DEPLOYMENT INTEGRATION OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE F/A-18 SQUADRONS: IS IT A VIABLE CONCEPT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

JONATHAN O. GACKLE, MAJOR, USMC
B. A., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1988

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
# Deployment Integration of United States Marine Corps and Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18 Squadrons: Is It A Viable Concept?

**Author(s):**
Major Jonathan O. Gackle, USMC

## Supplementary Notes

**DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT**
Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.

**ABSTRACT** (Maximum 200 words)
The *U.S. National Security Strategy* advocates an integrated strategic approach to security embodied by the terms Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now. Deployment integration is predicated on the third element—Preparing now for an uncertain future. The research model chosen for this study integrates an Australian F/A-18 squadron into the Marine F/A-18 unit deployment schedule at Marine Corps Air Station, Iwakuni, Japan.

The study concludes that deployment integration is indeed a viable cooperative security strategy that should be pursued. Although the research model is not recommended as a permanent arrangement, USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron integration is advanced as an important contingency capability. The effect of this arrangement is likened to a force multiplier in that when hostilities break out anywhere around the globe, an existing F/A-18 unit exchange can transition to an immediate RAAF contingency capability in Northeast Asia. The advantage of this contingency capability is added flexibility for geographic combatant commanders to use U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons in other regions of the world when circumstances demand it.

## Subject Terms
- F/A-18, deployment integration, cooperative security strategy, USMC, RAAF F/A 18, squadron integration

## Security Classification
- UNCLASSIFIED

## Number of Pages
- 184

## Limitation of Abstract
- UL
DEPLOYMENT INTEGRATION OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS AND ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE F/A-18 SQUADRONS: IS IT A Viable CONCEPT?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
Strategy

by

JONATHAN O. GACKLE, MAJOR, USMC
B. A., University of Minnesota, Minneapolis, Minnesota, 1988

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas 2000

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate:  Major Jonathan O. Gackle, USMC

Thesis Title:  Deployment Integration of United States Marine Corps and Royal Australian Air Force F/A-18 Squadrons: Is It A Viable Concept?

Approved by:

[Signature]
Stephen D. Coats, Ph.D.
Thesis Committee Chairman

[Signature]
Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Lickteig, M.S.
Member

[Signature]
Lieutenant Colonel Craig Orme, CSC.
Member

Accepted this 2d day of June 2000 by:

[Signature]
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.
Director, Graduate Degree Programs

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

DEPLOYMENT INTEGRATION OF UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS (USMC) AND ROYAL AUSTRALIAN AIR FORCE (RAAF) F/A-18 SQUADRONS: IS IT A VIABLE CONCEPT? by MAJOR Jonathan O. Gackle, USMC, 170 pages.

The *U.S. National Security Strategy* advocates an integrated strategic approach to security embodied by the terms Shape, Respond, and Prepare Now. Deployment integration is predicated on the third element--Preparing Now for an uncertain future. The research model chosen for this study integrates an Australian F/A-18 squadron into the Marine F/A-18 unit deployment schedule at Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan.

The study concludes that deployment integration is indeed a viable cooperative security strategy that should be pursued. Although the research model is not recommended as a permanent arrangement, USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron integration is advanced as an important contingency capability. The effect of this arrangement is likened to a force multiplier in that when hostilities break out anywhere around the globe, an existing F/A-18 unit exchange can transition to an immediate RAAF contingency capability in Northeast Asia. The advantage of this contingency capability is added flexibility for geographic combatant commanders to use U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons in other regions of the world when circumstances demand it.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

This thesis could not have been satisfactorily completed without the cooperation and input from several key people—military and civilian—who provided different perspectives based on their own experience in the U.S. and Australian defense communities. Their opinions were essential in developing a comprehensive analysis, the conclusions and ultimately, the recommendations that are presented in this paper.

Appreciation is extended to the following individuals whose contributions helped to steer the direction and focus of this study: author and RAAF historian, Dr. Alan Stephens, from the Aerospace Studies Center in Australia; Dr. Thomas Durell Young, Research Professor of National Security at the Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle, PA; General Charles C. Krulak (ret) former Commandant of the Marine Corps; Lieutenant General E. B. Hailston, Commanding General, III Marine Expeditionary Force; Major General W. C. Gregson, Director of Asia Pacific Affairs, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense; Colonel C. T. Hayes, Assistant Chief of Staff, Aviation Logistics Department, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing; Colonel Paul Peyton, Chairman, Department of Regional Studies, Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies, Honolulu, HI; Group Captain Peter McDermott, A/Director-General Military Strategy, Australian Defense Force and; Wing Commander Mel Hupfeld, Project Director - Air 6000, Australian Defense Force.

Special thanks goes to civilian and military officials from the defense community who took time to meet personally and discuss the merits, shortfalls, and wider implications associated with the research proposal. Among those that contributed through counsel and advice from a U.S. military perspective were General Terrence R. Dake, Assistant Commandant of the Marine Corps; General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command; Lieutenant General R. P. Ayres, Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies, and Operations, Headquarters Marine Corps; Rear Admiral W. W. Pickavance, Director of Operations for U.S. Pacific Command and; Major General Robert Magnus, Deputy Commander Marine Forces Pacific and; Mr. Lawrence F. Farrar, Political Advisor
to the Commandant of the Marine Corps. Likewise, contributing from an Australian political and military perspective were Ms. Adrienne Jackson, Counselor Defense Policy, Australian Embassy, Washington, DC, and Brigadier Gordon Jones, Australian Military Attaché.

This thesis would have been incomplete without contribution from the warfighters—those at the tactical level. Among the many who contributed, there are three who deserve special mention: Wing Commander Geoff Brown (ret), former Commanding Officer of No. 3 Squadron (1997-1999); Squadron Leader Steven Roberton, former RAAF exchange pilot at Marine Corps Air Station Beaufort, SC (1996-1998) and; Major Robert Rhinhorst, former USMC exchange pilot at RAAF Base Tindal (1997-1999).

A special thank you must also go to the thesis committee chairman, Dr. Stephen Coats, and thesis committee members Lieutenant Colonel Fred Lickteig (USMC), and Lieutenant Colonel Craig Orme (Australian Army). Their generosity in time, their patient guidance in working through difficult aspects of the paper, and the unwavering support they maintained throughout the process were important factors that contributed to the final product.

Finally, this project could not have been satisfactorily completed were it not for the wide range of support that came through the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) and the Graduate Degree Program office. The CGSOC curriculum provided an essential framework for the understanding of strategic, operational, and tactical level concepts discussed in this paper. The knowledge gained through Advanced Application Program courses offered by the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations was particularly useful in crafting the strategic setting and analyzing Asia Pacific flash points. Frequent consultations with the Graduate Degree Program staff, and the array of services provided by the Command and General Staff College and Combined Arms Research Library contributed immeasurably to this thesis.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>THESIS APPROVAL PAGE</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>iii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS</td>
<td>viii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS</td>
<td>x</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>xi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CHAPTER</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1. INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Australian Bilateral Ties</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Primary Research Question and Methodology</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Level Preview</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Level Preview</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tactical Level Preview</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assumptions</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Limitations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Delimitations</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Significance of the Study</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. STRATEGIC ANALYSIS</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Strategic Setting</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Point: Korean Peninsula</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Point: China and Taiwan</td>
<td>23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Point: South China Sea</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Point: India and Pakistan</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flash Point: Indonesia and East Timor</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia’s Strategic Policy</td>
<td>42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Australian Strategic Partnership</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Strategic Policy</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.-Japan-Australia Tripartite Arrangement</td>
<td>52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan: The Constitutional Dilemma</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Introduction</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S. Armed Forces Operational Setting</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
### ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ADAC</td>
<td>AUSMIN Defense Acquisition Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADEX</td>
<td>Air Defense Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADF</td>
<td>Australian Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMDA</td>
<td>Anglo-Malayan Defense Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMRAAM</td>
<td>Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ANZUS</td>
<td>Australia-New Zealand-United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>APEU</td>
<td>Asia Pacific Economic Update</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARF</td>
<td>ASEAN Regional Forum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASEAN</td>
<td>Association of Southeast Asian Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASP 97</td>
<td>Australia's Strategic Policy document from December 1997 Strategic Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ASRAAM</td>
<td>Advanced Short-Range Air-to-Air Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AUSMIN</td>
<td>Australia-United States Ministerial Consultations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CT98</td>
<td>COPE THUNDER 1998</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVW</td>
<td>Carrier Air Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DFAT</td>
<td>Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DMMH/FH</td>
<td>Direct Maintenance Manhours per Flight Hour</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPP</td>
<td>Democratic Progressive Party (of Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DPRK</td>
<td>Democratic People's Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EASR</td>
<td>East Asia Strategy Report</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ECP-583</td>
<td>Engineering Change Proposal</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEZ</td>
<td>Exclusive Economic Zone</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EW</td>
<td>Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPDA</td>
<td>Five Power Defense Arrangements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HARM</td>
<td>High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HNS</td>
<td>Host Nation Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HQMC</td>
<td>Headquarters Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HUG</td>
<td>Hornet Upgrade Project</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IADS</td>
<td>Integrated Air Defense System</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMA</td>
<td>Intermediate Maintenance Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSDF</td>
<td>Japanese Self-Defense Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSF</td>
<td>Joint Strike Fighter</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KMT</td>
<td>Kuomintang (Chinese Nationalist Party of Taiwan)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LFE</td>
<td>Large Force Employment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-11</td>
<td>Marine Aircraft Group 11, MCAS Miramar, CA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-12</td>
<td>Marine Aircraft Group 12, MCAS Iwakuni, Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAG-31</td>
<td>Marine Aircraft Group 31, MCAS Beaufort, SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MALS</td>
<td>Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MARFORPAC</td>
<td>Marine Forces Pacific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAW</td>
<td>Marine Aircraft Wing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCAS</td>
<td>Marine Corps Air Station</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCWL</td>
<td>Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEF</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOLE</td>
<td>Maneuver Operations in the Littoral Environment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATOPS</td>
<td>Naval Training and Operating Procedures Standardization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAVAIR</td>
<td>Naval Air Systems Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Noncommissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCA</td>
<td>Offensive Counter Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>O&amp;M</td>
<td>Operation and Maintenance</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OMFTS</td>
<td>Operational Maneuver From the Sea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operations Tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Pacific Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PEP</td>
<td>Personnel Exchange Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PERSTEMPO</td>
<td>Personnel Tempo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLA</td>
<td>People's Liberation Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRC</td>
<td>People's Republic of China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RAAF</td>
<td>Royal Australian Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROK</td>
<td>Republic of Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOFA</td>
<td>Status of Forces Agreement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STOM</td>
<td>Ship to Objective Maneuver</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TACAIR</td>
<td>Tactical Air</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEEP</td>
<td>Training Exercise Employment Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFG</td>
<td>Tactical Fighter Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>T&amp;S</td>
<td>Travel and Subsistence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UDP</td>
<td>Unit Deployment Program</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UK</td>
<td>United Kingdom</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USMC</td>
<td>United States Marine Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VMFA</td>
<td>Marine Fighter Attack Squadron</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WESTPAC</td>
<td>Western Pacific</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
# ILLUSTRATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Figure</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Asia Pacific Flash Points</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Regional Chokepoints</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. South China Sea</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4. Cross-Training Participants</td>
<td>159</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Assessment Criteria Matrix for Deployment Integration</td>
<td>120</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
GLOSSARY

Common understanding regarding the definition of key terms used throughout this thesis is central to defining and weighing the question of deployment integration. It is equally important to distinguish deployment integration as a new concept, set in the context of broader strategic policy.

The concept of deployment integration is predicated on five major principles of “Preparing Now” that are outlined in the U.S. National Military Strategy:

1. Interoperability. “Laying a solid foundation for interoperability with our alliance and potential coalition partners is fundamental to effective combined operations. We remain committed to doctrinal and technological development with our key allies and to combined training events and exercises that contribute to interoperability.” (NMS 1997, 14)

2. Overseas Presence. “Overseas presence enhances coalition operations by promoting joint and combined training and encouraging responsibility sharing on the part of friends and allies.” (NMS 1997, 12)

3. Posture. “Most U.S. forces are based in CONUS but are continuously available for deployment. We will maintain roughly 100,000 military personnel in both the European and Pacific regions and an appropriate presence in the Arabian Gulf region. . . . These forces affirm our leadership of important alliances and allow us to help shape allied defense capabilities.” (NMS 1997, 15)

4. Capabilities. “The U.S. military must have capabilities . . . able to defeat adversaries in two distant, overlapping major theater wars . . .” (NMS 1997, 15)

5. Readiness. “Ready forces provide the flexibility needed to shape the global environment, deter potential foes and, if required, to rapidly respond to a full spectrum of crisis and threats, including major theater wars.” (NMS 1997, 15)

It is in this context of the U.S. National Military Strategy that the term, deployment integration, was conceived and is defined. The terms that follow—security communities, security cooperation, and security pluralism—are post-Cold War multilateral security concepts used throughout this study. While there are nuances in the meaning of each term, they all share a common link to deployment integration. In short, deployment integration is a manifestation of these concepts—deployment integration is billed as the mechanism by which these security concepts can be brought to fruition.

Deployment Integration. A cooperative framework allowing groups of nations to assume shared responsibility for mutual security objectives in geographic areas of common strategic interest by joining allied military units in a forward-based, unit deployment arrangement. At the strategic level, deployment integration is seen as a cooperative security arrangement that transcends the traditional definition of collective defense (presupposing the existence of alliances) and collective security (deterring aggression between principal state actors in a region who also agree on the norms that govern international action). In essence, it is collective defense with a collective security benefit! At the operational and tactical level, deployment integration is a forward deployed arrangement that fully integrates—from command and control to operational employment—a subordinate allied component into the organizational structure of a larger allied command for limited periods. The conceptual model for this study involves allied military units from the U.S. and Australia; joined at a forward deployed site in Japan.
Security Communities. Karl Deutsch, a political scientist, coined this term to describe a community of nations that have dependable expectations of peaceful change. The concept has been adopted by the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis C. Blair, to describe his vision of the way ahead for military cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Security communities may be willing to put their collective efforts into resolving regional points of friction; contribute armed forces to support diplomatic solutions and; may plan, train, and exercise their armed forces together for these operations. Members of a security community need not be signatories to a security treaty, they can simply be groupings of nations that share a common geographic or functional concerns (U.S. Congress, Senate 2000, 17).

Security Cooperation. Security cooperation is a post-Cold War security concept designed to meet the challenges of a transformed agenda for the international system. It is a model of intrastate relations in which disputes are expected to occur, but they are expected to do so within the limits of agreed upon norms and established procedures. The term presupposes fundamentally compatible security objectives and seeks to establish collaborative rather than confrontational relationships among national military establishments (Nolan 1994, 4-5).

Security Pluralism. This term is from the U.S. Department of Defense East Asia Strategy Report published in 1998. Security pluralism refers to an array of cooperative and complementary frameworks in which nations seek to address their security concerns through the establishment of bilateral and multilateral relationships and dialogue (EASR 1998, 42).

The following are common terms related to military operations. The definitions are provided to help distinguish nuances between the meaning of words associated with subjects discussed in this paper. The definitions also provide a basis to clarify deployment integration—what it is and what it is not.

Alliance. A result of formal agreements between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives (Joint Pub 1-02 1998, 26).

Coalition. An ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action. Whereas alliance members typically have common national political and economic systems, coalitions often bring together nations of diverse cultures for a limited period of time (Joint Pub 1-02 1998, 82).

Combined. Connotes a military force composed of elements of two or more allied nations (Joint Pub 1-02 1998, 89).

Deployment. Relocation of an operational unit from its home station to an overseas operating site for a limited period and then returning to its home station (Joint Pub 1-02 1998, 33).

Interoperability. The ability of systems, units, or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable effective operations together (Joint Pub 1-02 1998, 231). A lack of interoperability means that incompatibilities exist between weapons systems, support equipment, and in operating procedures. These incompatibilities can very seriously reduce the efficiency level of a total force below what its sheer numerical value would seem to provide (Robertson 1987, 166).

Integration / Integrated. The uniting, blending, or joining together of one unit into another for simultaneous employment (Joint Pub 1-02 1998, 230).
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

U.S.-Australian Bilateral Ties

The defense links between the United States and Australia have never been stronger. Today I say, again, with utter confidence, our alliance is not just for this time, it is for all time.

President Clinton, Address to Australian Parliament, November 1996

The United States and Australia have a long-standing alliance forged by a common heritage, shared political values, like-minded economic philosophies, and an enduring coincidence of strategic interests and objectives. Each of these pillars contributes to forming the solid relationship that leads to a complimentary agenda in nearly all political, economic, and military arenas. The Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) Treaty of 1951 serves as the foundation for a legacy of defense partnership between the two nations and it is the cornerstone for U.S. security arrangements in the Asia Pacific region (EASR 1998, 26).

Redefined and strengthened by realities of the post-Cold War strategic environment, the U.S.-Australia alliance relationship continues to thrive based on mutual values and shared security interests. The political, diplomatic, and military support that each nation provides the other is fundamental to maintaining the national security and economic prosperity of both. Australia backs key U.S. strategic policies including among other things: the goal of developing a substantial security role for the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) Regional Forum; strategies for countering proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and systems for their delivery and; efforts to promote freer and fairer international trade through international fora, such as the World Trade Organization and Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation forum.

As a close and trusted ally, Australia has demonstrated a long-standing determination to pull its weight in the security field, striving to provide for its own self-reliant defense. At the same time, Canberra has played a vital role in supporting U.S. security interests by facilitating combined and unilateral exercises, providing essential logistic services, and granting consistent port access—all of
which are necessary to ensure readiness and coordinated responses to regional contingencies. The existence of these arrangements underscores the importance of Australia to regional security. It also demonstrates her commitment to a regional engagement strategy that is based, in part, on a credible and potent American presence in the Asia Pacific (EASR 1998, 12-13).

Similarly, the U.S. provides much to Australia. Among other things, America is a central component of Australia's security and defense network, as well as a primary source of technological innovation, military equipment, and intelligence. This cooperation provides Australia's forces with technology and information which is fundamental to its defense capability. The U.S. is also a key economic partner, particularly in relation to trade and investment (DFAT 1997, 32).

Primary Research Question and Methodology

Deployment integration of United States Marine Corps (USMC) and Royal Australian Air Force (RAAF) F/A-18 squadrons is a theoretical expansion of what military units already do in the way of combined exercises and coalition operations. Whether deployment integration is a viable concept for twenty-first century security arrangements is the question this thesis will answer. The research model chosen to illustrate the concept integrates an Australian F/A-18 squadron into the USMC F/A-18 Unit Deployment Program (UDP) schedule at Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Iwakuni, Japan.

The concept of a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment arrangement in Northeast Asia is predicated on the timing of separate, unrelated circumstances having strategic, operational, and tactical linkages. For example, a common allied weapons system is linked to an operationally stretched military in America, and a more poised and regionally focused defense force in Australia. The strategic element that intersects with the operational and the tactical linkages is the post-Cold War Asia Pacific environment and the realities of globalization. In short, deployment integration is tied to the mutual U.S.-Australian security objectives that derive the strategic incentives to improve interoperability between forces, which helps both countries to meet their global responsibilities.
It is emphasized that when contemplating deployment integration of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadrons the power of the idea is diminished if strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances are looked at in isolation. This is why research was conducted from U.S. and Australian strategic perspectives, as well as USMC and RAAF operational and tactical perspectives. Indeed, the very idea of deployment integration is grounded in and flows from the strategic, operational, and tactical considerations.

The thesis format is an extension of this logic. In other words, from the primary research question there emerge three subordinate questions that are related to the strategic, operational, and tactical elements of research. This is explained in Chapter 1 where the primary research question is introduced and the three subordinate questions are previewed. Chapter 1 also outlines assumptions, limitations, and delimitations that are associated with the work, as well as the significance of the study. The research and analysis component of this study is captured in Chapters 2, 3, and 4. These chapters are dedicated to significant issues raised at each level of warfare—the strategic, operational, and tactical. Chapter 5 includes the conclusions and recommendations, as well as some concluding thoughts on deployment integration and opportunities the concept presents. The literature review at Appendix A is a synopsis of the major sources cited in the study.

The Department of Defense (DOD) *East Asia Strategy Report* states that America “remain[s] ready to promote fresh approaches to security in response to changes in the regional environment” (EASR 1998, 8). To provide a fresh approach to security is the precise aim of this thesis. Built on the foundation of common security interests and objectives, deployment integration is a cooperative framework through which the U.S. and Australia are able to achieve political goals with limited resources. From this defense arrangement emerge benefits that span the strategic, operational, and tactical spectrum; benefits that transcend the traditional boundary of cooperation and extend to the greater Asia Pacific region. Although the research model is narrowly focused on Australia and the F/A-18 weapons platform, it should not detract from considering wider application of the idea.
Strategic Level Preview

The first subordinate question, discussed in Chapter 2, examines the strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region. Initially, analysis is focused on the regional flash points shown in Figure 1. The focus is then shifted to an examination of how these post-Cold War realities have changed U.S. and Australian national security strategy, and what the consequences are relative to the concept of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration in Northeast Asia. Knowledge of the current strategic setting is fundamental to the subsequent analysis done in this paper.

![Map of Asia](image)

Figure 1. Asia Pacific Flash Points (CIA World Fact Book 1998)

Entering the twenty-first century, the Asia Pacific region presents opportunities for greater prosperity, but it is also an area poised for armed conflict. Uncertain of the intentions of neighbors and regional powers, and subject to rising nationalism, the prospect of crises and danger is high. Chief among allied security concerns is the Korean Peninsula and China’s intentions as a twenty-first
century military and economic power. Historical mistrust and ongoing territorial disputes, including those in the South China Sea and the Taiwan Straits exemplify regional tension. After India and Pakistan conducted nuclear tests in May 1998, the specter of war between these two countries took on a new dimension. The result is new security complications not only for South Asia, but also for all Asia Pacific nations. These controversies are flash points centered on issues of sovereignty and nationalism (EASR 1998, 7).

Another factor relevant to the strategic environment and security calculations of the region is high growth rates that have transformed a number of Asian countries from agrarian societies to dynamic, export-oriented economies. Consequently, the 1997 Asian financial crisis and Indonesia’s economic and political difficulties, particularly with regard to the upheaval in East Timor, had far-reaching implications for the region. These are some of the major crises that concern Washington as principal guarantor of regional peace. They are of proportionate concern to Canberra where growing economic links and an increased stake in Asian security issues are more fully realized. Rising East Asia (e.g., the ASEAN states) and the consequent shift in the world economic center of gravity is changing the relativities of power and influence in the region. This, coupled with the phenomenon of globalization, makes Australia more vulnerable to shockwaves from Asia (DFAT 1997, 14-16). The effect gives rise to Australia’s middle power dilemma.

As the strategic focus narrows, analysis is shifted to Australia’s emergent national security strategy and invigorated partnership with the U.S. This is a byproduct of the post-Cold War strategic environment and the Coalition government that assumed office on 2 March 1996. The Joint Security Declaration issued after the Australia-U.S. Ministerial (AUSMIN) talks in July 1996 reaffirmed the alliance relationship and underscored its centrality to Canberra’s security policy (DOD 1997, 18). This was followed up by the government’s strategic review released in December 1997, Australia’s Strategic Policy (ASP 97), which marked the recognition of Australia’s broader requirements for security in the Asia Pacific region.
In the past, Australia has emphasized defense cooperation with Southeast Asian neighbors. Today, Canberra sees its relationship with Washington as the number one strategic priority (DOD 1999, 18). In addition to this relationship, the government has broadened its regional contacts by giving greater priority to strategic dialogue and exchanges of information with Japan, China, and South Korea (McLachlan 1997, RUSI, 12). This is a major post-Cold War development that factors into the research outcome. For example, the notion of a RAAF F/A-18 squadron deployed to and operating from Japanese soil raises both constitutional and political issues. The weight of these issues demanded that specific research effort be dedicated to Japan and the implication of its role as a partner in the cooperative security arrangement outlined in this thesis.

The *U.S. National Security Strategy* and *East Asia Strategy Report* articulate Washington’s policy in the Asia Pacific region. While the post-Cold War environment has had an effect on U.S. policy in the region, the change has been less profound than in Australia. Simply put, America’s strategic intent is to help dampen the sources of instability by maintaining a policy of engagement, overseas presence, and strengthened alliances. The U.S.-Australia alliance is a vital element of an overall strategy in which the military plays a key role (EASR 1998, 7). Military responsibility for the Asia Pacific region is assigned to the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC). Pacific Command’s (PACOMs) mission is to “promote peace, deter aggression, respond to crisis and if necessary, fight and win in order to guarantee security and stability throughout the Asia Pacific region” (Prueher 1998, 27). This strategy is anchored by Washington’s commitment to maintain a forward presence of 100,000 military troops in the region (EASR 1998, 10).

Three U.S. Marine Corps F/A-18 squadrons are part of PACOM’s forward presence. One *Hornet* squadron is permanently assigned to the Pacific Theater and two are on UDP rotations from CONUS. Host nation support (HNS) is provided by Japan, through agreements contained in the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security. These squadrons are attached to Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12) at MCAS Iwakuni.
**Operational Level Preview**

The second subordinate question, discussed in Chapter 3, is related to operational level forces and the implications associated with USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration. As a point of departure, initial analysis is more broadly focused on the post-Cold War operational environment from a DOD perspective. The focus is then narrowed to a service-level perspective where the analysis shifted to particular circumstances that confront the respective USMC and RAAF *Hornet* communities. Given the limited defense budgets that each service contends with, research and analysis is also dedicated to financial considerations associated with deployment integration.

The U.S. military perspective was framed in the context of increased requirements and fewer resources. For example, military personnel were sent on forty-eight overseas missions in the 1990s. Ten contingencies were carried out against Iraq, fifteen operations were executed in the Balkans, and Haiti required five different deployments. Since the demise of the Soviet Union nearly every part of the world has hosted American troops. From air wars over Iraq, Bosnia, and Kosovo, to hurricane and earthquake relief work in Guam and Central America, to Haiti and East Timor where it has been peacekeeping. In contrast to the forty-eight operations in one decade, the military was sent on only twenty such missions in the fifteen years between the American exit from Vietnam and the Cold War’s end. Amid the dramatically increased operations tempo (OPTEMPO) and personnel tempo (PERSTEMPO), there has been a corresponding decrease in U.S. active duty force structure (about 800,000 troops) and organizational structure. The Army went from eighteen to ten active divisions; the Navy went from 567 ships to just over 300; and the Air Force lost half its twenty-four fighter wings (*Washington Times*, 28 March 2000, 6). Viewed in this context, the idea of responsibility sharing and partnership through an integrated deployment arrangement has merit.

International circumstances and the American military experience during the past decade led General Charles C. Krulak to conclude that the U.S. Marine Corps had reached a “strategic inflection point” and that this will result in a kind of “revolution in national security affairs.” Consequently,
this led to development of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL) in Quantico, VA, and a five-year experimental effort called Sea Dragon (Krulak 1996, 28). Sea Dragon will be followed up by another warfighting experiment geared toward preparing the Marine Corps for future national security challenges, Coalition Warrior, scheduled to begin in 2001 (Coalition Warrior Advance Sheet 1999). Given the parallels that exist between the concepts advanced in this thesis and the MCWL’s warfighting experimentation, it is surmised that the Marines would have unique interest in the possibilities that deployment integration presents.

The Chapter 3 analysis includes a detailed review of USMC and ADF engagement activities and an explanation of what the expanding defense relationship provides in the way of operational level benefits. This is followed by a thorough analysis of the USMC F/A-18 operational setting. On the surface it would appear that there is little incentive in pursuing an integrated deployment arrangement with the Australians. However, when the layers are peeled back evidence shows that Marine Hornet squadrons are, in fact, doing a lot more with a lot less. A review of recent history indicates that there have been and continue to be second and third order affects associated with sustained, high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO. In other words, Marines are not immune to the adverse effects of being over-deployed.

The operational level analysis then shifts to a review of Australian defense policy, the Five Power Defense Arrangements (FPDA), and the RAAF F/A-18 operational setting. History shows that in Australian defense policy the pendulum has swung from forward defense in the 1950s and 1960s to continental defense in the 1980s and early 1990s. The 1997 strategic review marked the most distinct shift in recent times, reflecting a policy that demands more of the ADF in terms of geographic reach, current preparedness, and the potential intensity of conflict (Woodman 1999, 50). However, from an Australian DOD perspective there is difficulty in reconciling a more ambitious agenda for the ADF on one hand, with limited defense spending on the other. The concept of USMC and RAAF deployment integration is analyzed in the context of this dilemma.
A brief historical review of the FPDA in Chapter 3 is relevant given that since the 1950s the Arrangements have been the hub of regional engagement activities for the ADF. In 1971 the existing defense arrangement was replaced with a new consultative body that included Australia, Singapore, Malaysia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom (UK). During the same period it was decided that an Integrated Air Defense System (IADS) would be established within the framework of the FPDA. The FPDA’s linkage to the RAAF F/A-18 operational setting is through IADS and the ADF’s present day commitment to a series of FPDA exercises in which the center of activity for the F/A-18s is the Air Defense Exercise (ADEX). The operational analysis is focused on the relevance of these deployment obligations in terms of strategic value to Australia and training value to the RAAF. This analysis is paralleled with an examination of RAAF F/A-18 activity with U.S. air forces.

The operational analysis concludes with a discussion of financial considerations. The fact is that whether in Washington or Canberra, today’s resource constrained environment dictates that the value of an idea is assessed in terms of cost. Central to the financial assessment is an understanding that deployment integration is a new concept, which falls into a category that is neither training nor exercising. Instead, this cooperative arrangement is grounded in the idea of shared mutual security responsibilities. It is on this basis that a quid pro quo costing theory is applied. In other words, the “big-ticket” costs are a shared responsibility, balanced properly among the governments of Japan, Australia, and the U.S.

Tactical Level Preview

The third subordinate question, discussed in Chapter 4, is focused on the tactical level of war and the implications associated with deployment integration of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadrons. The fundamental concern among U.S. commanders is whether Australian F/A-18s are configured to participate in the full spectrum of combat operations. Beyond this, the analysis draws on advantages that come as a result of the common weapons system and more specifically, each service’s doctrinal employment of the weapons system. Also discussed in Chapter 4 are the logistic support issues to be
considered with deployment integration, the human dimension, and the long-term view of USMC and RAAF squadron integration—beyond the F/A-18.

In addressing the question of weapons system configuration and functional capability the analytical focus turns to the parallel upgrade programs that are currently in progress. The USMC upgrade is called Engineering Change Proposal (ECP-583) and the RAAF equivalent is the Hornet Upgrade Project (HUG). Both programs are designed to modify older “A” model F/A-18s to the most updated “C” model F/A-18 configuration—an imperative in today’s operational setting.

Doctrinally there is little difference in how USMC and RAAF squadrons employ the F/A-18 weapons system; however, there is some disparity in the emphasis each service gives to particular roles and missions. Generally speaking, Marine Hornets are more focused on the air-to-ground role and the RAAF is more air-to-air oriented. The important point to be made is that both services are well trained and able to adapt themselves to whatever missions are required. Likewise, when it comes to logistic support issues, minor difficulties can be overcome by adapting to the situation. Although the advantages of a common weapons system are significant in an integrated deployment scenario, the analytical focus is on identifying those areas of supply and maintenance support that are most likely to be problematic.

A discussion regarding the human element of deployment integration is relevant given the contradiction of circumstances in the USMC and RAAF Hornet communities. It is important to note that Marine F/A-18 squadrons are gainfully employed in real-world activities and to some extent the sustained high OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO has an adverse effect on morale and the retention of aircrew and maintenance personnel. Conversely, the RAAF fighter attack community has not been engaged in a real-world operational activity since the Korean War. On this basis of comparison, it is arguable that for reasons exactly opposite to those associated with the Marine Corps, the RAAF’s leadership is experiencing its own difficulties with morale and the retention of its F/A-18 aircrew and maintenance personnel.
The tactical analysis in Chapter 4 concludes with a discussion of deployment integration beyond the F/A-18. The Marine Corps has already committed itself to the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) as a replacement aircraft for the AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18 Hornet. In Australia, Project Air 6000 is the vehicle by which the RAAF is moving ahead in its search for a new platform to replace the F/A-18 and F-111 (Ritchie 1999). The parallel timelines chosen to replace aging tactical aviation (TACAIR) capabilities creates the possibility for USMC-RAAF collaboration, if defense planners in Canberra choose the JSF as a “RAAF niche capability” over long-range strike. The AUSMIN Defense Acquisition Committee (ADAC) would have a valuable role to play in any collaborative effort between the two services. Joint development of a USMC-RAAF JSF variant complements the Australian Army’s maneuver operations in the littoral environment (MOLE), the potential for future USMC-ADF combined task force operations, and the long-term prospect for deployment integration.

Assumptions

1. In response to questions regarding viability of a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment arrangement in Japan, General Anthony C. Zinni, Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command, was quick to emphasize that all forward deployed forces must be prepared to go to war. Although he is not responsible for the PACOM area of responsibility, General Zinni went on to say that the concept of deployment integration does have merit; however, as a warfighting CINC his overriding concern would be that Australia must have the will to commit forces when the situation demands it (Zinni 1999). That said, it is important to recognize that deployment integration represents the introduction of Australian F/A-18 squadrons into an operational environment that is more benign than war, but less benign than the traditional joint or combined exercise. In the event deterrence fails and hostilities break out, the assumption is that Australia would not hesitate in committing forward deployed F/A-18s alongside American combat forces. This assumption is based on historical precedent and the confluence of U.S. and Australian economic and security interests in the Pacific Theater (see Chapter 2 analysis).
2. Japan provides HNS for the land-based contingent of thirty-six USMC F/A-18s (three squadrons). Understanding that in an integrated deployment scenario, a RAAF Hornet squadron (twelve F/A-18 aircraft) would be operating at MCAS Iwakuni in place of a Marine squadron. Because there is no increase in the number of F/A-18s on the ramp, it is assumed that the government of Japan would accept the presence of an Australian unit on Japanese soil provided the formal agreement was under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement. This assumption is based on the fact that military cooperation between Japan and Australia suits an emerging partnership being forged between the two Asia Pacific nations. Moreover, increased military engagement is a logical extension of the two nations’ shared perspectives on regional security (DFAT 1997, 33). See Chapter 2 analysis regarding Japan and the constitutional dilemma associated with Article 9.

3. An integrated deployment arrangement with the RAAF does not increase the number of aircraft or the number of personnel at MCAS Iwakuni; it simply means that an Australian F/A-18 squadron assumes the operational role of what would otherwise be a USMC squadron. In short, Australia takes on an integral role in the regional security structure that serves Japan (and the Korean Peninsula). Therefore, the assumption is that standard USMC basing privileges and HNS services would apply to the RAAF squadron that is assigned to MAG-12 in place of a USMC squadron. See Chapter 3 for the analysis on financial considerations.

4. It is assumed that Washington’s current policy regarding engagement in the Asia Pacific (e.g., 100,000 forward deployed troops) and Canberra’s trend toward a more expanded strategic focus that covers the whole Asia Pacific will continue for the long-term. This assumption is based on the fact that as the global economy grows and becomes more interdependent, instability becomes less and less tolerable. That is why a continued credible forward presence by the U.S. is so vital and that is why Australia has expanded its area of primary strategic interest beyond Southeast Asia and the South Pacific to an area throughout the Asia Pacific (DOD 1997, 9-10). By helping to underwrite stability and providing the security foundation upon which Asian economies can
grow free from external pressures, it helps to defuse issues that potentially lead to conflict. This is good for the U.S., it is good for Australia, and it is good for Japan. In the tripartite arrangement each country ultimately profits economically while doing its share to enhance regional security. Markets replace threats, and trading partners replace enemies. At the same time, geography will not change—the tyranny of distance in Asia remains. Distance equates to time, and time equates to political leverage. The more immediate the involvement, the more rapid and credible the response, the more opportunity to influence events that produce outcomes favorable to the interests of all (Krulak 1996, 21). Recent events in Indonesia and East Timor bear this out. With regard to Australia, it is further assumed that the new Defense White Paper—due out in mid-year 2000—will validate the strategic direction already outlined in ASP 97.

