COMING IN FROM THE COLD . . . WAR:
DEFENSE HUMINT SERVICES SUPPORT
TO MILITARY OPERATIONS
OTHER THAN WAR

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army
Command and General Staff College in partial
fulfillment of the requirements for the
degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE
General Studies

by

David W. Becker
B.A., Saint Mary College, Leavenworth Kansas, 1995

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
2000

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited.
MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

THESIS APPROVAL PAGE

Name of Candidate: Mr. David W. Becker

Thesis Title: Coming in from the Cold . . . War: Defense HUMINT Services Support to Military Operations Other Than War

Approved by:

__________________________________________, Thesis Committee Chairman
Jacob W. Kipp, Ph.D.

__________________________________________, Member
Les W. Grau, M.A.

__________________________________________, Member
Joseph G. D. Babb, M.P.A., M.A.

Accepted this 2d day of June 2000 by:

__________________________________________, Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

COMING IN FROM THE COLD . . . WAR: DEFENSE HUMINT SERVICES SUPPORT TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR by David W. Becker, 72 pages.

This study examines the Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) and the role it plays in supporting Joint Task Forces (JTF) and theater commander in chiefs (CINCs) in military operations other than war (MOOTW). The examination included a study into the recent history of military HUMINT, and the Department of Defense's (DoD's) purpose for creating the DHS. This study will also examine the importance of HUMINT in supporting military forces in an MOOTW, and look at the doctrinal development of HUMINT over the course of three case studies to see where HUMINT in general has improved its support to the JTF. This examination led to studying DHS's role in supporting MOOTW, including DHS's capabilities and responsibilities to support U.S. forces, and how effectively DHS executes its role.

The conclusions of this research determined that HUMINT intelligence plays a critical role in a MOOTW, but HUMINT in MOOTW is less productive in the early stages of a MOOTW because of the inherent difficulties establishing the HUMINT infrastructure necessary to gather information. DHS can play a vital role supporting a JTF commander involved in a MOOTW. DHS was created to be a national level HUMINT organization, and is capable of establishing that HUMINT infrastructure necessary for HUMINT collectors prior to deployment into a theater. DHS can improve the intelligence picture for a commander by using its global capabilities to build a HUMINT infrastructure before a JTF is deployed into a theater for an MOOTW activity.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

First, I wish to thank my committee members, Dr. Kipp, Mr. Grau and Mr. Babb. I cannot stress enough how patient and tolerant they were in trying to combine my poor writing skills with my ideas. They spent countless hours helping me make my writing express my thoughts and ideas more clearly. Everyone writes about how their committee was instrumental, but these three gentlemen appreciated and understood what I wanted to say and they wanted this research to be conducted and completed. Their help was instrumental and indispensable.

I also wish to thank Colonel York, Captain Collins, and Richard Wilkins. I wish to thank Colonel Gerald York, for his sheer will power, determination, and tenacity, which makes Defense Humint Service a much better organization. I wish to thank Captain Martin Collins for supporting my application for CGSC and for encouraging me in this thesis. Finally, thanks to R. B. Wilkins, whose job I want to have someday. Your guidance and mentorship has kept me on track; you make DHS a great place to work.

Finally, and most importantly, I wish to thank my wife, Jennifer and son James for their patience and tolerance. Jennifer did not believe me for a minute when I told her my master’s thesis would not take up too much time, and tolerated endless nights watching me stare at a computer. She encouraged before I began this process and supported me when it seemed easier to set the thesis aside.
<p>| TABLE OF CONTENTS |
|-------------------|-----------------|
| APPROVAL PAGE                | ii              |
| ABSTRACT                   | iii             |
| ACKNOWLEDGMENTS            | iv              |
| LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS      | vii             |
| CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION    | 1               |
| Introduction               | 1               |
| Qualifications             | 7               |
| Limitations                | 7               |
| Key Definitions            | 8               |
| Endnotes                   | 10              |
| CHAPTER 2: CREATING THE DEFENSE HUMINT SERVICE | 14 |
| Introduction               | 12              |
| Recent History of HUMINT   | 12              |
| From Containment: Adapting HUMINT after the Cold War | 15 |
| The Birth of Defense HUMINT Service | 18 |
| Facing the New Threats; Establishing PDD-35 | 21 |
| Endnotes                   | 24              |
| CHAPTER 3: THE USE OF HUMINT IN MOOTW | 27 |
| Introduction               | 27              |
| The Significance of MOOTW  | 28              |
| Intelligence Needs in MOOTW | 29             |
| HUMINT in MOOTW            | 31              |
| HUMINT in Somalia: Operation Restore Hope | 34 |
| HUMINT in Haiti: Operation Restore Democracy | 40 |
| HUMINT in Bosnia: Operation Joint Venture | 44 |
| Searching for Information Outside the Theater of Operations | 48 |
| Summary                     | 50              |
| Endnotes                    | 52              |
| CHAPTER 4: CONCLUSIONS     | 55              |
| Introduction               | 55              |
| Building the Infrastructure Before Deployment | 58 |
| Information Outside the Area of Operations | 59 |
| Coordinating National Level HUMINT Collectors | 59 |</p>
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Further Study</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Endnotes</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LITERATURE REVIEW</td>
<td>62</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RESEARCH METHODOLOGY</td>
<td>66</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AOR     Area of Responsibility
ASD     Assistant Secretary of Defense
C3I     Command Control Communication and Intelligence
CCIR    Commander's Critical Intelligence Requirements
CENTCOM Central Command
CI      Counterintelligence
CIA     Central Intelligence Agency
CINC    Commander in Chief
DHS     Defense Humint Service
DIA     Defense Intelligence Agency
DOD     Department of Defense
GDIP    General Defense Intelligence Program
HOTA    HUMINT Operational Tasking Authority
HSE     HUMINT Support Element
HUMINT  Human Intelligence
IFOR    Implementation Force
IMINT   Imagery Intelligence
INSCOM  Intelligence and Security Command
IPW     Interrogation Prisoner of War
JSOTF   Joint Special Operations Task Force
JSTARS  Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LLSO</td>
<td>Low Level Source Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MOS</td>
<td>Military Occupational Specialty</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major Theater War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NGO</td>
<td>Nongovernmental Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PDD-35</td>
<td>Presidential Decision Directive - 35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PIR</td>
<td>Priority Intelligence Requirements</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PVO</td>
<td>Private Voluntary Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIGINT</td>
<td>Signals Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TFE</td>
<td>Task Force Eagle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNOSOM II</td>
<td>United Nations Somalia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UNPROFOR</td>
<td>United Nations Protection Forces</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

This study examines the role of human source intelligence (HUMINT) in support of a Joint Task Force (JTF) in a military operation other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW, a joint doctrine term derived from the Army's operations other than war (OOTW), refers to using military capabilities for a range of activities short of warfare. An operation in which U.S. forces deploy to conduct peacekeeping would be considered a MOOTW. This research focuses on the origins and development of Defense HUMINT Service (DHS) since the end of the Cold War and analyzes the role of the DHS in providing the necessary information for a JTF in a MOOTW. The thesis also examines what changes DHS could make to improve support to military commanders operating in a MOOTW.

The United States military doctrine has drastically changed in the post-Cold War era. In the early 1990s military doctrine shifted from a Cold War doctrine that focused on facing and containing Soviet military power to a doctrine based on multiple regional threats in a dynamic international security system. The United States national security strategy with its emphasis upon global engagement and enlargement brought demands for changes in military doctrine. This shift has forced the Department of Defense (DoD) to alter and adjust key aspects of national military strategy with regard to the type, scope, and location of military operations, including (MOOTW), in which the United States military will engage. When the armed forces shifted their doctrine to support, organizations supporting the armed forces also adjusted their mission to better support the forces in a MOOTW.
This study examines the origins of the DHS and its role in support to the armed forces in a MOOTW in three parts. The first part focuses on the rationale behind the creation of the DHS. The second part explores the utilization of HUMINT in MOOTW. The final part discusses the emerging problems with DHS support for MOOTW and identifies potential solutions to those problems. This study analyzes three MOOTW case studies to identify key issues involved in HUMINT support of MOOTW. Those case studies are Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Joint Venture in Bosnia.

The first phase of the study, examining the creation of DHS, is important because it identifies the HUMINT capability that senior DoD leadership sought when it created DHS. In reviewing the history and evolution of military HUMINT capabilities from the 1970s through the 1990s, it is quite clear that the end of the Cold War brought a series of security challenges that made HUMINT seem more relevant to the conduct of a wide range of operations, including MOOTW. This revival of interest in HUMINT and the establishment of DHS represented a sea change in intelligence priorities not seen since the end of the Vietnam War. A decade of a “small-scale contingency” in Vietnam had generated a large HUMINT capability, but had also led to serious dislocations in the intelligence community when the United States began to disengage militarily from Southeast Asia in the early 1970s.

Military HUMINT capabilities have fluctuated greatly since the 1970s. Several congressional investigations in the 1970s, including those addressing covert actions and domestic surveillance during the 1960s and early 1970s, led to greater congressional oversight of intelligence activities and a skepticism regarding HUMINT. This
skepticism, combined with significant advances in imagery and signals intelligence and the priority placed on strategic nuclear issues and arms control, pushed Congress and the executive to emphasize technical intelligence systems at the expense of HUMINT intelligence. In the 1980s, however, William Casey, the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) under President Reagan, brought a renewed interest in HUMINT intelligence in conjunction with U.S. strategic engagement in Central America, the Middle East, and Afghanistan. Following the lead of the CIA, each of the military services began to rebuild their own HUMINT capabilities. This growth of HUMINT resources in the latter days of the Cold War provides the context for the subsequent reorganization of HUMINT and the creation of the DHS in the post-Cold War era.

The 1990s brought the end of four decades of Cold War and radical changes in the international system, the threat environment, national security strategy, and the military strategy of the DoD. The desire for a peace dividend led to cuts in defense spending, while new security challenges raised distinct force and intelligence requirements. The service intelligence agencies had to confront the need to adapt to a post-Cold War world. Senior leaders within DoD intelligence community began to debate the merits of combining the service HUMINT organizations into one organization under the Defense Intelligence Agency.

With each of the military services conducting their own HUMINT programs, there was a redundant collection effort, an excessive administrative bureaucracy that oversaw each of the three separate service intelligence organizations, and associated additional costs. In 1992 the Deputy Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communication and Intelligence (C3I) directed the establishment of DHS within the
Defense Intelligence Agency to consolidate all DoD HUMINT activities and eliminate the large redundant bureaucracies. This consolidation included the individual services' HUMINT organizations and the Defense Intelligence Agency's defense attachés. DHS was activated on 1 October 1995.³

This reform gave the newly created DHS a global mission to conduct HUMINT intelligence operations in support of the National Command Authority, Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Theater Commanders Commander in Chief (CINC), and each of the military services. DHS now operates from 150 locations and is organized into operating bases and detachments and defense attaché offices throughout the world.⁴

Behind this brief account of the founding of DHS there stands a sharp debate over the organization of HUMINT to support the DoD. Senior civilian and military leaders brought their own perspectives and intentions to the debate over HUMINT organization and the creation of DHS. That debate reveals much about what its founders intended for DHS and the unique capabilities that they expected DHS to bring to support to a MOOTW.

