THESIS

DEVROMCI SOL:
A STUDY OF TURKEY'S REVOLUTIONARY LEFT AND
ITS IMPACT ON UNITED STATES INTERESTS, 1968-1999

by

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June 2000

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The thesis explains leftist development and violence against U.S. interests, suggesting Turkey’s rapid modernization and the resulting instability provided fertile ground for the extreme left’s emergence. By the 1970s, following periods of increased political liberalization, the rise of Marxist-Leninist ideology coupled with government intolerance to opposition groups elevated terrorism to the sole perceived avenue of change. External support, political assassinations, and reports of government oppression in Turkey support Devrimci Sol’s continued survival. It remains a threat.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Since the 1960s, terrorist groups have threatened United States commercial, diplomatic and military personnel and materiel in countries throughout the world. Although faced with such a threat in many theaters, no threat was more problematic than that faced in Europe. During the Cold War era, U.S. interests were especially at risk to terrorism in European countries such as Germany, Greece, Italy and Turkey.

The most potent threat came from the extreme, violent European left—the Fighting Communist Organizations (FCOs). Driven by a Marxist-Leninist ideology, these often small, lethal, urban terrorist groups flourished during the Cold War aiming to overthrow their country’s democratic government and replace it with their “vision” of a proletarian dictatorship.¹ As might be expected, such groups often opposed their country’s involvement with the U.S., perceiving U.S. interest in their country purely as imperialistic in nature. Compounding this were U.S. policies and decisions, such as weapons embargoes, which seemed to validate these claims. This meant European terrorists often directed their attacks against U.S. interests in their country.

Although many have written on the particulars surrounding such infamous terrorist organizations as former West Germany’s Red Army Faction or Italy’s Red Brigades, discussions regarding Turkey’s own FCO—Devrimci Sol—have mostly been confined to government circles. This thesis aims to modify that. The thesis covers 1968 through 1999.

The thesis, through a case study of Devrimci Sol (and its past and present derivatives), provides an understanding of the underlying causes for the emergence and continuation of Turkey’s revolutionary left. Specifically, the study analyses its origins in Turkey’s modernization endeavors and the political liberalization of the 1960s, the group’s cycle of declining and re-emerging violence against U.S. interests in Turkey, and its overall capability to survive numerous assaults. Lastly, the thesis analyzes Devrimci Sol’s successor organization, Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) or

Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front, in order to illustrate the revolutionary left’s current and future threat to U.S. interests in Turkey.

This thesis achieves several purposes. This thesis argues that issues surrounding Turkey’s modernization process and initial attempt at a multi-party political system provided the fertile environment for the emergence of leftist terrorism. It analyses Devrimci Sol, one of Turkey’s most lethal terrorist groups, especially for the United States. Through a detailed analysis of the domestic and international environment in 1960s Turkey, the thesis explains and documents the initial emergence of Turkey’s revolutionary left—especially the path from the Türkiye Halkın Kurtuluşu Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) or Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front to Devrimci Sol (Dev Sol) or Revolutionary Left. Furthermore, it traces the emergence of the DHKP-C, the product of a 1994-split in Devrimci Sol.

Second, the thesis explains the revolutionary left’s decision to violently oppose the Ankara regime, as well as begin terrorist attacks against U.S. interests in Turkey. The student movements of the 1960s and 1970s produced many of Turkey’s leftist terrorists. Turkey’s leftist student population emerged and flourished during liberalization periods, but when the ruling party answered its calls for continued liberalization with oppression, certain elements of the left became radicalized and responded with an “armed struggle.” Using approaches advanced by leading political scientists and terrorism experts, the thesis explains the revolutionary left’s decision to engage in an “armed struggle” against the Turkish Government. This is further discussed and supported within the context and aftermath of the 1980 military intervention.

Third, this thesis explores the 1980 coup’s lasting impact of widespread torture and violations of human rights on surviving (as well as newly recruited) leftist militants. This research suggest that the coup, coupled with early leftist martyrs, continues to fuel Turkey’s revolutionary leftist struggle against the “fascist” Ankara regime, and its “puppet master” the United States. Even though Turkey’s rapid modernization process ultimately provided the environment from which terrorists emerged, it remains only one element key to the revolutionary left’s continuation.

Furthermore, successive Ankara regimes’ continued repressive response against the population directly caused the rise of militant leftists. In addition, the initial group,
Devrimci Sol, and its present replacement have managed to endure successive destructive Turkish security operations against them. The movement’s longevity is a result of an extensive support base outside Turkey, a large prison network and the later attachment of human rights issues to its cause in order to gain greater exposure and appeal in the international arena. The repeated political amnesties granted shortly after each military coup further facilitated the revolutionary left’s ability to rebound.

Finally, applying a Department of Defense threat level assessment methodology, analyzing the factors of existence, capability, intentions, history, targeting, and security environment, this study offers an opinion on DHKP-C’s threat to U.S. interests currently in Turkey. Based upon a review of these factors, indicating the factors of existence, capabilities, intentions, and history are present, the DHKP-C threat to U.S. interests in Turkey is assessed as High. Thus, research demonstrates that Turkey’s revolutionary leftist terrorists remain a threat to U.S. interests in the region. Although beaten down in the early 1990s, this group continues to exist and demonstrate lethal capabilities. In addition, as recently as 1999, punctuated with a foiled attack against the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, DHKP-C reaffirmed its targeting of U.S. interests.

This element of Turkey’s left has repeatedly demonstrated a lethal ability against U.S. personnel, which continues to exist today. Therefore, understanding the nature of this group, its strengths and capabilities, and potential threat are essential to the protection of U.S. interests in Turkey. The decline in and apparent loss of appeal of Marxism-Leninism throughout the terrorist world and the eclipsing Islamic extremist paranoia of the 21st century should not cloud eyes to an old and familiar threat—many FCOs may be down, but they are not all out.

Finally, the author invites any comments pertaining to this thesis and the issues addressed in it. All comments should be forwarded to the author at E-mail account: kenvillethesis2000@hotmail.com.
I. INTRODUCTION

"The [Fighting Communist Organization] is an endangered species of terrorist group that is currently running on the 'fumes' of Marxism-Leninism. However, as a unique species... logic and prudence demand that these groups should continue to be studied."

Dennis Pluchinsky (1992)²

On 7 February 1991, at approximately 0700, Bobbie Eugene Mozelle, a civilian customs specialist with the United States firm Vinnel, Brown and Root (VBR) at Incirlik Air Base (IAB), Turkey, walked with his morning cup of coffee to his green, late-model 1963 Mercedes in downtown Adana, Turkey.³ As he reached his vehicle, a man—part of a 3-person hit team—approached from the rear of the car and shot him five times (Figure 1–1). Within a matter of seconds, terrorists had handed the U.S. its first terrorist-related


**Figure 1–1. Crime Scene Photograph of Mozelle Assassination**


casualty of Operation DESERT STORM, as well as the first such death in Turkey in almost ten years.

Shortly before noon that day, anonymous telephone callers to local newspapers claimed the attack in the name of the Turkish revolutionary left: Devrimci Sol (Dev Sol) or Revolutionary Left, and the Marksist-Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği (MLSPB) or Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit. According to the Dev Sol caller, the group had “punished a CIA agent in Adana, Turkey. The bases cannot be used for U.S. imperialism. Turkish and Kurdish people are not the servants of American imperialism.” According to the MLSPB caller, the group had “punished a CIA agent... Turkish lands are not an American base.... We want [the United States forces] to leave immediately.” Once again, violent Turkish leftist terrorists were attacking U.S. and other Western targets to demonstrate their opposition to the Ankara regime, Turkish-U.S. relations, and U.S. “imperialism” and U.S.-led military operations in the region.

This incident not only illustrated the extreme end of the revolutionary left’s spectrum of terrorist activity—assassination—but also highlighted characteristics and methods of Turkey’s revolutionary leftists key to understanding their activities. This assassination accurately displayed the capabilities, sophistication and thoroughness of the organization. Three militants—two shooters and a lookout—conducted this operation during daylight hours in Turkey’s third largest city. The Turkish police investigation indicated terrorists had surveilled both the location and the victim prior to the killing. In addition, the rhetoric of both callers’ messages illustrated the revolutionary left’s

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4 Although some experts suggest that in the early 1990s Devrimci Sol and MLSPB were the same organization, Ismet states MLSPB was in fact a separate organization established in 1975. On MLSPB see: Ismet G. Ismet, The PKK: A Report on Separatist Violence in Turkey, 1973-1992 (Ankara, Turkey: Turkish Daily News, 1992), 413.

5 Corsun, 26.

6 Ibid., 26.

7 Throughout this thesis “revolutionary left” refers to the violent, Marxist-Leninist terrorists of the Turkish left; i.e., Devrimci Sol, its predecessors of the 1970s, and its 1994 successor, DHKP-C. The term “Revolutionary Left” is the English translation of Devrimci Sol.
continued vehement displeasure for U.S. influence in the region and the left’s need to tie the U.S. to Turkey’s domestic issues.

From where did such an anti-U.S./Western terrorist organization come? What accounts for the revolutionary left’s opposition against Ankara and the United States? What are the ideological foundations of this movement, especially Devrimci Sol? What led to Mozelle’s death in 1991? Will more Americans suffer Mozelle’s fate in the future? What are the future implications of U.S. involvement in Turkey and the surrounding region as it relates to terrorist threats in Turkey? This thesis aims to provide insight into these questions and some tentative answers.

A. PURPOSE AND ARGUMENT

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the emergence, development and continuation of Turkey’s extreme leftist movement—the revolutionary left—from the 1960s to the present. The vehicle for this is a case study of the history and present circumstances of Turkey’s most militant and anti-Western leftist terrorist organization—Devrimci Sol—and its associated lineage. This will serve as the foundation for an analysis of certain elements of the movement opting to engage in violence as a method of promoting political change. Specifically, the thesis addresses details of Turkey’s modernization, which by the late 1960s—after 25 years of one-party dominance—had created a troubled political and economic environment. From this turbulent environment Turkey’s initial revolutionary leftists, the Türkiye Halkı Kurtuluşu Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) or Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front, and the Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO) or Turkish People’s Liberation Army emerged. Although Turkish security forces destroyed both groups’ senior leadership shortly after Turkey’s second coup (1971), by the late 1970s the revolutionary left had re-emerged in force. This time nearly 60 separate leftist groups operated in Turkey, most stressing their connection to the earlier THKP-C and THKO groups. Even so, Devrimci Sol and MLSPB emerged as the most deadly of these groups. As violence dramatically increased in the late 1970s, both groups frequently targeted U.S. interest in a “war” against the Turkish Government and “struggle” against perceived U.S. “imperialism.”

Specifically, the intent is to answer the following questions regarding the organization: (1) What prompted the emergence and development of the revolutionary
left in Turkey? (2) What drove the “ancestors” of Devrimci Sol to engage in an “armed struggle” as a method of demonstrating their opposition to the Ankara government? (3) What events or situations prompted leftists to target U.S. interests and personnel in the 1970s, and continues to the present? (4) What historical impact has this organization had on the U.S. and its personnel in Turkey? (5) Does the latest derivative of Devrimci Sol—Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) or Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front—pose a continuing threat to U.S. interests in Turkey? If so, to what degree?

The four primary theses of this study are:

(1) The revolutionary left’s initial emergence and development in Turkey can be attributed to that country’s rapid modernization. This process eventually led to the turbulent political, economic and social environment that characterized the new Republic during the 1950s and 1960s. After 25 years under a one-party dominant system (1923-1950), in the late 1940s, the Turkish Government decided to experiment with a multiparty political system and permitted an opposition party to form. In May 1950, this led to an unprecedented event in Turkey—the peaceful and successful transfer of government power between two parties. Although the incumbent party lost, its political leaders willingly relinquished power to the new, more liberal party. The jubilation over such an event was short lived. Without the benefit of an historical example of political tolerance, the new party soon fell back on old methods of dealing with those critical of government policies—increased government control. The resulting political and social oppression the new government imposed drew the extreme left from the newly urbanized population—specifically a growing and often unemployed student population. The resulting unemployment and rapid urbanization of Turkey’s larger cities between 1960 and 1980 provided fertile ground for rising, young, idealistic leftist leaders, as well as an ample source of leftist militants. Attempts at moving away from a single-party dominated system, eventually allowed opposition parties to drift to the left. This often became too threatening for traditional Kemalists—especially the armed forces, the self-appointed guardians of the constitution—often ending in military intervention. In addition, the left’s threat served to inflame the right, which ultimately turned to violence. Leftist militants’ ability to find haven in Europe or the Middle East following each military intervention proved key to their survival. The government’s eventual relaxation
of political activities and frequent release of jailed leftists following amnesties, often left both militants and their leaders intact and available for reconstitution. This led to the re-emergence and continuation of the revolutionary left movement.

(2) The revolutionary left initiated attacks on U.S. interests and personnel because it perceived an undue U.S. influence in domestic Turkish politics and economic policies, a belief Turkey’s revolutionary left still maintains today. Militants often cite historical foundations regarding U.S. “control” of Turkey through the U.S.-dominated North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). For example, the United States threatened to not intervene (nor would NATO) on Turkey’s behalf in any conflict with Russia if Turkey carried out an invasion of Cyprus in the early 1960s. The perceived U.S. imperialism in Turkey and its impact on both the Turkish economy and foreign policy created an environment conducive to leftist targeting of U.S. interests. Of course, the U.S. represented opposition to leftist ideas, especially those found in Marxism-Leninism. Furthermore, the U.S. stood in opposition to the Soviet Union, which some leftist terrorists saw as the ideological pillar from which they fought their revolution.

(3) Turkey’s continued economic and political instability explains the revolutionary left’s initial emergence and further supports its survival. Still, other factors developed later in the 1970 and 1980s, which aid in the movement’s longevity. The continued existence of Devrimci Sol’s follow-on group—DHKP-C—is an example of Turkey’s revolutionary left’s ability to last in its fight against the State. Although more a product of internal conflict and a power struggle for group leadership, DHKP-C (and its public affairs/political element DHKC) is the product of the group’s ability to change and adapt, even in the face of devastating Turkish security operations and internal splintering. Where its terrorist comrades in Germany and Italy succumbed to security operations and/or the impact of the communist collapse, Devrimci Sol adapted and still survives. Aiding in this survival was the group’s assimilation of Turkey’s human rights issues into its supporting ideology and cause. With the collapse of the Soviet Union came Europe’s increasing view of a diminished importance of Turkey in protecting NATO’s southern flank. Such a situation has allowed Europe increased flexibility in opposition to Turkey’s desire to enter the European Union. Most notably, Europe has cited Turkey’s continued
poor human rights record as an obstacle to its entrance into the Union. Such movements as DHKP-C, who is well placed in Europe, utilized such a situation to their advantage.

(4) The current revolutionary left representative, DHKP-C, remains a real threat to U.S. interests in Turkey. The organization and its leadership have an extensive and sophisticated history of violence against its "enemies." An analysis of the situation indicates the DHKP-C threat posed to U.S. interests in Turkey remains viable, yet possibly lower than in the past. Even so, this could rapidly change depending on international or regional affairs (such as military actions) and the perceived influence Washington has in such matters. Such triggering events as the 1991 U.S.-led coalition war against Iraq served as a warning of such changes. DHKP-C continues the revolutionary left's vehement opposition to U.S. "imperialism" within Turkey in its current organizational documents. Paralleling this, DHKP-C continues to demonstrate its concerns through action—most recently noted in June 1999, when Turkish security intervened in a planned rocket attack against the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.

B. RELEVANCE AND SIGNIFICANCE

This thesis is important because terrorist attacks on U.S. property and personnel, especially those assigned to regions such as Turkey, continue to pose real threats. More specifically, the leftist terrorist threat in Turkey to both permanent party and temporarily assigned personnel remains high. Because the positioning of U.S. Forces in Turkey remains a reality for the foreseeable future, it is essential that military commanders, security officials, and the military forces in Turkey fully understand the nature and threat posed by such an organization.

Research on the extreme left in Turkey, especially Devrimci Sol is extremely relevant to understanding such a threat. The importance lies in providing useful insights into the organization, which U.S. security agencies in the region can use in efforts to protect U.S. interests in Turkey. The thesis will provide an understanding of why this group remains in "business." As one of the last surviving members of what Yonah Alexander and Dennis Pluchinsky refer to as the "Fighting Communist Organizations," it behooves anyone operating in Turkey to better understand the reasons behind the revolutionary left's sustainment and longevity and what that means.
In addition, in regards to general research on terrorism and militant groups, such research as this contributes to the never ending need to understand the nature of international terrorism. Especially important is understanding a group’s decision to engage in terrorism as a method of demonstrating opposition to a government and the decision to possibly involve a third, external party. Finally, this thesis is relevant because in searching out published research in English on Devrimci Sol, this author realized quickly that specific research on the group was either severely dated (i.e., 1980s), restricted, or very general to Turkish history. So, it is the author’s wish that this thesis will ultimately contribute to a better understanding of one of the most dangerous terrorist groups to threaten U.S. interests outside its shores in the twentieth century.

C. RESEARCH SHORTFALLS

It is important to point out to the reader some thesis shortfalls. Although it endeavors to provide the most comprehensive and up-to-date analysis of Turkey’s revolutionary left, to include the current group’s (DHKP-C) threat, certain research limitations have in some ways diminished the thoroughness of the analysis. First, because this thesis was developed, compiled and produced in less than 10 months the majority of source material is English-based and not original Turkish language documents. Most of the material published in Turkish was not readily available outside Turkey. Second, although general Turkish history is well documented within the public domain, U.S. security agencies maintain the majority of current material tightly focused on terrorism matters—especially those occurring in Turkey. The majority of it is either difficult to track down or is restricted to “Government Use Only.” Although an extensive Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request was submitted to the Department of Defense within two months of the start of this research, the requested information never materialized in time for inclusion in this document. Therefore, the reader will find this thesis grounded extensively in non-Turkish sources, and focused almost exclusively on leftist terrorists actions against Americans, with only minor references to the domestic impact to Turkey.
D. THESIS OUTLINE

The following chapters analyze and chronicle the scope and level of leftist violence—specifically that perpetrated by the line of Devrimci Sol—in Turkey from 1968 to 1999. The thesis is essentially divided in to four parts. The first part (Chapter II) describes Turkey’s economic, political and social background from approximately 1950 to the present. The purpose is to illustrate the environment in which the revolutionary left developed, flourished, declined and then periodically re-emerged. The second part (Chapters III through VI) provides periodized details related to the revolutionary left’s terrorist activities, focused primarily on the groups involved, their rise and fall, and their impact on U.S. interests in Turkey. The chapters are periodized using Turkey’s successive military intervention as markers, with the exception of the last, which starts with the end of the Gulf War. The third part (Chapter VII) discusses today’s revolutionary left’s (DHKP-C) potential threat to the U.S. as a terrorist group. The last part (Appendices) contains 12 reference documents.

Chapter II establishes the volatile environment created when Turkey continued its rapid modernization after the 1950s, employing the views of Professor Samuel Huntington to account for a situation, which spawned the violent manifestations of political opposition to the Turkish Government. The primary purpose of this chapter is to describe the environment in which Turkish leftists emerged, flourish, declined, re-emerged, and remain today. This chapter analyses and describes the turbulent times of the post single-party dominant system in Turkey. In explaining the political, economical and social changes of this period—especially the liberalization, rapid urbanization and increased unemployment—this chapter aims to illustrate the environment in which certain sections of the Turkish population became politically mobilized and particular elements of Turkey’s left moved towards violence. The chapter covers the late 1950s through to the late 1990s.

