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DEVELOPMENT OF A FORMAL ARMY OFFICER MENTORSHIP MODEL
FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

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B.S., Hawaii Pacific University, Honolulu, HI, 1991
MBA, Webster University, St. Louis, MO, 2000

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

DEVELOPMENT OF A FORMAL ARMY OFFICER MENTORSHIP PROGRAM FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY by MAJ Robert A. Harney, Jr., USA, 111 pages.

This study addresses the role of formal mentoring processes in the U.S. Army. Specifically, this study examines which formal mentoring model should the Army adopt and implement as part of its overall officer development process. It also investigates the roles of senior leaders, mentors, protégés in the Army mentorship and leader development process as reflected by doctrine, polices, and formal applications.

This study concluded that Army ranks above the civilian sector but below some government agencies such as the Air Force, Coast Guard, and Department of Energy in developing and implementing effective programs. This study also concluded that Army has already adopted as part of its overall officer professional development programs formal mentoring models comprising either one-on-one or mentoring circles (one mentor with many protégés) processes or relationships. These programs, however, have shortcomings in the areas of structure; the pairing of mentors with protégés; cadet, candidate, and junior officer mentoring; and awareness training and feedback mechanisms.

Army doctrine (to include the Army definition of mentorship), previously conducted studies, retired and active duty senior leader comments, current Army formal mentoring processes, and this study’s extensive research indicate these formal models and associated mentoring can reap invaluable benefits in the areas affecting captain retention, readiness, cadet and officer candidate assimilation, minority representation in combat arms specialties, diversity awareness, and perceptions of fair and equal treatment—if properly executed.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I want to sincerely express my thanks and gratitude to everyone who helped me complete this study. I could not have completed this without their assistance.

I must first give thanks to God for providing me the strength and wisdom to complete this thesis with enthusiasm and a sense of purpose. I must also convey my deepest appreciation to my wife Lynne, son Dominick, and daughter Aerin for their continual support my entire career. Their love, patience, and encouragement served a motivation to complete this project.

I’d like to extend a special thanks to my committee, LTC Lenora Ivy, LTC Michael Pergande, and LTC Robert Smith. Their support, patience, and thought provoking critiques made the process an invaluable learning experience! I especially praise LTC Ivy for offering her advice and wisdom during the critical phases of this study. Her efforts made the process much smoother.

I thank all the senior leaders for their time, and for generously providing me their thoughts on informal versus formal mentoring. Their candid and insightful comments significantly contributed to this study’s findings.

Finally, I wish to thank the many mentors who have and persist in positively impacting my personal and professional life. It began with my Father and first mentor, Robert A. Harney, Sr., who taught me the importance of education, hard work, and pride in everything you do. It has continued with the likes of SFC John Gilbert and LTG Henry T. Glisson who impressed upon me the importance of character, continual self-improvement, and a sincere regard for others. May God Bless!
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<td>Air Force Instruction</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
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<td>AWC</td>
<td>Army War College</td>
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<td>BCTP</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Program</td>
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<tr>
<td>CA ARNG</td>
<td>California Army National Guard</td>
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<td>CA ARNG PAM</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAS3</td>
<td>Combined Arms Service Staff School</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CGSC</td>
<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSA</td>
<td>Chief of Staff, Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>DA PAM</td>
<td>Department of the Army Pamphlet</td>
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<tr>
<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>DOE</td>
<td>Department of Energy</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOT</td>
<td>Department of Transportation</td>
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<tr>
<td>EST</td>
<td>Enhanced Skills Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>FM</td>
<td>Field Manual</td>
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<tr>
<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GE</td>
<td>General Electric</td>
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<tr>
<td>HBCU</td>
<td>Historically Black Colleges and Universities</td>
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<td>HQDA</td>
<td>Headquarters, Department of the Army</td>
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<tr>
<td>IDP</td>
<td>Individual Development Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>LTG</td>
<td>Lieutenant General</td>
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<td>LEAP</td>
<td>Leadership Evaluation and Awareness Process</td>
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<td>Officer Advance Course</td>
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<td>OBC</td>
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<td>Office of Personnel Management</td>
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<td>Professor of Military Science</td>
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<td>Program Objective Memorandum</td>
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<td>Reserve Officer Training Corps</td>
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<td>TAP</td>
<td>The Army Plan</td>
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<td>USDA</td>
<td>United States Department of Agriculture</td>
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<td>USMA</td>
<td>United States Military Academy</td>
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<td>VCSA</td>
<td>Vice Chief of Staff, Army</td>
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<td>WOCS</td>
<td>Warrant Officer Candidate School</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

Three people have had a great impact on me: SFC Putnam, my first platoon sergeant, who taught me about positive leadership, technical competence, and caring for soldiers; General Harold K. Johnson, a former Chief of Staff who I once worked for, taught me about character, about "the personal in personnel," and caring for families; and finally, General Creighton Abrams, another former Chief of Staff, who taught me about the warrior ethic, open-mindedness, and innovation. I am thankful for their influence on me.

General (Retired) John A. Wickham, Jr., Collected Works of the Thirtieth Chief of Staff, United States Army

Throughout history, mentorship has played an important role in Army leader development, and is akin to guiding the student on a journey at the end of which the student is a different and more accomplished person (Galbraith 1998, 371). For example, General John J. Pershing served as mentor to Generals George S. Patton Jr., George C. Marshall, and Douglas MacArthur (Jolemore 1986, 5-6). General Dwight D. Eisenhower recognized General Fox Conner as a mentor who encouraged him to grow and develop, and General Marshall mentored numerous protégés by exposing them to the higher Army echelons (Eisenhower 1967, 185-87; Dooley 1990, 21). General William E. DePuy’s ability to work closely with his subordinates produced many general officers, among them retired Generals Donn Starry and Paul F. Gorman (Herbert 1988, 23). On a personal note, the many mentoring sessions the researcher received as aide to the Director of the Defense Logistics Agency provided professional development benefits and insights into thought processes yet to be realized.
The need for mentorship has brought about new initiatives in recent years. Field Manual (FM) 22-100, *Army Leadership*, incorporates mentoring into the leader development process and attempts to institutionalize a formal process by placing the responsibility of mentoring subordinates directly in the hands of their leaders. Additionally, the new officer evaluation reporting (OER) system uses the mentoring philosophy outlined in FM 22-100 as the basis for leader assessment of rated officer performance. Despite these measures, recent studies indicate the current mentoring process continues to facilitate perceptions of nepotism and a “Good Old Boy Network” within the Army, affords leaders a minimum amount of structure to follow in fostering mentoring relationships, and provides the Army little benefit in the development of competent and confident officers.

The current mentoring process also manifests itself within the precommissioning process. The Army lavishes considerable attention on the United States Military Academy at West Point (USMA) as compared with other sources of commission (Kruzel 1989, 177). This includes a minimum advanced degree requirement for all instructors and a sponsorship program in which former academy graduates volunteer to mentor cadets. The research shows that sponsorship increases the competence and professionalism of cadets entering active duty and helps to reduce the negative impacts associated with assimilation.

Ironically, academy graduates account for approximately 25 percent of yearly accessions. The majority of officers (65 percent) receive their commissions from the Reserve Officer Training Corps (ROTC) program, while approximately 9 percent are
assessed through the Officer Candidate School (OCS) and less than 1 percent from direct commissions (BG Aadland 1999). The Army draws its officers from four different sources, each with diverse educational and socioeconomic backgrounds and with varying levels of precommissioning leader development. The infusion of formal sponsoring and mentoring programs into the professional military education (PME) system could assist instructors and Professors of Military Science (PMS) in the preparation of cadets and candidates for entry onto active duty.

The Army has traditionally relied upon informal mentoring relationships for leader development. This one-on-one, nonstructured, sponsorship process normally occurs between like individuals and tends to exclude minority and women officers due to cultural perceptions and the lack of minority leader role models at the senior levels. For example, in 1990, blacks comprised 29.1 percent of the Army, but only 11 percent of the officer corps. Nine years later, those statistics had not changed significantly: blacks accounted for 26.5 percent of the Army population, but only 11.3 percent of the officer population (U.S. Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Human Resources Directorate, Demographics Unit 2000). When comparing 1990 to 1994 statistics with percentages at the senior ranks, a dichotomy of scale exists between white and black officers from major to general officer: the percentage of white officers increased by nearly 10 percent, while black officer percentages decreased nearly 6 percent (Butler 1994, 1). These figures coincide with Major James Mason’s 1989 survey that over 30 percent of black senior officer respondents reported having four or more protégés,
while 17 percent of white senior officers reported to have four or more protégés (Mason 1989, 96).

The lack of senior minority leaders exacerbates with the accession of minorities into Combat Arms branches: infantry, armor, field artillery, air defense artillery, aviation, and engineer; where the percentage of minority officers is substantially lower than the Army overall. For instance, 1 out of 139 minority cadets graduating from the USMA of 1989 selected a combat arms branch (Pittard 1991, 20). This phenomenon continues to reinforce unequal senior leader rank distributions unless measures are taken to reduce its impact.

The need for diversity awareness coincides with the lack of minority mentors at the senior officer level. The United States (U.S.) population statistics indicate that the number of civilians between seventeen and nineteen years of age will decrease among whites from 66 percent in 1999 to 59.3 percent by 2015. Conversely, the minority population within the same age group will increase from 34 percent in 1999 to 40.7 percent in 2015 collectively (U.S. Army, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel Human Resources Directorate, Demographics Unit 2000). This means the Army will rely more upon minority officers to lead the Army of the future and cross-cultural mentoring will play an important role in leader development.

Finally, mentoring has a direct correlation to retention. The Army attrition rate among captains increased from 9.6 percent in Fiscal Year (FY) 1998 to 10.6 percent for FY 1999. Critical captain shortages have resulted in the United States Total Army Personnel Command’s (PERSCOM) ability to fill only 84 percent of its active component
requirements and only 56 percent of its branch qualified captain requirements (Aadland 1999). The U.S. Air Force has also experienced similar attrition challenges with its pilots. The Air Force ended up 700 pilots short at the end of FY 1998 and estimates a shortage of 2,000 pilots by 2002 (General says mentoring should help retention [1999], 13). Major General William Hobbins, Director of Operations for U.S. Air Forces in Europe, believes increased mentoring among leaders could aid the retention process. Army Brigadier General Anders Aadland, Director, PERSCOM Officer Personnel Management Division, echoed General Hobbins’ sentiments during a October 19, 1999 briefing to Command and General Staff College students (Aadland 1999).

In summary, the development of a formal mentorship program will take on an even greater importance as the Army transitions to the twenty-first century. Expanding technologies, changing demographics, reduced budgets, and retention and readiness issues will challenge future leaders. Mentoring will help bridge the gap as the Army transitions to the information age and relies upon a small and more diverse group of soldiers to lead the Army After Next.

**Primary Question**

The primary question for this study is: Which formalized mentorship model should the Army adopt and implement as part of its overall officer development program?

**Problem Background**

One cannot overlook the importance of mentoring. As an assignments officer with the U.S. Total Army Personnel Command (PERSCOM), the researcher witnessed that the Army leaderships devote much attention to issues affecting professional
development. In executing career management duties, many Quartermaster Corps
officers received counseling and mentoring on such items as OERs, manner of
performance, and ways to improve competitiveness—areas more appropriate for
discussion with raters and mentors. Further, personal interviews reflected negative
perceptions regarding mentor involvement in the assignment process. A strong majority
felt that “who you know” (a senior mentor) applied more than overall performance in
determining future assignments. This situation appeared more profound among
minorities and women. In a 1985 Military Review article entitled “Leaders as Mentors,”
Lieutenant General (Retired) Charles W. Bagnal and authors warned against informal
mentoring relationships and the consequences of sponsorship and the good old boy
network. Specifically, they wrote that mentors:

may have a profound effect on the careers of their protégés when they intervene to
ensure that their protégés obtain desirable assignments. However, such a
sponsorship role is not a desirable aspect of Army mentorship because it results in
perceptions of favoritism, elitism and promotion by riding the coattails of
influential senior officers. This type of mentorship cannot be condoned in the
Army. (Bagnal and others 1985)

In the mid- to late-1990s, numerous independent studies raised concerns about
minorities in the Army, in particular African-American officers and their inability to
compete at the senior ranks. In 1995, Lieutenant Colonel Remo Butler wrote a U.S.
Army War College (AWC) Strategy Research Project essay entitled “Why Blacks fail in
the Army.” He concluded that the lack of cultural understanding among whites and
blacks contributed to poor promotion rates among minorities (African-Americans) at the
senior levels during the mid-nineties raised institutional concerns throughout the Army
(Butler 1995, 1-3). In 1998, Colonel Carrie Kendrick's U.S. Army War College Strategy research project essay entitled the "African-American Officer Role in the Future Army" verified Lieutenant Colonel Butler's findings. The essay also recommended improvements in the quality of the abilities of ROTC programs to prepare cadets for commissioned service, increased numbers of minorities assigned to high profile jobs, and better minority mentoring opportunities to compensate for the disproportionate amount of minority mentors at the senior ranks (Kendrick 1998, 14).

These studies not only revealed several disparities in the management and professional development of women and minority officers, but also relayed a lack of confidence across all races and genders in the system regarding fair treatment. More importantly, all research reviewed for this thesis recommended the need for institutional improvement in four basic areas: education, cultural awareness, initial and early development and assignment considerations, and mentoring.

The Army, however, has directed intervention in some of these areas. For example, PERSCOM now conducts a centralized board to select ROTC professors of military science. In 1998, PERSCOM directed assignment officers to pay closer attention to the assignment of minority officers at the captain through lieutenant colonel levels. That same year the Army implemented a new OER system that emphasized leader development, particularly at the lieutenant level. Additionally, PERSCOM now masks second lieutenant OERs from view by assignment officers and promotion and selection boards (that is, placing them in the restricted portion of an officer's Official Military Personnel File) upon promotion to captain. Army leaders adopted the masking principle
to give junior officers room to grow without the long-term effects associated with an adverse report in the early years of one’s career. The Army leadership has also considered plans to increase the number of minority officers in the combat arms branches by “force branching” a higher percentage of minority officers into combat arms specialties during the accession process. These plans would increase OCS selection prerequisites to a minimum bachelor’s degree civilian education level and precluding cadets with general studies degrees from entering active duty.

More significantly, the Army revised FM 22-100 to formally emphasize mentoring and the need for cultural and diversity awareness among leaders. While the manual makes great strides in addressing mentorship and identifying the special needs associated with women and minority development, its intended application contradicts the traditional meaning of mentoring and provides minimal structure to support a formal model in practice.

Related Subordinate Questions

This study examines several sub-questions in order to answer the primary research question:

1. Is a formal mentorship model really feasible?

2. Why has the Army not adopted a formalized program despite research reflecting its necessity?

3. How would a formal mentoring program provide a direct benefit to the Army, mentor, and protégé?

4. What criteria does one use to select the proper mentoring model?
5. What current government or civilian sector models, if any, provide a proper “fit” for the Army culture?

6. How would one implement the program?

Definition Key Terms

**Battle Command.** This is a term taken from FM 100-5, *Operations*, meaning the art of motivating and directing soldiers and their leaders into action to accomplish missions (U.S. Army, FM 100-5 1993, 2-14).

**Counseling.** FM 22-100 defines counseling as a developmental process and subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan of action necessary for subordinates to achieve individual or organizational goals. One must not confuse counseling with mentoring. While both activities focus on leader development, counseling centers around supervisor-subordinate relationships and associated assessments, rewards, and punishments. Mentoring involves counseling in a nonbias setting, and may or may not involve the supervisor in the relationship.

**Formal Mentoring,** according to Mr. Petrin, is “an agreed upon structure based on established goals and measured outcomes” (Petrin 1999). Formal mentoring relationships permit access to all who qualify and the organization pairs the mentor with the protégé. The characteristics of formal mentoring provide a direct benefit to the organization.