The recent history of HUMINT and the creation of DHS shed light on what the senior DoD leadership expected national-level HUMINT to provide and how DHS would receive its guidance and tasking. This is an important aspect of the HUMINT support for MOOTW and the role that DHS can play in support of MOOTW operations. A MOOTW very often involves a contingency response to a developing crisis in a particular state or region. As the events of the last decade suggest, there is no ironclad formula for where
such crises will develop. Before DHS can support a JTF, DHS must be tasked with the mission to collect the information.

Strategic HUMINT agencies receive their guidance from a document known as Presidential Decision Directive 35 (PDD-35). Following the Cold War, intelligence organizations struggled to identify priorities of effort for intelligence collection. PDD-35 was an attempt to organize and focus intelligence collection strategies for the different intelligence agencies. PDD-35 organized national intelligence collection priorities into geographic and political topics and prioritized them. PDD-35 organized the collection priorities into a "Tier" system, listed tier 0 through tier 4 as highest to lowest priorities. An examination of PDD-35 in detail reveals some critical insights into the problem of DHS to support a JTF in MOOTW. The worldview reflected in PDD-35 carries with it certain consequences, which restrict DHS support to a JTF in a MOOTW. These problems are primarily associated with the difficulty of the tier system providing foresight as to exactly where crises arise to which national command authority may wish to respond by mounting a contingency operation.

The second part of this thesis examines the use of HUMINT in MOOTW. Several questions stand at the heart of HUMINT utility in such operations. First concerns the probability that the military will continue to be called upon to conduct MOOTW. This question is critical, because a high probability of future MOOTWs would suggest that DHS should be prepared to support them. If there is no such probability, the DHS need not focus on the particular characteristics of MOOTW in its organizational development.
The next issue addressed here considers whether or not national-level HUMINT intelligence is of value to the JTF commander. This is obviously critical, because, while HUMINT may be necessary during a MOOTW, it does not necessarily follow that national level HUMINT, such as, DHS is capable of providing that information. Army Field Manual 34-1 states, “HUMINT is particularly important in force protection during OOTW.”5 The Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations states, “The primary source of intelligence in peace operations is normally HUMINT.”6 HUMINT can contribute significantly to MOOTW. This study examines this question in depth and assesses whether DHS can and has provided information, in a timely manner, which the JTF will use.

After examining the intelligence needs in MOOTW, and DHS’s ability to answer those needs, this study analyzes three case studies of HUMINT support in MOOTW: Operation Restore Hope in Somalia, Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, and Operation Joint Venture in Bosnia. As an integral part of this study, the case studies discuss the evolution of HUMINT support to MOOTW in the early 1990s and highlight the successes and failures of that support. An Analysis of specific successes and failures provides a benchmark against which to measure what DHS must do to improve HUMINT support to MOOTW.

Upon the examination of the recent history of HUMINT in the intelligence community, the creation of DHS and the use of HUMINT in MOOTW, the study turns its attention to the lessons that can be applied to the task of improving HUMINT support for MOOTW. These suggestions are couched in terms of what DHS can do to improve HUMINT support to military forces in a MOOTW. These recommendations involve
practical matters and are the heart of the thesis since they relate in detail to the challenge of improving DHS’s support to MOOTW.

**Qualifications**

The author has been involved in HUMINT for over sixteen years. He began his career as a private in the U.S. Army, and served four years as an interrogator with the First Infantry Division. From the Big Red One he transferred to Europe to serve in Germany where he debriefed refugees for several years. The author left the active service in 1992, but continued to serve the DoD as a civilian. He has worked to insure that intelligence support provided to the Army was the best possible. Intelligence support is a vital component in tactical, operational, and strategic success. Getting intelligence to the soldier in a timely and useful manner is a keystone of victory. Providing quality information to help the soldier do his job has been the hallmark of the DHS efforts to provide HUMINT support to military operations. The author has had the opportunity to watch HUMINT support to the military evolve over the past sixteen years. Personal experience has placed the author in a position to review some of those changes and to offer professional recommendations to continue to improve HUMINT support to the military in MOOTW.

**Limitations**

There are two limitations to this project. First, this paper avoids discussing clandestine HUMINT methods and capabilities for two reasons. Clandestine HUMINT is sensitive and difficult to discuss in an unclassified paper. Also, clandestine HUMINT makes up only about 20 percent of the collection effort of DHS. While clandestine
HUMINT is an important topic, the bulk of HUMINT collection involves overt strategic HUMINT.

It would be very difficult to discuss in detail the sixteen different types of MOOTW activities listed in Joint Publication 3-07. Therefore, this thesis is limited to discussing only peacekeeping and humanitarian support operations. These MOOTW activities were chosen because they often involve deployments to unfamiliar regions and normally require a coordinated, long-term commitment.

Key Definitions

A common definition of HUMINT becomes important when studying this type of intelligence support to MOOTW. HUMINT is the acronym for Human Source Intelligence. FM 101-5-1 defines HUMINT as, “¼ a category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.” There are two types of HUMINT, clandestine and overt. Clandestine HUMINT occurs when the person who obtains the information passes it on to the intelligence organization as a secret agent, without the consent of the person or organization that originated the information. Overt HUMINT occurs when the person or organization from or through whom the information is being obtained is aware that the collector is an intelligence officer. Overt HUMINT is collected in several ways; by debriefing emigrants and defectors, by debriefing American citizens traveling abroad, and from the open collection activities of civilian and military diplomatic personnel.

It is also important to define differences between strategic, operational, and tactical intelligence. “Strategic intelligence supports the formation of strategy, policy and military plans and operations at the national and theater level.” “Operational
intelligence supports the planning and execution of campaigns and major operations. It reflects the nature of the theater of war itself.\textsuperscript{14} "Tactical intelligence supports the execution of battles and engagements. It provides the tactical commander with the intelligence needed to employ combat elements against enemy forces and achieve the objectives of the operations commander. Tactical intelligence is distinguished from other levels by its perishability and ability to immediately influence the outcome of the tactical commander's mission. Tactical intelligence normally supports operations by echelons corps and below."\textsuperscript{15}

National level intelligence agencies, such as the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), and National Security Agency (NSA), usually provide strategic intelligence. Intelligence collected during a MOOTW activity, by a tactical military intelligence unit, may have value in the formation of strategy and policy, and therefore the information may fall into the category of strategic intelligence.

Both strategic intelligence and tactical intelligence may be collected by either national level collectors or by a tactical unit. Therefore, the type of intelligence, whether it is strategic or tactical, is based on level at which the information has utility, not the level of the collector gathering the information. This includes information the DHS collects out of theater in a global environment, but is used at a tactical level, and when DHS assets are pushed down into the tactical level to provide information to both the tactical commander and to the National Command Authority.

It is also important to define MOOTW. There are sixteen different types of MOOTW. They are: arms control, combating terrorism, counterdrug operations, enforcement of sanctions and maritime intercept operations, enforcing exclusion zones,
ensuring freedom of navigation and overflight, humanitarian assistance, military support
to civil authorities, nation assistance or counterinsurgency operations, noncombatant
evacuation operations, peace operations, protection of shipping, recovery operations,
show of force, strikes and raids, and support to insurgency.¹ It would be very difficult to
try to cover each different type of MOOTW and to assess DHS's capabilities to support
each. This paper will focus on the two MOOTW activities that tend to put more U.S.
military at greater risk and also tend to be more difficult. Those are, humanitarian
assistance and peace operations such as the operations in Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia.

¹U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, JCS Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations
Other than War (Washington, DC: The Joint Staff, 1995), vii.

²John Whiteclay Chambers II, ed., The Oxford Companion to American Military
History (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 192. The Oxford Companion refers
to the “Church Committee” hearings held in 1975 and 1976 regarding covert action.
While the primary target of the investigations was covert action, there was some backlash
which affected attitudes towards clandestine activity as well.

³Barbara Duckworth, “The Defense HUMINT Service: Preparing for the 21st

⁴Ibid.

⁵U.S. Army, FM 34-1, Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations,

⁶US Joint Chiefs of Staff, The Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for

⁷Jono Fischback, “With a little bit of Heart and Soul: Analyzing the Role of
HUMINT in the Post Cold War Era,” p.1. The final Report of the Snyder Commission,
Chairman Diane Snyder 1997; available from http://www.fas.org/irp/eprint/snyder/
humint.htm; Internet; accessed 13 August 1999.

⁸U.S. Army, FM 101-5-1, Operations Terms and Graphic (Washington, DC:
Department of the Army, 1997), 1-79.

10 Ibid., 57.

11 Ibid., 56-57.

12 Fischback, 11.


14 Ibid., 2-3.

15 Ibid., 2-3.

CHAPTER 2

CREATING THE DEFENSE HUMINT SERVICE

Introduction

Any examination of the capabilities of the DHS and its ability to support Joint Task Forces in a MOOTW activity must address DHS’s origins. Studying the recent history of the DoD HUMINT system sheds light on how the DoD HUMINT system developed into the current structure of the DHS. Finally, after examining the HUMINT system and how DHS came into existence, it is critical to understand how the DoD, theater CINCs, and JTFs task HUMINT and drive collection efforts.

Intelligence has always been a critical component of military operations. For most of history, through the middle of the nineteenth century, HUMINT was the only method for gathering intelligence. The Bible shows that Moses used HUMINT to scout out the Promised Land.¹ Sun Tsu, the Chinese military philosopher and general, emphasized the need for HUMINT when he wrote, “Foreknowledge cannot be gotten from ghosts and spirits, cannot be had by analogy, cannot be found out by calculation, it must be obtained from people, people who know the conditions of the enemy.”²

Recent History of HUMINT

In the 1970s HUMINT fell into disfavor within the U.S. military. DoD HUMINT capabilities were curtailed for several reasons. The intelligence community, as a whole, embraced the significant advances in signals intelligence (SIGINT) and imagery intelligence (IMINT) technology. Other factors also contributed to the decline of military HUMINT. The Soviet Union had been the primary threat to the U.S since the 1950s.
The Soviet Union was a hard target to penetrate with HUMINT sources. Further, the Soviet Union was a fixed target. Intelligence planners knew what information they wanted to look for and how to find the information using SIGINT or IMINT. Throughout the 1970s, U.S. intelligence was primarily interested in information regarding strategic nuclear issues and massing troop formations preparing for an attack. It was possible for the intelligence community to gather this type of information using SIGINT or IMINT capabilities. The seemingly high risk and low payoff of HUMINT, combined with bad publicity, resulted in the degradation of the military national level HUMINT capabilities.

In 1976, only 13 percent of all intelligence collected was from HUMINT. HUMINT received about one seventh of appropriated intelligence funds. CIA Director Admiral Stansfield Turner continued to underfund HUMINT throughout his tenure (1977 to 1981). He was a proponent of expanding technical intelligence collection capabilities and supported reducing the HUMINT effort. Ray Cline, a former senior official with the CIA, wrote that one of Turner’s biggest failings was that he mismanaged HUMINT at the expense of technical collection capabilities. All of these factors led the military to conclude that national level HUMINT was not worth much effort and left what little HUMINT activity remained to the CIA.

