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UNITED STATES GLOBAL SECURITY
AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY:
A CASE FOR EUROPEAN MILITARY AUTONOMY

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United States Global Security and the European Security and Defense Identity: A Case for European Military Autonomy

26 April 2000

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Chapter 1

Introduction

...China now seeks to avoid head-on confrontation until around 2030, when the Chinese expect US power to decline significantly. However, a war between China and the US could erupt over Taiwan.  

...In the twenty-first century, Africa, like Europe in the twentieth, will have to be confronted. The greatest threat to our value system comes from Africa. Can we continue to believe in universal principles as Africa declines to levels better described by Dante than by development economists?  

United States Security Interests and Globalization

The Cold War is over, the threat posed by communism no longer exists, and the United States (US) continues to occupy the preeminent position worldwide. With the removal of Cold War restrictions and constrictions, the pursuit of globalization is the most significant driving force that will shape human endeavor for the foreseeable future. With globalization will come new security threats that will demand new and innovative solutions; old ideas and old strategies applied to new security problems just won’t work.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of US-European security affairs. Since 1945, the US strategy in Europe, and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has been ensuring stability and prosperity in close proximity to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Second only to national survival has been the reconstitution and security of Europe. In the year 2000, has the US obtained its Cold War goals regarding Europe? There is no longer any credible threat to the territorial integrity of Europe; the economy of the European Union (EU) alone is near equal to that of the US and democratization and self-determination are flourishing. Is it necessary for the US to maintain its current level of military involvement and focus for these conditions to continue?

The likelihood of American confrontation with communism has diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War. The impact of globalization on the US will increase dramatically in the 21st Century. It is time for the US to shift to a security posture that is designed to protect US vital interests and influence security and stability in all regions of the world.

Although Europe will certainly continue to be part of the US security equation, it will only be one part. Other regions, such as the Pacific Rim and Asia, which contain half of the world’s population, will become increasingly important to US interests, as will Africa. A shift in US security policy focus away from Europe, to a more global

1 China Preparing for war with US, Wash. Times, February 2, 2000
perspective, will become unavoidable by the year 2030. How does the US set the conditions for this policy shift away from Europe?

The authors believe the basic elements are present today in two related developments. First, is our ability to build on the success of NATO, the most successful alliance ever known. Second is the EU’s current, yet embryonic, desire for military autonomy as evidenced by their interest in a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) capability. The US should seize upon these elements to start the transition process. Given the magnitude of this transition, it will likely take in excess of two decades of close coordination between the US and its European allies to complete. The result will be a secure Europe, still linked to the US, but more importantly a significant increase in US ability and agility to secure its interests globally.

Scope and Structure of the Research Paper

This research paper will assess three options available to US security policy makers in light of Europe’s desire for military autonomy in the form of ESDI. It is written from an American perspective and viewpoint. Our intention is to be forward looking (out to 2030, if not beyond) and focused on where US security requirements will be called upon in the coming decades, not fixated on a successful past. The authors reject any notion that the topic is about neo-isolationism, abandoning Europe, America “turning inward” or disengagement. As briefly mentioned above, the physical forces of globalization preclude any of this. In fact, globalization is what the US is trying to harness and is the basis of our assumptions which are:

1. European desire for ESDI is real and sustainable
2. Europe will remain reasonably stable and continue to consolidate
3. US security requirements will increase elsewhere vis-à-vis Europe
4. Globalization (economic, financial and information) will continue to develop, resulting in multiple centers of power
5. Africa will require more of our moral attention
6. The Pacific will become the dominant economic theater by the year 2030, if not before
7. No global challenge to democracy emerges

We have structured the paper accordingly. Chapter Two will examine the environment that confronts ESDI from the current Helsinki pledged force of 60,000 personnel by the year 2003 and the present US position using SECDEF Cohen’s “Three I test.” Chapter Three will cover the genesis of what has become known as ESDI. Chapter Four will discuss a possible structure for ESDI. Chapter Five will discuss the international reactions to ESDI, which could be significant when “out of theater” use of ESDI is considered (new European crusaders into the Middle East or Chechnya?). Chapters Six, Seven and Eight will discuss three options available to US policy-makers regarding their approach to and acceptance of ESDI. The final chapter will summarize and put forth our recommendation, which is that the US exert its leadership to shape the European desire to become more autonomous, thus gaining strategic agility for itself.
Why this is important and how will it be done?

The US approach to ESDI should be classic realpolitik by accepting that the concept of being the only remaining superpower is an illusion and is actually counterproductive. Supporting a transition to European military independence does not mean a loss of US prestige and should not be misunderstood as one. It is far more mature and prudent statesmanship to take a critical look at one’s current circumstance, determine where one wants or will need to go and then plot the appropriate course! For the first time in one hundred years the US can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. The US retains significant influence in all areas and will continue to hold what Walt W. Rostow calls the “critical margin of power and influence.” Operating in this margin means the US cannot impose its will on others as a hegemonic power; but big things can’t get done in the world without our active participation. Changing the current mindset of US security managers to work the margin to our advantage will take time. Nowhere will it be more difficult than in US-European security affairs. Dr. Lester Thurow puts the issue crisply:

*Attitudes and speech patterns remain in place long after they no longer reflect reality. No matter how many speeches are made proclaiming that it won’t happen, NATO will fade away as an important American-led military alliance. With the Soviet Union gone, Europe’s problems and perspectives are not America’s problems and perspectives. The American taxpayers simply aren’t going to pay for the defense of those richer than themselves from an enemy that cannot be specified or imagined. On the other side, Europe doesn’t want the shock of a rapid American withdrawal, but it no longer wants Americans running European military and foreign policies.*

Ironically the US will have to lead the Europeans in their quest for military autonomy. Minimizing the shock and meticulously managing the withdrawal will require the US to be deeply involved in the design and transition process. If properly done this will result in an effective European Union “second pillar” and a dramatic increase in US latitude to meet its own future requirements. Strategic ambivalence can be expected on both sides of the Atlantic before, during and after the transition. America will continue to be a dependable European ally. But the stark reality is that the security dynamics of Europe have significantly changed for the better. The US needs to seize the moment, focus on its own future security requirements and act boldly. The concept of ESDI can be the initial precursor to greater European Military autonomy and needs to be pursued as an American security objective.

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5 The European Union developed a long-range plan for deepening and strengthening the ties among and between European Union member states labeled by the EU as its Three Pillars. The Three Pillars are: 1. Internal Market, 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which ESDI is a part, and 3. Justice and Home Affairs.
Chapter 2
Military Autonomy and the European Desire for ESDI

At Helsinki, Finland, in December 1999, the EU formally pledged to create and have operational by the year 2003, a 60,000 member military force referred to as the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The ERRF is the first installment in the creation of an operational capability under ESDI. At first glance this is a relatively small portion (approximately 3-6%) of the over two million military personnel available from the combined European countries. By the EU’s design ESDI is envisioned to possess a separate military capability that excludes US involvement and precludes a NATO veto of its use. Javier Solana of Spain left his post as NATO secretary-general in October 1999, to become the EU’s first High Representative for forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is the second pillar in the EU’s ongoing efforts to deepen and broaden European integration. ESDI is an integral part in the construction of this pillar. Solana has stated his mandate is to give Europe the military capacity for “autonomous action independent of NATO.”

On February 5, 2000, US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) William Cohen spoke at the 36th Munich Conference on Security Policy. Cohen stated he supported NATO Secretary-General Robertson’s earlier comments that any ESDI development must incorporate the three “I’s” of indivisibility of transatlantic security; improvement of European capabilities; and inclusiveness of all European allies in the process. He went on to say that “NATO is, and should remain, the principal foundation of transatlantic and European security. NATO is and should remain, whole and intact … a coherent European capacity to act in its security interests should multiply NATO’s power, not divide it. We [US] believe that every step towards an ESDI should meet that test.”

Clearly the Helsinki pledges of 60,000 by 2003, and SECDEF Cohen’s vision of how ESDI should fit into NATO in the 21st century, are at odds. French officials, notably President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, have complained that the post-Cold War US has gone from superpower to hyperpower in its efforts to retain Cold War era dominance over European affairs through the Atlantic Alliance, which is the sole US institutional link to Europe. SECDEF Cohen’s support for the framework of testing ESDI against the three “I’s” of indivisibility, improvement and inclusiveness go against the most basic tenets of ESDI proponents, those being participation limited to only EU members and autonomy from the US and NATO. Just prior to Helsinki, Geoff Winestock of the Wall Street Journal commented regarding ESDI that the “…Europeans and US are already behaving like a husband and wife preparing for a messy divorce.” ESDI has the potential to significantly stress, if not fracture beyond repair, the historical relationship between Atlantic Alliance members like no other proposal since inception in 1949. Ironically, what fifty years of Soviet designs could not do, may happen from within to end the world’s most successful alliance ever.

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How can the circle be squared in such a way as to accommodate such divergent viewpoints? How can the “Three I’s” test of SECDEF Cohen and NATO Secretary-General Robertson be blended and shaped with High Representative Javier Solana’s mandate to give Europe the military capacity for “autonomous action independent of NATO”?

**Beginning to Square the Circle**

That ESDI will be established is the first of seven assumptions (previously listed in Chapter One). Assuming success allows us to look beyond the near term political noise and frustrations presented by actually meeting the Helsinki imposed 2003 deadline. Also assumed, and for the same reason, is the continued consolidation and growth in the EU’s power.

The idea of ESDI is not new. Although it is not our intent to present a detailed history, it is necessary to cover the past briefly to fully appreciate and understand why many feel so passionately about ESDI. Additionally, in order to look forward (beyond 2003) it is necessary to do so from a basis for understanding what (most likely) ESDI would look like, be capable of and its associated costs. Therefore Chapter Four discusses possible ESDI roles, missions, organization and how it will be controlled as currently envisioned.

With this information in place, there would appear to be three options available, which we consider individually in subsequent chapters. They are:

a. Option One: Status Quo (neglect of or opposition to ESDI)
b. Option Two: Adjust over time (ESDI “Lite”)
c. Option Three: US Bold Shift (transition out of NATO by 2030)

The authors recommend Option Three and believe it provides the US with the most flexibility in the future. We will use the Cohen/Robertson “Three I’s Test” as one measure of each option. More importantly we will argue that in a final act of leadership and prudent statesmanship to the Cold War era the US, in conjunction with its European allies, should develop a plan over the next two decades, to transition out of its pivotal role in NATO. At the same time the US must refocus its sights on emerging 21st century strategic goals and objectives with a global perspective.

**US Conditional Support and Concerns**

SECDEF Cohen and Secretary General Robertson’s’ support for ESDI is contingent upon passing the “Three I’s Test.” The test ensures that any ESDI capability will be centered on the concept of indivisibility of transatlantic security; improvement of European security/defense capabilities; and inclusiveness available to all European allies. These are the positive evolution of US Secretary of State (SECSTATE) Madeleine Albright’s “Three D’s” speech put forth at the December 1998 North Atlantic Council
meeting in Brussels\(^\text{10}\). The following chart shows just how similar these two frameworks are.

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The authors believe a fourth “I” is appropriate for the US to consider when determining our policy towards an autonomous European Military Capability. Our policy objective should be to “increase” US global security. Policy planners in the US should approach the ESDI dilemma with global security in mind. As stated above the authors believe the developments in the ESDI present the US with an opportunity to improve our security posture worldwide. US security planners must grasp this opportunity now and help shape the ESDI for the future in a way that increases our global security.

Both lists highlight US concerns regarding ESDI. Albright’s decoupling and Cohen’s indivisibility warn that there must be complete transparency between NATO and EU deliberations regarding security matters. The historic US desire for the Europeans to provide for more of their own defense is not in question. But Cohen stresses that “NATO is, and should remain, the principal foundation of transatlantic and European security ... A coherent European capacity to act in its security interests should multiply NATO’s power, not divide it. We [US] believe that every step toward an ESDI should meet that test.”\(^\text{11}\) But there is no question ESDI has the potential to divide the alliance like no other development or incident since its inception in 1949.

Regarding the second category of concern Albright’s no duplication and Cohen’s improve requirement are consistent and mutually supporting. Both secretaries believe it makes no sense for the EU to form new structures to deal with military planning, command and control, or operations when those capabilities already exist within NATO. All estimates suggest any ESDI capability will be enormously expensive to create and maintain. The Europeans will need to appropriate significant resources today to meet even the most basic year 2003 goals. Although defense spending by Europeans has begun to stabilize, this has only occurred after a decade of declining spending following the fall of the Berlin Wall (see Chapter 6). This decade of declining defense spending resulted in a significant capability differential between the US and the Europeans evident in the recent Kosovo air campaign. It will be difficult to justify any defense spending within the NATO alliance that does not correct this differential.

At the Munich Conference, SECDEF Cohen spoke directly to this very point when he said “…one member of NATO [US] conducted virtually two-thirds of all air support sorties and half of all air combat missions.”\(^\text{12}\) He went on to say that there were only a handful of countries that could supply precision munitions, operate in all kinds of weather and possessed ample secure communication equipment in order to minimize risk. Most aerial refueling requirements fell to the US because there was so little capability among the allies. What is most disturbing is that NATO had identified virtually all of

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\(^\text{11}\) Cohen, 5 Feb 2000.

\(^\text{12}\) Cohen, 5 Feb 2000.
these shortfalls several years earlier. Countries responsible had simply failed to take budgetary corrective action. Yet many of these same countries are considering allocating large funds to ESDI that would appear to be better applied elsewhere. As Minister Scharping (Germany’s Defense Minister) has said, “The problem in NATO is not too much America, but too little Europe.” It is difficult to see how this situation is not a duplication of effort and certainly does not improve the collective security arrangement. Surely this reluctance to correct these shortfalls will not escape the next US president, congress or public indefinitely.

The third and last of Albright and Cohen’s respective requirements are discrimination and inclusiveness. Here too both secretaries agree. This reflects the concern about countries such as Turkey (and to a lesser extent Norway) which are NATO members but not EU members. Because ESDI is envisioned to be limited to only EU members, what role would countries such as Turkey play? The potential for discrimination and exclusion is easy to see resulting in less than one Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.

Is There Disagreement?

Just two weeks after SECDEF Cohen’s speech at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof the Right Honorable Christopher Patten, a member of the European Commission with responsibility for External Relations, spoke to the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee regarding ESDI. At first glance it would appear that Patten and Cohen (and by extension Albright) agree on most significant issues. Patten agrees the Europeans need to be doing more in their own defense and correcting many of the capability shortfalls experienced in the Kosovo air war. Patten acknowledged that European members of NATO spend about 60% (albeit roughly having the same collective GNP of what the US spends on defense and although the Europeans have approximately 2 million personnel under arms they could “scarcely deploy 2% of that number for the Kosovo operation.” Patten goes on to say the ESDI is not intended to rival or duplicate NATO. Rather, ESDI is intended to act where “NATO as a whole is not engaged” or since “our transatlantic partners [US] will not want to intervene in every regional crisis on the European continent. Nor do I blame them. This is our backyard, not theirs.”

This general agreement is a thin veneer and most likely misleading as to the significant troubles to come in the near future. It is very difficult to see where or how the creation of a credible ESDI would not conflict with any or all aspects of the “Three I” framework. Are the Europeans prepared to fully support continued NATO modernization (as the US is) by correcting known shortfalls and at the same time devote adequate resources to ESDI? In the absence of major increases in European defense spending this is not likely to occur. This will lead to two, both less than optimal, situations.

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14 Christopher Patten, CH, Member of the European Commission, Speech to NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 22 February 2000.
15 Patten, 22 February 2000
First would be a situation where NATO shortfalls are left uncorrected because resources are allocated to meeting the Helsinki 2003 pledges of 50-60,000 troops. Patten's own admission could involve more like 200,000 troops when rotation cycles are factored in. NATO would be forced to assume operational risk and curtail necessary modernization. It is easy to see how this scenario could actually result in an increase in European dependency on the US for security. At the same time ESDI would exist in some form but would likely be unable to act autonomously or effectively, leading to the second scenario. The second scenario would be a situation, say in 2005, where ESDI is a dismal failure, sunk costs are gone and NATO shortfalls still exist. This would surely generate deep philosophical discussion in the US about our role in European security, but under much different political pressures and circumstances. It could actually result in a deepening of US commitment to Europe at a time when US commitments elsewhere have deepened considerably. Equally possible in this second scenario could be a justifiable exasperation by the US resulting in a rapid withdrawal from Europe.

What is Missing?

Fundamentally missing in either the desire for more military autonomy by the EU or fear of fracturing NATO by the US is recognition of the fact that the US role in European security affairs is changing rapidly. Actually the continued Euro-centric focus by the US is counterproductive to both itself and Europe. Currently all security options, even if ESDI passes the "Three I" test, assume a continued significant level of US participation in Europe. Yet the US cannot justify the same level of commitment in light of the globalization of our economy and our security requirements. Not only can the US not justify the same level, the US cannot sustain the same level indefinitely as different threats emerge around the globe.

The US and Europe need to make a fundamental shift in geopolitical thinking, a shift that envisions the EU as the leader in all aspects of European security. Imagine for a moment the EU trying to determine the feasibility of ESDI with the understanding that the US intended on stepping down from its pivotal leadership role within the next two decades. As stated in the conclusion of chapter one the US will have to partner with the Europeans and assist them through a lengthy transition process in their quest for military autonomy. Minimizing the shock and meticulously managing the withdrawal will require the US to be deeply involved in the design and transition process. If properly done this will result in an effective European Union second pillar and a dramatic increase in US latitude to meet its own future requirements.

America will continue to be a dependable European ally. But the stark reality is that the security dynamics of Europe have significantly changed, the question remains, "Will US security planners recognize the change and take advantage of it, or will we eventually be overwhelmed by emerging threats elsewhere in the world as we continue to focus on Europe?" The US needs to seize the moment, focus on its own future security requirements and act boldly. The concept of ESDI is a precursor that needs to be pursued as an American security objective.
As stated above, the US needs to take the lead in shaping the ESDI concept to become an effective, efficient and autonomous force resulting in strategic depth for the US. The time to act is now.
Chapter 3

Origins of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)?

Europe has long sought an indigenous collective security arrangement. This need was eventually met in NATO. More recently Europe has identified the need for a military capability beyond simple collective security, they identified a need for a power projection capability. With the continent at peace and secure, Europeans are looking beyond their borders in an effort to positively affect and control potential conflict on their flanks and beyond. How Europe has arrived at this juncture tells us much about current debate and probable future progress toward fulfilling this desire.

Continental Europe has known the massive devastation of a major war twice in this century. Numerous bilateral and multilateral security arrangements and mutual defense treaties set in place after the first World War proved powerless to deter the Second. The resolution of both conflicts had required significant military intervention by an initially reticent United States. Separated from Europe by a vast ocean and yet closely linked culturally, economically and morally, the US overcame isolationist tendencies to come to the aid of Europe.

Twice in the previous thirty years, the United States had become involved militarily in Europe’s wars, and hundreds of thousands of American lives had been lost. Despite its strong emotional appeal, isolationism had patently failed. 16

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had its beginnings in a post-war era where dependence upon the United States was openly acknowledged and clearly necessary. American troops had been garrisoned throughout large portions of West Germany and Berlin since 1945 and were widely based throughout western and southern Europe with the blessing of the sovereign nations involved. Industrially, Europe was a wasteland after World War II. Her population, depending upon location, faced joblessness, homelessness and widespread hunger. Recognizing the need to assist in rebuilding Europe and reinforce weak or fledgling democratic governments and institutions, the US remained engaged with her allies and former enemies through the European Recovery Program. Commencing in 1947, the Marshall Plan provided over 15 billion dollars of hard currency, goods and services to national and local organizations 17 chartered and dedicated to the rebuilding of European infrastructure and social institutions.

The nominal division of Germany into three western sectors (American, French and British) and a Soviet sector essentially formed the geographic divide for the next and

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longest of Europe’s modern wars. Far from having recovered from World War II, Europe was now the focal point in the new polarization of global power. It had become the potential ground zero for the Cold War. In answer to this continental rift and the ever-present concern of a resurgent Germany, France, Britain and the BENELUX countries formed the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948. Citing the United Nations charter, the signatory nations to the Treaty of Brussels pledged mutual assistance in “maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression” 18 as well as providing for their “collective self-defence”. 19

Much less concerned with the threat that Germany had and might again represent to world peace, the US saw the need for a larger collective security arrangement to counter the might and menace of an eastern bloc. The combined vectors of these energies seemed to make the advent of NATO a natural next step for Europe and her North American friends. The Soviet blockade of Berlin and subsequent relief airlift was still underway when twelve nations signed the Treaty of Washington forming NATO. Great Britain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Canada, and the US created the still enduring Atlantic Alliance, the purpose of which centered around the sentiment that “... an armed attack against one or more... shall be considered an attack against them all...” 20

Apart from the emerging consensus that postwar US security depended on increasing international involvement, the onset of the Cold War provided a powerful incentive for the United States to play a leading part in European affairs. 21

Americans and Europeans agreed...the direct Soviet threat could best be countered by immediate US intervention...and military alliance building and leadership... 22

As the US was gathering in her European allies, the Soviet Union began establishing an eastern confederation of nations that would eventually form the Warsaw Pact (1955). It is from this posture of offsetting political ideologies and military positions that the Cold War had its beginnings.

For over fifty years, NATO has been the highly visible incarnation of western political cooperation and military solidarity. For the US, NATO provided the showcase for a sound American foreign policy that touted reinforcement of democratic values and collective security. As our most significant institutional tie to Europe, the Atlantic Alliance became the framework for the UK’s “special relationship” with the US, a safe haven from European suspicions and danger from the Soviet Bloc for Germany, and the safety net and stable anchor seemingly necessary to smaller NATO countries. Based upon the age-old “causus belli” of crossing national borders or those of a country deemed

18 Treaty of Brussels (WEU), preamble, March 17, 1948.
19 Treaty of Brussels, preamble.
21 Dinan 17.
22 Dinan 17.
vital to the Alliance, NATO stood firm as a bulwark against the perceived external threat of the USSR and the unspoken internal threat of a resurgent and imperialistic Germany.

Long viewed as the threat by the Warsaw Pact countries, the Alliance’s expansion to the east has been and still is strenuously opposed by modern-day Russia. Launched initially to guarantee collective security and the territorial integrity of Europe (relying heavily upon American military might), NATO is working to evolve into an effective post-Cold War alliance able to react to the new threats of this era. Increasingly occupied with non-Article V activities, NATO Headquarters is populated not only by members of the Alliance but by delegations from Partnership for Peace ( PfP) nations.

Unfortunately, some of these dialogues and exercises (with Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and Belarus) give Russia further cause for concern. Envisioned as the way forward for an organization that began by promoting and guaranteeing stability on the continent, NATO now brings former Warsaw Pact and non-aligned countries under a common rubric which encourages dialogue, engagement and joint exercises (some involving actual military forces).

Making the European case for ESDI

It is the new regional security challenges on Europe’s flanks, combined with the ever-present humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement demands around the world, that have given new life to the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity. Whether driven by the desire for a greater political and security-related identity in concert with the Alliance or as a retort to NATO as Europe’s only refuge, some nations have begun to exhibit a rising will to do more within (or without) NATO. The optimistic Europeanist view might be characterized as “...a stronger European pillar would bolster the Alliance...”

The prospect of ESDI has become more real with every European Union (EU) summit since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. The political rhetoric has intensified with a substantive bilateral meeting (UK-France, St. Malo, December 1998), the General Affairs Council (Schloss-Reinhartshausen, March 1999), the NATO 50th Anniversary (Washington, April, 1999), the European Council (Cologne, June 1999) and the European Council Summit (Helsinki, December 1999).

The European Union currently boasts 15 members united to reinforce “...the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law” while “...desiring to deepen the solidarity between their peoples.”

Even today, the legacy of two world wars plays a crucial role in the process of European integration.

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24 Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty deals primarily with maintenance of national borders, protection of sovereign territory and collective security.
25 PfP is a NATO program of engagement with non-NATO nations desiring to observe the political process at NATO Headquarters and participate in military exercises with NATO nations on an invitational basis.
26 Dinan 472.
Essentially an economic (and now monetary) community, the EU has set forth three “pillars” in its effort to deepen and broaden itself. Thrust between the first (and only fully developed pillar) of Economic Community and the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs is the second (and arguably most contentious) pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is upon this pillar that current initiatives toward attaining a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) are attempting to build.

The EU as a force in international security

As an economic force, the EU closely matches the US. In terms of international development and humanitarian aid, Europe far outspends American government and non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts. The 15 member states of the EU are responsible for over half of all world aid, 60% of aid to the republics arising out of the former Soviet Union, 40% of the reconstruction costs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and over a third of total aid to the Middle East, while also maintaining current accounts with regard to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts. The EU’s continuing engagement in behalf of advancing democratic ideals remains very active in the 54 member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This ability to affect economic and social progress in the developing world stands in stark contrast to Europe’s inability to play a commensurate political or military role in world affairs. It is this imbalance in global influence that drives the EU’s CFSP and, more pointedly, the ESDI.

The present community inertia and collective momentum appear to be valid indicators of the EU’s readiness for launching its common defense posture and accompanying external policy. What was once a Soviet military threat to the east has become a socially bankrupt and politically aimless Russia. “Loose nukes”, cross-border organized crime and the potential for continued defaulting on foreign debt payments have become the new threats. Constructive engagement in economic, social and political arenas with this former Cold War adversary appears to be in the best interest of all concerned. Additionally, non-Article V military engagement outside of the traditional borders of Western Europe by European forces (including the reunified Germany) has become a reality.

...the [1997 European Union] Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making) such as those currently being undertaken in the Balkans.\footnote{General Affairs Council, “Presidency Seeks Consensus on Concept of Common Defence Policy,” European Information Service/European Report 17 March 1999, online, Lexis-Nexis, 28 October 1999.}

Beyond its economic influence, the EU apparently thinks that it is now ready to use its political and military might to promote its own principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law elsewhere in the world. Regarding how and when this is done, the EU is united in its belief that this should not fall to the blessing (or veto) of a non-European ally or even to an alliance based upon mutual defense. The EU has
matured to the point where consensus on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty and the Petersberg Tasks) may well be possible.

