THESIS

THE NAVAL ACADEMY-MARINE CORPS RELATIONSHIP: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MARINE CORPS' INFLUENCE ON THE ACADEMY AND THE ACADEMY'S PROFESSIONAL IMPACT ON THE MARINE OFFICER CORPS

by

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June 2000

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The Naval Academy-Marine Corps Relationship:
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Academy and the Academy's Professional Impact on the
Marine Officer Corps

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CORPS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN LEADERSHIP AND HUMAN RESOURCE
DEVELOPMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
June 2000

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ABSTRACT

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# Table of Contents

## I. Introduction ......................................................... 1
   A. Background ...................................................... 1
   B. Purpose .......................................................... 2
   C. Scope ............................................................. 3
   D. Methodology ..................................................... 4
   E. Limitations ...................................................... 5
   F. Organization of the Study ....................................... 5

## II. Historical Analysis .............................................. 9
   A. Naval Tradition of the Marine Corps ....................... 9
      1. Overview ....................................................... 9
      2. Origins of a Naval Instrument (1775 to 1835) .......... 11
      3. Departure from Strict Naval Roles (1834 to 1860) ..... 16
      4. Redefining a Role in the Naval Establishment (1860 to 1898) 20
      5. Building an Expeditionary Force (1898 to 1919) ........ 25
      6. Amphibious Warfare and the Fleet Marine Force (1919 to 1945) 29
      7. Emergence of a Modern Marine Corps (1945 to Present) ... 32
   B. Marine Corps Officer Commissioning ....................... 34
      1. Overview ....................................................... 35
      2. The Marine Corps Draws from Civil Life (1775 to 1883) 35
      3. The Naval Academy as the Sole Source (1883 to 1898) .... 41
      4. Requirements of an Expeditionary Force (1898 to 1916).... 44
      5. The World War I Buildup (1916 to 1918) ................. 47
      6. Inter-War Accession Source Divergence (1919 to 1941) ... 48
      7. World War II Accession Programs (1941-1945) ............ 52
      8. Force Reduction, Korea, and Beyond (1945 to 1980) .... 55
C. THE NAVAL ACADEMY-MARINE CORPS RELATIONSHIP.... 58
1. Overview........................................ 59
2. The Early Years of the Naval Academy
   (1846-1882)...................................... 61
3. The Naval Academy Commissions Marine
   Officers (1883-1897).............................. 66
4. The Early Naval Academy Commissioning
   Practices Revisited (1898-1914)............... 68
5. The Naval Academy as a Consistent
   Commissioning Source (1915-1980).............. 74
6. Implications of the Naval Academy-
   Marine Corps Relationship...................... 76
7. Service Selection of Marines from the
   Naval Academy.................................. 83

D. SUMMARY......................................... 87

III. CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS............................ 89

A. CURRENT NAVAL ROLES OF THE MARINE CORPS..... 89
1. Overview......................................... 89
2. Legal Imperatives for Marine Corps
   Organization...................................... 90
3. Marine Corps Warfighting Philosophy........... 93
4. Naval Orientation in Marine Corps
   Doctrine.......................................... 95
5. The Role of Naval Forces in National
   Security Strategy............................... 97

B. MARINE OFFICER ACCESSIONS........................ 99
1. Overview......................................... 99
2. Commissioning Sources.......................... 100
3. Intra-organizational Efforts.................... 112
4. Requirements.................................... 115
5. Officer Candidate Training...................... 118
6. Initial Officer Education....................... 121

C. THE MODERN NAVAL ACADEMY-MARINE CORPS
   RELATIONSHIP.................................... 123
1. Overview....................................... 123
2. The Marine Corps’ Institutional
   Influence........................................ 127
3. Marine Corps Focused Activities............... 134
4. Marine Corps Focused Curriculum............... 137
5. The Bulldog Requirement for Naval
   Academy Midshipmen............................. 145
6. Service Assignment Practices and Procedures................................. 154
7. Marine Pre-commissioning Initiatives for the Future.................... 162

D. SUMMARY................................................................. 164

IV. QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS........................................... 165
A. OVERVIEW................................................................. 165
B. PREVIOUS STUDIES...................................................... 166
  1. Schneider (2000)............................................... 166
  3. Long (1992)....................................................... 168
  4. North and Smith (1993)....................................... 169
  5. Hamm (1993)..................................................... 170
C. SERVICE SELECTION DATA ANALYSIS.................................. 173
  1. Context............................................................. 173
  2. Purpose........................................................... 174
  3. Data Source..................................................... 175
  4. Hypothesis....................................................... 176
  5. Methodology..................................................... 178
  6. Results........................................................... 179
D. BOC PERFORMANCE DATA ANALYSIS..................................... 185
  1. Context............................................................. 185
  2. Purpose........................................................... 187
  3. Data Source..................................................... 188
  4. Hypothesis....................................................... 191
  5. Methodology..................................................... 194
  6. Results........................................................... 194
E. SUMMARY................................................................. 212

V. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS............................................ 215
A. OVERVIEW................................................................. 215
B. PURPOSE................................................................. 216
C. INTERVIEWEES CRITERIA.............................................. 217
D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS................................................ 219
E. METHODOLOGY.......................................................... 221
F. RESULTS................................................................. 221
  1. Major Themes................................................... 221
  2. Minor Themes................................................... 233
G. SUMMARY................................................................. 244

VI. CONCLUSION............................................................ 247
A. COLLECTIVE OBSERVATIONS.......................................... 247
B. RECOMMENDATIONS................................................... 253
C. SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH..................... 257
APPENDIX A. SERVICE SELECTION DATA VARIABLES........... 261
APPENDIX B. BOC PERFORMANCE DATA VARIABLES.............. 263
LIST OF REFERENCES........................................ 265
BIBLIOGRAPHY.................................................. 271
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST................................. 273
I. INTRODUCTION

A. BACKGROUND

The United States Marine Corps has historically been classified as a naval service. Until the last half-century, the Marine Corps has almost exclusively operated in that capacity. Even as recently as the late 1970s, the Marine Corps was still commonly considered a component of the Navy and subject to its senior leadership on joint matters at the national level. Marines have historically operated on naval vessels, in naval campaigns, and in defense of naval shore establishments. However, the last half-century has been witness to the service's departure from its traditional roles and wide integration into non-naval air and ground based military functions. This trend is evidenced by the role of the Marine Corps during the Korean War, Vietnam Conflict and Operation Desert Storm. Today, law establishes the Marine Corps as a distinct service under the Department of the Navy with senior leadership at the joint and national levels. The organization continues to stress its ties to naval tradition and operations, evidenced particularly by its continued amphibious role. Nonetheless, the conception of the Marine Corps as a strict naval component is defunct.

Although the Marine Corps has continued to distinguish itself from the Navy, its historical relationship with the United States Naval Academy has not lessened. From relatively early in the academy's history, the Marine Corps has utilized the institution as an important officer-commissioning source. Academy graduates have distinguished themselves in the senior ranks of the Marine Corps and the institution served as the primary regular Marine officer-commissioning source until World War II. During certain historical periods, the senior Marine Corps leadership was
dominated by Naval Academy graduates. Additionally, eight of the Marine Corps Commandants have hailed from the institution. Today, however, the Naval Academy is a much smaller commissioning source for the Marine Corps and its graduates comprise a much smaller proportion of the senior ranks of the service. While the importance of this commissioning source has decreased numerically, the Marine Corps has not lessened its focus on the institution. In this respect, the Marine Corps continues to dedicate more assets to the academy than to most of its other commissioning sources. While the Marine Corps has continued to depart from its strict naval orientation, it has not lessened its historical relationship with the Naval Academy.

With respect to the continued relationship of the Marine Corps and the Naval Academy, this study explores its tenets in detail. In particular, the study examines the continued emphasis in contrast with the service’s departure from strict naval roles. Historically, the relationship could be explained by the need of the Marine Corps to rely on officers with a strong foundation in naval training. Today, it is more likely explained by traditions, customs, laws, accession requirements, or the Marine Corps’ intent to derive uniquely qualified officers from the institution. Building on these possibilities, this study provides a historical and contemporary examination of the factors that have built the Marine Corps–Naval Academy relationship. Primarily, this study assesses the effect of professional development at the Naval Academy on officer success in the Marine Corps.

B. PURPOSE

This study examines and evaluates the historical and contemporary relationship of the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. In this capacity, the study focuses on
exploring the evolution of the present relationship, revealing the perceived value of the relationship to the Marine Corps, analyzing the officer performance of academy graduates in the Marine Corps, and assessing the scope of Marine Corps influence at the academy. The overall purpose of the study is to provide extensive exploratory research into the many facets of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Specifically, the research in the study was concentrated on identifying the contributions of the Naval Academy to the Marine officer corps and analyzing the effect of those contributions.

Three principal goals were identified to meet achieve the purpose of study. First, the study aimed to provide a historical account of the Marine Corps-Naval Academy relationship, a topic that has not been previously explored in great detail or generated a scholarly compilation. Second, the study aimed to assess the tangible value of Naval Academy leadership development through the performance assessment of its graduates in the Marine Corps. Third, the study aimed to provide an extensive exploratory body of research from which further studies can be initiated, policy implications can be identified, and current aspects of the relationship can be scrutinized. In this capacity, the study is intended to be a primary element in a progressive research effort to explore the future course of this longstanding relationship.

C. SCOPE

The focus of the study was limited to an exploration of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, but sought to explore the relationship’s wide range of influences and implications. In this effort, research questions were designed to guide the exploratory research and
satisfactorily address each of the topic's principal tenets. The research questions pursued in this study are as follows.

- What historical governance has guided past and current practices of selection of Marine Corps officers from the Naval Academy?

- With respect to commissioning source, what historical trends have taken shape in the senior Marine Corps officer corps?

- What are the attitudinal perceptions of Marine officers with respect to the benefits derived from Naval Academy training and education?

- What factors affecting Midshipman at the Naval Academy (selection process, activities, academic focus, officer influence, etc.) influence their motivation or eligibility to be commissioned in the Marine Corps?

- What value does the Marine Corps place on the Naval Academy as an officer accession source? Are Marine officers that access from the academy expected to possess particular qualities or skills that differ from those expected from officers accessing from other sources?

- How do Marine Corps officers accessing from the Naval Academy perform at the Basic Officer Course (academic performance, military performance, leadership evaluation, and occupational specialty selection) in comparison to those from other commissioning sources?

- How do Naval Academy graduates perform as junior officers (measured by promotion to captain and major) in comparison to officers from other commissioning sources?

D. METHODOLOGY

In its capacity as an exploratory tool for evaluation of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, this study was conducted along a number of different lines of research. This multifaceted approach to the topic was intended to provide wide-ranging insights into the relationship's implications. The principal areas of research explored by this study follow.
• Historical analysis of laws, regulations, and practices governing the commissioning of Marine Corps officers from the Naval Academy

• Evaluation of the historical and contemporary institutional influence of the Marine Corps at the Naval Academy

• Qualitative analysis of the perceived value of the Naval Academy as a Marine Corps officer commissioning source and the perceived implications of the evolving Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship

• Qualitative and quantitative analyses of the factors that influence the assignment of Naval Academy Midshipmen to the Marine Corps

• Quantitative analysis of the performance of contemporary Marine Corps officers as a result of accession through Naval Academy

E. LIMITATIONS

Since this study intends to be primarily exploratory in nature, it does not intend to provide a focused quantitative or qualitative analysis of any singular element or implication of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Rather, the study intends to provide a broad exploratory view of the relationship in the context of its historical, current, and future importance to the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. Therefore, while conclusions concerning the topic can be drawn from the study, the emphasis lies on making evidence-based observations. These observations lay the groundwork for further research, narrowly focused analysis, and more meaningful conclusions. In this context, the study should be perceived as a broad exploration into the relationship, rather than as a means of policy analysis or authoritative recommendation.

F. ORGANIZATION OF THE STUDY

The organization of this study follows the progressive course of exploratory research undertaken in the project.
The study begins with a historical analysis, proceeds to a contemporary analysis, follows with an evaluation of quantitative evidence, and concludes with an analysis of qualitative data. Collective observations, recommendations, and suggestions for further study are conveyed after the concluding element of the study. The detailed organization of the chapters in the study is as follows.

- Historical Analysis
- Contemporary Analysis
- Quantitative Data Analysis
- Qualitative Data Analysis
- Conclusion

The historical analysis chapter begins with a historical evaluation of the Marine Corps' naval roles and traditions. A historical evaluation of the Marine Corps' officer commissioning practices follows. The chapter concludes with a historical examination of the relationship of the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps.

The contemporary analysis chapter parallels the historical analysis in its examination of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship in the modern era. The chapter begins with an evaluation of the Marine Corps' current emphasis on naval roles. An evaluation of current Marine Corps officer accession programs follows. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship in the modern era.

The quantitative data analysis chapter begins with a review of previous studies that have analyzed the performance of academy graduates in the Marine Corps. An analysis of primary data to establish the profiles of Midshipmen that aspire toward Marine Corps commissions follows. The chapter concludes with an analysis of primary data in order to evaluate the performance of academy
graduates at the Marine Corps Basic Officer Course during recent years.

The qualitative data analysis chapter evaluates primary interview data to determine the perceptions of Marine Corps officers as to the value of Naval Academy accession in the Marine Corps and the implications of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

The conclusion and recommendation chapter begins with a collective recapitulation of significant observations in the study. The chapter follows with a number of policy recommendations and concludes with suggestion for future research and analysis.
II. HISTORICAL ANALYSIS

As the first component of the study, the historical analysis begins to establish the context of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. The chapter addresses the historical character and missions of the Marine Corps, the historical evolution of officer commissioning practices, and the historical relationship between the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. The sections that follow provide analysis of each of these three elements. Overall, the purpose of the historical analysis is to establish the historical context for the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

A. NAVAL TRADITION OF THE MARINE CORPS

The first section of the historical analysis explores the naval origins and historical naval posture of the Marine Corps. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the Marine Corps' historical role in the naval service, as well as its divergence from naval roles during historical periods. In the context of the overall study, this section establishes the historical precedents upon which the modern relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps is built.

1. Overview

As the name implies, marines have historically been naval instruments. Consequently, the Marine Corps has performed seagoing duties primarily from its inception through the majority of its history. Despite the fact that the proficiencies of an individual marine have historically been characterized as soldierly, and marine organizations have tended to be organized in army-like units, American marines have served aboard naval vessels since the birth of the sea service. Their service aboard ships of the fleet
spans the days of sharp shooting from a frigate's rigging to the recent service of manning a five-inch gun on an aircraft carrier. In 1865, a Navy Lieutenant Commander wrote:

[A warship] would lose her true character without a marine guard. [And that Marines were needed to] preserve and maintain the peace of the ship. (Karsten, 1972, 82)

Although the naval tradition of the Marine Corps has been continuous throughout history, the emphasis on naval roles and missions for the Marines have evolved over time. Marine Corps Commandant Major General John A. Lejeune wrote in 1930: “The Marine Corps is part of the Naval Service, and its expeditionary duty with the fleet in peace and in war is its chief mission.” (Lejeune, 1930, 465) While Lejeune’s dictum is representative of the Marine Corps’ historically continuous orientation toward naval service, its divergence from that orientation in practice has dynamically shifted over time.

Since its formal charter in 1798, the Marine Corps has operated as a separate military service under the Department of the Navy. Consequently, this arrangement has served as both a conduit to the Marine Corps’ attainment of naval roles and a facilitator of cooperation between the two naval services. However, while the Navy-Marine Corps relationship has been longstanding and operationally bound together, it has not always been healthy and cooperative. In fact, inter-service rivalry and conflict within the Navy Department has been existent since early in its history. Historically, the naval aristocracy had always considered marines a slightly inferior breed (Karsten, 1972). According to novelist Herman Melville, himself an enlisted sailor in the mid Nineteenth Century, “the man-of-war’s-man casts but an evil eye on a marine.” (Karsten, 1972, 82) In turn, the Marine Corps identified the Navy as the most
significant threat to its existence during the early years. In the latter part of the Nineteenth Century in particular, the Marines waged an interdepartmental battle, lasting nearly fifty years, to retain some of its historical naval missions.

Despite the divergence of the service into non-naval roles and the historical conflict with its sister service, the Marine Corps has retained a significant amount of its naval traditions, character, identification, and operational functions. The Marine Corps' historical reliance on the Navy has continued unchanged, and much of its doctrine and warfighting philosophies remain founded upon its naval capabilities. As a recent joint message between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations indicates:

The eventual naval position should be based on two central principles. First, we must strengthen and preserve the close special relationship that characterizes the U. S. Navy-Marine Corps team...
(ALMAR 016-00, 2000)

2. Origins of a Naval Instrument (1775 to 1835)

Beginning during the Revolutionary War, American marines were employed in a variety of different naval capacities. Operating as a component of the Continental Navy, marines functioned internally as shipboard marksmen, policemen, guards, and cannoneers. Additionally, they were employed externally in naval landing parties, in defense of foreign and domestic bases, as amphibious combat elements, and in the task of port security. In fact, the Continental Marines were tasked in some form with every significant naval role that the Marine Corps would come to embrace in later history. In essence, the first historical episode of American marine employment set the precedent for the prominence of marines within the naval establishment.
Early in the revolution, the Continental Congress recognized that the military effort depended upon hampering the flow of men and supplies to the British Army. In this context, a navy and corps of marines were established to affect a naval blockade and interrupt naval supply lines. Although the role of marines was envisioned as a mere shipboard guard force, the navy utilized the asset to its fullest capacity. In March 1776, the first naval engagement of the war took place on the island of New Providence in the Bahamas. American marines were utilized as a landing party, conducting a raid in which they captured two British forts, debilitated the provisional British government, and secured essential military supplies. The success of the operation was limited and may have been equally accomplished by sailors. However, it held symbolic significance for the employment of marines by highlighting their previously untested amphibious capability. (Millett, 1970) Later, in April 1776, marines played a pivotal role in the first American naval battle of the revolution. Employed as sharp shooters and cannoneers, Continental Marines emerged as proficient sea soldiers by contributing to the defeat of the British warship Glasgow. While marines had long served as guards in privateer navies, this was the first evidence of their tactical employment in the Continental Navy. Again, the marines proved versatile beyond expectation and established themselves in an expanded naval capacity. (Moskin, 1992)

As the Revolutionary War progressed, marines continued to serve on most naval vessels and their operational roles expanded. In late 1776 the marines were stationed ashore to recruit and train future shipboard detachments. Collaterally, they were assigned the primary duty of guarding the continental vessels under construction. This
set the precedent for a Marine security role at domestic port facilities. In operations around Fort Mifflin and the Delaware River, in October and November 1777, marines were employed in defense of a domestic naval base for the first time. Later, in 1779, the marines were employed as a main defense element around Penobscot Bay, when the British government ordered the seizure of a protected anchorage to facilitate effective supply convoys. In 1779, the Continental Navy's role was expanded to the conduct of naval engagements in foreign waters. As a component of John Paul Jones's squadron, marines were again employed successfully as sea soldiers in multiple open water battles, as well as in an amphibious role during limited raid operations on British soil. Again, Continental Marines proved versatile and capable in every capacity. By the conclusion of hostilities, American marines were widely considered an essential element of any naval force. Furthermore, their capabilities had become regarded as unique. Marines had acquired new roles, and these roles were considered strictly under their domain. (Parker, 1970)

Although the role of American marines in the war was almost exclusively naval in capacity, the precedent for their utility in operations ashore was also established. Despite the fact that marines were heavily engaged in outfitting shipboard detachments and guarding naval vessels, they were assembled into a battalion and detached for service with the Continental Army in late 1776. Leaving only a single company to carry out the naval duties, Captain Samuel Nicholas, the senior officer in the Continental Marines, led the makeshift battalion to join Brigadier General John Cadwalader's brigade in defensive operations. The marine battalion fought with the army through the Trenton and Princeton campaigns, before disbanding in early
1777. Marine companies were later assembled in 1780 to augment the army's defense during the British offensive on Charleston. Once again, the marines saw limited service ashore before disbanding and returning to strict naval roles. Although American marines played a relatively insignificant part in the land war for independence, their versatility as a military force was established. When the American naval service was reestablished in the 1790s, this versatility had a significant influence on the conception of roles for the Marine Corps. (Millett, 1991)

Based on the Revolutionary War experience, Congress specifically provided for marine detachments when it ordered the construction of six frigates in 1794. However, while the war demonstrated the practicality of employing marines in naval capacities, it equally showed their versatility in land campaigns. Therefore, when the Marine Corps was formally established in 1798, it was created as an independent service. Marines were placed under the direct control of the President, to operate as a component of the Army or Navy depending on the nature of their employment. In this context, the Marine Corps emerged as a primarily naval component that could augment the army during crises ashore. This effectively strengthened the precedent of utilizing Marines in non-naval campaigns, but also created an ambiguous jurisdiction as to which service controlled them when operating ashore. Specifically, the 1798 act directed the Marine Corps to follow the Articles of War when ashore, but to follow the then unwritten Naval Regulations at sea. This arrangement proved to be a source of conflict throughout the period, especially when its provisions were evoked at naval shore establishments. (Millett, 1991)

Despite the provision for the Marine Corps to augment the Army, the service operated almost exclusively in its
naval roles during the first decade of the Nineteenth Century. During the naval quasi-war with France, beginning in 1798, the Marine Corps provided shipboard detachments that saw significant action both at sea and in limited objective operations on foreign soil. By the time hostilities subsided in 1801, Marines had again been employed in multiple capacities and their unique role as sea soldiers had been reestablished. In May 1800, Marines aboard the Constitution conducted a raid and vessel seizure on the island of Santo Domingo. In 1801 Marines were tasked with guarding French prisoners of war. During the Tripolitan War, in 1805, Marines were employed for the first time as the ground combat element of a combined arms amphibious operation. Thus, by the outbreak of the War of 1812, the Marine Corps had been reintegrated into its naval roles of the Revolutionary War and had emerged as a dedicated naval instrument. (Moskin, 1992)

Soon after the War of 1812 began, the government realized that their initial military defeats were due to the British domination of the Great Lakes. In this context, a naval war was initiated. Marines again saw significant action in all of their naval capacities. As an indication of the Marine Corps' significance in the naval establishment, Captain David Porter placed a Marine Corps officer in command of a ship for the first time. However, while most of the Marine duties during the war were naval, the precedent for employing Marine Corps units in support of the Army was again evoked. Marines participated most notably in the Battles of Bladensburg and New Orleans, again organizing makeshift units for combat and reconstituting their shipboard detachments at the conclusion of the campaigns. (Simmons, 1976)
Following the War of 1812, the Marine Corps reaffirmed its naval character and focused on naval roles for the duration of the period. Providing shipboard guards had been the Marines' primary mission during Jeffersonian era, and it reassumed that position in the twenty years that followed the war. However, while the Navy-Marine Corps relationship became solidified during these years, the controversy over control of Marine detachments ashore continued to be a source of conflict. Additionally, the usefulness of Marine shipboard guards began to be questioned within the naval hierarchy. The utility of Marines in landing operations, although continually tested, was also questioned due to the lack of armed conflict surfacing in these operations. Despite this growing tension, the Marine Corps embraced its naval missions and sought increased duties within the naval community. In the early 1830s, Marine Corps Commandant Archibald Henderson fought against the notion of removing marines from the seas and employing them strictly for shore defense. Henderson regarded the Marine Corps' role to be "on board the Ships of War in distant seas" (Millet, 1991, 56) to provide discipline, security, and combat power to the fleet.

3. Departure from Strict Naval Roles (1834 to 1860)

Congress passed legislation in 1834 that solidified the role of the Marine Corps as a naval instrument. Ending the controversy that spanned the previous era, the Marine Corps was placed under the jurisdiction of the Navy Department both ashore and at sea. While this action served to reaffirm the concept of the Marine Corps as a strict naval component, it ironically prompted the increased expansion of the service into non-naval roles. Accompanying the legislation was a specific Marine Corps Act that restricted the authority of Marine officers ashore and at sea.
Essentially, the act allowed Marine officers to command their Marines only when acting as the senior member of a landing party, and never aboard ships. The Marine Corps regarded this act, as well as other prevailing sentiments, as a threat to Marine naval roles. For this reason, the Marine Corps begin to regard its versatility in ground combat as the only impressive argument for its existence. (Millett, 1991). Embracing this philosophy, the Marines began to train and organize for participation in Army campaigns, while preserving their existing naval roles to the greatest extent possible.

Before long, the Marine Corps was indeed called into service ashore with the Army in a series of campaigns that would last throughout the period. Invoking the precedent set during past conflicts, President Andrew Jackson detached the Marine Corps for service with the Army during the Indian Wars from 1835 to 1842 (Parker, 1970). The Marines continued to maintain their presence on naval ships, but every available Marine at naval shore establishments was mobilized for the actions. This situation resulted in the Navy’s reliance on sailors to fill the security, guard, and often the amphibious roles traditionally assumed by Marines. Ultimately, this heightened the animosity between the naval services. The Navy increasingly envisioned a naval establishment in which sailors exclusively conducted the missions. (Simmons, 1970)

Beginning in 1836, the Marine Corps was given the task of fighting the Creek Indians in Georgia and Alabama. With the Marine augmentation, the Army was able to terminate those hostilities by the end of the year. Shortly thereafter, the Marines were sent to Florida to assist in the larger scale conflict with the Seminole Indians. The campaign in Florida lasted until 1842, at which time the
Marines were released from Army service and returned to their respective ship detachments and naval shore commands. Despite the long duration of the war effort, and the military frustration that accompanied it, the Marine Corps' involvement in the Indian campaigns strengthened its relationship with the Army. This served to again heighten the versatility associated with the service. Not only had the precedent for Marine service ashore been set again, it had become recognized for the first time as a principal mission for the Marine Corps. (Parker, 1970)

While the Marine Corps was reintegrated into the naval establishment in 1842, the arrangement proved to be only temporary. When the Mexican War erupted in 1846, Marine units were organized for service with the Army and many of their naval roles again fell to the Navy. During the conflict, Marines operated with both the Army and the Navy, but its predominant presence was inland. Beginning in 1846, Marine detachments were debarked from ships to participate in numerous skirmishes along the Gulf of Mexico coast. This Marine employment continued throughout the war, but was limited by the end of 1846 when most Marines were organized into battalions to augment General Zachary Taylor's offensive into Mexico. In 1847, Marines were critical elements of the forces that captured Vera Cruz and Mexico City. Additionally, Marine units were organized for duty with General Winfield Scott's army that fought on the western coast of Mexico and in California. By the end of the war, the Marine Corps had firmly established itself as both a land and naval component of the American military establishment. The precedent had been set for the Marine Corps' involvement in land warfare abroad, as well as for their role as a police force in conquered lands. (Simmons, 1976)
For the remainder of the period, the Marine Corps did not see any significant involvement in land warfare. While the service reverted again to primary naval roles, it continued to train and organize for contingency operations as part of the Army. In its naval capacity, the Marine Corps continued to constitute landing parties around the world. In particular, Marines were employed to protect American interests in Brazil in 1852; in Nicaragua during 1853; in Hong Kong, China and the Fiji Islands in 1855; and in China on numerous other occasions during the period. While none of these landings resulted in significant altercations, the precedent was set for the employment of Marines as a worldwide police force. Finally, the Marine Corps was given another new mission during the period, that of suppressing domestic disturbances. In 1857 and 1858 Marines were detached from naval establishments to quell riots in Washington, DC and New York respectively. Again, the employment of the Marine Corps had been expanded beyond naval roles and a precedent for its versatility was further established. (Parker, 1970)

On the eve of the Civil War, in 1859, Marines were called to quell the insurrection at Harper’s Ferry. While this appeared to build on the precedent of employing Marines in domestic land campaigns, the Marine Corps would ironically shift focus back to the naval establishment in the period that followed. While the Marine Corps had been primarily operating with the Army in the 1840s, the Navy was slowly converting to steam powered ships and envisioning a blue water fleet. Upon reverting to strict naval roles in the 1850s, the Marine Corps began to envision itself in significant infantry and artillery roles for the new offensive naval mission. In essence, the concept of amphibious forces embarked aboard Navy ships was born during
the period. Believing that this new concept was naturally a Marine mission, the Marine Corps set its emphasis on training and organizing such forces. (Millett, 1991)

4. **Redefining a Role in the Naval Establishment (1860 to 1898)**

Despite its role in the Harper's Ferry campaign, Marine Corps service during the Civil War was rendered primarily as detachments aboard Navy ships. Only on a few occasions did Marines fight ashore, and then only in limited numbers. Even when Marines did serve ashore during the war, they were either part of a ship's landing force or directly assigned to augment the Union Army (Parker, 1970). Even then, Marines were employed sparingly and a dedicated land mission for the service was not conceived. In this context, the Marine Corps was compelled to focus on preserving and expanding its roles in the naval establishment. Despite the limited naval conflict, Marines did assume a more dominant role with shipboard weaponry during the war. In the latter part of the period, this precedent served as a justification for the Marine Corps to retain its missions afloat. (Millett, 1991)

When the Marines did engage in the Civil War, it was primarily in the same naval roles that had characterized Marine involvement in the Revolutionary War and the War of 1812. In 1861, Marines were employed in defense of naval ports and installations, as well as to destroy naval facilities that had fallen under Confederate control. Later that year, Marines were assigned to the Potomac Flotilla and conducted amphibious raids and naval seizures along the entire Confederate coast. These operations continued through 1863, and further strengthened the Marine Corps' role in naval expeditions. By the end of 1863, the Marine Corps was called to action with the Army in South Carolina.
In 1864, Marines were again called to operate with the Army in Georgia. These actions were limited, however, and the Marines were detached again for naval service or consumed by the Union Army when the campaigns ended. Consequently, the war ended the habitual Army-Marine Corps relationship of the previous two decades. The Marines were faced with redefining their role as sea soldiers, and promptly took action toward that course. (Simmons, 1976)

After the Civil War, the traditional shipboard role changed with the advent of steam-powered ships. Since it was no longer necessary to station sharpshooters in the ships' rigging, Marines were re-employed as naval gunners. Additionally, the Marine Corps retained its traditional guard functions at sea. However, despite the departure from sail before the war, the naval establishment was considerably downsized in the late 1860s and technological advancement subsequently halted. Consequently, the concept of a blue-water Navy subsided, and with it subsided the emerging amphibious role for the Marine Corps. While Marines did conduct numerous landings during the period to protect American interests in Egypt, Mexico, Cuba, Uruguay, Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Panama, Haiti, China, Formosa, Korea, Alaska, the Arctic, and the waters off Greenland; armed conflict rarely arose. Additionally, the Marines were pivotal players in naval expeditions aimed at suppressing the African slave trade. The only instances of combat were when a Marine landing force fought a significant engagement in Korea in 1871, and in 1885 when Marines constituted the then largest deployment of American forces in history to open lines of communication in Panama. Both of these operations were conducted from a naval posture and the Marine Corps remained exclusively naval in orientation. Other than the continued employment of the Marine Corps to
quell domestic unrest, the return to sea soldiery marked the period. (Parker, 1970)

While the Marine Corps was embracing its naval roles during the period, its relationship with the Navy became adversarial. In particular, with the Navy completing its transition from sail to steam in the late 1880s, a controversy arose over whether Marine detachments should continue to serve on board naval vessels. As early as 1852, efforts to withdraw Marines had surfaced from the Navy hierarchy. However, the forestalled emergence of the new Navy after the Civil War put the issue to rest for nearly forty years. (Karsten, 1972). Then, with the naval renaissance in full swing and the battleship force emerging in the late 1880s, Navy progressives mounted a full-scale attack on the Marine Corps' naval roles. In particular, an emphasis was placed on the removal of Marines from the new warships. Having essentially acquiesced its role as a non-naval force, and having seen little conflict on landing operations, the Marine Corps strongly resisted the diminishment of any traditional naval mission. In fact, the Marine Corps conceived the efforts of the Navy progressives as a serious threat to its existence. In this context, the Marine leaders waged battle in Congress and the Navy Department to retain even the most miniscule of naval missions. Despite the commissioning of all new Marine officers from the Naval Academy after 1882, as well as the Marine Corps' dedicated efforts to identify with the naval establishment, conflict between the sea services intensified through the end of the period. (Shulimson, 1993)

In 1889, Navy progressives formally began their campaign to eliminate the Marine detachments in the Greer Board's strategic deliberations about the battleship Navy. In particular, the progressives sought the elimination of
the traditional Marine guards and the Marine gunnery detachments on ships of the fleet. According to Karsten, Marine guards were essentially "soldiers [designed] to watch, and search, and discipline the sailor." (1972, 82-83) In this capacity, the Marine guardsmen were tasked with keeping the sailors in line; a practice that assumed the low quality of enlisted sailors and hindered the Navy's recruiting efforts. Although the preservation of Marine guards was seriously questioned in 1864, 1876, and 1890, attempts to dismantle them were successfully thwarted by Marine Corps Commandants. Even most Navy officers considered Marines a necessary evil, and the progressives failed to make their case on the issue (Karsten, 1972). Despite their failure to eliminate the Marine roles at sea, the progressive Navy leadership did not give up the fight for another twenty years. In reality, the Marine guards had probably become antiquated. Only the symbolic threat of the gesture prompted the Marine Corps to fight for their preservation. As one Navy Ensign commented in 1890:

The presence of marines on warships is almost as un-American as would be the control, by troops, of citizens already provided with their legal and efficient authorities. (Karsten, 1972, 89)

Concurrent with the effort to eliminate Marine guards was the initiative to remove them from the gun batteries of the emerging battleship fleet. Despite the fact that Marine junior officers were now undergoing six years of training at the Naval Academy, the Navy progressives disregarded their potential skill as naval tacticians. These officers felt that sailors were more inclined to employ shipboard weapons. Furthermore, the progressives sought limitation of the Marine Corps' amphibious role. As with the issue of shipboard weapons, these officers insisted that the landing and occupation parties could be led exclusively by Navy
officers and manned by seamen. Just short of suggesting the outright abolition of the Marine Corps, the Navy progressives foresaw an extremely limited Marine role in the emerging naval establishment. Specifically, these officers envisioned Marines as defenders of shore installations that concurrently trained for expeditionary duties. Naturally, the Marine Corps perceived these initiatives as a threat to its continuously emphasized missions. Long regarding the shore defense mission as a secondary role, the Marine Corps refused to assume it as its primary duty and again mounted a considerable political campaign to deter any action. Meanwhile, Marine leaders were faced with numerous other initiatives to abolish the Marine Corps during the period. Perceiving that their only credible rationale for existence was a strong role in the emerging naval establishment, the Marines again fought to preserve their naval missions. As with the issue of Marine guards, this resulted in interdepartmental conflict that lasted for the next twenty years. (Shulimson, 1993)

Despite the Navy’s efforts to decrease the Marine Corps’ roles in the 1890s, the focus on amphibious operations emerged as a dominant theme in naval doctrine. In fact, Navy Captain Alfred T. Mahan’s 1890 work The Influence of Seapower upon History, 1600-1783 suggested an expanded role for the Marine Corps in landing operations. Mahan’s work was perhaps the first recognition of the advanced base mission. According to Mahan:

Allusion has been made to mobilize the Marine Corps in certain contingencies. If this Corps be kept up to the standard of its former efficiency, it will constitute a most important reinforcement, nay, backbone to any landing on the enemy’s coast. Measures should be framed by which the whole body could be collected. (Shulimson, 1993, 90)
In this context, the Navy heavily emphasized the development of an amphibious capability for the duration of the period. However, most Navy officers sought the new capability for the Navy leadership, rather than as a role for the Marines. Ironically, it was the early foresight of Navy officers that provided the Marine Corps its most significant mission in later periods. In fact, Navy officers were more forward looking than Marines. While the Navy hierarchy was theorizing amphibious and blue-water doctrine, the Marines were arguing for shipboard guards and secondary battery roles. (Shulimson, 1993)

5. Building an Expeditionary Force (1898 to 1919)

By 1898, the conflict within the Navy Department was coming to a head. In this context, Navy had even begun to resist the commissioning of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps. However, when the battleship Maine was sunk in Manila Bay, carrying with her 232 sailors and 28 Marines, the strife was put on hold and the sea services worked in unison to prepare for war. When the Spanish American War commenced in May 1898, the Marine Corps was immediately mobilized for service in a naval capacity. Marines played a pivotal role in the first actions of the war, accompanying Commodore Dewey's squadron in its defeat of the Spanish Flotilla in Manilla Bay. During the engagement, Marines were the first to land on Spanish territory while their counterparts in the Pacific landed unopposed at Guam, effectively ending that phase of the war. In June 1898, Marine Lieutenant Colonel Robert W. Huntington landed the first permanent Marine battalion at Guantanamo Bay, establishing them as the first American troops to acquire a beachhead on Cuban soil. Operating ashore as a naval landing force, the Marine Corps permanently established itself as an expeditionary force. This set the precedent
for Marine employment through the remainder of the period and beyond. The victory at Guantanamo Bay was won by a Marine unit and commanded by a Marine officer. This event gave added strength to the Marine Corps' efforts in obtaining the capture and defense of advanced bases as a primary mission. (Parker, 1970)

After the war, the interdepartmental conflict again arose. However, the Marine Corps' actions as an expeditionary force in Cuba served to secure that role for the service interminably. In 1906, the Navy hierarchy convinced President Roosevelt, long a critic of the Marines, to push for absorption of the Marine Corps by the Army. This Marine Corps perceived this initiative as yet another effort to eliminate them from ships of the fleet. Although the Marines defeated this initiative with congressional support, the Navy again pushed the issue in 1908. At that time, Roosevelt signed Executive Order 969 restricting the duties of the Marine Corps so as:

- To garrison different navy yards and naval stations, both within and beyond the continental limits of the United States.
- To furnish the first line of the mobile defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.
- To man such naval defenses, and to aid in manning, if necessary, of such other defenses, as may be erected for the defense of naval bases and naval stations beyond the continental limits of the United States.
- To garrison the Isthmian Canal Zone, Panama.
- To furnish such garrisons and expeditionary forces for duties beyond the seas as may be necessary in time of peace. (Millett, 1991, 139)

Although the Marine Corps had embraced the expeditionary role as its primary duty after the Spanish American War, it again mounted a campaign to retain the shipboard missions.
After a political maelstrom, Congress attached the Butler Rider to that year's Naval Appropriations Act, effectively restoring Marine shipboard guards and preserving the Marine Corps' role at sea. Roosevelt acquiesced and signed the legislation, which ultimately put the issue to rest forever. (Millett, 1991)

Having preserved its naval missions for the long term, the Marine Corps shifted focus to its emerging expeditionary role and colonial infantry mission. In 1899, the first Marine Brigade was established in the Philippines to serve as a ready expeditionary force. This force was intended for use by the naval commander or to support the Army. The Marine Brigade remained in the island country until 1914. Concurrently, Marines were deployed to China as early as 1898 to quell the Boxer Rebellion. Although originally a naval expedition, the Marine forces became established ashore for a long-term presence, conducting independent operations long after the naval commanders had departed. In 1914, the Marine Corps was again deployed to Mexico as a component of a naval expedition. Again, Marines conducted operations ashore for nearly six months after the Navy had departed. Additionally, they were organized into units of regimental strength for the first time in history. (Moskin, 1992)

By 1914 the Marine Corps had reshaped its role in the American military establishment as colonial infantrymen. While this emphasis would shift again to naval operations at the end of the period, the Marine Corps preserved the colonial infantry role duty until it formally ended in 1934. During these years, Marines established police forces and provisional governments in Haiti, Nicaragua, and other Latin American countries. (Moskin, 1992) While naval missions had continued, they had not provided the combat experience that
was characteristic of the expeditionary campaigns. This effectively lessened the Marine Corps' ties with the naval establishment. During the period, the Marine Corps had shifted its organization to permanent, army-like units for the first time. In every sense, the service had come to resemble a military arm of service, rather than an instrument of naval power projection.

Despite the successes that the Marine Corps achieved during the expeditionary era, Naval Academy graduates like John A. Lejeune began to question the colonial infantry role. Specifically, these officers insisted that the advanced base mission held the Marine Corps' future. These naval trained leaders, who had become officers during the previous period and had risen into the hierarchy by the end of this period, foresaw the Marine Corps as the defining element of naval amphibious warfare. Thus, they worked to reestablish the Marine Corps' operational focus on roles within the naval establishment. Essentially, they envisioned future warfare as an amphibious endeavor requiring both Navy and Army cooperation. In their vision, the Marine Corps was the ideal element to serve as the transition piece in amphibious operations. As early as 1914, the Marine Corps began to study this future concept of warfare. Later, the Marines aligned with the Navy for its development. John H Russell, a Naval Academy graduate and later Commandant of the Marine Corps, drafted one of the earliest advance base studies in this effort. (Millett, 1991)

Although the Marine Corps leadership sought a return to primary naval roles in the future, World War I further contributed to the Marine Corps' emphasis on non-naval expeditionary roles. In particular, Marines distinguished themselves as ground combatants at Soissons, Belleau Wood,
St. Mihiel, and elsewhere on the European Western Front. However, in the war’s aftermath the Marine participation had resulted in soiled relations with the Army. Despite the accomplishments of Marine commanders, the Army elected to de-emphasize the practice of employing Marine Corps units in ground combat operations. This position prompted Marine leaders to embrace their role in the naval establishment. (Millett, 1991). Despite the conflict with the Navy that persisted until 1909, interdepartmental cooperation had come full circle by the end of World War I. As former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Heywood related in congressional testimony,

 Naval officers are almost a unit as to the necessity for a larger number of Marines to act in cooperation with the Navy, especially now, since our outlying possessions will in all [make] such cooperation necessary. (Shulimson, 1993, 201)

6. Amphibious Warfare and the Fleet Marine Force (1919 to 1945)

The Marines remained intermittently involved in areas of Latin America during the two decades preceding World War II. However, the Marine Corps’ primary emphasis shifted to perfecting its advanced base capability and supporting the emerging amphibious doctrine. Since the Marine Corps had been utilized for amphibious operations ashore since its infancy, the service appeared naturally appropriate for the role. Therefore, Marine Corps leaders took the lead in the doctrine’s development. When Major General Lejeune became Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1920, he immediately initiated the development of the amphibious concepts that would later prove vital to the amphibious campaigns of World War II. However, despite Lejeune’s enthusiasm for a naval-oriented Marine Corps, this was no easy task. Amidst a national sentiment that the "war to end all wars" had been
won, opponents felt that the military establishment should be downsized, rather than developed. (Parker, 1970)

Although the Marine Corps was no longer challenged by the Navy for the amphibious mission, its leadership was still faced with the threat of organizational disbanding or consumption by one of the larger services. The proponents of the amphibious mission realized this threat, thus insisting that the Marine Corps could not duplicate the mission of the Army and hope to survive as an organization (Parker, 1970). Essentially, it had become necessary for the Marine Corps to develop a mission that was uniquely its own. Even the historical naval missions, which the Marine Corps had successfully retained, could no longer justify its preservation as a separate branch of service. The future of the Marine Corps depended upon its distinctive contributions. Again, Marine leaders embraced a naval orientation as the key to attaining this capability.