The middle chapters focus primarily on Turkey’s revolutionary leftist groups and their impact on U.S. interests in Turkey. Chapter III analyzes the emergence of terrorism and covers the period from 1968 to the 12 March 1971 coup. It introduces the original Turkish militant left, what is repeatedly referred to throughout the thesis as the revolutionary left. This chapter focuses on the increased presence and organization of
movements within the country's student population and the eventual emergence of militants. It chronicles the original organizations, which spawned Turkey's first revolutionary leftist terrorists. The chapter discusses the original martyrs of the movement and the initial operations directed against the United States. It includes a discussion regarding the decision to engage in terrorism as a method of opposition. Also, the chapter briefly reviews some historical events in Turkish history that supported a less than favorable view of the U.S. in the eyes of some Turks. Finally, this chapter—as will all remaining chapters—provides an analysis of the characteristics and level of international terrorism in Turkey during the time period. Further breaking the data down, it analyses tactics, targeting, and location of incidents as they related specifically to leftist actions perpetrated against U.S. interests. This chapter aims to answer the questions:

- From where did the revolutionary left come?
- What early events and people shaped its future development?
- What facilitated the left's eventual targeting of U.S. interests in Turkey?
- What was the revolutionary left's initial impact on U.S. interests in Turkey?

Chapter IV covers leftist activities following the 1971 coup to Turkey's third military intervention on 12 September 1980. It focuses on the central organization of this study—Devrimci Sol—the circumstances of its emergence in 1978, as well as its lethal actions against U.S. targets. The chapter begins with a discussion of the demise of the first organized elements of the revolutionary left—the martyrs of Kizildere—and their importance to the continuation of the next movement. This includes early leftist attempts, following the 1972 military intervention, to continue their cause outside Turkey. This chapter provides insight into the reasons behind the emergence of Devrimci Sol, as well as a look at what would become a key issue in the organization's ideological platform—human rights. It is important to understand the rise of Dev Sol in the pre-1980 coup period and the impact that Turkish security operations in the pre-coup years had on the future of the organization. Key questions answered in this chapter are:

- What was the importance of the first martyrs?
- What events led to the rise of Devrimci Sol?
- What bearing did leftist terrorism have on the 1980 military intervention?
How did *Devrimci Sol* survive the Turkish military’s stunning blow following the 1980 coup? What role did alleged human rights violations and torture have on this recovery? What prompted *Devrimci Sol* in 1991 to engage in lethal acts of terrorism against the West, ultimately resulting in the assassination of three foreign civilians and an attempt on a USAF officer in Izmir? Chapter V covers the post-1980 coup period through to the end of 1991. The intent in this chapter is to explore this period and shed light on the circumstances surrounding *Dev Sol*’s actions. This is accomplished through an analysis of the group’s operations against Western targets during the 1991 Gulf War, as well as the terrorist literature which surfaced during this period.

Chapter VI discusses events and issues from 1992 to 1999. The central issues in this chapter surround yet another survival story and transformation of *Devrimci Sol*. With the demise of the Soviet Union and the resulting ideological blow to Marxist-based revolutionary leftist groups, the continued survival of any terrorist organization grounded in such ideology warrants examination. Although potent Turkish security operations following the Gulf War tremendously decreased *Devrimci Sol* activities—especially those directed at U.S. targets—the group survived and continues to this day. This chapter discusses the emergence of *Devrimci Sol*’s follow-on organization—DHKP-C—and the suggested reasons for its emergence and the continued existence of this line of Turkey’s revolutionary left. Central questions in this chapter are:

- What impact did the communist collapse have on *Devrimci Sol*?
- What prompted 1992 Turkish security operations against *Devrimci Sol*?
- What was the impact of these operations?
- What prompted the split of *Devrimci Sol* and the emergence of DHKP-C?

Chapter VII examines two issues. First, the chapter aims to review DHKP-C ideology and recent activities using essentially the organizational documents publicly available through DHKP-C’s “public affairs” element, *Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi* (DHKC) or Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front. Such information provides a means to analyze how DHKP-C perceives its “calling,” what motivates its violent “revolutionary” and terrorist activities. The resulting analysis suggests DHKP-C,
especially following the 1980 coup, increasingly relies on continued Turkish Government oppression (e.g., banning of certain opposition parties) and suspected human rights violations (e.g., police torture and extrajudicial executions) to justify its existence. In addition, DHKP-C has attached the Kurdish separatist issue to its ideological platform, hoping to gain further international attention as a champion of Kurdish rights in such a hostile and “fascist” Turkey. The chapter argues that DHKP-C increasing believes these two issues are key in appealing to international audiences, and in the organization’s survival.

Does DHKP-C still pose a threat to the United States? That is the second question approached in Chapter VII. The short answer is a qualified ‘Yes’. This position is supported through an analysis of the organization examining DHKP-C’s historical activities, as well as its present intentions and capabilities. Although DHKP-C activity levels are nowhere near those of Devrimci Sol, it has demonstrated on at least two occasions within the last half of the 1990s the intent to attack U.S. interests. This chapter further offers some final comments regarding the future of Turkey’s revolutionary left and its relationship to U.S. interests in the region. This chapter serves to remind the reader of the dangers of such groups, and that further examination is warranted.

Following Chapter VII, the reader will discover several appendices, which provide additional information regarding the activities, impact, scope and views of certain elements of Turkey’s revolutionary left. This is accomplished, first, through a chronology of international terrorist incidents in Turkey, from 1968 to 1999. Along with this chronology are several English translations of organizational documents from the groups (e.g., communiqués, manifestos and bulletins) which provide further insight into the movement’s ideology.

E. DEFINITIONS

Before proceeding, a few terms used throughout this thesis require a brief explanation in order to ensure the reader understands their intended use.

*International Terrorism.* In the thesis, the RAND Corporation definition referred to in the *RAND-St. Andrews University Chronology of International Terrorism* is used:

Incidents in which terrorists go abroad to strike their targets, select victims or targets that have connections with a foreign state (e.g., diplomats,
foreign businessmen, officers of foreign corporations), or create international incidents by attacking airline passengers, personnel, and equipment. It excludes violence carried out by terrorists within their own country against their own nationals, and terrorism perpetrated by governments against their own citizens.  

Marxist-Leninists. The purpose and length of this thesis does not permit an in-depth analysis of Turkey’s revolutionary leftists’ interpretations and reliance on Marxist-Leninist ideology as a foundation for revolution. Yet, it is important that the reader appreciate the basics of the term Marxist-Leninists when used here, therefore, the following explanation is offered:

Marxist-Leninists conceive ‘Leninism’ to be the development of the scientific understanding of society propounded by [Karl] Marx and [Frederick] Engels. As such it is a science of the laws of development of nature and society, which elucidates the causal relationships between man and society and the advance to the classless society of communism. The major components of Marxism-Leninism are dialectical and historical materialism as a method of analysis, political economy as the study of the class relationships to the means of production and the level of productive forces, and the theory of scientific communism (the structure and process of communist societies). More narrowly defined, Leninism is that tendency within Marxist thought which accepts the major theoretical contributions of Lenin to revolutionary Marxism. Specifically, it is an approach to the seizure of power for and by the proletariat and the building of socialist society, which legitimates revolutionary action by the Party on behalf of the working class….Rather than relying on the spontaneous development of consciousness in the working class, Leninists see the party as a catalyst bringing revolutionary theory and political organization to the exploited masses….For Marxist-Leninists, the seizure of power is the result of revolutionary struggle and initially the dictatorship of the proletariat is established under the hegemony of the party.  

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In the initial stages of an ideological development, the infamous leader and one of the first extreme leftist martyrs in Turkey—Mahir Çayan—attempted to develop a two-stage model of revolutionary tactics based upon Marxism-Leninism. First, he envisioned the workers taking the lead, with the peasants playing a supporting role. Yet, in order for the revolution to succeed, the rural population would eventually have to be drawn into a mass popular movement, with "workers taking a back seat."\(^{10}\)

*Devrimci Sol*. In Turkish it means "Revolutionary Left," refers to the specific terrorist group that emerged in 1978, eventually splitting in 1994 to form today’s DHKP-C. The U.S. Department of State describes this group, under "(DHKP/C)" as:

Originally formed in 1978 as *Devrimci Sol*, or *Dev Sol*, a splinter faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front. Renamed in 1994 after factional infighting, it espouses a Marxist ideology and is virulently anti-U.S. and anti-NATO. Finances its activities chiefly through armed robberies and extortion.\(^{11}\)

*Terrorist Tactics*. An aspect of international terrorism concerned with the ways and means of which terrorists performed their actions. Specifically here, this refers to the method of attacking (e.g., assassination, bombing, raking, etc.) the target and/or victim.

**F. NOTE ON TURKISH SPELLING**

Although Atatürk patterned the modern Turkish alphabet after the Latin version, a few modifications were required in order to account for several sounds fully represented in the Latin alphabet. Most of the 29 letters sound the same as in English and most Turkish words are pronounced exactly as written. The following, partial, key is provided to help in properly pronouncing Turkish words (italicized in the text) used in this thesis.

- \(c\) as in 'jail'
- \(ç\) as in 'church'
- \(g\) as in 'get'

\(^{10}\) For details of Çayan’s views see: *Aydınlık* (Istanbul), January 1970, 188-221, quoted in George S. Harris, "The Left in Turkey," *Problems of Communism* 29, no. 4 (1980), 32.

\(^{11}\) U.S. Department of State, Office of Secretary of State, *Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998* (Washington D.C.: Department of State, 1999), Appendix B: *Background Information on Terrorist Groups.*
\[ \ddot{\text{g}} \text{ as in 'y', or 'heighbor'; lengthens the preceding vowel} \]

\[ \text{i as in 'dozen'} \]

\[ \text{i as in 'pin'} \]

\[ \text{j as in 'pleasure'} \]

\[ \text{o as in 'hørde'} \]

\[ \ddot{o} \text{ as in 'urge'} \]

\[ \ddot{s} \text{ as in 'shoe'} \]

\[ \text{u as in 'put'} \]

\[ \dddot{\text{u}} \text{ as in the French word 'rue'} \]
II. BACKGROUND: MODERNIZATION AND VIOLENCE IN TURKEY

"With a few notable exceptions, the political environment of [modernizing countries] after World War II was characterized by increasing ethnic and class conflict, recurring rioting and mob violence, frequent military coups d'etat, the dominance of unstable personalistic leaders who often pursued disastrous economic and social policies, ...arbitrary infringement of the rights and liberties of citizens, ...the pervasive alienation of urban political groups, ...and at times complete disintegration of broadly based political parties."

Samuel P. Huntington (1968)\textsuperscript{12}

There are many political science arguments and theories, which aid in explaining political violence. Yet, following a review of the comparative literature on social movements and revolutions, McAdam, Tarrow and Tilly indicate that any analyses of this phenomenon immediately faces several issues.\textsuperscript{13} First, there are few "general" theories of conflict and revolution. Most scholars focus on narrow elements of the phenomenon, emphasizing different sets of concepts, theoretical issues and comparisons.\textsuperscript{14} Second, most scholars on political violence and revolution focus on the "Western democratic experience," making their theory incompatible in non-Western situations. Finally, many theories focus on the process, rather than the cause; this thesis aims to determine the cause. Therefore, the author uses Samuel P. Huntington's argument and analysis regarding modernization and the need for strong institutions\textsuperscript{15} in explaining Turkey's violence. Huntington's discussions regarding the modernization of developing countries and the potential for violence provided support in explaining violence in Turkey in the second half of the twentieth century.


\textsuperscript{13} Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow and Charles Tilly, "Toward an Integrated Perspective on Social Movements and Revolution," in Comparative Politics: Rationality, Culture, and Structure, Mark I. Lichbach and Alan S. Zuckerman, eds., 142-73 (Cambridge, United Kingdom: The Press Syndicate of the University of Cambridge, 1997), 142.

\textsuperscript{14} Ibid., 143.

\textsuperscript{15} Huntington, 4.
Huntington’s description, although not a direct or exact characterization of Turkey’s modernization process, highlights certain elements of chaos that begin in Turkey during the middle of the twentieth century. Modernization is a multifaceted endeavor, requiring changes in many areas of human activity and thought.\textsuperscript{16} This was certainly true for Turkey, which after World War I began the transition from the Islamic-dominated society of the Ottoman Empire to the secular vision of Mustafa “Atatürk” Kemal—the Turkish Republic’s founding leader. Rapid modernization has characterized the Republic of Turkey—the bridge between Europe and the Middle East (Figure 2–1).

\begin{center}
\textbf{Figure 2–1. Map of Middle East}
\end{center}

\textsuperscript{16} \textit{Ibid.}, 32.
since the end of World War I. Dramatic political, economic and social changes associated with this process provided the fertile ground from which violent leftist terrorism eventually germinated, flourished and expanded. The increased availability of education to the general population and the increased number of college students, their exposure to numerous (often radical) political and economic ideologies often put growing student movements at odds with one another (e.g., leftist vs. rightist vs. Islamist) and the government.

Accompanying political and social unrest and unemployment found in the rapidly growing urban areas of Turkey's largest cities created a pool from which eager, yet sometimes uninformed, militants were recruited; the universities provided the ideologues. As greater numbers of people flooded the cities in search of employment or an education during the 1960s and 1970s, they frequently were confronted with unemployment and a myriad of political philosophies unfamiliar to them, yet which promised solutions to their economic and political predicaments.

The purpose here is to briefly analyze these rapid political, economic, intellectual, urban and employment changes and challenges, especially following the founding of the Second Republic [1960], and explain their impact. In doing so, Huntington's views and theories on the process of modernization and its impact on underdeveloped countries will serve as a guide. As he points out, modernization involves a fundamental shift in a society's values, attitudes and expectations;¹⁷ this could be no truer than what Turkey witnessed in its early history. In order to provide a background picture of these conditions over time and during the particular periods of terrorist activity discussed, this chapter covers 1968 to 1999. The chapters that follow this one will focus more on revolutionary leftists' activities and changes, as well as specifically address their impact on U.S. interests in Turkey.

A. POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC CHANGES AND OPPOSITION

Turkey’s search for economic and political stability has often resulted in dashed hopes and dreams, punctuated by periods of worker, student and political unrest, and on at least four occasions (1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997), military intervention in domestic politics. Successive governments developed and initiated political and economic liberalization strategies without sound political institutions, which often provided no more than short term gains, ending in near bankruptcy and political violence. After 1950, Turkey suffered economic disruptions approximately once per decade, with possibly the most serious crisis occurring in the late 1970s. It is important to note that attempts at economic advancement often did not occur in a stable political environment. Often the embryonic political parties—following Turkey’s move away from a one-party dominant system in the late 1940s—used promised economic improvements to gain the upper hand against rivals, not fully appreciating the impact unsound economic policies would later have on the country. In addition, it is important to understand the attempts and shortcomings of early economic initiatives in order to fully understand some of the elements, which contributed to the rise of some of Europe’s most violent and lethal political activity in the last half of the twentieth century.

1. Political Liberalization

Political modernization involves the rationalization of authority, the replacement of traditional, religious and ethnic political authorities by a single secular, national political authority.\(^{18}\) Such a situation occurred in the early days of the Republic. Since the start of the nationalist movement in Anatolia in 1919, the Turkish polity has suffered dramatic upheavals that have at times threatened to destroy its national being.\(^{19}\) As with other elements of the country, Turkey’s political history has been anything but smooth and tranquil. Coupled with Turkey’s measures to establish a stable economy have been several periods of increased political freedom and liberalization. Yet, as with economic

\(^{18}\) Ibid., 34.

\(^{19}\) Metin Tamkoc, “Stable Instability of the Turkish Polity,” The Middle East Journal 27, no. 3 (1973), 319.
endeavors, politicians have sacrificed long-term stability for short-term political gains. This has ultimately led to increased opposition to the party in power, increased chaos and ultimately political violence. Violence during these periods (e.g., 1971 and 1980) allowed a critical military—concerned with national security—to lose its confidence in the civilian government, often ending in military interventions.

It might be stated that Adnan Menderes and Celal Bayár’s registering of the Democrat Party (DP) in January 1946 initiated Turkey’s troubled path toward political liberalization and a multiparty system. Shortly after the DP’s second successful election [1954] against the Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (CHP) or Republican People’s Party (RPP), Menderes took it as a mandate to make sweeping changes, including reforms of the civil service and state-run enterprises. Yet, serious problems soon began to occur with the new regime. Democrats failed to carry through their promise of greater political liberalization. They remained suspicious of the RPP and determined to reduce its continuing power and influence.

As the government began to come under attack in the late 1950s, Menderes took measures to silence the opposition, including laws limiting the freedom of the Turkish press. Tension increased as the government tightened the law and imposed further restrictions on public assembly. To their critics it seemed the Democrats had moved into the realm of more general repression and were intent upon silencing the opposition with a view to retaining power.\(^{20}\) Unfortunately, the DP and the opposition party (RPP) failed to cooperate and ultimately brought the government to a screeching halt.

Following outbreaks of violent protests in central Anatolia during RPP leader İsmet İnönü’s political tour and the 28 April 1960 violent student demonstration in Istanbul, the country rapidly approached political chaos. The situation was inflamed one week later when military cadets staged a protest march supporting the student demonstrations; this signaled the eventual clash between the military and the civilian government. An answer came to the situation on 27 May 1960, when the military, under

General Cemal Gürsel, seized the government during modern Turkey’s first coup. Thus ended Turkey’s first attempt at political liberalization.

In the two decades after the establishment of a more liberal constitution following the 1960 coup, the government permitted the emergence of parties and movements which moved more and more from the political center. In addition, the 1961 constitution legalized the military’s interference in political matters. The proliferation of parties ultimately resulted in sharp differences in political opinions, eventually leading to an escalation in politically based violence, especially as students increasingly debated their differences at the end of a gun. Huntington seems to account for such a situation, stating such “rapid mobilization of new groups into politics coupled with the slow development of political institutions” produces violence such as found during this period.21 Turkey was not equipped to confront such a situation, since a single party had dominated its first 25 years of existence and its initial attempt otherwise (1950-1960) had failed. Furthermore, Professor Metin Tamkoc states the adoption of a new “liberal constitution in 1961, in theory, gave an end to dictatorial practices and facilitated greatly the expression of ‘socialist’ or Marxist-Leninist-Maoist’ views and ideas…that were totally banned in previous decades…result[ing in] political violence within and between the ranks of the elite.”22

Eventually, the economic and political instability leading up to 1971, drew a “coup-by-memorandum” from the military on 12 March 1971. This time the military pointed to the 1961 constitution to support its involvement in Turkish politics. Although one of the results of this coup was the crackdown on violent groups in general, the government predominately focused on leftist groups (versus rightists), as it viewed them as the “real” threat to national security. This was nothing new. David Barchard illustrated this historical view when he described a 1969 Turkish newspaper photograph

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21 Huntington, 4.
22 Tamkoc, 327.
of the 16 February riots in Istanbul. He described a photograph depicting “a riot policeman standing by impassive as a rightist...menaced the life of a leftist.”23

By 1972, Turkish security forces had decimated most of the violent leftist groups, resulting in many arrests and the fleeing of several influential leftists to Europe. The actions of the military and security forces would not be lost on the revolutionary left. In the decades that followed, leftist terrorists would seek their “revenge” when they focused a great deal of energy on targeting police and military personnel associated with the coups, especially those officials associated with torture in the 1980 coup.

