Unity of Effort: Crisis Beyond the FSCL

A Monograph
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ABSTRACT

UNITY OF EFFORT: CRISIS BEYOND THE FSCL by MAJ Christopher P. Gehler, USA, 50 pages.

This monograph examines joint doctrine's treatment of which component commander (land or air) controls operations between the fire support coordination line and the forward boundary within the Land Component Commander's area of operations. The Army and Air Force disagree over which component commander should control operations within this area. This monograph determines whether joint doctrine specifies or presents options for which component commander controls operations within this contested area or whether it simply presents overlapping responsibilities, without specification, that require further resolution to avoid confusion. The analysis uses specificity and consistency as criteria. Rather than explaining who should control operations beyond the FSCL, this monograph examines what joint doctrine says and how it resolves the interservice debate within the doctrine.

The first part of the monograph introduces the research question and nature of the issue. The next section presents the services' positions within the debate. The monograph then examines the service doctrines side-by-side to determine their differences as well as their consistencies. Next, the paper examines joint doctrine in detail. The manuals examined include Joint Pub 3-0, Operations, JP 3-03, Joint Interdiction Operations, JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, and JP 3-56.1, Command and Control of Joint Air Operations. The specific areas of the supported-supporting relationship, unity of effort, and the FSCL are covered in detail within the examinations of the service and joint doctrines. The monograph then examines the extent that two CINCs, CENTCOM and CFC Korea apply the doctrine directly. It determines what changes the CINCs see as necessary in the doctrine's employment. Finally, the monograph reviews the findings in the conclusion.

The monograph finds that joint doctrine does not resolve the interservice debate between the Army and Air Force. Rather it presents overlapping responsibilities that require further specification by the CINCs. These overlapping responsibilities are not presented as 'options' for the CINCs; rather they are ambiguous and conflicting responsibilities that detract from the goal of unity of effort. This aspect of joint doctrine is flawed. Joint doctrine should specify who controls operations within the area or present options for the CINC.
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Chapter 1

Introduction

*Joint Doctrine offers a common perspective from which to plan and operate, and fundamentally shapes the way we think about and train for war.*

*Joint Pub 1*

Authoritative military doctrine, such as joint doctrine, must empower warfighters and present them with options. The extent that joint doctrine fulfills this task determines its utility. Joint doctrine must effectively integrate joint forces without exposing weak points or seams that could either increase risk to friendly forces or reduce risk to enemy forces.¹ Joint doctrine should present tailorble employment options, not confusion.

Writing in *Joint Force Quarterly* several years ago, Generals Reimer and Fogleman, then service chiefs for the Army and Air Force respectively, acknowledged a lack of consensus on several key warfighting issues.² Among them was the issue of which component commander, land or air, should plan and control deep operations beyond the fire support coordination line (FSCL). This debate was not new; it predated the Persian Gulf War, though accounts of that war made the issue public knowledge.³ The services interpreted the events of the Gulf War differently; incorporating disparate lessons learned into their emerging service doctrines. Attempts by the services to build consensus and reconcile the debate were marginally successful. Through a series of Army – Air Force Warfighter Talks, the services debated the merits of each position. While they made progress in some areas, control of the deep fight remained a conundrum.⁴

The service disputes arose in areas where responsibilities, in the form of roles and missions, had the potential for overlap, and created questions over control of combat
assets. Control of operations beyond the FSCL was a case in point. The contested territory begins at the FSCL and extends to the limits of the Land Component Commander’s (LCC) forward boundary. Combat operations – or ‘the fight’ – inside the FSCL were clearly the LCC’s responsibility. Beyond the LCC forward boundary, the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) generally controlled operations. However, between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary, both services saw a legitimate claim for control of combat operations.

This contested area, between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary within the LCC AO, does not have a commonly agreed upon name in service or joint doctrine. Army doctrine, within its discussion of battlefield framework, describes operations in this area as deep operations. Deep battle, deep attack and deep supporting fires further describe missions there. Air Force doctrine recognizes combat operations beyond the FSCL as part of its Counterland mission. Air Interdiction, a subset of Counterland, is the primary mission associated with the area, though not exclusively. Joint doctrine’s treatment of control of operations between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary within the LCC AO is the focus of this paper.

In the wake of the passage of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act, joint operations and joint doctrine became permanent fixtures of the Armed Forces. Since its introduction, joint doctrine has been evolving and improving incrementally, maintaining the theme that joint warfare is team warfare. However, “this does not mean that all forces will be equally represented in each operation. Joint force commanders choose the capabilities they need....” Joint doctrine presents fundamental principles and is authoritative; it “deals with the fundamental issue of how best to
employ the national military power to achieve strategic ends (emphasis from original)." Given its role, the question arises as to how joint doctrine deals with the interservice debate over which component commander controls combat operations – or 'the fight' – beyond the FSCL but within the LCC AO.

The research question of this monograph is: Does joint doctrine resolve the debate between the Army and Air Force over which component commander, land or air, controls the fight between the FSCL and the forward boundary within the Land Component Commander’s area of operations? The hypothesis of the monograph is that joint doctrine does not resolve the Army-Air Force interservice debate. Rather than specify who controls the fight, joint doctrine appears to present overlapping responsibilities. This potential overlap could create confusion and in many ways fuel service parochialism. In the end, the CINCs must determine their theater and campaign strategy and how each component will integrate into that strategy. Rather than providing the CINC with clear options, joint doctrine may be providing a conflict of responsibilities that every CINC must address prior to hostilities.

The scope of this monograph is limited to examining this Army-Air Force interservice debate and its treatment within joint doctrine. Though the Navy and Marine Corps add to both the interservice dialogue and combat operations within the contested area, this paper will only address the debate as described. The Army and Air Force are the predominant forces within their functional roles and, as such, are the lead agents tasked with developing and writing the specific joint doctrine manuals examined by this monograph.
To answer the research question this monograph determines whether joint doctrine clearly specifies who controls operations within the contested area. Specificity requires that joint doctrine identify only one component commander to control operations within the given area for a specific time or phase and when that should change. The monograph also determines the level of consistency throughout joint and service doctrine. Consistency requires that joint and service doctrine hold the same position on who controls the operations within the contested area. These two criteria, specificity and consistency, determine whether or not joint doctrine resolves the debate. Resolution within joint doctrine is the key. Joint doctrine should not foster debate through lack of specificity or consistency. While it can present debatable options, joint doctrine should not create confusion over responsibilities. It is authoritative doctrine; as such, service doctrine must be consistent and compatible with it.

Chapter 2 of the monograph presents the services’ positions in the debate. It first examines the Army position and then the Air Force position. The intent for the chapter is to present the positions objectively; the sections within the chapter advocate the respective service position with minimal editorial commentary. The chapter concludes with a brief examination of pressures on the services outside of joint doctrine. These pressures are important to mention as they certainly fuel the interservice debate. A discussion of this interservice conflict would not be complete without addressing these pressures.

Chapter 3 presents a service doctrine cross-reference. It evaluates the level of specificity and consistency between the two service doctrines. To determine this, it examines treatment within service doctrine on the areas of the supported-supporting

Chapter 4 examines relevant joint doctrine. Relevant joint doctrine for this subject includes Joint Pub (JP) 3-0, *Doctrine for Joint Operations* (1995); JP 3-03, *Doctrine for Joint Interdiction Operations* (1997); JP 3-09, *Doctrine for Joint Fire Support* (1998); and JP 3-56.1, *Command and Control for Joint Air Operations* (1994). The Army, as the lead agent, developed and wrote JPs 3-0 and 3-09. By contrast, 3-03 and 3-56.1 are Air Force lead agent publications. Regardless of the lead agent, the publications all address the issue of combat operations between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary. The examination determines the specificity and consistency within these documents by again evaluating the supported-supporting relationship, unity of effort, and the purpose and use of the FSCL. By the conclusion of this chapter, all the elements necessary to answer the research question are available.