All completed work within the EU to this point has been generally economic in nature. The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been concerned with strengthening the economic position of the EU in regards to internal commerce, international trade and overall stability. The recent, but well-worn, term of globalization has become the watchword for the EU’s passage through this terrain. Ensuring that financial institutions, governmental entities and commercial infrastructures are preparing to operate at the high speed and efficiency of the information age has been an added benefit of EMU. The internal markets of Europe must be able to attain the optimal levels of competitiveness necessary to ensure sustainable growth, reduced unemployment and ultra-efficiency in capital, services and goods production. To have accomplished this was no small feat. Among the most sacrosanct of national totems is a country’s currency: national symbol, medium of trade, store of value and (in the cases of Germany and France, at least) objects of fervent nationalist pride.

_The bitter experiences of war and dictatorship in this century teach us that the unification project is the best insurance against a relapse of national egoism, chauvinism and violent conflict._

In the case of monetary policy, the EMU nations (currently 11 of the 15 EU member states, with Greece waiting for final accession) have willingly forfeited control of interest rates, strategic currency exchange rate adjustment and the ability to manipulate money supply. The same countries have pledged under the Maastricht “convergence criteria” to limit their use of fiscal policy controls (extreme deficit spending and high government debt) except in times of severe recession and depression. A greater weight in terms of nationalistic importance could be extended to these sovereign nations when addressing foreign policy and defense issues. Dependent upon one another in almost every conceivable economic sense, now the EU is seeking to combine the disparate and historically driven actions of 15 culturally, linguistically and philosophically distinct countries with regard to international relations and their combined defense.

In its continuing attempt to make its voice heard on the international stage and express its position on armed conflicts, human rights and other subjects, the EU crafted the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and assigned an important position to the Petersberg Tasks (named for the location of the WEU Ministerial Council that formulated them in 1992). Subsequently, the Cologne European Council (June 1999) placed these armed peacekeeping and humanitarian goals at the core of fleshing out this European common security and defense policy.

_... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO._

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The catalyst for these actions within the European Council most assuredly was the Kosovo conflict in the Balkans. The desire to act and influence the outcome of events had been met with a stark realization that most of Europe's ability to project military power out of area (OOA) resided within NATO. Beyond this, the US was the Alliance member upon which this OOA capability depended. Heavy sea and airlift, in-theater stockpiles of "smart precision weaponry", tanker support for in-flight refueling, various levels of logistical support and C³I (command, control, communications and intelligence) were all primarily shouldered by the US. US pilots flew a vast majority of combat missions as Europe contributed what it could.

Desire for military autonomy

In the face of obvious pressure from Britain and France, the US has finally acknowledged this rising political will and has reluctantly started to support the creation of a European Pillar within NATO.

_The formula of building a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO aims to reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link._ ³²

The potential composition of the ESDI will be more fully discussed in the next chapter, but early indicators from the prominent players indicate that it is likely to be an exercise in compromise. The NATO Strategic Concept (announced at the NATO 50th Anniversary in April 1999) assumed that ESDI would be developed within NATO and utilizing structures originally under WEU purview. This initiative allowed for multilateral military action utilizing forces answerable to the WEU. While the WEU never "owned" standing forces, the assets that it could utilize to conduct crisis prevention and management might include the EUROCORPS, the Multinational Division Central, the UK-Netherlands Amphibious Force, EUROFOR and EUROMARFOR. The utilization of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are linked to the 1995 Security Agreement between NATO and the WEU, which also links NATO communications systems to the small WEU command structure already in place. This ability to use NATO assets and C³I infrastructure, combined with the unique placement and membership of the WEU³³, made this a seemingly viable option. It was supposed that for the purpose of WEU-led operations, the CJTF imbedded in the NATO military command structure would come alive under the command of a European Deputy SACEUR.

Among other technical roadblocks to this concept was the Washington Summit Communiqué, which described the strengthening role of a European “pillar” through the EU as opposed to the WEU. This represented a vastly different model for reinforcing Europe’s role in its own security future. The integration of all WEU assets (including the

³³ Since 1995, the WEU has included (in some capacity ... member, associate member or observer) all of the current EU and European NATO member nations. While levels of participation and obligation vary with level of membership, signatory nations are resolved to maintain international peace and security and to resist any policy of aggression.
Satellite Center in Spain and the Brussels Planning Cell) into the EU would be accomplished. The EU would eventually embark upon a course that would bring independent military capabilities to the Union. The Communiqué made it fairly clear that the cooperative arrangements existing between the WEU and NATO would have to be reworked, revised or discarded in favor of EU-NATO cooperation. The European members of NATO appeared to be forwarding an idea that the future of trans-Atlantic relations should rest upon two fixed entities – the US and the EU.

Within two months of these two major “decisions” from the Washington NATO Summit came the European Council Summit in Cologne in June. In a further development of the EU’s version of ESDI came the announcement that an autonomous defense force would be created with assured political and military prerogatives. This would be a fully operational European military force, and further action to stand it up would be taken no later than the end of 2000. Additionally, soon-to-step-down NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed as the first EU foreign policy representative. The Communiqué from Cologne also explicitly expounded upon Europe’s need for the very items that the WEU had leaned upon NATO for. Interestingly, these intelligence, transport and command and control capabilities were addressed as within reach of the European defense industry establishment.

The latest European Council Summit (Helsinki, December 1999) dealt with the CFSP and ESDI in very specific detail. Dr. Solana, no longer Secretary-General of NATO, was now “dual-hatted” as High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the WEU. As such, the EU appeared to be counting on the synergy of his experience and influence to bring substance to this most controversial of efforts. In December 1999, Solana stated:

... ESDI is not about collective defence. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members. We are in no way attempting to duplicate the work of NATO. In fact, the improvements in European military capabilities will be a significant gain for the Alliance ... to take more responsibility for regional security, particularly in those areas bordering the Union where we have direct interests at stake ... to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond our borders ... to assert our values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas ... 34

European Rapid Reaction Force

At Helsinki, the EU specifically committed itself to developing a “corps-level” force capable of deploying within a 60-day window and minimally sustainable for one year. Whether this was meant to affirm the evolution of the EU to assume direct control of the EUROCORPS was not made plain. Secondly, development of C3I and logistical capabilities to support the force is being planned. Thirdly, the EU will establish new

permanent political and military committees within the European Council that are committed to guaranteeing adequate political accountability of the force. These committees would also be charged with consultation and cooperation with non-EU European allies and NATO.

_Helsinki therefore makes clear that the Union has as its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The European Union will have to become an intelligent customer of NATO. When NATO itself is not engaged, but the European Union launches a military operation, it should if necessary have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. This means that full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will have to be developed._  

Given that the US had always reacted negatively to proposals concerning EU and WEU merger, Dr. Solana’s comments could be viewed as an attempt to assuage American concerns over loss of influence in Europe. Certainly, the US can see a certain weakening in its European defense hegemony in the Council’s actions. CFSP and ESDI were now reaching beyond the basic construct of an EU-orchestrated intergovernmental relationship. Actual EU supra-national institutions now existed to deal with Europe’s need to project political and military will.

_The [Maastricht] Treaty’s foreign and security policy provisions pleased the United States by not establishing a separate EC defense identity, although, in the long term, the outcome of the EC-NATO-WEU debate tilts in favor of an independent EC defense position._

Arguably, long-term American interests would be best served by accepting the upstart ESDI’s bid to assume responsibility for collective European power projection and as a vehicle by which to shoulder more of its own security responsibilities. Most importantly, by welcoming the EU’s efforts to erect its second pillar, the US would be signaling a change of heart concerning her European allies. Instead of clinging to the past, the US intention would be to embark upon the far more important mission of re-focusing the relationship with Europe based upon today’s security and economic challenges.

Europe’s direction for ESDI and the long-term significance for US influence now seem clear. Through the initial guidance provided by the French and the British, the EU has apparently resolved to possess a military force that has the capability and authority to launch non-defensive actions without NATO or US approval. It is equally clear that the Europeans have tried to avoid alienating America, the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security. Determining the potential incarnations of the forces and new relationships will be addressed in the next chapter.

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36 Dinan, 496.
Chapter 4

What could ESDI be?

In this chapter, we turn our attention to what is possible in the longer term, less foreseeable future. As in many futurist works we intend to move beyond what current politicians and other government representatives are allowed to say in the interest of maintaining unity and moving the process forward into what we believe to be a possible end state for ESDI. Further, we believe this end state to be in the best interest of US security policy worldwide and that the US should not only support this end state, but actually help to achieve it.

We envision a much bolder more robust force as an outcome of the infant ESDI process. In the next 20 years, if Europe can overcome the obstacles, we expect an outcome similar to what some pejoratively term a European Army. This term is somewhat stilted in that, Europe will need more than an army to be successful in autonomous military decision making and operations. It will need both a naval and an air force as well as an organization to conduct satellite and other space-based operations. Some may mistakenly fear this as an effort by some European countries to return to their historical expansionist and imperialistic past, the authors think that with the right guidance and the correct direction this outcome is actually in the best interest of US security policy and European stability and security.

The question of what ESDI could or should look like is very complex. In this chapter, rather than spell out a model of actual end strengths and military formations, we will try to define some goals and capabilities for ESDI and give some general direction for the European nations to move in to achieve the end state. The end state of a successful ESDI should place the US in a position to take advantage of the New World order and emerging global markets while addressing emerging security threats. In fact, our thesis is that the US must turn its attention to the emerging areas of the world, specifically the Pacific. The US cannot afford to let the European continent return to a quagmire of bickering and warring factions and nations, because if it does, the US will find itself returning in strength to Europe as it did twice before in the twentieth century. We envision ESDI as the organization, either within or without NATO, most likely to allow the US to turn the focus of attention to other areas of the globe. Resources are finite: time, money, people, equipment and even attention. If the Pacific emerges in the 21st century as the place to be, the US must take resources from somewhere to apply there if it is to remain the world leader that it is today.

There is no doubt that one of the conflicts in Europe throughout history has been the friction between the desire of nations for both autonomy and security. The European history through 1948 demonstrated a desire for autonomy more than security. In 1949 and the 1950's security seemed to gain some ground on autonomy with the advent of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In each of these organizations, member nations surrendered some autonomous decision making ability in the name of collective security. For the Western European nations the threat that produced the necessity for NATO, the Soviet Union, disappeared in 1990. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the European Nations seem to be eyeing autonomy with some of their old-fashioned desires. During the period of 1949-1990 most observers
agree that the US was the glue that held NATO together. The European Nations would not let one of their own nations appear to be the leader. An outside nation, namely the US, filled this role without threatening any one European nation’s self-identity. One of the main questions for ESDI seems to be can the Europeans hold together a security arrangement without the help of an outside binding agent, like the US has been for the last 50 years? This brings us to the issue of membership and participation, who can join and who cannot?

Membership and Participation

To begin to answer the question of who can be a part of the ESDI we need to determine who is eligible. Currently the E in ESDI stands for European, so presumably, one of the first requirements for membership is a country must be in Europe. However, determining which nations are actually European is not an easy task. There is not a one source; this is Europe, authority. Depending on which person or which organization or which country you are talking too, you can get anywhere from 35-41 countries included in Europe. (See annex __ for a list of 41 European Countries)

Currently ESDI is the working brainchild of the European Union; so presumably, in the near future we will look to the EU and its 15 nations to form the nucleus of the ESDI. These 15 nations leave out between 20 and 26 other European nations, depending on how you count. In the 2020-2030 time frame this exclusion cannot remain. If the ESDI force is to be a viable voice for European security and military action, most if not all of the “European Nations” must participate in one form or another.

In Secretary of Defense, William Cohen’s three is the third of those I’s is inclusive. We believe that inclusivity is the foremost principle for membership within the ESDI. The European Union must seek to include all European nations within ESDI in one form or another. If this means associate memberships or special memberships then the European Community must be flexible.

EU membership may not be a prerequisite for inclusion in ESDI by 2020 or even 2015. To exclude European nations from the umbrella of ESDI will be to court the condition that prevailed in Europe prior to both WWI and WWII where each individual country had a variety of agreements, secret and otherwise, with other individual nations. The outcome of all these agreements was almost certain expansion of conflict to the whole continent in the case of any conflict on the continent.37

As to exclusion: certainly there are non-European countries that will have neither the desire nor a requirement to join in the ESDI (the majority of the nations of the world). So, exclusion in and of itself is not an evil. Exclusion of European nations will be a key stumbling block to ESDI effectiveness. Nations with the same goals and interests within Europe must be allowed to join ESDI and participate in some form in the decision making and the operations of the force.

If exclusion is not necessarily bad but inclusion is the preference, which countries will present membership problems? The most likely problems will come from two sets of countries. The first set are those countries on the geographic periphery of Europe because of their location and their proximity to and interests in other regions. The second

set consists of those countries nearer the geographic center of Europe that do not exhibit the same goals and interests as the remainder of the community. Russia and Turkey on the geographic periphery spring to mind. Russia will be dealt with further in Chapter 9, but suffice it to say here, the ESDI must come to some agreement with Russia or in regards to Russia if it is to be effective. As to Turkey, even now it is on the list of candidates for membership in the EU and thus may be in the nucleus of the ESDI. However, Turkey presents obvious problems with its relationship to Greece and the Balkans. These relationships could present the European Union with a first test case on whether it can be effective in dealing with internal member challenges without falling into internecine bickering and thus not getting anything done.

The Balkans pose a challenge to the Europeans from nearer their geographic center with countries that do not exhibit the same goals and interests as the remainder of Europe. At this point the Balkans seem likely to present the European Union with its first operational use of the ESDI force. In fact, at this printing, an ESDI force, considerably larger and more robust than is planned for 2003, would be an ideal substitute for the force currently deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo. Even so, given the history of the area, by 2010 or 2015 the Balkans may still provide the ESDI with an operational mission. A key question for the European Union is can they succeed where everyone except Tito failed and bring the Balkans into the community peacefully?

A further factor in unity and membership within ESDI will be the ability of member counties to subjugate some of their autonomy in order to further the security and stability requirements of the whole community. The majority of European history seems to favor their inability to complete this step forward in community. However, the past 50 years have given the entire community a successful taste of what they can achieve when acting together. In Chapter 3 we discussed the close and continuing monetary and economic integration of Europe over the past decade. In the future we believe that each nation will determine that it cannot act alone on the world stage and therefore will bind with its neighbors in more areas, security being the critical area for this paper. Will the US contribute to European unity or will we see this as too great a threat to our own world leadership?

Subjugation of autonomy and self-interest will be especially crucial when the member nations begin to look at funding ESDI. Some nations within the European community will almost certainly have to suboptimize their own nationalistic interests to benefit the security and stability of the whole. For a security organization to deploy a force to the field, command and control it, sustain it, and then redeploy it will require a very high level of standardization and interoperability. This is an exponentially more difficult challenge then the US's own struggle to standardize and make interoperable our own joint forces. This will be a process that takes time, desire, and money. The ESDI nations must be willing to invest all three into the effort to bring ESDI to fruition. With the incremental steps they are scheduled to take in the next 15-20 years an integrated, standardized, interoperable force is clearly possible. This idea is developed more fully in Chapter 6.

For inclusion to be an effective principle for membership in the ESDI framework the EU must keep the common goals and interests of the framework broad and general. The current goals and interests as stated in the various treaties and agreements from Maastricht, Berlin, Amsterdam, and Helsinki are excellent and should remain and be
effective well into the future. We can only hope that the Europeans will not let the ESDI
devolve into bureaucratic malaise but will keep it vibrant and vital through imaginative
use either in exercises or in real world operations. The devil will be in the details of
organization and employment of the force.

What will this force look like? (If not a European Army)

The size and shape of the ESDI force should be determined by what the threat to
security and stability in Europe will be. The definition of the threat in the year 2030 is as
varied as the number of defense think tanks and experts. Taking the NATO initiative for
threat definition in the future is a natural starting point for the planners of ESDI. There is
general consensus that the military forces of the future will be smaller than the forces of
the 40’s-90’s’. With the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact a significant ground attack or
defense requirement has disappeared. Although different nations view threats
differently, there is currently no real military threat to the existence of any of the
European states. A new threat may develop by 2030 so ESDI cannot discount it
completely, but one of the outcomes of an ESDI should be to identify and negate this
threat early on.

This leaves the B and C list threats that Perry and Carter identify in Preventive
Defense. Clearly the ESDI force should be focused initially and primarily on these
threats and on the Petersberg Tasks as outlined in the Amsterdam Treaty. These threats
require a medium-weight force that has enough manpower to complete the labor-
intensive tasks, with enough tactical mobility to move themselves around the area of
operations, and with enough protection to preserve force survival in the face of crew-
served automatic weapons and land mines. Initially the force does not need the ability to
fight alone in joint, combined arms, high intensity combat, but by the year 2030 it should
have these capabilities to include at least a two division heavy armor force.

The ESDI should be particularly heavy on intelligence gathering, analysis, and
dissemination capability. The ability of the ESDI to gather information from all of its
member nations, synthesize and analyze the information into intelligence, disseminate it
and act on it will be key to keeping the force small, deployable and affordable. The
experience with NATO and the leaps in information technology will aid the ESDI and
Europe in this effort. Information sharing within current NATO arrangements can still
occur and in fact will aid NATO, the US, and ESDI.

The force will have to be sustainable by the member nations. Currently the ESDI
nations envision a force of 60,000 sustainable for a year. The straight logistics costs of
an operation are initially high during deployment, then level off for the employment
phase, and then respike on redeployment. The two key costs in money occur during the
deployment and redeployment. The key cost during employment is in manpower. Unit
or individual replacements drive the train during employment. To be effective the ESDI
will need to sustain a larger force than 60,000 people for longer then a year. Christopher
Patten, in a speech to the joint meeting of European Parliament Foreign Affairs

38 Ashton Carter and William Perry, Preventive Defense: A New Security Strategy for America
Committee in Brussels on 22 February 2000, set a number of 200,000. This seems like a reasonable initial figure. An initial estimate for deployed time should rely on history for a reasonable time frame of deployability. So far the “Petersberg Task” operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti have extended far beyond the initial political time lines. The ESDI will need to sustain individual operations for at least 3 years, probably closer to 5 years. In addition, the ESDI will need to plan for more than one operation simultaneously, as the ongoing operations in the Balkans amply demonstrate.

Depending on the geographical location or locations of the ESDI forces and their proposed employment site, the ESDI will need to invest in both sealift and airlift, which will move the force from their home stations, to the employment or marshalling site, sustain them and redeploy them. Currently the European countries have sufficient opportunities to employ an ESDI force fairly close to home. This may not be the case in the future, and the ESDI must be prepared to deploy forces to Africa or possibly to countries in Southeast Asia or other areas of the Pacific. This will require a significant expenditure of resources, but the ESDI will be nothing more than airline clients until they have their own capability. The European Union must divide up the task among member nations so that no duplication occurs or one country is overwhelmed by the budget requirement. If the European Union wants to operate on its own, it will need to be able to deploy its own forces. The ESDI force should not have to rely on US support as the United Kingdom did during the Falklands War.

In addition to intelligence and strategic lift, the Europeans will need to modernize and standardize their ability to command and control the force. In the near term, the ESDI, with a focus on Petersberg Tasks, does not need the same capability as the US currently has to control joint operations in a high-intensity conflict, probably the most difficult command and control challenge of all. The ESDI needs a capability more robust than currently exists in the WEU but not as robust or extensive as the US/NATO capability. However, in the 2030 timeframe it will need the same or similar capability. To accomplish this the Europeans need to begin now to upgrade current command and control systems, integrate, modernize, and then exercise the command and control system. Again, as in the intelligence arena, modern technology in information sharing should aid the ESDI, as will the experience gained with and from NATO. Any improvement in the near term will aid both current capabilities with NATO and pave the way for separate ESDI operations.

Each of the improvements implies a clear requirement on the Europeans to spend more money on their security. This is the case and has been within NATO and it will prove even more critical for an ESDI. If the Europeans are serious about the ability to make security decisions on their own, their budgets must reflect this, and in the near term. The European community needs to begin now to fund a military buildup similar to the US defense buildup in the 1980s, but in a way that divides up the tasks so that there is little or no unnecessary duplication and the cost is not overwhelming to any one nation.

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39 Patten, 22 Feb 2000.

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Roles and Missions

As previously stated, the large ground threat to Europe is currently extinct. This means that the ESDI force will be free to focus on the Petersberg Task operations as opposed to a conventional offense and defense mission. This will be advantageous in the near term to both NATO and Europe as the western nations of the world are also refocusing on future threats and future roles and missions.

The Europeans currently have many capabilities that can be transferred to the new force. Key among them is their expertise in Petersberg Tasks and special operations. The Europeans have for many years conducted “Petersberg like” tasks on their own, either throughout Europe or in their former colonies. They have extensive doctrine in how to conduct these operations. This capability and knowledge will transfer directly to the new force.

In addition, several European nations have very sophisticated special operations forces skilled in counter- and anti-terrorism. These units and skills will also transfer directly to the new force. A joint special operations unit within the ESDI could be very helpful in combating B and C list threats throughout the continent and will greatly benefit the cost sharing effort among the nations.

A key challenge for individual nations and the community as a whole will be what to do with the nuclear forces extant in some of the countries. This will be a key question for NATO and the US as we view the evolution of the ESDI. The ESDI will probably need a general agreement along the lines of NATO’s, as we do not foresee even in the 2030 timeframe any nation making their nuclear weapons available to other countries or accepting too stringent requirements not to threaten to use them or to use them unilaterally.

Doctrine and Strategy

The NATO strategy of collective security replaced the outdated European strategy of Balance of Power. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the main threat upon which the collective security arrangement hung has disappeared. NATO and the Europeans are even now searching for a new strategy to replace collective security. One thing is certain, the new strategy should not move backwards in the direction of the Balance of Power doctrine. As previously noted, the shifting balance of power alignments in Europe were a significant contributor to war on the continent. The new strategy will need to address the growing threats to stability and security in Europe. Perhaps the new strategy should resemble the containment policy of America. That is, to seek out and isolate the threats to Europe so that they die of natural causes or at least remain contained and prevented from spreading. In order to accomplish this task, the Europeans must be prepared to deploy outside of Europe to ensure they deal with threats at arm’s reach, not close in.

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40 Kissinger, 17-21.
Internal Challenges to ESDI

As already discussed, there are several significant challenges that the European nations must overcome before they can successfully field an ESDI force. We have briefly stated the concerns with interoperability and the shortage of capabilities in the European community. Two other areas of concern exist. They are the European defense industrial complex and the possible escalation of an ESDI operation into Article V proportions.

The European nations, in order to field a successful ESDI force, will need to spend considerable funds on their military forces. They will naturally want those funds not only to benefit their military capabilities but also their economies. In order to do this they must revitalize their industrial complex. In a recent speech, former UK Prime Minister John Major stated that “Europe must unite its defense industry or become a client state of the US. They must unite corporations in order to compete with the US.”[41] This is an indicator that some in Europe are already making the mental leap from a small force ESDI force to a larger one with greatly increased capabilities, a force large enough to sustain a continental military industrial complex.

As the EU draws closer together economically and politically, it is only natural to push this closeness forward in the area of security and stability. The Europeans must take the steps necessary to unite the defense industry and then also divide up the workload so that each nation’s economy benefits from the build-up. This will require another step forward in putting security and stability ahead of national self-interest. Combining corporations and reinvigorating the military industrial complex is a concrete step forward towards a viable ESDI. If the Europeans begin this task, it will be a certain sign that they are serious about a military capability separate from the US.

The US should most certainly insist on and continue to support this effort. Not only will this help our security interests worldwide, it will certainly help diminish the amount of resources we commit to NATO, freeing them up for use in other regions of the world. In addition, for the near term, any increase in European military capability will mean increased capability for NATO. We do foresee opposition to this support from within our own military industrial complex as Europe, if successful, will become a competitor on the world market. However, we believe these risks are minimized by the globalization of the world economy, and in any case there are enough military clients in the world. After all, a large portion of the world was not our military client during the Cold War, arguably the heyday of military spending worldwide.

The second major challenge that ESDI will face from within Europe is containing conflict below the level of Article V. Article V is the key security agreement of the North Atlantic treaty, which states that “an attack on one is an attack on all.”[42] Under current arrangements, the ESDI force will only deploy when the remainder of the Alliance chooses not to be involved. This does not negate the provisions of Article V. The challenge, then, is to keep any ESDI deployment from escalating to the level of Article V proportions. In various cases of humanitarian operations or disaster relief this

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will not even be an issue. In other instances of peace enforcement or peacekeeping we can foresee the possibility of escalation to what could be considered an attack on a member of NATO as an offshoot of the ESDI operation.

While NATO exists and is the most relevant security arrangement in Europe there will always be discussions and deliberations prior to any deployment of ESDI, one of the main points will inevitably be the chance of escalation to Article V proportions. So for the near term this challenge will be dealt with in a public forum with much debate and discussion. The real challenge comes in the future as the relevancy of NATO diminishes and the ESDI forces become preeminent on the continent. Some arrangement must be made to prevent NATO nations from being drawn into conflicts that they have already chosen not to involve themselves. Again, for the near term, US and European security interests are so intertwined that it is hard to imagine an instance where the Europeans will want to become engaged but the Americans will not. With the growth of military capabilities in Europe will come the desire to flex the European muscle and to take autonomous, independent action. The French have always had this desire, even during the Cold War and the best years of the NATO Alliance. Currently a lack of capability prevents Europe from taking any separate action. This will not be the case with a successful ESDI.

The internal challenges to ESDI are not the only concerns the EU will need to account for. As previously stated, some countries may fear an ESDI force as they remember the history of two world wars started by European countries. International reaction to the formation of an ESDI capability is something the EU will need to consider, either to help shape it, take advantage of it, or soften it. International reaction to ESDI is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 5

Potential International Reaction to ESDI

An area of concern for the Europeans should be the international reaction to an increased military capability within Europe without the restraining hand of an outside agent such as the US. Several small nations within the European Community, as well as larger nations outside of the continent that see compelling interests threatened by the build-up of ESDI are likely to voice this concern. Two mitigating factors may diminish the immediate international reaction to ESDI. They are the very public and open way in which the Europeans are going about trying to develop the ESDI, and the opinion of some countries that ESDI will never come to fruition because the internal obstacles are too great to overcome. In either case, the European nations will need to prepare to handle a variety of reactions from around the globe.

