TASK FORCE 1-22 INFANTRY FROM
HOMESTEAD TO PORT-AU-PRINCE

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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

JOHN ROBERT EVANS, MAJ, USA
B.A., Norwich University, Northfield, Vermont, 1985

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

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Task Force 1-22 Infantry—From Homestead to Port Au Prince

Major John Robert Evans, US Army

U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
ATTN: ATTL-SWD-GD
1 Reynolds Ave.
Ft. Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

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This thesis centers on the historical review of one particular battalion as it participated in three operations other than war in the early 1990’s. The thesis is a five-chapter work containing an introduction, three chapters focusing on each of the deployments and a conclusion. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, deployed for hurricane relief operations after Hurricane Andrew devastated Homestead, Florida, in August of 1992. After returning from that operation, the division was thrust into a quick deployment to the Horn of Africa where it was to assist the starving nation of Somalia to get back on its feet. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, the Theater Quick Reaction Force plunged from a humanitarian focus to one of combat operations, June through August 1993. In September of 1994, the battalion again was deployed to Haiti to assist in Operation Uphold Democracy. Each deployment was different and challenging and required a unique approach for mission accomplishment.

This thesis finalizes efforts to unify, in one document, the account of the unit and its soldiers during what can be arguably three of the most challenging OOTW missions to date. With today’s shrinking Army and increasing missions in these types of environments, it is hoped that the experience and training regimen discussed in this thesis will assist others that may deploy in the future in support of a non standard military mission.

10th Mountain Division, Operations Other Than War (OOTW), Hurricane Relief Operations, Operation Restore Hope, Operation Continue Hope, Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy, Haiti.
MASTER OF MILITARY ARTS AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: MAJ John Robert Evans

Thesis Title: Task Force 1-22 Infantry--From Homestead to Port-au-Prince

Approved by:

[Signature]
Robert F. Baumann, Ph.D., Thesis Committee Chairman

[Signature]
MAJ Steven J. Rauch, M.A., Member

[Signature]
Lawrence A. Yates, Ph.D., Member

Accepted this 2d day of June 2000 by:

[Signature]
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the forgoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

TASK FORCE 1-22 INFANTRY--FROM HOMESTEAD TO PORT-AU-PRINCE
by MAJ John R. Evans, USA, 90 pages.

This thesis centers on the historical review of one battalion as it participated in three operations other than war in the 1990's. The thesis is a five-chapter work containing an introduction, three chapters focusing on each of the deployments and a conclusion.

The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 10th Mountain Division, deployed for hurricane relief operations after Hurricane Andrew devastated Homestead, Florida, in August of 1992. After returning from that operation, the division was thrust into a quick deployment to the Horn of Africa where it was to assist the starving nation of Somalia to get back on its feet. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, the Theater Quick Reaction Force plunged from a humanitarian focus to one of combat operations, June through August 1993. In September of 1994, the battalion again was deployed to Haiti to assist in Operation Uphold Democracy. Each deployment was different and challenging and required a unique approach for mission accomplishment.

The thesis focuses on detailed portions of the battalion's experiences in each of the deployments. It also compares and contrasts personnel and training practices and how the unit prepared for each eventual task.

This thesis finalizes efforts to unify, in one document, the account of the unit and its soldiers during what can be arguably three of the most challenging OOTW missions to date. With today's shrinking Army and increasing missions, it is hoped that the experience and training regimen discussed in this thesis will assist others in the future.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The study of military history is a time-honored tradition that can prevent potential tragic replays of desperate military situations. Understanding the past and learning from its lessons are an integral part of U.S. Army training and doctrinal development. An expansive view or study of historical events, however, provides only partial information in preparation for future actions. A detailed examination of a unit’s recent deployments and personnel characteristics can also be important. Understanding the impacts of past actions and experiences may enable predictions of how a unit will function operationally in a given situation. This type of study can be important for Army leadership to consider when choosing which units conduct future missions, especially in an Army of limited resources. Getting the right combination of experience coupled with capability will facilitate mission accomplishment.

The 10th Mountain Division and its subordinate brigades and battalions are an excellent example to study. The 10th Mountain Division participated in three key operations in the early 1990s to the mid-1990s that can provide insight as to how unit experiences and personnel dynamics may forecast how future operations will proceed. To focus further the subject, this thesis will concentrate on one particular battalion assigned to the division, as it participated and deployed on all three operations.

The focus of this study is on the experience of the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry. The unit deployed as a part of the First Brigade Combat Team for

One aspect of this study will spotlight the battalion's deployments over time and each of the unique situations that the deployment mission presented. In addition, the actions of the battalion will be compared and contrasted to other units within the 10th Mountain Division in an attempt to illustrate how previous experiences could influence a unit's future actions. This thesis is historical in nature to ensure that one unit's contributions to many diverse missions are recorded for future reference and also for a detailed accurate account of the tactical actions themselves.

My particular qualifications to write on this subject are unique to this study. As a member of the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, from June 1992 until April 1995, I participated in all three listed operations, and in two different capacities. Initially, from June 1992 until October 1993, I was the battalion's intelligence officer. During this time, the unit deployed to Operation Andrew in Florida and to Operation Restore and Continue Hope in Somalia. Upon returning from the Horn of Africa, I was given the opportunity to command the battalion's Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC) from October 1993 until April 1995. This period includes the deployment to Haiti for Operation Uphold Democracy.

The 22nd Infantry regiment has a long and proud history of service to the U.S. Army and the nation dating back to the Civil War. The unit's lineage dates back to its original constitution as the 13th Infantry in May 1861. Following the
Civil War, it was redesignated as the 22nd Infantry with service in the Indian Wars, World War II, and over two full years of combat action in Vietnam.

The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, has been a subordinate, decorated participant through all of these past actions, up to and including honors for service in the U.S. modern Army (combat actions in Somalia). As honors and battle streamers represent unit history, the list of honors bestowed upon the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry is long: the Presidential Unit Citation, Hurtgen Forrest (World War II), Belgian Fourragere for actions in and around Belgium and the Ardennes Forrest (World War II), and the Vietnamese Cross of Gallantry.\textsuperscript{2} As is evident, the regiment and its subordinate battalions (there were up to four at various times) served with distinction over long periods; however, with each period of service, there also came a long break between actions.\textsuperscript{3} For example, the time elapsed from action in World War Two to initial service in the Republic of Vietnam was almost twenty-five years. This twenty-five year gap clearly would result in an entire newly manned and equipped unit into the field for the next action. As the Army finds itself deploying more often for small-scale contingencies (SSCs) and operations other than war (OOTW), and due to drawdowns in endstrengths, the chances of today's Army units conducting several different operations, back to back, increases each year. The study of three relatively quick and successive deployments of one unit can provide insight as to how to best choose the right unit for the next mission.

The recent deployments of the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, span the entire spectrum of OOTW. The initial deployment to Florida was strictly humanitarian
and focused on disaster relief following Hurricane Andrew. Five months after redeployment from Operation Andrew, the battalion prepared for and deployed to what was also understood to be a humanitarian mission in Somalia. One year later, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, deployed to the streets of Port-au-Prince, Haiti, to provide public security and to facilitate the "return of democracy."

Preparation and execution of each of these missions were unique and challenging, especially since there were no written playbooks or tactics techniques, and procedures (TTPs) to follow. Additionally, it is interesting to note that the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was a cohort unit, and a large majority of the same junior officers, noncommissioned officers (NCOs), and enlisted soldiers participated in all three operations. Only the higher-level commands and some senior NCO positions changed between June 1992 and January 1995.4

The primary research question will center upon the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, as it was assigned to the 10th Mountain Division from June 1992 through April 1995. The research will explore the realm of operations other than war as the battalion conducted and experienced missions from Homestead, Florida, through the deployment to Port-au-Prince, Haiti. This thesis will investigate the idea of how unit deployment experiences shape unit and leader conduct on future deployments.

This study will also examine each operation and will devote a chapter to look at each mission in some detail. Moreover, an exploration of how the unit was postured for both personnel fill and training focus, along with specific mission preparation prior to each deployment, will add to the clarity and
understanding of the reader. Care must be taken in this regard not to generalize from these points too broadly, as this may have a tainting influence on predeployment procedures that may or may not be useful in the future; however, they are relevant for the scope of this project.

In August 1992, a category four hurricane devastated the southern coast of Florida. Total destruction of civilian communities coupled with the potential for looting, violence, and disease led to the deployment of military units for civilian assistance. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, deployed to Homestead, Florida, with the mission of providing security, debris clean up, and humanitarian relief. The battalion deployed on 29 August until the first week in October 1992. During that time, the unit was required to deal with civilian misery, collapsed civilian infrastructures, and local and national authorities that were originally assigned the duty to alleviate the suffering. One such agency was the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). However, in August of 1992, FEMA had not been tested and had very little experience in such a large-scale disaster. The organizational and logistical infrastructure of the 10th Mountain Division was exactly what was needed, and it was immediately available to help turn the chaotic situation around. The deployment to Florida was a first of its kind and presented many unique challenges. Part of the problem the unit faced was that there were no “play books,” doctrine, or predeployment training resources available to assist in preparation. These unique humanitarian missions were not part of the unit's mission essential task list (METL)—a theme which prevailed throughout all of the operational deployments that followed. A units METL is
derived from critical combat tasks that lead to mission accomplishment. These tasks outline a unit’s basic wartime function and the foundation of typical training routines as each METL task must be honed to a high degree.

The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry’s next mission was participation in Operation Restore and Continue Hope. In April 1993, the battalion deployed to relieve the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, in Somalia. The mission initially was to take control of a humanitarian relief sector (HRS) and oversee the security and operation of the United Nations relief effort within the assigned HRS. The data available from units in country and with unit data exchanged during the relief in place between battalions, the leadership quickly learned that this mission would be more involved and challenging than previously thought. Distinct to this operation was chaos and lawlessness anywhere outside of areas directly controlled by military forces; an armed, aggressive, and very complex threat; cooperation with nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); and assignment, under a United Nations staff, as a subordinate maneuver element, both for military command and control and the humanitarian relief of refugees. The most striking challenge to the operation was the progressive and apparent change in mind-set and mission from humanitarian assistance to combat operations beginning in June 1993.

The final act in the 1-22 Infantry trilogy was its participation in Operation Uphold Democracy. The nineteenth of September 1994 began with tactical air assaults and air landings of the First Brigade Combat Team and 1-22 Infantry onto Haitian soil at the Port-au-Prince International Airport. The mission was to
provide public security and a stable environment so that the conditions could be set for political nation building to begin once the existing "rogue state" government was removed.\textsuperscript{9} The battalion redeployed on or about 15 January 1995, after a successful relief in place operation with the 4th Battalion, 22nd Infantry, 25th Infantry Division (Light Infantry). Distinct to this operation was the recall, in flight, of the main invasion force prepared to engage in combat operations and the rapid adjustment to permissive entry and operations other than war. Also of interest was the use of the U.S. military for direct political and social stabilization goals, Haitian presidential regime security, and the conduct of operations with the U.S. Department of State.

Unit actions and the influence on operations in Haiti become remarkably clear based on previous unit and individual experiences, as chapter two through four indicate. This point will be illustrated by individual accounts of perceptions and actions and also by actions by different battalions at different locations within the 10th Mountain Division and its Area of Operations. This point will be established again with relief in place operations with the 25 Infantry Division (LI).

This thesis will only discuss the period immediately prior to, or during the actual operations. Any discussion outside the specific dates of the operation will be made only to assist in illustrating future trends in training or preparation for future operations. There are limited discussions and background data presented that are slightly outside the original scope of the thesis as it relates to an operation, particularly if that discussion points out a direct influence on the battalion's actions. However, discussions of political aims and resolution of
conflicts (operational level focus) are outside the scope of this work and will be left for higher-level discussions. The bottom line in this thesis is that unless there is a distinct reason, the focus will be a review of events at the battalion or Task Force (tactical) level.

Additionally, there will be comparisons and discussions of missions or occurrences of sister units during a specific period. This delimitation is key to defining the unit's operational behavior. For example, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, operated in Somalia after relieving the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry. Both units again deployed into Haiti; they were separated geographically, but were within the same joint task force area of operations. Did the units behave or operate similarly?

This thesis contains five chapters. Chapter 1 presents the background data, statement of purpose, and provides initial indications as to the conclusions. Chapters 2 through 4 will be chronological, each focusing on the operational deployments, beginning with Operation Andrew. Chapter 5 will conclude the thesis, answer the "so what" questions, and tie together the relevance of the subject as it relates to history.

Finally, it is important to review the primary question: Do previous unit deployment experiences shape the operational conduct of future deployments? I believe that the answer to that question is yes, and data to support that position will come to light as early as the end of chapter 2, with a discussion of how the character of the unit changed after deployment to Operation Andrew. Chapter 2 will begin with the unit's focus prior to deployment to Florida, discuss how these
unique operations were conducted in Florida, and culminate with post-mission lessons learned and preparation for follow-on missions to Somalia, outlined in chapter 3.

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3Ibid.

4LTC (ret) Jeffery A. Baughman, Interview by author, 8 January 2000, Olathe Kansas; and CPT Robert A. Helms, Interview by author, 01 December 1999, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas.

5Baughman.

6Domestic Engagement Collection, Group hurricane Andrew, SG House Papers, SSG AAR-001, TAB A, Overview Briefing Slides, Special Collections, 3rd Floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Slides 18-30.


8Ibid., 42.

910th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Written After-Action Review, Operation Uphold Democracy, Special Collections, Third Floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 15.
CHAPTER 2
HURRICANE ANDREW RELIEF OPERATIONS

This chapter is divided into two parts. The purpose of part I is to provide essential background information that will be referred to continually as a point of reference. It will include unit descriptions, training focus, and major unit activities prior to deployment for Hurricane Andrew relief. Part II will describe the actual deployment to Florida, the execution of the relief mission, the redeployment back to home station, and the refocusing actions of the unit to prepare for follow-on operations.

