ABSTRACT

America on the Offense: A New Manifest Destiny by Mark F. Duffield, Major, USAF, 63 pages.

When the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and an international rush to abandon communism the stage was set for a profound change in US national security strategy. As of this writing, the basic framework of the new "post Cold War strategy" has been in place for seven years. Yet military officers remain confused and opinion is divided over its fundamental nature and intent.

This monograph explores the historical nature of offensive and defensive strategy and compares current strategy to that from the Cold War to see if a shift in its offensive versus defensive orientation has occurred. It provides a historically based evaluation of the nature of both Cold War and current national security strategy. At its core, this monograph explores the possibility that America has embarked on an undeclared—even recognized—strategic level offensive since the end of the Cold War.

Beginning with a representative overview of military theorists, the timeless characteristics of offensive and defensive strategy are distilled into a single broad set of principals. The study surmises that defensive strategy can be detected by its emphasis on denial and enforcement of the status quo while offensive strategy is a rejection of the status quo and—as Sun Tzu stated most clearly—a move to "take all under heaven intact." These principals form the criteria for a test against which both Cold War and current national security strategy are evaluated at their highest level of intent.

The study concludes that while the Cold War strategy of deterrence and containment was clearly defensive, current national security strategy has made a fundamental shift to the offensive. Compared to the Cold War, the American concept of "interests have been broadened, the "ends" pursued are now far more aggressive, and the "means" of strategy execution have been expanded. At it heart, the current National Security Strategy document outlines a clear rejection of the status quo that has set America on the path of literally changing the world.

The monograph serves as a wakeup call to military officers and planners that American strategy is now clearly on an offensive footing where the stated policy is to use military power outside of the former constraint of defending "vital interests." Such an understanding will enable military planners to better anticipate—and hence plan—future military operations.

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Introduction

When Lewis and Clark crossed into North Dakota on their mission to find the Northwest Passage, they were obliged to spend their first winter with the Mandan Indians. There they hired a young Shoshone woman named Sacajawea to serve as a guide and interpreter. In the spring, as she led the party west into its first unexplored lands it is doubtful that she understood the magnitude of change she had begun for the people and cultures encountered. At the turn of the 18th century with the American Revolution and the Louisiana Purchase a part of recent history, a young America was looking to expand its sphere of influence by opening up frontiers for trade, farming, and eventually to bring new areas under its domain. President Jefferson commissioned the expedition to counter British plans to incorporate the West and the Pacific coast into their empire. Lewis and Clark’s “Corps of Discovery” was the first step in an offensive campaign—even a near-religion—that came to be known as “manifest destiny” where non-other-than-god mandated that America “had the right and duty to expand throughout the North American continent” and change it into their image.¹

Today Sacajawea is unknowingly leading another, much broader American offensive. Mounted on the face of the new US one-dollar coin, armed with the economic might of the world’s most powerful economy, she has again set out at the forefront of the continuing mission to expand America’s sphere of influence by opening frontiers. In the same tone as America’s first flirtation with manifest destiny, she reminds those she encounters on the new pathways toward globalization, that “In God We Trust.” While most understand that America’s economic and political might is growing, have many considered that a still-young America could assume a more aggressive—even

¹
offensive—national security policy? In the wake of Lewis and Clark's mission to open trade with the natives, America concluded that the best way to develop those lands was to transform it into an image of the East Coast. Military force followed economic interests and national prerogatives and led to the eventual domination of the West and its absorption into America. Could the other instruments of national power—including military—accompany those which open the door today? Has this already begun?

At the end of WW II policy makers faced the question of how best to guard America's national security. With the rise of the military power of the Soviet Union and the emergence of the nuclear threat, America's strategy was described in phrases such as "containment," "deterrence," "massive retaliation," and "flexible response"—all seemingly defensive terms. Throughout the Cold War, the specter of yet-another world war between camps largely clustered around two nuclear superpowers, suppressed most strategies that might have sought to change the status quo. The US appears to have remained in a relatively defensive orientation at the strategic level throughout the Cold War. The defensive nature of US strategy may have led to the adoption of limited objectives in both Korea and Vietnam. In Europe, the United States was also clearly on the defensive with a NATO strategy designed and limited to maintaining the status quo and specifically prohibited from attempting to change it.²

When the Cold War ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and a nearly unanimous international rush to abandon communism, most of the previous reasons for a defensive strategy evaporated. The United States became the undisputed superpower, the nuclear threat was greatly relaxed, and with the disappearance of the bipolar world, the Soviet Union no longer existed to either corral those nations that
sought to join the west nor shelter those that would antagonize it. American victory in the Cold War set the stage for a profound change in US national security strategy from a necessarily defensive orientation toward something else, which so far carries only such a non-descriptive name as the “post Cold War strategy”. Somewhere in the early 1990’s, after a brief period of naivete similar to the first few years after WW II, the United States again realized that the world is a dangerous place. The relative stability of the Cold War had been replaced, not with universal peace and cooperation, but with an “amorphous security system that lacks the bipolar structure and ideological clarity of the Cold War.”

While some regions have settled into the pursuit of the benefits of globalized market capitalism and democracy, others have fragmented into disintegrative nationalism, ethnic conflict, religious extremism, and economic failure with global implications that can not simply be fenced off and ignored.

Despite the lack of a clear descriptive phrase of how US strategy has changed, the current published National Security Strategy (NSS) dated October 1998, is full of terms that may point to a shift that is not admitted and may even remain unrecognized. Terms such as “engagement,” “NATO expansion,” “opportunity,” “shaping,” “non-proliferation,” “international law enforcement,” and “promoting democracy,” all indicate a possible shift to a more offensive strategy in pursuit of national policy, a policy that has repeatedly redefined “interests” to include an ever-broader range of issues. An important question arises. Has the United States returned to an undeclared—perhaps even unrecognized—offensive strategy since the end of the Cold War?

History can help answer this question. Beginning with the earliest recorded history and continuing to contemporary times, writers have debated the nature of
offensive and defensive strategy. This monograph examines some of the various
definitions or descriptions of offensive and defensive strategy, distilling out the key
features that remain constant. With working definitions of both offensive and defensive
strategy, American strategy from the Cold War and today is examined to see if a shift can
be identified. The monograph explores the nature of this shift, and explores the
implications for military planners.

BASIC CONCEPTS

Before delving into the complexities of distilling the wisdom of some of the most
noted military theorists, it is important that the reader review a few basic concepts.
While it is beyond the scope or intent of this work to illuminate all of its intricacies, it is
important that the reader have a basic understanding of the levels of war. At the top of
the hierarchy comes the “strategic level of war.” The strategic level of war is the macro
level look at how to accomplish the overall political objectives. No other level of
military consideration supercedes it. At this level, when the objective is met, the military
dimension of the political policy is fulfilled. Strategy is a “means of comprehensive
control.” As a superpower with global interests, the perspective of the US at the
strategic level of war is global. Even if an issue boils down to application in only one
region, it is because the other regions have been ruled out and not because the focus was
limited to exclude those other regions. Some theorists separate the strategic level of war
into two sub levels usually based on global versus theater concerns. For the purposes of
this monograph the strategic level will not be subdivided and will remain global in its
focus. At the other end of the hierarchy is the “tactical level of war.” Here the concern is
with battles, the fire and maneuver of tactical units, and their physical employment to accomplish some end. The tactical level of war naturally has a more narrow focus in both space and time.  

The "operational level of war" occupies the middle ground between the strategic and tactical levels and is the most difficult level to understand. Depending on the theorist, it is sometimes not even present. The operational level only becomes necessary when the size, scope, or length of a conflict grows to the point where victory requires a pattern of tactical actions. This pattern may be distributed over some combination of time, space, or purpose and is designed to orchestrate numerous individual actions to support a single operational-level aim, which is itself still short of the strategic level objective. The operational level of war seeks to link the tactical actions together into a single effort that contributes to an objective set at the strategic level of war. Tactical level efforts do not achieve the strategic level objective alone no matter how well executed. However, through creative coordination and synergy at the operational level of war—operational art—the myriad of tactical actions accomplish operational level objectives that become a key component of the strategic level objective. In the absence of an operational level thought process, the numerous tactical actions have no method of systematically contributing to the strategic objective.

One useful purpose of an understanding of the levels of war is that it helps break one source of confusion between the interrelationship of offense and defense. Within a level of war, the offense/defense relationship is fairly well understood. It is generally accepted that an offensive battle (in this case the tactical level of war) will include units conducting defensive missions. And a unit that has executed even the most successful of
offensives will at some point assume a defensive posture. Thus, an overall offensive will have components that are both offensive and defensive. The same general concept works within the operational and strategic levels of war.

Less-well-understood is that this same concept occurs across the levels of war. Defensive tactical engagements may contribute to an offensive operational level objective which is itself a part of a defensive strategy or vice versa. To sum up, offensive or defensive continuity need not cross the levels of war to support the offensive or defensive intent of the next level. This is as critical to understanding the main premise of this monograph as an understanding of the levels of war.

This monograph seeks to illuminate the changing nature of America's national security strategy. The root source is a document entitled—oddly enough “National Security Strategy” (NSS). It is the American President’s document and is published on an as-needed basis, usually every one or two years. The NSS outlines the highest level program for national security and is directive as well as explanatory in nature. The NSS is American political policy reference national security.

Below the NSS comes the “National Military Strategy” (NMS)—a document published by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). The NMS is written to outline the Chairman’s advice on how the military can best implement the President’s NSS. The NMS is advisory in nature and covers a broad range of strategic level issues. The Chairman’s NMS is US military policy at the strategic level, and remains subservient to the political policy.