Reaction within Europe

The first reactions are already coming in based on the initial announcements of ESDI by the EU. There are small nations within Europe but not part of the EU that view ESDI as a potential threat to their sovereignty. These nations, while not totally opposed, are voicing cautious alarm to this new development. The EU, UN and NATO response to events in Bosnia and Kosovo give credence to these fears. An independent military capability in the hands of the EU should be alarming to these nations, especially to nations that do not share the common goals and interests of the EU. The EU can mitigate these fears through open dialogue with the nations, but more important through an inclusive policy of membership in the EU and ESDI. Unfortunately, some European nations may never want to join the EU. In these cases the countries should be able to take part in many pre-deployment discussions concerning the ESDI, especially deployment within Europe. They should also be afforded the opportunity to take part in an operation in some capacity. The real key will be to see if the ESDI force directly or indirectly benefits non-member nations. Non member nation concerns within Europe should diminish as EU membership and ESDI participation grows. Non member nations must not be given reason to view the ESDI as a club with which the rest of Europe can bludgeon them into submission, but must be seen by all as a force for stability and goodness in the world.

Worldwide Reaction

Perhaps a bigger concern for the Europeans is the reactions of larger nations around the world that maintain large militaries of their own. Russia springs immediately to mind, but also Iraq and Iran on the Turkish border, China, India and Pakistan, or nations in the Middle East. Even the US may see a threat in the resurgence of independent military capabilities in Europe.
Russia

It is imperative that for long term stability and security the EU deals with Russia. It is in everyone’s best interest for the Russians to be willing partners in the European community and part of ESDI. It is definitely in Europe’s best interest to help Russia emerge from its current trouble and enter into normal relations with Europe, if for no other reason than preventing a massive refugee population from inundating Europe should the Russian economy and government completely collapse. But in addition the Russians still maintain a large nuclear capability which will always be a thorn in Europe’s side if Russia remains outside of normal relations.

The current conflict in Chechnya is a grave example of how the Russians can react if they feel isolated and cut off. Chechnya is not the last province within Russia, that will provide trouble. The NATO and European reaction to the Russian military operations in Chechnya will give the Russians great cause to mistrust an ESDI if it looks like an event of this kind would be a reason to deploy the ESDI onto Russian soil. It looks like a model for potential deployment to an area to protect human rights and the rule of law. Bringing Russia into the European fold will greatly reduce the tension on the continent. If the EU and Russia rebuff attempts to move into a closer, more normal relationship, Russia could revert to its aggressive, xenophobic tendencies. Russia may even look to its other border to form an offsetting military alliance that would be detrimental to regional stability and security. The Russians could then be anything from a spoiler and troublemaker in the region to an outright combatant. Russia outside of the European community may be the one thing that could keep NATO relevant for another 50 years.

China

China presents its own challenges to ESDI. With Europe’s historic interest in the Far East the Europeans will not ignore China as they begin to consolidate an autonomous military capability. China may have concern with ESDI on two fronts. First is the EU stance on human rights and second the possible shift in US resources from Europe to the Pacific region. In the first instance China has a deplorable record on human rights. With EU goals and objectives on human rights lining up almost identically with UN goals and objectives, China may see the ESDI force as one more capability aligned against it in terms of human rights abuses. If the ESDI force is used by the Europeans to stop human rights violations the Chinese may see a similar possibility when they view their problems in Tibet and with their other ethnic minorities. In addition if Robert Kaplan and Thomas Homer-Dixon are correct “...relations between the central government and the twenty-two provinces are deteriorating fast”\textsuperscript{43} and “our research suggests that environmental pressures in China may cause the country’s fragmentation. The effects of Chinese civil unrest, mass violence, and state disintegration could spread far beyond its borders.”\textsuperscript{44} If

\textsuperscript{43} Kaplan. 298
\textsuperscript{44} Homer-Dixon, Thomas F. “Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence From Cases” International Security (Harvard College and the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Boston), Summer 1994, 37.
this occurs suddenly and violently Europe may find itself performing Petersburg Tasks in Asia.

China's second area of concern might be the availability of US forces for operations in Asia. If, as we propose, the US withdraws significant resources from Europe, these resources would be available for the Pacific. With the Chinese already making plans based on their presumption that American power will decline by 2030, this shift would present them with bad news. In addition, they will have to deal with the basic fact that the US is paying more attention to the Pacific. With our commitment to Taiwan already bringing us into conflict with the Chinese, more available forces and more of our attention will not be welcome events to the Chinese. If Russia normalizes relationships and becomes a member of the EU and a participant in ESDI, this will move the potential threat to China right to its own borders.

Iran and Iraq

Iran and Iraq, although very separate countries culturally and politically, will be dealt with together. They will present Europe a unique challenge, especially if Turkey as expected gains membership in the EU. With very large militaries themselves as well as huge human rights troubles, internal ethnic strife, and Islamic fundamentalist regimes, both of these countries will form long-term challenges to the ESDI. Both countries are likely to see an increased military capability in Europe as a threat. A key to the Iran and Iraq reaction to ESDI will be whom they see as controlling decision making in this new arrangement. One initial reaction may be on the positive side if they foresee that America will have less sway over this force. Both countries still view America as "the enemy," and any divergence between the US and Europe, no matter how small, may be seen as a good thing. As the Moslem population in Europe grows, Iran and Iraq will also watch with interest to see what actions the EU takes to protect the various ethnic groups and what amount of participation in decision making these groups have. If the ESDI or the EU is seen as suppressing or oppressing the Moslem population we can expect outright political and public opposition to ESDI as well as potential action, covert or overt, by both countries. For the foreseeable future Iran and Iraq will view European autonomy more as a threat then as a welcome event. Also for the foreseeable future we expect that the goals and interests of Europe will be at odds with the goals and interests of both Iran and Iraq, which will therefore be potential adversaries. The historical animosity of these two regions goes back eons, and will remain so indefinitely. Iran and Iraq are likely to see themselves as potential candidates for ESDI action by the year 2030; they will definitely see the ESDI as counterproductive to their interests in many of the countries of Europe.

The United States

The US reaction to ESDI has always been mixed. The US has always been in favor of increased military capability in Europe, both in terms of an enhancement to NATO and in terms of reducing our resource commitment. The US was initially opposed to any separate European military capability. The US position today is that they support
a separable but not separate capability. That is to say, the US supports the idea of Europe being capable of acting independently and autonomously when the NATO alliance as a whole is not engaged. The capability, however, must originate within NATO and be an integral part of NATO.

The US is making incremental steps towards a more robust European capability with an eye on how much influence and prestige we will lose in NATO or Europe as the capability grows. These incremental steps we believe are in the correct direction and should continue and even increase. Currently the US position can be termed as grudging acceptance and support. For the foreseeable future the US will remain engaged in both the discussions and the development of ESDI. The US will desire to remain involved in order to exercise influence over the process and the outcome. This involvement should help to assure the concerns and fears of those smaller European nations that look to the US to preserve balance in Europe as it has done through the Cold War period. The US must be prepared to relinquish some of its influence in Europe in the building process of ESDI. But in the final analysis, the US should and will remain engaged in Europe even with a very robust ESDI presence because our goals and interest are intertwined with the dominant goals and interests of Europe.

African Nations

The reactions of the African nations are the least coherent and predictable. Perhaps this is not necessarily a negative, as they are the least likely to have intentional influence or impact on the outcome of the ESDI development. We say intentional influence or impact because the African continent could affect the development of ESDI by being one of the first recipients of an ESDI deployment. This could develop positively or negatively depending on the type and outcome of the operation. It seems ideal that a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation in Africa could provide the ESDI with a first chance at operational status sometime in the 2003-2005 timeframe. If this operation were to be successful, with the ESDI deploying in a timely manner, conducting effective operations, and redeploying within the anticipated one year sustainment time, the effect on the growth of ESDI could be phenomenal. It would be a great shot in the arm for the proponents of ESDI and could pave the way for an even bigger increase in both budgets and formations. In cases like this the African reaction would likely be positive and in fact could sway some of worldwide opinion. In addition to this, the African nations may see an autonomous European military capability as freeing up American resources from Europe making them available for other nations. This could bode well for Africa, which on the whole has been an often-ignored continent. After the abortive UN/US attempt at solving the crisis in Somalia (although the initial starvation crisis was dealt with) and then the total disregard of a disaster in Rwanda, Africa could be the beneficiary of ESDI both directly and indirectly.

On the other hand, certain countries on the African continent may be wary of a build up of autonomous European military capability if they hearken back to the European colonial period. Africa was the recipient of many colonial powers. This point of view would not look positively on a build up of capability in Europe. It was just within the last 50 years that the colonial powers began to recede from the continent. In addition, certain countries, especially in Northern Africa, will have the same doubts about
ESDI as Iran and Iraq. Fundamentalist regimes, ethnic strife, and internal population troubles plague these nations. They may see themselves as the recipient of a different kind of ESDI deployment, one that they would not welcome as they would disaster relief. In this case these countries would view ESDI as a threat. However, they will not be able to influence the development of ESDI to any great degree.

The United Nations

The United Nations, while not a country, is an international body that will have some reaction to ESDI. In this case we can fairly well predict a positive reaction to development as long as the EU continues to maintain goals and objectives that mirror the UN charter. In addition, the UN may look on ESDI as another resource that it can tap into. Especially in the Petersburg Tasks area, a trained and ready force will be a welcome addition to the UN. Moreover, the ESDI could become a counter to US reluctance to participate in UN sanctioned operations or as a counter to the US refusal or threatened refusal to pay UN dues. On the other hand the EU does not have the same institutional understanding with the UN that currently exists between the UN and NATO. In the preamble of the NATO Treaty, the signatories give preeminence to the UN and its decisions. No such agreement exists in any of the EU treaties. The EU may be reluctant to subordinate its own political will to that of NATO although the EU may look to the UN to legitimize its actions, much as NATO has done in the past. The US can look to the ESDI to take up some of the burden that it shoulders for the leadership and sustainment of some UN operations. The question remains; will the US be willing to give up some influence in exchange for not shouldering the lion’s share of all operations? Our belief is that the US can and should move in this direction.

With the current ESDI initiatives and a possible future ESDI force in mind, and with the expected international reactions as a backdrop, we now move to an examination of some possible solutions to future US global security concerns. We take a look at a spectrum of possible solutions with regard to Europe from doing nothing new to making a significant shift in US resources currently committed to the European continent. We propose that the US must do “something” to prepare for the future, and that “something” should include a significant shift in focus and resources from one continent to the globe.
Chapter 6

“Option One”
Oppose ESDI as a threat to US influence over Europe and the world

America’s commitment to the territorial and political integrity of Europe has never been in doubt. Consistent leadership within the Alliance has been matched by generous (and expensive) commitments of forward-garrisoned and deployed forces, stockpiled and preserved equipment and other NATO-dedicated warfighting assets. A seemingly selfless policy of engagement with her wealthy European allies has given the world a single reliable pole of stability and structure for over 50 years. Given the growing unrest both on Europe’s flanks and far from the continent, changing US engagement policy with reference to Europe seems to make little sense at this juncture.

The easiest, and most transparent, justification for maintaining current policy is that the Europeans are not now nor are they projected to increase defense spending. Their desire for an increased level of military autonomy rings hollow as Europe fails to “put its money where its rhetoric is.” US defense expenditures per active-duty soldier, sailor, airman or Marine are more than double the European NATO average. Among significant contributors to NATO-assigned assets, only Turkey (at 5.7% of 1999 GDP) exceeds or matches the US budget commitment (3.3% of 1999 GDP) to the defense of herself and allies. France (at 2.8% of 1999 GDP) and the UK (at 2.6% of 1999 GDP) provide the most visible of European commitments to the military alliance. Germany (at an alarming 1.5% of 1999 GDP) has recently indicated its plan to cut defense spending further. These figures, dismal though they are, do not adequately tell of Europe’s defense-related shortcomings or fully justify the urgency with which the US has called for Europe to invest in the future of its own security. Speaking to just the “big three” of European NATO allies: the UK, France and Germany, a mark/franc/pound spent does not yield the quantitative or qualitative amount of defense that one might expect. Inefficiencies in manning, equipping and training the armed forces of these major European powers have given them less return on their defense investment.

France

France stands as a proud, highly nationalistic and capable military power within the Alliance. Standing outside the integrated military of NATO, France does not specifically pledge forces to NATO. The impression that it spends considerably more on its defense in comparison to many other NATO nations is somewhat erroneous. Maintaining a strong national paramilitary force in its “Gendarmerie” and insisting that it be fully integrated into the national military organization (unlike Belgium, where the Gendarmerie resembles a “state police” with no direct military link) is one of the distorting factors. The Gendarmerie budget is financed via the Ministry of Defense and
actually subtracts a significant 0.3 percent of GDP (or roughly 9% of the total defense budget in 1999) from France’s “commitment” to the defense of itself and its allies.

As a nuclear power (since 1960), France has put particular emphasis on these capabilities and the ability to continuously upgrade them indigenously. This “force de frappe” or strategic deterrent consumes a small proportion of military personnel, but a significant (though classified) portion of the defense budget. Modernization of France’s nuclear arsenal, launch systems and delivery platforms by purely national technological and industrial resources may represent her armed force’s greatest mismatch between available budget and real-world priorities.

Large standing forces may not be as necessary as they were during the Cold War, but as France joins the growing list of European NATO member states that are transitioning away from conscription and towards a professional military, serious shortfalls in readiness may be experienced as troop numbers dwindle. With these formerly large numbers came a great “quality spread” of young conscripts, of which the top echelon was utilized in the highly-technical specialties of communications, data processing, photo/reconnaissance interpretation, foreign language linguists/translators and medical services. These same personnel now find better-paying employment outside of the military (a phenomenon not unknown to the US military, lately).

France has made progress in improving the deployability of her forces and thus her ability to impact out-of-area (OOA) events. Whether this is a legacy of France’s colonial empire or her continuing commitment to the Francophone world (notably sub-Saharan Africa), large portions of the army and navy are dedicated to power projection on short notice. France will commission her first nuclear-powered “big deck” aircraft carrier, the Charles DeGaulle, in 2000. The ship’s complement of roughly 40 fighter, light attack and early warning aircraft provide her with credible deployable airpower in littoral regions. The HELIOS-series of surveillance satellites and the EUMILSATCOM provide France with reasonable overhead assets. Tactical airborne ground surveillance is marginally accomplished by the Horizon helicopter-based AGS system. Shortfalls in airlift, supply and tactical logistics mirror those of most European NATO members.

**United Kingdom**

The UK, a European NATO member that regularly operates (as opposed to merely train) with US forces bilaterally, has managed to resist the stasis of European militaries. The defense budget has been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War, but most of the reductions have been absorbed by troop cuts, elimination of continental garrisons (British Army of the Rhine and Berlin Brigade, for example) and retirement of older RAF airframes and obsolete armor units from the army. Being a self-declared “special partner” of the US, Britain has never hesitated to act outside of the NATO framework whenever national interest was obvious and compelling. Britain’s own version of a “bottom up review” in 1997 and 98, the Strategic Defence Review, provided the British military-industrial establishment a baseline for modernization and eventual composition of forces.

Peacetime security, security of her remaining overseas territories, peace support and humanitarian operations, regional conflict outside of NATO, NATO regional conflict
and defense against strategic attack on NATO concisely identify the UK's main security interests. Airborne ground surveillance (the ASTOR fixed-wing-based system), national AWACS platforms, modified attack submarines capable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles and two big deck aircraft carriers (planned for 2012) demonstrate the UK's commitment to modernization. Britain's nuclear deterrent (entirely sea-based on four SSBN's) will be maintained in partnership with the US as newer D-5 missiles have been deployed (although warhead count will eventually be reduced by half). Airlift, supply and logistics shortfalls are being addressed through planned acquisitions of C-130J and C-17 aircraft, upgraded and new amphibious support ships and a networked approach to deployed logistics.

Germany

Germany may well represent the greatest quandary to the cause of European military reorientation and modernization. Forever the "state on the border" of the Iron Curtain and the assumed location of the last great land battle in history, Germany now finds itself more in the center of Europe than on the eastern border. Reunification with the former East Germany has further complicated the challenge that Germany finds itself in when addressing its defense future. Assumption of eastern debt, rebuilding the infrastructure of the new federal states, one-for-one exchange of the "ostmark" for "westmark", generous welfare measures for the impoverished east and clean-up of an ecological nightmare in this former Soviet satellite have brought huge pressures on the federal budget. Additionally, in meeting Maastricht "convergence criteria" for joining the EMU and converting to the Euro currency, Germans have been asked to accept a draconian level of social budget cuts and high levels of unemployment. These quantum changes and pressures have been widely thought to have spelled the end of Helmut Kohl's political career. The current Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, came to power under a political agenda for change and relief from the fiscal pressures affecting working Germans. In fact, Schroeder sees additional cuts to Germany's already reduced defense budget as one key to relieving some budgetary pressures. Despite opposition from Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping and senior military officers, Germany's armed forces will face smaller budgets in each of the next four years.

All this has happened at a time when German forces are faced with transforming a large numbers of conscripts trained in the defense of national territory into a smaller, mobile military force that could be dispatched to OOA conflicts. Recent constitutional changes have allowed these forces to be deployed for the first time since WWII. Unfortunately, the wider notion of security to include peacekeeping missions in distant lands (or in the Balkans, for that matter) does generate the same level of public support for defense expenditures as a highly visible and antagonistic threat on the immediate border.

The topics of national interest or international influence or aspirations have not been in the lexicon of the Federal Republic of Germany since the adoption of its post-war constitution. The official tasking of her armed forces currently includes, protecting national territory and citizens from political blackmail and external danger, promoting military stability and the integration of Europe, defending the country and her allies,
serving the goals of global peace and international security in accordance with the UN charter, and helping to save lives in cases of natural disaster and other emergencies as well as supporting humanitarian actions. In fact, so important is this wish to be seen as a good ally and trustworthy partner that six of seven German ground-mobile divisions are actually integrated with allied corps structures (NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps; the EUROCORPS with France, Spain and Belgium; two corps with US forces; a Dutch-German corps and a Danish/Polish/German corps). In fact, as the largest of NATO’s European members, Germany possesses the only military that specifically prepares for coalition action to the detriment of unilateral military intervention.

The German army still suffers from the armor-intensive, heavy footprint of the old “Fulda gap” days. With exception of the “crisis reaction forces”, the old concept of heavy mechanized contingents is the rule. The airforce is as ill prepared as the army with aging fighter-bomber wings (Tornado aircraft), decrepit fighter wings (old US F-4 Phantoms and former East German MiG-29’s), limited reconnaissance, no airborne ground surveillance and very limited airlift. The navy represents a capable, if limited, contribution to a modern array of forces. Maritime patrol aircraft, diesel-electric submarines and a traditional destroyer-frigate fleet represent a force capable of maritime interdiction but not power projection. As is the case with most European NATO members, Germany has a marked limitation in the areas of sealift, coordinated supply and deployable logistics.

Europe’s Weak History of Concerted Action

The above-noted military capabilities and trends fail to broach the topic of Europe’s historical inability to react promptly and forcefully in the face of international crisis. From the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis in August of 1990 to the ongoing Rwanda tragedy to the 1999 Kosovo crisis, Europe has prominently displayed its inability to take concerted international action, especially when that action is military in nature. This reticence of action revolves around the EU’s difficulty in reconciling divergent positions about security policy and defense within the community. Among the Union’s stumbling blocks on the way to conditional consensus concerning ESDI is the issue of pacifist and militarily neutral member states. Arguably, if the EU limits ESDI to Petersberg Task missions, these nations (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland) may find this course more acceptable. The combining of political hesitation and perpetual negotiation does not bode well for a particularly decisive ESDI.

The expansion of the EU to include new members combined with its emphasis on consensual decision-making implies that decisions will be taken on the basis of the lowest common denominator (among the member states’ positions). If this is true, Europe’s ability to act decisively and in real time during a foreign policy crisis is likely to remain hamstrung.  

European NATO nations field armed forces of more than two million soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Only a small percentage could be utilized in an OOA military

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operation. The previously reviewed military capabilities of the three major European NATO allies show that a successfully implemented ESDI may well only produce a limited ground force component in the short to mid-term. Maritime and air assets would provide support and sustainment to this component but not actually increase power projection by any measurable degree. From a force planning perspective, ESDI will be unable to offset the high-intensity combat capability requirements of US forces into the foreseeable future. The lack of a credible European land threat diminishes the potential occurrence of such a scenario. Europe may well continue to rely on NATO (i.e., the US) for supporting high-intensity operations, which requires maintenance of the current US-European link.

The US must deal with the hard cold facts of her allies’ commitment to their own and the collective security. Pronouncements and platitudes about ESDI aside, the general trend of their defense budgets is down. Perhaps even more telling is the European commitment (or lack thereof) to military research and development. This is often seen as the harbinger for real future investment in a country’s (or an alliance’s) military-industrial capabilities. The combined European NATO community has consistently spent a mere 25 percent of what the US spends. This figure is considered tied to overall defense budgets, the trend of which is all too clear.

Many reasons seem to point to the maintenance of the “status quo” for US security policy with reference to Europe. A European force may well take on a greater percentage of Balkan commitments. Burden sharing for the European NATO nations may soon be fulfilled by actual troop deployments as opposed to monetary transfers and rent-free base usage by US forces. All of this serves to relieve a small amount of the pressure on the US military at a time of reassessment of American obligations worldwide. The real world, real commitments and real numbers reveal the following “givens”:

- **The US defense budget is larger than that of the next seven largest defense budgets combined. Five of these are allies with whom we have formal defense treaties.**
- **The US spends more on personnel and training than the next five countries combined,**
  four of which are allies, which helps to ensure that US forces will continue to be well-trained and ready to fight.
- **The US is programmed to spend more on procurement over the next five years than the next ten countries combined, seven of which are allies. This makes it a good bet that among the “next militaries” the US will be dominant.**
- **The US has programmed more for military research and development than all the militaries of the world combined, thus giving the US the chance to expand the technology and capabilities gap in “the militaries after next”**.  

These considerations promote continued heavy US involvement in Europe as our best option. In this given scenario, the viability of ESDI over the long-term seems in doubt. Consider, however, that our rich European allies continue to garner a post-Cold War “dividend” while the US taxpayer shoulders the fallout from diminishing European

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defense outlays. From the perspective of the Cohen/Robertson “Three I’s test”, this option of maintaining the status quo by neglecting or opposing the EU’s efforts toward ESDI makes little sense in the long-term.

Previously discussed defense-related trends among NATO’s three largest European members have come about in an environment where the US opposes force structures distinct from NATO. For this reason, the overall improvement of military capabilities among European NATO members is not being served by an obstinate American ally. The other “I’s” of indivisibility and inclusiveness are satisfied, but only by the untenable situation created through continued US dominance of Europe’s defense.

This option is provided by the authors to acknowledge the divergence of thought in how the US should react to ESDI. It exists at one extreme of a range of probable outcomes and is not endorsed by the authors or by current US policy. As significant as the inertia to maintain the status quo in Europe is, the US must resist it. The US should leverage this European political desire toward greater autonomy in their military capabilities by pressing the Europeans to face the fiscal requirements of a necessary military build up. The Europeans’ internal economic self-absorption may lead to short term market benefits, but it will definitely result in long term security problems for themselves and the US. The US must look to the future and its own best security interests, be proactive and move the process of ESDI forward.

This is where the “Fourth I” of increased US Global Security must be used as a final “acid” test. Any option must absolutely place this factor ahead of all others. Option One, where future US global security policy perpetuates the Cold War status quo, fails in this most crucial of missions.
Chapter 7

“Option Two”
A stronger European pillar within the familiar NATO structure

It is the European Union’s drive to erect its second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP) that has brought us to this point. Successful economic and monetary union (and the necessary sacrifice of perceived national sovereignty in these areas) is moving towards. Given the accomplishments of the European internal market and the recent monetary union, this next step is actually more evolutionary than revolutionary. The concept and the proposed manifestations of the ESDI (whether built within NATO or outside of the Alliance) are of no threat to the continued importance and necessity of NATO.

ESDI has set in motion a process in which the EU (NATO members or not) may have international impact through an entire range of conflict management and crisis reaction tasks. Whether this be regional security, conflict on her flanks (the Balkans, for example), reaction to natural catastrophes, humanitarian relief or OOA peacekeeping, the EU will only act where there are clear and direct interests at stake. It is important to remember that at the core of the Union, economic interests shall always prevail. Further, Dr. Solana, High Representative of the EU for CFSP, has made it clear that “...the Union has [as] its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This will remain a guiding principle.” 47

The EU actually has set in place a mechanism that will ensure continuation of the North Atlantic Alliance in its intention to use NATO capabilities as required (or available). The precedent for this was set by the NATO-WEU agreement and it is assumed that as integration between the EU and WEU continues, this “understanding” will cross over. In order to proceed down a path of parallel obligation of military assets, full consultation and transparency between NATO and the ESDI must be pursued. Cooperation geared toward interoperability of NATO-pledged, EU-pledged and purely national military assets would be the ultimate goal.

Additionally, a consultation loop, which includes nations that fall outside of those holding membership in both NATO and the EU, must be considered. These countries, having pacifist or stringently non-aligned standings, are keen on maintaining a perceived neutrality with regard to use of military force, but may still be contributors toward a common goal in international contingencies involving ESDI forces. Medical personnel and supplies, food distribution and potable water processing, administrative personnel or civil police functions, and funding responsibilities could fall to the more pacifist EU member states. From Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and further developed with the Amsterdam Treaty and summits in Cologne and Helsinki, the concept of “joint action” by EU forces requires unanimity on decisions of principle but merely a majority concerning actual implementation. Consensus could still be achieved in forging European opinion concerning an international crisis, but abstention from actual involvement in a response could shield the more squeamish of EU member states while not hamstringing the total

47 Solana 3.
effort. It seems that Europe knows itself well enough to achieve compromise even concerning sensitive foreign policy and security issues.