Working in concert with the Navy, the Marine Corps conceived its initial amphibious doctrine as early as 1921. Largely due to the efforts of Major Pete Ellis, the Commandant approved Operation Plan 712 (Advanced Base Operations in Micronesia) which stated:

It will be necessary for us to project our fleet and landing forces across the Pacific and wage war in Japanese waters. To effect this requires that we have sufficient bases to support the fleet, both during its projection and afterwards. To effect [an amphibious landing] in the face of enemy resistance requires careful training and preparation to say the least; and this along Marine lines. It is not enough that the troops be skilled infantrymen or artillerymen of high morale; they must be skilled watermen and jungle-men who know it can be done—Marines with Marine training. (Parker, 1970, 48)

While the Marine Corps had developed its concept of this emerging amphibious role, it recognized that success was
contingent upon acceptance by the entire naval establishment. In this effort, Lejeune convinced the Navy that the Marine Corps should be utilized as a mobile force, accompanying the fleet during amphibious operations ashore and in every naval expedition requiring a mobile land force. He further pointed out that between Hawaii and Manila, the United States had no developed naval base as would be required in war. In 1923, while addressing the Naval War College, Lejeune stated:

On both flanks of a fleet crossing the Pacific are numerous islands suitable for utilization by an enemy for radio stations, aviation, submarine, or destroyer bases. All should be mopped up as progress is made. . . . The presence of an expeditionary force with the fleet would add greatly to the striking power of the Commander-in-Chief of the fleet. . . . The maintenance, equipping, and training of its expeditionary force so that it will be in instant readiness to support the fleet in the event of war, I deem to be the most important Marine Corps duty in time of peace. (Parker, 1970, 51)

Ultimately, Lejeune succeeded in convincing the Navy of the validity of the amphibious mission, which they had themselves embraced since the 1880s. Additional efforts were to be made before a Marine amphibious mission could be fully realized, but the evolution of a Fleet Marine Force had begun. In 1927, the offensive mission for the Marine Corps in amphibious operations was elaborated on in joint action of the Army and Navy. This document, prepared by the joint board, was the first attempt by the services to define and delimit their respective responsibilities in joint operations. The general role it assigned to the Marine Corps in landing operations symbolized the acceptance of its future role as a naval instrument. Emphasizing the naval orientation of the Marine Corps’ role, the document directed the Marines Corps
[To conduct] land operations in support of the fleet for the initial seizure and defense of advanced bases and for such limited auxiliary land operations as are essential to the prosecution of the naval campaign. (Parker, 1970, 53)

In December 1933, the Secretary of the Navy issued General Order 241. This order formally established the command and administrative relations between the fleet and the Fleet Marine Force. By January 1934, the last Marine unit designated as a Marine Corps Expeditionary Force was incorporated into the new Fleet Marine Force (FMF). Although the Army sought much of the Marine Corps' proposed amphibious role throughout the period, the Marines continued to develop its capabilities along a naval orientation. Marine leaders rejected any operational concepts that could be suitably accomplished by a land army. The key to the Marine Corps' efforts was its emphasis on a unique capability: namely the prosecution of a naval campaign during its transition to a land campaign. As a result, the Navy-Marine Corps relationship was restored to a level that had not been seen since first few decades of the services' existence. Although the Marine Corps retained its operational versatility, evidenced by its continued role in non-naval expeditionary operations, it had reestablished itself as a naval instrument. To this end, the Marine Corps formulated its amphibious doctrine around naval warfare concepts. As a result, the Navy and the Marine Corps prosecuted the war in the Pacific as a coordinated team, and permanently established their operational forces on the basis of that coordination. (Parker, 1970)

7. Emergence of a Modern Marine Corps (1945 to Present)

Following World War II, the Marine Corps continued to embrace its amphibious capability as the cornerstone of its
doctrine. Consequently, the service embraced its naval character and made its primary identification with the naval establishment. By the 1970s, the Marine Corps was accessing almost all of its officers through Department of the Navy governed sources. By the 1990s, it had reorganized its operating forces around the Marine Expeditionary Force structure, focusing its combat capabilities on the prosecution of naval operations. Essentially, the Marine Corps has remained firmly grounded in the naval establishment throughout the period. It has focused the development of its future capabilities on existing and future naval capabilities. However, despite this attachment to the naval service during peacetime operations and training, the Marine Corps has increasingly operated during wartime in a non-naval capacity. In line with historical precedent, the service has again diverged from a strict emphasis on naval roles.

During the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Persian Gulf Wars, Fleet Marine Force units waged major land campaigns primarily independent from the Navy. Furthermore, the plethora of naval operations that Marines have been involved in during the period have resulted in little armed conflict. As a result, naval roles have become greatly overshadowed by the Marine commitments in the major land engagements. Influenced by the major Marine Corps involvement in these wars, much of the service's current combat philosophies and doctrinal approaches to warfare have been modeled after the lessons learned from wartime service. In essence, the wartime missions of the Marine Corps have come to be identified with the experience of the last half-century. Since this period has been marked by a drastic departure from naval roles, the Marine Corps' doctrine has similarly been refocused. With the training and education
system of the Marine Corps designed along these lines, the organization's identification with the naval service has begun to blur. (Moskin, 1992)

After more than two centuries of continuous duty at sea, the Marine Corps withdrew its last shipboard detachments from aircraft carriers in the late 1990s. Shortly thereafter, the Marine Corps began to eliminate its traditional Marine detachments at naval shore installations, effectively surrendering the naval security mission at sea and ashore to the Navy. While these two missions had long outlived the requirement for a unique Marine capability, their preservation through the years was symbolic of the Marine Corps' firm place in the naval establishment. Although the Marine Corps has continued to identify with naval traditions, and still rests its primary peacetime capability in the Marine Expeditionary Force concept, the days of distinctly naval corps of Marines have certainly passed from the scene. In a military establishment that is organized around joint service structures and operations, the Marine Corps will continue to work with the Navy in the future. However, it has and will operate increasingly with the other services, thereby weakening the once special Navy-Marine Corps relationship.

B. MARINE CORPS OFFICER COMMISSIONING

The second section of the historical analysis explores the historical practices of officer commissioning in the Marine Corps. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate how Marine officer accession practices have evolved through history and the implication of those practices during historical periods. In the context of the overall study, this section reveals the Marine Corps' historical emphasis on different commissioning programs. In this context, the
section specifically demonstrates the historical value of the Naval Academy as a source of Marine officers.

1. Overview

Ever since this nation first incorporated a corps of marines into its defense establishment, the procurement of officers to lead the Marine Corps has undergone rapid evolution. While the procurement processes of the American army and navy have undergone similar changes over time, neither has experienced the rapid and tumultuous evolution that has characterized officer-commissioning practices in the Marine Corps. As early as 1802, the Army had standardized its officer accession process with the establishment of the Military Academy at West Point. The Navy followed suit in 1845 with the establishment of its academy, and both have drawn the core of their officer leadership from those institutions to the present day. The Marine Corps, however, has never had the luxury of reliance on a singular source to provide the institutional core of its officer corps. The multiple commissioning practices that the other services have embraced through the years have been intended merely to supplement the output of the respective academies. Conversely, the Marine officer corps has historically been built on these "supplemental" commissioning practices. Even the service's relationship with the Naval Academy has served as simply a component of a diverse officer accession program, rather than as a primary source around which the officer corps is built.

2. The Marine Corps Draws from Civil Life (1775 to 1883)

Shortly after the establishment of a corps of marines for Revolutionary War service, Captain Samuel Nicholas was appointed as the first Marine officer on 28 November 1775.
Although he was the senior marine officer throughout the conflict, Nicholas had little say in selection of officers for the corps. As had long been the practice in navies of the era, ship captains were highly autonomous and selected their own marine officers. Therefore, the corps of marines that did serve in the war was an amalgamation of independent marine units and led by officers who were commissioned under the auspices of the Continental Navy. In this context, marine officer accession was neither standardized nor controlled. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

Disbanding the naval service after the war, the new government had no requirement to standardize commissioning practices. After the XYZ affair enraged Congress and prompted their vote to build a navy in 1789, a separate corps of marines was not envisioned. Despite the establishment of such a corps in 1775, the role of marines in the Revolutionary War had been solely as a naval instrument and subject to the leadership of navy officers. Therefore, it was expected that marines would continue to serve in their strict naval capacity and would essentially perform as a specialized type of sailor. In this context, ship captains or homeport communities continued the practice of appointing Marine officers as needed. Under this quasi-legal arrangement, there were no standardized examinations or application processes for a commission. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

After nearly a decade of the informal Marine officer commissioning practices, Congress established a separate Marine Corps on 11 July 1798. Although the Marine Corps would continue to serve primarily in a naval capacity, and would remain subservient to the Navy, it was organized into a distinct service exercising centralized administrative control. Concurrently, the office of Commandant of the
Marine Corps was created to oversee the administration of the service. In this capacity, a primary duty of the Commandant was to centrally manage the Marine Corps' officer accessions. While the office of the Commandant was not granted operational control of Marine units, it was charged with screening applicants for presidential appointment. In this respect, the first formalized instrument of Marine officer commissioning was created. (Millett, 1991)

While the Marine Corps had achieved the status of a separate service and had formally gained control of managing officer accessions, many of the historical practices and patterns remained unchanged. Although the Commandant was now personally involved in screening applicants, his authority was truly limited to recommendation. In essence, the Commandant of the newly established Marine Corps wielded little power. Officer appointments were characteristically influenced by political influence, and the loyalty of appointees rested primarily with their benefactors. Without the benefit of an academy, as well as the legal and social unacceptability of commissioning from the ranks, all applicants came directly from civil life. As Millett explains:

Officer continued to enter the Corps through patronage with little consideration except their personal character, personal influence, social connections, and physical condition. (1991, 57)

Despite their limitations, early Commandants took a paternal interest in the appointment of officers. William Ward Burrows, the first Marine Corps Commandant appointed in 1798, immediately set such a precedent. Since the Commandant did not exercise operational control of Marines, officer recruitment and accession became the primary duty of the post. In fact, the Commandants remained personally responsible for this duty through the War of 1812, the
Seminole Wars, and the Mexican War. It was not until the Civil War, when the crisis required the recruitment efforts of more than one individual, that the Commandant delegated the responsibility for accessions to subordinates. Even then, Marine Corps Commandants remained personally involved in the process until the end of the century. (Millett, 1991)

From 1798 to 1846 the Marine Corps commissioned 289 officers. Of those accessed, only 69 of them served fifteen years or longer. Since military commissions during the period were permanent, and the vast majority of Army and Navy officers typically served full careers, these figures indicated a serious deficiency in the Marine officer accession system. Long wrestling with this problem, as well as their inability to influence the system, Marine Commandants consistently lobbied for corrective legislation in the political arena. As an example, Archibald Henderson, the fifth Commandant of the Marine Corps, complained to the Navy Secretary in 1824 that political patronage played too big a part in winning commissions. Concurrently, Henderson urged Congress to pass legislation that allowed for some graduates of the Military Academy at West Point to receive Marine officer commissions. Although his campaign for academy graduates was resisted in both Congress and the military establishment, it became a repeated theme for the next half century. Despite the inability to effect systemic changes, Henderson did use his personal influence to recruit most officers from Virginia, his home state, and the middle Atlantic region. Likewise, the Commandants that proceeded him were able to similarly influence Marine Corps accession patterns, despite their inability to achieve congressional relief. (Millett, 1991)
Having maintained its accession practices intact, the Marine Corps made little progress in raising the quality of the men it commissioned by the time the Civil War began. At the outbreak of the rebellion, the Marine Corps lost one third of its officer corps to the Confederacy. While the Army and Navy experienced a proportionally similar leadership drain, the Marines were hit harder. Losing their Adjutant Inspector (a prominent post in that era) and the majority of their prominent field commanders, the Marine Corps experienced both operational and personnel crises (Millett, 1991). In 1861, the Marine Corps was faced with filling 30 officer billets. Although an estimated 500 to 2000 applicants immediately surfaced for the commissions, political patronage weighed heavy in the selection process. The new officers, despite the assumed patriotic fervor that influenced them, proved to be equal in quality to those accessed in the past. From 1861 through 1865, a total of 75 new officers became Marine Second Lieutenants. These officers served the Marine Corps effectively during the war, but represented the same quality of officer that had burdened the service since its inception. (Shulimson, 1993)

Despite the lack of historical evidence that the Civil war era accessions were an improvement for the Marine officer corps, the war did witness some credible changes in the system. First of all, a number of newly commissioned officers had formerly attended one of the service academies. While these officers had not graduated from the military institutions for a variety of reasons, they did have the benefit of previous military training. This was considered a benefit over those applicants directly from civil life. As one Marine observed,

There are lots of ex-naval students in the service. Looking down the register I see no less
than eight that graduated at the back door.
(Shulimson, 1993, 123)

The second significant systemic change came on 25 July
1861 when Congress enacted mandatory examinations for
potential Marine officer candidates. These examinations
were be supervised by the Navy Secretary, and age limits
(20-25) were instituted to ensure the physical potential of
the future officers. Concurrently, the Marine Corps created
its own board of officers for screening candidates in
conjunction with the Navy oversight. Although Marine Corps
Commandants had long sought these measures, they did not
solve the crux of the accession problem. New Marine
officers continued to be patronage appointments, often
including sons of officers, congressmen, and prominent
families. (Millett, 1991)

After the war, the Marine Corps continued its campaign
for officer accession reform without success for the next 25
years. During this era, appointees were exclusively drawn
from civil life and continued to earn commissions through
political power or connection. The mandatory examinations
marked an improvement, but political influence determined
which candidates got to take them in the first place.
Additionally, the Navy became increasingly influential in
the Marine Corps accession practices after the war. Admiral
of the Navy David Porter personally used his influence to
select examination candidates during his tenure. Rear
Admiral Stephen B. Luce, an ardent Marine Corps supporter
during the later half of the century, personally continued
the crusade. In particular, Luce believed that Marines
should "be admitted to the school at West Point for a four
years' course." (Shulimson, 1861) Although Luce's campaign
was unsuccessful, the low quality of Marine officers and the
critical deficiencies in the Marine Corps' accession system
finally received attention in the Navy Department and in
Congress. However, inaction persisted and the Marine Corps continued its efforts to fix the problem internally. To ease tension with the Navy, Marine Commandant Charles McCawley even aborted the practice appointing academy dropouts. This measure was enacted despite the perception that the prior military training was beneficial. (Millett, 1991)

To summarize the quality of officers being accessed into the Marine Corps prior to 1883, a Philadelphia newspaper in 1882 wrote a striking article about what it referred to as the “social marines”. In the publication, the qualifications for appointment to commissioned rank in the Marine Corps relied upon:

- Social connections
- Birth
- Figure
- Ability as a dancer
- Evidence that he has never served in the ranks or performed labor of a degrading sort.

(Shulimson, 1993, 135)

Despite periodic acts of heroism in combat, most Marine officers of the era had earned their commissions through political power. Consequently, many of them were generally lacking in military aptitude. The Marine Corps' leaders tried desperately to improve the accession system, but had neither the political resolve nor legal assistance to do so.

3. The Naval Academy as the Sole Source (1883 to 1898)

After years of fruitless struggle to access officers from the Military Academy, the Marine Corps finally commissioned academy graduates, albeit from the Naval Academy, in 1883. In legislation passed in 1882, the legal precedent for Marine officer commissioning from the academy was set. Congress devised the measure as a solution to the
Navy’s inability to offer commissions to all its graduates. At the low point of the Navy’s officer personnel crisis from 1880 to 1882, the Navy had one academy graduate for every four enlisted sailors and 1,817 officers to man 37 ships. (Bartlett, 1992) Despite the significant draw down after the Civil War, the Navy had adamantly resisted the draw down in Naval Academy accessions. As a result, they faced a growing surplus of jobless graduates. Rather than decreasing the academy’s size, which the naval establishment had fought hard to achieve, the Navy reluctantly agreed to discharge or send to the Marine Corps its graduates that could not be immediately placed in the fleet. Although only as an afterthought, the Marine Corps was a beneficiary and immediately embraced the law as its solution to officer accession problems.

While the law did not necessarily intend for Naval Academy accessions to be the sole commissioning source for the Marine Corps, the service considered it to serve that purpose. Believing that academy graduates would be significantly higher in quality than those from civil life, the Marines reveled in their success and discarded any efforts to achieve accessions from the Military Academy. The Marine leaders may have considered the training received at West Point to be more appropriate for future Marine officers than that received at Annapolis. Nonetheless, they saw great promise in the new arrangement and relished any potential improvement in officer quality. To the Marine Corps’ pleasure, the Navy personnel crisis continued in stead until near the end of the century. As a result, the Naval Academy remained the sole source of Marine officer accessions during the period. (Greenwood, 1975)

Despite the marked improvement that Naval Academy accessions meant for the officer procurement process,
historical evidence of a vast improvement in the Marine officer corps is inconclusive. While many of the academy graduates accessed from 1883 to 1897 went on to distinguished officer careers, an equal percentage of those accessed before and after the period also distinguished themselves in the upper ranks of the Marine Corps. Despite the lack of evidence for improvement, the new accession source appeased the Marine leaders and was altogether healthy for the officer corps. As Shulimson argues:

Naval Academy graduates brought a common education and tradition that eventually resulted in a more positive image amongst Marine officers. In performance, they proved about the same despite the credentials. (1993, 118)

Probably the most significant aspect of the practice of commissioning academy graduates was the feeling amongst Marine leaders that it had eliminated political patronage from the accession process. While politics certainly had a diminished role under the new system, they were not eliminated. Politics indirectly influenced officer accessions through the significant role they played in Naval Academy admissions. According to Karsten’s thesis (1972), the social class of Naval Academy students was considerably higher than at other military schools. Evidence of this social stratification can be found through examination of social registers of the era, and political patronage was the predominant factor in securing appointments to the institution. Therefore, although Marine officer accessions from the Naval Academy turned out to be more of a social cross section than those going into the Navy (Shulimson, 1993), these officers still came from similar backgrounds to those appointed under the old system. Their Midshipman training, however, was a significant benefit to the Marine Corps. It effectively served to increase their potential for success despite the political roots of their accession.
4. Requirements of an Expeditionary Force (1898 to 1916)

As the end of the century neared, the Navy personnel crisis began to diminish. By 1897, the Navy was in a position again to commission all of its Naval Academy graduates. Therefore, the Navy initiated efforts to sever the practice of commissioning Marine officers from the academy. Having come to rely on the academy as its sole officer source, the Marine Corps ardently fought this initiative within the Navy Department. However, the outbreak of the Spanish American War temporarily quelled the conflict. Congress determined a need for a Marine expeditionary force, and with it a greatly expanded Marine officer corps. Since it would have been clearly unrealistic to meet the augmentation requirement with just Naval Academy graduates, the Marine Corps accepted the reality of utilizing alternate commissioning sources for the duration of the conflict. Despite the concession, the Marine Corps considered alternate accession sources to be only temporary measures, with a return to a solitary Naval Academy commissioning routine after the war. (Greenwood, 1975)

To meet the wartime requirement, the Marine Corps took the initiative to generate its own legislation. Still concerned about the quality of officers accessed from civil life, even if only temporarily, the Marine Corps pushed a bill that provided for one quarter of all new officers to be appointed from the meritorious noncommissioned officer ranks upon passing an examination. Despite the social implications and untested nature of commissioning from the ranks, senior Marine leaders felt that the idea held merit. Additionally, the concern about civilian appointees was widespread in the officer corps, as evidenced by Captain Henry C. Cochrane’s feeling that “[all civil life appointees
would be] sons of post traders” (Shulimson, 1993). Despite his fears, Cochrane nonetheless advised one aspiring applicant:

The usual plan should be pursued.... make written application supported by testimonials.... follow that up with any political, naval or social influence that he or his father or friends may have. (Shulimson, 1993, 212)

Despite the Marine Corps’ efforts, the legislation that was enacted simply allowed for the temporary promotion of officers from ranks and civil life during the crisis. In May 1898 Congress approved 43 temporary officers. Only three of these were prior enlisted men and 40 were from civil life. Contrary to the fears of the Marine Corps’ leaders, the temporary officers performed admirably during the Spanish American War. After the hostilities had subsided, the Marine Corps prepared to discharge the officers, revert the former noncommissioned officers to enlisted status, and resume utilizing the Naval Academy as its primary officer source. However, before the last of the temporary accessions were released, Congress passed legislation for a greatly expanded Marine Corps. An allowance was made to offer permanent commissions to the temporary appointees and the Marine Corps utilized it. Additionally, the larger Marine Corps would require new officers and the concept of a sole Naval Academy accession source lost practical validity. While the Marine Corps intended to continue its draw from the academy, it necessarily set out to revitalize its accession process in regards to commissioning from civil life and the ranks. (Shulimson, 1993).

In the aftermath of the war, the Marine Corps’ newly acquired fame ensured it would have no problem attracting new officer applicants. Although most accessions from civil life would likely be patronage appointments, the Marine
Corps restored and improved its entrance examinations. Only, Naval Academy graduates were exempt from these entry-level tests (Millett, 1991). With the Navy denying the Marine Corps a regular crop of academy graduates, completely diminishing by the early Twentieth Century, meritorious noncommissioned officers and civilians would serve as the foundation of the new Marine officer corps. Beginning in 1899, the Commandant of the Marine Corps was also able to screen all applicants and grant them permission to appear before Navy Department application board. For the first time, this authority was credible and effectively suppressed many of the problems associated with purely patronage appointments. However, while the problem associated with politics was mostly solved, the candidates from civil life categorically lacked the education and military experience that Naval Academy graduates had offered. This was a substantial loss to the Marine Corps, especially in the eyes of the numerous Naval Academy graduates that were moving up the ranks. The dispute over Marine accessions from the academy was not resolved until the end of the period. (Shulimson, 1993)

Although legally bound to send Naval Academy graduates to the Marine Corps, the Navy successfully defied legislation and commissioned all its graduates internally from 1903 to 1915. Essentially, the Navy was trying to maintain an officer corps exclusively comprised of academy graduates. In this effort, it could not spare any accessions to the Marines. However, the expanded naval roles and ship increases during the era made this a formidable task. While 17 percent of the Marine Corps' officers had risen from the ranks in 1916, the Navy resisted non-academy accessions (with few exceptions) until Naval Reserve officers were allowed in 1925. (Karsten, 1972).
Finally, by 1914 the Marine Corps had its first Commandant with a Naval Academy pedigree, Major General George Barnett. Through Barnett's initiative, the Marine Corps successfully resumed the practice of commissioning academy graduates by 1915. Having again raised the quality of its accession program, the Marine Corps opted to eliminate regular civilian appointments. The Marines intended to and drew their entire future officer corps from the academy and the now tested and proven enlisted ranks.

5. The World War I Buildup (1916 to 1918)

On 29 August 1916, two years after the outbreak of World War I, Congress implemented the second large expansion of the Marine Corps. Again, the Marines were faced with a necessary departure from its standardized officer accession process and the institutionally dreaded practice of commissioning from civil life. To ease the degraded quality of wartime accessions, the warrant officer ranks were created and the Marine Corps was enabled to appoint former Marine officers to commissioned grades. Furthermore, meritorious noncommissioned officer and civilian appointees would receive only two-year probationary commissions. This regulation facilitated easy dismissal for substandard performers and erased the stigma of a polluted regular officer corps. Additionally, in 1917 Congress created the Marine Corps Reserve to provide temporary officers solely for wartime service. Other than the temporary officers accessed for the Spanish American War, this was the first time the concept of a non-regular officer corps had been tested. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

In addition to the congressional action, the Marine Corps internally structured its accession program to ensure quality while meeting its requirements. As it had during the Civil War, the Marine Corps again targeted civilians
that had prior military training at military colleges or through former enlisted service. Additionally, the Marine Corps revised its entrance examinations, made them competitive, and offered them to prospective civilian and noncommissioned officer candidates from August through November 1916. After the United States entered the war on 6 April 1917, one final competitive examination was offered to aspirants from civilian life in July 1917. Thereafter, the Marine Corps returned to its policy of accessing only Naval Academy graduates, who were now a regular source, and current and former Marine noncommissioned officers. With few exceptions, this policy stood intact for the duration of the conflict. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

At end of war, 564 vacancies existed in the regular Marine officer corps. Despite the temporary nature of their commissions, many of the civilians and noncommissioned officers accessed during the conflict assimilated into the regular force. Once again, civilian appointees had distinguished themselves. However, the Marine Corps leadership still sought other means of accessing officers during peacetime. The emphasis again shifted to a reliance on the Naval Academy and the enlisted ranks, supplemented when necessary with civilians from War Department designated distinguished military institutions such as The Citadel, Virginia Military Institute, and Texas A&M University. (Millett, 1991)

6. Inter-War Accession Source Divergence (1919 to 1941)

By 1921, the Marine Corps was faced with the first peacetime accessions crisis in its history. Although World War I had again bolstered the service’s public image and created a large pool of aspiring civilian applicants, the Marine Corps’ decision not to access from civil life left it
reliant on the Naval Academy and the ranks. While the academy was now a consistent supplier of young officers, the naval institution could not meet the total requirement. In light of the existing policy, the remainder of the officers would have to come from the noncommissioned officer ranks. Enlisted examinations for commissions became annual, having previously been reserved for wartime. However, the Marine Corps still could not find enough highly qualified enlisted Marines to meet the need. Furthermore, was critically depriving the noncommissioned officer corps by commissioning its best performers. Ultimately, the decision was made to open the door for qualified civilian applicants. Major General John A. Lejeune, the Commandant at the time and a Naval Academy graduate, favored the Marine Corps' restrictive policy but recognized the need for alternate commissioning sources. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

While the Marine Corps was forced to diversify its accession process, it took measures to ensure that the quality of its officer accessions was maintained. Applicants from civil life would be eligible for commissions, but the Marines specifically sought college graduates from military oriented institutions. In May 1921 Lejeune contacted all distinguished military schools and solicited their recommendations of graduates for Marine Corps commissions. Additionally, the Marine Corps latched on to the Army Reserve Officer Training Course (AROTC) program, which permitted a select number of its graduates to accept regular Marine officer commissions. For the remainder of the decade, the Naval Academy, the AROTC program, and meritorious enlisted accessions were the primary sources of Marine officers. However, the preference for academy graduates and enlisted Marines still prevailed, as evidenced by the Marine Corps' election not to access
from AROTC or military colleges when every billet could be filled through the primary sources in 1927. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

In addition to its primary sources, the Marine Corps also began to explore other accession opportunities to meet future buildups or crises. The Marine Corps Reserve program began to be streamlined in 1920s. Also, the required standards for commissioning were outlined in the Marine Corps Manual, a professional guide for all Marines. When the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) was launched in 1926, the Marine Corps embraced the program as a potential source of Marine Corps Reserve officers. In fact, the Navy Department established a Marine Reserve Officer Training Corps (MROTC) concurrently and the Marines assigned active officers to staff its designated units. Unfortunately, the MROTC produced very few reserve officers during its existence and the Marine Corps withdrew its resident officer staff from the program in 1934. Ironically, the Marine Corps never truly recognized the program as a credible source of officers. In fact, its existence is not even mentioned in the 1931 edition of the Marine Corps Manual. The Marine Corps did maintain its relationship with the NROTC program, which while producing few Marine reserve officers during the period, would later serve as an important regular officer-commissioning source. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

At the beginning of the 1930s, the law provided for three sources of regular Marine Corps officers: the Naval Academy, Meritorious Noncommissioned Officers of the Marine Corps, and civilians. Other than the academy graduates, the main emphasis remained on accessions from the ranks. As the Marine Corps Manual of 1931 stated:

It is the policy of the Major General Commandant to give full effect to the legislative provisions
which open the way for advancement to the commissioned grades to meritorious enlisted men of the Marine Corps. (1931, 32)

As was the previous practice, civilian appointments would be made from approved colleges and universities with military training, and only to fill available billets after accessions from the Naval Academy and the ranks. University presidents made the recommendations for Marine Corps commissions and the AROTC program was utilized when necessary. (Marine Corps Manual, 1931)

By 1935, however, the Marine Corps recognized the importance of its reserve officer corps and could no longer turn away civilian applicants from schools without NROTC units. In this context, the Marine Corps created the Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) program for college students that sought a reserve commission as a Marine officer. Consisting of two consecutive summer training periods, essentially in the same format as the program today, the PLC was a great success and satisfactorily fulfilled the Marine Corps' reserve officer requirements. The program continued annually until 1942, producing 781 reserve and 39 regular officers. It especially served the Marine Corps well during the first two years of World War II. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

To supplement the PLC program, the Commandant of the Marine Corps General Holcomb created the Officer Candidate Class (OCC) program in 1940. In response to the stirring war in Europe and Asia, the Marine Corps anticipated the need for a larger reserve officer force. The OCC program was designed to fulfill the same purpose as the PLC program, but was targeted at civilian college graduates instead of college students. Like the PLC program, it was conceived in essentially its modern format with one summer of training and a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve. (OCS Home Page, 2000)
During the inter-war period of 1919 to 1941, the Marine Corps explored a number of different officer accession programs while maintaining its focus on its traditionally favored sources. During the decade of the 1930s, the economic depression required few vacancies to be filled in regular ranks. Therefore, the Marine Corps was able to restrict its accessions as desired. As a result, not a single civilian was commissioned in fiscal years 1930, 1932, and 1935. Toward the end of the decade, however, the looming world war and economic upturn created resurgence in the practice of commissioning civilians. College graduates became the preferred source of reserve officers during the period, and the Marine Corps steadily built the reserve officer corps in preparation for war. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

7. World War II Accession Programs (1941-1945)

With the outbreak of American involvement in World War II, the Marine Corps was faced with an expected force expansion. New officer accessions were immediately required. The OCC and PLC programs served as the major commissioning sources during the first few years of the war, but the emphasis on PLC began to diminish since the service of its trainees was delayed. In this context, the Marine Corps launched the first major officer recruiting effort in its history by assigning officer selection officers (OSOs) to colleges throughout the country in February 1942. Although the Marine Corps maintained its preference for graduates of military schools and those with prior military training, it was soon compelled to reach beyond that pool. Soon, the Marine Corps was targeting civilians with college degrees or any college experience at all. By 1942, direct commissions were being granted to over half of the newly accessed officers. (Millett, 1991)
At the outbreak of the war, the Marine Corps created a temporary college training program in response to the personnel crisis looming ahead. The program required students to enlist in the Marine Corps with the promise of officer training, but did not promise them the opportunity to graduate beforehand. The program had credible initial success, but fell short of fulfilling accession requirements when campus competition with the other services increased. While the elimination of the prohibition on married students again increased officer accessions temporarily, the Marine Corps continued to struggle. The final blow to the officer recruiting effort came in early 1942 when the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy came to a jurisdiction agreement concerning college recruiting. The Marine Corps was forced to concentrate its efforts only on schools that did not have an AROTC or NROTC program, a measure that critically hampered its efforts and forced its leaders to reassess their accession strategies. Meanwhile, the AROTC program continued to supply a small number of regular Marine officers, but the NROTC program did not commission graduates in the Marine Corps for the remainder of the war. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

Despite its previous setback, relief for the Marine Corps officer accession program came in late 1942 when the Navy implemented its V-12 program. The V-12 program was created to access college students and offered them the opportunity to graduate before commencing officer training. The Marine Corps was seamlessly incorporated into this program and it ensured satisfactory officer flow for the remainder of the war. By 1944 the program was working so well that 613 trainees had to be turned over to the Navy for commissions. When the V-12 program formally ended in 1946, 1,900 trainees were still enrolled. Those with four
semesters of college work or less were disenrolled, and the remainder were offered reserve commissions and released to inactive duty. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

Although the V-12 program fulfilled the Marine Corps' wartime requirements after 1943, other sources of commissioned officers were necessary in the interim. Facing difficulty in the college recruiting effort, the Marine Corps again turned to its enlisted force for officer accessions. Quotas were created for field commissions and commanders readily utilized the option until it was eliminated in February 1943. After that date, only noncommissioned officers that demonstrated bravery in combat or possessed critical aviation skills could be directly commissioned. Additionally, projected officer shortages in early 1943 prompted the Marine Corps to authorize its recruiting depots to commission up to one percent of their graduates. By late 1943, the officer shortages had not materialized and the authorization was rescinded for the remainder of the war. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

In addition to its temporary measures, the Marine Corps continued to access regular and reserve officers through its preexisting accession sources. Although the PLC and NROTC programs did not produce Marine officers after 1942, the Naval Academy, AROTC, and OCC continuously produced a small cadre of officers each year of the war. In October 1942 the OCC program was extended to meritoriously nominated noncommissioned officers from Fleet Marine Force units, and the top graduates of the recruit depots entered the program in 1943. By the end of the war, the Marine Corps had received officer service from a corps of men with widely divergent commissioning backgrounds. Even those accessed prior to the war were characterized by more diversity in commissioning source than in any time in the Marine Corps'
history. Of the 99 Marine general officers in World War II, 11 ascended from the Naval Academy, 21 had some prior enlisted service, 17 arose from distinguished military colleges, and 49 came directly from civil life (Nofi, 1997).

8. **Force Reduction, Korea, and Beyond (1945 to 1980)**

Immediately after World War II, force reductions spurred a major reassessment of Marine Corps accession programs. While the Marine Corps aimed to reconstitute its active force with regular officers, it realized that it would have to maintain some of its reserve officers to meet active duty requirements. In order to access reserve officers, the Marine Corps’ reserve officer accession programs had to be maintained. By 1950, the Naval Academy was sending five percent of its graduates to the Marine Corps, constituting the majority of the regular force. Additionally, the PLC program and the NROTC relationship were renewed by 1947, with their top graduates being offered regular commissions to supplement the Naval Academy core. The NROTC program still turned out very few reserve officers, despite the decision to staff each unit with a Marine officer for the first time. The AROTC program continued to supplement the regular force as well, now mostly with former enlisted Marines. The AROTC program would continue to be a primary Marine officer accession source until the NROTC program was expanded in the 1960s. The OCC program emerged as a fulfiller of accession requirements left over from the other sources. The establishment of the Air Force Reserve Officer Training Corps (AFROTC) program offered another resource for the accession of former enlisted Marines enrolled. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

At the outbreak of the Korean War, the Marine Corps reluctantly broadened its officer accession criteria and
turned to its enlisted force to supplement the existing programs. The Meritorious Noncommissioned Officer Program was created to allow enlisted men to continue careers as officers. Also, the OCC program was again opened up to the most outstanding enlisted candidates. By 1951, the Marine Corps was again forced to allow field commissions in combat units. Over 500 Master Sergeants and warrant officers earned temporary commissions between 1951 and 1952. By the end of hostilities, the noncommissioned officer corps was again deprived of its highest quality leadership. (Millett, 1991)

In the decade that followed the Korean War, the Marine Corps eliminated its formal officer accession sources targeted at the enlisted ranks. Instead, it experimented with a variety of supplemental internal and external commissioning programs. Although these new sources remained secondary to preexisting sources, they became consistent providers. These programs included the Military Academy, the Air Force Academy after its establishment, the interservice transfer (IST) program, the Marine Aviation Cadet (MARCAD) program, the Naval Scientific Education Program (NSEP), and the College Graduate Program (CGP) for enlisted reservists. Additionally, the PLC program was extended to prospective law and aviation officers. By the 1960s, as a result of the myriad of commissioning programs in use and the force requirements of the era, reserve officers outnumbered regular officers in the peacetime force for the first time in Marine Corps history. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

Force escalation again followed the outbreak of hostilities when the Marine Corps began to see large-scale deployment to Vietnam in 1965. Relying solely on its preexisting commissioning sources from 1965 to early 1967, although, the Marine Corps was able to meet its officer
accession requirements by simply expanding the number of program accessions. This allowed the Marines to leave their enlisted force intact. The draft, and the elimination of marriage deferrals in particular, eased the recruiting effort and the Marine Corps was swamped with applications from college graduates. However, by 1967 the service was faced with an increase in its officer strength by a third. Reluctantly, the Marine Corps again begin to access new officers directly from the enlisted ranks. Adding to the officer procurement difficulties was the widespread domestic protest movement that created a hostile environment for college OSOs. By 1970, the situation had deteriorated to the point that Marine officer recruiters were barred from numerous campuses. This, further impeded the recruitment process and shifted the burden again to the noncommissioned officer corps. (Moody & Nalty, 1970)

By 1975, with the Marine Corps' involvement in the war well eclipsed, the modern officer accession system was in place. The Naval Academy and the NROTC program would remain the primary source of regular officers, with a few each year accessing from the Military Academy, the Air Force Academy, IST, and the AROTC and AFROTC programs. To supplement the regular officer force after accession, reserve officers were allowed to compete for regular augmentation on an annual basis. The PLC program, still extended to aviation and law candidates, became the primary source of reserve officers, with the OCC program supplementing it to the degree required. Building on historical precedent, the Marine Corps also created dedicated officer commissioning programs for its outstanding enlisted members. The Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECF), created prior to the Vietnam War, was implemented to target enlisted Marines possessing a college degree. The Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP)
and Meritorious Enlisted Commissioning Program (MECEP) were added later to provide an opportunity for top enlisted Marines (without a degree) to gain both a college education and an officer's commission. Also by this time, all officer candidate training had been consolidated at the Officer Candidate School (OCS) in Quantico, Virginia. With the sole exception of Naval Academy graduates, potential Marine officers from every accession source underwent an OCS course of instruction for screening and evaluation.

C. THE NAVAL ACADEMY-MARINE CORPS RELATIONSHIP

The final section of the historical analysis is an exploration of the historical relationship between the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. The purpose of this section is to provide a detailed examination of the historical practice of commissioning Marine officers from the academy and the influence of the Marine Corps on the institution. In the context of the overall study, this section provides a historical account of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship and establishes the precedents upon which the modern relationship is built.
1. Overview

Like the relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps, the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship has been long enduring and often tumultuous. Although the academy was not originally intended as a source of Marine officers, and essentially remained that way for its first thirty-six years, it ultimately assumed that role which has continued to the present day. Undoubtedly, the Naval Academy has been a historically credible, and at times critical, source of Marine Corps officers. Likewise, the interest and influence of the Marine Corps on the academy has been a significant force shaping the evolution of the latter institution. Despite the inter-service feuding that has characterized the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship through the years, it has produced a significant underlying result. Namely, the relationship has influenced the evolution of the Marine Corps and furnished a part of the foundation upon which the modern Navy-Marine Corps team was built. It has been a unifying agent, drawing the two services together through graduates who were bound to each other by friendships and a common appreciation of naval power. Furthermore, it has helped ensure the solidarity of the naval services in the face of an increasingly joint environment with redefined service roles and missions. (Greenwood, 1975)

While the historical unifying role of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship appears less significant today, there was a critical period in time when its significance was tremendous. From 1914 to 1936, all five Commandants of the Marine Corps were Naval Academy graduates. Although this was largely due to the fact that the academy was the Marine Corps' sole accession source for an eighteen-year period, their leadership during the inter-war period was particularly noteworthy. (Millett, 1991) As
history has demonstrated, these were critical and formative years for the naval service. During this period, the Marine Corps emerged as a capable force of combined arms, the amphibious mission was identified, amphibious doctrine was written and tested, and the Navy-Marine Corps team was revolutionized. Essentially, a joint partnership for the exercise of amphibious combat power was created.

While the Marine Corps had long operated in a naval capacity, its previous maritime role had been one of subservience to the Navy. In contrast, amphibious warfare was developed on the premises of cooperation, coordination, unique service capabilities, and separate but equal roles for both of the naval services. Subservience had been eclipsed by interdependence, and the Navy and Marine Corps worked in unison to foster these evolutionary developments. Pivotal to the success of these efforts, were the Naval Academy graduates who led the Marine Corps during the period. (Greenwood, 1975)

Although these developments might well have occurred without benefit of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps, they did occur and academy graduates can be primarily credited with their success. Furthermore, the appreciation of naval power gained through the academy experience, as well as the vast associations and bonds that were forged there, proved instrumental in these leaders' abilities to recognize the amphibious mission and influence the Navy in its development. Perhaps the epitome of success for these leaders can be represented by the accomplishments of Major General John A. Lejeune, a Naval Academy graduate of the Class of 1888. In his nine years as Commandant of the Marine Corps, Lejeune realized, formulated, and developed the amphibious doctrine that would lead the Marine Corps into World War II. Today, this doctrine remains the central
foundation of Marine combat operations. Near the end of his tenure as Commandant, and thirty-nine years after leaving the Naval Academy, Lejeune attributed much of his success to his ties to academy classmates "[that were fastened with] rivets of steel that had withstood the ravages of time." At the time, his classmates in the upper naval echelons included the Secretary of the Navy, Curtis D. Wilbur; the Chief of Naval Operations, Charles F. Hughes; the Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Fleet, Henry A. Wiley; the Superintendent of the Naval Academy, Samuel S. Robinson; and numerous other flag and general officers. In this context, it is likely that Lejeune's perception was valid. (Greenwood, 1975)

As the above testimonial indicates, the Naval Academy did likely serve to unite the two naval services during its formative period. Even if such a conclusion is disputed, the fact remains that academy graduates led the Marine Corps through great foresight and perseverance, contributed in full measure to the development and maintenance of the amphibious assault capability, and promulgated the redefined union of the two services. Therefore, even if only by merely producing these leaders, the Naval Academy proved instrumental in the success and development of the modern Marine Corps. In doing so, it set a precedent as a formidable Marine Corps commissioning source that has continued since the early in the academy's history.

2. The Early Years of the Naval Academy (1846-1882)

From its formal charter in 1846, the United States Naval Academy was a producer of Marine Corps officers. Before 1882, however, the academy did not commission its graduates in the Marine Corps, thereby limiting the pool of aspiring Marines to individuals that did not successfully complete the curriculum leading to an Ensign's commission.
During this period, a number of these non-graduates did pursue and acquire a commission as a Second Lieutenant of Marines. However, these individuals competed in the same process as candidates from civilian life, where the Marine Corps derived the majority of its commissioned officers. Although the Marine officer corps was considerably small, it still relied on the regular input of new second lieutenants. Lacking a preparatory school or other dependable accession source, the Marine Corps was burdened with the inadequate practice of screening and selecting applicants from civilian life. Although its operational commitments were constantly changing, the Marine Corps' peacetime commitments to the Navy were a constant. Therefore, it primarily sought men with a background that qualified them for naval service. (Shulimson, 1993)

During the first thirty-seven years after the establishment of the Academy, there were few formal connections between the Marine Corps and the educational institution. Although the Marine Corps officers served primarily on Navy ships and installations, the Navy had no intention of providing Marine officers with academy training. Furthermore, neither service made any initiative to institute such a practice. During the period, a total of nineteen men were commissioned in the Marine Corps who had previously attended the Naval Academy. Eighteen of those officers had not completed the complete course at the academy due to academic failure, disciplinary separation, willing departure, and other unknown reasons. The only graduate among them, Charles H. Humphrey from the Class of 1863, resigned his Navy commission and later was accepted as a Marine lieutenant. This was not a formal arrangement, however, as the Naval Academy provided no option for Midshipmen to accept a commission as an officer of Marines.
While these men did satisfy the Marine Corps' desire for officers with a foundation in maritime affairs, they constituted only nine percent of the second lieutenants commissioned during the period. Additionally, their status as academy non-graduates did little to bolster the professional image of the Marine officer corps in the eyes of the Navy. (Bartlett, 1985)

Not only did the informal practice of accessing former Midshipman fail to impress the sister service, but a caveat to this practice served to sour the then "frail" relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps. As circumstances dictated, several of the former Midshipmen received their Marine Corps commissions well ahead of their former classmates receiving Navy commissions. During the period, Midshipmen completed four-year academic course at the academy, leading to graduation, and then served two years at sea as "passed Midshipmen" before earning their commission as an Ensign. Therefore, a Midshipman failing out of the academy as a plebe could theoretically become a commissioned officer, although in the lowly regarded Marine Corps, some five years ahead of his peers that stayed the course. This practice served to fuel great animosity between the Navy and the Marine Corps. In fact, some of the most intense opponents of the Marine Corps' continued naval roles were Navy officers who had seen classmates receive early commissions, and hence seniority. After years of unsuccessful lobbying by Marine Corps opponents in the Navy, Congress passed a 1916 law prohibiting the commissioning of any non-graduate until "after the graduation of the class of which he was a member." (Greenwood, 1975)

While the Marine Corps was formally excluded from the professional development aspect of the Naval Academy during the period, the actual presence of Marines at the
institution began early on. Beginning in 1850, ships home ported in Annapolis adopted the practice of sending their Marine detachments ashore temporarily to perform security duties. While this practice was initially haphazard and informal in existence, it soon became a mainstay of the academy culture. In 1865, a permanent Marine guard detachment was attached to the Naval Academy as was typical of other naval shore installations at the time. By 1903, a permanent barracks structure had been erected on the academy grounds. The detachment was moved onto the institution’s prison ship Reina in 1903 to make way for the newly established postgraduate school. Eventually, the Marine Barracks was transferred across the Severn River to the Naval Station, Annapolis. While this detachment provided a permanent Marine presence and the first visibility for the Marine Corps on the yard, there is no historical evidence that it had any influence on the perceptions of Midshipmen as to the Marine Corps. In fact, the officers and enlisted personnel assigned to the barracks were not considered part of the Academy and had limited contact with Midshipmen during the period. Despite this limitation, the detachment has remained permanent to the present day and eventually evolved into the Marine Barracks, USNA Company. (Sweetman, 1979)

As had been the case since the beginning of the century, the Marine Corps continued its effort to improve its officer accession process throughout the period. Like previous Marine Corps Commandants, Colonel Charles G. McCawley aspired to create a preparatory school, professional examinations, or any other means by which the service could procure officers of higher qualifications. Every year from 1878 to 1881, McCawley outlined this position in his annual report to Congress and called for
corrective legislation. In particular, he continued the age-old suggestion that future appointments to the rank of Second Lieutenant be made from graduates of the Military Academy at West Point. Despite the Marine Corps' defining role as a naval instrument, not to mention its existence in the Department of the Navy, neither McCawley nor his predecessors ever sought the Naval Academy as an accession source. While the Marine Corps regarded maritime experience as beneficial in regards to its appointees from civilian life, it apparently saw more benefit in soldierly training when it considered a service academy as its accession source. (Shulimson, 1993)

Ironically, Congress addressed the Marine Corps' officer accession requirements with legislation on 5 August 1882 stating:

All the undergraduates at the Naval Academy shall hereafter be designated and called naval cadets; and from those who successfully complete the six years' course appointment shall hereafter be made as it is necessary to fill vacancies in the lower grades of the line and engineer corps of the Navy and Marine Corps. (Greenwood, 1975, 48-49)

Even though the strength of the Navy had considerably declined in the years following the Civil War, approximately the same number of cadet Midshipmen and engineers had continued to enter the Naval Academy. Consequently, "passed Midshipmen" frequently left the academy and waited for years for an Ensign's vacancy on a ship. In 1882, a befuddled Secretary of the Navy reported to Congress that he had one Naval Academy graduate for every four sailors in the fleet. Congress took corrective action by deciding that only academy graduates that were required for immediate service would be commissioned. The remainder of each class would be discharged from the Navy and sent home with a year's severance pay. The members of the classes that had entered
between 1877 and 1881, upon whom its effects fell ex post facto, resented this legislation most deeply. To young men who had spent six years of their lives preparing for a naval career, the inequity appeared greater in that no serious effort was made to cut back on admissions to the academy. (Sweetman, 1979) Since this measure constituted a traumatic blow to those that had undergone the academy course and set their sights on a professional officer career, efforts were taken to minimize the negative impact. In this context, a caveat to the legislation allowed some graduates to accept commissions in the Marine Corps if vacancies existed. (Bartlett, 1985)

Although the Marine Corps had finally succeeded in its effort to acquire a credible accession source, more than three-quarters of a century of constant initiatives were not the reason. In fact, the Navy had been faced with the dilemma of releasing Naval Academy graduates, due to force downsizing, and Congress used the Marine Corps as a means of partially solving the quandary. It may have seemed logical for the legal foundation of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship to be based on efforts to enhance inter-service harmony or the character of both naval services. This, however, was not the case. Rather, the legal foundation of the relationship was rooted merely in an effort to solve a manpower crisis. Thus, in the minds of the Navy’s leadership, it was contingent on the existence of that crisis.