With a basic understanding of the levels of war and the two documents that outline strategy, it is prudent to cover the basic definitions required to understand the
main thrust of this work. First among these is a clear use of the terms “strategy” and “strategic.” These are two of the most loosely used words in governmental and military circles, the very places where the proper use of these words have the most profound meaning and hence where proper use should be most jealously enforced. The greatest confusion occurs when these words are used to describe lower level events. A typical misuse comes from a recent book on land warfare in the South Pacific in World War II. Describing the ongoing battle for Guadalcanal, a noted author, a tenured professor of military history wrote; “the completion of Henderson Field changed the strategic equation radically [emphasis added].” Proper use of the word “strategic” in this case would relate to the defeat of Axis forces or unconditional surrender of Japan. A single dirt airfield for use by a few tactical aircraft built in the fall of 1942 is clearly not at that level. What the author should have said—in fact what he goes on to describe—is a change in the “tactical” equation between Japanese and American forces related solely to their competing efforts to win the battle on Guadalcanal. \(^9\) While such criticism may seem picky, clear use of the terms “strategic” and “strategy” are essential to this work. A misunderstanding of the true meaning of these words will leave the reader confused. As they will be used here—indeed how they should always be used—the words “strategic” and “strategy” will be used to describe events and effects at the level of national security strategy, national military strategy, and the strategic level of war.

A corollary to the proper use of these words is that the strategic level of war can be dissected out from the other levels. Classifying an action clearly into a particular level of war is no small task as considerable undefined overlap occurs. This confusion is largely due to the relatively new recognition and acceptance of the operational level of
war. While it may have always existed, especially in larger conflicts, this middle level of war was not widely recognized. Indeed considerable confusion as to the characteristics that resulted in its emergence exists today even between experts.\textsuperscript{10} Even the venerable Clausewitz tended toward a two-tier description of the levels of war.

A major assumption of this work is that the concepts of theorists can be applied at the strategic level of war. This is necessary because many theorists with valuable insights wrote in the age of “classical war” where the “battle” was the “operation” and even the “strategy.”\textsuperscript{11} Before armies became more robust in size, depth, or lethality; entire wars were often decided in a single battle. The writing of theorists based on experience of classical war could meld the levels of war. The most common occurrence is collapse of the operational level between the strategic and tactical levels. With careful judgement, the applicability of lessons from one level of war can be deduced for their general applicability at other levels.

An unabridged history of mankind would be crowded with descriptions of bloody events. But later chapters—especially those covering the 1990’s would describe less-violent events like peace keeping, peace enforcement, and humanitarian assistance. While not “war” in its commonly described sense, such endeavors are certainly not “peace” either. Another major assumption of this work is that the levels of war exist even in the absence of combat. This assumption is necessary to have any meaningful discussion of events since World War II because the Cold War also this description of neither-war-nor-peace. The post Cold War environment is rife with military activity that involves little or no combat. They carry the new identification of “Military Operations Other Than War.” These non-combat tactical level events are linked to an American
strategic aim through operational planning. Therefore, even in the absence of combat, it is still valuable to fit such activities into the paradigm of the three levels of war.

**The Theory of Offensive and Defensive Strategy**

**SUN TZU ON STRATEGY**

Written in about the fourth century BC, Sun Tzu's *The Art of War* captures a depth of understanding that transcends time, culture, and profound technological change. War in Sun Tzu's day was usually indecisive due to the limitations of seasonal combat, inexperienced "sovereign" leadership, and unsuitable operational planning. Sun Tzu sought to change this by introducing a comprehensive operational planning methodology, which he backed up with an equally comprehensive tactical doctrine. These reveal elements of both operational and tactical thinking. Sun Tzu was the first to recognize war as the ultimate act of statecraft as opposed to the seasonal pastime of lords. His overarching thesis—that all battles are won or lost before they are fought—promoted operational planning, not battle, as the determinant of victory.

Sun Tzu devotes an entire chapter to the concept of offensive operational planning—which in translation was named "offensive strategy". The fundamental concept is to use battle as a last resort to other measures, and then only if needed.

Thus, those skilled in war subdue the enemy's army without battle. They capture his cities without assaulting them and overthrow his state without protracted operations...Your aim must be to take All-under-Heaven intact. Thus your troops are not worn out and your gains will be complete. This is the art of offensive [operational planning].

To execute this operational goal of taking the enemy intact and with minimal use of battle, Sun Tzu created a hierarchy of efforts. "Thus, what is of supreme importance in
war is to attack the enemy’s [operational plan]... The next best is to disrupt his alliances... The next best is to attack his army... The worst policy is to attack cities. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.”

Sun Tzu does not fully illuminate a concept of three levels of war, but throughout his chapters there exist elements of strategic thought that round out his clear consideration of the operational and tactical levels. The passages above are a mixture of strategic level (decisions to go to war and alliances), operational level thought (campaigns), and tactical battles. Sun Tzu’s emphasis is clearly on the operational level of war. The enemy’s operational plan is attacked through use of intelligence (spies), disinformation campaigns, and fifth columns that weaken him at home and among his allies. When combat must be used, speed is the most important factor in success. Several passages refer to the risks of hard fought battles and extended campaigns. In Sun Tzu’s thinking, battles cause casualties and expend state treasure. They not only weaken your army, they reduce the value of the conquest and expose the state to new enemies.

Sun Tzu’s concept of the defense can be deduced from his offensive theory, notably his chapter on “Dispositions.” “Anciently the skillful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy’s moment of vulnerability.” And since “Invincibility lies in the defense; the possibility of victory in the attack” Sun Tzu reveals his meaning of “invincibility” as a level of strength which precludes defeat, but a level not necessarily strong enough to bring victory. Sun Tzu saw the defense as a preparation for a transition to the offense. When inferior in strength—which Sun Tzu recognized as related to more than numbers—avoidance of decisive battle in favor of protracted operations is the only course to victory. Citing an example of a weaker opponent facing
a stronger aggressor, Sun Tzu advises “keep him under pressure and wear him down...nothing is better than to protract things and keep him at a distance...Now if you reject this victorious strategy and decide instead to risk all on one battle, it will be too late for regrets.”

He goes to describe the pursuit of new alliances with “powerful leaders” and what could only be described “forward defense” as additional strategic level defensive tools.

The distillation of Sun Tzu’s offensive and defensive strategy concern time and the judicious use of power and national wealth. Both offensive and defensive strategy employ moves to foil the enemy’s operational plan and weaken his alliances; it is a competition to maximize power through diplomatic and informational means.

THUCYDIDES ON STRATEGY

Important lessons on strategy, the effects of war on society, and on the nature of alliances can be pulled from the pages of Thucydides’ military classic. The cause of the Peloponnesian War was rooted in the competition between Athens and Sparta for economic supremacy in Hellas. Athens—seeking to increase her power—was following an expansionist, empire-building policy to ensure advantages in trade and markets. Sparta—the more cautious state—went to war to check the further spread of Athenian influence over the Hellenic city-states.

Thucydides’ lessons on offensive and defensive strategy are clear. Until the war between Athens and Sparta broke out, the normal offensive(defensive stances were reversed. Athens, the expansionist power, was on the offensive while Sparta assumed a more passive defensive strategy. Sparta, endangered by Athens’ growing hegemony struck out to change the status quo. Their means included land invasion seeking a quick
decisive battle of annihilation against Athens’ smaller army. With the strategic heart—the city of Athens—vulnerable, Sparta would control formation of a new status quo. Thucydides may have been the first writer to recognize the superior strength of defensive strategy. The operational plan employed by Athens, until fatally compromised, was one of forced protraction and denial of the strategic heart. The means of execution included the husbanding of their own resources, avoidance of decisive battle (due to relative weakness on land), and opportune raids to divert enemy resources. The significant lesson for strategy relates to how the opponents view the status quo. Those who take decisive moves to change the status quo are executing offensive strategy, while those who force protraction and deny change are on the strategic defensive. This will prove to be a recurring theme.

CLAUSEWITZ ON STRATEGY

Although never finished to the author’s satisfaction the well-studied military classic “On War” by Prussian General Carl Von Clausewitz gives valuable insight on the nature of strategy. Clausewitz starts his discussion at the operational level—defining war and solidifying its link to strategy. War is the “continuation of policy by other means” and “an act of force to compel our enemy to do our will.” The political objective—“to impose our will” drives the military aim—“to render the enemy powerless.”

Clausewitz’s means of accomplishing this aim is the destruction of the enemy’s army. Unlike Sun Tzu, Clausewitz found no theoretical limit to which violence could escalate in the new “total war.” He concludes that total strength is equal to the sum of total means plus strength of will. A strong believer in the interrelation of offense and defense, it is still possible to separate his ideas on the two. A careful study of book six
(Defense), and book seven (Attack), combined with his more generalized strategic views from other books—notably book one (On the Nature of War) and book three (On Strategy in General)—bring out certain key concepts.26

Unlike most other theorists, Clausewitz did not hold the defense in contempt. He refutes his unnamed contemporaries who saw “a battle accepted...as already half lost.”27 Indeed he found compelling reasons for use of a defensive strategy. In A Guide to Reading ‘On War’ Bernard Brodie explains the controversy of Clausewitz’s classification of the defense as the “stronger form of war” as largely a difference on the level of war he and his opponents were considering. “[M]ost of the advantages he attributes to the defense tend to be strategic [emphasis added] rather than tactical.”28 To Clausewitz the objective of a defensive strategy is to “maintain the status quo,” that is to “preserve” what already exists. It is a negative object that “should only be used so long as weakness compels and be abandoned as soon as we are strong enough to pursue a positive object.”29 Another key aspect of defensive strategy is “denying possession of something that the assailant would normally be content to have without war.”30 In other words, defensive strategy involves threatening war to raise the cost calculation of the enemy to a level above that he is willing to pay. A third characteristic of Clausewitz’s defensive strategy is lack of initiative. He leads off the entire book on defense by asking and answering two questions. “What is the concept of the defense? The parrying of a blow. What is its characteristic feature? Awaiting the blow.”31 While this sounds simplistic, it lays the groundwork for his detailed discussion in chapter three of the book on defense, where “initiative” is identified as a major difference between offense and defense at tactical and strategic levels. “Tactical initiative can rarely be expanded into a major
victory, but a strategic one has often brought the whole war to an end.” Hence, initiative is a defining characteristic of the offensive at the strategic level—even more so than at the tactical level. Although Clausewitz sees the defense as a temporary expedient caused by lack of relative strength, he still developed a sophisticated theory of defense that can be used to pursue policy.