Limitations

The significant limitation of this study was in assessing the reaction from the community of nations that comprise the Asia Pacific region. For example, Beijing will certainly see deployment integration in terms of the old Cold War paradigms, such as “containment” and “balance of power.” Some ASEAN states are likely to view U.S.-Australian defense cooperation in Northeast Asia terms of the West attempting to dominate the region. Still yet, other friends and nations may see USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration for what it really is—part of a necessary and increasing trend toward cooperative security in the Asia Pacific. There are also limitations in assessing Japan’s reaction to the proposals presented in this thesis. Nonetheless, recognizing that the fate of USMC and RAAF deployment integration ultimately lies in Tokyo’s response, reasons are advanced as to why a U.S.-Japan-Australia tripartite security arrangement would be in Japan’s best interest.

Delimitations

1. It is acknowledged that while Australian F/A-18s integrated with MAG-12 at MCAS Iwakuni would also be contributing to the security of South Korea, the analytical scope of this study was delimited to the U.S., Australia, Japan, China, and ASEAN.
2. Although deployment integration is introduced as a concept that can be applied to any U.S. ally and military capability, the scope of this study was delimited to the U.S.-Australia alliance and the F/A-18 weapons system; however, it is noted that the USMC and Australian Army also have a common weapons system in the Landing Assault Vehicle (LAV-25).

3. The research model was further delimited to Active component USMC F/A-18 squadrons because Reserve F/A-18s are not figured into the peacetime Western Pacific (WESTPAC) UDP schedule.

Significance of the Study

The significance of this study rests in the timing of multiple and varied strategic, operational, and tactical level circumstances. Collectively, these circumstances create opportunities for increased defense cooperation and responsibility sharing among three nations that have convergent interests on a wide range of regional and global issues.

At the strategic level, deployment integration is a mechanism by which the U.S., Australia, and Japan can assert leadership in the Asia Pacific community by embracing the concept of security pluralism espoused in DOD’s East Asia Strategy Report. Deployment integration is synonymous with security pluralism in that it is a cooperative framework that allows groups of nations to share responsibility for mutual security objectives in geographic areas of common strategic interest. In essence, it achieves a collective security end state through use of the existing U.S.-Japan collective defense arrangement—a cooperative security arrangement if you will.

The concept of deployment integration—captured in the USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron model outlined in this thesis—is significant for America because the U.S. military cannot and should not underwrite Asian security on its own. The idea suits Australia because it mitigates the middle power dilemma by extending the reach of the ADF without busting the defense budget. Deployment integration is significant to Japan because it provides a mechanism for building confidence and trust in Japanese behavior among Asian countries. Moreover, it allows Japan to be less dependent on the U.S. without creating a need for remilitarization of its own forces.
With regard to the timing of this study, it is noteworthy that in his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 March 2000, Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command, discussed the concept of “security communities” as his vision of the way ahead for military cooperation in the Asia Pacific. Deployment integration embodies his description of security communities—groups of nations [emphasis mine], not necessarily treaty alliance signatories, but rather nations joined by geographic considerations or common concerns. Admiral Blair sees these nations as being willing to put their collective efforts into solving regional points of friction; contribute armed forces to support diplomatic solutions; and plan, train, and exercise their armed forces together for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (U.S. Congress, Senate 2000, 17).

There is added significance to this study is because it is wedded to a research philosophy that links the operational and tactical components to the strategic component. It was noted earlier in this chapter that the power of the idea—the power of deployment integration is diminished if strategic, operational, and tactical circumstances are looked at in isolation. While it may be obvious that the U.S. and Australia share a strategic interest in shaping the Asia Pacific environment, responding to regional threats, and preparing for the next contingency, the corollary linkages at the operational and tactical level are less obvious.

At the operational and tactical level, deployment integration is equally significant to the U.S. military because it decreases operational stress while improving interoperability; it helps shape allied defense capability while improving overall operational readiness. Likewise, the significance of this study to the ADF is that it helps to facilitate objectives set down in ASP 97, such as: preservation of core skills and proficiency in combat operations; short notice response capability; knowledge edge; intelligence, and; interoperability with American forces—to include procedures, doctrine, protocols, and communication links (DOD 1997, 38-39, 47-48). The matter of timing is equally significant in that Australian F/A-18s are currently undergoing a major upgrade that will make them compatible with later model USMC Hornets forward-based at MCAS Iwakuni.
CHAPTER 2
STRATEGIC ANALYSIS

Introduction

There is a distinction between defense and security. Although this distinction is not well understood at the popular level, it is why governments sometimes concern themselves with issues that extend far beyond their borders. Security is a wider concept than defense. While defense focuses on the threat of invasion, security recognizes that a nation may have extensive overseas interests that are best defended at a distance. Security has to do with the ability of a state to conduct its affairs free from threats, intimidation, or other pressures that might unacceptably constrain its policy choices, to include trade and economic policy. The term security policy, then, relates to the government’s responsibility to predict likely threats and devise a means to cope with them (Lim 1996, 76).

Globalization—the process of accelerating economic, technological, cultural, and political integration—means that more and more nations are affected by events beyond their borders. The financial crisis of 1997 demonstrated in graphic terms the linkages between economic development and regional security in the Asia Pacific. What started as a collapse of investor confidence in Thailand during early summer quickly took on political and security dimensions as the crisis spread to other parts of the region (APEU 1998, v).

Although the 1997 financial crisis slowed the economic machinery of some nations, the Asia Pacific region continues to be the engine of world economic growth. Statistics show that East Asia exhibited the fastest economic growth in history over the last quarter century. In the 1990s it emerged as an economic center of gravity in the world economy. This growth was fostered by market-oriented economic policies on the part of individual countries and a secure regional environment. Indeed, the economic relationship between prospering nations of the region was vital to the security and economic well being of all. Today, the continued growth of Asian economies and
the corresponding expansion of trade between states serve to deepen economic interdependence among Asia Pacific nations, along with its attendant benefits and problems (APEU 1998, vi).

With 60 percent of the earth’s population—including India, China, and Indonesia as three of the four most populous countries—it stands to reason that economic growth and changing lifestyles created an expanding demand for energy in the Asia Pacific region over the last decade. Generating 29 percent of the world’s total production, many nations in the region rely on imports to satisfy their energy needs. As a consequence, more political and economic linkages are being developed between Asia and the rest of the world, especially oil producing nations of the Middle East. Dependence on this vital source is growing. In 1995 the Middle East supplied 56 percent of total oil consumption. The figure was expected to be 63 percent in 2000, and by 2010 experts project that Middle East oil will supply 74 percent of the region’s oil consumption (APEU 1998, xi). The implication of this is a corresponding rise in strategic significance of the major regional chokepoints depicted in Figure 1.

![Map showing major crude oil trade routes and interregional maritime trade](image.png)

Figure 2. Regional Chokepoints (Noer 1996, 18)
The Western entrance of Middle East crude to the Asia Pacific region is through the southern straits of the Indonesian archipelago—Malacca, Sunda, or Lombok. Once in the South China Sea, all vessels sailing north must transit past the Spratly Islands. More than one-third of the world’s ships and over half the world’s merchant fleet capacity sail through these chokepoints. Japan, Australia, and the nations of Southeast Asia send over 40 percent of their trade by sea through the straits—Hong Kong, Taiwan, and South Korea send more than one-quarter of theirs. The shortest route for most shipping is through Malacca, generally considered to be the second busiest strait in the world, and much more constricted than the busier English Channel (Noer 1996, 3-4).

These facts highlight the fundamental truth that behind East Asia’s economic vitality and dynamism is unrestricted and secure passage of shipping through strategic chokepoints. That said, the expanding volume of commerce flowing into and out of the Western Pacific foreshadows a future where the likelihood and the stakes of regional conflict are even higher than today. The bottom line is that the economic well being of the Asia Pacific region relies on political stability and political stability relies military security. These principles are an underlying theme throughout this work.

The Strategic Setting

The last decade of the twentieth century was one of momentous strategic change. As the Cold War ended at the global level, the strategic landscape of the Asia Pacific region also changed radically, in both security and economic dimensions. During the Cold War era, Washington was strongly committed to Asian security through what may be termed a hub-and-spokes system designed to cope with varied communist threats. Thus, the United States fought two major wars in Korea and Vietnam. With the demise of the Soviet Union, Russian influence receded from the region. Then, as China changed its basic foreign and economic policies, a new relationship with both countries developed (Yamamoto 1996, 60).

A new strategic landscape brought on by the collapse of Soviet communism helped to unleash East Asia’s economic miracle during the 1990s. Developing democracies and revived
economies characterized much of the Asia Pacific region, offering promise for continued peace and increased prosperity in the future. However, this promising future is tempered with evidence of present day instability and turmoil. Some nations in the region are fragmented politically, economically, and socially. Varying levels of distrust exist among key states due to longtime perceptions and historical wrongs. These so-called legacy issues, unsettled territorial disputes, and reunification questions are the basis for current threats of destabilizing unrest in the Asia Pacific region.

**Flash Point: Korean Peninsula**

The Korean Peninsula is the most volatile flash point in the Asia Pacific region. The unpredictability of North Korea’s regime keeps U.S. and Republic of Korea (ROK) forces on hair-trigger alert. Pyongyang’s deteriorating trend in international and internal position began with the loss of its economic, political, and ideological pillars at the end of the Cold War. Its former major allies, Russia and China, have since turned away from the social and economic systems that North Korea still espouses (U.S. Congress, House 1999, 2).

The Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) economy is in ruins, suffering a 40 percent decline since 1990. According to U.S. experts, factories are running at only 20 to 40 percent of capacity, while the countries long-running famine has killed at least one million people, with estimates ranging up to as many as three million (Finnegan 1999, 11).

In spite of this dismal state of affairs, North Korea’s military--the fifth largest in the world with 1.2 million troops and an additional five million reservists--continues to boost its capabilities in a wide range of areas (U.S. and ROK forces are only one-half this size). Additional mobile scud missiles, more long-range artillery, and increasing inventories of aircraft and sea vessels are being procured. Intelligence experts say that Pyongyang is expanding construction of its network of underground facilities to protect DPRK troops and aircraft in wartime and to prevent observation by U.S. military satellites. It is reported that up to 11,000 tunnels and caves already exist to support a
network that houses air defense missiles, repair facilities, fuel, ammunition, and aircraft hangers underground or in hardened shelters. Included with this is the capacity to launch aircraft from underground facilities (Finnegin 1999, 11).

In 1994 a diplomatic agreement known as the Agreed Framework averted a nuclear crisis. The agreement provided for a freeze of plutonium-producing nuclear facilities in the vicinity of Yongbyon, to be followed in time by the dismantlement of those facilities. To put off DPRK nuclear ambitions, two less proliferation-prone light water (nuclear) reactors were to be built with funds that would come from the U.S., South Korea, and Japan. The Agreed Framework also made clear that these countries would suspend funds amid any evidence of continued DPRK proliferation activity.

Four years after the Agreed Framework, U.S. intelligence reported the construction of an underground site at Kumchangni, North Korea, which was believed to be large enough to house a nuclear reactor and reprocessing facility (U.S. Congress, Senate 1999). Then, on 31 August 1998, North Korea launched a modified, three-stage Taepo Dong ballistic missile over Japan on a trajectory consistent with a satellite launch. Although the missile did not function correctly, the existence of the third stage came as a surprise to intelligence officials. This made it clear that the DPRK would be able to bring a militarily significant ballistic missile payload to bear on the U.S. within the next few years (U.S. Congress, House 1999). North Korea’s ballistic missiles were not expected to reach the 4,000-6,000 kilometer range until 2000-04, yet it is now known that with a light warhead of 100-500 kilogramms the DPRK’s Taepo Dong II missile could reach beyond 6,000 kilometers (Umbach 1999, 36). This variant would have sufficient range to strike Alaska, Hawaii, or Australia.

Concern over North Korea’s belligerent actions came to a head after the August 1998 missile launch, repeated infiltration attempts into South Korea, and continual shift of troops and equipment to more threatening forward positions near the Demilitarized Zone. This prompted President Clinton to appoint former Defense Secretary William Perry to head up a policy review team. In testimony to
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee after a May 1999 trip to Pyongyang, Dr. Perry noted that the DPRK had agreed to suspend long-range missile testing while both sides worked to improve relations. He also reported that an expert inspection team visited the suspected underground facility at Kumchagni, establishing that the site was not suitable for installation of a nuclear reactor and reprocessing plant.

In its final analysis, the policy review team determined that, while the North Koreans are undergoing terrible economic hardship, these hardships are unlikely to cause the regime to be undermined. “We therefore must deal with the DPRK regime as it is, not as we wish it to be,” Dr Perry said in his testimony. As a result of its analysis the review team, in consultation with the governments of Japan and the ROK, recommended a comprehensive and integrated approach to negotiations with Pyongyang. In essence, the recommendation was to establish two alternative strategies. In the first, if the DPRK is willing to forgo its long-range missile and nuclear weapons program, the allies should be willing to move step by step on a path to comprehensive normalization of relations, including establishment of a permanent peace. Alternatively, if North Korea does not demonstrate by its actions that it is willing to remove the threat, then the allies must take action to contain that threat (U.S. Congress, Senate 1999).

Critics contend that the Clinton administration has conditioned the DPRK to believe that brinksmanship brings benefits to the regime. On repeated occasions since 1994, North Korea has threatened to derail the Agreed Framework, and each time the U.S. has responded with concessions. Only after a promise of more food and aid was an expert team permitted to inspect an excavation in order to assuage worries that Pyongyang was planning to restart its nuclear program (Crispin and Shim 1999, 18-20). In February 2000, Pyongyang blamed U.S. delays in the construction of two light-water reactors for what it said was the worst power shortages in North Korea’s history. With this came yet another threat that it would reopen a mothballed nuclear reactor if the country is not compensated for its economic losses (Washington Times, 4 February 2000, 1).
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula have eased with South Korea's "Sunshine Policy" and the prospect of a summit between ROK President, Kim Dae Jung and his counterpart, Kim Jong II, but the DPRK remains unpredictable and a serious threat to peace. Pyongyang continues to enhance its military capability by forward deploying long-range artillery and troops along the Demilitarized Zone, building midget submarines, conducting infiltrations, and developing missiles. The scale of operations during the Winter 2000 training cycle exceeded what experts have observed over the past several years, demonstrating that the North remains willing to expend sizable resources to maintain readiness to resume war with the South (U.S. Congress, Senate 2000, 5). So, while the world hopes that peaceful unification is at hand, the Korean Peninsula remains an area poised for conflict.

So, what is Australia's stake in the Korean Peninsula, and how do her forces fit into the military equation? In answering this question, history is offered as a precedent. When war broke out on the Korean Peninsula in June 1950, the only remaining RAAF unit in Japan, No. 77 Fighter Squadron, went into action. The squadron had been part of the occupation force stationed at Iwakuni, when it was deployed for combat operations in Korea. There it provided vital air support for the American and Korean ground forces in blunting the edge of the North Korean offensive (Grey 1990, 203, 206). By the time an armistice was signed in July 1953, RAAF pilots had flown just over 21,000 individual sorties in support of the allied war effort (Coulthard-Clark 1995, 6).

Fifty years later Australia has an even more compelling security interest in the Korean Peninsula. The ROK is Australia's second-largest export market, third-largest trading partner, and close regional friend (DFAT 1997, 35). Canberra and Seoul held their first joint political-military talks in mid-1996. Since that time defense cooperation has been expanded to bolster shared interests in regional stability and unimpeded trade routes throughout the Pacific (Malik 1999, 85). While it is acknowledged that the ADF may not have a role in current theater operational plans, based on the facts presented, there should be little doubt as to Canberra's predisposition to commit forces in the event there is an outbreak of hostilities on the Korean Peninsula.
Flash Point: China and Taiwan

For the Chinese Communist leadership in Beijing, Taiwan is a domestic, not a foreign policy issue. The PRC White Paper, China's National Defense, explicitly states the issue of Taiwan is an internal affair of China. Incorporating the Taiwan Straits into a security and cooperation sphere of any country or military alliance is an infringement upon and the interference in China’s sovereignty (China’s National Defense 1998, 2). Yet even Beijing cannot disregard the fact that many states are involved--directly or indirectly--in Taiwan, and developments in China-Taiwan relations will have a major impact on stability throughout the Asia Pacific region.

The controversy over Taiwan, and in essence--who lays claim to the vital sea-lanes of the Taiwan Straits--centers on whether the island is a Chinese province or sovereign nation. Taiwan had been under Japanese colonial rule since 1895 when, in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the U.S. permitted the island to be occupied by members of Chiang Kai-shek’s Chinese Nationalist Army, the Kuomintang (KMT). When China’s Civil War between the Chinese Nationalists and the Chinese Communists ended in 1949, Chiang Kai-shek fled with remnants of his KMT government and military forces to Taiwan, where he declared Taipei to be China’s “provisional” capital and vowed to recapture the mainland. During that same year, in October 1949, Mao Tse-tung founded the People’s Republic of China (U.S. Department of State, Taiwan 1999, 3-4).

Although it remained under KMT martial law, the island of Taiwan developed steadily into a major international trading power with economic and social stability. It came as a blow to Taipei when in 1971, the United Nations (UN) accepted the Communist regime in Beijing as the official representative of China. Then came President Nixon’s visit to China in 1972, and Washington’s subsequent switch in recognition from the KMT regime in Taipei to the Communist regime in Beijing on 1 January 1979.

It was these events which galvanized Taiwan’s democratic opposition movement. In September 1986, the Tangwai (“outside-the-party”) movement culminated in the formation of the
Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), which soon grew to a full-fledged opposition party. In 1987, largely due to international pressure and the democratic opposition within Taiwan, a less-stringent national security law replaced martial law.

In 1991 the KMT abandoned their anachronistic claim of governing mainland China. In December of the same year, aging KMT legislators—elected “indefinitely” to the National Assembly while on the mainland in 1947—went into forced retirement. Since 1992, Taiwan has evolved into a free nation with increasingly democratic institutions. In 1994 the National Assembly amended the Constitution, paving the way for the first direct election of a president and vice president in March 1996 (*Taiwan and its Future* 1999, 3-4).

Until recently, the governing party of the KMT accepted the formula of “one-China-two systems” proffered by Beijing, maintaining that eventual reunification would depend upon whether the PRC became truly democratic. Whereas, the DPP has always maintained that since de facto independence existed, it was not necessary to proclaim independence in *de jure* terms; and, if necessary, a plebiscite could be held to determine the peoples will.

In early July 1999, former President Lee Tung-hui appeared to shift his position to one that was similar to the opposition DPP. In an interview with a German radio station, he stated that from now on Taiwan would treat contacts with China as special “state-to-state” relations, and under such relations there was “no longer any need to declare Taiwanese independence.” PRC officials took the remark as a major affront to its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan, reiterating its stated right to retake Taiwan by force if necessary (Scalapino 1999, 10). This incident characterizes Taipei’s further drift away from national unification and Beijing’s heightened anxiety.

When Washington changed its diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing in 1979, it acknowledged the Chinese position that there is but one China, and Taiwan is part of China. The Joint Communiqué announcing the decision also stated that within this context the United States would maintain cultural, commercial, and other unofficial relations with Taiwan. This was followed
up with legislation that was signed into law on 10 April 1979. The Taiwan Relations Act created domestic legal authority for the conduct of unofficial relations with Taiwan.

Following de-recognition, the United States terminated its Mutual Defense Treaty with Taiwan. Notwithstanding the absence of a defense treaty, the American government has continued the sale of appropriate defensive military equipment to Taiwan. This has been in accordance with the Taiwan Relations Act, which provides for such sales, declaring that peace and stability in the area are in U.S. interests. A healthy and balanced relationship with Beijing and Taipei has been recognized in the long-term interest of the United States by six consecutive administrations. In keeping with its one-China policy, Washington has consistently maintained that it does not support two Chinas, one-China, one-Taiwan, or Taiwan independence (U.S. Department of State, Taiwan 1999, 10).

During the past several months there have been some significant developments regarding the China-Taiwan issue, which have threatened to upset the status quo that Washington prefers. The most significant event in this high stakes affair occurred in March, when the DPP candidate, Chen Shui-bian, won Taiwan’s second presidential election. Defeat of the KMT, after a half-century of uninterrupted rule, marked the completion of Taiwan’s steady transition to democracy. A month earlier the U.S. House of Representatives had passed the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act to increase military ties with Taiwan. While provisions of the legislation were more symbolic than substantive, China viewed it as incendiary. Speaking at a security conference in Munich, Germany, Beijing’s Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs urged the world to accept its goal of absorbing Taiwan along the lines of its unification with Hong Kong and Macau—or else risk consequences “you don’t want to see” (Washington Post, 3 February 2000, 17).

Since 1992 the idea of one-China has become increasingly strained due to the emergence of democratic identity and a credible thrust toward independence in Taiwan, and a corresponding rise of nationalism in China. In February, China warned in a government position paper that it was growing
impatient and said it reserved the right to take military action against Taiwan if the reunification process dragged on indefinitely. Prior to that, China had said it would use force only if the island were to declare independence or be occupied by a foreign power. In a stream of statements since then, top Chinese leaders and policy makers have emphasized China's growing impatience and warned that by continuing to resist reunification on Beijing's terms Taiwan was treading a path to disaster (*Washington Post*, 23 May 2000, 23). Clearly, the political divide between Beijing and Taipei is widening with the passage of time.

During March 1996, prior to the first direct presidential election, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) forces staged threatening military exercises opposite Taiwan and launched missiles a mere twenty miles off the island's coast. The U.S. responded by dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Taiwan Straits (Watson 1996, 37). Since that time the PLA rapidly developed its force projection capability in the region as it seeks to overcome Taiwan's technological edge. With the build-up of conventional forces has been the introduction of several regimental-sized short-range ballistic missile and land attack cruise missile units along the southeastern coast of China (DOD Report to Congress 1999, 4).

In the month that followed President Lee's provocative remarks implying new state-to-state relations between China and Taiwan, Beijing warned Washington against interfering in any China-Taiwan conflict. During the same period the Taipei press reports said that Chinese and Taiwanese fighters flew as many as 100 sorties up to the center line of the Taiwan Strait, and in one instance a Chinese fighter went to missile lock-on status against a Taiwanese fighter (Young, Peter Lewis, October 1999, 8). If true, these reports serve to illustrate how precarious the situation is.

Again, there is no mutual defense treaty that guarantees America would come to the defense of Taiwan in the event hostilities were to break out. The Taiwan Security Enhancement Act, if signed into law, would only provide Taipei with the means to better defend itself against the growing PLA threat. In fact, when it comes to the defense of Taiwan, the U.S. has always been deliberately
ambiguous about where the tripwire lies—in part, because even Washington cannot tell in advance what it would take for Americans to go to war for Taiwan (Barry and Watson 1996, 41). Still, based on the threat that military confrontation between China and Taiwan would pose to freedom of navigation, to overall regional security, and to U.S. credibility around the world, one must assume that Washington would act.

Australia’s economic and trade interests notwithstanding, historical precedent suggests that with Washington in the lead, Canberra would commit forces if hostilities broke out in the Taiwan Straits. This assessment is based on Prime Minister Howard’s strong and timely support of U.S. actions in the Taiwan Straits after Chinese provocation aimed at influencing Taiwan’s elections in March 1996. Admiral J. W. Prueher, the former commander of Pacific forces, noted this in his testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1997 (Young, Thomas-Durell 1999 N 6, 254).

China is another area where there is a confluence of U.S. and Australian foreign policy. Canberra, like Washington, sees the challenges and the opportunities that China presents in the twenty-first century and the key role that it plays in the security environment of the Asia Pacific region. Each sees Beijing in the top ranks of its bilateral relationships. Each is moving on a path toward comprehensive engagement and confidence-building that helps to ensure China’s emergence as a stable, secure, open, prosperous, and peaceful country (EASR 1998, 30/DFAT 1997, 16). Each employs an engagement strategy where dialogue is based on shared interests, not shared values (Malik 1999, 86). In other words, Washington and Canberra recognize China is still a totalitarian state; but it does not fall in the category of an Iraq or North Korea. While it is an arch-practitioner of Realpolitik, highly attuned to the political utility of military power, the PRC is also a revisionist power, intent on redressing humiliations of past centuries (Lim 1996, 80).

That said, as China develops economically, there is the troubling possibility that it could become a greater threat on the world scene, exacerbating conflicts over territorial issues, the spread
of nuclear weapons, arms sales, and trade. Economic growth could feed China's nationalism and assertiveness as much as its democracy. The retrocession of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macao in 1999 has already stoked nationalistic sentiment (Taifa Yu 1999, 41). Evidence of this has been seen in the comments noted earlier by Beijing's Vice Minister for Foreign Affairs. These inflammatory remarks further dramatize the tension over Taiwan and make it difficult to know whether China is friend or foe. Therefore, Washington and Canberra engage Beijing with a cautious optimism, recognizing that even without malevolent designs, China's nuclear weapons capability, demographic weight, continental size, and fast-growing economy adds friction to the Asia Pacific and the global equation.

Finally, it should be noted that China has its concerns as well. Officials in Beijing view Australia's alliance with the U.S. as part of a broader American containment strategy. An analyst from the Chinese Foreign Ministry argued the 1996 Joint Security Declaration on renewed U.S.-Australian military cooperation provides the United States a replacement area for Pacific Rim exercises that it lost following withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992. China was also disturbed that Australia had been the most vocal of the Asia Pacific states in supporting American gunboat diplomacy. To cite examples, Chinese officials noted that Australia was the only country in the region to give its "prompt and unqualified support" for the U.S. deployment of aircraft carriers near Taiwan in March 1996 and cruise missile strikes into Southern Iraq in September 1996 (Snyder 1999, 101). The Chinese media had similar criticisms. When reporting on the strengthening of U.S. military relations with Japan and Australia, newspapers described it as a "strategic pincer movement" against China from the north and the south (Young, Peter Lewis, August 1999, 12).

**Flash Point: South China Sea**

The South China Sea, depicted in Figure 3 on the following page, encompasses a portion of the Pacific Ocean stretching roughly from Singapore and the Strait of Malacca in the southwest, to the Strait of Taiwan in the northeast. The area includes more than 200 small islands, rocks, and reefs, with the majority located in the Paracel and Spratly Island chains.
By themselves, the South China Sea islands are largely worthless. Many of these islands are submerged during high tide and little more than shipping hazards not suitable for habitation; the total land area of the Spratly Islands is less than three square miles. The *Law of the Sea Convention* does, however, confer upon any state with recognized title to islands a right to the full complement of maritime zones, including a territorial sea zone, a contiguous zone, a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ), and a 200-nautical mile continental shelf claim. Economic and political dimensions of the South China Sea ownership claims emerge when consideration is given to the potentially rich underground petroleum, natural gas, and mineral deposits that are assumed to exist. Sovereignty conveys exclusive rights to prospect for and develop these resources (Wood 1996, 143).

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, China has had an increased maritime-littoral focus in the South China Sea. China’s power projection capabilities in the region have been enhanced with the construction of an air base and docking facilities on Woody Island in the Paracel Island chain, and the acquisition of an air-to-air refueling capability for its naval aviation arm (Khanna 1999, 8).
Some interpret these developments, along with rapid buildup and modernization of the PLA Navy’s South Sea Fleet, as a benign effort to defend what are considered to be legitimate PRC interests, while others view it as a harbinger of Chinese expansionism. At issue in the South China Sea are the competing claims of China, Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam to a number of islands, reefs, and rocks within the Spratly archipelago. Sovereignty questions aside, the South China Sea dispute has major economic and political dimensions impacting the Asia Pacific security environment.

China’s creeping expansion in the South China Sea began in 1974, when it invaded and captured the Paracel Islands from Vietnam. In 1988 the Chinese and Vietnamese navies clashed again—this time at Johnson Reef in the Spratly Islands when the Vietnam People’s Navy lost two patrol boats and more than seventy sailors. In 1992 Beijing enacted the Law on the Territorial Waters and their Contiguous Areas, which specifically authorized the PLA to use its military capability in defending and enforcing China’s sweeping claim over all the island territories in the South China Sea. Regional tension was further aggravated when official Chinese maps were discovered to have national boundary demarcation lines keyed, which were inside the EEZs of Indonesia, Malaysia, Vietnam, and the Philippines (Wood 1996, 146). Further aggression in the South China Sea occurred in 1995 when the PRC occupied Mischief Reef.

Mischief Reef is some 800 miles from the Chinese mainland but only 150 miles from the Philippine western frontier-island of Palawan; well within Manila’s 200-nautical-mile EEZ. Here Beijing established an outpost that includes a three-story, barracks-type building; several octagonal structures with satellite communication equipment; weapons platforms; an airstrip; and a helicopter landing pad. Protests from the Philippine government have only been met with assurances that the facilities are for Chinese fishermen. Recently, China’s claim to sole sovereignty over the Spratlys has led to quasi-military occupation of disputed territory. This action was based on the 1992 law that codified the PRC’s self-proclaimed right to use force to protect Chinese territory (Satchell 2000, 32).
Prior to 1995, China only occupied areas claimed by Vietnam (Wood 1996, 146). Vietnam's ascension to ASEAN in 1995, therefore, had an effect on the shape of the Spratly Islands dispute, making it a two-sided conflict between the PRC and ASEAN. In fact, PLA actions in the Spratlys have been a major factor influencing strategy and planning of the ASEAN militaries. For example, it was largely due to Beijing's creeping expansion in the South China Sea that American forces are now returning to the Philippines. Under recently enacted legislation in the Philippine Senate a new joint visiting-forces agreement will facilitate increased military cooperation with the U.S. (Satchell 2000, 31).

From a regional security perspective the sovereignty claims in the South China Sea pose several problems. Apart from the hazard to regional stability and ASEAN solidarity, there is the threat to commercial and naval transit through the region. Approximately one-third of the world's merchant shipping plies the 1.4 million square mile South China Sea, carrying Middle East crude for oil-import dependent nations like Japan and South Korea and Asian manufactured goods for the West (Satchell 00, 32). The major sea-lanes compromised would include any EEZ or continental shelf possession declared by a successful claimant. Then, the main perils would come from the establishment of air defense, military exclusion, and/or some other form of security zone in areas which cross the sea lines of communication (Wood 1996, 147).

Unfortunately, ASEAN's own suspicions regarding each other's Spratly claims undermines its capacity to develop a coherent strategy in dealing effectively with Beijing. At present, ASEAN is divided over a draft code of conduct designed to curb Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. Clear differences have emerged not only between China and the ASEAN claimant states, but also between Malaysia, the Philippines, and Vietnam (Thayer 2000, 26). Notwithstanding suspicions within the alliance, it appears ASEAN's engagement policy vis-à-vis Beijing has moderated Chinese assertiveness and has helped to facilitate that country's peaceful integration into the regional security order (Nathan 1999, 12).
Notwithstanding a major threat to freedom of navigation and regional stability, Washington and Canberra have maintained similar positions of neutrality regarding the South China Sea disputes. The policy of neutrality is underscored by U.S. reluctance to extend its Mutual Defense Treaty with the Philippines to cover Manila’s claims to the Spratly Islands (Malik 1999, 87). That said, given the broad alignment of strategic interest in maintaining free passage through the vital shipping lane, it is likely that a combined U.S.-Australian force would respond if military action was required in the South China Sea.

Flash Point: India and Pakistan

The fifty-three year territorial dispute around an area that divides the Himalayan region of Kashmir between India and Pakistan has brought the two nations to war three times. Each claim the entire Kashmir region as rightfully theirs (Washington Post, 4 February 2000, 25). The border dispute was dramatically altered when nuclear tests shifted the scenario from a purely bilateral situation confined within South Asia to one that intrudes directly on the wider strategic environment of the Asia Pacific region.

India’s nuclear tests were conducted on 11 and 13 May 1998. Two weeks later on 28 and 31 May, Pakistan responded with its nuclear tests. India claimed that missile tests were in response to China’s continued intransigence on the border, to its assistance to enhance Pakistan’s military capability, and to its nuclear and missile programs. India had long claimed that Pakistan was developing nuclear weapons, so the nuclear missile test was portrayed as preemptive. The Indian missile test then provoked a Pakistani test, which confirmed the Indian claim that Pakistan’s nuclear program was well advanced.

The destabilizing trend toward something of a missile race in the sub-continent region has already begun. On 11 April 1999 India successfully tested an advanced solid fuel missile with an estimated range of 2,500 kilometers. Forty-eight hours after this, Pakistan launched an advanced missile variant of its own, claiming a range of more than 2,000 kilometers (Banerjee 1999, 12-13).
The South Asia missile race escalated again in February 2000 when Pakistan did the test-launch of a sixty-mile-range missile (*Washington Times*, 8 February 2000, 1).

As a result of tests conducted by India and Pakistan, the nuclear and missile scenario in the Asia Pacific has changed, irretrievably and forever. With a potent weapon in the hands of a possible adversary, it becomes imperative that this then be urgently countered. Japan and Taiwan are each seeking protection against the real or perceived threat of missile attacks from China and North Korea through collaborative efforts with the U.S. Far less stabilizing is the scenario where threatened countries seek to acquire matching missile capability to deter attack.

In addition to the impact that Indian and Pakistani missile proliferation has on military technology developments, there is also impact on relationships in the region. For example, India-China relations will now emerge as a major factor in the security architecture of the Asia Pacific region (Banerjee 1999, 14). Further complicating the strategic environment is Pakistan's illegitimate military government that seized power in a coup during October 1999. So far the military ruler, General Pervez Musharraf, has resisted calls to set a timetable for elections that would return the country to democracy (*Washington Post*, 4 February 2000, 25). The collective nature of the events described means that to an increasing extent the Indian sub-continent region must be taken into account in any strategic consideration in the Asia Pacific. Therefore, in addition to other flash points mentioned, South Asia has emerged as an additional, mutual concern to Washington and Canberra.

The United States and Australia have spoken with one voice regarding the issue of India and Pakistan. The common objective is to avert a nuclear and missile arms race in South Asia and to strengthen the international non-proliferation regime by constraining the belligerents' nuclear weapons program. After the AUSMIN consultations in November 1999, the two nations issued a joint communiqué calling on Pakistan to replace its military-led government with a "representative, balanced, accountable, and economically effective civilian government in as short a time frame as possible" (*AUSMIN Media Release* 1999).
India is assuming a growing strategic and economic importance in global and regional affairs. The projected growth of the Indian economy is for it to be one of the top five by year 2025. The commercial relationship between Washington and New Delhi has been growing steadily and, despite sanctions imposed in the wake of nuclear tests, America is the leading trading partner and source of foreign investment for India (U.S. DOS Foreign Operations 1999, 766). The country has also distinguished itself as one of Australia’s top ten trading partners. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, India’s growing economic and defense cooperation with the United States, Australia, and ASEAN nations has brought it closer to a shared world view. Finally, mutual interest in balancing China’s growing economic and military influence has resulted in a confluence of Indian-American, Indian-Australian, Indian-Japanese, and Indian-ASEAN interests (Malik 1999, 88-89).

**Flash Point: Indonesia and East Timor**

Indonesia annexed the province of East Timor on 17 July 1976, after more than 400 years of colonial rule by Portugal. There was enormous controversy over the annexation, which was not recognized by the UN. To ease tensions with its northern neighbor, Australia acknowledged Indonesia’s sovereignty over East Timor in August 1985. East Timor would have continued to be a province of Indonesia but for the Asian financial crisis in 1997. The economic and political chaos led to riots and the forced resignation of President Suharto after more than thirty years in power. At the same time, economic turmoil in East Timor reopened political grievances prompting Suharto’s immediate successor, B. J. Habibie, to agree to a UN-led independence referendum in the province. When results of the 78.5 percent pro-independence vote was announced it triggered killings between rival factions and the displacement of large segments of the population (Lowry 2000, 18).

East Timor demonstrated there was a limit to American intervention around the globe. Early on in the crisis it was determined that this 5,600 square mile hot spot on the eastern half of Timor island did not qualify as a vital or even an important U.S. national interest. It did, however, fall into the category of a humanitarian interest. Washington therefore responded with essential diplomatic
and military support. Included was U.S. military personnel and equipment, which proved crucial to mission success in the earliest stages of the operation. According to Australia’s Defense Minister, John Moore, the “crisis [in East Timor] has shown that the United States is a reliable strategic partner for Australia. . . . It has also shown that Australia is a reliable strategic partner for the United States” (Moore, Address 1999).

The strategic implications of East Timor were far greater for Canberra than they were for Washington. Australia’s northern neighbor is a nation comprised of more than 17,500 Southeast Asian islands that stretch 4,000 miles across the South Pacific. It is the world’s fourth most populous country behind China, India, and the United States. There is no question that it is in Australia’s vital interest for Indonesia to be a peaceful, stable, and democratic state with economic prosperity and credibility in the region. Jakarta is a vital element in Canberra’s regional defense strategy given its vulnerability is primarily to the north where surface threats to Australia come largely through the Indonesian archipelago.