With the recent identification of a 60,000-member rapid deployment force as a short-term goal, the EU has shown the resolve to bring a certain minimal substance to the idea of ESDI. This force could provide minor relief to US troops in Kosovo, Bosnia or the various “command cells” in Hungary, Croatia, Albania or Italy. In fact, these numbers combined with an effective transport and logistics “tail” could allow the US to incrementally reduce the number of troops both permanently garrisoned in Europe and regularly deployed to European Command AOR locations. US Air Force and Navy squadrons forward based in Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK could be drawn down in size and capability. Ships and their embarked naval air and amphibious assault forces patrolling the central Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas could be redeployed to other locations or withdrawn to continental US (CONUS) bases for short “respite periods”. In their place, ESDI maritime and amphibious forces supported by European land or carrier-based aircraft could deal effectively with supporting limited-engagement, lower intensity missions. The greatest impact could well be felt by US Army troops posted in Germany, as their high-tempo deployment operations could be somewhat curtailed by commensurate numbers of European troops on the ground in the Balkans. Additionally, deployments from US bases could be adjusted to reflect a lower European requirement for these “surge forces.”

What would be the benefit to US force planners? Most likely, this “ESDI dividend” would not represent a significant steady state reduction in either numbers or cost of US forces dedicated to Europe. American presence would continue to be felt, but in a less visible and pervasive way. During European rapid deployment force rotations, US reinforcement could return to pre-ESDI levels. Continuing to be the “eye in the sky” and strong backbone for any SACEUR force, C3I and “advanced logistics” (aerial tanking, strategic heavy lift and resupply) would all remain in-theater or readily available from CONUS. Troops would still garrison German casernes, but in decreased numbers. Airwings would still fly from joint US-NATO bases, but with a lower operational tempo. Ships would still ply European waters, but without the primary mandate of being the first and last maritime or amphibious force for Europe. Incremental, if limited, withdrawal from Europe would actually demonstrate to European allies that the US recognizes their combined political will to become a player on the international stage. Though not enough of a redirection of assets to impact another theater appreciably, this small downsizing could allow American force planners to factor the validity of an autonomous EU force into the world equation.

Where would this leave Europe? The US will remain committed to NATO and Europe, merely at lower fluctuating force levels. How the US demonstrates this resolve may be the key to the continent’s greatest challenge for the next 25 years. Remaining the key to most deployment support functions, the US could actually become a de facto “voting member” of the ESDI. Speed of response to requests for support from ESDI or the possibility of withholding support based upon US “priorities” could give the US the kind of influence in ESDI that it now holds in NATO.

Russia views the expansion of NATO to the east as a direct and quantifiable threat. A recent change in Russian “first-use” nuclear policy clearly demonstrates this in the light of the decrepit status of its own conventional forces. By focusing some American efforts
on constructive engagement with the former Cold War adversary as opposed to continuing to reinforce NATO, the US could well hasten Russia’s entry into a stable and united Europe. Force reductions, even the modest ones proposed here, would be something of a demonstration of mutual trust with Russia and of American regard for Europe (the same Europe that currently funds 60% of all international aid to the former Soviet Union).

*In the globalization system, the most threatening problems for the United States are black-market sales of nuclear warheads, strategic nuclear missile reduction, environmental degradation, containing rogues such as Iraq or North Korea, and financial viruses. None of these issues can be addressed effectively by America without the cooperation of a reasonably stable and democratizing Russia. Therefore, enlisting Russia’s cooperation, and doing whatever we can to advance political reform there should be our first priority – not expanding NATO, which can only undermine cooperation with Moscow.*

Option Two is presented as a possible midpoint position for US policy towards Europe and NATO. Obviously, less extreme choices often have appeal at first blush, but this option is not seen by the authors as the optimal solution for the US or Europe. The implicit guarantee of US support to ESDI actions will garner the same lack of defense budget commitment as exists in Europe today. This fails the cause of improvement of the overall military capabilities among European NATO members and perpetuates a situation where the US continues to dominate Europe’s defense picture. Maintaining any form of the status quo in Europe represents a lost opportunity for all involved parties. For the US, small reductions in dedicated manning and assets to NATO do not allow for increasing US Global Security. America must find the assets necessary to enhance her needs for power projection and forward presence in the 21st Century. For Europe, a further reduction of visible American military presence (especially the small one envisioned by this option) will yield no different response than greeted the large drawdown of the 90’s (75% of garrisoned troops).

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Chapter 8

“Option Three”
Encourage ESDI to allow a shifting of significant US assets away from Europe

The end of the Cold War, the increasing globalization of the world economy, and the rise of the Asian Tiger all portend a shift in the equilibrium of interests in the world. For the past 50 years, with some notable exceptions, America has focused on the security and stability of Europe. For short spans of time, as in the late 60’s and early 70’s in Vietnam, 1983 in Grenada, 1989 in Panama, and 1990 in the Persian Gulf, the US has focused elsewhere in the world. But for the majority of the time its major security focus has been on NATO and Europe.

Almost everything in America’s security environment was focused on Europe. Formation design was based on Europe: manning, equipping, doctrine, naval tactics, aerial tactics, ground tactics, and nuclear forces were all designed to support and win the ground war in Europe. The US poured billions of dollars into the effort and expended huge amounts of man-hours and political capital to ensure that the NATO alliance remained intact and militarily viable. The US focused on Europe to the detriment of other nations and regions around the world. During those times when America’s attention focused elsewhere the “attention” as well as other resources came from Europe and the forces in Europe suffered. During the Vietnam War, forces were taken out of Europe to fight the conflict. Readiness in Europe was abysmal, units were short of personnel and equipment, morale was terrible, and America was over-reliant on her nuclear deterrent.

Again in the early 90’s America’s focus shifted from Europe, this time to the Middle East. As the build up for Desert Shield/Desert Storm began forces were taken out of Europe to participate in the conflict. When Desert Storm ended most of these forces were returned to Europe. EUCOM sent an entire army corps from Europe to the desert to fight the war along with air wings, Marines, naval forces, and a host of individual replacements and support personnel.

The shifting of assets from Europe to trouble spots is no coincidence. The only place America can get assets, especially on short notice, is from Europe. Shifting American assets from Europe to trouble spots and back again was an acceptable strategy in a bi-polar world where America was fairly certain of the identity and location of the number one threat. This is not the case in a multi-polar world where America is not sure what or where the next number one threat will come from. The world has changed, the world security environment is no longer bi-polar, and there is not a threat yet visible that will make it bi-polar at least for the next 20 years. America must stop acting like the world around it is slowly evolving; the world has radically changed and will continue to change in the future.

The US must begin to focus on the emerging regions of the world. It is time for America to refocus our finite security resources into other regions. As in the past, America must take the assets from Europe, this time on a permanent basis. The US must take a significant portion of the resources it lavishes on Europe and either bring them back to a power projection status in America, or deploy them to forward areas prepared to
deal with emerging threats. This forward presence and engagement may even reduce or eliminate current threats.

America, of course, cannot just abandon NATO and Europe overnight without something or someone taking our leadership role in Europe. There is only one organization on the horizon that has the potential to replace or at least augment the US leadership role in Europe, and that is the EU and its ESDI. Not the ESDI as currently envisioned for 2003, but an ESDI possible in 2015, of which the authors think the current project is just one incremental step toward. In this process the US should support and encourage the Europeans to move forward, to spend more, to accept more responsibility, and to make a bold move towards a robust ESDI formation. Not only should we support and encourage, we should try to shape the program so that we can get the maximum worldwide security benefit from it. Only in this way can the US free enough resources to engage the new regions of the world and deal with the emerging threats of the 21st century. These new regions are the threats and opportunities of the 21st century; they will emerge whether the US is prepared or not. If America does not plan now to meet them and take advantage of them, our prestige and influence in the world will suffer as we react to them and retroactively try to control them. The US must be prepared to relinquish some influence and prestige in Europe in order to gain more influence and prestige in the global community.

The US in the 21st century should shift significant assets away from Europe and NATO and into at least the following areas: the Pacific Rim, Central and South America, the Middle East, and Africa.

**The Pacific Rim**

Most strategic experts have forecast the emergence in the 21st century of the Pacific Rim nations, both in terms of markets and threats. This is vital information for the US. China alone with its 1.1 billion people, growing economy, and internal struggles will be a region that requires considerable time and energy. Historically reclusive, unfathomed by the rest of the world, China will emerge in the 21st century to play a major role on the world stage. If the Chinese economy continues to grow at anything near its current rate, it will eclipse the GDP of the US by 2015. China is currently studying the latest conflicts involving the US and is undergoing doctrinal debates on how best to engage and defeat the US if it comes to conflict. They are experimenting with chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and other asymmetrical means with which to combat our recognized superiority in joint, high intensity combat. In addition, China is beginning to show expansionist tendencies again, which they never really give up, only shelved until they deemed the time right. With their recent troubles with Tibet, their acquisition of Hong Kong, and their recent threats against Taiwan, they are giving early signs of what may be the flow of events in the 21st century. The US needs to begin now to refocus on China in a serious way. China will require more effort and energy as the next decade progresses, as will North Korea.

Korean unification is a problem whose time will probably come in the first or second decade of 2000. The reunification of the Koreas on terms acceptable to the US will require a mixture of diplomacy and force. North Korea is a recalcitrant nation still
tunneling, still sending special operations forces into the South, and still working on
procuring weapons of mass destruction. The North Koreans envision reunification on
their terms, with them in control of the South, not vice versa. A conflict now on the
Korean peninsula could be devastating; if it is the second major theater war (MTW), the
US has already deemed it high risk, meaning high casualties. The US cannot and should
not settle for this, and there is no need to. Pacific Command needs an increase in both
funds and manpower. We can begin to shift resources to the Pacific from Europe or at
least towards a power projection platform in the US prepared to help influence actions in
the Pacific. In this manner the US can engage the Pacific and hopefully avoid the
conflicts that now seem inevitable.

Central and South America

South America is another region that demands US presence and interest. In a
recent speech General Jones, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, stated that one of
his concrete recommendations for modernizing the military was to move Southern
Command's headquarters back to a Central or South American country.49 In the 60's
through the 80's Central and South America were rife with communist regimes and
military dictatorships. With minimal US effort and resources, comparatively speaking, all of the Central and South American nations are fledgling democracies except for Cuba.
This includes Nicaragua, one of the most hard-line communist nations.

While the dictatorships have disappeared, threats to the US have not they have
merely shifted. Today organized crime, government corruption, drug cartels, and
rampant poverty threaten the democracies of Central and South America. Military
organizations are fledgling democratic institutions; they have yet to prove themselves in
any crisis situations. Civilian control is still an unknown quantity. Most of the new
democracies are being publicly attacked for their alleged human rights violations and
corruption. These threats to Central and South America translate into threats to America.
Drugs and illegal immigrants overrun our southern border. Drug proceeds enrich the
drug cartels and feed crime and corruption, while illegal immigrants flee the rampant
poverty and crime in their own countries. While all of these threats are not military in
nature, the military is involved either directly combating these threats or in a support role
to some US Federal agency.

It will take more of America's energy, attention, and resources, not less, to ensure
the new democracies continue on the correct path. America will need to engage the new
democracies and assist them in overcoming the challenges of poverty, corruption, and
drug smuggling. Southern Command needs an increase in both funds and manpower.

The Middle East

The Middle East already occupies a significant portion of America's time and
interest. The US maintains a significant presence in the gulf around the clock, 365 days a

49 General Jones, Speech to the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Ma. 6 Mar 00.
year to assist in maintaining the fragile peace or containing hegemonic dictators and regimes. The US Army maintains a battalion task force in the Sinai, a battalion task force on permanent rotation throughout Kuwait, as well as a Brigade Task force worth of equipment forward staged in the region and on preposition ships dedicated primarily to the region. The Navy maintains a carrier battle group permanently in the region and the Air Force rotates air expeditionary forces through the region. The US is currently the primary enforcer of the No Fly Zones in the North and South of Iraq and has been since the end of the gulf war. This level of activity is stretching the US military and Central Command thin.

In the future we can look forward to deploying more forces for Peacekeeping duties as Israel and the surrounding nations move toward peace. A large US presence is expected on the Golan Heights to maintain the peace should Israel and Syria sign a peace agreement. The agreements between nations assisted by the US will almost certainly require some sort of guarantee by the Americans. These guarantees usually include more soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in the region. Even with no increase in American involvement in the Middle East, current levels are exhausting the military and need relief in the form of more forces available for deployment and rotations. The US will need to maintain its current level of interest in the Middle East. Central Command needs an increase in both funds and manpower.

Africa

Finally, the most ignored continent in the world, Africa. America will need to expend an inordinate amount of resources in Africa in the coming years. The world cannot allow the problems in Africa to spread globally. Not only the Aids epidemic, but spreading pollution, rampant famine, population growth and poverty are old problems. The US should take the lead in looking for a solution in the coming years. The world will not allow another Rwanda crisis to go unanswered. The African continent has been left for too long in the ruins of colonial departure and ethnic/tribal strife. The increase in information technology will ensure that crises in Africa receive worldwide attention. Once a crisis hits the news, public outcry makes intervention almost inevitable. The US can expect to become more involved on the African continent in the 21st century. The African continent will draw greater US attention in the future and require more funds and manpower into the 21st Century.

Summary

Shifting significant assets out of Europe can meet the “Three I’s Test” necessary for US support of ESDI. More important, this option meets the fourth I test of increasing US global security.

European countries have historically been leery of spending the amount of money on defense that the US deems necessary for real improvement in European capabilities. The US has maintained that an improvement in European capabilities will translate to an improvement in NATO capabilities. The reality of US resources shifting from the
European continent to other areas of the world will provide the impetus to the EU to finally move to improve European capabilities, thus increasing the effectiveness of NATO.

The goal of greater inclusion is not substantially affected by a significant shift in US resources. An argument could be made that shifting US resources makes room for including other forces within NATO and the EU, this argument would be a big stretch. Suffice to say that inclusion is not affected either way to a great extent.

Perhaps the most contentious issue for both Europeans and the US is the issue of indivisibility. On first blush it may seem that shifting significant resources from Europe and NATO is divisive to the transatlantic security link. On closer examination this is really not the case. The US is not withdrawing from NATO and we are not turning our backs on our historic ties to the continent. The US will remain committed to NATO and especially to our Article V requirements. In shifting significant assets out of Europe to the rest of the globe, we are attempting to make the world a safer place. As the world becomes safer, European security and stability become more assured. To focus our attention and effort solely or predominantly on Europe while the remainder of the world shifts and transforms around us will merely postpone the inevitable. Better for Europe and the US to plan a shift in significant resources now, provide a smooth transition of power within the EU and NATO, and implement our own strategy than to react to emerging threats only when we are forced to. A sudden and dramatic shift of forces from Europe to deal with an extant threat somewhere else in the world (similar to Desert Shield/Desert Storm but with today’s force structure) would be truly divisive to the transatlantic security link. It is better for the long-term indivisibility of the transatlantic link to partner with Europe now in preparing to shift to a global US security posture.

As stated above this option meets the fourth I test, that of “increasing US global security.” The resources to meet the emerging 21st century threats must come from somewhere. Of all the options available to the US, spending more money on defense to procure more force structure is the least likely. While slight increases in defense spending are expected, nothing resembling the glory days of the Reagan build up years is envisioned. The US must more wisely and efficiently use the forces it has to provide for future US security. In the multi-polar world this means providing more presence and engagement in more places around the world. The only way to do this is to distribute the resources available in significant new ways. This means that the resources allocated to NATO and the EU must shift in significant ways. The way ahead to accomplish this significant shift is the topic of our next chapter.
Chapter 9

We have two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace. This would be a natural continuation of the mission the US launched fifty years ago with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Our second goal is to work with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no nation can meet alone. ⁵⁰

Conclusion

In conclusion, the authors assert that there are five mutually reinforcing conditions that portend a necessary and feasible shift in US Global Security Policy. These are:

#1- NATO won the Cold War
#2- A Stable, Wealthy and Democratic Europe
#3- Globalizing US Security
#4- Wise Use of Scarce Resources
#5- ESDI is the “Way Ahead”

NATO Won

President Clinton’s 1999 National Security Strategy For A New Century (excerpted above) is very telling and presents the two main points of this paper. Europe is democratic, prosperous, at peace and in the process of integration. Regarding each of these aspects, the US and NATO have played indispensable roles. The initial step for reaching this first goal was the advent of the Marshall Plan itself, first presented at Harvard. What made the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan possible was the steady presence of NATO as it offset the threat posed by potential German military resurgence and the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization. NATO stands as a monument to collective security by free peoples as the most successful military alliance ever created. Every dollar, franc, pound, mark ever spent on its creation, sustainment, modernization, expansion and operation was well worth it. Given the alternative, NATO has been bargain.

A Stable, Wealthy and Democratic Europe

Although there is still much that needs to be done, the EU has been remarkably successful in integrating the internal market, monetary union and the

necessary transnational institutions involving executive, judicial and legislative functions. The level of federalism or retention of national sovereignty within the EU is yet to be determined. ESDI and the quest for more military autonomy is part of this ongoing, if piecemeal, integration. Europe is decidedly democratic with positive progress being made even in the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Economic market-based reforms and the spread of democracy have proven the best measures in averting conditions that foster aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds. Even the historical threat to Europe over the past fifty years, Russia, will again engage in open and free elections this year. This expanding democratization is reason enough to believe that Europe has reached a political equilibrium that will endure. Historically, democracies do not attack other democracies. Admittedly, there may continue some level of conflict resulting from ancient hatreds or where old civilizations meet, but with further transnational growth, the spread of democracy and economic prosperity these will generally subside over time.

Globalizing US Security

The second goal President Clinton mentioned involves working with our allies and partners across the Atlantic in meeting the global challenges that no one nation could address on its own. The US needs to design a security strategy for the next fifty years, now. The same goals of integration, spread of democracy, prosperity and peace that guided our involvement in Europe for the past fifty years should now guide our involvement in the rest of the world. Now that Europe is a strong, stable and dependable US ally the time for the US to shift is now. This does not mean the US becomes neo-isolationist, abandons Europe, turns inward or disengages from our European allies. It is actually a natural continuation of the American ideal.

In a grand sense, America has always thought of herself as an exception and destined for greatness. President Dwight D. Eisenhower is noted as saying “America is the mightiest power God has yet seen fit to put upon his footstool. America is great because she is good.” 51 More recently SECSTATE Madeleine Albright said the US “was an indispensable nation.” 52 Former SECSTATE Henry Kissinger has written “during the twentieth century no country has influenced international relations as decisively . . . as the US” and “no other country has more firmly insisted that its values were universally applicable, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind and thus assuming an obligation to crusade them around the world.” 53

Nonetheless, The world has changed and the US has changed demographically, economically and geopolitically.

52 LaFeher. 26-33.
53 Kissinger. 17-18.
Demographic Shifts Away from Europe

Demographically, the US is moving away from Europe. From 1820-1974, immigrants from Europe made up 76.8% of all immigrants into the US compared with just 4.6% for Asians and 9% from Latin Americans.\(^{54}\) In the 1970s and 1980s, the US took in more than 5 million legal immigrants from Latin America (45%), nearly 4.5 million Asians (41%) and only about 1.5 million Europeans (13%). The US population is moving away from its European roots. In 1990, 80% of Americans claimed to be of European dissent, by 2020 it is projected to be less than 65%. These trends will increasingly dilute our historic European base and increasingly cause us to focus West.

Economic Shift

This trend away from Europe can also been seen economically. In 1960, Japan and East Asia together represented just 4% of the world gross national product (GNP), while the European Economic Community (EEC) represented nearly 25%. Today, the East Asian and EC shares of world GNP are nearly equal. According to the World Bank and other sources, four of the largest five (and seven of the largest ten) economies in the world in the year 2020 will be in Asia.\(^{55}\) The US is first and foremost an economic power that will naturally respond to these trends. In fact, it is already starting. US trade with Asia has exceeded trade with the EU since the late 1970s. Today, US trade with Asia is about $350 billion compared to $220 billion with the EU. In 1992, the share of US exports to Asia exceeded that to Europe by 33% to 21%, and the share of imports from Asia was greater by a ratio of 45% to 21%.\(^{56}\) The US Department of Commerce (in 1994) defined the "big emerging markets" as China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, South Africa, Poland and Argentina.\(^{57}\) A closer look would reveal only two (Poland and Turkey) are in Europe and none are in Western Europe.

This is not to say that the US must choose between either good relations with Europe or good relations with Asia. The US must and will continue to foster good relations with Europe. But it also means that Europe will be just one part of America’s global focus as other regions grow in importance to the US.

Shifting US Geopolitical Thinking

In light of demographic and economic shifts, America’s geopolitical thinking must also shift from a “Euro-centric” focus to a global focus. This shift will reach back to the most basic aspects of American exceptionalism. America must take the rule of law, market-based prosperity and increasing democratization to the rest of the world. To do this requires a significant shift in our political priorities from Europe to a wider focus.

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\(^{55}\) “War of the Worlds: A Survey of the Global Economy,” The Economist, 1 October 1994, 4

\(^{56}\) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), US Trade Review vol.1, 21-23

\(^{57}\)
In this effort, a change in generational political and military leadership will assist in the necessary change.

Consider the changes in the world generational political leadership over the last ten years on both sides of the Atlantic. Initially influenced by the experience of World War II and the Cold War, the previous generation of western world leaders accepted a NATO-centered security strategy. President George Bush was shot down in combat with Japan over the Pacific. UK Prime Minister Thatcher, French President Mitterrand, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl unquestionably were shaped by the war in Europe and Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe for forty years. Particularly interesting is that during the 1950s most members of the US Congress had served in the armed forces during WWII or the Korean War. Today very few members of Congress, less than 25%, have served in the military and even less in combat. The new generation of political leadership, President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Russia’s President Putin were all born after 1945. The major influences impacting these leaders include accelerating globalization, free flow of information through the Internet, interdependent economies and the overarching acceptance of rapid change as a constant in the world. This is also true of Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush, one of which will almost certainly be the next US president.

There is a concurrent shift in generational military thinking. Admiral Crowe, Generals Powell and Shalikashvilli (all former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) in the US, as well as their European counterparts, grew up in the aftermath of WW II and served in uniform during the height of the Cold War (much of this time in Europe). Today’s rising military leaders (primarily the one- and two-star Flag Officers) entered military service in the post-Vietnam era, witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union as mid-grade officers and have been the functional architects of America’s post-Cold War strategy. This generational leadership shift is showing signs of new security thinking as demonstrated by the recent US National Defense University senior advisory group, “NDU QDR ’01 Working Group”. This group is quietly putting together military strategy force structure options as part of the required Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for 2001 (looking at the threat environment out to 2025). One of strategies being considered involves increased emphasis on “transformation” of US forces to a new generation of combat technologies that could allow the US to more effectively counter a “peer competitor” (believed to mean China) in coming years.58 Although any such shift in military strategy is subject to enormous domestic and international political pressure, even the consideration of such a strategy serves as evidence of change. Equally important is that any new strategy recognizes and appreciates the need for wise use of scarce defense resources in the future.

Wise Use of Scarce Resources

All current military budget projections predict that US military spending will remain stagnant or, at best, increase marginally. With the same or a slight increase in military spending, the US will not purchase new or additional force structure. This mandates a reapportionment of current assets from less-threatened areas to more-

58 ca.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/ebird?doc_url=/Mar2000/s20003 10ndu.htm

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threatened areas to meet or preclude emerging threats. This reapportionment occurred in
the past on a temporary basis as the US reacted to emerging threats such as Vietnam,
Panama, Somalia and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The future security environment
requires a permanent reapportionment of limited assets in order to support a global
security strategy based upon power projection and forward presence. These assets should
come from Europe and our NATO-focused policy and be positioned for use in the
Pacific, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The European Union initiative
embodied in ESDI provides America with a potential capability to replace our leadership
and significant military contribution to their defense.

ESDI is the “Way Ahead”

Since the inception of NATO in 1949, US policy planners have tried to get the
Europeans to fund a larger portion of their defense bill. In addition, the Europeans have
always proclaimed a desire for increased autonomy from US decision making. Today,
both of these goals are within sight and demand the same thing that NATO solidarity in
the last 50 years demanded: US leadership.

For the first time the Europeans are not just talking about autonomy, they are
taking concrete steps to build a capability. They began to build this capability in spite of
initial US objections. Now is the time for US security planners to realize the potential
significance to our own global strategy of a more robust European capability. The US
should demonstrate the same leadership and resolve it has for the last 50 years within
NATO. We must bring the EU nations to the table for combined, transparent, visionary
negotiations and begin to map out the way ahead for ESDI as the future security
organization for Europe.

US leadership is necessary in this endeavor not only to increase our own global
security but to ensure we leave a stable Europe able to deal with current and future
threats. ESDI provides the most viable alternative to US leadership in Europe. The US
must give up its primary leadership role in Europe to take advantage of emerging
challenges worldwide. The way ahead is for the US to fully support and help lead the
European initiative embodied in ESDI.
United States Global Security and the European Security and Defense Identity: A Case for European Military Autonomy

26 April 2000

CDR John W. Cotton, USN
LTC John F. Garrity III, USA
LTC Steven C. Sifers, USA
Chapter 1

Introduction

... China now seeks to avoid head-on confrontation until around 2030, when the Chinese expect US power to decline significantly. However, a war between China and the US could erupt over Taiwan. \(^1\)

... In the twenty-first century, Africa, like Europe in the twentieth, will have to be confronted. The greatest threat to our value system comes from Africa. Can we continue to believe in universal principles as Africa declines to levels better described by Dante than by development economists? \(^2\)

United States Security Interests and Globalization

The Cold War is over, the threat posed by communism no longer exists, and the United States (US) continues to occupy the preeminent position worldwide. With the removal of Cold War restrictions and constrictions, the pursuit of globalization is the most significant driving force that will shape human endeavor for the foreseeable future. With globalization will come new security threats that will demand new and innovative solutions; old ideas and old strategies applied to new security problems just won’t work.

Nowhere is this more apparent than in the context of US-European security affairs. Since 1945, the US strategy in Europe, and through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), has been ensuring stability and prosperity in close proximity to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact. Second only to national survival has been the reconstitution and security of Europe. In the year 2000, has the US obtained its Cold War goals regarding Europe? There is no longer any credible threat to the territorial integrity of Europe; the economy of the European Union (EU) alone is near equal to that of the US and democratization and self-determination are flourishing. Is it necessary for the US to maintain its current level of military involvement and focus for these conditions to continue?