Chapter 5 tests some of the initial conclusions drawn from the previous two chapters by examining joint doctrine in action, as applied by two CINCs. The author reviews current and emerging theater policies for fighting between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary for CENTCOM and the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command (CFC). The level of clarity and specificity of joint doctrine should be evident if consistent procedures exist among the CINCs. Here again the author reviews the supported-supporting relationship, unity of effort, and the purpose and use of
the FSCL. Application of doctrine should highlight the specificity and consistency of joint doctrine.

The final chapter synthesizes the analysis presented. The monograph concludes with a review of the major elements presented. It also presents some final thoughts and implications from the analysis.
Chapter 2

The Interservice Debate

Regardless of how complementary our views on joint operations might be, specific responsibilities produce legitimate differences among component commanders. Generals Reimer and Fogleman

The Army Position

The Army believes that LCCs should plan and synchronize fires in the entire land AO.\textsuperscript{12} This position springs from the idea that the operational-level land force commander dominates land combat and provides decisive results for the CINC or JFC.\textsuperscript{13} To support the JFCs aims, the LCC dominates the opponent in his battlespace through depth and simultaneous attack. However, he cannot maximize depth unilaterally; he must integrate joint capabilities. More specifically, the LCC is the primary coordinator and integrator of joint capabilities within his battlespace, while the JFC coordinates and integrates joint force operations elsewhere in theater.\textsuperscript{14} Army doctrine acknowledges that the LCC is not always the supported force; often it is a supporting force.\textsuperscript{15} It also acknowledges that through campaign design, the CINC/JFC provides his vision and concept of how the joint force will achieve the overall objectives specifying phases, priorities of effort, and design for synchronizing effects.\textsuperscript{16} “Ground combat operations have the best chance for success when synchronized with air superiority and air interdiction operations.”\textsuperscript{17} This concept is similar to the tactical concept of combined arms operations. “The Army will not operate alone...but as part of a joint, combined, or interagency team.”\textsuperscript{18} The concept is to pose a dilemma for the enemy; as he avoids one capability, he opens himself to attack by another. A combination of forces, symmetrical
and asymmetrical, provides balance, a key to success.\textsuperscript{19} This is a consistent theme in discussions of maneuver and interdiction.

A key element of both maneuver and interdiction is operational fire. FM 100-7 describes the operational-level commander’s role regarding operational fires:

The (LCC) in supporting the CINC’s campaign plan, plans operational fires within his AO. His major role is to synchronize ground and air operational fires in his AO to achieve operational and tactical objectives. The (LCC) applies operational fires in depth to achieve operational objectives quickly with minimum casualties.\textsuperscript{20}

The LCC nominates targets that he cannot strike with his organic and allocated assets to the Joint Targeting Control Board (JTCB). These fires facilitate maneuver, isolate the battlefield, and/or destroy critical enemy functions and facilities. His intent is to extend the battlefield in time and space, without providing the enemy a place to hide or rest, and critically limiting his freedom to maneuver. In this way, he can hasten the enemy’s physical destruction, disintegrate cohesive enemy operations, and demoralize the enemy’s will to fight.\textsuperscript{21}

Army doctrine advances the unique role of the ground commander in understanding the capabilities, strengths, and weaknesses of the enemy ground forces, just as the air commander must understand for the opposing enemy air forces. Successful interdiction requires the expertise of both air and ground components. However, “when the campaign calls for ground operations to be decisive operations or defeat mechanisms, planning for the interdiction operations and target prioritization must be based on the ground commander’s concept of operations.”\textsuperscript{22}

The Army position embraces a joint approach that integrates across functional components (cross-functional) for success with minimum risks, as appropriate and within
the JFC's intent. This cross-functional approach is often referred to as the synergism argument, which holds that the capabilities of the various services should be blended in response to a given crisis.23 The Army sees the LCC as the commander responsible for blending or synchronizing these assets. Within his AO, the ground commander is the supported commander; outside his AO and for specific missions, he is a supporting commander. As the supported commander, he controls the operations including the contributions of the other functional components, within his AO. Unity of effort achieved through coordination and cooperation, regardless of command structure, is essential.24

The Air Force Position

The Air Force considers the JFACC best suited to coordinate fires beyond the fire support coordination line.25 A basic tenet in Air Force doctrine is centralized planning-decentralized execution, which is closely associated to the principle of war of unity of command.26 Following these concepts, the Air Force posits that joint interdiction needs the direction of a single commander. As the supported commander for air interdiction, the JFACC uses the JFC's priorities to plan and execute the theater wide interdiction effort, unconstrained by surface boundaries.27 AFDD 2, Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, continues:

By definition, the JFACC must control and execute the air and space assets of the other Services, in whole or in part, depending on the situation. However, the other Services have developed their air arms with differing doctrinal and operating constructs in mind. They have other mission priorities (primarily support of surface forces) that constrain their availability to exploit the full scope of air and space operations at the strategic and operational levels of war.28
Air Interdiction is the mission commonly, though not exclusively, associated with the area between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary. Distance and time are key elements of AI. AI is employed against enemy surface power and beyond the range at which it can effectively engage friendly surface forces. This distance minimizes the risk of fratricide and reduces the need to deconflict air maneuver and surface fires. Additionally, the timing when effects of AI will be felt can take days or even weeks. This also reduces the level of coordination necessary. In some cases, AI can provide the sole effort against enemy ground forces.

The combination of the centralized planning-decentralized execution tenet and the minimal requirement for coordination with ground forces for AI suggests that the air component commander is the commander best suited to run the ‘deep fight.’ The area between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary is only a small portion of the deep combat operations that the JFACC already controls. The JFACC has the requisite command, control, and coordination methods in place and is the natural choice. Through the ATO, the JFACC can insure unity of effort and directly accomplish the JFCs strategic and operational objectives. The JFACC will establish specific priorities for theater-wide AI and will apply those priorities to targets both inside and outside any surface AOs, based on JFC guidance. This way airpower is not diluted by tactical commanders, but maintains a theater-wide perspective.

Opposed to the Army’s ‘cross-functional’ component view of joint operations, the Air Force embraces a ‘within-functional’ component view of joint operations, where the air function rests with the JFACC. ‘Joint’ in this sense applies to the air assets of the services responding to the JFACC. Air operations must be joint is the mantra. This
‘within-functional’ approach is referred to, as the specialization argument, which states that all services, should stick to the roles for which they were established.32 Surface commander needs are tertiary and diluting. Across-functional joint operations should be minimized. Airpower is best controlled by airmen to achieve operational and strategic objectives rather than support a surface commander. In this way airpower should be seen as operational maneuver, not supporting fires.33

**Extra-Doctrinal Forces**

Pressure on this debate comes from sources outside of doctrinal halls as well. Since Operation Desert Storm, “Deep Attack”, in its larger sense, has evolved from a corps commander’s concept into a primary tool for fulfilling the joint force commander’s objectives.34 The services see specialization in this area as a natural extension and progression of their individual competencies. However, those charged with reducing the defense budget often view overlapping capabilities as an expensive redundancy.35

The last decade witnessed a Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), a Bottom-Up Review (BUR), and a Deep Attack Weapons Mix Study (DAWMS), all with an objective of creating savings in the defense budget.36 These documents deal with strategic concepts of how to reduce defense costs while preserving a means to win wars; their outcome can and will have a significant influence on doctrine. In many ways the services state their cases for budget battles within their doctrine.37

In early 1996, CENTCOM CINC, Army GEN J.H. Peay III, advanced a strategic concept for his theater that postulated airpower would be less effective in the next conflict in his region.38 This caused protests from Air Force headquarters; Air Force Chief of Staff GEN Fogelman became the first service chief to officially nonconcur with
a combatant commander’s major concept plan on the basis of its fundamental strategy. Fogleman contended the plan inappropriately applied airpower and thus would produce unacceptable casualties and prolong the conflict.\textsuperscript{39} This led the Air Force to develop and advance what came to be known as the “Halt Phase” strategy.\textsuperscript{40} Its earliest and main proponent was retired Air Force Maj. Gen. Charles D. Link, the Air Forces’ point man on the QDR.\textsuperscript{41} The halt phase strategy became a key concept advanced by the QDR and has since found its way into Air Force doctrine. As Air Force Col. Rich Meeboer, one of the senior planners who challenged the CENTCOM strategy observed: the Air Force “can’t effectively compete” in the world of joint experimentation and shrinking budgets unless it can point to a piece of paper that clearly lays out the USAF perspective on how to fight wars.\textsuperscript{42} Joint and Service doctrine has increasingly become the place for this codification.