Clausewitz saw the offense and defense as inextricably linked. “Where two ideas form a true logical antithesis, each complementary to the other, then fundamentally each is implied in the other.” Clausewitz stated that offensive strategy comprises non-acceptance of the status quo vice acceptance, conquest of something vice denial, and a dependence on initiative vice waiting. But Clausewitz does not stop there. He goes on to state some non-mirrored characteristics of the offense. Where a successful defense plans for an offensive counterattack at the earliest opportunity, the opposite is not true. An offense only sequels to a defense stance when forced to. Hence the offense is an integral part of defense, but the reverse is not true in that the objective of an offensive can be accomplished without use of the defensive.

To sum up the lessons of On War for strategy, the strategic defense is fundamentally a preservation of the status quo. The offensive is everything the defensive is not—an initiative oriented change of the status quo—tempered by a cost/benefit calculation. In his day and his environment of Prussian warfare at the turn of the 18th century, the army stood as the guardian of the status quo and the obstacle to victory. Naturally, Clausewitz’s strategic level thought translated quickly into operational and tactical approaches designed to destroy that obstacle. But as he recognizes, “the destruction of his fighting forces [is only] the means” and not a fundamental part of his
overall theory on offense and defense.\textsuperscript{35} Hence destruction of forces can be excluded as a defining characteristic of either offensive or defensive strategy.

**CORBETT ON STRATEGY**

An avid student of Clausewitz and Jomini, Julian S. Corbett extrapolated their land-centric theories—especially Clausewitz’s beginning look at limited warfare—into a comprehensive explanation for a small island nation’s rise to prominence. Never narrow in his approach, Corbett combined politics, economics, and joint operations into a comprehensive theory of maritime control and forced limited warfare where “command of the sea” translated into victory on land.\textsuperscript{36} Corbett’s concept of the offensive hinged first on the selection of a positive objective. The naval approach in turn hinged on the need to control lines of communication through “command of the sea.” Corbett recognized all naval operations as worthless unless they resulted in some affect on land. Hence he advocated joint operational planning where the maritime contribution included commerce control, defense of the strategic heart (forced limited warfare), use of the sea as an avenue of approach for land forces, and the isolation of a selected land theater (such as a colonial possession) against reinforcement to ensure a local superiority. Equally important with the methods of pursuing the offensive is the spirit to use superior strength.\textsuperscript{37} Hence Corbett’s offensive strategy rests on control of events on land and can only be judged at the operational level in terms of its contribution to an overall joint strategy.

In a similar vein to both Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, Corbett saw defensive strategy as the necessary evil to be adopted by the weaker opponent.\textsuperscript{38} However, the methods of employment are curiously offensive looking. The weaker fleet, at risk of annihilation in a
decisive battle, still retained a method of disputing command of the sea. Corbett found great value in the “fleet-in-being” where “we endeavour [sic] by active defensive operations to prevent the enemy either securing or exercising control for the objects he has in view.” Relying on surprise and concentration, the weaker fleet conducts hit-and-run raids on commerce and isolated components of the stronger fleet gaining local, temporary command of the sea for some purpose. Fleet-in-being tactics create useful affects for the defender. It denies general command of the sea, weakens the stronger navy through expenditure of resources, creates a dilemma between dispersal to guard against, and concentration to defeat, the raiding fleet, and raises the cost to the stronger opponent. Corbett’s defensive strategy is comprehensive and well thought out. It avoided the offensive cult ascribed to by most of his contemporaries and was exonerated in both world wars.

Compared to operations on land, maritime operations suffer a confusing reversal of offensive and defensive concepts as one moves from the strategic to operational level. For example, the fleet that enjoys command of the sea assumes what looks like a defensive positioning on straits, lines of communication and enemy ports. While the weaker, defensive fleet exercising fleet-in-being tactics seemingly conducts offensive, initiative oriented attacks. However, to translate Corbett’s lessons to the strategic level, one must note his reminder that “since men live upon the land and not upon the sea, great issues between nations at war have always been decided—except in the rarest cases—...by what your army can do against your enemy’s territory and national life.” Hence his operational level command of the sea that effects a denial of use by the enemy translates into a strategic level rejection of the status quo on land with the aim to “wrest
something from the enemy” that is conquest.\(^41\) His operational level, initiative based, raiding fleet-in-being creates a strategic level effect of protraction and denial where the weaker fleet awaits the opportunity to counter-strike; this is a begrudging acceptance of the strategic level status quo.\(^42\)

LIDDELL HART ON STRATEGY

The preeminent historian and author B. H. Liddell Hart proves himself skilled at deciphering the higher level decision-making behind the history-making acts. In his book *Strategy* Liddell Hart makes a convincing case for the utility of the “indirect approach” in both offence and defense, and in so doing illuminates his concepts of strategy. While proposing an inherent relationship between offense and defense is certainly not new, Liddell Hart describes a new element of this old truism. The indirect approach is a sequential use of offensive and defensive methods at a lower level of war to produce an overall effect at the next higher level. For example, an operational level offensive that seizes a psychologically significant site and then turns to tactical defense to await a passionate but poorly planned enemy attack, could form a winning offensive strategy. Likewise, a withdrawal, feigning weakness, which tempts an unbalanced advance into a preplanned counter attack, can produce an overall winning defensive strategy. Historical examples back up his claim of the indirect approach as the most effective, least costly, yet least often used method. This is largely due to its increased complexity.\(^43\)

In a refreshing break from normality, Liddell Hart is clear and pure on his use of terms concerning the levels of war. “Grand strategy” is that highest level of strategy directly linked to political policy. It coordinates all of the nation’s resources and power centers (financial, diplomatic, commercial, ethical, as well as military) with a long-term
view—beyond the current war—toward a victory, which is defined as a “better peace.” Liddell Hart's emphasis on nonmilitary elements of national power is similar to the contemporary description of the Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic paradigm of instruments of national power known as the DIME. Liddell Hart's use of the word “strategy”—which resides below his “grand strategy”—appears synonymous with the contemporary concept of “operational art.” Strategy is the matching of ends with means and the use of battles in combination to produce an overall military victory. The aim of Liddell Hart's strategy is to cause “dislocation” of the enemy through coordinated, dispersed, or distributed actions that form an unacceptable threat to the enemy's physical or psychological state. Such indirect methods include surprise thrusts against supplies, lines of communication or lines of retreat. Indirect methods shock the opponent and create a high degree of uneasiness. He criticized the more common practice of direct moves against the enemy main force as wasteful, predictable and less likely to succeed. The overall benefit of the indirect approach is a husbanding of combat power through a reduction in the amount of actual fighting. By separately addressing his “grand strategic” and “strategic” ideas, Liddell Hart is one of the only theorists to clearly address the strategic versus the operational levels of war.

Liddell Hart is also one of the few theorists to specifically address the offensive at the strategic level of war. Staying within his framework of the indirect approach, offensive grand strategy involves a “logistical move directed against an economic target.” While this initial description seems to indicate a fixation on the physical, he goes on to propose moves that are purely psychological in their aim. Liddell Hart's offensive grand strategy seeks to unbalance the opponent's psychological more than his
physical well-being. “Whatever the form, the effect [author’s emphasis] to be sought is
the dislocation of the opponent’s mind and dispositions—such an affect is the true gauge
of an indirect approach.” Liddell Hart’s offensive grand strategy does not end with
victory in battle or even victory in war—both of which may lead to little actual gain.

Two major problems must be solved—dislocation and exploitation [author’s
emphasis]. One precedes and one follows the actual blow—which in
comparison is a simple act. You cannot hit the enemy with effect unless you
have first created the opportunity; you cannot make that effect decisive unless
you exploit...before he can recover. The importance of these two problems has
never been adequately recognized—a fact which goes far to explain the
common indecisiveness of warfare. Hence, a “grand strategic” exploitation phase following military victory is essential to
securing the “better peace” which Liddell Hart deems as the only reason for going to war
in the first place.

The last element of Liddell Hart’s theory of offensive versus defensive grand
strategy is summed up in two simple words—“acquisitive” and “conservative.” The
“acquisitive” state is one that is unsatisfied with the current situation—the status quo—and is willing to accept risk and take action to change it. The “conservative” state is
content to foil the opponent’s bid for victory and threaten a protracted, exhaustive war.
Therefore, offensive strategy is associated with “acquisitive” policy, which is at its roots
a rejection of the status quo, while defensive strategy is “conservative”, and seeks victory
through enforcement of the status quo.

What if these five theorists could be gathered together? One can imagine a
worldwide, all-time summit meeting to discuss the nature of strategy. Already familiar
with the other’s theories, Liddell Hart would host the meeting. He would be anxious to
debate Clausewitz on absolute war versus moderated war. Corbett, thinking his theories
had been rejected, would find redemption in hearing of the conduct of the World War II
Battle of the Atlantic, and Halsey’s and Nimitz’s approach to defeating Japan.
Clausewitz would be appalled at how his own people had misinterpreted his theory and
might wish he had burned his incomplete manuscript. He would some solace in Corbett’s
idolization of his work, especially his start on limited war. Thucydides would be proud
that his historical account had gained him fame while Sun Tzu would be utterly shocked
that his ideas ever left the kingdom of Wu. But once the formalities were over, and with
a common picture of the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war (briefed by
Liddell Hart) what would find in common? An in depth look at the individual theories,
adjusted for differing concepts of the levels of war, reveals a surprising degree of
agreement.

All five would quickly conclude that at its heart, offensive strategy is a rejection
of the status quo. Liddell Hart would describe this under his concept of risking action to
pursue a better peace. Corbett would explain that his principals comprised an operational
level contribution to a rejection of the status quo. Sun Tzu and Clausewitz, more focused
on battles, would describe initiative in the attack as an execution of the state’s (Sun Tzu
would say sovereign’s) rejection of the status quo. Thucydides would be in full
agreement that Sparta had initiated her offensive after a rejection of Athens’ growing
strength. The discussion would then turn to a more controversial aspect of the offense.