The likelihood of American confrontation with communism has diminished significantly since the end of the Cold War. The impact of globalization on the US will increase dramatically in the 21st Century. It is time for the US to shift to a security posture that is designed to protect US vital interests and influence security and stability in all regions of the world.

Although Europe will certainly continue to be part of the US security equation, it will only be one part. Other regions, such as the Pacific Rim and Asia, which contain half of the world’s population, will become increasingly important to US interests, as will Africa. A shift in US security policy focus away from Europe, to a more global

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1 China Preparing for war with US, Wash. Times, February 2, 2000
perspective, will become unavoidable by the year 2030. How does the US set the conditions for this policy shift away from Europe?

The authors believe the basic elements are present today in two related developments. First, is our ability to build on the success of NATO, the most successful alliance ever known. Second is the EU’s current, yet embryonic, desire for military autonomy as evidenced by their interest in a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) capability. The US should seize upon these elements to start the transition process. Given the magnitude of this transition, it will likely take in excess of two decades of close coordination between the US and its European allies to complete. The result will be a secure Europe, still linked to the US, but more importantly a significant increase in US ability and agility to secure its interests globally.

Scope and Structure of the Research Paper

This research paper will assess three options available to US security policy makers in light of Europe’s desire for military autonomy in the form of ESDI. It is written from an American perspective and viewpoint. Our intention is to be forward looking (out to 2030, if not beyond) and focused on where US security requirements will be called upon in the coming decades, not fixated on a successful past. The authors reject any notion that the topic is about neo-isolationism, abandoning Europe, America “turning inward” or disengagement. As briefly mentioned above, the physical forces of globalization preclude any of this. In fact, globalization is what the US is trying to harness and is the basis of our assumptions which are:

1. European desire for ESDI is real and sustainable
2. Europe will remain reasonably stable and continue to consolidate
3. US security requirements will increase elsewhere vis-à-vis Europe
4. Globalization (economic, financial and information) will continue to develop, resulting in multiple centers of power
5. Africa will require more of our moral attention
6. The Pacific will become the dominant economic theater by the year 2030, if not before
7. No global challenge to democracy emerges

We have structured the paper accordingly. Chapter Two will examine the environment that confronts ESDI from the current Helsinki pledged force of 60,000 personnel by the year 2003 and the present US position using SECDEF Cohen’s “Three I test.” Chapter Three will cover the genesis of what has become known as ESDI. Chapter Four will discuss a possible structure for ESDI. Chapter Five will discuss the international reactions to ESDI, which could be significant when “out of theater” use of ESDI is considered (new European crusaders into the Middle East or Chechnya?). Chapters Six, Seven and Eight will discuss three options available to US policy-makers regarding their approach to and acceptance of ESDI. The final chapter will summarize and put forth our recommendation, which is that the US exert its leadership to shape the European desire to become more autonomous, thus gaining strategic agility for itself.
Why this is important and how will it be done?

The US approach to ESDI should be classic realpolitik by accepting that the concept of being the only remaining superpower is an illusion and is actually counter-productive. Supporting a transition to European military independence does not mean a loss of US prestige and should not be misunderstood as one. It is far more mature and prudent statesmanship to take a critical look at one's current circumstance, determine where one wants or will need to go and then plot the appropriate course! For the first time in one hundred years the US can neither withdraw from the world nor dominate it. The US retains significant influence in all areas and will continue to hold what Walt W. Rostow calls the "critical margin of power and influence." Operating in this margin means the US cannot impose its will on others as a hegemonic power; but big things can't get done in the world without our active participation. Changing the current mindset of US security managers to work the margin to our advantage will take time. Nowhere will it be more difficult than in US-European security affairs. Dr. Lester Thurow puts the issue crisply:

"Attitudes and speech patterns remain in place long after they no longer reflect reality. No matter how many speeches are made proclaiming that it won't happen, NATO will fade away as an important American-led military alliance. With the Soviet Union gone, Europe's problems and perspectives are not America's problems and perspectives. The American taxpayers simply aren't going to pay for the defense of those richer than themselves from an enemy that cannot be specified or imagined. On the other side, Europe doesn't want the shock of a rapid American withdrawal, but it no longer wants Americans running European military and foreign policies."

Ironically the US will have to lead the Europeans in their quest for military autonomy. Minimizing the shock and meticulously managing the withdrawal will require the US to be deeply involved in the design and transition process. If properly done this will result in an effective European Union "second pillar" and a dramatic increase in US latitude to meet its own future requirements. Strategic ambivalence can be expected on both sides of the Atlantic before, during and after the transition. America will continue to be a dependable European ally. But the stark reality is that the security dynamics of Europe have significantly changed for the better. The US needs to seize the moment, focus on its own future security requirements and act boldly. The concept of ESDI can be the initial precursor to greater European Military autonomy and needs to be pursued as an American security objective.

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3 The European Union developed a long-range plan for deepening and strengthening the ties among and between European Union member states labeled by the EU as its Three Pillars. The Three Pillars are: 1. Internal Market, 2. Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), of which ESDI is a part, and 3. Justice and Home Affairs.
Chapter 2

Military Autonomy and the European Desire for ESDI

At Helsinki, Finland, in December 1999, the EU formally pledged to create and have operational by the year 2003, a 60,000 member military force referred to as the European Rapid Reaction Force (ERRF). The ERRF is the first installment in the creation of an operational capability under ESDI. At first glance this is a relatively small portion (approximately 3-6%) of the over two million military personnel available from the combined European countries. By the EU’s design ESDI is envisioned to possess a separate military capability that excludes US involvement and precludes a NATO veto of its use. Javier Solana of Spain left his post as NATO secretary-general in October 1999, to become the EU’s first High Representative for forging a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). CFSP is the second pillar in the EU’s ongoing efforts to deepen and broaden European integration. ESDI is an integral part in the construction of this pillar. Solana has stated his mandate is to give Europe the military capacity for “autonomous action independent of NATO.”

On February 5, 2000, US Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) William Cohen spoke at the 36th Munich Conference on Security Policy. Cohen stated he supported NATO Secretary-General Robertson’s earlier comments that any ESDI development must incorporate the three “I’s” of indivisibility of transatlantic security; improvement of European capabilities; and inclusiveness of all European allies in the process. He went on to say that “NATO is, and should remain, the principal foundation of transatlantic and European security. NATO is and should remain, whole and intact … a coherent European capacity to act in its security interests should multiply NATO’s power, not divide it. We [US] believe that every step towards an ESDI should meet that test.”

Clearly the Helsinki pledges of 60,000 by 2003, and SECDEF Cohen’s vision of how ESDI should fit into NATO in the 21st century, are at odds. French officials, notably President Jacques Chirac and Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine, have complained that the post-Cold War US has gone from superpower to hyperpower in its efforts to retain Cold War era dominance over European affairs through the Atlantic Alliance, which is the sole US institutional link to Europe. SECDEF Cohen’s support for the framework of testing ESDI against the three “I’s” of indivisibility, improvement and inclusiveness go against the most basic tenets of ESDI proponents, those being participation limited to only EU members and autonomy from the US and NATO. Just prior to Helsinki, Geoff Winestock of the Wall Street Journal commented regarding ESDI that the “…Europeans and US are already behaving like a husband and wife preparing for a messy divorce.” ESDI has the potential to significantly stress, if not fracture beyond repair, the historical relationship between Atlantic Alliance members like no other proposal since inception in 1949. Ironically, what fifty years of Soviet designs could not do, may happen from within to end the world’s most successful alliance ever.

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9 Wall Street Journal, Oct 12, 1999, 21
How can the circle be squared in such a way as to accommodate such divergent viewpoints? How can the “Three I’s” test of SECDEF Cohen and NATO Secretary-General Robertson be blended and shaped with High Representative Javier Solana’s mandate to give Europe the military capacity for “autonomous action independent of NATO”?

Beginning to Square the Circle

That ESDI will be established is the first of seven assumptions (previously listed in Chapter One). Assuming success allows us to look beyond the near term political noise and frustrations presented by actually meeting the Helsinki imposed 2003 deadline. Also assumed, and for the same reason, is the continued consolidation and growth in the EU’s power.

The idea of ESDI is not new. Although it is not our intent to present a detailed history, it is necessary to cover the past briefly to fully appreciate and understand why many feel so passionately about ESDI. Additionally, in order to look forward (beyond 2003) it is necessary to do so from a basis for understanding what (most likely) ESDI would look like, be capable of and its associated costs. Therefore Chapter Four discusses possible ESDI roles, missions, organization and how it will be controlled as currently envisioned.

With this information in place, there would appear to be three options available, which we consider individually in subsequent chapters. They are:

a. Option One: Status Quo (neglect of or opposition to ESDI)
b. Option Two: Adjust over time (ESDI “Lite”)
c. Option Three: US Bold Shift (transition out of NATO by 2030)

The authors recommend Option Three and believe it provides the US with the most flexibility in the future. We will use the Cohen/Robertson “Three I’s Test” as one measure of each option. More importantly we will argue that in a final act of leadership and prudent statesmanship to the Cold War era the US, in conjunction with its European allies, should develop a plan over the next two decades, to transition out of its pivotal role in NATO. At the same time the US must refocus its sights on emerging 21st century strategic goals and objectives with a global perspective.

US Conditional Support and Concerns

SECDEF Cohen and Secretary General Robertson’s’ support for ESDI is contingent upon passing the “Three I’s Test.” The test ensures that any ESDI capability will be centered on the concept of indivisibility of transatlantic security; improvement of European security/defense capabilities; and inclusiveness available to all European allies. These are the positive evolution of US Secretary of State (SECSTATE) Madeleine Albright’s “Three D’s” speech put forth at the December 1998 North Atlantic Council
meeting in Brussels\textsuperscript{10}. The following chart shows just how similar these two frameworks are.

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The authors believe a fourth “I” is appropriate for the US to consider when determining our policy towards an autonomous European Military Capability. Our policy objective should be to “increase” US global security. Policy planners in the US should approach the ESDI dilemma with global security in mind. As stated above the authors believe the developments in the ESDI present the US with an opportunity to improve our security posture worldwide. US security planners must grasp this opportunity now and help shape the ESDI for the future in a way that increases our global security.

Both lists highlight US concerns regarding ESDI. Albright’s decoupling and Cohen’s indivisibility warn that there must be complete transparency between NATO and EU deliberations regarding security matters. The historic US desire for the Europeans to provide for more of their own defense is not in question. But Cohen stresses that “NATO is, and should remain, the principal foundation of transatlantic and European security … A coherent European capacity to act in its security interests should multiply NATO’s power, not divide it. We [US] believe that every step toward an ESDI should meet that test.”\textsuperscript{11} But there is no question ESDI has the potential to divide the alliance like no other development or incident since its inception in 1949.

Regarding the second category of concern Albright’s no duplication and Cohen’s improve requirement are consistent and mutually supporting. Both secretaries believe it makes no sense for the EU to form new structures to deal with military planning, command and control, or operations when those capabilities already exist within NATO. All estimates suggest any ESDI capability will be enormously expensive to create and maintain. The Europeans will need to appropriate significant resources today to meet even the most basic year 2003 goals. Although defense spending by Europeans has begun to stabilize, this has only occurred after a decade of declining spending following the fall of the Berlin Wall (see Chapter 6). This decade of declining defense spending resulted in a significant capability differential between the US and the Europeans evident in the recent Kosovo air campaign. It will be difficult to justify any defense spending within the NATO alliance that does not correct this differential.

At the Munich Conference, SECDEF Cohen spoke directly to this very point when he said “...one member of NATO [US] conducted virtually two-thirds of all air support sorties and half of all air combat missions.”\textsuperscript{12} He went on to say that there were only a handful of countries that could supply precision munitions, operate in all kinds of weather and possessed ample secure communication equipment in order to minimize risk. Most aerial refueling requirements fell to the US because there was so little capability among the allies. What is most disturbing is that NATO had identified virtually all of

\textsuperscript{10} Madeleine Albright, Speech to North Atlantic Council, Brussels, December 1998.
\textsuperscript{11} Cohen, 5 Feb 2000.
\textsuperscript{12} Cohen, 5 Feb 2000.
these shortfalls several years earlier. Countries responsible had simply failed to take budgetary corrective action. Yet many of these same countries are considering allocating large funds to ESDI that would appear to be better applied elsewhere. As Minister Scharping (Germany’s Defense Minister) has said, “The problem in NATO is not too much America, but too little Europe.” 13 It is difficult to see how this situation is not a duplication of effort and certainly does not improve the collective security arrangement. Surely this reluctance to correct these shortfalls will not escape the next US president, congress or public indefinitely.

The third and last of Albright and Cohen’s respective requirements are discrimination and inclusiveness. Here too both secretaries agree. This reflects the concern about countries such as Turkey (and to a lesser extent Norway) which are NATO members but not EU members. Because ESDI is envisioned to be limited to only EU members, what role would countries such as Turkey play? The potential for discrimination and exclusion is easy to see resulting in less than one Europe from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains.

Is There Disagreement?

Just two weeks after SECDEF Cohen’s speech at the Hotel Bayerischer Hof the Right Honorable Christopher Patten, a member of the European Commission with responsibility for External Relations, spoke to the European Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee regarding ESDI. At first glance it would appear that Patten and Cohen (and by extension Albright) agree on most significant issues. Patten agrees the Europeans need to be doing more in their own defense and correcting many of the capability shortfalls experienced in the Kosovo air war. Patten acknowledged that European members of NATO spend about 60% (albeit roughly having the same collective GNP) of what the US spends on defense and although the Europeans have approximately 2 million personnel under arms they could “scarcely deploy 2% of that number for the Kosovo operation.” 14 Patten goes on to say the ESDI is not intended to rival or duplicate NATO. Rather, ESDI is intended to act where “NATO as a whole is not engaged” or since “our transatlantic partners [US] will not want to intervene in every regional crisis on the European continent. Nor do I blame them. This is our backyard, not theirs.” 15

This general agreement is a thin veneer and most likely misleading as to the significant troubles to come in the near future. It is very difficult to see where or how the creation of a credible ESDI would not conflict with any or all aspects of the “Three I” framework. Are the Europeans prepared to fully support continued NATO modernization (as the US is) by correcting known shortfalls and at the same time devote adequate resources to ESDI? In the absence of major increases in European defense spending this is not likely to occur. This will lead to two, both less than optimal, situations.

14 Christopher Patten, CH, Member of the European Commission, Speech to NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Brussels, 22 February 2000.
15 Patten, 22 February 2000
First would be a situation where NATO shortfalls are left uncorrected because resources are allocated to meeting the Helsinki 2003 pledges of 50-60,000 troops. Patten's own admission could involve more like 200,000 troops when rotation cycles are factored in. NATO would be forced to assume operational risk and curtail necessary modernization. It is easy to see how this scenario could actually result in an increase in European dependency on the US for security. At the same time ESDI would exist in some form but would likely be unable to act autonomously or effectively, leading to the second scenario. The second scenario would be a situation, say in 2005, where ESDI is a dismal failure, sunk costs are gone and NATO shortfalls still exist. This would surely generate deep philosophical discussion in the US about our role in European security, but under much different political pressures and circumstances. It could actually result in a deepening of US commitment to Europe at a time when US commitments elsewhere have deepened considerably. Equally possible in this second scenario could be a justifiable exasperation by the US resulting in a rapid withdrawal from Europe.

What is Missing?

Fundamentally missing in either the desire for more military autonomy by the EU or fear of fracturing NATO by the US is recognition of the fact that the US role in European security affairs is changing rapidly. Actually the continued Euro-centric focus by the US is counterproductive to both itself and Europe. Currently all security options, even if ESDI passes the "Three I" test, assume a continued significant level of US participation in Europe. Yet the US cannot justify the same level of commitment in light of the globalization of our economy and our security requirements. Not only can the US not justify the same level, the US cannot sustain the same level indefinitely as different threats emerge around the globe.

The US and Europe need to make a fundamental shift in geopolitical thinking, a shift that envisions the EU as the leader in all aspects of European security. Imagine for a moment the EU trying to determine the feasibility of ESDI with the understanding that the US intended on stepping down from its pivotal leadership role within the next two decades. As stated in the conclusion of chapter one the US will have to partner with the Europeans and assist them through a lengthy transition process in their quest for military autonomy. Minimizing the shock and meticulously managing the withdrawal will require the US to be deeply involved in the design and transition process. If properly done this will result in an effective European Union second pillar and a dramatic increase in US latitude to meet its own future requirements.

America will continue to be a dependable European ally. But the stark reality is that the security dynamics of Europe have significantly changed, the question remains, "Will US security planners recognize the change and take advantage of it, or will we eventually be overwhelmed by emerging threats elsewhere in the world as we continue to focus on Europe?" The US needs to seize the moment, focus on its own future security requirements and act boldly. The concept of ESDI is a precursor that needs to be pursued as an American security objective.
As stated above, the US needs to take the lead in shaping the ESDI concept to become an effective, efficient and autonomous force resulting in strategic depth for the US. The time to act is now.
Chapter 3

Origins of the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)?

Europe has long sought an indigenous collective security arrangement. This need was eventually met in NATO. More recently Europe has identified the need for a military capability beyond simple collective security, they identified a need for a power projection capability. With the continent at peace and secure, Europeans are looking beyond their borders in an effort to positively affect and control potential conflict on their flanks and beyond. How Europe has arrived at this juncture tells us much about current debate and probable future progress toward fulfilling this desire.

Continental Europe has known the massive devastation of a major war twice in this century. Numerous bilateral and multilateral security arrangements and mutual defense treaties set in place after the first World War proved powerless to deter the Second. The resolution of both conflicts had required significant military intervention by an initially reticent United States. Separated from Europe by a vast ocean and yet closely linked culturally, economically and morally, the US overcame isolationist tendencies to come to the aid of Europe.

Twice in the previous thirty years, the United States had become involved militarily in Europe’s wars, and hundreds of thousands of American lives had been lost. Despite its strong emotional appeal, isolationism had patently failed. 16

NATO

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) had its beginnings in a post-war era where dependence upon the United States was openly acknowledged and clearly necessary. American troops had been garrisoned throughout large portions of West Germany and Berlin since 1945 and were widely based throughout western and southern Europe with the blessing of the sovereign nations involved. Industrially, Europe was a wasteland after World War II. Her population, depending upon location, faced joblessness, homelessness and widespread hunger. Recognizing the need to assist in rebuilding Europe and reinforce weak or fledgling democratic governments and institutions, the US remained engaged with her allies and former enemies through the European Recovery Program. Commencing in 1947, the Marshall Plan provided over 15 billion dollars of hard currency, goods and services to national and local organizations 17 chartered and dedicated to the rebuilding of European infrastructure and social institutions.

The nominal division of Germany into three western sectors (American, French and British) and a Soviet sector essentially formed the geographic divide for the next and

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longest of Europe’s modern wars. Far from having recovered from World War II, Europe was now the focal point in the new polarization of global power. It had become the potential ground zero for the Cold War. In answer to this continental rift and the ever-present concern of a resurgent Germany, France, Britain and the BENELUX countries formed the Western European Union (WEU) in 1948. Citing the United Nations charter, the signatory nations to the Treaty of Brussels pledged mutual assistance in “maintaining international peace and security and in resisting any policy of aggression” as well as providing for their “collective self-defence”.

Much less concerned with the threat that Germany had and might again represent to world peace, the US saw the need for a larger collective security arrangement to counter the might and menace of an eastern bloc. The combined vectors of these energies seemed to make the advent of NATO a natural next step for Europe and her North American friends. The Soviet blockade of Berlin and subsequent relief airlift was still underway when twelve nations signed the Treaty of Washington forming NATO. Great Britain, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, Norway, Denmark, Portugal, Iceland, Canada, and the US created the still enduring Atlantic Alliance, the purpose of which centered around the sentiment that “... an armed attack against one or more ... shall be considered an attack against them all ...”

Apart from the emerging consensus that postwar US security depended on increasing international involvement, the onset of the Cold War provided a powerful incentive for the United States to play a leading part in European affairs.

Americans and Europeans agreed ... the direct Soviet threat could best be countered by immediate US intervention ... and military alliance building and leadership ...

As the US was gathering in her European allies, the Soviet Union began establishing an eastern confederation of nations that would eventually form the Warsaw Pact (1955). It is from this posture of offsetting political ideologies and military positions that the Cold War had its beginnings.

For over fifty years, NATO has been the highly visible incarnation of western political cooperation and military solidarity. For the US, NATO provided the showcase for a sound American foreign policy that touted reinforcement of democratic values and collective security. As our most significant institutional tie to Europe, the Atlantic Alliance became the framework for the UK’s “special relationship” with the US, a safe haven from European suspicions and danger from the Soviet Bloc for Germany, and the safety net and stable anchor seemingly necessary to smaller NATO countries. Based upon the age-old “causus belli” of crossing national borders or those of a country deemed

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18 Treaty of Brussels (WEU), preamble, March 17, 1948.
19 Treaty of Brussels, preamble.
21 Dian 17.
22 Dian 17.
vital to the Alliance, NATO stood firm as a bulwark against the perceived external threat of the USSR and the unspoken internal threat of a resurgent and imperialistic Germany.

Long viewed as the threat by the Warsaw Pact countries, the Alliance’s expansion to the east has been and still is strenuously opposed by modern-day Russia. Launched initially to guarantee collective security and the territorial integrity of Europe (relying heavily upon American military might), NATO is working to evolve into an effective post-Cold War alliance able to react to the new threats of this era. Increasingly occupied with non-Article V activities, NATO Headquarters is populated not only by members of the Alliance but by delegations from Partnership for Peace (PfP) nations.

Unfortunately, some of these dialogues and exercises (with Ukraine, the Baltic Republics and Belarus) give Russia further cause for concern. Envisioned as the way forward for an organization that began by promoting and guaranteeing stability on the continent, NATO now brings former Warsaw Pact and non-aligned countries under a common rubric which encourages dialogue, engagement and joint exercises (some involving actual military forces).

Making the European case for ESDI

It is the new regional security challenges on Europe’s flanks, combined with the ever-present humanitarian, peacekeeping and peace enforcement demands around the world, that have given new life to the concept of a European Security and Defense Identity. Whether driven by the desire for a greater political and security-related identity in concert with the Alliance or as a retort to NATO as Europe’s only refuge, some nations have begun to exhibit a rising will to do more within (or without) NATO. The optimistic Europeanist view might be characterized as “... a stronger European pillar would bolster the Alliance ...”

The prospect of ESDI has become more real with every European Union (EU) summit since the Maastricht Treaty was signed in 1992. The political rhetoric has intensified with a substantive bilateral meeting (UK-France, St. Malo, December 1998), the General Affairs Council (Schloss-Reinhartshausen, March 1999), the NATO 50th Anniversary (Washington, April, 1999), the European Council (Cologne, June 1999) and the European Council Summit (Helsinki, December 1999).

The European Union currently boasts 15 members united to reinforce “... the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights, fundamental freedoms and of the rule of law” while “... desiring to deepen the solidarity between their peoples.”

Even today, the legacy of two world wars plays a crucial role in the process of European integration.

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24 Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty deals primarily with maintenance of national borders, protection of sovereign territory and collective security.
25 PfP is a NATO program of engagement with non-NATO nations desiring to observe the political process at NATO Headquarters and participate in military exercises with NATO nations on an invitational basis.
26 Dinan 472.
Essentially an economic (and now monetary) community, the EU has set forth three “pillars” in its effort to deepen and broaden itself. Thrust between the first (and only fully developed pillar) of Economic Community and the third pillar of Justice and Home Affairs is the second (and arguably most contentious) pillar of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). It is upon this pillar that current initiatives toward attaining a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) are attempting to build.

**The EU as a force in international security**

As an economic force, the EU closely matches the US. In terms of international development and humanitarian aid, Europe far outspends American government and non-governmental organization (NGO) efforts. The 15 member states of the EU are responsible for over half of all world aid, 60% of aid to the republics arising out of the former Soviet Union, 40% of the reconstruction costs in Bosnia-Herzegovina, and over a third of total aid to the Middle East, while also maintaining current accounts with regard to United Nations (UN) peacekeeping efforts. The EU’s continuing engagement in behalf of advancing democratic ideals remains very active in the 54 member Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This ability to affect economic and social progress in the developing world stands in stark contrast to Europe’s inability to play a commensurate political or military role in world affairs. It is this imbalance in global influence that drives the EU’s CFSP and, more pointedly, the ESDI.

The present community inertia and collective momentum appear to be valid indicators of the EU’s readiness for launching its common defense posture and accompanying external policy. What was once a Soviet military threat to the east has become a socially bankrupt and politically aimless Russia. “Loose nukes”, cross-border organized crime and the potential for continued defaulting on foreign debt payments have become the new threats. Constructive engagement in economic, social and political arenas with this former Cold War adversary appears to be in the best interest of all concerned. Additionally, non-Article V military engagement outside of the traditional borders of Western Europe by European forces (including the reunified Germany) has become a reality.

... the [1997 European Union] Amsterdam Treaty incorporates the Petersberg Tasks (humanitarian and rescue missions, peace-keeping and the tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peace-making) such as those currently being undertaken in the Balkans. 29

Beyond its economic influence, the EU apparently thinks that it is now ready to use its political and military might to promote its own principles of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law elsewhere in the world. Regarding how and when this is done, the EU is united in its belief that this should not fall to the blessing (or veto) of a non-European ally or even to an alliance based upon mutual defense. The EU has

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matured to the point where consensus on a Common Foreign and Security Policy (enshrined in the Amsterdam Treaty and the Petersberg Tasks) may well be possible.

All completed work within the EU to this point has been generally economic in nature. The European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) has been concerned with strengthening the economic position of the EU in regards to internal commerce, international trade and overall stability. The recent, but well-worn, term of globalization has become the watchword for the EU’s passage through this terrain. Ensuring that financial institutions, governmental entities and commercial infrastructures are preparing to operate at the high speed and efficiency of the information age has been an added benefit of EMU. The internal markets of Europe must be able to attain the optimal levels of competitiveness necessary to ensure sustainable growth, reduced unemployment and ultra-efficiency in capital, services and goods production. To have accomplished this was no small feat. Among the most sacrosanct of national totems is a country’s currency: national symbol, medium of trade, store of value and (in the cases of Germany and France, at least) objects of fervent nationalist pride.