Budget pressures, which exist outside of joint doctrine, are always present. In fulfilling their mission of manning, equipping, and training their forces, the services are on the front line of advancing the arguments for the resources to meet their roles and missions. A service’s view of their roles and missions may be expansive for sound doctrinal reasons as well as budgetary reasons. Often these reasons are woven tightly. Both reasons pit service against service for the claim of a role or mission. Determining the underlying basis for the claim is often impossible, as the arguments become circular. This monograph examines the interservice debate within doctrine. It acknowledges the external pressures present without discounting them. While these external pressures often fuel debate, joint doctrine must provide the warfighter with options, not debate: with clarity, rather than confusion.
Chapter 3

Service Doctrine Cross-Reference

There are no actual villains in this scenario: each service sought to accomplish the mission but was looking at the situation through a lens colored by its own concept of warfighting.\textsuperscript{43}

Bernard E. Trainor

The Army and Air Force are natural partners in the conduct of operations on and over land.\textsuperscript{44} However, as noted, they do not always have identical views on every issue. This chapter examines the extent of commonality between the two services’ doctrines on fighting beyond the fire support coordination line but within the land force AO. It looks for the similarity within the positions on the following subjects: supported-supporting relationship, unity of effort and control, and the purpose and use of the FSCL. This provides the basis for understanding key differences and similarities, and thus the essence of the debate. With this, the monograph can continue to examine joint doctrine’s progress in resolving the debate.

Supported-Supporting

Army and Air Force doctrine both use the concept of supported and supporting commanders as contained within JP 3-0 and defined by JP 0-2, "Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF)"

"Unless limited by establishing directive, the commander of the supported force will have the authority to exercise general direction of the supporting effort. General direction includes the designation and prioritization of targets or objectives, timing and duration of the supporting action, and other instructions necessary for coordination and efficiency." The supporting commander has the responsibility to ascertain the needs of the supported commander and take action to fulfill them as is within existing capabilities, consistent with priorities and requirements of other assigned tasks (emphasis from the original).\textsuperscript{55}
With this common understanding, the question then becomes who is supported and who is supporting. FM 100-7 states that the LCC maybe the supported commander for planning and execution of major operations within the CINC/JFCs plan. Specifically it cites JP 3-0 and states that the LCC “is the supported commander for air interdiction in his AO and therefore specifies target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations therein.” It continues:

As the supported commander, the (LCC) provides necessary guidance (restrictions, constraints) for all operations in the area beyond the FSCL and within the (LCC) AO. The LCC does not necessarily have to control the supporting operations or joint service activities in this area. Still, supporting commanders must follow the LCC’s intent and guidance for activities in this area. Control of interdiction becomes a functional example... Thus the LCC does not need to directly control the overall interdiction effort (air, ground) but, as the supported commander, he exercises general direction over interdiction and other activities of supporting commanders in his AO.47

FMs 100-5 and 100-7 discuss the Army/LCC’s potential role as a supporting commander, though neither specifically acknowledges the JFACC’s role as the supported commander for theater-wide air interdiction; this specification would possibly require explanation of the distinction between the two supported commanders’ responsibilities. These manuals are content to not address the issue directly. This subject and other aspects of the JFACC’s role are covered in great detail in FM 6-20-10, Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for the Targeting Process. However, within the area between the FSCL and the forward boundary, the Army position is consistent: the LCC is the supported commander within his AO, inclusive of Air Interdiction.

AFDD 1, Air Force Basic Doctrine, establishes that the JFACC is the supported commander for air interdiction.48 It stresses that surface and air commanders must cooperate to identify critical targets, when they will be hit, and how surface and
interdiction operations will complement each other. *Counterland* continues this theme but makes mention of a supporting role. "The JFACC...is the supported commander for the JFC's overall air interdiction effort and a supporting commander when providing CAS or AI to the ground commander." It addresses the subject later saying:

Based on the JFC's guidance, the JFACC will normally establish the specific priorities for theater-wide AI and will apply these to air interdiction targets located both inside and outside any surface AOs. The surface commander can determine specific targets for air interdiction or, more preferably, provide the air component mission-type instructions that allow more leeway in tactical mission planning... Ultimately, interdiction priorities within the surface AO are considered along with the theater-wide priorities, that are established by the JFC and guide the overall targeting process.

Though there is no specific mention of the ground commander being the supported commander for AI within his AO, the passages do allude to it by discussing the JFACC's supporting role when providing AI to the ground commander. The issue of supported-supporting becomes determining whether the AI is responding to the ground commander or to the air commander for theater-wide AI.

A key element in the supported-supporting concept is targeting. The battle between the FSCL and the LCC forward boundary can involve fires from all the services. What those fires are directed against is an issue of targeting. Targeting is a matter of specifics: priorities, timing, and effects. All services have the ability and need to target. At issue are which targets get hit, with what, and for how long are often. FM 100-5 stays within its theme of being the supported commander stating that the LCC decides what activities occur within his AO and how they contribute to his mission accomplishment. Designation of individual targets or sets of targets, priority, timing and effects are all the purview of the supported commander, the LCC within AO. This designation ability
allows the LCC to synchronize joint actions, specifically maneuver and interdiction. According to FM 100-5, synchronization is the ability to focus resources in time and space to produce maximum relative combat power at the decisive point.52

Contrasting with this view, the Air Force sees targeting throughout the JFC AOR as a functional (air) responsibility.53 As the supported commander for theater-wide AI, the JFACC designates targets wherever they are located including within the surface AO. While the target priorities of the surface commander will be considered, counterland operations must primarily respond to theater-wide priorities or risk dilution to the point of ineffectiveness.54

After Desert Storm, concern for joint target development grew. All services, with the exception of the Air Force, supported the formalization of the Joint Targeting Coordination Board (JTCB) as a tool for JFCs.55 Proponents of the JTCB advocated that the board, rather than a single component (JFACC), should deliberate and determine target priorities, and have and influence on apportionment of assets. The Air Force, as the proponent for the JFACC, saw this as an assault on its responsibility and authority.56 Subsequent development of the concept led to two schools of thought: the position supported by the Air Force of a JTCB subordinated to the JFACC and the position of the other services of an "honest broker" style JTCB operating at the JFC level.57 The Army (supported by the Navy and Marines) saw targeting as the responsibility of all services, not subordinate to a single component. The Air Force had concerns that a JTCB would dilute the theater-wide focus of its targeting effort. The Army views the JTCB as a necessary balance to conflicting JFACC priorities in its ability to target, as the supported commander, within its AO.
The service doctrines clearly present opposing themes if not tacit confrontation. The literal reading of service’s doctrinal publications shows some congruence, though the position of each service is clear. Both services stress their supported roles as would be natural, but neither actively acknowledges the other’s applicable joint ‘supported commander’ roles. The Air Force position comes close by acknowledging the supporting relationship when providing CAS and AI to the ground commander, but seemingly contradicts itself when discussing targeting without out regard for surface boundaries. The Army position is equally silent in its primary manuals, though it does openly acknowledge the relationship in The Targeting Process. Though the service doctrines may be technically accurate, the themes presented are clearly parochial positions.