In the 1980s, the U.S. intelligence community realized that, regardless of impressive technical capabilities, there is some information that HUMINT is particularly useful in gathering. HUMINT tended to be better at collecting the particularly difficult to gather political information, intentions and the attitudes of individuals and cultures. William Casey, CIA Director under President Ronald Reagan, emphasized this point when he testified before Congress in 1981, stating:
The wrong picture is not worth a thousand words. No photo, no electronic impulse can substitute for direct on-the-scene knowledge of the key factors in a given country or region. No matter how spectacular a photo may be, it cannot reveal enough about plans, intentions, internal political dynamics, economics, etc. There are simply too many cases where photos are ambiguous or useless, and electronic intelligence can drown the analysts in partial or conflicting information. Technical collection is of little help in the most difficult problem of all--political intentions. This is where clandestine human intelligence can make a difference. I am personally dedicated to supporting it and strengthening it.\(^7\)

Casey's point was not that HUMINT could collect all the required information, but that a triad of the "INTs," SIGINT, IMINT and HUMINT were necessary to better collect the information necessary to defend the country. HUMINT has several other advantages. HUMINT is significantly cheaper than the SIGINT or IMINT systems. HUMINT can obtain documents and equipment, and HUMINT can place sensors.\(^8\) Taking all of these factors into consideration, the military began to restore their HUMINT capability and redevelop their HUMINT program in the 1980s.

As the individual services began to recast their HUMINT capabilities, each service became responsible for operating their own program. The Army developed the largest HUMINT program of the military services, followed by the Air Force. The Navy and Marines combined for the smallest program of the DoD HUMINT effort.\(^9\) Throughout the 1980s each service expanded and conducted their own HUMINT program, with minimal coordination and with separate bureaucratic and administrative processes. There was no national level effort or national coordinating authority for DoD HUMINT. Further, each of the services was responsible for tasking its service requirement, and there was no apparent interservice or joint coordination to support theater CINCs.
There are several methods for collecting overt HUMINT. Information can be collected by debriefing emigrants and defectors who have moved to the US. Military personnel, government employees, and other U.S. citizens who have traveled abroad on business or to attend conferences can provide additional information. Finally, civilian, military, and diplomatic personnel may collect overt intelligence.¹⁰

From Containment: Adapting HUMINT After the Cold War

After the fall of the Berlin Wall, the DoD began a reevaluation of intelligence requirements in the context of a dynamic shift in the international security environment. There was a push to downsize a U.S. military created to deter the Communist bloc in Europe. At the same time, senior intelligence officers began to look at the future intelligence needs of the post-Cold War military. Clearly military intelligence efforts would have to change from focusing efforts against the Soviet Union, to collecting information on a larger group of regional actors. These new requirements demanded a central management structure.¹¹ Two competing concepts for this central management of HUMINT emerged.

One concept was to create a centralized management, which allowed the services to maintain control of their respective HUMINT organizations. The other concept was to merge all service HUMINT organizations into one organization. Major General Charles Scanlon was a senior army intelligence officer who was the commander of the U.S. Army Intelligence and Security Command from 1990 until 1993. A career intelligence officer, he served during the Vietnam War as the G-2 of the 101st Airborne Division. In 1992, he wrote an article for American Intelligence Journal on the topic of centralized management of HUMINT. In the article he stated, “A central management structure is
needed to ensure that military wide priority requirements are met, and the service Title 10 responsibilities and oversight responsibilities are executed.”

In order to create an organized national HUMINT effort, the DoD needed to centrally manage HUMINT and to improve command and control. This would create national-level military HUMINT effort more responsive to the needs of the Theater CINCs. Because the individual services collected their own information, both their intelligence and sources were compartmentalized. A source that could answer specific questions for the Army might also be able to answer questions for the Navy. Navy analysts might find answers to key questions from an Army source, but there was no national system to coordinate requirements or sources and insure the information did not get lost. Specifically, General Scanlon pointed out that a source operating in one theater might be able to answer requirements in another theater. A centrally managed system would be much more responsive than an uncoordinated, service-oriented system, yet allow the services to maintain and operate their individual programs.

DoD leadership also wanted to refocus HUMINT so that it would be effective in a post-Cold War environment focusing on multiple actors. As General Scanlon said, “HUMINT is often the only intelligence discipline suited to collect against low-tech threats. Sophisticated threat signatures may be lacking, but there are always human sources.” It became clear that in a regional situation, technical collection capabilities might not be responsive enough, or the necessary signals might not be available for interception. During the Cold War, the Soviet threat was a monolithic, stationary target. IMINT and SIGINT were capabilities well suited for this type of target. Targets in the post-Cold War environment were small and spread all over the globe in new threat
scenarios posing difficult problems for IMINT and SIGINT. This situation was increasingly more common as the military began to conduct more MOOTW activities.

Finally, General Scanlon emphasized that the shift in the National Military Strategy (shifting from the bipolar conflict to regional hostilities) required a new “National HUMINT Strategy,” to match the National Military Strategy. This new national HUMINT strategy had to be directed against emerging threats, regional security, and transnational issues. This new HUMINT strategy could not be achieved without a central management structure. General Scanlon recommended that the Defense Intelligence Agency serve as the lead for the DoD HUMINT management. General Scanlon, however, did not believe that centralized control of HUMINT officers would be necessary. He wanted centralized management through DIA, which would streamline the management structure, but continue to decentralize execution of HUMINT operations.

Other senior ranking intelligence officers thought that centralized management should also include centralized control, tasking, and execution. Major General John A. Leide, Director for Attaches and Operations, Defense Intelligence Agency, was one of those who saw the need to centralize control, tasking, and management of HUMINT. Major General Leide had been in the Army since 1958. He was an infantry company commander during the Vietnam War and served as the Central Command (CENTCOM) J2 during Desert Storm. Major General Leide thought that centralizing management would make HUMINT more capable of responding to the new challenges facing the military. He went further though when he discussed the need to develop, “new, more innovative, and more responsive methods to meet present and future requirements.” General Leide wanted to develop and use new HUMINT collection methods and
capabilities. In order to enhance the HUMINT collection capabilities, DIA needed to have more than centralized management. It had to be able to exercise HUMINT Operational Tasking Authority (HOTA). This would essentially give the DIA day-to-day control of all the separate service HUMINT assets. Only in this way could HUMINT develop “new, innovative and responsive methods of collection.”

General Leide helped draft a HUMINT concept proposal with which the service secretaries concurred in September 1992. This proposal consolidated all service HUMINT management and operations to better support the theater CINCs. The proposal also established HUMINT Support Elements (HSE). The new defense HUMINT structure would place these HSEs at every CINC headquarters to serve as liaison between the defense HUMINT structure, and the theater CINC. The proposal further posited the establishment of joint operational bases. These operational bases would provide operational control of all HUMINT collection in the base’s assigned region. The national intelligence community, DoD leadership and Congress, supported and subsequently backed this proposal. There was a weakness in the old system of management, and these were logical approaches to unifying the defense HUMINT management and operational capability.

The Birth of Defense HUMINT Service

On 18 December 1992, Deputy Secretary of Defense for Command Control Communication and Intelligence Donald Atwood signed DoD Directive 5200.37, Centralized Management of Department of Defense Human Intelligence (HUMINT) Operations. This directive essentially followed General Liede’s line of reasoning. It established two basic tenets. In the first paragraph, the directive charged the Director of
DIA, as the DoD HUMINT manager, to provide operational tasking to all DoD HUMINT elements and gave the director general oversight of DoD HUMINT. It also established DIA as the responsible organization for establishing all procedures for the conduct of HUMINT and for validating DoD HUMINT tasking requirements. This essentially allowed DIA to choose which intelligence requirements would receive the highest priority. The directive also charged the DIA with providing for all research and development for DoD HUMINT activities. The most critical paragraph of the directive was paragraph 2, which states:

To increase efficiency and minimize costs consistent with meeting operational needs, the Secretaries of the Military Departments, the commanders of the unified and specified commands, and the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency shall consolidate the HUMINT activities of the Military Departments, the unified or specified commands and the Defense Intelligence Agency into elements to be known as operating bases pursuant to plans that shall be prepared by the ASD/C3I and approved by the Secretary of Defense.

This directive essentially unified all DoD HUMINT activities and gave operational control of all DoD HUMINT to DIA under the newly created “operating bases.” In 1993, the Deputy Secretary of Defense directed the establishment of the DHS under DIA. DHS was established to consolidate the operating bases, the HSE’s, the Defense Attaché Service, and all other General Defense Intelligence Program (GDIP) funded HUMINT programs into one organization. DoD mandated the establishment of DHS in 1993, but it took a few years to plan and build the new organization. The final pieces were brought together when the new operating bases were created and DIA activated DHS officially on 1 October 1995, and DIA declared DHS fully operational less than one year later on 12 September 1996.
DHS now has the responsibility to conduct worldwide HUMINT operations. It is responsive to the theater CINCs, the DoD, and the national level decision makers. DHS has over 2,000 personnel assigned who conduct administrative and operational missions in over 150 locations. DHS is organized into operating bases and detachments, over 111 defense attaché offices, and HUMINT support elements located at every theater CINC and service chief's office.

In creating DHS, DoD realized the capabilities that Generals Scanlon, Leide, and others identified as a critical requirement for the post-Cold War era. DHS is a national-level HUMINT organization capable of responding in one theater to support a crisis or action in another theater. Because of the centralized management of joint HUMINT assets, it is now possible to assign collectors in one theater, branch of service, to target and collect information for other theaters and services.

The mission of the DHS is to conduct HUMINT operations, collect information worldwide, and provide timely, relevant information to its customers. The DHS has three customers: Theater CINCs, weapons and equipment researchers, and national-level decision makers in Washington, DC. All of DHS's efforts are focused to support these three customers. DHS collects information for the theater commanders and through the theater J-2, for JTF commanders. This includes immediate combat critical and targeting information. DHS also collects intelligence on critical databasing information for planners and for systems developers. Information, such as opposing order of battle and information on foreign weapons development and technology, are critical for planning the future equipment needs of the military. Finally, DHS provides strategic information
and information on the long-term intentions of adversaries to military and national level decision makers.\textsuperscript{33}

DoD HUMINT had grown from a small, service-oriented effort in the 1970s to a joint, global organization, capable of responding to many of the challenges faced by the HUMINT community today. Combining the service HUMINT organizations into the Defense HUMINT Service streamlined collection, management and coordination between the services and enhanced this growth. One of the purposes of creating the Defense HUMINT Service was to create a joint organization better suited to provide support to the unified commanders in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986.\textsuperscript{34}

**Facing New Threats: Establishing PPD-35**

The reorganization of individual service HUMINT organizations into the DHS did not solve all of the organizational and managerial problems faced by the military HUMINT intelligence organizations in the post Cold War era. Throughout the early 1990s, the intelligence community (as well as the rest of the DoD) continued to function as if they were still facing the Soviet Union. This was not an unfamiliar phenomenon within the DoD, but it created a vacuum within the intelligence community. As the Cold War came to an end, collection priorities became uncertain. Along with large reductions in forces, there was an expanding global effort to collect information outside of what used to be the intelligence community’s only target--the Soviet Union. It was clear that the intelligence community could not focus on every requirement all the time. There was no standardized prioritization of intelligence requirements.
The White House took steps to resolve this problem in 1995. On the second of March 1995, President Clinton signed Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 35. PDD-35 was an attempt to prioritize intelligence requirements globally for all intelligence organizations, including DHS. PDD-35 established a list of priorities in tiers, from tier 0 to tier 4. Tier 0 is the highest priority and calls for the collection of information on indications and warnings of impending hostilities, crisis management information, and support to military operations. The tier level goes down from the highest priority tier 0 through tiers 1, 2, 3 to tier 4. Following tier 0, the next priority is to provide political, economic, and military intelligence information on countries hostile to the United States. The priority for information continues to decline to tier 4. Tier 4 countries are of almost no interest to the United States.