The bitter experiences of war and dictatorship in this century teach us that the unification project is the best insurance against a relapse of national egoism, chauvinism and violent conflict. 30

In the case of monetary policy, the EMU nations (currently 11 of the 15 EU member states, with Greece waiting for final accession) have willingly forfeited control of interest rates, strategic currency exchange rate adjustment and the ability to manipulate money supply. The same countries have pledged under the Maastricht “convergence criteria” to limit their use of fiscal policy controls (extreme deficit spending and high government debt) except in times of severe recession and depression. A greater weight in terms of nationalistic importance could be extended to these sovereign nations when addressing foreign policy and defense issues. Dependent upon one another in almost every conceivable economic sense, now the EU is seeking to combine the disparate and historically driven actions of 15 culturally, linguistically and philosophically distinct countries with regard to international relations and their combined defense.

In its continuing attempt to make its voice heard on the international stage and express its position on armed conflicts, human rights and other subjects, the EU crafted the Amsterdam Treaty (1997) and assigned an important position to the Petersberg Tasks (named for the location of the WEU Ministerial Council that formulated them in 1992). Subsequently, the Cologne European Council (June 1999) placed these armed peacekeeping and humanitarian goals at the core of fleshing out this European common security and defense policy.

... the Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises without prejudice to actions by NATO. 31

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The catalyst for these actions within the European Council most assuredly was the Kosovo conflict in the Balkans. The desire to act and influence the outcome of events had been met with a stark realization that most of Europe's ability to project military power out of area (OOG) resided within NATO. Beyond this, the US was the Alliance member upon which this OOA capability depended. Heavy sea and airlift, in-theater stockpiles of "smart precision weaponry", tanker support for in-flight refueling, various levels of logistical support and C\textsuperscript{3}I (command, control, communications and intelligence) were all primarily shouldered by the US. US pilots flew a vast majority of combat missions as Europe contributed what it could.

Desire for military autonomy

In the face of obvious pressure from Britain and France, the US has finally acknowledged this rising political will and has reluctantly started to support the creation of a European Pillar within NATO.

The formula of building a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) within NATO aims to reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link. \textsuperscript{32}

The potential composition of the ESDI will be more fully discussed in the next chapter, but early indicators from the prominent players indicate that it is likely to be an exercise in compromise. The NATO Strategic Concept (announced at the NATO 50\textsuperscript{th} Anniversary in April 1999) assumed that ESDI would be developed within NATO and utilizing structures originally under WEU purview. This initiative allowed for multi-lateral military action utilizing forces answerable to the WEU. While the WEU never "owned" standing forces, the assets that it could utilize to conduct crisis prevention and management might include the EUROCORPS, the Multinational Division Central, the UK-Netherlands Amphibious Force, EUFOR and EUROMARFOR. The utilization of Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) are linked to the 1995 Security Agreement between NATO and the WEU, which also links NATO communications systems to the small WEU command structure already in place. This ability to use NATO assets and C\textsuperscript{3}I infrastructure, combined with the unique placement and membership of the WEU\textsuperscript{33}, made this a seemingly viable option. It was supposed that for the purpose of WEU-led operations, the CJTF imbedded in the NATO military command structure would come alive under the command of a European Deputy SACEUR.

Among other technical roadblocks to this concept was the Washington Summit Communiqué, which described the strengthening role of a European "piller" through the EU as opposed to the WEU. This represented a vastly different model for reinforcing Europe's role in its own security future. The integration of all WEU assets (including the

\textsuperscript{32} Lluis Maria de Puig, "The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO," NATO Review Summer 1998, online, ProQuest, 19 October 1999.

\textsuperscript{33} Since 1995, the WEU has included (in some capacity . . . member, associate member or observer) all of the current EU and European NATO member nations. While levels of participation and obligation vary with level of membership, signatory nations are resolved to maintain international peace and security and to resist any policy of aggression.
Satellite Center in Spain and the Brussels Planning Cell) into the EU would be accomplished. The EU would eventually embark upon a course that would bring independent military capabilities to the Union. The Communiqué made it fairly clear that the cooperative arrangements existing between the WEU and NATO would have to be reworked, revised or discarded in favor of EU-NATO cooperation. The European members of NATO appeared to be forwarding an idea that the future of trans-Atlantic relations should rest upon two fixed entities – the US and the EU.

Within two months of these two major “decisions” from the Washington NATO Summit came the European Council Summit in Cologne in June. In a further development of the EU’s version of ESDI came the announcement that an autonomous defense force would be created with assured political and military prerogatives. This would be a fully operational European military force, and further action to stand it up would be taken no later than the end of 2000. Additionally, soon-to-step-down NATO Secretary-General Javier Solana was appointed as the first EU foreign policy representative. The Communiqué from Cologne also explicitly expounded upon Europe’s need for the very items that the WEU had leaned upon NATO for. Interestingly, these intelligence, transport and command and control capabilities were addressed as within reach of the European defense industry establishment.

The latest European Council Summit (Helsinki, December 1999) dealt with the CFSP and ESDI in very specific detail. Dr. Solana, no longer Secretary-General of NATO, was now “dual-hatted” as High Representative of the EU for Common Foreign and Security Policy and Secretary-General of the WEU. As such, the EU appeared to be counting on the synergy of his experience and influence to bring substance to this most controversial of efforts. In December 1999, Solana stated:

... ESDI is not about collective defence. NATO will remain the foundation of the collective defence of its members. We are in no way attempting to duplicate the work of NATO. In fact, the improvements in European military capabilities will be a significant gain for the Alliance... to take more responsibility for regional security, particularly in those areas bordering the Union where we have direct interests at stake... to use all legitimate means to project security and stability beyond our borders... to assert our values of humanitarian solidarity and respect for human rights in all areas... 34

European Rapid Reaction Force

At Helsinki, the EU specifically committed itself to developing a “corps-level” force capable of deploying within a 60-day window and minimally sustainable for one year. Whether this was meant to affirm the evolution of the EU to assume direct control of the EUROCORPS was not made plain. Secondly, development of C3I and logistical capabilities to support the force is being planned. Thirdly, the EU will establish new

permanent political and military committees within the European Council that are committed to guaranteeing adequate political accountability of the force. These committees would also be charged with consultation and cooperation with non-EU European allies and NATO.

_Helsinki therefore makes clear that the Union has as its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. The European Union will have to become an intelligent customer of NATO. When NATO itself is not engaged, but the European Union launches a military operation, it should if necessary have recourse to NATO assets and capabilities. This means that full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO will have to be developed._\(^{35}\)

Given that the US had always reacted negatively to proposals concerning EU and WEU merger, Dr. Solana’s comments could be viewed as an attempt to assuage American concerns over loss of influence in Europe. Certainly, the US can see a certain weakening in its European defense hegemony in the Council’s actions. CFSP and ESDI were now reaching beyond the basic construct of an EU-orchestrated intergovernmental relationship. Actual EU supra-national institutions now existed to deal with Europe’s need to project political and military will.

_The [Maastricht] Treaty’s foreign and security policy provisions pleased the United States by not establishing a separate EC defense identity, although, in the long term, the outcome of the EC-NATO-WEU debate tilts in favor of an independent EC defense position._\(^{36}\)

Arguably, long-term American interests would be best served by accepting the upstart ESDI’s bid to assume responsibility for collective European power projection and as a vehicle by which to shoulder more of its own security responsibilities. Most importantly, by welcoming the EU’s efforts to erect its second pillar, the US would be signaling a change of heart concerning her European allies. Instead of clinging to the past, the US intention would be to embark upon the far more important mission of refocusing the relationship with Europe based upon today's security and economic challenges.

Europe’s direction for ESDI and the long-term significance for US influence now seem clear. Through the initial guidance provided by the French and the British, the EU has apparently resolved to possess a military force that has the capability and authority to launch non-defensive actions without NATO or US approval. It is equally clear that the Europeans have tried to avoid alienating America, the ultimate guarantor of Europe’s security. Determining the potential incarnations of the forces and new relationships will be addressed in the next chapter.


\(^{36}\) Dinan, 496.
Chapter 4

What could ESDI be?

In this chapter, we turn our attention to what is possible in the longer term, less foreseeable future. As in many futurist works we intend to move beyond what current politicians and other government representatives are allowed to say in the interest of maintaining unity and moving the process forward into what we believe to be a possible end state for ESDI. Further, we believe this end state to be in the best interest of U.S. security policy worldwide and that the US should not only support this end state, but actually help to achieve it.

We envision a much bolder more robust force as an outcome of the infant ESDI process. In the next 20 years, if Europe can overcome the obstacles, we expect an outcome similar to what some pejoratively term a European Army. This term is somewhat stilted in that Europe will need more than an army to be successful in autonomous military decision making and operations. It will need both a naval and an air force as well as an organization to conduct satellite and other space-based operations. Some may mistakenly fear this as an effort by some European countries to return to their historical expansionist and imperialistic past, the authors think that with the right guidance and the correct direction this outcome is actually in the best interest of U.S. security policy and European stability and security.

The question of what ESDI could or should look like is very complex. In this chapter, rather than spell out a model of actual end strengths and military formations, we will try to define some goals and capabilities for ESDI and give some general direction for the European nations to move in to achieve the end state. The end state of a successful ESDI should place the US in a position to take advantage of the New World order and emerging global markets while addressing emerging security threats. In fact our thesis is that the US must turn its attention to the emerging areas of the world, specifically the Pacific. The US cannot afford to let the European continent return to a quagmire of bickering and warring factions and nations, because if it does, the US will find itself returning in strength to Europe as it did twice before in the twentieth century.

We envision ESDI as the organization, either within or without NATO, most likely to allow the US to turn the focus of attention to other areas of the globe. Resources are finite: time, money, people, equipment and even attention. If the Pacific emerges in the 21st century as the place to be, the US must take resources from somewhere to apply there if it is to remain the world leader that it is today.

There is no doubt that one of the conflicts in Europe throughout history has been the friction between the desire of nations for both autonomy and security. The European history through 1948 demonstrated a desire for autonomy more than security. In 1949 and the 1950’s security seemed to gain some ground on autonomy with the advent of both NATO and the Warsaw Pact. In each of these organizations, member nations surrendered some autonomous decision-making ability in the name of collective security. For the Western European nations the threat that produced the necessity for NATO, the Soviet Union, disappeared in 1990. With the disappearance of the Soviet Union and the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact, the European Nations seem to be eyeing autonomy with some of their old-fashioned desires. During the period of 1949-1990 most observers
agree that the US was the glue that held NATO together. The European Nations would not let one of their own nations appear to be the leader. An outside nation, namely the US, filled this role without threatening any one European nation’s self-identity. One of the main questions for ESDI seems to be can the Europeans hold together a security arrangement without the help of an outside binding agent, like the US has been for the last 50 years? This brings us to the issue of membership and participation, who can join and who cannot?

Membership and Participation

To begin to answer the question of who can be a part of the ESDI we need to determine who is eligible. Currently the E in ESDI stands for European, so presumably, one of the first requirements for membership is a country must be in Europe. However, determining which nations are actually European is not an easy task. There is not a one source; this is Europe, authority. Depending on which person or which organization or which country you are talking too, you can get anywhere from 35-41 countries included in Europe. (See annex __ for a list of 41 European Countries)

Currently ESDI is the working brainchild of the European Union; so presumably, in the near future we will look to the EU and its 15 nations to form the nucleus of the ESDI. These 15 nations leave out between 20 and 26 other European nations, depending on how you count. In the 2020-2030 time frame this exclusion cannot remain. If the ESDI force is to be a viable voice for European security and military action, most if not all of the “European Nations” must participate in one form or another.

In Secretary of Defense, William Cohen’s three I’s the third of those I’s is inclusive. We believe that inclusivity is the foremost principle for membership within the ESDI. The European Union must seek to include all European nations within ESDI in one form or another. If this means associate memberships or special memberships then the European Community must be flexible.

EU membership may not be a prerequisite for inclusion in ESDI by 2020 or even 2015. To exclude European nations from the umbrella of ESDI will be to court the condition that prevailed in Europe prior to both WWI and WWII where each individual country had a variety of agreements, secret and otherwise, with other individual nations. The outcome of all these agreements was almost certain expansion of conflict to the whole continent in the case of any conflict on the continent.37

As to exclusion: certainly there are non-European countries that will have neither the desire nor a requirement to join in the ESDI (the majority of the nations of the world). So, exclusion in and of itself is not an evil. Exclusion of European nations will be a key stumbling block to ESDI effectiveness. Nations with the same goals and interests within Europe must be allowed to join ESDI and participate in some form in the decision making and the operations of the force.

If exclusion is not necessarily bad but inclusion is the preference, which countries will present membership problems? The most likely problems will come from two sets of countries. The first set are those countries on the geographic periphery of Europe because of their location and their proximity to and interests in other regions. The second

set consists of those countries nearer the geographic center of Europe that do not exhibit the same goals and interests as the remainder of the community. Russia and Turkey on the geographic periphery spring to mind. Russia will be dealt with further in Chapter 9, but suffice it to say here, the ESDI must come to some agreement with Russia or in regards to Russia if it is to be effective. As to Turkey, even now it is on the list of candidates for membership in the EU and thus may be in the nucleus of the ESDI. However, Turkey presents obvious problems with its relationship to Greece and the Balkans. These relationships could present the European Union with a first test case on whether it can be effective in dealing with internal member challenges without falling into internecine bickering and thus not getting anything done.

The Balkans pose a challenge to the Europeans from nearer their geographic center with countries that do not exhibit the same goals and interests as the remainder of Europe. At this point the Balkans seem likely to present the European Union with its first operational use of the ESDI force. In fact, at this printing, an ESDI force, considerably larger and more robust than is planned for 2003, would be an ideal substitute for the force currently deployed in Bosnia and Kosovo. Even so, given the history of the area, by 2010 or 2015 the Balkans may still provide the ESDI with an operational mission. A key question for the European Union is can they succeed where everyone except Tito failed and bring the Balkans into the community peacefully?

A further factor in unity and membership within ESDI will be the ability of member countries to subjugate some of their autonomy in order to further the security and stability requirements of the whole community. The majority of European history seems to favor their inability to complete this step forward in community. However, the past 50 years have given the entire community a successful taste of what they can achieve when acting together. In Chapter 3 we discussed the close and continuing monetary and economic integration of Europe over the past decade. In the future we believe that each nation will determine that it cannot act alone on the world stage and therefore will bind with its neighbors in more areas, security being the critical area for this paper. Will the US contribute to European unity or will we see this as too great a threat to our own world leadership?

Subjugation of autonomy and self-interest will be especially crucial when the member nations begin to look at funding ESDI. Some nations within the European community will almost certainly have to suboptimize their own nationalistic interests to benefit the security and stability of the whole. For a security organization to deploy a force to the field, command and control it, sustain it, and then redeploy it will require a very high level of standardization and interoperability. This is an exponentially more difficult challenge than the US’s own struggle to standardize and make interoperable our own joint forces. This will be a process that takes time, desire, and money. The ESDI nations must be willing to invest all three into the effort to bring ESDI to fruition. With the incremental steps they are scheduled to take in the next 15-20 years an integrated, standardized, interoperable force is clearly possible. This idea is developed more fully in Chapter 6.

For inclusion to be an effective principle for membership in the ESDI framework the EU must keep the common goals and interests of the framework broad and general. The current goals and interests as stated in the various treaties and agreements from Maastricht, Berlin, Amsterdam, and Helsinki are excellent and should remain and be
effective well into the future. We can only hope that the Europeans will not let the ESDI devolve into bureaucratic malaise but will keep it vibrant and vital through imaginative use either in exercises or in real world operations. The devil will be in the details of organization and employment of the force.

What will this force look like? (If not a European Army)

The size and shape of the ESDI force should be determined by what the threat to security and stability in Europe will be. The definition of the threat in the year 2030 is as varied as the number of defense think tanks and experts. Taking the NATO initiative for threat definition in the future is a natural starting point for the planners of ESDI. There is general consensus that the military forces of the future will be smaller than the forces of the 40’s-90s’. With the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact a significant ground attack or defense requirement has disappeared. Although different nations view threats differently, there is currently no real military threat to the existence of any of the European states. A new threat may develop by 2030 so ESDI cannot discount it completely, but one of the outcomes of an ESDI should be to identify and negate this threat early on.

This leaves the B and C list threats that Perry and Carter identify in Preventive Defense.\(^{38}\) Clearly the ESDI force should be focused initially and primarily on these threats and on the Petersberg Tasks as outlined in the Amsterdam Treaty. These threats require a medium-weight force that has enough manpower to complete the labor-intensive tasks, with enough tactical mobility to move themselves around the area of operations, and with enough protection to preserve force survival in the face of crew-served automatic weapons and land mines. Initially the force does not need the ability to fight alone in joint, combined arms, high intensity combat, but by the year 2030 it should have these capabilities to include at least a two division heavy armor force.

The ESDI should be particularly heavy on intelligence gathering, analysis, and dissemination capability. The ability of the ESDI to gather information from all of its member nations, synthesize and analyze the information into intelligence, disseminate it and act on it will be key to keeping the force small, deployable and affordable. The experience with NATO and the leaps in information technology will aid the ESDI and Europe in this effort. Information sharing within current NATO arrangements can still occur and in fact will aid NATO, the US, and ESDI.

The force will have to be sustainable by the member nations. Currently the ESDI nations envision a force of 60,000 sustainable for a year. The straight logistics costs of an operation are initially high during deployment, then level off for the employment phase, and then respike on redeployment. The two key costs in money occur during the deployment and redeployment. The key cost during employment is in manpower. Unit or individual replacements drive the train during employment. To be effective the ESDI will need to sustain a larger force than 60,000 people for longer than a year. Christopher Patten, in a speech to the joint meeting of European Parliament Foreign Affairs

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Committee in Brussels on 22 February 2000, set a number of 200,000.\textsuperscript{39} This seems like a reasonable initial figure. An initial estimate for deployed time should rely on history for a reasonable time frame of deployability. So far the “Petersberg Task” operations in Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti have extended far beyond the initial political time lines. The ESDI will need to sustain individual operations for at least 3 years, probably closer to 5 years. In addition, the ESDI will need to plan for more then one operation simultaneously, as the ongoing operations in the Balkans amply demonstrate.

Depending on the geographical location or locations of the ESDI forces and their proposed employment site, the ESDI will need to invest in both sealift and airlift, which will move the force from their home stations, to the employment or marshalling site, sustain them and redeploy them. Currently the European countries have sufficient opportunities to employ an ESDI force fairly close to home. This may not be the case in the future, and the ESDI must be prepared to deploy forces to Africa or possibly to countries in Southeast Asia or other areas of the Pacific. This will require a significant expenditure of resources, but the ESDI will be nothing more then airline clients until they have their own capability. The European Union must divide up the task among member nations so that no duplication occurs or one country is overwhelmed by the budget requirement. If the European Union wants to operate on its own, it will need to be able to deploy its own forces. The ESDI force should not have to rely on US support as the United Kingdom did during the Falklands War.

In addition to intelligence and strategic lift, the Europeans will need to modernize and standardize their ability to command and control the force. In the near term, the ESDI, with a focus on Petersberg Tasks, does not need the same capability as the US currently has to control joint operations in a high-intensity conflict, probably the most difficult command and control challenge of all. The ESDI needs a capability more robust than currently exists in the WEU but not as robust or extensive as the US/NATO capability. However, in the 2030 timeframe it will need the same or similar capability. To accomplish this the Europeans need to begin now to upgrade current command and control systems, integrate, modernize, and then exercise the command and control system. Again, as in the intelligence arena, modern technology in information sharing should aid the ESDI, as will the experience gained with and from NATO. Any improvement in the near term will aid both current capabilities with NATO and pave the way for separate ESDI operations.

Each of the improvements implies a clear requirement on the Europeans to spend more money on their security. This is the case and has been within NATO and it will prove even more critical for an ESDI. If the Europeans are serious about the ability to make security decisions on their own, their budgets must reflect this, and in the near term. The European community needs to begin now to fund a military buildup similar to the US defense buildup in the 1980s, but in a way that divides up the tasks so that there is little or no unnecessary duplication and the cost is not overwhelming to any one nation.

\textsuperscript{39} Patten, 22 Feb 2000.
Roles and Missions

As previously stated, the large ground threat to Europe is currently extinct. This means that the ESDI force will be free to focus on the Petersberg Task operations as opposed to a conventional offense and defense mission. This will be advantageous in the near term to both NATO and Europe as the western nations of the world are also refocusing on future threats and future roles and missions.

The Europeans currently have many capabilities that can be transferred to the new force. Key among them is their expertise in Petersberg Tasks and special operations. The Europeans have for many years conducted “Petersberg like” tasks on their own, either throughout Europe or in their former colonies. They have extensive doctrine in how to conduct these operations. This capability and knowledge will transfer directly to the new force.

In addition, several European nations have very sophisticated special operations forces skilled in counter- and anti-terrorism. These units and skills will also transfer directly to the new force. A joint special operations unit within the ESDI could be very helpful in combating B and C list threats throughout the continent and will greatly benefit the cost sharing effort among the nations.

A key challenge for individual nations and the community as a whole will be what to do with the nuclear forces extant in some of the countries. This will be a key question for NATO and the US as we view the evolution of the ESDI. The ESDI will probably need a general agreement along the lines of NATO’s, as we do not foresee even in the 2030 timeframe any nation making their nuclear weapons available to other countries or accepting too stringent requirements not to threaten to use them or to use them unilaterally.

Doctrine and Strategy

The NATO strategy of collective security replaced the outdated European strategy of Balance of Power. With the demise of the Soviet Union, the main threat upon which the collective security arrangement hung has disappeared. NATO and the Europeans are even now searching for a new strategy to replace collective security. One thing is certain, the new strategy should not move backwards in the direction of the Balance of Power doctrine. As previously noted, the shifting balance of power alignments in Europe were a significant contributor to war on the continent. The new strategy will need to address the growing threats to stability and security in Europe. Perhaps the new strategy should resemble the containment policy of America. That is, to seek out and isolate the threats to Europe so that they die of natural causes or at least remain contained and prevented from spreading. In order to accomplish this task, the Europeans must be prepared to deploy outside of Europe to ensure they deal with threats at arm’s reach, not close in.

40 Kissinger, 17-21.
Internal Challenges to ESDI

As already discussed, there are several significant challenges that the European nations must overcome before they can successfully field an ESDI force. We have briefly stated the concerns with interoperability and the shortage of capabilities in the European community. Two other areas of concern exist. They are the European defense industrial complex and the possible escalation of an ESDI operation into Article V proportions.

The European nations, in order to field a successful ESDI force, will need to spend considerable funds on their military forces. They will naturally want those funds not only to benefit their military capabilities but also their economies. In order to do this they must revitalize their industrial complex. In a recent speech, former UK Prime Minister John Major stated that "Europe must unite its defense industry or become a client state of the US. They must unite corporations in order to compete with the US."\(^{41}\) This is an indicator that some in Europe are already making the mental leap from a small force ESDI force to a larger one with greatly increased capabilities, a force large enough to sustain a continental military industrial complex.

As the EU draws closer together economically and politically, it is only natural to push this closeness forward in the area of security and stability. The Europeans must take the steps necessary to unite the defense industry and then also divide up the workload so that each nation’s economy benefits from the build-up. This will require another step forward in putting security and stability ahead of national self-interest. Combining corporations and reinvigorating the military industrial complex is a concrete step forward towards a viable ESDI. If the Europeans begin this task, it will be a certain sign that they are serious about a military capability separate from the US.

The US should most certainly insist on and continue to support this effort. Not only will this help our security interests worldwide, it will certainly help diminish the amount of resources we commit to NATO, freeing them up for use in other regions of the world. In addition, for the near term, any increase in European military capability will mean increased capability for NATO. We do foresee opposition to this support from within our own military industrial complex as Europe, if successful, will become a competitor on the world market. However, we believe these risks are minimized by the globalization of the world economy, and in any case there are enough military clients in the world. After all, a large portion of the world was not our military client during the Cold War, arguably the heyday of military spending worldwide.

The second major challenge that ESDI will face from within Europe is containing conflict below the level of Article V. Article V is the key security agreement of the North Atlantic treaty, which states that "an attack on one is an attack on all."\(^{42}\) Under current arrangements, the ESDI force will only deploy when the remainder of the Alliance chooses not to be involved. This does not negate the provisions of Article V. The challenge, then, is to keep any ESDI deployment from escalating to the level of Article V proportions. In various cases of humanitarian operations or disaster relief this

\(^{41}\) John Major, Speech to the ARCO Forum of Public Affairs, Kennedy School of Government, Harvard University, Cambridge, Ma. 15 September 1999.

\(^{42}\) North Atlantic Treaty, Article V, 1949.
will not even be an issue. In other instances of peace enforcement or peacekeeping we can foresee the possibility of escalation to what could be considered an attack on a member of NATO as an offshoot of the ESDI operation.

While NATO exists and is the most relevant security arrangement in Europe there will always be discussions and deliberations prior to any deployment of ESDI, one of the main points will inevitably be the chance of escalation to Article V proportions. So for the near term this challenge will be dealt with in a public forum with much debate and discussion. The real challenge comes in the future as the relevancy of NATO diminishes and the ESDI forces become preeminent on the continent. Some arrangement must be made to prevent NATO nations from being drawn into conflicts that they have already chosen not to involve themselves. Again, for the near term, US and European security interests are so intertwined that it is hard to imagine an instance where the Europeans will want to become engaged but the Americans will not. With the growth of military capabilities in Europe will come the desire to flex the European muscle and to take autonomous, independent action. The French have always had this desire, even during the Cold War and the best years of the NATO Alliance. Currently a lack of capability prevents Europe from taking any separate action. This will not be the case with a successful ESDI.