Unity of Effort

Team warfare that seeks all members of the team to contribute to a common objective or endstate requires unity of command and unity of effort. Unity of effort is a complementary theme to the principle of war, unity of command. It acknowledges that not every situation allows for forces working toward a common objective to be in the same chain of command. FM 100-5 says that unity of effort requires coordination and cooperation. “Collateral and main force operations might go on simultaneously, united by intent and purpose, if not command.”58 More to the subject at hand, FM 100-5 asserts that unity of effort is essential to operation within a given battlespace. “Ownership of assets is less important than the application of their effects toward an intended purpose. In that way, battlespace can overlap, shared by two adjacent commanders who perceive ways to employ their respective assets to mutual advantage.”59 This statement captures
the potential situation and suggests that coordination and cooperation, the essence of unity of effort, is the answer.

Within this debate, the first unity of effort problem is what is the common objective and who sets it. The LCC's plan directly supports the JFC's plan and achieves operational-level objectives as directed. Likewise, the JFACC's air operations plan supports the achievement of the JFC's objectives. Establishing what the common objective is among competing objectives, all within overlapping battlespace, becomes key.

AFDD 1 discusses the need for unity of effort, in lieu of unity of command, but suggests it is no substitute. Unity of command is important for all forces, but it is vital in employing air and space forces. Centralized C2 is essential for fusing the JFACC's capabilities. Airmen best understand air and space power.

Theater and global ranging capabilities impose theater and global ranging responsibilities, which can be discharged only through the integrating function of centralized control under an airman. This is the essence of unity of command and air and space power.

*Counterland* continues in this vein:

Since there will rarely be enough counterland-capable assets to meet all demands, a single air commander can best ensure the unity of effort required for optimum use of those assets; designating a JFACC adheres to the principle of unity of command.

The services' doctrines recognize the concept of unity of effort, but neither develops it in great detail. As with the supported-supporting relationship, both doctrines stress their particular roles. The Army's greater accommodation for unity of effort seems to come from its 'across-functional' component joint warfighting concept. Army doctrine stresses the need and role for airpower in successful combat operations. That
role can be supporting, mutually supporting, and in some cases supported. Air Force doctrine stresses a ‘within-functional’ component joint approach, to pool like-assets under a single air commander to achieve operational objectives. Support outside of the component function is a secondary and diluting concern for the JFACC.

The Fire Support Coordination Line

In many ways, the purpose and use of the fire support coordination line is at the heart of the interservice debate. The services see this line from distinctly differing points of view. The events of Operation Desert Storm led many to view the FSCL as a boundary, dividing the land and air battles. ⁶⁴ While not a boundary, its purpose and use have evolved over the years since its inception.

The fire support coordination line traces its roots to the post-World War II bomb line which was established by the ground commander to facilitate aerial engagement while protecting friendly troops. ⁶⁵ The original definition of the FSCL in the 1961 Field Artillery Tactics manual focused on allowing the commander to coordinate fires not directly under his control but may have an effect on current operations. ⁶⁶ From 1961 until the introduction of AirLand battle in 1982, the FSCL became a coordination measure that effectively protected friendly troops short of the line and allowed for attacks from all forces, especially air, beyond the line. Additionally, it delineated air operations short of the line as CAS, and air operations beyond the line as AI, effectively giving the air commander control of sorties beyond the line. ⁶⁷

Technological advances combined with AirLand battle doctrine created the possibility for greater control and synchronization of operations in depth. Ground commanders were becoming able to conduct operations and synchronize actions (and
beginning to) within their entire AO rather than just portions of it. Where once the Army was content to allow the Air Force to attack targets independently within portions of the ground zone, AirLand battle and emerging deep operations theory sought to provide all actions in the AO with a unity of effort.

In 1996, through the Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks, the Army and Air Force agreed upon several issues regarding the FSCL. Key among these was that all targets forward of the FSCL and inside the LCC’s AO would be coordinated with all affected commanders to the maximum extent possible. The talks also established that the LCC is the supported commander throughout his AO for joint fires while the JFACC is the supported commander beyond those boundaries. However, the agreement changed nothing regarding target prioritization, which the JFACC still effectively controlled, throughout the theater. This agreement was a compromise for both services.

Given the LCC’s expanding desire for control of operations throughout his AO, the question arose over the utility of the FSCL. FM 6-20-10, The Targeting Process, explains there is an implicit suitability test of the FSCL for the LCC. As the LCC’s desire for control beyond the FSCL expands, the utility of the FSCL diminishes. Both FMs 100-5 and 100-7 predate the Warfighter Talks and advance the need for coordination and synchronization of supporting fires to achieve success. FM 100-7 states the purpose of the FSCL is to allow supporting fires to swiftly attack targets of opportunity within the guidance given by the LCC for operations in his AO.

The Air Force advances a position that seeks to limit the expansion of the ground commander’s role. The FSCL, from the Air Force perspective, effectively ends the point that the ground commander ‘controls’ combat assets; this interpretation allows for the
JFACC to assume control of the assets, primarily air, beyond the FSCL. *Counterland* states that:

The purpose of the FSCL, as stated in joint doctrine, is to ensure the coordination of fire not under the surface commander’s control but which may affect his current tactical situation... the FSCL is primarily used to establish command and control for planning and execution purposes; it does not define mission types.\(^73\)

Therefore, the surface commander does not control these fires beyond the FSCL.

The Air Force uses the FSCL as a dividing line for control of missions between the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC), which supports the ground commander, and the Air Operations Center (AOC/JAOC), which supports the JFACC. The ASOC:

is directly subordinate to the JAOC, and is responsible for the coordination and control of air component missions within its associated ground commander’s area of operations (AO). This AO typically extends (out) to the FSCL for actual control of mission execution and may extend to the corps’ forward boundary for planning and advisory purposes.\(^74\)

CAS is the purview of the ASOC, while AI is controlled by the AOC. Though the AOC may retask AI to the ASOC, unless specifically delegated, targeting authority for AI missions remains with the AOC.\(^75\) If the ground commander does not designate a FSCL, as *The Targeting Process* considered, the JFACC will employ “beyond FSCL” procedures right up to the FLOT under JFACC control. “The important point is that by not designating a FSCL the ground commander does not gain more control of counterland assets; instead it reduces the ground commander’s ability to coordinate aerospace power not under his control.”\(^76\) This directly questions the LCC’s control within his AO.

Both the Air Force and the Army assert technically congruent positions (post Warfighter Talks) on the FSCL, but, the underlying themes and intents of the their
doctrines are opposed. The Army sees the FSCL as a permissive measure; though internally, the Army is questioning the FSCL’s utility given the ground commander’s increasing capabilities. The Air Force sees it as a restrictive measure, delineating the ground and air efforts. While the ground commander wants to coordinate all attacks beyond the FSCL, the Air Force sees the attempt as a threat to its AI mission that will inherently reduce potential mission effectiveness.77

This examination of the supported-supporting relationship, unity of effort, and the purpose and use of the FSCL, has shown that there is a great deal of technical compatibility. The literal words often say very similar things. However, the concepts are presented in themes that advance service perspectives. Winnefeld and Johnson, in Joint Air Operations, make this observation:

“Service doctrines and traditions are a two edged sword: they provide a rationale and a way to fight, but they are a detriment when they are considered superior to either joint doctrine or what must often substitute for it, the joint commander’s plan and fighting instructions.”78

The Army advances a cross-functional component “joint” approach while Air Force promotes a within-functional component “joint” approach. Bernard Trainor points out that the service that depends the most on support from a sister service will champion jointness (cross-functional), while services (or functional components) capable of semi-autonomous action are inclined to go their own way if circumstances allow.79 The Army is an example of the first characterization, while the Air Force is an example of the second.