PDD-35 seemed to be an excellent solution to the problem of prioritizing intelligence requirements. It gave the intelligence community a prioritized list from the most to least important issues facing the National Command Authorities. PDD-35 gave the highest priority to supporting military crisis operations. There were, however, two unintended consequences to PDD-35. Both of these consequences had drastic effect on DHS’s ability to support military operations other than war.

The first consequence was that PDD-35 failed to allow intelligence organizations to anticipate crises. A congressional study examining the issue stated, “The [intelligence community] has responded to Presidential Decision Directive-35 (PDD-35), by focusing resources on the highest priority issues at the expense of maintaining basic coverage on ‘lower’ tier issues.” PDD-35 identified intelligence priorities within the intelligence community. The list within PDD-35 is obviously of vital national interest, but it is a list
of anticipated information needs. Any type of prioritized list forces intelligence collectors to search for the known threat, it does not allow the intelligence collector to search for an emerging threat.

The other consequence of PDD-35 is that the lower-tiered requirements were ignored. As PDD-35 was published, intelligence agencies began to focus their assets on the most important priorities, as one would expect they would. In focusing the intelligence effort on high priority, near term requirements, other less important requirements were ignored. This focus on the pressing issues threatens the baseline intelligence collection necessary to understand what is happening day to day all over the world. What is worse, no baseline intelligence is available in case of a crisis in a lower tiered country.

This was a major problem in both Rwanda and Somalia. These countries were not high on the list of priorities, and may have even been tier 4 countries. However, when a military operation began in each of these countries they became tier 0 countries. Both were countries that had little or no intelligence coverage, yet suddenly became top priority. As a consequence of PDD-35 the intelligence community was not looking for a crisis in either country. Because Rwanda and Somalia were low on PDD-35 listing, the intelligence community was unprepared for either crisis. Further, because the countries had such a low priority, no significant baseline information database existed as U.S. military forces moved into both Rwanda and Somalia.

While DoD HUMINT has grown from a small, narrowly focused effort by each of the services to the globally oriented joint Defense HUMINT Service there still seem to be some problems with DHS’s ability to support the global demands of MOOTW. DHS
clearly has a large role to play in MOOTW, however, one of the problems they must overcome is the PDD-35 tasking problem.


9 Ibid.


12 Title 10 responsibilities refer to title 10 of the United States Code. Congress under the authority of the constitution is responsible for raising a military. All laws for the military are listed under title 10 of the U.S. Code. Under title 10, Congress has delegated different responsibilities to different parts of the military depending on the service capabilities. That delegation has reached down to intelligence. Certain organizations within the Department of Defense, including Defense Intelligence Agency receive mandatory responsibilities from Congress under Title 10.


14 Ibid.
Ibid.

Ibid., 9.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid., 12.


Ibid., 16.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.


Ibid.


Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

Ibid.

35 PDD-35 intelligence requirements; available from www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/pdd35.html; Internet.

36 Ibid.

37 Ibid.

38 Ibid.


40 Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence House of Representatives, One Hundred Fourth Congress, “Intelligence Requirements Process,” IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, 6.

41 Ibid.

42 Ibid.
CHAPTER 3
THE USE OF HUMINT IN MOOTW

Introduction

Several issues should be examined while studying the Defense HUMINT Service's role supporting military operations other than war (MOOTW). The first issue is, Are MOOTW actions a significant mission for the military, or will the military move away from MOOTW to what some view as its more traditional role as warfighter? This is important because DHS's support to MOOTW activities will only be necessary if the military continues its MOOTW activities.

If the national command authorities continue to have the military conducting MOOTW activities, then the next question is, What intelligence information will be necessary to provide support for the MOOTW activity, and what role can HUMINT play in collecting that information? Understanding what intelligence information a commander will need in a MOOTW activity is a two step process. First, what type of unique intelligence information is required in MOOTW, and then, what specific type of information is HUMINT expected to provide, and capable of providing? Studying the criticality of HUMINT in MOOTW will lead to the examination of DHS's role in supporting MOOTW activities.

The final step in studying DHS support to MOOTW is to examine three MOOTW actions plus some vignettes as case studies, to evaluate what type of information was necessary, and to determine how HUMINT was able to meet the needs of the commanders. Those three cases are military operations that occurred in Somalia, Haiti,
and Bosnia. This examination will establish whether or not HUMINT is important in MOOTW activities, and will be the first step in determining how DHS support to MOOTW can be improved.

The Significance of MOOTW

There seems to be a myth within the U.S. Army MOOTW are a recent phenomenon of the post-Cold War era. Even General John Shalikashvili, former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, contributed to the perpetuation of this myth when he said, “While we have historically focused on warfighting, our military profession is increasingly changing its focus to a complex array of military operations-other than war.”¹ In reality, MOOTW, “nontraditional” military operations, have been as much a part of U.S. military history as traditional warfare. A partial list of past actions that fall within the MOOTW definition include: the Whiskey Rebellion; Lewis and Clark Expedition; reconstruction of the South; the Pullman Strike; actions in the Philippines and Cuba; earthquake relief in San Francisco; the occupation of Haiti and the Dominican Republic; the Sandino affair in Nicaragua; the Greek civil war; the Huk insurrection in the Philippines; the 1958 peace operations in Lebanon; stability operations in Dominican Republic; U.S. riot control; the Mayaguez incident; early actions in Vietnam; peacekeeping in Lebanon in 1984; counterinsurgency operations in El Salvador; intervention in Grenada; hurricane Andrew relief efforts; famine relief and nation building in Somalia; intervention in Haiti, humanitarian relief efforts for Hurricane Mitch in Central America; and intervention in Bosnia and in Kosovo.² This list is not intended to name every instance where the U.S. participated in a MOOTW activity. The list merely demonstrates the fact that MOOTW is not a new phenomenon within the sphere
of military operations, but something with which the U.S. military has been dealing with almost since independence.

The Cold War created the recent perception that there is no role for the U.S. military in MOOTW, or that the military is somehow losing its focus or straying away from what is really important. During the Cold War, the U.S. and Soviet Union both avoided MOOTW activities as a matter of policy to avoid polarizing every small-scale contingency into an East-West confrontation.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, U.S. national security policy developed a more proactive policy of engagement throughout the world. The 2000 National Security Strategy continued this trend. The 2000 National Security Strategy calls for the military to be prepared to respond to transnational threats, such as terrorism and crime. It also calls for the military to have a capability to respond to smaller scale contingencies. The national security strategy specified that the U.S. military must be prepared to conduct MOOTW operations if it is in the national interest to do so. Specifically the NSS states, “The United States must be prepared to respond to the full range of threats to our interests abroad. Smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the full range of military operations short of major theater warfare, including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, enforcing embargoes and no-fly zones, evacuating U.S. citizens, and reinforcing key allies.” This statement in the NSS clearly indicates U.S. resolve to remain engaged militarily throughout the world.

**Intelligence Needs in MOOTW**

The first priority in a policy of engagement is to maintain good intelligence. The NSS for 1999 identified intelligence as a critical U.S. capability as an instrument for
implementing the national security strategy.⁴ The importance of this point should not be overlooked. The 1999 NSS states: “The U.S. intelligence community provided critical support to the full range of our activities abroad—diplomatic, military [emphasis added by author], law enforcement, and environmental. Comprehensive collection and analytic capabilities are needed to provide . . . near-real time intelligence in times of crisis.”⁵ This same point is made again in the 2000 NSS, which states: “The U.S. intelligence community provides critical support to the full range of our involvement abroad.”⁶ The national command authority has established the clear need for good intelligence in order to achieve the goals set forth in the national security strategy.

Policymakers need the intelligence community to provide the information necessary to make strategic decisions, but what about the military commanders involved in the MOOTW? Good intelligence is the cornerstone of any successful military operation. Intelligence encompasses every aspect of a military operation from the tactical level through the operational to the strategic level. Commanders at every level require intelligence to give them a clear view of the entire situation.⁷

Joint doctrine distinguishes a difference in intelligence needs between classic military operations and MOOTW. During combat, military intelligence requirements are focused almost exclusively on the enemy’s military capability; that is, order of battle, dispositions, future missions, and similar information. In MOOTW, the intelligence requirements are quite different. Information collection and analysis in MOOTW may require emphasis on information regarding the political, cultural and economic factors that affect the military operations.⁸ Information required in a MOOTW includes information on local infrastructure, police capabilities and loyalties, judiciary
effectiveness, factions within and opposing the host nation government, and effectiveness of the host government. Standard military operations have only one “enemy” and are usually conducted on a linear battlefield. MOOTW actions can to involve separating belligerents, such as situations in Haiti and Bosnia. It is possible that there may be multiple factions which U.S. forces will have to deal with, creating a unique challenge for intelligence. This type of information is critical to the JTF commander of a MOOTW activity. U.S. intelligence technical collection systems are not designed to collect this information readily. HUMINT has the capability to seek out this information in ways other intelligence disciplines cannot.

**HUMINT in MOOTW**

The U.S. intelligence community built an extensive, comprehensive and impressive information collection capability. This capability is based on overhead reconnaissance systems, such as satellites, JSTARS, and other “national technical means.” These capabilities are excellent at determining enemy dispositions, numbers, massing of forces, and moving military equipment. This is the type of information that is very important in a conventional major theater war (MTW). Colonel. H. Allen Boyd, former Director of Futures at the U.S. Army Intelligence Center at Fort Huachuca, Arizona identified the problem when he said:

> It [U.S. intelligence systems] remains a system primarily focused on conventional scenarios where the military tasks are clear, the threat is homogenous, and technology is the predominant means of resolving ambiguity. It is a system designed for use against an opponent whose intent we know or can readily presume by virtue of its formations and patterns that the high-technology sensors detect.
The type of information collected by these "national technical means" is critical for a MTW, but those systems are largely ineffective in a MOOTW activity. The information required in a MOOTW includes local infrastructure, police capabilities and loyalties, judiciary effectiveness, attitude and opinion of the multiple factions that maintain an influence in the area, and other factors. Furthermore, military objectives and political and economic agendas tend to be inseparable in a MOOTW. Differing factions frequently change positions and are very situation dependent. HUMINT is more suited to collect this type of information than the more technologically oriented intelligence capabilities. Recent joint doctrine has emphasized this need for HUMINT. The Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations states, "The primary source of intelligence in peace operations is normally human sources." Other joint documents reiterate this same point. Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other than War states that HUMINT may provide the most useful source of information. The doctrine writers recognized that all forms of intelligence must be used to gather the information needed for a MOOTW, and the information must be fused and used to queue the different intelligence disciplines to gain a better overall picture of the situation. In MOOTW, HUMINT is most capable of discovering that information identified as being critical in the MOOTW environment.