Most leaders consider sponsorship a key element of mentoring. **Sponsoring** is the act of intervening without request in behalf of another (*Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 1976, 2204). Within the context of mentoring, sponsorship
involves a mentor applying their positive influence over a protégé’s career for the purpose of obtaining a desirable assignment, school, or position.

A High Profile job refers to assignments that considered career enhancing for future promotions, military schooling, and command. Such jobs include aide-de-camp, the Joint Chief of Staff Internship Program, or positions within the Pentagon or other elite organizations that expose an officer to higher-level Army leadership processes.

Leader Development. FM 22-100 describes leader development as the process of helping subordinates reach their fullest potential through training and education, expectations and standards, and values and ethics. Leader development encompasses the mentoring process.

FM 22-100 also lists teaching, developmental counseling, and coaching as three techniques involved in the mentoring process. Teaching gives knowledge or provides skills to others, causing them to learn by example or experience. Developmental Counseling is subordinate-centered communication that produces a plan outlining actions necessary for subordinates to achieve individual or organizational goals. Coaching involves a leader assessing performance based on observations, helping the subordinate develop an effective plan of action to sustain strengths and overcome weaknesses, and supporting the subordinate and the plan.

Mentorship. The word mentor is a Greek term that obtains its meaning from the fictional character Mentor, the tutor of Telemachus in Homer’s classic novel “Odyssey.” The Webster Third New International Dictionary refers to a mentor as a trusted guide, a provider of wise counsel and advice, and confidant. FM 22-100 defines
mentorship as: "The proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity;" and, "an inclusive process for everyone under a leader's charge" (U.S. Army, FM 22-100 1999, 5-16).

Mentoring can be either informal or formal in nature. Mr. Rene D. Petrin, President of Management Mentors Inc., a consulting firm in Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, describes Informal Mentoring as "a non-structured process performed primarily by managers (supervisors) toward protégés" (Petrin 1999). Informal mentorship arrangements usually involve unspecified goals with undetermined outcomes. They are exclusive in nature in that the mentor and protégé enter into a mutual arrangement, and the organization benefits indirectly from the relationship. These informal mentoring characteristics can have a negative impact on morale within an organization.

Minority Group. A minority group is defined as a body of individuals differing from the predominant section of a larger group in one or more characteristics such as ethnic background, language, culture or religion (The Webster Third New International Dictionary 1976, 1440). In the Army, Caucasians comprise the dominant minority group. Women, African-Americans, Hispanics, Asians and Native-Americans make up remaining minority groups.

Limitations

This thesis focuses on formal mentoring to the Army at large. Thus, the scope of this document is limited to the mentorship of only commissioned officers as it relates to
current doctrine, leader development, Army values, and the recognition of diverse cultures. The mentoring process and its effects among warrant and noncommissioned officers differs and justifies further study.

**Delimitations**

The conduct of mentorship assumes many forms within the Army. This thesis will not, however, include research on group mentoring relationships, such as instructor-led training, officer professional development sessions, or off-duty social events.

The research will not contain additional studies on racism or discrimination within the Army. Consequently, this thesis makes reference to essays by Lieutenant Colonel Butler and Colonel Kendrick, which confront these issues in great detail (Butler 1995, 5; Kendrick 1998, 2). The research will, however, expand on their conclusions and recommendations that relate to formal mentorship as a means of reducing the negative perceptions depicted in their essays.

The research will cite issues facing women and African-American officers as the culture reference for this thesis. Consequently, this study will not present additional analysis on other minorities in the military. Though each group represents a different culture with equally important needs, the overall plight of women and African-American officers in the military provides adequate insight into issues facing all minority groups.

**Assumptions**

This study makes the following assumptions:

1. Army senior leaders recognize that good effective mentorship processes will improve leader performance.
2. Senior leaders can develop and improve their mentoring skills.

3. Protégés perceive the mentoring process as beneficial to their professional development.

4. Due to tradition and natural interpersonal tendencies, the informal mentoring process will continue to play a role in leader development.

Summary

This study will attempt to show that the Army must develop doctrine that provides leaders a formal guide to follow when developing mentoring relationships: one that includes all officers in the process, and benefits the entire organization. The writings of past and present Army senior leaders, the findings and recommendations of previous studies, and observations as an assignment officer warrant this study and should clearly demonstrate the need for a formal mentoring program.
CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

In my interviews with more than a hundred four-star generals, I asked each man whether he thought his success was the result of having a sponsor. Not one of the generals who achieved four-star rank believed that his promotions or assignments were because of whom he knew, the way he parted or cut his hair, his school, his family, or his golf game. They all believed that their success was based on dedicated service to the country. In turn, however, their superior job performance led to impressing the people in their career who could mentor them.

Edgar F. Puryear Jr., American Generalship: Character is Everything: The Art of Command

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to provide a review of the literature relating to the contention that the U.S. Army needs to adopt a formal officer mentorship program. This chapter also looks into the underlying patterns in the literature and prior information that provide insight into the positive and negative impacts on the mentoring process.

Much has been written about mentorship and its effects on the individual and the organization. Consequently, the literature review, grouped into five distinct categories, focuses on the issues relevant to the subject.

The first category addresses Army doctrine; specifically, relevant doctrine found in Army regulations (ARs), field manuals (FMs), and pamphlets (DA PAMs). This category includes details on the structure of the current mentoring process and on its place in the Army.
The second category contains prior research on mentoring in the military. The literature comprises data from previous studies on Army mentorship and focuses on their findings and recommendations. This category also contains survey data findings and recommendations.

The third category reflects senior leader thought on mentoring. This category addresses Army senior leader awareness of prior research regarding the need for formal mentoring processes and the resulting attempts to implement recommended changes to mentoring. The reviews in this category also contain literature on mentoring from U.S. Air Force and Marine senior leader sources.

The fourth category outlines current formal mentoring programs within the Department of Defense (DoD). This contains information on mentoring processes gathered within the Army, Air Force, Navy, and Coast Guard.

Last, the fifth category includes literature on mentoring programs within other government agencies and the civilian sector. This category also contains published and unpublished materials from civilian academia and subject matter experts reflecting formal mentoring roles and benefits by the mentor, protégé, and organization as a whole; and both the positive and negative impacts of mentoring. This category also describes the role of cultural awareness and diversity, and its benefits to women and minority mentoring programs.

**Army Doctrine**

The role of mentoring in the leader development process has a doctrinal base. FM 100-5, *Operations*, outlines how the Army thinks about the conduct of military
operations. More important to this thesis, FM 100-5 describes the role of doctrine and its impact on leader development:

Doctrine touches all aspects of the Army. It facilitates communication between Army personnel no matter where they serve, establishes a shared professional culture and approach to operations, and serves as the basis for curriculum in the Army system. Doctrine permeates the entire organizational structure of the Army and sets the direction for modernization and the standard for leadership development and soldier training. (U.S. Army, FM 100-5 1993, 1-1)

Battle Command, a doctrinal combat function discussed in the manual, lists decision making and leadership as its two vital components. Further, the following excerpt from FM 100-5 implies mentoring in its description of leadership as a component of Battle Command: “Leadership is taking responsibility for decisions; being loyal to subordinates; inspiring and directing assigned forces and resources toward a purposeful end; establishing a teamwork that engenders success” (U.S. Army 1993, 2-15).

Finally, FM 100-5 describes leadership as “the most essential dynamic of combat power” (U.S. Army, FM 100-5, 2-11). The mentoring process provides a means for developing technically competent and confident officers to lead and help create combat power or the ability to fight.

FM 22-100, Leadership, attempts to formalize the mentoring process. It depicts mentoring as a direct leader action or a “leader to led” relationship in which the mentor improves subordinate leader action through teaching, developmental counseling, and coaching. By using these techniques through mentoring, the leader fosters subordinate development of actions, skills, and attributes that form the foundation of success in
operational assignments. The process also helps subordinates internalize the Army values (Table 1), which are essential to moral leadership.

The manual also describes the mentoring process as totally inclusive, in which every subordinate has the right to partake in. The manual addresses the need for diversity and cultural awareness among leaders and recognizes the continued need for informal mentoring relationships; particularly among women, minorities, and those officers in

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>VALUE</th>
<th>MEANING</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Loyalty</td>
<td>Bear true faith and allegiance to the U.S. Constitution, the Army, your unit, and other soldiers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Duty</td>
<td>Fulfill your obligations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respect</td>
<td>Treat people as they should be treated</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selfless-Service</td>
<td>Put the welfare of the nation, the Army, and your subordinates before your own</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Honor</td>
<td>Live up to all the Army values</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integrity</td>
<td>Do what’s right, legally and morally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal Courage</td>
<td>Face fear, danger, or adversity (Physical or moral)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

low-density specialties with few role models. The manual maintains, however, that overall mentoring responsibility, regardless of the relationship, lies with the subordinate's supervisory chain of command.

requires the leader to interview the subordinate to assess current proficiency status, previous training and experience, and personal desires for the definition of professional development needs. The basic skills development phase occurs within the first few months of assignment and focuses on the subordinate’s attainment of the minimum proficiency level necessary for mission accomplishment. The advanced development and sustainment phase involves proficiency maintenance, additional skill training, and challenging assignments based on performance. Leaders, the key to program success, supervise and mentor subordinate professional development throughout each phase of the development process.

The new OER system, as outlined in FM 623-105 (The Officer Evaluation Reporting System), formally recognizes the need to mentor subordinates. The system recognizes that officers come from diverse backgrounds and require varying degrees of professional development to assimilate into the Army culture. The manual incorporates the mentoring and leader develop concepts outlined in FM 22-100 and FM 25-101 by requiring raters to counsel and mentor rated officers on a quarterly basis. Additionally, junior officers receive detailed counseling on specific areas to aid in the assimilation process. Finally, the new OER system has an Army values base and requires raters and senior raters to use them as a baseline for assessing professional development needs and measuring the rated officer’s manner of performance.

Department of the Army Pamphlet (DA PAM) 600-3, Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management, outlines professional and leader development requirements according to rank, branch, and career field. This manual serves as a
guideline for addressing an officer’s functional professional development concerns. Thus, mentors have a viable tool in DA PAM 600-3 to assist protégés in mapping out career time lines and assessing professional development needs.

*The Army Plan* (TAP-00-15) provides leadership guidance on policy and resource planning to ensure that the total Army is organized, trained, and equipped to conduct sustained land warfare. The TAP excerpts which follow outline guidance in which mentoring can have a major impact:

Top capitalize on technological advances, there will be a premium on mature, experienced, tactically proficient leaders and soldiers with exceptional degrees of mental agility and psychological resilience. Future leaders must understand:

1. Interpersonal Relations – treating others with dignity and respect; possessing conflict-management skills.

2. Information Systems – being able to understand and apply technologies.

3. People and Cultures – maintaining a broad appreciation of other cultures; having a language proficiency; demonstrating awareness of family, social, and cultural problems; displaying political acumen.


5. How to influence others – applying effective indirect leadership, quickly assessing and shaping organizational culture; rapidly building teams.


*Prior Research on Mentoring in the Military*

The literature réview includes several studies on the subject of mentoring, each building on the findings and recommendations of the preceding author. In 1989, Major James Mason prepared a Master of Military Arts and Science thesis entitled “Mentoring:
Its effects on Black Officers' Careers within the Army.” His study addressed the mentoring experiences of both black and white senior Army officers, and found within his study that there was no correlation between mentoring and black officer career progression within the Army.

Major Mason summarized that 58 percent of senior officers reported involvement in a mentoring relationship. Of those surveyed, 34 percent of the black senior officers and 16 percent of the white senior officers surveyed felt that the mentor’s rank was extremely important. This same study showed that 47 percent of the Black senior officers, compared to 22 percent of the white senior officers surveyed, felt that mentors played an important role in leader development. Over 30 percent of the black senior officers responding to the survey reported having four or more protégés, while 17 percent of white senior officers reported have four or more protégés (Mason 1989, 94-98). He also reported that 53 percent of black senior officers surveyed, compared to 56 percent of white officers, thought mentoring helps black officer career progression within the U.S. Army and that mentoring played an important part in their present career success. More important to this thesis was Major Mason’s conclusion that Army mentoring was an informal process (Mason 1989, 9).

Lieutenant Commander Mary Sullivan, U.S. Navy, concluded in her 1993 topical research summary that the mentoring relationships in the military include many of the characteristics and benefits associated with mentoring in the private sector. Her research indicated that a significant number of males agreed mentoring contributed to their
decision to remain in the military and the process potentially influences four organizational functions:

1. Career Socialization. Adaptation to an organization’s culture, and familiarization with informal norms through the mutual exchange of information between the mentor and protégé.

2. Upward mobility. The mentoring process may identify subordinates with excellent potential, and results in further protégé development through diverse mentoring strategies.

3. Preparation of leaders. A mentoring relationship can equate to a “mini leadership course” that provides a realistic experience for both participants.

4. Job performance. The mentoring relationship may produce a synergistic effect that enhances both mentor and protégé performance (Sullivan 1993, 1).

Lieutenant Commander Sullivan’s research included a survey to determine predominate mentor and protégé roles and perceived benefits. The survey concluded that 10 percent of the respondents participated in some sort of formal mentoring program. The respondents identified the primary roles of their mentors as teacher (25 percent)—“an instructor in specific skills and knowledge necessary for successful job performance,” and role model (23 percent)—“someone you can emulate.” The respondents cited job performance (31 percent) as the primary quality that encouraged mentors to establish mentoring relationships with protégés (Sullivan 1993, 5).

Lieutenant Commander Sullivan’s survey addressed mentor-protégé interactions. Her data showed that mentoring relationships helped the protégé perform better (98
percent), and was important for promotion success (86 percent). Mentors received credit in this survey for enhancing the protégé's competency and self-worth (93 percent) and protecting them (sponsorship) from organizational pressures (48 percent). Protégés identified coaching (16 percent), challenging assignments (15 percent), and mentoring (14 percent) as the primary benefits they derived from the mentoring process (Sullivan 1993, 5).

Lieutenant Commander Sullivan also noted that mentors often select protégés based on their exposure to senior leaders, and enthusiasm and actual job performance in the accomplishment of key organizational projects. She stated this factor may unfortunately result in barriers based on gender differences. For example, women in general frequently work in organizations lacking informal access to mentors. The frequent interaction and intimacy in communication commonly associated with mentoring relationships may also deter cross-gender mentoring due to peer pressure, fear of sexual harassment implications, or other organizational factors. Also, women may find themselves excluded from male-oriented organizational activities that would precipitate mentoring situations (Sullivan 1993, 3).

In 1994, Major Mark Ritter's Master of Military Arts and Science thesis entitled "Senior Leader Mentoring: Its Role in Leader Development Doctrine" addressed the proper role of senior leaders mentoring as a viable component of the Army's leader development doctrine. His study suggested that senior leader mentoring is a valuable method for developing Army officers. He demonstrated that teaching, coaching, advising, and sponsoring are all valid mentoring activities and as such should be included
in the Army's leader development doctrine. He did acknowledge, however, that the Army definition of mentorship needs clarification in terms of its nature and the aspect of sponsoring (Ritter 1994, 90). Major Ritter's research also concluded the mentorship process should become expected behavior by senior leaders to enhance subordinate leader development.

Major Ritter discussed mentoring as an informal relationship and recognized its exclusionary nature. He proposed a two-tiered activity as a method to reduce the potential for exclusionary practices yet retaining mentoring in Army doctrine. The first tier involved the senior leader doctrinal responsibilities of teaching, coaching, and counseling. The second tier entailed the identification of officers with high potential and included advising and sponsoring the protégé for the good of the Army. Major Ritter concluded that mentoring should be integrated into all three pillars of the Army leader development process: institutional training, operational assignments, and self-development. He also recommended the inclusion of mentoring in the Army officer education system curriculum (Ritter 1994, 93).