Part I

The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was one of three organic light infantry battalions assigned under the command and control of the first brigade, 10th Mountain Division, in June 1992. The other two battalions were 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, and 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry. The battalion consisted of three light infantry rifle companies (A, B, and C companies) and a Headquarters Company (HHC).¹ Each of the rifle companies contained roughly one hundred soldiers divided into four platoons. Three of the platoons were rifle platoons of about thirty infantrymen, while the fourth platoon, the headquarters platoon, was split into two sections: a command section, containing the company command group and a supply and training section, and a weapons section that contained two 60-millimeter mortars and two, man-packed, M47 antitank (AT) dragons with their crews.²
The battalion’s headquarters company had a completely different organization than a rifle company. It contained both combat and combat support sections and platoons. The combat platoons within HHC were the scout platoon (battalion organic reconnaissance); the 81-millimeter mortar platoon (organic indirect fire support) and a high mobility multi-wheeled vehicle (HMMWV) antitank platoon that was armed with the M220 tube-launched optically tracked wire-guided antitank missiles (TOW). The combat support sections of the HHC consisted of the battalion staff (S-1 through S4), a support platoon (battalion organic logistical support), and a medical platoon that contained the battalion aid station (BAS), with an evacuation section capable of conducting casualty evacuation. Finally, HHC had a field mess platoon that provided class one ration support to the battalion.

In June 1992, these were the key leaders and staff of 1-22 Infantry:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion Commander</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonel William Martinez</th>
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<tr>
<td>Battalion Command Sergeant Major</td>
<td>CSM Stanley Kaminski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion XO</td>
<td>Major Dave Brown</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion S3</td>
<td>Major Jeffery Baughman</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain A.J. Preston</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain Brad Booth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain Jeff Pryzbalak</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC Commander</td>
<td>Captain Pat McGowan</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

During the summer of 1992, 1-22 Infantry had several critical goals that were essential to the battalion’s training and preparation for future operations. These critical goals were subdivided into three distinct areas: personnel fills, unit training, and preparation for deployment.

**Personnel:** The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, received a partial cohort reload of enlisted soldiers (MOS 11B infantryman and 11C indirect fire
infantryman [mortars]) in the grades of E-1 and E-2. The Army designed the cohort process to enlist, train, and provide to units entire platoon or company-sized elements assigned to a parent battalion. These cohort elements were assimilated into the parent unit’s mission and training plan and would then remain with that parent unit as the core of the unit’s soldiers for the duration of their enlistment (two to three years). Upon completion of their first enlistment, as the cohorts were to enter the junior NCO ranks, it was anticipated that they would then become the core of the NCO cadre for the next fill of cohort soldiers coming behind them. Each of the three rifle companies received approximately eighty new privates on or about 1 June 1992.³ (Percent fill, by company, was between fifty and seventy five percent depending on the needs of the rifle company.⁴ This is important to illustrate the common core of soldiers that participate in all of 1-22 Infantry’s operational deployments from 1992-1995.)

Training: After the reception and in processing, the next step was initial specific unit training of the new cohort soldiers. This became the focal point for early summer training in 1-22 Infantry. This cohort train-up, as described by the battalion’s operations officer, Major Baughman, began first at the individual level with tasks such as rifle marksmanship and basic individual movement techniques. Upon successful completion of individual-level training, the companies began squad-level training, followed by platoon-level training. Platoon and company leadership concentrated additionally on the development and refinement of squad, platoon, and company standard operating procedures (SOPs).⁵ The capstone-training event at the end of the summer to signify full
cohort integration and that the unit was prepared to deploy for its wartime mission was the successful completion of squad and platoon live fire training exercises. This use of the live-fire exercise (LFX) as the capstone event to any training cycle or predeployment cycle became the philosophy adopted by the battalion commander and the operations officer and was used continuously, with positive results, throughout all of the deployments of 1-22 Infantry from 1992 through 1995.

**Division Ready Force Assumption:** The last key event for the battalion in the summer of 1992 was the assumption of the Division Ready Force (DRF). All units within the XVIII Airborne Corps (to which the 10th Mountain Division belonged) participated in the Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) program that ensured XVIII Airborne Corps combat units could be deployed from their home stations and be enroute to a contingency within eighteen hours. Each of the divisions within XVIII Airborne Corps provided at least one division ready brigade (DRB); each DRB provided one DRF, and each DRF further prepared and provided one company to be the initial ready company (IRC). The concept of deployment was that the IRC would deploy within two hours of notification, the DRF within eighteen hours of notification, and the DRB, if needed, within ninety-six hours.

The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, assumed the DRF cycle on 28 August 1992. Preparation for a light infantry unit was not nearly as enormous a task as for a heavy mechanized or armor unit; however, the tasks were still time
consuming and just as important. These tasks, completed to standard, ensured that units were combat ready and prepared for any contingency.

Rifle companies concentrated on weapons maintenance, packing common unit equipment (such as squad boxes containing ropes, saws, and pioneering tools), for unique missions and the packing of personal gear and TA-50 into rucksacks and duffle bags. The Headquarters Company had a much larger task in preparing to assume the DRF mission. It contained all of the wheeled vehicles within the battalion and maintained the heavier equipment. The HHC concentrated first on vehicle maintenance and preparation for overseas movement, followed by the same individual equipment-related preparation tasks that the rifle companies also completed. All of the battalion’s equipment was carefully and methodically packed within the load plans of the vehicles, or onto Air Force 463L cargo pallets and secured with cargo nettings. The last key preparatory action concerned personnel. Each soldier went through a process known as the soldier readiness check (SRC) that comprised medical, dental, financial, and legal preparations. Once the SRC was complete, generic family support briefings were arranged for spouses. These briefings were designed to provide essential information on local post services available if the unit was to deploy during its time as the DRF-1.

With all of the DRF assumption tasks complete, a final briefing by the battalion staff and commander to the brigade commander verified that the unit was completely prepared to assume the DRF-1 mission. This briefing occurred
on the morning of 28 August 1992, and at 1200 hours, 1-22 Infantry assumed the DRF-1 mission for the 10th Mountain Division.\textsuperscript{12}

\textbf{Part II}

At 0500 hours, 24 August 1992, Hurricane Andrew, a category four hurricane, crashed through southern Florida, devastating the town of Homestead, Homestead Air Force Base, Florida City, and the surrounding areas. Its maximum sustained winds were 145 miles per hour and gusts up to 175 miles per hour were recorded. It was one of the three most devastating hurricanes to hit the United States in the twentieth century and is thought to have been the most damaging hurricane on record in terms of property damage and total cost.\textsuperscript{13}

It took nearly five days for the word to filter to the battalion about its deployment to Florida for Hurricane Andrew relief operations. Major Baughman, the operations officer, recalls the date time group to be the 29th of August at about 1800 hours. By 2200 hours, the official deployment order was in the command group's hands, and an advance party consisting of the operations officer and the battalion commander departed from Fort Drum for Griffis Air Force Base, New York, located in the vicinity of Syracuse.\textsuperscript{14} The base served as the aerial port of embarkation (APOE) for the 10th Mountain Division during all three contingency missions. The trip from Fort Drum south to Griffis Air Force Base took from two to three hours depending on the weather conditions. By the next morning, 30 August 1992, 1-22 Infantry was transported by bus to Griffis and on to a contracted "Tiger Air" 747 for the flight to Homestead Air Force Base.\textsuperscript{15}
The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, and all of the 10th Mountain Division formed a portion of the Army Forces (ARFOR) of Joint Task Force Andrew (JTF Andrew).\textsuperscript{16} The specified mission of the JTF was:

Beginning 28 Aug 92, Joint Task Force Andrew establishes Humanitarian Support Operations vicinity Miami, Florida in the relief effort following Hurricane Andrew. The Task Force will establish field feeding sites, storage / distribution warehousing, cargo transfer operations, local / line haul transportation operations and other logistical support to the local population.\textsuperscript{17}

Along with this mission statement and the JTF Commander’s intent, the staffs at the 10th Mountain Division, down to First Brigade, produced their own subsequent orders, and from this guidance, data was drawn to formulate 1-22 Infantry’s mission statement: to provide local security as necessary, prevent looting of personal property, provide relief to the local population as needed, assist in debris removal, and operate feeding sites.\textsuperscript{18} According to Baughman, the mission initially was very unclear.

The first views of the damage from the storm for the soldiers of 1-22 Infantry came as the battalion deplaned at Homestead Air Force Base and embarked on busses towards the then unbuilt First Brigade base camp. Hangars were torn open, C-130 cargo planes and F16 fighters were flipped over and strewn about as if they were toys. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry soldiers could see that their work was cut out for them and they could also begin to understand the “why” behind their deployment.\textsuperscript{19}

While the battalion set up a base camp in the vicinity of the outskirts of Homestead, Florida, key leaders and staff reconnoitered the local area where the battalion would be conducting its mission. The city was divided into zones by
streets and geographic areas among all of the battalions of the first brigade in the same fashion as other units of the division. The initial reconnaissance revealed the complete devastation that the people of the Homestead area had endured with the passage of the hurricane. Only major streets and highways had any of the debris cleared off of them and all other roads were blocked with trash and debris. Roofs had been blown off of buildings, and telephone and light poles had been blown over. Power and lights were off in all parts of the district, and potable water and food was unavailable.

After the reconnaissance operations, the battalion commander and staff devised their plan to alleviate the problems in the assigned area of operations (AO). The plan divided the battalion sector into company zones that were then marked on acetate graphics, overlaid on the Homestead, Florida, map. Each company then divided its sectors into platoon areas of operations and each of the leaders was assigned general cleanup tasks. First priority went to removal of anything that would cause a health hazard, either to a soldier or civilian, followed by food distribution. The third priority was concentration on large debris removal. Lastly, leaders would follow through by asking the residents what it was that they needed help with to get their lives back in order. Each unit would spend the daylight hours deployed into their assigned sectors removing debris and assisting the local population as necessary. Special equipment, whether deployed with the unit or purchased, was critical to speeding the recovery effort. The handsaws that were deployed in the squad boxes, and the purchased chain saws were of particular benefit. In addition to soldier labor in each
neighborhood, the battalion was also responsible for oversight of several feeding sites (mobile kitchen trailer [MKT] operations), the placement and maintenance of porta-potties, and the placement and emptying of large trash dumpsters. The MKT operations were manned by support units from outside of 1-22 Infantry. Just under 900,000 meals were served off of MKTs for the first thirty three days of the operation. The porta-potties and dumpsters were contracted relief initiatives that also became reporting criteria based on location within a units' AO.

As the cleanup effort got underway, the JTF and division staffs developed a means to measure success of the operation. The basic premise was that as each sector was cleared of debris and as civilian life was returned to a more normal state, that sector was deemed completed. To measure this, statistics of all types were collected and reported by local commanders to their higher headquarters. (Some examples of reported information were the number of dump truck loads to the dump, the number of meals served at an MKT per day, or the number of dumpsters emptied daily). This push of information and reporting naturally resulted in a tendency by units to compete in clearing their assigned areas faster than other units. Competition bred the need for units to lead the “race” towards mission accomplishment. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, proved it could produce results as well as other units; that was the nature of the command climate: win any and all competitions and uphold the lineage of the unit, no matter the mission.

One primary focus for some of the battalion’s senior leaders in the race to clean areas and declare them “cleared” came in the form of material handling
equipment (MHE), such as bulldozers and dump trucks. A light infantry battalion is very limited in the amount of heavy wheeled vehicles it has to apply to a mission such as debris removal. Piles of cut trees and trash moved by hand to the sides of a road or an intersection did not constitute a cleared area. Only after all of the gathered piles had made it to the designated dump sight was the area considered "cleared." The contracting of civilian dump trucks to support military units was the answer to the lack of MHE. However, the dump truck companies and their drivers did not understand an even and fair division of trucks per working unit; they only recognized the military officer or NCO who controlled his truck. The resourceful unit and commander "commandeered" as many dump trucks as possible to clear assigned sectors faster. This became the daily ritual for the staff and company commanders—get as many trucks as possible and keep them as long as possible. This phenomenon was a potential detriment to any unit's mission accomplishment for the assigned day's task—that is if enough trucks were not secured.

As time and the mission progressed, and the destroyed areas improved, each unit's sector was ranked in terms of the amount of work still to be completed (waste and trash removal) and how much had been accomplished, and this was again reported in terms of percentage. Each sector was reported on daily by the commander who owned that sector to the next higher headquarters. These reports eventually translated into measurable graphics on how well the JTF and its subordinate units were doing in terms of providing relief.
By mid-September 1992, civilian relief agencies began to control more of the relief missions and therefore relieved military units of their responsibilities. Due to this reduction in workload for military units, there was no need to maintain such a large military force with little or no work. Consequently, decisions were made at the JTF level to redeploy units back to their home stations. Naturally, the first unit of the JTF to redeploy was the 82nd Airborne Division, as it was the only unit of the XVIII Airborne Corps capable of forced entry and needed to be re-postured for follow-on missions. With the loss of that division, efforts of the 10th Mountain Division and First Brigade were expanded north to encompass a larger area of operations. The move north occurred as a relief in place operation much in the same way as a relief would occur in a combat situation. The unofficial rumor that stemmed from all of the data collection and from the apparent race to clear areas led some soldiers to believe that the sooner the AO was cleared, the sooner units could go home. With the expansion of 1-22 Infantry’s AO north, this rumor abated, and 1-22 remained for the duration.

With the success of the cleanup effort ever present in briefings and press newscasts, the key question in mind was how the mission would end? How would the JTF know when it had succeeded and accomplished the mission, and then, of course, how would that lead to the redeployment of units back to their home stations? These questions were answered by the higher headquarters staffs that produced the categories of indicators that demonstrated mission accomplishment. Subordinate unit work and reporting all contributed to these categories. As life improved for the local population, the improvement
manifested itself in local self-sustainment without military assistance, thereby calling for a change of mission (end of the relief operation) and the redeployment of the 10th Mountain Division, much in the same way as the 82nd Airborne.