Insofar as the situation in East Timor is concerned, Australia was driven to action out of humanitarian interest. While Canberra’s support for peacekeeping operations is nothing new, the Timor operation—multilateral in scope, strongly representing Southeast Asia, led by Australia, and conducted under UN peace enforcement mandate—is of a very different scale and nature than that which Australia has grown accustomed to. It is the first time that the ADF has been asked to build and lead a multinational force and to provide the single largest component. It is the nation’s largest deployment of ADF personnel overseas in a generation. And it is the most significant strategic challenge for Australia in thirty years (Moore, Address 1999).

Viewed in terms of the future strategic relationship between Australia and the United States and in terms of future defense cooperation between the ADF and U.S. military, the crisis in East Timor is bound to produce favorable outcomes for both sides. For example, Canberra’s international prestige will be elevated in the Asia Pacific region and throughout the larger world community.
Lessons that Australia takes away from its Timor experience will prove fundamental in its ability to contribute when future contingencies arise. It is a dose of realism—a wake-up call—to what leadership in the post-Cold War environment demands. Likewise, Washington can only applaud the efforts of its ally in the South Pacific, because whatever the outcome, its bodes well for the U.S. in terms of Canberra’s understanding the demands/burdens of strategic and operational leadership.

In a September 1999 address to the Australian Defense Studies Center, the Defense Minister outlined some realities that the Australian experience in East Timor had already brought to bear. First, it drove home the point that a nation’s diplomacy cannot be effective without the backing of convincing defense capability. Events in Timor reinforce the fact that the ADF must be able to deliver the government the options it needs to protect the nation’s interests and promote regional stability. Also, the experience compels Canberra to reconcile the need for forces required in operations of the peace-making and peacekeeping variety, and those that might be required for higher intensity warfighting operations. Finally, the Timor experience has ended debate on the defense budget. Members of Parliament now understand there is a compelling need for increased defense spending (Moore, Address 1999).

It should be noted, however, that although there may be a consensus for increased defense spending, there will be no change in the defense budget until the current strategic review process is completed and a new Defense White Paper is released later this year. The purpose is to ensure that Australia’s strategic outlook is assessed objectively and realistically, and that the required force structure is determined independent of budgetary bias. The future budget will then be tailored to comply with the defense requirement vis-à-vis a defense requirement that must be tailored to comply with an available budget (Grazebrook 2000, 4).

Events in East Timor have also stirred Australia’s academic community. Professor Paul Dibb, head of the Strategic and Defense Studies Center at the Australian National University, said there is a “credibility gap between Australia’s declaratory policy, which some see as a return to
forward defense, and a defense budget which is simply inadequate to fund the ADF.” At the same time Dibb makes the point that “Southeast Asia is no longer the strategic shield once envisaged.” He said that “in Northeast Asia there is a struggle for power and influence. . . . In the twenty-first century the strategic future of [Southeast Asia] will be determined by this contention for power.” Dibb concluded his remarks to the 1999 Logistics Conference in Canberra by declaring that “the size of the ADF is inadequate to meet the challenge of the new millennium” (Wolfe 1999, 29).

Professor Dibb’s commentary is particularly relevant given that in 1985 he was tasked to review the content, priorities, and rationale of Australia’s forward defense planning, and advise on present and future defense capabilities. A year later the Hawke government adopted most of his recommendations in its 1987 Defense White Paper. What they did not adopt was his recommended use of non-military methods to advance Canberra’s interests in the South Pacific and his recommendations about defense posture in Southeast Asia where he argued that the FPDA was no longer relevant to Australian strategic concerns. To the contrary, the Hawke government decided that Australia should be prepared to use its military forces in the South Pacific, “in pursuit of security interests not immediately affecting the defense of [Australia’s] national territory.” The Hawke government also said that FPDA had “renewed importance as a means of keeping Australia’s interests engaged in Southeast Asia” (Lee 1999, 28-29).

These remarks are noteworthy given that Professor Dibb has been a long time critic of the government’s last strategic review, ASP 97, because it announced a more regionally focused strategic policy and the need for increased defense capability. It is obvious that he has adopted a decidedly different view on what Australia’s policy should be in the year 2000. The irony is that if the Hawke government had accepted some of Dibb’s proposals in its 1987 Defense White Paper, Australia, and indeed the ADF, would be in a far worse position than it is today. Interestingly, Dibb now says that Canberra has security interests in Southeast Asia, and it would appear that he gives tacit recognition to wider security interests in Northeast Asia.
The significant point to take away from this discussion is that it took an Australian-led UN mission in East Timor for one of Canberra’s leading defense experts to come around to a view that is already outlined in ASP 97. Critics that read “forward defense” into the 1997 strategic review failed to recognize that increased volatility in the strategic environment did in fact present increased challenges to Australia’s security interests. Three years later some of the same detractors are now critical because the Coalition government elected in 1996 did not go far enough in making provision for a so-called forward defense capability. (Forward defense was the post-World War II strategic policy that still carries negative connotations in Australia from the Vietnam backlash). That said, there is no question mobilization of the ADF for operations in East Timor has had a significant effect on the political debate in Canberra. This is a profound development that leaves the door wide open for legitimate debate on an innovative concept that steps out of the traditional security framework and cooperative defense paradigm.

ASEAN and the ASEAN Regional Forum

ASEAN was established on 8 August 1967—at a time when Southeast Asia was ideologically divided among communist and non-communist states. Its primary purpose was to maintain peace, resolve regional conflicts, and/or contain them to avoid further escalation. In short, ASEAN was a diplomatic device for sub-regional reconciliation. The original five alliance states were non-communist Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines. Brunei was the next country to enter the alliance, in 1984. Although the goal of expanding the alliance to include all ten Southeast Asian states had been announced in the 1967 founding declaration, there was little hope it would happen (Wood 1996, 119). This changed with the end of the Cold War. Vietnam joined in 1995; with Laos and Burma following in 1997. The goal of the ASEAN Ten was finally realized on 30 April 1999 when Cambodia was admitted into the alliance (Nathan 1999, 6).

Economic health is a principal component of ASEAN’s security and security is a principal component of ASEAN’s economic health—the two are mutually supportive. Although ASEAN
states have been slow to embrace the latter component of that dynamic, attitudes are now changing after the Asian financial crisis and the subsequent events in East Timor. Better understood among ASEAN states is how economics supports security. Indeed, economic growth has been a central element of each member’s nation-building strategy. The transition from colony to independent state presented a major imperative to create unifying institutions and linkages; growing markets were a powerful force to that end. Economic growth was also central to overcoming the internal security threats faced by most of the ASEAN states in the 1960s and 1970s (Wood 1996, 122). Today, the internal stability that has been achieved by ASEAN states is due more to economic successes than any military operations—a truth borne out by the Indonesian experience.

Since the end of the Cold War there has been an increased recognition among ASEAN states that regional stability is crucial to economic health. The end of the bipolar world made it apparent that regional security frameworks in the Asia Pacific were inadequate to cope with the post-Cold War situation. This was to some extent alleviated by the expansion of the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference mechanism into the ARF, which was officially inaugurated in Bangkok during July 1994. The ARF draws together twenty-two countries which influence or are involved in security of the Asia Pacific region. The list includes the ASEAN Ten, ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners (the U.S., Canada, European Union, Australia, Japan, China, India, South Korea, and New Zealand), as well as Russia, Papua New Guinea, and Mongolia. ARF meetings are held at Foreign Minister level, annually, in conjunction with the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference.

The ARF mechanism is commonly viewed as the most acceptable and least controversial lowest common denominator to manage pan-Asian security in the post-Cold War era. Principal features of the ARF include the following: (1) it is a security dialogue inviting and engaging all interested and involved participants to express and moderate their security concerns; (2) it includes all key Asia-Pacific actors; (3) it is a process involving minimum institutionalization, consensus decision-making, and official and non-official diplomacy (e.g., seminars and workshops involving
academics); (4) it is a non-threatening mechanism since the agenda is set by ASEAN—a regional grouping whose credibility and political acceptability is beyond question; (5) it is a confidence building measure in the sense that security dialogue rests firmly on a foundation of economic and political consultations via the ASEAN Post Ministerial Conference, and builds on this foundation of promise and performance. The ARF espouses the fundamental principles of ASEAN’s *Treaty of Amity and Cooperation*, some of which include the following: (1) non-interference in the internal affairs of one another; (2) the right of every state to lead its national existence free from external interference, subversion, or coercion; (3) renunciation of the threat or use of force (Nathan 1999, 10).

Understanding these features and fundamental principles of the ARF, the central question that must be answered is this: Is the ARF an adequate regional security framework to deter, deal with, and/or resolve regional conflicts such as the Korean Peninsula, China-Taiwan, India-Pakistan, the South China Sea dispute, and Indonesia-East Timor? Or, should the ARF be viewed merely as a confidence building measure awaiting a more formalized security framework in the future? The ARF, as presently constituted, is clearly not intended to serve as a formal security structure. It is noted, however, that in the Second ARF Chairman’s Statement of 1 August 1995, the ARF agreed on a gradual three-stage evolution of confidence building, preventive diplomacy and, in the longer term, approaches to conflict resolution (Thayer 2000, 26).

At the present time, the ARF’s value as a potential security framework for Asia lies precisely in its confidence building ability. Yet, it is widely recognized that the ARF has thus far been unable to move from confidence building measures to preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution (Nathan 1999, 12). The prospect of future progress in this regard has dimmed since potentially new fault lines have opened up with ASEAN’s enlargement in recent years. ASEAN’s ability to steer ARF is called into question as new fissures have appeared between Thailand and the Philippines, on the one hand, and Burma, Vietnam, Laos, and Malaysia on the other. There are divisions over the draft code of conduct designed to curb Chinese assertiveness in the South China Sea. New fissures have also
appeared in the aftermath of ASEAN’s inability to deal with the Indonesian haze problem, the Asian financial crisis, and East Timor (Thayer 2000, 26).

It is surmised that while part of the ARF’s difficulty in moving beyond confidence building may be attributed to internal differences, any substantial progress in moving toward the conflict resolution phase is dampened by the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation—specifically, the principles noted above. In other words, until ASEAN recognizes that force may be required in some situations (such as East Timor), and until the alliance members are willing to renounce the self-proclaimed principle of non-interference, the ARF is consigned to phase one confidence building measures.

Returning to the question regarding the ARF’s ability to deal with major flash points in the Asia Pacific region—it has already been noted that a slow response in East Timor prompted Australia to take the reins of leadership in that conflict. On the other hand, it appears ASEAN’s engagement policy vis-à-vis Beijing has moderated Chinese assertiveness, helping to facilitate that country’s peaceful integration into the regional security order. While this is a credit to confidence building through the ARF mechanism, ASEAN’s inability to steer ARF to its self-proclaimed conflict resolution phase has blunted its negotiating leverage with China—the result being stalemate in the South China Sea (Nathan 1999, 12).

As ASEAN Dialogue Partners, the U.S. and Australia speak with one voice in encouraging the ARF to take a more central role in discussing and managing issues that threaten stability in the region. Each is committed to working with the ARF to develop norms of regional behavior aimed at avoiding conflict and settling disputes, each takes an active role in expanding the ARF’s confidence building agenda, and each would see value in the ARF developing a conflict resolution capacity. In a region where there is little history of multilateral approaches to security, the U.S. and Australia see enormous value in the ARF (EASR 1998, 66/DFAT 1997, 23). The bottom line is that the ARF has a valuable security role, but it is not equipped to deal with the large-scale conflict. A U.S.-Japan-Australia tripartite arrangement, on the other hand, is a security structure that would be equipped to
deal with large scale conflict. Both arrangements, in fact, could do a great service to the Asia Pacific region, coexisting for the benefit and the enhancement of the other.

**Australia’s Strategic Policy**

The 1997 Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper noted globalization and the continued rise of East Asia as the two key trends that will shape Australia’s strategic environment in the twenty-first century (DFAT 1997, 57). *ASP 97* also reaffirmed the nation’s turn towards the Asia Pacific region for its economic and strategic survival (DOD 1997, 4). Today, more than ever, there is general agreement on both sides of politics that Australia’s security is indivisible from that of its geostrategic region. Foreign policy experts agree that the nation is threatened when there is a general breakdown in security of the wider region. Consequently, the first and foremost objective of Australia’s defense policy is to ensure that peace and stability are maintained in a regional environment characterized by economic growth, ethnic divisions, power rivalry, and confident nationalism.

Continuing economic growth in East Asia has strategic consequences for Australia. As *ASP 97* points out, the nation’s economic, political, and strategic weight in relation to other countries in the region is in decline as strong growth increases their confidence and assertiveness. This dynamic of increasing economic dependence and relative declining influence is another factor that drives Australia’s political, economic, and strategic engagement with the Asia Pacific (Malik 1999, 69).

To further explain Canberra’s shift in strategic thinking it is useful to remember that during the Cold War Australia’s strategic interests were closely bound up with maintaining a global balance of power. In the 1970s and 1980s Canberra defined its region of primary strategic interest as Southeast Asia and the South Pacific. At that time, strategic events in Asia beyond that closer region affected the nation’s security largely through consequences to the global balance, rather than more directly. That is no longer true. While it has important interests—including strategic interests—at the global level, today Australia’s strategic interests are directly engaged throughout the wider Asia-
Pacific, because events beyond the nearer neighborhood of Southeast Asia have direct effects within it (DOD 1997, 9-10).

In the 1990s, changes in the strategic balance brought about by the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic rise of East Asia presented Canberra with new opportunities and new challenges in shaping the emerging regional order. For instance, the financial crisis of 1997 and the consequent economic slowdown in some Asian countries made it clear that both economic growth and economic slowdown have significant security implications. The Australian response involved increased recognition of the need to become a partner in the broader span of Asia Pacific regional affairs in order to help shape a strategic setting that promotes peace and stability (Malik 1999, 2).

Canberra's recognition that its security and economic well being is directly affected by events within the wider Asia Pacific region is fundamental. Practicalities of Australia's geostrategic location dictate that any future military threat must come from the Asian region. Thus, the reality of its regional engagement with Asia is that Australia, by definition of its closer relations, will have greater exposure to the same threats as other nations in the region, be they the cause of military, economic, or social instability. This makes it more vulnerable to shockwaves from Asia (Malik 1999, 5). Given the circumstances described, the dilemma rests in how a developed middle power, with limited capability and influence, might better protect its vulnerability and at the same time exert sufficient influence to shape the wider strategic environment. In short, the situation Canberra finds itself in might be appropriately termed--the middle power dilemma.

U.S.-Australian Strategic Partnership

The collective realities associated with the middle power dilemma serve as the catalyst for a reinvigorated alliance and increased defense cooperation between Washington and Canberra. This is the cornerstone in a strategy designed to ease Australia's middle power dilemma. After assuming office on 2 March 1996, the Liberal-National Coalition government, led by Prime Minister John Howard, embarked on a review of national security strategy that was unprecedented in its rapidity
and breadth in modern Australian history. The new government was determined to change the
direction of Australia’s security policy and security orientation. In order to accomplish this, it
established among other things, the objective of achieving a closer defense relationship with the
United States; and a fundamental review of strategic guidance to the ADF with a view toward its
reorientation.

The government wasted little time in the move to implement change. At its first AUSMIN
meeting held during July 1996, a commitment to reinvigorate the U.S. security alliance was made.
Nested in this was a new strategic basis paper calling for the ADF to improve its ability to engage in
power projection operations in Southeast Asia and beyond, in conjunction with Australia’s allies.
The government also endorsed findings and recommendations of the *Defense Efficiency Review*,
which envisaged a 10 percent shift in resources away from support activities to improving ADF
combat capabilities. Finally, it embraced elements contained in another major review aimed at
improving combat capabilities through the emerging revolution in military affairs (Young, Thomas-
Durell 1999, 53-54).

The Joint Security Declaration issued after the 1996 AUSMIN talks was a seminal event in
the U.S.-Australian alliance. It reaffirmed validity of the forty-five-year-old alliance in the post-
Cold War era and underscored the centrality of the alliance relationship to Australia’s foreign and
security policy. Indeed, *ASP 97* reinforced this by stating that Australia’s alliance with the United
States is the most important strategic relationship it maintains and that preservation and development
of the relationship are among the highest of strategic priorities (DOD 1997, 18).

The 1996 AUSMIN talks also included an agreement to expand defense cooperation, long
considered the bedrock of the alliance relationship. The intent was to strengthen mutual cooperation
and improve higher level interoperability between the ADF and U.S. military forces by developing
a more robust joint/combined exercise program (EASR 1998, 26). In March 1997 the ADF became
important partners in TANDUM THRUST. This had formerly been a U.S.-only joint task force

44
exercise that started in 1992, but when the ADF joined the Americans in a coalition it became a combined task force exercise involving all the services. TANDUM THRUST 97, the fourth in a series, was hosted by Australia and happened to be the largest exercise ever held in the country. It involved more than 28,000 military personnel, over 250 aircraft, and up to forty naval vessels. Today TANDUM THRUST is the largest CINCPAC-sponsored exercise conducted regularly (every two years) at different locations throughout the Western Pacific (Asia-Pacific Defense Forum 1999, 7-8).

KINGFISHER and CROCODILE are two Australian-led and U.S.-supported exercises that also reflect a strengthened defense relationship. KINGFISHER is focused on theater strategic and operational level crisis action planning processes. This is the lead-in to CROCODILE, which is a joint/combined exercise with maritime/land defense focus. CROCODILE 99 was the first in this new series of theater-level, bilateral combined planning and field training exercises where U.S. forces are subordinated to an Australian-led Combined Task Force. Demonstration of combined interoperability with PACOM forces and its Joint Task Force (JTF) is important to the ADF as Australia seeks to assert itself more effectively in the region (CINCPAC, JS20 1999).

ASP 97 identified three basic tasks the ADF could be required to perform. Among them was defending Australia’s regional interests. Former Defense Minister Ian McLachlan described this as representing a reaffirmation of the expansion of the ADF task from a more narrowly constructed “Defense of Australia” approach to a wider but unspecified regional role (McLachlan, Address 1997). Indeed, RAAF strategic level doctrine changed in 1998 to reflect the new defense philosophy that recognizes the ADF’s potential in contributing to the promotion of Australia’s wider national interest. The Air Power Manual, which articulates the RAAF’s strategic level doctrine, states that Australia’s strategic engagement with the region is an integral element of its national effort toward greater regional influence (Air Power Manual 1998, 16).
The AUSMIN talks held in July 1998 produced a different set of outcomes reinforcing the Coalition government’s emphasis on increased defense cooperation with the U.S. and its efforts to ensure the ADF is better equipped to participate in coalition operations (Young, Thomas-Durell 1999, 56). Included among these outcomes were the following key points:

1. Understandings on technology-sharing in areas of central importance to effectiveness of the ADF and its capacity to contribute to coalition operations, including among other things, combat aircraft capabilities.

2. Agreement to further develop the ability of the ADF and United States military to operate together. Included here were steps to take advantage of the far-reaching technological and organizational changes resulting from the revolution in military affairs, and developing more effective planning on how the two forces could operate together with the new technology.

3. Agreement to develop the relationship between the ADF and U.S. Central Command. The government’s aim in developing the relationship with Central Command rests largely on its own strategic interest in Southwest Asia and the Middle East and the fact it has committed military forces to recent operations in the Persian Gulf. A well-developed relationship with between Central Command and the ADF is fundamental to Australia’s effective contribution to future operations in that region.

4. Agreement to develop the relationship between the ADF and Joint Forces Command to further the objective of interoperability. In addition to furthering the interoperability of forces, it can be reasonably assumed this relationship serves the purpose of developing the ADF’s own joint force projection capability, an area of specialty for Joint Forces Command.

5. Agreement to build a long-term partnership in the field of wide-area surveillance, involving Australia’s new procurement projects, such as the Airborne Early Warning and Control Aircraft and the Jindalee Operational Radar Network (AUSMIN Media Release, 1998).
Each of these outcomes, either directly or indirectly, give credence to USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron deployment integration as it is outlined in this paper. The ADAC was yet another product that emerged from AUSMIN 1998, which further complements the proposed arrangement. Details related to the ADAC and the possibilities for collaborative development of a next-generation fighter attack capability will be discussed in Chapter 4.

U.S. Strategic Policy

For America, post-Cold War events have secured its destiny as the world’s only super power for several years into the new century. As a consequence the nation has come to be seen as the guarantor of freedom for peoples around the globe and its ubiquitous military presence has become symbolic of that. In the Asia Pacific region most governments acknowledge that the security framework established by the American military presence has been an important shield behind which they have pursued their search for peace and prosperity. In their view, the continued strategic engagement of the U.S. will remain the cornerstone of Asia Pacific security (Thakur 1998, 9).

Notwithstanding America’s role as the world’s only super power, the end of the Cold War did prompt questions as to Washington’s plan for a continued military commitment to the Asia Pacific region. In the early 1990s the U.S. entered a period of significant force reduction. Typical of this was the United States Air Force (USAF) which lost 65 percent of its overseas bases—once considered to be the cornerstone its global striking power. Concern among many Southeast Asia nations was raised in 1992 when the U.S. military vacated the last of twenty-three installations in the Philippines after that government amended its Constitution to forbid permanent basing of foreign troops on Philippine soil. Among the military installations vacated was Subic Bay Naval Base and Clark Air Base that projected U.S. military power throughout Southeast Asia after World War II and served as logistical hubs for Korea and Vietnam (Satchell 2000, 30).

The answer to Washington’s plan for a continued military presence in the Asia Pacific region evolved through a series of East Asian strategy reports outlining the changes to be made in
defense strategy and force structure. In 1995 DOD issued a report noting that tension in the region and continuing areas of uncertainty required a reaffirmation of U.S. security commitments. This report was the first to confirm Washington’s intention to maintain 100,000 troops in the region (EASR 1998, 5). Since then, U.S. commitment has been further cemented. This is largely due to the economic, political, and military situation in East Asia and the fact that it is one of the most volatile regions in the world today.

Indeed, the President’s National Security Strategy of the United States released in December 1999, affirms Washington’s commitment to the Asia Pacific community. The document links security interests with economic growth and the nation’s commitment to democracy and human rights. The U.S. military presence is seen as a stabilizing force and as the bedrock to maintaining peace and security that have enabled most nations in the region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all (NSS 1999, 34).

Military responsibility for the Asia Pacific region is assigned to the combatant Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Pacific Command. CINCPAC’s area of responsibility includes the Pacific, Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia, South Asia and the Indian Ocean, encompassing forty-three countries. About 300,000 personnel from all U.S. military services fall under the command of CINCPAC. Forward deployed forces comprise approximately 100,000 troops and military assets. This number is meant to symbolize America’s commitment to the Asia Pacific region and enables the United States to react to potential crisis. It is based on analysis of the present-day strategic environment and the military capabilities needed to achieve U.S. goals for security and stability in the region. The 100,000-troop level represents formidable capabilities of the U.S. Seventh Fleet, the U.S. Eighth Army and Seventh Air Force in Korea, and the Fifth Air Force and III Marine Expeditionary Force in Japan (EASR 1998, 9-11).

PACOM strategy derives from two fundamental premises. The first premise is that there is a growing intersection of political, economic, and military aspects of security. Each of these aspects is
interdependent and cannot be advanced separately. While CINCPAC is responsible for advancing the military security piece of the strategy, it is done in close association with the State Department and foreign offices in other nations. The second premise is that security underlies the stable conditions that are a prerequisite for economic and political prosperity. The theory is that economic systems rest on political order and political order rests on military security.

Apart from normal peacetime interactions in the region, PACOM strategy is designed to address the divergent or unpredicted events that may occur. Three aspects in this strategy are preventive defense, crisis response, and warfighting.

The ADF has a participating role in CINCPAC’s preventive defense and crisis response strategy. Recall that the U.S.-Australia alliance was given new life based on post-Cold War strategic developments, such as globalization, territorial disputes, reunification questions, and the emergence of China. These realities demonstrated more than ever the need for a robust, integrative approach to the region. Given this understanding it becomes self-evident that the reinvigorated U.S.-Australia alliance is beneficial to both nations. Australia, largely due to its shared values, shared interests, and geographic position, has emerged as a vital link to regional support of the national security strategy and CINCPAC’s concept of preventive defense and crisis response.

Preventive defense is a shaping function that includes peacetime activities designed to reassure the region and deter conflict. These activities take many forms, including exercises and joint training, high-level visits, port calls, and multinational conferences (Prueher 1998, 27). The level of U.S. peacetime engagement activity with Australia has been on the rise. Since the July 1996 AUSMIN talks and the resultant Joint Security Declaration there has been an increasing level of activity between the two nations. For example, the flow of high-ranking distinguished visitors to Australia has increased significantly—a trend that began with President Clinton’s visit in November 1996. The number of military personnel exchange and liaison positions has increased, as have the
number of port calls by U.S. naval vessels. CINCPAC has also expanded the joint and combined exercise program with the ADF (LeBlanc 1999).

With regard to the joint and combined exercise program, the overarching concept at the strategic level is to alternate between U.S.-led/AUS-supported and AUS-led/U.S.-supported exercises. U.S.-led exercises include TANDUM THRUST, TEMPEST EXPRESS, TEMPO BRAVE, and RIMPAC. AUS-led exercises include KINGFISHER and CROCODILE. The two countries have transitioned to an exercise schedule based on a four-year, rolling cycle to eliminate the need for exercise participants to compete for resources. The U.S.-Australia exercise program coordinates respective engagement strategies while at the same time promoting security cooperation, exercising the protection of critical sea lines of communication, and enhancing joint and combined interoperability (CINCPAC, J520 1999). Each of these contributes in one way or another to the CINCPAC strategies of preventive defense, crisis response, and warfighting capability in the Asia Pacific region.

The warfighting aspect of CINCPAC’s strategy is employed as a last resort. If diplomatic efforts fail to deter conflict, PACOM remains prepared to fight and win quickly and decisively. While the preference is to fight with the combat support of regional allies and coalition partners, the capability and the will exist to fight alone if necessary (Prueher 1998, 27-29). The overriding principle in the PACOM strategy, however, is that an able, robust military supported by a network of overlapping and interlocking security relationships is an essential guarantor of peace in the Asia Pacific region (EASR 1998, 66).

The U.S. is a formidable military power, but it cannot underwrite regional and global order on its own. Existing theater operation plans notwithstanding, evidence shows that during modern-day contingency operations painstaking effort is dedicated to building ad hoc coalitions. The Gulf War demonstrated, and Bosnia and Kosovo confirmed two truths; the U.S. is loathe to lead without followers, and other Western powers will not follow without U.S. leadership (Thakur 1998, 8).
Based on this present-day reality, the major challenge for the Asia Pacific region lies in creating the more effective security structure that is grounded in a network of overlapping and interlocking security relationships. CINCPAC is very much interested in the idea of an integrated security structure based on a combination of self-defense and collective defense. The collective approach to regional security has at its root the ability for non-bilateral treaty partners to work together. According to Admiral Blair, the key to this development lies in leveraging bilateral relationships into multilateral relationships (Karniol 1999, 32).

It is relevant to note that in less than one year, events in the Asia Pacific region appear to have achieved what diplomacy could not accomplish in nearly ten years. The U.S. tried to encourage a shift from bilateral to multilateral military exercises in the early 1990s but was met with Asian resistance. It is Admiral Blair’s contention that the crisis in East Timor has made countries in the region increasingly receptive to multilateral military exercises. The policy brakes that prevented a more collective security approach came off after the situation in East Timor provided military officers in the region rationale to better argue the case with their ministers. Today CINCPAC is on a path toward achieving its aim of a more collective, integrated approach to security through a new generation of regional exercises called TEAM CHALLENGE (Karniol 1999, 32).

TEAM CHALLENGE moves traditional bilateral exercises into a multilateral exercise framework. It is designed to train CINCPAC contingency JTFs and improve interoperability with the Armed Forces of Australia, Thailand, Singapore, and the Philippines. The exercise is geared to demonstrate CINCPAC’s ability to rapidly deploy a JTF to conduct joint/combined operations in a smaller scale contingency. TEAM CHALLENGE has listed among its desired effects a mutual defense capability for Southeast Asia, training for mutual friends and allies in peace operations, and overall improved training with more realistic military response scenarios (CINCPAC, J352 1999).

The philosophy behind USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is closely aligned with PACOM’s emerging TEAM CHALLENGE Exercise concept—the collective approach to
regional security. The Director for Operations at U.S. Pacific Command, Rear Admiral Pickavance, pointed this out during a personal interview when USMC and RAAF F/A18 deployment integration was discussed. His favorable view of the proposed concept was based on the fact that it fit nicely with the larger PACOM strategy of leveraging bilateral relationships into multilateral relationships. With regard to interoperability, he felt any opportunity to coalesce allied forces is a good thing and that Australian F/A-18s operating with Marine Hornets in Iwakuni would be an example of that. When questioned as to possible problems the arrangement might pose regarding current theater operation plans, Admiral Pickavance countered with solutions as to how those obstacles might be overcome (Pickavance 1999).

U.S.-Japan-Australia Tripartite Arrangement

Australia and Japan have been contributing indirectly to each other’s security for more than forty years, through separate alliances with the U.S. By allowing American military ships to access their ports and by allowing American military units to operate on their soil, Australia and Japan have contributed to security of the wider Asia Pacific. The two countries also contribute to stability in the Southeast Asian archipelago, and each is important to development of the ASEAN states. Japan contributes through investment and aid, and her model as a successful economy. Australia, on the other hand, contributes less through economics and more through the FPDA, her growing bilateral links with ASEAN states, and her military power projection capabilities, which are significant in regional terms (Lim 1996, 84).

In terms of twenty-first century security structures, the region will continue to depend on U.S. bilateral alliances for stability, just as it did during the Cold War; however, these alliances are likely to become more collegial in nature. In other words, the Cold War was a period during which the international security system relied on such concepts as deterrence, alliances, containment, and balance of power. In the twenty-first century the trend is toward devising appropriate multilateral (and bilateral) security arrangements and undertaking joint and combined security-related activities
which will create and enhance the confidence and trust of nations in each other (Yamamoto 1996, 55-56). In the Asia Pacific region this trend has already been somewhat validated by the changing framework in military exercises that was described earlier (e.g., from bilateral to multilateral). In the context deployment integration and the notion of a tripartite arrangement, the bottom line is that individual members of the U.S. alliance network (e.g., Japan and Australia) will find mutual benefit in cooperating more effectively as America looks to share more of the security burden among its allies in the twenty-first century. In essence, the participant countries reap the benefits of collective security through use of the existing U.S.-Japan collective defense arrangement.

The common security linkage to America is but one factor that makes Australia and Japan natural trans-Pacific friends and feasible partners in a tripartite arrangement with the United States. Australia’s 1997 Foreign Affairs and Trade White Paper discusses a wide range of other converging strategic, political, and economic interests that the two countries have with each other. Japan is the number one export market for Australia by a considerable margin—more than double the value of the next largest market—and so trade and investment relations between them has profound importance. With foreign and trade policies that are closely aligned, each country welcomes the other’s playing a more active regional and international role. The White Paper goes on to state that Japan is likely to become a more important defense partner of Australia as it works, within the framework of the U.S. alliance, to gradually assume greater responsibility for her own security and to develop closer defense links within the region. Canberra sees value in expanding strategic dialogue and defense cooperation with Tokyo as a logical extension of the close partnership between two countries and shared perspectives on regional security (DFAT 1997, 32-33).

This analysis suggests that by forming a trilateral relationship between the U.S., Australia, and Japan, multiple and mutually reinforcing aims can be met. For example, a tripartite defense arrangement in Northeast Asia will provide operational relief for U.S. forces. Ultimately it could allow for some reduction of U.S. presence in the region without reduced U.S. commitment to the
region—an outcome that most Asian nations would applaud. Moreover, the equitable sharing of mutual security responsibilities would have broad appeal in America where such an arrangement might serve as a catalyst for continued public support of U.S. military presence in the region.

For Australia, a tripartite arrangement in Northeast Asia—facilitated through the integrated deployment mechanism—helps to mitigate its middle power dilemma by formalizing Canberra’s security and trade interests across and up and down the Pacific. The arrangement would also help to provide ballast to the ARF as the pre-eminent security dialogue forum in the Asia Pacific region (Thakur 1998, 9).

A tripartite security arrangement has potentially significant political benefits for Japan. It is important to note that because of Asia’s experience in the early twentieth century and during World War II, these countries remain suspicious about Japanese behavior. The appearance of any move toward Japanese remilitarization creates havoc in the region. That said, the assertion is that if a multilateral (or trilateral in the case of this research model) cooperative security arrangement is developed, within the context of the existing U.S.-Japan security arrangement, this will help to increase confidence and trust in Japanese behavior among Asian countries (Yamamoto 1996, 69).

Japan: The Constitutional Dilemma

HNS for the F/A-18 component of the III MEF forward deployed presence is provided by Japan. Research into the question of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration was done based on the following assumption: the government of Japan would accept the presence of one Australian F/A-18 squadron at MCAS Iwakuni on a rotational basis, provided the formal agreement was under the auspices of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Agreement (see Chapter 1 assumptions).

At issue is the Japanese Constitution, a document written by Americans after Japan’s defeat in World War II and approved by General Douglas McArthur. It took effect in 1947, and has not been revised since. The sticking point is Article 9, which promises that Japan will forever renounce war. That said, it should be noted that while Article 9 does not renounce the right of self-defense--a
nation’s inherent right which allows it to be minimally armed for its own defense--it does renounce the right of collective self-defense. The implication in terms of deployment integration is significant. Except under strict constraints of the U.S.-Japan Mutual Security Treaty, Japan cannot exercise the right of collective self-defense (Atsushi 2000, 21-22). Among other things, this Article 9 clause made it unconstitutional for Tokyo to dispatch Japanese Self Defense Force (JSDF) troops to the Persian Gulf in 1991 and it is this clause that prohibits foreign exchange officers that are assigned to American military units from deploying to Japan. Ultimately, it is this Article 9 clause--renouncing the right of collective self-defense--that stands in the way of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration at MCAS Iwakuni.

More pressing than the issue of Australian F/A-18 squadrons on Japanese soil is the dilemma regarding RAAF F/A-18 exchange pilots assigned to USMC squadrons. Indeed, the first step toward USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is to reach some accommodation for third nation exchange personnel to deploy in country with the U.S. military units to which they are assigned.

The RAAF exchange pilot that is currently assigned to MAG-31 characterizes the dilemma associated with Article 9. Within one month of his assignment to Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 115 (VMFA-115) he was made the squadron Pilot Training Officer. As the Pilot Training Officer it was his responsibility to develop and execute a pilot training program for the squadron’s air-to-air and air- to-ground combat readiness evaluation and UDP workup. One week before the squadron deployed to Iwakuni he was transferred to VMFA-122 where he assumed the duties of Assistant Operations Officer and secondary duties as Pilot Training Officer. Here, again, he developed a six-month pilot training program specifically tailored to meet operational requirements of WESTPAC contingency scenarios (Saunders 2000).

This discussion serves to make two points. First, the exchange officer position brings unique and valuable skills to MAG-31 squadrons--skills that are well-integrated into the unit’s activities in CONUS. The second point is an extension of the first. At a time when squadrons are scrambling to

55
meet their aircrew manning requirements for WESTPAC, one of the most qualified and experienced pilots is prohibited from joining the team, and therefore, must be reassigned to a non-deploying unit. This undermines unit integrity at the critical time and place where a full allocation of combat qualified aircrew is needed most.

Colonel Paul Peyton (USA), Chairman of the Department of Regional Studies at the Asia Pacific Center for Security Studies in Honolulu, HI, was consulted regarding the dilemma outlined above. He indicated that it would be “next to impossible” for an Australian exchange officer to serve in Japan with a USMC unit unless some fundamental tenets of Japanese national security policy were to change. Making specific reference to Article 9, he said the JSDF is prohibited from participating in any collective security arrangements other than the bilateral relationship with the U.S. under which American military forces are stationed in Japan (Peyton 1999).

The III MEF Commander, Lieutenant General E. B. Hailston, had a similar opinion. While acknowledging that the concept presented (e.g., USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration) had value, he believed that it was some period of time too soon. He indicated that he would like to expand multilateral training himself, but felt there would be solid reluctance to the idea of stationing Australian forces on Japanese soil. On the point of foreign exchange officers deploying to Japan with Marine units, he was sympathetic to the situation described. As the Commanding General of III MEF, Japan’s abrogation of the right to collective self-defense prohibits all his units from training with members of foreign armed forces on Japanese soil (Hailston 1999).