HUMINT does have a few weaknesses which hinder its usefulness in MOOTW. Doctrine identifies the first weakness. Joint Pub 3-07 praised HUMINT as the most useful source of information but stated that HUMINT infrastructure may not be in place when U.S. forces arrive, and must be established as quickly as possible. It may take as long as two months to set up a HUMINT infrastructure.
The other weakness is the current concept of HUMINT from the Army tactical MI unit’s perspective. In planning MOOTW, intelligence personnel tend to classify and plan all HUMINT activities around counterintelligence (CI) and interrogation (IPW) teams, which produce the intelligence.\textsuperscript{16} Intelligence planners tend to plan to collect only information using those CI/IPW teams, which are focused on low level source operations, elicitations, debriefing indigenous personnel and returnees, and screening operations.\textsuperscript{17} They discount all of the other potential information that is available. Each soldier in theater has the potential to view or collect a piece of intelligence critical to the mission. Infantry on patrol, civil affairs teams, engineers, and medics, all have the potential to view and provide information. It is the responsibility of the J2 to identify these as a potential sources of information and insure that their reports get into the intelligence channels. This type of HUMINT collection is not normally considered as an option in standard HUMINT operations. The J2 must bring this information into the intelligence information flow. HUMINT channels are the natural conduit for capturing this information.

Nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and private volunteer organizations (PVO) are also potential information providers. The \textit{Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations} states, “Approaches to NGO, PVO, and other civilian organizations for information should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the purposes for which information will be used.”\textsuperscript{18} Doctrine identifies these organizations as possible sources of information; however, military planners rarely ask NGOs or PVOs for information. NGOs and PVOs have usually been in country for a long time. They have usually conducted negotiations with
all of the different factions in a conflict. They have already identified the trouble spots and problem areas, and they have the potential to provide a wealth of information.

The term “intelligence” can make some of these private organizations nervous. They may fear being viewed as choosing sides, or they may be afraid that they are being secretly compromised in a covert action. However, if the military is up-front, open, and honestly states what the information is going to be used for and simply asks for the information, the organizations will tend to be open and willing to provide the information. As long as these organizations are provided the opportunity to volunteer information, good relations can be maintained with the PVOs even if they choose not to provide the information.

**HUMINT in Somalia: Operation Restore Hope**

In 1992, shortly after President Bush lost his reelection attempt, he deployed U.S. forces in a unique humanitarian relief operation in Somalia. Somalia was a legacy of the vacuum of Cold War politics. Somalia had been on one side or the other of the Cold War for several years. After the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the Somali civil war broke out. The Somali government collapsed, and Somalia became a failed state controlled by clans.

During the same timeframe Somalia, a country normally capable of producing enough food to feed itself, suffered a drought causing a famine. Relief supplies poured into the country to aid in the famine relief. The clans, recognizing an opportunity to generate more power, began to control the food as a source of power. Images of starving children and thugs with guns denying these children food caused President Bush to deploy U.S. Forces into Somalia to provide a secure environment in which the NGOs and
PVOs could deliver food. This was the extent of the mission assigned to the U.S. forces when they were deployed to Somalia.

Operation Restore Hope in Somalia is a good choice for a MOOTW case study. It resembles several other MOOTW operations that have been recently conducted by the U.S. military. Somalia clearly demonstrates the importance of HUMINT in a MOOTW. It was also the first operation to identify the areas where HUMINT was lacking and to identify areas where HUMINT needed to be improved. Finally, while DHS did not exist during the Somali operation, the Central Intelligence Agency was the national HUMINT collection organization in Somalia. Their participation caused several problems, which demonstrated potential critical problems in using intelligence from other than the DoD sources.

When the U.S. military moved into Somalia in 1992, it had been a long time since United States Central Command (CENTCOM) was deployed in a peacemaking role. Somalia caught CENTCOM off guard. It was the 18th intelligence priority of the nineteen countries in the CENTCOM AOR.\textsuperscript{20} There was no "normal" threat to U.S. forces there. When U.S. forces entered Somalia, they had only a one-line entry on the database on the Somali military.\textsuperscript{21} That one-line entry was irrelevant since the Somali Army ceased to exist over a year before when the national government collapsed, and six family-based clans began to battle for control of the country.\textsuperscript{22}

There was no real intelligence of any value available to military planners prior to the U.S. deployment, but that was not the only problem. National technical intelligence collection means were unable to contribute significantly to the intelligence collection effort. There were really no Somali military formations to photograph. There were no
maneuver forces to counter and the Somalis had no electronic communications system which the U.S. could intercept or exploit.  

HUMINT was going to have to be the primary collection method in Somalia. Tactical HUMINT collectors consisted of counterintelligence (CI) agents and interrogators for prisoners of war (IPW). These two disciplines were not designed to operate in a MOOTW activity. This was a new type of mission added on to the “normal” CI or IPW doctrine. According to doctrine, CI agents are designed and trained to counter intelligence threats from other countries. That is, they are supposed to prevent other intelligence organizations from collecting information on U.S. forces. CI agents can conduct some deb briefings and interviews to collect information on force protection and counterintelligence purposes. Doctrinally, they are not trained or supposed to be tasked to collect foreign intelligence information on the opposing factions.

U.S. Army interrogators were trained and task organized to collect foreign intelligence on a linear battlefield. In 1992 U.S. Army HUMINT collectors were task organized at the tactical level to collect information on a linear battlefield from captured prisoners and displaced persons. CI agents conduct interviews of displaced persons to detect enemy agents trying to infiltrate U.S. rear areas. Neither of these specialties lend themselves to collecting information in a split-based operation on a nonlinear battlefield where there are belligerents, but no enemy.

HUMINT collection methods, such as low-level source operations, elicitations, deb briefings, and screening operations, were the best, and the primary sources of intelligence information in Somalia. The CI operations conducted in Somalia were critical to the success of the collection mission. CI agents debriefing locals, talking to
the military police, and conducting low-level source operations provided the bulk of intelligence information gathered in Somalia. The problem was that doctrinally they were not tasked, trained, or organized to conduct that mission.

While HUMINT proved to be extremely successful, primarily due to the young CI agents adapting their mission to meet the circumstances they faced, it was not without its problems. There were two significant problems with HUMINT during Operation Restore Hope. The first problem was a problem inherent with HUMINT. The second problem was a problem inherent in MOOTW operations.

The first problem was that while HUMINT was critical in Operation Restore Hope it took a long time to set up. One advantage to technical collection capabilities is that once the necessary equipment arrives in country it is a matter of switching on the equipment and the collectors can begin to gather information. HUMINT operations cannot just be turned on. HUMINT operations require that the collectors meet with sources and set up operations over a period of weeks. The Intelligence and Communications Architecture Report on *Operation Restore Hope* stated, “Although HUMINT was the major means of intelligence collection in Somalia for the JTF, several drawbacks affected these operations. HUMINT is a time-intensive operation requiring extensive efforts to build sources and trust. . . . HUMINT teams did not have the time they required to gain area familiarity and establish rapport.”

This is particularly important in a context of changing policy goals over time.

The fact that the Army CI agents did not arrive in country for two weeks after initial deployment further complicated the collection task. This slowed the development of time sensitive HUMINT operations. HUMINT is not like the more
technical aspects of intelligence collection. When HUMINT collectors arrive in country, there is no switch to throw to begin the flow of information. HUMINT, in its most basic form is nothing more than talking to people about what they have seen or heard. It takes time to set up the infrastructure necessary to identify, meet with, and gain the confidence of these people. Joint doctrine also identifies this time delay as a drawback. Joint Pub 3-07 discusses the importance of HUMINT, but goes on to state, "However a HUMINT infrastructure may not be in place when U.S. forces arrive; it therefore needs to be established as quickly as possible." While HUMINT was critical in Somalia, it obviously took time to establish the infrastructure necessary to begin gathering information.

There was a second problem with HUMINT in Somalia. The number of forces deployed in MOOTW tends to be limited. Since the National Command Authorities do not want large-scale troop deployments in most peacekeeping operations, they routinely sets force caps in theater. This was the case in Somalia. The number of personnel deployed into Somalia directly affected the level of intelligence support. Every intelligence billet meant that one other billet had to be removed. The intelligence effort became a balancing act between the number of soldiers deployed and the capabilities desired. The guidance provided to the JTF was to keep personnel and equipment to a minimum. These low-level troop minimums made it difficult to deploy the number of HUMINT collectors necessary to do the mission properly.

Clandestine HUMINT Effort for Task Force "Ranger"

Once Operation Restore Hope had been completed, the United Nations took on nation-building efforts in Somalia under UNOSOM II. Their goal was to rebuild the
Somali government and infrastructure. UNOSOM II challenged the authority of the clans within Somalia and the clans fought back. After twenty-four Pakistani soldiers who were serving in UNOSOM II were killed in an ambush set up by the Habr Gidr clan, UNOSOM II asked for U.S. aid in ending the clan grip on Somalia. The U.S. response was to attempt to remove the Habr Gidr clan leadership by using Delta Force accompanied with U.S. Army Rangers to grab the leaders. This group was known as "Task Force Ranger."

HUMINT also played a role in the Task Force Ranger effort in Somalia. The plan called for operators from the Delta Force, accompanied by about 100 rangers to fly on helicopters, quickly secure an area, and snatch the senior leadership of the Habr Gidr clan. This type of operation depends on accurate and timely intelligence in order to establish the location of the clan leadership.

There is no official information available regarding what type of HUMINT was available for Task Force Ranger. There is no official documentation acknowledging the presence of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) in Somalia during Operation Restore Hope. Unofficial documentaries provided all of the information regarding the HUMINT for Task Force (TF) Ranger. According to the frontline documentary, TF Ranger relied on HUMINT from CIA operations in theater. The problem was that the CIA officers in Mogadishu were not providing the information they collected to the JTF or to TF Ranger. They were sending the information back to CIA headquarters in Langley. Langley would then decide what information was to be disseminated and what was not. According to one CIA officer, this process took from twelve to seventy-two hours to complete.
This circular method for passing information is clearly ineffective and can be very dangerous to U.S. forces on the ground. While no one gave reasons for this circular reporting method, the most logical reason was to protect either the CIA case officers or the sources providing the information. This is a dangerous precedent. On the one hand intelligence officers should protect both their cover and their sources, on the other hand U.S. soldiers are kept at risk to protect sources and cover identity of case officers. This would seem an easy problem to overcome by requiring the CIA to share information with the JTF, but that is not possible. First, the CIA is separate from the DoD and they do not fall within the DoD chain of command at any level. They can report to their own headquarters first if they so choose. In fact, joint doctrine dictates that U.S. forces are responsible for providing support to other government agencies operating in theater, yet those agencies may choose their own reporting channels.