3. The Naval Academy Commissions Marine Officers (1883-1897)

On 1 July 1883, when the Naval Academy Class of 1881 completed its sea duty and final examinations, nine men from it ranks were commissioned as Marine Second Lieutenants. Former Midshipmen W. H. Stayton, C. A. Doyen, Lincoln
Karmany, and future Marine Commandant George Barnett were amongst the first Naval Academy graduates to serve as Marine Corps officers. In 1884, one more member of the Class of 1881 and four from the Class of 1882 followed the same path. While this pattern would have continued in 1885, with the Navy manpower crisis still in full effect, the Marine Corps could not commission any new officers that year. Congress passed legislation that limited the size of the Marine Corps by directing a reduction in officer strength from eighty-two to seventy-five. Since this reduction had to be achieved through normal attrition, and the Marine Corps had been unsuccessful in its efforts to obtain compulsory retirement legislation, the prospect for new academy graduates looked dim for the next few years. In fact, it took five years for the Marine Corps to achieve the necessary attrition. Therefore, no Naval Academy graduates, nor any men from other accession sources, were appointed as Marine Second Lieutenants until 1889. However, when officer accession from the academy finally resumed, it continued on an annual basis until outbreak of the Spanish-American War. (Puleston, 1942)

Over the fifteen years of this period, all fifty officers commissioned in the Marine Corps hailed from the Naval Academy. Despite the lapse of 1885 to 1888, the service had achieved its goal of significantly enhancing the quality of its officer procurement process. In fact, the officers accessed during the period proved to be remarkable leaders of the Marine Corps during its expeditionary period, the First World War, and the development of amphibious warfare and the Fleet Marine Force. Referred to as the "Famous Fifty", these officers' careers were marked by the most continuous period of successive combat engagements in the Marine Corps' history. Forty-four of them served until
death or retirement, five became Commandants of the Marine Corps, thirteen became general officers, and fifteen reached the rank of Colonel. Since this exceptional retention rate was not completely uncharacteristic of previous periods, the benefits of their Naval Academy education were not quantifiable. Nonetheless, the Marine Corps recognized the advantages of accession from the Naval Academy. For the first time in its history, the Marine Corps had secured a dependable supply of capable, well-educated officers possessing sound experience in naval/maritime matters from the time of their commission. (Greenwood, 1975)

4. The Early Naval Academy Commissioning Practices Revisited (1898-1914)

As the Marine Corps was realizing a steady influx of Naval Academy graduates after 1888, the Navy's manpower crisis was diminishing. By the late 1890s, the Navy could again offer all of its graduates a commission as an Ensign. The law only required that Marine officer vacancies "be filled as far as practicable from graduates of the Naval Academy." (Greenwood, 1975, 49), so each year the Navy Department reached a policy decision that appointments to the Marine Corps were "not practicable". Thus, they began to minimize the number that could be commissioned as Second Lieutenants. While the Navy did not immediately take the initiative to eliminate graduates commissioned in the Marine Corps, it took the first steps toward severing the relationship. In 1896, one Marine officer billet was not filled and in 1897 the academy followed the same suit. Since the Marine Corps had come to rely on the Naval Academy as its sole accession source, the institution's failure to meet its accession requirements presented a future dilemma. However, before this situation could be addressed, the Spanish American War broke out and the character of the
Marine officer corps was changed permanently. (Greenwood, 1975)

In the Naval Appropriation Act of 1898, Congress greatly expanded the size of the Marine Corps and authorized the appointment of additional officers for wartime service. These officers ascended from both the civilian and noncommissioned officer ranks. While the Marine Corps had a long history of accessing its junior officers from civilian life, it had not flirted with commissioning from the ranks except in a few isolated instances. As the American military officer corps had traditionally been aristocratic in origin, the commissioning of enlisted men had been categorically resisted. Ironically, this enactment would serve to permanently erase that aversion in the Marine Corps and solidify enlisted accessions to the officer corps for years to come. Although only three meritorious enlisted men were selected at once to fill these temporary billets, along with forty men from civilian life, the first steps were taken. (Bartlett, 1985)

While the war temporarily solved the problem of decreased accessions from the Naval Academy, the Marine Corps continued to expect that the academy would be its sole commissioning source. The forty-three wartime commissions were considered temporary and the Marine Corps had no intention of utilizing non-academy sources again after hostilities had subsided. However, when the war was settled and the temporary officers were almost all discharged, Congress passed an act in March 1899 expanding Marine Corps officer strength to 211 and requiring that all but sixty of these billets be filled as soon as possible. In an instant, the Marine Corps had capitalized its previous dilemma and was faced with the need to procure many quality officers immediately. The loss of a few Naval Academy accessions had
become insignificant and the Marine Corps again faced a return of the problems that plagued it prior to 1882. As an immediate solution, thirty of the recently discharged temporary officers were reappointed to the permanent service as First Lieutenants. Additionally, a number of new officers from civilian life, as well as four graduates from earlier classes at the Naval Academy (that had been discharged for lack of billets), were quickly accessed and appointed as Marine Second Lieutenants. (Greenwood, 1975)

These initial appointments provided the Marine Corps with officers possessing some combat experience or appreciation of naval warfare. However, filling the remainder of the billets proved extremely challenging. According to the current law, only a portion of the candidates could be drawn from civilian life, from which the Marine Corps was resistant to draw them anyway. The remainder of the appointees were directed to come from the Naval Academy or from meritorious noncommissioned officer ranks. The latter source was still an untested method that caused much institutional uneasiness.

The Congressional Act of 3 March 1899 specifically required at least one appointment into the Marine Corps from each Naval Academy class. While this law may have intended to strengthen the legal relationship between the academy and the Marine Corps, its effect was quite the opposite. Essentially, the Navy took advantage of the legislation to minimize its commitment. Thus, the academy provided only one Marine officer in 1899, one in 1900, and none in 1901, essentially violating the law. Although expanded, accessions from the noncommissioned officer ranks could not alone satisfy the Marine officer accessions requirements. The Marine Corps again faced an officer procurement crisis.
The Navy leadership had strongly resisted the academy arrangement all along and was finally taking the initiative to cease its existence. Since inter-departmental fighting was at its peak during the period, this was perceived as a characteristic offensive by the Navy leadership that held its "lesser" sister service in contempt. Additionally, the Navy had not followed suit of the Army and Marine Corps in that it successfully resisted officer accessions from any source other than its academy. This fact made it even less willing to give up its graduates to the Marine Corps. (Greenwood, 1975)

In this context, Commandant of the Marine Corps Brigadier General Charles Heywood formally objected to the Navy's initiative. In particular, Heywood highlighted the Navy's failure to comply with the law in 1901. He "urged that the Marine Corps be given its quota of officers from the Naval Academy" (Greenwood, 1975, 49), and in 1902 the academy complied with the law and commissioned one graduate in the Marine Corps. While Heywood succeeded in gaining the Navy's legal compliance, he failed in his mission to secure the Marine Corps' quota. Essentially, he lost the battle which was further solidified in 1903. In that year, Congress again increased the authorized number of Marine Corps officers, but only included expanded authority to draw them from civilian life. The Marine Corps was forced to rely on examining boards (which they had finally instituted in the late 1800s) to screen and select candidates from civilian life and the noncommissioned ranks. (Bartlett, 1985)

When Brigadier General George F. Elliott became Commandant in 1903, he inherited the grim outlook of the legislation. Likely accepting the inevitability of the situation, Elliot put the procurement issue to rest in his
first annual report. In the report he stated that the young men commissioned through the examining board system were "of a desirable class, and appear to have within them the possibilities of developing into capable officers." While this initiative has been attributed to defeatism or an effort to promote interdepartmental harmony, the latter result was not achieved during his tenure. From that point on, the academy did not commission a single graduate in the Marine Corps for thirteen years. Relying primarily on civilian accessions, as in the period before 1882, the applicants were abundant but their qualifications were categorically poor. During the period the Marine Corps commissioned twenty-seven non-graduates of the Naval Academy, as well as three graduates who had resigned their Navy commissions. However, this contributed to less than eight percent of the total Marine officer accessions. At least in the arena of officer commissioning, the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship again failed to exist. (Greenwood, 1975)

When Major General William P. Biddle, become Commandant of the Marine Corps in 1911, an initiative to formally sever the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship was in the works. Having provided no academy graduates to the Marine Corps for several years, some in the Navy’s leadership sought the finality of legitimizing the practice. In response to their lobby efforts, Congress passed an act in March 1912 that stated: "midshipmen upon graduation would be commissioned Ensign." (Greenwood, 1975, 50) This proposed legislation would have amended the 1882 Act to exclude Marine Corps commissioning as an option. Although the Marine leadership had been mute on the issue since 1903, Biddle seized the opportunity to resurrect the Marine Corps' officer accession practices. He skillfully mobilized the
service's strong political allies when forwarding "the recommendation that hereafter so far as practicable officers of the Marine Corps be appointed from graduates of the Naval Academy and that the necessary steps be taken to amend the present law so that graduates may be appointed the Marine Corps upon graduation." (Greenwood, 1975, 50) Biddle successfully countered the initiative. In July 1912, Congress modified the law to essentially the 1882 form. The Marine Corps Commandant's annual report of 1913 directed that any Marine Corps vacancies should "be filled first by graduates of the Naval Academy." (Greenwood, 1975, 50)

Although Major General Biddle had achieved a Pyrrhic victory, the Naval Academy again commissioned no graduates in the Marine Corps in 1914. Assuming the office of Marine Corps Commandant that year, Major General George Barnett vehemently continued Biddle's campaign stating:

I unhesitatingly express the opinion that the interest of the service would be served if the officers of the Marine Corps were appointed from graduates of the Naval Academy, for not only would the Corps then receive officers who were better educated technically than those now admitted, but also better qualified physically as the four years at Academy result in the survival of the fittest. Recently, there have been altogether too many young officers of the Corps who soon after their entry have developed physical defects which render them unfit for service. (Greenwood, 1975, 50)

Major General Barnett not only shared his predecessor's view on revitalizing the officer corps, but also was particularly zealous about reestablishing the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. As an academy graduate from the Class of 1882, the first to commission officers in the Marine Corps, Barnett was the first Commandant to hail from the institution. As could be expected, he was firm in the belief that his commissioning source was the most advantageous for the Marine Corps. In a strong offensive,
Barnett fought to change the current Navy Department policy to conform to law and meet his service's requirements. Additionally, he proposed that the Naval Academy set up a separate curriculum at the end of the second or third year for the Midshipmen designated as potential Marine officers. This idea essentially amounted to a separate Marine Corps academy and the separate curriculum never came to fruition. Nonetheless, Barnett's power play succeeded and the Navy Department reversed the policy that had stood for nearly twenty years. Beginning with the Class of 1915, the Marine Corps again received a constant input of Naval Academy graduates into its officer corps. Although no academy graduates entered the Marine Corps in 1918 due to wartime exigencies, the accessions have continued in stead from 1919 to the present. While the law never established a basis for the number of Marine Corps accessions, the two services instituted the practice of arriving at an annual agreement. This practice, in different forms, has continued to the present day. (Bartlett, 1985)

5. The Naval Academy as a Consistent Commissioning Source (1915-1980)

Although the policies behind the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship have remained consistent since 1915, the nature of the relationship has nonetheless evolved significantly. Primarily, the Marine Corps accessions from the academy grew steadily to 1975, doubling approximately every twenty years. Broken into ten-year increments, the average number of graduates entering the Marine Corps per year works out as follows (Greenwood, 1975):

- 1915-1924: 14
- 1925-1934: 22
- 1935-1944: 29
- 1945-1954: 48
\* 1955-1964: 61
\* 1965-1974: 98

While expansion of the Naval Academy and expansion of the Marine Corps are obviously most responsible for this growth, the two institutions have not done so in concert. From 1915, when appointments resumed, through 1934, Academy officers constituted fifty five percent of those receiving permanent commissions. After 1935, however, even the increased number of academy graduates fulfilled only a small portion of the Marine Corps' annual regular officer requirement. With the academy no longer the primary source of officers, despite its increased input, the domination of academy graduates in the Marine Corps' officer ranks diminished. Coupled with the expansion of the Marine Corps into more non-naval roles during the period, the dilution of the Marine officer corps dominated by Naval Academy graduates may have been responsible for the weakened solidarity of the Navy-Marine Corps team during the 1970s. (Greenwood, 1975)

A second evolutionary change in the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship was the gradual strengthening of the Marine Corps' institutional influence. With increasing frequency over the years, officers from the tenant Marine Barracks were incorporated into the role of Midshipmen instruction. While these officers were still not considered organic to the Naval Academy, their presence and influence on the Brigade of Midshipmen was significantly enhanced. In particular, Marine officers became instructors in the fields of ordnance, gunnery and physical training. While the first two of these roles had essentially been eliminated by the end of the period, their prominence in the latter area has continued to the present day. At the end of World War II Marine officers were assigned directly to the staff and
faculty of the Naval Academy. Initially these officers comprised less than a dozen billets in the Executive, Ordnance and Gunnery, and Aviation Departments; but the presence steadily increased. By the end of the period, more than forty officers were distributed throughout the Academy structure. While this evolution was a significant factor in enhancing the image and recruiting efforts of the Marine Corps at the academy, it held an even higher significance. Essentially, it symbolized a revolution in the posture of the Naval Academy; namely a departure from a pure Navy institution to an institution that develops future officers for the entire naval service. (Bartlett, 1985)

6. Implications of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps Relationship

Having examined the many variations in policy that defined the historical Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, the significant implications of those variations are worthy of further analysis.

First, although Marine Corps leaders had long considered West Point as the best source of Marine Corps officers, their efforts to secure the officers from that academy bore no fruit. Subsequently, all fifty officers entering the Marine Corps from 1883-1897 were Naval Academy graduates. When the United States entered into World War I in 1917, the Fourth Marine Brigade (essentially the entire dedicated combat element of the Marine Corps) operated as an organic element of the Army in a ground warfare campaign. Ironically, the “Famous Fifty” Naval Academy graduates filled nearly every senior leadership position in the Marine Corps. George Barnett was the Major General Commandant, four of the five authorized Brigadier Generals, all seventeen Colonels of the line, and most of the senior staff officers were also from the academy. Historical accounts
indicate that the academy dominated leadership performed brilliantly in the war. In particular, Brigadier General John A. Lejeune was even given command the Army Second Division. However, General Pershing and the majority of the Army leadership were reluctant to rely on the Marine Corps or to expand their role. While merely speculation, it must be pondered whether a Marine Corps dominated by West Point graduates would have been more influential in the war. (Greenwood, 1975)

Secondly, despite the Marine Corps’ desire to preserve the Naval Academy as its primary commissioning source at the turn of the century, it apparently acquiesced to the Navy’s initiatives in the pursuit of interdepartmental harmony. Although the reliance on accessions from civilian life had been the scourge of the service prior to 1882, the Marine Corps again accepted this practice. Furthermore, Marine leaders insisted that it satisfactorily met the Marine Corps’ requirements. Consequently, the Marine Corps received no Naval Academy graduates for thirteen years. The service was therefore compelled to draw its officers exclusively from non-naval sources. As a consequence, when Major General John H. Russell retired as Commandant on 1 December 1936, he was the last of the senior academy graduates on active duty. Although the "Famous Fifty" had stayed long enough to identify the new amphibious mission, create the Fleet Marine Force, and begin structuring a new capability; their ranks were depleted well before the new doctrine could be employed in combat. The ranking members of the later crop of Naval Academy graduates, those who began entering in 1915, had at most 21 years service and not a single officer above the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. While many of these relatively junior academy graduates worked on the development of the new amphibious capability,
they did not occupy the key leadership positions at the outbreak of World War II. Therefore, Marine leaders that had few ties to the senior leadership of the Navy oversaw the execution of the amphibious mission. Ironically, that amphibious mission was jointly developed by the Navy and Marine Corps, and in particular by Naval Academy graduates. Again, it can only be speculated the degree to which a Marine Corps dominated by (or at least infused with) academy graduates could have facilitated a more successful naval campaign in the early years of the war. (Greenwood, 1975)

The third implication of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship was the pronounced rift it created in the Marine officer corps. The Marine Corps had long sought to improve the quality of its officers. Thus, the acquisition of the Naval Academy as a commissioning source appeared to solve the dilemma. During the nearly two decades that the academy was the sole Marine officer-commissioning source, the character of junior Marine officers was transformed. The products of the Naval Academy were commonly perceived as more intellectual, more educated, and more socially astute at the entry level. However, the great expansion of the Marine Corps after the Spanish American War forced the service to again fill its officer ranks with mostly untested, less educated, and less socially inclined men from civilian life and the ranks. Coupled with the Navy’s efforts to thwart Marine officer accessions from the Naval Academy, the Marine Corps seemed to be deprived of a quality accessions program once more. However, despite the lesser qualifications of the new accessions, many proved themselves worthy during the years of foreign campaigning that characterized the Marine Corps’ focus during the early twentieth century. By the outbreak of World War I, the
Marine Corps had developed a deeply divided officer corps. This division positioned "roughnecks", those officers that had earned their reputations in combat, against the "intellectuals", who were politically astute and earned their reputations in staff positions ashore. (Bartlett, 1991) Consequently, the majority of the intellectual faction was comprised of Naval Academy graduates, while the roughneck faction was primarily comprised of officers that had accessed into the Marine Corps from civilian life. Essentially, although not categorically accurate, this created a rift between those that had graduated from the Naval Academy and those that had not.

In the defense of this perceived split along accession source lines, many of the academy graduates were senior to those that filled the ranks from other sources. Therefore, it was natural that the junior officers assumed more of the combat duties and the senior officers more of the staff duties. This had long been the traditional practice in a Marine Corps that had not deployed as large units.

Additionally, some Naval Academy graduates did become veteran campaigners, Major General John A. Lejeune and Major General Wendell C. Neville in particular. Even Brigadier General Smedley D. Butler, the most outspoken of the roughneck faction and most heroic combat veteran of the day, regarded these two officers highly. However, despite the academy's representation in the roughneck faction and the natural experience gap that existed, the rift remained considerable until the early 1930s.

Ironically, it was the Navy, and not the Marine Corps, which was truly responsible for the split. High-ranking Navy officers were much more comfortable with Naval Academy graduates. Therefore, these officers considered the academy pedigree "to be an absolute prerequisite to wielding

79
influence within the Navy Department. Evidence of this can be seen in Colonel Littleton W. T. Waller’s failed bid for the Commandancy during the 1910s. Although there was a widely accepted feeling that Waller was the most distinguished Marine leader of the time, he was not a Naval Academy graduate. In regard to his failure to achieve the post, Butler commented:

[Waller] was in line for Commandant of the Corps. But he didn’t have a fighting chance with the pendants in Washington, because he had not gone to Annapolis. (Venzon, 1992, 218)

Later, during Butler’s bid for the Commandancy in 1929, a Naval Academy graduate, Ben H. Fuller, was chosen despite popular support for Butler and his unprecedented combat record. This record was characterized by two awards of the Congressional Medal of Honor. During the race, Butler remarked:

Even the newest privates know this is a showdown between the Naval Academy element and those from civil life and the ranks. (Venzon, 1992, 232)

Afterward, Butler again remarked:

Because I am not a Naval Academy man, a clique of admirals-without-ships determined that I should never be Commandant of the Marine Corps. (Bartlett, 1995, 61)

Brigadier General Logan Feland, another competitor for the Commandancy in 1929, also attested to Butler’s beliefs:

The Navy people tell me that above all they don’t want Butler at Headquarters because...they don’t believe he will play the game and work with the Navy organization. (Bartlett, 1995, 60)

While Butler was indeed erratic in behavior and wildly outspoken, the Navy certainly did favor academy graduates at the Marine Corps’ helm. Commander Charles R. Train, President Hoover’s aid-to-camp, delivered the Navy’s position on the race by stating that Fuller was a Naval Academy classmate of the Chief of Naval Operations Admiral
William V. Pratt "which can only tend to good results" (Bartlett, 1995, 61). Furthermore, Train indicated that Feland was the second choice because "he was not a graduate of the Naval Academy." (Bartlett, 1995, 61)

While the race for the post of Commandant in 1929 was the most prolific example of the rift within the Marine officer corps, it was not a solitary incident. In fact, this episode represented almost twenty years of infighting between factions that were dissimilar in origin, social status, education, and foresight. While the roughnecks envisioned a future for the Marine Corps in campaigning and ground warfare, the intellectuals embraced the future of amphibious naval roles. Butler best sums up his feelings about the rift in a letter to President Roosevelt after retirement:

[I wish to] bring to your attention a class of Marines which is fast passing out, discouraged and broken in spirit. This class to which I refer is composed of those officers who do not have, at least, some Naval Academy education, but who, notwithstanding this handicap, is with one or two exceptions...almost entirely responsible for the proud record of the Marines. This class has become convinced, rightly or wrongly, that no individual effort can overcome this lack of Naval Academy training- (Bartlett, 1992, 93)

The fourth implication of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship was the promulgation of inter-service rivalry between the Navy and the Marine Corps. There is no question that a rift between sailors and Marines had long preceded the commissioning of Marine officers from the Naval Academy. The academy commissioning practice presented yet another forum for dispute, power brokering, and general ill will. Since 1852, Congress had controlled appointments to the academy. (Naval Academy Web Site, 2000) In that context, the ultimate decision to commission Marine officers from the institution was neither initiated nor controlled by
the Navy. The Navy was not initially displeased by the decision, since it assumed that the Marine Corps would only receive those graduates that would have otherwise been discharged to civilian life. However, the Navy’s efforts to eliminate the practice after the personnel crisis had ended attests to the interdepartmental animosity that persisted. This assumption is evidenced by the address of one Naval Academy Superintendent in the early 1890s. He said, “And the last man in the class, if he so chooses, may elect the Marines”. (Bartlett, 1992) Furthermore, the Navy was appalled at the thought of commissioning any of its high-ranking graduates in the Marine Corps. The attempt to block Midshipman John A. Lejeune’s Marine Corps commission illustrates this feeling. Ranking sixth in his class, Lejeune selected the Marine Corps, only to have his case overturned by the Superintendent of the Naval Academy. Lejeune was ultimately successful after enlisting the help of a prominent senator and the Secretary of the Navy. However, during his plight he was rebuked by one Naval Academy officer who said, “You have altogether too many brains to be lost in the Marine Corps”. (Bartlett, 1991)

Once the Navy was again in position to commission all Naval Academy graduates, eagerness to sever the Marine Corps relationship set in. During the period from the conclusion of the Spanish American War to World War I, the Navy and Marine Corps engaged in the most intense period of interservice rivalry during their history. Defying both congressional acts and periodic mandates, the Navy categorically resisted the commissioning of Marine officers from the academy. As Bartlett comments:

More than once since the first graduate opted for forest green rather than a double-breasted blue blazer, the Marine Corps accessions pattern from the Naval Academy has felt the heavy hand of
parochial, arbitrary, and capricious Navy meddling. (1992, 90)

Despite its rise in prominence during this period of American neocolonialism, the Marine Corps did not wield the power within the Navy department to counter the offensive. Simultaneously, the Navy was engaged in its long lasting battle to remove the Marines from warships, assume their role as naval landing parties, and bring them under the control of Navy officers at shore establishments. Ultimately, the Marine Corps was successful in retaining its historical naval missions. Likely, the rise of Naval Academy officers in the ranks, including nearly twenty years of academy trained Commandants, worked in the Marine Corps' favor. Thereby, the Marine Corps achieved an unprecedented level of influence in the Navy Department and a cooperative relationship with Navy leaders for the first time. While the Navy continued to view the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship with unease, it was solidified during this period and destined for lasting perpetuation.

7. Service Selection of Marines from the Naval Academy

Having established the historical basis for Marine officer commissioning from the Naval Academy, the varying procedures used to determine how many Academy graduates could become Marines merit examination. Even after it was legally resolved that the Marine Corps would receive regular academy accessions, the task of determining the exact number was left to the Navy Department. This task was to be accomplished on an annual basis. Since 1915, the issue has continuously been resolved through interdepartmental negotiation. Prior to World War II and after 1915, the principal considerations for the number of academy graduates commissioned as Marines centered upon the number of openings
in the Marine Corps and the availability of funds to fill them. The needs of the Navy, precedents of previous years, a consensus as to what would be a "fair split", and the Navy's requirement after 1947 to commission some of its graduates in the Air Force also significantly influenced the outcome. (Bartlett, 1985)

By the end of World War II, the practice of expressing the Marine Corps' share as a percentage of the graduating class had taken form. Furthermore, by 1951 the idea of permanently basing this percentage on a ratio of the total officer strength of the two services had gained currency. With due allowance for occasional new ground rules or special adjustments, the current practice is essentially based on that concept. From 1951 to 1972, the Marine Corps' share varied between 13 and 16 2/3 percent of the total graduates. In 1972, the Navy and Marine Corps came to an agreement basing the split on the latter percentage. In effect, the personnel chiefs of the two services drafted a memorandum of agreement that has stood essentially intact to the current day (Bureau of Naval Personnel, 1972). In 1978, this practice was extended to allow for up to sixteen and two-thirds of the female Naval Academy graduates to accept Marine Corps commissions as well. (Bartlett, 1985)

A second aspect of the service selection process that merits examination is the question of which graduates would fill the Marine Corps billets. Service selection at the Naval Academy has historically been and remains an essentially voluntary process. In reference to the commissioning of Marine officers from the academy, it has always remained completely voluntary. Despite the fact that the Marine Corps has not attained its quota periodically, graduating Midshipmen have never been assigned or compelled to accept a commission as a Marine Second Lieutenant.
However, for those Midshipmen that sought a Marine Corps commission, there has existed a system of preferential criteria for determining distribution of the allotted commissions. Beginning with the Class of 1881, the first preference went to those who formerly served as enlisted men in the Marine Corps. In the early 1940s, preference for a Marine commission was extended to sons of former and active Marine Corps officers and former members the Marine Corps Reserve. In the early 1970s, graduates of Junior Marine Corps Reserve Officer Training Corps units were further incorporated into the preference category. Historically, individuals in these preference groups were essentially assured a Marine Corps commission as long as they were physically qualified and indicated the desire to be a Marine. (Greenwood, 1975)

After the preference group had been accommodated, the remaining Marine Corps spaces were traditionally allocated to applicants in order of their class standing. As with the Navy warfare communities, Midshipman could choose to enter the Marine Corps if there were spaces available at the time of their service selection. In this context, the attractiveness of service in the Marine Corps was the primary determinant of how many Midshipmen in the upper ranks of each class would become Marines. Despite the variations in the attractiveness of Marine Corps service, the selection system proved to be surprisingly equitable. Among the "Famous Fifty," 13 graduated in the upper third of their class, 18 in the middle third, and 19 in the lower third. After normal Marine officer accessions from the Naval Academy resumed in 1915, this trend continued. From 1915 to 1924, the distribution of academy graduates entering the Marine Corps by upper, middle, and lower thirds was 30-44-67. From 1925-1934, the distribution was 66-100-56.
Despite the disparity in graduates entering the Marine Corps from the upper third of each class, these results were acceptable to the Marine Corps. Believing that class standing had never been a precise indicator of career success, the Marine Corps was content with assessing those academy graduates that had the desire to be Marine officers. A better quality indicator could not be achieved by some mathematical distribution formula. (Greenwood, 1975)

Beginning in 1937, however, a marked change occurred. With world war on the horizon, the full development of the Fleet Marine Force in progress, and the joint effort of the Navy-Marine Corps team to develop doctrine at the forefront of the naval establishment, Marine Corps careers seemed to take on a new attractiveness. In this context, the Naval Academy Class of 1937 sent the Marine Corps 14 graduates from the upper third, ten from the middle, and only three from the lower third. The Class of 1938 followed suit with a distribution of 13-13-1. Disturbed by this trend and its forecasted continuance, Superintendent of the Naval Academy Rear Admiral Wilson Brown proposed a change to the service selection system in 1939. According to his proposal, the Marine Corps vacancies remaining after the priority candidates were accommodated would be allocated by creating a quality spread. Essentially, this spread would be achieved by dividing Marine Corps applicants into three or four equal groups according to class standings, allocating an equal number of vacancies to each group, and having the applicants in each group draw lots. Not only did this proposal represent a drastic departure from previous practice, it only applied to the service selection process as it pertained to the Marine Corps. The Secretary of the Navy approved the proposal almost immediately, but he soon reversed his decision after it provoked considerable
interdepartmental debate. Specifically, the debate involved an appeal by retired General John A. Lejeune and the pressuring of Marine Corps friendly politicians. (Bartlett, 1992)

While the Marine Corps had thwarted the offensive, the victory proved temporary. The Marine Corps was allotted 25 graduates from the Class of 1939 and only three claimed preference by right of prior service. About seventy Midshipmen applied for the 22 remaining openings and all of them were filled by the upper third of the class. Insistent that this was evidence of a trend with severe negative implications for the Navy, the Superintendent of the Naval Academy again forwarded his proposal and the Secretary again approved it. The new system was implemented, beginning with the class of 1940, and overcorrected for the disparity at the Marine Corps’ expense. The Classes of 1940 through 1947 collectively commissioned 282 Marine officers. Of those newly commissioned Marine Second Lieutenants, 49 ranked in the upper third of their class, 67 in the middle third, and 166 in the lower third. The Marine Corps vehemently objected to the new service selection procedures and eventually achieved modification. However, following World War II Marine quotas were often under-subscribed. Additionally, the traditional system of service selection did not again produce a trend that worried the senior Navy leadership. (Bartlett, 1992)

D. SUMMARY

Through this analysis, the historically significant themes of the Marine Corps’ naval posture, Marine officer commissioning practices, and the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship have been explored. Through this examination, the historical context for the study is primarily established. While this context provides the foundation for
the further analyses in the study, it is not complete. The contemporary, quantitative, and qualitative analyses that follow will further develop the historical context, and collectively the overall context of the study. Therefore, while the historical analysis is a critical component of this exploratory study, it is only one element of a broad examination of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

Having concluded the analysis of the historical context of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, the study now shifts to an analysis of the relationship's contemporary context. Focusing on the same elements examined in the historical analysis, the contemporary analysis further explores Marine Corps roles, Marine officer accession practices, and the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship in their modern capacities. By examining the same elements as the historical analysis, the contemporary analysis will facilitate comparison between eras and contribute further to the historical account of the topic. Building on the context developed in the historical analysis, the contemporary analysis will provide comprehension and understanding of the modern Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.
III. CONTEMPORARY ANALYSIS

Having concluded the historical analysis, the study now turns to an examination of contemporary issues that characterize the Marine Corps and the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Paralleling the sections in the historical analysis, the contemporary analysis addresses the modern organizational character and missions of the Marine Corps, the current Marine officer commissioning practices, and the present relationship between the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. The sections that follow provide analysis of each of these three elements. Their collective purpose is to establish the contemporary context for the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

A. CURRENT NAVAL ROLES OF THE MARINE CORPS

The first section of the contemporary analysis explores the current naval roles and operational posture of the Marine Corps. The purpose of this section is to demonstrate the Marine Corps' current emphasis on naval roles and character in comparison to its emphasis on non-naval roles and missions. In the context of the overall study, this section establishes the modern relationship between the Navy and the Marine Corps and the Marine Corps' current role in the naval establishment.

1. Overview

Despite its emergence as an independent player in the joint arena, its decreased role in naval security operations, and its tendency to concentrate its operations on non-naval warfare during large-scale conflicts, the Marine Corps remains a primarily naval component in both law and practice. This is particularly true of its peacetime posture, which today is centered upon its naval capabilities.
and forward deployed naval forces. The Marine Corps continues to develop its combat capabilities for protracted land warfare, such as with its Air Contingency Force (ACF) and Unit Deployment Program (UDP). Also, it has retained its significant land-based forward presence, such as that in Japan and Korea. However, the primary role of the Marine Corps in the national security strategy remains its naval forces, namely its Marine Expeditionary Forces that have reacted to most of the world crises involving the Marines since 1991.

2. Legal Imperatives for Marine Corps Organization

The composition and functions of the United States Marine Corps are established by the National Security Act of 1947 and written into Title 10 of the United States Code (Subtitle C, Chapter 507, Section 5063). As these legal imperatives indicate, the primary missions of the Marine Corps are inherently naval in nature (Angersbach, 1990). An analysis of these functions serves to illustrate the organization of the Marine Corps to facilitate service in the naval establishment.

The Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services as may be organic therein. (Paragraph A)

This first legal imperative for the organization of the Marine Corps implies its status as a separate service. While the Marine Corps is considered separate by law, it is clearly defined as a naval service one as demonstrated by its placement in the Department of the Navy. The imperative also implies that the Marine Corps’ organizational structure will be modeled along the lines of a land army, although naval in mission and possessing a broad array of combined arms capabilities.
The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine forces of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential to the prosecution of a naval campaign. (Paragraph A)

The second legal imperative for the Marine Corps’ mission implies that all its forces, regardless of collateral or alternate functions, be established as instruments of naval warfare. The imperative further implies that the Marine Corps will project its combat capabilities under the structure of fleet Marine forces, which is characteristic of the Marine Expeditionary Force structure in place today. Furthermore, the imperative specifically charges the Marine Corps with maintaining the capability to perform the advanced base and amphibious warfare missions. Both of these missions are inherently naval in orientation and prosecution.

In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases... (Paragraph A)

This third legal imperative for the Marine Corps again implies its fundamental role as a naval instrument. In the 1980s and early 1990s, this mission specifically justified the role of securing nuclear weapon arsenals aboard Navy ships (Cairney, 1990). However, the emphasis on these traditional Marine Corps roles has severely lessened in recent years. In fact, the Marine Corps completely removed its remaining Marine detachments aboard aircraft carriers by 1998 and is currently engaged in the process of turning over most of its naval installation security missions to the Navy. The fact remains, however, that the Marine Corps is charged by Congress to perform these functions. The service
may very well reassume these roles if future conflicts determine the requirement for unique Marine capabilities. And shall perform such other duties as the President may direct. However, these additional duties may not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. (Paragraph A)

The fourth legal imperative for the Marine Corps allows for its departure from naval roles, or utilization in non-naval campaigns, when the Marine Corps’ utility in such operations is determined credible. This imperative formalizes the historical precedent of utilizing Marine Corps forces for land campaigns. The evocation of the imperative has been most prevalent during large-scale conflicts and protracted military deployments ashore. However, the imperative also implies that such use of Marine forces will only be initiated in the absence of their utility in naval operations. Again, this justifies the Marine Corps’ role in Korea, Vietnam, and the Persian Gulf War, when the requirement for Marines to prosecute amphibious operations was virtually non-existent. Additionally, the imperative implies the utility of Marines in other capacities, as demonstrated by the deployment of Marine personnel in support of the overseas State Department security program (Nofi, 1997).

The Marine Corps shall develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations that pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment used by landing forces. (Paragraph B)

This legal imperative implies the Marine Corps’ preeminent role in the landing phase of amphibious operations. In other words, the imperative firmly grants the Marine Corps the primary role during the transition from a naval campaign to a land campaign in large-scale conflict. The imperative also implies the Marine Corps’ responsibility
for joint cooperation in amphibious and other military operations.

The Marine Corps is responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war. (Paragraph C)

The final legal imperative for the organization of the Marine Corps implies its responsibility to maintain the Marine Corps Reserve (Nofi, 1997).

3. Marine Corps Warfighting Philosophy

Aside from the Marine Corps’ legal imperatives toward maintaining naval oriented forces, the emphasis on the Marines’ naval orientation can be seen clearly in its own philosophy, doctrine, and strategic objectives. In the Marine Corps’ current institutional philosophy titled Making Marines, the service regards naval affiliation and orientation as one of the “Five pillars of our Corps” (USMC USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997). These five elements of the Marine Corps philosophy are (USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997):

- Warfighting. The Marine Corps’ most important responsibility is to win our nation’s battles. We exist because the American people and the Congress expect their Marines to provide a lean, ready, and professional fighting force—a force that guarantees success when committed. Today, we provide such a force.

- People. Our second most important responsibility to the American people is to make Marines. Our ability to win our nation’s battles rests, as it always has, on the individual Marine.

- Core Values. The Marine Corps is a force rich in history and traditions, and ingrained with the highest values of Honor, Courage, and Commitment. These three core values are at the very soul of our institution. They frame the way that Marines live and act.

- Naval Character. The Navy and Marine Corps are
inextricably linked. Together, the Sea Services provide a tremendously versatile and unique warfighting capability to the nation. Naval Forces have the ability to go anywhere rapidly, remain on station for indefinite periods of time, project force across any shore and against any foe, while-sustaining ourselves from both sea and land bases. To ensure that this capability is retained, the tactics, techniques, and procedures that have worked so well in the past will be updated and refined to meet the challenges of tomorrow. The bond between the Navy and Marine Corps has never been stronger, and together we will seek innovative ways to increase the value of naval expeditionary forces to the National Military Strategy.

- Education and Training. During times of fiscal constraint, Marines have always turned to training and education to help retain the agility of mind and body that sets them apart as a military force.

As indicated by the above philosophy, the naval character of the Marine Corps is not merely a description of its congressionally charged duties or its past and current operational posture. Rather, it is a defining element of the institution’s character. Naval character is prominently regarded on the same level of importance as the Marine Corps’ ability to perform military functions, the strength derived from its members, the moral and ethical values that it guides it, and its dedication to lifelong learning and improvement. In fact, the Marine Corps’ ties to naval customs, traditions, roles, and missions are considered as much a defining element of the service as those elements that are not specifically naval in orientation. Even with the increasing emphasis on a joint military establishment, and the Marine Corps’ increased operational cooperation with the Army and the Air Force, no identification with joint capabilities or joint forces is mentioned in the philosophy. In contrast, the identification of naval capabilities,
namely forward presence and rapid force projection, is a cornerstone of the stated philosophy. In essence, the Marine Corps continues to regard its relationship with the Navy as more than just a cooperative effort to drive amphibious operations. Rather, the Marine Corps regards the Navy as its sister service and acknowledges their joint capabilities as the product of a cooperative naval team.

4. Naval Orientation in Marine Corps Doctrine

As with the Marine Corps' philosophy, naval character and orientation play critical roles in the Marine Corps' warfighting doctrine. The majority of Marine Corps doctrinal publications concern the employment of ground, aviation, and supporting forces in land based operations, and the principal tenets of the Maneuver Warfare doctrine. However, the few doctrinal publications that are dedicated to naval expeditionary warfare and amphibious warfare are held equally in importance. Furthermore, the Marine Corps' overall doctrinal foundation relies on the integration of Maneuver Warfare doctrine with the doctrine of Operational Maneuver from the Sea (OMFTS). OMFTS is the Marine Corps' primary doctrinal concept for the future and its predecessor is the amphibious warfare doctrine of World War II. OMFTS is the current foundation upon which the Marine Corps' doctrinal outlook is built and is purely naval in character and orientation. (U. S. Marine Corps, 1998)

According to Marine Corps doctrine, the Navy and the Marine Corps are a team that collectively maintain and project naval expeditionary forces. As conveyed in the Marine Corps' statement on current concepts and issues of 1997:

Naval expeditionary forces provide unique and versatile capabilities to meet national security objectives. Naval forces provide both continuous forward presence and expeditionary power
projection. These enduring capabilities are the centerpiece of DON's strategic direction [and]... define a new approach to naval warfare and shift the sea services' operational focus toward projecting influence and strength along the world's littorals. This will be done by capturing the unique capabilities of each service and the development of new innovative concepts that will shape future naval forces, thus ensuring continued operational primacy in the next century. (USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997)

Not only does the Marine Corps' emphasis on naval expeditionary forces suggest a cooperative and coequal Navy-Marine Corps team, but it also indicates a shift in naval power projection from the traditional uses of naval forces. Published in 1996, OMFTS describes this new approach to the projection of naval power ashore. The premise of the doctrine is the exploitation of the Navy-Marine Corps Team's expeditionary capabilities. Furthermore, it provides a framework for applying maneuver warfare to maritime operations within a joint operations context. OMFTS couples doctrine with diverse technological advances in tactical mobility and conventional weapon lethality. Overall, the new doctrine emphasizes the preeminence of naval forces in the rapidly evolving littoral environment of the future. It casts the Marine Corps' future along these lines, emphasizing the service's role in providing naval expeditionary forces as its primary capability. (U. S. Marine Corps, 1998)

Above all, the new doctrinal approach to naval warfare espoused in OMFTS anticipates the widely diverse threats the country will face in the chaotic littorals. Furthermore, it reflects the nation's long-standing reliance on naval forces to influence events overseas (USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997). Essentially, the Marine Corps' doctrine establishes naval expeditionary forces as essential elements of both peacetime engagement and crisis response operations.
Accordingly, it describes forward presence as both the foundation of, and the springboard to maintaining regional stability to protect the nation's interests. In situations short of war, OMFTS envisions cooperative Navy and Marine Corps forces engaged in forward areas. In this capacity, Navy and Marine forces will be able to demonstrate resolve, prevent and contain crises, reassure allies, and enable successful coalition operations (USMC Concepts and Issues, 1997). Again, these capabilities are inherently naval and reinforce the Marine Corps' primary role within the naval establishment.