In 1995, then Lieutenant Colonel Remo Butler wrote a an Army War College strategy research project essay entitled "Why Black Officers Fail in the U.S. Army." Lieutenant Colonel Butler's essay looked at the phenomenon of black officers falling behind their white counterparts at an alarming rate. Lieutenant Colonel Butler showed statistically that in 1990 blacks comprised 29.1 percent of the Army but only 11 percent of the officer corps. Four years later those statistics had not changed significantly: Blacks accounted for 27 percent of the Army population but only 11.2 percent of the
officer population. As officers ascend to the senior ranks a dichotomy of scale existed between white and black officers from major to general officer: the percentage of white officers increased by nearly 10 percent, while black officer percentages decrease nearly 6 percent (Figure 1) (Butler 1995, 1). Lieutenant Colonel Butler contended that cultural misunderstandings on the part of both whites and blacks in the military, rather than racism, are the primary causes of failure.

![Figure 1. Rank Comparison](image-url)
Lieutenant Colonel Butler’s study examined some of the cultural biases inherent in the military culture, which included the topic of mentorship as a means to overcome misperceptions. Lieutenant Colonel Butler recommended making mentoring a:

Viable program (that must be) conducted by everyone in a leadership position for every junior officer in the unit. This should be conducted equally for all junior officers—not just those whom we like or favor by color or temperament. (Butler 1995, 24)

Lieutenant Colonel Butler also asserted that the biggest problem facing black junior officers was the poor military education received from historically black colleges and universities (HBCUs) compared to their service academy counterparts. He attributes this disparity to the quality of instruction, lack of emphasis on professional behavior, and few opportunities to get involved in cross-culture relationships prior to commissioning. Lieutenant Colonel Butler identified a critical need for young black officers to find themselves a mentor early onto their careers to enhance the assimilation process. He also recommended diversity awareness training to assist all leaders in communicating across cultural lines (Butler 1995, 16).

In 1998, Colonel Carrie Kendrick prepared an Army War College strategy research project essay on the “African American Officer’s Role in the Future Army.” She claimed that the Army’s reputation as the nation’s equal opportunity leader had come under scrutiny by both the media and senior African-American officers for factors adversely affecting minority advancement. This analysis also caused senior Army leaders to take a closer look at the problem. Colonel Kendrick’s study revealed many areas of race relations identified as problems in previous studies remained unresolved. She cited
the lack of minority mentorship as one of those issues and the need to formalize the process for everyone’s benefit regardless of race. More specifically, she stated:

1. The Army should define “formal mentoring” and the expected role of mentors (aside from the expected mentor role of the supervisor when conducting formal counseling).

2. Mentoring in the Army is lacking.

3. Mentorship should begin before the first assignment, at the educational institution, and by officers on staff at the ROTC departments.

4. The USMA has a formal mentor program. While not all Academy graduates reach the pinnacles of the Army’s career ladder, their initial assimilation is easier because of the preparation. (Kendrick 1998, 20)

   Officers interviewed by Colonel Kendrick felt that socialization and an understanding of Army culture were most important upon entry into active duty. They felt ill prepared to enter active duty and lacked confidence in reporting to their first assignment (Kendrick 1998, 33). Many also believed their lack of understanding of Army culture resulted in needless and unnecessary conflict after entering active duty.

   Colonel Kendrick’s research also revealed a perceived disparity in the ability of white mentors to relate to black subordinates. She pointed out that a separate survey revealed 90 percent of white officer respondents revealed they “strongly agree” with the statement “African American are more likely to choose other African Americans as mentors” (Kendrick 1998, 39). As a result, they do not actively seek out minorities and women as protégés. The survey further revealed white officers weren’t concerned about this, but felt choosing someone like oneself (not necessarily along racial lines) was quite normal.
Colonel Kendrick noted that many black officers felt constrained in their interactions with white mentors due to racial differences. Many interviewees stated that their leaders, while they talked to them, spoke in very nebulous terms and often in a manner not reflective of a guiding or coaching style (Kendrick 1998, 29). She concluded that managing diversity could help correct negative perceptions.

Colonel Kendrick recognized the need for the Army to adopt a formal mentoring program, teach it in a formal setting, and develop a means for measuring its success. She concluded that the nature of leadership lends itself well to such a process, and the Army values system can only strengthen when people feel the “system” allows the development of everyone. She acknowledged that while the new OER system seems to serve as a form of mentorship, it does not encourage the sponsorship aspects associated with the traditional mentor-protégé role. Colonel Kendrick felt that the formal mentoring process is too complex to address all components during OER counseling. Additionally, junior officers have traditionally had a reluctance to initiate frank personal and professional development discussions with their raters.

Colonel Kendrick believed the precommissioning institutions (USMA, ROTC, and OCS) provide the ideal setting for the establishment of formalized mentoring program. She based her rationale on the fact that the officer’s crucial formulative phase begins during this period (Kendrick 1998, 40).

On 23 November 1999, the Department of Defense released a report entitled “Career Progression of Minority and Women Officers.” The study revealed that from
1977 to 1997, the representation of active duty racial minorities and women commissioned officers more than doubled, from 7 percent to 15.3 percent for minorities and from 5.9 percent to 14.1 percent among women (Department of Defense Study 1999). The study acknowledged that the numerous service programs aimed at identifying potential minority candidates and assisting them in obtaining commissions played a part in the increased minority accession rates. On the other hand, the research determined the following shortcomings:

1. Minority members, and to a lesser extent women, may start their careers at a disadvantage because of preentry difference in academic achievement and lower representation in fields of study of most interest to the military.

2. Minorities and women tend to be concentrated in administrative and supply areas and underrepresented in tactical operations, the area that yields two-thirds of the general and flag officers of the service.

3. Compared to white men, promotion rates for White women are about the same. But promotion rates for black men and women are lower through the critical O-4 (rank of Major) point, then about the same thereafter. Factors contributing to the different promotion rates for minorities and women are educational and precommissioning preparation, initial assignments contributing to a "slow start," and limited access to peer and mentor networks (Department of Defense Study 1999).
Senior Military Leader Literature on Mentoring

Senior leaders have written numerous articles about the benefits of mentoring within the military services. In a letter to General John J. Pershing, General George S. Patton Jr. said the following about his mentor: “Whatever ability I have shown or shall show as a soldier is a result of a studious endeavor to copy the greatest American soldier, namely yourself. I consider it a priceless privilege to have served with you in Mexico and France” (Jolemore 1986, 5).

In another example of mentorship in action, General George C. Marshall made the following comments about Lieutenant Colonel Hunter Leggett, Marshall’s mentor during his years at Fort Leavenworth: “A much older officer, Lieutenant Colonel Hunter Leggett, would frequently work through some of the lessons with the lieutenants, of whom he became very fond” (Jolemore 1986, 6).

General (Retired) John A. Wickham Jr., United States Army Chief of Staff from June 1983 to June 1987, spoke of mentoring in his collected works. He acknowledged the Army has no formal mentoring program or checklist for leader implementation and involved long-term relationships, took on either a formal or informal role, and was not restricted to the chain of command. He felt effective mentoring requires leaders to use their experience, wisdom of years, counseling and teaching skills, and above all caring for junior officer personal growth, professional development, and strengthening of Army values.

Mentoring, according to General Wickham, is really a two-way process and a personal choice by both parties. The senior agrees to his role as mentor by investing time
in the development of the junior, while the junior demonstrates a willingness to learn
from their mentors. General Wickham also warned against sponsorship: “Mentoring is
not sponsorship or patronage. Favoritism, cronyism, or the use of one’s office, position,
or grade by a senior NCO, officer, or supervisor to enhance unfairly a subordinate’s
career over others cannot be condoned” (Wickham 1987, 152).

In a 1985 Military Review article entitled “Leaders as Mentors,” Lieutenant
General Charles Bagnal and others recognized that a number of private organizations and
public agencies have benefited from formalized mentorship programs. They asserted that
research suggested formal mentorship relationships are not typical leader-subordinate
relationships and that not all leaders can act as mentors. They also said that if one
interprets mentorship as a style of leadership, the term mentor takes on a somewhat
different meaning than that which has been used in previous research. Stated more
succinctly, the authors believed the Army has essentially redefined the term mentor, as
used in FM 22-100, to mean a leadership style that closely resembles coaching. In their
opinion, this definition emphasizes subordinate development and not the sponsorship
aspects of mentorship (Bagnal and others 1985, 8).

Lieutenant General Charles Bagnal and others found that mentors help protégés
clarify career goals through the development of a long term strategy, aid in the
development of short-term individual development plans, share knowledge and provide
instruction, serve as a role model and include the protégé in developing activities, and
provide counseling and visibility. They also stated that the typical mentor is eight to
fifteen years older than the protégé, and that the relationship is usually long term (Bagnal and others 1985, 7).

In a July 1986, *Military Review* article entitled “The Mentor: More than a Teacher, More than a Coach,” Major General Kenneth Jolemore disagreed with the views of Lieutenant General Bagnal and others, regarding mentorship as a formal process. He felt that given the informal and natural interpersonal human activity of mentoring, one could not order it away. Major General Jolemore stated that:

I believe that, if the Army were to order it (informal mentoring) not to be done, the decision would create a barrier to ethical behavior. Surely sponsoring will continue, and those practicing it will be inclined to deny their actions for fear of harming their own careers. (Jolemore 1986, 8)

General Jolemore also recognized three cautions associated with a formalized mentoring process. First, he insisted formal participation must be voluntary. He felt that one cannot make mentor-protégé relationships happen since they require a willingness to share experiences, successes, and failures. The second, preventing the mentoring program from becoming a burdening commitment, involved developing a time line for establishing relationships. General Jolemore stated mentoring requires a great deal of time, and that six months is a good length for the first mentor-protégé relationship. The third caution entails selecting and matching mentors carefully. General Jolemore stated that the formal pairing of relationships with leaders to their subordinates does not match the traditional mentoring elements found in organizations with successful formal programs (Jolemore 1986, 16).
General Jolemore also stated that without a proper understanding of the full spectrum of mentor functions, one can easily fall to discussing something other than mentoring. He identified nine behaviors (functions) in mentoring in his Military Review Article: teaching, guiding, advising, sponsoring, role modeling, validating, motivating, protecting, and communicating. Each function provides elements of structure to the program (Jolemore 1986, 8).

Matthew Culbertson shared General Jolemore’s views in his *Marine Corps Gazette* article “Death by Formalization” by stating a formal mentoring program will degrade the reverence of an unspoken and vital tradition, and potentially render its practice ineffective. With a movement afoot within the Marine Corps to formalize mentoring, Culbertson saw it as a clear step in the wrong direction. He stated that mentoring within the Marine Corps is alive and well, and that the focus should be on developing an environment that allows mentor-protégé associations to thrive (Culbertson 1999, 45).

Culbertson also referred to two contrasting schools of thought. The first viewed mentorship as a concept almost parallel to leadership. He asserted this approach favors the formal mentoring process and could result in a protégé having numerous mentors over the course of one’s career (due to frequent rotations associated with the profession).

The second school of thought viewed mentorship as an informal one-time, long-term association between professionals. Culbertson also stated the under the second school of thought the leader has no inherent responsibility to offer mentorship to every willing subordinate. Consequently, Culbertson favored the second school of thought because it provides numerous opportunities for developing Marines and links professional
development to experience and the interworkings of the Marine Corps (Culbertson 1999, 46).

Major General (Retired) Sidney Shachnow provided a simple explanation on why the Army's slow responsiveness to establishing a formal mentoring program: "Mentoring is critical, but it is not urgent. And, as we all know, most of our time and energy are spent on urgent stuff that is not critical" (Shacknow 1999, 36). He further elaborated that the problem with mentoring is that it just "happens" spontaneously or naturally, resulting in too many people "falling through the cracks" and not getting the mentoring they require when it is most needed.

Major General Schachnow also stated in his *Special Warfare* article entitled "Mentoring: Critical Assistance in the SOF Community" that protégé benefits vary depending on particular needs, aspirations, and the situation. According to Major General Shachnow, the benefits may include increased confidence; improved leadership, management, communication, listening, challenging, and empathizing skills; mature thought processes; and a broader perspective of the Army and the impact of his or her leadership and management style (Shacknow 1999, 38).

Most recently, the Army's top two senior leaders expressed their views on mentorship and its benefits to the organization. General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff, Army (CSA), acknowledged the critical nature of mentoring and the fact it is not often done during a sensing session with selected U.S. Army Command and General Staff College students. He stated battalion commanders influence captains and leadership is the key to turning junior officer attrition around. He indicated mentoring takes on many
forms (such as one-on-one relationships, classroom instruction, officer professional
development sessions, and officer club discussions!) and involves everyone in training
and growing leaders into the profession. General Shinseki also pointed out that
camaraderie, something the Army’s missing, is key. In sum, The CSA expected
everyone to mentor junior officers by telling of the Army story and the bolstering the
profession (Shinseki 2000).

General John M. Keane, Vice Chief of Staff, Army (VCSA), indicated that within
the past ten years the voluntary captain attrition rate had risen from 6.7 percent to an all-
time high of 10.6 percent. He challenged senior leaders to take immediate action to turn
this trend around; if not reversed, the Army may face an inability to meet future
requirements (Keane 2000). Most important to this study is General Keane’s assertion
that mentoring can change many of the negative perceptions associated with high captain
attrition (reduced training opportunities, time, and resources; “zero defects” mentality;
and a culture of micromanagement by leaders):

I need your help in convincing these young warriors that there is a bright light at
the end of the tunnel. Listen to their concerns, and let them know what we are
doing to address them. We know that many of their concerns are similar to those
we had as junior officers; so share with them what it was like when you were a
captain -- when you stood in their shoes and faced similar hard decisions. Be
candid, but let them know the rewards that come with staying the course -- both
personal and professional. Emphasize that the Army is working hard to identify
the challenges facing our soldiers and taking action to fix them. (Keane 2000)

Air Force General Lester Lyles, Chief of Staff, Office of the Chairman of the Joint
Chiefs of Staff, said that the senior military leadership plans to establish mentoring,
communications, and education programs. He remarked, “Enhancing mentoring efforts is
the most effective initiative that leaders need to focus on” (Lyles 2000). He also called mentoring a two-way street:

It’s not just supervisors and commanders talking to people about what is expected of them, what to do to progress in their careers, and what jobs and training they need to move up. Sometimes it’s the other way around. The person who wants to be mentored sometimes needs to just ask somebody. Don’t be shy. (Lyles 2000)

Major General Reginal Clemons, Deputy Commanding General, Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe, proposed “your legacy is in the soldiers you mentor” (Clemons 2000). He indicated all leaders have the responsibility to mentor and everyone must embrace this concept. He also stated mentoring involves providing accurate information and offering your experiences to junior officers.

Major General Joseph Arbuckle, Commanding General, U.S. Army Industrial Operations Command, viewed mentoring as a leadership tool that cannot be delegated. Proper mentoring has long-term effects and impacts directly on the personal and professional growth of an officer (Arbuckle 2000).

The aforementioned literature demonstrates the importance of mentoring relationships. Some senior leaders, however, disagreed with the need for both formal mentoring and diversity awareness programs. For example, Lieutenant Colonel Colin Agee, Commander of the Los Angeles, California Army Recruiting Battalion, felt that the term mentoring has become an overused buzzword. He stated “a true mentoring relationship is something that occurs infrequently over a career between professionals who develop a bond that transcends and outlives their particular position in a rating scheme.” Further, he stated, “when we try to institutionalize and mandate mentoring, we
mutate it into a form that defies its essence” (Agee 1999, 1). In a memorandum to the Commanding General of Fort Carson, Colorado, Lieutenant Colonel R.W. Zimmerman identified the Army’s overemphasis on diversity programs as one of many factors that influenced his retirement (Zimmerman 1999, 3).