Service doctrine promotes a vision for the service’s employment. They each advocate their perspective, though not necessarily “the” joint perspective. While the CINC’s employ forces, the services develop the doctrine that guides that employment.
Neither service hides this point. The introduction of FM 100-5 says that, "as the Army's keystone doctrine, FM 100-5 describes how the Army thinks about the conduct of operations." Correspondingly, AFDD1 states, "its purpose is to promulgate the Air Force perspective on the employment of air and space power." Both doctrines claim compatibility with joint doctrine, which may be technically correct. An examination of joint doctrine is necessary to determine this compatibility.
Chapter 4

Joint Doctrine

The nature of modern warfare demands that we fight as a joint team. This was important yesterday, it is essential today, and it will be even more imperative tomorrow. John M. Shalikashvili

The role of joint doctrine is to present fundamental principles gained from collective warfighting experience to achieve a unity of effort. It is not policy or strategy; rather it deals with how best to employ national power to achieve strategic ends. It is an authoritative way of conducting combat operations (national power) to achieve the goals of policy and strategy. Given the different approaches presented by the services, which is the “joint” way? Does joint doctrine specify what is the “joint” way, and is it consistent in its position? Ideally, joint doctrine should either prescribe the approved joint answer or provide the JFC with options. It should not however, provide conflicting guidance open to wide interpretation.

Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations, is the keystone document for joint doctrine. It plays the critical role in how joint operations are conducted. Because of its role, JP 3-0 will be the baseline to check the other joint doctrines against. However, since the Army was the lead agent for JP 3-0, this examination will highlight differing perspectives, especially within the Air Force lead agent documents.

Supported-Supporting

The JFC establishes areas of operation for land and naval forces based on their concept of the operation and their requirement for depth to maneuver rapidly and conduct combat operations at extended ranges. Within these AOs, land and naval commanders are designated the supported commander. This statement is under the subheading of
“Synchronizing Maneuver and Interdiction” in the “Joint Operations in War” chapter. It does not specify supported for what, but rather is open-ended. The passage continues:

(These supported commanders) are responsible for the synchronization of maneuver, fires, and interdiction. To facilitate this synchronization, such commanders designate the target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction operations within their AOs.  

Joint Pub 3-03, Joint Interdiction, and JP 3-09, Joint Fires Support, use the same language. JP 3-56.1, C2 for Joint Air Operations, is less encompassing. The JFACC functions as a supporting commander for CAS and AI within the land AO, but the section does not discuss synchronization.

JP 3-0 continues that it is incumbent upon the supported commander to clearly articulate his vision of operations to supporting commanders. Once the supporting commanders understand what the supported commander wants accomplished, they “can normally plan and execute their operations with only that (emphasis added) coordination required with supported commanders.”

This passage seems to downplay the level of required coordination to synchronize the supported commander’s fight.

Critical to understanding the supported-supporting relationship is target prioritization. JP 3-0 specifies that interdiction target priorities within land and naval boundaries are considered along with the theater/JOA-wide interdiction priorities. Several references in JP 3-0 add that theater/JOA-wide interdiction is conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations. While JP 3-0 gives surface commanders the ability to set targets and priorities, JP 3-56.1 counters that the JFACC is empowered with broad targeting oversight functions including deconfliction and coordination.

Implicit in this statement is the necessary conformation of the LCC’s priorities to those of the JFACC/JFC. These priorities are reflected in the apportionment decision. Here, joint
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doctrine tries to accommodate all concerned. The LCC sets priorities, but those targets will be hit according to the JFACC/JFC overall priorities.

The doctrine does not discuss phasing in these passages or when the JFACC’s effort is paramount to the LCC’s. The overlapping concerns of the JFACC and LCC are considered through the apportionment decision. Realizing this overlap, doctrine cautions that JFCs need to carefully balance doctrinal imperatives that may be in tension, including the needs of the maneuver force and the undesirability of fragmenting Theater/JOA air assets.\textsuperscript{89} JP 3-0 adds that JFCs establish target nominations to specifically highlight their joint interdiction needs that could affect planned or ongoing maneuver.\textsuperscript{90} The intent here is to provide added visibility to these needs, presumably to allow the JFC to revisit the apportionment and or targeting recommendations.

All of these documents agree that the LCC is the supported commander within his AO and that the JFACC is the supported commander for theater/JOA-wide interdiction. This presents an overlap of responsibilities that is common throughout. The parenthetical caveat added within JP 3-0 and 3-03, that JOA-level interdiction “is conducted relatively independent of surface maneuver operations” does not significantly clarify. Questions of what takes precedence, the supported relationship or theater-wide targeting priorities are not adequately specified, presenting precedence for both. Effectively, this lack of specificity creates confusion over who should control the operations, which include the targeting function.

\textbf{Unity of Effort}

Joint doctrine fully embraces the concept of unity of effort and discusses it prominently. It is essential for the joint team’s success. JFCs achieve unity of effort
through campaign design: unity of effort is a campaign planning fundamental. The purpose of establishing support relationships, as outlined above, is “to enhance unity of effort for given operational tasks, emphasize or clarify priorities, provide a subordinate with an additional capability, or combine the effects of similar assets.” While all joint forces support the JFC, support relationships establish a unity of effort for subordinate objectives that support the JFC objectives.

Designation of the main effort, by phase, promotes unity of effort and provides focus. This concept, further developed, could provide guidance on who controls the fight forward of FSCL but inside the LCC forward boundary. JP 3-09, Joint Fire Support, the newest of the examined publications, provides additional insight. This manual acknowledges the increasing overlap of capabilities (though not responsibilities) and places the burden of ensuring unity of effort on the JFC. Establishing a main effort by phase, an overall supported commander, is an option in resolving the overlap.

The two Air Force lead-agent publications, JP 3-03 and 3-56.1, both stress unity of effort in conjunction with the concept of centralized planning-decentralized execution. This treatment of unity of effort is mainly concerned with the functional responsibilities of the JFACC and the overall theater-wide mission. Unity of effort prevents dilution of assets from the overall theater/JOA-wide mission. JPs 3-03 and 3-56.1 only discuss unity of effort within functional responsibilities, such as title heading “Unity of Effort in Joint Interdiction”; their mention of cross-functional unity of effort is alluded to only in the joint doctrine common pages in the Preface.

Ambiguities and overlaps in perceived responsibilities make it necessary for the JFC to actively ensure unity of effort. Though doctrine discusses unity of effort, the
provided means of achieving it are contradictory. It becomes incumbent upon the JFC to ensure unity of effort through additional clarification, procedures, and framework not fully addressed in this doctrine.

Fire Support Coordination Line

Joint Doctrine categorizes the fire support coordination line as a permissive control measure. The appropriate surface commander establishes it in consultation with higher, supporting and affected commanders. JP 3-0 says that:

Supporting elements may attack targets beyond the FSCL, provided the attacks will not produce adverse effects on, or to the rear of, the line. The FSCL is not a boundary – the synchronization of operations either side of the FSCL is the responsibility of the establishing commander out to the limits of the land or amphibious force boundary.94

Use of a FSCL by the LCC eases the coordination requirements for attack operations within the AO by forces not under their control, such as naval gunfire and air interdiction. It applies to types of fires against surface targets. The concern for coordination of attacks beyond the FSCL recognizes that various forces operate beyond the FSCL and therefore risk fratricide, as well as the concern for inefficiency through redundant targeting.

The treatment of the FSCL is identical in Joint Interdiction Operations and virtually unmentioned in C2 for Joint Air Operations. However, Joint Fire Support presents an important “change” in doctrine. This new publication states:

The establishment of an FSCL does not create a “free-fire area” (FFA) beyond the FSCL. When targets are attacked beyond an FSCL, supporting element’s attacks must not produce adverse effects on or to the rear of the line. Attacks beyond the FSCL must be consistent with the establishing commander’s priorities, timing, and desired effects and deconflicted whenever possible with the supported headquarters.95
This is a distinct change in the discussion of the FSCL. It recognizes the LCC as the supported commander within his AO and his requisite “unity of effort” in targeting and attacks. This is consistent with the JP 3-0 and further supports the point that the LCC “synchronizes operations in his AO by designating target priority, effects, and timing of interdiction in his AO.”