As Turkey approached the 1980s, once again political disputes continued to ramp up. The eventual return of many left-wing militants and continued disputes among those in government contributed greatly to the rapid escalation of political violence in 1978 and 1979. In 1978 alone, there were more than 4,000 separate acts of political violence. By the summer of 1980, experts attributed the loss of 183 lives, on average, per month to the out-of-control violence.24 As it became apparent to the military that the ruling civilian government was unable to create an effective coalition, as well as affect the halting of the devastating political violence, it moved to seize control. On 12 September 1980, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Kenan Evren, informed the country the military had seized control of the government. With that announcement, the military arrested leading political figures and declared martial law throughout the country. Within 13 months, the military government directed all political parties to disband, confiscated their property, and barred all persons previously holding leadership positions in parties from politics for 10 years. The only exceptions were members of the Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi (TBMM) or Turkish Grand National Assembly, who were barred for five years.

According to McFadden, the political system the military dismantled had been “liberal to a fault.” The post-1960 coup constitution facilitated broad access to the

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political process by newly mobilized social and economic groups, and proportional representation of distributing seats in the TBMM encouraged a surfeit of political parties. Lowered restraints on the diversity of political philosophies produced a wide spectrum of political opinions, some of which became represented at the national level. The ultimate result was the paralysis of the polity through severe fragmentation and polarization. This resulted in essentially two situations (not mutually exclusive): the “legal” legislative process became ineffective, and the “illegal” militant organizations turned to armed struggle to defend their ideas. It will later be discussed how, from the different leftist camps that emerged during these turbulent times, sprang Turkey’s future terrorist leaders.

In 1983, following the gradual relaxation of military control, the government still closely monitored political activity and restricted such activities to the limits outlined in the 1982 constitution. On 6 November 1983, the military allowed the participation of three parties (out of an original 12 founded) in the first election since the 1980 coup. The election ended with Turgut Özal becoming Prime Minister. By March 1984, Özal’s government began moving to more liberalization, with the lifting of the 1983 ban on some of the outlawed political parties. Unfortunately, this was not a means to liberalize, rather a stratagem to divide the opposition. This move would ultimately weaken Özal’s party. Continued moves to liberalize the political process in Turkey as it faced (and went through) the 1990s, brought the return of many of the “old guard.” In addition, it allowed for the re-emergence of some leftist organizations, as well as more Islamic parties, such as the Refah Partisi (RP) or Welfare Party. The RP would later become of great concern to the Turkish military and its perceived need to protect the secular path of the Republic. By 1989, the revolutionary left was once again on the rise and by the Gulf War had returned in full force.

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25 Ibid., 69.

26 The three parties allowed to participate were the Anavatan Partisi or Motherland Party, the Halkçı Partisi or Populist Party, and the Millîyetsçî Demokrasi Partisi or Nationalist Democracy Party.

2. Continuous Economic Difficulties

The Turkish economy’s ongoing and turbulent reorientation has left the economy a study in contrasts. The country’s development strategy in the 1950s and 1960s aimed at fostering agricultural and industrial production, improving basic infrastructure, and integrating the rural and urban sectors into a single-market economy. The execution of this plan, supported by International Monetary Fund (IMF) stand-by arrangements throughout the 1960s, resulted in a period of steady and substantial growth for the country. According to Yavuz Canevi, former Undersecretary of Treasury and Foreign Trade (1986–89), Turkey maintained annual growth rates averaging 6 to 7 percent from 1965 through 1977. Yet, as he points out, this economic performance was not without cost.

In order to achieve such economic growth, the government adopted an import substitution strategy, making Turkey critically dependent on imports of capital and intermediate inputs and on strong protection of its domestic markets. This ultimately neglected the country’s export potential and fostered inefficiencies and distortions within the domestic economy. Ultimately, the life of the plan became dependent on external savings, as domestic savings were drained as a result of negative interest rates and discretionary allocation of credit. Compounding this was the need to fill the resulting foreign exchange gap created because of the excessive import dependence.

The first of several crises arrived in August 1958, when Turkey encountered a balance of payments crisis, ending in a devaluation of the Turkish lira. Many economic scholars have pointed out that devaluation was an error, as it only postponed eventual economic collapse; the country should have opted for more comprehensive economic reforms. Because this selected answer to the crisis lacked a sound macroeconomic basis

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30 Ibid., 179.

31 Ibid., 179-80.
and the populist government continued on a road of deficit financing, the situation soon emerged as a political crisis, which on 27 May 1960, coupled with the political weakness of the regime ushered in the first of several military coups.

Unfortunately, the government took no macroeconomic lessons from this crisis. When in 1970, the country faced a second foreign exchange situation, the only answer was another devaluation of the lira. On 12 March 1971, the military made this situation worse when it handed the government a written ultimatum threatening the army would exercise its constitutional duty if a strong credible government was not formed, economic stability regained, and measures undertaken to end political unrest.

Shortly after this, although the situation failed to improve, Turkey experienced a short period of rapid improvement in its balance of payments, actually resulting in a current account surplus. Supporting this were the remittances by Turkish workers who had moved to Europe, which peaked in 1974 with a total of $1.462 million. This would soon be overshadowed by the oil crisis of 1973–74, which led to the quadrupling of oil prices on the international market. Since Turkey was critically dependent on oil as a source of energy, its import bill steeply increased. By the time the second oil crisis arrived in 1979, two-thirds of Turkey’s foreign currency earnings went to meeting its oil needs. Thus, Turkey faced the 1980s in a situation Canevi best describes:

During the years leading up to the crisis (1974-79), annual GNP [Gross National Product] growth had declined to an average of 4.4 percent. The public-sector deficit expanded rapidly from less than 2 percent of GNP in 1974 to more than 6 percent in 1979, averaging 4.5 percent from 1974 to 1979. Thus, Turkey faced the second round of oil price increases with an extremely weak economy, a grossly overvalued currency, virtually no foreign exchange reserves, strongly negative real interest rates, a very high rate of inflation, widespread unemployment, stagnant output, political turmoil, and an external debt in excess of $13.5 billion, more than a quarter of which was short term.

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32 Ibid., 180.
33 Zürcher, 280.
34 Ibid., 280-1.
35 Canevi, 182.
Finally realizing the need for serious economic reforms, the new Süleyman Demirel government initiated a major change in the orientation of Turkish economic policy, introducing a major and comprehensive economic stabilization package. The job was given to the under-secretary for economic affairs in charge of planning, Turgut Özal, a powerful technocrat. The program initiated in January 1980, aimed not only at redressing the economic situation, but also at changing the development strategy Turkey had followed for several decades. Even so, this did not prevent the military, in the face of crippling political violence between the left and right (and other internal security concerns), from leaving their barracks and assuming control on 12 September 1980. Upon the establishment of a new government, the military appointed Özal to continue the implementation and further strengthening of the already-introduced reforms.36

Although the economy improved following the 1980 coup, the rapid resurgence of growth and the improvement in the balance of payments were insufficient to overcome unemployment and inflation. Although, the official jobless rate fell from 15 percent in 1979 to 11 percent in 1980, it rose again to 13 percent in 1985.37 This was partly attributed to a dramatic increase in the labor force. In addition, the same pattern occurred regarding inflation, with a steep increase to 40 percent by 1984 from a low of 25 percent in 1981-82.38 The next economic beating would come in 1991, during the Gulf War. The United Nations (UN) embargo on Iraq required the ending of oil exports through the Cayhan pipelines, causing the loss of pipeline fees. Compounding this was the estimated loss of $3 billion in trade with Iraq.39 Extreme leftist groups pointed to this as yet another example of the imperialist west, especially the U.S., controlling Turkey’s economy and foreign policy.

In 1994, once again, Turkey found its economy in crisis. The government’s decision to increase civil servant salaries and to increase transfers to state enterprises two

36 Ibid., 182.
37 Turkey: A Country Study, 156.
38 Ibid., 156.
39 Ibid., 156-7.

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years earlier enlarged the public-sector borrowing requirement to a record 17 percent of Gross National Product (GDP) in 1993. Although this boosted domestic demand, by mid-1993 inflation had increased to 73 percent. In addition, the resulting rise in the real exchange rate increased imports, yet slowed expansion of exports. By 1993, the trade deficit had risen to $14 billion and the current account deficit was at 6.3 billion. 40 The situation continued to get worse as domestic and international confidence in Turkey’s ability to manage its balance of payments problem weakened. By the beginning of 1994, Turkey had lost two Central Bank governors as a result of sharp disagreements between the bank and the government on how best to solve the country’s economic crisis.

Turkey’s economic difficulties (and poor decisions) compounded its ability to establish sound political institutions, which were not matching social expectations. This contributed to the violence-prone environment and instability implied. 41 A review of past and recent left-wing terrorist communiqués and Internet documents sharply illustrates such groups’ interest in the well being of the country, as well as their use of it to attract support. In 1992, a Devrimci Sol communiqué issued following the assassinations of several prominent Turkish security officials, specifically pointed out their displeasure with the economic situation and unemployment by stating: “We must demand jobs and housing. We have a right to a life with dignity. If we do not raise our voice, they [the Turkish Government] will continue to deprive us of bread, jobs, and the lives of our children.” 42 In the 1999 edition of the DHKP-C’s revolutionary program document, 43 the organization devotes a large section to criticizing the government’s mishandling of the economy, promising better times under “Marxist–Leninist” leadership. Specifically, the document states that

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40 Ibid., 157.

41 Huntington, 49-59.

42 Alexander and Pluchinsky, 254.

...the anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution will put an end to the economic hegemony of the oligarchy and imperialism because they hinder the development of the productive forces and the economic growth of the country. It will take action to ensure that all resources and products will serve to increase the wealth of the people, and it will make possible the free development of the productive forces.44

B. URBANIZATION AND UNEMPLOYMENT

Another result and measure of modernization is the growth of the city.45 Turkey eventually underwent a substantial redistribution of its population. By 1986, forty-six percent of Turkey’s population was concentrated in a few large cities. For example, Istanbul’s population rose from 1 million in 1950 to over 5 million by 1986.46 Many experts point to the explosive growth in and around Turkey’s largest cities as it modernized as a contributing factor to violence and the left-wing extremism witnessed following the 1950s. According to a 1991 RAND study,

...the emergence and escalation of political terrorism in Turkey took place just after the country’s social scene had undergone rapid and far-reaching changes...the most important...[being] the transformation of Turkey from a predominantly rural society to an increasingly urban one.47

Turkey’s population increased from 21 million in 1950 to 52 million in 1986.48 Rapid urbanization continued to drastically shift the Turkish population, resulting in the urban population increasing from 19 percent in 1950 to over 40 percent in 1975; an estimated 650,000 villagers and townspeople annually moved to the larger cities in the mid-1970s.49 According to data (Table 2–1) provided in a World Bank report, this

44 Ibid.
45 Huntington, 72.
46 Yapp, 310.
48 Yapp, 309.
49 Sayari and Hoffman, 3.
pattern began early in the Republic’s history. As might be expected, urban populations were much greater consumers of services such as health care and education than were people living in the rural areas.

The movement of the population to cities not equipped to welcome them gave rise to the term *gecekondu*—literally “set up overnight”—referring to the makeshift structures self-assembled in the urban areas of cities to house the newly arrived population. According to Sabri Sayari, the *gecekondu* population increased from 1.2 million to 7.5 million between 1960 and 1985.\(^{50}\) The rapid shift in population was the result of many things. First, there was an increase in fertility rates, leading to a larger available work force. Second, the introduction of mechanized agricultural methods meant a decreased need for the traditional agricultural laborers. These two factors combined to form an extremely under utilized workforce. The ending result was the migration of this “unneeded” population to Turkey’s major cities (i.e., Ankara, Adana, Izmir, and Istanbul; see Figure 2–2), where the “industrial and economical advancement” of the cities promised much needed employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YEAR</th>
<th>TOTAL POPULATION (Million)</th>
<th>URBAN POPULATION (Percent of Total)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1935</td>
<td>16.60</td>
<td>16.27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>17.82</td>
<td>18.10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1945</td>
<td>18.79</td>
<td>18.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>20.95</td>
<td>18.73</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>24.06</td>
<td>22.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>27.75</td>
<td>26.20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>31.39</td>
<td>29.77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>35.67</td>
<td>35.09</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**Table 2–1. Turkish Urban Population Growth, 1935-70**

\(^{50}\) *Ibid.*, 5.
Unfortunately, the envisioned employment was unavailable, leaving many people marginally employed or unemployed. Early labor surplus figures (Figure 2-3) provide an illustration of the steady increase in potential employment. In fact, by the time of the first episode of violence and the 1971 military coup, total labor surplus rates exceeded 10 percent. This new group, without work, compounded the situation further as they were unable to afford available housing, thus the establishment of the gecekondu. It is here that many of the new problems arose for the administrators of these large cities, who were not prepared to meet the demands for transportation, water and electricity of such a rapid increase in population. The economic problems the Turkish government faced in the late 1970s and early 1980s compounded this dilemma, resulting in little financial relief to these areas. Unfortunately, the cities were unable to provide for this urban population, which became a very restless mass and began to apply pressure on local governments, demanding they be heard.

As will be discussed later, Turkish terrorism—especially the left—originated in Turkey’s two largest cities: Istanbul and Ankara; also the locations of most of the major universities. Until the 1950’s, the state-run universities were geared to educate a select
number of young people for recruitment into political and professional elite positions. With the increase in urban populations, the universities began to feel the impact, straining its previous elitist orientation. With the increase in rural student applications, the student population began to change, bringing with it the openness to newly introduced ideas. Coupled with this was the diminished guarantee of employment or upward social mobility after university.

This concern over future employment steadily contributed to a volatile atmosphere within Turkish universities. As Huntington suggests, increases in education—among other things—often give rise to enhanced aspirations and expectations, which, if not satisfied, galvanize groups into politics. Furthermore, as the

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51 Ibid., 8.

52 Huntington, 47.
theories of Marx, Lenin and Mao—coupled with discussions of the “revolutions” throughout the world during the 1970s—became hotly debated topics within the student population, violence eventually exploded on the campuses. Turkish campuses became arenas in which left-and-left, as well as left-and-right, battled over political and ideological disagreements.

The combination of the poor and unemployed populations of the *gecekondu* and the increased politicization of the university student population created a resourceful situation for terrorist groups on both sides. The newly emerged revolutionary left groups found a plentiful source of recruits in the unemployed and disenfranchised youth of the *gecekondu*. In fact, many analysts point to the relationship between urbanization and extremism in Turkey, particularly emphasizing the contribution of *gecekondu* to the escalation of the armed movement. In addition, Kemal Karpat, an expert on the *gecekondu* phenomenon in Turkey, argues that no other factor

...contributed as much to social and political change and, indirectly, to political unrest in Turkey as the agglomeration of rural migrant settlements around the major cities of Turkey.... Alienated youth in the *gecekondu* and elsewhere in the cities provided a large recruitment pool for every militant, radical, and terrorist group.  

Needless to say, Turkey’s modernization and the resulting (and continuing) political and economic instability contributed to the emergence of terrorism. The country’s difficulty in establishing a sound democratic base and a toleration of opposition parties during periods of increased liberalization, prohibited it from escaping potential political violence. Compounding this is the ups-and-downs of the economy. Although some economic experts indicate Turkey is slowly moving to a more sound economy such a situation remained elusive to previous Ankara regimes. This led to increased unemployment and unrest among the population, especially the students.

This chapter illustrated the turbulent and unpredictable political and economical environment from which revolutionary leftist groups initially emerged. Turkey’s continued problems in these areas have made it difficult to find a solution to the problem.

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53 Sayari and Hoffman, 12.
of terrorism. Even so, these factors are not the sole reason for the left’s existence. As will be discussed later, Ankara’s brutal attacks on the left and continued alleged human rights violations served to provide reasons for leftist activities. The following chapters focus on the terrorists and their attacks on U.S. interests in Turkey.
III. EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT

"The People's Liberation Army of Turkey believes that the liberation of our people and the independence of our country will be achieved by armed struggle and that this course is the only course.... Our aim is to liquidate American and all foreign enemies, destroy the traitors and establish a fully independent Turkey cleared of the enemy."

Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu Manifesto (1971) 54

It can be said that none of the armed left-wing terrorist organizations active in Turkey today (or those operating in the recent past) are new. For the most part, their origin extends back to Turkey's turbulent political and economic past discussed earlier. The Turkish revolutionary left emerged out of the new political freedoms of the 1960s and 1970s, when radical left-wing publications, organizations and parties were allowed to flourish. 55 In fact, İmset states "their roots go back to a special student’s club, the Fikir Kulüpleri Federasonu (FKF) or Federation of Idea Clubs active during the 1960s." 56 He suggests, as does Andrew Corsun, a terrorist expert with the U.S. Department of State (DOS), that radicalized student movements as the FKF gave birth to Turkey's first left-wing terrorist groups.

In addition, these groups partly evolved in the late 1960s as a result of the radical student protest movements common in Europe and the United States, where the disaffected left rallied around such issues as U.S. imperialism, the Vietnam conflict, nuclear weapons proliferation, the plight of the Palestinian people, and the need to support third world revolutionary struggles. 57 Once certain elements (and individuals) of the FKF became mobilized and made the decision to engage in an "armed struggle," the groundwork was founded for some of Turkey's most violent and lethal leftist

54 Margaret Krahenbuhl, Political Kidnappings in Turkey, 1971-1972 (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1977), 106.

55 Graham E. Fuller, Turkey Revisited: Reflections on Turkish Society and Culture after 20 Years of Absence (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1988), 22.

56 İmset, 407.

57 Corsun, 14.
organizations. In addition, leftists soon projected their hatred further, singling out the U.S. as a key source of Turkey’s problems. Soon after, revolutionary leftists began targeting U.S. interests.

The focus here is on the initial emergence of the revolutionary left in Turkey, specifically the period immediately leading up to the 12 March 1971 coup. This requires an analysis of the key student organizations from which the left emerged, as well as key radicalized student leaders. This discussion is accomplished though a detailed review of specific acts and consequences of these groups, the leaders, and the terrorist groups that emerged. Parallel to this is the decision by some student leaders to violently oppose the government, rather than seek change through less violent and politically acceptable methods. Finally, during this period the left decided to target U.S. interests. As will be seen, U.S. actions and their perceived influence in Turkish domestic affairs “validated” the left’s worst “imperialistic” fears. This, coupled with Turkey’s membership in NATO, ultimately served to rationalize the decision to target U.S. interests.

A. STUDENT MOVEMENTS AND INITIAL ACTIONS

The 1960s saw the rise of new actors on the Turkish political stage, most notably the extreme left. One of the unique characteristics separating the sixties movements from past leftist activity was the organized and violent manner in which they pursued their ends. In their new forms, the left was a product of the economic development of the period since 1960, of the process of urbanization, of the expansion of education, in particular of the considerable growth of universities, and of the growth of anti-Western sentiments. The first leaders of Turkish leftist terrorist groups were products of early 1960s student movements, especially the FKF.