Concerning the objective of offensive strategy, Clausewitz and Thucydides would
be the odd men out. Sun Tzu would be adamant about the centrality of the need to “take
all under heaven intact”, and Liddell Hart would agree wholeheartedly by explaining that
his grand strategic “exploitation” and the “acquisitive” state were exactly that concept in
different words. Corbett, initially thinking that Sun Tzu was advising capture of the enemy fleet, would agree fully when he looked up one level of war. His theory of Britain’s rise to power was based on intact absorption of other states’ colonies where command of the sea enabled Britain to “take” such colonies with their economic resources “intact.” Clausewitz and Thucydides would argue that neither of them ever really thought of taking over their enemies intact for the long term. Was it not enough to defeat the enemy’s army and then dictate the terms of the peace? Thucydides would relent when reminded of Athens’ pre-war goal of expanding its empire and its accumulation of allies during the early fighting. Clausewitz would be the most difficult to convince, but would eventually submit to Liddell Hart’s Logic concerning Napoleon. Napoleon—smart general but poor diplomat—had lost in the end exactly because he never did take any state intact. He ruined that opportunity in Spain by deposing the monarchy, weakened his allies against Russia by first decisively defeating them in battle (think what a few extra Prussians could have done at Borodino), and had every one of his supposed allies rise up against him at Waterloo. Clausewitz would finally admit that had Prussia been a willing ally of France (that is taken intact) he himself would have fought for Napoleon instead of against him. When pressed to explain the term “all under heaven,” Sun Tzu would admit that what he really meant to do was to gain strength and eliminate a potential or actual opponent by absorbing his land, resources, and people while minimizing damage—to himself and to the prize—by minimizing battle. Sun Tzu would be pleased that his ancient wisdom survived the debate intact as the delegates adopted the phrase “to take all under heaven intact” as the agreed-upon intent of offensive strategy.
Turning to defensive strategy, the theorists would find themselves describing the same concept in different words. Liddell Hart would call it “conservatism” where the state is satisfied with what it has and seeks to preserve it. Sun Tzu would illuminate his ideas of “invincibility” and forward defense based on the agro-military policy as an overall attempt to keep things as they are. Thucydides would agree that Athens really wanted nothing more of Sparta than to be left alone (especially after the war started). Clausewitz would be in full agreement having based his theory on “preservation” of the situation as it stands. And Corbett would agree that the “negative object” of his defensive strategy—which he took from Clausewitz—is the same thing as preservation. All would agree to wording that the nature of defensive strategy is enforcement of the status quo.

Having agreed on “what” defensive strategy is, they would then debate how it is accomplished. Sun Tzu would explain his concept of “invincibility” as a posture and level of strength high enough to avoid defeat but not high enough to conquer the opponent. War against an invincible opponent is a loosing proposition. Invincibility forces an opponent into a long war that exhausts his treasure and forces his withdrawal. Sun Tzu’s defensive strategy is a denial of victory. Clausewitz would agree, his theory of the defense is based denial by raising the cost to the enemy so that he eventually decides to give up his objective. Corbett would explain that his fleet-in-being—despite its offensive look—is actually a strategic level denial of general command of the sea as well as a method of protraction designed to weaken an offensive opponent. Thucydides would explain that protraction and exhaustion were exactly the weapons of Athens’ initial success against Sparta and that a key component was protection of the strategic heart—that is denial of the city of Athens. Liddell Hart would agree with all that had been said.
with only one more comment. He would say that exhaustion should be avoided; that both
offensive and defensive strategy should contain a caveat to negotiate an end to war before
exhaustion leaves the state in a worse position whether victorious or not. In the end all of
the theorists would agree that denial of the opponents objectives best sums up their ideas.

The final part of the summit would concern the common traits of both offensive
and defensive strategy. All but Clausewitz would quickly agree that strategy is general is
not about battles and bloodshed, but the minimization of them. But with Sun Tzu
explaining how he always planned to defeat a previously weakened enemy and with
Liddell Hart explaining the utility of moderation, Clausewitz might yield on the
usefulness of “ideal war.” Sun Tzu and Liddell Hart would also convince the other three
that strategy should involve all of the state’s sources of power including diplomatic,
informational, economic and not just military. Finally, all of the theorists would yield to
the logic of Liddell Hart’s “indirect approach,” which Sun Tzu would say was really his
idea. The discussion would end with all five theorists in nearly full agreement on the
timeless nature of strategy.

At the end of the summit the five theorists would issue a joint statement on the
nature of offensive and defensive strategy. At the highest level of war, offensive strategy
is a rejection of the status quo where the (usually) stronger power attempts to take all
under heaven intact. Defensive strategy is an enforcement of the status quo—usually by
the weaker power—where the aim is denial of the opponent’s objectives. All strategy
involves the use of all of the state’s sources of power (diplomatic, informational,
economic as well as military) in an indirect approach designed to minimize the use of
battle. Thus the summit would end and the theorists would return to their graves.
The Nature of Cold War Strategy

During the Cold War, even the printed word could transmit the feeling of fear. In the preface to a 1963 Georgetown University study of US National Security David Abshire wrote “of significance is the consensus that the Communist goal...of world domination is unchanged, and that the Communists are...arguing as rival morticians over the best way to bury us.” It is not insignificant that “communist” was spelled with a capital letter indicating its use as living breathing proper noun, and that all of the verbs were present tense. In the darker days of the Cold War, the survival of America and even the long term viability of democracy to face down the growing “Capital-C Communism” was in doubt.

In World War II America executed and won what became an offensive war where victory was consummated in the unconditional surrender of all enemies. The initial expectation that victory would produce a stable and friendly international scene, combined with the all consuming drive to “get the boys home” led to a rapid demobilization of the US military machine that had won the war. Even in the face of continental-sized bad news such as Soviet entrenchment in occupied areas and Chinese communist advances against Nationalist forces, America continued to demobilize. America had no spirit for maintaining her military strength despite her wide-ranging aspirations in world affairs. When Truman took action to remedy this gross mismatch of ends and means, 18-months were required to reverse course from a non-strategy of willing blindness toward some method of dealing with the developing Cold War.
By 1950 the wind-blown nations of World War II had largely settled into two piles called “East” and “West.” The East was led by the Soviet Union who had already raked up Eastern Europe, parts of Iran and North Korea. The Soviets were also sponsoring insurgencies in numerous other areas including Southern Europe, Greece and Turkey. China—now communist—was shirking its age-old rivalry with Russia in favor of solidarity in the communist cause. Having entered the contest late, America now moved rapidly to consolidate a position. The NATO alliance was formed in 1949 and the “West” was built around this core plus other interested nations. With the bipolar world defined, the competition for supremacy commenced.

The beginning of the Cold War is difficult to link to one particular event. It came into being as an ideological divide deepened into rival armed camps that came to recognize each other as the enemy. It was played out over a protracted period of time and was marked by watershed events. West Berlin was blockaded but saved by a determined airlift. America fought two limited wars in Korea and Vietnam. The Cuban alliance with the Soviet Union marked the death of the Monroe Doctrine, and proxy wars flared in all parts of the globe. For forty years the Cold War ebbed and flowed. The Cold War ended with the defeat of the Soviet Union through economic exhaustion and China’s move away from ideology in favor of economic progress—perhaps to avoid the fate of the Soviet Union. The Cold War was a victory for the US.

DETERRENCE

But forty years earlier, the grim atmosphere of world events in 1949 were still on the downward slope when America lost her nuclear monopoly. As the 1950’s
progressed, the number and power of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of both the East and the West grew to a level threatening destruction beyond even Biblical proportions. As these devices were mated to high performance, long range missiles and aircraft, they became truly strategic weapons. The implications for strategy were largely unknown and only partially answered by scientific and psychological theory. In *Strategy in the Missile Age*, Bernard Brodie outlined three broad theoretical strategies for the nuclear age. The first of these—*preventive war*—was clearly offensive. Preventive war accepted that total war was inevitable, and with a first-strike likely to be decisive against the opponent’s means of retaliation, a premeditated surprise attack was the best means of ensuring victory. The second strategy—*preemptive attack*—straddled the line between offense and defense. Preemptive attack was theoretically advantageous when warning systems could provide enough warning of impending enemy attack to allow one to “beat the enemy to the punch” and achieve the coveted first-strike advantage. In other words “I will not strike first unless you do.” Preemptive attack differed from preventive war in that the former was keyed off of an impending enemy attack while the later was a premeditated surprise. The third broad strategy—*deterrence*—played into the psychology of intent and the science of a survivable retaliatory force. In broad terms nuclear deterrence was achieved by creating the impression that enough retaliatory weapons would survive a first-strike to enact unacceptable punishment on the attacker. Although all three strategies were debated in the US and in the Soviet Union, in practice only one nuclear strategy was acceptable or suitable. Preventive war was forsworn as both immoral and unlikely to succeed, and preemptive attack was deemed unsound due the shaky assumption of timely warning and the ghastly specter of accidental nuclear war.
Both strategies became obsolete when nuclear forces became more survivable thereby eliminating much of the first-strike advantage. This left only one workable strategy regarding nuclear war—deterrence—which as events proved was very different and often de-coupled from conventional deterrence.\textsuperscript{53}

CONTAINMENT

As the 1940s progressed into the early 1950's the relative non-action sought by nuclear deterrence coupled with the imbalance of conventional power between the East and West gave birth to the defining strategy of the Cold War—that of "containment." The adoption of this strategy arose out of two factors. First, continued Soviet expansionism combined with China's alignment against the West became a clear and growing threat. Secondly, the US was neither strong enough nor possessed of the spirit to attempt a military defeat of this threat even in the early years of nuclear supremacy. Hence, the decision was made to check the growth of communism but not to try to destroy it. Enacting the new strategy of containment required political, military and economic measures. Politically, the "Truman Doctrine" was adopted where the US announced the intention to "employ military force to contain Communist advance if necessary."\textsuperscript{54} Militarily, the US began to rearm and sponsored the formation of NATO and SEATO. Economically, the Marshall Plan was funded "to improve the economic and political life in Western Europe and thereby make it poor soil for the growth of communism."\textsuperscript{55} Thus, \textit{containment} was the strategy for facing the threat of communism and \textit{deterrence} was the strategy for facing the threat of nuclear war.
EVOLUTION OF DETERRENCE

Nuclear deterrence went through several evolutionary phases during the course of the Cold War. In the years immediately following World War II America enjoyed nuclear deterrence through nuclear supremacy. This honeymoon of nuclear deterrence faded as Soviet stockpiles grew and eventually a more sophisticated approach was needed. During the Eisenhower administration (1953-1960), deterrence was founded on the principal of “massive retaliation” where nuclear war meant total war and a general strategic nuclear response. By 1960 massive retaliation was losing its appeal. With the continuing threat of limited war and the precedent of non-use of massive retaliation in the Korean War, the Kennedy administration adopted “flexible response” as a more credible means of deterrence. In flexible response, a wide range of tactical and strategic nuclear options replaced the one-trick-pony of massive retaliation. The only other significant change to deterrence was Johnson’s policy of nuclear “sufficiency.” Throughout the 1950s the US had enjoyed a numerical advantage in nuclear weapons. As the Soviet Union expanded production of ICBMs, this advantage was repeatedly threatened. Eventually, the Johnson administration gave up the missile race (in numbers) due to the marginal utility to deterrence. Nuclear “sufficiency” was deemed adequate to maintain deterrence in light of the continuing survivability of the retaliatory forces. And here the evolution of nuclear deterrence during the Cold War ended; the Nixon, Carter and Reagan administrations all maintained nuclear deterrence from a numerically inferior position based on Johnson’s concept of sufficiency.