Because the CIA will never be in the chain of command, DoD cannot direct their support in any situation. Therefore, they cannot be ordered into any theater a CINC wants them in, and there is no guarantee that they will show up. There is no way to guarantee that the same priorities that exist for the CIA exist for the DoD. If a MOOTW were a high priority for DoD, but not for CIA, minimal or even no CIA support will result.

**HUMINT in Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy**

In September 1994, the United States military began another intervention mission in the country of Haiti. The purpose of the intervention was to achieve a “coup de main” similar to Operation Just Cause in Panama. Operation Restore Democracy was a result of U.S. and U.N. frustration at Raoul Cedras’ continual disregard of U.N. mandates
to give up power and leave Haiti. In 1991 Cedras had seized power as the leader of a military junta which ousted elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide.

The United Nations had been negotiating with Cedras to leave Haiti and allow a multinational peacekeeping force to enter Haiti and begin to rebuild the country. Ultimately Aristide would be reinstated as president. After years of Cedras making promises and then backing out, the U.S. military developed a plan for a forced entry and takeover of the country. They developed a plan for a permissive entry in case negotiations were successful. The invasion was launched and then recalled after successful last-ditch negotiations. Because of the turnaround in the invasion plans, a rapid meld of both plans was executed.36

As in Somalia, no sophisticated signals infrastructure existed within Haiti to allow for any significant technical intelligence collection operations. There was a very limited communications system available to the factions that posed a threat to U.S. Forces.37 Therefore, as in Somalia, HUMINT was the primary intelligence collection discipline.38

Human intelligence was collected in one of three ways during Operation Uphold Democracy. Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) Special Forces A detachment patrols and infantry patrols from the 10th Mountain Division and the 82nd Airborne Division scouted and reported significant activity they observed. Some civilian organizations volunteered information and the tactical HUMINT assets of the JTF 180 and 190 collected and reported information. Both task forces relied heavily on their patrols and on the JSOTF operations for intelligence during their first several days on the ground.39 While patrol reporting provided a tactical “vision” of what was happening, it did not provide the type of information necessary to understand how the Haitians were
going to react to the intervention, what they were going to do next, and if they supported or opposed U.S. intervention. That type of information came only from talking to Haitians, and that capability did not exist during the first several days of the intervention.

HUMINT collection operations in Haiti provided the same types of challenges as the problems faced in Somalia. The only tactical HUMINT assets available to the 82nd Airborne and the 10th Mountain Division were counterintelligence agents and Army interrogators. Both of these military occupational specialties (MOS) had some of the skills necessary to conduct the mission, but neither of the MOS’s were fully qualified to collect information in a peacekeeping operation.

The 10th Mountain Division had learned several lessons from Somalia by the time they became involved in Haiti. When 10th Mountain formed JTF-190, and the 82nd formed JTF-180, they created a unique solution to the dilemma that their HUMINT collectors were task organized to fight a MTW. Both JTFs broke up the separate CI and the IPW teams and formed combined CI/IPW teams to travel around in teams and collect HUMINT information. Each of the military specialties brought individual capabilities to these newly created teams. The JTF-180 took the concept a step further. After reorganizing the separate CI and IPW teams into combined CI/IPW teams, they dispatched them to accompany the infantry patrols. Both task forces also utilized the large organized network of voluntary and NGOs in Haiti to collect information.

The biggest drawbacks to HUMINT in Haiti were the same problems U.S. forces encountered during Somalia. Again, there was no switch to turn on the flow of HUMINT information. No HUMINT infrastructure existed before the intervention began, and it took as long as nine days before an infrastructure was set up and began producing
information. Prior to D+9 the only HUMINT available to the commanders was the reporting coming from the JSOTF A teams or the infantry patrols. On D+9 the IPW/CI teams had finally established enough of an infrastructure to begin reporting information.\footnote{42}

The JSOTF A teams were reporting what they saw, but they also encountered a problem with HUMINT. As the JSOTF A teams were sent out into the villages of Haiti, they had no HUMINT support to inform them of what was happening in their villages. The A teams created a solution to this problem by conducting low-level source operations (LLSO) to better identify the threat their team faced in the villages in which they were operating.\footnote{43} This resulted in some success, but the focus of this operation was very tactical. It would have been possible to expand this collection effort had the effort been unified and coordinated. Special Operations operators conducted LLSOs, but it would have been better if the LLSOs had been coordinated and centrally managed.

**Clandestine HUMINT Effort in Haiti**

In the early days of Operation Restore Democracy, The 101st MP Company, attached to JTF 180, was ordered to cordon off, search for, and confiscate weapons at a Haitian military installation. The JTF intelligence shop provided all available intelligence about the installation, including photographs. The company commander performed an aerial reconnaissance flight over the installation. The day before the mission was to be executed, the JTF J-2 told the company commander there was a HUMINT collector who had been in the compound. This collector could provide a detailed description of what was in each of the buildings, where the weapons were stored, where the guards were, and where the officers quarters were. The J-2 told the
commander that the source would meet with the commander at 6 p.m. that evening to pass on his knowledge.

When the HUMINT collector did not arrive that evening as planned, the company commander called the J-2 to inform him the collector did not show up. The JTF J-2 had to become personally involved before the meeting took place. When the source finally showed up, he told the commander that he did not come the first time because he was afraid his cover would be blown. The source provided what the commander considered valuable information, and the company commander was able to fulfil his mission. The commander never knew which agency or organization the collector worked for.44

This initial failure of the collector to provide information essential to a mission where U.S. forces be put at risk is a product of a Cold War mentality in which a HUMINT case officer is trained to protect his cover and his source at all costs. This was a critical policy in the Cold War, when the lives of combat troops did not hang in the balance. In MOOTW, however, this mentality puts the U.S. forces at a higher level of risk. The U.S. intelligence officers should not place the protection of their cover over the lives of U.S. troops, and this decision should never be left in the hands of the individual case officer involved.

**Humint in Bosnia: Operation Joint Endeavor**

Prior to the signing of the Dayton peace accords, the U.S. was hesitant to provide ground forces for UNPROFOR (United Nations Protection Forces) in Bosnia. After signing the Dayton peace accords, the U.S. sent a contingent of forces (Task Force Eagle) to take part in a NATO-led multinational operation known as Implementation Force (IFOR) into Bosnia. The first U.S. units to deploy into Bosnia were primarily forces
from the 1st Armored Division stationed in Germany. The first U.S. soldiers entered Bosnia on 6 December 1995. At that time, DHS had been in existence for sixty-six days and would not be declared fully operational for another nine months.

The deployment to Bosnia was another peacekeeping operation where HUMINT was going to be critical. HUMINT operations were expected to prove very successful in Bosnia after HUMINT had proved so effective in Somalia and Haiti. Lessons learned in Somalia and Haiti were applied in Bosnia. The use of CI and HUMINT teams for Joint Endeavor were now doctrine, and they would prove to be a key provider of information to Task Force Eagle. Because of the emphasis on HUMINT there was a large deployment of tactical HUMINT assets to Bosnia. Up to 110 U.S. Army CI and tactical HUMINT soldiers deployed for Joint Endeavor. These soldiers were divided into four-man teams and spread throughout the entire AOR of Task Force Eagle. Such a large deployment of these assets led to another doctrinal change, the creation of the G2X. There were so many HUMINT collectors that the G2X had to be created within the G2 to help manage, task, and eliminate any conflicts between the numerous HUMINT collectors. The concept of a G2X came from joint doctrine. Joint doctrine called for a J2X, since Task Force Eagle was a division-level organization it was dubbed the G2X.

The G2X had officers from DHS, another national agency, and representatives from the Army, Navy and Marine Corps. This was an important improvement in HUMINT collection within theater. Both the national agency and DHS accepted tasking directly from the G2X. The DHS element within the G2X provided critical support to the G2. They assisted in accepting the commanders’ priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and converting them into taskings that DHS assets could attempt to answer.
The CIA and DHS deployed collection elements into Bosnia. Their job was to gather information about the intent of the different factions involved in the Dayton agreements. Possessing this information aided the deployment and provided an added dimension to force protection. It was critical to the success of the overall mission in Bosnia. DHS also changed the standard reporting procedures that had been in place with other national agencies. In Somalia, the CIA reported their information back to their headquarters in Virginia, and they would decide how to disseminate the information. This caused a lag of up to seventy-two hours before the information came to the task force commander. DHS collected and disseminated information first to the commander, then to the theater consumers, and finally to the national intelligence community. This eliminated the lag time, and it also increased the trust between the tactical and national level units. The commander knew that he was receiving all available information and not just what the national-level agency thought he should have.

The deployment of DHS into Bosnia was the first time that the DoD deployed a national level joint HUMINT operation in a MOOTW activity. Even though DHS had only been in existence for sixty-six Days at the start of Task Force Eagle, they had a few stunning early successes. Their first success occurred before the IFOR even entered Bosnia. A team from DHS was able to conduct a route reconnaissance into Tusla, and provided reports of their reconnaissance and ground level photographs of the routes to the 1st Armored Division moved into Tusla. These reports answered commanders critical intelligence requirements (CCIR) and were instrumental during the force flow phase. DHS received high praise from the commanding general of Task Force Eagle, for both providing the information and uniquely possessing the ability to collect it.
While DHS did record a number of successes, they also arrived with their share of problems. The first problem was that the DHS personnel arrived with lots of money, but little else. They had no tents, no food, and most importantly, no vehicles. The supplies that they needed when they first arrived could not be purchased with money. They arrived in a city that had been involved in a civil war for several years. There were no restaurants, no hotels, and no car rental agencies, yet they deployed with none of the equipment necessary to sustain them.52 The DHS personnel managed to get by because they joined the tactical Military Intelligence Battalion (MI Bn) deployed to Tusla base. The MI Bn was happy to have the support of DHS and agreed to help the DHS personnel. The MI Bn. provided initial support by hand-receipting Army vehicles, trailers, and tents to DHS. Eventually the DHS personnel were able to obtain their own vehicles and to arrange for accommodations, but they were very dependent on the support of other units during the initial phases of deployment.53

The other problem faced by DHS was the problem facing all deployed HUMINT assets on both the tactical and national level. As in previous deployments to Somalia and Haiti, it takes time to set up a functioning HUMINT infrastructure capable of collecting information. The initial reporting done by DHS elements prior to Task Force Eagle deployment was from personal observation. It takes several weeks to begin to meet with people, identify individuals willing to provide information, and develop leads that eventually provide information. There is no short-term solution to eliminate the three to eight weeks it takes to establish a HUMINT infrastructure. If the HUMINT assets do not enter the area of operations within the first two weeks, then it will take from six to eight weeks before a steady stream of information begins to flow from HUMINT assets.
Searching for Information Outside of the Theater of Operations

One other area where HUMINT has not met with resounding success is the attempt to find information on a global level for a regional operation. There is frequently information in the U.S. that would be of great value to the tactical commanders involved in MOOTW. Two examples illustrate the problem. The first example took place during the Grenada invasion, and the second example involved U.S. action in Haiti.

The U.S. intervened in Grenada in October of 1983 in response to the execution of Prime Minister Maurice Bishop. Grenada became important to the U.S. after Cuba began a military buildup of the island. Cuba began building a large airport which could provide a potential intermediate staging area for an air assault against the U.S. or other countries in the region. When Prime Minister Bishop was executed and a more ardent communist government took over, President Reagan decided to intervene.