During the late 1960s, as the student unrest of the West reached Turkey, the FKF—termed a side-arm of the Türkiye İşçi Partisi (TIP) or Turkish Labor Party founded in 1965—stood as a single and united entity representative of left-wing activities. However, in October 1969, as the disputes and debates began to rage over ideology and

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58 Yapp, 318.
political objectives, the FKF emerged as Devrimci Genç (Dev Genç) or the Revolutionary Youth Organization.\(^{59}\) According to İmset, the influential Turkish leftist Mahir Çayan\(^ {60}\) (and his followers) seized control of the Dev Genç Central Administrative Committee in 1970.

In November 1970, Çayan (Figure 3–1) and his followers decided to establish the Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (THKP-C) or Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front in Ankara. The new leaders would be Mahir Çayan, Ertüğrul Kürkçü, Münir Ramazan Akpolga, and Yusuf Küpeli. In January 1971, the group announced the establishment of the THKP. According to their plan, THKP was to be the political leader of the movement, while the THKP-C would conduct the armed activities of the

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\(^{59}\) Dev Genç is credited as the first truly organized militant leftist organization in Turkey.

\(^{60}\) Imset, 408. For most Turkish radicals, Mahir was the founder of the Armed Propaganda Strategy which he based on the assumption that in order to pacify the people and keep them under control, the “Turkish oligarchy,” in cooperation with western imperialism, had instituted a suni denge (artificial balance) based on a betterment of living standards and fear of the state. Unless the “balance” was tilted and the people were shown that the state was not as strong as it claimed and that it was proved the state was not immune, there could be no revolution in Turkey. Armed propaganda—armed activities directed at selective targets—according to Mahir, was the only basic strategy which could diffuse this artificial balance and give the people the courage to side with the revolution.
organization. Upon the establishment of the group, THKP-C leaders quickly moved to establish urban guerilla groups and decided to concentrate activities on the youth and workers sectors in Istanbul, Ankara, Izmir, Adana and the Black Sea region.

At the same time, another militant group emerged on the scene; radical students essentially populated it as well. This group was the Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO) or Turkish People’s Liberation Army. It came to the world’s attention when on 4 March 1971, THKO militants kidnapped four USAF airmen on their way back to Ankara from an installation outside of the city. Later that day, someone delivered a ransom note to the Turkish Radio and Television (TRT) organization, demanding $400,000 ransom and that the THKO manifesto be broadcast over TRT; the kidnappers set a 36-hour deadline for their demands to be met or the hostages would be killed. At 1600 that day, President Richard Nixon held a news conference and stated he would not recommend the Turkish Government bargain with the kidnappers.

Eventually, on 5 March, the Turkish Government searched the Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi or Middle East Technical University (METU), and a number of houses and apartments in attempts to locate the hostages—none of their efforts located the four airmen. The government’s actions led to increased tension between it and the universities. On 8 March, the Turkish National Police (TNP) responded to an unrelated domestic incident at the apartment building where the THKO was holding the airmen. After the police departed, the THKO terrorists became concerned the police were aware of where they were and fled the area. By midnight that day, the airmen realized they were alone and escaped. On 12 March 1971, the army, led by General Memduh Tağmaç, took action, forced the Demirel government to resign and installed a new government.

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61 Ibid., 409. According to İmset, a review of both groups' histories reveals there was little difference in the two and they were essentially the same group.

62 See Appendix I for translated manifesto.

63 Krahembuhl, 27.

64 Yapp, 319.
As a result of the Turkish military’s 12 March 1971 “coup-by-memorandum” the THKP-C accelerated their activities before they completed the organizational process, as to “remove the mask of the oligarchy” and prove that the coup was backed by the United States.\footnote{Imset, 409.} On 17 May 1971, the group’s first significant action was the abduction and assassination of Ephraim Elrom, the Israeli Consul to Istanbul.\footnote{According to a RAND Corporation study, terrorists demanded the release of all guerillas the Turkish Government had in custody for Elrom’s safe return. The government subsequently rejected the group’s demands, launching a house-to-house search. On 23 May, security forces discovered Elrom’s body in an apartment; he had been shot to death. For more information see: Brian M. Jenkins and Janera Johnson, \textit{International Terrorism: A Chronology, 1968-1974} (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1975) and Krahenbuhl.} This incident established the presence of the THKP-C and spread the group’s name throughout Turkey. Although Çayan hoped to expose the “Western exploitation...[through] developing markets in allied countries” with his armed propaganda, Turkish security forces captured him (1 June 1971) and cut short his organization’s activities.

Although on 29 November 1971, Çayan escaped from prison, Turkish security forces later killed him and the majority of THKP-C leadership during a security forces’ operation on 30 May 1972. The government initiated the operation when eleven THKP-C and THKO militants kidnapped a Canadian and two British NATO technicians, commonly referred to as the “Kizildere Operation.” The terrorists demanded the release of three THKO leaders—Deniz Gezmiş, Yusuf Aslan and Hüseyin İnan (Figure 3–2)—awaiting execution.\footnote{The Turkish Government had tried, convicted and sentenced the three to death for their part in the kidnapping of four USAF airmen.} When authorities refused this demand, the militants demanded safe passage to the Syrian border.\footnote{Krahenbuhl, 72.} By 1400 on 30 May, the militants and the Turkish Government forces surrounding the hideout began to exchange gunfire. At 1610, government forces entered the hideout shooting after hearing “explosions” inside the house, finding all three technicians dead. According to the self-appointed “spokes group”—DHKC—for the Turkey’s present revolutionary left, the “British hostages
[were] punished [italics added] as had been threatened earlier,” following the killing of Çayan, who DHKC credits as the first member of the militants to “fall” in the incident.⁶⁹


Figure 3–2. THKO Leaders Gezmiş, Gezmiş Standing at His Trial, Aslan and Inan

During this operation, Turkish security killed ten THKP-C members.⁷⁰ Following the Kizildere operation, the government had technically crushed THKP-C and most of the remaining members, including Çayan’s spouse Gulten, left the country.⁷¹ It would be several years before the revolutionary left would return to Turkey to wage their armed struggle. Yet, from the protection of central Europe—which became a significant safe harbor for Turkish leftists—the remaining members of both THKO and THKP-C pondered their loss and began formulating their return and the continuation of the struggle.

⁶⁹ Legend after Legend: An Epic of Revolutionary Struggle (London: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front Information Bureau, 1998), 17.

⁷⁰ Depending on the source (e.g., Turkish Government or Turkish leftists), the number of terrorists security forces killed during Kizildere ranges from 9 to 11.

⁷¹ Imset, 411.
B. TERRORISM AS A MEANS OF OPPOSITION

Following World War II, President İsmet İnönü announced that the time had come to move towards democracy. A small group immediately broke ranks from the ruling party and established the Democrat Party discussed earlier, which eventually sought and came to power in the early 1950s. The DP victory was a remarkable and devastating victory but in many ways its most interesting feature was that an authoritarian regime should have permitted it.\(^2\) For the first time in recent memory, an authoritarian regime had freely competed with an opposition and lost, then allowed a peaceful transfer of power. Many saw this as a significant evolution of Turkey’s political system.

If Turkey was on the road to political evolution and democracy, what happened? The specific questions are: Why did certain elements of the leftist movement in Turkey select terrorism as their method of opposition to Ankara? Why did the U.S. become a significant target of terrorism? In part, after the 1950 election, the country would soon realize their political evolution was nowhere near complete. For by the end of 1960, the military would stage the first of many coups and execute the Democrat Party’s founder. The first question is answered in the student activities and government reactions to these activities during Turkey’s modernization process, as previously described. The second question concerns Turkey’s entry into NATO—which most saw as an extension of U.S. policy—and the perceived role both NATO and the U.S. had within Turkey.

Terrorism is not just violence. It includes acts of violence, yet these acts are intended to influence a wider audience, and to send that audience a message.\(^3\) Who is the audience? In most cases it is the regime, the international stage, another country (e.g., the U.S.), and most importantly the population. Therefore, terrorism is often referred to as a method of demonstrating opposition to a government outside customary channels and processes of “peaceful” opposition. Within the context of this thesis the focus is on revolutionary left terrorism primarily confined within the borders of Turkey; yet, a

\(^2\) Yap, 166.

significant percentage of the terrorist acts were directed at international targets—primarily the United States.

According to Martha Crenshaw, a group’s lack of opportunity for political participation or available avenues of political opposition can motivate that group to engage in terrorism. Furthermore, regimes that deny access to power and persecute dissenters create dissatisfaction. Couple with this, if the regime’s repression is inefficient, revolutionary terrorists have a better chance of emerging.\(^74\) As Turkey modernized, its student population increased, and moves to political modernization became apparent with the 1950 election, the volatile environment Crenshaw suggests began taking shape.

In the liberalized atmosphere of the time just prior to the Democrat Party’s rise, people (and groups) soon openly expressed ideological attitudes ranging from racialism to communism. In addition, segments of the population began criticizing specific actors and policies, especially those of the RPP, quickly rose, both in quantity and intensity.\(^75\) Around this same time, several student organizations emerged with distant connections to political influence in Turkish history. As they emerged in the environment of increased education and rising student population, actors connected to the newly liberalized political parties began funding and using these organizations for their political agendas—as well as against their political opponents. As the members of an opposition-supported student organization began expressing their dissent with the current regime’s policies, the regime responded closing that organization and making it illegal. In earlier actions, the Ankara regime actually sponsored attacks on student organizations opposing them. For example, in 1945, the RPP sponsored a violent demonstration against an opposition organization in Istanbul, which ended with the destruction of the opposition’s publishing and distribution offices.\(^76\)


\(^76\) *Ibid.*, 34.
When the DP came to power in 1950, a similar pattern began. Under the increased liberalization of the time, opposition grew, especially that of the left. Lacking a tradition of tolerance of dissent, the DP soon began retaliating against its opposition. It accomplished this by moving to control the activities of the RPP, as well as student organizations that supported it. By the end of the 1950s, the Democrat Party appeared to be moving to quash the opposition, in an attempt to return to a one-party dominant system.\(^77\) In 1960, the actions of the DP had created an environment prone to violence as an expression of dissent. In reaction to this, the military stepped in and took control. Thus ended the Second Republic.

Yet, this cycle of periodic repression would continue into the 1960s and 1970s, reinforcing the belief within the student population—especially the left—that the only means to opposition was through a revolution, as it appeared the government had closed all doors of peaceful opposition. With the 1980 coup, this cycle of violence would take on a new, more intense character with the severe and alleged brutal put down of leftist terrorism. The regime’s actions during this period would provide immense justification, in the eyes of the revolutionary left, to battle the regime. The circumstances of the 1980 coup will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter.

C. IMPERIALISM: TARGETING THE UNITED STATES

Following the successful avoidance of World War II, Turkey began to enjoy better relations with the West, specifically the United States. As one of the original aims of the founders of Turkey was to modernize in the “Western” way—including its military—it was only natural that Turkey would seek membership in the newly established North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). Once NATO was established, first a RPP government and then a DP regime earnestly endeavored to gain admission. In those days of cold war intensity, foreign policy was bipartisan in Turkey, and the U.S. connection was welcomed by virtually everyone.\(^78\) Because of the rise of the Cold War

\(^77\) Yap, 10.

and Turkey's strategic position on Europe's eastern flank and proximity to its historical enemy of Russia, such a relationship seemed a positive situation for both Europe and Turkey.

In 1952, NATO formally accepted Turkey as a member. Although welcomed by many in the government, outside the government, some elements did not see the move as positive, especially certain members within the Turkish left. Increasingly, such elements came to perceive the West and its institutions, specifically the U.S. and NATO as exercising too much influence in Turkish affairs. Within the revolutionary left, one common theme began to appear and became constant: the need to combat U.S. imperialism and its influence in Turkey. The eventual U.S. attitude towards Turkey's role in Cyprus validated the revolutionary left's fears.

A discussion regarding violence and terrorism directed at U.S. interests in Turkey would not be complete without first reviewing early Turkish-U.S. relations regarding Turkey's role in Cyprus. In 1964, Turkey intended to occupy the Northern section of Cyprus to protect the interests of the Turkish-speaking Cypriots. Before undertaking such a move, Ankara informed the U.S. as a courtesy to an ally. The U.S. response was less than welcomed. In June, before the Turks could dispatch forces, President Lyndon Johnson sent Prime Minister İnönü a harsh letter warning that NATO might not protect Turkey from Soviet intervention if Turkey took military action on Cyprus. 79 This obvious threat was leaked to the Turkish media with devastating effects on Turkish-U.S. relations. 80 Turkey did not attack Cyprus, but many within the political establishment as well as the general population felt a sense of overwhelming betrayal by a trusted friend.

Public resentment against the U.S. was intense; the incident marked the end of the era of unquestioning diplomatic cooperation with Washington. 81 By 1970, student anti-U.S. protests (Figure 3–3) began to occur and the left in general became more confident in their opposition to the U.S. presence. Pressure from leftist elements—who now took

79 Ibid., 32.


81 Long and Reich, 33.
up the cry of moving Turkey out of NATO—forced the Ankara regime to review its alliance. The result was a restriction of U.S. privileges and activities compared to times prior to the incident. In 1974, when a Greek-backed junta staged a coup in Cyprus, Ankara invaded, eventually occupying 40 percent of the island. The U.S. Congress condemned Turkey’s military action.\textsuperscript{82} In fact, the U.S. Congress levied an arms embargo on the Republic lasting into the late 1970s. For many Turks, such acts represented serious U.S. interference in matters of Turkish security—the U.S. had gone too far.

A final example of the revolutionary left’s fears of U.S. imperialism came in Turkey’s 1973 banning of opium farming, following U.S. pressure. Although the U.S. agreed to compensate the loss to the extent of $35 million, the Turkish government later claimed the amount fell short and that and estimated 100,000 families had virtually lost their livelihood.\textsuperscript{83} Although a year later, the government announced the cultivation of

\textsuperscript{82} Fay, 20.

opium would resume on state farms, the U.S. involvement would not be lost on the revolutionary left or the rural population.

These episodes of U.S. interference in Turkish affairs were not lost on the emerging revolutionary left in the sixties and seventies, who viewed such acts as direct imperialistic power threats to Turkish security. Leftist terrorists now viewed the U.S. and NATO through the same eyes. A review of an early THKO manifesto published in 1971 illustrates this when it stated: “Use the weapon in your hands for the sake of the liberation of our country. Oppose the commanders under orders to NATO and the interest of the traitors fed by Americans.”

The U.S. (through NATO) now represented a foreign invader who had to be fought.

D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1968-71

Between 1968 and 1971, Turkey encountered its initial bout with leftist terrorism, especially as it impacted non-Turkish interests like the United States. A review of recorded incidents of international terrorism—especially those directed at U.S. interests—provides insight into the characteristics of the revolutionary left, its tactics, targets and impact on U.S. interests. The following figures illustrate this impact, the variations in leftists’ methods and the selection of U.S. targets, as well as the fluctuation in violence and its link to the political conditions at the time. This section reviews data recorded between 1968 through 12 March 1971, the day the Turkish military intervened.

During this period, Turkey witnessed 48 incidents of international terrorism. Of these, the data indicates leftists or suspected leftists perpetrated 44 incidents (Figure 3–4); 43 of which concerned activities directed at or involving U.S. interests (Figure 3–5). Predominantly, leftists targeted the U.S. military, presumably as it represented their new enemy (NATO) and was easily identified. Supporting this, a review of individual incidents during this period indicates several occurred at NATO sites where U.S. military

84 Krahenbuhl, 106-11.

85 See Appendix D for a complete chronology of international incidents of terrorism in Turkey between 1968 and 1999. See Appendices E through H for graphical representation of data for the same period.
were assigned. The level of incidents peaked in early 1971, and as might be expected, dramatically fell following military intervention on 12 March 1971.

![Graph showing the number of terrorist incidents in Turkey from 1968 to 1971.](image)

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 3–4. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1968-71**

Revolutionary leftists confined the majority of their activities to Turkey’s four largest cities, especially Ankara and Istanbul. This coincides with the fact that university students, who attended school in one of these large cities, established their movements in these two cities and wished initially to appeal to the population of the city. In addition, the majority of their targets—U.S. military and diplomatic interests—were located in or near one of these four cities. Over 26 incidents alone occurred in Ankara (Figure 3–6), the location where Gezmiş allegedly established his group THKO.

In the early 1970s, Turkish leftists were rather unsophisticated, conducting operations (e.g., bombings, raking, and Molotov cocktail attacks) which required little planning. A review of tactics recorded during this time appears to support this. Bombings (and attempted bombings) accounted for over 65 percent (Figure 3–7) of all
leftist acts against U.S. targets. This coincides with a similar pattern RAND researchers identified in the spectrum of worldwide international terrorism during the 1970s and 1980s.\(^{87}\) Bombs provided a dramatic, yet fairly easy and often risk-free, means for the revolutionary left to draw attention to their cause. In this respect, bombings did not require the same organizational expertise, logistics and knowledge required of more complicated or sophisticated operations, such as kidnapping, assassination, and assaults against defended targets.\(^{88}\) The use of unsophisticated methods supports the fact that the

\(^{86}\) Between 1968 and 1971, there were no recorded incidents of leftist targeting of U.S. interests other than “military” and “diplomat-government”.


\(^{88}\) *Ibid.*, 4-5.
revolutionary left in Turkey had little "terrorist" experience going into the 1970s, thus it initiated less taxing—yet effective—methods of attacks.

![Graph showing the number of leftist incidents against U.S. interests, 1968-71.](image)

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 3–6. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1968-71**

Although terrorists caused nearly 50 deaths between 1970 and 1972, leftist attacks claimed no U.S. lives during this period, inflicting mostly property damage. Even so, following the 12 March 1971 military intervention, THKC-P and THKO militants did kidnap and murder the Israeli Consul to Istanbul, and three NATO technicians (one Canadian, two British) during the Kizildere operation. As previously mentioned, this marked the end of the revolutionary left activity during this period.

The data collected for this time period indicates a relatively new terrorist group, as their preferred use of bombings illustrates. The fact most incidents occurred in the

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four largest cities parallels the claim that this initial movement was primarily one involving restless students attending the university and the new urban youth. Furthermore, leftist attacks on U.S. military and diplomatic establishments demonstrated the revolutionary left’s new found hatred for NATO and U.S. imperialism, not to mention most of these targets were in close striking distance from the large cities.

![Pie chart showing percentages of different tactics used against U.S. interests, 1968-71.]

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 3-7. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1968-71**

Although terrorist activities during this time were unsophisticated and Turkish security forces halted them by 1972, the revolutionary leftists who survived never forgot Kizildere or the cause. As the period leading up to the 1980 coup illustrates, they would soon return, bringing the nation to the brink of civil war. In addition, evolution within the revolutionary left soon spawned a most violent and sophisticated group Ankara (as well as the U.S.) had to contend with during the late 1970s, and ultimately in the early 1990s—*Devrimci Sol*. 
IV. DEVIRIMCI SOL: RE-EMERGENCE OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT

“We repudiate all agreements that strengthen imperialism. We stand against the whole economic, political and military presence of imperialism in our country. We want the U.S. and NATO bases to be closed and all the bilateral agreements to be annulled. ... We will continue to target imperialist bases, U.S. installations, agents, and officials unless the imperialist murderers take their hands off our country and leave.”