5. The Role of Naval Forces in National Security Strategy

Within the strategic environment, the Marine Corps' emphasis on naval character and warfare are as primary as they are in its philosophy and doctrine. Although the Marine Corps maintains a variety of both naval and non-naval capabilities for strategic employment, its primary strategic emphasis is on the unique capabilities it can bring to bear as a naval expeditionary force. As an illustration of how the Marine Corps' regards naval forces in the strategic environment, its Concepts and Issues paper states:

Marines embarked aboard Navy ships provide the National Command Authority (NCA) with a "rheostat" of national response capabilities. Naval expeditionary forces are a self-sustained air, land and sea strike force, operating from a protected sea base that can be tailored to meet any contingency. Whether deterring through presence, conducting disaster relief or evacuation operations, Marines embarked aboard Navy ships are globally engaged today and prepared for employment tomorrow. Moreover, employment of these flexible forces comes at little or no extra cost because these capabilities have already been bought and paid for! No other nation in the world possesses the politically and operationally flexible
"rheostat" of national response capabilities offered by Marine forces aboard Navy ships. (1997)

As evidenced by the above statement, the Marine Corps regards its naval expeditionary posture as its primary asset in the current world environment. Likewise, it advertises that capability as the preeminent military tool for the future. Because Marine forces are organized specifically to be forward deployed and expeditionary (in both doctrine and practice), the Marine Corps regards its forces as naturally inclined to respond to politically, socially, and militarily chaotic crises in today's world. As the 1997 Concepts and Issues further state:

Seldom has the relevance and rationale for naval forces -- the Navy-Marine Corps Team -- been so compelling. As a maritime nation with global economic and security interests, naval forces continue to play a pivotal role in protecting those interests. With their advantage of forward deployment, they are highly responsive to fast-breaking events, and adaptable with precise measures of escalation control. Additionally, they possess significant on-station endurance and credible projection capabilities to influence or resolve events. In sum, there is no better insurance against international uncertainty than sufficient naval forces capable of ensuring unchallenged maritime and littoral supremacy. (1997)

Overall, the Marine Corps envisions its role in the strategic environment as providing a key component of naval forces and naturally inclined to rapid crisis response. While the Marine Corps does not discount its other strategic capabilities, its premise that naval forces are the most appropriate for the emerging environment indicates that it regards its naval capabilities to be its most important. Therefore, in light of its traditional departure from naval roles during large-scale conflicts, the Marine continues to emphasize its naval character, organize its forces for naval power projection, and link its strategic outlook to the
preeminence of naval capabilities. This naval orientation is embedded in the Marine Corps' legal imperatives, warfighting philosophy, and military doctrine.

B. MARINE OFFICER ACCESSIONS

The second section of the contemporary analysis explores the current practices of officer commissioning in the Marine Corps. The purpose of this section is to reveal the Marine Corps' current officer accession practices and the implications of those practices on the service's accession requirements. In the context of the overall study, this section demonstrates the Marine Corps' current emphasis on different commissioning sources and its continued emphasis on the Naval Academy as a source of Marine officers.

1. Overview

The practice of commissioning officers in the Marine Corps has remained relatively static over the past twenty years. Likewise, the service's emphasis on particular commissioning programs has remained relatively unchanged since early in the century. This emphasis can be seen in both the efforts the Marine Corps has made with regard to particular sources and the legal imperatives that govern its accession system. According to United States Code:

Vacancies on the active-duty list of the Marine Corps in the grade of second lieutenant shall be filled, so far as practicable, first, from members of the graduating class of the Naval Academy; second, from meritorious noncommissioned officers of the Regular Marine Corps; and third, from other persons. (Title 10, Chapter 539, Section 5585)

As dictated by the legal precept above, the Marine Corps has long preferred to access officers from particular sources. Accordingly, the Marine Corps' preference has been first with its traditional regular commissioning source (the
academy), second with its own ranks (being time tested and having undergone lengthy scrutiny), and third with its other sources, which essentially amounts to their role as gap fillers. Later, the Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) program also became a primary means of accessing regular Marine officers. However, the days of obtaining elements of a regular officer force at accession are gone. Officers from all sources now compete on the same playing field for augmentation and promotion. While this has eliminated the significant advantage that NROTC and academy graduates once held, it has not necessarily eliminated the advantages conferred by the training and education undergone in those programs. In this context, the different Marine officer commissioning sources continue to produce officers with different levels and varieties of knowledge, experience, and ability at accession. For this reason, the Marine officer commissioning practices of today merit an intensive evaluation.

2. Commissioning Sources

The Marine Corps relies on more primary commissioning sources than any other American armed service. In fact, it is the only service that has a Platoon Leaders Class (PLC) program (Graham, 1994) and ranks highest in its reliance on the enlisted force to produce future officers (DOD web site, 2000). Each year, approximately 2,200 marine officer candidates attend one of ten courses at the Officer Candidate School (OCS) (OCS web site, 2000). Yearly, the Marine Corps commissions approximately 1,400 new Second Lieutenants for active service (USMC M&RA Accessions Data, 1993-1999). In each of the primary commissioning sources, candidates can apply for designation as either a ground or aviation candidate prior to commissioning. In addition, the Officer Candidate Class (OCC) and PLC programs also access
law school students for service as judge advocates after graduation. In contrast to the other services, all commissioned Marine officers are accessed for service in the unrestricted line. In this context, even those accessed for specific duty as judge advocates or naval aviators can elect another career path at their first professional school.

Prior to 1996, all Marine officers commissioned from the Naval Academy, Marine Enlisted Commissioning and Education Program (MECEP), and NROTC program (on scholarship) were designated as regular officers. While these officers were originally intended to provide the institutional core of the officer corps, they have typically represented less than 30 percent of accessions in the modern era. Effectively, this has required the Marine Corps to draw the remainder of its permanent force from PLC, OCC, and other sources (USMC M&RA Accessions Data, 1993-1999). While Title 10 of the United States code gave the authorization for Naval Academy, MECEP, and NROTC graduates to receive regular commissions, it was “tradition and policy—not law [that] produced the Regular officers who join our ranks from the Academy and NROTC.” (Armstrong, 1985, 18) This policy changed in FY92 when the Defense Authorization Bill for that year stated:

After September 30, 1996, no person may receive an original appointment as a commissioned officer in the Regular Army, Regular Navy, Regular Air Force, or Regular Marine Corps until that person has completed one year of service on active duty as a commissioned officer (other than a warrant officer) of a reserve component. (Marine Corps Gazette, 1992, February, 8)

a. **United States Naval Academy (USNA)**

The Naval Academy is the Marine Corps’ oldest official commissioning source still in use and was one of its three regular officer-commissioning sources until the
practice was eliminated in 1996. Although the Marine Corps does not have exclusive oversight over the development of officer candidates at the academy, the service has long sought the institution’s graduates in increasing numbers. Each year up to 16 2/3 of each graduating Naval Academy class can take their commissions in the Marine Corps. This percentage has equated to approximately 160 Marine Corps billets in recent years. Marines select the candidates for Marine commissions at the academy through a service assignment process, and each will serve five years on active duty, the longest obligation incurred on Marine Corps accessions. During their tenure at the academy, future officers are appointed to the grade of Midshipman in the active duty Navy. Aside from the military instruction and summer training undergone by all Midshipmen, prospective Marine candidates also have the opportunity to participate in Marine Corps focused familiarization training during the summer and academic year. While few of these activities are formal requirements, the typical Midshipman ascending into the Marine Corps will be a member of the extracurricular Semper Fidelis Society, participate in the four-week Leatherneck summer training program, and take a Marine Corps professional development course after selecting a Marine commission. Currently, the Naval Academy is the only primary Marine officer-commissioning source that does not require candidates to complete a course at the Officer Candidate School (OCS).

The Marine Corps also provides an opportunity for its enlisted members to seek an officer commission through the Naval Academy. As Marine Corps Order 1530.11G states:

The U.S. Naval Academy at Annapolis, Maryland offers an outstanding opportunity for qualified Marines to embark on careers as officers in the U.S. Marine Corps or U.S. Navy. Students at the Naval Academy are Midshipmen, U.S. Navy, receiving
appropriate midshipmen pay, tuition, room, and board.... Upon graduation, they receive a Bachelor of Science degree and a commission in the Marine Corps Reserve or Naval Reserve.... The Secretary of the Navy may annually appoint to the Naval Academy 85 enlisted members of the Regular Marine Corps and Regular Navy and 85 enlisted members of the Marine Corps Reserve and Naval Reserve (including those on inactive duty). (1994)

Most enlisted members receiving Naval Academy appointments first attend the Naval Academy Preparatory School (NAPS) for nine months of intensive preparation for the academic, military, and physical training curriculums at the Naval Academy. After completing NAPS, enlisted Marines are appointed as Navy Midshipmen and undergo the normal academy course. Although the Marine Corps attracts a large percentage of former Marines at service assignment, they are neither obligated to select nor ensured a Marine Corps commission at graduation. (Marine Corps Order 1530.11G, 1994)

b. Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC)

The Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC) program is the Marine Corps' second oldest formal commissioning program. Originally established to commission Navy reserve officers for wartime service, the Marine Corps joined the program shortly thereafter and has continuously participated in it throughout the last half century. Intended originally to provide a broad base of citizens knowledgeable in the arts and sciences of naval warfare, the program evolved into an outlet for young men to undertake careers in the naval profession. Eventually, the program came to be utilized primarily as a producer of regular officers. Until 1996, NROTC was the Marine Corps' second regular officer-commissioning source. Today, the NROTC program is administered at 69 college campuses and trains
students at over 100 academic institutions (CNET web site, 2000). The NROTC program offers full tuition scholarships to high school, enlisted, and college applicants through a competitive national selection process, and commissions them in the active Navy or Marine Corps upon successful completion of the course. Additionally, students can join an NROTC unit without the scholarship benefits and receive a commission by completing the same course requirements. NROTC scholarship students are appointed as Midshipmen in the Navy or Marine Corps Reserve, and transition to active duty during summer training. Upon commissioning they incur a four-year service obligation. (Montgomery, 1991) The stated mission of the NROTC program is:

To develop young men and women morally, mentally, and physically, and to instill in them the highest ideals of honor, courage, and commitment. The program educates and trains young men and women for leadership and management positions in an increasingly technical Navy and Marine Corps. (CNET web site, 2000)

Within the NROTC program, the Marine Corps identifies its potential candidates early and runs a concurrent Marine option program. While Marine option Midshipmen undergo much of the same basic training as other NROTC students, their training regimen is normally more intensive and involves significantly more extracurricular participation. Like all NROTC students, Marine option Midshipmen participate in Career Training for Midshipmen (CORTRAMID) during their 3rd Class summer. There, they gain initial exposure to the Marine Corps in a one-week familiarization exercise (CNET, 2000). During their 2nd Class summer, select Marine option Midshipmen will join a Fleet Marine Force unit for four weeks while the remainder will participate in a training cruise aboard a Navy vessel. After an intensive preparation program during the 2nd Class
year, Marine options will attend the Bulldog course at OCS. Six weeks in duration, Bulldog will serve as the final evaluation for Marine options and determine their suitability for a Marine Corps commission. While Bulldog is the shortest of the Marine Corps' OCS programs, it assumes a significant level of preparation during the candidate's first three years in the program. Unlike Navy option NROTC students, Marine options must pass this additional evaluation before commissioning.

c. **Platoon Leaders Class (PLC)**

The PLC program has served as the Marine Corps' largest commissioning source in recent years. Like the Naval Academy and the NROTC program, PLC allows for long-term evaluation of candidates prior to their commissioning. PLC is offered at most colleges and universities, particularly those without dedicated NROTC programs. PLC is intended to facilitate the accession of officer candidates while they are still college students. PLC particularly targets potential candidates during their first two years at a university, but the program can be joined during the junior year as well. The earlier a PLC candidate is joined into the program, the longer the evaluation period for the Marine Corps. While the NROTC Marine option training program is structured and intensive, PLC training during the academic year is minimal or nonexistent. Although PLC students are under the cognizance of an Officer Selection Officer (OSO), their training and preparation for OCS is usually self-incumbent. Upon graduation, PLC students that have successfully completed their prescribed OCS course are commissioned into inactive duty until their first professional officer course convenes. Once the course convenes, they are transitioned to active duty and normally incur a three and a half-year service obligation.
PLC students attend a variety of different courses at OCS, depending on the level at which they joined the program. Students that join during their freshmen or sophomore years first attend the six-week PLC Junior course which serves to both indoctrinate them into the Marine Corps and evaluate their potential for continuation in the program. Students attend the course during the summer after they join the program and upon successful completion, return for the six-week PLC Senior course during the summer following their junior year. The PLC Senior course serves as the final evaluation and screening of PLC candidates for Marine commissions. Upon completion of the course students are eligible for commissioning when they graduate from college. The final PLC course offered at OCS is the PLC Combined course for students that join the program in their junior year. The PLC Combined course is ten weeks in duration and combines the elements of the other PLC courses in an intensive indoctrination and screening regimen. The course is completed in its entirety during the summer following the participant's junior year. After successful completion, PLC Combined participants fall under the same commissioning and active duty criteria as those completing the PLC Senior course. (OCS web site, 2000)

d. Officer Candidate Class (OCC)

The OCC program is the Marine Corps' third oldest formal commissioning source and the second longest in continual use. Like the PLC program, it was originally designed to create a cadre of Marine reserve officers for potential wartime service. Over the years, the OCC program has also served as the primary means of accessing Marine officers during wartime force buildups. The program is specifically designed to commission college graduates that do not have previous military experience. It is targeted at
both college seniors and those that have already obtained four-year college degrees. While the OCC program can be joined during the senior year of college, the formal training at OCS does not occur until after college graduation. Like PLC students that join the program during their junior year, OCC students attend a ten-week course at OCS shortly after graduation or joining the program (OCS website, 2000). Also similar to PLC students, OCC participants are personally responsible for their preparation for the OCS course and under the cognizance of an OSO. Upon successful completion of the course, participants are immediately commissioned for active service and report directly to The Basic School to begin a three and a half-year service obligation.

The OCC program has traditionally served the Marine Corps' need to fill gaps in annual accession requirements not filled by its other primary sources. The program has been particularly significant in this role during wartime (Moody and Nalty, 1969), and has increased in magnitude in recent years as well. In essence, the number of annual accessions through OCC fluctuates with the productivity of the other sources and changes in the Marine Corps' annual requirements. Despite its recent prominence, in particular regard to minority accessions, the OCC program provides the Marine Corps the shortest observation period of its candidates prior to commissioning. Therefore, OCC appears to be less desirable than the other sources as an accession means (Lienau & Sabal, 1997).
e. **Enlisted Commissioning Program (ECP)**

The ECP is the Marine Corps' oldest enlisted commissioning program and originally served to formalize enlisted commissioning practices. The program is available for active duty and active reserve enlisted Marines of any rank that possess a four-year college degree and show potential for officer service. As Marine Corps Order 1040.43 states:

The ECP allows qualified enlisted Marines in the Regular Marine Corps and in the Marine Corps Active Reserve (AR) Program to apply for assignment to Officer Candidates School (OCS) and subsequent appointment to unrestricted commissioned officer grade in the U.S. Marine Corps Reserve. (1995)

Participants in the ECP program are selected through a highly competitive annual board and ordered to OCS for officer training. At OCS, ECP candidates participate in the same ten-week course as OCC candidates and are immediately commissioned for active service upon completion. As with all the enlisted commissioning programs, the Marine Corps benefits from the enlisted experience and considerable evaluation period that ECP accessions undergo.

f. **Meritorious Commissioning Program (MCP)**

Similar to the ECP program, the MCP program is the Marine Corps' newest enlisted commissioning program. The MCP program is available for active duty and active reserve enlisted Marines of any rank. Unlike ECP, MCP does not require candidates to have completed a four-year college degree. However, MCP candidates must have completed some undergraduate coursework. As Marine Corps Order 1040.43 directs:

MCP applicants must have satisfactorily earned an associate level degree or completed 60 semester hours or more of unduplicated college work at a
regionally accredited college or university. Enlisted Marines possessing a 4-year degree are not eligible for MCP. Subsequent to commissioning it will be incumbent on the Marine to continue progressing toward a 4-year baccalaureate degree to be competitive for augmentation and promotion. (1995)

Because MCP is the only formal commissioning program that facilitates the commissioning of college non-graduates, applicants must have demonstrated exceptional performance during enlisted service. Therefore, MCP applicants are normally noncommissioned officers or those that have had significant experience in the operating forces. Like ECP, MCP applicants are selected through a highly competitive annual board and attend the ten-week course at OCS. Following the OCS course, MCP candidates adhere to the same criteria for commissioning, assignment, and service obligation as ECP and OCC candidates. After successful initial tours as junior officers, MCP accessions are often afforded a temporary leave of absence to complete their degree work.

g. Meritorious Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP)

MECEP is the second oldest officer-commissioning source for enlisted Marines. Until 1996, MECEP was also the third source of regular officer commissions. Like ECP and MCP, the MECEP program fulfills the purpose of allowing enlisted Marines that possess potential for officer service to continue their careers in a commissioned status. More so than ECP and MCP, however, MECEP was originally intended to produce career Marine officers from the ranks. The program is specifically targeted at active duty noncommissioned officers and no college coursework is required for acceptance to the program. MECEP participants are again selected through a competitive annual board and must

109
concurrently gain admission to an authorized college or university. Upon selection to MECEP and acceptance by a university, selectees are detached from their current units and enter the program as prescribed by Marine Corps Order 1560.15L:

- Marines selected who have at least 24 hours of college credit and/or a 1200 or better on the SAT will be ordered to report directly to their college in time for the fall semester.

- All other selectees will be ordered to report to the MECEP Preparatory School in Newport, RI during early June for approximately 10 weeks of instruction in mathematics, English, physics, chemistry or physical science, as appropriate to their areas of interest. (1994)

As program participants, MECEP students remain on active duty with all pay and benefits. However, their tuition and fees are not paid by the service as with NROTC scholarship recipients. They are attached to the NROTC unit at their university, and undergo the Bulldog program at OCS during the summer following their first year of coursework. Unlike NROTC students, MECEP participants do not participate in other summer training programs. Rather, they are compelled to take academic courses during every quarter or semester and complete their degree requirements as early as possible. Upon graduation and successful completion of Bulldog, MECEP students are commissioned on active duty and incur a four-year service obligation. At commissioning, most MECEP students have at least six years of active service. Some MECEP students even attain the staff noncommissioned officer ranks before commissioning. The experience that these accessions bring to the Marine officer corps is again invaluable. (Marine Corps Order 1560.15L, 1994)
h. **Broadened Opportunity for Officer Training (BOOST)**

While BOOST is not actually a Marine officer-commissioning source, it serves as springboard for enlisted accession into some of the primary commissioning programs. The purpose of BOOST as stated by Marine Corps Order 1560.24D is:

The BOOST Program provides an opportunity for selected personnel of all ethnic groups from educationally deprived or culturally differentiated backgrounds to compete more equitably for selection to the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Education Program (MECEP), the Naval Academy or Naval Reserve Officer Training Corps (NROTC). BOOST provides an educational program for selected Marines to prepare them to compete for selection into these programs. (1992)

Like other enlisted accession programs, BOOST applicants are selected annually by a competitive board. Some participants are also contracted into the program at enlistment. After a one-year training and education program, BOOST participants are either selected into MECEP, NROTC, NAPS, or the Naval Academy; or are sent back to the active enlisted force if they fail selection.

i. **Other Commissioning Sources**

In addition to its primary commissioning sources, the Marine Corps accesses a small number of candidates each year from nontraditional sources. As with all Marine Corps commissioning programs, officers accessed in this manner still report to The Basic School for entry-level training. These sources include:

- United States Military Academy (USMA) and United States Air Force Academy (USAFA)
- Direct Commissioning Program (DCP)
- Inter-service Transfer (IST)
A few selected cadets from USMA and USAFA are given the opportunity each year to seek a commission in the Marine Corps. These candidates must successfully complete the Bulldog program and are subsequently commissioned for a five-year service obligation.

A few noncommissioned officers in the Marine Corps Reserve may be selected through DCP to complete the OCC training course at OCS. Successful OCS graduates will be commissioned on active duty and ordered to The Basic School. After completing the Basic Officer Course, they revert to inactive status and return to their previous unit for service.

Very few commissioned officers of other services are accessed into the Marine Corps annually through the augmentation and retention board. This process is known as IST and those officers selected are commissioned in the Marine Corps and immediately report to The Basic School for duty.

3. Intra-organizational Efforts

To facilitate its officer accessions, the Marine Corps dedicates significant manpower resources to its primary commissioning programs. The overall officer recruiting efforts fall under the cognizance of the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, even at commands outside of its formal jurisdiction such as the Naval Academy. The duties of Marine officers and staff noncommissioned officers with a role in officer accessions vary significantly by program and command. However, their primary role remains consistent, namely the recruitment, selection, and initial screening of potential Marine Corps officers. The significant players in the Marine officer accessions process are as follows:

- Officer Selection Officers (OSOs)
• Marine Officer Instructors and Assistant Marine Officer Instructors (MOIs & AMOIs)
• Naval Academy Marines

OSOs are essentially officer recruiters that are assigned to Marine Corps recruiting stations throughout the country. OSOs are assigned to particular geographic regions, and principally focus their efforts on college campuses within their domain. OSOs primarily recruit candidates for the PLC and OCC programs and are the primary advisors, trainers, and points of contact for men and women that enroll in those programs. OSOs also assist prospective candidates with applications for NROTC scholarships or appointments to the Naval Academy, but their primary duty lies in educating civilians about Marine Corps career opportunities and selecting candidates for those careers to access through PLC or OCC. Once a candidate has been selected for the program, the OSO is also responsible for guiding them in their preparation for the appropriate OCS course, conducting further screening prior to the course commencement, and preparing them for the Basic Officer Course after the OCS course. Company grade officers that have completed their first operational tour normally fill OSO billets. Typically, each OSO is responsible for multiple colleges or university in their area and combine their training efforts with NROTC units when they exist.

One MOI and one AMOI are assigned to each NROTC unit in the country to facilitate the Marine option program. Although MOIs and AMOIs are typically integrated into the unit and assigned other duty functions, they are primarily charged with the training, education, and further screening of Marine option NROTC students at the unit. Unlike OSOs, MOIs and AMOIs do not select or normally recruit candidates for the program. However, they periodically identify potential Marine option students, from amongst the Navy
option Midshipmen in the unit or other unaffiliated college students. MOIs and AMOIs also assist prospective candidates with the application process. More so than the OSO, MOIs and AMOIs are intensely involved in the preparation of both NROTC and MECEP students for the Bulldog program. After candidates have successfully completed Bulldog, MOIs and AMOIs are also tasked with preparing them for commissioning and duty at The Basic School. MOIs are typically senior Captains or junior Majors, while AMOIs are Staff Sergeants or Gunnery Sergeants with drill instructor experience. MOIs are responsible for teaching Marine focused Naval Science courses in the curriculum, while AMOIs instruct all Midshipmen in close order drill. During the summer, numerous MOIs and AMOIs augment the OCS staff and play pivotal roles in the Bulldog program.

Today, Marines stationed at the Naval Academy play an important role in the education, training, and screening of potential officers for commissions in the Marine Corps. Like MOIs and AMOIs, Naval Academy Marines do not select candidates for participation. Rather, they instruct Marine Corps focused courses, oversee the instruction of close order drill, prepare Midshipmen for summer training programs, and lead and evaluate Midshipmen during the summer programs. Additionally, Naval Academy Marines play an even greater role in the screening of candidates for Marine commissions than do MOIs and AMOIs. Whereas OCS performs the critical screening and evaluation function for NROTC and MECEP candidates, the Marines at the Naval Academy perform that mission with regard to academy Midshipmen. Furthermore, the Marines at the academy are engaged in a significant recruiting effort, while the Marines at NROTC units are not. Probably the greatest distinction between the Marines at the Naval Academy and MOIs and AMOIs is that
the latter have a clear primary role in Marine officer accessions, while the former have a variety of other primary duties and play their role in the accession process more indirectly.

While the Marine Corps has allotted significant manpower resources to the NROTC, Naval Academy, OCC, and PLC sources, the numbers assigned are disproportionate to the number of accessions realized. In 1997, the Marine Corps had billeted 71 OSOs across the country and the number remains approximately the same today (Lienau & Sabal, 1997). This number of OSOs was responsible for accessing approximately 66 percent of all new Marine officers in 1997, and their duty was a dedicated recruiting effort. At the same time, the Marine Corps had 44 officers and staff noncommissioned officers assigned to the Naval Academy and approximately 140 officers and staff noncommissioned officers assigned to NROTC units (Higgins, 1991). These two sources produced approximately 11 and 12 percent of all Marine officer accessions respectively, and theirs was not nearly as concerted a recruiting effort (M&RA Accession Data, 2000). While this disparity may reflect the Marine Corps' preference for and emphasis on academy and NROTC accessions, it does not erase the fact that the majority of Marine officers are being produced by OSOs. More so than any other player, OSOs have a pivotal role in the officer-recruiting establishment.

4. Requirements

Each year the Marine Corps must commission a fluctuating number of officers to meet its end strength requirements. In recent years, the officer requirement has hovered between 1,300 and 1,400 new commissions (M&RA Accessions Data, 1993-1999). Traditionally, the PLC and OCC programs have provided the Marine Corps its required
flexibility in achieving the desired number of officers. Consequently, these two sources have accounted for the majority of Marine Corps accessions in recent years. Despite the flexibility inherent in the PLC and OCC programs, and particularly with the OCC program, the Marine Corps has made a concerted effort toward minimal utilization of these programs. Preferring to produce as many new officers as possible from its traditional sources of regular officers and enlisted accessions programs, the Marine Corps bases its number of PLC and OCC accessions on the number of vacancies required to fill after the preferred sources are utilized (D/C for M&RA, Interview, 2000, March 23). The productivity of the various Marine officer-commissioning sources in recent years is reflected in Table 3.1 below.

Table 3.1. Marine Corps Officer Accessions (M&RA, HQMC, 1994-2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>FY</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>PLC</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>MECEP/ECMCP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>221</td>
<td>278</td>
<td>228</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>1026</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(18.5%)</td>
<td>(21.5%)</td>
<td>(27.1%)</td>
<td>(22.2%)</td>
<td>(9.0%)</td>
<td>(1.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>225</td>
<td>521</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1204</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(15.0%)</td>
<td>(18.7%)</td>
<td>(43.3%)</td>
<td>(14.4%)</td>
<td>(7.8%)</td>
<td>(0.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>182</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1471</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(8.0%)</td>
<td>(12.4%)</td>
<td>(48.7%)</td>
<td>(20.3%)</td>
<td>(10.2%)</td>
<td>(0.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>164</td>
<td>206</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>209</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.2%)</td>
<td>(15.4%)</td>
<td>(29.6%)</td>
<td>(26.8%)</td>
<td>(15.6%)</td>
<td>(0.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>161</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>528</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1384</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.6%)</td>
<td>(10.9%)</td>
<td>(38.2%)</td>
<td>(28.0%)</td>
<td>(10.1%)</td>
<td>(1.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1364</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(11.2%)</td>
<td>(12.7%)</td>
<td>(16.9%)</td>
<td>(39.3%)</td>
<td>(19.6%)</td>
<td>(0.4%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>168</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(10.6%)</td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
<td>(24.2%)</td>
<td>(32.8%)</td>
<td>(19.6%)</td>
<td>(0.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 yr avg</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>430</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(12.1%)</td>
<td>(14.4%)</td>
<td>(32.8%)</td>
<td>(26.5%)</td>
<td>(13.3%)</td>
<td>(0.8%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As the table indicates, the number of accessions from the Naval Academy, NROTC, and the enlisted sources comprise an average of less than 40 percent of those commissioned over the seven-year period. In this context, the PLC and OCC programs together have been tasked with producing nearly 60 percent of all new Second Lieutenants. In particular,
the OCC program has been utilized to produce over 30 percent of all new officers during the last few years. Since OCC is the least preferred vehicle for officer accessions, the Marine Corps has become increasingly concerned about its increased reliance on the program (D/C for M&RA, Interview, 2000, April 23). On average, the Naval Academy has produced approximately 12 percent of new Marine officers since the Bulldog requirement was eliminated for those commissioned in 1993. While this constitutes only a small percentage of total Marine Corps officer accessions, it is a significant increase over the years when the Bulldog requirement existed (1989 to 1992). In 1989, academy graduates constituted only 7.7 percent of total accessions, followed by 6.6 percent in 1990, 7.4 percent in 1991, and 10.5 percent in 1992 (M&RA Accessions Data, 1993-1999). Despite the merits of the Bulldog requirement, the low accession rates during the period increased the burden on the Marine Corps Recruiting Command, specifically with regard to PLC and OCC.

Above all, the data demonstrates the large diversity existent in the Marine Corps' officer accessions system. While PLC was the largest producer of Marine officers, yielding nearly 33 percent of the total during the seven-year period, its products still represented a small segment of the newly commissioned officer community. In essence, the Marine Corps has created an accession system that is reliant on numerous sources, rather than on any one in particular. This ensures diversity in the initial experience of officers, and serves as a buffer to any sort of dominant pedigree entering the system.
5. Officer Candidate Training

In some form or other, all Marine Corps officer candidates, excepting those from the Naval Academy and IST, are screened, evaluated, and instructed in a course at OCS. While each of the courses at OCS is different in length and content, all teach candidates the same skill sets that will prepare them for further officer education after commissioning. Additionally, all courses utilize the same methods of instruction, practical application, and testing. The emphasis on leadership demonstration also remains the same in all courses, as do the time-tested methods of screening and evaluation (CNET, 1999). As the OCS web site explains:

Each course is a screening process, with the mission to motivate, train, evaluate, and screen potential officers. And, while many people associate change with progress, the methods at OCS have not changed appreciably since they were first developed. (2000)

OCS is located at Marine Corps Base Quantico, where it has been since established as Officers Camp of Instruction in 1917. It was subsequently renamed as Officers Training Camp in 1918, Marine Corps Officers Training School in 1919, Marine Corps Officers Training School in 1920, Officer Candidate School in 1944, and finally Officer Candidates School in 1963. Other than when makeshift screening courses were convened throughout the fleet during World War II, and when The Basic School took over the responsibility of training officer candidates for a short period after the war, OCS has continuously trained aspiring Marine officers from a variety of sources since its inception. (OCS web site, 2000)

Unlike the current Marine Corps oriented summer training programs for Naval Academy and NROTC Midshipmen,
OCS courses do not perform the function of providing participants with Marine Corps familiarization. Rather, the OCS curriculum is designed primarily as a screening and evaluation tool, performing a training function only in a secondary capacity. As the stated mission of OCS reveals:

The mission of Officer Candidates School is to train, evaluate, and screen officer candidates to ensure that they possess the moral, intellectual, and physical qualities for commissioning and the leadership potential to serve successfully as company grade officers in the Fleet Marine Force. (CNET, 1999,6)

The key component of the OCS screening function is the immersion of candidates into an environment that attempts to simulate the intensive stress of combat. In this context, the calculated training in the OCS curriculum merely serves the purpose of creating the type of stress required for an effective evaluation. In effect, the OCS training is not oriented toward infusing a certain degree of professional knowledge in the candidates for their officer education. Rather, the training only intends to expose them to the type of environment, activities, and skill applications that will allow the staff to properly assess their ability to become Marine officers. (Lienau & Sabal, 1997) As indicated in the OCS commander’s philosophy:

OCS is not Recruit Training and the approach to training and to evaluating candidates is fundamentally different than the approach used to train recruits. The end product of Recruit Training is a basic Marine that will obey, react, and follow under the stress of combat. The end product of OCS is a lieutenant who has exhibited the potential to think and to lead under the stress of combat. Accordingly, the training techniques and evaluation criteria must support our efforts to produce that Marine lieutenant. (OCS web site, 2000)

The primary areas in which candidates are evaluated at OCS are leadership, academics, and physical fitness. Of
these three areas, leadership receives the most significant attention and is the primary area in which the screening and evaluation functions are performed. The motto of OCS is Ductus Exemplo (leadership by example) and leadership is evaluated by numerous methods. These methods include: observation reports, leadership ratings, graded examinations, practical applications, and performance in leadership billets. An officer candidate's presence under pressure is the key indicator of leadership potential. The Marine Corps abides by the premise that effective evaluation of potential officers can best be achieved through continuous exposure to carefully controlled and challenging situations. To effect this evaluation, the OCS staff judiciously applies stress to solicit a meaningful response. This focus on leadership evaluation under stress is explained in the OCS commander's philosophy:

Although academics and physical fitness are of great importance, always keep in mind that, above all else, future Marine officers must be leaders. If there is a common thread that is woven through the fabric of the Marine Corps, it is the quality of our leadership. Those who do not show the potential to develop the leadership qualities we have come to expect of Marine officers must not be commissioned. (OCS web site, 2000)

With the mission of OCS centered upon the evaluation process, and the entire training regimen established to facilitate evaluation, it becomes incumbent upon the OCS staff that this function is being carried out effectively. In this pursuit, the school abides by an evaluation philosophy that lays the foundation for a process reliant on three principles:

- **Evaluation must be constant....** The platoon staff must develop the ability to observe candidate actions frequently, at odd times, and when least expected in order to gain insight into the true attitude and motivation of the candidate. The candidates must realize that
their actions, good and bad, will be noted and considered in the evaluation process.

- Everything that a candidate company does should be aimed toward furthering the evaluation process. Some events are obvious aids to the evaluation process, but others are not.

- Careful evaluation will allow the staff to ultimately determine those individuals who possess the characteristics we seek in our officer corps. OCS screening concludes the overall selection process which began, not when the candidate first arrived at OCS, but when the Officer Selection Officer (OSO) first made contact with the prospective candidate. (OCS web site, 2000)

     Above all, OCS is not a summer training opportunity aimed at generating interest in or educating individuals about the Marine Corps. Rather, it is a dedicated screening and evaluation tool, which allows the Marine Corps to determine the suitability of aspiring Marine officers. In this context, the evaluation function of OCS is not only the preeminent element of each course. Rather, it is the fundamental reason that the school exists. As the evaluation philosophy of OCS indicates, every aspect of the instruction and immersion at OCS is structured to facilitate the evaluation function.

6. Initial Officer Education

Regardless of their accession source, or means of screening and evaluation, all newly commissioned Marine Corps officers report to The Basic School (TBS) for their first formal officer education and training. Each Basic Officer Course (BOC) at TBS is comprised of approximately 250 Second Lieutenants. Typically, six classes are convened each fiscal year. The stated mission of TBS is to:

     Educate newly commissioned or appointed officers in the high standards of Professional Knowledge, Esprit-de-Corps, and Leadership required to prepare them for duty as a company grade officer
in the Operating Forces, with particular emphasis on the duties, responsibilities and Warfighting Skills required of a rifle platoon commander. (TBS web site, 2000)

Similar to OCS, the evaluation and training at TBS falls under three principal categories. These categories are academics, military skills, and leadership; with the primary emphasis and crux of the evaluation placed on leadership. The BOC is a 21-week course, during which newly commissioned officers are taught the basic skills required by all Marine officers and select their primary military occupational specialty (MOS). While the BOC curriculum does assume a basic level of knowledge and ability gained at OCS, these skills are taught again so that a lack of exposure to them is not crippling.
C. THE MODERN NAVAL ACADEMY-MARINE CORPS RELATIONSHIP

The final section of the contemporary analysis is an exploration of the present relationship between the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. The purpose of this section is to provide a detailed examination of the practice of commissioning Marine officers from the academy and the Marine Corp's current influence at the institution. In the context of the overall study, this section provides a contemporary account of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship and establishes the modern context for empirical study and analysis.

1. Overview

Since the end of World War II, the Marine Corps-Naval Academy relationship has steadily evolved as the military institution has developed into a joint service venture to produce both Navy and Marine Corps officers. A marked departure from the academy's original purpose, the development of future Marine officers has become fully integrated into the Naval Academy's mission. No longer do Marine Corps accessions from the academy merely represent the Marine Corps' share of Midshipmen specifically trained for service in the Navy. Rather, the preparation of Midshipmen for duty in both services had become an acknowledged function of the academy. The results of this shift are the restructuring of the curriculum and training to that end. Consequently, the institutional influence of the Marine Corps has greatly increased in recent history. Although this influence is often perceived as being excessively disproportionate to that of the Navy, it has nonetheless increased with every indication that the trend will continue.
As has historically been the case, the Naval Academy has served as an extremely unique commissioning source for the Marine Corps. The military training and education that academy graduates bring to the Marine Corps are the most extensive of the service's accession sources not targeted at enlisted Marines. Additionally, the skills and experiences acquired by Naval Academy graduates are extremely divergent from those accessing through the other sources. While the programs of all other Marine commissioning sources focus purely on aspects of the Marine Corps, the Naval Academy focuses on the broader aspects of the entire naval service. Therefore, while there may be a perception that academy Midshipmen possess a less corporate Marine Corps education at commissioning, they possess a corporate knowledge of the entire naval service that is unsurpassed by those accessing in another manner.

In assessing the modern Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, it is important to understand the critical elements that make this commissioning source divergent from the others. In the course of this research, three significant themes surfaced which characterize the uniqueness of the academy as a Marine officer-commissioning source. These themes highlight many of the current issues in the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship and reveal the source of some prevailing conflicts. These themes are:

- Community versus service
- Familiarization versus screening
- Minimal enlisted interaction

Within the institution, the role of the Marine Corps is framed in the same manner as the Navy warfare communities. Rather than revealing the unique nature of the Marine Corps as a completely separate service, the Naval Academy presents it as merely another naval warfare occupation, as distinct
in culture and function as the Navy communities are to each other. While this emphasis does not preclude academy Midshipman from understanding that the Marine Corps is a separate service comprised of its own separate communities, it does frame Marine Corps service as merely an occupational choice to be weighed at service selection. In effect, this lack of emphasis on the Marine Corps as a separate service downplays the widely divergent cultures of the two services and the drastic departure this represents for those choosing a commission as a Marine Second Lieutenant. Consequently, this institutional emphasis perpetuates the belief that the Naval Academy curriculum itself adequately prepares Midshipmen to serve as officers in the Navy and Marine Corps. The academy was certainly designed to prepare future Navy officers, but it must be questioned whether it has evolved enough to fully prepare them for a career in a different service.

Despite the fact that the Naval Academy has been regularly commissioning graduates in the Marine Corps for over eighty years, emphasis on the Marine Corps in the curriculum has been minimal until recent years. However, with the increasing recognition of the academy's role as a Marine officer accession source, a substantial effort has been undertaken to familiarize Midshipman with the Marine Corps during their four-year education. Although the Marine Corps focus at the Naval Academy has reached new heights in recent years, it intends only to perform a basic function of familiarization. While familiarization is an integral function of all Marine Corps accession programs, the predominant characteristic of the non-academy programs is their function of screening candidates for potential officer service. Despite experimentation with Marine Corps screening programs at the academy through the years, the
institutional emphasis remains heavily weighted on performing the familiarization function. In the eyes of the institution, the four-year course itself is intended as the screening tool.

For most of the Naval Academy’s history, officers exclusively fulfilled the leadership functions regarding the professional development of Midshipmen. Only since 1995 have enlisted sailors and Marines been integrated into leadership roles, and even now these roles are restricted to a few functional areas, i.e. drill, counseling. In effect, Marine officers commissioned from the Naval Academy have experienced relatively little interaction with enlisted service members at commissioning, and in many cases virtually none with enlisted Marines. Conversely, officers accessed through all other primary Marine officer accession programs have received their primary instruction, training, leadership, and supervision from enlisted Marines, consequently gaining a great appreciation for the role that these individuals play in the Marine Corps. In essence, the Marine Corps has entrusted its noncommissioned officer corps with the screening of the service’s future leaders. In contrast, the Naval Academy almost exclusively entrusts this role to officers. This effectively deprives Midshipman of the comprehension of the trust and confidence that the Marine Corps grants to its enlisted members.

As the three prevailing themes in Marine officer commissioning from the Naval Academy suggest, there has historically been some general concern about the institution’s adequacy as a Marine Corps accession source. The academy is effectively the only primary commissioning source that the Marine Corps does not fully control. Also, the increasing Marine influence over the years has only come through hard-fought and deliberate efforts at many levels.
Despite the concern, the Naval Academy has continued to produce high quality Marine Corps junior officers and has continuously been relied upon by the service. Historical evidence indicates that the academy long served as the Marine Corps' primary and preferred commissioning source. Even in its more limited role in accessions today, the academy’s products are increasingly sought. As former Secretary of the Navy James Webb recently indicated (2000), the Naval Academy creates the best mix of academic and leadership instruction to produce military leaders, so long as it does not aim to be a specifically top-notch academic institution (at the expense of leadership development). For this reason, Webb, and many current and former Marine officers, see extraordinary value in the continued accession of academy graduates and the continued proliferation of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

2. The Marine Corps’ Institutional Influence

Each Marine assigned to the Naval Academy has a primary duty related to the internal functioning of the institution. The secondary duty of each academy Marine is to facilitate the accession of the most highly qualified Midshipman for service in the Marine Corps. In different capacities, each Marine at the academy performs this secondary function both individually and as a combined effort between the entire or selected Marine staff. Despite the fact that the Marine officer recruiting effort is a secondary duty for each staff member, it is the primary reason why the Marine Corps has sent him or her to the Naval Academy. In this context, the selection and training of Midshipman for commissions in the Marine Corps is the most important function of Marines at the academy.

Today, the Marine Corps recruiting and selection efforts at the Naval Academy are concerted. These efforts
are organized and directed by the Marine staff, which historically was not the case. During the mid 1960s, the academy prohibited direct recruiting efforts by Marine Corps personnel (Webb, 2000). Marine recruiting at the time was informal and indirect, and normally conducted by Midshipmen who were advised and encouraged by Marine staff members (Webb, 2000). Even into the 1980s and early 1990s, as attested to by numerous academy graduates interviewed in the study, the Marine Corps recruiting efforts remained primarily indirect (Selected Marine Corps officers, Interviews, 2000). Despite this traditional lack of direct recruiting efforts, the Marine Corps has long viewed the Naval Academy in the same terms as its other accession sources. The Manpower and Reserve Affairs section of Headquarters Marine Corps and the Marine Corps Recruiting Command have and continue to exercise oversight of the Marine accession efforts at the academy (Interview with D/C for M&RA, 2000, March 27).

a. Marine Mission at the Naval Academy

Regardless of their primary duty at the Naval Academy, all Marines at the institution fall under the cognizance of the Marine Representative, a Colonel (O-6) that collaterally serves as the Director of the Division of Humanities and Social Sciences. The mission of the Marines at the Naval Academy is:

- To facilitate the accession of the highest quality Midshipmen to become Marine Officers.
- To prepare those selected Midshipmen to succeed at The Basic School.
- To demonstrate to all Midshipmen that the Marine member of the Navy-Marine team is dedicated and well trained -- a professional. (USNA Marines web site, 2000)
As this mission statement indicates, the Marines at the Naval Academy are tasked with an officer accession role that exceeds the boundary of their prescribed primary duties. Facilitating the accession of the highest quality Midshipmen for the Marine Corps implies a concerted recruiting effort and a screening process. The preparation of Marine candidates implies the conduct of Marine specific training prior to commissioning. Finally, the professional demonstration by Marines again implies the recruiting effort, as well as the projection of a positive image of the Marine Corps throughout the naval service.

b. Marine Corps Staff Distribution

Marines at the Naval Academy perform a myriad of different primary duties, permeating almost every segment of the institution. Since the first Marines were assigned directly to the academy staff after World War II, in contrast to the pre World War II practice of assigning them in support roles at the nearby Marine Barracks, their numerical strength has both increased and remained static. Until the Vietnam War, the Marine Corps staffed the academy with very few officers. Then, between the late 1960s and the late 1970s, the Marine Corps greatly increased its presence at the academy in response to accession difficulties through other sources. These difficulties can be attributed to the prevailing public sentiments during and after the Vietnam War (D/C for M&RA, Interview, 2000, March 27). By 1983, 42 Marine officers and one Marine enlisted man were members of the Naval Academy staff. Over the next 15 years, however, the manning level remained essentially static. In 1997, 36 Marine officers and eight enlisted Marines were on the academy staff (Ramos, 1997). By 2000 the Marine presence had drastically increased to 54 officers and 7 enlisted. The primary reason for the increase was the
continual interest in the accession source by Marine Commandant General Charles C. Krulak (1996-2000). General Krulak had graduated from the Naval Academy and served on the academy staff earlier in his career (Ramos, 1998).