Of primary concern to the U.S. was the safety of U.S. students attending a medical school on the island. U.S. intelligence had a good understanding of the threat on the island. They were able to assess accurately the capabilities of both the Cuban and Grenadan forces on the island.\(^{54}\) The operation planners did not have accurate information on the numbers of the American students and where they were located. That information was readily available in the U.S. The school chancellor happened to be in New York City on routine business. He clearly possessed the detailed information needed by the military commanders, yet for some reason he was never contacted.

A similar situation occurred while planning the Haitian intervention. During the planning phase of the intervention, the Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, was tasked to produce information papers on Haiti and military
operations relating to Haiti. Officers at Fort Leavenworth were well aware that one of the leading experts in the United States on Haiti was located forty minutes away from Leavenworth in Lawrence, Kansas. Dr. Bryant Freeman was Director of Haitian Studies at the University of Kansas and was widely recognized as one of the most knowledgeable people in the United States regarding Haiti.

Some officers at Fort Leavenworth initially wanted to bring Dr. Freeman into their research process as an external consultant. After much debate this initiative was stopped for fear of a security leak. Then, some of the military planners at Fort Leavenworth tried to bring Dr. Freeman to Leavenworth as a cultural expert for a couple of days to provide a perspective on the culture, people, background and different factions operating in Haiti. Their proposal was first accepted then rejected. The planners then proposed that Dr. Freeman give an eight-hour presentation. This was first approved then reduced to a four-hour lecture, then to an hour, and finally cancelled all together.\(^5\)

Information available from the most renowned U.S. expert on Haitian affairs never made it into planning channels because there was no collection system in place to gather the information. Dr. Freeman was so familiar with the Haitian government that he had met both Papa Doc and Baby Doc Duvalier. He possessed detailed knowledge of every aspect of Haitian life, culture, and government that would be necessary and helpful for the U.S. planners. Unfortunately, he was unable to provide this information for almost a year until he served as an advisor to Major General Joseph Kinzer, Commander of the UN mission in Haiti starting in March of 1995.\(^6\)

In both of these examples, information important to the success of a military operation was available in the U.S., however, for some reason the information was not
gathered. While in both cases, the lack of information did not alter the final course of events; it could have posed a problem for the planners. Not collecting the information could have led to the loss of American lives. The failure to collect such information in the future could put others at risk.

Summary

The purpose of examining the role of HUMINT in MOOTW was to determine its advantages and disadvantages. The initial examination demonstrated that MOOTW will remain a priority for the military. The Army will continue to conduct MOOTW as long as it remains a U.S. priority. MOOTW will remain a priority for the predictable future.

Having established that MOOTW will remain a priority, the next step was to examine the role of HUMINT in MOOTW. The research demonstrated that HUMINT was the preeminent intelligence provider in MOOTW. It would be difficult to conduct MOOTW without the HUMINT collectors providing information. The three case studies demonstrated that HUMINT is and will remain the primary source of information in a MOOTW activity. Over and over, commanders praised the results of HUMINT and recognized how hard their tasks would be without the input from HUMINT. While the commanders and planners obviously appreciated the efforts and success of HUMINT in MOOTW, there were some problems with HUMINT.

The primary problem with HUMINT, identified repeatedly throughout the three case studies was that HUMINT in its current state is not a “turnkey” operation. It takes time to develop a HUMINT infrastructure within a MOOTW activity. That infrastructure is not developed until after HUMINT forces begin arriving in the country. Since HUMINT is not the highest priority on the force flow list, it generally takes a week or
two to bring all the HUMINT collectors into a theater. After the HUMINT collectors arrive, it takes another three to five weeks to begin to build the infrastructure necessary to begin to collect information. It takes longer to collect information on a regular basis. Therefore, it could potentially take two months before HUMINT begins to report regular substantive information in MOOTW. This can pose a significant problem, especially in MOOTW in which SIGINT or IMINT is less effective, since U.S. Forces will be operating with little or no intelligence.

This problem was substantiated by the three case studies. In all three cases, HUMINT was a critical part of the overall effort, but it took several weeks to begin collecting information. In Somalia force limitations, doctrinal problems, and poor utilization of the available HUMINT collectors, all restricted the collection capabilities. In Haiti a new combination of CI and IPW teams helped eliminate some of the doctrinal problems encountered in Somalia, but national-level intelligence organizations could have provided better support, and again, it took time to develop the HUMINT infrastructure. In Bosnia the G2 established a G2X, which helped alleviate HUMINT coordination and created a mechanism to help deconflict potential problems, but the issue of establishing a HUMINT infrastructure continued.

The other issue, identified by the two vignettes, was that there is no national-level effort to collect information for the tactical commander. This is an important issue for national-level agencies who are supposed to support the theater CINCs. The advantage of having a national agency over regional or service-oriented agencies is that it is truly national and is not focused on regional or service oriented issues. In order to serve the theater CINC’s better, the national agencies must be able to reach all over the world to
gather information, otherwise the national agencies become merely regional intelligence organizations centrally managed. This fails to live up to the capabilities envisioned by the senior defense leaders who wanted an agency with true global reach when they created DHS.

1Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1995), opening statement.

2Lawrence A. Yates, “Military Stability and Support Operations: Analogies, Patterns and Recurring Themes,” Military Review, July-August 1997. This article was reprinted for the CGSC Text for A645 Case Studies in U.S. Peace Operations and interventions since WW II. Printed in 1999, p. 13. Dr. Yates stated that this list is not intended to be an all-encompassing list of MOOTW operations.


5Ibid., 24.


7Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 20 November 1996), I-2.

8Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, IV-2.

9Joint Chiefs of Staff, JTF Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1997), VII-5.


12Ibid.

13Joint Chiefs of Staff, JTF Commanders Handbook For Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 16 June 1997), chapter 7, 1.
Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-07, Chapter 4-2.

Ibid.,

Boyd, 32.


Ibid., 2.

Joint Pub 3-07, chapter 4-3.

The Intelligence and Communications Architecture (INCA) Project Office, Operation Restore Hope: A Communications and Intelligence Assessment (Washington, DC, November 1994), 4-2.

White, 57.

The Intelligence and Communications Architecture Project Office, 4-2.

White, 57.


The Intelligence and Communications Architecture Project Office, 4-17.

Ibid.,


Joint Pub 3-07, chapter 4-2.

The Intelligence and Communications Architecture Project Office, 4-6.


The information on Task Force Ranger is not taken from official sources, but is a compilation from two documentary sources. The first is the Frontline documentary referenced immediately above. The other source of information is from the book Black Hawk Down. Mark Bowden, Black Hawk Down, A Story of Modern War (New York: Atlantic Monthly Press, 1999).
Cran.

Ibid.,

The research and reporting of HUMINT in Haiti has already been completed. Major Martin Urquhart, USA published an MMAS thesis in 1996 from the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College titled, “The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy.” This thesis provides a comprehensive review of the HUMINT operations in Haiti and does not need to be repeated in its entirety here.


10th Mountain Division, 20.

Ibid.,

Martin Urquhart, The Effectiveness of Human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy (Fort Leavenworth, KS: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College 1996), 57.

Ibid., 55.

Ibid., 73.

Ibid., 74.


Major Durian, who served as Company Commander 101st MP Co., interviewed by author at Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2000.


Ibid., 238. 54
The J2X is the HUMINT Coordination Officer of the J2 staff, either at the CINC or JTF level. Because the deployed unit was a part of a division, the division intelligence staff created a G2X as opposed to a J2X. The G2X serves as the HUMINT Coordination Officer at the Division staff level. This was the first time a G2X was used in a MOOTW.

Ibid.

Transcript of Pentagon Press conference, “DOD says Bosnia Intelligence Effort Smoothest Ever” 18 January 1996. During the opening statement of the press conference, the attendees were told that they may not identify any of the speakers by name, but that any information provided in the conference would be attributed to “A Senior Pentagon Official.”

Ibid., 230.

Major George Peters, CGSC student, interview by author, Fort Leavenworth, KS, 10 February 2000.

Ibid.,

Ibid.,


Kretchik, Baumann, and Fishel, 50.
CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

Among the three issues highlighted in this study, the biggest issue confronting HUMINT in MOOTW is not product, but timeliness. Although HUMINT was the most useful, productive, and responsive intelligence capability available to the JTF commander in each of the case studies, there was a lag time of between three to eight weeks before the HUMINT infrastructure could be established and reliable intelligence appeared. The second issue concerned the failure of national-level HUMINT to look globally for regional information. The third issue concerned the lack of operational control by JTF J2 over national level HUMINT collectors deployed in his area of responsibility.

Building the HUMINT Infrastructure Prior to Deployment

The case studies show that it takes too much time to establish the HUMINT infrastructure in theater. Until that is accelerated, collection cannot begin. An apparent solution is to give the HUMINT collectors higher priority for shipment in the force deployment plan. If the HUMINT collectors (DHS or others) were to arrive in country a week or two sooner, then the HUMINT infrastructure would be developed that much faster. However, this quick “fix” still does not solve the problems of the delay in reporting. The overarching problem is that the infrastructure does not exist until HUMINT collectors establish it. Putting HUMINT collectors into the crisis sooner only marginally speeds up the reporting process. The reporting process is sped up only by the number of days the HUMINT collectors arrive in theater sooner.
Establishing the HUMINT infrastructure before HUMINT collectors arrive in the area of operations would accelerate the speed at which HUMINT information begins flowing to the JTF to a rate that would make an appreciable difference. A national-level agency, such as, DHS has the capability to establish this infrastructure before the deployment into theater, but only a national level agency could do it. A few changes are necessary in order to establish the HUMINT infrastructure prior to deployment, and such a shift will require some changes in the way DHS conducts business in MOOTW.

The changes must start with the HUMINT Support Element (HSE) assigned as liaison to the unified commands. The mission of the HSE is to provide a clear conduit from DHS to the unified command CINCs. They work closely with the CINC J2 to insure that HUMINT provides the information needed by the CINC. This conduit must begin to pass information both ways.

With the possible exception of some NEOs, MOOTW activities do not spring up overnight. Most MOOTW activities are carefully planned over time. There was time for detailed planning in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti operations. For example, the first version of the JTF 180 plan for Haiti was prepared in February of 1994, seven months before the mission was executed. The Bosnia operation had an even longer lead time. It was clear that U.S. troops could be deployed into Bosnia before the Dayton negotiations began. This lead time, which exists in most MOOTW, is critical for planning HUMINT collection.

When it becomes clear that U.S. forces are going to deploy in a MOOTW activity, the HSE assigned to the theater command responsible for the region should notify DHS so that DHS can prepare to support that CINC. The HSE element, working closely with
the CINC's J2, will be aware that a plan is being prepared for a MOOTW. When the
HSE notifies DHS, then DHS can begin concurrent planning for HUMINT support to the
MOOTW activity.

Upon notification, DHS should initiate two actions. First, DHS must begin to
collect information required by the JTF commander for the MOOTW. The JTF J2 will
begin to identify intelligence needs regarding the MOOTW activity. Intelligence needs
in an MOOTW are basically predictable. Will the entry be permissive or hostile? What
are the prevailing attitudes of the local nationals? What factions would support or oppose
the U.S. presence? These and similar questions are examples of information required by
the JTF for planning. The HSE should assist the J2 in converting these questions to
requirements that can be tasked to DHS for collection.