EVOLUTION OF CONTAINMENT
Nuclear deterrence was demonstrably successful worldwide against both the Soviet Union and China. However, in its relationship to containment, “deterrence” carried the further burden of preventing conventional war. Nuclear deterrence was a part of the equation and worked well in deterring conventional war in Europe, but it suffered a dramatic loss of credibility in limited war, proxy war and insurgency. Before this fact was fully realized, US policy made the attempt to link the two. In 1954, with a “containment” war in Korea just ended, Secretary of State Dulles attempted to extend massive retaliation to cover local aggression through a policy speech that came to be called the “New Look.” The intent was to strengthen containment by deterring future Koreas with the threat of massive retaliation. The policy was an immediate failure. Despite repeated warnings against direct or indirect intervention in Indochina, neither the Soviet Union nor China were deterred from supporting efforts that led to the defeat of the French at Dien Bien Phu. The US had not carried through on its threat and massive retaliation was fatally discredited as a means of deterring conventional war outside Europe due to its light-switch options of strategic nuclear war or surrender.59

Kennedy’s flexible response took this failure into account in its design. Where massive retaliation had de-emphasized conventional forces in favor of cheaper strategic nuclear weapons, flexible response brought improvements in conventional forces to deter/fight both limited and general war. It faced its first containment test in Vietnam. Although US efforts in Vietnam eventually failed, the combination of nuclear threat plus conventional capability that marked flexible response was successful in other proxy wars in South America, Africa and the Middle East. The core concepts of flexible response were carried through to the end of the Cold War. Although Presidents Nixon, Carter and
Reagan made some modifications, the basic promise of conventional capabilities and wide-ranging nuclear options remained the cornerstone of containment.\textsuperscript{60}

**TESTING OF COLD WAR STRATEGY**

With this broad-brush outline of Cold War strategy, it is now possible to judge its nature with the detached, yet historically guided test developed earlier. Cold War strategy was based on two broad concepts—containment and deterrence. Both had numerous sub-components and deterrence contained both nuclear and conventional aspects. But judged at their highest level, the question is posed; were containment and deterrence a rejection or an enforcement of the status quo? Were they a means of denial or an attempt to take all under heaven intact?

Deterrence fits cleaningly into the column of enforcement of the status quo. As used throughout the Cold War, deterrence was clearly a negative object as per Clausewitz’s description of a defensive act. The force structure of deterrence was designed never to be used. By rejecting preventive war and preemptive attack, the US was left with the status quo seeking strategy of deterrence. This status quo of non-action was in place and jealously guarded throughout the Cold War. Further proof of the status quo nature of deterrence is the Cuban missile crisis. In Kennedy’s words, the Soviet move was a “deliberately provocative...change in the status quo which can not be accepted.”\textsuperscript{61}

Restoration of the status quo (no nuclear missiles in Cuba) was a cause worth the risk of direct—even nuclear—war with the Soviet Union. Also telling is that the crisis was diffused by a simple return to the status quo. Another factor pointing to the defensive nature of nuclear deterrence is Johnson’s adoption of nuclear sufficiency. By accepting sufficiency—meaning inferiority in numbers—the offensive use of nuclear weapons
became impossible. Conventional deterrence, revived under Kennedy’s flexible response, was also clearly an enforcement of the status quo. Its sole purpose was to supplement the failed ability of massive retaliation to deter conventional war. Deterrence in the Cold War was also a forty-year act of denial. Sun Tzu would have immediately recognized the survivable nuclear retaliatory force as fitting his concept of invincibility designed to deny the enemy efforts to gain supremacy. Deterrence was lastly a strategy of forced protraction that economically and politically exhausted the Soviet Union and tamed the ideologues of China. Thus, Brodie is correct in stating that a commitment to deterrence carries the price of “de-emphasis of the offensive principal as irrelevant.”62 As an enforcement of the status quo and an act of denial—deterrence was clearly a defensive strategy.

With containment as the lynchpin of US Cold War strategy, understanding its root nature is vital to understanding the overall US mindset. If one is not careful to remain at the strategic level of war, the offensive operational-level acts that made up this strategy can be confused for the strategy itself. For example, the “pacification” program in the Vietnamese countryside can look like a rejection of the status quo and an attempt to take all under heaven intact. However at its root containment was neither. It was designed to halt, but not to roll back communist gains. In Korea, the US settled for a solution nearly identical to the starting conditions. Although a bloody military tie at the operational level, Korea was an unheralded strategic-level containment victory. For North Korea and their Soviet backers, the Korean War was seen as a loss, a failed attempt to change the status quo.63 In Vietnam there was no plan for victory in the traditional sense in that there was no plan to militarily defeat the North Vietnamese. It was a war to keep
dominoes from falling, but not a war to stand up those that had already fallen down. In a speech to the UN General Assembly a US official stated “We do not seek to overthrow the Government of North Vietnam. We do not seek to do any injury to Mainland China nor to threaten any of its legitimate interests. We do not ask of North Vietnam an unconditional surrender or indeed the surrender of anything that belongs to it.”

Hand in hand with containment’s enforcement of the status quo is its stated intention to draw the line and deny communist attempts to cross it. The tool of this denial was to “smother the many conflicts that cleave the Free World.” By denying the growth and spread of revolutionary war, containment solidified the status quo of political alignment. Thus containment as a strategy of denial and an enforcement of the status quo is clearly a defensive strategy.

For forty years America engaged in the Cold War. And for forty years America was engaged in a defensive strategy. The Cold War was marked with a palpable fear that America might perish. The US fell into a defensive huddle to hold her position and hope for better days ahead. And while David Abshire’s preface in 1963 opens with a fearful “gallows humor” of the—capital-C—Communists as America’s morticians, it closes with a grim determination to form “insurmountable obstacles” to the enemy, Sun Tzu’s invincible warrior in the defense.

The Nature of Current Strategy

The Cold War ended differently than other American wars. No one scheduled a parade, no monuments were erected in front of town hall, no “VC” day was declared, and no one waits for their grandchildren to ask them what they did in the war. It ended with the economic and political implosion of the enemy. The monolithic enemy simply
disintegrated upon itself and—despite the continuing presence of nuclear weapons—became much less of a threat. In the world’s largest defensive victory, the West had won and the East had lost.

Similar to the first days after World War II, the end of the Cold War brought on a wave of optimism that America’s security troubles were largely over. With communism defeated, the rapid spread of democracy and capitalism would create a new world of cooperation. The new role for America would be “handling isolated regional tensions while guiding the world as it progressed toward stability and greater integration.” And just like the late 1940’s, that optimism was quickly tempered as the post Cold War security environment began to take shape. The initial euphoria that assumed only positive change gave way to a realization that the future remained “up for grabs.”

The intervening ten years since the end of the Cold War have seen the rise of profound, yet conflicting trends. On the positive side, America is certainly more secure than at any time during the Cold War. America has no shadow of a peer competitor and though nuclear weapons can not be uninvented, they appear to be much less likely to be used against America. The integrative forces of economic globalization continue to bind an ever-larger segment of the globe into an interdependent pact where war is now seen as the enemy of prosperity—at least between members of the globalized economic community.

But all is not the world of Locke. The positive changes since the end of the Cold War are threatened by the rise of equally profound new problems. The demise of Soviet central control has opened a Pandora’s box and loosed a host of security plagues. New, and often artificial, states with borders that bear little relation to the ethnicities
within threaten the stability of entire regions, especially in South and Central Asia.⁷¹ Other states, loose from Soviet control, now threaten their neighbors and even their own populations. Transnational threats of terrorism and international crime find fertile ground in the anarchy of states that did not, or could not, establish their own system of legal control. The spread of dangerous technologies that could lead to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) has accelerated. Finally, a host of countries have simply defaulted on their responsibility to provide the basic security, governance, and services to their populations and have disintegrated into the Hobbesian scenario of “failed states.” All of these trends, none of which were foreseen, can threaten the post Cold War gains.⁷²

Unlike all of her previous interwar periods, America has not stood idly by, this time, while these trends have worsened. Although sometimes clumsy and not always successful, American strategy seems designed to head off future threats before they grow larger.⁷³ This new strategy is born in part out of increased American expectations. No longer burdened with a great threat to national survival, America now seeks “prosperity” in a democratic, free market, global economic community that America seems intent to lead, dominate, and benefit the most from.⁷⁴ The new American strategy outlines three core objectives, “to enhance our security,” “to bolster America’s prosperity,” and “to promote democracy abroad.” Naturally these three are linked to a common purpose “to secure and strengthen the gains of democracy and free markets while turning back their enemies.”⁷⁵ While the first two core objectives are stated in terms of the American condition, the text goes on to explain that improvements to world security, prosperity and democracy translate into improvements to America’s condition. Security and prosperity
and democracy are no longer seen as a zero-sum-game as they often were in the Cold War. The three objectives are also seen as interrelated. Economic prosperity at home and abroad improves American security; democracy abroad translates into fewer threats to American security; and the linkage of democracy to economic prosperity is a theme emphasized on nearly every page of the NSS.