Based on the facts presented thus far, it appears the earlier assumption that Japan would accept the presence of a single RAAF F/A-18 squadron stands on pretty thin ice. However, for the purpose of this thesis the original assumption shall stand based on the following: (1) historical precedent; (2) changes in international circumstances and significant security events and; (3) the recent establishment of constitutional research councils.
The historical precedent goes back to the end of World War II when the Allies disarmed and occupied Japan. Among the allied occupation units was the RAAF’s No. 81 Wing, comprising three squadrons which began assembling at Iwakuni in February 1946. The last of the occupation units to depart Iwakuni was No. 77 Fighter Squadron, when it was deployed for action in Korea after war suddenly erupted on 25 June 1950. When the Korean War started several RAAF units returned to Iwakuni where they formed into No. 91 Wing from October 1950 until the Japan base began closing down in July 1956 (Coulthard-Clark 1995, 6-7).

Meanwhile, Japan’s Constitution took effect on 3 May 1947. The 1952 Treaty of Peace with Japan afforded a progressive and orderly transition to the restoration of full sovereignty from the stringent controls that had been in effect. At the same time, the Japanese government accepted Article 51 of the UN Charter, which stated that each nation has the right of self-defense against armed attack—a doctrine that was consistent with Article 9 of the Japanese Constitution. On 23 June 1960, the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security came into force. It is under this treaty that Japan hosts a carrier battle group, the 5th Air Force, elements of the Army’s I Corps, and III MEF. Under the stipulation Japan’s right of self-defense, the JSDF has gradually expanded its capabilities and assumed primary responsibility for the immediate conventional national defense of Japan’s homeland, territorial seas and skies, and sea lines of communication out to 1,000 nautical miles (U.S. Department of State, Japan 1999, 3, 5-7).

The second point, regarding changes in international circumstances and significant security events, began during the 1991 Persian Gulf War. The U.S. called on Japan, its security treaty partner, to cooperate in the military operation as an ally. But as long as Japan faithfully observed the strictures of its Constitution, it could not dispatch troops to the Persian Gulf. After much anguish, it sent $9 billion dollars instead. This contribution was not highly regarded internationally; Japan was criticized as a nation that limits its involvement by sending money, not people. As a response to this criticism, in 1992 the Japanese Diet passed legislation on participation of JSDF personnel in UN-led
peacekeeping operations, to define the maximum involvement permitted within the bounds of the Constitution. The legislation made it possible to send JSDF personnel to places such as Cambodia, Mozambique, the Golan Heights, and Central America (Atsushi 2000, 22).

In April 1996, the U.S. and Japan issued the Joint Declaration on Security. This reaffirmed that the security relationship, which began in 1960, remains a linchpin of U.S. security strategy in the Asia Pacific region. Shortly thereafter, the Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation took up review of the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, originally approved in November 1978. It was recognized that although the Cold War had ended, instability and uncertainty persisted in the region (e.g., Asia Pacific flash points). Accordingly, the maintenance of peace and stability in areas surrounding Japan had assumed greater importance for the security of Japan. In view of the changes in the post-Cold War environment, the U.S. and Japan decided to explore ways to enhance defense cooperation based on achievements made under the Guidelines approved in 1978 (U.S. Department of State, Subcommittee for Defense Cooperation 1997, 1).

By revising the Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Washington and Tokyo established a framework for working together in peacetime operations. Included were the defense of Japan, peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations, and functional areas for regional contingencies; to include areas related to Japan’s support for U.S. regional contingencies. The Defense Guidelines provide political authorization for bilateral defense cooperation—a matter of particular necessity given constitutional restrictions imposed on the JSDF through war-renouncing Article 9 (Gregson and Sakoda 1999, 52).

Recognizing the obvious sensitivities to Japanese militarism during the first half of the twentieth century, the Defense Guidelines agreement to broaden the JSDF role in supporting American forces in response to contingencies, or “situations in areas surrounding Japan,” set alarm bells ringing in Japan and throughout the region. Notwithstanding the calculated ambiguity, this is simply dealing with realities of the Asia Pacific’s strategic environment. Most would agree that it
refers to uncertainties in the Korean Peninsula, Taiwan Straits, and the South China Sea. In any case, officials in Beijing are particularly angry, claiming the new Guidelines represent “Cold War thinking” designed to contain China (Economist 1999, 24).

Controversy over the revised Defense Guidelines inhibited pushing the necessary legislation through the Japanese Diet, where required bills were pending since April 1998. Many politicians believed the only way to enact the new Guidelines was to reinterpret the Constitution. Some saw this as a welcome opportunity for Japan to gain a wholly new Constitution, while others thought the Constitution was fine, but may need tweaking in a few places (Economist 1999, 24).

The Defense Guidelines-related legislation was finally approved by the Diet in May 1999, with a reasonable majority in both houses. It is arguable that events in the region had more to do with rallying legislative support and parliamentary action than any diplomatic efforts. Tokyo was shocked by Pyongyang’s launch of a ballistic missile into Japanese airspace in August 1998. Then, there was the incursion of two suspected DPRK spy ships in Japanese territorial waters in March 1999. That incident ended when Japanese naval ships fired warning shots at the two unmarked vessels, which fled towards North Korea. Most observers agree that adventurism by Pyongyang galvanized a large swath of the political establishment to take action on pending security issues.

In the span of just a few months, Japan expanded its military role to support U.S. forces, laid plans to deploy reconnaissance satellites, and earmarked funds to start joint research with the U.S. on a ballistic missile defense system. What’s more, the government abruptly backed legislation that granted official status to the national flag and anthem (Dawson 1999, 18-19). These actions by the Japanese legislature signal a significant shift that is emerging across a broader range of political opinion. It is a shift that is at odds with the country’s postwar efforts to project a pacifist image.

Unclassified PACOM Country Team background notes correctly describe Japan as a nation that is undergoing a domestic political transition which will have implications on the future security and stability of the Asia Pacific region. The country has a mostly homogeneous population heavily
reliant on consensus building in its decision making. In describing Japan’s political significance to the U.S., background notes point to a significant pacifist sentiment that lacks any perception of a real-world threat. This results in political pressure for a small, territorial defense-centered military and for U.S. force reductions in Japan. As World War II and the Cold War recede into history, younger Japanese are questioning the continued presence of American forces, particularly on Okinawa. The growing prevalence of this sentiment among the Japanese and Okinawan people results in pressure on both Washington and Tokyo to reduce U.S. forward presence (CINCPAC, Japan Country Team 1999).

In view of the Country Team assessment, recent parliamentary actions that are claimed to signal a shift in the broader range of public opinion should be welcome developments in Washington and the U.S. military community. Long-term strategic considerations aside, most Japanese appear to tacitly approve of the government’s recent policy initiatives. Despite the country’s worst recession since World War II, public support for the former Prime Minister who shepherded these initiatives through the Japanese Diet had risen nineteen points; to 57 percent in the wake of government action. (Prime Minister Obuchi died in office during the Spring of 2000.) Further evidence to support claims of a shift in public opinion was reported in another poll by Japan’s largest daily newspaper. Here, polling evidence showed that 70 percent of Japanese citizens are worried about national security threats, up seven points from the same poll conducted two years earlier (Dawson 1999, 19).

So what does all this mean for the dim prospects of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration? What does it mean regarding the dilemma faced by parent units that would like to get foreign exchange officers onto Japanese soil for training and operations with the U.S. military units to which they are assigned? These questions give rise to the third point as to why the assumption stands regarding Iwakuni-based deployment integration. In July 1999, Japanese lawmakers passed a bill authorizing the establishment of “constitutional research councils.” These research councils provide a forum for discussing, among other things, Article 9 of the Constitution.
Legislative approval for constitutional research councils was described as an “epoch-making decision” by Toshiyuki Shikata, a professor of law at Teikyo University who formerly served as a General in the JSDF (Dawson 1999). It appears that a dose of realism—unwittingly provided by antagonists in the region—precipitated an epoch-making decision that years of diplomatic effort could not achieve.

The prospect of constitutional reform notwithstanding, it would appear that given the proper incentive, new and expanded defense arrangements do emerge in spite of Article 9. The recently approved Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation and Japanese peacekeeping operations are two examples. With regard to deployment integration, the timeline for Australian F/A-18s operating from Japanese soil is some years in the future, but the concept is possible in view of other significant security events that have occurred—beginning with the end of the Cold War.

Insofar as foreign exchange personnel deployed on Japanese soil with U.S. military units is concerned—relative to other recent changes that have occurred in Japanese security policy—this pales in comparison. The solution could be as simple as an amendment to the existing Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. The question regarding this seemingly benign arrangement is, Has the U.S. ever asked the government of Japan if it would allow foreign exchange personnel to deploy with American military units in country? If so, in view of the dramatic changes occurring, has this question been asked in recent times? If not, maybe it is time for U.S. officials to start exploring the possibilities.
CHAPTER 3
OPERATIONAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

The strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war are doctrinal perspectives that help to clarify the links between strategic objectives and tactical actions, but there are no finite limits or boundaries between them. Recall that Chapter 2 dealt with the strategic level of war where national leadership generates national objectives (based on the strategic environment) and a national security strategy to pursue them. Because the military instrument of power is a component of national security strategy and since the National Command Authorities of the President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority over the Armed Forces through combatant commanders, CINCPAC-level issues were included in the strategic analysis.

By definition, the operational level of war links the tactical employment of forces to strategic objectives. However, with no finite boundaries it is difficult to establish how far in either direction the operational analysis should extend. To simplify the matter, the operational analysis in Chapter 3 is contained within a DOD and service-level framework. With the operational setting of the U.S. and Australia’s respective military services as point of departure, the analytical focus in this chapter is narrowed to particular circumstances that confront the USMC and RAAF F/A18 communities. Included in the operational analysis is some discussion regarding financial aspects of deployment integration and how service costs are mitigated. This analysis is designed to support the cost-related assumption outlined in Chapter 1.

U.S. Armed Forces Operational Setting

The readiness of U.S. armed forces, particularly for the high intensity combat missions central to the nation’s military strategy, has continued to erode since the early 1990s. It is apparent that the high pace of military operations, due in large part to the burdens of repeated deployments for
peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, and declining budgets are taking a heavy toll on American military forces. Four trends are salient.

First, military personnel are working harder and longer to execute their peacetime missions due to an inherent tension between personnel and resource shortages and the increased pace of operations. Military personnel and their families are paying an increasingly higher human price from being repeatedly asked to do more with less. Second, the quantity and quality of combat training is being compromised, especially for the most demanding mission—to fight and win tomorrow’s high intensity wars. Third, the quality of military life continues to erode to the point where a growing number of talented and dedicated military personnel and their families question the desirability of a life in uniform. And fourth, military equipment is aging prematurely due to extended use and reduced maintenance. Budget cuts and the increased OPTEMPO have started to affect the reliability and availability of existing fleets of equipment. In sum, these trends depict a significant, systemic readiness problem that will continue to undermine the preparedness of U.S. military forces (U.S. Congress. House. 1997, 263).

The U.S. military services, and particularly fighter aviation units, are working harder than ever before. From interviews with aviation personnel and based on testimony before the House Committee on National Security, it is understood that aviation units are extensively using “work arounds” to solve the problems of aircraft breakdowns and parts shortages. There are widespread reports of maintenance personnel working extended hours to take parts from an unserviceable aircraft to place on another—a practice commonly known as cannibalization—in order to meet operational requirements.

The operating motto of “doing more with less” is incompatible with maintaining a highly-motivated, well-trained, quality military force able to execute the demands of the National Military Strategy. This reality is the result of declining defense budgets, a smaller force structure, fewer personnel, and aging equipment laboring under a higher pace of operations. There is good reason
to be concerned about the extent to which the military services must strip people, parts, equipment, and funds from non-deployed units to fill shortfalls in deploying units. This shell game leaves non-deployed units ill-prepared to maintain combat skills and increases the burden on those left behind who must work longer and harder to maintain operations at home station (U.S. Congress. House. 1997, 325).

All of this goes to show that the fundamental dilemma facing the Pentagon remains constant: how to maintain a viable all-volunteer force in an operational environment where the number, scope, and duration of military missions continue to grow while military forces and defense budgets continue to decline. It is predicted that the gap between strategy and resources will persist for some time (U.S. Congress, House 1997, 10). Moreover, in the near term the burden of responsibility will not change for the world’s only global power. Operating in a strategic environment characterized by rising regional powers, asymmetric challenges, and transnational dangers has a cost. That cost is reflected in the need for continued overseas presence, combined with the requirement to rapidly project combat power anywhere in the world. Experts agree that the demand for these military capabilities and skills is unlikely to diminish (NMS 1997, 18).

The nation’s budget is driving the U.S. inexorably toward some very difficult choices. Simply put, sooner or later, the administration, congress, and the services must confront the fact that at current budget levels America can no longer sustain and modernize force structure while also operating at the current tempo. For the first time since the end of the Cold War the U.S. is in a zero-sum budget game: any congressionally directed increases to any particular program or service must result in a like decrement somewhere else. In 1999, defense spending, as a share of gross domestic product, fell to 3.2 percent, less than any year since before the Korean War. Given the pressures that entitlements and debt reduction will continue to exert on the federal budget in the first decade of the twenty-first century, it is hard not to conclude that each of the services will be forced to contend with decreased, not increased, budget figures (Steele 1999, 17).
Notwithstanding America’s position as the only global power, the circumstances described above are not unique to the United States. A new approach to security issues could well serve all. While nation’s struggle to come to grips with a dramatically changing world where economic and national security issues are now inextricably linked, the military services must come to grips with how to provide forces and combat capabilities to meet the strategic vision in a resource-constrained environment (Steele 1999, 14). Hence, this is one area where the strategic and operational linkage in deployment integration occurs.

Across a landscape of challenges in the new century, peculiar circumstances face the U.S. and Australia at the strategic level and the U.S. Marine Corps and RAAF at the operational level. These circumstances while difficult to overcome, are more easily overcome through partnership at the strategic and operational level. The cooperative action of two nations and two services achieves more than if each were to pursue its objectives and attack its difficulties independently. The strategic aspect of this has already been discussed. What follows is how similar partnership at the operational level can help to overcome service challenges while at the same time deriving key benefits across the spectrum of warfare.

USMC Perspective: Deployment Integration and the MCWI.

The former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, long argued that the Marine Corps was at a “strategic inflection point”—a point described by Andrew S. Grove, chief executive officer of Intel Corporation, as a time in the life of a business when its fundamentals are about to change. Grove said that when poised at such a time, one can no longer fight the competition in the same way, because “the rules of the game” have changed. As a result, technology can no longer ensure a dominant market position. Why? Because simply laminating new technology on top of old concepts and doctrine and organizations is useless in the new strategic environment. Instead, one has to try to understand how the environment has changed, anticipate the operational challenges such changes might create, and then conceive and develop new concepts and organizations to solve
them. Accepting this, the Marine Corps believes that the current strategic inflection point will result in a kind of “revolution in national security affairs” (Steele 1999, 15, 18).

While a revolution in national security affairs is significant at the strategic level, even more important at an operational level is the Marine Corps’ preparation for this revolution. To help chart a course to master challenges of the twenty-first century the service looks to its MCWL, which was created in 1995. The MCWL was established as a means for developing new technology, new organizations, and new concepts. The Lab developed an initial Five-Year Experimentation Plan in 1996, called Sea Dragon—the process by which the Marine Corps would prepare for the future. This three-phase experimentation plan is not one particular innovation or idea, but rather a commitment to innovation. Neither is it a predetermined force structure or a predetermined operational technique. Instead, it is a method of evaluating potential structures and techniques as well as training, education, and doctrinal ideas. Sea Dragon is a “model for future thinking and an umbrella under which ideas are born, tested, bear fruit, or die” (Krulak 1996, 28).

In an article published in the Winter 1999 edition of Naval War College Review, Lieutenant General Martin R. Steele, USMC, discussed Sea Dragon and some of the ways that the experiments have been applied to break down old national security paradigms. For instance, there has been an effort, he says, to “conceptualize a combined-arms approach to national security, one based on the idea of building deep coalitions among interested partners both inside and outside of government, and among international organizations and our allies.” Lieutenant General Steele went on to explain the Marine Corps view that more time must be spent closing the interagency gaps, expanding the idea of jointness to include new levels of governmental coordination and forging new collaborative partnerships with allies and non-governmental organizations. (Steele 1999, 19).

Capable Warrior, the third and final phase of the five-year Sea Dragon experimentation plan, is currently underway. When the MCWL has completed the Capable Warrior warfighting experiment, the assessments that apply to the Marine Corps’ operational concepts—Ship to Objective
Maneuver (STOM) and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS)—as well as innovations uncovered during all previous warfighting experiments, will then be incorporated into Coalition Warrior. Coalition Warrior will be conducted in a combined scenario with coalition partners operating side-by-side with U.S. Marines. Issues that have been identified, that potentially could hamper synergy between U.S. forces and coalition forces, will be addressed in order to ensure U.S. innovation and enhancements do not adversely affect the ability to work with coalition partners (Coalition Warrior Draft Concept Paper 1999).

Deployment integration clearly fits into the rubric of a combined-arms approach to national security and the concept of deep coalitions that Lieutenant General Steele described in his article. Therefore, if indeed the Marine Corps is at a strategic inflection point and the rules of the game have changed, then the ideas offered in this paper may have a place in the MCWL’s warfighting experimentation. The timing suggests that Coalition Warrior, scheduled to begin in 2001, would be that place (Coalition Warrior Advance Sheet 1999). Always on the cutting edge of innovative thought, the Marine Corps is ideally suited to experiment with a revolutionary concept that could relieve the burden on its own forces. At the same time, the Corps would be advancing the national interest by embracing the concept of security pluralism and putting the idea of strategic communities into practice—recognizing that USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is an integrated security structure that transcends collective defense and collective security.

USMC Engagement with the ADF

It has already been discussed how the 1996 AUSMIN talks were a seminal event in U.S.-Australian defense relations at the strategic level. From an operational perspective these talks were equally significant in opening the door to new training opportunities for the U.S. Marine Corps. Access to large training areas in Northern Australia compensates for space that was lost when the U.S. withdrew from Philippine bases. Moreover, it allows for large-scale maneuver and live-fire exercises that are constrained in Japan due to artillery fire restrictions (AUSMIN 1996).
According to the Australian Defense Minister, John Moore, Canberra supports USMC engagement initiatives with the ADF because they are of great benefit in advancing interoperability and improving the capabilities of the defense forces. The Defense Minister also points out that USMC-ADF engagement initiatives are supported because such activities assist the forward deployment of U.S. forces, a posture that Australia sees as an important contribution to strategic stability in the region (Moore, Interview 1999, 23).

The 1996 AUSMIN talks that produced the arrangement for Australia to host USMC training in the Northern Territory included the following agreements: (1) establishment of a Liaison Cell to coordinate training and exercises, and to support range and training area use; (2) authorization to conduct landing exercises with Marine Expeditionary Units (MEU) en route to the Arabian Gulf and; (3) establishment of suitable support facilities. The intent of these U.S. Marine Corps engagement initiatives is not to develop a permanent large-scale base in Australia. Instead, the long-term aim is to work with the ADF in developing, with modest infrastructure, geographically larger training areas that are more functional (HQMC, PLU 1999).

USMC-ADF activities in Northern and Western Australia have included exercises such as CROCODILE and TANDUM THRUST at the strategic level, but there are incentives for the Marine Corps to build on the bilateral training regime already in existence. For example, MEUs that transit the Pacific from southern California to the U.S. Central Command area of responsibility in the Persian Gulf region require an area for sustainment training. The issue of MEU readiness, coupled with the port facilities and other infrastructure—to include facilities for accommodation, ammunition and fuel storage, live-fire ranges, and nearby air facilities—make MEU sustainment training in the Northern Territory especially attractive.

Unfortunately, MEU sustainment training in the Northern Territory is problematic for two reasons. First, the ADF’s 1st Brigade presently uses the two primary field-training areas within the Northern Territory (Mount Bundy and Kangaroo Flats). Second, because these two training areas
are only accessible during the dry season (May/Jun to Sep/Oct), unilateral MEU sustainment training impacts 1st Brigade’s ability to train in its own back yard. The short-term solution to this was the permanent assignment of a Marine Forces Pacific (MARFORPAC) liaison officer to Headquarters, Australian Northern Command in Darwin to coordinate MEU sustainment training and other USMC activities with the ADF. With a liaison officer in position, MARFORPAC has an important conduit to Northern Command. This aids in the planning and execution of a wide range of cooperative USMC and ADF activities, and it provides the nucleus for an eventual USMC liaison cell in Darwin. The long-term solution to coordinated use of training areas for MEU sustainment training is seen in the cooperative development of future training areas. Bradshaw Field and Yampi Sound, both located in the Northern Territory, offer outstanding potential for large-scale maneuver and live-fire training (HQMC, PLU-2 1999).

MEU sustainment training and development of Northern Territory training areas are two separate initiatives proceeding at different rates. First, MEU sustainment training is progressing on track, with the initial evolution scheduled in August/September 2000 for approximately five days; thereafter one MEU per year (HQMC PLU-2, 1999). The second initiative is Bradshaw Field. This training area is being developed by the ADF. It was scheduled to be on line for CROCODILE 99 but there were delays in making it available due to continuing Aboriginal rights claims against the property. Further development of this range may be undertaken through USMC-ADF cooperative efforts. Although there are no current plans for development of the Yampi Sound training area, this may change after Australian amphibious ships become operational.

With plans for deploying MEUs to conduct vital sustainment training while en route to the Arabian Gulf, the Marine Corps is moving to a new level of training cooperation with the ADF. An incremental approach by both sides, carefully planned and executed, in full consultation with one another is essential to the further strengthening of this important strategic relationship. Development of an infrastructure capable of supporting periodic Marine training is seen as an important hedge.
against an uncertain future. It cannot be assumed that current USMC force structure and basing in the Asia Pacific region will continue indefinitely. Therefore, it is in the security interest of both nations that the USMC and ADF cooperate in proceeding toward the identification, development, and utilization of new training sites (HQMC PLU, 1999). 

Among the engagement initiatives outlined above are other ongoing USMC-ADF activities already in place. CROCODILE and TANDUM THRUST are large, strategic level exercises that have already been discussed. Smaller scale exercises include the following:

1. SOUTHERN FRONTIER: Unilateral air-to-ground training conducted annually at RAAF Base Tindal (Delamere Air Weapons Range) by MAG-12. During this three-month exercise each of the MAG-12 F/A-18 squadrons rotate through Tindal for approximately one month at a time.

2. GOLD EAGLE: A MARFORPAC scheduled III MEF sponsored bilateral infantry unit exchange conducted in Hawaii and Queensland between a USMC Infantry Company (-) from 3D Marines and an Australian Army Infantry Company from 3rd Brigade.

3. VALIANT USHER: This exercise series involves the Amphibious Ready Group and the MEU integrating with the ADF to conduct operations at sea; advance force operations; combined arms, live-fire amphibious assault operations with follow-on training ashore and; retrograde operations.

4. VIGILANT BLADE: Although VIGILANT BLADE 1999 was canceled due to ADF operational commitments at the time, the series will continue with a command post exercise planned for 2000. The next command post and field training VIGILANT exercise is anticipated for 2001.

5. FORECONEX: Annual bilateral reconnaissance training between III MEF and Australian Army.

6. 1st RADIO BATTALION and 7th SIGNALS REGIMENT SERIES includes:

   a) PHIEDIPPIDES SHIELD: CRYPTO training.

   b) RUNNING BEAR: CRYPTO training in an electronic warfare (EW) environment.

7. NORFORCE PATROL TRAINING: This recent initiative, conducted for the first time in 1998, involves a small group of RECON Marines from III MEF conducting patrol and survival training
in Australia’s Northern Territory with Northern Force personnel for a period of five to six weeks. The Marines provide instruction to ADF personnel on USMC patrol techniques while at the same time learning skills taught by their Australian counterparts (MARFORPAC, G-3 1999).

Further evidence of increased USMC-ADF engagement activity is reflected in the personnel exchange program (PEP). Since 1998 the following PEP billets have been created to support the expanding links between the U.S. Marine Corps and the ADF:

1. USMC Major: billet at J7 (International Interoperability), Headquarters Australian Theater. The ADF billet is at G3 (Theater Operations), MARFORPAC. Commenced January 1998.

2. USMC Major: Liaison Officer billet at Headquarters Northern Command / ADF Liaison Officer billet at MARFORPAC. Commenced June 1998.

3. USMC Major: billet at the Army Experimentation Office, Combined Arms Training and Doctrine Center in Victoria. To commence during mid-year 2000. The ADF billet, at the MCWL, Quantico, VA, has been filled since January 1998.

While there are a number of other PEP billets that exist between services of the ADF and the USMC, there two F/A-18-related billets which have particular significance in terms of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration. One of these billets is for a Captain--F/A-18 pilot at No. 75 Squadron, RAAF Base Tindal, exchanging with a RAAF Flight Lieutenant--F/A-18 pilot at MAG-31, MCAS Beaufort. The second billet is for a Captain--F/A-18 aviation maintenance officer at No. 3 Squadron, RAAF Base Williamtown, exchanging with and a RAAF Flight Lieutenant--F/A-18 engineering (maintenance) officer at MAG-11, MCAS Miramar. These exchange positions have existed since the mid-1980s when the RAAF acquired F/A-18s. The officers that have filled these billets, have been fundamental in forging the close links of mutual respect and service familiarity that exist between the two communities. In considering the question of deployment integration, U.S. officials would do well to consult those Marines that have served with the RAAF in these billets.
USMC F/A-18 Operational Setting

In an era of drawdown, funding shortages, recruiting and retention shortfalls, and operational stress, the U.S. Marine Corps stands out as well-organized and respected institution. The Marines came through the post-Cold War downsizing period with fewer personnel and unit losses than any of its sister services (Gresham 1999, 63). In fact, a rudimentary glance at the F/A-18 organizational structure reveals that since Desert Storm the number of USMC Hornet squadrons has actually grown from twelve to fourteen.

This finding, an actual increase in structure amid drastic aviation unit reductions in other services, could be perceived as controversial at best. It certainly detracts from the debate regarding deployment integration and the use of RAAF F/A-18 squadrons as a stress-reliever for Marine squadrons that participate in the WESTPAC UDP schedule. Based on a cursory look, some DOD officials might contend that Marine Hornets are under-utilized and that an integrated arrangement with the RAAF would be justification to reduce organizational structure or siphon assets to the Navy CVWs (Thumm 2000). That said, a more thorough analysis of the USMC F/A-18 operational setting is warranted.

In reducing the post-Cold War structure of its aviation component the Marine Corps pursued a neck-down strategy that contributed to the elimination of up to fourteen squadrons that were made obsolete when the multi-role, two-seat F/A-18D Hornet entered service in 1989. While six of these units (A6-Es) were transitioning to the F/A-18D for redesignation as Marine All Weather Fighter Attack Squadrons, an additional four, single-seat FA-18A squadrons were also being deactivated. This explains the increase in the number of Hornet squadrons (x 2) noted earlier (HQMC 2000).

The Marine Corps’ decision to procure the F/A-18D was significant because it replaced four obsolete aircraft, while sharing 95 percent commonality with the single-seat F/A18 variant that was already in service. This reduced the number of USMC tactical fixed wing aircraft types from seven to three: the F/A-18 Hornet series, the AV-8B Harrier attack jet, and the EA-6B Prowler EW
platform. In the role of all-weather day and night attack, the F/A-18D replaced the A-6E Intruder. Equipped with the Advanced Tactical Airborne Reconnaissance System, the F/A-18D replaced the RF-4B Phantom in the role of tactical reconnaissance, and it replaced the OA-4M Sky Hawk in the role of fast forward air controller. After Desert Storm the Marine Corps replaced the OV-10 Bronco, which had served as the Corps' primary airborne supporting arms control platform. The F/A-18D was then tasked, along with the Marine light attack helicopter community, to pick up the OV-10 Bronco's mission (Dillard 1999,1). The salient point to take away from this discussion is that the F/A-18D assumed the roles of four different aircraft types, and with that, an operational workload which far outweighed the net increase in F/A-18 organizational structure.

Meanwhile, downsizing in the U.S. Navy also brought new post-Cold War challenges for Marine fighter attack aviation. The Navy drawdown created a shortfall in CVW squadrons. Defense Planning Guidance currently requires the Navy to maintain eleven active carriers and one operational reserve. Thirty F/A-18 squadrons, on a rotational basis, are required to support the CVWs. There are only twenty-two Hornet squadrons after the Navy drawdown. Consequently, in June 1993 the Marine Corps signed a Memorandum of Agreement that provided three F/A-18 squadrons for long-term carrier integration and an additional two squadrons for periodic integration (Ostrom 1995, 61).

The Marine fighter community was also affected by the Base Relocation and Alignment Commission decision to consolidate all F/A-18s at parent commands located on the East and West Coast (MCAS Beaufort, SC and MCAS Miramar, CA). With this came another decision that permanently stationed one Hornet squadron at MCAS Iwakuni. This meant that the WESTPAC UDP schedule would be supported equally by the CONUS-based parent commands. The only thing that did not change through post-Cold War drawdowns was the Pacific Theater requirement for three USMC F/A-18 squadrons (36 aircraft) to support the forward-deployed III MEF aviation package.

The net result of the changes discussed has been increased OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO for the Marine F/A-18 community. A House National Security Committee report completed after
calendar year 1998 points out that the Marine Corps participated in fifteen contingency operations during the seven-year period from 1982 through 1989. However, in the period since the Berlin Wall came down in November 1989 through 1998, the Marines had participated in sixty-two contingency operations (Linsley and Oldham 1999, 85). As an individual community, USMC Hornet squadrons reflect a similar pattern. From 1982 through 1989 F/A-18s participated in two real world operations. From 1990 to present Marine Hornet squadrons have participated in at least eleven contingencies (USMC Operations, 1999).

Herein lies the crux of the matter: absent contingency operations, there appears to be no compelling evidence to suggest that Marine F/A-18 squadrons are over-tasked. Out of the thirteen squadrons available for the WESTPAC UDP schedule, four are integrated into the CVW rotation (two East Coast and two West Coast single-seat squadrons). The remaining nine squadrons (six F/A-18D and three F/A-18A/C single-seat) are available for the Iwakuni deployment schedule. This provides a reasonable eighteen-month turnaround time between each six-month WESTPAC deployment period—a schedule that is sustainable for the long term.

Notwithstanding normal peacetime operations, there are, however, significant second and third-order effects to consider when routine deployment commitments are weighed against decreased manning and increased maintenance, a rigorous pre-deployment training regime, and an increasing number of no-notice, short-notice, and sometimes open-ended contingencies. The following are some examples that illustrate the second-order effects of unplanned contingencies and how these may contribute to third-order effects of reduced readiness, retention, and morale:

1. During Desert Storm four Marine F/A-18 squadrons were deployed in support of U.S. Central Command. Unable to keep pace with the UDP schedule that coincided with the operations in Southwest Asia, one WESTPAC squadron was forced to remain in theater for eleven months; well beyond the standard six-month deployment period. In this case, the second-order effects came in the way of an extended deployment to Iwakuni. While an eleven-month deployed period
for one squadron is not unreasonable in a wartime situation, defense planners should pause to consider this: apart from activating Reserve F/A-18s, how might the Hornet community have coped with its UDP schedule had the war dragged on for an extended period? How would the Marines have coped if four squadrons had been committed to the CVW at that time?

2. From July 1993 to June 1997, F/A-18 squadrons from MAG-31 supported enforcement of the no-fly zone over Bosnia-Herzegovina. In doing so, what began as a single ninety-day operational deployment to Aviano Air Base in northern Italy for one squadron turned into 180 days, and then a bona fide UDP schedule carried out over four years (USMC Operations, 1999). Again, there were second-order effects as a consequence of a small-scale contingency operation involving solo squadron deployments out of MAG-31. During this period the redeployment turnaround time for the WESTPAC UDP schedule slipped by one-third. The turnaround time was reduced from eighteen months to twelve months for most F/A-18 squadrons supporting the WESTPAC deployment schedule (USMC Unit Deployments, 1999).

3. From May to July 1999, two F/A-18D squadrons from MAG-31 deployed to Taszar, Hungary to participate in Joint Task Force Noble Anvil, part of NATO’s Operation Allied Force. One of the squadrons tasked for this mission was redeployed less than thirty days after returning from a six-month Iwakuni deployment. The other squadron had been home for eleven months since its last six-month deployment (Davis 1999). Again, the second and third-order effects are self-evident.

4. In early March 2000, a USMC F/A-18D squadron from MCAS Miramar deployed to Al Jabr Air Base, Kuwait to relieve a USAF A-10 squadron that had been on station for operations to enforce the southern no-fly zone over Iraq—Operation SOUTHERN WATCH. The deployment had been arranged between the two services during the previous year and was programmed as a one-time commitment for a period of three months (Barrow 2000). What this means insofar as future F/A-18 deployments to Kuwait is unknown; however, suffice it to say that there are going to be second and third-order effects once again. In this case, the squadron presently deployed to Al Jabr is
scheduled to return home during June and it is programmed to redeploy to Iwakuni in September. Scheduled during that turnaround period is a squadron work-up for WESTPAC that includes among other things, a four-week combined arms exercise at Marine Corps Base, Twenty-nine Palms, CA (Karnetsky 2000).

5. Another factor that should be taken into account when considering the impact of future Hornet operations is the increasingly high demand for unique capabilities provided by the F/A-18D squadrons. As more aircraft are equipped with the advanced tactical airborne reconnaissance system (ATARS) there will be increased operational demands on those squadrons.

As DOD officials ponder the question of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration, third-order effects of extended or rapid-fire deployment rotations must be taken into account. In an editorial printed in the U.S. Naval Institute journal, Proceedings, a Marine Corps F/A-18 pilot wrote, “In the debate over retention, the leadership needs to remember that pilots care about more than just money.” What decision makers do not seem to understand, he says, is that “most of the aviators who are leaving the Corps (at least the many I know) are not doing it out of selfish desires for money or the easy life. They are leaving out of the selfless desire to take care of their own—their families.” The writer says that his peers do not want to leave the Corps, but at the same time “Marines cannot be expected to lead their troops by example and their family by proxy.” His assertion is that as manpower and assets decrease while requirements increase, families suffer. “The high tempo can be endured by families for a short time—and they expect it when their loved ones are in combat—but this is the norm.” The real issue, he says, is that “Marines are over-deployed” (Craft 1999, 70).

The fact that in 1998 only one in ten eligible carrier-based naval aviators accepted incentive bonuses to remain in the service validates the point made regarding deployments. In the report cited it explains that retention rates for critical jobs like pilots continue to fall as men and women with those skills spend more and more time away from home in what many regard as non-essential tasks (Korb 1999, 49).
Problems of over-deployment are compounded by decreased manning and increased aircraft maintenance workload. A look at the Marine Corps Table of Manning Requirements for an F/A-18 squadron Table of Organization (T/O) reflects that in 1992, total force structure—in the maintenance department only—equaled 130 enlisted Marines. In 1999 the same document reflected 120 Marines in the maintenance department. Notwithstanding evidence that some decrease in maintenance structure was decremented to squadron staff sections (figures show a net increase of three personnel in staff sections), the manpower reduction does not seem unreasonable (HQMC 1992 and 1999). Provided these numbers were an accurate reflection of squadron manning levels, the offset between 1992 and 1999 would be more manageable. Unfortunately, the T/O is a wartime planning figure largely irrelevant to fleet units. The figure that units focus on is the staffing goal derived from the Authorized Strength Report. Authorized strength is the number of Marines funded by the U.S. Congress. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Aviation receives a percentage of this strength to design manning for aviation units.

In April 1991, the Authorized Strength Report (or staffing goal) for an East Coast USMC F/A-18 squadron was 100 percent of T/O (Daas 1995, 5). Today the authorized strength for an F/A-18 squadron fluctuates—depending on occupational specialty—between 80 and 93 percent of T/O. In the case of USMC squadrons assigned to the carrier, the demand for manning is much greater. The Navy requirement for an embarked F/A-18 squadron runs between 203 and 206 Marines. In addition, the CVW wants a fully complemented USMC squadron for work-ups, which start nine months in advance of a scheduled six-month deployment (HQMC, MMEA 2000). The reality is that deploying units are still fed Marines up to a week before sail date. This excess must come from internal assets. In other words, East and West coast parent commands (MAG-31 and MAG-11) are forced to make drastic adjustments through inter-squadron transfers in order to achieve the required staffing goal for CVW and WESTPAC deploying units. Although the staffing goal for WESTPAC
squadrons is considerably less than for carrier squadrons, the requirement to outfit with personnel is equally challenging (Davis 1999/Lex 2000).