During the last week of September 1992, 1-22 Infantry no longer deployed into the neighborhoods of the Homestead area, but instead concentrated on redeployment activities. The main focus was on equipment maintenance and accountability, as well as shipment of equipment back to home station. The battalion redeployed back to Fort Drum, New York, on or about 7 October 1992, after serving in Hurricane Andrew relief for some forty consecutive days.34

Upon arrival at Fort Drum, the unit continued to recover its equipment, conducted after action reviews (AARs), and allowed soldiers time off to be with families. Once these events were completed, the unit returned to its training cycle, picking up where it had left off prior to the deployment.35 Specifically, the squad-level training resumed immediately, and the future focus became the training, preparation, and testing of rifle platoons. This training focus would culminate with intense platoon-level live-fire exercises scheduled for the spring of 1993 in accordance with the battalion commander’s baseline training and preparation philosophy.36

**Deployment After-Action Reviews.** The key AAR comments that were recalled during the interview process emphasized three major themes. The first was that a light infantry battalion, well trained in its combat tasks, could perform any assigned mission, combat or humanitarian, even if it was not perfectly suited for the job. Secondly, in regard to the combat training tasks, if a unit, regardless
of its level (squad through company), could execute intense and stressful live fire training, then it would be prepared for any action, whether combat or something less than combat. This philosophy would follow 1-22 Infantry through the next three years and two more deployments and may have influenced why it reacted a particular way in various situations. Perhaps that philosophy also contributed to the battalion’s overall success during its deployments.

The third lesson learned was that the family support group and its functions were key to the unit’s success on the deployment. The Hurricane Andrew relief operation was the only deployment that was truly “open ended” in terms of how long the unit would be deployed; no one knew the duration upon deployment. This fact caused a great deal of stress on the families waiting at home station, and that in turn caused undo stress on the deployed soldiers and the unit. Although the other two key AAR comments were indirectly woven into future training and unit philosophy, the focus on a functional, dynamic, and self-sustaining family support group was taken to heart and learned well. This lesson would manifest itself positively when the battalion deployed later to both Somalia and Haiti.37 This observation is by no means an attack on any of the leaders in the family support group, but only is stated in observance of how critical the support group is to successful military operations. The positive story with this deployment was that 1-22 Infantry and its families were allowed to learn this lesson in a low-risk, real world contingency in the shape of hurricane relief, rather than a combat situation such as Somalia.
Personnel turnover in the NCO and enlisted ranks was almost nonexistent after the redeployment from Hurricane Andrew relief. This fact is most important in that the unit enjoyed enlisted and leader (both officer and NCO) continuity. Squads, platoons, and companies generally maintained their personnel integrity; a few minor changes occurred at the platoon leader level, as new lieutenants came to the battalion, and two of the four company commanders changed.\textsuperscript{38} In one case, Captain Preston turned A company over to Captain James (Mike) Robertson and Preston proceeded to take command of the HHC from Captain McGowan, who then became the assistant battalion S3.\textsuperscript{39}

The road to the next deployment actually began about six weeks after redeploying from Florida. During the week of 30 November 1992, the 10th Mountain Division and 1-22 Infantry were notified of the impending deployment to the war-torn and famine-stricken country of Somalia.\textsuperscript{40} It appeared to the members of the battalion that the “ante had just been upped.” With one contingency mission under its belt, training was resumed at its standard pace and intensity. Additionally, the personnel “team” was set with a group of semi-seasoned veterans of a real world contingency. Unbeknownst to the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, it was on the road to its baptism of fire in an extremely complex environment on the Horn of Africa.

\textsuperscript{1}LTC (ret) Jeffery A. Baughman, Interview by author, 8 January 2000, Olathe Kansas

\textsuperscript{2}CPT Robert A. Helms, Interview by author, 01 December 1999, Ft. Leavenworth Kansas.
3 Baughman.

4 Helms.

5 Ibid.

6 Baughman.

7 Ibid.

8 Authors' notes.

9 Baughman.

10 Helms.

11 Baughman and Author Notes.

12 Baughman.

13 Domestic Engagement Collection, Group Hurricane Andrew, SG House Papers, SSG AAR-001, 3rd Floor, Special Collections, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, Tab A Briefing Slides, slide 3.

14 Baughman.

15 Baughman and Authors' notes.

16 House Papers, SG-001 TAB A Briefing Slides 6 & 8.

17 Ibid., slide 15.

18 Baughman.

19 Helms.


21 Ibid., L24-C-4.

22 Helms.
23 Ibid.

24 Baughman and authors' notes.

26 House Papers, SG-001 TAB A Briefing Slide 32.

26 Authors' notes and discussions with Baughman.

27 Baughman.

28 House Papers, SG-001 TAB A Briefing Slides 21-41.

29 Helms.

30 Baughman.

31 Palmer and Rash, L24-C-5.

32 Authors' notes.

33 House Papers, SG-001 TAB A Briefing Slides 42-49.

34 Baughman.

35 Helms.

36 Baughman.

37 Helms, Baughman and Authors' notes.

38 CPT David A. Jones, Interview by Author, 11 December 1999, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, and Helms.

39 Baughman.

40 Martinez, Personal Experience Monograph, 1.
CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONS RESTORE AND CONTINUE HOPE--SOMALIA

The first week of December 1992 was one of high tension at Fort Drum, New York, as the 10th Mountain Division had been notified that it would participate in humanitarian relief operations in the war-torn and starving country of Somalia. For weeks the national press corps had been dramatizing the death and horror of a starving nation by showing film of the daunted and understaffed nongovernmental organizations that were in country trying to bring food and medical care to the masses. Somalia had been an important part of many nations' interests, particularly during the Cold War, because of its proximity to the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. The subsequent loss of international attention after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 left Somalia to depend on its own resources. Somalia slowly slipped into an anarchic state of warring clans and starving people. In 1992, this anarchy, coupled with widespread drought and starvation, contributed to the deaths of over 250,000 Somalis, including a large number of children. An estimated 1.5 million more Somalis were to face starvation in the coming year.¹ These scenes, portrayed continually on television sets around the world, led to the eventual deployment of U.S. forces under the Unified Task Force (UNITAF) to quell the starvation by providing much needed humanitarian relief and support. This chapter will outline the initial battalion preparations in support of the 10th Mountain Division's preparation for deployment, its delayed and eventual deployment, initial and subsequent missions, relief in place, and, finally, redeployment.
Pre-Deployment Part One

As the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel William Martinez, outlines in his monograph on Somalia, the actual deployment to the Horn of Africa started almost four months before any of the soldiers actually stepped onto the continent itself. He recalls the starting point of the deployment to be 30 November 1992. The reason for this declaration was that once again, the 10th Mountain had been chosen for the mission in Somalia. The division was to deploy the division headquarters (-), one of its two infantry brigades, a portion of the aviation brigade, and the requisite combat service support from the division support command. Additionally, the division headquarters would act as the ARFOR headquarters of the Joint Task Force (JTF) assigned the relief mission now named Operation Restore Hope, and its 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), the DRB, would deploy as the operational force on the ground.

There was considerable confusion and discussion as to how 2nd BCT would actually look as it began preparations to deploy. In fact, at least one of its organic battalions was not available for deployment because it was deployed away from home station conducting an off-post training exercise at Fort Pickett, Virginia. Because of the shortage, there was a shift in forces that would normally deploy with the 2nd BCT. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, the DRF-3, was designated to fill the void and was to deploy as the third battalion of the 2d Brigade.

Upon hearing of the new task organization with the 2nd BCT, the battalion commander and staff began to prepare 1-22 Infantry to deploy. This task was
not easy under normal circumstances as there is always confusion at the outset of any new assignment. Things were even worse in this case as the leaders were now trying to prepare under a different brigade headquarters that had different personalities and standard operating procedures. Adding to this was the push from above the division headquarters to execute this deployment quickly. Trains loaded with vehicles and equipment were due to depart Fort Drum as early as 7 December 1992, just eight days after notification, and troops were to be on the ground as early as 12 December 1992. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, continued its intensified preparations.

A few days after notification, the final 2nd BCT task organization was published. Two of the three battalions assigned to the brigade would deploy; 2-87 Infantry and 3-14 Infantry were the chosen combat units. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was “turned off” for the deployment, but was told to continue preparations. The battalion S3, Major Baughman, recalled being “turned on and off” for the initial deployment twice prior to the final manifest of units to deploy in December 1992. This situation produced mixed feelings for many of the leaders and soldiers in the battalion. On the one hand, it was nice not to have to conduct back-to-back deployments, but on the other hand it was hard to watch the division headquarters and the 2nd BCT deploy to what was decidedly the largest operational game in town at that time. With the decision finalized, 1-22 Infantry returned to normal operations and training plan, always with an eye and ear focused on the Somalia situation, as rumors of a rotation of units into theater began to surface.
Actual Predeployment

By mid-January 1993, the rotation rumors seemed to be correct. During this time, 1-22 Infantry was notified by its parent brigade headquarters that it would deploy and backfill one of the battalions in Somalia by April 1993. In fact, the entire mission in Somalia was going to change and forces would be reduced in theater as events on the ground were going so well. The reality was that the JTF and U.S. forces would turn over Operation Restore Hope to the United Nations. The U.S. force from the 10th Mountain Division that would continue the mission in support of the United Nations operation was the First Brigade Combat Team with two subordinate battalions. Those battalions were 1-22 Infantry and 3-25 Aviation. This was all a part of a time-phased plan to change the lead headquarters to UN control and to reduce U.S. forces, sometime around May-June 1993.

Upon notification in mid-January 1993, the battalion staff again began detailed planning for the final preparation, deployment, and assumption of the new mission. The focus of preparation training was twofold. First, training vignettes, supplied by units in country and the division staff, were introduced and new techniques were shown to the companies of 1-22 Infantry. Examples of this new training focused on how to conduct security checkpoints and how to search for illegal weapons. Additionally, detailed information briefings on the country and culture were provided to the soldiers to assist in preparing them for what they would be seeing and experiencing. Secondly, the unit planned and executed live-fire training exercises and a battalion STAFFEX (staff exercise) for
March 1993, about thirty days before the deployment. This again reinforced the command philosophy that the unit must be prepared to handle the worst and most complex situation and that all lesser, noncombat activities that a light infantry battalion encounters would not be that difficult to perform. As these training events carried on, so did unit equipment preparation tasks. The battalion was to fall in on the relieved units' vehicles so that transport to the theater would be simplified and less Air Force lift would be required. With that, unit MILVAN containers were packed with unique required items only. Soldiers carried with them the minimum personal gear required and personal weapons onto the deployment aircraft.

By the end of February and early March 1993, the battalion was well prepared for what it faced as members of the humanitarian mission in Somalia. The battalion commander, operations officer, and logistics officer all traveled to the actual location that 1-22 Infantry was to operate from. They conducted leader and logistics reconnaissance actions, and the commander approved the final package of troops and equipment necessary to deploy in early April.

With the deployment pending and the reconnaissance completed, the time came for the battalion to send forward an advanced party. The composition of this advanced party was between ten and fifteen leaders and soldiers, most with the logistical background to begin the property transfers between battalions. Additionally, the operations and intelligence officer of 1-22 Infantry deployed in the advanced party to begin the task of learning the intricacies of the Area of Operations and transitioning operations between units. The advanced party
flew into Mogadishu, Somalia, via Air Force C-5, during the last few days of March 1993.17

Upon arrival in Mogadishu, the battalion's advanced party was met by a small group of leaders from 2-87 Infantry, lead by their battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel James Sykes. The group from 2-87 Infantry contained soldiers who were rotating out of theater. Due to this fact, the incoming soldiers from 1-22 Infantry took the departing soldiers' place as security in the mounted convoy, and an exchange of live ammunition on the tarmac of the airport occurred between the old and new personnel—a sobering sign that this was something completely different from previous missions. Most members of the advanced party were very serious and focused. Weapon and ammunition checks appeared to take a greater importance.

The drive from Mogadishu to the small port town of Marka (soon to be the central focal point of 1-22 Infantry) took approximately one and one half hours, during which time the advanced party got its first look at the capital city and the surrounding countryside. Central Somalia is a high plateau area of the country that is sparsely vegetated and thus qualifies it as a semi arid, desert region. Various small villages dot the countryside with thatched shacks providing the average housing abode for the mostly nomadic people of the central and southern regions.18 The quick glimpse the advanced party had of Mogadishu left the impression of a run-down mass of thatched shanties and huts coupled with, or adjacent to, brick and mortar buildings ranging from one to several stories tall.
The structures and buildings lined dirt and semi paved roads and trails, all of which seemed to have no design or order to them.

The city of Marka is located about sixty miles south of Mogadishu and was critically important to the humanitarian relief effort as it contained one of three ports on the southern coast. The port is a “lighterage” port, meaning that shipping could anchor off shore from the shallow water port, and barges would carry the cargo to and from the port facility. This port was central to the assigned HRS and the NGO plan for relief missions. As an alternative to trucking supplies down the dilapidated Afgooye road from Mogadishu into the HRS, the port offered easier transport of larger loads that could be trucked directly into the humanitarian relief sector.

Upon arrival in Marka, the advanced party began its transition work immediately. The leaders and staff from 2-87 Infantry provided informational briefings and reconnaissance opportunities for the staff and leaders of 1-22 Infantry. The basic scheme of maneuver for the relief in place between battalions was that as an infantry company from 1-22 Infantry arrived, a company from 2-87 Infantry redeployed to Mogadishu and eventually back to Fort Drum. The transition was designed to be most detailed at battalion and company level, but the transition did get down to the platoon level as well. Leaders of the 2nd Battalion, 87th Infantry, would provide oversight and guidance on missions, while 1-22 units and leaders “got on their feet” and felt comfortable with the surrounding area and the mission. The transition was completed and the entire
battalion was on the ground and had assumed the HRS mission by 9 April 1993.\textsuperscript{22}

The initial mission of the battalion was to occupy HRS Marka, control the port and its operations, ensure security for NGOs, and oversee the humanitarian relief operations. An additional task for the battalion, beyond the responsibility that 2-87 Infantry had, was to provide a "Theater Quick Reaction Force."\textsuperscript{23} Little attention was paid to this fact in April 1993, but that task would in fact change entirely how the United States and UN conducted business in Somalia in the very near future.