Interviews conducted with senior Army leaders (colonels and higher) revealed varying views on mentoring. All interviewees recognized the importance of mentorship but differed in opinions on the relevance of a formal program. For example, Major General Kip Ward, Commanding General, 25th Infantry Division (Light); Colonel (Promotable) Robert Johnson, Deputy Commanding General and Assistance Commandant of the U.S. Army Engineer School; and Colonel (Promotable) Remo Butler of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command felt the new OER system in itself is a formal mentoring program (Ward 1999; Butler 1999; and Johnson 1999). Colonel Stanley Evans, Dean of Students and Administration for the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, disagreed with the need for a formal program, but felt that educating leaders on the mentoring process and linking junior officers to mentoring networks could increase the current system’s effectiveness (Evans 2000).

Implementing a formal mentoring process entails overcoming resistance to change. General (Retired) Donn A. Starry, former Army Training and Doctrine Commanding General, points out in a March 1983 Military Review article entitled “To Change an Army” pointed out certain requirements associated with change in the military and called for creative solutions to future needs. Citing the pre-World War II German
Army's ability to change and turmoil regarding the U.S. Army's reorganization of 1973 as examples, he provides the following set of requirements to effect change:

1. There must be an institution or mechanism to identify the need for change.

2. The principle command and staff elements responsible for change must have the appropriate educational background to affect solution of problems.

3. There must be a spokesman for change.

4. The spokesman must build a consensus that will give the new ideas, and the need to adopt them, a wider audience of converts and believers.

5. There must be continuity among the architects of change so that consistency of effort is brought to bear on the process.

6. Someone at or near the top must support and hopefully become a champion of the cause for change.

7. The change must be subject to trials (Starry 1983, 23).

Literature Review on Current Mentoring Programs within DoD

The Army has mentoring programs established under its purview. Many senior leaders view the new OER system as a formal mentoring program. Specifically, AR 623-105 requires the rated officer's rating chain to discuss (at a minimum) and document duty description and performance objectives within thirty days of the beginning of the evaluation period. The rating chain subsequently assesses the rated officer's performance based upon the nature of the job and established objectives. They use the mentoring and leader development guidelines from FM 22-100 and FM 25-101 to assist them in the process. The rating chain completes follow-up counseling every ninety days to address
strengths and implement corrective action for weaknesses. This process forms the ultimate basis for OER completion.

The rating chain also plays an additional yet important role in the professional development of lieutenants. They must initiate, record, and approve professional development task on the Junior Officer Developmental Support Form (JODSF) (Figure 2). The lieutenant's immediate supervisor uses the JODSF as a working tool to conduct follow-up performance counseling, update and revise developmental tasks, and assess developmental progress. The supervisor summarizes the counseling sessions on the JODSF and completes follow-up counseling every ninety days. As with the traditional rating chain responsibilities, this process forms the ultimate basis for OER completion.

The USMA provides mentoring opportunities for cadets through a formal sponsorship program. The program involves former academy graduates volunteering their time to coach and mentor cadets on areas ranging from academics to active duty expectations. The process functions under the traditional definition of mentoring (trusted counselor, teacher, or guide), relies upon the development of informal mentoring relationships and often leads to a long-term interaction involving sponsorship. More importantly, the process helps to reduce the negative impacts associated with assimilation into active duty units.
JUNIOR OFFICER DEVELOPMENTAL SUPPORT FORM

For use of this form, see AR 623-10B; the approving agency is DCSER

NAME OF ALTEN OFFICER (Last, First, Initial)

GRADE

ORGANIZATION

PART I: INSTRUCTIONS. Use of this form is mandatory for Lieutenants and WO1s assigned for all other ranks.

Initial Face-to-Face Part IV and IV

- Discuss major organizational performance objectives from DA Form 87-4-1.
- Discuss leader values, attributes, and skills as related to future duty.
- Discuss the emergency plan and the emergency plan.
- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.
- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.
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- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.

GROUP FOLLOW-ON DEVELOPMENTAL SUPPORT PLAN

- Discuss major organizational performance objectives from DA Form 87-4-1.
- Discuss leader values, attributes, and skills as related to future duty.
- Discuss the emergency plan and the emergency plan.
- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.
- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.
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- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.
- Discuss the development plan and the development plan.

NOTE: Reference for Army Leadership Doctrine is FM 22-100.

PART II: CHARACTER. Description of the leader's professional and personal strengths and weaknesses.

ARMY VALUES

1. COURAGE: Shows self-direction and initiative in the performance of assigned duties.
2. HONOR: Honors commitments, follows through on assignments.
3. INTIMACY: Maintains high moral and ethical standards in personal and professional life.
4. DEMONSTRABLE: Demonstrates leadership ability.

CHARACTERISTICS: Student's personal and professional characteristics.

1. PEOPLE: Adapts to and coordinates with others.
2. VALUE: Adapts to and coordinates with others.
3. DECISIONS: Makes decisions in a timely manner.
4. INNOVATION: Demonstrates originality of thought and ideas.

PART III: DEVELOPMENTAL ACTION PLAN. Developmental tasks that target major organizational performance objectives as set forth in DA Form 87-4-1. The approving agency is DCSER.

IMPLEMENTATION: Communicating, Decision Making, Marketing

COMMUNICATIONS: Articulates solutions and oral communication clearly and concisely. Maintains a professional image and positive public relations. Displays leadership in planning, organizing, coordinating, and controlling.

DECISION MAKING: Demonstrates sound, logical decisions based on analysis/synthesis of information, and sound moral judgment to allocate resources and select appropriate courses of action.

INNOVATION: Innovates, develops, and applies superior means and methods.

OPERATIONS: Planning, Executing, Assessing

PLANNING: Uses critical and creative thinking to develop comprehensive plans that are realistic, adaptable, and effective.

EXECUTION: Demonstrates tactical and technical proficiency; meets mission standards; achieves mission objectives. Demonstrates the ability to lead, plan, and organize missions. Demonstrates the ability to supervise and manage resources effectively. Demonstrates the ability to plan, execute, and control operations.

DA FORM 87-4-1A, OCT 87

Figure 2. Junior Officer Development Support Form

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Figure 2 (cont). Junior Officer Development Support Form
The Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) is another formal mentoring process in which each corps and division commander participates in the BCTP process under the mentorship of a retired 3- or 4-star general officer. The designated general officer avails himself to the commander by providing discussion and feedback throughout both planning and execution phases of the process. The relationship formally terminates upon completion of the division’s BCTP rotation.

In November 1999, the California Army National Guard implemented a formal warrant officer mentor program. Established as California Army National Guard Pamphlet (CA ARNG PAM) 600-11-1, the program intends to provide every warrant officer the “opportunity to receive the necessary tools for success throughout their careers” through direct command emphasis (California Army National Guard 1999, 1). The pamphlet defines a mentor under the traditional view of trusted counselor, teacher, or guide, formally outlines in detail mentoring roles and responsibilities, and focuses on preparing candidates for successful completion of Warrant Officer Candidate School (WOCS) and fostering junior warrant officer mission-oriented and personal excellence. Finally, the program recognizes the requirement for direct supervisor mentoring and the informal mentoring process. The CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentoring Program compliments both processes by building special trust and confidential relationships most junior officers tend to seek outside their chains of command.

Recently, the Army implemented the pilot phase of its 360 degree Leader Feedback Program. The program’s intent, developed by the Center for Army Leadership at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, is to develop a formal process to gather doctrinally based
leadership feedback from multiple sources (superiors, peers, subordinates, and self) for
the purpose of increased leader self-awareness. Accordingly, the resulting feedback will
enhance communications, effectiveness and job satisfaction, and serve as a
developmental counseling tool to construct action plans to facilitate leader improvement.
The program also educates the force on what we expect of leaders, and includes an
assessment on the ability to teach, coach, and mentor subordinates (Sergeant 2000).

The Army plans to implement the 360 degrees Leader Feedback Program in four
phases, with a desired endstate of an integrated system that provides “on demand” 360
degree leader development opportunities across the Army and permits assess via the
internet (Sergeant 2000). Phase one, the pilot phase, involves the determination of
resource requirements, the development and testing of the initial assessment instrument
with selected organizations (CAS3 and CGSC students, III Corps Artillery, and the 4th
Infantry Division), and the obtainment of Army-level program approval. Phase two
(Program Development) validates pilot program findings, projects and secures POM
funding, initiates appropriate Programs of Instruction (POI) to orient and train the force,
expects the program to include Department of the Army (HQDA) civilian leaders, and
creates a web-based leader development and feedback site. Phase three entails
preimplementation and aims at overcoming resistance to change. During this phase, the
Army will introduce a limited number of organizations to the program, conduct thorough
evaluations and modify the program as required, hire and train sustainment personnel to
maintain the leader development system, and use the media to inform and reduce anxiety
in the force. Finally, phase four encompasses program implement and sustainment. This
includes operating the leader development website, and conducting periodic evaluations for program assessment and modification purposes.


The manual assigns commanders the responsibility for promoting and developing formal mentoring programs within their units and designates immediate supervisors (or rater in the evaluation chain) the task of primary mentor (coach, guide, role model, etc.). Rater duties include discussing performance, potential, and professional development plans with the subordinate. The manual points out that feedback should distinguish between individual goals, career aspirations, and realistic expectations. Additionally, references and programs, such as the Air Force *Officer Professional Development Guide*, assignment policies, performance feedback, PME, academic education, recognition, and self-development actions help the commander and supervisor focus attention on the subordinate’s near, mid- and long-team personal and professional goals (U.S. Air Force, AFI 36-3401 1997, 2-5).
The program recognizes the existence of varying mentoring avenues and informal relationships. Though commanders and immediate supervisors have overall mentoring responsibilities, this designation in no way restricts subordinates from seeking advice from other sources or mentors. Air Force Instruction (AFI) manual 36-3401 contains a listing of Air Force sanctioned organizations mentors and protégés can use to enhance mentoring relationships (U.S. Air Force, AFI 36-3401 1997, Attachment 3).

The manual also identifies tools and assessments to assist the mentor and protégé in establishing an effective mentoring relationship. The tools, available via the Internet, include AFI manuals, such as the Officer Professional Development Guide and information on mentoring in the Air Force, mentor-protégé relationships, mentoring topic checklists, and individual development plans (IDP) (U.S. Air Force, Mentoring Program Tools 1997). Assessments consist of annotations on mentor evaluations and protégé questionnaires to gauge program effectiveness.

The Coast Guard started a formal mentoring program in 1991 after a leadership study found a direct correlation between mentoring and personnel retention. Due to resource and budget constraints, the Coast Guard partnered with all Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies to develop the One DOT Mentoring Program. This internet-based program allows a Coast Guard member to not only seek out volunteer Coast Guard mentors with similar characteristics, but also expands the search across other DOT agencies.
The Coast Guard also requires mentors to attend a five-day mentoring course, which is offered six to eight times a year for up to twenty students per class. The mentor course allows participants to:

1. Develop a broader understanding of the mentoring process.
2. Understand the importance of in the Coast Guard culture.
3. Identify mentor and Coast Guard needs in relation to the mentoring program.
4. Understand the mechanics and dynamics of establishing and maintaining a mentoring relationship.
5. Become a mentor (U.S. Coast Guard 1993).

Additionally, the course contains a wide range of subjects with group discussions on mentor/protégé roles, implementing mentoring relationships, cross-cultural mentoring, interpersonal communications, and group dynamics.

The Navy, like the armed services, has experienced an increased attrition rate among its junior officers. In December 1999, The Naval Supply Corps developed a Junior Officer Mentoring Guide to provide senior Supply Corps officers with a “ready tool box to help discuss and appraise career options with their junior Supply Corps officers,” and “to be used for counseling from day one and is especially valuable for mentoring those officers coming up at the end of their initial service obligation” (U.S. Naval Supply Systems Command 1999). The guide centers on the mentor’s ability to assist protégés in making an informed decision on the pros and cons of continued military service versus a civilian career. Specifically, the guide instructs senior officers to discuss factors, such as pay; advancement; personal and professional growth; insurance; and

Literature Review from Other Government Agencies and the Civilian Sector

Many literary works from other government agencies and the civilian sector support the need for a formal mentoring model. The U.S. Office of Personnel Management (OPM) recognizes three different kinds of mentoring: supervisory, informal, and structure-facilitated mentoring. Supervisory mentoring consists of the day-to-day coaching and guidance that an employee receives from their boss. Informal mentoring is an unofficial pairing of individuals that naturally occurs between people as the need arises. Structured-facilitated mentoring, the most formal type, consists of planned, sequenced steps and is organizationally sponsored (U.S. Office of Personnel Management 1999).

The OPM points out that numerous government agencies have implemented successful formal mentorship programs to develop and maintain a well-trained and versatile workforce. Most of these programs focus on recruiting and retaining minorities and women in the federal government by providing opportunities for significant and impact assignments, mentoring, formal career development programs, and formal education. For example, the Department of Energy (DOE) has a structured mentoring program that developed as a pilot program in 1995. Since then, the program has evolved
into several tailored variations of the basic program that today involves the Headquarters, field installations, and major contractor operated facilities. The program also has a 60 percent participation rate among women, and companies like NIKE and the State of New York have adopted similar models (U.S. Office of Personnel Management 1999).

Jack Welch, Chief Executive Officer of the General Electric (GE) Corporation, takes a hands-on approach to mentoring and demands the same from his top executives. The GE formal mentoring process consists of supervisors providing candid and:

intensive reviews that force those running units to identify their future leaders, make bets on early career “stretch” assignments, develop succession plans for all key jobs, and decide which high potential executives should be sent to Croton-on-Hudson, New York for leadership training. (Byrne 1998, 105)

Additionally, Mr. Welch spends more than 50 percent of his time on people issues and considers the care and feeding of talent into GE as his greatest achievement. He accomplishes this through regular contact with GE’s 3,000 plus executives and keeping personal tabs on the top 500 of them personal file reviews; and openly challenging promotions, assignments, and succession plans. He also attentively oversees diversity programs by expecting unit leaders to bring women and minority managers and protégés to the meetings he attends.

The Federal Express Corporation integrated mentoring into its Leadership Evaluation and Awareness Process (LEAP), which was implemented in June 1988 to improve leadership effectiveness and retention. The LEAP, a volunteer program designed for employees interested in first-line management positions, involves a five-step process aimed at assessing personal interest and aptitude for leadership. Step three, the
Manager’s Focused Recommendation, generally follows a three-to-six-month period during which the candidate’s manager (mentor) evaluates and coaches the candidate (protégé) based on the Federal Express nine leadership attributes (charismatic leadership, individual consideration, intellectual stimulation, courage, dependability, flexibility, integrity, judgment, and respect for others). Since its initiation, the LEAP program has helped reduce the first-line manager turnover rate by more than 80 percent and has improved the performance review scores of LEAP-endorsed managers (American Management Association 1997, 20-24).

Some corporate chief executives discourage formal mentoring programs within their organizations. Mr. Max De Pree, author and former Chairman of Herman Miller, Incorporated (a multinational provider of office, healthcare, residential furniture, and furniture management services with near $2 billion in annual sales), commented during an interview in Mr. Peter Drucker’s Managing the Non-Profit Organization that:

It’s never been easy formally to establish mentorship programs. I think that mentorship, in a certain sense, depends on chemistry. People make a connection. One person feels ready to help another. One person feels ready to accept help from a certain person. I believe that the best way to have mentorship take place is to reward it visibly when it happens rather than try to structure it. (Drucker 1990, 42)

Mr. De Pree further recognized in his book, Leadership is an Art, the need for diversity of people’s gifts, talents, and skills. He stated leaders must endorse diversity in addition to ratios, goals, parameters, and bottom lines. He also believed that “understanding and accepting diversity enables us to see that each of us is needed,” and
that "it also enables us to begin to think about being abandoned to the strength of others, of admitting that we cannot know or do everything" (De Pree 1989, 9).