Although Turkish security forces delivered a crushing blow to the county’s first revolutionary leftist organizations—THKP-C and THKO—they did not destroy the movement. In addition to Ankara’s continued political and economic difficulties, three other important factors significantly contributed to the movement’s survival. They were the establishment of revolutionary leftist martyrs (e.g., Çayan) at Kizildere, the escape of some key leftist terrorists to Europe and Syria, and the new civilian government’s political amnesty in 1974. These events provided a psychological foundation and productive environment in which the revolutionary left was able to evaluate “what went wrong,” regroup, and with the amnesty and accompanying increased political freedom once again advertise their cause and practice their “armed struggle” against the “fascist” Ankara regime and U.S. imperialism.

During the interim period between coups, the revolutionary left would surge and Çayan’s Marxist-Leninist ideology would spread through many sectors of the Turkish population, not just the student groups. Such an ideology, hostile to a government unable to provide a sufficient number of jobs, began to appeal to those in economic dire straits in Turkey’s overcrowded urban centers. In addition, unlike before, Turkey would not only witness the return of terrorism, but also a dramatic increase in intensity and the number of groups involved. As some Turkish scholars have stated, Turkey faced an undeclared civil war by 1980.

A. MARTYRS, ESCAPE AND POLITICAL AMNESTY

Kizildere and the resulting deaths of several founding leftist leaders provided a key (psychological) element for the revolutionary left’s survival into the mid-1970s and beyond. Specifically, it was Kizildere where THKP-C’s Mahir Çayan—a key Turkish Marxist ideologue—became the militant left’s first martyr and forever a symbol of its revolutionary struggle in Turkey. For a great many radical leftists, Çayan represented Turkey’s “Che.”91 Parallel to this, and just as important for many revolutionary leftists, were the 6 May 1972 executions (martyrdom) of THKO founder Gezmis and his two accomplices for their 1971 kidnapping of four USAF airmen. Many leftists viewed Gezmis, although considered more of a militant than an ideologue, as Çayan’s counterpart in the THKO. With one swift blow, Turkish security had not only killed the key leadership of the early revolutionary left, but unknowingly contributed to the movement’s existence by handing them martyrs.

Although the government had killed or imprisoned the majority of THKP-C and THKO leadership, many in the movement successfully escaped to Europe and the Middle East, where they were safe and permitted to regroup. For example, the only immediate remaining elements of the movement—Çayan’s spouse Gulten and several of Çayan’s colleagues—had fled to Europe. Although some leftists escaped to Syria, the majority of Turkish terrorists fleeing there were Kurdish separatists, especially members of the newly founded Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan (PKK) or Kurdish Worker’s Party. Thus, the remnants of the extreme left laid low for the most part and Turkey witnessed an inactive militant left between 1972 and 1974. Even though leftist terrorism quieted following the crackdown, those militants who had fled were busy continuing the “fight” outside Turkey.

Çayan’s spouse and a group of sympathizers attempted to establish a following in Paris, referred to as the temporary “X-group”. The group never really obtained a significant following and was short lived, as it came up wanting in armed activities and

91 “Che” refers to Ernesto “Che” Guevara. Although considered a “hero” and revolutionary theorist of the successful 1959 Fidel Castro Cuban revolution against the dictatorship of Fulgencio Batista, Guevara’s later attempt at launching a rural guerrilla campaign and revolution in Bolivia failed.
was based outside Turkey. For Turkish revolutionary leftists the “X-group” represented a false struggle, as the group was unable to match talk with action (i.e., armed struggle) and was not active in Turkey. Even so, many Turkish leftists concentrated on evaluating mistakes made during their initial challenge to the Ankara regime unmolested outside the country. Of particular importance, these refugee leftists established support networks in central Europe among the expatriates (Turkish immigrant workers) who had come to Europe in search of employment in the 1960s and 1970s. In addition, they found sources of economic support in this community—voluntarily or through extortion.

One of the final factors contributing to the revolutionary left’s successful return in the late-seventies was a government amnesty. On 15 May 1974, the Turkish Parliament passed a general amnesty ultimately leading to the release (or reduced sentences) of nearly 50,000 political prisoners. This paved the way for an infusion of old (as well as new) terrorists, as many of those in jail had not renounced their fight against the government. In fact, many leftists imprisoned mingled together in Turkey’s barracks-style facilities, able to fully evaluate their errors and plan further actions upon release. Furthermore, many had mingled with other non-political prisoners who they (terrorists) in some cases recruited.

According to İmset, with the 1974 general amnesty, the first serious splinters also began to appear, as many revolutionary leftists criticized Çayan’s struggle as pacified—his followers were not engaging in an “armed struggle” in Turkey. As would be expected, segments of the revolutionary left began to grow calling for a return to Turkey, to return to fighting “the war.” From within this movement developed two of the more prominent groups, and most familiar to U.S. security officials, as they claimed or were credited with some of the most lethal attacks against U.S. personnel during the late 1970s. The groups were the Marksist-Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği (MLSPB) or Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit, and Devrimçi Yol (Dev Yol) or the Revolutionary Path.

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92 Corsun, 15.
93 İmset, 411.
Following the left’s defeat in 1972, the MLSPB emerged as one of the first—and lethal to U.S. personnel—groups to re-establish violence in Turkey.\textsuperscript{94} Citing the “X-group” as a pacifist organization, it was founded in 1975, its members claiming they were the \textit{true} THKP-C.\textsuperscript{95} Although confining most of its activities to Istanbul, the MLSPB sometimes cooperated with other “THKP” splinter groups that began to populate Turkey’s largest cities. The very secretive MLSPB soon stood out among others for its staging of very spectacular operations. In 1979, Turkish security credited the group with killing at least four U.S. persons, the El Al Airlines director in Istanbul, and a 15 million Turkish lira robbery.

One of the group’s most spectacular attacks against U.S. personnel occurred on 14 December 1979, in Istanbul. Four militants (including a female leader) successfully ambushed and killed four Americans: three civilian contractors and one U.S. military enlisted person. It appeared the 4-person team had waited in the area for over two hours prior to their attack. Some experts familiar with the MLSPB suggest this demonstrated the group’s previous planning and knowledge of the “routines” of the area. The TNP’s follow-up investigation indicated the group had surveilled the area at least 3-4 days prior to the incident. The group later stated they had “punished” the Americans because of U.S. involvement in Iran and elsewhere in the world.

In addition to such spectacular acts, the MLSPB conducted several “popular robberies” in which militants stole from the Turkish government and distributed the stolen goods to the people of Istanbul’s slum districts.\textsuperscript{96} In an attempt to gain support and demonstrate the ineffectiveness of Ankara, the group attempted to assume the position of a Turkish “Robin Hood.” Even so, as the 1980 coup approached, several successful security operations decimated the MLSPB. In February 1980, the TNP captured 60 MLSPB members in Istanbul. Most of the leadership Turkish authorities did not kill

\textsuperscript{94} According to İmset, at least 16 groups emerged claiming to fight for the same cause as those who had perished at Kızılordere.

\textsuperscript{95} İmset, 413.

\textsuperscript{96} \textit{Ibid.}, 413.
during security operations, following the same pattern THKP-C and THKO survivors established in 1972, fled to Europe; e.g., Germany, France and Sweden.

According to the U.S. State Department, one of the most important indigenous leftist groups in Turkey during the 1970s was Devrimci Yol. Although many of the early leaders of the leftist movement prior to 1972 were either in prison or dead, the 1974 amnesty enabled less prominent "first generation" members to resume activities. As such, the leadership ranks of Dev Yol included several of these radical activists.97 As Sabri Sayari indicates, these "new" leaders had only played secondary roles during the pre-1971 coup period. Yet, with the execution or killing of most of the early key THKP-C and THKO leaders, these secondary role players were able to move into leadership positions upon the resurgence of the revolutionary left in the mid-1970s.

Most sources agree that by 1977, Devrimci Yol had become the most organized movement—especially within the student population—and the largest terrorist organization in Turkey.98 It concentrated a great deal of its efforts in Turkey's largest cities, maintaining two powerful committees in Istanbul and Ankara. Experts on the Turkish left during this time accept Dev Yol as a continuation of the earlier Devrimci Genç movement. One of the important aspects of this movement was that it embarked on creating a new mass organization, following the 1974 release of political and terrorist prisoners. The group claimed to support Çayan's policies and views, but differed on Çayan's position regarding the Soviet Union. According to İmset, Devrimci Yol accused the Soviet Union of deviating from socialism because of its revisionist leadership and of actually assisting Turkey's ruling classes and not the 'liberation movement.'99

The movement was most noted for its continuous battles with other leftist and rightist groups, and attempts at spreading its form of Marxist-Leninist ideology and controlling the student population. A major part of Dev Yol's efforts were concentrated

97 Sabri Sayari, Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1985), 7-8.

98 Corsun, 15.

99 İmset, 423.
in schools and were limited to marches, boycotts, workers strikes, and graffiti slogan writing on the public walls. In fact, the movement was considered very effective in running semi-legal student associations, including the *Lise Der* (secondary school students association), which was quite influential in the larger cities. Important here is that unlike the MLSPB, *Devririnci Yol* was not known for targeting U.S. interests.

Although initially concentrating its efforts on schools and limiting its activities to less violent activities, by 1977 *Devririnci Yol* began advocating more violence in order to obtain its objectives. By the end of 1977, the organization declared that ‘the only way to teach the fascists a lesson’ was to use their own methods and destroy political parties’ regional offices—and clash with those parties’ associated youth organizations. Thus, the organization’s open conflicts with opposition student groups on campuses increased.

Unfortunately, *Devririnci Yol*’s less violent activities concerned some members and soon elements within the organization began voicing displeasure with the direction of the group. Ultimately, organizational infighting resulted in the more serious minded of the militants breaking from the main group and forming *Devririnci Sol*. This group would not only be associated with the pre-1980 leftist violence in Turkey, but would usher in a new wave of extremely violent attacks and assassinations during the first two years of the 1990s, becoming well known for its targeting of U.S. personnel during the Gulf War.

**B. DEVRIMCI SOL: THE SPLINTER OF 1978**

Since the early 1970s, there have been eight primary Marxist-Leninist (left-wing) terrorist groups—commonly labeled the Fighting Communist Organizations (FCOs)—active throughout western Europe. One of the most active of these groups emerged in Turkey: *Devririnci Sol*. Although the group’s origin leads back to leftist movements in

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101 Belgium’s *Cellules Communistes Combattantes* (Communist Combatant Cells), 1984-85; France’s *Action Directe* (Direct Action), 1979-87; Germany’s *Rote Armee Faktion* (Red Army Faction), 1970-1990s; Greece’s *Epanastatiki Organosi 17 Noemvri* (17 November), 1975-Present; Italy’s *Brigate Rosse* (Red Brigades), 1970-88; Portugal’s *Forces Populares 25 de Abril* (Popular Forces of 25 April), 1982-87; Spain’s *Grupo de Resistencia Antifascista Primero de Octubre* (First of October Anti-Fascist Resistance Group), 1975-mid-1990s; and Turkey’s *Devririnci Sol* (Revolutionary Left), 1978-Present.
the 1960s and 1970s, it was not until August 1978, that Dev Yol’s Istanbul committee formally renamed itself and split from its mother organization in Ankara.

Devrimci Yol drew a great deal of its success from the establishment of an extensive and organized structure, with a central committee leadership responsible for formulating and directing the organization’s ideology and strategy. Even so, the group fell prey to a common conflict which often plagues such groups: in-fighting based upon personality conflicts and difference in ideological direction and execution. Often the dispute over mission execution, which was the case between Dev Yol and the soon-to-be Dev Sol, develops out of a difference in targeting and the level of violence the organization was willing to employ to conduct the “revolution.”

In the case of Dev Yol, two factions—the central committee in Ankara, and regional leaders in Istanbul—developed out of Istanbul’s criticism of the central committee’s “pacifist policies…and [their] fail[ure] to serve the interest of the ‘Turkish Marxist struggle.’” Essentially, Istanbul argued that Ankara concentrated attacks more on Turkish right-wing groups, rather than against the representatives of oligarchy and imperialism, including the United States. The dispute would never be resolved. In June 1978, the central committee attempted to rid itself of the Istanbul faction by renaming itself the Tüm (whole) Devrimci Yol. Soon after this, the Istanbul group met and officially changed its name to Devrimci Sol and officially splintered in August 1978.

Unfortunately for Devrimci Yol, many of its members (including complete regional and city cells) agreed with Dev Sol and promptly “defected” and joined ranks with the new group. These defections illustrated the frustration many Dev Yol members had with the less violent means of protest against a regime seen more and more as illegitimate. In addition, many believed Dev Yol was not true to Çayan’s ideology, only

102 Corsun, 15.

103 Ibid., 15.

104 Corsun states that Latin American terrorists’ actions inspired the Istanbul faction when it moved to change its name to Devrimci Sol. İmset echoes this stating that the initial leader of Devrimci Sol—who he identifies as “B.U.”—in visiting several provinces prior to the split, explained that Turkey needed a “Latin American type” freedom organization which would base its struggle on political demands but give priority to armed activities.
paying lip service. Many members within Dev Yol believed the organization (as well as most other THKP-C want-to-be groups) lacked any serious political background, some even more criminals than revolutionaries. In addition, the secrecy surrounding the more “attractive” and militant MLSPB prohibited the more energetic militants an avenue to express their revolutionary cause—Dev Sol became their solution. An alleged repentant Dev Sol militant quoted in 1991 provides some insight into this situation:

Only the Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLSPB) in Istanbul was attractive for the youth but almost impossible to reach for it gave great importance to secrecy. Just at that time something happened which many believed would fill the gap. Dev-Yol’s Istanbul faction split with a bang. Just like that...until then, there were indications of unease at the top levels of the organization as well as among the grassroots but no one really believed that a whole network of the organization could walk out with only one step.\(^{105}\)

The new organization soon became one of the most important and well-organized terrorist groups to emerge in Turkey, as well as Europe. Although many aspects of Dev Sol’s internal structure during this period are not publicly known, U.S. State Department reports suggest its structure was well organized and very compartmentalized around a central committee and a General Director. Figure 4–1 illustrates the suspected view of the organization’s structure. This diagram represents generally what the U.S. State Department believed the organization to look like by the late 1980s, yet many terrorist experts suspected it began to resemble this prior to the 1980 coup.

The Central Committee soon became known as the Merkez Yapı or Central Structure, and it began establishing subcommittees, aimed at “concentrated armed activities” and recruitment in high schools and universities. In a short time, Devrimci Sol managed to become Turkey’s most serious terrorist threat and the only group to integrate “armed cell-struggle” with mass organizational activities.\(^{106}\) The original leaders of the organization were Bülent Ülüler (Central Committee head), Abdullah Aksakal (General Secretary), and Edip Eranic (finance officer). The group’s “board” members were

\(^{105}\) Corsun, 16-7.
\(^{106}\) Imset, 428.
Celalettin Can and Emin Ovat. Finally, there was Dursun Karataş, the general manager for operations in Turkey, who would soon become the supreme leader of Devrimci Sol into and past the 1990s.

Crenshaw’s cellular or pyramidal model\(^\text{107}\) best describes Devrimci Sol’s structure. As described, decisions were made at the top of the pyramid and communicated to subordinate but compartmentalized units, with the upper echelon

![Diagram of Devrimci Sol Organizational Structure]


Figure 4–1. Diagram of Devrimci Sol Organizational Structure

having comprehensive knowledge of the organization and the identities and location of subordinate leaders. This demonstrated a significant leap of sophistication from the small-number and more *ad hoc* days of THKP-C and THKO. The tremendous increase

\(^{107}\) Martha Crenshaw, “An Organizational Approach to the Analysis of Political Terrorism,” *Orbis* 29, no. 3 (1985), 469.
in members, with a major share of Dev Yol’s recruit bounty transferred to Dev Sol, enabled a greater scope and intensity in operations, as an increased support network took shape. As this increased sophistication and size powered a more effective organization, it would ultimately lead to organizational conflicts and vulnerabilities, especially during the early 1990s. These issues will be discussed in the next chapter.

C. TERRORISM AND THE 1980 MILITARY INTERVENTION

As Turkey approached the 1980s, political disputes continued to ramp up. The eventual return of many left-wing militants and continued disputes among those in government contributed greatly to the rapid escalation of political violence in 1978 and 1979. Compounding this was the parallel emergence of Devrimci Sol and the MLSPB, and the violence associated with them. According to one researcher, in 1978 alone there were more than 4,000 separate acts of political violence. Terrorist violence became so rampant in Turkey that by the summer of 1980, some reports state terrorist activities claimed 183 lives on average each month.¹⁰⁸

In light of this situation, the Turkish military made moves to seize control when it became apparent the ruling civilian government was unable to create an effective coalition or halt the devastating political violence. Compounding the civilian government’s ineffectiveness was the obvious inability of the highly politicized police force to assist in curbing violence or checking the upsurge of guerrilla activity in Turkey’s “Kurdish” regions and the threat of Islam.¹⁰⁹ The January 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran worsened the situation, both encouraging Turkish Islamists and increasing concerns in the Kemalists military. The government’s attempt to combine regard for civil liberties with tough law-and-order measures satisfied no one, least of all the military.

Many terrorist groups, especially the revolutionary left, increasingly and openly defied the ruling government. For example, in addition to physical attacks, those

¹⁰⁸ McFadden, 70.
¹⁰⁹ Yapp, 323.
supporting the revolutionary left increasingly defaced walls and buildings of Turkey's largest cities (Istanbul and Ankara) with vehemently anti-government graffiti (Figure 4–2). In addition, as Turkey moved closer to 1980, Turkish security increasingly captured terrorists with large caches of weapons (Figure 4–3). For many military leaders, the continued discovery of such caches increasingly signaled a growing terrorist threat to national security. Partially as a result of such incidents, on 23 December 1978, the

![Image of graffiti]


**Figure 4–2. Revolutionary Leftist Graffiti Prior to 1980 Military Coup**

civilian government, under continued pressure from the military, proclaimed martial law in 13 provinces. Although this measurably reduced violence, it was only temporary and did not solve the problem. By the last half of 1980, the military had had enough.

On 12 September 1980, Chief of the Turkish General Staff, General Kenan Evren (Figure 4–4), informed the country the military had seized control of the government. With that announcement, the military arrested leading political figures and declared martial law throughout the country. Within 13 months, the ruling military junta directed all political parties to disband and confiscated their property. In addition, the military barred all persons previously holding leadership positions in parties from politics for 10

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110 Left photograph reads: “Death to Fascism”, “Damn Fascism”, “Social Fascism”, and “People’s Liberation”. Right photograph reads: “Fascist Governor; We will settle the score for the tortures you ordered committed in Ünye, Aybaşti, and Ordu. [Signed] Revolutionary Left. Take Arms Comrades!”
years. The only exceptions were those who had held positions in the Grand National Assembly; the generals barred them from politics for five years.