The battalion provided both mounted and dismounted security patrols through the city of Marka and the surrounding countryside. These patrols, usually squad or platoon sized elements, covered the local area at various times of the day and night, looking for suspicious bandit or dangerous clan activity and providing a sense of security for the NGO's and local population. In addition, several static security checkpoints were established on the main lines of communication (LOCs) leading to and from the port. The intent was to search for stolen relief supplies and weapons that were fueling the black market in the country.\textsuperscript{24} The port was also secured continuously by one rifle platoon from the battalion.\textsuperscript{25}

The humanitarian mission progressed easily from the time the battalion had control of the relief sector during April 1993. The most threatening situations faced at that time were coming from low-level crime activities, such as banditry and theft, or from helping Somali casualties (within the ROE allowed limits)
resulting from interclan fighting. Each of the line rifle companies and their platoons conducted local security patrols and static security checkpoints to help combat the threats. Mounted platoons (mortars and antitank) accompanied NGO convoys and ensured their security during relief trips throughout the sector. The largest threat beyond the bandits on these NGO convoy missions was how to deal with large crowds and the occasional woman or child that would attempt to steal food or cooking oil. This relatively calm environment on the deceptively beautiful coast of Somalia soon changed, as rumors of another change of mission and location began to circulate from the Brigade Headquarters.

By the end of April, the battalion turned the HRS over to Pakistani control and reported to Mogadishu for full-time QRF operations in support of the UN Headquarters. The transition between 1-22 Infantry and 1st battalion of the Sind Regiment, Pakistani Brigade, began on 26 April 1993. This was the first time since December 1992 that Marka would be secured by other than U.S. forces. This transition was a source of apprehension for the local Somali leaders, who were concerned that the Pakistanis might favor more extreme Islamic Fundamentalists, generally considered the root cause of trouble or criminal activity in the surrounding areas. With this issue in mind, all precautions were taken and proper coordinations made for the transition to occur. A change of responsibility ceremony on 28 April 1993 marked the beginning of the 1st battalion, Sind Regiment’s duties in Marka, and the first relief in place of 1-22 Infantry. At the request of the Pakistani battalion commander, small portions of 1-22 leaders, staff, and units stayed behind to ensure a smooth and final
transition. All 1-22 Infantry forces were moved and in place at the University Compound in Mogadishu by 30 April 1993.\textsuperscript{30}

May 1993 commenced with a unique problem for 1-22 Infantry. Once all of the unit equipment and soldiers were settled, complete focus turned to Quick Reaction Force missions. The basic problem was that the United Nations Mission in Somalia (UNISOM II) Headquarters (now transitioned from UNITAF) had little idea of what to use the QRF for. Several ideas came forth from the UN headquarters for using the QRF in show-of-force missions around Mogadishu and potentially all of central and southern Somalia. This confusion of what to do with the QRF was compounded at the battalion level, as 1-22 Infantry was required to be able to respond anywhere within the country of Somalia to support local UN forces. This was significant as even UNITAF forces (during the first phases of the operations from December 1992 to March 1993) confined their area of operations to only the southern 40 percent of the country.\textsuperscript{31} This larger AOR resulted directly in a lack of focus by the QRF on potential hotspots and threats. Nevertheless, senior U.S. staff members of the UN headquarters wanted to restrict the use of the QRF and deploy it only when necessary.\textsuperscript{32} Along with show of force, there were several attempts at using the QRF for humanitarian missions, such as refugee repatriation. One such mission actually resulted in a battalion deployment west to the Kenyan border to repatriate Somali refugees from camps just inside Kenya back to the their home towns of Gabahare and Bardera.\textsuperscript{33} The repatriation mission, although attempted twice,
was never completed because of recurring, more volatile events in the southern port city of Kismayo.

By mid May 1993, it was apparent that the mission of the QRF would in fact be almost exclusively show-of-force missions, and on two occasions, portions of the battalion were sent to patrol with UN forces in Kismayo and out west to the town of Baledogle.\textsuperscript{34} The final trip to Kismayo brought about the ultimate change in mission for Task Force 1-22 Infantry. During the end of May, angry crowds and clan infighting were on the rise, particularly in the Kismayo port area. Two warlords (Morgan and Jess) were planning a fight over the control of the city. The Belgian force stationed at the port in Kismayo asked for assistance, and the UNISOM II headquarters dispatched the QRF from the Bardera and Gabahare mission to reinforce the Belgian forces in Kismayo.\textsuperscript{35} This show of force was different, as it was to be a coalition operation between U.S. and Belgian forces with the purpose of patrolling and securing the surrounding areas, thereby preventing clashes between Somalis or UN elements. Two companies (Bravo and Charlie companies), along with the battalion TAC, would move using ground and air assets into Kismayo, establish an operating base, and begin security patrols along with Belgian forces. There was a much more tense feeling in the air at this time, especially shown in the behavior of the Belgian forces who expected a fight between armed Somali and UN forces.\textsuperscript{36} The coalition forces completed their plans the night of 4 June 1993, and the operation was set to kick off in the early morning hours of 5 June 1993.\textsuperscript{37}
Combat Operations  
(The First Battles of Mogadishu)

A day that will be remembered in history is 5 June 1993. It began with a search and attack mission with the Belgian battalion as planned the previous day and night. The search and attack mission ended abruptly in the early afternoon with a flash radio message from the brigade TAC to the battalion TAC to return to the Kismayo airfield as soon as possible. An ambush of Pakistani forces had occurred in Mogadishu, and 1-22 Infantry (-) was to redeploy as quickly as possible back to the capital city as the situation there seemed grave.38

Upon aborting the mission in Kismayo, the battalion TAC and the two companies redeployed to the airfield. Here, an unplanned but timely link-up was made with a Belgian C-130 that had just completed resupplying its detachment and was preparing to return to Mogadishu. It was immediately filled with as many soldiers as could fit into the space available. The flight took about an hour and landed by mid-afternoon at the Mogadishu International Airport. The northern side of the city was partially covered with smoke, as automobile tire blockades had been set ablaze in the vicinity of the ambush site.39

The ambush of the Pakistani battalion had occurred on 21 October Road, which is the northernmost, east-west paved road in the city. They had been attacked by the Somali National Alliance (SNA) forces of Mohammad Farah Aidid who were upset that the UN had directed inspections of the Authorized Weapons Storage Sites (AWSS) located in the northern sections of the city.40 Shortly after the ambush, the brigade commander ordered the battalion's remaining QRF company to respond to the ambush. Under the command of Captain Mike
Robertson, Alpha company, the only unit from 1-22 Infantry that had not deployed to Kismayo, was ordered to deploy to the ambush area and develop the situation. Alpha company conducted security and force protection operations with the Pakistanis until the arrival of the battalion TAC and the additional infantry forces brought north from Kismayo.

The battalion TAC and A Company link up occurred at approximately 1530 hours. For the rest of the afternoon and evening, elements of 1-22 Infantry secured and cleared the immediate area of Somali combatants and assisted the Pakistani battalion in evacuating from the ambush zone. These security and evacuation tasks included recovery and removal of the Pakistani dead and wounded that were still scattered in and around the ambush site. The battalion was then ordered to begin conducting additional search and attack patrolling missions in the northern neighborhoods of the city, looking for those Somali forces that prosecuted the ambush. There were no additional engagements or casualties after the additional search and attack patrolling mission. The TAC received a final change of mission for that day at approximately 2000 hours when the brigade headquarters radioed to return to base at the university compound.

In his book *Seeking Peace from Chaos: Humanitarian Intervention in Somalia*, Samuel M. Makinda outlined the casualty figures for 5 June 1993 as twenty-four Pakistani soldiers killed in action.\(^{41}\) Martinez also recalls that eight Somali gunmen and their weapons were captured and that 1-22 Infantry had not taken any battle casualties.\(^{42}\) Somali casualties for the day were unknown. The day's events were vitally important for 1-22 Infantry as the full focus of the
battalion and brigade Task Force changed within one afternoon. The mission had transformed well beyond just a humanitarian mission. The UN headquarters began to plan for offensive combat action in retaliation for the attack of 5 June 1993. This would be the first direct use of offensive force by a UN headquarters command since the Korean War. The main force to execute those missions fell squarely on the First Brigade Combat Team, the only remaining 10th Mountain unit left in Somalia.

**Offensive Combat Operations**

D-Day for the first set of UN attacks against the SNA was 12 June 1993. The attacks were composed of three specific target sets. The first target was the SNA-controlled radio station and its relay location. This target was designated as OBJ A4. The station had been increasing its anti-UN and anti-U.S. propaganda for some time prior to the 5 June ambush. The purpose of making the station a target was twofold: the first was to destroy the downtown radio station, and the second was to gain simultaneous control of the relay station so it could be used to transmit a less-aggressive message to the population in Mogadishu. AC-130 gunships were to hit the downtown station while A/1-22 Infantry (nicknamed "attack" company) would conduct a combat air assault to seize the relay station. The other two target sites were AWSSs that had been overtaken by Somali gunmen. The first AWSS was to be completely destroyed by AC-130 and Cobra gun ships. This was the storage site that contained the heaviest armor, including M60 tanks. The site was located about one kilometer north of 21 October Road and was designated OBJ A3. The last target site was also an AWSS. It was the
sister site to OBJ A3 and was located just off of the north side of 21 October road in the vicinity of the cigarette factory. It was designated as OBJ A1. B/1-22 Infantry (nicknamed “battle” company) would conduct a ground movement from the University Compound north on Afgooyee road, turn east on 21 October road, dismount, deploy, then seize and secure the AWSS.

The battalion commander designated two separate TACs to deploy with each of the companies. The first TAC, with the battalion S3, would air assault in with Attack Company to provide direct command and control (C2) while the actual battalion TAC would move via ground to provide C2 for both operations. The mission kicked off at 0350 with the gunships attacking first, followed by the A Company air assault at 0400 into objective A4. The combat air assault went off well. It resulted in seizing and securing the relay station with one enemy KIA and 38 captured. Simultaneous with the A4 attack, B Company and the battalion TAC crossed the start point (SP) and began the ground move from the compound to OBJ A1. As the ground convoy turned east onto 21 October Road, Somali gunmen executed an “L” shaped ambush using the wall that lined the south side of the Afgooyee and 21 October Roads as protection. A brief but intense firefight ensued resulting in 5 casualties inflicted on the gunmen (two KIA, three captured). Quickly the ground convoy got back under way towards the objective. The attack into OBJ A1 was further delayed as B Company and the TAC had to wait to enter the compound because ordnance in the AWSS from the earlier gunship attack was still exploding. The objective was secured with light resistance. Four tons of weapons and ammunition stored there were gathered
together and blown in place by explosive ordnance detachment (EOD) personnel.\textsuperscript{44}

The next date for attacks on additional SNA targets was set for 17 June 1993. The mission for that day focused on the Aidid neighborhood, located east-southeast from the Embassy and University Compound. That particular neighborhood was the location from which multiple sniper attacks on the Embassy were originating. The lead for the mission that day was the Pakistani brigade with additional Moroccan and Italian forces in support. The latter provided a cordon force around the Aidid neighborhood, while the Pakistani brigade conducted a search for weapons and any Somalis that were suspected snipers or that may have participated in the 5 June attack. The QRF was on standby to assist, if necessary, as an extraction or reinforcing force. To facilitate the battalion’s mission, the commander designated the battalion intelligence officer to collocate with the Pakistani brigade headquarters to act as a liaison officer, and to provide the battalion headquarters with timely situation reports on the progress of the mission and to guide the battalion into the zone of attack if required. The Pakistani brigade headquarters controlled the operation from the outskirts of the Aidid neighborhood (also known as Aidid’s Garage) from atop one of the largest buildings in the vicinity of the area of operations near the K7 circle. Based on their mission analysis, the Pakistanis had requested additional indirect fire support in the form of M203 grenade launchers that could assist with CS crowd control agents (crowds directly in the combat zone were becoming a problematic dimension on the battlefield) or, if necessary, High Explosives (HE)
in case the situation got out of control and an immediate extraction was necessary. Two M203 teams (two men per team) from the battalion deployed under the C2 of the intelligence officer to fill the Pakistani request. The night before the mission, an AC-130 gunship launched preemptive attacks using both its 20 millimeter mini-gun system and its airborne 105 millimeter cannon. The ground attack began at 0545 hours with the establishment of the cordon and search by two Pakistani battalions (the 1st Punjab and 7th Frontier Force). Many firefights erupted both inside the area being searched and along the cordon area in the Moroccon sector. In one ambush, Somali gunmen inflicted heavy casualties on one Moroccan battalion. Sniper fire, coming from multiple locations, was extremely prevalent on any exposed unit or soldier throughout the area of operation. The mission ended at dusk on the 17th without capturing any of the targeted Somalis; however many cached weapons and mortar rounds were secured. Both Pakistani and Moroccon forces sustained casualties; there were no U.S. casualties.  

From June 17th until July 11th, 1-22 Infantry conducted several other raids along with several search and attack missions. None of the missions produced the results desired by higher headquarters. Part of this was due to reliance on poor human intelligence sources. These sources, supposedly reliable, rarely provided the detailed information necessary to capture a suspect Somali or to uncover the exact whereabouts of a weapons cache.

Each search and attack mission was preceded by two to three days of preparation and rehearsals, followed by a one-day mission, and concluded with
the unit returning to its base camp at night. This practice of sending the QRF from place to place with little or no result became the daily ritual, and tended to produce a sense of frustration as to what the overall strategy for action was. Lieutenant Colonel Martinez remarked: “There seems to be no strategy in the plans we receive. We just react to hot spots like firemen trying to put out a fire. At least in fire fighting, they make firebreaks and use strategy to put out the fire.”