With aviation units there is no legitimate downside in the operational cycle where priority can shift. Non-deploying units have the same manning requirements as those that are getting ready to deploy. To complicate things further, manning shortfalls are exacerbated by deployability status of individual Marines. Squadrons often have significant numbers of non-deployable Marines for a variety of reasons and so another deployable Marine has to replace them. Typically, it is those that have recently returned from a deployment. The result is a rapid-fire effect where some Marines are required to make one deployment after another. This dynamic has an obvious negative effect on retention, family stability, and overall morale.

A review of maintenance statistics also contradicts the reality of the situation to some extent. For instance, direct maintenance man-hours per flight hour (DMMH/FH) for the F/A-18C went from 7.3 in 1990 to 11.5 in 1999. Cannibalization rates per 100 flight hours for the same type/model aircraft went from 5.2 to 7.8. Figures for the F/A-18A and F/A-18D type/model aircraft fluctuate within a similar range (HQMC, ASL Branch 2000). These are by no means remarkable figures. In fact, cannibalization within the MAG to assist units in achieving the twelve-aircraft, 100 percent mission capability rate necessary to deploy is nothing new. Even before the post-Cold War draw-down this was standard practice coordinated by the MAG maintenance officer.

What has not been standard is the need to cannibalize from aircraft external to the MAG. Most recently, the Miramar squadron that deployed to Southwest Asia during February 2000 had to request higher authority to cannibalize from a Navy squadron at Naval Air Station Lemoore. The truth is that MAG maintenance officers at MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Miramar have said that increasingly extreme measures are required to get squadrons “out of town” with twelve, similarly configured aircraft. Making this job more difficult is the necessity to have all projected high time components replaced in order to mitigate support problems while overseas (Davis 1999/Lex 2000).
Therefore, while cannibalization and DMMHR/FH statistics are not dramatic, when balanced against increased OPTEMPO and reduced manning, there is sufficient evidence to indicate that Marines in the F/A-18 community are accomplishing a lot more with a lot less.

Continued uncertainty regarding the USMC F/A-18 operational environment and associated force structure challenges lends credence to the notion that an Iwakuni-based integrated deployment arrangement with the RAAF would be prudent. While no one can assume to know what the future will offer in the way of new challenges for fighter attack aviation in the Marine Corps, it is clear that the current trend points to more commitments and not less. That said, it would be wise for defense planners concerned about resource constraints, operational burn-out, and overall readiness to look outward for relief.

The MARFORPAC Operations (G-3) Air Officer indicated that West Coast F/A-18s do not have an OPTEMPO problem and, therefore, he did not see the need to integrate Australians into the UDP schedule. He also did not see where the benefits of integrating RAAF F/A-18s into MAG-12 at MCAS Iwakuni for any length of time would outweigh the costs of doing business (Gregson 2000). Notwithstanding these arguments, the bottom line is this: the debate can go on regarding the question of whether West Coast or East Coast F/A-18s have an OPTEMPO or PERSTEMPO problem, but one fact remains—even if F/A-18 operations are not sufficiently demanding to warrant an integrated deployment arrangement with the RAAF in peacetime, it does not mean there won’t be a compelling need for such an arrangement in wartime.

Under legitimate circumstances, a military organization that looks outward for operational relief is smart management. The *U.S. National Security Strategy* acknowledges this by the emphasis it puts on the strategic imperative of defense cooperation (NSS 1999, 11). The *National Military Strategy* echoes the same message through the emphasis that it puts on interoperability and overseas presence (see glossary). The American military is committed to the doctrinal and technological development with key allies in order to further interoperability. Likewise, the U.S. enables support
for a collective approach to regional security through its overseas presence and combined training with friends and allies (NMS 1997, 12, 14). The point is that an operationally stretched military in peacetime equates to a compromised fighting force in wartime—and smart management preempts this. A Commander in the Argentine Navy put it best when he said, “Interoperability, mutual confidence, and success cannot be obtained on the brink of conflict, nor can they be achieved by a sudden and improvised effort. *Good intentions cannot replace professional preparations*” (Department of the Army 1997, 3-0).

**Australian Defense Policy and the ADF**

The second half-century of federal Australia, like the first, was marked by a debate over defense policy. The question was whether the nation should focus on direct defense of the continent and its northern approaches (continental defense) or whether it should aim to defend from beyond Australian shores with its “Great Power” allies (forward defense). Immediately after World War II, the Labor government adopted a policy of continental defense but successive Liberal-Country Party governments switched to a policy of forward defense in the 1950s and 1960s amid the threat of communist aggression in Asia (Lee 1999, 8). Specifically, the government feared communist domination of Indochina and a subsequent Soviet inspired thrust through the peninsular of Malaya to the northern fringes of Australia. In essence, the policy of forward defense was aimed at “containing” communism and mitigating threat of the so-called domino theory (Brown 1996, 2).

From the 1970s Australian defense policy makers shifted slowly toward the policy of continental defense and self-reliance—a policy largely preserved by the Hawke and Keating Labor governments in the 1980s and early 1990s (Lee 1999, 8). However, as early as 1990 the pendulum began to swing away from continental defense when new situations in Southeast Asia highlighted the difficulty Australia had in responding to regional requests. The shift away from a narrow focus on developing ADF capabilities for the defense of Australia to a more comprehensive security policy was first reflected in a strategic planning document prepared in 1989, *Australia’s Planning in the*
1990s. This was followed by the 1993 Strategic Review which strongly restated Australia’s “primary commitment to developing [its] self-reliant capacity” while claiming that “the challenge is to expand and accelerate strategic engagement with the region as a major new emphasis in defense posture.”

The evolution in Australian defense policy continued with a new Defense White Paper released in 1994, Defending Australia 1994. The 1994 Defense White Paper maintained continuity with the past by introducing the new concept of “defense-in-depth” under which the former layered defense strategy and self-reliance was swept up with both technological depth and the depth provided by accessing the wider national infrastructure. Left unresolved, however, were significant contradictions between current policy and the emerging post-Cold War strategic challenges. The White Paper’s generous claim that “one of the government’s major objectives is to establish Australia’s place in these emerging strategic patterns and to shape them to meet Australia’s interests” sat uncomfortably alongside another issue— the concern that regional cooperation should not entail either a substantial increase in resources or significant adjustments to the force structure (Woodman 1999, 40, 47-48).

It was not until the election of a Liberal-National Party Coalition government in 1996 and the subsequent release of ASP97 that Australia’s changing strategic policy was boldly articulated. This document was the first to acknowledge that Australia is wedded to events in Northeast Asia where regional instability is most likely to occur. That said, ASP97 acknowledged the importance of its peacetime activities, but in planning force structure this was considered “less significant than the possibility that Australia might wish to make a direct contribution to the maintenance of broader regional stability” in a future conflict where strategic interests are engaged. ASP 97 put new emphasis on being able to commit forces to regional contingencies, particularly if this prevents “a potentially hostile power [from] gaining access to bases close to Australia.” An underlying theme in ASP97 is that “it would, in fact, be a significant failure of Australian strategic policy to allow a direct threat to Australia to develop if there had been opportunities to forestall it” (DOD 1997, 32). The
bottom line, then, is that ASP97 reflects a policy demanding more of the ADF in terms of geographic reach, current preparedness, and the potential intensity of conflict (Woodman 1999, 50).

A new Australian Defense White Paper is scheduled for release sometime during mid-year 2000. This begs the question of whether defense policy will reverse course or follow the current trend. Based on the permanence of globalization and changing strategic relativities discussed in Chapter 2, it is envisaged that the 2000 Defense White Paper will validate the policy direction outlined in ASP97. Indeed, the reality of globalization in and of itself would indicate that a significant change in policy direction is simply not feasible. Therefore, it is also predicted that the new Defense White Paper will address fundamental issues that were sidestepped in ASP97—the question of how Australia will support and fund its more ambitious agenda for the ADF.

Herein lies one of the operational benefits that deployment integration offers to the ADF. While politically it is sensible for Australia to be interested in developments in Northeast Asia, the inference that the role of the ADF might be more than a token presence suggests that Australia runs the grave risk of attempting to “punch above its weight.” The danger is that unless planners adopt, in accordance with their own concern about changing strategic relativities, a more realistic perspective on Australia’s strategic credentials, they may be locking future development of the ADF into a framework which the nation simply cannot sustain.

In the short term, the situation described could be to the detriment of both overall capability coherence and Canberra’s ability to carve out an appropriate position from which to influence regional developments. In the longer term, if this scenario is played out it may necessitate another significant change of policy direction within the next ten to fifteen years with potentially damaging consequences for Australia’s strategic influence and credibility (Woodman 1999, 51).

An obvious remedy to this aspect of the middle power dilemma is provided by the proposal offered in this thesis. USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration in Northeast Asia, or some variation thereof, would be an affordable, sustainable, and mutually beneficial mechanism by which
the ADF might be able to achieve Canberra’s strategic initiatives. Given the political will, such an arrangement could be achievable. This would help to ensure Australia’s strategic influence in the region without putting its credibility at risk by “punching above its weight.”

The Five Power Defense Arrangements

While acknowledged that it is a strategic security structure, it is in the context of Australia’s changing defense policy that the FPDA are analyzed and the ADF’s post-Cold War operational role is assessed. This is relevant given that since the 1950s the Arrangements have been the hub of ADF regional engagement activities.

The forerunner to the FPDA was the 1957 Anglo-Malayan Defense Arrangements (AMDA) designed to provide security and defense for newly independent Malaya. Australia became associated with the AMDA in 1959. With the subsequent merger of Malaya, Singapore, Sabah, and Sarawak to form the Federation of Malaysia, AMDA was amended to cover the external defense of the entire region. The security arrangement was tested during a “period of confrontation” with Indonesia in 1963. This led to military action with British and Australian troops engaged against Indonesian army units in Sarawak and Malacca. In an effort to defuse racial violence with the Malays, Singapore was expelled from the Federation in 1965. During the next several years, continued presence of the Australia-New Zealand-UK forces under the auspices of the AMDA helped to stabilize the Malaysia-Singapore relationship while at the same time providing a hedge against communist aggression.

In July 1967, the UK announced the intention to halve its military forces in Malaysia and Singapore during the next four years, to be followed by a total withdrawal of all British Forces East of Suez completed by 1975. At this stage neither Malaysia or Singapore possessed a significant indigenous military capability so Defense Ministers of the participating nations put forward a proposal to replace the existing AMDA with a new consultative body called the Five Power Defense Arrangements that came into effect on 1 November 1971. The aim of FPDA was to provide a useful
transitional mechanism, which allowed each member to pursue national interests within a flexible cooperative scheme.

The Ministers also decided that an Integrated Air Defense System would be established within the framework of FPDA to assume responsibility for the air defense of Malaysia and Singapore. This was the cornerstone of the Arrangements. On 11 February 1971, Headquarters IADS was established at Butterworth Air Base in Penang, Malaysia. As part of the ADF’s forward defense capability, RAAF aircraft had already been based in Singapore and Malaysia. Given the imminent departure of British forces East of the Suez, the ADF was to assume a leading role in the Far East Command’s multi-nation air defense organization. Hence, the first IADS Commander was an Australian. The initial reason for placing a RAAF officer in command of Headquarters IADS was that the majority of forward-based theater assets, two Mirage fighter squadrons, were Australian. Today IADS continues to be commanded by an Australian. This is largely a political arrangement considered more acceptable to Singapore and Malaysia due to the historic, underlying tension that has characterized their relationship (Brown 1996, 1-4).

The underlying tension between Singapore and Malaysia contributes to the notion among some that the FPDA is a dysfunctional security structure made obsolete because it no longer provides the service it was originally designed for. The contention is that Singapore and Malaysia have developed independent national defense forces with formidable defense capabilities. Compared with other nations in Southeast Asia, they no longer require Commonwealth assistance for their rudimentary security needs. Add to this, a 1998 political dispute between Singapore and Malaysia that spilled over into the FPDA causing cancellation of the years major exercise. Such occurrences serve only to highlight a major FPDA shortcoming that limits effectiveness and threatens credibility of the Arrangements (Heron 1999, 21).

Notwithstanding these doubts over continued viability of the FPDA, in keeping with the larger strategic policy outlined in ASP97, the Coalition government has given new life to the
Arrangements. ASP97 noted that the “FPDA remains an effective and valuable element of [Australia’s] regional presence.” Echoing the government’s policy, former Defense Minister, Ian McLachlan, asserted that Australia will stay a committed and enthusiastic member of FPDA and it will maintain a high level of involvement in FPDA activities.

Based on this, the FPDA are destined to remain a valued part of the web of bilateral and multilateral security frameworks for the foreseeable future. To avoid the anachronistic label it is logical that the post Cold-War function of FPDA should change. Thus, the Arrangements have undergone transformation from a threat-oriented security agreement to one that maintains regional order; a confidence-building mechanism that is conducive to regional security. Today Australian defense planners see the FPDA as a catalyst in achieving a broader security network in the Asia Pacific, as a building block on which to base further military cooperation among all ASEAN states, and as a useful means of projecting power and influence in Southeast Asia. The FPDA’s future role is seen in the context of expanding military ties throughout the region; as a forum for military cooperation rather than as a military agreement directed against a specific threat as was the case in the early years of its formation (Malik 1999, 78-79).

RAAF F/A-18 Operational Setting

Although the RAAF fighter community has a long and illustrious aerial combat history that includes extensive action in the First and Second World Wars (designated Australian Flying Corps during WWI), today it is battling to maintain legitimacy as a TACAIR combat force. The RAAF F/A-18 community, relative to that of its USMC counterpart, is a smaller force—every bit as proficient in tactical acumen, but unused and untested in a real-world contingency since the Korean War. With seventy-one F/A-18s allocated between three operational squadrons and one training squadron, these “national assets” comprise the Tactical Fighter Group (TFG).

During March 1999, the TFG Commander, Air Commodore John Kindler, had a meeting with the officers of No. 3 Squadron and No. 75 Squadron at RAAF Base Tindal. In a discussion of
broader air force issues, he affirmed the government's commitment to its new defense policy that shifted focus from a narrow view on low-level contingencies to a larger scope of activity that might involve the requirement to operate beyond Australia's shores to protect regional and global interests. He expanded on this by saying that more recent policy decisions indicated an increased willingness to commit Australian F/A-18s in future coalition operations. The implication for RAAF fighter squadrons, the Commander explained, was that the likelihood of a contingency deployment was much higher (Kindler 1999).

The unquestioned competency of Australia's TACAIR component and the robust nature of the U.S.-Australia alliance leads one to question why the F/A-18 has been a dormant asset. Given the factors of aircrew competency and a strong allied relationship, it seems that when coalition-building, RAAF Hornet squadrons would be among the first of any warfighting dimension offered as part of a coalition force, if not specifically requested.

RAAF F/A-18 dormancy is not for the lack of operational demand. Historical precedent and the prevailing thought in current defense policy is that Australia has "important interests--including strategic interests--at the global level" (DOD 1997, 9). Canberra's decision to contribute elite Special Air Service troops and KB707 refuel tankers to the U.S.-led military build-up in the Persian Gulf during 1998 offers recent confirmation of this fact (Malik 1999, 239). In reality, major ADF assets from the Air Force and Navy have contributed to coalition activity on several occasions in recent history, including the Indian Ocean in the 1970s, the Persian Gulf in the 1980s, and the Gulf War in 1991 (Harris 1999, 112). And so, while various other component capabilities of the ADF have participated in real world contingencies, legitimate questions persist as to why Australian TACAIR has not been offered as a warfighting dimension to coalition forces.

Unfortunately, from the research conducted there were no definitive answers to explain the inactivity of Australian F/A-18s during the last decade. Notwithstanding the fact that an important deterrent function has been achieved through TACAIR presence and participation in annual FPDA
exercises, the most logical explanation for F/A-18 dormancy is twofold. First, it could be that to some degree there was a lack of political will to put precious limited national assets at risk. Second, it could be that RAAF F/A-18 operational limitations simply made it impractical for those aircraft to participate in the coalition scenarios that unfolded in recent times. There could well have been a situation where Australian *Hornets* were simply not invited to participate in coalition air operations because of the aircraft’s operational limitations.

Speculation regarding operational limitations and F/A-18 dormancy is derived from *ASP 97* where preparedness and the concept of sustainability are discussed. The document explains that specific consideration must be given to the serviceability of key systems and that the systems must be able to perform to specification under demanding conditions of the wartime environment. The key elements of preparedness, according to *ASP 97*, are the state of platforms and systems; holdings of critical consumable items—especially weapons—and the availability of support services such as battle damage repair and depot level maintenance.

 Particularly noteworthy in *ASP 97* is the candor shown in unmasking the ADF’s errant ways. On this point, the document explains how experience has shown that a policy of “fitting for but not with” a particular capability—in the expectation that there would be time in which to acquire, fit, and develop proficiency in the use of a particular capability—is a flawed concept. The example cited in *ASP 97* was when Royal Australian Navy ships deployed at short notice to the Persian Gulf in 1990 and needed urgently to be fitted with a range of operational capabilities, including anti-air defensive and chemical weapon protection capabilities (DOD 1997, 39-40). It could be surmised that similar examples might have applied to the Australian F/A-18s in recent times.

The *Hornet* upgrade program currently underway in the RAAF (discussed in Chapter 4) will eliminate system deficiencies that exist in the F/A-18 weapons platform. In terms of future coalition operations and in terms of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration, this upgrade is an essential step in the right direction. It means that the RAAF will soon have a modified airframe
suitable for service in the Pacific Theater of operations. Likewise, changed attitudes regarding the willingness to employ a national asset, and lessons learned in support service--such as maintaining the capability to operate in a nuclear, biological, and chemical environment--means that the RAAF will have a revitalized fighter attack element that is poised to reassert itself as a TACAIR combat force. After the upgrade, RAAF Hornets will be more equipped to respond to contingencies and participate as a force multiplier in the Asia Pacific region than any time in recent history.

**FPDA and the Tactical Fighter Group**

The Iwakuni UDP and CVW schedules are the principal deployment obligations for USMC Hornet squadrons. Similarly, annual FPDA exercises in Southeast Asia are the principal deployment obligation for the RAAF's TFG. The strategic and political value of the FPDA and the military exercises that flow from it are not questioned. In spite of the persistent mutual suspicions between Singapore and Malaysia, there is a broad consensus among participants and neighbors in the region that the FPDA is an important security institution and that its exercise activities contribute to stability in Southeast Asia (Yam 2000, 24). What is questionable, however, is the operational training value that FPDA exercises provide to TFG squadrons and aircrew.

It has already been mentioned that IADS was the cornerstone of the original FPDA. Today FPDA continues to serve as a basis for the management of IADS. The system has been expanded to coordinate surveillance of not only the Malayan Peninsula, but also parts of the Eastern Indian Ocean and South China Sea (Malik 1999, 79). To compensate for the redeployment of its TACAIR forces to mainland Australia from Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia during the late 1980s, the RAAF now commits a significant number of F/A-18 and F-111 flying hours to ADEXs that are held each year.

While the sophistication of the platforms and sensors supplied to the ADEX's by member countries had changed drastically by the mid-1990s, it was not until recently that the concept of operations was modified to better utilize assets. A common criticism to the operational concept was that it failed to fully exploit the capabilities of fourth generation fighter attack aircraft and that it did
not represent good training value for the flying hours committed. For instance, the lack of a night flying component and poor operational infrastructure were seen as weaknesses. Similarly, a shift in the ADEX center of activity from Butterworth and Singapore to the South China Sea had further diluted value of the exercise for TFG squadrons. While the intention of this had been to increase joint training value with maritime forces, increased transit time to the training area was limiting on-station time. This virtually excluded any F/A-18 forces based in Butterworth from engaging in quality air-intercept training (Brown 1996, 5).

Many of TFG’s criticisms regarding the FPDA exercises that it is involved with have been muted in recent years and, in fact, modifications continue to be made that are improving the training value afforded by these exercises. Among the most significant changes was the decision to move Hornet operations from Butterworth to Kuantan Air Base where improved operational infrastructure such as more modern and reliable navigational aids and enhanced weather radar capability has had an impact. The move to Kuantan has also enabled a significant increase in on-station training time because of proximity to the South China Sea training area. Another advantage that aircrew see is the opportunity for contact with their Malaysian counterparts who fly the MIG-29 (Roberton 2000).

One more change that the TFG viewed favorably was the reduction in Hornet flight hours committed to IADS. The FPDA exercise commitment that at one time resulted in the effective loss of a single F/A-18 squadron for up to 14 weeks has been scaled back to a deployment period that runs between two and four weeks. At present the TFG has a commitment for two ADEXs per year. No. 75 Squadron is tasked with one four-week exercise each year from its home station, RAAF Base Tindal, in the Northern Territory. The other ADEX is generally a two-week tasking that alternates each year between No. 77 Squadron and No. 3 Squadron, both based at RAAF Base Williamtown, New South Wales. In terms of enhanced training value, it is perhaps more significant to note that these deployments are now used as the basis for increased engagement with other countries in the region. For example, FPDA exercises are often coordinated to facilitate RAAF participation in other

89
regional exercises such as THAI-BOOMERANG, conducted from Korat Air Base in Thailand, or the Singapore-U.S. exercise, COMMANDO SLING, conducted from Paya Lebar Air Base in Singapore (Roberton 2000).

Notwithstanding the fact that operational training value gained from FPDA exercises is on the rise, there continues to be wide agreement among Hornet aircrew that the best training value comes from exercising with American forces. The prevailing opinion is that whether operating with the Marines or USAF, quality briefs and debriefs are among the most frequently noted aspects that differentiate skill levels. Malaysian and Singaporean pilot skills are simply not to the standard of their U.S. and Australian counterparts (Rhuinhorst 1999). This fact is more accurately reflected in squadron post exercise reports. For example, during Phase 2 of work-up training for ADEX 98-2, RAAF Hornets had a 13:1 kill ratio against Singaporean F-5s and F-16s. During Phase 4 IADS proper of ADEX 98-2 the F/A-18s had 64 kills claimed and zero against (Post Exercise Report, CHURINGA 1998). Results were similar during the 1999 ADEX when Australian F/A18s, flying defensive counter air missions against New Zealand’s A-4s and Singaporean A-4s and F-5s, compiled a 97:1 kill ratio (Roberton 2000).

An unfortunate dimension of the FPDA that further limits the operational value of exercises is the ongoing distrust that exists between Singapore and Malaysia. Training limitations imposed as a result of political in-fighting between the two nations diminishes value of the exercises for all participants. For example, relations between the two countries may affect the amount of airspace available for Large Force Employment (LFE). During an ADEX in 1999 one of the countries agreed to release only enough airspace to allow a maximum of eight aircraft for LFE missions. Training is also affected when one country prohibits the use of its air fields as a divert for the other in case of an emergency or bad weather (Rhuinhorst 1999). There have been other cases where one country would not allow participation of its premier weapons system (F-16 or MIG-29) in an exercise, only to have the other country respond in kind the following year (Roberton 2000). Although much of
this information would be difficult to substantiate officially, the examples are provided only to make a point regarding the operational limitations that appear to be an inherent part of FPDA exercises.

Although SOUTHERN FRONTIER is a unilateral exercise where Marine F/A-18 squadrons deploy to Northern Australia, the Tindal-based RAAF Squadron generally takes advantage of the opportunity to work with their USMC counterparts. Insufficient air-to-ground ranges in Korea and Japan prompted the arrangement whereby Iwakuni-based squadrons have access to Delemere Air Weapons Range. The exercise covers a three-month period during which each of the three MAG-12 squadrons rotate through RAAF Base Tindal, heel-to-toe, for about four weeks at a time. This gives forward deployed units the opportunity to conduct low altitude training, making effective use of the squadron’s annual Non Combat Expenditure Allowance of air-to-ground munitions (Rhuinhorst 1999). Most often the combined training occurs when RAAF F/A-18s act as escort for USMC strike packages into the target area. The Marines have also used SOUTHERN FRONTIER to piggy-back onto the RAAF’s largest air defense exercise, PITCH BLACK. This exercise is conducted annually in the Northern Territory, during a period that coincides with SOUTHERN FRONTIER. There is a broad consensus among both USMC and RAAF Hornet aircrew that the combined training produces valuable lessons learned for both services (Rhuinhorst 1999/Robertson 2000).

TFG participation in the COPE THUNDER 1998 (CT 98) exercise and the lessons learned from that experience serve to further illustrate the significant training value gained from exercising with American forces. Sponsored by U.S. Pacific Air Forces, COPE THUNDER scenarios are repeated four times a year lasting approximately two weeks each. Since the closure of Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines, the TFG has had no real opportunity to participate in these large USAF exercises. The move of the COPE THUNDER series to Alaska seemingly put the exercise out of reach for Australian Hornets. However, the government’s increased emphasis on the U.S. alliance and the expanding strategic focus outlined in ASP 97 had an obvious impact on events that occur at the operational level. Given the framework of understanding laid down thus far, it should
come as no surprise that there was a willingness to demonstrate that Australia could extend the reach of its TACAIR combat capability to an area at the northern edge of its principal strategic interest.

Representing the TFG at CT 98, No. 3 Squadron’s role in the exercise was to conduct offensive counter air (OCA) and strike missions as part of a simulated UN air campaign. The main elements of the campaign were to maintain a no-fly zone and to provide interdiction, resupply, and extraction missions in support of UN personnel on the ground. Conducting sweep and escort missions in the morning and strike missions in the afternoon, the squadron compiled a greater than 7:1 air-to-air kill ratio. The experience gained by flying through EW ranges and validating defensive reactions of maneuver and terrain masking in combination with the effects of jamming was of significant value. For the RAAF, this helps to address a perceived deficiency in training against a realistic and modern surface-to-air threat as well as an air-to-air threat.

Apart from the opportunity to participate in multi-nation LFE missions, several aircrew were exposed to Mission Commander and OCA Commander duties, and participation in the Joint Air Operations Cell. The Joint Air Operations Cell provided valuable insight to procedures and doctrine used at all stages of the development of the Air Tasking Order. This included the direction given in the commander’s intent, creation of target lists, apportionment of assets, weaponeering, and the building of OCA, strike, insertion, and combat search and rescue packages. The exercise also allowed the squadron to validate OCA and strike doctrine and procedures, as well as AMRAAM employment doctrine and procedures (Post Exercise Report, CT 1998, 2-4). In addition to the many training benefits gained from CT 98, there was also significant training value gained from planning and executing the 18,000 nautical mile transit of six F/A-18s (CT Lessons Learned 1999).

In terms of F/A-18 operational experience, the collective advantages in deploying long distances to operate alongside U.S. forces in either a large-scale exercise or in a real-world setting was clearly evidenced through the CT98 experience. No. 3 Squadron’s Commanding Officer at the time of the deployment, Wing Commander G.C. Brown, recommended afterwards that the TFG
consider participation in a COPE THUNDER-type exercise every two years—ideally twelve aircraft for six weeks. The prevailing logic was that it would facilitate more realistic operational exposure to *Hornet* aircrew and maintenance personnel. As Wing Commander Brown explained, one augmented squadron could deploy and participate in the first CT scenario. During the two-week interim period he suggested that aircrew and maintenance personnel be rotated as the detachment conducts bilateral training with local USAF squadrons, or enhanced unilateral training through use of the EW ranges. The second CT scenario would be closed out with the transit back to Australia, thus affording the majority of *Hornet* aircrew in the TFG with extremely coveted, high-end operational experience (CT Lessons Learned 1999).

As policy makers and defense planners in Australia wrestle with the middle power dilemma and how to develop the maximum operational effectiveness from a relatively small force, it is worth while to consider USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration in the context of the following core principals outlined in *ASP97*:

1. Australia’s defense posture must include the means to influence strategic affairs within the greater Asia Pacific region (DOD 1997, 31).
2. The ADF’s capabilities are to be geared to a higher level of threat scenarios (DOD 1997, 32).
3. Australia will give highest priority to maximizing interoperability with the U.S. military forces (DOD 1997, 48).
4. The key to the ADF maintaining its operational advantage amid increasingly capable regional forces is the future exploitation of the new technologies of the revolution in military affairs to provide the knowledge edge (DOD 1997, 56).
5. Australia has access to the most advanced applications of information technology to warfare through its alliance with the United States (DOD 1997, 57).

These principles make very clear the confluence of operational and strategic imperatives for Australia and the ADF. The TFG’s commitment to FPDA exercises meets the strategic imperative;
however, based on the evidence presented it is doubtful that these same commitments meet the operational imperative. Conversely, there should be wide agreement that a deployment commitment to Northeast Asia would meet the operational imperative—and indeed, a commitment such as this might go a long way toward reconciling ASP 97 issues associated with force capability and expectations for the ADF to meet higher level threat scenarios. This analysis does not suggest that TFG deployment commitments to FPDA should be compromised in any way. What it does suggest is that USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration might be a useful mechanism by which the Australian government could implement—and the ADF could achieve—important strategic objectives outlined in ASP 97.

Financial Considerations

In the glossary it is stressed that deployment integration is a concept to be distinguished from what is commonly done in the way of coalition operations and combined exercises. Neither does deployment integration fall into the category of training, which would occur through a DOD administered security assistance program such as International Military Education and Training, Foreign Military Sales, or some other specifically authorized program. The relevant point is this: security assistance programs that furnish training must not be supported by appropriations intended to be used for the operation and maintenance (O&M) of U.S. forces. Although the term training is broadly defined, the following do not constitute training:

1. Interoperability, safety, and familiarization. Minor amounts of safety instruction, interoperability instruction, and familiarization instruction do not constitute training and can therefore be financed with O&M appropriations.

2. Exercising. According to U.S. law the need to differentiate between training and exercising is critical. Exercising is practicing what is already known. Training is teaching or validating concepts or procedures not previously known or mastered. U.S. forces may exercise with foreign units, so long as participants pay their fair share of support costs (Joint Pub 3-07.1 1996, A-4).
This understanding of U.S. legislation, coupled with the knowledge and understanding that deployment integration is neither training nor exercising makes it evident that a different set of rules needs to apply. The glossary definition of deployment integration is: “A cooperative framework allowing groups of nations to assume shared responsibility for mutual security objectives in geographic areas of common strategic interest by joining allied military units in a forward-based, unit deployment arrangement.” The operative words are “assume shared responsibility.” For an Australian F/A-18 squadron deploying to MCAS Iwakuni this constitutes the following:

1. Arriving on station trained and prepared to assume operational responsibility in an environment that is more benign than war, but less benign than the traditional joint or combined exercise scenario.

2. Undertaking interoperability, safety, and familiarization training with USMC squadrons, not to exceed an amount that could reasonably violate the legal interpretation of training.

3. Operating with other aviation and/or ground units in the region as may be required in accordance with the MAG-12 Training Exercise Employment Plan (TEEP).

Given this understanding, big-ticket costs in support of a forward deployed RAAF F/A-18 squadron would be a shared responsibility apportioned among the three governments that have a common strategic interest—Japan, Australia, and the United States. According to U.S. responsibility sharing policy—articulated in the 1998 Defense Authorization Act—the cornerstone of effective alliance relationships is the fair and equitable sharing of mutual security responsibilities, and the proper balancing of costs and benefits. The 1998 Defense Authorization Act acknowledged that each country’s contribution to security is a mix of political, military, economic elements (Cohen 1998, 78). Such is the case with an Iwakuni-based, USMC and RAAF integrated deployment. In the most simple terms, it is the type of quid pro quo logic expressed in U.S. responsibility sharing policy that underlies the financial dimension of deployment integration. The logic follows the line of reasoning described below:
1. Japan, as host nation, absorbs basing and utility costs. Japan's share in cost is predicated on an understanding that the same terms of the Special Measures Agreement between the U.S. and Japan would apply to Australia if it assumed a share of the security role. Under terms of the existing Special Measures Agreement, Japan pays virtually all local national labor employed by U.S. forces and public utilities on U.S. bases in exchange for the security umbrella provided (Cohen 1998, 87).

2. The U.S. underwrites cost associated with logistic supply, maintenance, and operational support infrastructure. As noted earlier, because deployment integration is neither an exercise nor training it is conceivable that certain expenditures could be covered by O&M funds. Cost would likely be divided between MARFORPAC allocated funds and Navy account blue dollars for Aviation Fleet Maintenance (OFC-50). This is predicated on the assumption that MAG-12 would provide the RAAF use of its facilities, and direct supply (consumable items) and intermediate maintenance support through the Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS). Circumstances may require that the MARFORPAC allocated funds be used to support RAAF movements for inter-theater deployments in support of the MAG-12 TEEP.

3. Australia underwrites cost incurred by the deployment of one, twelve-aircraft F/A-18 squadron. The expenditure of Australian funds would be approximated to the standard flight hour operating cost and per diem/travel and subsistence (T&S) expense for a standard overseas deployment.

   It would be easy for defense planners in Canberra to dismiss the idea of deployment integration prematurely on the basis that it is cost prohibitive, especially in view of the unexpected expenditures associated with ongoing operations in East Timor. However, it is the author's opinion that this financial decision is one which must be made in the context of what might be gained in return for the dollar. Things like international prestige and regional influence at the strategic level, or, at the operational and tactical level, more front-line exposure and interoperability to help ensure combat effectiveness and the knowledge edge--these cannot be quantified by dollar value. As Wing
Commander Brown pointed out after his squadron had participated in COPE THUNDER 1998: “It worked out at about the same cost as a four-week detachment to Singapore or Kuantan, but had far more tactical value.” He was surprised that the “exercise did not cost all that much in T&S” (CT Lessons Learned 1999).

Provided the governments of Australia, Japan, and the U.S. can agree to a cost arrangement based on or similar to the quid pro quo-type discussed earlier, then T&S expenditure would be less than a FPDA exercise of similar duration. This assessment is based largely on the fact that lodging, subsistence, and vehicle rental expense is significantly reduced, if not eliminated, through the use of on-base facilities and services. Acknowledging that more personnel are required to support twelve aircraft, and acknowledging that the length of deployed time would be greater than if the unit was participating in a four to six-week FPDA exercise, much of the T&S cost would still be offset by use of military lodging, dining, and motor pool services.

With regard to costing, the Reciprocal Unit Exchange Program could serve as a precedent or point of departure for deployment integration. The unit exchange program is an O&M funded Foreign Internal Defense activity that falls under Title 10 of the U.S. Code. As such, reciprocity is broadly defined; it is not a dollar-for-dollar bargain. This permits the U.S. to assume greater dollar costs for funding things such as travel for both units (Joint Pub 3-07.1 1996, A-8). If the principle was applied in terms of deployment integration, it might involve U.S. dollars underwriting the cost of Intermediate Maintenance Activity (IMA) repairs or the cost of minor consumable items, such as those costs described in paragraph 2 above.

Apart from Australia’s T&S expenditure, there is the aircraft operating cost that accounts for the most significant aspect of big-ticket expense incurred by the RAAF. This figure would be based on the number of flight hours accrued during a six-month WESTPAC deployment (approximately 2400 FH) and the RAAF’s Flying Hours Cost Recovery Rate (approximately $5800 / FH for fuel, parts, petroleum, oil, lubricants, etc.). This expense is far less significant when planners take into
account the fact that these flight hours are already allocated to the TFG and distributed among the squadrons to expend as they see fit. That said, the relevant question to consider is whether there is more strategic, operational, and tactical value to be gained from flight hours that are expended in the Northeast Asia theater of operation, or in Australia and Southeast Asia.

In considering deployment integration, defense planners in Canberra cannot discount the fact that there is an increasing demand within the ADF for F/A-18 support of maritime and land-based training requirements. Nor should they discount the political and strategic value of the FPDA activities. Rather, these things must be weighed against the strategic advantages of an ADF presence in Northeast Asia. The decision must also be weighed against more obvious operational and tactical advantages that would be gained through increased interoperability with U.S. forces and legitimate exposure to the type of information that is essential to Australia maintaining its knowledge edge and high-end operational experience for F/A-18 aircrews. In other words, defense planners in Canberra should consider USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration in terms of how much strategic, operational, and tactical bang the arrangement will bring for the defense force buck.
CHAPTER 4
TACTICAL ANALYSIS

Introduction

In the course of researching the subject of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration numerous contacts were made with military and civilian officials—in the U.S. and Australia—that are serving in key positions and deal with matters related to the Asia Pacific region. The purpose of these interviews was to identify perceived obstacles to the conceptual model described in this paper and at the same time assess the interest level for such a proposal.