To execute the new strategy, America has revised the concept of “instruments of national power.” The traditional DIME (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic) paradigm has been updated to reflect a more international and aggressive approach by the addition of an entire new instrument called “law enforcement.” The addition of law enforcement—meaning “international” law enforcement—is significant. International law has long been recognized, but its enforcement has often been untenable. This was especially true during the Cold War when the East/West conflict stymied most attempts to enforce international law across the ideological divide. The new emphasis and the language throughout the post Cold War NSS signals an American intent to increase enforcement through a host of means including international organizations and unilateral action if necessary. The new “DIMEL,” as it might be called, encompasses all of the means by which America intends to execute her strategy.76

Despite America’s improved position since the end of the Cold War, the “means” required still fall short of the “ends” desired. Hence a method of prioritization remains in force. The adaptation of priorities reveals important aspects of the new strategy’s character. In balancing the application of resources, national interests are divided into three categories. The highest of these—“vital interests”—has actually changed very little from the Cold War. Vital interests are related to the “survival, safety and vitality”
of the nation. All measures—including unilateral military force—are promised to protect them. Next in the hierarchy come “important national interests.” While not influencing survival, they do influence “national well being” and a cost /risk/benefit analysis will determine the response. The lowest category is “humanitarian and other interests.” This category affects neither survival nor well-being, but is strictly related to situations where American values demand action as simply the right thing to do. Natural disasters, support for democratization, and violations of human rights are typical values related interests. This last category has no real definable limits. The important point here is that the latter two categories were added since the end of the Cold War.

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<th>CORE OBJECTIVES (ENDS)</th>
<th>INTERESTS (PRIORITY)</th>
<th>SOURCES OF POWER (MEANS)</th>
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<td>Security</td>
<td>Vital</td>
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<td>Prosperity</td>
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<td>Democracy</td>
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America now has a written policy to act on “interests” far removed from national survival if the cost/risk/benefit calculation indicates a positive outcome. It is significant that this positive outcome can be defined as far down as the satisfaction of American values. When the broader catchment of American interests are applied to the broadened core objectives of national security, the stage is set for a much lower threshold of stimulus to trigger a concrete American response, pursued with a broader range of tools.

It is well beyond the scope of this monograph to do a thorough coverage of the interaction of DIMEL “means,” prioritized through the three levels of “interests” and applied to the three core objective “ends” of the American National Security Strategy. However, certain recurring themes show the logic and the nature of the post Cold War
strategy. First, none of the three core objectives (security, prosperity or democracy) stops at America’s shores or at any set limit of distance from them. In fact, recurring phrases such as “we seek a world that is…” specifically include the entire globe as America’s strategic concern. Second, all three core objectives and all three levels of American interests carry the possibility of employing any of the DIMEL instruments of national power to effect the desired change. To be clear, the full arsenal of American power is available to pursue even the lowest tier interest related to satisfaction of American values.

Certain examples are illustrative of this process at work. Operation ALLIED FORCE is certainly a major one. In 1999 Serb oppression of their Kosovar Albanian minority posed no direct threat to the American security. Nor did it threaten American well-being or vitality. At worst it posed a second order threat to regional stability, which—thinking globally—could eventually tie back to either a security or well-being concern. But the link was probably not strong enough to justify war. However, by systematically disenfranchising the majority of Kosovo’s population—in the face of American efforts in Bosnia—the real core objective affected was that of “promoting democracy abroad.” The resulting instability caused by the spread of ethnic conflict or mass refugee migration threatened ongoing measures to spread democracy throughout Southern and Eastern Europe. Furthermore, Serb oppression affected no “vital” or “important” interests. But it squarely offended American “humanitarian” interests.

When the cost/risk/benefit analysis showed a positive outcome, the full DIMEL was brought to bear and culminated in the American led military operation. Therefore, it is an inescapable conclusion that this war was fought primarily to satisfy American values.
Recent American interaction with North Korea also illustrates this strategy at work. In October 1999, a North Korean policy review team, led by retired Secretary of Defense Dr. William J. Perry published its report. After cutting through the diplomatic language, a very aggressive American policy is apparent. The report called for a significant change to the policy implemented in response to the 1994 crisis over the North Korean nuclear program. The situation (to be modified) involved a North Korean freeze on their plutonium production program in exchange for improved diplomatic initiatives and a higher-technology nuclear reactor that is far less likely to be used to produce weapons and is much easier to monitor. However, the situation from 1994 did not remain static. Developments in North Korean long-range ballistic missiles approached a capability to reach beyond Asia to the continental United States. In addition North Korea could reopen the frozen nuclear reactor at any time to harvest a sizeable amount of plutonium to add to the small amount (perhaps enough for 1-2 weapons) that it already has. This duo of nuclear weapons potential and long range missiles—that North Korea could employ or sell—emerged as a clear threat to the top core objective of “security.”

Prevention of a development of such weapons clearly fell into the priority of a “vital interest” related to “survival, safety, and vitality” of America. Dr Perry’s report clearly stated the unacceptability of maintaining the status quo. It recommended a full use of the DIMEL to maintain security and clearly stated that by one of two paths, America will achieve the desired change. The first path is a broad range of DIMEL rewards in exchange for an end of the ballistic missile program with the plutonium production freeze remaining in place. The second path—employed if North Korea rejects the first path—promised that America will “act to contain the threat.” This is a clear intention to take
whatever means are necessary to solve the situation according to American desires. As of this writing, American policy toward North Korea is still under review, but according to the tenants of the NSS, America will pursue firm measures—utilizing the full DIMEL—to satisfy this vital interest and core objective.

While America's response to North Korea involves a "vital interest" and the top core objective of "security," it is one of the exceptions. The vast majority of post Cold War endeavors have been executed in pursuit of one of the new, lessor-categories of interests. In the 1990's, American responses in Bosnia, Somalia, Haiti, Libya and Sudan are difficult to link to any "vital" or even "important" interest as these terms are defined. However, they are very easy to link to a "humanitarian/other" interest. Of significance is that America is not shy about the use of power to pursue even this lowest tier interest. Yet politicians, military officers and the media remain stuck in the paradigm of "vital interests." Even those in favor of American intervention based on humanitarian interests usually try to justify them as somehow linked to a "vital interest" when a valid linkage is lacking. Despite the written strategy to employ instruments of national power in pursuit of lower tier interests, strategy makers and executors seem unwilling to admit that this is actually taking place. Instead they stumble to link such moves to "vital interests."

A last vignette illustrating the post Cold War strategy at work is NATO enlargement and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). They will be dealt with together because they serve the same core objectives and interests. PfP is a group of NATO and non-NATO nations, comprising mostly the Newly Independent States (NIS) from the Soviet Union’s demise. This group maintains a formal working relationship with NATO—short of membership—that includes a mechanism to consult on security
NATO enlargement involves gradually expanding the alliance with new members that will enjoy full rights and security guarantees under the NATO charter. Enlargement serves the purposes of extending security to new democracies and the expanding European Union.

Although neither is a unilateral American program, both reflect the new American strategy executed through the NATO alliance that America leads. NATO enlargement and PfP enhance all three of America’s core objectives. American security is enhanced through the stabilizing effect on the NIS, which has resulted from the heading off of security fears that could lead to conflict. NATO enlargement provides a security guarantee to new members, while PfP provides security consultations and the incentive of eventual membership. Democracy is promoted through the interaction of PfP nations with the all democratic NATO and through NATO enlargement by the simple fact that non-democratic nations “need not apply.” The core objective of “prosperity” is enhanced through increased security and democracy that sets the stage for economic progress and the real prize of EU membership. Overall improvements to the security, prosperity, and democracy of the NIS translates into a more secure and prosperous America.

Although a more secure, prosperous and democratic NIS is certainly desirable, none of these conditions qualifies as a “vital interest.” America’s survival, safety and vitality are not threatened. But, such improvements do affect American well-being and American values. Hence, both NATO enlargement and PfP serve “important” and “humanitarian/other,” but not “vital” interests. Yet this has not limited the effort that America has brought to bear on moving the NIS toward security, prosperity, and democracy.
A final defining concept of the post Cold War strategy is the “imperative of engagement.” In describing this concept, the NSS is emphatic that America must remain “strong at home,” “exert global leadership,” and be “willing to use all appropriate instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors.” And in even stronger terms the folly of the alternative to engagement is described as a “passive submission to powerful forces of change” at a time when American influence is at an all time high. Such “isolationism” is condemned to having “helped squander Allied victory in World War I.” Although America pursued a policy called engagement in the Cold War, in practice this translated primarily into remaining involved with allies in a mutual defense of interests and negotiating with rivals. The wording from the new NSS expands the concept of engagement, increasing the emphasis on “act[ing] forcefully”—in other words coercion or intervention. Such wording is a strong indication of America’s intention to expand her “engagement” of both allies and rivals to affect the course of world events.

The process of America’s post Cold War strategy can be best demonstrated by following America’s perceived role through the ends, means, and interests to a final result. America defines her role in global affairs under an expanded “imperative of engagement” where American strength, leadership, and willingness to act—forcefully when needed—form the basis upon which the strategy is built. This imperative has given rise to an expansion of objectives that serves to gathers partners through the spread of security, democracy, capitalism—in effect an expansion of alliances. The likelihood of intervention is greater due to the adoption of wider interests that include a range of concerns from survival to the promotion of American values. And finally, American
strategy now employs expanded instruments of national power—from DIME to DIMEL—through the addition of international law enforcement. The final result of this multi-dimensional expansion of ends, means, and interests is a lower threshold of intervention, which led to a very busy 1990s and continues today.

TESTING OF CURRENT STRATEGY

While it is clear that American strategy has changed since the end of the Cold War, increased complexity makes identification of an offensive versus defensive trend difficult. Numerous informal discussions with classmates and instructors at both the Command and General Staff College (CGSC) and the School and Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) during the conception and writing of this monograph produced a wide variety of opinion on the offensive versus defensive nature of current strategy. However, by utilizing the test developed earlier, a post Cold War offensive trend can be identified. To help avoid confusion the reader is reminded of two earlier themes. First, the interrelationship of offense and defense is still relevant in the post Cold War. Nuclear “deterrence”—identified earlier as part of a defensive strategy—still plays an important role. And “containment”—another defensive technique—is identified in the current NSS as one tool for dealing with rouge states. However, neither deterrence nor containment forms the dominant basis of current strategy. They now form a small part of a much broader strategy. The second reminder is a warning to stay at the strategic level of war and avoid confusing the tactical or operational acts of execution for the strategy itself. It is simplistic—but-true that strategy can only be judged at the strategic level of war. The vital questions are now posed. Is current strategy a rejection or an enforcement of the
status quo? Is current strategy a means of denial, or and attempt to take all under heaven intact?