Another source of frustration for the soldiers was the near nightly ritual of mortar or RPG attacks at the base camp. Since the attacks by UN forces on 12 June, the base camp was subjected to increasing attacks that grew more lethal and accurate at each occurrence. Starting at about 2200 hours through about 0100 hours, Somali forces attacked the compound with harassing direct and indirect fire. These attacks resulted in a small number of U.S. and UN casualties; none were from 1-22 Infantry. Several requests by Lieutenant Colonel Martinez to patrol the areas outside of, and adjacent to the compound to stop the attacks were denied by higher authorities without explanation. This fact was significant, as the heavily bunkerized Tunisian forces, responsible for perimeter security, conducted no active patrolling outside of the walls or bunkers. With the commander of 1-22 Infantry’s request continually denied, the result was that the SNA ruled the night and the units on the University Compound were forced to endure the incessant attacks.

During late June and early July, an additional mission was proposed from higher headquarters and serious planning got underway for its execution. The
new mission became affectionately known within the battalion’s leadership as the “Prize” or Aidid “Snatch” mission. The intent was to identify the location of Aidid and his party, send in the QRF via Black Hawk helicopters, capture him and bring him to justice for the original June ambush. In addition, it was hoped that Aidid’s removal would provide a calming effect on the agitated city. Additional training was conducted and TTP were developed in order to conduct the mission. A few of the training events included intense air assault training between the infantry companies and the brigade’s Black Hawk Company. A new TTP was developed for the mission, that of mounting a Barret .50 Caliber sniper rifle, manned by a battalion scout sniper team, into a Black Hawk helicopter. The sniper team, with the powerful Barret, had the ability to disable key vehicles in Aidid’s convoy, thereby temporarily stopping its movement. This would allow the infantry assault teams that were airborne to land quickly and capture the prize. This mission, in fact, was attempted several times in late July and early August 1993, but to no avail. Either the intelligence was not accurate enough, or higher headquarters aborted the mission. However, this was first attempted by 1-22 Infantry prior to other Special Operations Forces being assigned to the mission after August, as described in Mark Bowden’s book, Black Hawk Down. 49

One last momentous mission was given to the battalion in early July that was more significant for the unit and stemmed, it was thought, directly from the “snatch” mission. This mission was fluid from the start, as its intent was again to attack and capture as many of Aidid’s lieutenants as possible, or even Aidid himself. The events that led up to the attack of 12 July 93 began with detailed
planning on 7 July 1993. The target location was the Abdi house. Abdi Hassan Awale was believed to be using his house to conduct high-level meetings of the Aidid clan and the SNA.\textsuperscript{50} Because only Human Intelligence (HUMINT) from an inside source could alert the forces of the impending meetings, the team built to conduct the mission was on a 30-minute warning string to react to the gathering. The team was built around the battalion's "Attack Company." A reinforced platoon and the company headquarters formed the assault force. The other two rifle Platoons from A company along with the MP platoon from the battalion made up the support by fire Platoons and the cordon force. To round out the package, two Black Hawks from the aviation battalion provided airborne C2 for the battalion and brigade commanders. The final piece of the battalion supporting the assault company was a ground convoy that consisted of a reinforcing rifle company (Charlie Company, nicknamed "Combat") and the battalion TAC. From its assembly areas within the Embassy Compound, Charlie Company was poised to launch via ground convoy to the Abdi house. The Charlie Company mission was either to assist or to extract Alpha Company, as necessary.

Intelligence sources inside the clan that worked for the UN Headquarters gave notice that a meeting was to take place at the Abdi house the morning of 12 July 1993. The battalion was notified and had the attack team in place by 0955 hours. At 1018 hours, after confirmation of the target, six Cobra gun ships fired sixteen TOW missiles into the Abdi House; 30-millimeter chain guns were also used to great effect. Each of the Cobras continued to fire TOW and chain gun rounds into the house until approximately 1022 hours. One minute later, three
Black Hawk Helicopters landed in the vicinity of the destroyed house. One bird, containing the support-by-fire platoon, charged with supporting the assault platoon, landed on the French Embassy roof, which provided excellent cover and observation of the Abdi house. Two other Black Hawks, with elements of the other two rifle platoons, landed among the rubble in the street in front of the Abdi house. Simultaneously, a cordon force of the remaining A Company elements and the MP platoon constructed a cordon around the house. One of the two platoons that landed in the street provided close security for the assault platoon as it made its way from the street into the compound and the house to search for surviving SNA leadership and any valuable intelligence. By 1035 hours, the raid was completed and all elements were enroute back to the base camp. The raid did not result in any captured SNA leaders or intelligence documents, but it did signify another major change in focus for the QRF. Somali casualty figures vary by account, but the numbers were significant. The casualty report from the commander of 1-22 Infantry to higher headquarters was: "in total 13 Somali killed in action (KIA) and 7 WIA from the raid. Later Aidid claimed that we killed over 70 Somali."\textsuperscript{51} That UN attack conducted by the First Brigade may have been the final straw that led up to the ambush of the ranger battalion in October of 1993. As an SNA leader recounted the 12 July attacks in Bowden's \textit{Black Hawk Down}:

\begin{quote}
It was one thing for the world to intervene to feed the starving, and even for the U.N. to help Somalia form a peaceful government. But this business of sending in U.S. Rangers swooping down into their city killing and kidnapping their leaders, this was just too much.\textsuperscript{52}
\end{quote}

In actuality, the "rangers" that the SNA leader talks of during the attack on the Abdi house in July 1993 were soldiers from 1-22 Infantry.
This foreboding and foreshadowing quote was further highlighted by retired Admiral Jonathan Howe, former special representative of the UN Secretary General to Somalia, as he outlined the evolvement of the QRF in Somalia:

The United States also maintained its Army QRF force in Somalia for longer than originally envisaged and used it more extensively. Although small in size and restricted in what it was authorized to do, the very capable QRF became, nonetheless the backbone of the UN force during the period of organized hostilities.\textsuperscript{53}

\textbf{Transition}

With the completion of the Abdi house mission, offensive combat operations were over for 1-22 Infantry. On 13 July 93, Lieutenant Colonel Martinez was officially notified that the battalion change of command would take place two days later. Additionally, he was notified that the battalion was to be relieved by the 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, from the second brigade and that 1-22 Infantry would redeploy on 12 August 1993.\textsuperscript{54}

Upon notification that 2-14 Infantry would backfill the battalion, initial coordination and planning for the event began immediately. The transition plan was predicated on the previous experiences of relief in place operations that occurred with 2-87 Infantry and the Pakistani battalion at Marka. The transition focused at the battalion and company level, with units operating in conjunction with each other, then replaced in kind as a like unit assumed QRF duties. The first transition would be the QRF ready company. The 2nd Battalion, 14th Infantry, was particularly cautious and security conscious as they were entering an unknown environment, much as 1-22 had acted as it entered Somalia in April.
However, August 1993 proved to be a much more tense an environment as things in Somalia had become considerably more dangerous when compared to December 1992 or April 1993.\(^{55}\)

As a brief review of the operation, 1-22 Infantry was tasked to conduct a variety of mission while deployed to Somalia. Initially, the battalion was charged with ensuring continued humanitarian relief, as well as providing security and stability within its assigned sector of the AOR. Later, as the QRF, the battalion was tasked to conduct show of force operations throughout the country and eventually was required to conduct combat operations in Mogadishu. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, in this author's assessment as a first hand observer and participant, did all that it was asked to do, and much more. Some of the characteristics displayed by the unit during the operation were flexibility, determination and discipline. These traits are the mark of a versatile unit that is able to perform a variety of tasks, regardless of conditions. Additionally, it is this author's assessment that all assigned missions were executed to standard. The basis for this assessment is founded on several levels. First are my personal observations. The second comes from the positive comments made by MG Montgomery (the deputy commanding general of UNISOM), to all of the soldiers of 1-22 Infantry as he thanked the battalion on a job well done prior to its redeployment. Lastly are the written comments made by retired Admiral Howe. His praise of all of the QRF units (to include 1-22 Infantry [endnote 53]) further justifies the declaration of mission success. These points will become important at the conclusion of this thesis.
Redeployment occurred on 13 August 1993 with one last convoy from the University Compound to the Mogadishu airport, where the battalion boarded a Tiger Air 747 and flew back to Griffis Air Force Base. The usual post deployment activities were planned to allow soldiers to unwind and spend time with their families after being deployed for almost six months.

**Personnel**

During the deployment, two company changes of command and one battalion change of command occurred. Bravo Company was taken over by Captain Steve Knott, who was newly assigned to the battalion after a short tour in the brigade staff, and Charlie Company was taken over by Captain Ed Rowe. Rowe was completely new to the brigade, confident, and a previous combat veteran with the 82nd Airborne Division. Lieutenant Colonel Martinez relinquished command of the battalion to Lieutenant Colonel Egon Hawrylak. Hawrylak was also new to the brigade and had spent about 10 days observing 1-22 Infantry. Though not as flamboyant as Martinez, Hawrylak was confident and very concerned for troop welfare. The majority of the NCOs remained assigned to 1-22 Infantry and reenlistment rates were extremely high, and the twice-deployed enlisted cohort soldiers began their second year assigned to the battalion. Estimates of the personnel changeover in enlisted ranks were placed at or under 25 percent, thereby leaving an overwhelming majority of the same soldiers in line for future operations. The phenomenon of high reenlistment rates was an interesting occurrence as well. Martinez and Baughman thought it was due in part to the fact that the battalion was conducting
real world operations that kept soldiers' interest. Others did not have the same feeling looking at the deployments since Florida and would question the reenlistment rates. The perception from some indicated that soldiers and junior leaders were not happy performing humanitarian or peacekeeping operations.

Along with the battalion change of command, the brigade changed command with Colonel Campbell, relinquishing command to Colonel Andrew Berdy in June of 1994. The battalion also made two other company changes of command in spring 1994. The leadership team was as follows by the summer of 1994:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Battalion Commander</th>
<th>Lieutenant Colonel Egon Hawrylak</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Battalion Command Sergeant Major</td>
<td>CSM Stanley Kaminski</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion XO</td>
<td>Major Scott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battalion S3</td>
<td>Major Rick Runde</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain John Kuntz</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain Steve Knott</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C Company Commander</td>
<td>Captain Ed Rowe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHC Commander</td>
<td>Captain John Evans</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Training**

The training again refocused on original training plans as outlined earlier in this document by the operations officer (now the executive officer), with a spotlight towards the upcoming Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) rotation set for the spring of 1994. To prepare for the JRTC, the battalion deployed to Fort Pickett, Virginia, in February 1994 for intense platoon and company-level training, then on to the JRTC in April of 1994. Subsequent plans for after JRTC, called for a rigorous summer training cycle to adapt to the new brigade commander's training philosophy (similar to that of the previous battalion commander) of complex, company level live-fire training evaluations (EXEVALS).
All of this was designed to continue building on past training and operational successes that 1-22 Infantry benefited from.

August 1994 began with rumors of a potentially new deployment to the Caribbean Country of Haiti, where, as the situation there deteriorated, it appeared that the 10th Mountain Division, the First Brigade Combat Team and 1-22 Infantry would get involved in an invasion to restore the country's democratically elected government. Chapter four will develop the situation for the training and eventual deployment to Haiti, initial and subsequent missions in country, and eventual relief in place by elements of the 25th ID (Light).

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4 Ibid., 1.

5 Interview with MAJ Mark Suich by Dr. Robert F. Baumann and LTC Walter E. Kretchik, 10 March 2000, Fort Leavenworth Kansas.

6 LTC (ret) Jeffery A. Baughman, Interview by author, 8 January 2000, Olathe Kansas.

7 Author's notes.

8 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Written After-Action Review, Operation Uphold Democracy, Special Collections, Third Floor Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 1.
9Baughman.

10Martinez monograph, 2.

1110th Mountain Somalia AAR, 2.


13Author’s notes. The information briefings centered on known Somali cultural distinctions, Somali clan information, threat weapons, terrain, weather and indigenous medical threats. The information briefed to the soldiers and leaders was derived from information provided by U.S. Central Command in the form of a small pocket reference pamphlet entitled “Country Information Guide, Somalia, Operation Restore Hope.” The information was not overly detailed or completely understood by the battalion intelligence shop, particularly in regard to the intricacies of Somali clans. However, it was the only source immediately available to satisfy initial training and staff information requirements for deployment planning.

14Baughman.

15Martinez monograph, 2.

16Baughman.

17Ibid., and author’s notes. There is disparity between what the battalion commander, S3 and S2 recall for dates of deployment for the advanced party. LTC Martinez marks the date for the advanced party as 30 March 1993 with the battalion on the ground [complete] and the Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS) mission completely assumed by 9 April 1993. The author and operations officer recall an earlier deployment of 27-28 Mar 1993 for the advanced party.


19Ibid., 139-140.

20Baughman.

21Helms.

22Martinez monograph, 2.
23Ibid., 2.

24Jones and Helms.

25Jones and Baughman.

26Jones.

27Helms.


29Martinez monograph, 22.


31Howe, 56.

32Ibid., 25.

33Ibid., 34.

34Ibid., 26-38.

35Ibid., 38.

36Author's notes.

37Martinez monograph, 38.

38Ibid., 39.

39Baughman.

40Ibid.


42Martinez monograph, 39-40.

43Martinez monograph, 42, and Author's analysis.
Martinez monograph and Baughman.

Author’s notes.

Interview of MAJ Brian Imiola by Dr. Robert F. Baumann, 10 March 2000, Fort Leavenworth Kansas. Discussion of support operations to QRF missions.

Martinez monograph, 50.

Imiola.


Ibid., 71.


Bowden, 74.

Howe, 58.

Martinez monograph, 55.

Baughman.

Baughman.

Helms and Jones Interviews.

Baughman.

Jones.

Baughman.
CHAPTER 4
OPERATION UPHOLD DEMOCRACY--HAITI

In June of 1994, the first brigade combat team received a new commander. Colonel Andrew Berdy had previous experience with the XVIII Airborne Corps, commanding a light infantry battalion with the 101st Airborne Division during Operation Desert Storm. Berdy, a no-nonsense, tough but fair commander was convinced from his past combat experiences that grueling, realistic training was the only focus his brigade required to be ready for any mission. This was nothing new to the soldiers and leaders of 1-22 Infantry, as they had been exposed to this type of intense training under their previous commander. This chapter will outline the summer-training focus for 1-22 Infantry, the change in focus with the notification for another deployment, the preparations for deployment to Haiti, initial and subsequent operations in country, relief-in-place operations and recovery, and lessons learned after operations.