The internal challenges to ESDI are not the only concerns the EU will need to account for. As previously stated, some countries may fear an ESDI force as they remember the history of two world wars started by European countries. International reaction to the formation of an ESDI capability is something the EU will need to consider, either to help shape it, take advantage of it, or soften it. International reaction to ESDI is the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter 5
Potential International Reaction to ESDI

An area of concern for the Europeans should be the international reaction to an increased military capability within Europe without the restraining hand of an outside agent such as the US. Several small nations within the European Community, as well as larger nations outside of the continent that see compelling interests threatened by the build-up of ESDI are likely to voice this concern. Two mitigating factors may diminish the immediate international reaction to ESDI. They are the very public and open way in which the Europeans are going about trying to develop the ESDI, and the opinion of some countries that ESDI will never come to fruition because the internal obstacles are too great to overcome. In either case, the European nations will need to prepare to handle a variety of reactions from around the globe.

Reaction within Europe

The first reactions are already coming in based on the initial announcements of ESDI by the EU. There are small nations within Europe but not part of the EU that view ESDI as a potential threat to their sovereignty. These nations, while not totally opposed, are voicing cautious alarm to this new development. The EU, UN and NATO response to events in Bosnia and Kosovo give credence to these fears. An independent military capability in the hands of the EU should be alarming to these nations, especially to nations that do not share the common goals and interests of the EU. The EU can mitigate these fears through open dialogue with the nations, but more important through an inclusive policy of membership in the EU and ESDI. Unfortunately, some European nations may never want to join the EU. In these cases the countries should be able to take part in many pre-deployment discussions concerning the ESDI, especially deployment within Europe. They should also be afforded the opportunity to take part in an operation in some capacity. The real key will be to see if the ESDI force directly or indirectly benefits non-member nations. Non member nation concerns within Europe should diminish as EU membership and ESDI participation grows. Non member nations must not be given reason to view the ESDI as a club with which the rest of Europe can bludgeon them into submission, but must be seen by all as a force for stability and goodness in the world.

Worldwide Reaction

Perhaps a bigger concern for the Europeans is the reactions of larger nations around the world that maintain large militaries of their own. Russia springs immediately to mind, but also Iraq and Iran on the Turkish border, China, India and Pakistan, or nations in the Middle East. Even the US may see a threat in the resurgence of independent military capabilities in Europe.
Russia

It is imperative that for long term stability and security the EU deals with Russia. It is in everyone’s best interest for the Russians to be willing partners in the European community and part of ESDI. It is definitely in Europe’s best interest to help Russia emerge from its current trouble and enter into normal relations with Europe, if for no other reason than preventing a massive refugee population from inundating Europe should the Russian economy and government completely collapse. But in addition the Russians still maintain a large nuclear capability which will always be a thorn in Europe’s side if Russia remains outside of normal relations.

The current conflict in Chechnya is a grave example of how the Russians can react if they feel isolated and cut off. Chechnya is not the last province within Russia, that will provide trouble. The NATO and European reaction to the Russian military operations in Chechnya will give the Russians great cause to mistrust an ESDI if it looks like an event of this kind would be a reason to deploy the ESDI onto Russian soil. It looks like a model for potential deployment to an area to protect human rights and the rule of law. Bringing Russia into the European fold will greatly reduce the tension on the continent. If the EU and Russia rebuff attempts to move into a closer, more normal relationship, Russia could revert to its aggressive, xenophobic tendencies. Russia may even look to its other border to form an offsetting military alliance that would be detrimental to regional stability and security. The Russians could then be anything from a spoiler and troublemaker in the region to an outright combatant. Russia outside of the European community may be the one thing that could keep NATO relevant for another 50 years.

China

China presents its own challenges to ESDI. With Europe’s historic interest in the Far East the Europeans will not ignore China as they begin to consolidate an autonomous military capability. China may have concern with ESDI on two fronts. First is the EU stance on human rights and second the possible shift in US resources from Europe to the Pacific region. In the first instance China has a deplorable record on human rights. With EU goals and objectives on human rights lining up almost identically with UN goals and objectives, China may see the ESDI force as one more capability aligned against it in terms of human rights abuses. If the ESDI force is used by the Europeans to stop human rights violations the Chinese may see a similar possibility when they view their problems in Tibet and with their other ethnic minorities. In addition if Robert Kaplan and Thomas Homer-Dixon are correct “...relations between the central government and the twenty-two provinces are deteriorating fast” and “our research suggests that environmental pressures in China may cause the country’s fragmentation. The effects of Chinese civil unrest, mass violence, and state disintegration could spread far beyond its borders.” If

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43 Kaplan, 298
this occurs suddenly and violently Europe may find itself performing Petersburg Tasks in Asia.

China's second area of concern might be the availability of US forces for operations in Asia. If, as we propose, the US withdraws significant resources from Europe, these resources would be available for the Pacific. With the Chinese already making plans based on their presumption that American power will decline by 2030, this shift would present them with bad news. In addition, they will have to deal with the basic fact that the US is paying more attention to the Pacific. With our commitment to Taiwan already bringing us into conflict with the Chinese, more available forces and more of our attention will not be welcome events to the Chinese. If Russia normalizes relationships and becomes a member of the EU and a participant in ESDI, this will move the potential threat to China right to its own borders.

Iran and Iraq

Iran and Iraq, although very separate countries culturally and politically, will be dealt with together. They will present Europe a unique challenge, especially if Turkey as expected gains membership in the EU. With very large militaries themselves as well as huge human rights troubles, internal ethnic strife, and Islamic fundamentalist regimes, both of these countries will form long-term challenges to the ESDI. Both countries are likely to see an increased military capability in Europe as a threat. A key to the Iran and Iraq reaction to ESDI will be whom they see as controlling decision making in this new arrangement. One initial reaction may be on the positive side if they foresee that America will have less sway over this force. Both countries still view America as "the enemy," and any divergence between the US and Europe, no matter how small, may be seen as a good thing. As the Moslem population in Europe grows, Iran and Iraq will also watch with interest to see what actions the EU takes to protect the various ethnic groups and what amount of participation in decision making these groups have. If the ESDI or the EU is seen as suppressing or oppressing the Moslem population we can expect outright political and public opposition to ESDI as well as potential action, covert or overt, by both countries. For the foreseeable future Iran and Iraq will view European autonomy more as a threat then as a welcome event. Also for the foreseeable future we expect that the goals and interests of Europe will be at odds with the goals and interests of both Iran and Iraq, which will therefore be potential adversaries. The historical animosity of these two regions goes back eons, and will remain so indefinitely. Iran and Iraq are likely to see themselves as potential candidates for ESDI action by the year 2030; they will definitely see the ESDI as counterproductive to their interests in many of the countries of Europe.

The United States

The US reaction to ESDI has always been mixed. The US has always been in favor of increased military capability in Europe, both in terms of an enhancement to NATO and in terms of reducing our resource commitment. The US was initially opposed to any separate European military capability. The US position today is that they support
a separable but not separate capability. That is to say, the US supports the idea of Europe being capable of acting independently and autonomously when the NATO alliance as a whole is not engaged. The capability, however, must originate within NATO and be an integral part of NATO.

The US is making incremental steps towards a more robust European capability with an eye on how much influence and prestige we will lose in NATO or Europe as the capability grows. These incremental steps we believe are in the correct direction and should continue and even increase. Currently the US position can be termed as grudging acceptance and support. For the foreseeable future the US will remain engaged in both the discussions and the development of ESDI. The US will desire to remain involved in order to exercise influence over the process and the outcome. This involvement should help to assuage the concerns and fears of those smaller European nations that look to the US to preserve balance in Europe as it has done through the Cold War period. The US must be prepared to relinquish some of its influence in Europe in the building process of ESDI. But in the final analysis, the US should and will remain engaged in Europe even with a very robust ESDI presence because our goals and interest are intertwined with the dominant goals and interests of Europe.

**African Nations**

The reactions of the African nations are the least coherent and predictable. Perhaps this is not necessarily a negative, as they are the least likely to have intentional influence or impact on the outcome of the ESDI development. We say intentional influence or impact because the African continent could affect the development of ESDI by being one of the first recipients of an ESDI deployment. This could develop positively or negatively depending on the type and outcome of the operation. It seems ideal that a humanitarian assistance or disaster relief operation in Africa could provide the ESDI with a first chance at operational status sometime in the 2003-2005 timeframe. If this operation were to be successful, with the ESDI deploying in a timely manner, conducting effective operations, and redeploying within the anticipated one year sustainment time, the effect on the growth of ESDI could be phenomenal. It would be a great shot in the arm for the proponents of ESDI and could pave the way for an even bigger increase in both budgets and formations. In cases like this the African reaction would likely be positive and in fact could sway some of worldwide opinion. In addition to this, the African nations may see an autonomous European military capability as freeing up American resources from Europe making them available for other nations. This could bode well for Africa, which on the whole has been an often-ignored continent. After the abortive UN/US attempt at solving the crisis in Somalia (although the initial starvation crisis was dealt with) and then the total disregard of a disaster in Rwanda, Africa could be the beneficiary of ESDI both directly and indirectly.

On the other hand, certain countries on the African continent may be wary of a build up of autonomous European military capability if they hearken back to the European colonial period. Africa was the recipient of many colonial powers. This point of view would not look positively on a build up of capability in Europe. It was just within the last 50 years that the colonial powers began to recede from the continent. In addition, certain countries, especially in Northern Africa, will have the same doubts about
ESDI as Iran and Iraq. Fundamentalist regimes, ethnic strife, and internal population troubles plague these nations. They may see themselves as the recipient of a different kind of ESDI deployment, one that they would not welcome as they would disaster relief. In this case these countries would view ESDI as a threat. However, they will not be able to influence the development of ESDI to any great degree.

The United Nations

The United Nations, while not a country, is an international body that will have some reaction to ESDI. In this case we can fairly well predict a positive reaction to development as long as the EU continues to maintain goals and objectives that mirror the UN charter. In addition, the UN may look on ESDI as another resource that it can tap into. Especially in the Petersburg Tasks area, a trained and ready force will be a welcome addition to the UN. Moreover, the ESDI could become a counter to US reluctance to participate in UN sanctioned operations or as a counter to the US refusal or threatened refusal to pay UN dues. On the other hand the EU does not have the same institutional understanding with the UN that currently exists between the UN and NATO. In the preamble of the NATO Treaty, the signatories give preeminence to the UN and its decisions. No such agreement exists in any of the EU treaties. The EU may be reluctant to subordinate its own political will to that of NATO although the EU may look to the UN to legitimize its actions, much as NATO has done in the past. The US can look to the ESDI to take up some of the burden that it shoulders for the leadership and sustainment of some UN operations. The question remains; will the US be willing to give up some influence in exchange for not shouldering the lion’s share of all operations? Our belief is that the US can and should move in this direction.

With the current ESDI initiatives and a possible future ESDI force in mind, and with the expected international reactions as a backdrop, we now move to an examination of some possible solutions to future US global security concerns. We take a look at a spectrum of possible solutions with regard to Europe from doing nothing new to making a significant shift in US resources currently committed to the European continent. We propose that the US must do “something” to prepare for the future, and that “something” should include a significant shift in focus and resources from one continent to the globe.
Chapter 6

“Option One”
Oppose ESDI as a threat to US influence over Europe and the world

America’s commitment to the territorial and political integrity of Europe has never been in doubt. Consistent leadership within the Alliance has been matched by generous (and expensive) commitments of forward-garrisoned and deployed forces, stockpiled and preserved equipment and other NATO-dedicated warfighting assets. A seemingly selfless policy of engagement with her wealthy European allies has given the world a single reliable pole of stability and structure for over 50 years. Given the growing unrest both on Europe’s flanks and far from the continent, changing US engagement policy with reference to Europe seems to make little sense at this juncture.

The easiest, and most transparent, justification for maintaining current policy is that the Europeans are not now nor are they projected to increase defense spending. Their desire for an increased level of military autonomy rings hollow as Europe fails to “put its money where its rhetoric is.” US defense expenditures per active-duty soldier, sailor, airman or Marine are more than double the European NATO average. Among significant contributors to NATO-assigned assets, only Turkey (at 5.7% of 1999 GDP) exceeds or matches the US budget commitment (3.3% of 1999 GDP) to the defense of herself and allies. France (at 2.8% of 1999 GDP) and the UK (at 2.6% of 1999 GDP) provide the most visible of European commitments to the military alliance. Germany (at an alarming 1.5% of 1999 GDP) has recently indicated its plan to cut defense spending further. These figures, dismal though they are, do not adequately tell of Europe’s defense-related shortcomings or fully justify the urgency with which the US has called for Europe to invest in the future of its own security. Speaking to just the “big three” of European NATO allies: the UK, France and Germany, a mark/franc/pound spent does not yield the quantitative or qualitative amount of defense that one might expect. Inefficiencies in manning, equipping and training the armed forces of these major European powers have given them less return on their defense investment.

France

France stands as a proud, highly nationalistic and capable military power within the Alliance. Standing outside the integrated military of NATO, France does not specifically pledge forces to NATO. The impression that it spends considerably more on its defense in comparison to many other NATO nations is somewhat erroneous. Maintaining a strong national paramilitary force in its “Gendarmerie” and insisting that it be fully integrated into the national military organization (unlike Belgium, where the Gendarmerie resembles a “state police” with no direct military link) is one of the distorting factors. The Gendarmerie budget is financed via the Ministry of Defense and
actually subtracts a significant 0.3 percent of GDP (or roughly 9% of the total defense budget in 1999) from France’s “commitment” to the defense of itself and its allies.

As a nuclear power (since 1960), France has put particular emphasis on these capabilities and the ability to continuously upgrade them indigenously. This “force de frappe” or strategic deterrent consumes a small proportion of military personnel, but a significant (though classified) portion of the defense budget. Modernization of France’s nuclear arsenal, launch systems and delivery platforms by purely national technological and industrial resources may represent her armed force’s greatest mismatch between available budget and real-world priorities.

Large standing forces may not be as necessary as they were during the Cold War, but as France joins the growing list of European NATO member states that are transitioning away from conscription and towards a professional military, serious shortfalls in readiness may be experienced as troop numbers dwindle. With these formerly large numbers came a great “quality spread” of young conscripts, of which the top echelon was utilized in the highly-technical specialties of communications, data processing, photo/reconnaissance interpretation, foreign language linguists/translation and medical services. These same personnel now find better-paying employment outside of the military (a phenomenon not unknown to the US military, lately).

France has made progress in improving the deployability of her forces and thus her ability to impact out-of-area (OOA) events. Whether this is a legacy of France’s colonial empire or her continuing commitment to the Francophone world (notably sub-Saharan Africa), large portions of the army and navy are dedicated to power projection on short notice. France will commission her first nuclear-powered “big deck” aircraft carrier, the Charles DeGaulle, in 2000. The ship’s complement of roughly 40 fighter, light attack and early warning aircraft provide her with credible deployable airpower in littoral regions. The HELIOS-series of surveillance satellites and the EUMILSATCOM provide France with reasonable overhead assets. Tactical airborne ground surveillance is marginally accomplished by the Horizon helicopter-based AGS system. Shortfalls in airlift, supply and tactical logistics mirror those of most European NATO members.

United Kingdom

The UK, a European NATO member that regularly operates (as opposed to merely train) with US forces bilaterally, has managed to resist the stasis of European military. The defense budget has been significantly reduced since the end of the Cold War, but most of the reductions have been absorbed by troop cuts, elimination of continental garrisons (British Army of the Rhine and Berlin Brigade, for example) and retirement of older RAF airframes and obsolete armor units from the army. Being a self-declared “special partner” of the US, Britain has never hesitated to act outside of the NATO framework whenever national interest was obvious and compelling. Britain’s own version of a “bottom up review” in 1997 and 98, the Strategic Defence Review, provided the British military-industrial establishment a baseline for modernization and eventual composition of forces.

Peacetime security, security of her remaining overseas territories, peace support and humanitarian operations, regional conflict outside of NATO, NATO regional conflict
and defense against strategic attack on NATO. Concisely identify the UK's main security interests. Airborne ground surveillance (the ASTOR fixed-wing-based system), national AWACS platforms, modified attack submarines capable of firing Tomahawk cruise missiles and two big deck aircraft carriers (planned for 2012) demonstrate the UK's commitment to modernization. Britain's nuclear deterrent (entirely sea-based on four SSBN's) will be maintained in partnership with the US as newer D-5 missiles have been deployed (although warhead count will eventually be reduced by half). Airlift, supply and logistics shortfalls are being addressed through planned acquisitions of C-130J and C-17 aircraft, upgraded and new amphibious support ships and a networked approach to deployed logistics.

Germany

Germany may well represent the greatest quandary to the cause of European military reorientation and modernization. Forever the "state on the border" of the Iron Curtain and the assumed location of the last great land battle in history, Germany now finds itself more in the center of Europe than on the eastern border. Reunification with the former East Germany has further complicated the challenge that Germany finds itself in when addressing its defense future. Assumption of eastern debt, rebuilding the infrastructure of the new federal states, one-for-one exchange of the "ostmark" for "westmark", generous welfare measures for the impoverished east and clean-up of an ecological nightmare in this former Soviet satellite have brought huge pressures on the federal budget. Additionally, in meeting Maastricht "convergence criteria" for joining the EMU and converting to the Euro currency, Germans have been asked to accept a draconian level of social budget cuts and high levels of unemployment. These quantum changes and pressures have been widely thought to have spelled the end of Helmut Kohl's political career. The current Chancellor, Gerhard Schroeder, came to power under a political agenda for change and relief from the fiscal pressures affecting working Germans. In fact, Schroeder sees additional cuts to Germany's already reduced defense budget as one key to relieving some budgetary pressures. Despite opposition from Defense Minister Rudolph Scharping and senior military officers, Germany's armed forces will face smaller budgets in each of the next four years.

All this has happened at a time when German forces are faced with transforming a large numbers of conscripts trained in the defense of national territory into a smaller, mobile military force that could be dispatched to OOA conflicts. Recent constitutional changes have allowed these forces to be deployed for the first time since WWII. Unfortunately, the wider notion of security to include peacekeeping missions in distant-lands (or in the Balkans, for that matter) does generate the same level of public support for defense expenditures as a highly visible and antagonistic threat on the immediate border.

The topics of national interest or international influence or aspirations have not been in the lexicon of the Federal Republic of Germany since the adoption of its post-war constitution. The official tasking of her armed forces currently includes, protecting national territory and citizens from political blackmail and external danger, promoting military stability and the integration of Europe, defending the country and her allies,
serving the goals of global peace and international security in accordance with the UN charter, and helping to save lives in cases of natural disaster and other emergencies as well as supporting humanitarian actions. In fact, so important is this wish to be seen as a good ally and trustworthy partner that six of seven German ground-mobile divisions are actually integrated with allied corps structures (NATO’s Allied Rapid Reaction Corps; the EUROCORPS with France, Spain and Belgium; two corps with US forces; a Dutch-German corps and a Danish/Polish/German corps). In fact, as the largest of NATO’s European members, Germany possesses the only military that specifically prepares for coalition action to the detriment of unilateral military intervention.

The German army still suffers from the armor-intensive, heavy footprint of the old “Fulda gap” days. With exception of the “crisis reaction forces”, the old concept of heavy mechanized contingents is the rule. The airforce is as ill prepared as the army with aging fighter-bomber wings (Tomado aircraft), decrepit fighter wings (old US F-4 Phantoms and former East German MiG-29’s), limited reconnaissance, no airborne ground surveillance and very limited airlift. The navy represents a capable, if limited, contribution to a modern array of forces. Maritime patrol aircraft, diesel-electric submarines and a traditional destroyer-frigate fleet represent a force capable of maritime interdiction but not power projection. As is the case with most European NATO members, Germany has a marked limitation in the areas of sealift, coordinated supply and deployable logistics.

**Europe’s Weak History of Concerted Action**

The above-noted military capabilities and trends fail to broach the topic of Europe’s historical inability to react promptly and forcefully in the face of international crisis. From the outbreak of the Persian Gulf crisis in August of 1990 to the ongoing Rwanda tragedy to the 1999 Kosovo crisis, Europe has prominently displayed its inability to take concerted international action, especially when that action is military in nature. This reticence of action revolves around the EU’s difficulty in reconciling divergent positions about security policy and defense within the community. Among the Union’s stumbling blocks on the way to conditional consensus concerning ESDI is the issue of pacifist and militarily neutral member states. Arguably, if the EU limits ESDI to Petersberg Task missions, these nations (Austria, Finland, Sweden and Ireland) may find this course more acceptable. The combining of political hesitation and perpetual negotiation does not bode well for a particularly decisive ESDI.

*The expansion of the EU to include new members combined with its emphasis on consensual decision-making implies that decisions will be taken on the basis of the lowest common denominator (among the member states’ positions). If this is true, Europe’s ability to act decisively and in real time during a foreign policy crisis is likely to remain hamstrung.*

European NATO nations field armed forces of more than two million soldiers, sailors, airmen and marines. Only a small percentage could be utilized in an OOA military

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operation. The previously reviewed military capabilities of the three major European NATO allies show that a successfully implemented ESDI may well only produce a limited ground force component in the short to mid-term. Maritime and air assets would provide support and sustainment to this component but not actually increase power projection by any measurable degree. From a force planning perspective, ESDI will be unable to offset the high-intensity combat capability requirements of US forces into the foreseeable future. The lack of a credible European land threat diminishes the potential occurrence of such a scenario. Europe may well continue to rely on NATO (i.e., the US) for supporting high-intensity operations, which requires maintenance of the current US-European link.

The US must deal with the hard cold facts of her allies’ commitment to their own and the collective security. Pronouncements and platitudes about ESDI aside, the general trend of their defense budgets is down. Perhaps even more telling is the European commitment (or lack thereof) to military research and development. This is often seen as the harbinger for real future investment in a country’s (or an alliance’s) military-industrial capabilities. The combined European NATO community has consistently spent a mere 25 percent of what the US spends. This figure is considered tied to overall defense budgets, the trend of which is all too clear.

Many reasons seem to point to the maintenance of the “status quo” for US security policy with reference to Europe. A European force may well take on a greater percentage of Balkan commitments. Burden sharing for the European NATO nations may soon be fulfilled by actual troop deployments as opposed to monetary transfers and rent-free base usage by US forces. All of this serves to relieve a small amount of the pressure on the US military at a time of reassessment of American obligations worldwide. The real world, real commitments and real numbers reveal the following “givens”:

- **The US defense budget is larger than that of the next seven largest defense budgets combined.** Five of these are allies with whom we have formal defense treaties.
- **The US spends more on personnel and training than the next five countries combined,** four of which are allies, which helps to ensure that US forces will continue to be well-trained and ready to fight.
- **The US is programmed to spend more on procurement over the next five years than the next ten countries combined, seven of which are allies. This makes it a good bet that among the “next militaries” the US will be dominant.**
- **The US has programmed more for military research and development than all the militaries of the world combined, thus giving the US the chance to expand the technology and capabilities gap in “the militaries after next”**. 46

These considerations promote continued heavy US involvement in Europe as our best option. In this given scenario, the viability of ESDI over the long-term seems in doubt. Consider, however, that our rich European allies continue to garner a post-Cold War “dividend” while the US taxpayer shoulders the fallout from diminishing European

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defense outlays. From the perspective of the Cohen/Robertson "Three I's test", this option of maintaining the status quo by neglecting or opposing the EU's efforts toward ESDI makes little sense in the long-term.

Previously discussed defense-related trends among NATO's three largest European members have come about in an environment where the US opposes force structures distinct from NATO. For this reason, the overall improvement of military capabilities among European NATO members is not being served by an obstinate American ally. The other "I's" of indivisibility and inclusiveness are satisfied, but only by the untenable situation created through continued US dominance of Europe's defense.

This option is provided by the authors to acknowledge the divergence of thought in how the US should react to ESDI. It exists at one extreme of a range of probable outcomes and is not endorsed by the authors or by current US policy. As significant as the inertia to maintain the status quo in Europe is, the US must resist it. The US should leverage this European political desire toward greater autonomy in their military capabilities by pressing the Europeans to face the fiscal requirements of a necessary military build up. The Europeans' internal economic self-absorption may lead to short term market benefits, but it will definitely result in long term security problems for themselves and the US. The US must look to the future and its own best security interests, be proactive and move the process of ESDI forward.

This is where the "Fourth I" of increased US Global Security must be used as a final "acid" test. Any option must absolutely place this factor ahead of all others. Option One, where future US global security policy perpetuates the Cold War status quo, fails in this most crucial of missions.
Chapter 7

“Option Two”
A stronger European pillar within the familiar NATO structure

It is the European Union’s drive to erect its second pillar (Common Foreign and Security Policy - CFSP) that has brought us to this point. Successful economic and monetary union (and the necessary sacrifice of perceived national sovereignty in these areas) is moving towards. Given the accomplishments of the European internal market and the recent monetary union, this next step is actually more evolutionary than revolutionary. The concept and the proposed manifestations of the ESDI (whether built within NATO or outside of the Alliance) are of no threat to the continued importance and necessity of NATO.

ESDI has set in motion a process in which the EU (NATO members or not) may have international impact through an entire range of conflict management and crisis reaction tasks. Whether this be regional security, conflict on her flanks (the Balkans, for example), reaction to natural catastrophes, humanitarian relief or OOA peacekeeping, the EU will only act where there are clear and direct interests at stake. It is important to remember that at the core of the Union, economic interests shall always prevail. Further, Dr. Solana, High Representative of the EU for CFSP, has made it clear that “...the Union has [as] its objective the capacity to conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises, but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged. This will remain a guiding principle.”

The EU actually has set in place a mechanism that will ensure continuation of the North Atlantic Alliance in its intention to use NATO capabilities as required (or available). The precedent for this was set by the NATO-WEU agreement and it is assumed that as integration between the EU and WEU continues, this “understanding” will cross over. In order to proceed down a path of parallel obligation of military assets, full consultation and transparency between NATO and the ESDI must be pursued. Cooperation geared toward interoperability of NATO-pledged, EU-pledged and purely national military assets would be the ultimate goal.