As revealed earlier, current strategy is based on an expanded imperative of engagement. The wording and intent of this imperative reveal that it is clearly a rejection of the status quo. Through this more aggressive engagement, America has stated the intention to steer global affairs toward a desired end state and not to maintain the situation as it is. Terms such as “imperative” and “willingness to act forcefully” indicate a determination similar to Liddell Hart’s theme of the “spirit to use superior power. Engagement in the post Cold War (expanded beyond interaction with allies), is more initiative oriented and now risks action to pursue change. Hence, the post Cold War engagement is more offensive that that used during the Cold War.

America’s expansion of core objectives also indicates a more offensive strategy. While the desire to enhance our security has remained constant from the Cold War, the increased emphasis on the lower tier objectives—prosperity and promotion of democracy abroad—from another clear rejection of the status quo. America—no longer content with survival—has set prosperity and the spread of democracy as the new goals. With the defensive battle of containment won, America is now moving out from the containment trenches to spread democracy abroad. Promoting democracy and capitalism—the only means of attaining prosperity according the NSS—can be viewed as a means of gathering new ideological allies—NATO enlargement and PIP are the best examples. This equates to a strategic level counterattack hinged on the Cold War defensive victory. All of the theorists promoted the use of the counterattack and Liddell Hart in particular spoke of a “strategic level exploitation phase.” At its logical end state, the core objectives of
prosperity and democracy would have the entire globe democratic, capitalist allied to America, and integrated into a global community that America would lead. Even Sun Tzu—who coined the phrase “to take all under heaven intact,” never thought that big. If democratization is not an attempt to take all under heaven intact what is?

In the Cold War, America was fixated on vital interests related to national survival and vitality. Such vital interests generally translated into a set of conditions (a status quo) that America would take firm action to enforce. Hence, a fixation on vital interests—as defined in the NSS—indicates a more defensive strategy. As shown earlier, the vast majority of America’s effort is expended in pursuit of the lower tier “important” and “humanitarian/other” interests and not “vital” interests. These interests are more offensive in nature because they usually translate into a rejection of the status quo. For example, American efforts in Bosnia and Haiti are identified in the NSS as examples of important national interests. Both of these efforts involved the use of force to change the existing status quo. And as show earlier, Operation ALLIED FORCE was fought in pursuit of humanitarian interests, which rise out of the enforcement of American values. Hence America’s expansion of interests into a wider net that precipitates action is a more offensive orientation.

In John Stuart Mill’s *On Liberty*, the author broke with conventional wisdom and even his own upbringing to claim that “The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will is to prevent harm to others.” However, when that threshold is crossed Mill’s beliefs include not only the right, but also the obligation to intervene. Current American strategy has extrapolated this obligation beyond individuals to interactions between nations, and

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between a state and its own citizens. Keeping this in mind, the expansion of the instruments of national power from the DIME to the DIMEL carries interesting implications. First, in the post Cold War period, America has demonstrated an increased propensity to use this power. This would naturally follow from the more offensive posture of engagement, core objectives and the wider definition of American interests. But more indicative of the changing nature of national power is the addition of “[international] law enforcement.” By including this as a declared tool, America has signaled the intent to act to enforce an international standard of conduct that the victors of the Cold War have the power to define. In practice the standard of behavior has been expanded beyond the interaction between nations and now includes a nation’s interaction with its own people. This is a clear rejection of the status quo in that oppressive governments and even specific individuals are no longer ignored as an issue of national sovereignty. America’s new strategy states the intention to use a wide variety of international organizations and even unilateral action to enforce international law. This is a rejection of a former status quo of national sovereignty and meets therefore meets the criteria of an offensive strategy.

America’s post Cold War strategy is clearly offensive in nature. While nuclear deterrence and some amount of containment underwrite it, this is simply a manifestation of the interrelationship of offense and defense. When measured against the combined wisdom of the time proven theorists, America’s new strategy shows a shift to the offensive through an increased propensity to reject the status quo and an ongoing sequence of moves designed, in the long term, to take all under heaven intact. This post Cold War strategy combined with the new political will—Liddell Hart’s spirit to use
superior power—is an indicator that America is on the move and intends to write the future and “move against the threats in this new global era.” While some may conclude that the end of the Cold War has put America into a strategic pause waiting for the next peer competitor to rise up, the imperative of engagement and the expansion of the ends, means, and interests of the post Cold War strategy prove this false. For better or worse, America has entered an offensive “pursuit phase” of the Cold war victory.

**Importance and Conclusion**

In light of the strategy changes since the end of the Cold War, the Weinberger Doctrine can be declared officially dead. It was a the embodiment of a defensive strategy harnessed to vital interests that proved fatally flawed in dealing with the increased complexity of the post Cold War security environment. As written and practiced, American strategy is no longer limited to defending vital interests. Vital interests remain, but now form the defensive core on top of which America has built a new offensive orientation. Sun Tzu would have understood this. “Anciently the skilful warriors first made themselves invincible and awaited the enemy’s moment of vulnerability.” That moment of vulnerability arrived when the Soviet Union disintegrated and the invincible America now stirs.

In 1990 John Mearsheimer published an article entitled *Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War*. In it he outlined a post Cold War Europe fundamentally destabilized by a return to multi polarity and more prone to war due to a Hobbesian fear rising out of a lack of security where all might turn against all. He saw the best hope for maintaining peace as a controlled nuclear proliferation designed to arm the many nations with nuclear
weapons to maintain the Cold War concept of deterrence through the fear of mutual assured destruction. Within the assumptions presented, the logic of his argument was sound. Fortunately, those assumptions—NATO’s demise and America’s return to isolationism—proved false. America’s post Cold War strategy was designed, in part, to prevent the very scenario Mearsheimer outlined.87

The West—led by America—has embarked upon an offensive to consolidate the Cold War victory. As Clausewitz realized “no victory will be effective with out the pursuit” and his tactical/operational warning has applicability at the strategic level as well. To leave the defeated wreckage of the Soviet Union to its own fate would invite Mearsheimer’s prediction and plant the seeds of America’s next threat. It would squander the forty-year effort of the Cold War. The new American strategy recognizes this possibility and is designed to conduct a strategic pursuit phase, and push out the strategic frontiers with a sophisticated approach based on security, prosperity, and democracy. Liddell Hart described this as the “strategic exploitation phase.” America is now in a window of opportunity of undetermined duration. The window could close due to numerous reasons such as an alliance of rogue states, a failure of NATO to maintain a consensus, a plunge into anarchy of transition states such as Russia or China, or the rise of a peer competitor or an aggressive nuclear armed non-peer. The intent of American strategy is to push out the frontiers of American influence by absorbing former rivals into the American led global community until these frontiers meet and disappear thereby completing the victory of the Cold War.

If students and even instructors from a course that covers national security strategy remain confused as to its nature, it is not unreasonable to expect that the general
public, military officers and political decision-makers would fail to understand it as will. This confusion has a significant impact on the military. As one of the instruments of national power, it is imperative that the focus and capabilities of that force match the strategy. To contribute effectively to this new offensive strategy the military must be resourced appropriately—not necessarily more or less—just appropriately for the mission assigned.

The first step in this process is a clear understanding by military officers that American strategy has changed fundamentally from the Cold War to a more offensive—even acquisitive orientation. It is outlined in black and white in a publicly available document and all military officers have an obligation to read and understand its implications to their profession. Such an understanding would begin a fundamental change of mindset among military officers and better enable them to represent their needs to their political masters. Such an understanding would go far in developing a more widespread understanding of why military power is used in cases unrelated to either security needs or vital interests, and it would enable military planners to more accurately anticipate—and therefore plan—future operations. Any military planner who continues to think of military operations only in terms of direct threats to American security will be ineffective. Any commander who continues to think that the power of their command is reserved for the defense of vital interests will be incapable of interpreting the purpose of most missions assigned and incapable of explaining this purpose to their personnel.

National Security Strategy enjoys an agility that national Military Strategy does not. The NSS can change nearly at will with a decision by the president. Military strategy has momentum based on budgets, equipment, doctrine, training, and even culture
that is far more difficult to alter. Currently, the strategy mindset of most military officers retains a Cold War/Weinberger Doctrine defensive attitude that national security strategy abandoned six years ago. It is time for military officers to come out of the cold and recognize their new offensive role in the new manifest destiny that American strategy has embarked upon.

END NOTES


4 Ibid., xiv.

5 President of the United States, A National Security Strategy for a New Century (Washington: Produced by the Executive Brach of the United States Federal Government, 1998). Terms in quotations were taken directly from the document.


apparent in Erwin Rommel’s North African defeat—Naveh makes the point that a mismatch of defensive and offensive missions can occur across the levels of war.


10 The complexities of Operational Art are well beyond the scope of this monograph. The intent of the discussion here is to ensure that the reader has a basic understanding of the three levels of war before delving into the details of Cold War and current national security strategy. For the interested reader desiring additional study, an illuminating discussion of one debate on the emergence of the “Operational level of war” and “Operational Art” read the competing views in the following works: James J Schneider, *Vulcan’s Anvil: The American Civil War and the Emergence of Operational Art*. Unpublished article for use by US Army Command and General Staff College and the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library, 1991), and the published book; Robert M. Epstein, *Napoleon’s Last Victory: 1809 and the Emergence of Modern War*, initial draft of later publication distributed for academic use at the US Army School of Advanced Military Studies, (Fort Leavenworth: Combined Arms Research Library, 1992).

11 James J Schneider, 3-24.

12 Sun Tzu. *The Art of War*, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (London: Oxford University Press, 1963), part III of the introduction, 20-38. This is a description of the Chinese ‘warring states” period during which the author of Sun Tzu is thought to have lived.