As the summer of 1994 commenced, all of the infantry battalions in the brigade prepared and trained for their culmination exercise scheduled for August and September--that of company level, combined arms, live-fire External Evaluations (EXEVALs). The live-fire philosophy had pervaded many levels within the 10th Mountain Division, and the Army as well, as was evident from Colonel Berdy’s desire to conduct them. The planned EXEVALs were the most intensive any of the leaders and soldiers of 1-22 Infantry had seen or participated in. Having just completed limited platoon level-live fires as preparation for the JRTC rotation, these company-level LFXs would culminate all of the past training
into one large-scale exercise. The brigade S3, Major Baughman, who had recently been assigned to the brigade staff from 1-22 Infantry, recalls that the LFXs involved the entire rifle company, which moved by air assault assets to an objective, with a mission of conducting a live-fire raid, with supporting artillery and mortars. All of this was executed at night, one of the ultimate environmental challenges. Training units in the dark is of paramount importance, particularly when preparing for combat operations. The lack of light complicates all endeavors. Clearly, one of the most crucial factors for a commander is that darkness severely reduces command and control for all units, both friendly and enemy. Those units that can operate more comfortably at night have a distinct advantage over an opponent, particularly when bolstered with technology. Use of night vision devices, such as the PVS-7, by all infantry soldiers in the 10th Mountain Division increased this advantage and was an integral part of the deployed equipment. These types of training events represented graduate-level testing for company commanders.

As each battalion and company prepared for its turn in the LFX training event, preparations of a different sort were occurring at the division and higher level staffs that was to impact all of the companies in the first BCT as well. Continual unrest and corruption (a well-established pattern of Haitian life), coupled with the ouster of President Aristide by General Cedras in 1991, began to influence many levels within the national command authority and the department of defense. The complex political situation continued to irritate the political leadership of the United States. Concern over events in the Caribbean
has always drawn attention or some kind of action by the United States from early in this county’s history. In 1915, U.S. Marines were the first American combat troops to enter Haiti as the result of political upheavals there, and they occupied it until 1934.3 A myriad of additional factors lead to the eventual deployment of U.S. forces to Haiti again in 1994. The first of three key factors was the threat of Haitian boat refugees flooding the United States to avoid the terror of the police and the Cedras government. Second was the approval of the Governor’s Island Agreement that linked U.S. support to the UN cause of returning President Aristide to his elected position. Finally, the USS Harlan County Incident that began as a Humanitarian mission to help Haitians and ended up in a disastrous retreat in the face of paid Cedras thugs, occurred in October of 1993. These events, coupled with pressure from the national command authority, precipitated the notification on 25 July 1994 by the XVIII Airborne Corps that the 10th Mountain Division was to begin planning for a deployment to Haiti to assist in repairing the improper political and human situation present there.4

The two operations plans (OPLANs) that took U.S. troops to Haiti for a second time in this century were OPLAN 2370, which outlined an armed invasion of the country, and OPLAN 2380, calling for a permissive entry by U.S. forces. If required, JTF 180 (XVIII ABC) would execute OPLAN 2370 with a forced entry into Haiti, followed by peacekeeping and stabilization operations. OPLAN 2380, if executed, placed responsibility on a newly formed JTF. The 10th Mountain Division was assigned authority as the JTF 190 Headquarters. OPLAN 2380
outlined a permissive entry operation into the country, followed by necessary security and stabilization missions. Early and subsequent planning and intelligence indicated, almost to the last minute, that OPLAN 2370 was the plan of choice for execution.

As the staffs at the division continued to prepare for OPLAN 2380, the rumors of deployment again filtered down the chain into the battalion. There was concern by some in leadership positions that the pace and number of recent deployments were perhaps too much, particularly in the case of a unit such as 1-22 Infantry, fresh from two other recent deployments. Beyond the concern of the operational tempo, it was thought that those with experience in Somalia, where a humanitarian mission developed into combat operations, might compare the two missions, particularly if OPLAN 2370 was executed, or if any armed incidents with the FAd'h (Haitian military) or police occurred. Additional training, focused on preparation for the mission, was introduced to the soldiers in the brigade and battalion. This training took some of the lessons learned from Somalia and applied them to the preparation training for deployment. The capital of Haiti, Port-au-Prince, is a large, built-up area, densely inhabited by poor and destitute people. Accordingly, the battalion implemented MOUT (Military Operations in Urban Terrain) training and also exercised squads and platoons through vignette lane training focusing on roadblocks, security techniques, and crowd control. These were the very training events (except for MOUT training) that the soldiers of 1-22 encountered prior to deployment to Somalia.
By early September 1994, it was clear the 10th Mountain Division would be involved in operations in Haiti regardless of which OPLAN was executed. Final packing of equipment and vehicles was completed and the first shipments left Fort Drum for the port at Bayonne, New Jersey, on 11 September 1994. The first two battalions of the First BCT, 1-87 Infantry and 2-22 Infantry, deployed on 12 September 1994 and boarded the USS Eisenhower. They were to conduct an air assault into the Port-au-Prince (PAP) International Airport. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, remained at Fort Drum until shortly before D-Day, when the unit would deploy to Griffis Air Force Base, embark on Air Force aircraft and land at the PAP International Airport shortly after the air assault forces secured it.

As both JTFs (180 and 190) continued preparation and deployment actions, the political arm of U.S. national power continued its work in Port-au-Prince. Negotiations conducted by a diplomatic team led by Former President Carter found the means to end the political crisis peacefully. As the 82nd Airborne Division was enroute from Fort Bragg, and the 1st Brigade (-), 10th Mountain Division waited offshore, the Cedras regime capitulated to U.S. demands and agreed to relinquish power. These actions allowed for the final decision to be made to execute OPLAN 2380 instead of OPLAN 2370. The 82nd Airborne Division turned around, and D-Day for OPLAN 2380 was set for 19 September 1994.

The two battalions aboard the USS Eisenhower conducted an air assault movement from the deck of the aircraft carrier into the International airport tarmac beginning 190930SEP94. Of the soldiers who conducted the air
assault, one of the battalions did have combat experience in Somalia. That battalion was 2-22 Infantry, who backfilled 2-14 Infantry after the October 1993 battle in Mogadishu. Those troops, as well as the soldiers from 1-87 Infantry, disembarked the aircraft tactically, dispersed away from the aircraft, and sought cover behind their rucksacks.\textsuperscript{11}

Whether this was a connection to past experiences from Somalia, or just standard operation procedure as a tactical exit from an aircraft is still debated. Perhaps it reflected the "Somalia Syndrome," as outlined in the book \textit{Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation Uphold Democracy}. The authors offer a definition of the term "Somalia Syndrome." It is a perception of Haiti, by veterans of Somalia, as exactly the same scenario, mission, and environment. This comparison led those veterans to function in Haiti as they did in Somalia. This perception was not valid in all cases, however. Some of the research indicated that those who did connect Haiti to Somalia did so because of where they specifically had been in Somalia and specifically what missions they had conducted. For example, according to Major Brian Imiola, a veteran of both Somalia and Haiti with the 10th forward support battalion, which saw little to no direct combat action in Somalia, soldiers in support battalions kept an open mind when going to Haiti.\textsuperscript{12} Conversely, soldiers who did have direct combat experience in Somalia, such as soldiers from 1-22 Infantry or, in particular, those from 2-14 Infantry that were involved in the larger scale firefight in Mogadishu through October 1993, readily associated current with past operations. Some of these veterans did see Haiti as another
Somalia, as was outlined by Major Mark Suich, an infantry company commander, first with 2-14 Infantry, and then with the long range surveillance detachment for the 10th Mountain in Haiti.\footnote{13}

As the air assault occurred, 1-22 Infantry made the trip from Fort Drum to Griffis Air Force Base, manifested, loaded aircraft, and flew in to the PAP international airport behind the air assault forces.\footnote{14} The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, closed into Haiti completely with the final arrivals of the headquarters company (minus battalion command and control that deployed with the lead company), as it was last to deploy into theater. All 1-22 Infantry units were on Haitian soil, secured and accounted for by 192000SEP94.

\textbf{Mission:}

The mission of US forces under OPLAN 2380 was to:

\begin{quote}
Conduct military operations to restore and preserve civil order; protect US citizens and interests and designated Haitians and third country nationals; create a secure environment for the restoration of the legitimate government of Haiti; and provide technical assistance to the government of Haiti.\footnote{15}
\end{quote}

At the brigade and battalion level, this mission initially boiled down to providing security by "presence" and by patrolling with U.S. soldiers in the streets of Port-au-Prince. Limited patrolling began immediately on 20 September (approximately 1/3 of the battalion at any time) and continued as the division expanded its lodgment in Haiti.\footnote{16} At lower levels of the battalion, this patrolling was something of an uneasy flashback to previous experiences, as Port-au-Prince reminded some soldiers and junior leaders of Mogadishu, again relating to the "Somalia Syndrome."\footnote{17}
Port-au-Prince was very similar to Mogadishu with some minor exceptions. Its poorest populace lived in the slums of “Cite Soliel,” where inhabitants inhabited makeshift dwellings and rundown shacks and buildings with no potable water or electricity. Open sewage and garbage piles filed the streets. As elevation increased towards the west of town, there was a sharp contrast in living conditions. The higher that patrolling units went into the hills, the better the living conditions. Upon reaching the top of the western hills of Port-au-Prince, patrolling units encountered the high-class neighborhoods of Petionville, luxurious and elegant for even American tastes; this area housed the richest of Haitians.

In Somalia, some criticized the lack of patrolling, suggestive of a belief that more overt patrolling might have reduced SNA activity against UN forces. Strikingly, some more senior Somalia veterans did not make the same connections between the two missions. More seasoned personnel, such as MAJ Baughman, evidently understood that, although there were some similarities in the two areas of operation, the differences were vast when the facts were more closely examined. Perhaps this phenomenon deals again with where a soldier experienced certain aspects of a given mission. Those with more seniority would not necessarily experience the same events (or the same events in the same way), as lower ranking individuals did. They also would be more privy to the larger scope of the operation and could perhaps keep their perspective in context.
The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry quartered itself initially on the southwest corner of the airport runway systems, setting up the battalion headquarters in abandoned buildings on the edge of the tarmac. Each of the companies was assigned perimeter space for security purposes and developed initial fighting positions. These positions were not held long before higher headquarters began pushing to get American troop presence out into the city.

The 1st Battalion, 87th Infantry, and the 10th FSB remained at their initial air assault locations at the main port where they continued to secure and ensure its proper operation. 2nd Battalion, 22nd Infantry, along with the aviation brigade, remained at the international airport and provided security. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, pushed out via air assault and ground convoy to the downtown military airport, Bowen Field. This airfield was originally the headquarters for the Haitian Air Force. There was concern from both the battalion and brigade headquarters over the occupation of Bowen Field, as this potentially was one of the first direct confrontations between U.S and Haitian military units since landing in country. The operation went off with out any hindrance, and the airfield was secured and eventually occupied by the remainder of First Brigade (Brigade HQ first, followed by the FSB once they completed brigade equipment download operations), minus 2-22 and 1-87 Infantry, each of which maintained their security positions at the airport and port, respectively. Bowen Field became the initial operating base for the brigade headquarters, the 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, and the 10th Forward Support Battalion.
Additional expansion of static security operations extended further into Port-au-Prince as key municipal and governmental buildings were identified. Units rotated among several assignments, such as securing the Duvalier properties, General Cedras' house, various local officials' offices or residences, and eventually the national palace, soon to be the seat of power for the returning President Aristide. The conduct of static security operations reduced significantly the ability of units to conduct other missions, such as presence patrolling and security patrolling. Reports of up to one-third of a unit's combat power being used to secure itself and another third securing the local establishments were not uncommon. This left the last third of a unit split between downtime, maintenance, and patrolling the streets. By process of elimination, this left only one third of the time and troop resources available for units to be involved outside their bases, engaging the population and providing needed street security and presence patrols. This fact appears to be in stark contrast with the forces of Second Brigade in Cap Haitien. According to the battalion commander, Lieutenant Colonel Buckley of 2-87 Infantry (the main combat force in that city), there were patrols in the streets of Cap Haitien virtually twenty-four hours a day. There were many factors as to why there was such a large disparity between locations and units, such as city size and past experiences that will be examined in more detail in the conclusion of this work.

Along with security, there were several other missions that occupied soldiers' and units' time. One of the major programs that 1-22 Infantry, along with other units, were involved in was a weapons buy-back program. The intent
of this program was to remove, voluntarily, dangerous weapons and munitions from the streets of Haiti, in an effort not only to protect the local population, but also to enhance force protection for the soldiers in the multi-national force (MNF). Payment price increased according to how dangerous the item was or what operational condition the weapon was in.\textsuperscript{22} The better the condition of the weapon, the more money was paid to the Haitian turning it in. Although the intent of the program was worthy, it was the opinion of many that the weapon buy-back initiative was only marginally successful. Most weapons turned in were rusted and nonoperational, and most explosives appeared unstable and perhaps posed a greater danger to the soldiers and Haitians handling them at the turn-in station.\textsuperscript{23} There were insufficient explosive ordnance detachments (EOD) to handle the ordnance and no EOD teams at any of the turn-in stations operated by 1-22 Infantry. One such station manned by 1-22 Infantry was at the front gate of Bowen Airfield, a high traffic area for Haitian civilians and U.S. units.

In addition to the weapons buy-back program, 1-22 Infantry participated in the divisions "weapons cache operations." During these operations, units would conduct cordon and search operations to seize suspected weapons caches.\textsuperscript{24} Occasionally, the search and seizure missions would be modified to include the detention of suspect Haitian personnel who were identified for apprehension and questioning.