The Deputy Commander for Marine Forces Pacific, Major General Robert Magnus, was among those interviewed. Upon hearing an explanation of the integrated deployment concept, his immediate response was, “Yes, this is something that the Marine Corps may be interested in, but... Do Australian F/A-18s have the minimum configuration required to play in the full spectrum of operations?” The implication being, while USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration might make good sense at the strategic and operational level for reasons outlined in the preceding chapters, credibility of the idea still centers on tactical considerations. That said, the analysis in Chapter 4 is directed at assessing those considerations. Also examined in this chapter is the long-term prospect of deployment integration as it relates to U.S. and Australian interoperability beyond the F/A-18 weapons system.

USMC Engineering Change Proposal (ECP-583)

The aircraft configuration question raised by Major General Magnus reflects the reality of today’s coalition environment. Aware that the Australians operate older version F/A-18As, similar to the Lot 7, 8, and 9 aircraft in the USMC inventory, he was mindful of the implications of not having upgraded aircraft. The problem with older model Marine F/A-18s is that these aircraft fall short in warfighting capability for the following reasons: (1) old radios prevent full communications capability with state-of-the-art aircraft, joint command and control systems, and ground forces, (2)
the aircraft are unable to carry or fire state-of-the-art missiles resulting in outdated air-to-air tactics and capability, (3) the air-to-ground capability is limited because the aircraft are unable to carry or fire new precision weapons needed in the present-day warfighting environment where collateral damage is less acceptable, (4) the aircraft cannot lase because it has no capability to self-designate, and (5) the aircraft cannot adapt because the older mission computers lack storage needed for new weapons software (ECP-583 1999). In short, without these capabilities the weapons system ceases to be a warfighting asset and instead, becomes a warfighting liability.

To address capability shortfalls in its Lot 7, 8, and 9 F/A-18As the Marine Corps invested in ECP-583. This comprehensive upgrade includes radar, computer, communications, and weapons carriage systems that make the aircraft compatible with the most updated F/A-18C. It enables the “A” model aircraft to employ all USMC current and programmed future weapons, including the Joint Stand-Off Weapon, Joint Direct Attack Munitions, Stand-Off Land Attack Missile-Extended Range, AMRAAM, and the AIM-9X Sidewinder. The modification enhances commonality between “A” and “C” model F/A-18s, thereby solving obsolescence issues, decreasing the logistics footprint, and reducing aircrew and maintenance training. ECP-583 also bridges the modernization gap for the “A” model aircraft, which the Marines expect will remain in service until the 2015 time frame. The most important aspect of ECP-583 is what it gives the combatant commander—a capable warfighting asset to meet theater operation plan requirements (Concepts and Issues 2000, 66).

**RAAF Hornet Upgrade (HUG) Project**

Rationale for the RAAF’s buy-in to HUG is based on the understanding that Australia’s core defense activity is to defeat attacks on its own territory. *ASP 97* identifies the northern air and sea approaches as the centerpiece of any national defense strategy. Continuing that logic flow, the key to achieving domination of the maritime approaches is air superiority. Air superiority is essential to defeat any attack on Australian territory. It is essential if RAAF aircraft are going to operate against hostile shipping without interference from adversary aircraft. It is essential if RAAF aircraft are
going to protect Australian ships from hostile aircraft. Central to that achievement has been the RAAF’s “control of the air” core capability (Stephens 1998, 24).

It could also be surmised that the basis for HUG is, in part, related to the circumstances of F/A-18 dormancy and operational limitations that may have precluded participation of Australian Hornets in recent coalition activities (see Chapter 3: RAAF F/A-18 Operational Setting). Dr. Alan Stephens, an Australian who writes and lectures extensively on the subject of air power, doctrine, security, and military history, describes the problem in terms of what “interoperability” means to the USAF. To them, the concept of interoperability is clearly defined as meaning “capable of operating with the USAF, on their terms, on day one.” Dr. Stephens explains that “first-tier” capability is required for interoperability and any platform which is going to qualify as first-tier must be fitted with all of the leading-edge systems applicable to its role(s). On today’s battlefield it is advanced technology which “confers a seat at the coalition table” (Stephens 1999, 13-14).

It is important to note that the logic in approving HUG for RAAF F/A-18s was remarkably similar to the logic applied in approving ECP-583 for USMC Hornets. First, recognition that control of the air is the RAAF’s core capability meant that if Australia was to forego HUG, the strategic, operational, and tactical value of the F/A-18 would be diminished to the point of obsolescence (i.e., combat readiness issue for USMC). Second, HUG was seen as a cost effective means to retain the technological edge and buy time until a new generation aircraft emerged (i.e., bridge the gap to leap ahead technologies for USMC) (Grazebrook 1998-1999, 24).

Incorporation of HUG Phase 1, approved in late 1997, is already underway. HUG Phase 2 was approved in the May 1998 defense budget and will be incorporated sometime later. Current projections are for all seventy-one aircraft to be cycled through Phase 1 and Phase 2 of the upgrade program by the end of 2005 (Grazebrook 1998-1999, 24). In the context of deployment integration, bear in mind that what ECP-583 does for USMC Hornets, HUG will do for the RAAF F/A-18s. The following are included among the essential RAAF F/A-18 capability upgrades:
1. The ARC-210 (HAVE QUICK) multi-mode radio sets gives Australian pilots jam-resistant, reliable communications across the UHF/VHF radio wave spectrum. Considered essential in any coalition environment, it will enable vital communications with other joint U.S. air forces as well as ground combat units.

2. The AN/APG-73 radar will dramatically speed up the F/A-18’s data processing capabilities, give it a more sophisticated electronic countermeasures capability, and better signal acquisition. It will also enable RAAF pilots to take radar imagery pictures of surface targets. With the AN/APG-73 radar improvements will be new displays, a combined interrogator transponder for identify friend or foe, and data link that will enhance the pilot’s ability to identify, track, and target multiple aircraft at long range during all-weather conditions.

3. HUG includes an embedded global-positioning system and inertial navigation system. The global positioning system is a space-based radio navigation system that provides precise location, time, velocity, and reference data for users. Signals are received and processed via multiple satellites and sent to display units that give operators exact latitude and longitude readings. The embedded global positioning system will serve as the primary onboard navigational and target detection system, thereby enabling pinpoint accuracy when using laser guided munitions.

4. HUG includes improved XN-8 mission computers, which will allow for software loads that can accommodate new air-to-air and air-to-ground standoff strike weapons capabilities. Unlike USMC F/A-18s, the RAAF Hornet’s already have the capability to fire the beyond visual range AMRAAM missile. However, the XN-8 mission computer is an enhanced software capability that is necessitated by introduction of the Advanced Short-Range Air to Air Missile (ASRAAM) to RAAF service in 2001. The ASRAAM has a capability comparable to the AIM-9X Sidewinder that is scheduled to enter the USMC missile inventory.

5. Australian F/A-18s are currently in the process of being fitted for night vision goggle capability with appropriate cockpit lighting and an improved heads-up display. The night vision package
allows the RAAF pilots to navigate and locate surface targets at night. A helmet-mounted cueing system is planned during Phase 2 of the upgrade. The cueing system is a significant enhancement for air-to-air combat because it will open the target kill range to about sixty degrees out from the nose. In short, it eliminates the need to point and shoot. In air-to-ground, the system will be able to cue the missile’s seeker-head on a surface target without pointing the aircraft in the direction of the threat. The ability to kill a surface and air threat without pointing the nose of the aircraft at its target is substantial survivability enhancement.

6. Advanced data link is another component of HUG planned for Phase 2. Data links are central to providing pilots with the information dominance that is critical in modern air warfare. Fitting an advanced data link (also known as LINK 16) to the F/A-18 gives Australian pilots a total battle space picture—air and surface. This is achieved through data links to Airborne Early Warning Control Aircraft that are in the sky and ground control intercept controllers on the ground.

**Weapons System Employment**

Doctrinally there is little difference between how USMC and RAAF squadrons employ the F/A-18 as a weapons system. In part, similarities in doctrine are the byproduct of a shared platform. Through the Foreign Military Sales arrangement, the RAAF receives the same maintenance and operating publications as the Marines, to include the F/A-18 NATOPS and Tactics Manual. The NATOPS contains general information regarding aircraft performance characteristics, emergency handling procedures, and aircraft systems and how they function. The Tactics Manual is a four-volume publication that provides information and instructions on weapons system employment in the air-to-air and air-to-ground mode, as well as associated limitations.

Although there is little disparity in USMC and RAAF doctrinal employment of the F/A-18, the emphasis on particular roles and missions is different for each service. The Marines, because of their expeditionary nature and integration with the Marine Air Ground Task Force (MAGTF), are more focused on the offensive air support role. Offensive air support missions that Marine F/A-18
squadrons generally focus on include close air support against hostile targets in close proximity to friendly forces; air interdiction to destroy or delay the enemy’s military potential before it can be brought to bear against friendly forces; and armed reconnaissance for the purpose of locating and attacking targets of opportunity.

The RAAF, on the other hand, procured F/A-18s as a defensive weapon to defeat attacks on Australia from its northern air and sea approaches. Consequently, Hornet aircrews in the RAAF are more proficient in air-to-air weapons employment where they focus on sweep and escort missions in support of F-111 strike missions. RAAF aircrews also place greater emphasis on the maritime strike and maritime defense role for missions that are designed to protect Australian naval forces against hostile aircraft and shipping.

Although the emphasis on particular roles and missions (generally air-to-air for the RAAF and air-to-ground for the Marines) is different for the two services, it is important to point out that each service still maintains a high level of proficiency across the board. F/A-18 pilots in the RAAF maintain proficiency through a six-month block-training program during which a comprehensive air-to-air and air-to-ground training package is executed. Included in their “six-monthly” (similar to the TEEP that is generated for Marine squadrons) is an air-to-air package that goes from basic fighter maneuvers (1v1) to the most elaborate air combat maneuvers involving large force packages (2v1, 2v4, 4vX, and 8vX). The air-to-ground training regime includes gunnery and application bombing where close air support, strike, and armed reconnaissance missions are practiced. Each year RAAF squadrons participate in at least one live bombing exercise (Rhuinhorst 1999).

The significant point to take away from this discussion is that Australian F/A-18 squadrons are tactically proficient and well prepared to assume an operational role in Northeast Asia. As one Marine F/A-18 pilot that recently returned from WESTPAC put it, “anyone who has flown with the Australians would know that they could go to WESTPAC tomorrow and do the job” (Mahoney 2000). Among the USMC F/A-18 pilots consulted regarding various aspects of this paper, there was
a broad consensus that RAAF pilots are every bit as capable as their Marine counterparts in carrying out whatever missions are required in theater. In other words, if the existing war plan was activated and the mission tasking for Iwakuni-based squadrons was air interdiction or air escort for high-value assets, Australian F/A-18s could do the job. Of the seven Marine pilots talked to that had experience flying with the Australians, one of them qualified his remarks by saying that RAAF squadrons would require a WESTPAC work-up period and familiarization with munitions in the USMC inventory if they were made available to Australians for use operationally.

The point raised by the Marine pilot highlights the only drawback with regard to weapons system employment--USMC F/A-18 squadrons are more stand-off weapons capable in strike-type missions than the RAAF. The RAAF does not have the Walleye, Maverick, or High-Speed Anti-Radiation Missile (HARM) in its inventory; neither is it capable of employing the HARM since it does not have the additional computer required to carry the weapon. RAAF Hornets do, however, have AMRAAM and soon, ASRAAM capability (Saunders 2000). Notwithstanding the proposed purchase of follow-on stand-off weapons in 2006 (Ricketts 2000, 57), the real question is whether AMRAAM and ASRAAM are considered sufficient capabilities for Australian F/A-18 squadrons to assume an operational role in Northeast Asia.

To answer the question regarding RAAF munitions capability as it relates to an operational role in Northeast Asia is beyond the scope of this study; however, it is not beyond the scope of this study to suggest that if defense planners are not secure in those RAAF capabilities, then the U.S. must be prepared to fight unilaterally in the Pacific Theater--this is the bottom line. Alternatively, NOFORN (not releasable to foreign nationals) issues would need to be worked through. A weapons lease agreement or technology transfer arrangement that allows Australian squadrons access to the requisite weapons during a designated work up period would be necessary to ensure that RAAF aircrews were prepared to respond operationally in support of the broader regional interests. The foundation for such an arrangement is the alliance relationship and the existing USMC-RAAF PEP.
Logistics Support Issues

The expeditionary culture of Marine aviation and the very nature of the Marine Air Ground Task Force is based on principles that are reflected in USMC-RAAF F/A-18 squadron deployment integration. The fact that integration is something Marine Hornet squadrons do all the time should be viewed as a major advantage and indeed, an attractive feature in the Marine Corps’ participation in this cooperative defense arrangement. Whether it is integrating the aviation combat element into the MEU or integrating a single F/A-18 squadron into the Navy’s CVW, the template for USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration at the tactical level already exists. Therefore, the logistic support aspect of deployment integration has more to do with working out details and less to do with developing new procedure.

The advantages of a common weapons platform are enormous when it comes to deployment integration and logistics support issues. Because the concept calls for an Australian F/A-18 squadron to fall in on existing infrastructure already tailored to support Hornet operations, the requirement to build new facilities or buy new equipment is eliminated. Because a RAAF squadron would be on site only in the absence of a Marine squadron, the net increase in aircraft on the ramp is zero--at no time would MCAS Iwakuni be host to more than thirty-six F/A-18s.

It was noted earlier that part of the impetus behind ECP-583 was enhanced commonality between the “A” and “C” model of the F/A-18, thereby reducing the logistics footprint (Concepts and Issues 2000, 66). Although, there is little doubt that HUG will do the same in eliminating major compatibility gaps in USMC and RAAF aircraft configuration, it is acknowledged that some minor differences will still exist. For example, there are rudimentary differences in the oxygen regulating systems and in some ancillary equipment used for air-to-ground weapons carriage. In the case of ancillary equipment, the Marines have upgraded older style BRU-32 racks through a succession of modifications. This simply means that readiness of mission role equipment would require the RAAF to preposition peculiar parts. It may also require the RAAF to provide additional IMA technical
support to overcome these issues and ensure that maintenance is accomplished. While configuration incompatibilities should be minimal, decisions will be required as to the mechanics of managing the Australian spares inventory within or external to the MALS aviation supply department. Details will need to be worked out as to the replenishment of RAAF spares for those items that are not repairable at the IMA (Hayes 2000).

It is likely that the Marines will continue to deploy upgraded Lot 9 F/A-18As—similar to the upgraded RAAF F/A-18A model aircraft—to Iwakuni for the next several years. The only Active component squadrons that continue to fly these older aircraft are MAG-31 squadrons—VMFA-115 and VMFA-122. Both of these units are in the Iwakuni UDP mix and both squadrons are scheduled to have aircraft cycled through the ECP-583 upgrade during the next two years. What this means in terms of USMC and RAAF deployment integration is that there are no engine-related compatibility issues since both services have similar F404-GE-400 engines installed vis-à-vis the F404 enhanced performance engine in the F/A-18C/D aircraft (Davis 1999).

Ground support equipment, and aircraft test equipment used by the two services is mostly compatible. Marine squadrons that deploy to RAAF Base Tindal often use IMA workshop facilities and support equipment provided by the Australians. If there is a difference in support equipment it is usually a case where one service’s equipment is preferred over the other because it performs the same function better. If an integrated arrangement was to occur, a site survey would be required to identify any peculiar support equipment shortfalls, in which case these would be overcome by the Australian’s providing their own equipment.

The Marine Aviation Logistics Squadron (MALS) is equipped with the Naval Aviation Logistics Command Management Information System and Shipboard Uniform Data Processing System, which synchronizes all aviation maintenance and supply functions from the squadron to the MALS IMA. Familiarization training would be required to educate RAAF personnel on the use of these computer-based management systems in order to ensure optimum maintenance and supply
support from the MALS (Hayes 1999). Because the RAAF personnel also use a Computer Aided Maintenance Management System to process and track maintenance and supply transactions it is expected that the transition to another electronic system would be less difficult.

Marine UDP squadrons deploy with augmented personnel. When the squadron arrives at MAG-12 these Marines are assigned to specific maintenance and supply positions within the MALS. The organizational structure in a RAAF F/A-18 squadron already accommodates this requirement to a large extent. Supply and IMA personnel are permanently integrated into the squadron. However, depending on the occupational specialty required at the IMA, some inter-squadron transfers may be necessary prior to a deployment. In addition to this, all RAAF personnel would require Chemical Biological Radioactive training and outfitting in the appropriate above the neck and below the neck equipment prior to assuming an operational role in Northeast Asia (Hayes 2000).

Although F/A-18 Maintenance Instruction Manuals used by RAAF technicians are the same NAVAIR publications that the Marines use, there is a difference in maintenance philosophy. The professional knowledge gained through exposure to another maintenance culture would be extremely valuable to both services. The RAAF, for example, does not have easy access to depot level repair facilities or equipment manufacturers in the United States. To overcome this, the organization has established an in-house engineering capability to satisfy its own engineering support requirements. Design and approval of repair specifications and standards that enable in-service equipment to meet stated performance, airworthiness, and mission capability requirements is a key engineering function that facilitates a leap forward in repair capability at the squadron level.

This leap forward in repair capability is accomplished by approved workaround procedures that add to, or supersede NAVAIR procedures. Released in the form of “RAAF Supplements,” these workarounds are then incorporated in the appropriate maintenance publication. Because squadron maintenance personnel in the RAAF have the detailed procedures and the authority to effect a wider range of aircraft component and structural repairs, there is far less reliance on the IMA and depot
level support activities. For example, squadron-level repairs are typically carried out on ALE-39 electrical switching units, whereas in the USMC these items are sent to the original equipment manufacturer or a repair depot because NAVAIR publications reflect an automatic beyond capable maintenance repair code. Another example is countermeasures chaff dispensing modules (commonly known as chaff and flare buckets) that are highly susceptible to cracks and chipping. These items are automatically sent to the IMA where repairs are often slow and turnaround time is unpredictable at best. Again, through organizational level repair procedures outlined in the RAAF Supplement, technicians at the squadron are able to effect component repairs and eliminate cost and delays associated with IMA, depot, or manufacturer processing and repair.

The Human Dimension

*Australia's Strategic Policy* says that the armed forces are at the heart of its strategic policy, and in so doing, the document alludes to the very important human dimension to Australia’s national defense. Along with the many ways that the armed forces contribute to security, they more broadly contribute to the nation’s self-esteem and standing overseas. The quality and capability of the armed forces helps to define the country, its national confidence, and sense of national identity. *ASP 97* then goes on to say, “But the value of our armed forces in these ways is, in the end, simply a reflection of their capacity to perform their core task—to fight and win” (DOD 1997, 3). That said, it follows that legitimate employment of the armed forces in the performance of its task generates not only personal pride within the service member, but it also boosts national pride and self-esteem.

Given this framework of understanding, an interesting paradox emerges concerning the human dimension of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration. The ubiquitous presence and apparent over-utilization of U.S. forces around the globe during the past several years has diminished the American military’s enthusiasm for overseas operations. Whereas at one time service members were eager to deploy overseas and looked forward to the opportunity to participate in real-world operations, now they have become weary of it. Recall the situation described in the previous
chapter where a Marine F/A-18 pilot explained why he and his peers were choosing to leave the Corps. Now consider the situation of the ADF in Australia and members of the F/A-18 community in particular. Herein lies the paradox: RAAF squadrons would be eager to participate in a real-world operational activity and it would boost morale. USMC squadrons, on the other hand, already have a full plate, and more deployed time has an adverse effect on morale. This assessment is probably not documented and it would obviously be difficult to prove, but it is the author’s subjective opinion that a contradiction in circumstances exists between the USMC and the RAAF.

The contradiction in circumstances centers on each service’s OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO, and the generally different attitude regarding what an increased level of real-world activity would do for their service. The activity of USMC F/A-18 squadrons is well documented and it is arguable that the sustained, high tempo of operations has had an adverse effect on retention and morale. In contrast, the use of RAAF fighter attack aviation in a real-world circumstance has not occurred since the Korean War. The fact that RAAF fighters did not participate in the Vietnam War had an affect on the morale of pilots at that time. In his book, *The RAAF in Vietnam: Australian Air Involvement in the Vietnam War*, Coulthard-Clark makes this point when he writes about the Cabinet’s decision in December 1966 to commit Australian air to the war in Vietnam. The book quotes what Peter Howson, the Minister for Air, recorded in his diary after it was decided that RAAF fighters stationed at Ubon Air Base in Thailand would not be committed to the war effort: “...I saw [Sir Laurence] Jim McIntyre (External Affairs) and stressed the loss of morale in Ubon [among RAAF fighter pilots] when they see USAF F-4s fighting twenty-four hours a day alongside them.” This desire to perform—to employ professional skills in combat—is a good thing and it reflects the prevailing attitude among RAAF F/A-18 pilots today.

Again, while much of this discussion is the subjective opinion of one Marine who worked alongside the Australians in a F/A-18 squadron, the point of morale is worth noting. More anecdotal evidence comes from a March 1999 meeting where the TFG Commander discussed the increased
willingness and indeed, likelihood that Australian F/A-18s would be committed in the event of a future contingency (Kindler 1999). News regarding this fundamental change in the government’s attitude had an instant, noticeable, and somewhat enduring effect on aircrew and maintenance personnel. It generated new energy and a sense of optimism. Suddenly training was no longer routine—it gave purpose to the squadron’s activity. The lesson in this suggests that when decreasing demands are placed on a service component over a long period of time, there is a corresponding risk of decline in the effectiveness and enthusiasm of its members. A RAAF F/A-18 pilot characterized it best when he said, “the greatest threat to Australia is that there is no threat” (Churchill 2000).

An F/A-18 pilot from another middle power explained the morale dynamic in a different way. The Canadian Task Force Commander that led a contingent of eighteen CF-18s and 280 personnel during NATO’s air war over Kosovo said, “Everyone of us have dedicated our entire professional life to excel in some aspect of air warfare, or to support such missions. The fact that Canada asked us to actually go into combat is a culmination of all those efforts” (Larsen 1999, 13).

In recent years there has been an exodus of highly experienced, mid-career level aircrew and maintenance personnel from the RAAF F/A-18 community. This could be for any number of reasons; however, if among the reasons is a belief that the Airmen’s entire professional life might be consigned to fulfilling the same routine, then perhaps the challenge associated with deployment integration would offer a few Airmen incentive to stay with the RAAF for some time longer.

The bottom line is that the human dimension should not be ignored when considering the question of an integrated deployment arrangement. Assume for a moment that there are, in fact, contradicting circumstances between personnel that serve in Marine F/A-18 squadrons and their counterparts that serve in the RAAF. Would it not then serve the purpose of both communities to develop an arrangement that permitted RAAF squadrons to share the responsibility of real-world operational activity in Northeast Asia? The answer is yes, it would.
Deployment Integration: Beyond the F/A-18

Deployment integration is a revolutionary concept in the realm of defense cooperation and national security affairs. As such, the realistic expectation is that it would take years to implement given the political sensitivities of the Asia Pacific region. Therefore, the concept is presented as a long-term objective that should be pursued through an incremental, confidence building process over the next several years. In the context long-term planning, there are linkages that emerge with regard to the notion of a RAAF niche capability, the ADF’s focus on integration of service capabilities, and the ADAC’s potential role in USMC-RAAF collaboration on the JSF.

RAAF Niche Capability

In the framework of a more complex security environment in the twenty-first century, new defense acquisitions, and a future USMC-RAAF integrated deployment scenario, the theory of a “niche capability” advocated by Dr. Alan Stephens has merit. His theory is especially significant given the variance between what ASP 97 advances in the way of an expanded ADF focus and increased defense cooperation with the U.S. military on one hand, and a limited Australian defense budget on the other hand.

If coalition operations and air power are likely to be the way of the future, then it raises difficult questions for allies of the United States. The most pertinent question is, How do U.S. allies remain relevant? Air forces that either avoid or are incapable of making necessary technological improvements are likely to fall by the wayside, forfeit their current warfighting dominance, and risk eventually losing their value. The critical issue is that while American air power continues its consistent rise as the world’s dominant warfighting instrument, the capabilities that U.S. allies bring to the fight are being marginalized (Stephens 1999, 5).

Notwithstanding America’s position as the world’s only super power, the reality is that it does need more from its allies than just political legitimacy and access to overseas basing. The U.S. military cannot and should not be expected to underwrite the security of friends and allies around the
world, recognizing that in today’s environment there are increasing demands placed on the military to maintain stability in peacetime. So, the crux of the issue is that if allies wish to be good global citizens by contributing to regional security structures and international coalition operations, how do they maintain the technological pace necessary to keep their forces sufficiently advanced to enable participation in the full spectrum of operations?

The approach offered by Dr. Stephens is that of a “niche” air force. Because it is no longer financially feasible for the middle power to build a balanced air force to “first-tier” U.S. standards, a single niche capability is selected, developed, and maintained to those standards. Defined in terms of weapons systems, that might mean something like a fifth-generation fighter, or a leading-edge airlift, air-to-air refueling, or airborne early warning and control capability. Dr. Stephens explains that niche capability allows no room for half-measures. First-tier means exactly that—a silver bullet capability that could confidently be used in the opening volley of the opening day of any campaign. Allies who subscribe to the niche concept would be signaling their willingness to do their fair share (Stephens 1999, 13).

Because investment in a niche capability would represent, in part, a response to budgets that can no longer support a full complement of advanced systems, other force elements would have to function at a reduced standard, or be cut from the order of battle altogether. Accepting this, Stephens’ concept of niche capability is an attractive option for budget-conscious defense planners that are searching for a suitable capability replacement for the aging F/A-18 and F-111.

It would be advantageous to replace the F/A-18 and F-111 with a single weapons system that can integrate and interoperate easily with U.S. capabilities forward deployed to the Asia Pacific. To that end, it is important to note that the Marines have decided to replace its AV-8B Harrier and F/A-18 platforms with the JSF. In terms of USMC-RAAF deployment integration this means that USMC squadrons could be operating the JSF at MCAS Iwakuni as early as the 2012 to 2015 time frame—a period that coincides with the RAAF’s projected replacement of its F/A-18 fleet (Ritchie 1999).
When it comes to the middle power dilemma and security challenges of the twenty-first century, the most significant decision that Australia must make is whether it will fight again. If so, then defense planners must field capabilities that are able to participate in the full spectrum of operations. If that means foregoing the full range of capabilities, then so be it. The important thing to remember is that a single, first tier niche capability will get invited to the theater of operation and carry more political weight than multiple, second and third-tier capabilities that remain at home.

**ADF Integrated Capabilities and the JSF**

From a RAAF perspective, the case that Dr. Stephens makes for a niche air force capability is strong. In terms of a middle power contributing to coalition operations, it is both prudent and productive that Australia should favor a first tier niche capability, and forego second and third-tier capabilities which can only continue to degrade relatively and absolutely. Although a niche JSF capability would mean the end of a manned fast jet capability for long-range strike, the overriding appeal is in the larger contribution that the JSF would bring to the Australian Army as it moves to integrate other service capabilities and maneuver operations in the littoral environment--MOLE (Future Land Warfare-Draft 2000, 3).

In response to demands of the changing strategic environment, the Australian Army’s draft document, *Future Land Warfare: Land Warfare Concepts 2030*, foreshadows the ADF’s ambition to integrate capabilities, similar to the versatile task force structure of the Marines. The Army’s draft document states that MOLE are defined as integrated sea, air, and land operations involving forced entry from the sea, undertaken in the littoral region--similar to amphibious task force operations conducted with the MEU. Like the MEU, MOLE will require the closest integration of service capabilities for surveillance and reconnaissance; counter offensive operations; seizure of forward operating bases; destruction of enemy force projection assets, command and control assets, and logistics nodes and; protection of Australia’s sea lines of communication (Future Land Warfare-Draft 2000, 3).
With regard to the JSF, it is noteworthy that the operational demands for MOLE are linked to capabilities of the short take-off and vertical landing variant of the JSF. It was on the basis of mission requirements similar to MOLE that the Marines selected the JSF to replace its AV-8 and F/A-18 fleet. The requirement for a state-of-the-art, multi-mission jet aircraft capable of operating with full mission loads from amphibious class ships or expeditionary airfields as a superior attack aircraft; a stealthy, top-line fighter and; an escort platform was considered essential for the modern combined arms task forces (U.S. Congress, Senate 1999).

As defense planners in Canberra contemplate a replacement platform for the F/A-18 and F-111 it would be useful to consider the following recent developments: (1) the ADF’s recognition of the need for closer integration of service capabilities (2) the Army’s focus on MOLE and (3) the Navy’s acquisition of amphibious assault ships. These developments foretell a trend that helps to determine what the RAAF can most effectively contribute to the future integrated sea-air-land equation. It is the author’s opinion that a niche JSF capability holds the most promise in terms of what the RAAF can contribute to MOLE, the potential for future interoperability with USMC amphibious task forces, and ultimately, the long-term prospects for USMC-RAAF deployment integration.

**JSF Collaboration and the ADAC**

While the U.S. Marine Corps is already committed to the JSF, the RAAF is immersed in Project Air 6000—the vehicle by which they are moving ahead in the search for a new “aerospace combat capability.” Part of Air 6000 is directed toward replacing the aging fleet of F/A-18s and F-111s (Ritchie 1999). Taking an approach to modernization similar to that of the Marines, the RAAF has opted to pursue a major program that upgrades the current F/A-18A/Bs to a modern F/A-18C/D configuration. This will take the Australian *Hornets* to a planned withdrawal date of 2012 (Ritchie 1999). Although the JSF is a candidate for the F/A-18 and F-111 replacement, no final decisions have been made. Other possible choices include the F-22 *Raptor*, the French-made *Raphael*, and the
Euro-fighter, which is being developed by a multi-nation syndicate led by Germany and the UK (Young, Peter Lewis 2000, 48).

The window of opportunity that would allow U.S. and Australian defense planners to go down the collaborative path on JSF development is limited. Because the ADF wanted to leverage its initial investment into JSF with some specified minimum outcomes, there were delays in the decision to participate in the first level of interest, with an eventual decision not to enter. There is now a second opportunity for Australian participation in the next phase of JSF development—the engineering, manufacturing, and development phase. The cost for participation would likely be significantly higher than the initial phase. The decision timeline for Australian participation is currently uncertain; however, initial discussions suggest that a decision would be required by the end of year 2000 to ensure achievement of the benefits of collaboration (Hupfeld 1999).

Like all militaries, the ADF is no different in its concern about defining the requirements for a new combat aircraft capability. A critical consideration in this process will be the emergence of an updated assessment of the strategic environment (expected at mid-year via the new Defense White Paper), for which capability decisions must be generated. Such an assessment is considered crucial in order to avoid costly mistakes made because an acquired capability is deemed unsuitable to the nation's needs and situation (Ritchie 1999).

Following the strategic line of reasoning just described; there are other declared intentions to assist defense planners in the future capabilities decision. Among them are the following:

1. The declared intention to “give the highest priority to maximizing interoperability with the United States . . . and to be prepared to make significant investments to sustain such interoperability as new systems are introduced” (DOD 1997, 48).

2. The declared intention that in planning force structure, consideration will be given to the possibility that Australia “. . . might wish to make a direct contribution to the maintenance of
broader regional stability in a future conflict in the Asia Pacific region in which Australia’s strategic interests were engaged” (DOD 1997, 32).

3. The declared intention to engage in alliance operations (Mclachlan 1997, RUSI, 12).

In the context of these declared intentions it seems logical that two minimum criteria must be met in choosing a replacement platform for the F/A-18 and F-111. First, the weapons platform should be compatible with one in the U.S. arsenal. Secondly, it should be a weapons platform that is likely to be engaged in an area where Australia’s strategic interests are most concentrated—the Asia Pacific region. The obvious choices that remain are the U.S.-built F-22 and the JSF. Taking the decision criteria a step further and considering (1) the possibility of future combined USMC-ADF amphibious task force operations (2) parallel USMC-RAAF TACAIR replacement strategies and (3) the coincidental planned F/A-18 withdrawal dates of 2012 to 2015 (Ritchie 1999/Dake 2000)—each of these factors is incentive to consider the possibilities of USMC-RAAF collaboration in the JSF procurement process.

So what is the role of ADAC in this discussion? A product of the 1998 AUSMIN talks, ADAC is the senior bilateral forum between the U.S. DOD and the Australian DOD for discussion and cooperation of matters involving acquisition and follow-on support of defense equipment. The marriage between USMC-RAAF JSF collaboration and ADAC can be found in the committee goals and purpose, which are outlined in the ADAC Terms of Reference. Included among the ADAC’s goals are the following: (1) to identify similarities in future needs and engage in early discussion of equipment-related operational requirements; (2) promote interoperability, standardization, and the exchange of technical information between U.S. and Australian defense forces and; (3) facilitate mutually beneficial cooperation in the fields of systems development, acquisition, and follow-on logistics support (ADAC 1998). This characterizes the potential role that the ADAC could have in the development of a JSF variant compatible for future combined USMC-ADF amphibious task force operations and in a future USMC-RAAF integrated deployment scenario.
CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Methodology and Conclusions

In the process of American policy formulation, the assessment criteria most often used for evaluating national security strategy and national military strategy include the following tests:

1. Feasibility. Can the action be accomplished by the means available? As it applies to deployment integration, feasibility is an assessment of the strategic, operational, or tactical level component (ways) given the resources available (means). The concept of deployment integration is feasible if it has a reasonable chance of success given the financial and material resources available.

2. Suitability. Will attainment of the objective accomplish the desired effect? Deployment integration is suitable if, when achieved, it leads to a desired national security outcome.

3. Acceptability. Are the consequences justified by the importance of the effect desired? The profit and cost account (political profit and cost) of the whole undertaking is essential to determining if deployment integration will be advantageous. Success must be at reasonable cost. Acceptability is determined by weighing disadvantages at the strategic, operational, and tactical level against the benefits that would be achieved if the concept were to be implemented (Davis 1997, L1-E-1).

Conclusions regarding viability of an integrated deployment arrangement with USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadrons are based on the above criteria. Feasibility, suitability, and acceptability assessments are done at the strategic level for each of the participant nations—the U.S., Australia, and Japan (as host nation). At the operational and tactical level these assessments are done only for the U.S. and Australia.

Using the criteria outlined above the simple answer is yes, deployment integration is a viable concept that should be pursued as new method of security cooperation in the twenty-first century. It should be noted, however, that deployment integration of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadrons is not recommended as a permanent arrangement, but as a capability to be achieved. There is more utility
for each service in a well-developed, annual F/A-18 unit exchange that can transition into a RAAF contingency capability in Northeast Asia. A USMC-RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability would then provide the warfighting CINCs more flexibility to use Marine F/A-18s in other regions of the world when circumstances demand it.

A permanent, integrated WESTPAC unit deployment rotation fails to meet operational level criteria for acceptability. First, it is questionable whether the TFG has the resources to sustain regular six-month deployments to Northeast Asia without compromising FPDA commitments. Second, for the Marines there is some concern that integrating RAAF F/A-18 squadrons into the WESTPAC UDP schedule could result in more USMC squadrons being diverted to the Navy’s CVW (Thumm 2000). Given the uncertainty of these issues, it has been assessed that deployment integration is more viable when characterized in terms of a contingency capability that can be relied on to back-fill at Iwakuni when international circumstances require it. Therefore, the conclusions and recommendations in this chapter should be evaluated in the same context—deployment integration as an ADF contingency capability and not a permanent WESTPAC UDP arrangement.

At the strategic level of warfare feasibility, suitability, and acceptability assessments are done from the perspectives of the United States, Australia, and Japan. For each of these nations USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is assessed as feasible and suitable. However, there are some political implications for each country, which make acceptability difficult at the strategic level. Acknowledging the sensitive nature of domestic and regional issues, the bottom line assessment is that through carefully orchestrated confidence building measures and the trend toward increased security cooperation in the region, the complexities can be overcome.