Additionally, a consultation loop, which includes nations that fall outside of those holding membership in both NATO and the EU, must be considered. These countries, having pacifist or stringently non-aligned standings, are keen on maintaining a perceived neutrality with regard to use of military force, but may still be contributors toward a common goal in international contingencies involving ESDI forces. Medical personnel and supplies, food distribution and potable water processing, administrative personnel or civil police functions, and funding responsibilities could fall to the more pacifist EU member states. From Title V of the Maastricht Treaty and further developed with the Amsterdam Treaty and summits in Cologne and Helsinki, the concept of “joint action” by EU forces requires unanimity on decisions of principle but merely a majority concerning actual implementation. Consensus could still be achieved in forging European opinion concerning an international crisis, but abstention from actual involvement in a response could shield the more squeamish of EU member states while not hamstringing the total

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47 Solana 3.
effort. It seems that Europe knows itself well enough to achieve compromise even concerning sensitive foreign policy and security issues.

With the recent identification of a 60,000-member rapid deployment force as a short-term goal, the EU has shown the resolve to bring a certain minimal substance to the idea of ESDI. This force could provide minor relief to US troops in Kosovo, Bosnia or the various “command cells” in Hungary, Croatia, Albania or Italy. In fact, these numbers combined with an effective transport and logistics “tail” could allow the US to incrementally reduce the number of troops both permanently garrisoned in Europe and regularly deployed to European Command AOR locations. US Air Force and Navy squadrons forward based in Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK could be drawn down in size and capability. Ships and their embarked naval air and amphibious assault forces patrolling the central Mediterranean and Adriatic Seas could be redeployed to other locations or withdrawn to continental US (CONUS) bases for short “respite periods”. In their place, ESDI maritime and amphibious forces supported by European land or carrier-based aircraft could deal effectively with supporting limited-engagement, lower intensity missions. The greatest impact could well be felt by US Army troops posted in Germany, as their high-tempo deployment operations could be somewhat curtailed by commensurate numbers of European troops on the ground in the Balkans. Additionally, deployments from US bases could be adjusted to reflect a lower European requirement for these “surge forces.”

What would be the benefit to US force planners? Most likely, this “ESDI dividend” would not represent a significant steady state reduction in either numbers or cost of US forces dedicated to Europe. American presence would continue to be felt, but in a less visible and pervasive way. During European rapid deployment force rotations, US reinforcement could return to pre-ESDI levels. Continuing to be the “eye in the sky” and strong backbone for any SACEUR force, C3I and “advanced logistics” (aerial tanking, strategic heavy lift and resupply) would all remain in-theater or readily available from CONUS. Troops would still garrison German caserns, but in decreased numbers. Airwings would still fly from joint US-NATO bases, but with a lower operational tempo. Ships would still ply European waters, but without the primary mandate of being the first and last maritime or amphibious force for Europe. Incremental, if limited, withdrawal from Europe would actually demonstrate to European allies that the US recognizes their combined political will to become a player on the international stage. Though not enough of a redirection of assets to impact another theater appreciably, this small downsizing could allow American force planners to factor the validity of an autonomous EU force into the world equation.

Where would this leave Europe? The US will remain committed to NATO and Europe, merely at lower fluctuating force levels. How the US demonstrates this resolve may be the key to the continent’s greatest challenge for the next 25 years. Remaining the key to most deployment support functions, the US could actually become a de facto “voting member” of the ESDI. Speed of response to requests for support from ESDI or the possibility of withholding support based upon US “priorities” could give the US the kind of influence in ESDI that it now holds in NATO.

Russia views the expansion of NATO to the east as a direct and quantifiable threat. A recent change in Russian “first-use” nuclear policy clearly demonstrates this in the light of the decrepit status of its own conventional forces. By focusing some American efforts
on constructive engagement with the former Cold War adversary as opposed to continuing to reinforce NATO, the US could well hasten Russia’s entry into a stable and united Europe. Force reductions, even the modest ones proposed here, would be something of a demonstration of mutual trust with Russia and of American regard for Europe (the same Europe that currently funds 60% of all international aid to the former Soviet Union).

In the globalization system, the most threatening problems for the United States are black-market sales of nuclear warheads, strategic nuclear missile reduction, environmental degradation, containing rogues such as Iraq or North Korea, and financial viruses. None of these issues can be addressed effectively by America without the cooperation of a reasonably stable and democratizing Russia. Therefore, enlisting Russia’s cooperation, and doing whatever we can to advance political reform there should be our first priority – not expanding NATO, which can only undermine cooperation with Moscow. 48

Option Two is presented as a possible midpoint position for US policy towards Europe and NATO. Obviously, less extreme choices often have appeal at first blush, but this option is not seen by the authors as the optimal solution for the US or Europe. The implicit guarantee of US support to ESDI actions will garner the same lack of defense budget commitment as exists in Europe today. This fails the cause of improvement of the overall military capabilities among European NATO members and perpetuates a situation where the US continues to dominate Europe’s defense picture. Maintaining any form of the status quo in Europe represents a lost opportunity for all involved parties. For the US, small reductions in dedicated manning and assets to NATO do not allow for increasing US Global Security. America must find the assets necessary to enhance her needs for power projection and forward presence in the 21st Century. For Europe, a further reduction of visible American military presence (especially the small one envisioned by this option) will yield no different response than greeted the large drawdown of the 90’s (75% of garrisoned troops.

Chapter 8

“Option Three”
Encourage ESDI to allow a shifting of significant US assets away from Europe

The end of the Cold War, the increasing globalization of the world economy, and the rise of the Asian Tiger all portend a shift in the equilibrium of interests in the world. For the past 50 years, with some notable exceptions, America has focused on the security and stability of Europe. For short spans of time, as in the late 60’s and early 70’s in Vietnam, 1983 in Grenada, 1989 in Panama, and 1990 in the Persian Gulf, the US has focused elsewhere in the world. But for the majority of the time its major security focus has been on NATO and Europe.

Almost everything in America’s security environment was focused on Europe. Formation design was based on Europe: manning, equipping, doctrine, naval tactics, aerial tactics, ground tactics, and nuclear forces were all designed to support and win the ground war in Europe. The US poured billions of dollars into the effort and expended huge amounts of man-hours and political capital to ensure that the NATO alliance remained intact and militarily viable. The US focused on Europe to the detriment of other nations and regions around the world. During those times when America’s attention focused elsewhere the “attention” as well as other resources came from Europe and the forces in Europe suffered. During the Vietnam War, forces were taken out of Europe to fight the conflict. Readiness in Europe was abysmal, units were short of personnel and equipment, morale was terrible, and America was over-reliant on her nuclear deterrent.

Again in the early 90’s America’s focus shifted from Europe, this time to the Middle East. As the build up for Desert Shield/Desert Storm began forces were taken out of Europe to participate in the conflict. When Desert Storm ended most of these forces were returned to Europe. EUCOM sent an entire army corps from Europe to the desert to fight the war along with air wings, Marines, naval forces, and a host of individual replacements and support personnel.

The shifting of assets from Europe to trouble spots is no coincidence. The only place America can get assets, especially on short notice, is from Europe. Shifting American assets from Europe to trouble spots and back again was an acceptable strategy in a bi-polar world where America was fairly certain of the identity and location of the number one threat. This is not the case in a multi-polar world where America is not sure what or where the next number one threat will come from. The world has changed, the world security environment is no longer bi-polar, and there is not a threat yet visible that will make it bi-polar at least for the next 20 years. America must stop acting like the world around it is slowly evolving; the world has radically changed and will continue to change in the future.

The US must begin to focus on the emerging regions of the world. It is time for America to refocus our finite security resources into other regions. As in the past, America must take the assets from Europe, this time on a permanent basis. The US must take a significant portion of the resources it lavishes on Europe and either bring them back to a power projection status in America, or deploy them to forward areas prepared to
deal with emerging threats. This forward presence and engagement may even reduce or eliminate current threats.

America, of course, cannot just abandon NATO and Europe overnight without something or someone taking our leadership role in Europe. There is only one organization on the horizon that has the potential to replace or at least augment the US leadership role in Europe, and that is the EU and its ESDI. Not the ESDI as currently envisioned for 2003, but an ESDI possible in 2015, of which the authors think the current project is just one incremental step toward. In this process the US should support and encourage the Europeans to move forward, to spend more, to accept more responsibility, and to make a bold move towards a robust ESDI formation. Not only should we support and encourage, we should try to shape the program so that we can get the maximum worldwide security benefit from it. Only in this way can the US free enough resources to engage the new regions of the world and deal with the emerging threats of the 21st century. These new regions are the threats and opportunities of the 21st century; they will emerge whether the US is prepared or not. If America does not plan now to meet them and take advantage of them, our prestige and influence in the world will suffer as we react to them and retroactively try to control them. The US must be prepared to relinquish some influence and prestige in Europe in order to gain more influence and prestige in the global community.

The US in the 21st century should shift significant assets away from Europe and NATO and into at least the following areas: the Pacific Rim, Central and South America, the Middle East, and Africa.

The Pacific Rim

Most strategic experts have forecast the emergence in the 21st century of the Pacific Rim nations, both in terms of markets and threats. This is vital information for the US. China alone with its 1.1 billion people, growing economy, and internal struggles will be a region that requires considerable time and energy. Historically reclusive, unfathomed by the rest of the world, China will emerge in the 21st century to play a major role on the world stage. If the Chinese economy continues to grow at anything near its current rate, it will eclipse the GDP of the US by 2015. China is currently studying the latest conflicts involving the US and is undergoing doctrinal debates on how best to engage and defeat the US if it comes to conflict. They are experimenting with chemical and biological weapons (CBW) and other asymmetrical means with which to combat our recognized superiority in joint, high intensity combat. In addition, China is beginning to show expansionist tendencies again, which they never really give up, only shelved until they deemed the time right. With their recent troubles with Tibet, their acquisition of Hong Kong, and their recent threats against Taiwan, they are giving early signs of what may be the flow of events in the 21st century. The US needs to begin now to refocus on China in a serious way. China will require more effort and energy as the next decade progresses, as will North Korea.

Korean unification is a problem whose time will probably come in the first or second decade of 2000. The reunification of the Koreas on terms acceptable to the US will require a mixture of diplomacy and force. North Korea is a recalcitrant nation still
tunneling, still sending special operations forces into the South, and still working on procuring weapons of mass destruction. The North Koreans envision reunification on their terms, with them in control of the South, not vice versa. A conflict now on the Korean peninsula could be devastating; if it is the second major theater war (MTW), the US has already deemed it high risk, meaning high casualties. The US cannot and should not settle for this, and there is no need to. Pacific Command needs an increase in both funds and manpower. We can begin to shift resources to the Pacific from Europe or at least towards a power projection platform in the US prepared to help influence actions in the Pacific. In this manner the US can engage the Pacific and hopefully avoid the conflicts that now seem inevitable.

Central and South America

South America is another region that demands US presence and interest. In a recent speech General Jones, the Commandant of the US Marine Corps, stated that one of his concrete recommendations for modernizing the military was to move Southern Command’s headquarters back to a Central or South American country. In the 60’s through the 80’s Central and South America were rife with communist regimes and military dictatorships. With minimal US effort and resources, comparatively speaking, all of the Central and South American nations are fledgling democracies except for Cuba. This includes Nicaragua, one of the most hard-line communist nations.

While the dictatorships have disappeared, threats to the US have not they have merely shifted. Today organized crime, government corruption, drug cartels, and rampant poverty threaten the democracies of Central and South America. Military organizations are fledgling democratic institutions; they have yet to prove themselves in any crisis situations. Civilian control is still an unknown quantity. Most of the new democracies are being publicly attacked for their alleged human rights violations and corruption. These threats to Central and South America translate into threats to America. Drugs and illegal immigrants overrun our southern border. Drug proceeds enrich the drug cartels and feed crime and corruption, while illegal immigrants flee the rampant poverty and crime in their own countries. While all of these threats are not military in nature, the military is involved either directly combating these threats or in a support role to some US Federal agency.

It will take more of America’s energy, attention, and resources, not less, to ensure the new democracies continue on the correct path. America will need to engage the new democracies and assist them in overcoming the challenges of poverty, corruption, and drug smuggling. Southern Command needs an increase in both funds and manpower.

The Middle East

The Middle East already occupies a significant portion of America’s time and interest. The US maintains a significant presence in the gulf around the clock, 365 days a

49 General Jones, Speech to the International Security Studies Program at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University, Medford, Ma. 6 Mar 00.
year to assist in maintaining the fragile peace or containing hegemonic dictators and regimes. The US Army maintains a battalion task force in the Sinai, a battalion task force on permanent rotation throughout Kuwait, as well as a Brigade Task force worth of equipment forward staged in the region and on preposition ships dedicated primarily to the region. The Navy maintains a carrier battle group permanently in the region and the Air Force rotates air expeditionary forces through the region. The US is currently the primary enforcer of the No Fly Zones in the North and South of Iraq and has been since the end of the gulf war. This level of activity is stretching the US military and Central Command thin.

In the future we can look forward to deploying more forces for Peacekeeping duties as Israel and the surrounding nations move toward peace. A large US presence is expected on the Golan Heights to maintain the peace should Israel and Syria sign a peace agreement. The agreements between nations assisted by the US will almost certainly require some sort of guarantee by the Americans. These guarantees usually include more soldiers, sailors, airmen, and Marines in the region. Even with no increase in American involvement in the Middle East, current levels are exhausting the military and need relief in the form of more forces available for deployment and rotations. The US will need to maintain its current level of interest in the Middle East. Central Command needs an increase in both funds and manpower.

Africa

Finally, the most ignored continent in the world, Africa. America will need to expend an inordinate amount of resources in Africa in the coming years. The world cannot allow the problems in Africa to spread globally. Not only the Aids epidemic, but spreading pollution, rampant famine, population growth and poverty are old problems. The US should take the lead in looking for a solution in the coming years. The world will not allow another Rwanda crisis to go unanswered. The African continent has been left for too long in the ruins of colonial departure and ethnic/tribal strife. The increase in information technology will ensure that crises in Africa receive worldwide attention. Once a crisis hits the news, public outcry makes intervention almost inevitable. The US can expect to become more involved on the African continent in the 21st century. The African continent will draw greater US attention in the future and require more funds and manpower into the 21st Century.

Summary

Shifting significant assets out of Europe can meet the “Three I’s Test” necessary for US support of ESDI. More important, this option meets the fourth I test of increasing US global security.

European countries have historically been leery of spending the amount of money on defense that the US deems necessary for real improvement in European capabilities. The US has maintained that an improvement in European capabilities will translate to an improvement in NATO capabilities. The reality of US resources shifting from the
European continent to other areas of the world will provide the impetus to the EU to finally move to improve European capabilities, thus increasing the effectiveness of NATO.

The goal of greater inclusion is not substantially affected by a significant shift in US resources. An argument could be made that shifting US resources makes room for including other forces within NATO and the EU, this argument would be a big stretch. Suffice it to say that inclusion is not affected either way to a great extent.

Perhaps the most contentious issue for both Europeans and the US is the issue of indivisibility. On first blush it may seem that shifting significant resources from Europe and NATO is divisive to the transatlantic security link. On closer examination this is really not the case. The US is not withdrawing from NATO and we are not turning our backs on our historic ties to the continent. The US will remain committed to NATO and especially to our Article V requirements. In shifting significant assets out of Europe to the rest of the globe, we are attempting to make the world a safer place. As the world becomes safer, European security and stability become more assured. To focus our attention and effort solely or predominantly on Europe while the remainder of the world shifts and transforms around us will merely postpone the inevitable. Better for Europe and the US to plan a shift in significant resources now, provide a smooth transition of power within the EU and NATO, and implement our own strategy than to react to emerging threats only when we are forced to. A sudden and dramatic shift of forces from Europe to deal with an extant threat somewhere else in the world (similar to Desert Shield/Desert Storm but with today’s force structure) would be truly divisive to the transatlantic security link. It is better for the long-term indivisibility of the transatlantic link to partner with Europe now in preparing to shift to a global US security posture.

As stated above this option meets the fourth I test, that of "increasing US global security." The resources to meet the emerging 21st century threats must come from somewhere. Of all the options available to the US, spending more money on defense to procure more force structure is the least likely. While slight increases in defense spending are expected, nothing resembling the glory days of the Reagan build up years is envisioned. The US must more wisely and efficiently use the forces it has to provide for future US security. In the multi-polar world this means providing more presence and engagement in more places around the world. The only way to do this is to distribute the resources available in significant new ways. This means that the resources allocated to NATO and the EU must shift in significant ways. The way ahead to accomplish this significant shift is the topic of our next chapter.
Chapter 9

We have two strategic goals in Europe. The first is to build a Europe that is truly integrated, democratic, prosperous and at peace. This would be a natural continuation of the mission the US launched fifty years ago with the Marshall Plan and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Our second goal is to work with our allies and partners across the Atlantic to meet the global challenges no nation can meet alone. 50

Conclusion

In conclusion, the authors assert that there are five mutually reinforcing conditions that portend a necessary and feasible shift in US Global Security Policy. These are:

#1- NATO won the Cold War
#2- A Stable, Wealthy and Democratic Europe
#3- Globalizing US Security
#4- Wise Use of Scarce Resources
#5- ESDI is the “Way Ahead”

NATO Won

President Clinton’s 1999 National Security Strategy For A New Century (excerpted above) is very telling and presents the two main points of this paper. Europe is democratic, prosperous, at peace and in the process of integration. Regarding each of these aspects, the US and NATO have played indispensable roles. The initial step for reaching this first goal was the advent of the Marshall Plan itself, first presented at Harvard. What made the reconstruction of Europe through the Marshall Plan possible was the steady presence of NATO as it offset the threat posed by potential German military resurgence and the Soviet-led Warsaw Treaty Organization. NATO stands as a monument to collective security by free peoples as the most successful military alliance ever created. Every dollar, franc, pound, mark ever spent on its creation, sustainment, modernization, expansion and operation was well worth it. Given the alternative, NATO has been bargain.

A Stable, Wealthy and Democratic Europe

Although there is still much that needs to be done, the EU has been remarkably successful in integrating the internal market, monetary union and the

necessary transnational institutions involving executive, judicial and legislative functions. The level of federalism or retention of national sovereignty within the EU is yet to be determined. ESDI and the quest for more military autonomy is part of this ongoing, if piecemeal, integration. Europe is decidedly democratic with positive progress being made even in the former communist states of Eastern Europe. Economic market-based reforms and the spread of democracy have proven the best measures in averting conditions that foster aggressive nationalism and ethnic hatreds. Even the historical threat to Europe over the past fifty years, Russia, will again engage in open and free elections this year. This expanding democratization is reason enough to believe that Europe has reached a political equilibrium that will endure. Historically, democracies do not attack other democracies. Admittedly, there may continue some level of conflict resulting from ancient hatreds or where old civilizations meet, but with further transnational growth, the spread of democracy and economic prosperity these will generally subside over time.

Globalizing US Security

The second goal President Clinton mentioned involves working with our allies and partners across the Atlantic in meeting the global challenges that no one nation could address on its own. The US needs to design a security strategy for the next fifty years, now. The same goals of integration, spread of democracy, prosperity and peace that guided our involvement in Europe for the past fifty years should now guide our involvement in the rest of the world. Now that Europe is a strong, stable and dependable US ally the time for the US to shift is now. This does not mean the US becomes neo-isolationist, abandons Europe, turns inward or disengages from our European allies. It is actually a natural continuation of the American ideal.

In a grand sense, America has always thought of herself as an exception and destined for greatness. President Dwight D. Eisenhower is noted as saying “America is the mightiest power God has yet seen fit to put upon his footstool. America is great because she is good.” 51 More recently SECSTATE Madeleine Albright said the US “was an indispensable nation.” 52 Former SECSTATE Henry Kissinger has written “during the twentieth century no country has influenced international relations as decisively... as the US” and “no other country has more firmly insisted that its values were universally applicable, thereby acting as a beacon for the rest of mankind and thus assuming an obligation to crusade them around the world.” 53

Nonetheless, The world has changed and the US has changed demographically, economically and geopolitically.

52 LaFeher. 26-33.
53 Kissinger. 17-18.
Demographic Shifts Away from Europe

Demographically, the US is moving away from Europe. From 1820-1974, immigrants from Europe made up 76.8% of all immigrants into the US compared with just 4.6% for Asians and 9% from Latin Americans.\(^{34}\) In the 1970s and 1980s, the US took in more than 5 million legal immigrants from Latin America (45%), nearly 4.5 million Asians (41%) and only about 1.5 million Europeans (13%). The US population is moving away from its European roots. In 1990, 80% of Americans claimed to be of European dissent, by 2020 it is projected to be less than 65%. These trends will increasingly dilute our historic European base and increasingly cause us to focus West.

Economic Shift

This trend away from Europe can also been seen economically. In 1960, Japan and East Asia together represented just 4% of the world gross national product (GNP), while the European Economic Community (EEC) represented nearly 25%. Today, the East Asian and EC shares of world GNP are nearly equal. According to the World Bank and other sources, four of the largest five (and seven of the largest ten) economies in the world in the year 2020 will be in Asia.\(^{35}\) The US is first and foremost an economic power that will naturally respond to these trends. In fact, it is already starting. US trade with Asia has exceeded trade with the EU since the late 1970s. Today, US trade with Asia is about $350 billion compared to $220 billion with the EU. In 1992, the share of US exports to Asia exceeded that to Europe by 33% to 21%, and the share of imports from Asia was greater by a ratio of 45% to 21%.\(^{36}\) The US Department of Commerce (in 1994) defined the "big emerging markets" as China (including Hong Kong and Taiwan), India, Indonesia, Brazil, Mexico, Turkey, South Korea, South Africa, Poland and Argentina.\(^{37}\) A closer look would reveal only two (Poland and Turkey) are in Europe and none are in Western Europe.

This is not to say that the US must choose between either good relations with Europe or good relations with Asia. The US must and will continue to foster good relations with Europe. But it also means that Europe will be just one part of America’s global focus as other regions grow in importance to the US.

Shifting US Geopolitical Thinking

In light of demographic and economic shifts, America’s geopolitical thinking must also shift from a "Euro-centric" focus to a global focus. This shift will reach back to the most basic aspects of American exceptionalism. America must take the rule of law, market-based prosperity and increasing democratization to the rest of the world. To do this requires a significant shift in our political priorities from Europe to a wider focus.

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\(^{35}\) "War of the Worlds: A Survey of the Global Economy," The Economist, 1 October 1994, 4

\(^{36}\) General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), US Trade Review vol.1, 21-23

\(^{37}\)
In this effort, a change in generational political and military leadership will assist in the necessary change.

Consider the changes in the world generational political leadership over the last ten years on both sides of the Atlantic. Initially influenced by the experience of World War II and the Cold War, the previous generation of western world leaders accepted a NATO-centered security strategy. President George Bush was shot down in combat with Japan over the Pacific. UK Prime Minister Thatcher, French President Mitterrand, and German Chancellor Helmut Kohl unquestionably were shaped by the war in Europe and Soviet occupation of Eastern Europe for forty years. Particularly interesting is that during the 1950s most members of the US Congress had served in the armed forces during WWII or the Korean War. Today very few members of Congress, less than 25%, have served in the military and even less in combat. The new generation of political leadership, President Bill Clinton, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and Russia’s President Putin were all born after 1945. The major influences impacting these leaders include accelerating globalization, free flow of information through the Internet, interdependent economies and the overarching acceptance of rapid change as a constant in the world. This is also true of Vice President Al Gore and Governor George W. Bush, one of which will almost certainly be the next US president.

There is a concurrent shift in generational military thinking. Admiral Crowe, Generals Powell and Shalikashvili (all former Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff) in the US, as well as their European counterparts, grew up in the aftermath of WW II and served in uniform during the height of the Cold War (much of this time in Europe).

Today’s rising military leaders (primarily the one- and two-star Flag Officers) entered military service in the post-Vietnam era, witnessed the collapse of the Soviet Union as mid-grade officers and have been the functional architects of America’s post-Cold War strategy. This generational leadership shift is showing signs of new security thinking as demonstrated by the recent US National Defense University senior advisory group, “NDU QDR ’01 Working Group”. This group is quietly putting together military strategy force structure options as part of the required Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) for 2001 (looking at the threat environment out to 2025). One of strategies being considered involves increased emphasis on “transformation” of US forces to a new generation of combat technologies that could allow the US to more effectively counter a “peer competitor” (believed to mean China) in coming years.58 Although any such shift in military strategy is subject to enormous domestic and international political pressure, even the consideration of such a strategy serves as evidence of change. Equally important is that any new strategy recognizes and appreciates the need for wise use of scarce defense resources in the future.

**Wise Use of Scarce Resources**

All current military budget projections predict that US military spending will remain stagnant or, at best, increase marginally. With the same or a slight increase in military spending, the US will not purchase new or additional force structure. This mandates a reapportionment of current assets from less-threatened areas to more-

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threatened areas to meet or preclude emerging threats. This reapportionment occurred in the past on a temporary basis as the US reacted to emerging threats such as Vietnam, Panama, Somalia and Desert Shield/Desert Storm. The future security environment requires a permanent reapportionment of limited assets in order to support a global security strategy based upon power projection and forward presence. These assets should come from Europe and our NATO-focused policy and be positioned for use in the Pacific, Asia, Africa, Latin America and the Middle East. The European Union initiative embodied in ESDI provides America with a potential capability to replace our leadership and significant military contribution to their defense.

ESDI is the “Way Ahead”

Since the inception of NATO in 1949, US policy planners have tried to get the Europeans to fund a larger portion of their defense bill. In addition, the Europeans have always proclaimed a desire for increased autonomy from US decision making. Today, both of these goals are within sight and demand the same thing that NATO solidarity in the last 50 years demanded: US leadership.

For the first time the Europeans are not just talking about autonomy, they are taking concrete steps to build a capability. They began to build this capability in spite of initial US objections. Now is the time for US security planners to realize the potential significance to our own global strategy of a more robust European capability. The US should demonstrate the same leadership and resolve it has for the last 50 years within NATO. We must bring the EU nations to the table for combined, transparent, visionary negotiations and begin to map out the way ahead for ESDI as the future security organization for Europe.

US leadership is necessary in this endeavor not only to increase our own global security but to ensure we leave a stable Europe able to deal with current and future threats. ESDI provides the most viable alternative to US leadership in Europe. The US must give up its primary leadership role in Europe to take advantage of emerging challenges worldwide. The way ahead is for the US to fully support and help lead the European initiative embodied in ESDI.