Mr. Thomas C. Leppert, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the Turner Corporation (a Fortune 500 company and the largest construction firm in the United States), revealed that his organization relies on informal mentoring processes in the development of junior supervisors. He did indicate an intention to implement a formal mentoring program as part of his overall vision for the company (Leppert 1999).

Mr. Jack Carew, founder of Carew International--a global sales-training organization based in Cincinnati, Ohio--professes that the trend toward downsizing and reengineering has forced many seasoned executives out of the workforce. Such initiatives have resulted in many corporations left with promising young professionals without mentors to help implement new strategies. He further stated that recent cultural, philosophical, and psychological changes in the complexion of the workplace have created an environment in which young professionals have little in common with their superiors. Finally, Mr. Carew commented that the ineffective mentoring within most organizations suboptimizes confidence, competency, and potential among junior leaders (Carew 1998, ix-x).

William Byham, president of Development Dimensions International, a Pittsburgh, PA based global training and human resource consulting firm, agreed with Mr. Carew. He contended that downsizing and rightsizing initiatives have led corporate executives to neglect their role of preparing the next generation for top management. Now, many companies have forgotten how to do it. Mr. Byham suggested, "that
companies have a development pool, where every person in the organization can be
developed to their fullest potential. Though some people need to be on the accelerated
path, this select pool of people are those to draw from” (Tremaine 2000, D-1, D-2).

Mr. Byham also stated that leadership affects organizational performance and the
bottom line relies on these factors:

1. Quality and availability of leadership development programs.
2. Accuracy of selection and replacement decisions.
3. Leaders’ skills in coaching, employee development, and performance
management (Tremaine 2000, D-2).

The Drucker Foundation has published much material on mentoring and diversity
awareness. Mr. Peter F. Drucker commented in his book, Managing the Non-Profit
Organization, that “there has to be a mentor if you give that much (high) load, that much
(high) demand, and that much (high) responsibility to beginners” (Drucker 1990, 42). In
the Drucker Foundation’s The Leader of the Future: New Visions, Strategies, and
Practices for the Next Era, Frances Hesselbein and others recognized the fact that first-
line leaders benefit significantly from “executive champions” that play a mentoring role
in “helping line leaders to mature, understand complex political crosscurrents, and to
communicate their ideas and accomplishments to those who have not been involved.”
They further stated that every organizational leader should grow (mentor) subordinates
and be evaluated on the process (Hesselbein and others 1996; 50, 306-07).

Regarding diversity, Hesselbein and others warned that the United States is
rapidly moving toward a population in which one-third of the people are of diverse races
and colors. They also stated that true leaders for the future will need to be comfortable with diversity and must be willing to accept five fundamental challenges:

1. They must be willing to become more sensitive and understanding with respect to the ethnic, cultural, and gender differences within the workplace and to demonstrate that sensitivity and understanding.

2. They must have a vision for the workplace that ultimately results in a significant broadening of the corporate and the workplace environment.

3. They must be willing to craft and implement new and different employment and communication processes to enhance and promote perceptions of fairness and equity.

4. They must be willing to bring full and unquestioned commitment to the effective utilization of a diverse work force.

5. They must be the linchpin between their organization and the larger community, to establish the organization as a place where people want to work and be productive and to develop new market and existing ones (Hesselbein and others 1996, 78-79).

Psychologist Kathy E. Kram of Boston University noted that the mentorship relationship can play a critical role in the individual professional development and contributions made by the mentor as well as the protégé to the organization (Kram 1985, 110). Having written numerous books on the subject, she identified two basic roles that a mentor performs. First, the mentor enhances the career development of the protégé. The second relates to psychosocial functions that enhance the protégé's sense of professional competence, identity and effectiveness.
Kram also identified four phases of the mentorship process. Phase One, initiation, normally lasts six to twelve months, and involves the mentor recognizing a protégé’s potential and the protégé recognizing the mentor’s ability to aid in the development process. During Phase Two, cultivation, the mentor and protégé develop an interpersonal bond, and mentor takes on an increasing personal and professional development role that centers on organizational values. Kram suggested this phase will last two to five years. Phase Three, separation, occurs when mentor and protégé roles change drastically, or the protégé no longer feels the need for mentorship. Elements of this phase include job rotation or separation from the organization. Phase Four, redefinition, results from the mentor and protégé redefining their relationship and assuming new roles.

Ms. Laurent A. Parks Daloz’ chapter entitled “Mentorship,” as discussed in Michael Galbraith’s book entitled *Adult Learning Methods*, stated that mentoring functions include support, challenge, and vision (Galbraith 1998, 371). Supportive activities include listening, providing structure, expressing positive expectations, and advocating. Challenging activities encompass providing alternative perspectives, unmasking assumptions, encouraging hypothetical thinking, and giving feedback. Vision activities provide a developmental map by honoring tradition, suggesting new language, and providing a “mirror” of how others perceive the protégé.

Daloz suggested potential problems with mentoring relationships. The challenges include a need for control and misuse of power by the mentor, charges of favoritism and rivalry among protégés, desertion by the mentor, excessive emotional dependence by either party, or differing ethics (Galbraith 1998, 367).
Daloz pointed out mentor rewards and assessment of the mentoring method. The mentoring relationship itself provides reward in which mentors work in a responsive and interactive way with the protégé. She also recommended protégé assessment of their progress and the helpfulness of their mentor. Protégés accomplish this through either self-assessment or collegial assessment in group mentoring settings.

Mr. Rene Petrin, President of Management Mentors, Incorporated, a consulting firm from Chestnut Hill, Massachusetts, described in detail what he calls the “Best Practices in Mentoring” (Petrin 1999). He stated that the successful mentoring program has a strategic fit, change agent, clear and effective guidelines, credible program coordinator, appropriate mentor-protégé training, and materials that integrate and support the pairs. Petrin stressed that mentoring and business objectives should include employee career and professional development opportunities; support diversity goals for retention, visibility, and overcoming the “glass ceiling;” and link training efforts with the acquisition of needed skills and knowledge. He not only highlighted the differences in formal and informal mentoring (defined in Chapter 1), but also provided a comparison of coaching to mentoring. He described coaching as:

1. A job requirement managers must do for all their staff as a job requirement.
2. A function that takes place within the formal line manager–employee relationship.
3. Focused on developing the individual within their current job.
4. A functional interest arising out of the need to ensure that the individual can perform required tasks to the best of their ability.
5. A relationship initiated and driven by the individual’s manager.

6. A finite relationship that ends as individuals move on.

On the other hand, Mr. Petrin described mentoring as:

1. A relationship in which the protégé’s manager is not the mentor.

2. A relationship that interacts with the mutual consent of both the mentor and protégé.

3. Career-focused or focused on professional development that may be outside the protégé’s profession.


Petrin also discussed the key issues associated with mentoring and diversity. He stated that mentoring programs need to be inclusive of all populations, may require a two-mentor process, must ensure the program meets the needs of diverse protégés, and includes diversity awareness training.

Petrin described in his “Best Practices in Mentoring” concept five mentoring models: One-on-one, Resourced-based, Training-based, Mentoring Circles, or Hybrid (Petrin 1999). The One-On-One model is the most common method used in companies. It works on the principle that one mentor works with one protégé, involves peer or senior mentoring, and provides the most personal mentor-protégé relationship. Companies often combine this approach with the resourced based model.

The resourced-based model involves the use of a general pool of mentors to assist protégés on an “as needed” basis. This method requires less structure, functions more
like informal mentoring, and is rarely used by itself and often combined with other models.

The training-based model links mentoring to training programs and ties classroom theory to “real life” experiences. Course materials form the basis for mentoring.

The mentoring circles model entails one mentor with several protégés at a time, and works best in situations involving few mentors and many protégés. This method requires mentor understanding of group dynamics. Additionally, this approach does not provide for one-on-one relationships and session scheduling becomes a challenge. The hybrid model combines one or more of the aforementioned approaches in order to fit specific organizational needs.

The Mentoring Institute Incorporated, out of Sidney, British Columbia (Canada), provided on-line answers to four frequently asked mentoring questions (The Mentoring Institute 1998). The first question addressed the issue of whether managers should serve as mentors. The Management Institute believed managers can serve as effective and supportive mentors in an informal environment setting. They do not, however, recommend leader to led mentoring relationships in formalized mentoring programs. The Management Institute points out that a survey of over 5,000 protégés concluded only a handful wanted their manager or supervisor for their mentor. Most protégés felt uncomfortable discussing really sensitive issues with someone whose judgment of their job performance might be influenced by what they revealed (The Mentoring Institute 1998).
The second frequently asked question concerned the concept of group mentoring. The Mentoring Institute stated group mentoring provides an efficient way for protégés with common needs to acquire technical expertise. The institute helped the AT&T Consumer Products Lab implement such a mentoring model, which resulted in reduced turnover rates and faster product development. The institute also warned of four difficulties in applying the group mentoring model to nontechnical programs: getting the entire group to meet at the same time, group dynamics, sharing sensitive issues, and determining and attaining group mentoring goals (The Mentoring Institute 1998).

The third question concerned whether an organization should develop an informal mentoring program. The Mentoring Institute does not believe an organization can develop an informal program. To do so requires the application of formal features: among them sufficient and agreed upon structure. They noted that most mentoring programs fail due to insufficient structure (The Mentoring Institute 1998).

The fourth question deals with the selection and matching of mentors and protégés for a formal program. The Mentoring Institute pointed out that the mentor-protégé selection and matching process represents the most important aspect to formal program development. They also indicated that most organizations ask applicants to fill out written applications, submit to structured interviews, or a combination of both (The Mentoring Institute 1998).

Other literature in the civilian sector and other government agencies provided key insights into the role of diversity awareness in the mentoring process. Dr. Alvin
Poussaint, psychiatry professor at Harvard University Medical School, believes mentoring plays a vital role in networking for Blacks. He stated:

I think mentoring is particularly important to Black people because we haven’t been up there in high positions long. We don’t know the style itself: “how much do they want me to act culturally White in order to promote me? How can I act? Am I selling out when I do that?” (Fraser 1994, 60)

John W. Gardner, former Health, Education, and Welfare Secretary and author of On Leadership (required reading for Army field grade officers) addressed the importance of the mentor’s role in mentoring, diversity, and leader development. He stated:

“Leaders, managers and teachers must wage a battle within themselves against the impulse to underestimate their people and condescend to them. Condescension does not release energies or stir people to give the best that is in them” (Garner 1990, 169). The Honorable Gardner’s remarks stress the relationship between mentoring and diversity awareness within today’s military.

Charles C. Moskos and John Sibley Butler pointed out in All That We Can Be: Black Leadership and Integration the Army Way that nearly one-half (194 of 436) of Year Group 1995 ROTC commissions awarded to black officers went to students from HBCUs. The significance of this statistic lies in the fact the Army recognizes that some ROTC students in HBCUs lack the written, verbal, and mathematical skills needed to compete successfully with their contemporaries. Though initiatives, such as Enhanced Skills Training (EST), have increased the pass rate of blacks attending officer basic courses from 80 to 99 percent, the authors acknowledged educational deficiencies within HBCUs must be addressed to bring individuals up to required standards for success in either the military or civilian sector (Moskos and Butler 1996, 83-85). Finally, they stated
that mentoring programs, such as professional development seminars offered by The ROCKS, Incorporated, and the Air Force Cadet--Mentor Action Program (organizations aimed at improving awareness and the professional development of minority Army and Air Force officers), can help juniors officers overcome such deficiencies, as well as offer them the support and guidance to enable them to work and advance within the military system (Moskos and Butler 1996, 50-51).

Faye Crosby, a social psychologist at the University of California at Santa Cruz and a leading authority on affirmative action in education and business, felt mentoring can help bridge the gap between men and women, blacks and whites, and managers and subordinates. She warned, however, that mentoring programs can also backfire, creating feelings of alienation, guilt, and disappointment (Crosby 1999).

Crosby elaborated on the major pitfalls of mentoring. Disaffection occurs among protégés who enter into mentoring programs with high advancement expectations. Morale problems arise when those not selected for mentoring program participation feel alienated and resentful and when those chosen feel embarrassed and self-conscious. Finally, reinforcement of stereotypes among mentors can occur toward women and minorities if the program lacks sufficient structure. Crosby points out that an organization can avoid these drawbacks with planning, oversight, and training and socialization on diversity issues.

Mr. George Fraser, author of *Success Runs in our Race*, highlights the benefit from multicultural mentor-protégé relationships: “A better understanding of our culture and our work ethic” (Fraser 1994, 268). He also addressed two keys to successful
mentoring not previously mentioned. First, the mentor should put themselves in the protégé’s shoes. This means trying to understand the character and the background of the one being mentored. Second, do not always assume the protégé will get the point. The mentor should make sure the one being mentored understands or sees the value in the guidance rendered (Fraser 1994, 116).

A Careers and Engineer magazine article by USDA career counselor Pamela M. McBride, entitled “How to Establish yourself as a Bonafide Professional,” encouraged readers to “be responsible for your own professional development” (McBride 1998, 24). She pointed out that individuals maximize their professional development opportunities by laying the groundwork for networking that works. Efforts in this area include establishing the right mentoring relationships. McBride warned that mentoring relationships should never be a one-way street. She stated that a mentor should never feel responsible for a protégé’s professional growth nor in solving their personal or professional problems. She also stated that what protégés get out of the relationship depends on what they put into it.

Summary

The literature review supports this thesis by offering varying opinions and comparisons on informal and formal mentorship models. It highlights Army doctrine that will serve as the basis for the mentoring model. The examination of prior research, and government and civilian sector mentoring programs provides insight for the composition of mentoring processes within the formal model. Finally, the writings of and interviews
with retired and active duty military officers and subject matter experts support prior research and contribute to the analysis for determining the ideal mentoring model.
CHAPTER 3

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

How does one develop as a decision-maker? Be around people making decisions. (Puryear 2000, 232)

Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology used to conduct the study on the Development of a Formal Army Mentorship Model for the Twenty-First Century, and explains the methods used to analyze the literature and data collected.

Description of the Study

This thesis determines which formalized mentorship model should the Army adopt and implement as part of its overall leader development program. This study also addresses the roles of senior leaders, mentors, and protégés in the Army mentorship and leader development process as reflected by doctrine, policies, and informal applications.

A review and analysis of the available literature to determine the Army climate toward, and the need for, a formalized mentorship process was conducted. The review included writings from senior leaders and academia regarding feelings toward mentoring; prior research; and information on mentoring programs within the DoD, other governmental agencies, and the civilian sector from which the Army may benefit from their examples.

The analysis of current Army doctrine, regulations, policies and guidance provided the foundation for developing the model by defining the role of mentoring in the leader development process. The review of literature on mentoring programs within
DoD, other government agencies, and the civilian sector determined new and developing concepts in the mentoring process. Finally, literature from senior Army leaders and academia provided insight on current thought processes from sometimes differing yet important perspectives.

The Command and General Staff College Leadership Lecture Series program brings in distinguished military and civilian speakers to address the students. Four of these briefings had a direct correlation to the Army mentoring process. The data gathered from the briefings was analyzed and compared with information obtained from the literature review.

Face-to-face interviews with senior Army officers in the grade of colonel and higher were conducted to gain a better understanding of their attitudes and perceptions of the Army mentoring process. While the interviews reflected the opinions from a limited group of officers with diverse backgrounds (male and female, white and black, Combat Arms, Combat Support, and Combat Service Support), their views may generally reflect other senior officer views on mentoring but may not guarantee the accuracy or perspectives of the entire population. Regardless, a better appreciation of current senior leader thoughts on mentorship as compared to the literature written by other senior leaders was obtained.

The evaluation of the literature review, briefing attendance, and face-to-face interview data formed the basis for analyzing the development of a formalized Army mentorship model. Specifically, the data addresses the subquestions as they relate to the primary research question:
1. Is a formal mentorship model really feasible or necessary?