Doctrine for *Joint Fire Support*, dated 12 May 1998, updates the doctrinal discussion of the FSCL and presents a modification to the definition of the term. The updated purpose of the FSCL is to “facilitate expeditious attack of surface targets of opportunity beyond the coordinating measure.” Interestingly, the definition of the term, approved for inclusion in the next edition of JP 1-02, does not include the strengthened reference of “consistent with” the supported commander’s priorities as discussed in JP 3-09. The new definition deletes any reference to “not under control of,” as well as, “tactical” operations. However, this new definition clearly contradicts the old purpose of the FSCL cited in the latest *Counterland*, dated 27 August 1999 (published over a year after JP 3-09), being “to ensure the coordination of fire not under the surface commander’s control but may affect his current tactical situation (emphasis from the original).” It is doubtful that the citation of the old definition was an oversight; the service had been negotiating a new definition for years. Rather, the new definition is clearly at odds with the basic Air Force position.

**Findings**

Joint Doctrine does not specify which commander controls the fight forward of the FSCL to the LCC forward boundary for all operations or even some operations. Rather, it presents overlapping responsibilities that must be reconciled by prevailing
priorities. The latest discussion of the FSCL in JP 3-09 presents a potential answer to the question, but is countered by both the priorities discussion (contained throughout these joint publications as well as within 3-09) and its less precise approved definition. The language of joint agreements, as Trainor noted, is often ambiguous. This apparent victory by the Army is as dubious as it is pyrrhic. The concessions that allowed the Air Force to agree to this treatment of the FSCL came with the price of concessions from the Army’s Theater Air Defense mission. Essentially, both lead agents held the other’s manual (the Army’s JP 3-09 and the Air Force’s JP 3-01, Countering Air and Missile Threats) hostage to each service demands. These concessions broke the “doctrinal logjam.” However, these agreements to sub-points do not end the conflict of overlapping responsibilities.
Chapter 5

Doctrine in Action

As a guiding principle, Joint Force Commanders should exploit the flexibility inherent in joint force command relationships, joint targeting procedures, and other techniques to resolve the issues that can arise from the relationship between interdiction and maneuver.\textsuperscript{102}

General Colin Powell

The test of doctrine comes from its application and utility in the field and ultimately in combat. How it is applied should indicate some measure of how clear and understandable it is. Consistency in its application suggests specificity and clarity. Lack of consistency may suggest a lack of clarity or specificity, though theater application issues may also affect this. With this in mind, this monograph now examines the application of doctrine by two CINCs: CENTCOM and the Republic of Korea-United States Combined Forces Command (CFC). It is important to note that the standard operating procedures of the CINCs are authoritative and directive, and take precedence over joint and service doctrine if a conflict between them arises.

CENTCOM

CENTCOM promulgates its vision for deep operations within its \textit{Concept of Operations for Joint Fires}, final draft version dated, 27 July 1999. Its describes procedures and responsibilities for the planning, synchronization, deconfliction, and execution of joint fires in the CENTCOM AOR. Joint fires are defined as lethal or non-lethal weapons effects from any component in coordinated action toward a joint objective. Joint fires strive to disrupt, divert, delay, and destroy enemy air, sea, and land forces capabilities before they can be used effectively against friendly forces.\textsuperscript{103} Correspondingly, CENTCOM’s definition for deep operations is nearly identical. This
publication stresses that synchronization, in a manner consistent with the CINC’s priorities and concept of operations, requires detailed air and ground coordination and results in synergistic effects.\textsuperscript{104}

The CENTCOM discussion of supported-supporting relationships follows joint doctrine closely. It makes a clarification that while the JFACC is the supported commander for AI theater-wide, within the JFLCC AO, the JFLCC is the supported commander for interdiction and “Killbox” AI while the JFACC is the supported commander for strategic attack (SA) and counterair (CA). This distinction minimizes the overlap of responsibilities as targets are distributed for attack under these general headings. AI within the JFLCC AO essentially supports his fight.

CENTCOM uses a “Killbox” reference system to coordinate, deconflict and synchronize attack operations. This system is detailed in the multiservice manual, \textit{Targeting} (FM90-36 and AFJPAM 10-225).\textsuperscript{105} Killboxes are based on a 30’x 30’ nautical Mile (nm) grid system covering the AOR. The boxes provide a quick and common reference for coordination between all components. Beyond the FSCL and short of the LCC forward boundary, the boxes are assumed to be open unless specifically closed by the LCC for his organic interdiction needs. This frees the JFACC to attack targets within the killboxes, in accordance with the LCC’s targeting priorities.\textsuperscript{106} Platforms such as JSTARS, AWACS, and ABCCC will be assigned control of these boxes through the ATO for attack and deconfliction purposes. AI attacks within the boxes conform to JFLCC targeting priorities. While not a replacement for fire support control measures, the Killbox system is an effective means to deconflict attack assets, synchronize joint actions, and provide unity of effort. Though not perfect, the system
reduces confusion by specifying responsibilities, command relationships, and procedures to execute coordinate those relationships and responsibilities.

CENTCOM employs a Joint Coordination Board (JCB). It is used to disseminate JFC priorities, intent, and to refine targeting guidance. It is a JFC level board, chaired by the DCINC with component and JFC staff representation designed to ensure unity of effort. It approves the JFACC’s apportionment recommendation and approves targeting guidance. It also provides a forum for discussion on battlespace geometry and effects of previous guidance. It is not concerned with the particular details of targeting or the specifics of the Joint Integrated Priority Target List (JIPTL). This, along with the apportionment decision, distinguishes it from the JTCB discussion in joint doctrine. The CINC directed the JFACC to form and chair a Joint Target Working Group (JTWG) to further evaluate and refine the JIPTL. This makes component representatives directly involved with target development and weaponizing, the absence of which was a common criticism of the JFACC system during Desert Storm. These processes (the JCB and JTWG) are employed by the CINC to actively achieve unity of effort.

Consistent with the latest developments in joint doctrine, CENTCOM uses the approved FSCL definition contained in the latest JP 1-02 (10 JUN 98) as discussed in the joint doctrine section of this monograph. However, the approval authority is normally retained or delegated by the JFC. The JFLCC (as the appropriate land commander) still makes the recommendation in coordination with higher, supporting, and subordinate commanders. This measure also facilitates unity of effort, though it must be noted that until July of 1999, CINC CENTCOM retained the JFLCC responsibilities and appointed a deputy JFLCC (DJFLCC) to run daily operations.
The procedures that CENTCOM employs are well within the spirit of joint doctrine. They provide specificity where doctrinal responsibilities overlap. It clarifies, yet maintains each component's core responsibilities.

**Korea**

The latest concepts in joint doctrine often come from the CINCs who employ forces on a daily basis. Standing ready, Korea is a case in point. Combined Forces Command (CFC) Korea use a series of publications to coordinate and execute deep operations. The most prominent of these are *Deep Operations – Korea*, and *Targeting Operations – Korea*. Both references cited are dated 1 May 1999 and incorporate the latest changes from JP 1-02.

Deep operations in the Korean Theater of operations (KTO) extend from the FSCL through the limits of the KTO. GCC (LCC) deep operations extend from the FSCL to the forward boundary (FB). ACC (JFACC) deep operations extend from the GCC FB throughout the limits of the KTO. This begins a clarification process that is fully consistent with joint doctrine.