13 *The Art of War* as translated by Samuel B. Griffith makes the common terminology mistake warned of earlier. Using the modern definitions of the three levels of war, Sun Tzu was in actuality an “operational” level planner who left the “strategic” decision making to the political level “sovereign.” However, the word “strategic” is used to cover just about everything above the tactical level. In the Griffith translation the reader should be wary that when the word “strategic” is used, the modern term “operational planning” is probably more fitting.

14 Ibid., 79.

15 Ibid., 77-78.

16 Ibid., 144-149.

17 Ibid., 64-85. Although chapter 3 of Sun Tzu’s treatise is entitled “Offensive Strategy”, it would be better titled Offensive Operational planning. Elements of strategic level thought are better explained in other chapters most notably chapters 1, 2 and 4.

18 Ibid., 85.
19 Ibid., 68-69.

20 Ibid., 68-69. By "powerful leaders" Sun Tzu is referring to the formation of external alliances that tip the balance of power against the suspected aggressor. While the modern term "forward defense" is certainly not used in the Sun Tzu's text, the concept he describes is exactly that. Against a stronger opponent Sun Tzu calls for fortification along mountains and rivers and an "agro-military policy." The agro-military policy is the stationing of military forces and their families along frontiers. The soldiers split their time between military training and farming. This was the most economical method of maintaining a forward presence along vulnerable frontiers and cut down on deployment time.

21 This is similar to the concept of the "DIME" where Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic measures form the instruments of national power. Sun Tzu clearly calls for diplomatic, informational and military means. Agrarian society and the relative paucity of trade at the time probably limited the use of economic means.


23 Ibid., 75-76.


25 Ibid., 75-77.

26 Ibid., 523. Clausewitz's book on the defense is more than twice as long as his book on attack. This is not because he found the defense more complex or more important than the offense. It is because Clausewitz saw the offense and defense as so inseparable that illuminating his views on one nearly exhausted his views on the other.

27 Ibid., 361.


29 Ibid., 357.

30 Ibid., 679.

31 Ibid., 357.

32 Ibid., 363.

33 Ibid., 523.
34 Ibid., 523.

35 Ibid., 526.

36 Julian S. Corbett, Some Principals of Maritime Strategy (Annapolis: The Naval Institute Press, 1988), xi-xliv. Corbett was an unlikely strategist. Straddling, in time, the transition of sail to steam, he had no practical experience with either. Nor was he a soldier. In fact, a product of a privileged youth, a law degree from Cambridge, and failed attempts at both painting and the writing of fiction, he gained no practical military experience of any type. Yet, he is now acknowledged as one of the greatest maritime strategists. Corbett’s ideas arose from his avid study of naval history, which he found at odds with prevalent contemporary naval theory and doctrine which emphasizing the importance of the decisive naval battle to the exclusion of most other naval endeavors. Eventually recognized as an accomplished naval historian and editorial writer, he was invited to lecture at the British Royal Naval College from which he launched his theory that eventually became the humbly titled book.

37 Ibid., 37.

38 Ibid., 35.

39 Ibid., 165.

40 Ibid., 16.

41 Ibid., 31.

42 Ibid., 309-310.


44 Ibid., 146-147.

45 Ibid., 146-147.

46 Ibid., 336.


48 The term “unconditional surrender” was official Allied policy in the prosecution of the war against both Germany and Japan. While Germany did in fact surrender unconditionally, the situation at war’s end with Japan was more complex. After the
defeat of Germany, the American war effort against Japan became confused by a myriad of issues including waning public will, a self-inflicted steadfastness to the policy of “unconditional surrender,” an ongoing demobilization, frightful casualty estimates for an invasion of Japan, and the recent invention of the atomic bomb. Japan’s eventual surrender was not in fact unconditional. Instead it was a craftily drawn compromise that allowed Japan to keep their institution of the Imperial State and their Emperor, while fulfilling the word if not the entire intent of the Potsdam Declaration. The term “unconditional surrender” is used here as a relative term to help explain the psychology behind the post WW II demobilization, the initial unwillingness of America to accept the realities of the developing Cold War, and as a comparison to the way that the Cold War ended. In that context the term fits. For a detailed treatment of American decisions relative to the surrender of Japan, see: Michael D. Pearlman, Unconditional Surrender, Demobilization, and the Atomic Bomb (Fort Leavenworth: Combat Studies Institute, 1996).


50 Abshire, 23-24. When America finally entered the contest of the Cold War, one of the first crises was the Greek insurgency. This was seen as particularly serious because it was a violation of the informal spheres-of-influence agreement of between Stalin and Churchill. When Britain proved economically incapable of supporting the Greek democracy, America was obliged to fill the void lest Greece fall to communism in short order. Tito of Yugoslavia and not the Soviet Union sponsored the communist insurgency in Greece. Although Stalin disapproved of Tito’s support for the insurgency—probably out of deference to his agreement with Churchill—the Greek insurgency was still seen as part of a worldwide communist conspiracy.

51 Khrushchev’s quote on the Monroe doctrine was in itself provocative. “We consider that the Monroe Doctrine has outlived its time, has outlived itself, has died, so to say, a natural death. Now the remains of this doctrine should best be buried as every dead body is so that it should not poison the air by its decay.” N.T. Carbomell, And the Russians Stayed: The Sovietization of Cuba (New York: 1989), 100. as quoted in Donald Kagan, On the Origins of War: and the Preservation of Peace (New York: Doubleday, 1995), 454.


53 Ibid., 176 and 271. Brodie is clear that a commitment to deterrence is equivalent to a “de emphasis of the offensive principal as irrelevant.”

54 Abshire, 23.
55 Ibid., 24.

56 Tarr, 65. As taken from the 1983/84 lesson plan for US Army Command and General Staff College Strategic Studies course outlined on page LP3-3-4. Massive retaliation is also described in Brodie, 248-263.


58 US Army Command and General Staff College Strategic Studies course outline pages LP4-4-14 through LP4-4-15.


60 The most notable change enacted by the later administrations of Nixon, Ford, Carter, and even Reagan was an attempt to deal with the Soviet Union on a friendlier basis along the lines of live-and-let-live. This “détente” did not change the overall strategy of containment. It was just a friendlier veneer to recognized stalemate. Both sides still recognized the profound incompatibility of the opposing ideologies. The fickle nature of détente did not fundamentally alter the nature of containment.

61 President Kennedy’s 1962 address to the American people during the Cuban missile crisis as quoted in Kagan, 437.

62 Brodie, 271.


64 Statement by Arthur J. Goldberg before the UN general Assembly on September 22, 1966. As quoted in the 1983/84 lesson plan for US Army Command and General Staff College Strategic Studies course outline.

65 Abshire, 12.

66 In 1980s it became clear that communism was an economic failure that might very well collapse of its own accord. In retrospect some might try to attribute such foreknowledge to the drafters of containment and see the strategy as one designed to hasten the demise of communism thereby changing the status quo. Assuming such foresight in the 1950s and 1960s would be in error. No policy document outlines a belief in the inevitable, self-inflicted collapse of communism when the strategy of containment
was drafted. The documents are clear that containment was designed as a means of defense against a strong, dangerous and growing threat.

67 Ibid., xviii.


69 Ibid., xi-xii.

70 Microsoft Encarta 98 Encyclopedia, s.v. John Locke [CD ROM] (Seattle: Microsoft Inc., 1998). John Locke (1632-1704) was an English philosopher who founded the school of empiricism. He believed in the innate goodness of man and questioned the divine right of royalty. His principals included the concepts of natural law, property rights, the duty of government to protect individual rights, and the rule of the majority. According to his theory mankind naturally gravitates toward goodness.


73 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1-3. The NSS is clear that a return to isolationism is not a viable option. On the contrary, the NSS foresees a growing need for American involvement due to the increased complexity of the post Cold War security environment.

74 Ibid., iii-iv. Although the NSS does not state an American intention to “dominate” the economic stage, the language used throughout the document reveals that intention. For example, what other nation states as one of its primary goals, the global spread of market capitalism and free markets. The very first paragraph of the preface to the NSS states an intention to “harness the forces of global integration,” and the need for American leadership is a constant theme throughout. Hence it is justifiable to state that American does intend to “dominate” the world’s economy. For another, perhaps even more forceful view of why America is so well positioned to dominate the globalized world economy see chapter 16 of: Thomas L. Friedman, The Lexus and the Olive Tree (New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 1999).

75 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, iii.

76 Ibid., 1. The term “instruments of national power” is used throughout the NSS document and refers to the full portfolio of “means” of policy execution. The term “DIME” was introduced earlier in this monograph s an acronym for the four previously
recognized instruments of national power (Diplomatic, Informational, Military, and Economic). The new acronym “DIMEL” is used here—perhaps for the first time—due to the addition of Law enforcement as a recognized instrument of national power.

77 Ibid., 5-6.

78 Oberdorfer, 307 and United States Department of State - Office of the North Korea Policy Coordinator. Review of United States Policy Toward North Korea: Findings and Recommendations (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1999), 2. Dr. Perry’s report—accomplished under the auspices of the State Department—acknowledged that in harvesting operations prior to 1994, North Korea has produced a “small amount of fissile material.” In Oberdorfer’s book, the amount is set at enough to produce “one or two bombs of about ten kilotons of explosive power each, similar to those exploded by the United States at Hiroshima.”


82 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1.


84 Ibid., iii.

85 The Weinberger doctrine—promoted by former Secretary of State Casper Weinberger—is a guideline for justifying the use of military force. According to the doctrine, America should not use military force unless there is a clear threat to a vital national interest, such use is the last resort, and overwhelming force is employed.

86 Thomas Hobbes. Leviathan pt 1 ch 4. Originally published in 1651. As quoted in John Bartlett. Familiar Quotations, ed. Justin Kaplan (Canada: Little, Brown and Company Inc., 1992), 239. Thomas Hobbes (1588-1679) was a philosopher and author who saw little good in the hearts of men. He saw man’s natural state as a life and death battle of “every man against every man” with no rules. According to Hobbes, the only factor that keeps society together and men from their natural state is “a common power to keep them all in awe” that is a common fear.

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