At the operational and tactical levels of warfare the tests for feasibility, suitability, and acceptability are less complicated. The overall analysis is simplified because the JSDF is not part of the operational and tactical equation. The advantage of a common weapons platform also helps in eliminating a host of problems that would otherwise be associated with an integrated arrangement,
such as logistic support. In passing the suitability test, the RAAF’s *Hornet* upgrade program is a critical factor for the U.S. and Australia. At the operational and the tactical levels it is, once again, acceptability criteria that are most problematic, but difficulties are overcome by confidence building.

Table 1 below provides a snapshot of the assessment criteria and conclusions. If “**IDC**” appears in the block it means that the conditions for USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron integrated deployment capability already exist (RUN Phase). “**HUG**” denotes that the *Hornet* upgrade must be completed before the minimum criteria for integrated deployment capability is met. Because a crawl-walk-run implementation strategy is used, different levels of confidence building measures may apply. If confidence building is required during the CRAWL Phase it is denoted as “**CB 1-3**,” which denotes confidence building for one to three years after the process to integrated deployment capability is started. Likewise, if confidence building is required during the WALK Phase it is denoted as “**CB 4-8**,” which denotes confidence building in the subsequent four to eight year period.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assessment Criteria</th>
<th>Strategic</th>
<th>Operational</th>
<th>Tactical</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japan</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Feasible</td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>IDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Suitable</td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>IDC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acceptable</td>
<td>CB 1-3</td>
<td>CB 4-8</td>
<td>CB 1-3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>IDC</td>
<td>IDC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**IDC** = Conditions for Integrated Deployment Capability (RUN Phase) already exist

**HUG** = *Hornet* upgrade required before Integrated Deployment Capability is met.

**CB 1-3** = Confidence Building during one to three year CRAWL Phase

**CB 4-8** = Confidence Building during four to eight year WALK Phase

---

120
From Balance of Power to Security Pluralism

The most relevant dynamic in the strategic outcome to USMC and RAAF F/A18 deployment integration is the region's subtle shift from a balance of power mindset to security pluralism—from an attitude of confrontation to an attitude of cooperation. As security pluralism gains momentum in the region, acceptability issues related to Japanese history and Article 9 of the Constitution, China's reaction, and ASEAN will diminish. It is only logical that significant transformations in the nature of post-Cold War security threats compel equally significant revisions in security concepts. If it is accepted that today's security threats cannot be met effectively with traditional forms of readiness and deterrence (because of major constraints in military budgets and force structure), then more constructive and sophisticated forms of influence will obviously be required.

The wisest and most cost-effective actions that nations can pursue are those that create an environment of peace, discourage violence and instability, and build confidence. In the Asia Pacific region the common goal is peaceful development for the benefit of all. This goal is best achieved by further development of security relationships and dialogue. In his remarks to a distinguished group of Asian diplomats at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in Singapore, the Commander in Chief for U.S. Pacific Command, Admiral Dennis Blair, reasoned that the traditional balance of power thinking that dominated the twentieth-century is obsolete. At best, it produced an uneasy peace that could be shattered by a wide range of intended or unintended events. Admiral Blair surmised that the dynamics of competition in the balance of power environment leads to ever-higher expenditures on more lethal military armaments that, in turn, increase the destructive capabilities if peace shatters (Blair 1999).

Security pluralism is the preferred alternative to balancing power. Introduced in the DOD's *East Asia Strategy Report* published in 1998, security pluralism relies on a network of security and military relationships—bilateral and multilateral—to develop and maintain a peace that allows economic and cooperative development by which all nations in the region can prosper and benefit.
(EASR 1998, 66). It relies on diplomacy and negotiation to make progress on difficult issues such as a fragile peace on the Korean Peninsula, the tenuous relations between China and Taiwan, the disputed territorial claims in the South China Sea, and rising tensions between India and Pakistan. These security issues are not just bilateral. Since 50 percent of the world’s economy derives from Asia, the globalization of economics and finance means that any significant problem affects the world economy ( Strategic Studies Institute 1999, 8).

America supports the growing pattern of security pluralism. To this end, Washington has abandoned the old balance of power thinking by seeking, instead, to engage Beijing through an incremental process, from confidence building measures to military cooperation. Likewise with Russia, another Cold War rival, the U.S. now sees that country’s continued integration into Asia Pacific security affairs as an important element of the strategic mix (EASR 1998, 64-66). The U.S. is not alone in its thinking that multilateral security relationships are the more useful means to effectively address changed circumstances. The Chief Researcher at the Nomura Research Institute in Tokyo, Mr. Satoshi Morimoto, expressed a similar belief. He said that the U.S.-Japan alliance would be more meaningful in the twenty-first century if the two nations could make a loose group with such countries as Australia, New Zealand, ASEAN, or a unified Korea.

In his testimony to the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 March 2000, Admiral Blair talked about security communities as his vision of the way ahead for military cooperation in the Asia Pacific. He described security communities as “groups of nations”, not necessarily treaty alliance signatories, but rather nations joined by geographic considerations or common concerns. Admiral Blair went on to explain that in his mind these nations would be characterized by the willingness to put their collective efforts into solving regional points of friction. Among other things, these groups of nations that make up security communities would contribute armed forces to support diplomatic solutions, as well as plan, train, and exercise their armed forces together for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations (U.S. Congress, Senate 2000, 17).
At the 1998 Conference on Pacific Security cosponsored by the Strategic Studies Institute, participants from throughout the Asia Pacific region agreed that multilateralism may be the most propitious road to take in order to attain common political and security objectives within the context of increased interdependence and globalization. The rationale offered by the conference participants included the following: (1) Multilateralism offers the United States an opportunity to decrease its regional security burden and reduce the sentiments against anti-American unilateralism while still attaining its engagement goals. (2) Multilateralism allows China to practice diplomacy, while still learning the rules of the road. (3) Multilateralism may be the only way for Japan to implement guilt-free foreign relations with its former enemies. (4) Korea could use multilateralism to get the security guarantees it so desperately needs with all its neighbors (Strategic Studies Institute 1999, 14).

It is an intriguing development that one year after Admiral Blair’s visit to Singapore where he discussed the need to move from balance of power thinking to security pluralism, that country’s leadership is now echoing those same sentiments. In a recent speech Deputy Prime Minister and Defense Minister Dr. Tony Tan Keng Yam stressed that while Asia policies had previously focused on economic issues, future economic development cannot function independent of an adequate security framework. He stated that while the effects of globalization in the economic and financial spheres are more evident, the security implications of globalization are less understood. Dr. Tan added that there is a need to strengthen the “nexus” between economics and security, in order to enhance international, multilateral, and bilateral cooperation between regional countries to tackle problems concerning security (World News Insights, 17 January 2000).

Existing security structures within the Asia Pacific region are diverse. The U.S. is a party to five of them, which were forged almost fifty years ago in the context of the emerging Cold War. In this sense legacies are important. They provide starting points and a basis for smooth transitions. The U.S. treaty with Japan remains essential to the security umbrella provided to that country and indeed, much of East Asia. The FPDA, although a legacy of colonial era, provides opportunities
for dialogue and interaction in Southeast Asia (Blair 1999). The ANZUS treaty, another relic of the Cold War, has been reinvigorated to enhance cooperative efforts between the U.S. and Australia in maintaining regional peace and stability.

While the value of legacies is important for continuity and setting the foundation for new initiatives, there can also be too much legacy and history. There are perhaps many foreign policy experts and defense officials on both sides of the ocean that would be skeptical regarding the idea of a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability in Japan simply on the basis of legacy issues. For example, because country X has never forgiven country Y or because countries X and Y don’t trust country Z, there is little hope for a cooperative security arrangement of the type described in this paper. If that is in fact the case, then other nations must follow America’s example in moving beyond its own Cold War politics regarding China and Russia. Although nations should not be blind to history, history should not blind nations. An old Russian proverb sums it up best: “forget the past and lose an eye; dwell on the past and lose both eyes” (Cossa 1999, 2).

The Art of the Possible: Integrated Deployment Capability

USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is about security pluralism; not balance of power or containment strategy. Deployment integration is nothing more than a cooperative security arrangement for deterring aggression through military preparation. The benefactors are not only the U.S., Australia, and Japan, but all nations in the region—to include China. The new concept is a non-threatening defense measure designed to nurture stability in the region. The beauty is that it fits the security pluralism paradigm and provides enhanced readiness at little cost. Portrayed accurately, deployment integration rejects the balance of power paradigm. Make no mistake: it is not about strengthening a “northern anchor” and a “southern anchor” in the Pacific; it does not require new expenditures for the procurement of an increasingly lethal capability and; it does not perpetuate a destabilizing conventional arms race in the region. When development of a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability is viewed in its proper context, the art of the possible unfolds.
The Art of the Possible: Japan

From a Japanese strategic level perspective, the USMC and RAAF integrated deployment arrangement is assessed to be feasible and suitable. Suitability is based on the Chapter 2 analysis regarding a tripartite arrangement and the confluence of strategic, political, and economic interests between Japan and Australia. Feasibility is based on the Chapter 3 analysis regarding financial considerations. Difficulty with Japan centers on politics and the acceptability test; specifically, constitutional issues associated with Article 9 and the renounced right to collective self-defense—a right that is in fact recognized under international law (Defense of Japan 1998, 69).

The Japanese and their Asian neighbors are mindful of history. They have not forgotten the behavior of Japan during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. The Sino-Japanese War (1894-1895), the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), the creation of a puppet state in Manchuria in 1931, the invasion of China in 1937, and World War II are the basis for legacy issues that remain etched in the collective memory of Asia (Scales and Wortzel 1999, 4). These legacy issues are not only the root of Japan’s pacifist Constitution, but they are also the source of distrust that most Asians have toward Japan.

Asia’s distrust of Japan is ameliorated somewhat because Japan must act within constraints of the U.S.-Japan security relationship. While that arrangement continues to work, it is important for Japan to also participate in multilateral security frameworks. In the post-Cold War era it is generally accepted that multilateral security frameworks lead to a more stable and peaceful environment. In this context, USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration would be a great benefit to Japan if it can be utilized as a fora for Japan to explain and clarify its policies and intentions to other Asian countries. The theory is that if a cooperative security arrangement is developed with Japan, it will increase confidence and trust in Japanese behavior among Asian countries. A similar logic was applied at the 1998 Conference on Pacific Security when participants explained that multilateralism may be the only way for Japan to implement guilt-free foreign relations with its former enemies. If
remilitarization of Japan is the fear of Asia, it would seem that the best way to counter the prospect of that happening would be through a cooperative security arrangement. That said, one fact remains: the end of the Cold War brought about radical changes in the security environment surrounding Japan, and so Tokyo must reformulate its security policies accordingly.

In the Chapter 2 analysis regarding Japanese constitutional issues there was significant evidence suggesting that Japan is gradually moving away from the course of unilateral pacifism and adopting security policies of a "normal" nation. New evidence of this continues to unfold even without changes to the Constitution. For example, there are new plans to designate funds in a future budget to add four airborne-refueling aircraft to the JSDF. This is a significant development in the sense that these planes would give Japan a force projection capability, which is currently forbidden by Article 9 (World News Insights, December 1999). Another development that indicates Tokyo is taking serious steps to adapt to new realities was the announcement in February 2000 that Japan may dispatch vessels to patrol the Straits of Malacca. Japan is steadily defining its defensive perimeter outward: from waters around Japan to those in its immediate region (1000 miles) and now to regions of strategic importance more than 2000 miles away. Sending armed Japanese vessels to the Strait of Malacca would firmly place this strategic waterway within Japan's areas of operation, making naval operations that were at one time unthinkable an accepted part of regional and national security (World News Insights, February 2000).

The Japanese Parliament announced on 21 January 2000 that it was set to begin a formal, five-year review of its Constitution (World News Insights, 25 January 2000). The fact these constitutional research councils are now underway is in and of itself a remarkable development that portends to new possibilities for expanded defense cooperation with Australia, as well as other nations in the region. Notwithstanding the outcome of these councils, as international circumstances bring about new interpretations of the existing Constitution the notion of one Australian exchange
pilot deployed to MCAS Iwakuni with a Marine squadron would appear to be insignificant in comparison to other remarkable events that have occurred.

In view of Tokyo's rapidly changing security policy, the question regarding acceptability criteria centers on when—not if—USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration will become politically acceptable for Japan. The key is in progressing toward the goal of integrated deployment capability through deliberate, calibrated confidence building measures aimed at developing trust among all Asia Pacific nations—Japan included—through transparency of the strategic intentions behind this new cooperative security arrangement.

The confidence that deployment integration is a question of when, and not if, is based on the fact that the all-important confidence building process is already in progress. It began with politico-military talks between Japan and Australia in 1996. This was followed by a goodwill visit during June 1997, when four Australian Navy vessels and a RAAF P-3 Orion arrived in Japan. Then, in September 1997 Defense Minister McLachlan visited Tokyo. During this visit the two countries decided to substantially upgrade defense ties by undertaking low-key naval exercises, swapping information on maritime surveillance, increasing exchanges of defense personnel, and increasing contacts on training, peacekeeping, and intelligence exchanges. Australia and Japan have thus created the basis of a security arrangement that can be expanded (Malik 1999, 84). Geopolitically, a tripartite U.S.-Japan-Australia security arrangement is no longer inconceivable.

During July 1998, six RAAF F/A-18s remained overnight at Yakota Air Force Base, Japan, en route to Alaska for Exercise COPE THUNDER. This was the first time that Australian fighter aircraft had landed in Japan since the Korean War. Had the Japanese government been prepared to host the aircraft as a goodwill gesture or as a confidence building measure then the event could have been heralded as yet another remarkable increase in the level of military cooperation between the two nations. But the Australian F/A-18 entry into Yakota was conducted under UN Command procedures and it required a great deal of groundwork to allay Japanese concerns over possible
incorrect assumptions that might be drawn by regional observers (McDermott 2000). That, however, should not diminish the importance of the event. The fact that it happened and it happened without incident or any negative publicity or reaction in Australia is significant in terms of progress made toward the ultimate aim outlined in this paper. The bottom line is that it showed that there were no repercussions to Australian F/A-18s on Japanese soil in terms of the wartime legacy. This should provide defense planners in the U.S. and Australia a solid point of departure for progressing toward a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability.

The Art of the Possible: China

When debating U.S.-Australian defense cooperation in Northeast Asia policy makers should pause to consider that while China publicly states its principled objection to stationing U.S. forces on foreign soil, there are reports that privately Chinese leaders take a different view. U.S. presence in Japan is seen to act as a guard against the remilitarization of that nation. These same Chinese leaders are said to privately acknowledge that the presence of American combat forces stabilizes the Korean Peninsula. Moreover, while China’s military strategists complain that the U.S. nuclear arsenal is a threat to China, they acknowledge in private that without extended deterrence, as provided for in the U.S.-Japan and U.S.-Republic of Korea defense treaties, Korea might develop nuclear weapons and Japan could follow suit. It is said that privately some leaders in China have gone so far as to admit that without the defensive conventional arms provided to Taiwan by the United States, Taiwan might develop nuclear weapons (Scales and Wortzel 1999, 4-6).

Private ruminations notwithstanding, no matter how deployment integration is packaged, it is certain to provoke China’s real or feigned concerns about containment and force Beijing to take countermeasures. There would be the hue and cry that the United States is bent on maintaining its hegemonic balance of power under the subterfuge of security pluralism. At work would be the fear that America is trying to contain China through military alliances. The Chinese reaction would be similar to that in 1996, when strengthened ties with Japan and Australia were announced through
separate Joint Security Declarations. These reaffirmed defense ties were deemed a threat to the PRC. The state-run media in Beijing described it as the United States, “using these two anchors [Japan and Australia] as the claws of a crab in a strategic pincer movement aimed at China from the north and the south” (Young, Peter Lewis, August 1999, 12).

Australia is particularly sensitive to the public perceptions of Chinese officials. As a middle power in East Asia, Canberra is acutely aware that while China’s economic stature grows so, too, will its impact on the security and politics of the region and the world. Strategic interests dictate that bilateral relations with Beijing remain one of the government’s top priorities. Recognizing this, Canberra dispatched a special envoy to placate Beijing when the U.S.-Australian alliance was given new life in 1996. In an address to the China National Defense University in Beijing during May 1999, the Australian Defense Minister said that the region and the world could not afford to have the U.S. (“the greatest power”) and China (“probably the second biggest power”) on bad terms. The fact that a Defense Minister deliberately chose to style China as the second biggest world power reflects Australia’s own perception of China’s importance (Young, Peter Lewis, July 1999, 9).

So why would Canberra enter into a U.S.-Australian integrated deployment arrangement at the risk of offending Chinese sensitivities? For that matter, why would Washington be interested in such an arrangement given the emphasis it also puts on bilateral relations with Beijing? This is the crux of the acceptability test. Are the consequences justified by the importance of the effect desired? Given evidence presented in the strategic analysis, the effect is that deployment integration goes a long way toward easing Australia’s middle power dilemma and reconciling the ends and the means laid out for the ADF in ASP 97. Deployment integration also achieves a desired effect for the U.S. in that it is a manifestation of American policy. In other words, the initiative supports a growing pattern of security pluralism in the Asia Pacific region. Rejecting the idea in Washington would be tantamount to rejecting its own national security strategy, national military strategy, and East Asian strategy. So, the answer is that benefits of the arrangement outweigh the consequences.
With regard to the consequences, U.S. and Australia officials already know what Beijing’s response to deployment integration will be--politics as usual. The nub is, when assessing threat the experts must consider capability plus intention. In Washington and Canberra policy makers know what their own long-range intentions are--policy makers know the motives that would lie behind an USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability. The question is, What are China’s future intentions? While the U.S. and Australia both welcome China in taking its rightful place as a world power, there is conflicting evidence as to what the PRC’s future intentions involve. If Beijing’s long-range intentions are indeed benign and U.S.-Australian long-range intentions are benign, then it stands to reason that Chinese officials should agree that it too could derive some benefit from an integrated security arrangement. The benefit to China would be on par with the benefits it has accrued--along with other Asian countries--from the stability that American forces bring to the Korean Peninsula.

The truth is that China benefits from stability in the Asia Pacific just as much as any other country in the region. Japan, Australia, and the U.S. are not the only nations that depend on sea lanes from the Middle East. 67 percent of China’s oil also comes through the Straits of Malacca. Does the fact that Beijing is planning to reduce dependence on this strategic sea lane by building a pipeline across Kazakstan (Strategic Studies Institute 1999, 10) mean that China may have some long-range ambitions in the South China Sea which could impede the free flow of shipping through the region? Maybe, but the initiative is not denounced by the U.S. and Australia.

Now consider the rapprochement between China and Russia. Since the establishment of official diplomatic ties in 1989, Beijing and Moscow have cooperated in many areas. Of special note are the military ties that have formed. In December 1992, the countries signed a joint communiqué agreeing to strengthen military cooperation through the Chinese purchase of Russian military arms. Purchases have included SU-27 Flankers, TU-22M Backfire medium-range bombers, T-72 tanks, S300 surface-to-air missiles, low-noise Kilo-class submarines, and the Sovremenny-class destroyers.
Also signed in 1992 was a Memorandum of Understanding on Sino-Russian Military Equipment and Technology Cooperation. Since then the Chinese government has employed hundreds of Russian and Ukrainian military scientists in its defense industries, most of whom work on developing high-tech armaments and nuclear weapons (Taylor and Kim 1997, 8).

It now appears a more vigorous strategic partnership is beginning to take shape between China and Russia. During March 2000, the state-run People's Daily in Beijing ran a series of articles touting the benefits of strategic partnership between Russia and China. The articles also called for a multi-polar world, instead of one in which the U.S. is the dominant power. This coincides with a flurry of high-level diplomatic activity leading up to the summit between President Vladimir Putin of Russia and President Jiang Zemin of China. In addition, the two nations are working on proposals for an oil pipeline from the Russian Far East into China, nuclear fuel for a Chinese reactor, and new sales and increased cooperation on advanced weapons systems (World News Insights, March 2000). The point is that if Moscow and Beijing suddenly deemed it to in their strategic interest to form a military alliance, would the decision to proceed depend on what Washington or Canberra had to say about the arrangement? In all likelihood, the answer is no.

Uncertainty regarding Chinese intentions is exactly why the U.S and Australia should start the process toward a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability now rather than later. Whether China's future intentions are benign or otherwise, its military and economic influence will grow in the region. As this influence grows so will the political cost of deployment integration. If Beijing's intentions are in fact benign, the impact of waiting is less significant. If in fifteen years it turns out that Beijing's intentions had been something other than benign, then it may be too late for the U.S. and Australia to initiate this type of cooperative security arrangement. In fifteen years the PRC's countermeasure to closer U.S. defense ties with Australia and Japan might be considerably more threatening than mere rhetoric. The bottom line is that policy making in Washington and Canberra should not be held hostage to Chinese rhetoric.
The Art of the Possible: ASEAN

The strong reaction from some ASEAN states to Australian leadership in East Timor makes it clear that once again it is the acceptability test that demands scrutiny. Much is made of Australia’s unique situation as a Western civilization with links to Asia. Indeed, for most of the past decade Australian diplomacy has focused on creating links with its Asian neighbors in an effort to bridge the Western-Asian gap. However, Australian advocacy for East Timor, combined with Prime Minister Howard’s previous statements regarding an expanded Australian role in Asia, has sparked a negative reaction among ASEAN states (World News Insights, September 1999). While many may dismiss Australia’s more active stance toward Asia as unrealistic because it does not have sufficient power projection capability (e.g., the middle power dilemma), these reactions are important indicators of what regional sentiment might be toward USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration in Northeast Asia.

After the emotionally-charged rhetoric is stripped away, ASEAN states are left to face the reality that it was only in the absence of leadership from Southeast Asian nations that Australia stepped up to assume leadership responsibility for resolving the crisis in East Timor. There should be no apologies for Australia accepting a UN mandate. Similarly, there should be no apologies for Australia’s move toward a more proactive role in Asia. This, after all, coincides with the increased recognition among nations that the nexus between economics and security is increasing the need for partnership in maintaining regional security (World News Insights, January 2000). The fact is that ASEAN states should applaud Australia for its demonstrated willingness to help underwrite Asian security through its actions in East Timor.

Australia and the U.S. are among ASEAN’s Dialogue Partners that see the ARF mechanism as the most acceptable and least controversial lowest common denominator to manage Asian security in the post Cold-War era. And while Washington and Canberra provide unequivocal support to the ARF, there are ASEAN states that complain of Western influence and would like to see a decreased
U.S. presence in the region. Again, this ignores the reality that in the Asia Pacific regional stability has been underwritten by the strategic U.S.-Japan security alliance—which can also be interpreted as providing the backbone for any successful functioning of ARF in the near future. Until the ARF is able to progress from a confidence building mechanism to one that is able to deal with conflict resolution, ASEAN states would be wise to accept any assistance that the U.S. and Australia brings to the regional security table (Nathan 1999, 10-12).

Much like the China assessment, the greater good achieved for Australia, relative to the political cost of offending ASEAN sensitivities should be the overriding factor in the acceptability test for Canberra’s strategic level decision making. Most of the political cost can be mitigated through diplomatic efforts emphasizing stability that the U.S.-Australia-Japan cooperative security arrangement brings to the region. As the advantages of security pluralism become more recognized and accepted among ASEAN states, USMC and RAAF deployment integration will be viewed with corresponding favor. Likewise, Asian confidence and trust in Japanese behavior will increase as the intent and predictability of the arrangement unfolds.

The Art of the Possible: Australia

Insofar as strategic level acceptability is concerned, it has been emphasized that success in implementing USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration is largely dependent on how well the concept is packaged and then communicated to the Asia Pacific audience. The importance of this applies equally to the domestic audience in Australia. It is likely that the concept would be well received by an American audience, but the public reaction in Australia would be quite different. Opponents are likely to misinterpret deployment integration as a return to forward defense. Taking into account an accepted fact that the distinction between defense and security may not be well understood at the popular level (see Chapter 2 Introduction), deployment integration is assessed to be acceptable to Canberra in view of the overall strategic, operational, and tactical benefits accrued.
The argument that deployment integration is a return to forward defense strategy is simply not accurate. There is no costly overhead in maintaining overseas infrastructure, nor is there any permanent basing of military units and equipment overseas. Rather, the concept of deployment integration is more about forward engagement—about leveraging Australia’s national defense capability in a way that contributes more significantly to regional stability. Having a regionally significant defense force enhances Australia’s international status and regional standing. This in turn strengthens the government’s capacity to influence the regional agenda and other significant events in the Asia Pacific (DFAT 1997, 22).

The bottom line in determining the acceptability of a USMC-RAAF integrated deployment capability is that any short-term political cost is far outweighed by the long-term national security and military benefit. In other words, all of Australia benefits when the ADF contributes in protecting vital national security interests from beyond Australian shores. The fact it can be done at minimum financial, equipment, and personnel cost is a bonus.

**The Operational Imperative: U.S. Perspective**

The U.S. national security strategy says that for the foreseeable future, the Armed Forces of the United States “must have the capability to deter, and, if deterrence fails, defeat large-scale, cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames.” Maintaining a two major theater war capability “deters opportunism elsewhere when the U.S. is heavily involved in deterring or defeating aggression in one theater, or while conducting multiple smaller-scale contingencies in other theaters” (NSS 1999, 19).

The lesson from the seventy-eight day Kosovo air war is that the United States no longer has a two-war military. Marine Corps Lieutenant General John Rhodes told a House subcommittee, “We’re a one-major regional contingency-plus force.” The Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee said that Kosovo showed “we don’t have the size force or assets to do two major theater wars. If something major broke out while we were doing Kosovo, we would have been in big
trouble.” Three of the four service chiefs that testified before the committee spoke of the two-major theater war policy and each of them concluded that U.S. forces were not equipped to meet the two-war standard (Donnelly 1999, 28-29).

The 1997 *Quadrennial Defense Review* concluded that “based on recent experience and intelligence operations, the demand for small-scale contingency operations is expected to remain high over the next fifteen to twenty years.” Three years later the services are maintaining readiness of deployed forces at the expense of non-deployed forces (Donnelly 1999, 33). Three years later the U.S. military is in an asset-limited environment with force structure levels lower than at any other time since World War II. Since the *Quadrennial Defense Review*, demands for small-scale contingency operations have increased. The U.S. military is indeed operating in an increasingly challenging environment in terms of international conflict and engagement. Fleet commanders now say that missions must be prioritized to allocate support, meaning that some missions are falling through the cracks (Clemins 1999, 43-44).

When it comes to the U.S. military and operational capability the same alarming message is proclaimed, whether it is in congressional testimony, professional journals, or the print media. The services are continuing to do more with less. The all-volunteer force is working harder and longer, and getting by with fewer resources and less support . . . and the weight of this challenge is reflected in retention and operational readiness. Congressional leaders and military leaders agree that the focus must be on easing the burden on troops while flexing to meet ever-increasing tasks. But what remains unresolved is the contradiction between what the military is expected to be capable of doing and what government is willing to support with funding.

So what can the United States do about the problems related to military readiness, retention, OPTEMPO, and budget constraints? It is unlikely that America will pull back from existing commitments, and it is unlikely that any administration would rebuild the force structure that was dismantled during the past decade. Therefore, it is in the absence of satisfactory answers to these
questions that a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron integrated deployment capability is assessed to be feasible, suitable, and acceptable at the operational level of warfare.

Deployment integration is assessed to be feasible because it equates to a force multiplier for the Pacific Theater combatant commander. The arrangement also equates to organizational structure for Marine TACAIR in the Pacific Theater. How else can the U.S. military get a force multiplier, organizational structure, improved readiness and interoperability, and, perhaps, higher retention at rock bottom expense (see Chapter 3 financial considerations)? It is a question worth pondering.

Integrated deployment capability with Australian F/A-18s is suitable because it meets U.S. National Military Strategy objectives for interoperability, overseas presence, posture, capabilities, and readiness (see glossary). The arrangement facilitates interoperability, and interoperability is only achieved by interoperating. The arrangement encourages increased responsibility sharing on the part of a Pacific region ally—an objective of overseas presence. The arrangement helps shape allied defense capabilities—an objective of posture. The arrangement enhances capabilities, which is essential if circumstances require that the U.S. military fight two distant, overlapping major theater wars—an objective of capabilities. The arrangement enhances the U.S. military’s ability to rapidly respond to crisis and threats around the globe—an objective of readiness (NMS 1997, 12-15).

From a U.S. military perspective, acceptability of deployment integration at the operational level creates some problems related to the theater war plan. Because Australian F/A-18s would be satisfying the operational role of a USMC squadron, there should be no need to modify the existing Air Task Orders. However, an arrangement allowing the RAAF an opportunity to train with certain weapons which are not in their own munitions inventory may be needed. For example, if an Air Task Order required that Iwkuni-based F/A-18s fly suppression of enemy air defense (SEAD) missions using HARM, then there would need to be some provision for the Australians to have access to that capability, since HARM is not in the RAAF inventory. Notwithstanding the need to reconcile these types of issues, deployment integration is deemed acceptable at the operational level.
because overall benefit to the U.S. outweighs the cost and effort in sharing relevant information and technology required for Australian F/A-18s to participate effectively in Pacific Theater operations.

From a more parochial USMC perspective, there may be some defense officials who would view USMC deployment integration with the RAAF as an opportunity to divert more Marine F/A-18 squadrons to the CVW. This could be a legitimate concern to the Marines if deployment integration became a permanent arrangement rather than a contingency capability. There may also be critics within the Marine Corps who disagree that the F/A-18s have an OPTEMPO problem and, therefore, any disruption to the WESTPAC UDP rotation constitutes a cost that does not outweigh the benefit gained. Presupposing that this is an accurate assessment, the validity of it would then have to rest on knowledge of the future—something that flies in the face of a key element of U.S. global security strategy: Prepare Now for an uncertain future (EASR 1998, 8). Therefore, from a USMC operational level perspective, integrated deployment capability with the RAAF is assessed as acceptable.

The Operational Imperative: ADF Perspective

When assessing the feasibility, suitability, and acceptability of an integrated deployment arrangement in Northeast Asia, an operational level logic similar to that of the U.S. military applies to the ADF. The United States military has difficulty reconciling the National Security Strategy requirement to fight two simultaneous major theater wars with its current organizational structure. Likewise, the ADF has difficulty meeting requirements called for in ASP 97. Canberra’s ambition to project influence in its wider region of strategic interest is limited by ADF force structure. On that basis the proposed arrangement is assessed to be feasible. Constraints on the Australian defense budget do not permit large expenditures that would be required to increase ADF structure. However, a modest expenditure that facilitates a limited ADF presence in Northeast Asia operating alongside and supplementing the U.S. presence is economically feasible.

Deployment integration is assessed as suitable for the ADF because it advances ASP 97 objectives for interoperability with the U.S., readiness, preparedness, and the knowledge edge.
From an ADF perspective the acceptability criteria for an integrated deployment capability will not be met for at least two to three years. The cost of putting capability-limited aircraft into theater does not outweigh any short-term benefits that would be derived. It is estimated that in two to three years the TFG will have a sufficient number of F/A-18s that have been through the HUG program to meet the force structure requirement of twelve aircraft. The delay will ensure that Australian Hornets are equipped to participate in the full spectrum of theater operations. The arrangement is also considered acceptable from the FPDA perspective. Provided those deployment obligations are not compromised, there should be no conflict at the operational level. Based on the present FPDA commitment for two ADEXs per year, one of the three operational TFG squadrons should be available for operations in Northeast Asia.

The Tactical Imperative

An integrated deployment with USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadrons is assessed to feasible, suitable, and acceptable at the tactical level of war. At this level, advantages of a common weapons system are fully realized for both services. While there will always be tactical-level challenges that must be overcome, these are primarily third-order issues that can be dealt with at the Squadron or Group level. Feasibility for the RAAF is likely to center on the cost of logistic re-supply for major components that are unable to be repaired on site.

The key outcome with regard to suitability is the hands-on, tactical level experience that will be afforded to squadron personnel from both services. The value of this close-contact experience cannot be quantified other than to say that whether it is in aircrew debriefs or in the maintenance hanger, Airmen and Marines will learn from each other.

Acceptability at the tactical level is assessed to be mutually reinforcing. The Marines that are able to spend more time at home will be grateful for the operational relief. RAAF Airmen that are able to experience something closer to real-world operations will be similarly grateful for the opportunity to excel in a different environment.
Recommendations

The most important message from the conclusions outlined above is that USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron deployment integration is not a security arrangement that can be executed quickly. The success and, indeed, the value of the initiative rests largely on the incremental process by which it must be implemented. Each phase of implementation provides benefits at the operational and tactical levels, which would be minimized if execution of the arrangement were accelerated. More important than this, however, each phase of implementation is vital to building confidence in the areas where strategic acceptability assessments are difficult—China, ASEAN, and Japan. As the initiative develops to maturity through the confidence building crawl-walk-run execution process, there will be a commensurate decline in political cost and/or resistance to deployment integration. The bottom line is that political cost declines as the cultural and philosophical shift toward security pluralism gains momentum in the region.

CRAWL: Confidence Building 1-3 Years:

1. Discussion. The analysis in Chapter 3 (Japan: The Constitutional Dilemma) revealed that in view of the dramatic changes which have recently occurred in Japanese security policy, it is now conceivable that changes could be made to the policy which prohibits foreign exchange personnel from deploying with U.S. military units to Japan. The incremental dilution of Article 9 is already underway. By making provision for RAAF pilots to forward deploy with Marine F/A-18 squadrons the government of Japan would be taking a logical and benign step toward normalizing its security policy. The experience gained by RAAF pilots from this experience would be vital to the future integration of Australian squadrons into the Pacific Theater of operation. More important for the Marines at MAG-31, it would relieve pressure on aircrew manning.

Recommendation. Recommend that U.S. officials initiate discussions with the government of Japan regarding a status of forces agreement (SOFA) that would allow RAAF exchange personnel to deploy with Marine F/A-18 squadrons to MCAS Iwakuni. This could be under the
auspices of the existing Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation. Alternatively, arrangements could be made through the UN Command (Rear) located at Camp Zama. One of the UN Command responsibilities is to ensure that provisions of UN SOFA’s can be carried out—namely, free access to designated UN bases in Japan by forces from countries that are part of that UN Command. Australia is one of the nations that falls under the UN SOFA. If the need for Australian exchange personnel to deploy with U.S. forces was explained to Japanese authorities—tied to a situation involving the UN SOFA—this would allow those authorities a “legal” way of approving the arrangement (Peyton 1999). The important point to be made is that there are a variety of options to pursue in overcoming this issue, none of which is possible until the U.S. initiates appropriate action.

2. Discussion. In Chapter 3, deployment integration was discussed relative to experimentation at the MCWL. The Coalition Warrior experimentation is scheduled to begin in 2001 and culminate in 2003 with a major joint and combined advanced warfighting experiment. The purpose of Coalition Warrior is to determine the implications of OMFTS and STOM for forces participating in multi-nation amphibious operations. A key variable in multi-nation operations is the degree to which allied forces interoperate. Most frequently, interoperability is understood in a rather narrow sense, but the aim of Coalition Warrior is to explore intellectual-based enhancements, and technical and procedural enhancements to achieving greater interoperability. This will be done in the context of future operational concepts and anticipated capabilities in the 2010-2015 time frame (Coalition Warrior Advance Sheet 1999). By introducing the concept of USMC-RAAF deployment integration with a common JSF variant, and aligning this arrangement with the Australian Army’s concept of MOLE, a new dimension could be added to the Coalition Warrior experimentation.

Recommendation: Because this study does not cover the details of interoperability—such as what the command and control arrangements might be for a USMC-RAAF integrated arrangement at MAG-12—there would be value in experimenting with the concept. Moreover, if experimentation
involves combined and joint scenarios with ADF units in the Pacific Theater, then the advantages of a common USMC-RAAF JSF weapons platform could be more adequately assessed. Therefore, it is recommended that the MCWL Wargaming Division examine whether these concepts can be "wargamed" into scenarios being developed for the upcoming *Coalition Warrior* Advanced Warfighting Experiment.

3. **Discussion.** The RAAF conducts an enlisted exchange program with the UK's Royal Air Force and the Royal New Zealand Air Force. The value of this annual, four-month exchange is limited because these services do not operate a common weapons system. Recognizing the value that could come from an enlisted exchange with another F/A-18 squadron, a trial cross-training arrangement was carried out between USMC and RAAF squadrons during Exercise SOUTHERN FRONTIER in 1998. Based on the success of the trial arrangement a draft *USMC-RAAF Cross-Training Agreement* was drawn up and forwarded to the Chief of Operations, Air Force Headquarters, for review and implementation into the SOUTHERN FRONTIER Memorandum of Understanding (see Appendix B and C). Efforts to formalize the agreement stalled when key personnel that were familiar with the cross-training initiative were reassigned.