Currently, Marines at the Naval Academy are assigned in every principal functional area of the institution. The majority of the Marine staff performs duties as either academic instructors or as company officers/senior enlisted advisors for Midshipman companies. Currently, Marine instructors are predominantly serving in the Economics, History, Political Science, Electrical Engineering and Computer Science departments. Traditionally, each of the six Midshipman battalions has had one Marine serving as a company officer and one of the battalions has had a Marine serving as the battalion officer. Since 1994, each of the battalions has also had a Marine staff noncommissioned officer serving as the senior enlisted advisor to one of the companies. The current Deputy Commandant of Midshipman is also a Marine officer, a position not held by a Marine until the early 1990s. Marines also serve in the Department of Professional Development, as coaches in the Physical Education Department, and in the Admissions Office. The efforts of the Marines at the Naval Academy are facilitated by an organic Marine staff. This staff consists of the Marine Representative and two staff secretaries. The current distribution of officers at the Naval Academy is as follows (Office of Marine Staff Secretary, 2000):

- Brigade of Midshipmen: 12 officers, 7 enlisted
- Academics: 26 officers
- Physical education: 3 officers
- Marine Staff: 3 officers
• Professional development: 6 officers
• Other: 4 officers

c. Marine Barracks

Located at the Annapolis Naval Station, the United States Naval Academy Company, Marine Barracks was formerly an organic element of the Naval Academy. Its purpose has traditionally been to perform any duties that were designated by the commander of the institution. While the primary mission of the company has traditionally been to provide security to the academy, the Marines have historically performed a plethora of other duties including training, administrative, and ceremonial support. In recent years, largely due to the lessened role of the unit's security function and the introduction of Marines on the academy staff, the company has been downsized and re-designated as a subordinate command belonging to the Marine Barracks in Washington, DC. While this reorganization has effectively rendered the unit an external tenant to the Naval Academy, its official mission and functions have not significantly changed. (Interview with Marine Barracks CO, 1999, August)

The overall mission of the United States Naval Academy Company is to perform all duties and provide appropriate support as designated by the Superintendent of the United States Naval Academy (Marine Barracks CO, Interview, 1999, August). In essence, the company is dedicated to fulfilling any duties that require Marines on or in support of the mission of the academy. However, while the mission of the Naval Academy is centered upon the development of Midshipmen, the United States Naval Academy Company actually has very little interaction with these future officers. Rather, the company performs a variety of tasks that focus on the external perceptions of the
academy's image. In fulfilling its mission, the USNA Company has three primary sub-missions that generate the majority of its functions. These sub-missions are (Marine Barracks CO, Interview, 1999, August):

- To provide a security force for the United States Naval Academy
- To provide ceremonial support as required by the Superintendent
- To provide administrative support for all Marine personnel permanently attached to the Annapolis Area Complex

The first sub-mission is the primary role of the USNA Company. As mentioned above, while this role has become mostly ceremonial in nature, it has not decreased in magnitude. The Marine security force stands a number of posts including all open gates at the Naval Academy. While the company is no longer the academy's primary security force, its still performs a limited security function by augmenting the efforts of the civilian security detachment.

The second sub-mission has resulted in intensive operations in recent years, mostly involving evolutions that are external to the academy. While the Midshipman are primarily tasked with any ceremonial functions that are performed on the academy grounds, the USNA Company will augment those efforts during events that are specifically related to the Marine Corps. Ceremonial functions that the company normally performs include Marine Corps birthday ball ceremonies, color guard details when the Marine Corps colors are flown, flag popping ceremonies (raising and retiring colors for flag officers), funeral details, community parades, and greeting high ranking officials upon their arrival. Except for their security duties, this ceremonial sub-mission is the most important role for the United Stated Naval Academy Company.
Since the Naval Academy's administrative section does not provide support for the Marines attached to the institution, the United States Naval Academy Company performs the third sub-mission for those individuals. While the Marines in the Annapolis Area Complex report to the company for all administrative matters, much of the actual administrative functions are performed at their parent unit, Marine Barracks, Washington, DC. Therefore, the company is actually a facilitator for administrative matters, rather than actually performing the function. They are, however, responsible for ensuring that all matters are handled properly. Therefore, the company performs a large amount of coordination with the administrative section of their parent unit.

d. Marine Involvement at the Naval Academy

Aside from primary duties, recruiting efforts, and organized training activities, Marines assigned to the Naval Academy are involved in numerous extracurricular activities that allow them to interact with Midshipmen. Coupled with their primary roles, these activities contribute indirectly to the Marine Corps' mission at the academy. Extracurricular involvement by Marine officers and staff noncommissioned officers increases the opportunity for Midshipmen to gain exposure to Marines' requisite knowledge of the Marine Corps and perceptions about the role of Marine officers. Additionally, participation in extracurricular activities increases the opportunities for Marines to identify, evaluate, educate, and recruit potential candidates for Marine Corps commissions.

The most significant extracurricular involvement by Marines at the academy is as officer representatives to Midshipmen athletic teams and club organizations. Marines currently serve as officer representatives for the varsity
football team, club rugby team, German Club, and a multitude of other organizations at the academy. The role of an officer representative allows the Marine to become involved with a select group of Midshipmen. Since most Marines at the Naval Academy are involved in this program, their collective participation helps further facilitate the recruiting effort.

A second extracurricular means of involvement with Midshipman comes through participation in battalion team activities. All Marines at the Naval Academy are organized into these teams, which are assigned to each of the six battalions in the Brigade of Midshipmen. The purpose of the battalion teams is to facilitate Midshipman contact with Marine officers and staff noncommissioned officers. While some Midshipman are afforded the opportunity to interact regularly with Marines, being members of companies with Marine company officers or senior enlisted advisors, most are not. The battalion team members are specifically assigned to companies without a dedicated Marine influence to give professional guidance to aspiring Marines and educate other Midshipmen about the Marine Corps.

Additionally, Marines participate in other activities outside of primary duties such as character development seminars, admissions boards, and ethics forums. In all of these activities, Marines again expand their ability to influence Midshipman beyond the reach of primary roles.

3. Marine Corps Focused Activities

Aside from the efforts of the Marine staff at the Naval Academy, Midshipmen are exposed to the Marine Corps through a variety of different activities that are specifically oriented to that end. Most of these activities are extracurricular or voluntary. They are sought out primarily
by Midshipmen with an interest in the Marine Corps inspired by personal influence or preexisting desire.

a. *Semper Fidelis Society*

The most significant Marine oriented activity at the academy is the Semper Fidelis Society. This extracurricular activity was established in the early 1980s during the tenure of Marine Representative Colonel C. E. McDaniel as a vehicle for instilling an awareness among Midshipmen of the advantages of serving in the Marine Corps. (Peterson, 1985) As interviews with academy graduates revealed, the society's membership was limited primarily to prior enlisted Marines in the early years. However, the membership pool has extended over the years, facilitating greater exposure of the Marine Corps amongst Midshipmen and credibly enhancing the Marine recruiting efforts. As former Marine Representative Colonel John O. Ripley revealed:

There is no question but that the Semper Fidelis Society has been a major factor in the Corps' reaching its goal for the third year straight. (Peterson, 1988)

While the Semper Fidelis Society is basically a Midshipman extracurricular club, run by Midshipmen and overseen by Marine officers, it serves a far greater purpose than a mere venue for social gathering. The stated mission of the society is:

- To develop esprit de Corps and pride among the future Marines at USNA, and foster Marine Corps traditions on the yard.
- To prepare Midshipmen for service in the Corps by providing the opportunity to develop professional skills relevant to Marine Corps officers.
- To educate members of the society on the Marine Corps in general, Marine Corps career opportunities, and the lifestyle of the Corps.
• To promote interest in the Marine Corps among the Brigade of Midshipmen and the larger academy community.

• To increase the level of professionalism and military competence of a core of Midshipmen in order to increase the discipline and martial spirit of the Brigade. (USNA Semper Fidelis Society web site, 2000)

In accomplishing its mission, the Semper Fidelis Society plans, coordinates and executes events throughout the academic year. These activities include periodic lectures from distinguished Marine officers, semiannual field exercises at Marine Corps Base Quantico, VA, monthly tactical decision exercises, semiweekly physical fitness training, and periodic conditioning hikes and land navigation training.

b. USMC Midshipman Qualification Program

As a supplement to the regularly scheduled events of the Semper Fidelis Society, the club has devised the USMC Midshipman Qualification Program to foster the professional growth of those aspiring to be Marine officers. The program is targeted specifically at those Midshipmen possessing a serious interest in a Marine commission and is overseen by selected Marines at the academy. The stated mission of the program is:

To provide Midshipmen with an improved understanding of the basic knowledge and fitness requirements required to excel at The Basic School and as officers in the United States Marine Corps. Successful completion of this program involves a demonstration of a wide array of Marine Corps knowledge and skill. Completion is recognized by the presentation of a series of awards. (Semper Fidelis Society web site, 2000)
c. Drill

Since most Midshipmen are required to participate in the academy’s close order drill program, certain varsity athletes excepted, the activity is an indirect opportunity for the Marine Corps to yield institutional influence. Because the drill program is conducted under the leadership of Marine staff noncommissioned officers, Midshipmen gain great exposure to the professionalism, knowledge, and skills possessed by enlisted Marines. Furthermore, the enduring relationship of close order drill to Marine Corps culture creates an opportunity in the program to immerse Midshipmen in a Marine focused environment.

d. Additional Activities

In addition to the major Marine focused activities at the Naval Academy, a number of additional events serve to further enhance the Marine Corps’ institutional influence. The annual Marine mess night and birthday ball celebrations are open to Midshipman as a means to expose them to Marine Corps history and traditions. Also, during the Plebe indoctrination, much of the physical training and drill components are executed under the leadership of Marines. Lastly, an annual static display of weapons and machinery and a military occupational specialty mixer are conducted. These events serve as a means of familiarizing Midshipman with Marine Corps combat capabilities and career opportunities. While these additional activities are more infrequent and less intensive than the previously discussed Marine focused programs, they nonetheless contribute to the accomplishment of the Marines’ mission at the Naval Academy.

4. Marine Corps Focused Curriculum

Prior to 1988, the Naval Academy did not possess significant summer or academic year programs in the regular
curriculum that focused on Marine officer careers. Since that time the institution has experimented with a number of different programs, mostly aiming at exposure to and familiarization with the Marine Corps. Although the extracurricular Marine focused activities at the Naval Academy are an integral part of the Marine Corps’ accession efforts; they remain essentially voluntary and do not possess the strength of those organic to the curriculum. For this reason, the curricular programs dedicated to Marine Corps familiarization and training are the key components of the Marine effort at the academy.

The vast majority of Marine Corps focused programs in the curriculum are conducted during the summer training segments. Each summer, Midshipmen participate in two distinct segments of training in the operating forces or supporting establishment. Some of these training opportunities focus directly on Marine officer careers. While Marine Corps focused training is incorporated into the academic year curriculum, the opportunities are few and normally reserved for Midshipmen that have already been selected for Marine Corps commissions.

a. Naval Tactical Training (NTT)

NTT is a three-week summer training program conducted for Midshipmen during their 3rd Class summer regimen. Implemented in recent years, the course is conducted primarily at the Naval Academy, with some field evolutions transpiring at Fort Mead. The NTT program aims to build familiarization with small unit tactical training in the naval service and other armed services. The first and second weeks of the program provide an introduction to joint warfare and focus on advance force operations as conducted by Navy Special Warfare units. The third week concentrates on small unit Marine Corps training, and serves
as the only dedicated Marine Corps training program during a Midshipman's entire first year at the Academy. Approximately 600 Midshipmen participate in NTT annually, giving only half of each class an introductory Marine Corps experience. The stated objectives of the NTT program are:

- To build understanding of the context in which other services operate with the Navy.
- To provide exposure to advance force small unit tactical training.
- To build experience in ground combat skills/Marine small unit tactical training. (USNA 'Division of Professional Development, 2000)

Although the objectives of the NTT program imply both instruction and practical application, the training is a tactical familiarization exercise in format. Although overseen by Marines at the academy, it is instructed by newly promoted Second Lieutenants that have not yet been through the Basic Officer Course or immersed in the Marine Corps culture. Considering the low experience level of the participants and cadre, a pure familiarization exercise is most likely appropriate. However, the NTT training is not a required evolution for 3rd Class Midshipman. Therefore, many Midshipmen will enter their second year at the academy without the benefit of significant exposure to the Marine Corps.

b. Professional Training for Midshipman (PROTRAMID)

PROTRAMID is a four-week summer training program conducted for Midshipmen during their 2nd Class summer regimen. In some form, the program has been conducted since at least the mid 1960s when it was known as "the road show" (D/C for M&RA, Interview, 2000, March 27). Originally conducted during the 3rd Class summer, with the intent of providing Midshipman with occupational community
familiarization early in their academy experience, PROTRAMID is conducted at multiple sites along the eastern seaboard. The program aims at familiarizing Midshipman with the principal unrestricted Navy warfare communities and the Marine Corps. One week each is dedicated to Surface Warfare, Submarine Warfare, Aviation, and Marine training. The Marine Corps week is conducted at The Basic School in Quantico, Virginia. Newly graduated Second Lieutenants from the Basic Officer Course fill the instructor roles. The stated objectives of the PROTRAMID program are:

- To expose Midshipmen to the primary warfare communities that they can enter upon commissioning.
- To provide them with hands on experience in the professional skills of the Marine Corps, aviation, surface warfare, and submarine warfare. (USNA Division of Professional Development, 2000)

Although the majority of 3rd Class Midshipman will participate in PROTRAMID, it is still an elective program. Therefore, since it is the only dedicated Marine Corps training program during the 3rd Class year, some Midshipmen will complete half of their Naval Academy experience without gaining a valid familiarization with the Marine Corps. Even for those that do participate in PROTRAMID, the program is again a pure familiarization tool. PROTRAMID is conducted on a Marine Corps facility and its instructors are external to the academy. Therefore, it is likely more effective than NTT in exposing Midshipmen to the unique Marine Corps culture. However, like NTT, there are few tangible leadership opportunities for Midshipmen during the program. PROTRAMID is focused on educating all future naval officers about the Marine Corps, not on targeting potential Marine candidates (Mundy, 1991).
c. Leatherneck

The Leatherneck program is the primary Marine Corps training opportunity for Midshipmen at the Naval Academy. Conducted during the 1st Class summer, Leatherneck is comprised of four weeks of training at The Basic School and instructed by some of the school’s recent graduates. The program focuses on the skills and proficiencies that Second Lieutenants will acquire at The Basic School. Like PROTRAMID, the staffs at the academy and The Basic School jointly organize the Leatherneck program. However, unlike PROTRAMID, Leatherneck provides participants with their first credible leadership experience in a Marine Corps environment. While this experience is still extremely limited, the course provides an intensive concentration on the roles of Marine junior officers that is unparalleled to this point in their education. Marine officers from the Naval Academy accompany the Midshipmen during the program and evaluate their potential for a Marine commission. The stated missions of Leatherneck are as follows:

- The primary mission of Leatherneck is to expose Midshipman to introductory Marine officer training and enhance their understanding of Marine Corps culture and training standards.

- While fulfilling the primary mission, the Naval Academy staff can accomplish the secondary mission, which is to observe and evaluate Midshipman. (USNA Division of Professional Development, 2000)

While such evaluation lends itself toward performing a screening function, this is only a secondary purpose of the program. Leatherneck, like NTT and PROTRAMID, is still primarily a familiarization program with the intent of further exposing Midshipman to the Marine Corps and allowing them to perform the tasks of junior
Marine officers. As recently stated in a letter by the officer in charge of the Leatherneck program:

Leatherneck is not boot camp, Officer Candidate School, or Plebe Summer Part II. Midshipman will be given the same respect and privileges as Junior Officers. (Leatherneck OIC letter, 2000, March 31)

Again, Leatherneck is an elective training opportunity, although there is no cap on the number of Midshipmen that can participate. 225 Midshipmen attended the program in 1997, 280 in 1998, and 320 in 1999. (USNA Division of Professional Development, 2000)

Beginning in 1993, the Leatherneck program has evolved from a pure familiarization exercise to one that combines both the familiarization and screening functions (USNA Division of Professional Development, 2000). However, whereas the screening function is the primary task of OCS (where all other potential Marine officers are evaluated), it is very much a secondary function at Leatherneck. Furthermore, because the program is designed as a familiarization exercise, and some participants may not have even participated in NTT or PROTRAMID, there exists no common level of proficiency and knowledge from which to screen. Interview evidence indicates that the program attracts a large number of Midshipmen who are not particularly interested in Marine Corps service. These participants recognize their lack of familiarization with the Marine Corps and wish to gain that experience before they ruling it out. In this context, it becomes very difficult to screen between participants with a dedicated desire to join the Marine Corps and those aiming to simply increase their Marine Corps knowledge. While a pre-Leatherneck preparation program is conducted on weekends during the preceding months, participation in this training is strictly voluntary.
d. Fleet Marine Force (FMF) Training

Selected Leatherneck participants are offered a second training opportunity with an FMF unit during the second half of their 1st class summer. Billets for FMF training are available to Leatherneck participants and allocated to applicants by class standing. In some form, a few Midshipmen have had the opportunity to train with operational Marine units since at least the early 1980s (Peterson, 1985). Designed as a progressive phase of the Leatherneck training, approximately 80 Midshipmen each year (82 in 1999) will join operational units in the 1st and 2nd Marine Expeditionary Forces for four weeks of additional experience. Two weeks of FMF training will be conducted with a combat arms or service support unit, and an additional two weeks is spent with an aviation unit. While this training experience equates to the fleet cruises that Midshipmen participate in throughout their academy experience, it is limited to a select few and offered late in their four-year program. Therefore, less than ten percent of each graduating class will have the opportunity to experience an operational Marine Corps command. Only about 50 percent of those that are eventually commissioned as Marine officers will have the same experience. (USNA Division of Professional Development, 2000)

e. Capstone Course

The only dedicated Marine Corps curriculum during academic year is the NS40X Junior Officer Practicum course given during the second semester of the 1st Class year. Although implemented in 1995, the course had periodically been offered in some form as early as the mid 1960s to prepare graduating Midshipman for the Basic Officer Course (BOC) (D/C for M&RA, Interview, 2000, March 27). The
concept behind the course is to provide a final preparation means for graduating Midshipmen that is focused on the naval warfare community or service they are about to enter. The course focuses on the basic skills required for junior officers at the commencement of their first professional school. In this context, the course is required instruction that is administered after the Midshipmen have completed the service assignment process. The stated primary objective of the course is:

To provide Midshipmen with a professional background that will prepare them for the service community they are about to enter, whether that be SWOS, nuclear power school, flight training or TBS. (USNA Division of Professional Development Web Site, 2000)

The stated supporting objectives of the Capstone course are:

- To provide Midshipmen with a broader understanding of the Navy and Marine Corps, their components and how they work together. This understanding will increase their ability to articulate what the Navy and Marine Corps are all about and will also increase their understanding of the challenges and opportunities that will become apparent to them as newly commissioned officers. (USNA Division of Professional Development web site, 2000)

- The second supporting objective of the NS40X course is to provide Midshipmen with a specific depth of understanding expected of a graduate of a service academy regarding joint operations, information technology and military sociology.

In accomplishing the primary and supporting objectives of the course, the Marines at the academy combine their expertise and team-teach the course material. Instruction in the course is again a secondary duty for the Marines, but a large number of them participate. The structure of the course is divided into three segments. The first segment serves as their final instruction in naval
professional development and is common to the capstone courses of all Navy warfare communities. The second segment focuses on Marine leadership, with particular emphasis on doctrine and combat experience. The final segment of the course focuses on Marine Corps professional development, with emphasis on the administrative skills needed by junior officers. While the course is primarily intended to prepare Midshipmen for the BOC, it does not accomplish this task with the same curriculum as the OCS courses. Therefore, the Leatherneck program is intended to teach Midshipmen those additional skills acquired by officers that attend an OCS course. (USNA Division of Professional Development web site, 2000)

5. The Bulldog Requirement for Naval Academy Midshipmen

Prior to 1988, an intensive Marine Corps focused summer training program did not exist for Naval Academy Midshipmen. Furthermore, a supplemental means of screening academy Midshipmen for Marine Corps commissions did not exist either. During this period, academy graduates sent to the BOC without a Marine Corps skill set comparable to those accessing through OCS. Furthermore, the Marine Corps had no ability to decide which academy Midshipmen became Marine officers. Beginning in 1988, academy Midshipmen were required to attend and successfully complete the Bulldog course designed for NROTC and MECEP students. Only upon successful completion of Bulldog could they choose the Marine Corps during the academy’s service selection process. When the Class of 1989 selected their services and communities, the Marine Corps received its first Naval Academy graduates that had undergone a screening process overseen by Marines (Bulldog in 1988) and had received significant preparation for The Basic School.
Although Midshipmen were not required to attend Bulldog until 1988, the initiative began to take shape in the early 1980s. During the years after 1979, the Marine Corps regularly filled its academy quota and was forced to turn away many qualified candidates due to low class standing (Director of MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14). Since class standing at the institution was and continues to be predominantly determined by academic achievement, this performance measure was primary in the Marine Corps' accession efforts at the academy. Conversely, academic achievement was and continues to have lower emphasis in the Marine Corps' other accession efforts. This is evidenced by the fact that Naval Academy class standing has been weighted about 70 percent for academics and only six percent for military aptitude in recent decades. Meanwhile, class standing at all OCS programs is weighted 50 percent for leadership, 25 percent for military skills, and only 25 percent for academics. (Fagan, 1991) This attests to the Marine Corps' higher emphasis on military achievement than on academic achievement. In this context, the academy accession process was not allowing the Marine Corps to select candidates based on its own determined performance measures. With the number of potential Marine officers constantly exceeding the number of available billets during the period, increasing concern over the quality of accessions surfaced.

Despite the Marine Corps' increased accessions from the academy after 1979, the performance of those graduates and some of those before them in the Marine Corps was less than exceptional. Marine Representative in the early 1980s Colonel McDaniel, an experienced recruiter who had been sent to the Naval Academy specifically to achieve the quota, was successful in increasing the popularity of Marine officer
careers. Despite his success, he was unable to determine which Midshipmen were selected. With the dismal performance records of academy graduates continuing to concern the Marine Corps, the Commandant of the Marine Corps General Paul X. Kelley sent Colonel Ripley to the institution as Marine Representative in 1983. Colonel Ripley was an academy graduate and distinguished combat veteran. He was charged with continuing to reach the Marine Corps quota of graduates, but more importantly to raise the quality of officers accessed. (Director of the MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14).

Upon assuming his duties, Colonel Ripley immediately initiated a study at The Basic School. He examined the performance records of academy graduates at the BOC over the preceding ten years, and then tracked their performance for four years in the Fleet Marine Force. As he expected, the study showed that Naval Academy graduates were stratified in two groups, the top of the class and bottom of the class, at both the BOC and in the operating forces. However, he found that more of these officers were clustered at the bottom than at the top, thereby determining that the current training and selection process at the academy were not adequately serving the Marine Corps’ needs. (Director of the MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14).

After his efforts to implement an organic screening process for Marine commissions at the academy failed, Ripley set his sights on instituting a requirement for Marine Corps selectees to complete an OCS program. Colonel Ripley had previously served as an MOI in an NROTC unit. Based on that experience, he believed that the Marine Corps’ own screening program was the only way to ensure that candidates possessed the mettle required for Marine officer commissions. Setting the Bulldog requirement as his goal, Colonel Ripley
presented his initiative to General Kelley along with the justifying evidence from the study. General Kelly immediately embraced the concept, but charged the negotiations to two general officers on his staff that had graduated from the academy and did not fully embrace the proposal. The reluctance of these officers to push the initiative, coupled with the Navy’s determined resistance, resulted in the Bulldog requirement not materializing during Colonel Ripley’s tenure at the academy. (Director of the MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14).

Throughout Ripley’s term at the academy, the Navy’s resistance to any screening program for the Marine Corps was adamant. First of all, the Navy was convinced that any graduate of its academy was equally prepared to serve in the Navy or Marine Corps, despite the fact that there was little exposure to the Marine Corps in the curriculum. Secondly, the Navy was unconvinced of the need to screen Marine Corps candidates at Bulldog because they were faced with the issue of what to do with the program’s failures. Naturally, the Navy would be forced to commission Midshipmen in its ranks that had essentially amounted to “Marine Corps rejects” (Director of the MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14). Ironically, the Navy had long permitted a screening process for its nuclear power program and frequently commissioned its “rejects” in other communities. Although no stigma seemed to surface over this practice, it remained inconceivable to allow the Marine Corps (an altogether separate service) to implement a similar process.

Just prior to his departure from the academy in 1987, Ripley briefed incoming Secretary of the Navy James Webb on his failed initiatives and showed him the performance data he had obtained (Director of the MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14). Webb, also a distinguished combat Marine and
academy graduate, had long felt that the service academies should produce the best officers in the service and was shocked by the data (Webb, 2000). Furthermore, Webb had come to the same conclusions as Ripley based on his own observations going through the BOC and serving in a recruit-training unit during the early 1970s. Shortly after his appointment, Webb formally instituted the Bulldog requirement for Midshipmen as captured by his 1987 address at the Naval Academy:

Those of you who wish to serve in the Marine Corps, can start thinking about Bulldog. The average class standings at Basic School have dropped dramatically over the past 20 years. The class of 1986 did particularly poorly. They averaged in the bottom 40 percent. This is inexcusable, after four years of study and training. In addition, I signed the promotion board to Captain a few months ago, and was shocked to see that 11 Naval Academy graduates failed selection to Captain in the Marine Corps. (Webb, 1987)

In explaining the dismal performance of former Naval Academy Midshipmen in the Marine Corps and justifying the credibility of the initiative, Webb also commented:

We could be taking too many Academy graduates into the Marine Corps. We could be drawing some who are not properly motivated, or who don't know what they are getting into. But Bulldog will remedy this, and I am very confident that the Naval Academy Marines will do superbly, and will benefit greatly from the training. (Webb, 1987)

Aside from the statistical evidence that prompted the decision, Webb also based the new policy on his concerns about the academy's growing de-emphasis on the military indoctrination function of the academy course. In particular, Webb felt that Marine officers required a boot camp experience and that the Plebe indoctrination no longer equated to that experience. Furthermore, Webb’s decision to implement the Bulldog program for Midshipmen was due to what
he perceived as the Naval Academy’s inconsistency with the Marine Corps accession process. Since NROTC Midshipmen were commissioned into the Navy without attending OCS, he thought the additional screening process was unnecessary for the Navy accessions from the academy. However, since the Marine Corps required an OCS screening in addition to the NROTC program, he believed that the same should apply to the academy Midshipmen accessing into the Marine Corps. (Webb, 2000)

In July 1998 the first Naval Academy Midshipmen participated in the Bulldog program. Reluctantly, the institution made the necessary adjustments in the curriculum to allow the Marine staff to implement a dedicated pre-Bulldog preparation program during the semester preceding the training. As was the practice in NROTC units, Marines from the Naval Academy augmented the OCS staff and served as platoon and company commanders for the Bulldog program. The academy Midshipmen were fully integrated with NROTC and MECEP candidates and

When Bulldog ended, the performance of the Naval Academy candidates also was indistinguishable from that of their counterparts. (Holcomb, 1988, 117)

Naval Academy Midshipmen experienced a 13 percent attrition rate that first summer, slightly below OCS average in the past. However, academy Midshipmen not completing the course did not have the opportunity to return the next summer like the NROTC or MECEP candidates. This presented an institutional problem for the program, since some failures were due to unavoidable physical injuries and not to a candidate’s inability to complete the course. (Director of the Joint Staff, Interview, 2000, March 27) Additionally, the Bulldog course presented a serious conflict when it interfered with varsity athletic programs that began during the summer. Preexisting summer training
programs for Midshipmen were flexible in this respect, but the Bulldog requirement was not. Effectively, this forced a decision between athletic participation and pursuit of a Marine Corps commission. The Naval Academy was consequently concerned about this conflict. (Holcomb, 1988)

Despite its incompatibilities with the Naval Academy’s existing practices, the Bulldog program did alleviate the Marine Corps’ concern over the quality of its academy accessions. As Holcomb related, “The Naval Academy does not develop the leadership style of the midshipman as well as OCS does (1998, 118).” Although the Marine Corps no longer realized its full quota under the Bulldog system, it could ensure that the Midshipmen it commissioned had demonstrated their abilities under the Marine Corps’ own standards. Furthermore, it exposed Naval Academy Midshipmen to the leadership roles played by enlisted Marines for the first time. As a testament to the great value inherent in the experience, one Marine staff member and Bulldog platoon commander from the academy commented:

Nothing at USNA prepared Midshipmen for drill instructor encounter.... Bulldog alumni also have learned that enlisted personnel are skilled professionals and competent leaders, worthy of their respect. This will help fill an important void. (Holcomb, 1988, 118)

Despite its merits, the Bulldog requirement for academy Midshipmen was eliminated in 1992. Beginning with the class of 1993, Midshipmen could again select service in the Marine Corps without having undergone any further screening process. Although the elimination of the program was likely due to the Navy’s concerted efforts, the Marine Corps had also been concerned about the decreasing number of accessions it was receiving from the academy. When asked about the future of the Bulldog requirement for academy
Midshipmen, former Commandant of the Marine Corps General Carl E. Mundy commented:

How will the Marine Corps draw quality Midshipman from the Naval Academy?... Selection rates for promotion in the Marine Corps are significantly higher for Naval Academy graduates. We would draw quality officers from these blue suits out here tonight whether or not we sent them to Bulldog.... I personally don’t favor the continuation of Bulldog as a screening program to screen Naval Academy Midshipmen for coming in the Marine Corps.... The fact that you go [to Bulldog] or not will inhibit your ability to apply for service selection in the Marine Corps. (Mundy, 1991)

In this context, the Bulldog program was terminated for academy Midshipmen and Marine Corps accessions again rose to the quota. While this effectively eliminated the Marine Corps’ ability to screen applicants, the concept of dedicated Marine Corps summer training continued. In 1992, the Academy transitioned to a three-week course conducted at OCS known as Midshipmen Leadership Training (MLT). MLT was a required summer training program for all 3rd Class Midshipmen and was framed as a familiarization tool rather than a screening tool. The program had mixed reviews, and was subsequently replaced with the Leatherneck program in 1993. Therefore, while the Marine Corps lost its screening program when Bulldog was discontinued, the precedent for dedicated Marine summer training was well established.

In the aftermath of the termination of the Bulldog requirement, the 1980s era concerns about the quality of Naval Academy accessions resurfaced. Since the Marine Corps could no longer evaluate academy Midshipmen at OCS, the service had to determine if the academy itself could accomplish the mission of OCS adequately. As one Marine officer wrote just prior to the participation of academy Midshipmen in Bulldog:
The purpose of Bulldog is the evaluation and screening of those persons incapable of handling the pressures of an unfamiliar, high physical and mental stress environment (the closest approximation of combat we can achieve in peacetime). (Owen, Jr., 1987, 34)

While the Leatherneck program had took the place of Bulldog, filling the void of Marine Corps focused training existent during the 1980s, it was not designed to specifically serve the same purpose.

In a study conducted by the commanding officer of the Basic School in the mid 1990s, Naval Academy graduates were found to be performing statistically lower at the BOC than those accessing through PLC, MECEP, ECP, MCP, and NROTC. This study was significant in that it was conducted after the Bulldog requirement had been eliminated and before the new service assignment process had been instituted. Only officers accessed through the OCC program were outperformed by the Naval Academy graduates. This finding prompted the staff at The Basic School to increase its involvement in the new Leatherneck program. (Interview with MCU President, 2000, April 12)

After 1995, the Marine Corps was again able to screen academy applicants with the advent of a new service assignment system. However, this new process did not constitute the same means of screening (by enlisted Marines under Marine Corps standards in a high-stress environment) as that utilized by the Bulldog program. As Webb recently related to a group of aspiring Marine officers from the academy, there is an additional hurdle for academy graduates in the Marine Corps due to their lack of an OCS experience (2000). Particularly, Webb conveyed the sentiment that academy Midshipmen are at an initial disadvantage in the Marine Corps being the only Second Lieutenants that will not have been under the hands of a drill instructor. Since
academy graduates are been screened according to Marine Corps standards, Webb believes that those who would have failed such screening will not perform to standard in the Marine Corps. Meanwhile, he believes that those who would have screened favorably will achieve success despite their lack of an OCS experience. In this respect, he sees the Marine Corps screening process as necessary to perform the selection function, but not to teach any particular skills. Webb did not conclude that Midshipmen would be at any disadvantage due to not receiving the actual OCS instruction. (Webb, 2000)

6. Service Assignment Practices and Procedures

For most of the last half century, the service selection process at the Naval Academy remained static. Midshipmen were allowed to select their service or Navy warfare communities in order of their position on a lineal list based on merit. As long as Midshipmen were physically qualified for their selection, there was no further screening process or prerequisites other than their successful completion of the academy course. While this was the process throughout the period, there were some exceptions that constituted a screening process. In particular, the nuclear power community has long conducted candidate screening through an interview process. Additionally, the Naval Special Warfare community required the completion of a physical-screening course as a prerequisite to service selection. Finally, the requirement for Marine accessions to have completed the Bulldog course from 1989 to 1992 also constituted a prerequisite screening process to service selection. After 1992, Midshipmen were again able to choose their commission in the Marine Corps regardless of the summer and academic year training activities they had participated in.
In 1994, the Naval Academy significantly altered its service selection process. Beginning with the class of 1995, a service assignment system was created. This new system allowed the representatives of the Navy warfare communities and the Marine Corps to select their future members, rather than allowing the Midshipmen to self select. In essence, this drastic departure from the historical process of service selection constituted a further screening process for naval communities beyond what the academy course conferred. Each warfare community and service continued to maintain its numerical caps and gender distribution requirements, but were able to structure their selection requirements, standards, and procedures to fit their needs. (Interviews with USNA graduates, 2000, March)

Long frustrated over its inability to commission some qualified candidates from the lower portion of each class, the Marines at the Naval Academy embraced the new service assignment system. Furthermore, the system offered a means of screening Marine Corps aspirants. Over the years, the performance record of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps had fluctuated according to circumstances surrounding service selection at the academy. For example, during the Vietnam War the Marine officers accessed from the academy compiled exceptional performance records. Since the likelihood of service in Vietnam was virtually guaranteed for Marine selectees, the Midshipmen that selected Marine Corps commissions during the period were cognizant of the risks and likely driven by a genuine desire to serve. (Webb, 2000) In 1980, declining nuclear accessions prompted the Naval Academy to draft selected male members of the graduating class for service in the submarine community. The only option to avoid the draft was to select service in the Marine Corps, and Midshipmen pursued this option in
record numbers. Not surprisingly, the motivation of many of these "Rickover Marines" was not genuine and resulted in unimpressive officer performance records (Bartlett, 1992). Finally, throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s, Midshipmen frequently selected Marine Corps aviation billets when Navy aviation billets became unavailable (Director of the MCHC, Interview, 2000, March 14). In effect, the officers accessed in this manner possibly did not possess a genuine desire to serve as Marine officers. Rather, they pursued Marine Corps commissions solely as a means to become a naval aviator. Under the new service assignment system, the Marine staff at the Naval Academy was finally able to screen out the candidates who appeared to be joining the Marine Corps' ranks for the wrong reasons.

a. Accessions Data

The number of Midshipmen desiring assignment in the Marine Corps has risen in recent years, far exceeding the number of billets available. However, this has not always been the case. Beginning during the Vietnam War era, and lasting until the submarine draft of 1980, the number of billets allotted to the Marine Corps in each class was not filled. After 1980, when the number of applicants for the Marine Corps far exceeded the number of positions available, the Marine Corps regularly attracted more Midshipmen than it could offer commissions. This trend continued until Bulldog requirement was instituted in 1989. From 1989 until the elimination of the Bulldog requirement in 1992, the Marine Corps fell significantly short of its accession goal for the Naval Academy. After the Bulldog requirement subsided for the class of 1993, the Marine Corps again exceeded it goal every year with the exception of 1995. In recent years, particularly after 1995, the Marine Corps has had to turn away large numbers of qualified applicants due to its quota
Tables 3.2 and 3.3 below depict the Marine Corps accessions trends at the academy since 1984 (Division of Professional Development, 2000).

Table 3.2. Accessions under service assignment system (PRODEV, USNA, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Considered</th>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>% Not Selected</th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
<th>Class Size</th>
<th>% of Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2000</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>78.9</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>951</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1999</td>
<td>175</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>84.6</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>148</td>
<td>903</td>
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<tr>
<td>1998</td>
<td>200</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>77.0</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1997</td>
<td>177</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>974</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>66.9</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>957</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 3.3. Accessions under service selection system (PRODEV, USNA, 2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>Ceiling</th>
<th>Class Size</th>
<th>% of Class</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1995</td>
<td>118</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>915</td>
<td>12.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1994</td>
<td>180</td>
<td>160</td>
<td>933</td>
<td>19.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>1052</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1992</td>
<td>142</td>
<td>169</td>
<td>1016</td>
<td>14.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>953</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1990</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>9.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1989</td>
<td>110</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>1076</td>
<td>10.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>178</td>
<td>1062</td>
<td>16.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1987</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>173</td>
<td>1034</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>185</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>18.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1985</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1984</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>1004</td>
<td>16.7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As can be seen in the accessions data, the Marine Corps has reached its ceiling and had to turn away applicants from the Naval Academy in every year since the service assignment system was implemented. On average during those five years, 21 percent of the applicants for Marine Corps commissions were not selected. Many of those candidates were fully qualified to serve as Marine Second Lieutenants, but the quota prohibited their selection. During the service selection system period, it is not possible to determine how many Midshipmen seeking Marine commissions were unable to select the Marine Corps in years that the ceiling was reached. Once the quota was achieved during the period, Midshipmen could no longer select Marine
Corps billets, and thus no record exists indicating whether or not the Marine Corps was their first choice of assignment. The Marine Corps successfully accessed approximately 16 2/3 or more of the graduating class in every year except those that the Bulldog-screening requirement existed. In 1994, the Department of the Navy allowed an additional 20 applicants to be assigned to the Marine Corps (Division of Professional Development, 1994). During the years with the Bulldog requirement, an average of 10.9 percent of the graduating Midshipmen selected service in the Marine Corps. The full quota of 16 2/3 percent of each class was realized both before and after this period.

b. Regulations

Although law allows for the commissioning of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps, it establishes no numerical formula for such distribution. Rather, the authority to establish a numerical distribution resides within the Department of the Navy and has historically been decided upon through a formal or informal agreement between the two services. Prior to 1972, the Navy and Marine Corps came to an informal annual agreement on the academy graduate distribution. By the late 1960s, it had become customary to allot Marine Corps billets to one-sixth, or 16 2/3 percent of each class based on the fact that Marine officers comprised one sixth of all officers in the naval service. (Greenwood, 1975) In 1972, this practice was formalized in a Memorandum of Agreement between the Commandant of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Operations. The memorandum established the Marine Corps’ allotment of academy graduates at 16 2/3 percent of the total and dictated other regulations regarding the commissioning of
Marine officers from the institution. The principal tenets of the agreement were:

- All billets allotted to the Marine Corps will be filled exclusively by volunteers.
- Up to 16 2/3 percent of the graduates of each academy class may be commissioned in the Marine Corps.
- Former Marines or sons of those serving or having served honorably on active duty in the Marine Corps will be identified before service selection and given priority.
- All other Midshipmen will have the opportunity to select the Marine Corps in order of their Overall Order of Merit at the time of service selection.
- Under subscribed Marine billets at service selection or vacancies occurring later due to attrition will not be filled. (Memorandum of Agreement, 1972)

With only minor changes, the 1972 agreement has stood intact to the present day. Its affirmation of the inherently voluntary nature of Marine Corps service selection attests to the institutional belief that service in the Marine Corps is not an expected career path for academy graduates. When women were introduced to the Naval Academy in 1976, the agreement was extended to allow the selection of up to 16 2/3 percent of the female graduates for Marine Corps service also. In 1993 a second memorandum of agreement was signed, this time between the Deputy Chief of Staff for Manpower and Reserve Affairs of the Marine Corps and the Chief of Naval Personnel. This new agreement reaffirmed the 1972 agreement on the numerical distribution and effected minor changes to the process including:

- Clarifying that selection would be based on Overall Order of Merit and gender neutral.
- The review of the agreement on a triennial basis.
- Changing the priority for Marine billets to include only sons or daughters of Marines that were currently serving on active duty, were deceased or disabled while on active duty, or were retired from
the regular component with pay. (Memorandum of Agreement, 1993)

Building on the 1993 changes, a third memorandum of agreement was signed by the personnel chiefs of the two services in 1994. This new agreement was in response to the Marine Corps’ growing interest in accessing more graduates from the academy, as well as the growing interest in Marine commissions that had resulted in a significant number of unaccepted applicants each year. The changes reflected by the 1994 agreement were:

- An allowance for up to 25 percent of the graduating class to be commissioned in the Marine Corps after 30 August 1994.
- An allowance for Marine billets vacated after service selection to be refilled from a waiting list. (Memorandum of Agreement, 1994)

While the 1994 agreement signified a marked departure from the 1972 practice, its tenets were either overturned or never enacted. The formal requirement for acknowledging priority status was eliminated by the service assignment process and the cap for Marine accessions continues to remain at 16 2/3 percent of each academy class.

c. Process

To screen applicants under the current service assignment process, the Marine officers at the Naval Academy convene an annual board. Through this board, they select a number of Midshipmen for Marine commissions up to the established ceiling. The board is chaired by the Marine Representative, and is comprised of six voting Marine members from different segments of the institution. Additionally, numerous Marines at the Naval Academy serve on the board as non-voting recorders. The recorders provide input regarding applicants but do not make decisions. Prior to the convening of the board, each applicant is also
interviewed by a team of Marines. The results of that interview are heavily considered during the selection process.

The current service selection process does not operate under formal requirements. Rather, the entire record of each applicant is assessed, with the goal of determining suitability for a Marine Corps commission. Informally, however, there are particular performance measures that are weighed heavily in the process. Although they are not prerequisites for selection, these performance measures are considered the most important determinants of a Midshipman’s potential to successfully serve as a Marine officer. Primary among these measures are:

- Leatherneck participation and evaluation
- Semper Fidelis Society membership and participation
- Service selection interview team evaluation
- Personal recommendations
- Past or current Marine Corps affiliation

While these are recognized as important measures in the Marine Corps service selection process, they are not strict determinants or guarantees of selection. In fact, during the 2000 service selection board a number of prior enlisted Marines, Semper Fidelis Society members, and Leatherneck participants were not offered Marine Corps billets. Additionally, a number of candidates that had not participated in all of these activities (including the Leatherneck program) were offered Marine Corps commissions. Therefore, the determination of suitability for a Marine Corps commission is made through a detailed evaluation of each applicant’s record. (Division of Professional Development, 2000)
7. Marine Pre-commissioning Initiatives for the Future

As has historically been the case, the Marine Corps continues to seek a larger proportion of Naval Academy graduates. The historical rationale for this initiative was to access better officers, and some evidence indicates that this rationale still persists. The Marine Corps also seeks academy accessions to relieve the pressure existent on its recruiting command. In the past few years, these efforts have intensified with the increased popularity of Marine Corps service and the resulting non-selection of qualified applicants. While the Marines at the Naval Academy are regularly turning away high quality officer applicants, the Marine Corps Recruiting Command is struggling to attract applicants through some of its other accession sources. Beginning in 1997, then Commandant of the Marine Corps General Krulak began a major initiative to increase the Corps’ share of academy graduates. General Krulak’s argument rested primarily on the premise that Marine officers then comprised approximately 25 percent of all naval service officers, as is currently the case, and therefore should be able to access up to 25 percent of the Naval Academy’s graduates if deemed qualified. (Ramos, 1997)

In addition to the increase in accessions, the Marine Corps simultaneously began to seek an expanded role for Marines stationed at the academy. Although General Krulak personally increased the number of Marines at the institution during his tenure, the concern for increased Marine influence has continued to the present day. As Naval Academy Board of Visitors member and Retired Marine Brigadier General Thomas Draude commented in 1997,
It's not the Navy Academy.... There needs to be a bigger role for the Marine Corps in the day-to-day operations of the academy. (Ramos, 1997)

Additionally, Draude, incoming Marine Representative Colonel Patrick Halton, and outgoing Marine Representative Colonel Mike Glynn all felt one of the top four jobs at the academy should always be held by a Marine. At that time, a Marine officer did not hold the Superintendent, Commandant of Midshipmen, Deputy Commandant of Midshipmen, or Head of Character Development positions. (Ramos, 1997) While a Marine currently holds one of these positions, and has during most years after 1993, Navy officers have still exclusively filled the top two jobs.