The major focus for the month of October 1994 was twofold. Initially, the brigade combat team assisted in building and eventually moving into its own logistics support base, appropriately designated "Warrior Base" after the
brigade's nickname. This was a standard tent city designed to house soldiers and equipment; it was supported by Army logistics units and contract services from Brown and Root.

The operational focus during October for all Port-au-Prince units was clearly the return of President Aristide. Diplomatic efforts, combined with military efforts in security and stability, allowed for the safe return after three years of the democratically elected president. The fifteenth of October 1994 was the day set for Aristide to fly into the international airport, move via ground convoy to the palace, and take political control of the country. All of the subordinate elements of the 10th Mountain Division operating in the Port-au-Prince area had a major role in the operation. 1st BCT was the division's main effort with responsibility for the palace and its surrounding areas.\(^{25}\) Within the brigade plan, 1-22 Infantry was assigned an area of responsibility in the vicinity of the national palace and its surrounding neighborhoods. All companies from 1-22 Infantry, to include the combat platoons and company C2 of headquarters company, that had elements not already involved in static security were posted throughout the streets surrounding the palace. Each company monitored the Haitian crowds and provided security, military presence, and support to local officials as necessary. Units trained for the operation extensively with several days of rehearsals, including a full-scale dress rehearsal conducted on 14 October. Fortunately, the entire mission went off without any major incidents. The event was considered the "watershed" event of Operation Uphold Democracy, as this is what U.S. forces had come to Haiti to do.\(^{26}\)
The remainder of October and early November saw a shift of some forces away from duties and missions in Port-au-Prince only. The decision was made for Infantry units to begin conducting Out of Sector (OOS) missions with the purpose of expanding the presence of Army forces, showing force in outlying areas, and supporting International Police Monitors and SF units. Each of the rifle companies of 1-22 Infantry planned and conducted limited OOS operations. The most significant and farthest away from the base of operation and the city was the mission that C/1-22 conducted the week after Tropical Storm Gordon came through the island 14-15 November 1994. Charlie Company, with engineer support, deployed to the southern coast town of Jacmel and rendered humanitarian relief and support to the local population.

An additional shift in operational focus for the battalion came in mid to late November 1994. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was relieved of several of its static security missions in the city and was assigned to two major areas of responsibility. The first was security of the national palace. The focus on security of the palace by the division leadership was such that it was necessary to commit a larger force there with sole responsibility for the area. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, left one rifle company and the battalion's logistics tail at Warrior Base and moved all of the C2, one rifle company, and the mounted, special platoons of the HHC to the palace to conduct the mission. The third rifle company remained assigned to the static security areas of responsibility that still belonged to the battalion.
The scheme of maneuver had one rifle company in security and maintenance at Warrior Base, the second on static security at the remaining various sites in Port-au-Prince and the third was on twenty-four hour security on the palace and its grounds. That company was also on an internal rotating basis within the palace, as it had one rifle platoon in maintenance, another securing the perimeter, and the remaining platoon postured as a quick reaction platoon for use in and around the palace.

The headquarters company C2, with its three combat platoons, were designated a fourth maneuver company by the battalion commander. The Antitank and Mortar platoons were already mobile on HMMWVs and were armed with Mark 19 Grenade Launchers and M60 Machine guns (MGs) on the AT Gun vehicles, and M60 MGs on pedestal mounts for the cargo HMMWVs for the mortar platoon. The battalion commander detached the Air Defense Artillery (ADA) platoon's cargo HMMWVs and drivers to the HHC commander and the battalion's scout platoon used them for mobility, also mounting M60 MGs on pedestals. The remainder of the company was under the supervision of the company executive officer and first sergeant, pushing logistics packages (LOGPACs), using the support platoon, from Warrior Base to all the deployed companies in and around Port-au-Prince.

The new mission for the HHC was to provide mounted and dismounted security for President Aristide's motorcade and to provide local security at any location that Aristide stopped or spent the night. This included security
operations around Aristide's residence that was located several kilometers away from the palace, outside of Port-au-Prince.

Training for this mission began the week prior to Thanksgiving and was overseen by United States Department of State (DOS) personnel who specialized in presidential security. Training focused on several critical tasks, the most important of which were driving skills (both offensive and defensive), motorcade operations, communication between headquarters company, the DOS and Haitian security personnel, and vignette training geared toward insuring that the VIP in the motorcade was out of danger and away from any dangerous situation that developed as quickly as possible. HHC 1-22 Infantry relieved HHC 2-22 Infantry of the mission on 25 November 1994. From 25 November 1994 through 15 January 1995, HHC 1-22 Infantry conducted seven actual motorcade missions. Most of the motorcades involved localized Port-au-Prince moves between the palace, the residence, or to and from political engagements within the city. One motorcade operation during the last week of November and the first week of December was a major OOS move and spanned five days, as President Aristide conducted several speaking engagements along the southern claw of the Haitian country. The visits, with overnight stays, were in the towns of Les Cayes, Maragonne, and the western most city of Jeremie.29

Ultimately, Haiti ended up being a much calmer scenario for the battalion to work in as compared to its last three months in Somalia. There was one major altercation between elements of 1-22 Infantry and the Haitian military (FAd'h) and police that occurred during the afternoon and evening of 26 December 1994.
The FAd’h and police headquarters building was located to the northwest of, and across the street, from the palace and was situated on the north side of the central park traffic rotary adjacent to the west side of the national palace. The two story, brick and mortar building was the scene, in September, of many negotiations between Former President Carter, his team of diplomats and Lieutenant General Cedras’ faction. C/1-22 Infantry was manning the perimeter of the palace and HHC (-), with two mounted platoons (AT and scouts) staged at the palace ready to respond to any required moves of President Aristide’s motorcade.

Heavy weapons gunfire erupted during an internal dispute at the FAd’h headquarters in the early afternoon, causing the QRF Platoon from C Company to respond and deploy. The platoon maneuvered across the street and began assessing the situation after taking up positions around the perimeter fence of the FAd’h headquarters and effectively cordoned off the building. A call from the battalion TOC alerted the HHC to assist by bolstering the cordon with the AT platoon and to maneuver and clear the building with the remaining dismounted scout platoon. The scout platoon and company headquarters C2 maneuvered out of the south side palace gate, as heavy gunfire continued to emanate from the FAd’h headquarters. As the HHC element maneuvered through the park and traffic rotary to link up with the C Company commander, the rifle platoon from C Company engaged and wounded several unidentified assailants armed with M203 grenade launchers that appeared as though they were about to engage C
Company, and possibly the HHC element with indirect fires. The direct action by
the platoon thwarted that potential attack.

Upon arrival of the HHC element and the battalion commander, face-to-
face coordination was made between all commanders. The battalion
commander, Lieutenant Colonel Hawrylak, instructed C Company to maintain the
cordon, with the help of the AT platoon, and for HHC’s C2 and its dismounted
platoon to conduct a room by room and floor by floor search and clear operation
to develop the situation and gain control of the building and its occupants. The
HHC element cleared the first floor with no contact with Haitians, moved to the
second floor, and found several armed, uniformed Haitians in several different
offices. All of the Haitians were secured, searched and detained.

By days end, there were five WIA Haitian FAd’h members and 500
weapons of various types and sizes seized from what appeared to be an arms
room. All weapons were taken by HHC elements to the U.S. controlled weapons
storage sites and sixty-two detainees involved either directly or indirectly in the
altercation were transported to the Joint Interrogation Center (JIC) for
questioning.30 As it turned out, this event was the result of an internal Haitian
dispute and was not directed at U.S. soldiers. It involved some armed, lower
ranking members of the police force who were unhappy with not being paid.
They confronted the leadership in the headquarters about the pay problem when
one of the general officers, headquarted in the building, drew his pistol to
influence the strained situation. A firefight ensued between loyal police and the
unpaid disgruntled police.31

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By mid-December 1994, 1-22 and the first brigade were informed that they were to be relieved by elements of the 25th Infantry Division stationed in Hawaii. Interestingly enough, 1-22 Infantry was directly relieved by its sister battalion, 4-22 Infantry. The relief in place occurred in the same fashion as 1-22 Infantry had executed previously in Somalia. An advanced C2 party from the relieving battalion arrived to begin coordination for mission comprehension and management, followed by troop units that swapped one for one after conducting shared operations for a specified time. The relief in place went off without any problems and 1-22 Infantry was relieved of duties in Port-au-Prince by 4-22 infantry on or about 15 January 1995 and began flowing home 20-21 January 1995.\textsuperscript{32}

As per the other three deployments, after some much needed time off, the battalion began to recover its equipment as it flowed into the rail head at Fort Drum, conducted after action reviews, and looked toward future operations in the summer that included the West Point training mission for the brigade. The Brigade S3, Major Baughman, once again noted that recorded lessons learned, captured by the after action review process, were not directly incorporated into any of the future training events.\textsuperscript{33} This trend may have been due to the desire of the leadership to concentrate unit training on warfighting skills and only to adjust training, as required, with the assumption of a new OOTW mission.

With the close of the Haiti operation, the battalion composition quickly began to change. The cohort soldiers who had been the mainstay of the battalion since June 1992 were due to PCS or ETS during the summer months of
1995. The battalion commander remained for his second year of command, but late October 1994 saw the change of Command Sergeants Major, with Command Sergeant Major Frank Toles replacing Command Sergeant Major Kaminski. Bravo Company changed command in Haiti, with Captain Knott relinquishing command to Captain Dan Deleon, a brigade staff officer since the summer before the Haiti deployment. Charlie and HHC companies were due to change in the early springtime, and all of the senior, experienced lieutenants that inprocessed around the same time as the cohort soldiers in the summer of 1992 were due to ETS or PCS to the advanced course. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, had seen its share of a multitude of different type operations spanning the entire OOTW spectrum and had performed well. But the words of the brigade S3, and previous member of the battalion, summed things up: “we were some whipped pups after the third deployment.”

As a brief review of the Haiti operation, 1-22 Infantry was again tasked to conduct a variety of missions, some very similar to those assigned while deployed to Somalia, and some vastly different. Initially, the battalion was charged with providing security and stability with its presence and patrolling in Port-au Prince. Later, the mission was expanded to provide additional military support for the reintroduction of President Aristide into the country. This was further extended by the assignment of the battalion as the sole military unit responsible for the security of the National Palace and for the personal safety and security of the Haitian President. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, in this authors assessment, did all that it was asked to do, and much more. The
battalion repeatedly displayed how versatile and agile it was in the conduct of various. Once again, it is this author's assessment that all assigned missions were completed to standard. The basis for this is predicated on some significant events. The first example was that there were no breaches of security at any time or location assigned to 1-22 Infantry's area of responsibility, including the National Palace and the President's personal residence. Additionally, and most rewarding, was the personal praise President Aristide gave, just prior to the unit's redeployment, to all of the soldiers and leaders of HHC and the rest 1-22 Infantry on their outstanding and professional performance while deployed to Haiti. These additional details on mission success will also resurface at the conclusion of this thesis.

1LTC (ret) Jeffery A. Baughman, Interview by author, 8 January 2000, Olathe Kansas.


3Ibid., 1-20.

4Operation Uphold Democracy, 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry), Written After-Action Review, reproduced and printed by Special Collections, Third Floor, Combined Arms Research Library, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 24 August 1999, 5.

5Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 57-64.

6Ibid., 60-61.

7Baughman.
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Ibid., p. 40.

Ibid., 40.

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28 Baughman.

29 Author's notes.

30 Ibid.

31 10th Mountain Division After-Action Review, 7, and Baughman.

32 Baughman.

33 Ibid.

34 Ibid.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSION

The ultimate purpose of this thesis is to examine the historical events of one battalion from the 10th Mountain Division as it conducted three key operations other than war during the early and mid-1990's. Among the considerations relevant to the thesis was the fact that same battalion, manned with the virtually the same soldiers and leaders, deployed over a short period on three successive missions. This set of facts resulted in a unique unit personality based upon distinct common experiences. What was the significance of continuity among the leaders and soldiers? What was the impact of repeated, closely spaced deployments? Did one deployment influence the perception and actions of 1-22 Infantry as it approached the next mission? Lastly, how well did the unit's perceptions of itself correspond to those of other participants and critical observers? This concluding chapter will address each of these questions in some detail, offer some conclusions based on these facts, and provide some insight as to what future research can be done beyond this thesis.

The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, experienced a very demanding and eventful three years from 1992 to 1995. Much has been written about the three operations in which the unit participated, but virtually nothing specific has been written on unit experiences. By undertaking this study, it was hoped that a few chapters of missing detailed history would fill that void and enlarge our understanding of events. Part of the original thought for this work came from the study of the 22nd Regiment’s long and distinguished history. There are volumes
written about the regiment's service in the Civil War, the Indian Wars, World War Two and Vietnam. Initial inquiries with the regiment's official society revealed a distinct lack of information on any recent events involving the first battalion. Requests from the president of the 22nd Infantry Society to fill that void partly precipitated the result produced here.

From a training perspective, it is evident that a key to success for 1-22 Infantry in its endeavors was to train vigorously. This manifested itself in the philosophy of the battalion commander, LTC William J. Martinez. Subsequent battalion and brigade commanders carried on the tradition, continually affirming the belief that a unit is best prepared to handle any situation if it is prepared to handle the worst of situations. The training event of choice to prepare a combat unit for the worst of situations was that of complex, live-fire exercises. The purpose of infantry is to close with and destroy the enemy by fire and maneuver—all infantrymen understand this and can easily train to that mission standard. However, in today's complex international environments, a combat unit may be called upon to perform tasks that do not remotely resemble any of its wartime missions. Still, the philosophy of training to the high end of the combat spectrum (as any operation can always be toned down, if necessary) was once again validated, as 1-22 Infantry proved during all of its deployed duties. Evidence of this fact is in the continual training focus of the unit prior to each of its deployments. The battalion leadership demanded tough, realistic, live-fire training throughout all deployment preparations. Live-fire training was supplemented with smaller efforts in the education of its soldiers with such items
as vignette lane training or instruction on the culture or distinctive aspects of the area of operation only after notification of an impending OOTW operation. The success of the unit on the ground, as prepared by its training regimen, is best illustrated by the preparation for and execution of operations in Somalia and Haiti (chapters three and four). The ability of 1-22 Infantry to change quickly its focus from humanitarian operations to combat operations in Somalia is one example. Another was the unit's ability again to refocus from combat operations to security and stability operations in Haiti. Both examples indicate that 1-22 Infantry did its job well. As outlined at the conclusion of chapters three and four, each mission that the battalion was asked to accomplish was completed more than satisfactorily. The unit's versatility and ability to deal with many different demands shows the hallmark of the training philosophy. The 1st Battalion, 22 Infantry, was prepared for the worst of situations, and handled them all well. This "high-end spectrum training" lesson learned is nothing new to the Army, but must continue to manifest itself in the preparation of units for future missions.