Consistent with these assigned areas, *Deep Operations – Korea* maintains that the GCC is the supported commander from the FSCL to the FB. The ACC is the supported commander from the GCC FB and beyond. CFC describes the supported and supporting commander relationship in this way:

The supported commander has the responsibility to resolve conflicts and authority to compel agreement on issues pertaining to activities within their AO in accordance with the CINCCFC's priorities and intent. Supported commanders have the authority to designate target priority, effects, and timing within their AO. Supporting commanders will provide augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander as required, and develop supporting plans.¹¹⁰
This definition is a strengthened version of what is found in JP 3-0. The ideas of “resolve conflict” and “compel agreement” most probably trace their roots to the ideas found in the definition of the coordinating authority (JP 1-02), which specifically does not have this authority.

The ACC is designated as the coordinating authority for all air operations and fires past the FSCL and performs this function primarily in the planning phase during the Integrated Tasking Order (ITO) construction. To accomplish this tasking, the ACC “coordinates and synchronizes air operations and fires past the FSCL by use of the ITO, Airspace Coordination Order (ACO), FSCMs, Killboxes, and quickfire procedures.”

The combination of these relationships between the GCC and ACC provides a specificity and clarity lacking from the original doctrine. Where joint doctrine provided overlapping supported commanders, CFC explains the GCC is supported to the FB and the ACC is supported beyond. For all air and fires beyond the FSCL, the ACC is the coordinating authority. The strengthened supported commander designation also provides clarity. These changes remain consistent with joint doctrine, but resolve a great deal of the confusion it allowed.

CFC Korea also employs a targeting board, called the Combined Targeting Board (CTB). The CTB is established and run by the ACC; the CINC delegated the management of the joint targeting process to the ACC. The boards purpose is to synchronize the application of combined air power with land, sea power, and prevent fratricide throughout the theater. Each component has targeting responsibility and authority. The CTB members represent the components as the Master Air Attack Plan is developed and approved. However, the air strategy that the CTB contributes to is the
ACC's. His objectives form the basis of the air strategy. Components prioritize their targets within the ACC's objectives using an A B C method. Priority A "must" be attacked, B "needs" to be attacked, and C "would like" to have this attacked, with fully supporting clarification supporting each priority. The highest target on the list is an A priority within the ACC's number one objective set, and so on. Though the ACC is charged with running the targeting process, the CINC requires a high level of component integration throughout the targeting cycle. All of this integration under the direction of the ACC provides the CINC a unity of effort.

Unity of effort in targeting combined with clear command relationships resolves confusion. The overlapping responsibilities of joint doctrine are untangled. Proper authority is granted to supported commanders. Additionally, the CINC charged the ACC with coordinating authority for all air operations beyond the FSCL, determining that he was best capable. These procedures leave little ambiguity to the deep operations construct in CFC.

CENTCOM and CFC Korea have taken joint doctrine, applied in to their given theaters. Neither enacted radical procedures. Both concepts are consistent with the themes of joint doctrine, however, they seek practical application of these themes. Though not identical, the concepts of the two CINCs judiciously delegate authority to subordinate commanders to accomplish the mission with a unity of effort.
Chapter 6

Conclusion

Trust is based on insight and familiarity, knowing who will do the right thing in the proper way. A soldier’s expectation of airpower must be based on the realization that airmen have theater-wide perspectives and responsibilities. An airman must appreciate the vital role of airpower in land combat and understand that air flown in support of LCCs must complement the plans of LCCs.\textsuperscript{116} Generals Reimer and Fogleman

As it is currently written, joint doctrine is flawed. It lacks the specificity and clarity that modern operations demand. Rather than presenting warfighters with options, it presents them with contradicting statements. While the themes and basic premises contained within it are sound, it provides overlapping responsibilities as the foundation of the joint construct. This framework does not foster synchronization, synergy, or unity of effort. Joint doctrine does not resolve the Army – Air Force debate over which component commander controls the fight forward of the FSCL but within the LCC forward boundary.

The joint publications examined showed a bias to the particular lead agent that developed them. JP 3-0 and 3-09, do a good job of maintaining an Army theme throughout them. Correspondingly, JP 3-56.1 and 3-03 herald the Air Force view of warfighting. These themes were fully developed in the supporting service doctrine. Within service doctrine though, both the Army and Air Force stated their purpose was to provide their service perspective to how best to fight. Including references to jointness and joint operations, the service doctrine painted joint operations in the way the service would like them conducted. Both services stressed their supported commander roles while only maintaining the possibility of supporting roles.
The Army, often derided for its land-centric view of warfare, presents a cross-
functional component joint approach to warfare. This stems from its fundamental view
of warfare, but it is also a realization of its dependence on other services, such as the Air
Force. Army doctrine fully embraces the team concept. Joint doctrine too heralds team
warfare, both for its unifying aspects and, undoubtedly, the Army’s influence on its early
development. This cross-functional approach or synergism approach holds that the
capabilities of the various services should be blended in response to a given crisis.
Synergism blends airpower and landpower into a joint option.

The Air Force, long dominated by this land-centric approach, advances a within-
functional component view of warfighting. This “joint”, from the Air Force perspective,
is all air elements, regardless of service, operating under the control of a single airman.
This is an autonomous airpower approach. All attempts at subordinating any part of it to
surface support dilutes it overall effectiveness (or at least its potential.) This ‘within-
functional’ component approach (or specialization argument) states that all services
should stick to the roles for which they were established.

These arguments and views both have merit. The question is how are they
presented in joint doctrine. Current doctrine allows for the existence of both concepts,
rather than providing options of one or the other, or a phasing of the concepts approach.
The examination of CENTCOM and CFC Korea showed that both CINCs deemed it
necessary to clarify who controlled the portion of the deep fight between the FSCL and
the LCC forward boundary. The CINCs also established unity of effort within their
targeting processes. Interestingly, joint doctrine does provide options regarding the
JTCB and its use. One CINC opted for the JFC level board while the other opted to
subordinate it under the JFACC. Finally, both CINCs employed additional fire support and air control measures to supplement its use of the FSCL and facilitate synchronization and unity effort. These efforts certainly suggest that doctrine could provide guidance that presents options rather than confusion.

Joint doctrine is moving in the right direction. Changes to the lead agent concept and the involvement of the Joint Warfighting Center promise a top-down approach that should eliminate ambiguous language. Finding the balance between a top-down approach for unity of effort and a bottom-up approach for what really works (doctrine is based on collective warfighting experience) will present a big challenge. This challenge must be met; joint doctrine requires clarity. Clarification and specification are the seeds to a successful operation with a unity of effort.
Endnotes

1 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1: Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff/77, 1995), i.

2 Dennis J. Reimer, GEN, and Ronald R. Fogleman, GEN, “Joint Warfare and the Army-Air Force Team,” Joint Force Quarterly, Spring (1996), 10. This source highlights many of the issues upon which the services disagree. Though the title uses the term ‘team,’ the article hints at the deep differences between the two service’s perspectives.


4 Joint Warfighting Center, “Joint Force Fires Coordinator Study,” (Fort Monroe, VA: Joint Warfighting Center, 1997), F-3. The appendix noted contains the Memorandum of Agreement between the two services on the points they could agree upon; the MOA was not comprehensive of the issues debated. Several issues such as this one were omitted for lack of consensus.


6 Within this monograph, the author will refer to the Land Component Commander as opposed to the Joint Force Land Component Commander (JFLCC). Joint doctrine refers to the JFLCC, land commanders, and service commanders. Army doctrine refers the Land Component Commander or Army Operational Commander. The ‘joint’ part of JFLCC comes from Marine involvement. Examples of a JFLCC are sparse though there is movement in that direction within the joint community. Because of the sparse examples of a JFLCC, LCC will be used throughout the monograph. It should be understood that this is the operational level commander, directly subordinate to the Joint Force Commander, and may become a JFLCC as necessary.

7 Department of the Army, FM 100-5: Operations, (Washington D.C.: HQDA, 1993), 6-13,14. The Army generally refers to all operations beyond the FSCL as deep, referring to both time and space. The Air Force deep battle concept begins at the FSCL and extends throughout the AOR. This contested area is at the extreme “shallow” end of Air Force deep operations as noted in AFDD 2.