2. Why has the Army not adopted a formalized program despite research reflecting its necessity?

3. How would a formal mentoring program provide a direct benefit to the Army?

4. What government or civilian sector models, if any, provide the proper "fit" for the Army culture?

5. What criterion does one use to select the proper mentoring model?

6. How would one implement the program?

7. The author will specifically address the aforementioned questions in chapters 4 and 5.

Analysis of Data

A qualitative approach was used to evaluate the data obtained from the literature review, briefing attendances, and face-to-face interviews. The data analysis consisted of five phases: data and literature collected, determination of mentoring model courses of action, the development and discussion of criteria for selection of the mentoring model, and determination of conclusions and recommendations.

System to determine application methods used and the level of instruction received in mentorship

This study analyzed the five generally accepted mentoring model categories or courses of action in order to determine their proper "fit" into a proposed formalized Army mentorship model:
1. **One-on-one**: One mentor working with one protégé.

2. **Resource-based**: A general pool of mentors to assist protégés as needed.

3. **Training-based**: The linking of classroom experience to “real life” experience.

4. **Mentoring circles**: One mentor with several protégés.

5. **Hybrid**: A combination of one or more of the above-mentioned approaches.

The best mentoring model or course of action was selected based on five criteria.

Each of the following criteria were derived from Army doctrine, prior research on the subject, expert opinion, and senior leader comments from the literature review and interviews:

1. **Strategic Fit**: Strategic fit embodies the mentoring model’s compliance with Army vision, goals, culture, values, and doctrine. The acceptable mentoring model must provide as strategic fit to overall Army objectives.

2. **Structure**: Structure refers to the mentoring program’s ability to formalize Army, mentor, and protégé roles and put into a meaningful frame of reference or mentoring process. The model conforms to the Army definition of mentorship, and includes the identification of feedback mechanisms. The acceptable mentoring model must have structure in order to ensure its success.

3. **Accessibility**: Accessibility refers to the inclusive nature of the mentoring process. The acceptable model must be resourced so that everyone wanting to participate can do so.

4. **Army Diversity Initiatives**: This relates to the understanding of issues concerning minorities and women and the ability of the mentoring model to support
cross-cultural relationships. The acceptable model must support the Army’s diversity awareness initiatives.

5. Precommissioning and early commissioning professional development: This encompasses the preparation of cadets, officer candidates, and junior officers for entry and assimilation into active duty. The acceptable model must include pre-commissioning and early commissioning professional development with the mentoring process.

This study concluded with the proposed formal mentoring model based on the analysis portion of chapter 4 and the five generally accepted mentoring model categories. The conclusion discusses the implementation process and methods to overcome resistance to change. Finally, the recommendations relate to the adaptation process and the need for future studies in specific areas.

Due to time constraints, this thesis did not include a formal test of the recommended mentoring model. Instead, it relied upon a theoretic approach to the formalized mentorship model to prove its adaptation for Army-wide use.
CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS

He (Captain Miller) evidently thought I’ve got this ordinarily able second lieutenant. Sometimes he gets a little ahead of his skis and takes a tumble. I’ll teach him a lesson, scare the bejeezus out of him; but let’s not ruin his career before it gets started. Miller’s example of humane leadership that does not always go by the book was not lost on me. When they fall down, pick ‘em up, dust ‘em off, pat ‘em on the back, and move ‘em on.

General (Retired) Colin Powell, *My American Journey*

Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to analyze the research data on the contention that the U.S. Army needs to adopt a formal officer mentorship program. The analysis provides the basis for accepting or rejecting the primary question to this thesis: Which formalized mentorship model should the Army adopt and implement as part of its overall officer development process?

The analysis is a comparison of the literature review, interviews with several senior Army officers, and statistical data gathered from various sources. Additionally, this comparison examines the following subquestions:

1. Is a formal mentorship model really feasible?
2. Why the Army has not adopted a formalized program despite research reflecting its necessity?
3. How would a formal mentoring program provide a direct benefit to the Army, mentor, and protégé?
4. What criterion does one use to select the proper mentoring model?
5. What current government and civilian sector models, if any, provide a proper “fit” for the Army culture?

6. How would one implement the program?

**Mentoring Definition**

This chapter begins with an analysis of the definitions on mentoring. To recall from Chapter One, Webster’s Third New International Dictionary refers to a mentor as a trusted guide, a provider of wise counsel and advice, and confidant (*Webster’s Third New International Dictionary* 1976, 2044). FM 22-100 defines mentorship as: “The proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity,” and “an inclusive process for everyone under a leader’s charge (U.S. Army, FM 22-100 1999, 5-16).

Mentoring can be either informal or formal in nature. General Shinseki pointed out that one must be careful about defining mentorship due to its varying meaning among individuals and organizations (Shinseki 2000). And the analysis indeed revealed there are as many definitions for mentorship as there are organizations.

The Army at large, however, tends to fluctuate between the above mentioned definitions depending upon whether one refers to either the informal or formal mentoring process. Webster’s definition is closely associated with the Army’s traditional (informal) view of mentoring. This nonstructured process brings mentors and protégés together based upon common interests. Such relationships have contributed to perceptions of nepotism, favoritism, and the presence of “the Good Old Boy Network” within the ranks.
The exclusionary nature of the informal process could result in barriers based on race, gender, accessibility, or other organizational factors. Finally, informal relationships tend to relegate the leader's overall responsibility for mentoring (U.S. Army, FM 22-100 1999, 5-17).

The Army revised its definition of mentorship in the 1999 update of FM 22-100. Consequently, the analysis for accepting or rejecting the primary question of this thesis focuses on this new meaning. The revision of FM 22-100 resulted in beginnings of a formal process and the establishment of mentoring as a leadership style (Bagnal and others 1985, 8). In doing so, the manual takes into account the following assumptions:

1. That all leaders are willing and able mentors.

2. That all subordinates will accept the mentoring relationship and confide in their superiors on sensitive subjects.

3. The process, as defined, requires minimum structure.

The analysis of information revealed the falsehood of these assumptions. First, as General Bagnal and others pointed out, not all leaders can act as mentors, and the officer professional military education (PME) system pays very little attention to training and orientation of potential mentors and protégés in the roles they play in mentorship (Bagnal and others 1985, 8). Second, in a survey on “leader to led” mentoring relationships, most protégés felt uncomfortable in discussing really sensitive issues with someone whose judgment might be influenced by what they revealed. Finally, all formal mentoring programs require structure and most fail due to insufficient organization (The Mentoring Institute 1999).
The Army definition of mentorship also makes the process all-inclusive and embraces the concept of coaching. Coaching; a leader's assessment of a subordinate's performance based on observations, helping that subordinate develop an effective plan of action to sustain strengths and overcome weaknesses, and providing support enhances the formal structured mentoring process. Coaching, therefore, is the primary role of the mentor (Bagnal and others 1985, 16).

Roles Within the Mentoring Process

The mentor, protégé, and Army have vital roles in the mentoring process. Mentor roles include those outlined in FM 22-100 (observer, assessor, coach, teacher, counselor, and evaluator). The mentor uses mentoring tools (such as DA PAM 600-3, career timelines, and individual development plans) to clarify protégé career goals, to help develop long-term strategies for career planning and advancement, and to implement short-term individual development plans. The mentor shares their knowledge and experience, provides visibility for the protégé, serves as a role model, and uses effective communications to tie all roles together (Bagnal and others 1985, 7). In essence, mentors "pick 'em up, dust 'em off, pat 'em on the back, and move 'em on" (Powell 1995, 46).

The sponsoring aspect of mentorship differs from providing visibility and deserves special critiquing. While its notion serves to benefits the protégé, its abuse can result in control and misuse of power favoritism, rivalry, and questionable ethical behavior. Further, sponsorship tends to place an otherwise deserving officer at a disadvantage in favor of the protégé. For these reasons, mentors must view sponsorship with caution in the development of formal mentoring relationships.
The protégé has roles of first and foremost performing, and taking responsibility for their professional development by actively seeking out and accepting the mentoring process. This means they must possess a willingness to openly communicate with the mentor, receive advice, and dedicate themselves to the process.

The Army also has roles in the formal mentoring process. First, it determines and implements the appropriate mentoring model. It gains senior leader support and provides resources for the process. Finally, the Army provides structure to the formal mentoring program in the form of mentor–protégé roles, the mentoring process itself, and feedback mechanism to evaluate its effectiveness.

The Benefits of Mentoring

Formal mentoring programs benefit the mentor, protégé, and Army alike. The mentor benefits directly from the experience through personal and professional growth verification of time well spent in building successful relationships. The mentor develops more effective communication skills; and becomes comfortable in dealing with sensitive issues, gains a better understanding of diversity, and in establishing cross-cultural mentoring relationships. Finally, mentors formulate their legacy in the enhanced career development of protégés (Drucker 1990, 46).

The protégé, in turn, becomes a competent and confident performer, develops a mature thought process, and obtains a broader Army perspective. The process helps them feel wanted and speeds up the assimilation process. The resulting development of long-term strategies and short-term action plans (based on individual needs, aspirations, and
the situation) help protégés take responsibility for themselves. The process also increases communication and a willingness to learn.

The Army benefits as well. The inclusive nature of formal mentoring contributes to the personal and professional growth of the officer corps and the strengthening of Army values. Studies show the process directly affects captain attrition and leaders also grow into the profession (Shinseki 2000). Lastly, mentoring programs reflect a commitment from Army senior leaders on the effective utilization of the workforce.

**The Mentoring Process**

The analysis disclosed the following functions that are crucial to mentoring: teaching, guiding, advising, validating, motivating, protecting, communicating, and serving as a role model (Jolemore 1986, 8). Teaching includes teaching specific job-related skills in accordance with Army doctrine (for example, FMs 100-5, 22-100), and commissioned officer development and career management guidelines (DA PAM 600-3). Guiding entails observing and assessing protégé conduct and performance. It also acquaints the officer with Army values and culture, organizational norms, and unwritten rules. Advising involves using one’s age and experience to tell the Army story and impart wisdom to the receiver. Validating evaluates protégé growth through constructive feedback and lends emotional support in stressful times. Motivating, an outgrowth of counseling, provides incentive for the protégé to accomplish goals based upon long-term strategies and short-term development plans. Protecting provides an environment in which the protégé can take risk without fear of failure. Finally, communicating brings all other functions together.
The formal mentoring process applies the above listed nine functions in four phases: initiation, cultivation separation, and redefinition (Kram 1985, 110). Initiation involves the matching process in which the mentor recognizes a protégé’s need for mentorship and the protégé determines the mentor’s ability to aid in the development process. Matching the mentor to the protégé is the most important aspect to the mentoring process: The relationship fails if the parties cannot establish a mutual connection.

The cultivation phase further develops the interpersonal bond by the mentor taking on an increasing personal and professional development role and applying the nine critical functions. The phase also includes support, challenge and establishing a vision (Galbraith, 1998, 371). Support means listening, providing structure, and expressing expectations. Challenging encompasses providing alternative perspectives, unmasking assumptions, encouraging critical thinking and giving feedback. Vision articulates a long-term professional development strategy and a short-term action plan with focus on Army values.

The separation phase occurs when the relationship drastically changes, the officer shifts to a new chain of command, or the protégé no longer feels the need for mentorship. Finally, redefinition results from the mentor and protégé re-evaluating their relationship and assuming new roles. This includes the establishment of long-term relationships.
Feasibility of a Formal Mentoring Model

Feasibility refers to an organization’s ability to successfully manage and execute a formal mentoring program. Accordingly, the analysis revealed the Army has developed the foundation to adopt a viable mentorship model.

The feasibility assessment manifests itself in doctrine, comments of senior leaders, and tools currently in place to enable the formal mentoring process. The primary sources of doctrine relating to mentoring are FM 100-5, FM 22-100, and FM 623-105. FM 100-5 provides the basis for which the Army fights and wins wars, and it establishes the direction for the role of mentoring in the leader development process. FM 22-100 provides leadership doctrine for meeting mission requirements, and establishes the use of mentoring in its overall theory for leader development and instilling Army values. It also places overall mentoring responsibilities in the leader’s hands.

The Army OER system ties the mentoring concepts outlined in FM 22-100 to the leader development process. The Junior Officer Development Support Form (JODSF) requirements further emphasize the chain of command’s duty to mentor lieutenants. Because FM 623-105 assigns observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating responsibilities to the rated officer’s chain of command, most senior leaders view the OER system as a formal mentoring process.

Comments from senior leaders validate the feasibility for a formal mentoring model, particularly during the precommissioning process and lieutenant years. Lieutenant General Bagnal and others suggested the need for increased education and training and formal mentoring programs at the cadet and junior officer levels. They also recognized
the need for senior Army leader commitment, realistic expectations, integrating formal mentoring programs into the overall scheme of career and leader development, providing structure, carefully matching mentors with protégés, providing training, and development as a means to monitor program effectiveness (Bagnal and others 1985, 5-10).

Recent statements from the CSA and VCSA and other current senior leaders seem to echo Lieutenant General Bagnal and other’s conclusions in light of current high captain attrition rates and associated perceptions, and the CSA vision of “bold, innovative leaders of character and competence, (which is) fundamental to the long-term health of the Army” (Shinseki 1999). All have laid the foundation by expressing a sincere commitment to mentoring and leader development, and have challenged the entire officer corps to “Tell the Army Story.” The Army has outlined the expectations of mentoring via FM 22-100 and the CSA Vision Statement, and the integration of the OER system into formal mentoring and the overall professional development program. Diversity awareness training, the revision of DA PAM 600-3 (Commissioned Officer Development and Career Management) to include OPMS XXI initiatives, and the development of the 360° Leader Feedback Program also provide effective tools for establishing realistic expectations and evaluating mentoring results.

Commitment to the formal mentoring process, however, requires focus on four conditions to ensure feasibility and build on the current foundation:

1. **Structure.** The Army must outline required procedures for program support. This includes providing mentors the flexibility in how they accomplish goals.
2. **Selection.** A system must be developed to carefully match mentors with protégés.

3. **Cadet, candidate, and Junior Officer Mentoring.** Any formal mentoring process must include these populations to ease the challenges associated with assimilation.

4. **Training.** The PME process needs to address the mentoring process to clarify roles and develop skills required for effective mentoring relationship (Bagnal and others 1985, 10).

   *Why hasn’t the Army adopted a formalized mentoring program despite research reflecting its necessity?*

The following conclusions from prior research over the past ten years highlight the need for formal mentoring programs within the Army:

1. Senior officer mentoring is important to leader development and career progression.

2. Mentoring contributes to culture adaptation, competence, confidence, upward mobility, and decisions to stay in the military.

3. Mentoring is key in the early years and should begin before the first assignment (during the precommissioning process).

4. Black senior leaders have a higher mentor-to-protégé ratio than their White counterparts.

5. Cultural misunderstandings and lack of diversity awareness often limit the mentoring process.
6. The exclusionary nature of informal mentoring leads to race and gender barriers due to a lack of minority mentors and exposure to senior leaders.

Despite these conclusions, the Army has been slow though not inactive in formalizing the mentoring process. The analysis revealed four possible reasons for the delay in its implementation. The first reason lies in a perception among senior leaders that the Army had no apparent challenges requiring a change to the current mentoring process. Recent discussions on readiness, captain attrition, a disproportionate number of minorities in Combat Arms specialties, and diversity awareness have brought formal mentoring concepts to the limelight.

The second reason, closely related to the first, concerns the informal mentoring process as an integral part of Army culture and a general resistance to change. The quotes contained in this thesis from former senior leaders on their mentoring experiences reflect the tradition associated with the informal process. General Wickham not only acknowledged this fact in his *Collected Works* but also warned that people can fall through the cracks from the second order affects of sponsorship (Wickham 1987, 152). Matthew Culbertson felt formal processes “potentially render the traditional mentoring practice ineffective” (Culbertson 1999, 45). Major General Jolemore believed the human dimension of mentoring “made the ordering away of the informal process impractical, and could create a barrier to ethical behavior” (Jolemore 1986, 8). In sum, the informal process and traditional view of mentoring are ingrained in the Army culture and present a barrier to change.
The third reason relates indirectly to culture and involves leader emphasis and priorities given time constraints. Major General Schachnow stated that “mentoring is critical, but it is not urgent. And we all know, most of our time and energy are spent on urgent stuff that is not critical” (Shacknow 1999, 36).