In September 1998, General Krulak formally asked the Chief of Naval Personnel for an increase in Marine accessions. Specifically, he requested up to 18 percent for 1999 and up to 24 percent thereafter. At the time, the Navy had 55,176 officers on active duty, while the Marine Corps had 17,896. The latter figure constituted exactly 25 percent of all naval service officers. (Ramos, 1998) Despite the Marine Corps' efforts and justification, the Navy categorically resisted the initiative. However, the Secretary of the Navy saw merit in the argument and directed the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) to study it in December 1998. By 1999, CNA had concluded their study and proposed that the Marine Corps be allotted 20 percent of the Naval Academy graduates in 2000 and 22 percent by 2002. Additionally, CNA proposed that the Marine Corps be allotted 22 percent of all NROTC scholarships by 2001. Consequently, the Marine Corps concurred with the results of the study but the Navy did not. The increase in NROTC scholarships has been authorized to date, but the initiative to increase academy accessions is ongoing. (M&RA, 2000)
D. SUMMARY

Through this analysis, the significant contemporary themes of the Marine Corps' naval character and operational orientation, Marine officer commissioning practices, and the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship have been explored. Coupled with the historical analysis, this analysis further developed the context of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship required for the quantitative and qualitative analyses in the study. However, while the study now turns its focus to the evaluation of data, the context established by the first two elements of research is not fully developed. Quantitative and qualitative analysis will provide further evidence that will contribute to the overall context and increase the comprehension of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

Having concluded the analysis of the contemporary context of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, the study now shifts to a quantitative analysis of selected data. With the context of the study well developed through the historical and contemporary analyses, the quantitative analysis will focus on significant aspects of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship that can be measured statistically. While the quantitative analysis intends to measure variable relationships germane to the study, it also serves as a further means of exploration. In this capacity, the quantitative analysis provides a statistical examination of some tenets of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship and provides further evidence for its historical and contemporary contexts.
IV. QUANTITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

A. OVERVIEW

Having thoroughly analyzed the historical and modern contexts of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, the study now switches focus to a statistical evaluation of the implications of that relationship. In this capacity, the study will analyze selected quantitative data with the goal of further exploring significant themes that permeate and characterize the relationship. To focus the analysis, the data has been selected with the purpose of illustrating the effects that the Naval Academy has had on the Marine officer corps in the recent era. In particular, data was sought that reflects the most current impacts of the relationship and provides insights into its evolving future. However, while the statistical evidence is utilized to draw meaningful conclusions concerning the interactions between the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps, it is not intended to fully explain those interactions or provide a basis for policy recommendations. Rather, the statistical analysis in this study serves to further paint the picture of the relationship in concert with the exploratory nature of the study. In essence, the analysis is merely another means to enrich the context established by the historical and modern analyses, as well as to open the door to future research and inquiry.

The framework of this quantitative analysis is built upon three areas of exploration. First, the analysis seeks to explore the institutional influence of the Marine Corps on the Naval Academy through examination of the factors that influence Midshipmen to select Marine commissions. While the scope of this exploration is limited, it is an important initial inquiry into a critical aspect of the relationship.
Second, the analysis seeks to evaluate the academy's preparation of future Marine Corps officers through an examination of their performance at the Basic Officer Course (BOC). Considering the divergence in the training curriculums of the Naval Academy and the other Marine Corps accession programs, this area of analysis is particularly germane to the study. Third, the analysis seeks to evaluate the performance of Naval Academy graduates as Marine Corps junior officers. While a dedicated quantitative study of officer performance is beyond the exploratory scope of this research, recent secondary research on the topic will be explored to further illustrate the prevailing issues in the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship.

Despite the limited objectives of this quantitative research, statistical analysis will perform a critical function in future research on the topic. In this respect, the quantitative function performed here will be a springboard to future efforts. Furthermore, statistical evidence is an essential element of even purely qualitative or historical studies. Furthermore, it generally lays the groundwork for serious policy recommendations. Therefore, statistical analysis was incorporated into this study to both enhance the exploration of the topic and to expand its value beyond the scope of solely qualitative observations.

B. PREVIOUS STUDIES


In 2000, Sergeant K. R. Schneider conducted statistical research at the TBS testing office to determine the accession sources and measure TBS performance of past and current Marine Corps general officers. As a result of the research, the distribution of current active and reserve Marine general officers by commissioning source can be
evaluated. Today, Naval Academy graduates comprise 18.6 percent of the Marine general officer corps. Only general officers accessing from OCC and PLC comprise a larger share, 40.2 percent and 29.4 percent respectively, and this is likely due to the massive influx of accessions from these sources in response to the Vietnam War requirements. The percentage of new accessions that these academy graduates constituted in the late 1960s and early 1970s was not uncovered by this study. However, it can be assumed that their share of the general officer corps is significantly higher than their share of those initial accessions. However, academy graduates only account for 9.8 percent of the Brigadier Generals in the Marine Corps, and the ten FY2000 selections for this grade did not include Naval Academy alumni. In this context, the accession source trends in the Marine officer corps should continue to be evaluated. Table 4.1 depicts the data referenced above.

Table 4.1. General Officer Commissioning Source Distribution (2000)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Rank</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>PLC</th>
<th>ECP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GEN</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>4 (100%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LTGEN</td>
<td>4 (33.3%)</td>
<td>1 (8.3%)</td>
<td>5 (41.7%)</td>
<td>1 (8.3%)</td>
<td>1 (8.3%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGEND</td>
<td>11 (24.4%)</td>
<td>3 (6.7%)</td>
<td>16 (35.6%)</td>
<td>12 (26.7%)</td>
<td>2 (4.4%)</td>
<td>1 (2.2%)</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BGEND</td>
<td>4 (9.8%)</td>
<td>3 (7.3%)</td>
<td>16 (39.0%)</td>
<td>17 (41.5%)</td>
<td>0 (0.0%)</td>
<td>1 (2.4%)</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All</td>
<td>19 (18.6%)</td>
<td>7 (6.9%)</td>
<td>41 (40.2%)</td>
<td>30 (29.4%)</td>
<td>3 (2.9%)</td>
<td>2 (2.0%)</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


In 1991, D. J. Montgomery conducted a study to evaluate the NROTC commissioning source in light of its increased role in regular Marine Corps officer accessions. Montgomery surveyed the MOIs at all 58 NROTC units across the country to solicit their responses to programmed questions and their
opinions about the source's value to the Marine Corps. He used a Likert scale to quantify responses and included amplifying data in his findings. Although the study was focused on the NROTC program, some of the findings did have implications for a study of Marine officer commissioning from the Naval Academy.

One of the most significant findings of the study was that the vast majority of MOIs believed wholeheartedly that Naval Academy Midshipmen must access through an OCS screening program. Specifically, 57 of the 58 respondents believed that academy Midshipmen should attend OCS before receiving a Marine Corps commission, and the only respondent not in agreement was undecided. The responses were likely biased by the fact that the MOIs were closely involved with the OCS program and that Naval Academy Midshipmen were already attending Bulldog. However, here were even academy graduates among the respondents. In a related response, all 58 MOIs also agreed that NROTC Midshipmen must access through an OCS program as well.

A second finding of the study with significance to a study of the Naval Academy was that over half (33 of 58) of the MOIs did not support the practice of granting regular commissions to NROTC graduates. However, many of those who disagreed insisted that the practice should be tied to the commissioning practice of the Naval Academy. Therefore, they felt that the practice should continue as long as the academy did the same. In this respect, the respondents projected the feeling that the two sources were comparable in their function of preparing future Marine officers.

3. Long (1992)

In a 1992 study, P. F. Long analyzed professional and personal characteristics that affected performance later in a Marine officer's career, specifically analyzing promotion
rates to Major, Lieutenant Colonel, and Colonel. Long focused his research on variables independent of performance, and therefore did not utilize data derived from fitness reports or other means of evaluation. He utilized a database comprised of all Captains, Majors, and Lieutenant Colonels in the primary promotion zone from FY1986 to FY1992, and created multivariate promotion models using log-linear stepwise regression. Among his findings, Long determined that accession from the Naval Academy was a positive, statistically relevant factor in selection for promotion to Major and Lieutenant Colonel. While accession from the academy was not found to be significant in the promotion to Colonel, it was the only commissioning source significant to any of Long’s models. In the statistical analysis, Naval Academy graduates promoted to Major at a higher rate over the seven-year period than officers from the other sources. The results of this statistical analysis are depicted in Table 4.2 below.

Table 4.2. Selection Rate to Major (FY1986 to FY1992)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>OCC/PLC/ECF/Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>70.4%</td>
<td>60.8%</td>
<td>66.0%</td>
<td>65.6%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>29.6%</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
<td>34.0%</td>
<td>34.4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


While Long’s study was focused on field grade officer promotion rates, J. H. North and K. D. Smith’s 1993 study examined the effect of accession characteristics on promotion to Captain and Major. The study analyzed a database of all Marine officer accessions from FY1980 to FY1991, compiled from the Headquarters, Marine Corps master file and TBS BOC records. Constructing bivariate probit models, North and Smith found statistical significance in
commissioning source variables, having both positive and negative effects on promotion rates. In their results, they determined that accession from the Naval Academy increased the likelihood of being promoted to Captain while accession through PLC, OCC, and MECEP decreased the likelihood of promotion. While the study did not discover any significance in the academy’s effect on promotion to Major, it did find that accession through PLC, OCC, and ECP were negative determinants.


Like North and Smith, J. J. Hamm again analyzed promotion variables to Captain and Major. Additionally, he extended the research to the evaluation of these variables on BOC performance. Utilizing a database that spanned 12 years and included 17,870 valid cases, Hamm analyzed the performance of all Marine officers that attended the BOC from 1980 to 1991, in order to ensure a statistically significant sized cohort for the Major selection analysis. In his interest to track officer performance patterns as early in the career as possible, he even sought to incorporate OCS data but found it was unavailable. Despite the fact that Hamm was primarily concerned with determining the statistical significance of ethnicity on promotion, his results yielded credible data for the assessment of Naval Academy graduate performance in the Marine Corps.

According to the study’s findings, Naval Academy graduates performed significantly better than OCC and PLC accessions at the BOC. NROTC graduates performed slightly better than academy graduates in the sample, and ECP accessions performed significantly better than those from all other primary commissioning sources. Of interest, officer accessions from secondary sources posted high BOC performance marks during the period, which were not
explained in the study's results. Also, the Naval Academy graduates that had been required to complete the Bulldog course were in the sample, but there is no indication that Hamm broke out these cohorts and analyzed their performance independently. The results of this analysis are reflected in Table 4.3 below.

Table 4.3. Assignment to BOC Third (Hamm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>BOC Third</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>PLC</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>ECP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Top</td>
<td>670 (37.5%)</td>
<td>1448 (41.3%)</td>
<td>1863 (27.1%)</td>
<td>1083 (26.4%)</td>
<td>619 (54.4%)</td>
<td>251 (55.3%)</td>
<td>5934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle</td>
<td>584 (32.6%)</td>
<td>1151 (32.8%)</td>
<td>2461 (35.8%)</td>
<td>1396 (34.0%)</td>
<td>301 (26.5%)</td>
<td>87 (19.2%)</td>
<td>5980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottom</td>
<td>535 (29.9%)</td>
<td>909 (25.9%)</td>
<td>2549 (37.1%)</td>
<td>1626 (39.6%)</td>
<td>217 (19.1%)</td>
<td>116 (25.5%)</td>
<td>5952</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1789</td>
<td>3508</td>
<td>6873</td>
<td>4105</td>
<td>1137</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>17866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In contrast to the findings in the TBS performance analysis, Naval Academy graduates promoted to both Captain and Major at significantly higher rates than did officers from other sources. Academy graduates in the sample promoted to Captain at a rate of 87.8 percent, nearly nine percentage points higher than the next highest source (NROTC at 79 percent), and 14 percentage points higher than the average selection rate (23.8 percent). To Major, academy graduates again promoted the highest at 66.7 percent, over seven percentage points higher than the next highest source (PLC at 59.3 percent), and 9.2 percent higher than the selection rate of 57.5 percent. These statistical results are depicted in Table 4.4 and Table 4.5.

Table 4.4. Selection Rate to Captain (Hamm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>PLC</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>ECP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>1251 (87.8%)</td>
<td>1973 (79.0%)</td>
<td>3437 (70.7%)</td>
<td>1881 (66.3%)</td>
<td>618 (76.7%)</td>
<td>269 (78.2%)</td>
<td>9429 (73.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>173 (12.2%)</td>
<td>525 (21.0%)</td>
<td>1424 (29.3%)</td>
<td>958 (33.7%)</td>
<td>188 (23.3%)</td>
<td>75 (21.8%)</td>
<td>3343 (26.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1424</td>
<td>2498</td>
<td>4861</td>
<td>2839</td>
<td>806</td>
<td>344</td>
<td>12772</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Table 4.5. Selection Rate to Major (Hamm)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>PLC</th>
<th>OCC</th>
<th>ECP</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>88 (66.7%)</td>
<td>136 (56.2%)</td>
<td>239 (59.3%)</td>
<td>168 (56.2%)</td>
<td>67 (54.0%)</td>
<td>42 (48.3%)</td>
<td>740 (57.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>44 (33.3%)</td>
<td>106 (43.8%)</td>
<td>164 (40.7%)</td>
<td>131 (43.8%)</td>
<td>57 (46.0%)</td>
<td>45 (51.7%)</td>
<td>547 (42.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>299</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>1287</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


D. W. Estridge conducted the final statistical study in this evaluation in 1995. The purposes of his study were: To build credible models to estimate the effects of personal and professional characteristics on promotion to Major and Lieutenant Colonel in the Marine Corps and to estimate the effect of Naval Postgraduate School education on promotion rates. Utilizing FY1993 and FY1994 promotion board results, Estridge created a database of 1521 Captains in zone for promotion to Major and 1453 Majors in zone for promotion to Lieutenant Colonel. He constructed and analyzed binomial logistic regression models, and created performance indices from fitness reports in addition to other characteristic variables from the master file. As a result, Estridge discovered that higher mean fitness report scores were consistently equated with higher selection rates. In regard to Naval Academy accessions, their promotion rates were again the highest of any commissioning source for selection to both Major and Lieutenant Colonel. Academy graduates averaged a 72.6 percent promotion rate to Major, nearly four points higher than the second highest source (OCC and PLC at 68.7 percent), and over five points higher than the overall promotion rate (67.3 percent). Similarly, they promoted to Lieutenant Colonel at a rate of 60.4 percent, 4.5 percent higher than the next highest (NROTC, OCC and PLC at 55.9 percent), and over five percent higher than the average
promotion rate. The above data is reflected in Table 4.6 and Table 4.7.

Table 4.6. Selection Rate to Major (Estridge)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>OCC/PLC</th>
<th>ECP/Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>98 (72.6%)</td>
<td>127 (59.6%)</td>
<td>516 (68.7%)</td>
<td>75 (66.4%)</td>
<td>816 (67.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>37 (27.4%)</td>
<td>86 (40.4%)</td>
<td>235 (31.3%)</td>
<td>38 (33.6%)</td>
<td>396 (32.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>751</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>1212</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 4.7. Selection Rate to Lieutenant Colonel (Estridge)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected</th>
<th>USNA</th>
<th>NROTC</th>
<th>OCC/PLC</th>
<th>ECP/Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>32 (60.4%)</td>
<td>52 (55.9%)</td>
<td>222 (55.9%)</td>
<td>13 (44.8%)</td>
<td>319 (55.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>21 (39.6%)</td>
<td>41 (44.1%)</td>
<td>181 (44.1%)</td>
<td>16 (55.2%)</td>
<td>259 (44.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>403</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>578</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

C. SERVICE SELECTION DATA ANALYSIS

1. Context

The first primary data analyzed in this study provides insight into the inclination of Midshipmen at the Naval Academy to pursue a career in the Marine Corps. Although every Midshipman at the academy is eligible to seek a Marine Corps commission through the service selection process, it is assumed that certain factors in the academy experience will increase or decrease their likelihood of aspiring to be a Marine officer. To be certain, most of these factors are statistically immeasurable and may or may not be influenced by the Naval Academy experience. In that respect, an intensive study of the motivations that drive Midshipmen toward the Marine Corps would lend itself more toward focused qualitative research and examination of interview or questionnaire data. This analysis is limited to quantitative data and does not seek to explore the
intangible factors affecting a Midshipman’s likelihood of selecting the Marine Corps. However, it does seek to uncover a limited number of statistically measurable factors that may be influential. In this context, the data analysis that follows is a cursory examination of military, academic, and professional orientations of academy Midshipman that may influence their interest in a Marine commission.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this statistical analysis is to identify those individual experiences at the Naval Academy that may influence a Midshipman’s community choice. Specifically, the analysis seeks to determine if any military experience, academic endeavor, or other factor associated with the academy positively contributes to a Midshipman’s desire to serve as an officer in the Marine Corps. While it is unquestionable that personal factors such as personality, lineage, and background play a significant role in this process, this analysis will focus strictly on individual academic and military experiences that may influence that choice. In other words, this study does not seek to explain every factor that may contribute to Naval Academy service selection. Rather, it seeks to explore the possibility that some seemingly significant factors do contribute to the process.

While the Naval Academy equally prepares Midshipmen for service as Navy or Marine officers, the desire of an individual to enter the latter branch of service represents a more significant departure from the academy experience than do the Navy warfare communities. It is assumed that the Marine Corps attracts Midshipmen that are both fundamentally different in personal and professional orientation, and have different experiences during the four years at the Naval Academy. In that context, this
statistical analysis of academy Midshipmen will serve to explore those experiences and identify possible influences on selecting to serve in the Marine Corps.

3. Data Source

The data utilized in this analysis was a sample drawn from Naval Academy service selection data for the graduating classes of 1997 and 1998. The sample included 1,836 individual cases, 928 from the 1997 class and 908 from the 1998 class. Every graduating Midshipman in these two classes was included in the sample. After recoding, 41 separate variables were examined, primarily focused on class rankings, service selection choices, and academic courses of study. The complete list of variables containing statistical data for the sample is included in Appendix A. All data in the sample was compiled by the Institutional Research Center at the Naval Academy and was furnished to them by the institution.

Although the data includes all cases from the graduating classes of 1997 and 1998, incomplete data exists for some variables. In particular, the Academic Order of Merit (AOOM) and Military Order of Merit (MOOM) variables are missing numerous cases in the lowest quartile of each class. These missing cases can be explained by the fact that the sample does not include cases that were valid at service selection but attrited prior to graduation. In effect the lowest quartile of the AOOM and MOOM rankings include less than 25 percent of the total cases. Conversely, the Overall Order of Merit (OOOM) variable was recomputed after graduation, thereby adhering to a scale that reflects all of the cases in the sample. Therefore, all quartiles of the OOOM ranking will reflect 25 percent of the total number of cases in the sample.
The most important variable in the analysis contains data on the cases in the sample that selected the Marine Corps as their first choice (firstmar). While the variable containing data on which cases were eventually assigned to the Marine Corps was also included in the data set, it was not utilized for the purpose of this analysis. Rather than examining the factors associated with Midshipmen that were ultimately selected for the Marine Corps, this analysis exclusively examined the factors associated with Midshipmen that intended to serve in the Marine Corps. By utilizing this approach, the analysis aimed to discover the possible influences on that intent, regardless of whether or not it resulted in selection.

4. Hypothesis

In order to establish a hypothesis, every variable in the sample that could possibly contribute to primary selection of the Marine Corps was evaluated. The variables that were expected to be important in the analysis included:

- Military Order of Merit (MOOM)
- Academic Order of Merit (AOOM)
- Group III Academic Major (group3)
- Gender (gender)

In light of the assumed divergence between the institutional cultures of the Navy and the Marine Corps, it was expected that Midshipmen whose academy experiences most closely meshed with the Marine Corps would be most likely to service select it first. In this context, the MOOM ranking, essentially a ranking of military aptitude for each Midshipman, seemed likely to have a positive influence on the likelihood of selecting the Marine Corps. Since military aptitude is fundamental to the Marine Corps profession, it was assumed that Midshipmen who had excelled
in this area would be more likely to select the Marine Corps than Navy warfare communities.

In contrast to the assumption about MOOM, AOOM, essentially a ranking of academic aptitude for each Midshipman, was expected to have a negative influence on the likelihood of selecting the Marine Corps first. Because of the technical core curriculum of the academy, it was assumed that individuals that were less inclined toward a technical occupation would gravitate toward the Marine Corps. It was also expected that those Midshipmen that were less technically inclined would perform at a lower level, thereby becoming more attracted to the Marine Corps where technical emphasis within the officer corps is virtually nonexistent.

Building on the previous premise, it was assumed that individuals with Group III academic majors, namely those from the humanities and social science fields, would be more likely to select the Marine Corps first. While all Naval Academy graduates receive some technical foundation in their academic education, the Marine Corps only requires a bachelor’s degree for commissioning. This is clearly evidenced in the NROTC program curriculum where Midshipman seeking a Navy commission must complete two semesters each of physics and higher mathematics courses. In contrast, those seeking a Marine Corps commission are excused from this requirement. Since the Marine Corps places less of an emphasis than the Navy on the technical abilities of its officers, it is understandable why the requirements differ. Additionally, it is commonly believed that the Marine Corps attracts more officers with liberal arts backgrounds since it places its emphasis on leaders that can think and articulate. While the Navy also seeks officers with verbal and cognitive abilities, it attracts more officers with technical backgrounds since it equally seeks leaders with
the skills to operate sophisticated systems. In this context, it was assumed that Group III academic majors would either find more utility for their academic skills in the Marine Corps or perceive themselves as potentially disadvantaged in the technically focused Navy officer corps.

Although gender was not considered a factor influenced by the Naval Academy experience, it was included in the analysis due to its assumed influence on a Midshipman's professional outlook. In this context, the final assumption of the hypothesis is that gender will have an influence on the decision to service select the Marine Corps first. In particular, it is assumed that women will be less likely to prefer the Marine Corps to Navy warfare specialties since their opportunities in certain primary fields are restricted. Although women have been integrated into the most Marine occupational fields, they are still excluded from the combat arms specialties. Additionally, women cannot be assigned to career enhancing combat service support billets when they are organic to combat arms units. Therefore, while on the surface it appears that women have widespread opportunities to serve in the Marine Corps, these opportunities are still significantly limited. In contrast, with the exceptions of the small submarine and special warfare communities in the Navy, women have unlimited opportunities in the surface warfare and aviation communities that comprise the largest portion of the Navy unrestricted line. In this context, it is assumed that female Midshipmen will perceive these limitations and be less inclined toward Marine Corps service selection.

5. Methodology

The method of conducting this statistical analysis was prescribed by the following format:
• The initial assumption was made that some factors based on the Naval Academy experience influence the service selection decision made by a Midshipman.

• The focus was narrowed to determining which factors influenced Midshipmen to service select the Marine Corps first.

• Professional observations and experiences were assessed to determine which factors would likely influence a Midshipman to pursue a Marine Corps commission.

• A hypothesis was formed based on the factors of the Naval Academy experience that likely influenced the service selection of Marine Corps.

• Data was acquired and variables were identified for hypothesis testing.

• Data analysis was conducted focusing on statistical frequencies and relationships evidenced through cross tabulations and means comparisons.

6. Results

After three and a half years of intensive professional development, Naval Academy Midshipmen are well educated about the roles of the Marine Corps and Navy warfare specialties at the commencement of the service selection. In this context, it was assumed that Midshipman had gained the necessary exposure to their choices and understood where they were best suited to serve by this juncture. In examining the frequency of Midshipmen being granted their first choice at service selection, it was revealed that the vast majority of them were assigned to an occupational field or service they primarily selected. In the sample, 90.7 percent of the cases indicated receipt of the first choice of service or community. Furthermore, 96.9 percent received either their first or second choice and 98.9 percent received at least their third choice. Virtually none of the Midshipman received their last three choices. This data is represented in Table 4.8 below.
Table 4.8. Choice of Community Assigned at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>6th</th>
<th>Missing Value</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1666</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(90.7%)</td>
<td>(6.2%)</td>
<td>(2.0%)</td>
<td>(.4%)</td>
<td>(.3%)</td>
<td>(.1%)</td>
<td>(.3%)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Analysis of the academic majors of Midshipman at the time of commissioning revealed that relatively high percentages had selected the four humanities and social science majors offered. Of interest, the political science major actually had the highest frequency at the technically focused institution with 11.8 percent of the total. Not surprisingly, Midshipman with Group I academic majors had the highest percentage of the total with 38.8 percent.

Table 4.9. Academic Major at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Code</th>
<th>Major</th>
<th>Group</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>% of Cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>EAS</td>
<td>Aerospace Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EEE</td>
<td>Electrical Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EGE</td>
<td>General Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EME</td>
<td>Mechanical Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>179</td>
<td>9.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENA</td>
<td>Naval Architecture</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EOE</td>
<td>Ocean Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESE</td>
<td>Systems Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESP</td>
<td>Marine Engineering</td>
<td>I</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FBC</td>
<td>Economics</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FPS</td>
<td>Political Science</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HES</td>
<td>English</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>7.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HHS</td>
<td>History</td>
<td>III</td>
<td>151</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCH</td>
<td>Chemistry</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SCS</td>
<td>Computer Science</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SGS</td>
<td>General Science</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>3.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SMA</td>
<td>Mathematics</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td>Ocean</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>163</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPH</td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPH</td>
<td>Physics</td>
<td>II</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>1836</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conversely, Group II majors had the lowest frequency with 24.9 percent. By statistical determination, none of the categories appeared to encompass an overwhelming majority of
the Midshipman. The results of this analysis are reflected in Table 4.9 above.

Moving to the analysis of factors expected to increase the likelihood of selecting the Marine Corps, the MOOM variable was examined first. Analysis of the effect of MOOM on selecting the Marine Corps first revealed negligible statistical significance. However, by examining the variable in quartiles, it was revealed that Midshipmen selecting the Marine Corps first were less likely to be in the higher two quartiles than those that chose Navy communities (49.2 percent vs. 53.6 percent). This result was in sharp contrast to the hypothesized relationship, and seemed to disprove the assumption that superior military performance increased a Midshipman’s likelihood of selecting the Marine Corps. The results of this cross tabulation are reproduced in table 4.10.

Table 4.10. Military Order of Merit Quartile at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected USMC First</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>396 (26.4%)</td>
<td>408 (27.2%)</td>
<td>380 (25.3%)</td>
<td>316 (21.1%)</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>87 (26.3%)</td>
<td>76 (22.9%)</td>
<td>95 (28.6%)</td>
<td>74 (22.3%)</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>483</td>
<td>484</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>1832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the MOOM variable, statistical analysis of the effect of AOOM on selecting the Marine Corps first also revealed minimal relevance. However, by again examining the variable in quartiles, it was revealed that Midshipman that chose Marine Corps first were more likely to be in the lowest quartile than those that chose Navy communities (24.7 percent vs. 21 percent). Likewise, they were less likely to be in the highest two quartiles than those selecting Navy communities first were (49.4 percent vs. 53.4 percent). In this context, the results were in accordance with the
hypothesized relationship. Table 4.11 below depicts the data explained in these observations.

Table 4.11. Academic Order of Merit Quartile at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected USMC First</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>407</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>1500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(26.3%)</td>
<td>(27.1%)</td>
<td>(25.5%)</td>
<td>(21.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.0%)</td>
<td>(24.4%)</td>
<td>(25.9%)</td>
<td>(24.7%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>478</td>
<td>488</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>397</td>
<td>1832</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Examining a cross tabulation between gender and the likeliness of choosing the Marine Corps first produced results that corresponded to the hypothesis. Only 10.5 percent of the Midshipman that selected the Marine Corps first were female, as opposed to 14.2 percent of the total that chose Navy warfare communities. The results of this analysis are depicted in Table 4.12 below.

Table 4.12. Gender at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected USMC First</th>
<th>Male</th>
<th>Female</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1288</td>
<td>213</td>
<td>1501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(85.8%)</td>
<td>(14.2%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>298</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(89.5%)</td>
<td>(10.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1586</td>
<td>248</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

A cross tabulation between those that selected the Marine Corps first and those that received their first choice resulted in an unexpected finding. Those that selected the Marine Corps first were 88.6 percent likely to receive their first choice while those that chose Navy warfare communities were 91.6 percent likely to receive their first choice. While this result was not particularly germane to the hypothesized model, it does indicate that the interest in service selecting the Marine Corps outweighs the interest in selecting the Navy warfare communities on
average. The results of this cross tabulation are reflected in Table 4.13 below.

Table 4.13. Community Choice Assigned at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected USMC First</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>5th</th>
<th>.6th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>1370</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(91.6%)</td>
<td>(5.8%)</td>
<td>(2.0%)</td>
<td>(0.1%)</td>
<td>(0.3%)</td>
<td>(0.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>295</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(88.6%)</td>
<td>(7.8%)</td>
<td>(1.8%)</td>
<td>(1.5%)</td>
<td>(0.3%)</td>
<td>(0.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1665</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1828</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Returning to the hypothesis, an examination of the academic major groups with respect to the likeliness of choosing the Marine Corps first was conducted. As expected, this produced statistically relevant results that corresponded to the hypothesis. Midshipman that chose the Marine Corps first were less likely to be Group I academic majors (31.8 percent vs. 40.2 percent), less likely to be Group II majors (17.1 percent vs. 26.6 percent), and considerably more likely to be Group I majors (51.1 percent vs. 33.1 percent) than those that chose Navy warfare communities. The examination of individual majors for those that chose the Marine Corps first also produced similar results. With the exception of two outliers, general engineering and general science, the percentages for the prospective Marine officers were categorically lower in all other Group I and II majors, and higher in all Group III majors. A possible explanation for these outliers is that both majors essentially constitute a survey curriculum within their individual groups. Therefore, they are less technically oriented than the other Group I and Group II academic majors. Data relating to the examination of major groups on service selection is depicted in Table 4.14.
Table 4.14. Academic Major Group at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected USMC First</th>
<th>Group I</th>
<th>Group II</th>
<th>Group III</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>1501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(40.2%)</td>
<td>(26.7%)</td>
<td>(33.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(31.8%)</td>
<td>(17.1%)</td>
<td>(51.1%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>667</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although not prompted by the original hypothesis, another variable evaluated for possible influence on choosing the Marine Corps first was the OOOM. This variable was tested after the minimally relevant findings with the two other order of merit variables and was found to have greater relevance. Midshipmen who chose the Marine Corps first were considerably less likely to be in the highest two quartiles than those that chose Navy communities (43.5 percent vs. 51.5 percent). Because the OOOM is heavily weighted by the AOOM, the result was not totally unexpected. However, further testing would be required since the quartiles do not give a completely accurate representation of the effect of any order of merit variable. The results of this finding are detailed in Table 4.15 below.

Table 4.15. Overall Order of Merit Quartile at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected USMC First</th>
<th>1st</th>
<th>2nd</th>
<th>3rd</th>
<th>4th</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No</td>
<td>384</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>360</td>
<td>368</td>
<td>1501</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(25.6%)</td>
<td>(25.9%)</td>
<td>(24.0%)</td>
<td>(24.5%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yes</td>
<td>73</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(21.9%)</td>
<td>(21.6%)</td>
<td>(29.4%)</td>
<td>(27.0%)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>457</td>
<td>461</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>458</td>
<td>1834</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As a final means of analyzing the data in the sample, the mean rank in each order of merit variable was compared for those selecting both the Marine Corps and Navy Warfare
communities. Additionally, the comparison was extended to each of the specific Marine Corps options selected: ground (firstgrd), pilot (firstplt), and naval flight officer (firstmfo). In all order of merit categories, cases selecting the Marine Corps first were lower (higher on the scale) than those choosing Navy communities first. In the case of those selecting Marine ground occupations first, these results were lower yet. Consequently, Midshipman selecting Marine pilot billets first were higher in all categories than those choosing other specialties. The results for Marine NFOs were mixed, lower in OOOM and AOOM but higher in MOOM. Overall, these results indicate the need for divergent research into the factors affecting the likelihood of selecting Marine ground and aviation communities first. For the purposes of this exploratory analysis, the focus remained on the selection of the Marine Corps as a cohesive whole. The results of this analysis are depicted in Table 4.16 below.

Table 4.16. Mean Order of Merit at Service Selection

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Selected First</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>OOOM</th>
<th>MOOM</th>
<th>AOOM</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>1500</td>
<td>464.09</td>
<td>465.14</td>
<td>465.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>332</td>
<td>501.57</td>
<td>477.75</td>
<td>485.87</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Ground</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>522.49</td>
<td>510.15</td>
<td>504.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Pilot</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>461.37</td>
<td>429.16</td>
<td>440.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine NFO</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>492.91</td>
<td>424.67</td>
<td>507.15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>1832</td>
<td>470.90</td>
<td>467.43</td>
<td>469.43</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

D. BOC PERFORMANCE DATA ANALYSIS

1. Context

The second set of primary data analyzed in this study provides a measurement of Naval Academy graduate performance at the Basic Officer Course (BOC). Despite the variation
amongst accession sources in pre-commissioning military training, all new Second Lieutenants receive their first training as Marine officers through attendance of a BOC course. Although BOC performance is not necessarily an indicator of officer performance later in the career, it is certainly a credible measure of a new officer's performance level at the time of commissioning. In this respect, BOC performance is an indicator of both the individual performance capacity of a Marine officer at commissioning and the preparation afforded an officer by his or her accession source. This statistical analysis does not completely determine the degree to which the commissioning source itself was a determinant of an individual's performance. However, it does indicate the collective performance level of officers from a particular source. Therefore, the analysis provides tangible evidence of the performance of Naval Academy graduates at the BOC during the period.

A particular benefit of this statistical analysis is that it facilitates performance measurement of officers prior to indoctrination into the Marine Corps culture. Effectively, the analysis measures their performance as Marine officers during a period when their only experience is derived from their commissioning source. Although some officers in the sample accessed from the enlisted ranks, thereby affording them a previous level of Marine Corps indoctrination, such experience does not eliminate the benefit of the study. Rather, it allows analysis of that experience and measures its value against accession directly from civil life or other means. In essence, the analysis provides insight into the collective abilities of Marine officers from different commissioning sources during their first professional Marine Corps endeavor. While similar
performance analysis can be, has been, and should continue to be conducted later in an officer's career, the influence of commissioning source during later periods will not be as strong as during the BOC. A myriad of factors such as career paths, occupational orientations, family situations, retention decisions, duty assignments, and command relations will impact performance measurement later in the career. Since officers at the BOC are unaffected by these factors, affected by them equally, or affected in a much less divergent manner, the influence of commissioning source on performance is more easily determinable. For most new officers, the preparation afforded by their commissioning source is the strongest non-personal factor in their BOC performance.

2. Purpose

The purpose of this statistical analysis is to determine the initial performance level of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps in comparison to officers commissioned through other accession sources. In the context of previous research and historical changes in the academy's service selection process and training programs, the analysis particularly seeks to determine the performance capacity of Naval Academy graduates as Marine officers in recent years. Considering the significant changes in the service selection process and Marine Corps focused training programs at the academy in the previous five years, an analysis of BOC performance is merited. Furthermore, since many of these changes have been in response to scrutiny from the Marine Corps, the analysis will help partially answer the question of whether or not the Naval Academy now satisfactorily accomplishes the mission of OCS. Alternately, the analysis will help answer the question of whether or not satisfaction of the OCS mission is necessary.
While the purpose of this statistical analysis is to evaluate the collective performance of academy graduates at one level of their Marine Corps career, it does not intend to make a results-based assessment of the value of Naval Academy graduates to the Marine officer corps. Rather, it intends to merely indicate their performance at one career stage when they are equally competing with officers from all other primary accession sources. In essence, the analysis seeks to determine the performance of officers based on the preparation afforded by their commissioning source. It does not attempt to determine how they will perform later in their careers. In the context of the entire study, this data analysis serves to explore yet another aspect of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Specifically, the analysis examines statistical evidence of the suitability of the academy as a Marine officer accession source. Rather than determine whether academy graduates are more or less suited for Marine Corps service, the analysis will determine how they perform as Marines armed with little more than their Naval Academy experience.

3. Data Source

The data utilized in this analysis was a sample drawn from BOC classes that commenced from 1995 to 1999. The classes selected for the study were D, E, and F companies from 1996 to 1999; and E and F companies from 1995. The sample included 3,136 individual cases; 646 from the 1999 classes, 721 from the 1998 classes, 670 from the 1997 classes, 711 from the 1996 classes, and 388 from the 1995 classes. Every graduating Second Lieutenant in these companies was included in the sample, as well as students that did not successfully graduate with their respective class. After recoding, 43 separate variables were examined, primarily focused on commissioning source, military
occupational specialty (MOS), leadership aptitude scores, academic aptitude scores, military skills aptitude scores, and overall class rankings. The complete list of variables containing statistical data for the sample is included in Appendix B. All data in the sample was compiled from course data catalogued in the TBS Testing Office. The data utilized in the study was digitally recorded on proprietary software and required conversion prior to statistical analysis. BOC data for courses convening prior to E Company in 1995 were unavailable in digital format.

Although The Basic School convened six BOCs during each of the years in the sample, only the data from three of the courses were examined. Of the six courses, the three selected were the only ones that included a significant number of Naval Academy graduates. Since the vast majority of academy accessions enter the active force at the same time, they are normally concentrated in the selected classes. Although some academy graduates during the period were not included in the sample, their number is miniscule, rendering the exclusion insignificant to the overall results. Almost every Naval Academy graduate that entered the Marine Corps from 1995 to 1999 was included in the sample.

While the exclusion of a few Naval Academy graduates in the sample does not pose a limitation on the analysis, the exclusion of numerous cases that accessed through other sources during the period may. By excluding three classes during each year examined, the performance of only a select group of Second Lieutenants from the other commissioning sources is analyzed. While the excluded data precludes the determination of overall performance rates (by source) for each year of the sample, it still allows the analysis of a performance rate snapshot during a given BOC. Furthermore,
the number of cases from each source is more than adequate to allow an analysis of statistical significance.

Although the inclusion of all courses during the period would seem to have enhanced the study of overall performance rates, it consequentially would have biased the results. Since much of the student performance at the BOC is measured in relation to the performance of other students, the study focused on those courses that included a significant mix of cases from each commissioning source. In particular, the study focused on those courses attended by a significant number of academy graduates. Since few Naval Academy, NROTC, and MECEP students attend the other three courses, it would not be possible to determine how students from other sources would have competed with them. In effect, the inclusion of data from the excluded courses would likely have either raised or lowered their average performance rates in the overall sample. While such an analysis would have adequately demonstrated the performance of all Naval Academy graduates at the BOC, in relation to all other officers that attended the course, it would not have demonstrated the performance of academy graduates when competing with other students. The aim of this study was to determine how academy graduates performed when competing with other officers at the BOC. Therefore, the exclusion of the three courses was determined as the best means to that end.

In the sample, complete data exists for all graduates of each BOC. For the few cases representing non-graduates, data is unavailable for aptitude scores and class rankings. This unavailable data resulted in some minor gaps in class rankings and a slightly disproportionate number of cases in each percentile category in the sample. Additionally, some non-graduates are not included in the data for each
course because they were recycled into a later course prior to graduation. With the possible exception of the 1999 courses, the data for these cases is reflected in the sample and classified under the course from which they ultimately graduated. While the recycled cases did not result in class ranking gaps, they were responsible for the variation in overall class size. In regard to all BOC non-graduates, it is impossible to account for their performance in the sample due to missing data or recycling. For this reason, it cannot be determined from the data how many Second Lieutenants in each class actually failed to complete the course. The non-graduates that were still enrolled in a given BOC at graduation are reflected in the data. Conversely, the number of students recycled or dropped permanently from the course prior to graduation is not reflected. Therefore, the results of the analysis can only accurately reflect the performance of BOC graduates in relation to other graduates, and not in relation to all students that began the course.

4. Hypothesis

In order to establish a hypothesis, every performance and attribute variable in the sample was evaluated. The variables that were expected to be relevant in the analysis included:

- Commissioning source by primary category (source_p)
- Academic aptitude score (ac_scor) and ranking (ac_rank)
- Military skills aptitude score (mil_scor) and ranking (mil_rank)
- Leadership aptitude score (ld_scor) and ranking (ld_rank)
- Overall aptitude score (ov_scor) and ranking (ov_rank)

191
As the examination of each Marine officer-commissioning source indicates, the level of pre-commissioning screening, evaluation, and preparation varies in form and intensity. Therefore, it was expected that officers accessing from the different sources would perform at different levels on average at the BOC. Previous studies and qualitative research further provided evidence to base this assumption.

It was assumed that the Naval academy graduates had undergone the most intensive and structured academic experience during their undergraduate years. Therefore, it was assumed that they would perform better than officers from other sources in the academic aptitude category. It was not assumed that the Naval Academy necessarily produced the most academically talented officers or that it provided the highest quality academic education. However, it was assumed that the academy’s academic environment was most similar to that experienced during the BOC. In this context, it was expected that academy graduates would be best prepared for a rigorous academic curriculum when simultaneously constrained by other professional endeavors. Only officers with prior enlisted Marine Corps service were expected to be more familiar with the academic subjects, thereby performing at a higher level.

Although the OCS does not regard military skills instruction as its primary purpose, it nonetheless incorporates a significant amount of military skills training into its curriculum. In this context, it is assumed that Naval Academy graduates would be less apt to perform better in the military skills category than officers that participated in an OCS course would. The exception to this assumption was with regard to OCC accessions. OCC graduates were expected to perform at the lowest level due to their historically low performance patterns. However, in
light of the increase in Marine Corps focused familiarization and preparation programs at the Naval Academy during the period, it was assumed that academy graduates would perform better than indicated by past research. While the OCS course was still assumed to provide a better foundation in military skills than the academy programs, a statistically relevant disparity in performance was only expected in comparison to prior enlisted Marine officers.

The Marine Corps focused curriculum at the Naval Academy was assumed to nearly compensate for the OCS experience in military skills aptitude. However, the same assumption was not made in regard to leadership aptitude. Based on the evaluation of the Naval Academy experience, it was determined that the leadership training received by Midshipman was fundamentally different from the leadership concept evaluated at the BOC. Conversely, the leadership evaluation and training in the OCS courses was evaluated and considered similar to that conducted at the BOC. In this context, it was assumed that Naval Academy graduates would be at an initial disadvantage due to lack of exposure with the Marine Corps' concept of leadership. Consequently, it was assumed that academy graduates would perform below the level of officers from other sources in leadership evaluations. However, OCC accessions were again expected to perform at the lowest level due to their performance in previous studies and the Marine Corps' limited ability to evaluate them prior to commissioning.

Based on the previous research, qualitative evidence, and the assumptions detailed above, Naval Academy graduates were expected to perform at overall levels below officers accessing through enlisted commissioning programs and NROTC, and above officers accessing through PLC and OCC. The only
previous quantitative study reviewed on overall BOC performance indicated a result similar to this assumption. However, in light of the increased emphasis on Marine Corps familiarization and training at the Naval Academy, it is assumed that the performance gap between academy graduates and the other sources (OCC and PLC excluded) would be much smaller. In fact, statistical relevance in the analysis of these variables was only expected with regard to PLC, OCC, and MECEP accessions.

5. Methodology

The method of conducting this statistical analysis was prescribed by the following format:

- The initial assumption was made that the commissioning source of newly commissioned Marine Corps Second Lieutenants would influence their performance at their first professional officer development school.

- The focus was narrowed to specifically assessing the performance of Naval Academy graduates at the BOC.

- Professional observations and experiences, previous studies, and quantitative data were assessed to determine how Naval Academy graduates would likely perform at the BOC.

- A hypothesis was formed based on the above assessment as to the performance of academy graduates in the course.

- Data was acquired and variables were identified for hypothesis testing.

- Data analysis was conducted focusing on statistical frequencies and relationships evidenced through cross tabulations and means comparisons.