The second action DHS needs to take is to begin generating the HUMINT
infrastructure necessary to collect information in the area of operations. The DHS will be
tasked to support a JTF in future MOOTW activities. While the MOOTW is still in its
planning stages, DHS should begin developing a HUMINT infrastructure in the area of
operations before the DHS collectors deploy to the area of operations of the MOOTW.
Establishing the infrastructure prior to deployment to the area will begin to generate
intelligence information three to eight weeks sooner than waiting until the collectors are
deployed. Eight weeks worth of information could be critical to a commander in the
early stages of a MOOTW. If the infrastructure is established prior to deployment, then it
could be turned over to the HUMINT collectors as they arrive in the area of operations.
HUMINT collectors could then begin collecting information as soon as they arrive in the
region, and it will give commanders timely, critical information. The infrastructure can

58
be established by identifying people, businesses, organizations, or other experts who may have contacts in the region in question. These contacts will be capable of providing contacts within the region that could potentially form the nexus of the HUMINT infrastructure necessary to gather the information.

**Information Outside the Area of Operations**

Another issue identified by this research is that intelligence organizations tend to search for information only in the region of concern. This falls short of the vision that both Generals Scanlon and Liede had for a DoD national level HUMINT organization. General Scanlon wrote that sources with information on one region of the world will have to be contacted and debriefed in another region of the world.² The DHS must be able to collect information globally for a specific region or MOOTW activity before it can be considered a national-level organization, otherwise DHS is merely a group of regional organizations with centralized management and control.

Two examples of this problem identified in this research were in Grenada and Haiti. The problem was that the planners were looking for information in the region for which the operation was to take place, not globally. In both examples, people with detailed knowledge regarding the political and military situation in the region were in the U.S., yet they were not contacted by anyone, and the critical information went unreported. Both of these MOOTW activities occurred before the creation of DHS. The DHS has the obligation to insure this does not happen again.

The DHS provides the solution to this problem. It is the national-level HUMINT organization created with a capability to search globally for information about a regional problem. In order for DHS to be effective, DHS personnel must be involved in the
intelligence process during the planning of a MOOTW and not after the start of the MOOTW.

**Coordinating National-Level HUMINT Collectors**

The establishment of the J2X and G2X should prove to be the solution to the problem of deconflicting HUMINT activities in MOOTW. The issue of coordination between different agencies working in a theater may never be completely resolved, but there are inherent problems that must be resolved. In Somalia the CIA had a convoluted reporting system that only reported information from Somalia to their headquarters in Virginia. Their headquarters would relay selected information back to the JTF in Somalia, causing a delay of up to seventy-two hours. Such delays have the potential to put soldiers at risk in a MOOTW activity. Establishing the J2X will at least create a venue to deconflict this problem. Joint doctrine still allows the CIA to report only to their headquarters. The J2X or G2X will provide a coordination point that may help. The CIA collectors will not be placed under the chain of command of the JTF commander and cannot be forced to provide the information directly to the JTF. Having a CIA liaison officer in the J2X creates a mechanism by which the CIA can pass the information if they choose to do so.

Establishing the J2X and G2X should also eliminate a different problem that occurred in Haiti. In Haiti, a HUMINT collector from an unidentified organization did not provide information to an Army captain because he was afraid his cover would be blown. The critical issue is that the collector should never be in a position where he himself is responsible for deciding whether he should risk exposing himself to provide information to help protect soldiers. There are other people who should make that
decision. A JTF commander in a MOOTW would not allow a captain to pick and choose which missions he will execute and which are too dangerous or present too much risk. The collector in Haiti essentially decided that his cover was more important than relaying information he possessed to soldiers who were going to risk lives to execute their mission.

The information the collector had would mitigate those risks, at some risk to the collector. The decision to expose the collector is not a decision ever to be left to the collector himself. The J2X or J2 must become involved in this situation. This is where the CIA and DHS liaison officers within the J2X can become involved. If the collector works for an agency outside the J2's chain of command, the J2 will have some resource to which he can turn to resolve the dilemma. Someone must have the authority to make the decision and the ability to weigh the risk to the collector vise the risk to the soldier who needs the information. The J2X should have the ability to work with the collector's chain of command to resolve the problem.

Further Study

This study leads to two further questions. The first concerns what would be the best way for DHS to build a HUMINT infrastructure before entering a MOOTW activity? Would it be better to form ad hoc planning groups for each MOOTW, or should DHS generate a planning cell dedicated to planning HUMINT operations, which would include MOOTW activities? Answering this question is the next logical step for DHS in providing support to CINCs in a MOOTW.

The second question concerns the manner in which DHS explains to the military how to best employ DHS. This thesis identified that the HUMINT Operations Center and
the G2X in Bosina were unfamiliar with what DHS's capabilities were and how best to employ them. This is not surprising when one considers that most of today's Army majors last attended a service school eight years ago, three years before DHS was created. Unless a planner on a staff has received direct support from DHS in the past or has worked with DHS it is unlikely that he will know how to employ DHS assets or what the capabilities of those collectors are. DHS should determine the best way to inform the military about the capabilities of DHS.

---


LITERATURE REVIEW

Several information sources supported this research. Information regarding military doctrine came primarily from service manuals or joint publications. Information on the history of HUMINT came from a variety of publications including books and journals. Information on national intelligence organizations came from a broad range of sources including The Congressional Record and from not for profit organizations, such as the Federation of American Scientists. Interviews and transcripts rounded out the research with personal experiences and vignettes.

Military Publications

The primary source of information on doctrine came from service and joint manuals. Joint documents determined doctrine regarding the uses of HUMINT and strategic intelligence in MOOTW. Joint Pub 2-02, National Intelligence Support to Joint Operations, discussed the role that each national intelligence agency plays in a joint operation. Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operation; Joint Pub 2-01, Joint Intelligence Support to Military Operations; and Joint Pub 3-07, Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, explain how all the doctrine and functions of a joint operation work together. The Joint Task Force Commanders Handbook for Peace Operations provides a detailed description of the needs of the task force commander. It lays out all the requirements, capabilities, responsibilities, and assets of a Joint Task Force.

Army field manuals establish army doctrine for the use of intelligence in MOOTW. FM 100-5-1 provides the doctrinal definitions for most of the terms defined in
this study. FM 34-1, *Intelligence and Electronic Warfare Operations*, is the cornerstone field manual on army intelligence doctrine. Several after action-reports were used to understand the successes and problems with HUMINT in MOOTW. These were the 10th Mountain Division after-action summary on “Operation Restore Hope,” and the Intelligence and Communications Architecture Project Office review of “Operation Restore Hope.”

**Scholarly Journals**

Professional journals covered the growth of HUMINT through the 1990s. The journals captured the thoughts and opinions of the senior intelligence leadership as they debated the changes that occurred in HUMINT doctrine. *Defense Intelligence Journal* published two issues that provided insight on DHS’s capabilities, and the focus of the intelligence community in the next century. Several issues from the *American Intelligence Journal*, dating as far back as 1989, were useful in following the debate regarding HUMINT in MOOTW and the creation of DHS.

**Books**

Several books provided information for this study. *The Military Intelligence Community* provided an overview of the capabilities of the different intelligence agencies and the function of intelligence. *Strategic Intelligence: Theory and Application*, published by the U.S. Army War College, provided detailed information on the form and substance of strategic intelligence. Three other books *Black Hawk Down: A Tale of modern Warfare*; *Invasion, Intervention, "Intervasion ": A Concise History of the U.S. Army in Operation uphold Democracy*; and *Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience*
provided detailed information on MOOTW, each regarding their specific region of interest.

Scholarly Works

A Master of Military Art and Science thesis "The Effectiveness of human Intelligence in Operation Uphold Democracy" by Major Martin Urquhart examines the need for HUMINT in a MOOTW and was instrumental in identifying the problems with HUMINT in MOOTW. "The final Report of the Snyder Commission," released in January 1997, is a work authored by students of the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton University. It contained an excellent review of PDD-35 and provided insight on the future of HUMINT.

IC21: The Intelligence Community in the 21st Century, a staff study from the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence of the House of Representatives, identifies key issues and problems with PDD-35. Making Intelligence Smarter, by the Council of Foreign Relations, provides information on the creation of DHS and the use of HUMINT in MOOTW.

Official Publications

Two official documents helped guide the research. The 1998 and the revised 1999 A National Security Strategy for a New Century, issued by the White House, were two documents used to identify the importance of both MOOTW and intelligence.
Interviews

Three Interviews were used to develop personal experiences during MOOTW operations. Two interviews involved Operation Restore Democracy in Haiti, and one interview was with an officer who had experience with DHS in Bosnia.
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research for this project encompassed three phases. First, because so much of HUMINT is classified, I had to determine if there was going to be enough unclassified material available to write this project in an unclassified forum. I spent the first few weeks trying to determine if I could find the information in an unclassified format. While classifications did create some limitations, I quickly discovered that I could write this paper in an unclassified format.

The next phase of the research developed the questions prompting the research. The purpose of the study was to determine if DHS could support a MOOTW. In order to determine this, a series of questions had to be answered. The first question was; what was the purpose for creating DHS? The second question was, can DHS support a MOOTW?

Answering the first question led me to research the recent history of DoD HUMINT. In order to discover why DHS was created, I had to understand the recent history of DoD HUMINT. This, in turn, led to an understanding of why DHS was created. This research identified what deficiencies the senior leaders of DoD saw in DoD HUMINT and why they felt DHS would solve some of those problems.

Establishing why DHS was created led to a series of questions to determine if DHS could support a MOOTW. First the research had to establish whether MOOTW was going to continue to be a legitimate mission of the DoD. Then the research had to determine what the intelligence requirements were for the commander in MOOTW.
Finally, the research had to determine if HUMINT could provide the information then determine if DHS could provide that information.

Determining that DHS could provide the information led to the final questions. First, was collecting and providing the information within DHS's mission? Second, could DHS obtain information usable to a JTF commander in a MOOTW? Answering these two questions pulled all the research together and led to the study conclusions.
BIBLIOGRAPHY

Articles


Books


**Government Publications**


**Papers**


Transcripts


Interviews

Durian, Randy, Major. Interview by author. Fort Leavenworth KS, 10 February 2000.
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

1. Combined Arms Research Library  
   U.S. Army Command and General Staff College  
   250 Gibbon Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-2314

2. Defense Technical Information Center/OCA  
   8725 John J. Kingman Rd., Suite 944  
   Fort Belvoir, VA 22060-6218

3. Dr. Jacob Kipp  
   Foreign Military Studies Office  
   101 Meade Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

4. Mr. Les Grau  
   Foreign Military Studies Office  
   101 Meade Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027

5. Mr. Geoff Babb  
   Department of Joint and Multinational Operations  
   USACGSOIC  
   1 Reynolds Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352

6. Dr. Lawrence Yates  
   Combat Studies Institute  
   USACGSOIC  
   1 Reynolds Ave.  
   Fort Leavenworth, KS 66027-1352