The fourth reason centers on the belief that implementation of the New OER system, implemented in 1997, created a formal mentoring program within the Army. While the system forms the foundation for a formal process, it lacks sufficient structure; assumes the rating chain has the willingness and ability to mentor and the protégé will open up to the process; and provides no feedback mechanism to assess program effectiveness.

**Mentoring Model Selection Criteria**

The analysis determined five criteria for the evaluation and selection of a proper mentoring model. These criterions are derived from Army doctrine, prior research on the subject, and senior leader comments from the literature review and interviews.

1. **Strategic Fit:** Strategic fit embodies the mentoring model’s compliance with Army vision, goals, culture, values, and doctrine. The acceptable mentoring model must provide as strategic fit to overall Army objectives.

2. **Structure:** Structure refers to the mentoring program’s ability to formalize Army, mentor, and protégé roles and put into a meaningful frame of reference or mentoring process. The model conforms to the Army definition of mentorship, and includes the identification of feedback mechanisms. The acceptable mentoring model must have structure in order to ensure its success.
3. **Accessibility:** Accessibility refers to the inclusive nature of the mentoring process. The acceptable model must be resourced so that everyone wanting to participate can do so.

4. **Army Diversity Initiatives:** This relates to the understanding of issues concerning minorities and women and the ability of the mentoring model to support cross-cultural relationships. The acceptable model must support the Army’s diversity awareness initiatives.

5. **Precommissioning and early commissioning professional development:** This encompasses the preparation of cadets, officer candidates, and junior officers for entry and assimilation into active duty. The acceptable model must include precommissioning and early commissioning professional development with the mentoring process.

**Evaluation of Current Formal Mentoring Models**

The analysis evaluates eight mentoring programs (four Army, one Air Force, one Coast Guard, one from another government agency, and one from private industry) based on the above-mentioned criteria. Additionally, the analysis will classify the processes into one of five “Best Practice in Mentoring” concepts (or models) described by Rene Petrin (One-on-one, Resourced based, Training-based, Mentoring circles, or Hybrid) (Petrin 1999). Since the analysis focuses on formal mentoring models, the researcher screened out of the evaluation process mentoring concepts listed the literature review as informal programs.

An analysis will first review civilian sector mentoring practices prior to evaluating mentoring models. The research indicated the civilian sector lags behind government
agencies in the development of formal mentoring programs. Though corporations, such as Federal Express, Incorporated, have incorporated mentoring into their formal leader development processes, most rely solely on the informal process to identify subordinates with potential and groom them for increased management responsibilities.

This phenomenon may have occurred as a residual effect of corporate restructuring, downsizing, and reengineering; and the neglect of leader development programs. These initiatives forced many seasoned executives out of the workforce, taking with them the knowledge and wisdom gained from years of corporate experience. Many companies have also forgotten how to prepare junior leaders for top level management. As a result, many eager and promising managers in the business arena lack mentors, and the competence and interpersonal skills necessary to succeed (Carew 1999, ix).

Additionally, Mr. Max DePree of Herman Miller, Inc., Mr. Thomas Leppert of the Turner Corporation, and Mr. Peter Drucker of the Drucker Foundation all acknowledged the difficulties associated with establishing formal mentoring processes. Consequently, both Mr. DePree and Mr. Drucker advocated rewarding mentoring when it happens rather than structuring the process (Drucker 1990, 42).

The analysis evaluated four formal Army programs for proper fit. Most Army senior leaders consider the new OER system a formal mentoring process, and the analysis validated their contention. The analysis, however, revealed several major shortcomings with the system as a formal mentoring process. Given the mentoring model selection criteria, the OER system provides a strategic fit in its compliance with overall Army
objectives. It contains structure as outlined in AR 623-105 by giving specific guidance on the rating chain responsibilities of observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating subordinates. The manual informs the rated officer of their duties to perform, initiate discussions regarding duty description and performance objections, seek the advice of superiors and ask for feedback, and describe accurately all duties, objectives, and significant contributions on their OER Support Form (DA Form 67-9-1) (U.S. Army, AR 623-105 1997, 7). The new OER system includes every officer and mandates special rating chain requirements (in the form of the JODSF) for the development of junior officers.

The new OER system drawbacks start with the assumption that all leaders are willing and able mentors, and that all subordinates will accept the mentoring relationship and confide in their superiors on sensitive subject. The Army culture has emphasized informal mentoring, and no where in the PME process does instruction include training on mentorship. Under the new OER system, one gives little consideration to the matching of mentors with protégés due to automatic chain of command involvement and the assignment process (you get who you get!). Finally, the new OER system does not extend to cadets or officer candidates. These groups rely upon a separate evaluation systems for development, and sponsorship programs (only in the case of USMA cadets) to develop the attribute necessary for assimilation into active duty units. As a result of these shortcomings; program structure, leader training on mentoring processes, and the development of precommissioning evaluation/mentoring programs to augment the new
OER system takes on even greater importance. Diversity awareness training in the
development of cross-cultural relationships also supports the mentoring process.

The USMA Sponsorship Program, the second evaluated Army mentoring process,
provides a strategic fit by using volunteer and former USMA graduates to introduce
cadets to Army goals, culture, values, and doctrine. The program provides minimum
structure by prescribing the mentor and protégé roles in the relationship, and allows
assess to all cadets desiring a mentor. Finally, the USMA Sponsorship Program supports
Army diversity awareness initiatives and contributes to precommissioning professional
development by reducing the challenges associated with assimilating into the Army.

Although the USMA Sponsorship Program appropriately matches mentors with
protégés and outlines mentor and protégé roles, it leaves the conduct and development of
the mentoring relationship to the parties at hand. This results in some relationships being
less beneficial than others. Also, one could expand the program to include other sources
of commissioning (ROTC, OCS, etc.).

The BCTP process is the third evaluated Army mentoring process and relates
directly to general officers. BCTP fits strategically into overall Army objectives and
provides structure based upon the nature of the relationship developed between the
mentor and corps or division commander (protégé). Every corps or division commander
undergoing BCTP participates in the mentoring relationship. Due to the BCTP mentoring
process focus on senior Army officer professional development, the program is not
appropriate for the development of junior officers.
The elements comprising the CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentor Program, the final evaluated Army process, can apply to any commissioned officer program. The program provides superb structure by thoroughly defining the roles of the commander, mentor, and protégé. The program requires each mentor and protégé to sign a "Mentor/Mentee Statement of Understanding and No Fault Agreement" that confirms the relationship and its nonattribution aspects. The structure also includes references, mentor discussion topics, and milestones. The program also supports precommissioning and early commissioning professional development initiatives by assigning mentors to potential warrant officer candidates for pre-course assessments and course preparation (California National Guard, CA ARNG PAM 600-11-1 1999, 2).

The CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentor Program has a shortcoming in providing a strategic fit with overall Army objectives. The program manual makes no mention of FM 22-100 as a leadership training and counseling reference. Consequently, the program defers overall warrant officer mentoring responsibilities away from the direct leader and into the hands of senior warrant officers (California National Guard, CA ARNG PAM 600-11-1 1999, 2).

The U.S. Air Force Mentoring Program supports the Secretary's vision of bringing about a cultural change in officer professional development, and in developing well-rounded, professional, and competent future leaders (U.S. Air Force, AFI 36-3401 1997, 1). It provides structure in that assigns mentor roles and responsibilities (coach, guide, role model, communicator) down to the unit level, outlines tools (via the internet) to use in the formal mentoring process, and includes feedback mechanisms (mentor
evaluation report annotations, and protégé questionnaires). Both leaders and subordinates have web-based access to mentor training guides, and all officers have access to the program. Finally, the program supports Air Force diversity issues and centers its main effort on company grade officers.

The Air Force Mentoring Program has shortcomings in the form of matching mentors with protégés, and in the protégé’s ability to accept the relationship. As with the Army OER system, the Air Force leader-to-led mentoring program leaves little room for exercising proper matching techniques. The program does, however, recognize the existence of informal mentoring and does not restrict protégés from seeking such relationships.

The U.S. Coast Guard’s One DOT Mentoring Program provides the most comprehensive formal process of all programs evaluated. The program provides a strategic fit for both the Coast Guard and participating Department of Transportation (DOT) agencies, increasing opportunities for career development, and contributing to increase retention. The program’s internet based matching process allows Coast Guard members to seek out mentors with similar interest across agency lines. Similarly, each mentor attends a five-day course to develop a broader understanding of the mentoring process to include implementing relationships and cross-cultural mentoring. The programs accessibility to all Coast Guard members enables junior officer professional development.

Due to the establishment of mentoring relationships via the Internet, the program can take on a global perspective with mentors and protégés separated by distance.
Consequently, the relationship relies more on telephonic or electronic communication than in face-to-face interaction.

The analysis determined one non-DoD government agency and one corporate sector formal mentoring program for evaluation. The Department of Energy’s (DOE) mentoring program obtains its strategic fit from leader sponsorship, and its structure through a planned sequential mentoring process. The program supports its diversity programs and junior manager professional development by actively seeking minorities and women as mentors and protégés. Accessibility may be an issue because the program limits participation to high potential employees.

The Federal Express Corporation’s Leadership Evaluation and Awareness Process (LEAP) have a unique approach to formal mentoring. The LEAP program provides a strategic fit by supporting the company’s vision of improving leader effectiveness and retention, and a policy of pursuing promotion from within. The program has an extensive structure which potential managers go through a six-step qualification process: one-day management orientation course, employee leadership profile self-assessment, manager’s focused recommendation, peer assessment, and LEAP panel evaluation. The potential manager’s supervisor mentors the employee throughout the process, closely examining personal interest and leadership aptitude. The supervisor focuses the examination on eight leadership attributes: charismatic leadership, individual consideration, intellectual stimulation, courage, dependability, flexibility, integrity, judgment, and respect for others (American Management Association, Membership Publications Division 1997, 22-24). The program permits all employees to enter the program because the potential manager
(and not the supervisor) makes the decision. Additionally, LEAP supports the company’s equal opportunity program and contributes for employee professional development.

The LEAP qualification process lasts approximately three to six months. Therefore, the formal mentoring relationship terminates upon completion of the process.

The analysis contains an evaluation of the five mentoring models described by Rene Petrin (One-on-one, Resourced-based, Training-based, Mentoring Circles, and Hybrid). The Training-based model, however, was screened out due to its definition falling within the delimitation scope of this thesis. After careful review, the analysis revealed that either the One-on-one or Mentoring Circles mentoring models provide the proper fit for a formal Army officer mentoring program, depending on the situation.

The analysis determined six of seven mentoring programs evaluated (three of four Army programs) fell within the One-on-one or Mentoring Circles models. The CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentoring Program, Coast Guard One DOT Mentoring Program, and Federal Express LEAP process all classify as one-on-one models: one mentor matched with one protégé. From an Army perspective, this mentoring model provides the most personal type of model and normally evolves into long-term relationships. A lack of senior mentors within an organization may create a problem in establishing one-on-one models and matching mentors with protégés. Accordingly, cross-cultural and distance mentoring (via the internet) could compensate for senior leader shortages within an organization.

The Mentoring Circles Model (one mentor working with several protégés at one time) works best in situations involving few mentors and many protégés. The new OER
system falls within this model, since the rating chain normally supervises more than one officer. Within the Army, this model normally takes on a short-term association and may lose some of the personal features of one-on-one models, but the relationship can redefine itself into a long-term bond. Mentoring circles models also create a time challenge for the mentor, and require an understanding of the mentoring process and group dynamics. Therefore, mentor training programs help in the implementation process.

The Army BCTP process provides an example of the Resource-based Model: A pool of retired three and four-star generals (mentors) avail themselves to division and corps commanders (protégés) on an as needed basis. This model provides less structure than one-on-one and mentoring circle concepts due to the nature of senior leader relationships. Because of this factor and the short-term nature of the association, this model was ruled out as a favorable mentoring model. Likewise, the analysis did not consider any Hybrid mentoring model processes since this thesis reviewed none.

**Program Implementation**

The analysis revealed the complexity of implementing formal mentoring programs within the Army. The difficulty arises in change in emphasis from informal mentoring to formal programs and the tradition associated with the former. Implementation also entails adopting the best mentor practices from other successful programs, which may be unfamiliar to the current Army culture.

Mr. Petrin of Management Mentors, Incorporated, described a successful mentoring program as one that has:
1. A strategic fit.

2. Clear and effective guidelines.

3. A credible program coordinator.

4. Appropriate training for mentors and protégés.

5. Resources to support the mentoring relationship (Petrin 1999).

The evaluation criteria covered the first three factors in detail. Further, he outlined five key steps in implementing a mentoring program: Design, Implementation, Training, Maintenance, and Completion (Petrin 1999). The design phase involves a determination of strategic purpose, getting a “Champion,” and selecting an appropriate design task force. The CSA outlined the Army’s professional development initiatives in his 1999 Vision Statement, and FM 22-100 determines a strategic purpose through its definition of mentorship. The “Champion” must come from the highest levels, preferably from the Army Staff, in support of the mentoring program.

The selected Task Force assists in the creation of learning objectives (mentor, protégé, and Army benefits and endstate), appropriate mentoring model (one-on-one and mentoring circles), and mentor-protégé matching techniques (for example, web-based applications). This includes determining program scope (from cadets up to field grade officers), roles and responsibilities, mentoring process guidelines, training needs, and resource requirements. Finally, the Task Force submits its recommendations for approval, documents approved procedures, reviews periodic feedback, and makes appropriate changes as necessary.
During the implementation phase, the Army markets the program to the field force, and matches mentors with protégés. Marketing takes the form of chain teaching programs or the formulation of briefing teams similar to those dispatched for the new OER system, and the conduct of a media campaign. The matching process begins with the most important aspect of recruiting and screening mentors and protégés. Matching, however, does not occur under the new OER system.

Phase three involves the training of both mentors and protégés in mentoring dynamics and on program guidelines. The lessons consist of instruction on diversity and cross-cultural mentoring. Chain teaching or briefing teams could educate the field force on the formal mentoring process. Internet based tools, such as the Navy Supply Corps Mentoring Guide, can also supplement training initiatives. Last, the training should be integrated into PME curriculum down to the precommissioning level.

During the maintenance phase, the Task Force or program coordinator monitors the program through periodic evaluations and feedback. Initiatives, such as the web-based 360 degrees Leader Feedback Program, provide an effective feedback mechanism. Surveys at the basic and advance courses, Combined Arms Service Staff School (CAS3), Command and General Staff College (CGSC), and the Army War College (AWC) also serve as viable feedback mechanisms. Regardless of the evaluation mechanism, the feedback forms the basis for program changes and expansions as required.

Lastly, the completion phase centers on the formal mentoring association itself. Under the new OER system, the formal relationship ends upon change of a rater or senior
rater or transitions into an informal arrangement depending upon the bond established. Formal mentoring ends among cadets and officer candidates upon entry on active duty.

The last analysis aspect considers the importance of overcoming resistance to change. Using General Donn Starry’s set of generalized requirements for effecting change:

1. Army leaders must identify the need for change, assign a Task Force to draw up parameters for change, and to describe clearly what needs to be done and how it differs from what has been done before.

2. The Task Force and Army leader frames of reference must bring a common cultural bias to problem solution.

3. There must be a “Champion” for change to build consensus and a wider audience of converts and believers.

4. The Task Force and other architects of the change must bring a consistency of effort on the process.

5. Senior Army leaders must possess a willingness to consider the arguments for change, agree to the need, embrace the formal mentorship process, and support the change at a minimum (Starry 1983, 23).