Figure 4-3. Example of Seized Caches of Terrorist Weapons

The level and spread of violence during the pre-1980 coup period cannot be overstated. According to Turkish government data provided in a 1983 report, the total number of "ideologically-based" terrorist incidents\(^{111}\) between 26 December 1978 and 11 September 1980 was 32,893.\(^{112}\) The report further states that leftist groups accounted for 33 percent of these incidents.\(^{113}\) According to the U.S. State Department, between May 1978 and the 12 September coup, Devrimci Sol alone committed 298 killings, 28 robberies, and 396 incidents of armed assault.\(^{114}\) The occupational data on terrorists in

\(^{111}\) Based upon the 1980 military junta’s “definition” of such “terrorist” incidents, they included everything from “student unrest” and political demonstrations to hanging “illegal political leaflets” and armed attacks. In reference to “terrorist” ideologies, the military identified any ideology (e.g., Islamic, leftist, and secessionist) openly or covertly opposed to the government or called for changes to the Kemalist state.

\(^{112}\) State of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey, Presented to the U.S. Army by Lt. General Kaya Yazgan (Ankara, Turkey, 1982(?)), Table 2, 46. Unfortunately the report does not differentiate between domestic and international incidents, but it is assumed that these numbers include acts of terrorism perpetrated against non-Turkish targets.

\(^{113}\) Rightist groups (6 percent), Secessionist (2 percent), and Unknown Political Persuasion (59 percent).

\(^{114}\) Corsun, 19.
the Turkish Government report suggested the violence of this period extended beyond the student populations of pre-1972—terrorism no longer was an exclusively student

Figure 4-4. General Kenan Evren, Leader of 1980 Military Intervention

phenomenon. According to data (Table 4-1) for the period between 12 September 1980 and 11 September 1982, "students" only accounted for 20 percent of those terrorists

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>NUMBER</th>
<th>PERCENTAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Student</td>
<td>11,560</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unemployed</td>
<td>11,084</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>9,014</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Worker</td>
<td>8,036</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Servant</td>
<td>6,015</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Professions</td>
<td>6,166</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teacher</td>
<td>3,739</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Housewife</td>
<td>872</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>56,486</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Source: State of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey, Presented to the U.S. Army by Lt. General Kaya Yazgan, (Ankara, Turkey, 1982(?)), Table 20, 64.

Table 4-1. Profession Breakdown of Captured Terrorists, 12 Sep 80-11 Sep 82
captured. Still, as Sayari points out, unlike the pre-1972 terrorists, the majority of students during this period were dropouts from the universities and tended to be less educated than their predecessors.\textsuperscript{115}

Finally, the Turkish Government reported a "younger" terrorist captured during this period. Data of those terrorists captured in the two years immediately following the military takeover cites 56 percent of the terrorists were between the ages of 16 and 25 years (31,445). Those between the ages of 25 and 35 years accounted for 29 percent of captured terrorists.\textsuperscript{116} A sizeable segment of the new recruits were young people whose families had recently moved to the cities,\textsuperscript{117} where they were thrown into an unfamiliar environment, without traditional support networks, and without employment.

D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1971-80

Some experts identified \textit{Devrimci Sol} as just one of over 60 Marxist-Leninist terrorist groups responsible for crippling security problems in Turkey during the late 1970s,\textsuperscript{118} which eventually lead to the 1980 military intervention. The Turkish military executed the coup in order to return political and social stability to the country. The coup also enabled authorities to crack down on leftist terrorism. As illustrated in Figure 4–5, the number of incidents of international terrorism between 1971 (13 March) and 1980 (12 September) dramatically increased—Turkey's second bout of political violence was quite severe. A review of several international terrorist incident databases for these years identified a total of 178 incidents of international terrorism in Turkey. Of these, databases credited leftist (or suspected) groups with perpetrating 153 incidents—citing 127 of those as directed against U.S. interests.

The dramatic increase in violence—compared to the pre-1971 coup period—paralleled the increase in the number of terrorist groups. Previously, only the groups

\textsuperscript{115} Sayari, \textit{Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case}, 9.

\textsuperscript{116} Those between 35 and 45 accounted for 11 percent, and those older than 45 accounted for 4 percent.

\textsuperscript{117} Sayari, \textit{Generational Changes in Terrorist Movements: The Turkish Case}, 11.

\textsuperscript{118} Alexander and Pluchinsky, 231.
THKP-C and THKO represented the principal terrorists, both groups were quite small and had no more than a few hundred active terrorists among them. In addition, as illustrated in Chapter II, the Turkish Government did not take many useful lessons from its experience with terrorism in the early 1970's. The government further compounded this situation by not seriously attending to continued economic difficulties, opting instead to battle the symptom (terrorism) rather than the potential cause (i.e., unemployment, student grievances, and political oppression).

![Graph](image)

**Sources:** See Appendix C.

**Figure 4–5. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1971-80**

By the end of the 1970s, some experts claim as many as 60 leftist groups were engaged in terrorism, their numbers extending into the thousands of active members. According to Turkish military data regarding apprehension of suspected terrorists in the

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first two years following the military takeover, the security forces arrested over 56,000 suspected terrorists, identifying over 30,000 of these as suspected leftists. In addition, the civilian government’s inability to curb violence prior to 1980 made matters worse. After 1975, terrorist incidents began to feed upon one another. Furthermore, many terrorists’ perception that the civilian government lacked the will to impose order signaled an open invitation to political terrorism. The civilian government’s decision to declare martial law in December 1978 in several provinces resulted in a sharp decrease in incidents. Even so, the decision to declare martial law arrived too late, only slowing, not successfully checking the violence.

Specific leftist targeting (Figure 4-6) of U.S. interests during this period remained predominantly directed at U.S. military and diplomatic personnel and materials, representing 80 percent of the targets. As was the case prior to 1972, such targets represented the focus of leftist displeasure—“imperialism” and NATO—both of which the revolutionary left increasingly viewed as supporters of a “fascist” Ankara. In addition, these targets remained in or near major urban populations, the preferred environment of the revolutionary left. Different from the previous period of violence was the terrorists’ increased targeting of U.S. business, religious and cultural establishments. This indicated the left’s growing view that “all” U.S. interests represented an “imperialistic” threat and U.S. businesses were identified with Turkey’s continued economic problems.

During this period, leftists confined the overwhelming majority of their activities against the U.S. to Turkey’s four largest cities (Figure 4-7). This coincided with the fact that many of the militants during this period where not only students, but also people from the over-crowded urban centers near the large cities. Also, as was the case earlier, terrorists found the majority of their U.S. targets (e.g., diplomatic, military, and now businesses) in or near one of these cities. Over 63 percent of the incidents against U.S.

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120 State of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey, Table 18, pg 62.

interests occurred in Istanbul or Izmir, a large number of them directed at U.S. military personnel and establishments.

![Bar chart showing the number of incidents per year from 1971 to 1980.](image)

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 4-6. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1971-80**

During Turkey's second bout with terrorism, tactics became more sophisticated. Bombings (and attempted bombings) continued to be the method of choice accounting for over 55 percent (Figure 4-8) of all terrorist acts during this period. As an illustration of a move to more sophisticated tactics and targets, during 1979 and 1980 revolutionary leftist groups assassinated ten U.S. citizens. All but one incident appeared well planned and executed. This type of activity coincided with the increased organizational sophistication of the leftist groups, especially *Devrimci Sol*. It appeared the militant left had overcome the moral dilemma of assassination, as appeared to be the case in 1971, when THKO "abandoned" four kidnapped USAF airmen unharmed. Also, as some experts have pointed out, many leftist militants that fled Turkey following the 1971-72 crackdown sought safety in Europe and Middle Eastern countries hostile to the Ankara regime.
While there, many Turkish terrorists met with other leftist terrorists (e.g., Germany’s Red Army Faction), as well as Palestinian militants in Syria. According to the Turkish

![Diagram](image_url)

Sources: See Appendix C.

Figure 4–7. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1971-80

Government, such groups, primarily the Palestinians, provided many Devrimci Sol militants with weapons and sabotage training.

During this period, Turkey witnessed one of its most crippling bouts with terrorism. The dramatic increase in international-related incidents witnessed paralleled those in the domestic category. During this period, the revolutionary left recovered from the government’s 1971-72 crackdown, returning with a vengeance. Such groups did not confine their vengeful attacks to Turkish targets alone. As the data demonstrates, as 1980 approached, the groups that emerged out of the ashes of THKP-C and THKO—Devrimci Sol and the MLSPM—increasingly sought out and attacked U.S. interests. Furthermore, these groups broadened their targets, attacking more non-military and diplomatic facilities and personnel than witnessed in the previous period of violence. Although these
groups continued to bomb as a preferred method of attack, they became more organized, structured, and sophisticated, as demonstrated in the several well-executed assassinations

Sources: See Appendix C.

Figure 4–8. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1971-80

of Americans. Despite their increased sophistication and numbers, the revolutionary left was no match for the Turkish military. In addition, although many Turkish citizens welcomed the 1980 intervention and its halting of terrorism, the human rights legacy of the time would become a rising concern. Furthermore, the military’s action was only a short-term answer—the revolutionary left would once again return in the next decade.
V. THE GULF WAR AND DEVrimci Sol

“This [Gulf] War is being waged in the interest of the oil monopolies and oil sheikhs. Blood is flowing for the sake of the imperialist thieves. Imperialism does not accept anything that goes against its interests in this oil-rich region. The reason for the oppression of the people in the Middle East is that the imperialists insist on playing a dominant role.”

*Devrimci Sol* Operation DESERT STORM Communiqué (Undated)\(^{122}\)

The generals of the 1980 coup seized the reins of government, exercised firm actions and restored order, including the mass arrest of terrorists and those sympathetic to such causes. The swiftness and the often-cited brutality of the military’s crushing repression of violence ultimately came at a high social cost. During operations to squash terrorism the issue of human rights and torture at the hands of the security forces began to take center stage, especially as it impacted revolutionary leftists. As the government released militants or they escaped from custody, many began disclosing the tortuous nature of the country’s return to order. Once again, Turkish military actions to halt terror ultimately aided in the revolutionary left’s continued survival, as the military’s ruthless worked to confirm the “fascist” nature of the Ankara regime that the terrorists had preached about.

Although Turkish security operations severely incapacitated the organization, many *Devrimci Sol* militants eluded capture and fled to Western Europe and the Middle East. These escapes, the relaxation of martial law in 1985 and 1987, and numerous *Devrimci Sol* prison breaks in the late 1980s benefited the group’s reconstruction. For example, on 25 October 1989, *Devrimci Sol*’s eventual leader Dursun Karataş and his closest lieutenant (Bedri Yaşan) successfully escaped from Sağmacılar Prison.\(^{123}\) It was soon after Karataş’ escaped that *Devrimci Sol* began stepping up its attacks, especially those directed at U.S. interests.

\(^{122}\) Alexander and Pluchinsky, 249-50. See Appendix K for translation of the Communiqué.

\(^{123}\) Corsun, 17.
Following the initiation of U.S.-led military operations against Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, Devrimci Sol launched one of its most intensive attacks on U.S. interests in Turkey. The re-constituted Dev Sol demonstrated, like its ancestors, an ability to strike both Turkish and international targets, especially U.S. interests. During 1991, leftist attacks against U.S. targets dramatically increased, well past those seen in previous years. Yet, during this period, Dev Sol rationalized its attacks against the U.S. in the name of battling its imperialist oppression of the Middle East, not just fighting U.S. support of the “fascist” regime. Also, as eluded to earlier, the group began attacking authorities identified as torturers of the 1980 military intervention.

A. THE 1980 COUP’S LEGACY OF REPRESSION AND TORTURE

In the aftermath of the 1980 coup, the generals immediately set upon the terrorist elements in Turkey. Although remaining strongly biased against leftists in general, the military’s anti-terrorism campaign was somewhat more equitable than that which followed the 1971 coup. This time, security forces rounded up many more rightists, especially the Grey Wolves. Even so, the government still viewed the left as the source of terrorism. Within the first six weeks following the military takeover the state arrested over 11,500 people; by the end of 1980 the number increased to 30,000 and exceeded 120,000 after one year. The immediate and measurable impact was a drastic reduction in the number of terrorist-related incidents. According to Turkish sources, within one year following military intervention, Turkey witnessed over a 75 percent drop

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124 Even so, according to the government, in the first two years following the coup, rightists only accounted for 13 percent (7,571 persons) of those arrested on suspicion of terrorist activities. State of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey, Table 18, 62.

125 The Grey Wolves was the militant youth wing of Turkish Army Colonel Alparslan Türkeş' extreme right-wing Milliyetçi Hareket Partisi or National Action Party. The Turkish Government credited Mehmet Ali Ağca, an admitted member of the Grey Wolves, with the 1 February 1979 assassination of Abdi İpekçi, editor of the influential daily Milliyet. On 13 May 1981, following his November 1979 escape from prison, Ağca shot and wounded the Pope in Rome.

126 Zürcher, 294.
in terrorist related incidents. Specifically, the military government cited a 64 percent decrease in leftist-attributed incidents.\textsuperscript{127}

Even though the immediate impact of the military takeover was a restoration of order and a significant reduction in terrorist actions, it was not without cost. As Zürcher points out:

The negative side [of the coup] was that it was achieved at great human and social cost. It was not only suspected terrorists who were hunted down and arrested. Respectable trade unionists, legal politicians, university professors, teachers, journalists and lawyers, in short, anyone who had expressed even vaguely leftist...views before September 1980 was liable to get into trouble. The universities were put under tight centralized control through the establishment of the \textit{Yüksek Öğretim Kurulu} (Higher Education Authority), which directly appointed all rectors and deans. Late in 1982 over 300 academics were dismissed, followed by a second wave of dismissals early in 1983. Many others resigned of their own accord, because those fired also lost their pensions and the right ever again to hold a job in the public sector.\textsuperscript{128}

Table 5–1 provides the military’s data regarding the breakdown of non-terrorists subjected to legal actions as of 1 September 1982. It quickly became apparent that the military viewed everyone opposed to them as a terrorist. Such broad actions quickly alienated the general population, especially those caught in the middle of difficult economic times. As mentioned in Chapter II, Ankara’s attempts at economic prosperity remained temporary at best. The resulting unemployed found no comfort in the government’s attack on them just because they voiced a desire for a better life. Once again, the regime’s failure to recognize this served to draw some supporters to the left, as they too were “victims” of the state.

Social disruption was not the only legacy of the 1980 coup. Numerous allegations of torture surrounding the security officials charged with capturing and interrogating suspected terrorists soon surfaced. Many human rights organizations reported that during both interrogation and detention, Turkish security widely employed torture, often

\textsuperscript{127} State of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey, Table 2, 46; and Table 10, 54.

\textsuperscript{128} Zürcher, 294.
applying it as a common practice of doing business. According to Zürcher, in the aftermath of the 1980 coup, Amnesty International repeatedly drew attention to widespread torture and its sometimes-fatal effects. In an attempt to defend against such allegation, the military regime provided its data regarding inquiries into such allegations.

According to a Turkish Government report, as of 4 October 1982, the Martial Law legal authorities had conducted 540 inquiries into “allegations of torture and ill

![Pie chart showing the number of non-terrorists subjected to legal actions, 1 Sept 82.](chart.png)


**Figure 5–1. Number of Non-Terrorists Subjected to Legal Actions, 1 Sept 82**

treatment.” Of these, authorities directed court trials for only 142 of the accused persons. Of those tried, only 15 defendants were convicted. In addition to allegations of torture, Turkish military authorities investigated 204 deaths allegedly resulting from torture


130 *State of Anarchy and Terror in Turkey*, Table 34, 78.
during the first two years following the coup.\textsuperscript{131} To the disbelief of many, including many leftist militants, the government's investigations concluded that only four of the deaths related to torture-related injuries. The government's concluding remarks regarding allegations and its investigations served to create an air of suspicion and cover-up:

\begin{quote}
[T]he propaganda based on allegations of...systematic torture, [was] to a great extent purposely originated. The result of investigations show[ed] that the majority of the allegations [were] baseless, however those which happened to have any truth in them, [were] immediately subject to legal action.\textsuperscript{132}
\end{quote}

Allegations of torture and the government's apparent reluctance to admit to or rectify the situation increasingly damaged its international credibility. Following the coup, member states of the European Union froze relations with Ankara. In addition, the pan-European parliament, the Council of Europe, cited the military regime's record of human right violations as justification for banning Turkish participation in 1982.\textsuperscript{133} Furthermore, this situation provided leftists who had fled Turkey following martial law with legitimacy in the eyes of some Europeans. In addition, Devrimci Sol (as well as its successor, DHKP-C) increasingly pointed to such allegations as proof of the repressive nature of the "fascist" Ankara government. In fact, during and soon after the 1980 coup, the "struggle against state torture" emerged as a key element in the revolutionary left's propaganda and call for revolution.

In addition to Europe's expressed displeasure with the military takeover in Turkey and the treatment of political prisoners, Devrimci Sol began to cite torture and human rights violations as their reason for opposing the Turkish regime. A review of organizational documents discloses Dev Sol's opposition to Ankara concerning this issue. The most prominent example of this was the two-volume Devrimci Sol manifesto entitled

\textsuperscript{131} Ibid., 24.

\textsuperscript{132} Ibid., 25-6.

\textsuperscript{133} Turkey: A Country Study, 256.
Hakliyiz Kazanacağiz or We Are Right, We Will Win. The DHKC reports the document to be 1,354 pages long, and on 27 October 1988, was read as a defense for the “1,243 revolutionaries” sentenced by the military tribunals. The document cites torture many times as the reason Dev Sol “struggled” against the regime and listed the names of 845 security officials (most connected to the 1980 coup) in a death list, citing torture as their crime.

This “vengeful” tone continued into the 1990s. For example, a communiqué dated 7 February 1992, claiming credit for the assassinations of several Turkish police officers, cites the “punishment” of four officers “because they were torturers.” It further states the “punishment” of a chief prosecutor of the State Security Court was conducted as he “was an enemy of the people and the revolutionaries, who during the coup d’etat of 12 March 1971 and 12 September 1980 worked as a prosecutor...[and] was present when people were tortured...demand[ing] the heads of revolutionaries during trials.” Thus, in an over zealous attempt to stop terrorism, the military regime provided Dev Sol with a psychological platform from which to justify its terrorist activities.

B. EUROPE, POLITICAL RELAXATION AND PRISON BREAKS

Following the beginning of martial law in December 1978, many terrorists, especially those associated with Devrimci Sol, followed their leftist ancestors’ and fled to Europe and the Middle East. Devrimci Sol was able to regroup and reorganize in Europe (primarily in Germany and the Netherlands) and then systematically rebuild its terrorist and propaganda structures in Turkey, as the government was once again handed back over to civilian leadership and martial law gradually lifted. With the continued encouragement from Turks in Central Europe— specifically those living in Germany —

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134 We Are Right, We Will Win (London: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front Information Bureau, 1998), 7-8.

135 Alexander and Pluchinsky, 252.

136 The German Government did not formally ban Devrimci Sol until 1983, and then it was not until the early 1990’s—when group infighting resulted in the murders of several militants inside Germany—that German law enforcement officials became seriously concerned with Devrimci Sol’s activities.
would-be terrorists persisted in plotting. By the end of the seventies over 2.5 million Turks lived in Western Europe. As was the case in the early 1970s, the movement was able to reconstitute unmolested by Turkish authorities, as well as to raise (or extort) financial support.