Another key factor discussed in this work had to do with the time between deployments for the same unit. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry conducted three deployments in as many years. Because such sequential deployments may be unavoidable in the future with today's shrinking Army, consideration of the impact on the unit and the mission will prove important.

Coupled with the dilemma of time between deployments is the peculiarity of the unit's personnel element. Average MTOE units that are not cohort (as 1-22 Infantry was) may enjoy a psychological advantage for newly assigned
OOTW missions by virtue of having an open mind and fresh approach to the new deployment. There is an important trade off, however, that is often overlooked when considering the mindset of a veteran soldier or unit when faced with similar deployments. This fact became clear during the interview process and further professional discussions with LTC (Ret) Baughman. He provided an excellent analogy that showed the pros and cons of these two juxtaposed points. A well-trained and experienced unit, with more than one operational deployment, may have a clouded or biased view of a newly assigned mission, tending to assume similarity to previous deployment experiences. Conversely, those veterans are unparalleled when it comes to action and reaction to the myriad of situations that units, and sometimes individual soldiers, can come across in these difficult operations other than war. Those veterans' greatest asset to successful mission accomplishment was their training and past deployment experience. Still, the less experienced soldier will not have a biased view of the deployment and may handle things differently and more delicately.¹ Which situation is better? Perhaps the experience coupled with the professionalism of the American soldier that this author saw during each deployment is the answer.

In regard to whether each deployment affected future deployments, there is suggestive evidence from interviews, developed in chapters three and four, that indicates they did. One distinguishing fact discovered in the research was that soldiers who were assigned to particular units, and who experienced direct, ground level action, found that previous deployments had a distinct bearing on how they perceived future operations. For example, interviews with combat
leaders (a rifle company commander and a rifle platoon leader), when compared to those of support unit leaders, illustrate this point. The rifle company commander from 2-14 Infantry and platoon leader from 1-22 Infantry were clearly affected by their combat experiences in Somalia, which tended to cloud their judgment on the conduct of the mission in Haiti. Many of their actions and feelings about Haiti seemed to be a result of experiences in Somalia and this led them to view Haiti the same as the previous deployment. Conversely, the interview with the support battalion S3 noted that support troops who served in Somalia went into Haiti with a more open mind. This point, of course, indicates a question for further research and is not a final conclusion as this may have been true for some but not for all. Individual experiences differed as pointed out in interviews with others such as another rifle platoon leader (Helms) and the brigade S3 (Baughman). They did not necessarily view Haiti as another Somalia—they recalled similarities, but not a fixed connection.

A comparable point emerges concerning similar units that experienced the same deployment area, but not necessarily the same environment. The comparison and contrast of unit experiences can be illustrated with each of the brigades in the 10th Mountain Division. For example, the two battalions of the 2nd Brigade that initially deployed into Somalia did not experience the same type of environment as the 1st Brigade and 1-22 Infantry that followed later. This may have had a direct impact on how the units behaved on the ground later in Haiti. As outlined in chapter three, the environment was much different in Somalia from December 1992 through March 1993 when 2nd Brigade was deployed to
Somalia. During that time, the environment was less stressful as the mission of the unit was to support humanitarian operations by providing security, stability and occasional show of force missions. The environment also allowed for more uninhibited movement throughout the AOR in accomplishment of the mission. The situation arguably provided an entirely different environment from June through August 1993 for 1st Brigade and 1-22 Infantry, and subsequently again into October 1993 for the Aviation Brigade and 2-14 Infantry, as each of these units concentrated solely on combat operations within the confines of Mogadishu.

Each of the brigades behaved differently in their various areas of operation as well. The 2nd Brigade, and in particular its subordinate battalion, 2-87 Infantry, appeared to conduct missions without the restraints that were imposed on the 1st Brigade. In Somalia, 2-87 Infantry was only assigned duties centered around Marka, a relatively quiet sector, with only a few deployments to the southern port city of Kismayo or other locations to deal with minor clan violence or to conduct show of force missions. Conversely, 1-22 Infantry was forced to give up the HRS duties in Marka and concentrated almost exclusively in Mogadishu, the eventual scene of many combat actions from June until October 1993. These facts and unit experiences had great importance later as each of the brigades and battalions deployed to conduct operations in Haiti. I believe that both brigade's actions in Haiti were partially a result of their experiences from assigned duties in Somalia. In Somalia, one unit maneuvered
freely in a more benign environment at the outset, and the other was burdened with more rigid restraints and a menacing environment near the end.

As both brigades and their subordinate battalions deployed to Haiti, the restraining factors were once again more prevalent on 1st Brigade and 1-22 than for 2nd Brigade and 2-87. Duties and actions in Cap Haitian were scrutinized far less by higher echelon leadership and the press. Additionally, 2nd Brigade had the luxury of a much smaller area of operation to be concerned with. Moreover, that AOR had less of an impact on Operation Uphold Democracy as a whole. This point is made to not degrade or downplay the importance of actions undertaken by units of the 2nd brigade, but merely to point out differences in unit behavior as a result of past operational experiences. Based on the distinct aspects of 2nd Brigade's area of operation, and its freedom of movement within the AOR, the unit was able to spend more of its time patrolling and interacting with the local population, thus increasing both security and popular Haitian opinion of the American presence there.4

Port-au-Prince, on the other hand, was clearly a much larger city, the main population center and center of gravity for the entire operation. This resulted in the 1st Brigade, assigned Port-au-Prince as its primary area of responsibility, bearing a larger share of public scrutiny. The sheer size of the city, coupled with the large number of static security requirements placed on units, reduced drastically the amount of time and resources available for patrolling and interaction with the local populace. This apparent lack of patrolling and interaction has been a point of consternation and criticism for the 1st
Brigade and 1-22 infantry for quite some time. The units of 1-22 Infantry were in fact constantly busy and were patrolling in Port-au-Prince, but were connected, unfairly, to the overall impression of many who studied the Haitian operation that all units were bunkered down and merely passing the time. Was this the result of learned unit experiences or from association with inaccurate and unfair perceptions by critics?

This question leads to the final concluding thoughts of this thesis. One point has already been emphasized above with the discussion of individual soldier and unit perceptions of future operations, based on the experience of each. These are internal perceptions and generally originate from individual soldiers in 1-22 Infantry or comparable military units. The opposite is external perception and tends to originate from unique (such as special operations forces [SOF]) units or from those outside the military.

These perceptions of one unit by another, or an outside source, are generally critical in nature and are often unfair assessments of the situation. One such assessment is outlined in a newspaper article and a book by writer Bob Shacochis, who covered events in Haiti for the New York Times. His assessment was that the mission in Haiti was conducted with two different U.S. Armies. The first Army was that of the U.S. Special Forces, in his view, the only worthwhile participants in the mission. The other was the Infantry of the 10th Mountain Division, who were, in his assessment, incapable of doing anything productive in Haiti. Shacochis viewed the 10th as an occupation force,
a “division of 15,000 Infantrymen, recent graduates of the University of Futility--Somalia Campus.” He goes on to say that when dealing with the mission requirements and the threats in Haiti, it was the U.S. Special Forces that were much more productive and better suited to handle situations, and that the Infantry (10th Mountain) had little to do “except guard itself.” Shacochis continued his unfair attack on the soldiers of the 10th Mountain Division in his book on Haiti entitled *The Immaculate Invasion* where he asserts, “all the Tenth Mountain knew how to do [in Haiti] was to dig in, run in place, or freak out.” He then continued that the 10th could undo in a minute all of the positive work the SF units had taken so much time to complete. These statements illustrate the clearest disparity in how events were recorded, particularly from the point of view of some in the press. It is clear to me that many people such as Bob Shacochis, were not seeing the whole story. The soldiers of 1-22 Infantry were doing much more than merely guarding themselves. Shacochis seems to have failed to focus below the division level when making his assessment of the situation in Haiti. Additionally, his day-to-day exposure to the mission came only from a direct association he had with U.S. Special Forces. Perhaps a few days “in the trenches” with the soldiers of 1-22 Infantry would have precluded such an unfair assessment.

These unfair assessments and perceptions often lead to improper labeling and negative association with the mention of a deployment mission. These labels, usually derogatory, generally describe the mission in one or two words.
These labels are manifested in the press and other forms of print and can potentially be detrimental to future operations, even before they start.

A current derogatory label of today is "siege mentality" or "bunker mentality." This label has its own negative connotation and is another moniker for the Army to shed. It is arguable that this term developed after the Somalia conflict, as Somalia operations presented the appearance to many who studied them that all UNISOM forces (even U.S. forces) stayed inside bunkers and allowed the menacing forces of warlords, such as Mohammad Farah Aidid, to control the capital and the surrounding countryside. This term was used again frequently during and after the Haiti deployment as U.S. forces in Port-au-Prince were criticized for the lack of continual patrolling and of remaining overnight in secured compounds. A Military Review article by Dr. Robert F. Baumann highlights this misperception:

After the mission's first few days, the perception developed at the JTF 180 headquarters—which remained in Haiti to support Shelton and the political mission to orchestrate the departure of Cedras and the return of Arisitide—that the 10th Mountain Division (L) was slow in getting out of its compound to establish real presence and interact with the populace.7

The article continues by stating that the Joint Psychological Operations Task Force (JPOTF) advised the commander of 10th Mountain Division "that U.S. patrols should establish a more visible presence in the streets to avoid a 'siege mentality' characteristic of recent operations in Somalia."8 It is easy to see how some observers arrived so quickly at conclusions such as "siege mentality." It is true that 1-22 Infantry was not continuously patrolling its AOR twenty-four hours a day, especially considering the amount of static security requirements
that were levied on the battalion. However, from this author’s perspective, when looking at both Somalia and Haiti, and 1-22 Infantry’s experience and actions in each, that mentality was nonexistent at the battalion level—hiding in bunkers was not the focus.

One must be careful about broadly applying phrases such as “bunker mentality” when comparing situations such as Somalia and Haiti. Deployed units, as this thesis has shown, have distinct parts and personalities. Therefore, they may not all behave in an identical manner. Again, that said, the overall impression of many was that all of the UNISOM forces in Mogadishu, and the majority of the 10th Mountain Division in Port-au-Prince, at any given time, were constantly bunkered down. This generalization is not accurate. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry, was as active as it was allowed to be in patrolling the areas in and around Mogadishu. The same could be said for the battalion’s actions in Haiti. The 1st Battalion, 22nd Infantry was extremely busy in Haiti and was clearly not bunkered down.

Perhaps breaking misperceptions and negative labeling is the next internal battle for the Army and its leaders to wage. How does the Army break this mold? An excellent place to start is to ensure accurate reporting of the facts surrounding military operations and to ensure complete analysis of a situation before allowing sources to criticize the mission, or the unit conducting the mission. After all, it is easy to be a Monday morning quarterback, but Sunday afternoons are a different story.
Closing Remarks

The evolution of this thesis from its genesis through completion has been extremely eye opening and will remain a high point of my professional development. The work has been generally rewarding and positive, but I must be truthful with my perceptions on the subject after concluding the research and writing. I was dismayed and somewhat shocked to discover how many different sources degraded the hard work of many soldiers and leaders of the 10th Mountain Division in both Somalia and Haiti. I was unaware of this negative image of the 10th Mountain Division until I arrived at the Command and General Staff College and began my research in earnest. I became painfully aware of the issue, in particular, as I underwent my interview process for the Combat Studies Institute Oral history Program. This thesis took on a life of its own as I found it necessary to point out many apparently unfair grievances and inaccuracies that I discovered in various other products and documents. This is by no means an attempt at vindication, or to degrade others' work, but merely an attempt to set the record straight for many of the veterans of the 10th Mountain Division that undoubtedly feel the way that I do about their service in these operations. The 10th Mountain Division, its subordinate units, and in particular, its soldiers, did their jobs well and extremely professionally in tough and unforgiving environments. To the nay sayers of the division's actions, I recommend re-looking at the facts with full knowledge and more detailed analysis. To my fellow comrades of 1-22 Infantry: "Regulars By God" and a job well done!
Acknowledgments. This thesis would not have been possible without the help of several key individuals that were very influential in seeing it to fruition. The knowledge, patience, guidance and assistance of all of the members of the thesis committee were invaluable to completing the work. Of special note is the help of the thesis chair, Dr. Robert F. Baumann, whose historical knowledge and never failing quiet but sincere guidance was outstanding. His right hand man and second reader, MAJ Steve Rauch was another staunch supporter and deserves great credit on seeing this to its end state. Invaluable also were those that participated in the oral history interviews, without whose inputs would have grounded this project from the beginning. Of greatest note, in this regard, are the comments, clarifications and assistance of LTC (R) Jeff Baughman--a great soldier, leader and mainstay of this effort. My sincerest thanks to all that assisted with the project.

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3Baughman and Helms.

4Analysis of comments made during Buckley interview.


8 Ibid., 17

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Secondary Sources


Combat Studies Institute Video Documentary. Rhythm of the Street. Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas.


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3. Dr. Robert F. Baumann  
   Combat Studies Institute  
   USACGSC  
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   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

4. MAJ Steven J. Rauch  
   Combat Studies Institute  
   USACGSC  
   1 Reynolds Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

5. Dr. Lawrence A. Yates  
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