Summary

The analysis of this study’s literature, prior research, interviews with several senior Army officers, and statistical data gathered from various sources indicate the potential of formal officer mentoring models as a valuable leader development enabler. The analysis also indicates the Army has implemented at least four formal
mentoring processes, and that the civilian sector lags behind government agencies in the development of formal mentoring programs.

The analysis verified senior Army leader contention that the new OER system constitutes a formal mentoring process. The new OER system, along with programs such as the USMA Sponsorship Program, BCTP senior mentor process, and CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentor Program form the foundation for effective one-one or mentoring circle mentoring models within the Army. However, these programs have shortcomings and need to address the areas of structure; paring of mentors with protégés; cadet, candidate, and junior officer mentoring; and mostly importantly, training and feedback to meet Army officer professional development needs.

The analysis shows the structure of a formal mentoring program must conform to Army culture, values, and doctrine. This includes compliance with the Army definition of mentoring as outlined in FM 22-100, and the roles of observer, assessor, coach, teacher, counselor, and evaluator in the process. Structure should also emphasize the benefits gained from mentoring relationships by the mentor, protégé, and the Army.

Finally the analysis illustrates the complexities involved with implementing a formal mentoring process. The designing, implementing, training, maintaining, and completion sequences require a champion and an appropriate Task Force to create a successful program. Implementation also necessitates the design of measures to overcome resistance to change and to evaluate its progress for feedback and modification as needed.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

We are about leadership; it is our stock in trade, and it is what makes us different. We take soldiers who enter the force, and we grow them into leaders for the next generation of soldiers…We provide this opportunity to American youth so that we can keep our Nation strong and competitive, and enable it to fulfill its leadership role in the community of nations. We invest today in the Nation’s leadership for tomorrow.

General Eric K. Shinseki, Chief of Staff of the Army,
Address to the Eisenhower Luncheon, 45th Meeting of the Association of the United States Army

Summary

The purpose of this study was to examine the contention that the U.S. Army needs to adopt a formal officer mentorship program as part of its leader development process.

Specifically, this thesis tested the basis for accepting or rejecting the primary question:

Which formalized mentorship model should the Army adopt and implement as part of its overall officer development process?

This study examined the following subquestions:

1. Is a formal mentorship model really feasible?

2. Why has the Army not adopted a formalized program despite research reflecting its necessity?

3. How would a formal mentoring program provide a direct benefit to the Army, mentor, and protégé?

4. What criterion does one use to select the proper mentoring model?
5. What current government and civilian sector models, if any, provide a proper "fit" for the Army culture?

6. How would one implement the program?

The analysis used for this study compared the results of the literature review, interviews with several senior Army officers, and statistical data gathered from various sources. An extensive review of literature looked into the underlying patterns in the literature and prior research material that provide insight into the positive and negative impacts on the mentoring process. The literature review focused on Army doctrine, prior relevant research; senior leader opinion on the subject; formal mentoring programs within DoD, other government agencies, and the civilian sector; and writings from academia and subject matter experts. The information gathered from the literature review, interviews, and statistical data formed the basis for answering the research questions.

The study's analysis indicated the potential of formal officer mentoring models as a valuable leader development enabler. The results of the analysis also indicated the Army has implemented at least four formal mentoring processes, and that the civilian sector lags behind government agencies in the development of formal mentoring programs. Further, the new OER system forms the foundation for a formal mentoring process.

The analysis showed the structure of a formal mentoring program must conform to Army doctrine, which includes the definition of mentoring as outlined in FM 22-100. It must contain the roles of observer, assessor, coach, teacher, counselor, and evaluator in its process and facilitate diversity awareness and cross-cultural mentoring relationships.
The structure should also emphasize the benefits gained from mentoring relationships by the mentor, protégé, and the Army. The sponsoring aspect of mentorship, while its notion intends to benefit the protégé, can result in control and misuse of power, favoritism, rivalry, and questionable ethical behavior if abused. For these reasons, mentors must view sponsorship with caution in the development of formal mentoring relationships.

Finally the analysis illustrated the complexities involved with implementing a formal mentoring process. The designing, implementing, training, maintaining, and completion sequences require a champion and an appropriate Task Force to create a successful program. Implementation also necessitates measures to overcome resistance to change and to evaluate its progress for feedback and modification as needed.

Conclusions

This thesis concluded that Army ranks above the civilian sector but below some government agencies such as the Air Force, Coast Guard, and Department of Energy in developing and implementing effective mentoring programs. The Army has, however, as part of its overall officer professional development programs, adopted formal mentoring models comprising either one-on-one or mentoring circles (one mentor with many protégés) processes or relationships.

This thesis also concluded that various elements within the Army have implemented formal mentoring processes. The new OER system, along with programs such as the USMA Sponsorship Program, BCTP senior mentor process, and CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentor Program, form the foundation for effective one-
one or mentoring circle mentoring models within the Army. These programs, however, have shortcomings in the areas of structure; the pairing of mentors with protégés; cadet, candidate, and junior officer mentoring; and awareness training and feedback mechanisms to meet the CSA’s desired endstate of “the development of bold, innovative leaders of character and competence (which is) fundamental to the long-term health of the Army” (Shinseki 1999). Army doctrine (to include the Army definition of mentorship), previously conducted studies, retired and active duty senior leader comments, current Army formal mentoring processes, and this study’s extensive research indicate the above mentioned formal mentoring models and associated processes can reap invaluable benefits. These benefits can subsequently affect captain retention, readiness, cadet and officer candidate assimilation, minority representation in combat arms specialties, diversity awareness, and perceptions of fair and equal treatment—if properly executed.

The conclusions relating to this thesis’ six research subquestions follow. The discussion of each subquestion serves as answers to the questions.

1. Is a formal mentorship model really feasible?

Based on the research, feasibility manifests itself in doctrine, comments from senior leaders, and in current mentoring tools used to enable the formal mentoring process. The Army OER system ties the mentoring concepts outlined in FM 22-100 to the leader development process. The CSA Vision Statement and recent comments from the CSA and VCSA have laid the foundation for feasibility by expressing a sincere commitment to leader development and mentoring. Tools such as the leader development
program model outlined in FM 25-101 and the 360 degrees Leader Feedback Program verify feasibility and enable the mentoring process.

2. Why has the Army not adopted a formalized program despite research reflecting its necessity?

The analysis revealed four possible reasons. First, there appeared to be a perception among senior leaders that the Army had no apparent problems requiring a change to the mentoring process. However, current issues such as readiness, captain attrition, the lack of minorities in Combat Arms specialties, and perceptions of unfair and unequal treatment have placed greater senior leader emphasis on formal mentoring concepts. Second, the Army culture, as with any established organization, generally resists change. Informal processes and a traditional view of mentoring are ingrained in the Army culture and present a barrier to change. Third, leaders placed little emphasis in mentoring due to time constraints and competing priorities. Lastly, many senior leaders believed the New OER System of 1997 created a functional formal mentoring program within the Army.

3. How would a formal mentoring program provide a direct benefit to the mentor, protégé, and Army?

The mentor benefits directly from the experience through personal and professional growth verification of time well spent in building successful relationships. The mentor develops more effective communication skills; and becomes comfortable in dealing with sensitive issues, gains a better understanding of diversity, and in establishing
cross-cultural mentoring relationships. Finally, mentors formulate their legacy in the enhanced career development of protégés (Drucker 1990, 46).

The protégé, in turn, becomes a competent and confident performer, develops a mature thought process, and obtains a broader Army perspective. The process helps them feel wanted and speeds up the assimilation process. The development of long-term strategies and short-term action plans help protégés take responsibility for themselves. The protégé also increases communication skills and a willingness to learn.

The Army redefines its culture to fit current norms. The inclusive nature of formal mentoring contributes to the personal and professional growth of the officer corps and the strengthening of Army values. Leaders also grow into the profession, and mentoring programs reflect a commitment from Army senior leaders on the effective utilization of the workforce (Drucker 1990, 42).

4. What criterion does one use to select the proper mentoring model?

This study derived the criterion from Army doctrine, prior research on the subject, and senior leader opinion from the literature review and interviews. Factors involving strategic fit, structure, accessibility, support of Army diversity initiatives, and support of precommissioning and early commissioning professional development played a decisive role in establishing formal mentoring model relationships.

5. What current government and civilian sector models, if any, provide a proper “fit” for the Army culture?

The analysis revealed the new OER system, USMA Sponsorship Program, and CA ARNG Warrant Officer Mentor Program form the foundation for effective one-one or
mentoring circle mentoring models within the Army. They do, on the other hand, require revision and senior leader support to become more effective programs. Government programs such as The Air Force, Coast Guard One DOT, and the DOE Mentoring Programs; as well as the Federal Express LEAP process, also provide a proper “fit.” Their strategic outlooks, structure, inclusive nature, support of diversity issues, and support of precommissioning and early commissioning professional development processes can be easily incorporated into the Army culture.

The analysis also indicated the civilian sector lags behind government agencies in the development of formal mentoring programs. These programs have proven difficult to formulate and may have occurred as a residual effect of corporate restructuring, downsizing, reengineering, and overall neglect. These initiatives forced many seasoned executives out of the workforce, taking with them the knowledge and wisdom gained from years of corporate experience.

6. How would one implement the program?

The analysis of academia and subject matter experts determined the five key steps in implementing a mentoring program as Design, Implementation, Training, Maintenance, and Completion. The design phase involves a determination of strategic purpose, getting a “Champion,” and selecting an appropriate design task force. The implementation phase markets the program to the field force and matches mentors with protégés. The training phase involves the familiarization of mentors and protégés in mentoring dynamics and program guidelines. The maintenance phase consists of the task force or program coordinator monitoring the program through periodic evaluations and
feedback. Lastly, the completion phase centers on the formal mentoring association relationship ending or transitioning into an informal arrangement depending upon the bond established.

Implementation also entails overcoming resistance to change. Therefore, the formal mentoring process must demonstrate the need for change, draw up parameters for change, and describe clearly what needs to be done and how it differs from what has been done before. There must be a "Champion" for change to build consensus and a wider audience of converts and believers. Last, senior Army leaders must possess a willingness to consider the arguments for change, agree to the need, embrace the formal mentorship process, and support the change.

Recommendations

The following recommendations are made based on the basis of this study's analysis:

1. That the Army develops a formal officer mentoring program as part of its doctrine. This means not only addressing mentorship as part of FM 22-100, but also writing a separate guideline or regulation on the subject. This recommendation serves to provide a strategic fit to Army vision, objectives, culture, and values. It provides structure by identifying mentor, protégé, and Army roles, and puts into effect a meaningful mentoring process. The formal mentoring program should also include the identification of tools (mentor guides, timelines and individual development plans) to assist in building effective relationships. The Air Force and Coast Guard provide
examples of effective formal mentoring programs integrated into doctrine. At a minimum, the formal mentoring program should include the following guidelines:

a. Each battalion or brigade level equivalent commander should have the responsibility for program implementation within their units. Professors of military science should have the same responsibilities within their respective USMA or ROTC organizations.

b. The program should focus on the reception and integration, basic skills development, and advanced development and Sustainment (U.S. Army, FM 25-101 1990, B-1). The counseling and leader development activities outlined in FM 22-100, Army Leadership; and FM 623-105, The Officer Evaluation Reporting System, must also be included with program implementation.

c. Each leader will personally interview and counsel their subordinates in accordance with OER guidelines and during the reception and integration phase. The purpose is to assess the subordinate’s competence and confidence levels for determination of strengths and weaknesses. Leaders will also discuss assigned duties, previous experience and training, personal desires, and future assignments.

d. Leaders should assist subordinates in the mentoring process through the establishment of a vision and goals, the development of personal and professional timelines (long-term planning aids), and the implementation of individual (short- and near-term) action plans. The mentor and protégé should develop these products based on the leader’s assessment and the subordinate’s identification and recognition of goals, strengths, and weaknesses.
e. Leaders should also determine the subordinate’s basic skills proficiency as part of the assessment process. This activity provides the basis for the mentoring relationship, the development of individual action plans, and subordinate’s mastery of basic skills.

f. Leaders should provide the subordinate continual feedback regarding the progress of individual action plans. Additionally, the leader should ensure the subordinate sustains basic skills and provide opportunities for them to advance their proficiency. This includes new assignments, increased responsibility, and exposure to developmental activities.

g. The program should include the pairing of protégés with a nonchain of command mentor. This mentoring relationship compliments the formal rating chain by providing the protégé an additional outlet for discussing issues. It should also be voluntary since not all subordinates desire such mentoring relationships. In sum, commanders need to provide and articulate formal mentoring opportunities for all, and subordinates need to partake in the process.

2. **Incorporate mentor-protégé training into the PME process.** Current Army doctrine assumes all leaders are mentors. Therefore, training on the formal mentoring process should begin at precommissioning and continue through the basic and advance courses, CAS3, CGSC, AWC, and pre-command courses. Instruction should also include diversity awareness teachings and lessons on establishing cross-cultural relationships. Chain teaching programs on the formal mentoring process would serve as an interim solution for increasing awareness on the need for mentoring within the Army. Web-based
applications such as those used by the Air Force, Coast Guard, and Naval Supply Systems Command would enhance the training process.

3. **Focus the formal mentoring process on cadets and officer candidates, and company grade officers.** The establishment of formal precommissioning mentoring programs provide all sources of commission similar assimilation benefits as enjoyed by cadets under the USMA Sponsorship Program. Likewise, this study shows that the effective mentoring of company grade officers has a direct correlation with retention. The program guidelines described above can also apply to all precommissioning processes.

4. **Expand the new OER system to encompass the pre-commissioning evaluation process.** The cadet adaptation of the JODSF does two things: First, doing so automatically integrates mentoring into the leader development process, thus holding the Professor of Military Science (PMS) responsible for the mentoring process. Second, cadets and officer candidates become acquainted with the new OER system and mentoring at an early on, which helps ease assimilation difficulties.

5. **Increase feedback mechanisms.** Periodic surveys conducted at the basic and advance courses, CAS3, CGSC, AWC, and pre-command courses could provide valuable information on the application of formal mentoring programs and required modifications. The web-based 360 degrees *Leader Feedback Program* has the potential to provide each leader meaningful feedback on their ability to coach and mentor subordinates.
Recommendations for Future Research

The following recommendations for future research could further the understanding of the impact of the implementation of formal mentoring models on leader development and the Army culture.

1. Conduct an Army-wide survey to determine the application of mentoring as it is currently being conducted or experienced. This study indicates that the formal mentoring process can be a valuable aspect of the leader development process—if correctly implemented. Time constraints, however, prevented the development, dissemination, retrieval, and data interpretation of a survey. Additionally, Major Mark Ritter made the same recommendation and the research indicated no such surveys have been accomplished (Ritter 1994, 95). The typical survey questions should include: Have you experienced a mentoring relationship; as a mentor or protégé? Was it a formal or informal mentoring relationship? What roles should the mentor, protégé, and Army play in mentoring? What aspects were evident in the relationship; teaching, coaching, counseling, advising, guiding, evaluating, or sponsoring? Which aspects were most important? Are mentoring activities unfair to some individuals and why? Is having a senior mentor an important requirement for promotion, command, assignments, and school? How did you learn to mentor subordinates? Does the Army take mentoring seriously?

2. Conduct a study on the application of formal mentoring processes in noncommissioned and warrant officer leader development. This study would ensure the
vertical and horizontal integration of formal mentoring programs into both doctrine and the overall leader development process.

Summary

History has shown that the Army has been at the forefront of numerous managerial and leader development initiatives that have positively affected our society. In keeping with this tradition, this study provides recommendations as a basis for implementing a formal mentoring within the Army. It also suggests subsequent research in the areas of mentoring and leader development. Finally, this study indicates that formal mentoring processes already exists in the Army, and with further refinement, can be a valuable leader development activity for the future.
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