8 Air Force Doctrine Center, AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, (Maxwell AFB: HQ AFDC, 1999), 60. Counterland includes close air support (CAS) as well. Other operations within the contested area could include CAS, strategic attack, or counterair operations.

9 Joint Pub 1, i.

10 Ibid., i.

11 Ibid., iv. Team warfare and unity of effort are consistent themes throughout joint doctrine often mentioned when discussing how to best employ military power.


13 Department of the Army, FM 100-7: Decisive Force: The Army in Theater Operations, (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1995), 1-5. The discussion of “dominating land combat” and “providing decisive results” is a part of FM 100-7. The Army position clearly emphasized land combat as critical to “decisive” operations, though the nature of the term is currently under debate within Army doctrinal channels.
14 Ibid., p. 1-8. This concept is also developed to a lesser degree in JP 3-0, where the land commander is responsible for operations within his AO and the JFC’s focus is theater-wide.


16 Ibid., p. 4-3.

17 Ibid., p. 5-1.

18 FM 100-5: Operations, 2-2. Bernard Trainor notes that the Army as a dependent service will advocate this position from necessity (noted later).

19 Ibid., p. 2-2. Balance refers to both the type of forces and type of operations. Land and air forces together provide balance; land-only or air-only are not. Though not a disqualifier from success, there is an inherent danger associated with a one-medium-only approach that this passage alludes to.

20 FM 100-7: Decisive Force, 5-5. The direct citation uses the term ‘Army Commander’ rather than LCC.

21 Ibid., p. 5-7.

22 Ibid., p. 5-8. This passage holds the key to the debate in the author’s opinion. The CINC must decide and specify who is responsible, by phase if desired, to ensure unity of effort. Regardless of which command the CINC designates, he should specify the responsible commander to eliminate confusion. Joint doctrine should present this as options rather than overlapping responsibilities. The problem with this answer is that it requires both services to be capable of the task: a capability that budget-cutters may not agree with.


24 FM 100-5: Operations, 2-5.


27 Ibid., p. 49. “Unconstrained by surface boundaries” is the key point stressed by the Air Force. Their approach is strictly functional, not geographic, as the land commander’s inevitably is.

28 Air Force Doctrine Center, AFDD 2: Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, (Maxwell AFB: HQ AFDC, 1998), 50. This passage clearly shows the Air Force’s predisposition to a ‘within-functional’ (air-only or primarily) approach.

29 AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 3.

30 Ibid., p. 3. Within the Air Force argument, the definition and purpose of AI are crucial. Essentially, they characterize the ground commander’s desires as deep CAS. There is no accurate term any more since the Air Force dropped the Battlefield Air Interdiction concept.


33 AFDD 2: Organization and Employment of Aerospace Power, 5. AFDD 2 and AFDD 2-1.3 both stress that air power is a maneuver force. This stems from the service's view that joint doctrine is predisposed to favor the surface or "maneuver" commander, especially with regard to the supported-supporting relationship. This is the land-centric approach to warfare. For an excellent discussion of this argument see: "Airpower in the Context of a Dysfunctional Joint Doctrine," by Lt Col Carl Pivarsky Jr.


35 Ibid., 3.


38 Ibid., 1.

39 James Riggins and David E. Snodgrass, "Halt Phase Plus Strategic Preclusion: Joint Solution for a Joint Problem," Parameters, Autumn (1999), 70. This article as well as the Grossman article shows the direct link between doctrinal concepts and budget concerns.

40 Ibid., 70-71.


42 Ibid., 7.


46 FM 100-7: Decisive Force, 7-6.

47 Ibid., p. 7-8. The source uses "Army Commander" rather than LCC.

48 AFDD 1: Basic Air Force Doctrine, 49. This document does not stress the theater-wide aspect of the supported relationship, simply that the JFACC is the supported commander for AI.

49 AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 2.

50 Ibid., p. 48.

51 FM 100-5: Operations, 6-12. This is a key passage in understanding the Army's position. The Army wants to assert its responsibility to control operations throughout its AO.

53 **AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 10.** Also reflected in *Joint Pub 3-56.1: Command and Control of Joint Air Operations*, (Washington, D.C.: Joint Staff/7), IV-2.

54 **AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 22.**

55 Michael R. Moeller, Maj., “The Sum of Their Fears: The Relationship between the Joint Targeting Coordination Board and the Joint Force Commander,” (Maxwell AFB: Air University, 1995), 19. This monograph provides a good discussion on the Air Force position on targeting and the JTCB.

56 Ibid., p. 19.

57 Ibid., p. 20. Also see James Winnefeld, *Joint Air Operations*, for a discussion of how the other services view the Air Force’s attempts to consolidate power within the JFACC.

58 **FM 100-5: Operations, 2-5.**

59 Ibid., 6-13.

60 **FM 100-7: Decisive Force, 1-4.**

61 **AFDD 1: Basic Air Force Doctrine, 13.**

62 Ibid., p. 13.

63 **AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 47.**


66 Ibid., p. 6.

67 Ibid., p. 11.

68 Winton, “Partnership and Tension,” 111. The Army’s creation of the Deep Operations Coordination Center (DOCC) corresponded with this desire. Joint STARS, satellite technology, and other intelligence advances increasing provided the ground commander with greater capability to acquire and track targets throughout his AO. The acquisition of systems such as the AH-64 and ATACMS missile provided the means to affect the entire AO.

69 “JFC Study,” F-3.

70 Ibid., F-3. See note 4.

71 Department of the Army, *FM 6-20-10: The Targeting Process*, (Washington, D.C.: HQDA, 1996), 3-20. This is especially true given the new definition of the FSCL as described later within the monograph. The utility of the FSCL, as currently applied, appears to be limited. In effect, all fires (and operations) are under the LCC control within his AO.

72 **FM 100-7: Decisive Force, 7-8.** Note the term “supporting.”
73 AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 59. This definition/purpose are now out-of-date, noted later.

74 Ibid., p. 51.

75 Ibid., p. 52. The JFACC effectively controls all AI; no AI is under the ground commander’s indirect control through the ASOC (as with CAS).

76 Ibid., p. 62. This statement supports the Air Force notion that the FSCL is a restrictive measure; essentially a boundary in all aspects except the name.

77 Ibid., p. 62.


80 FM 100-5: Operations, v.

81 Joint Pub 1, vi.

82 Joint Pub 3-0, i.

83 Ibid., p. IV-15.

84 Ibid., p. IV-15.

85 Joint Pub 3-56.1, II-3.

86 Joint Pub 3-0, IV-15. This statement is confusing but seems to indicate that knowledge of the intent is all that is required by the supporting commander.

87 Ibid., p. IV-13. This addition of “relatively independently” seems to make a distinction in the types of AI, i.e., AI and BAI.

88 Joint Pub 3-56.1, IV-2, 3.

89 Joint Pub 3-0, IV-13.

90 Ibid., p. IV-15.

91 Ibid., p. II-8.

92 Ibid., p. III-25.

93 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-09: Doctrine for Joint Fire Support, (Washington D.C.: Joint Staff/J7, 1998), I-3. This is another key concept. The JFC must ensure unity of effort. He may delegate this by establishing supported relationships, but he is responsible for the overall unity of effort.

94 Joint Pub 3-0, III-34.

95 Joint Pub 3-09, A-2.

96 Joint Pub 3-0, IV-15.
97 Joint Pub 3-09, GL-6.

98 AFDD 2-1.3: Counterland, 59.

99 As evidenced by the Memorandum of Agreement, cited earlier, which resulted from the Army-Air Force Warfighter Talks.

100 "JFFC Study," F-3.

101 "JFFC Study," F-3.


104 Ibid., p. 2.


107 Winnefeld, Joint Air Operations, 127.


111 Ibid., 11.

112 Ibid., 14.

113 Ibid., 14.


115 Ibid., p. 13-14.

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