Following the gradual relaxation of military control starting in 1983, political activity was still closely monitored and was restricted to limits outlined in the 1982 constitution. On 6 November 1983, the military allowed the participation of three parties (out of an original 12) in the first election since the coup. The election ended with Turgut Özal becoming Prime Minister. By March 1984, Özal’s government began a liberalization of the polity, with the lifting of the earlier ban on some of the outlawed political parties. Unfortunately, this was not a means to liberalize, rather a stratagem to divide the opposition. This move would ultimately weaken Özal’s party. Many Turkish experts cite Özal’s liberalization moves and relaxation of military-imposed restrictions as a decision taken in an attempt to ease European condemnation of Turkey’s human rights violations.

Whatever the true reasons, the continued moves to liberalize the political process in Turkey as it faced (and went through) the 1990s, allowed for the re-emergence of some leftist organizations. The government’s liberalization resulted in the relaxation of restrictive measures first erected to eradicate terrorism following the 1980 coup, then utilized to maintain order and prevent a resurgence of violence. On 19 November 1985, two years after the return of civilian rule to Turkey, martial law ended in Istanbul and a less restrictive State of Emergency was proclaimed.

This was followed in March 1986 with the reduction of prison sentences through the Execution of Sentence Act, the end of martial law in Turkey on 19 July 1987, and finally the end of the State of Emergency in Istanbul in November 1988. Although these actions were positive signs of Turkey moving to a more democratized society, a side

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137 Harris, Turkey: Coping with Crisis, 145-6.
138 Zürcher, 284.
139 Ibid., 298.
effect was terrorists were able to freely move about. In some cases, terrorists living outside Turkey were now able to re-enter the country undetected. Lastly, the civilian government’s moves to re-establish normalcy in Turkish society led to either reduced prison sentences or early release from prison for a great many terrorists, who had not given up the Marxist-Leninist cause.

Compounding this problem and supporting the survival of Devrimci Sol (as well as other leftist groups) were significant prison breaks in the late 1980s. According to the U.S. State Department, between 1983 and 1994, some 7,900 men escaped from Turkish prisons. On 24 March 1988, twenty-nine leftist terrorists escaped from Metriş Maximum Security Prison and in September, eighteen more escaped from Kirşehir Maximum Security Prison. The most significant prison escape was that of Dev Sol leader Dursun Karataş (Figure 5-2) and Bedri Yağan (Dev Sol Central Committee member).


Figure 5-2. Devrimci Sol (DHKP-C) Leader Dursun Karataş

140 Corsun, 22.
from Sağmacılar Prison on 25 October 1989. These two individuals would provide key leadership to the reconstituted Dev Sol, and would organize and direct the increase in leftist attacks on U.S. interests in the early 1990s.

Thus, during the six years of civilian rule in Turkey following the coup, Devrimci Sol reconstituted itself. The safehaven of Europe provided a source of financial support and a place to reorganize. The government’s gradual relaxation of martial law permitted increased freedom of movement. Successful prison escapes and releases provided essential personnel, resources and leadership. So, by 1990, Dev Sol had sufficiently recovered from the devastating blow of the 1980 coup and was able to re-initiate its “armed propaganda” struggle against Ankara. In addition, it recovered just in time for the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. This event “triggered” the group to re-engage U.S. targets and dramatically increase its targeting of U.S. interests in Turkey.

C. DEVRİMCI SOL’S COME BACK AND THE GULF WAR

On 30 January 1990, Devrimci Sol militants assassinated Mehmet Çakmakçı, a Turkish policeman. This was the first Dev Sol assassination of a Turkish official since the 1983 return to civilian control. With this killing, the organization signaled it had not succumbed to the “fascist” state and was back to continue its campaign of “armed propaganda.” Although initially confining its attacks to Turkish targets, with the arrival of the Gulf War, Dev Sol began seriously targeting U.S. interests, including more sophisticated operations such as assassination and rocket attacks.

In 1991, Devrimci Sol conducted approximately 146 terrorist operations against various targets, including the assassination of two U.S. contractors and a British businessman. An analysis of Dev Sol operations and targets disclosed some group objectives. First, the majority of the organization’s assassination targets were Turkish security officials. Of these officials, the majority was linked to anti-leftist security operations during either the 1971 or the 1980 coup. As stated earlier, the group often

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141 Ibid., 17.

142 Alexander and Pluchinsky, 231.
claimed targeted security officials were responsible for conducting, supervising or allowing the torture of leftists arrested during the coups. For example, on 28 March 1991, Devrimci Sol militants killed former Turkish general Memduh Ünlütürk, who was associated with the 1971 coup, in his house in the Uskudar district of Istanbul. The group held Ünlütürk responsible for the Kizildere operation, which ended with the death of the revolutionary left’s idolized martyr, Mahir Çayan.

Lastly, although Dev Sol targeted U.S. interests prior to 1991, it was not until the Gulf War that the group began committing serious assets to assassinating U.S. personnel in opposition to the U.S.-led coalition against Iraq. From January 1990 until the initiation of Operation DESERT STORM (17 January 1991), Dev Sol carried out 10 assassinations and one attempted assassination against Turkish officials. The targets included active duty and retired military officers, police officials, and civilians allegedly associated with death or torture of leftist terrorists following the 1980 coup. It appeared the group was more interested in settling domestic scores with those responsible for earlier repression in the 1970s and 1980s, rather than attacking typical imperialist targets.

With the advent of the U.S.-led war with Iraq, Devrimci Sol expanded its targeting to U.S. interests, carrying out a wave of bombings and selected assassinations. It became apparent the group was concentrating its attacks against the U.S. in response to specific events, such as the war. Further examples included a plot (exposed by Turkish security) against the U.S. Secretary of State and U.S. President’s visits to Turkey, as well as the assassination of a U.S. contractor on Özal’s visit to the United States. According to a 22 March 1991 Dev Sol “Bulletin,” the organization assassinated the contractor so Özal would have “one of Bush’s children” to “not go to America empty-handed.”

D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1980-91

Between the 1980 coup and the end of 1991, a total of 153 incidents of international terrorism were recorded (Figure 5–3). Reports credited leftists or suspected

143 Corsun, 23.

144 Alexander and Pluchinsky, 247. See Appendix J for bulletin.
leftists with 91 incidents. Of these incidents, terrorists directed 82 attacks against U.S. interests. The single greatest rise in leftist activity occurred during 1991, following the

![Graph showing number of incidents over years]

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 5–3. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1980-91**

initiation of the Gulf War, with 50 incidents of international terrorism. During the U.S.-led war period (from the start of Operation DESERT SHIELD on 15 August 1990 through the end of 1991), there were a total of 47 leftist or suspected leftist perpetrated incidents against U.S. interests in Turkey.\(^{145}\)

During this time, left-wing terrorists attacked U.S. interests with the intensity last witnessed in the late 1970s. This increased violence caused two U.S. deaths, several injuries, and extensive property damage. One of the first *Dev Sol* bombings occurred at

\(^{145}\) During this period the *Islamic Jihad* took credit for killing a USAF NCO using a car bomb in response to U.S. involvement in the Gulf War.
the Military Transportation Management Command (MTMC) outpost (Figure 5–4) in Istanbul in January 1991. In a phone call to the Turkish daily newspaper Milliyet, an unidentified caller claimed credit for the bombing in the name of Dev Sol, stating it was in “protest against the imperialist forces in the Gulf.”\(^{146}\) Although the bombing resulted in no injuries, it caused significant property damage. It became apparent that Turkey’s revolutionary leftists viewed the U.S. as the “puppet master” behind the coalition forces that militarily opposed Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait.

During this period, there was a dramatic shift in the left’s targeting of U.S. interests (Figure 5–5). Unlike previous periods of violence where the left sought predominately diplomatic and military targets, this period witnessed a dramatic increase in the targeting of U.S.-related businesses. Although there was a slight increase following the 1980 coup, in 1991 business-related incidents significantly increased.

There are two reasons for this shift. First, terrorists easily identified such targets as symbols of capitalism, often viewed as the means of “exploiting” the masses. Second, by

![Graph](image)

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 5-5. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1980-91**

the late-1980s and early 1990s, U.S. personnel had significantly hardened government and military installations in Turkey against terrorist attacks, especially during the war. This suggests Devrimci Sol was cognizant of security arrangements at such targets and selected lower-risk targets. Such decisions maximized terrorist survival and success of the attack; businesses typically were not protected with armed guards.

Revolutionary leftists continued to almost exclusively conduct attacks against U.S. targets in Turkey’s four largest cities during this period. The continuing reason for this was that most U.S. interests remained located in these cities, especially U.S.-related businesses. During 1991, the majority of incidents occurred in Istanbul (Figure 5-6), suggesting Devrimci Sol found it a more conducive environment within which to operate. Istanbul served two possible purposes. First, as the city with the largest population
density in Turkey,\textsuperscript{147} it provided an easy area to maneuver in, as well as hide. In addition, Istanbul was located close to one of the left’s most important supporters—Greece.

\begin{figure}[h]
\centering
\includegraphics[width=\textwidth]{figure56.png}
\caption{Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1980-91}
\end{figure}

Sources: See Appendix C.

\textbf{Figure 5–6. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1980-91}

In addition to the high number of incidents in Istanbul, 1991 witnessed an increase in terrorist activity in Adana. Although it too contained a significant portion of Turkey’s population—it is the fourth largest city—the left’s interests centered on Adana most likely because it hosted the most prominent U.S. military installation (Incirlik Air Base) in the country. Furthermore, during the Gulf War, for the revolutionary left, Incirlik represented U.S. imperialistic aggression against the Iraqi people.

\textsuperscript{147} \textit{Turkey: A Country Study}, 86-8. According to Turkey’s 1990 census, Istanbul contained 12 percent (6.6 million) of the country’s population and its population density was 1,330 persons per square kilometer.
Bombings and attempted bombings remained the tactic-of-choice for leftist attacks against the U.S. during this period (Figure 5–7), accounting for over 75 percent of all incidents. This supports the belief Turkish leftists wanted to maximize effect and minimize both cost and risk. As mentioned earlier, bombings potentially provided all this. Most bombings were unsophisticated, low cost, and required little training for the militant bomber.

![Pie chart showing incident types]

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 5–7. Leftist Tactics against U.S. Interests, 1980-91**

Even so, Devrimci Sol conducted two rather sophisticated assassinations of Americans during this period. Both incidents demonstrated the increased skill of its militants and cellular nature of the organization. The first incident (7 February 1991) involved the assassination of a U.S. contract employee working at IAB in Adana. In the early morning hours, a two-man hit team walked up to the victim, as he was approaching his vehicle at home, and shot him five times. The Turkish police identified a witness that suggested militants had surveilled the victim’s home several days before, indicating the incident was planned in advance. On 28 February 1991, a two-person Devrimci Sol hit team attempted to assassinate a USAF officer in Izmir. A follow-on bulletin indicated
the attack was in response to U.S.-Ankara cooperation in the Gulf War. Additionally, this incident demonstrated prior planning and the use of cells to execute an operation.

A third example of such planning and execution was the 22 March 1991 Devrimci Sol assassination of the Vinnel, Brown, and Root (VBR) site manager in Istanbul. At approximately noon on that day, three men arrived at the VBR office, one dressed in a Turkish police uniform. The uniformed man asked to speak with the person in charge. When the site manager showed up, the terrorists requested the secretary and a Turkish worker join them in the Deputy’s office. With everyone in the office, one of the terrorists drew a handgun and directed everyone to kneel on the floor and indicated they were members of Dev Sol. While the other three hostages were tied up, the site manager was taken to his office (Figure 5–8) where he was bound, gagged, then shot twice in the head and once in the chest.

Further analysis of the event disclosed the Devrimci Sol attackers used a sound suppression device on their weapon. Also, it was evident the attack was conducted inside the VBR office in order to demonstrate Dev Sol’s ability to penetrate a “hardened” facility and to further instill fear in both U.S. and foreign business personnel. The timing of the event coincided with the Islamic holy month of Ramazan, which meant some of the Turkish workers were away from both the VBR office and other surrounding buildings at the local mosque for prayer.

Once again, as in the late seventies, the early 1990s witnessed the revolutionary left’s return. Although similar in many respects to its ancestors, the Devrimci Sol of this era demonstrated some significant differences in their activities. First, the group’s attacks focused primarily on Turkish targets relating to their need to punish the torturers of the previous coups. They were not only acting as revolutionaries, they assumed the role of judge and executioner. It was not until the advent of the Gulf War that they shifted their

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148 See Appendix L for a translation of Devrimci Sol’s bulletin issued following the attack.

149 Corsun, 35.

150 Islamic month of fasting, observed during the ninth month of the Islamic calendar. During this month, in accordance with Qu’ranic guidance, the faithful are required to undertake fasting between sunrise and sunset.
attention. In light of this, *Dev Sol* employed some of its resources against “imperialist” targets more for international appeal than displeasure with U.S. involvement in Turkish affairs. Thus, with the Gulf War, *Dev Sol* appeared to respond to trigger events in attacks against the United States. This change appeared to be a result of the group’s desire to direct its primary efforts at punishing its domestic enemies—security officials. The number and types of targets hit demonstrated the group’s increased capacity and sophistication in carrying out terrorism. Even though *Dev Sol* demonstrated great skill and sophistication, its activities soon embarrassed the government and once again—although not through a coup—brought the full wrath of the Turkish security system upon them with devastating affect.


**Figure 5–8. Photograph of U.S. Contractor Killing and Devrimci Sol Slogans**

151 Left wall: “We are determined and we shall win.” [Signed] Dev Sol, Armed Revolutionary Unit.” Right wall: “The Middle East belongs to the Middle East...It cannot be divided.” [Signed] “Dev Sol”.

85
VI. AFTERMATH OF THE COLD WAR COLLAPSE

"The movements which tied all their hopes to [the] balance [of the Soviet Union against the imperialists] went into a phase of surrender and reconciliation after the collapse [of socialism]."

*Devrimci Sol Member Alsan Tayfun Ozkok (1990s)*\(^{152}\)

In the 1990s, *Devrimci Sol* stood out as the most active leftist terrorist group in Turkey, especially in regards to a terrorist threat posed to U.S. interests. Yet, following its surge of activity during the Gulf War, especially that directed at U.S. and western interests, the Turkish Government reacted vigorously, conducting several successful safe house raids and introducing new antiterrorist legislation.\(^{153}\) As security forces continued raids, many militants retreated back to the safehaven of Europe, especially to Germany and the Netherlands. In addition, shortly after the Gulf War, the organization found itself in the middle of an ideological dispute, pitting its two prominent leaders (Karataş and Yağan) against one another. The result was a violent split. The Karataş faction emerged as the ruling faction and the organization changed its name. During this same period, the collapse of the communist regimes of the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe dealt *Dev Sol* an ideological blow, as it put Marxism-Leninism in question.

Although these events greatly reduced *Dev Sol's* capacity to wage its "armed struggle" against the Turkish state, let alone attack the United States, the organization did not fade away as was the case with several of its FCO counterparts in other European countries. Its network in central Europe, coupled with its ideological adaptation—in part supported through the group's attachment of human rights to its political program—aided in sustaining the group. In addition to incorporating the fight against human rights violations, *Devrimci Sol* (and later DHKP-C) relied on the martyrdom of its members as


\(^{153}\) *Turkey: A Country Study*, 357.
sign of success—even in death at the hands of Turkish security was a battle considered won. In this atmosphere, the group survived and continues today.

A. EUROPE AND AN IDEOLOGICAL CHALLENGE

As Turkish security forces continued their assault on leftists, primarily Devrimci Sol, following the Gulf War, many terrorists once again sought refuge in Europe. Devrimci Sol's well-established network in Europe provided support and funding outside Turkey. Earlier leftists had first established the network following their exodus in the early 1970s. In addition, the militants escaping the military junta of 1980 further solidified this network, tapping even deeper into its many sympathizers among the foreign Turkish population in Western Europe. Europe also provided Devrimci Sol with a location to regroup far away from ruthless Turkish security raids.

Following the Gulf War, Devrimci Sol embarked on a public affairs campaign, utilizing the power of the Internet. With the establishment of an Internet site and later several "DHKC Information Bureaus" throughout Europe, including Greece, England, the Netherlands, Austria, and Italy, the organization "embraced" the world. With the power of the Internet, the organization was able to take its cause and grievances against Ankara to a broader audience. In addition, it was able to voice displeasure over "fascist" and "imperialistic" activities in Turkey (and the world) at the stroke of a computer key. The Internet also enabled DHKP-C to connect with a greater, global "revolutionary" movement, gaining further ideological support.

Such activity, coupled with the fact that Turkish Marxist-Leninists had developed their own "personalized" view of the ideology, assisted Devrimci Sol in weathering the temporary ideological disruption following the Soviet collapse. Although it was assumed that with the collapse of the communist regimes in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union and the concurrent discrediting of the communist parties in those countries, the European FCOs would encounter a serious ideological crisis leading to their demise, this did not

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happen. In commenting on the collapse of the Soviet Union, a prominent *Devrimci Sol* member, Alsan Tayfun Ozkok, suggests reasons for the organization’s continued survival:

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the other countries of the socialist bloc is an important loss for the revolutionary movements of the world. The balance which the Soviet Union established against imperialism, although in a revisionist fashion and based on wrong policies, created a space to live for many revolutionary and patriotic movements and this was an advantageous position for those movements. The movements which tied all their hopes to this balance went into a phase of surrender and reconciliation after the collapse.... The only difference in our interpretation of socialism is that we now believe that the process of transition from socialism to communism will take longer than our expectations.\(^{156}\)

Although over half of the FCOs are no longer together, at least three are still active, one of which is *Devrimci Sol*’s successor, DHKP-C. It is important to point out that those FCOs no longer active dissolved, not only because of the communist collapse, but also due to aggressive and accurate counter-terrorist operations on behalf of their respective countries’ security services.

Still, unlike Turkey, other European countries plagued with FCOs did not suffer from the same political and economic challenges still present in Turkey today. Because of this, other European FCOs found it difficult to gather support within populations having no reason to support their “revolution.” These countries did not have the crippling unemployment and inflation present in Turkey. Also, unlike other countries, Turkey increasingly came under fire regarding pervasive human rights violations, attaching an air of sympathy to the revolutionary left’s cause and opposition to an “oppressive” regime.

\(^{155}\) Alexander and Pluchinsky, ix.