6. Results

Based on an initial evaluation of the data set, Naval Academy graduates performed much higher than expected by the hypothesis. When comparing the mean class rank of cases by principal commissioning source category, academy graduates consistently performed higher than all other students except
those accessing through MECEP. The mean rank of academy graduates was higher than that of students accessing through PLC, OCC, NROTC, and secondary sources. With the exception of the leadership ranking, Naval Academy graduates achieved a higher mean rank than ECP and MCP accessions who had come from the Marine Corps enlisted ranks. These results of the initial analysis are depicted in Table 4.17 below.

In the overall class-ranking category, academy graduates posted the second highest mean of all sources (98.43). This was over 17 points higher than the average mean rank (114.84) and over 14 points higher than the mean for NROTC graduates (112.54). This was an important finding since NROTC graduates were expected to perform at a higher rate than did academy graduates.

Table 4.17. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (Total)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>112.87</td>
<td>108.00</td>
<td>108.18</td>
<td>122.53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>103.91</td>
<td>107.73</td>
<td>97.95</td>
<td>106.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>69.37</td>
<td>77.25</td>
<td>69.14</td>
<td>84.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>112.54</td>
<td>109.20</td>
<td>115.23</td>
<td>114.84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>143.59</td>
<td>141.43</td>
<td>135.03</td>
<td>139.45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>103.90</td>
<td>105.58</td>
<td>111.22</td>
<td>97.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>121.81</td>
<td>125.33</td>
<td>116.99</td>
<td>119.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>98.43</td>
<td>98.22</td>
<td>105.98</td>
<td>96.12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>114.84</td>
<td>114.85</td>
<td>113.77</td>
<td>114.90</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>114.84</td>
<td>114.85</td>
<td>113.77</td>
<td>114.90</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Similarly important was the fact that Naval Academy graduates performed at a higher rate than did students from two of the three primary enlisted accession sources. MCP accessions achieved a mean of 103.91 and ECP accessions achieved a mean of 112.87, over five and 14 points lower.
respectively than academy graduates. As expected, MECEP graduates achieved a mean overall rank (69.37) nearly 30 points higher than did academy graduates. This indicates that the significant enlisted experience of most MECEP accessions appears to confer a great advantage at the BOC. Likewise, the fact that most MCP accessions carry more enlisted experience than ECP accessions seems to again indicate that the amount of enlisted experience is an influential factor in BOC performance. However, the enlisted experience of MCP and ECP students did not appear to counter the preparation or performance potential of students that accessed through the Naval Academy. These results are reflected in Table 4.17 above.

In the academic aptitude-ranking category, academy graduates posted the second highest mean of all sources (98.43). Again, academy graduates performed at a higher level than MCP and ECP accessions (at 107.73 and 108.00 respectively) and at a lower level than MECEP accessions (at 77.25). Since the hypothesis expected the high performance of academy graduates in this category, the results were not unexpected. Again, the significant experience of MECEP students seemed to positively influence their academic performance at the BOC. However, the disparity in mean academic rank between MECEP and Naval Academy accessions was not as large as in the overall performance category (over 20 points as opposed to nearly 30 points). Naval Academy graduates achieved a higher mean academic rank than OCC, PLC, and NROTC accessions. These results are indicated in Table 4.17.

It was hypothesized that the increase in Marine Corps focused training at the Naval Academy would positively influence the military-skills performance of graduates at BOC. However, it was still assumed that they would perform
at a lower level than would students from most other accessions sources. In contradiction to the hypothesis, the findings revealed that academy graduates achieved the second highest mean rank (96.12) of all the sources in the military-skills category. Additionally, Naval Academy accessions performed at a mean rank less than 12 points lower than MECEP students (at 84.52) and much higher than MCP and ECP students (at 106.91 and 122.53 respectively). Furthermore, the mean military-skills aptitude rank of academy graduates was the highest achieved by them in any category. This finding was relevant as it indicates the positive influence of the pre-commissioning Marine Corps focused training received at the Naval Academy. These results are reflected in Table 4.17 above.

In the leadership aptitude-ranking category, academy graduates posted the third highest mean of all sources (105.98). MECEP accessions again achieved a higher mean than the academy accessions (over 36 points), and MCP and ECP accessions were statistically close at 97.95 and 108.18 respectively. This finding seems to indicate that enlisted Marine Corps experience has more influence on BOC leadership performance than on the other evaluated categories. Conversely, the Naval Academy experience seems to be the least influential in BOC leadership performance than in the other categories. Academy accessions achieved a lower mean in the leadership category than in any of the other evaluated areas. Naval Academy graduates still performed at a higher rate than OCC, PLC and NROTC graduates, but the disparity between scores were less relevant than in the other categories. Table 4.17 again reveals these results.

The previous quantitative analysis revealed that Midshipmen selecting Marine Corps aviation billets performed better at the academy (as indicated by order of merit) than
those that selected Marine Corps ground billets. This finding suggested the possibility that Marine Corps ground accessions from the academy would not perform as well at the BOC as Marine Corps aviation accessions from the academy. In this context, the means comparison of class rankings was again analyzed with the aviation options from all sources excluded. This was achieved by eliminating all cases from the comparison that were assigned a pilot or NFO MOS. Since, the vast majority of pilot or NFO designations are assigned prior to commissioning; very few students can select these designations at the BOC. Therefore, an evaluation of the mean rankings for students with aviation MOSs is relatively equivalent to an evaluation of mean rankings for students that arrived at the BOC with the designation. Consequently, the performance of Naval Academy graduates that selected aviation billets at the academy can be evaluated in the same manner. The results of the mean rank comparison for all students receiving other than a pilot or NFO MOS are detailed in Table 4.18 below.

Table 4.18. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (Ground)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>140</td>
<td>119.28</td>
<td>112.29</td>
<td>113.09</td>
<td>129.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>100.66</td>
<td>108.89</td>
<td>94.79</td>
<td>103.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>198</td>
<td>73.80</td>
<td>77.47</td>
<td>73.37</td>
<td>89.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>469</td>
<td>117.55</td>
<td>111.15</td>
<td>118.61</td>
<td>121.91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>149.50</td>
<td>145.11</td>
<td>138.32</td>
<td>147.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>103.08</td>
<td>98.80</td>
<td>107.67</td>
<td>105.36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>122.96</td>
<td>128.02</td>
<td>113.30</td>
<td>124.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>392</td>
<td>122.96</td>
<td>128.02</td>
<td>113.30</td>
<td>124.42</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>103.72</td>
<td>103.13</td>
<td>106.69</td>
<td>104.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>103.72</td>
<td>103.13</td>
<td>106.69</td>
<td>104.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2310</td>
<td>120.05</td>
<td>118.39</td>
<td>115.71</td>
<td>122.78</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
As the data in the above table indicates, the mean rank achieved by Naval Academy graduates in all categories was still consistently higher than the mean rank achieved by students from all other primary sources except MECEP. The only exception to this finding for ground-designated officers was in the performance of students from secondary sources. As suspected, academy graduates with ground MOSs performed at a lower mean rank in all categories than did those with aviation designations. This result can be seen by comparing the above results with the overall sample results in Table 4.17. Essentially, the performance of Marine Corps selectees at the Naval Academy appears to maintain some consistency at the Marine Corps BOC. However, the data set for service selection was only a two-year sample, precluding completely accurate conclusions on the finding.

While the initial analysis seems to indicate that Naval Academy graduates have performed better at the BOC over the last five years than in previous eras, more examination of the data was necessary before conclusions could be drawn. The next step in the analysis involved the examination of mean rankings by commissioning source during each individual year. The objective of this analysis was to determine if the performance levels had been constant through the period or if there had been annual deviation. Since the commissioning practices and Marine Corps focused curriculum at the Naval Academy have evolved in the previous five years, it would not be surprising if the performance of academy graduates had also evolved. The results of the means comparisons of BOC rankings by year are depicted in Tables 4.19, 4.20, 4.21, 4.22, and 4.23.
Table 4.19. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>103.94</td>
<td>103.40</td>
<td>96.77</td>
<td>109.89</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>74.60</td>
<td>91.40</td>
<td>71.16</td>
<td>77.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>70.38</td>
<td>72.29</td>
<td>66.65</td>
<td>86.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>131</td>
<td>99.79</td>
<td>97.75</td>
<td>101.36</td>
<td>105.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>134.82</td>
<td>133.39</td>
<td>122.85</td>
<td>130.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OTHER</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>110.58</td>
<td>107.42</td>
<td>134.58</td>
<td>102.08</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>122.24</td>
<td>122.36</td>
<td>116.24</td>
<td>120.96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>101.83</td>
<td>101.83</td>
<td>108.99</td>
<td>92.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>646</td>
<td>108.16</td>
<td>108.19</td>
<td>105.64</td>
<td>108.19</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Although the mean ranks for academy graduates in 1999 are similar to the mean ranks for the entire sample, MCP and NROTC accessions performed better in almost all categories than Naval Academy graduates. Only in the academic aptitude category did Naval Academy graduates perform better on average than did NROTC graduates. Except for the fact that ECP accessions achieved mean ranks lower than academy graduates in all categories except leadership aptitude, the results of the 1999 sample were closely in line with the original hypothesis. In the leadership category, enlisted accession sources produced the top three mean ranks and academy graduates produced a mean rank (108.99) lower than the average for the sample (105.64). Although this appears to be a downward trend for Naval Academy graduate performance, further research and observation would be required before determining that the academy preparation was the cause. The results are reflected in Table 4.19 above.
Table 4.20. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (1998)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>160.13</td>
<td>146.75</td>
<td>135.19</td>
<td>176.44</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>134.21</td>
<td>135.79</td>
<td>125.21</td>
<td>137.47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>78.42</td>
<td>79.42</td>
<td>84.79</td>
<td>91.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>115.17</td>
<td>114.30</td>
<td>117.56</td>
<td>114.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>231</td>
<td>145.90</td>
<td>146.39</td>
<td>137.49</td>
<td>143.14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>77.67</td>
<td>125.00</td>
<td>60.33</td>
<td>47.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>133.40</td>
<td>138.54</td>
<td>129.10</td>
<td>121.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>94.63</td>
<td>90.79</td>
<td>104.40</td>
<td>99.26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>721</td>
<td>120.69</td>
<td>120.69</td>
<td>119.61</td>
<td>120.69</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the 1998 sample, Naval Academy graduates achieved mean ranks much higher than the average in all categories. Of the primary sources, they again performed at the highest level of all students except MECEP accessions in every category. Although students from secondary sources posted the highest scores in three categories, there were only three cases in the sample, rendering their performance statistically insignificant. Again, the lowest mean rank in all categories achieved by academy graduates was in leadership aptitude. The results are reflected in Table 4.20 above.

As in the 1998 sample, Naval Academy graduates achieved mean ranks higher than all other sources except MECEP in every category except leadership aptitude.
Table 4.21. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (1997)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>109.56</td>
<td>110.22</td>
<td>102.56</td>
<td>121.56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>135.00</td>
<td>127.00</td>
<td>143.00</td>
<td>94.50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>63.72</td>
<td>72.36</td>
<td>64.72</td>
<td>72.92</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>127</td>
<td>116.04</td>
<td>111.09</td>
<td>116.07</td>
<td>119.11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>141</td>
<td>135.15</td>
<td>133.03</td>
<td>127.10</td>
<td>132.93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>74.65</td>
<td>83.71</td>
<td>77.65</td>
<td>75.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>115.83</td>
<td>122.13</td>
<td>110.87</td>
<td>113.09</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>94.06</td>
<td>90.81</td>
<td>105.32</td>
<td>92.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>670</td>
<td>110.90</td>
<td>110.92</td>
<td>110.43</td>
<td>110.89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the leadership category, academy graduates were outperformed on average by ECP and MECEP accessions. Although MCP accessions did not outperform academy graduates in this category, there were only four cases in the sample rendering their performance statistically insignificant. Again, academy graduates achieved their highest mean rank in the academic category (90.79) and their lowest mean rank in the leadership category (104.40). Mean ranks for academy graduates in every category were again much higher than the average. The results are reflected in Table 4.21 above.

In the 1996 sample, Naval Academy graduates achieved the third highest mean overall rank of all the sources (behind MECEP and MCP) and were well above the average in all categories. Surprisingly, academy graduates achieved their lowest mean rank in the academic aptitude category (110.75) in which they performed below ECP, MCP and MECEP accessions. In the overall rank category, Naval Academy graduates achieved a mean rank (106.49) nearly equal to MCP and ECP students (at 106.48 and 107.16 respectively). In all categories academy graduates outperformed NROTC, PLC,
and OCC accessions by 10 points or more. The results are reflected in Table 4.22 below.

Table 4.22. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (1996)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>107.16</td>
<td>96.02</td>
<td>113.61</td>
<td>114.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCP</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>106.48</td>
<td>102.00</td>
<td>97.78</td>
<td>116.22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>50.66</td>
<td>74.76</td>
<td>43.96</td>
<td>75.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>122.05</td>
<td>120.55</td>
<td>124.29</td>
<td>123.13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>153.80</td>
<td>148.41</td>
<td>149.45</td>
<td>145.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>107.67</td>
<td>103.17</td>
<td>105.90</td>
<td>113.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>100</td>
<td>126.29</td>
<td>125.21</td>
<td>121.79</td>
<td>122.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>158</td>
<td>106.49</td>
<td>110.75</td>
<td>108.05</td>
<td>102.38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>711</td>
<td>118.17</td>
<td>118.22</td>
<td>117.08</td>
<td>118.14</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In nearly all categories, the 1995 sample produced the highest mean ranks for Naval Academy graduates during the five-year period. Academy graduates were ranked 18 points or higher than the average rank in every category. The exceptional performance of 1995 academy graduates may be due to the high selectivity for Marine Corps billets during that year's service selection process. In that first year of the service assignment format, academy officials chose to leave 37 of the Marine Corps quotas unfilled. While data indicating how many Marine Corps candidates were turned away is unavailable, it can be assumed that all quotas had corresponding applicants. An examination of the service selection data from previous and later classes lends weight to this assumption. Therefore, it is likely that high selectivity for Marine Corps commissions produced high performing officers at the BOC. The results are reflected in Table 4.23 below.
Table 4.23. BOC Mean Rank by Commissioning Source (1995)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>109.92</td>
<td>107.52</td>
<td>105.40</td>
<td>120.76</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96.60</td>
<td>98.20</td>
<td>93.20</td>
<td>98.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>89.12</td>
<td>104.65</td>
<td>88.12</td>
<td>98.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>95.76</td>
<td>77.80</td>
<td>113.05</td>
<td>100.29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>151.11</td>
<td>145.33</td>
<td>140.47</td>
<td>148.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>112.79</td>
<td>114.05</td>
<td>125.23</td>
<td>97.37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>116.55</td>
<td>121.57</td>
<td>112.16</td>
<td>120.17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>87.60</td>
<td>92.82</td>
<td>97.58</td>
<td>87.00</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>388</td>
<td>115.82</td>
<td>115.73</td>
<td>116.12</td>
<td>116.27</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Having identified the performance trends at the BOC by commissioning source during the period, the analysis next turned to an examination of MOS distribution. As explained above, naval aviation MOSs were normally contracted to officers prior to commissioning. Naval Academy graduates were comprised of the highest percentage of aviators (41.9 percent) than were any of the other primary accession sources. While 39.6 percent of PLC graduates were assigned pilot or NFO MOSs, the other commissioning sources were assigned 20 percent or less aviation MOSs than academy graduates. Since future Marine pilots performed at higher rates at the Naval Academy, it is possible that the larger proportion of academy aviation designees at the BOC conferred an advantage. Further analysis was necessary to explore this possibility. The results of this analysis are reflected in Table 4.24 below.
Table 4.24. MOS Category Distribution by Commissioning Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Pilot/NFO</th>
<th>Combat Arms</th>
<th>Service Support</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>16 (10.3%)</td>
<td>35 (22.4%)</td>
<td>105 (67.3%)</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>10 (12.5%)</td>
<td>12 (15.0%)</td>
<td>58 (72.5%)</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>55 (21.7%)</td>
<td>58 (22.9%)</td>
<td>140 (55.3%)</td>
<td>253</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>127 (21.3%)</td>
<td>199 (33.4%)</td>
<td>270 (45.3%)</td>
<td>596</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>137 (18.5%)</td>
<td>201 (27.1%)</td>
<td>404 (54.4%)</td>
<td>742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>44 (41.9%)</td>
<td>20 (19.0%)</td>
<td>41 (39.0%)</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>191 (32.8%)</td>
<td>165 (28.3%)</td>
<td>227 (38.9%)</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>246 (39.6%)</td>
<td>159 (25.6%)</td>
<td>216 (34.8%)</td>
<td>621</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>826 (26.3%)</td>
<td>849 (27.1%)</td>
<td>1461 (46.6%)</td>
<td>3136</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

MOSs are assigned at the BOC by a "quality spread" in which an equal number of billets for each MOS are available in each third (by overall rank) of the class. However, the combat arms MOSs are commonly considered to be more desirable than the combat service support MOSs. Therefore, they normally fill up faster in each third. Assuming that the combat arms MOSs are considered more prestigious, a measure of combat arms assignments by source presented itself as another means of performance analysis. Although the "quality spread" system renders any analysis based on this premise imperfect, it was nonetheless conducted to examine any apparent patterns. Excluding the cases with naval aviation MOSs, 36.8 percent of the sample were assigned combat arms MOSs and 63.2 percent were assigned combat service support MOSs. Naval Academy graduates were assigned the highest percentage of combat arms MOSs (42.4 percent), tied with NROTC accessions and nearly the same as PLC accessions (41.4%). Interestingly, the three primary enlisted commissioning sources yielded the lowest percentage.
of combat arms officers (29.3 percent for MECEP, 25 percent for ECP, and 17.1 percent for MCP). Since these accession sources performed categorically high in the sample, the selection of combat arms MOSs cannot be statistically linked to performance. It is possible that the students from enlisted accession sources are older on average, and therefore less likely to select the physically demanding combat arms MOSs. However, an age variable was not included in the data set, so there is no statistical evidence for the assumption. The results of this analysis are detailed in Table 4.25 below.

Since the mere distribution of combat arms MOSs by source cannot be statistically linked to BOC performance, a further analysis of Naval Academy graduates was conducted. By evaluating the mean rank achieved by academy graduates assigned to different MOS categories, it could be established whether or not performance varied between those categories. In the analysis, some relevant results were found.

Table 4.25. MOS Ground Category Distribution by Commissioning Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Combat Arms</th>
<th>Service Support</th>
<th>Total Ground</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>35 (25.0%)</td>
<td>105 (75.0%)</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>12 (17.1%)</td>
<td>50 (82.9%)</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>50 (29.3%)</td>
<td>140 (70.7%)</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>199 (42.4%)</td>
<td>270 (57.6%)</td>
<td>469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>201 (33.2%)</td>
<td>404 (66.8%)</td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>20 (32.8%)</td>
<td>41 (67.2%)</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>165 (42.1%)</td>
<td>227 (57.9%)</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>165 (42.1%)</td>
<td>227 (57.9%)</td>
<td>392</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>159 (42.4%)</td>
<td>216 (57.6%)</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>159 (42.4%)</td>
<td>216 (57.6%)</td>
<td>375</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Academy graduates in the aviation or combat arms categories achieved nearly the same overall mean rank (90.37 and 90.71 respectively) and a rank nearly 23 points higher than the mean achieved by academy graduates in the combat service support category (113.30). This result supports the assumption that higher performing officers at the BOC are more likely to select a combat arms MOS. In both the military skills and academic aptitude rankings, academy graduates in the aviation category achieved the highest means. They were followed by those in the combat arms category, and last by those in the combat service support category. This seems to follow the findings of the service selection analysis, which indicated that Midshipmen selecting Marine Corps aviation billets had a higher average academic and military order of merit at the academy. However, in the leadership ranking academy graduates in the combat arms category achieved the highest mean of 83.80. This was nearly 15 points higher than those in the aviation category (98.79) and about 25 points higher than those in the combat service support category (123.78). This result seems to indicate that leadership performance at the BOC cannot be linked to performance at the Naval Academy. These findings are reflected in Table 4.26 below.

Table 4.26. BOC Mean Rank Distribution by MOS Category
(USNA)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>MOS Category</th>
<th># of Cases</th>
<th>Overall</th>
<th>Academic</th>
<th>Leadership</th>
<th>Military Skills</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Pilot/NFO</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>90.37</td>
<td>90.74</td>
<td>104.89</td>
<td>83.80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Arms</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>90.71</td>
<td>99.69</td>
<td>83.48</td>
<td>98.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service Support</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>113.30</td>
<td>105.67</td>
<td>123.78</td>
<td>108.19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>98.43</td>
<td>98.22</td>
<td>105.98</td>
<td>96.12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

207
As a final means of measuring Naval Academy graduate performance at the BOC an analysis of performance scores was conducted. Although every student at the BOC is ranked in each aptitude category and overall within a class, that rank is determined by a score. While the ranking is a more accurate measure of a student’s performance, especially in leadership aptitude where the scores are determined by their performance in comparison to classmates, the analysis of scores was utilized to check and validate the previous findings. The method used in this part of the analysis was a comparison of the percentage of cases distributed in different percentile categories by source. Another purpose of this examination was to validate or invalidate the perception that the performance of academy graduates is stratified in the top or bottom portions of each class. The results of this analysis are depicted in Tables 4.27, 4.28, 4.29, and 4.30 below.

Table 4.27. BOC Overall Percentile by Commissioning Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total # of Cases</th>
<th>Top 1/3</th>
<th>Middle 1/3</th>
<th>Bottom 1/3</th>
<th>Top 10%</th>
<th>Bottom 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECF</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>61 (39.1%)</td>
<td>40 (25.6%)</td>
<td>55 (35.3%)</td>
<td>27 (17.3%)</td>
<td>11 (7.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>35 (43.8%)</td>
<td>22 (27.5%)</td>
<td>23 (28.8%)</td>
<td>17 (21.3%)</td>
<td>9 (11.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>154 (60.9%)</td>
<td>65 (25.7%)</td>
<td>34 (13.4%)</td>
<td>78 (30.8%)</td>
<td>7 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>205 (34.4%)</td>
<td>224 (37.6%)</td>
<td>167 (28.0%)</td>
<td>52 (8.7%)</td>
<td>44 (7.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>138 (18.6%)</td>
<td>205 (27.6%)</td>
<td>399 (53.8%)</td>
<td>29 (3.9%)</td>
<td>145 (19.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>31 (29.5%)</td>
<td>45 (42.9%)</td>
<td>29 (27.6%)</td>
<td>7 (6.7%)</td>
<td>16 (15.2%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>167 (28.6%)</td>
<td>209 (35.8%)</td>
<td>207 (35.5%)</td>
<td>36 (6.2%)</td>
<td>52 (8.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>254 (40.9%)</td>
<td>238 (38.3%)</td>
<td>129 (20.8%)</td>
<td>70 (11.3%)</td>
<td>29 (4.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>1043</td>
<td>316</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the overall class rank category, 40.9 percent of Naval Academy graduates scored in the top third percentile and only 20.8 percent scored in the bottom third percentile.
This distribution appears to weigh heavily in the upper ranks of the class and corresponds to the results reflected by their mean rank. While the academy graduates' share of the top tenth percentile was only slightly higher than average (11.3 percent), their share of the lowest tenth percentile was much lower (4.7 percent). A relevant, yet not surprising result of this analysis was that the three enlisted accession sources yielded a high proportion of the top tenth percentile in the sample (collectively constituting 69.4 percent). With 38.3 percent of the students falling out in the middle third percentile, Naval Academy graduates did not appear to be stratified at either pole of the sample. As mentioned previously, the data indicated a higher proportion of Naval Academy graduates with higher scores on the spectrum than with lower scores. These results are evidenced in Table 4.27 above.

Table 4.28. BOC Academic Percentile by Commissioning Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total # of Cases</th>
<th>Top 1/3</th>
<th>Middle 1/3</th>
<th>Bottom 1/3</th>
<th>Top 10%</th>
<th>Bottom 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>62 (39.7%)</td>
<td>51 (32.7%)</td>
<td>43 (27.6%)</td>
<td>25 (16.0%)</td>
<td>13 (8.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>33 (41.3%)</td>
<td>20 (25.0%)</td>
<td>27 (33.8%)</td>
<td>10 (12.5%)</td>
<td>8 (10.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>141 (55.7%)</td>
<td>77 (30.4%)</td>
<td>35 (13.8%)</td>
<td>63 (24.9%)</td>
<td>7 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>240 (40.3%)</td>
<td>213 (35.7%)</td>
<td>143 (24.0%)</td>
<td>77 (12.9%)</td>
<td>34 (5.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>109 (14.7%)</td>
<td>224 (30.2%)</td>
<td>409 (55.1%)</td>
<td>20 (2.7%)</td>
<td>159 (21.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>36 (34.3%)</td>
<td>38 (36.2%)</td>
<td>31 (29.5%)</td>
<td>7 (6.7%)</td>
<td>11 (10.5%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>158 (27.1%)</td>
<td>216 (37.0%)</td>
<td>209 (35.8%)</td>
<td>35 (6.0%)</td>
<td>55 (9.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>266 (42.8%)</td>
<td>207 (33.3%)</td>
<td>148 (23.8%)</td>
<td>78 (12.6%)</td>
<td>25 (4.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>315</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

With regard to Naval Academy graduates, the results of the analysis of academic aptitude scores produced nearly parallel results to the analysis of overall class scores. Again, a much higher percentage of academy graduates scored
in the top third percentile (40.9 percent) than scored in the bottom third percentile (20.8 percent). The percentage of academy graduates in the top tenth percentile was again slightly higher than the average (12.6 percent) and the percentage in the bottom tenth percentile was again lower than average (4.0 percent). While academy graduates again outperformed NROTC graduates in all categories, the latter students were much closer to the former than in the overall class score analysis. These results are reflected in Table 4.28 above.

Table 4.29. BOC Leadership Percentile by Commissioning Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total # of Cases</th>
<th>Top 1/3</th>
<th>Middle 1/3</th>
<th>Bottom 1/3</th>
<th>Top 10%</th>
<th>Bottom 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>58 (37.2%)</td>
<td>46 (29.5%)</td>
<td>52 (33.3%)</td>
<td>26 (16.7%)</td>
<td>16 (10.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>34 (42.5%)</td>
<td>25 (31.3%)</td>
<td>21 (26.3%)</td>
<td>19 (23.8%)</td>
<td>5 (6.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>153 (60.5%)</td>
<td>66 (26.1%)</td>
<td>34 (13.4%)</td>
<td>73 (28.9%)</td>
<td>7 (2.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>179 (30.0%)</td>
<td>217 (36.4%)</td>
<td>200 (33.6%)</td>
<td>51 (8.6%)</td>
<td>50 (8.4%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>186 (25.1%)</td>
<td>218 (29.4%)</td>
<td>338 (45.6%)</td>
<td>45 (6.1%)</td>
<td>117 (15.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>31 (29.5%)</td>
<td>32 (30.5%)</td>
<td>42 (40.0%)</td>
<td>9 (8.6%)</td>
<td>21 (20.0%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>184 (31.6%)</td>
<td>199 (34.1%)</td>
<td>200 (34.3%)</td>
<td>40 (6.9%)</td>
<td>53 (9.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>226 (36.4%)</td>
<td>237 (38.2%)</td>
<td>158 (25.4%)</td>
<td>50 (8.1%)</td>
<td>43 (6.9%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>1051</td>
<td>1040</td>
<td>1045</td>
<td>313</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the analysis of leadership aptitude scores, Naval Academy graduates produced a distribution of scores much closer to the sample average. The highest percentage of academy graduates were in the middle third percentile (38.2 percent), while 36.4 percent were in the top third and 35.4 percent were in the bottom third. Academy graduates constituted only 8.1 percent of the top tenth percentile, less than average, but still constituted a disproportionately small portion of the bottom tenth
percentile (6.9 percent). As expected, the three enlisted commissioning sources yielded the most students in both the top third percentile and the top tenth percentile. However, academy graduates still constituted a smaller portion of the bottom third and bottom tenth percentiles than did ECP and MCP accessions. NROTC graduates yielded a lower percentage in the top third percentile than academy graduates (30 percent) and a slightly higher percentage in the top tenth percentile (8.6 percent). These results are reflected in Table 4.29 above.

Table 4.30. BOC Military Skills Percentile by Commissioning Source

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Source</th>
<th>Total # of Cases</th>
<th>Top 1/3</th>
<th>Middle 1/3</th>
<th>Bottom 1/3</th>
<th>Top 10%</th>
<th>Bottom 10%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ECP</td>
<td>156</td>
<td>49 (31.4%)</td>
<td>53 (34.0%)</td>
<td>54 (34.6%)</td>
<td>11 (7.1%)</td>
<td>12 (7.7%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MCP</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>34 (42.5%)</td>
<td>21 (26.3%)</td>
<td>25 (31.3%)</td>
<td>13 (16.3%)</td>
<td>7 (8.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MECEP</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>133 (52.6%)</td>
<td>75 (29.6%)</td>
<td>45 (17.8%)</td>
<td>49 (19.4%)</td>
<td>11 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NROTC</td>
<td>596</td>
<td>186 (31.2%)</td>
<td>220 (36.9%)</td>
<td>190 (31.9%)</td>
<td>52 (8.7%)</td>
<td>51 (8.6%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OCC</td>
<td>742</td>
<td>164 (22.1%)</td>
<td>218 (29.4%)</td>
<td>360 (48.5%)</td>
<td>46 (6.2%)</td>
<td>134 (18.1%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>34 (32.4%)</td>
<td>43 (41.0%)</td>
<td>28 (26.7%)</td>
<td>7 (6.7%)</td>
<td>14 (13.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PLC</td>
<td>583</td>
<td>168 (28.8%)</td>
<td>215 (36.9%)</td>
<td>200 (34.3%)</td>
<td>43 (7.4%)</td>
<td>57 (9.8%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USNA</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>278 (44.8%)</td>
<td>203 (32.7%)</td>
<td>140 (22.5%)</td>
<td>93 (15.0%)</td>
<td>27 (4.3%)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>3136</td>
<td>1046</td>
<td>1048</td>
<td>1042</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As with the analysis of academic and overall class standing scores, Naval Academy graduates yielded disproportionately high scores in the military-skills category. A much higher proportion of academy graduates produced scores in the top third percentile (44.8 percent) than in the bottom third percentile (22.5 percent). Likewise, 15 percent of Naval Academy graduates scored in the top tenth percentile while only 4.3 percent were in the bottom tenth percentile. Again, the performance scores
produced by academy graduates appeared to be in concert with the results of the mean rank comparison. With the exception of MECEP accessions, Naval Academy graduates collectively produced the highest military skills aptitude scores across the spectrum. These results are reflected in Table 4.30 above.

E. SUMMARY

Through the quantitative data analysis, the context of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship has been further developed. The findings of previous statistical studies, the analysis of service selection data, and the analysis of BOC performance data produced evidence for many of the themes and implications of the relationship previously illustrated by the historical and contemporary analyses. Furthermore, the quantitative data analysis highlighted additional themes and implications of the relationship not exposed by other means of exploration. In the overall context of the study, the quantitative analysis served as the statistical tool for validating assumptions and verifying evidence obtained through the evaluation of secondary sources.

Having concluded the limited quantitative analysis of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, the study now shifts to a qualitative analysis of interview data. With the context of the study well developed through the historical analysis, contemporary analysis, and the quantitative data; the qualitative analysis will focus on examining aspects of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship that were not thoroughly explored by other means. Specifically, the qualitative data analysis focuses on the insights and impressions of Marine officers as to the value of the Naval Academy as a Marine officer accession source and the influence of the Marine Corps on the
institution. While the quantitative analysis was primarily focused on measuring statistical relationships and validating assumptions, the qualitative analysis serves primarily as a means of exploratory research, and secondarily as a measurement of perceptions about the relationship.
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V. QUALITATIVE DATA ANALYSIS

A. OVERVIEW

Having thoroughly analyzed statistical data to assess implications of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, the study now switches focus to a quantitative evaluation of the relationship. This segment of the study builds upon both the previous examination of the historical and modern contexts of the relationship and the findings of the quantitative research and analysis. While quantitative and historical analyses are key elements of this exploratory study, these measures alone fall short of capturing the wide implications of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Through quantitative research, a wider segment of these implications can be established and explored. In essence, the quantitative analysis is a means of exploring gaps left unfilled by the other research methods.

In this capacity, the analysis will examine selected qualitative data with the goal of further exploring significant themes that permeate and characterize the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. To focus the analysis, the data has been gathered with the purpose of illustrating the effects that the Naval Academy has had on the Marine officer corps in the recent era. As with the quantitative analyses, data was sought that reflects the most current impacts of the relationship and provides insights into its future. However, while the qualitative evidence is utilized to draw meaningful conclusions concerning the interactions between the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps, it is not intended to fully explain those interactions. Rather, the qualitative analysis in this study serves to further paint the picture of the relationship. Coupled with the historical and quantitative analyses, the qualitative
research results can be utilized to make initial assessments, prompt policy recommendations, and generate future research or inquiry. In this respect, the qualitative segment of the study was not intended to characterize the relationship by itself, but rather as an integral component of the overall study.

The framework of the qualitative analysis is built upon interviews with Marine Corps officers who have had experience at the Naval Academy or substantial interaction with academy graduates. From the interviews, qualitative data was extracted to meet two requirements of the study. The first requirement was to gather quantitative data that revealed facts not obtained through historical or quantitative research. By meeting this requirement, the quantitative research facilitated further research into areas previously unexamined and filled gaps in the historical and modern analyses. The second requirement was to gather qualitative data that revealed the impressions and insights of Marine Corps officers concerning the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Such data was mostly unobtainable through other research means and served as an integral tool for exploration. Primary qualitative data also provided the most current insights into the implications of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. This significantly benefits the study, since even the most recent quantitative and historical data runs the risk of being dated and unreflective of the current situation.

B. PURPOSE

The purpose of this qualitative analysis is to establish themes reflective of the current Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. The means of achieving this purpose is through interviews with selectively chosen Marine Corps officers. While the interviews were primarily focused
on areas of exploration germane to the research questions of the study, this did not preclude the gathering of data concerning implications that had not been previously considered or explored. In essence, the interviews intended to extract any data concerning the current and historical Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship that would enrich the overall study. As mentioned above, the primary focus of the analysis was centered on the examination of impressions and insights offered by the interviewees. The secondary focus was on the gathering of historical and quantitative data as a means of filling gaps in the study's collection of facts.

In the effort to focus the qualitative research on the questions posed in the study, interview questions were focused on the questions that could not be answered sufficiently through historical or quantitative research. In this respect, the qualitative analysis serves primarily as a unique means of exploration in the study. Only secondarily does the analysis act as a means of filling gaps in areas primarily explored by other methods. Since the entire focus of the study is exploratory in nature, the qualitative research and analysis will likely prove to be the most significant element of the entire project. Certainly it will provide the most unique insights into the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, and will likely generate the most implications for future research and inquiry.

C. INTERVIEWEE CRITERIA

Qualitative research was conducted over a two-month period and involved interviews with Marine Corps officers. Each interview lasted from 30 to 60 minutes in duration and was recorded on audiotape for later transcription. One interview was conducted with an interviewee stationed
overseas by means of electronic mail. All other interviews were conducted with officers currently serving at the Naval Academy, the Navy Annex, the Pentagon, or aboard Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia. More than half of the interviewees, and all the junior officers, were then serving at the academy. The data extracted from the interviews was used in the study with the guarantee of anonymity for the interviewees.

The interviewees were carefully selected to ensure their familiarity with the Naval Academy or credible experience with the academy's Marine officer accessions. Although the impressions and insights of officers unaffiliated with the academy would have been valuable to the study, the decision was made to exclude them from the sample. It was decided that the primary objectives of the qualitative analysis could be best met through interviews with officers that were familiar with the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Therefore, only officers that met such criteria were included in the interview sample.

Aside from familiarity with the academy or the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, additional criteria were considered in the interviewee selection process. In particular, interviews were sought with officers that had accessed through the academy, had served on the academy staff, had evaluated Naval Academy graduates at the BOC, had gone to Bulldog during the years that it was required, or had served as the Senior Marine Representative at the academy. Additionally, officers were sought for interviews from all levels of rank and experience. The final sample included four Captains, three Majors, two Lieutenant Colonels, four Colonels, and five general officers. Fourteen of the officers interviewed had graduated from the academy and sixteen had served on the academy staff at some
point during their career. Six officers had served as Naval Academy company officers, one as an academy battalion officer, three as Marine Representatives, three as academic instructors, and one as the commanding officer of The Basic School. Only five of the officers had arisen from a military family and only one had prior enlisted experience.

D. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS

Although the subjects explored in each interview were not limited, a number of typical interview questions were formulated beforehand to guide the data collection. Typically, each of these questions was asked in some form during a given interview or was answered through another course of exploration. While these questions were the foundation for the interview process, the course of each interview was different and determined the depth into which each topic was explored. Frequently, new questions arose during the process, which were incorporated into the question set for later interviews. The principal interview questions are as follows:

- What were the factors that led to your initial decision to attend the Naval Academy?
- What were the factors that contributed to your decision to seek a commission as a Marine Corps Second Lieutenant?
- What was your impression of the recruiting and professional development roles the Marine Corps played at the Naval Academy? Did you perceive any difference in the Marine Corps' interest in and emphasis on the academy as an accession source from its interest in and emphasis on other accession sources?
- What is your impression of the Marine Corps' current strategy toward, interest in, and expectations of the Naval Academy as an officer accession source?
- What are your impressions of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps? Compared to other accession sources, do you consider the academy experience to
be an advantageous, disadvantageous, or insignificant factor in Marine officer success? Does this impression vary at different levels of rank and/or experience?

- Considering the highly selective admissions procedures and intensive nature of the training, should Naval Academy graduates be better prepared to accept a commission as a Marine Second Lieutenant than those commissioned from other accession sources? If so, should this advantage diminish as levels of rank and experience increase? If not, should any of the other current commissioning sources produce better prepared Marine Second Lieutenants?

- What have you perceived as any shortfalls in the Naval Academy experience in preparing future Marine Corps officers? Have these shortfalls been scrutinized by the Marine Corps leadership, received the appropriate level of attention, or been subject of change or correction?

- Have you come across any positive or negative impressions of the Naval Academy commissioning source amongst Marine Corps officers? If so, what factors or perceptions can be attributed these impressions?

- To what extent has the understanding of the Navy gained through the Naval Academy experience contributed to your success as a Marine Corps officer? Has the lack of that experience, with respect to understanding the Navy, placed officers from other accession sources at any noticeable disadvantage?

- In the context of changing roles and missions, is the Naval Academy experience less valuable to Marine officers today than it was in the past?

- Does the Naval Academy satisfactorily accomplish the mission of OCS with respect to its Marine Corps graduates? If not, is this shortcoming insignificant or should the Marine Corps aspire to incorporate academy graduates into this program or create another one that achieves similar results?

- Is the Marine Corps' allocation of manpower assets to the Naval Academy appropriate with regard to its interest and expectations of the accession source? Is there any advantage for the Marine Corps in seeking accessions from the other service academies?
E. METHODOLOGY

The method of conducting this qualitative analysis was prescribed by the following format:

- The determination was made that qualitative data would enrich and strengthen the overall study.
- Areas of research and specific research questions were identified which would benefit from qualitative research.
- Interview questions were formulated and structured to best facilitate data gathering for the identified areas of research and research questions.
- Criteria for interviewees were established and possible interviewees were selected based on the criteria. Interviewees accepted interview requests and interviews were conducted. Interview data was recorded on audio media.
- Interviews were transcribed and data was classified according to its utility in the study.
- Historical and quantitative data was analyzed first and incorporated into previous efforts. Interviewee impressions and insights were analyzed and classified as major or minor themes, depending on the number of interviewees that expressed them. Notable quotations were identified and grouped with the appropriate theme.

F. RESULTS

1. Major Themes

The major themes that were identified in the quantitative analysis are discussed below. Each of these themes was identified by a majority of the officers interviewed for the study.

a. Finding #1

Possessed no desire to serve as a Marine officer upon entry into the Naval Academy. With only three exceptions, the academy graduates surveyed did not apply to the military institution with the consideration of serving in the Marine Corps. Therefore, their impressions of the
Marine Corps gained at the academy were the determinants of their decision to become a Marine officer. One field grade officer commented that after gaining initial exposure to the Marine Corps, "The Marines at the academy and their personal example convinced me that I was right." Another officer indicated that, "Based upon four Marine officers that impressed me I joined the Marine Corps." Amongst senior officers, these impressions were gained primarily through the personal example set by Marines stationed at the academy. There appeared to be little Marine Corps focused training or familiarization in the curriculum during their experience, thus increasing the importance of Marine officer influence.

b. Finding #2

Perceived a distinct difference between the professionalism displayed by Navy and Marine Corps officers at the Naval Academy. The majority of officers cited this as the largest influence on their choice of a commission in the Marine Corps. With only one exception, every officer below the rank of Colonel revealed this experience. One interviewee indicated that, "The Marine officers at USNA overwhelmed the Navy officers and had a following." While these officers did acknowledge the influence of Marine Corps occupational opportunities on their decision, nearly all of them indicated that this influence was much less important than the professionalism of the Marine officers they encountered. In this respect, some of the interviewees acknowledged that they would have sought a Marine Corps commission regardless of what the occupation held. As one officer indicated:

I had zero Marine training, so I based my choice on the caliber of the individuals there. I was overwhelmed by the Marines there.
c. Finding #3

The Marine Corps influence at the Naval Academy is disproportionately overshadowed by the Navy influence. Interviewees of all ranks shared the perception that the Marine Corps was subjected to an unequal partnership with the Navy. One officer commented that, "The Marine Corps presence at the Naval Academy resembles younger brother outdoing an older brother...and the Navy is not always comfortable with that." While many of the interviewees felt that this inequality had lessened in recent years, they still perceived its existence. Furthermore, each of these officers regarded the inequality as an impediment to Marine Corps accession efforts at the institution. Furthermore, they viewed increased Marine Corps influence at the academy as a necessity. In particular, these officers suggested that a Marine Corps officer be placed in one of the top two billets at the academy (Superintendent or Commandant of Midshipmen). As one General officer indicated,

The Commandant at the Naval Academy needs to be a Marine general. That is the only way to make it a Naval Academy and not a Navy Academy. I’ve told the Secretary of the Navy that too.

d. Finding #4

Naval Academy graduates are not as well prepared for the BOC as officers that graduated from an OCS course. Half of the officers interviewed felt that the academy experience did not provide Midshipmen with the same level of preparation as that received by non-graduates. One officer commented, "There was very little preparation for going to The Basic School." Consequently, these officers felt that academy graduates do not perform as well at the BOC individually than if they had accessed through a different program. However, nearly all interviewees felt that Naval
Academy graduates were as well prepared or better prepared for service beyond the BOC than were officers from other sources. Despite this feeling, interviewees still felt that the lack of preparedness for the BOC by academy graduates was not acceptable. In essence, they felt that the academy must produce Marine officers that are as well prepared for the BOC as they are for later career service. As one general officer reflected:

I think the NROTC types get the same advantages. I don’t think that the academy gave me a leg up. I think those that spent two summers at OCS had the leg up and the academy folks had a disadvantage initially.

e. Finding #5

Even after four years of intensive evaluation at the Naval Academy, the leadership potential of Midshipmen (to serve as Marine officers) cannot be adequately assessed. All but three officers interviewed felt that the Naval Academy experience did not allow for a sufficient evaluation of an officer candidate’s leadership potential. Many of the interviewees also felt the OCS courses did not provide an adequate assessment of leadership potential, but went much further toward that end than did the academy. One senior officer revealed:

There would be some real value in conducting some further screening. I do think we would benefit for more stress to be incorporated into the Leatherneck training that allowed us to understand the Midshipmen’s abilities better.