**Recommendation.** Recommend that a formal noncommissioned officer (NCO) technical exchange agreement be established as a confidence building measure between USMC and RAAF F/A-18 maintenance organizations. It is suggested that the U.S. Marine Corps initiate a formal agreement modeled after the example provided at Appendix B, or expand the existing Memorandum of Understanding that governs the current F/A-18 pilot and aviation maintenance officer exchange. As a cost saving measure, it is recommended that the NCO technical exchange be limited to a four-month period, similar to the RAAF's current arrangement with the UK and New Zealand. To better facilitate future RAAF operations at MCAS Iwakuni, it is recommended that the NCO exchange be conducted with an F/A-18 squadron from MAG-12.
4. Discussion. The F/A-18 Maintenance Instruction Manuals used by the RAAF are the same as those used by the Marines; however, through the use of RAAF Supplements maintenance technicians are able to effect a higher level of repair at the squadron. Marines, on the other hand, endure long lead times and excessive repair costs on many of the same component and aircraft structural repairs because they are left to rely on manufacturer or a depot level maintenance facilities.

Recommendation. A technical information exchange agreement is recommended as a confidence building measure between USMC and RAAF F/A-18 maintenance organizations. Each service’s best maintenance practices are contained in RAAF Supplements and Hornet-related USMC “Beneficial Suggestions” that are submitted from Marines in the fleet. Mutual access to the unique maintenance practices and repair procedures employed by each service would reduce maintenance man-hours, shorten repair turnaround time, and decrease O&M expenditures.

WALK: Confidence Building 4-8 Years

1. Discussion. There are three air bases in Japan that UN Command member countries can use for UN Command sanctioned activity. UN Command member countries are Japan; the U.S.; the UK; Australia; Italy; France; Canada; New Zealand; the Philippines; Thailand; South Africa and; Turkey. The three air bases are Yakota Air Force Base, Kadena Air Force Base, and Marine Corps Air Station Futenma. Australia operates C-130, P-3, and KB-707 aircraft through these bases regularly for UN Command-related familiarization training (McDermott 2000). Under a similar arrangement it is conceivable that there could also be limited RAAF F/A-18 activity, provided such activity was linked back to the UN Command. Limited activity could be conducted out of Kadena Air Base where Marine F/A-18s often exercise with USAF F-15Cs from the 18th Fighter Wing. Also, the anticipated closure of MCAS Futenma raises the prospect that MCAS Iwakuni could become designated as a replacement base for UN Command activity.

In Chapter 3 (FPDA and the Tactical Fighter Group) there was a discussion regarding No. 3 Squadron’s participation in Exercise COPE THUNDER 1998. The No. 3 Squadron Commanding
Officer recommended that TFG should consider participation in a COPE THUNDER-type exercise every two years. In doing so, he suggested that twelve aircraft be deployed for six weeks, with an arrangement to rotate the aircrew and maintenance personnel at mid-point in the exercise in order to maximize the training value (CT Lesson Learned 1999). It is important to point out that MAG-12’s SOUTHERN FRONTIER exercise at RAAF Base Tindal and the COPE THUNDER exercise series in Alaska generally overlap to some degree.

**Recommendation No.1.** Recommend that U.S. officials coordinate an arrangement between Australia and the government of Japan that would permit RAAF F/A-18s to conduct limited, low intensity operations from a U.S. military base in Japan. To legitimize the activity and create further incentive for the Australians, it should be arranged to coincide with a U.S.-sponsored COPE THUNDER exercise in Alaska. Authority to conduct limited activity out of MCAS Iwakuni would be ideal; however, if this is deemed unacceptable, then it is recommended that the activity be conducted from Kadena Air Base where it can be linked to some form of UN activity. Conducting this activity in conjunction with a transit to or from Alaska would be a significant confidence building measure that would signal increased cooperation between Japan and Australia. The objective would be to repeat the process annually, with the aim to increase the level of RAAF F/A-18 activity incrementally each year.

**Recommendation No.2.** In order to facilitate future RAAF Hornet operations out of MCAS Iwakuni (assuming operations were still limited to UN-sanctioned activity), recommend that U.S. officials negotiate with the government of Japan to designate MCAS Iwakuni as a UN Command Base, replacing MCAS Futenma, which is scheduled for closure.

2. **Discussion.** Exercise GOLD EAGLE is a functioning bilateral Infantry Company Reciprocal Unit Exchange between elements of the 3D Marines out of Hawaii and 3rd Brigade in Queensland. GOLD EAGLE 2000, scheduled for execution during June and July, will be the sixth unit exchange to occur between the two services. The GOLD EAGLE 2000 Initiating Directive
provides relevant information that sets a precedent for the Reciprocal Unit Exchange. For example, the furnishing of mutual logistics support is accomplished in accordance with the *U.S.-Australia Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement*, dated 4 December 1998. The *Australia-U.S. Handbook for Arranging Mutual Logistics Support During Combined Operations and Exercise* is used to interpret and explain official policy regarding mutual logistics support provisioning. The following logistics support is generally provided on a reciprocal basis: transportation, rations, accommodations, consumables, and medical care. For GOLD EAGLE 2000, training ammunition is to be provided on a reciprocal basis (GE Initiating Directive 2000).

With the GOLD EAGLE unit exchange in mind, recall MAG-12’s unilateral SOUTHERN FRONTIER exercise, which is typically conducted during a three-month period from June/July to August/September. Fiscal records from the 1999 SOUTHERN FRONTIER exercise reflected nearly $300,000 in O&M expense for the services and the use of facilities at RAAF Base Tindal. Included in this cost was logistic support provisioning similar to that outlined above—accommodation, rations, and transportation. Facilities expense included electricity and use of the weapons range (Oxendine 2000). Under a Reciprocal Unit Exchange arrangement with the RAAF it is likely that this O&M expense could be zeroed out.

**Recommendation.** After Australian F/A-18s have established a suitable level of operational activity in Japan, it is recommended that SOUTHERN FRONTIER be transitioned into a Reciprocal Unit Exchange between elements of MAG-12 and the TFG. It is suggested that the F/A-18 unit exchange progressively build from a two to four-week exchange to a more elaborate and robust exchange that covers the entire three-month period during which a SOUTHERN FRONTIER Exercise would typically run. In essence, it would be on the basis of this three-month unit exchange that a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability would be established.
RUN: Integrated Deployment Capability (9-JSF Years)

1. **Discussion.** The intent of a robust and functioning three-month unit exchange is that it provides the necessary foundation for transition into a six-month integrated deployment capability. This F/A-18 squadron back-fill capability at MCAS Iwakuni would have enormous value in the event of a contingency situation requiring the deployment of Marine F/A-18 squadrons to other regions of the world. During peacetime the integration arrangement could be carried out under the auspices of a unit exchange—a cooperative security arrangement if you will. The caveat is that the arrangement, while providing a valuable training opportunity for the Australians, should still be carried out with the understanding and intent that it is a real-world operational activity with Australia supporting the United States in the defense of Japan and the Korean Peninsula. That said, the following points are offered in defense of the proposed arrangement:

   a) The arrangement provides U.S. commanders with maximum firepower on the ramp at Iwakuni during periods that would otherwise be compromised by the absence of an F/A-18 squadron deployed to SOUTHERN FRONTIER.

   b) If hostilities break out on the Korean Peninsula during the period in which MAG-12 is deployed to Tindal, RAAF KB707 refuel tankers and C-130s can be mobilized on short notice to ferry Marine F/A-18s into Iwakuni. The bottom line is that the unit exchange arrangement provides greater opportunity for coordinated airlift during contingency situations. With precious few airlift assets available in theater, the addition of Australian capability expands the range of transportation options available to U.S. commanders.

   c) An F/A-18 unit exchange which transitions into an integrated deployment capability must be looked at in terms of its value as a force multiplier. A RAAF integrated deployment capability is the safety net when Marine F/A-18 squadrons are spread thin around the globe and the WESTPAC deployment schedule can no longer be met. Some might argue that safety net is the mission and purpose of the Marine F/A-18 Reserve component. That may, indeed, be the case, but it
is a very parochial view. The fact that USMC F/A-18 reserve squadrons may be capable of assuming the forward deployed role in Iwakuni does nothing for improving interoperability with allied forces; it does nothing to encourage responsibility sharing on the part of allies; it does nothing to help shape allied defense capabilities and; it contributes little in the effort to expand the overall military readiness and flexibility that is required should the need to "defeat adversaries in two distant, overlapping major theater wars" arise (NMS 1997, 12-15).

d) While there are those that might argue against the need to develop a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability, it is interesting to point out that a recent study was conducted to examine the feasibility of integrating Reserve F/A-18 squadrons into the Iwakuni UDP schedule. Shortly after becoming Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Jones tasked the 4th Marine Aircraft Wing to conduct the study. Although no official documentation could be obtained as to the purpose of this study, officials at Headquarters Marine Corps did say that it was, in part, driven by the interest in bringing some operational relief to the Active component F/A-18 squadrons. Notwithstanding the outcome of that study, the mere fact it occurred validates the basis of this thesis.

Recommendation: It is recommended that diplomatic and military efforts be directed to developing an Iwakuni-based USMC-RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability. The intent should be for this capability to be implemented when international circumstances demand it. A possible trigger might be when the demand on Marine squadrons is such that it significantly disrupts the WESTPAC UDP schedule.

2. Discussion. The tactical analysis in Chapter 4 included a discussion of ADAC and possibilities for collaborative effort between the USMC and RAAF in development of a JSF variant that can replace the F/A-18. While there is much uncertainty in the future, the one thing that should remain constant is the U.S-Australia defense partnership at the strategic level and the USMC-ADF defense partnership at the operational and tactical level. As President Clinton said in his address to Parliament in November 1996, "... our alliance is not just for this time, it is for all time." If that is
in fact the case, then, a USMC and RAAF integrated deployment capability should be considered within the framework of a long-term initiative that starts now. Following this logic, and based on the possibility that finite resources in Canberra could force defense planners down the path of a niche capability for the F-111 and F/A-18—a niche capability that is oriented toward an integrated ADF—then the opportunity for collaboration with the Marine Corps seems feasible.

**Recommendation:** It is recommended that the appropriate USMC officials contact Mr. Martin Ischinger, the International Program Manager, Pacific Armament Cooperation Directorate. In doing so, the suggestion is that questions be raised as to opportunities for collaborative effort in the development of a JSF variant that is suitable for both the U.S. Marine Corps and the ADF. Mr. Ischinger is the U.S. point of contact for all issues related to the ADAC.

**Concluding Thoughts**

Early in Chapter 1 it was stated that the narrow research focus on Australia and the F/A-18 weapons platform should not detract from wider application of the integrated deployment concept. The value in using a narrowly focused research model to illustrate this concept was that it avoided generalizations that could easily be dismissed by the critics.

Recognizing the wider application of this concept, if defense planners in Washington and Canberra decided to pursue a USMC and RAAF F/A-18 integrated deployment capability in Japan, the initiative could very well be a catalyst for similar arrangements in the region. For example, deployment integration might be conceivable at Kunsan Air Base, South Korea or Misawa Air Base in Japan where the USAF is forward deployed with F-16Cs and F-16Ds. These USAF capabilities parallel those in Thailand’s Air Force and the Royal Singapore Air Force. Both of these Asian countries have between thirty-five and forty F-16C/Ds in their inventory—a sufficient number that allows them to be meaningful contributors to the wider Asia Pacific regional security structure without compromising their own national defense. In the case of Royal Singapore Air Force, a precedent for integration with the USAF has already been set. That country currently has a number
of its F-16s stationed at Luke Air Force Base, AZ, as well as other aircraft at Cannon Air Force Base, NM, and McConnell Air Force Base, KS. The two air forces also maintain an integrated command structure at each location (McAdams 1999, 7).

An integrated approach to security underscores the intent of deployment integration. It is about small and medium powers—Western and Asian—extending the geographic reach of their armed forces to participate as partners in maintaining regional security. While the American military will need to provide the core infrastructure and the core force structure (the bones), other nations with similar military capabilities can be called on to provide equipment and personnel (the meat) to fill out the requirement. This, after all, is what security pluralism and the idea of strategic communities is about—collective responsibility in areas of common security interest. Deployment integration, in full maturity, would allow the United States to decrease military forces in a region without reducing American commitment to the region!
APPENDIX A

LITERATURE REVIEW

Introduction

The literature review introduces the reader to key sources of information that were used in developing the basis for research, analysis, conclusions, and recommendations in this thesis. The quality of analysis and the attitude in which the reader accepts the conclusions and recommendations derived from it is largely dependent on the credibility and currency of referenced literature and other sources of information. Therefore, the intent of this literature review is to instill confidence as to the veracity of the author’s information and analysis, which ultimately should give greater credibility to the conclusions and recommendations advanced.

As noted in Chapter 1, three subordinate questions delineate the project into strategic, operational, and tactical level research. The literature review is outlined accordingly. Minor references are not discussed in this literature review.

Strategic Level Sources

Knowledge of the Asia Pacific region’s strategic setting is central to the analysis of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron deployment integration. In fact, it is largely based on the strategic setting that U.S. and Australian national security strategy and national military strategy is derived. That said, to accurately capture the U.S. strategic perspective there are three set piece documents that were cited throughout this thesis: (1) the President’s national security strategy document published in December 1999--A National Security Strategy for a New Century; (2) the Defense Secretary’s Asia Pacific strategy document published in November 1998--The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region; and (3) the national military strategy document for which the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is responsible--Shape, Respond, Prepare Now--A Military Strategy for a New Era, last published in 1997. To accurately capture Australia’s strategic perspective there were two set piece documents cited throughout this thesis: (1) the Department of Foreign Affairs and
Trade 1997 White Paper—*In the National Interest* and (2) the Coalition government’s strategic review released in December 1997—*Australia’s Strategic Policy*.

Another key resource cited throughout this thesis was the published information generated from the AUSMIN talks that were held in 1996, 1998, and 1999. These particular meetings between the U.S. Secretary of State and U.S. Secretary of Defense and their Australian counterparts produced significant outcomes that fit solidly within the framework of this study. Likewise, published remarks by the U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Cohen, and Australian Defense Ministers Ian McLachlan (1996-1998) and John Moore (1998-present) were frequently cited for authoritative value.

Admiral Dennis Blair, Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command was cited throughout the strategic analysis and in the concluding chapter. The position that he holds and the audience to which he addressed his remarks made him a particularly credible source. His testimony to the House Armed Services Committee on 3 March 1999, and his fiscal year 2001 posture statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 7 March 2000 were significant in terms of this study. Admiral Blair’s speech delivered at Singapore’s Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies in May 1999 was cited because his discussion of collective responsibilities for security in the Asia Pacific region fit squarely in the context of the theories espoused in deployment integration. Another valuable source was a Defense Weekly Interview with Admiral Blair that was published in the 22 December 1999 issue of *Jane’s*. The information that was cited in this piece corroborated the author’s December 1999 interview with Rear Admiral Pickavance, Director for Operations, U.S. Pacific Command.

During a visit to PACOM in December 1999, the author had discussions with key personnel in the Operations Directorate and Strategic Planning and Policy Directorate. At this time numerous unclassified documents were obtained, thus providing another valuable source of information. Some of the CINCPAC documents cited in the strategic analysis included the 1999 PACOM Mission Brief,
a 1999 PACOM information paper on the military-to-military relationship with Australia, and a 1999 PACOM information paper on TEAM CHALLENGE.

Two books that featured significantly in the strategic analysis were Peace Building in the Asia Pacific Region (1996), edited by Peter King and Yoichi Kibata, and Australia's Security in the 21st Century (1998), edited by Dr. J. Mohan Malik. Peter King is Professor of Australian Studies at the University of Tokyo. Among the authors most frequently cited in his book were Professor Robyn Lim, Faculty of Law at Hiroshima Shudo University and Professor Yoshinobu Yamamoto from the Department of International Relations at the University of Tokyo. Dr. Malik is the Senior Lecturer and Director of the Defense Studies Program at Deakin University in Australia. His book, the most widely referenced non-government source throughout this thesis, discusses changes in Australia's defense strategy, alliance relationships, advantages and disadvantages of the nation's expanding ties with the Asia Pacific region, and alternative security strategies available to Australian defense planners. The contributing editors most frequently cited in the strategic analysis were Dr. Malik and Dr. Thomas-Durell Young, a Research Professor at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College.


Due to the dynamic nature of the Asia Pacific region and the need for currency, there was a greater reliance on major newspapers, magazines, professional journals, periodicals, and the Internet. More so than books, these types of sources were cited throughout the work. Among the newspapers most often cited were recent articles printed in The Washington Times and The Washington Post.
Other key sources for information regarding Japan and East Asian affairs came from articles printed in the *Economist* and *Far Eastern Economic Review*

Among the professional defense journals frequently cited throughout this work were the following: (1) *The Asian Defence Journal*, published monthly out of Kuala Pumur, Malaysia. The publication is a recognized professional journal available to and used by senior government officials, senior military staff officers, and those involved in policy making. Its stated objective is to enhance awareness of the latest developments in defense technology, military strategy, and geopolitics. (2) *The Asia-Pacific Defence Reporter*, published monthly in Australia. Cited most frequently was the editorial and region section that focuses on the latest strategic developments in the Asia Pacific. (3) Published in the UK and specializing in global defense news and analysis, *Jane's Defence Weekly*, was cited for articles that appeared in its Asia Pacific section.

World News Insights, Inc., which analyzes and predicts trends in world affairs, was cited numerous times; primarily in the conclusion where the most current information was required. In January 2000, stratfor.com was spun out as an independent company of World News Insights, Inc. The stratfor.com web site is editorially independent of the original consulting firm, Stratfor Inc., which furnishes private clients with business intelligence. The web site is advertised as taking the best practices of intelligence analysis, combining it with the rigors of journalism--accuracy, speed, and truthfulness--and delivering knowledge about major global events to anyone on the web. The information accessed from stratfor.com was from the web site's Asia homepage where regional intelligence updates and archived information is provided.

**Operational Level Sources**

The two set piece documents referenced throughout the operational analysis were the *National Military Strategy* and *Australia's Strategic Policy*. These documents, more than any other, transcend the concept of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 squadron deployment integration through the national defense strategies that are espoused. That said, the operational level analysis first centered
on the issue of downsizing in the U.S. military and the corresponding increase in operational tasking that has occurred since the end of the Cold War. The House Armed Services Committee’s June 1997 Report of the Committee on National Security was cited as the primary source for outlining readiness issues. Information obtained from a MARFORPAC web site detailing past USMC operations was used to corroborate evidence presented in the House report with circumstances in the Marine F/A18 community. Telephone interviews were also conducted with F/A-18 maintenance officers at MCAS Beaufort and MCAS Miramar in December 1999 and February 2000 to further corroborate the House report published in 1997 with the current USMC operational setting.

USMC interest in deployment integration was surmised on the basis of articles written by former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Charles C. Krulak, and the former Deputy Chief of Staff for Plans, Policies and Operations, Lieutenant General Martin R. Steele. General Krulak’s article was published in the Autumn 1996 issue of National Security Studies Quarterly and General Steele’s appeared in the Winter 1999 issue of Naval War College Review. The opinions expressed in these articles and the discussion regarding work that is being undertaken by the MCWL fits squarely with the concept of deployment integration and shared responsibility for common security interests.

On a visit to Headquarters Marine Corps during January 2000, the author obtained several unclassified documents related to ongoing USMC engagement initiatives with the ADF. Among the documents referenced in the operational analysis were information papers on USMC training plans for Northern Australia and MEU sustainment training in Northern Australia.

With regard to the operational analysis of Australian defense policy and the ADF, there were several references attributed to the works of Dr. David Lee and Dr. Stewart Woodman—contributing authors to Dr. Malik’s book, Australia’s Security in the 21st Century. Dr. Lee is a Senior Research Officer in the Historical Documents Branch of the Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade and Dr. Woodman is the Director of Graduate Studies at the Strategic and Defense Studies Center, Australian National University, Canberra.
In terms of experience and position, a vital source in the operational analysis was Wing Commander Geoff Brown (ret). While a student at the RAAF Staff College in 1995, he wrote an essay entitled, *The Five Power Defense Arrangements--The Need For Change*. As an F/A-18 pilot, the perspective from which Wing Commander Brown wrote was uniquely aligned with the focus of this thesis. The historical background and operator perspective he provided with regard to the genesis of the FPDA, the IADS, and the ADEX as each relates to the Tactical Fighter Group was invaluable. Shortcomings of the FPDA exercises, which appeared in his 1995 essay, were later tempered with another perspective offered in a December 1999 telephone interview with the author. After nearly three years as the Commanding Officer of No. 3 Squadron, Wing Commander Brown was an authoritative voice on FPDA exercise improvements. During command his squadron had also participated in a major U.S.-sponsored exercise--COPE THUNDER 1998. Again, he was cited as an unbiased and authoritative voice on the operational value of U.S.-Australian exercises.

Other key sources cited in the operational analysis, particularly with regard to the discussion of FPDA and the TFG, were Squadron Leader Steve Roberton and Major Robert Rhuinhorst. As an F/A-18 exchange pilot, Squadron Leader Roberton was assigned to MAG-31 at MCAS Beaufort from June 1996 - May 1998. While assigned to MAG-31 he divided his time between two units. Early in the tour he was the pilot training officer for VMFA-115, and later he served in the same capacity for VMFA-122. As the pilot training officer he was responsible to train squadron aircrew for the demands of a WESTPAC unit deployment. Since returning to Australia, Squadron Leader Roberton has been a Flight Commander at No. 3 Squadron, RAAF Base Williamtown. As a Flight Commander he has shared responsibility for development of the squadron training schedule and has had individual responsibility for the planning and execution of numerous squadron deployments, to include FPDA exercises. Major Rhuinhorst was the USMC F/A-18 exchange officer assigned to No. 75 Squadron at RAAF Base Tindal from November 1997 - November 1999. Having been on several WESTPAC deployments himself and after serving with the RAAF, he was a uniquely qualified
source on the subject USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration. As a Flight Commander at No. 75 Squadron he had responsibilities similar to those described for Squadron Leader Roberton. Post exercise reports and introductory comments from the compilation of COPE THUNDER Lessons Learned were also cited in the operational analysis. Again, the weight that should be given to information in these sources and their relevance to the thesis is significant.

The primary source for the operational level analysis relating to financial considerations was Joint Pub 3-07.1—Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense. Cited here was the Commander’s legal considerations outlined in Appendix A of the Joint Pub.

**Tactical Level Sources**

A significant aspect of the tactical analysis had its genesis in an interview with the Deputy Commander of MARFORPAC, Major General Robert Magnus, on 28 December 1999. Major General Magnus emphasized the importance of allied capabilities in today’s environment of coalition warfare. He intimated that unless RAAF Hornets were able to participate in the full spectrum of operations required for Pacific Theater war plans, it is unlikely that U.S. defense officials would give the concept of USMC and RAAF F/A-18 deployment integration serious consideration. Consequently, the tactical level analysis began with discussion of the simultaneous USMC and RAAF F/A-18A modification programs. The principal source of information regarding the USMC upgrade was a MARFORPAC ECP-583 information brief. The principal source of information regarding the RAAF’s HUG project was DOD’s Defense Acquisition Organization web site.

Included in the tactical analysis was a discussion of deployment integration beyond the F/A-18 and how the JSF and ADAC may fit into the equation. ADAC derived from the 1998 AUSMIN talks as a solution for keeping Australia and the ADF on par with U.S. military capabilities. Given that deployment integration is a long-term endeavor that extends beyond the F/A-18, a linkage evolves with ADAC, the JSF, and a RAAF niche capability. Principal sources for discussion on this subject were the following: (1) The November 1999 speech on *The Future of Air Dominance*
and Offensive Strike that was delivered by Rear Admiral C. A. Ritchie, Head Capability Systems, Australian Defense Headquarters. (3) A telephone interview with Wing Commander Mel Hupfeld, the Project Director for Air 6000. (3) The Australian Army’s second draft document, Future Land Warfare: Land Warfare Concepts 2030. (4) A paper written by Dr. Alan Stephens entitled, High Noon of Air Power. Dr. Stephens is a leading voice in championing the concept of niche capability as a solution to Australia’s constraints on defense spending. He has authored numerous books and articles on security, military history, doctrine, and air power and has lectured extensively on those subjects throughout Southeast Asia, Europe, and North America.

As the thesis narrowed to the tactical level of war there were fewer published sources to cite. Consequently, the author’s own knowledge as a Marine officer—with an occupational background in F/A-18 maintenance—became a principal source for this paper. Some operational analysis and much of the tactical analysis drew on the experience of a squadron WESTPAC deployment and later, the experience as a MALS maintenance officer tasked with supporting other Hornet squadrons as they worked to meet maintenance requirements and deployment schedules. The professional experience that was most useful in developing the tactical analysis and ultimately, the recommendations that were presented was the author’s time spent as an F/A-18 exchange officer with the RAAF. Indeed, it was from this experience as the flight line and aircraft maintenance officer at No. 3 Squadron, from June 1996 through June 1999, that the idea for USMC and RAAF F/A-18 collaboration emerged.
APPENDIX B

USMC AND RAAF CROSS-TRAINING AGREEMENT
EXERCISE SOUTHERN FRONTIER

INTRODUCTION

A trial cross-training arrangement was carried out between No. 3 Squadron and Marine Fighter Attack Squadron 122 during the final phase of Southern Frontier 1998. The intent was to assess the benefit of cross-training between the two services and determine the feasibility of permanent arrangement under the auspices of Southern Frontier. USMC and RAAF F/A-18 cross-training was carried out during the period of 25 August to 16 September, and was assessed to be highly beneficial by both services. The professional knowledge gained through exposure to another Hornet maintenance culture flowed in all directions. The Commanding Officers of each squadron, based on the favorable results, gave their enthusiastic endorsement to the concept. There were no associated costs incurred to either service.

PURPOSE

The cross-training arrangement is to be carried out between elements of 81 WING, RAAF Base Williamtown and elements of Marine Aircraft Group 12 (MAG-12), Marine Corps Air Station Iwakuni, Japan. It is designed to further develop the active relationship between RAAF and USMC technicians. The maintenance philosophy and engineering culture of the two services differ significantly. It is by exposure to these differences, at the technical level, that innovative ideas will be nurtured and practical benefit will be gained by each service.

NUMBER AND MUSTERING / OCCUPATIONAL SPECIALTY (MOS) OF PERSONNEL TO BE CROSS-TRAINED

The optimum number of maintenance personnel selected for cross-training is four (two from each unit). This is a reasonable number that enables diversity in the cross-training while having little impact on the operational capacity of the units involved. The mustering / occupational specialty chosen to cross-train should be negotiated between the units to allow for maximum flexibility in selecting suitable representatives.

SELECTION CRITERIA

Maintenance personnel selected for cross-training shall be those who are an exemplary representative of their service and have demonstrated superior capabilities. The individuals are to be well versed in the practices and doctrines of their service, and particularly qualified through experience in the specialization that they fill. RAAF representatives shall be a minimum rank of Corporal, with a Trade Supervisor qualification. Likewise, USMC representatives shall be a minimum rank of Sergeant, with a Collateral Duty Inspector qualification. Provided the on site commanders agree, there should be scope to expand the cross-training arrangement to include junior engineers and maintenance officers.
TOUR OF DUTY

The tour of duty for cross-training representatives shall be for the maximum period that each MAG-12 squadron is deployed in country. However, the period shall not exceed a time that precludes the return of USMC personnel temporarily assigned to 81 WING squadrons at RAAF Base Williamtown to their parent unit at RAAF Base Tindal by service air. To maximize advantages of the cross-training it is suggested that MAG-12 representatives be members of the squadron’s advance party. Likewise, it is suggested that 81 WING personnel selected for cross-training be on site at RAAF Base Tindal at the earliest possible date to assist the inbound MAG-12 squadron’s advance party. This tour of duty arrangement is designed to give cross-training representatives time to assimilate with their host unit and develop early on, the trust and confidence necessary for legitimate technical employment of service member skills.

MAINTENANCE AUTHORITY / TECHNICAL EMPLOYMENT

The use of electronic signatures by both services will preclude the use of cross-training representatives in a supervisory capacity and otherwise restrict their maintenance authority. However, to the maximum extent feasible, the host unit shall employ these personnel in maintenance tasks which are commensurate with the technical expertise and skill level of the individual. Personnel selected for cross-training shall be thoroughly immersed in the maintenance organization so as to give them a grass roots perspective on the maintenance practices of another service. Focus should be on identifying and discussing among peers and senior maintenance managers the perceived strengths and / or weaknesses of the unit’s maintenance processes and procedures.

ADMINISTRATION

Personnel selected to cross-train shall be administered and controlled as prescribed by the host unit. The following administrative factors apply:

A. Travel: 81 WING shall arrange transport of all personnel selected for cross-training. It is understood that the timing and / or availability of service air will largely dictate the tour of duty length. In exceptional circumstances, if transport by civilian air is required, then the payment of that cost will be negotiated between each service’s on site commander.

B. Billeting: On base accommodation shall be arranged by the host unit.

C. Subsistence: All meals shall be provided by the messing facilities on base.

D. Allowances:

1. 81 WING personnel shall receive the standard deployment allowance for RAAF Base Tindal.

2. MAG-12 personnel shall receive the standard per-diem rate for Southern Frontier personnel.

For the Royal Australian Air Force

For the United States Marine Corps
USMC / RAAF CROSS-TRAINING DETAILS

* CROSS-TRAIN PERIOD FROM 25 AUG - 16 SEP 98

* ARRANGEMENT BETWEEN 81WG ELEMENT AT RAAF BASE WILLIAMTOWN, NSW AND MAG-12 ELEMENT AT RAAF BASE TINDAL, NT

PARTICIPANTS:

SGT CHANCE STREETMAN - AVIONICS TECHNICIAN, VMFA-122

SGT TED HOUGHTON - AIRFRAMES MECHANIC, VMFA-122

CORPORAL ANDY JACOBS - ARMAMENT, 3SQN

CORPORAL AARON EMMITT - AVIONICS TECHNICIAN, 3SQN
REFERENCE LIST


*Coalition Warrior Advance Sheet: Workshop 00-1*. 1999. Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory, Quantico, VA: Wargaming Division, 6 December.


Davis, MAJ Don, USMC. 1999. Aircraft Maintenance Officer, MAG-31, MCAS Beaufort, SC. Telephone interview by author, 13 December.


Gregson, MGEN Wallace C., USMC, Director, Asia Pacific Affairs, OSD. 2000. Electronic mail to author, 18 January.


Hayes, COL C.T., USMC. 2000. Assistant Chief of Staff, Aviation Logistics Department, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Electronic mail to author, 7 January.


HQMC. Manpower Management Enlisted Assignments. 2000. Manpower and Reserve Affairs Department, Washington, DC. Telephone interview by author, 8 March.


HQMC. 2000. History and Museums Division. Washington, DC.


Kindler, AIRCDRE John, Commander, Tactical Fighter Group. 1999. Meeting with officers of No. 3 Squadron and No. 75 Squadron, RAAF Base Tindal, Australia, March.


Mahoney, MAJ Chris, USMC. 2000. Air Combat Tactics Instructor, Marine Aviation and Weapons Tactics Squadron One, MCAS Yuma, AZ. Telephone interview by author, 20 January.


Oxendine, CWO-3 David, USMC. 2000. MAG-12 Fiscal Officer, MCAS Iwakuni, Japan. Electronic mail to author, 8 May.

Peyton, COL Paul, USA. 1999. Chairman, Department of Regional Studies, Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies. Electronic mail to author, 3 December.


Roberton, SQNLDR Steven, No. 3 Squadron Flight Commander, Royal Australian Air Force. 2000. RAAF Base Williamstown, Australia. Telephone interview by author, 10 March. (Note: SQNLDR Roberton was the RAAF exchange pilot at MAG-31 from June 1996-May 1998.


166


Thumm, COL M. W., USMC. 2000. Assistant Chief of Staff, Operations, 1st Marine Aircraft Wing. Electronic mail to author, 5 January.


INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College
   250 Gibbon Ave.
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

2. Defense Technical Information Center
   8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944
   Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

3. Marine Corps Staff College
   Breckenridge Library
   MCCDC
   Quantico, VA 22134

4. Dr. Stephen Coats
   Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

5. Lieutenant Colonel Frederick W. Lickteig, USMC
   Marine Corps Detachment
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

6. Lieutenant Colonel Craig Orme, Australian Army
   Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

7. Lieutenant Colonel Kevin Richards
   Department of Joint and Multinational Operations
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

8. Lieutenant Colonel David Lemelin
   CTAC
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

9. Mr. George Fithen
   English Department
   USACGSC
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

10. Major Jonathan O. Gackle
    101 Manhattan Drive
    Kulm, ND 58456
CERTIFICATION FOR MMAS DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT

1. Certification Date: 2 June 2000

2. Thesis Author: Major Jonathan O. Gackle, USMC

3. Thesis Title: Deployment Integration of United States Marine Corps and Royal Australian
Air Force F/A-18 Squadrons: Is It a Viable Concept?

4. Thesis Committee Members
   Signatures: ____________________________  ____________________________
   ____________________________  ____________________________

5. Distribution Statement: See distribution statements A-X on reverse, then circle appropriate
   distribution statement letter code below:

   A B C D E F X  SEE EXPLANATION OF CODES ON REVERSE

If your thesis does not fit into any of the above categories or is classified, you must coordinate
with the classified section at CARL.

6. Justification: Justification is required for any distribution other than described in Distribution
Statement A. All or part of a thesis may justify distribution limitation. See limitation
justification statements 1-10 on reverse, then list, below, the statement(s) that applies (apply) to
your thesis and corresponding chapters/sections and pages. Follow sample format shown below:

   EXAMPLE

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Limitation Justification Statement</th>
<th>Chapter/Section</th>
<th>Page(s)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Direct Military Support (10)</td>
<td>Chapter 3</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical Technology (3)</td>
<td>Section 4</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative Operational Use (7)</td>
<td>Chapter 2</td>
<td>13-32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

   Fill in limitation justification for your thesis below:

   Limitation Justification Statement / Chapter/Section / Page(s)
   ___________________________________________ / ____________________________ / ____________________________
   ___________________________________________ / ____________________________ / ____________________________
   ___________________________________________ / ____________________________ / ____________________________
   ___________________________________________ / ____________________________ / ____________________________

7. MMAS Thesis Author's Signature: ____________________________
STATEMENT A: Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited. (Documents with this statement may be made available or sold to the general public and foreign nationals).

STATEMENT B: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies only (insert reason and date ON REVERSE OF THIS FORM). Currently used reasons for imposing this statement include the following:

1. **Foreign Government Information.** Protection of foreign information.

2. **Proprietary Information.** Protection of proprietary information not owned by the U.S. Government.

3. **Critical Technology.** Protection and control of critical technology including technical data with potential military application.

4. **Test and Evaluation.** Protection of test and evaluation of commercial production or military hardware.

5. **Contractor Performance Evaluation.** Protection of information involving contractor performance evaluation.

6. **Premature Dissemination.** Protection of information involving systems or hardware from premature dissemination.

7. **Administrative/Operational Use.** Protection of information restricted to official use or for administrative or operational purposes.

8. **Software Documentation.** Protection of software documentation - release only in accordance with the provisions of DoD Instruction 7930.2.

9. **Specific Authority.** Protection of information required by a specific authority.

10. **Direct Military Support.** To protect export-controlled technical data of such military significance that release for purposes other than direct support of DoD-approved activities may jeopardize a U.S. military advantage.

STATEMENT C: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors: (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT D: Distribution authorized to DoD and U.S. DoD contractors only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most reasons are 1, 3, 7, 8, and 9 above.

STATEMENT E: Distribution authorized to DoD only; (REASON AND DATE). Currently most used reasons are 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, and 10.

STATEMENT F: Further dissemination only as directed by (controlling DoD office and date), or higher DoD authority. Used when the DoD originator determines that information is subject to special dissemination limitation specified by paragraph 4-505, DoD 5200.1-R.

STATEMENT X: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and private individuals of enterprises eligible to obtain export-controlled technical data in accordance with DoD Directive 5230.25; (date). Controlling DoD office is (insert).