In particular, many officers felt that the unique aspects of Marine Corps leadership were difficult to impress upon Midshipmen at an academy entrenched in the culture of the Navy. Conversely, many of the officers agreed that the OCS course was specifically designed to teach and evaluate the unique Marine concept of leadership. Some officers also
pointed to the heavy academic concentration of the academy as an obstacle to adequately assessing leadership potential in a military environment.

f. **Finding #6**

Marine instructors and officer representatives have a significant influence on potential Marine officers at the Naval Academy. While most interviewees acknowledged that Marine company officers carried the most potential to influence Midshipmen toward a Marine Corps commission, nearly all interviewees felt that instructors and officers that worked with extracurricular activities equally had the potential to influence when involved. In particular, a number of officers indicated that they were personally motivated toward the Marine Corps by coaches and athletic officer representatives. A number of senior officers also indicated that athletic teams were the prime recruiting ground for Marine Corps officers. These officers believed that the athletic prowess and teamwork experience of Midshipmen athletes rendered them among the best candidates for Marine Corps commissions.

g. **Finding #7**

None of the training or instruction unique to the Naval Academy confers an advantage in the Marine Corps. The majority of interviewees felt that their specific training at the Naval Academy did not give them any advantage over officers that accessed through other programs. As one general officer commented, "I never felt I had an advantage or disadvantage because of the Naval Academy." Another officer revealed:

> Has it helped me, yes. Has it conferred any great advantage for me in the Marine Corps, no.
In fact, most of these officers felt that the BOC and initial experiences in the FMF provided all the training and knowledge necessary for a successful Marine Corps career. As another officer remarked:

I think one can come in from any accession source with the right attitudes and succeed as well as those from an academy. In fact, the capacities that an academy gives you are not necessarily things that are going to help you succeed. Some have not adapted quickly enough to the Marine Corps because there is quite a discernable change.

Some officers did cite some specific advantages held early in the career, but felt they were relatively insignificant and easily overcome by those that had not attended the academy. Of the few advantages cited nearly all concerned knowledge of the Navy that facilitated their productivity on shipboard deployments. Concerning initial advantages, one general officer interviewed commented:

The school was terrific and the curriculum was good for me. Beyond the general feel for being in the military I don’t think there are any real advantages. PLC and OCS lieutenants had some pretty concentrated training that conferred them advantages over us.

h. Finding #8

The stress levied on Midshipmen during the Plebe indoctrination period is not equitable to the stress levied on candidates during an OCS course. With only two exceptions, interviewees did not consider the environmental stress of the Plebe indoctrination at the academy to be on par with the environmental stress of the OCS courses. A field grade officer in the sample commented:

No way in the wildest imagination can the Naval Academy equate to the OCS experience. They are not put through that kind of pressure.

Furthermore, nearly all of the officers felt that Midshipmen were not exposed to the same level of stress as with an OCS
course at any point in the four-year academy experience. One officer stationed at the academy commented, "I don't think we can reproduce the emotional stress of OCS at USNA." Many interviewees acknowledged their lack of knowledge concerning the stress incurred at OCS, but made their assessment of stress at the academy based on what knowledge they did possess.

i. Finding #9

Many Naval Academy Midshipmen have been commissioned as Marine officers who would not have successfully completed an OCS course. The majority of interviewees felt that many academy graduates over the years have chosen Marine commissions, yet would have been considered unqualified by the Marine Corps' own accessions standards. This sentiment was expressed by officers of all ranks and specifically targeted at accessions prior to the transition to the service assignment policy in 1995. Specifically, interviewees cited personal knowledge of Midshipmen that chose the Marine Corps for reasons other than their motivation to be a Marine officer. One officer commented, "We had people entering the Marine Corps for other reasons than wanting to be a Marine." Another indicated that a mentality existed to the effect that Midshipmen chose the Marine Corps because "I am not qualified for aviation and I am not qualified for submarines and I don't want to be on a gray boat." A former Marine Representative at the academy also commented, "I think we need to screen those individuals out that want to be Marines just so they don't have to drive ships or just because they didn't get a Navy air slot." Additionally, a number of these officers acknowledged a trend for aspiring naval aviators to select the Marine Corps as a means to fly when
Navy aviation billets were unavailable. To this effect, one officer in the sample commented:

They would go Marine Corps just so they could fly.... Guys wanted to be Marines as an easy way to get to Pensacola, so they would put up with TBS to get to Pensacola.

During periods at the academy when Marine Corps commissions were popular and many candidates were turned away, interviewees indicated that the order of merit driven selection process resulted in the accession of many officers with exceptional academic aptitude but less than exceptional leadership aptitude.

j. Finding #10

The significant academic emphasis at the Naval Academy is in contradiction to the Marine Corps' emphasis on leadership development. The majority of officers interviewed, and nearly every Colonel and general officer, felt that the academy's emphasis on academic achievement was excessive and hindered the selection of the best candidates for Marine Corps commissions. As a former Senior Marine Representative commented:

The Navy equates a high GPA to high leadership performance. And there are those that justify that system. The Navy is reluctant to factor in the determinants that the Marines are looking for. On the admissions board I'd find all these high GPA guys and then I'd look at the ECAs. Was he a joiner? Was he a team player? [If not] this could be a huge danger signal.

Since class standing at the academy continues to weigh heavily in the service assignment process, these officers felt that the disproportionate weight of academic achievement on the Overall Order of Merit gave high academic achievers an advantage in the process. In this context, these officers felt that academic achievement was not the primary indication of success in the Marine Corps, and
therefore did not serve the Marine accession process well. A general officer in the sample commented:

Over the years the emphasis has shifted out of Bancroft Hall to the academic side. The pendulum has swung too far. You need to look at the purpose of the institution. When I was a Midshipman, Bancroft Hall owned the academy. There is a fine balance there.

Additionally, some of these officers felt that the technical curriculum of the academy advantaged Midshipmen with an inclination toward technical studies. Effectively, this would disadvantage those with an inclination toward less or non-technical studies. Since the Marine Corps does not specifically seek technical academic backgrounds in its unrestricted officer accessions, these officers felt that the technical bias at the academy did not serve the Marine officer accessions process well.

**k. Finding #11**

Naval Academy Midshipmen require further screening by the Marine Corps before being offered Marine commissions. All but three officers interviewed felt that academy Midshipmen required further screening than that afforded by the Naval Academy experience. As one officer indicated, “Coming from a guy who may not have made it under such a program, I think it would be valuable.” While only a few of these officers suggested that academy Midshipmen should attend one of the preexisting OCS courses, all felt that the purposes of those courses should be carried out in some capacity. One field grade officer commented, “I don’t think Bulldog is necessary, as long as you have something at the academy that screens according to the Marine Corps criteria.” Another field grade officer revealed:

The Naval Academy program is sufficient to produce Navy officers. Does that hold true for Marine
officers without a further screening process? I don’t think so at all.
Different opinions surfaced concerning the manner in which this screening should be conducted. Most officers believed that the current Marine Corps focused courses at the academy should be redesigned along the lines of the OCS courses. Another officer felt:

You can’t really make Midshipmen into Marines here because it’s not the full immersion. You need to really go to Quantico (OCS or TBS) to get that.

Only one of the officers interviewed felt that the screening mission could be carried out for academy Midshipmen without a dedicated Marine Corps summer training course that incorporated the function. The majority of interviewees felt that the existing programs did not carry out the screening function adequately. As a general officer in the sample commented:

You need some kind of a test that shows that you want it. I liked it when they instituted the Bulldog program. If you have a program that demonstrates some self-sacrifice that is necessary.

1. Finding #12

Naval Academy graduates should be better inclined to succeed as Marine officers than are officers accessing through other sources. Two-thirds of the officers in the sample felt that the Naval Academy should produce the Marine Corps’ best officers considering the considerable amount of preparation that is undergone during the four-year course. According to one interviewee, “Any time you invest more in something you should get a better return.” Another officer similarly commented, “Absolutely the academy should be turning out a better product than the other accession sources.” Consequently, most of these officers did not feel that the academy had accomplished this in the past or was
inclined to do so currently. As a general officer indicated:

The service academies are supposed to provide the nucleus of a professional officer corps. If they are not doing that the institutions need to change.

Another general officer similarly commented:

There comes a time when the taxpayer will ask whether or not the service academy investment is worth the product produced. I see that time around seven to ten years in the future. The academy needs to produce the quantifiably best officers or the investment will not be worthwhile. Even performance on par will not be sufficient.

A few of the officers interviewed believed that the academy is designed to produce the best Navy officers, but not the best Marine officers. In this context, they believed that the academy would continue to produce high quality Marine Corps officers that are no more or less inclined to succeed as those accessing from other sources. As another general officer and academy graduate expressed, “Sacrilegiously, I’ll say that that an officer will be as good regardless of where he goes.” Some of these officers further believed that if the academy produced the best Marine Corps officers, it would create institutional bias in the promotion system and result in an unhealthy Marine officer corps. In this respect, they believe that the accession of Marine officers from the academy that are merely on par with other officers is the most desirable outcome.

m. Finding #13

Perceived a negative stigma attached to Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps. About half of the officers in the sample experienced some sort of negative stigma directed at academy graduates during their Marine Corps career. Junior officers perceived this stigma more than did senior officers, and the officers that did not
perceive it believed that the perception was generated by a misunderstanding of good-natured rivalry. A few of the officers that did perceive the stigma as negative believed that it was inspired by jealousy. Other officers that perceived the stigma believed that it might have been prompted by the actions of academy graduates who purposely brought attention to their pedigree. According to one academy graduate interviewed, "If you wear that ring, you are saying something is different about me and something is going to be different about the way I perform." The majority of officers that perceived the stigma felt that it was unfounded. Nearly all of the officers interviewed believed that any negative stigma was likely caused by the fact that academy graduates did not complete an OCS course. Since OCS is considered a rite of passage the majority of officers from other accession sources, this finding is understandable. A few officers even saw value in requiring academy Midshipmen to attend an OCS course solely for the purpose of erasing the negative stigma. According to one general officer:

My belief is that we should have a Bulldog like program for officers coming out of the Naval Academy into the Marine Corps. I believe it better prepares them and diminishes the we/they attitudes.

n. Finding # 14

Perceived no difference between Naval Academy graduates and officers from other sources in regard to performance as Marine Corps officers. Nearly all of the interviewees above the rank of Captain believed that academy graduates collectively perform at the same level as officers from other sources after the BOC. Citing personal experience, most of these officers revealed that academy graduates produced similar performance patterns to all other
officers. Additionally, they believed that it would be a rare circumstance if any advantage conferred by the academy experience be recognized. As one field grade officer commented:

I think that they (academy graduates) fall out the same as those from other sources. The pride factor and not wanting to let the academy down helps them overcome their initial disadvantage.

The above comment reflects a finding associated with many academy graduates. These officers indicated that academy graduates feel pressure to perform better than officers from other sources due to their loyalty to the Naval Academy. However, none of these officers indicated that this pressure produced any recognizable results in Marine officer performance patterns that they observed. All the Captains in the sample believed that they could detect a higher level of performance in Naval Academy graduates at the junior officer level. However, these officers felt that advantage diminishes by the completion of the first tour.

2. Minor Themes

In addition to the major themes extracted during the transcription and analysis of interviews, a number of important minor themes surfaced. While these themes did not surface with the frequency of the major themes, they produced equally important results for the study. In fact, some of these minor themes did not surface in some interviews due to the unique course that each interview took. Therefore, some of the minor themes may have been major themes if their subject matter had been explored in every interview. The minor themes of the qualitative analysis are discussed below.
a. Finding #1

Naval Academy Midshipmen that find appeal in the Marine occupation and lifestyle tend to self-select the Marine Corps at service assignment. Almost half of the officers interviewed felt that self-selection, and not Marine recruiting efforts, is the primary influence on academy Midshipmen to pursue Marine Corps commissions. One junior officer believed that "Midshipman that tend toward the Marine Corps tend to want the full military experience." Although most of these officers also thought that academy Midshipmen received limited exposure to the Marine Corps, they felt that the best candidates would select Marine officer commissions despite the lack of exposure. A few officers even suggested that the self-selection process itself was sufficient enough to eliminate the need for further screening. One of these officers commented, "They must be choosing the Marine Corps for the right reasons or they will not serve their Marines well." Consequently, these officers also felt that the former service selection process (prior to 1995) effectively served the needs of the Marine Corps.

b. Finding #2

A concerted recruiting effort by Marines at the Naval Academy was not perceived as a Midshipman. One third of the officers interviewed, and mostly Captains and Majors, did not perceive any recruiting efforts on the part of Marines stationed at the academy. All of these officers were academy graduates and all recognized the recruiting effort once they were stationed at the institution as officers. In regard to the Marine Corps' efforts toward recruiting at the academy, one former Marine Representative commented, "In no uncertain terms they wanted good Marines
and fulfillment of the mission." Most of the interviewees that did perceive a Marine recruiting effort at the academy did not perceive it as an organized effort. Rather, they felt it was merely a self-initiated effort by particular officers. Numerous interviewees also believed that current Midshipman do not perceive the Marine Corps recruiting effort at the academy, despite its recognized existence. Additionally, a few interviewees felt that a concerted Marine recruiting effort at the academy was unnecessary and would not positively affect the quality of Marine officers assessed. These officers felt that the best candidates would self-select Marine Corps service with or without recruiting efforts. As one of these interviewees commented:

Our current presence is fine. It's good to be a little nebulous, to be the few and the proud.

c. Finding #3

The Naval Academy prepares better career officers for the Marine Corps than it prepares junior Marine officers. Of the numerous officers that felt that academy graduates were less prepared than contemporaries for the BOC, most felt that they were better prepared than were their contemporaries for career service. These officers felt that the academy experience does not provide advantages for officers early in their careers, rather that it prepares them better for prolonged service and service at higher ranks. A few of these officers also felt that a shift in focus to preparing better junior officers would be at the expense of preparing better career officers. In this context, they believed that the lack of academy graduate preparation for the BOC was acceptable in the long term. However, as mentioned earlier, many interviewees believed that lack of preparation for the BOC is unacceptable.
d. Finding #4

Marine officers at the Naval Academy were perceived as unique with regard to rule enforcement. All of the junior officers in the sample felt that the Midshipmen perceived Marines at the academy as strict rule enforcers. In this respect, they felt that the perception unfortunately cast the image of the Marine Corps in a negative light. While they did believe that this stigma attached to Marines at the academy was positive in nature, they felt that it tended to present the Marine Corps as a group of extremists and could pose as a hindrance to recruiting efforts. Although none of these officers suggested that the image be thwarted, they nonetheless recognized the implications of its persistence.

e. Finding #5

The Semper Fidelis Society engaged in very few training activities and was perceived as a club for prior enlisted Marines. Less than half of the academy graduates interviewed acknowledged the presence or influence of the Semper Fidelis Society during their tenure as Midshipmen. Of the interviewees that did acknowledge the society’s existence, only two of them participated in its activities. Most of those that recognized the society perceived its membership as being almost exclusively comprised of prior enlisted Marines. In contrast, these officers (who were then stationed at the academy) characterized the society’s current influence and training activities as greatly expanded.

f. Finding #6

Naval Academy graduates have a tendency to be less aggressive at the BOC and as junior officers than are officers from other accession sources. A few officers in
the sample believed that academy graduates are less inclined to excel at the BOC because they are burned out from the four-year immersion process. Conversely, they believed that officers from other accession sources (who have not undergone lengthy immersion) are more eager for the BOC challenges and therefore are more aggressive in the initial stages of their careers. One Captain in the sample revealed this sentiment:

You can see the gleam in the eye of the OCS graduate, which is the same as the Plebe's at the end of Plebe summer, but somewhere along the line they lose it. When newly commissioned graduates check in to TBS, they have a glossy eyed look.

Another officer similarly commented, "Some are not as hungry as their counterparts, they came through 4 years of the regime and put on the coast button." Almost half of the interviewees felt that the immersion in a military environment conferred by the academy is excessive to the point of degrading the potential value of the experience. As one of these officers revealed:

I would consider that four years may in fact be a detriment to them initially, because socially that environment probably inhibits them. They had no chance [at the academy] to make decisions that are learned through experience.

**g. Finding #7**

The Naval Academy produces the Marine officers with the clearest understanding of the Marine Corps' role in the naval establishment. Almost every interviewee below the rank of Colonel felt that academy graduates gained a clearer understanding of the Marine Corps as a naval instrument than did those that accessed in another manner. One of these officers commented:

You walk away with a naval understanding of the world. A young man or woman that comes out of the
Naval Academy has that understanding that exceeds that of a young man or women coming out of OCS. Additionally, most of these officers also felt that academy graduates are more inclined to embrace the Navy as the sister service than do officers accessing through non-Navy programs. In this context, they also indicated that failure to embrace the Navy-Marine Corps team concept could hinder an officer’s performance later in their career. These interviewees felt there was a tendency for non-academy and non-NROTC graduates to view the Navy as merely another military service. Essentially, they believe it is viewed in the same light as the Army or Air Force. Therefore, they felt that officers with that mindset would not recognize the importance of fostering a special relationship with the Navy. As one of these officers indicated:

I think Naval Academy and ROTC graduates see the Navy-Marine Corps relationship more clearly. Those from other sources tend to look at the Navy as just another service, like the Army and Air Force, and not as a sister service. If you come into a culture where you only understand and breathe the Marine Corps, you are going to become more separatist.

h. Finding #8

The Naval Academy induces a level of stress that is commensurate, although different, than that induced at an OCS course. Almost half of the officers in the sample, and most of the Captains and general officers, felt that the stress induced on academy Midshipmen was different from that induced on OCS candidates. However, they felt that the two types of stress were equal in intensity. Essentially, these officers felt that the stress received over the four-year academy course was comparable with the more intense stress received during the much shorter OCS courses. Therefore, they felt that academy Midshipmen were exposed to a
necessary level of stress to facilitate their evaluation as potential Marine officers. As one of these officers expressed, "Naval Academy graduates were behind the power curve at TBS, but you very quickly caught up because of the rigors that you went through at USNA." A general officer in the sample similarly commented:

Depends on how you define stress. It was a different kind of stress and a prolonged stress. I think both programs are effective, just different ways of doing it.

However, few of these interviewees felt that such an evaluation was being adequately conducted. Rather, they indicated that the necessary stress for evaluation existed but that the potential evaluation was not transpiring. According to one of these officers, "What they do at the Naval Academy in no way emulates what occurs at OCS in the way of screening potential Marine officers." Additionally, the general officers admitted that their estimation of the stress level was outdated and that it had likely degraded over the decades since their attendance.

i. Finding #9

The Naval Academy's transition to a service assignment process has drastically improved the quality of Marine Corps accessions from the institution. Nearly half of the officers in the sample indicated that the post 1994 service assignment process at the academy has achieved favorable results. These officers believe that the process dramatically improved both the Marine Corps' ability to screen applicants and the overall quality of academy accessions into the Marine Corps. As one general officer indicated:

I think you have one (a screening process) now, that we didn't have when I went through. It is an appropriate process because you have Marines assessing future Marines.
Aside from the short-lived Bulldog requirement, most interviewees felt that the new process has allowed the Marine Corps to screen and evaluate academy Midshipmen for the first time in history. According to a former Marine Representative at the academy, "It was quite alright for nuke power to have selectivity, but not for the Marines to have selectivity." A number of officers interviewed even preferred the service assignment process as a screening tool to an OCS course where the function was performed externally, albeit by the Marine Corps and not through self-selection. Many of the officers that did not recognize the improvement marked by the new service assignment process admitted that they were lacking in knowledge about it.

j. Finding #10

Leadership ineptitude will rarely prevent a Midshipman from graduating from the Naval Academy. A number of interviewees, from all ranks, felt that the academy did not adequately screen future Navy and Marine officers for leadership capacity. Most of these officers believed that the institution rarely denied commissions to students that showed negligible promise as future leaders. Conversely, they felt that Midshipmen were frequently separated from the academy for academic ineptitude and conduct offenses. In this context, these officers felt that the academy taught leadership but only evaluated the academic and disciplinary abilities of Midshipmen. Therefore, they felt that the Marine Corps needed an additional screening process to perform the function of assessing leadership potential. As one academy graduate commented, "You were fortunate if you had a leadership position, otherwise there was no formal leadership instruction at all."
k. Finding #11

Midshipmen perceived the Bulldog requirement, and currently perceive the Leatherneck program, as familiarization exercises rather than screening processes. The majority of Captains and Majors in the sample believed that academy Midshipmen perceive current Marine Corps focused training opportunities as familiarization exercises. According to one officer stationed at the academy:

Leatherneck has a different purpose [than OCS]. We have already considered these individuals (participants) commissionable. Furthermore, many of these officers felt that Midshipmen perceived the Bulldog course as a familiarization exercise during the period it was required. Essentially, these officers believe that the academy promotes this orientation in all its programs and continues its historical reliance on self-selection. Since the evaluation function of the Leatherneck program has become increasingly important to service assignment in recent years, these officers believe that the perception of the program as a familiarization exercise is in contradiction to its intent. As one Colonel commented, “Any kind of procurement program you have to be brutally honest.... You can’t lead them down the garden path.” Another officer similarly commented, “You (Midshipmen) have to have a mental attitude and total commitment to be a Marine that lasts for four years.”

1. Finding #12

Relationships built at the Naval Academy prove significantly beneficial during an officer’s career in the Marine Corps. A few officers in the sample believed that the relationships formed as Midshipmen at the academy proved valuable later in their careers. Field grade officers were
almost completely in agreement on the benefit of these relationships. According to one Colonel:

The relationships with your classmates from the Naval Academy will carry with you during your entire career. That in and of itself is an enormous advantage for the Marine Corps. There will always be a good natured, complimentary rivalry. Naval Academy guys immediately bond with each other when they are in the fleet.

Additionally, many of these officers felt that academy graduates tend to naturally bond. Furthermore, they felt that this occurred even if the individuals had not met each other at the academy. Since the academy has historically produced more Marine officers than any other single academic institution, some officers felt that these relationships and bonds conferred an advantage upon academy graduates in the Marine Corps. In particular, they saw increased importance in these relationships when the interaction was with Navy officers.

m. Finding #13

The performance of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps tends to be stratified at the top and bottom of the officer corps. Almost half of the officers interviewed believed that the academy tended to produce a disproportionate amount of officers at the top and bottom of the performance spectrum. As one general officer indicated:

I think we continue to get a mixed bag from the Naval Academy. We’ve always gotten a good core of achievers but we’ve also gotten a good cross-section of lieutenants that didn’t do well.

These interviewees did not discount the existence of academy graduates that post average performance records. However, they strongly felt that academy graduates tend to disproportionately comprise the top and bottom echelons of the Marine officer corps. Some of these interviewees believed that this trend occurs at the BOC, while most of
them believed that the trend holds true later in the career. Of those officers that did not perceive this trend, a number of them believed that it formerly held true on performance evaluations due to pressures created by the augmentation process. Essentially, these officers believed that there was pressure on commanding officers to rank average academy graduates lower than their peers with reserve commissions. The idea behind this practice was that academy graduates had already obtained their regular commission, and therefore did not need to compete for augmentation. When all performance was equal, these officers believed that academy graduates (and others with regular commissions) would be ranked lower so that the records of reserve officers could make more competitive.

n. Finding #14

The Marine Corps should seek more accessions from the Naval Academy than currently realized under the existing memorandum of agreement. About a third of the officers in the sample believed that the Marine Corps should seek a higher quota of accessions from the academy. According to a general officer heading the Marine Corps’ manpower efforts:

Purely from an accession standpoint we could reduce the burden on the recruiting command through USNA.... Statistically we can prove that the academy does [produce high caliber officers] and so we want a larger share of each graduating class.

In particular, officers currently serving at the academy indicated that a large number of qualified Midshipmen had to be turned away in each of the last few years. A few officers felt that there were not enough academy graduates qualified for the quotas already available or that a larger share would decrease the desired heterogeneity of the Marine officer corps. As a former Marine Representative commented:
I disagreed with the quota itself. 175 from one institution was far too many. It ruined the homogeneity [sic] of the Marine Corps. We take them from anywhere.

The remainder felt that that the current quota was equitable considering the needs of the Navy.

**o. Finding #15**

Considering the increased emphasis on joint service military operations, the Marine Corps should look at the other service academies for increased officer accessions. In the current joint military establishment, a few officers in the sample believed that the Marine Corps would benefit from regular accessions from the other service academies. While these officers still saw benefit in accessing Marine officers with naval training and orientations, they believed there is an increasing need to build an officer corps with Army and Air Force expertise. However, most of these officers believed the main emphasis should remain on the Naval Academy, considering the continuing emphasis on Marine Expeditionary Forces and service in a naval capacity.

**G. SUMMARY**

As with the quantitative research, the qualitative data analysis has further developed the context of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Through interviews with Marine Corps officers, a multitude of themes were developed concerning the impressions of the academy as a Marine officer commissioning source, the Marine Corps’ institutional influence at the academy, and the future of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship. Since the overall study is exploratory in nature, it is appropriate that its final element of research should be exploratory as well. In this capacity, the qualitative data analysis
served as the primary exploratory means of original research in the study. The observations from the analysis are built upon the context established by the historical, contemporary, and quantitative analyses. Furthermore, the qualitative analysis serves as the unifying agent in the study, bringing the different elements to a cohesive conclusion.
VI. CONCLUSION

Through historical, contemporary, quantitative, and qualitative analyses, a detailed examination of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship has been conducted in this study. Collectively, these elements of the study have revealed, explored, and analyzed the prevailing themes of the relationship in both its historical and modern contexts. From the findings of each element of the study, numerous observations, recommendations, and suggestions for further research have surfaced. The sections that follow relate the primary findings and insights generated from the overall study.

A. COLLECTIVE OBSERVATIONS

In concluding this study, a recapitulation of the significant observations from the historical, modern, quantitative, and qualitative analyses is merited. While some of these observations were made previously in their respective segment of analysis, they are again presented here to establish their importance in the overall context of the study. Furthermore, the collective observations build on all the study's areas of exploration, rather than on a single area of analysis. Effectively, these observations answer the primary research questions posed by the thesis.

The practice of commissioning Marine officers from the Naval Academy arose due to circumstances other than the close relationship between the naval services. Without question, the academy was designed to educate and train future Navy officers and the concept of commissioning Midshipmen in the Marine Corps was neither conceived nor sought by the Navy. Furthermore, the Marine Corps specifically sought accessions from the Military Academy, and not the Naval Academy, during the period prior to the
practice's institution. Ultimately, it was the Navy's inability to commission all its officers than generated a new accession source for the Marine Corps. Until 1914, the Navy categorically resisted the practice, which was initiated by congressional action but left to the Navy Department to regulate. Even after the practice was accepted, historical evidence points to constant efforts on the part of Navy to limit it. The Navy's current resistance to the Marine Corps' initiative to increase its quota of academy accessions is representative of this historical trend.

The Marine Corps remains primarily naval in its operational orientation. Although the Marine Corps has recently eliminated many of its traditional naval functions aboard ships and at naval shore establishments, its primary functions remain naval in character. The doctrine and operational concepts currently espoused by the Marine Corps place primacy in the service's naval character and naval missions. Additionally, the legally mandated missions of the Marine Corps continue to revolve around its function in naval expeditionary and amphibious warfare. Likewise, its current operational emphasis is placed primarily on its contribution to naval forces. The majority of future Marine Corps capabilities conceived by the service are naval in nature. Even the recently eliminated naval missions are legally entrusted to the Marine Corps and may be again fulfilled during conflict situations.

The Bulldog requirement for Marine Corps accessions from the Naval Academy (1989-1992) was influenced by a number of factors. The principal factors included: low performance rates of academy graduates in the Marine Corps, the lack of Marine Corps focused curriculum and training at the academy, low augmentation rates in the Marine Corps, the
inconsistency of academy commissioning practices with the commissioning practices of other sources, and the inability of Marines at the academy to screen potential officer candidates. While the measure had been discussed and fostered within the Marine Corps for many years before its implementation, officials at the Naval Academy and in the Navy successfully resisted it. The ultimate implementation of the measure was only possible through the initiative of a convinced Secretary of the Navy. While the merits of the Bulldog requirement were not specifically evaluated in this study, it did generate a number of problems for both the Naval Academy and the Marine Corps. These problems included: the inability of certain varsity athletes and Midshipmen injured at Bulldog to earn a Marine Corps commission, the Navy’s resistance to commissioning Bulldog failures as Ensigns, and failure on the Marine Corps’ part to achieve its annual quota of academy accessions during every year of the requirement. The requirement was likely terminated due to all the problems above, but the decreased accessions seems to have driven its termination within the Marine Corps. As the research in this study indicates, most of the problems that initiated the measure seem to have been countered at the present time. However, the lack of a Bulldog requirement for academy Midshipmen continues to generate concern and discontent within the Marine officer corps.

Naval Academy graduates have been historically unprepared for the Basic Officer Course and appear to have performed at lower rates than officers from most other sources. Despite the academy’s credible record of producing distinguished and capable Marine officers, it does not appear that this was considered an important function of the institution until the modern era. Rather, the production of
Marine Corps officers appears to have been an afterthought through most of the academy’s history. A current evaluation of the training program and curriculum of the Naval Academy seems to indicate that this historical trend has ceased. The academy has redefined itself as an institution charged with producing uniquely qualified officers for both branches of the naval service. Its institutional culture, training programs, and curriculum all seem to indicate that this redefined focus is present. There is evidence that the Marine Corps influence at the academy continues to be overshadowed by the influence of the Navy, but there is also evidence to indicate that the Marine Corps influence has been steadily increasing.

Certain factors in a Naval Academy Midshipman’s profile makes him or her more likely to choose the Marine Corps at service selection than Navy warfare communities. Quantitative evidence indicates a tendency for Marine Corps aspirants at the academy to be disproportionately concentrated in the humanities and social science academic majors. Since the Marine Corps does not place emphasis on technical backgrounds or abilities when selecting officer candidates, it is likely that Marine Corps careers hold more promise for Midshipmen with non-technical academic majors. Additionally, evidence indicates that women at the academy are less likely to aspire toward a Marine Corps commission than toward service in Navy warfare communities. Likely, this propensity to select Navy occupations is due to the restriction on women serving in Marine combat arms occupational specialties and in service support billets attached to combat arms units. Academic and military performance did appear to have some relevance in the profile of Midshipmen that aspired toward the Marine Corps. However, it did not appear as relevant as the two previously
stated determinants. Factors unmeasured in this study; such as personal orientation, interests, and background; are likely more credible determinants of a Midshipmen's propensity to seek a Marine Corps commission.

Naval Academy graduates have recently performed at the Basic Officer Course with higher overall performance rates than officers from all other sources (except the Marine Corps Enlisted Commissioning Program). Despite the historical lack of preparation of academy graduates for this course, and their accompanying low performance rates, academy graduates have collectively outperformed officers from all other sources during the last five years. This study did not determine the exact impetus for this performance increase. However, evidence points to the increase in Marine focused curriculum and training at the academy and the improved service assignment process that facilitates screening as the major influences. Although the Bulldog requirement did perform these functions during its existence, it did not perform them over the entire academy course. The current Marine focused programs and evaluation system at the academy are designed to accomplish these functions. Therefore, the current screening and training programs at the academy may better prepare academy Midshipmen for Marine Corps service than the Bulldog requirement alone. However, some evidence points to benefits of the Bulldog requirement, particularly the inducement of stress, which are not captured by the current academy programs or curricula.

Naval Academy graduates have recently performed at the lowest level in leadership aptitude than in any of the Basic Officer Course evaluation areas. While academy graduates still outperformed officers from nearly every other commissioning source in this area, they performed
considerably better in military skills and academic aptitude. In contrast, officers from all primary enlisted commissioning sources have performed better in leadership aptitude than in any of the other evaluation areas. Evidence seems to indicate that the lower performance of academy graduates in leadership aptitude may be due to a lack of emphasis on leadership training and application at the academy. Evidence also indicates that this lower performance is due to a discernable difference in the leadership concept taught at the Naval Academy and that taught by the Marine Corps.

Naval Academy graduates are collectively expected to perform and retain at higher rates than are officers from other sources. Evidenced by both quantitative and historical evidence, the study found that larger initial investment in academy accessions was and is expected to produce better results. The Marine Corps has historically rejected this concept in its institutional culture to prevent bias in the officer corps and in the promotion system. However, viewing the concept from an accession standpoint reveals that the academy is one of the Marine Corps' most desirable commissioning sources. Therefore, the Marine Corps places great value in achieving its annual quota from the institution. The current Marine Corps effort to increase the academy quota further attests to the desirability of the institution as a Marine officer accession source.

The assignment of Marine Corps personnel at the Naval Academy is in accordance with the Marine Corps' accession efforts and recruiting requirements. Evidence indicates that the recent increase in Marine Corps personnel at the academy serves as an instrument of the service's efforts to increase its presence at and accessions quota from the
institution. Although recruiting efforts by Marines at the academy often go unnoticed by Midshipmen, they are nonetheless concerted. The Marine Corps recruiting command and the manpower section at Headquarters Marine Corps both exercise oversight over the recruiting efforts at the academy. Furthermore, evidence indicates that the recruiting mission is the principal impetus for stationing Marines at the academy. Evidence also indicates that Marines stationed at the academy both recognize and embrace their recruiting function.

The Naval Academy experience has historically conferred some advantages on Marine officers that access in that manner. In fact, during certain historical periods, the Naval Academy pedigree appears to have been particularly advantageous as an institutional bias toward non-graduates existed within the Navy Department. Specifically, the navies and insights gained by academy graduates during the post World War I era appeared to be the impetus for the development of the amphibious warfare doctrine. Today, institutional bias toward graduates or non-graduates appears to be non-existent in the Marine Corps. Qualitative evidence indicates that some advantages continue to be conferred on academy graduates by the experience, but they appear to be minor and diminish after the initial period of service.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

Having conducted extensive exploratory research into the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship, and identified its major themes and implications, the study now turns to suggested policy recommendations. Since the study is exploratory in nature and intended to evaluate the wide range of issues in the relationship, each of these recommendations should be followed only after further
specialized research and analysis. In this context, even the quantitative and qualitative analyses in this study should be followed up with additional scrutiny before the findings are accepted or acted upon. The recommendations of this thesis are detailed below.

Increase and expand the summer training opportunities for Naval Academy Midshipmen. Primarily, more opportunities should be created for Midshipmen to participate in Fleet Marine Force cruises during their 1st Class summer. Secondly, Fleet Marine Force cruises should be implemented during the 2nd Class summer. Above all, the opportunities for Marine Corps focused training should parallel the opportunities existent for Navy focused training. Fewer billets should be offered, but the same number and types of training should be available at all levels. Only by offering equivalent training opportunities focused on Marine Corps careers can the academy equitably orient Midshipmen toward both naval services.

Create a Marine option designation, similar to that existent in the NROTC program, to which Midshipmen can be assigned after their 2nd Class year. Such a designation will ensure that the Marine Corps staff at the academy can adequately evaluate each aspiring Marine officer. Furthermore, they can be evaluated for a substantial period after they have demonstrated their intent. Presently, the service assignment system is biased in the favor of Midshipmen who have happened to be more exposed to Marine officers. Such exposure is advantageous because it increases their opportunity for evaluation. A Marine Option system would ensure an equitable amount of evaluation for each designated Midshipman, as well as an opportunity for them to concentrate on preparation for a Marine career. If the main purpose of the academy remains to prepare future
career officers, this designation would result in a more concentrated effort toward that end.

Redesign the Leatherneck program as a dedicated screening process for future Marine officers, rather than a familiarization process for all Midshipmen. Mixing the evaluation and familiarization functions degrades the ability to accomplish both adequately. If one is satisfied the other is not. Unlike the Bulldog program, no intensive preparation should be necessary if the Leatherneck program focuses purely on screening and evaluation. Furthermore, no preparation should be encouraged to facilitate an equal assessment of the leadership potential of each participant. However, such a change would require more familiarization with the Marine Corps earlier in the academy experience. Otherwise, Leatherneck will have to continue to fulfill the familiarization function, at the expense of performing evaluation and screening. The evaluation function cannot be adequately performed at any other time during the four-year course.

Continue to seek an increase in accession quotas at the Naval Academy to reduce the burden on the recruiting command and raise the quality of officer accessions. Based on the recent performance of academy graduates at the Basic Officer Course, they should be sought in larger numbers. This is particularly true in light of the fact that numerous qualified aspirants have been turned away in recent years. During the same time, the Marine Corps has struggled to maintain its quality standards in the Officer Candidate Class program, which it has increasingly relied on to fill accession deficiencies. Not only will increased academy accessions lessen the reliance on the Officer Candidate Class program, but it will also eliminate the need to relax quality standards.
Experiment with an increased Marine Corps presence at the other service academies and increase their number of accessions. In the increasingly joint military environment, officer accessions from the other service academy will bring unique knowledge and insight to the Marine officer corps. Just as Naval Academy graduates bring a particular orientation and blend of experiences to the Marine Corps, graduates from the other service academies will do the same. Furthermore, the few accessions each year from the other service academies appear to have performed better than officers from some of the primary Marine commissioning sources have.

Increase the emphasis on leadership instruction at the Naval Academy. Furthermore, ensure that Midshipmen are extensively exposed to the Marine Corps' concept of leadership throughout the four-year course. This function can be best carried out through a dedicated Marine option program. Currently, the Marine concept of leadership is only intensively instructed during the last twelve months at the academy. Above all, Marine Corps and Naval Academy officials must be concerned that leadership aptitude is the lowest performance area for academy graduates at the Basic Officer Course. This must particularly be a concern since leadership, and not any technical or tactical ability, is the most important performance area for Marine Corps officers.

Ensure that all Naval Academy Midshipmen receive extensive exposure to and familiarization with the Marine Corps. The Naval Academy must prepare future Navy and Marine Corps officers that are familiar with and understand both naval services. The current system that allows some Midshipmen to avoid any Marine Corps focused training during the four-year course should be changed. Such a change will
enhance the understanding of all future Navy officers and ensure that all Midshipmen have the knowledge necessary to aspire toward a Marine Corps career if they so desire.

Maintain ambiguity in regard to the officer quality expectation for each of the different Marine commissioning sources. Although it is clear that the Marine Corps prefers to access its officers from particular sources and not to access them from others, this fact should not be emphasized outside of the agencies performing that recruiting function. Otherwise, institutional bias will creep into the promotion system, thereby eliminating the Marine Corps' ability to make unbiased selections and assessments of performance potential.

Continue to safeguard against Naval Academy Midshipmen pursuing Marine Corps careers for the wrong reasons. The current service assignment and interview processes have been effective instruments to this end. The Marine option designation would further enhance the Marine Corps' ability to screen applicants with undesirable motivations for a Marine Corps commission. Furthermore, the Marine Corps should insist that Midshipmen identify their desire for Marine Corps service prior to electing a ground or aviation designation. Future Marine officers should be sought based on their desire to lead Marines. Their occupational orientation should be determined later. The NROTC program currently operates under this philosophy. In this context, a Midshipman that requests a Navy aviation billet as a second choice to a Marine Corps aviation billet should not be considered.

C. SUGGESTED FURTHER RESEARCH

This study intended to provide insight and understanding of the Naval Academy-Marine Corps relationship through a broad exploratory analysis of the topic. This
intent was the primary goal of the research. Since the study was structured to be an exploratory tool, its secondary goal was to provide a sufficient basis of knowledge from which further research and analysis can be conducted. In this capacity, the following suggestions for further research have been identified.

- A curriculum analysis of the United States Military Academy and the United States Air Force Academy, particularly focused on the quality of leadership instruction, to assess their value as Marine officer accession sources.

- An analysis of the performance of Naval Academy Midshipmen at the Bulldog course (1988 to 1992) to evaluate their level of preparation and abilities in contrast to candidates from the other sources.

- A statistical analysis of the performance of Naval Academy graduates at the Basic Officer Course during the early 1990s and the 1980s, with particular focus on accessions during years that Bulldog requirement existed.

- An analysis of the performance of Naval Academy graduates in the Marine Corps based on a performance index of fitness report scores and selection rates to Captain and Major.

- A statistical analysis of the augmentation rates of Naval Academy graduates in comparison to those from other accession sources. This research should be conducted in the future, since academy graduates have only recently begun to compete in the augmentation process.

- A detailed comparison of Officer Candidate School curriculum with the curriculum of the Leatherneck program, particularly in reference to leadership instruction and evaluation.

- Interviews with recent Basic Officer Course graduates to determine their impressions of the difference between the Marine Corps leadership concept and the leadership concept instructed at the Naval Academy.

- Interviews with officers unaffiliated with the Naval Academy to determine their impressions of the value of the academy education for Marine officers, the performance of academy graduates in the Marine
Corps, and the stigma attached to academy graduates in the Marine Corps.

- Interviews with Navy officers that graduated from the Naval Academy to determine their perceptions of the Marine Corps' presence at the academy.

- A detailed comparison of Naval Academy admissions profiles to Marine Corps officer accession profiles from non-academy sources.

- A statistical analysis of the GT scores of Naval Academy graduates in comparison with the GT scores of other accessions at the Basic Officer Course.

- Interviews with current Naval Academy Midshipmen who are aspiring toward the Marine Corps with the purpose of further developing a profile of potential Marine officer candidates at the academy.

- A statistical analysis of the retention rates of Naval Academy graduates in comparison to the retention rates of officers from other commissioning sources.
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APPENDIX A. SERVICE SELECTION DATA VARIABLES

alpha - USNA identification code  
company - USNA Midshipman company at graduation  
class - USNA graduation year  
gender - sex  
major - academic major at graduation  
group1 - engineering academic major  
group2 - science/mathematics major  
group - humanities/social science major  
groups - academic major classification group  
aoom - Academic Order of Merit at graduation  
moom - Military Order of Merit at graduation  
ooom - Overall Order of Merit at graduation  
aoomq1 - Ac. Order of Merit (quartile) at graduation  
moomq1 - Mil. Order of Merit (quartile) at graduation  
oomq1 - Ov. Order of Merit (quartile) at graduation  
communit - warfare specialty assigned at serv. selection  
first - first choice community at service selection  
second - second choice community at service selection  
third - third choice community at service selection  
fourth - fourth choice community at service selection  
fifth - fifth choice community at service selection  
sixth - last choice community at service selection  
firstfo - first choice Navy NFO at service selection  
firstplt - first choice Navy pilot at service selection  
firstmfo - first choice Marine NFO at service selection  
firstmplt - first choice Marine pilot at service selection  
firstgrd - first choice Marine ground at serv. selection  
firstmar - first choice Marine Corps at service selection  
firstsub - first choice submarines at service selection  
firstsw - first choice SWO (conv.) at service selection  
firstnuk - first choice SWO (nuc.) at service selection  
granted - choice granted at service selection  
choice1 - granted first choice at service selection  
notfirst - granted other than first choice at serv. sel.  
navy - commissioned in the Navy  
machine - commissioned in the Marine Corps  
aviation - granted Navy aviation specialty at serv. sel.  
surface - granted SWO specialty at service selection  
submarin - granted submarine specialty at serv. selection  
comm - community granted at serv. sel. (5 categories)  
comm4 - community granted at serv. sel. (4 categories)
APPENDIX B. BOC PERFORMANCE DATA VARIABLES

ssn - social security number
ov_rank - overall rank at graduation
ov_score - overall score at graduation
ac_rank - academic rank at graduation
ac_score - academic score at graduation
ld_rank - leadership rank at graduation
ld_score - leadership score at graduation
mil_rank - military skills rank at graduation
mil_score - military skills score at graduation
mos - military occ. specialty assigned during BOC
mos_cat - military occ. specialty by primary category
aviation - assigned a naval aviator MOS
svc_spt - assigned a combat service support MOS
cbtarms - assigned a combat arms MOS
gender - sex
race - race code
source - commissioning source
source_p - commissioning source by primary category
company - BOC company
year - academic year attended BOC
usna - graduated from the Naval Academy
female - female gender
ac_top - academic score in top third of class
ac_mid - academic score in middle third of class
ac_bot - academic score in bottom third of class
ac_10 - academic score in top 10 percent of class
ac_90 - academic score in bottom 10 percent of class
ld_top - leadership score in top third of class
ld_mid - leadership score in middle third of class
ld_bot - leadership score in bottom third of class
ld_10 - leadership score in top 10 percent of class
ld_90 - leadership score in bottom 10 percent of class
mil_top - military skills score in top third of class
mil_mid - military skills score in middle third of class
mil_bot - military skills score in bottom third of class
mil_10 - mil. skills score in top 10 percent of class
mil_90 - mil. skills score in bot. 10 percent of class
ov_top - overall score in top third of class
ov_mid - overall score in middle third of class
ov_bot - overall score in bottom third of class
ov_10 - overall score in top 10 percent of class
ov_90 - overall score in bottom 10 percent of class
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