B. TURKISH SECURITY OPERATIONS IN THE NINETIES

*Devrimci Sol* was very successful and executed several spectacular operations against both Turkish security and U.S. interests during the early 1990s. In fact, it was reported that the Turkish police identified and stopped a *Dev Sol* plan to attack President George Bush during his July 1991 visit to Istanbul. Prior to the President's arrival, Turkish police arrested over 12 terrorists and uncovered eight safe houses.157 Between 1992 and 1993, *Devrimci Sol* was credited with 26 lethal attacks against Turkish security or governmental personnel. By the end of the first three years of the 1990s, the group had killed 73 people, including two Americans, one Briton, eight Turkish military officers, and 37 Turkish policemen.158

Even with these successes, beginning in mid-1991, the group began to sustain enormous defeats at the hands of a determined Turkish security force. Turkish security continued to press hard throughout the 1990s in their attempt to eradicate the revolutionary left from Turkey. Some experts familiar with the situation immediately following the Gulf War suggest Turkey's successes in combating *Devrimci Sol* are directly related to Ankara calling out of retirement an ex-security official. Reportedly, this official's effectiveness against terrorism was matched only by the brutality with which he dealt with terrorists. Some claims suggest Ankara's embarrassment and fear of a repeat of 1979-80 violence prompted the government to give him *carte blanche* in dealing with its leftist problem. Whatever the case, by 1992, Turkish security operations began to heavily impact the upper echelons of the group.

Between July 1991 and December 1993, Turkish police uncovered approximately 148 *Devrimci Sol* safe houses and killed over 90 terrorists and suspected terrorists. Most damaging was that during these raids Turkish security killed several key group officials. For example, in April 1992, Sinan Kükül (Central Committee member) and Sabahat Karataş (Central Committee member and *Dev Sol* leaders Dursun Karataş' spouse) were killed. In early March 1993, a dramatic safe house raid ended in the death of Bedri

157 Alexander and Pluchinsky, 231.
158 Corsun, 24.
Yağan, a Central Committee member and the group's number two leader. Finally, on 24 March 1993, Turkish police killed two of Dev Sol's key "regional" commanders: İbrahim Yalcin ( Aegean region commander) and Avni Turan (Black Sea region commander).\(^\text{159}\)

Although Turkish security never completely halted the left's domestic activities, by the end of 1993, leftist attacks against U.S. interests essentially ceased. Operations to identify and apprehend suspected revolutionary leftists continued throughout the 1990s, with the Turkish press reporting almost monthly the captures of leftists throughout the large cities of Turkey. One of the results of these stepped-up operations was the tactical withdrawal of the left. This was especially the case, as the group entered its second serious period of infighting, beginning in 1992. This event would distract the organization from its primary aim of attacking the Turkish Government and force members to focus on internal disputes, ultimately ending with Dursun Karataş coming out as the undisputed leader of a "new" organization.

C. THE SECOND REVOLUTIONARY LEFT SCHISM

If Turkish security operations were not enough for Devrimci Sol in the early 1990s, in September 1992 the organization became its own worst enemy, as it faced a debilitating split placing Karataş and Yağan against each other. According to DOS reports, the schism occurred over a protest regarding a lack of leadership, financial mismanagement, and apparent security breaches.\(^\text{160}\) Allegedly, the dispute involved ideological differences, Karataş' supreme control of organizational finances, as well as his poor security safeguards over telephone lines. According to DOS, between March and December of 1993, the group murdered eight of its own militants in this fight. Furthermore, according to security officials in Germany—where by 1996 it was

\(^{159}\) *Ibid.*, 36.

estimated 1,200 Dev Sol militants and sympathizers resided—infighting began to cause serious injuries and deaths.  

On 30 March 1994, the faction behind Karataş announced its victory over the “mutinous traitors” of the Yağan-based faction. With this the “new” group proclaimed its name as Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (DHKP-C) or Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front). Although many outsiders point to pure internal and financial motives, a review of recent organizational publications available via the Internet provides interesting insights into what might have been the cause. According to DHKP Bulletin No. 8, many of the “traitors” were “Kurdish nationalists.” The bulletin further suggests Turkish security officials may have taken advantage of the infighting:

The left that supported these traitors [Kurdish nationalists] could not even come up with a single sentence to explain their behaviour when the time to draw up a balance sheet came, and they wrote their names in history as movements which can even cooperate with imperialism and the oligarchy to divide and destroy another movement. The [DHKP-C], on the other hand, lives on.

The bulletin states the so-called “traitors” cooperated with Turkish security officials (the “oligarchy”) in attacks against Devrimci Sol. It further suggests security officials possibly introduced provocateurs into the group, aiming to disrupt and make the group vulnerable to security operations. Highly successful Turkish security operations against Devrimci Sol safehouses during this time would seem to support such claims. Of particular interest was the 1993 killing of Yağan, Karataş’ primary rival in the dispute. This occurred just one year following a TNP raid ending in the death of Karataş’ spouse. Even though there is no public information to support it, such a situation suggests the possible “cooperation with the oligarchy” may have existed within both factions, and the Karataş faction may have pointed Turkish security in the direction of its rival. Whatever

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163 Ibid.
the case, the end result for U.S. interests in Turkey was a significant drop in leftist attacks.

D. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM IN TURKEY: 1992-99

As a result of successful Turkish security operations starting in late 1991 through 1993, as well as Devrimci Sol’s internal dispute between 1992 and 1994, revolutionary left attacks decreased considerably against U.S. interests during the last seven years of the twentieth century. Even with the transformation of the 1978 Dev Sol organization in 1994 to the DHKP-C, levels of violence failed to significantly increase. As Figure 6–1 illustrates, consulted databases recorded 110 incidents of international terrorism during

![Graph showing the number of terrorist incidents from 1992 to 1999.]

Sources: See Appendix C.

Figure 6–1. International Terrorist Incidents in Turkey, 1992-99

the period. Of these, data credited the Kurdish group PKK with the majority of the 84 incidents of non-leftist violence perpetrated. By 1993, the PKK dominated the Turkish terrorist scene, causing numerous Turkish military operations both in Southeastern
Turkey, as well as cross-border operations into the “Kurdish protected” zone of Northern Iraq. The left was essentially absent from the international terrorism scene in Turkey.

For the most part, the revolutionary left conducted few attacks against U.S. interests after 1992. In fact, during this period leftist attacks accounted for 18 percent of all incidents involving U.S. interests—a dramatic decrease from previous periods. As mentioned, this was attributed to Turkish security operations and Devrimci Sol’s internal conflict. Even with the final resolution of the conflict in 1994 and the emergence of DHKP-C, the revolutionary left did not significantly increase activities against U.S. interests.

During 1998, aside from two peaceful demonstrations outside U.S. Consulates protesting U.S. action against Iraq during Operation DESERT FOX, there were no significant incidents involving U.S. personnel or property. After 1992, the revolutionary left conducted only two significant, yet unsuccessful, operations against the United States. The majority of DHKP-C attacks arrived in the form of verbal condemnations and threats via its Internet site. In fact, in June 1999, DHKP-C turned its attention to NATO-led air operations over Kosovo, albeit via the Internet. According to the group’s statement, “U.S.-imperialism” was involved in Kosovo as a greater conspiracy to “rule everything and everybody in the world” through destruction.\(^\text{164}\)

Leftist targeting was almost exclusively confined to U.S. business and diplomatic targets (Figure 6–2). In addition, over 50 percent of incidents for this period were carried out during 1992. As was the case in the previous period, targeting was most likely a result of attacking less protected targets, such as businesses. In addition, as noted in Figure 6–3, leftist terrorists confined their 1992 activities almost exclusively to Istanbul. Even during the less active remainder of the 1990s, the revolutionary left maintained this pattern. Also contributing to this situation was Devrimci Sol’s (and later DHKP-C) propensity to target the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Leftist terrorists targeted the consulate four times during this period.

The only significant leftist threat against the U.S. military occurred on 4 January 1998, when Adana TNP uncovered a DHKP-C plan to attack Incirlik Air Base.

Sources: See Appendix C.

Figure 6–2. Leftist Targeting of U.S. Interests, 1992-99

According to the TNP, two militants (one male, one female) planned to attack both IAB and a police station in nearby Osmaniye. According to press reports, security officials conducting a search of the militants' homes recovered numerous incriminating items: 2 hand grenades, 2 hand-made bombs, a sketch of their "act of terrorism" planned for IAB, a cellular phone and DHKP-C organizational documents.

Bombings and attempted bombings remained a favorite tactic for leftist attacks against the U.S. interests during this period, accounting for nearly 60 percent of all

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incidents (Figure 6–4). Such data continued to support the suggestion leftists wanted to maximize effect and minimize both cost and risk using “easier” methods of attack. Of

![Graph showing the location of leftist incidents against U.S. interests, 1992-99](image)

Sources: See Appendix C.

**Figure 6–3. Location of Leftist Incidents against U.S. Interests, 1992-99**

particular interest during this period was Devrimci Sol and DHKP-C’s use of rockets or Rocket-Propelled Grenades (RPGs) in their attacks on the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. In 1992, Dev Sol militants used rockets twice—the first time unsuccessfully—against the consulate. Most recently in June 1999, TNP surprised and killed two DHKP-C militants attempting to launch a Light Anti-tank Weapon (LAW) against the U.S. Consulate. The use of such weapons, coupled with the “professional” 1996 assassination of prominent Turkish industrialist Özdemir Sabancı at his office in Istanbul, indicated a possible sustained, if not increased level of sophistication in attacks. Both tactics required technical knowledge, extensive planning and professional execution, unlike that required during the average bombing.
As the "new" DHKP-C moved to regain ground lost prior to 1994, it was unable or unwilling to devote efforts to increased attacks inside Turkey. The most obvious reason for this is found in successful personnel and leadership-robbing TNP operations in the early 1990s. In addition, TNP continued operations against the DHKP-C throughout the decade, presenting a significant barrier to DHKP-C operations. According to Turkish press reports, between mid-1998 and May 2000 alone, Turkish security captured or killed over 400 suspected DHKP-C militants.\textsuperscript{166} Instead, DHKP-C mounted increased verbal attacks against Ankara and U.S. \textit{imperialism} through its Internet site operating out of Europe. The site, operated by DHKP-C’s front press organ DHKC, vigorously attacks Turkey’s poor human rights record and U.S. military operations in the Middle East and the Balkans. With the end of the Cold War and Turkey’s decreased importance as NATO’s barrier to possible Soviet aggression, DHKP-C moved to increase European pressure on Ankara’s poor human rights record. Although DHKP-C voiced its continued faith in Marxism-Leninism, its increased focus on rhetoric as opposed to action


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demonstrates the organization's awareness that the rest of the world does not necessarily share its confidence in such an ideology, or in violence as the avenue to political legitimacy.

DHKP-C's decreased activities against U.S. interests reflects several important things regarding the organization's possible direction. First, the disruptions of the early 1990s, reduced its capacity to operate against "secondary" targets like the United States. Second, when DHKP-C did decide to mount an attack against the U.S., it selected high profile targets; e.g., the U.S. Consulate and the most active U.S. air base in the region. In the case of the consulate, the group possibly selected it because Dev Sol had launched several attacks against the facility in the past and because it is an open target. Of course, both recent attempts against the U.S. might signal independent decisions by DHKP-C militants. If so, this possibly means Karataş did not completely regain control over operations inside Turkey following the 1992-94 schism. Lastly, DHKP-C's increased Internet activity demonstrates an organizational attempt to establish a legitimate place for it as a political party. As Turkish security continues to close avenues for working from inside the country, DHKP-C leadership (Karataş) seems to have decided a more prudent attack lies outside, especially from inside an unthreatened, Turkey-hostile Europe.
VII. THE FUTURE THREAT OF THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT

"The founding date of our Party is March 30, 1994. But our Party is not ‘new’ in the political arena. It is the continuation of the struggle and the follow up to the tradition of 16 years of Devrimci Sol [italics added]. In it, the traditions and experiences of Devrimci Sol are carried to a new level."

Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi (1998)\(^{167}\)

In 1994, following a two-year period of infighting and constant police operations, the Karataş faction of Dev Sol renamed itself. The group continued to target U.S. interests in Turkey, but not on the scale of attacks conducted in earlier periods. Although DHKP-C mounted only two significant, "unsuccessful" operations against U.S. targets since 1992, these recent activities reaffirm the group’s continued virulently anti-U.S. and anti-NATO position. Even so, what level of threat does DHKP-C pose to U.S. interests in Turkey? What is the potential future of Turkey’s revolutionary left? In this final chapter, a DoD threat factor system is employed to determine DHKP-C’s potential threat to U.S. interests. Finally, in light of increased human rights disputes between Turkey and Europe, what does this mean for DHKP-C and its continued existence?

A. REVIEW OF DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE THREAT FACTORS

Following the devastating terrorist attacks against U.S. interests during the mid-1990s, the Department of Defense (DoD) developed a "common" method to assess the terrorist threat to U.S. and DoD personnel, facilities, material, and interests overseas. This method is based upon a careful analysis of six "threat analysis factors"—existence, capability, intentions, history, targeting and security environment.\(^{168}\) The determination

\(^{167}\) Political Development in Turkey: The People on the Road to Power (London: Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front Information Bureau, 1998), 181.

of each factor’s presence (or absence) in a particular location enables DoD to establish a specific “threat level” for that area. 169

The threat levels are: critical, high, medium, low and negligible. These threat levels are based on the presence of a combination of the threat factors. The following descriptions establish the requirements for each particular threat level. 170

- **CRITICAL.** Factors of existence, capability, and targeting must be present. History and intentions may or may not be present. CRITICAL is differentiated from all other terrorist threat levels because it is the only one in which credible information identifying specific DoD personnel, facilities, assets, or interests as potential targets of attack is present.

- **HIGH.** Factors of existence, capability, history, and intentions must be present, but analysts lack specific targeting information.

- **MEDIUM.** Factors of existence, capability, and history must be present. Intentions may or may not be present. Threat level MEDIUM and threat level HIGH are similar in that data for the factors existence, history, and capability exist.

- **LOW.** Existence and capability must be present. History may or may not be present.

- **NEGLIGIBLE.** Existence and/or capability may or may not be present.

It is important to note that a threat level based upon this particular method only applies to the terrorist threat to U.S. and/or DoD interests in the particular area. It does not apply to the indigenous population or another “third” country present in a given area.

A review of each individual threat factor, as it relates to the revolutionary left today in Turkey, will provide us with both an understanding of the possible threat DHKP-C presents, as well as the level of concern the U.S. should place regarding the group’s threat.

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170 Ibid.
1. Existence

This factor is present. The factor of existence is based upon the fact that a terrorist group is present, assessed to be present, or able to gain access to a given country or locale. The revolutionary leftist group DHKP-C exists in Turkey, as demonstrated in both documented attacks and attempted attacks against both U.S. and domestic Turkish targets. In addition, according to Turkish press reports, Turkish authorities have captured or killed nearly 100 suspected DHKP-C member in 2000.171

2. Capability

This factor is present. The factor of capability is based upon the acquired, assessed, or demonstrated level of capability to conduct terrorist attacks. In the last half of the 1990s, DHKP-C militants have demonstrated a sophisticated capability to carry out armed attacks against targets inside Turkey. The following three events illustrate DHKP-C continued capability:

- 9 January 1996 – DHKP-C gunmen breached security at the twin towers of Sabancı Center in Istanbul. Once inside they shot and killed three people: Özdemir Sabancı, a Turkish industrialist and head of a Toyota car joint venture with Japan; Haluk Gorgun, the firm’s general manager; and a company secretary. That the gunmen were able to gain access to a secure facility, commit three murders, then escape demonstrated high level of sophistication and capability.

- 4 January 1998 – Adana TNP captured two DHKP-C militants planning to attack IAB, which is the United States’ most significant air base in the region. Although TNP thwarted their plans, materials seized during a search of their residence disclosed a measure of sophistication and capability. Items seized revealed the militants had successfully conducted surveillance of the base. They also possessed a computer, bomb making equipment, and small arms.

- 4 June 1999 – Istanbul TNP stumble on two DHKP-C militants preparing to fire a rocket at the U.S. Consulate. Again, although unsuccessful, this incident illustrated DHKP-C is potentially capable of fielding weapons more sophisticated than small arms or home-made explosives.

3. Intentions

This factor is present. This factor of intention is based upon recent demonstrated anti-U.S. terrorist activity, or stated or assessed intent to conduct such activity. As illustrated above, as recent as June 1999, DHKP-C has demonstrated a willingness and capability to mount terrorist attacks against U.S. targets inside Turkey. In addition, DHKC continued to publish anti-U.S. statements. In the organization's "Party Program" (Appendix M), DHKP-C declares, under the heading of "The Enemies in This War," that "first of all, U.S. imperialism and all imperialist forces, together with their military, economic and political bases, their offices, and their secret service bases set up under the guise of providing 'aid'" continue to be enemies. In light of such written declarations, the group's intentions must be taken seriously.

4. History

This factor is present. This factor of history is based upon demonstrated terrorist activity over time. As pointed out in this thesis, the Turkish revolutionary left—from THKP-C to DHKP-C—has targeted U.S. interests in Turkey since 1968. In particular, the revolutionary left is credited with 13 of 15 terrorist-related deaths (Table 7-1) of U.S. citizens in Turkey between 1976 and 1991. According to DOS reports, the majority of these attacks appeared well executed, illustrating previous planning and surveillance of the intended target or targets. In addition, DHKP-C demonstrated activity as early as June 1999, when militants targeted the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul.

5. Targeting

This factor is unknown. The factor of targeting is based upon current credible information on activity indicative of preparations for specific terrorist operation. There exists no open source information indicating DHKP-C is preparing to execute a terrorist operation against a U.S. target inside Turkey.

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6. Security Environment

This factor is present. The factor of security environment is based upon the internal political and security considerations that impact on the capability of terrorist elements to carry out their intentions. Several examples exist illustrating Turkish security

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>CITY</th>
<th>PLACE</th>
<th>VICTIM</th>
<th>TACTIC</th>
<th>GROUP</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>11-Aug-76</td>
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<td>Airport</td>
<td>Civilian - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>PFLP</td>
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<tr>
<td>12-Apr-79</td>
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<td>Residence</td>
<td>USAF - 2</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>THKP-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11-May-79</td>
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<td>Hotel</td>
<td>USA - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>MLSPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2-Jun-79</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Civilian - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>THKP-C</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>14-Dec-79</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>USA/DoD - 1/3</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>MLSPB</td>
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<td>Shot</td>
<td>MLSPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>USAF - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>MLSPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Aug-82</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Airport</td>
<td>Civilian - 1</td>
<td>Shot/Bomb</td>
<td>ASALA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7-Feb-91</td>
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<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>Contractor - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Dev Sol</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>22-Mar-91</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>Contractor - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Dev Sol</td>
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<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Office</td>
<td>UK Person&lt;sup&gt;b&lt;/sup&gt; - 1</td>
<td>Shot</td>
<td>Dev Sol</td>
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<td>Vehicle</td>
<td>USAF - 1</td>
<td>Bomb</td>
<td>Islamic Jihad</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<sup>a</sup> Only three terrorist-related U.S. fatalities were credited to non-leftist terrorists: the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia, and an Ankara-base Islamic Jihad cell.

<sup>b</sup> Some sources state Devrimci Sol believed this victim was a U.S. person.


**Table 7–1. U.S. Casualties to Terrorism in Turkey, 1968–98**

is capable of countering most DHKP-C operations, but not all. According to a government report quoted in the Turkish press, between 1988 and April 1998, Turkish authorities mounted 2,208 operations against DHKP-C alone. As a result of these operations, authorities reported killing 239 militants, while capturing 8,627. In addition, as pointed out earlier, TNP pre-empted two planned DHKP-C operations

against U.S. interests in 1997 and 1999. Even so, authorities have been unable to prevent all DHKP-C attacks. In addition to the 1996 Sabancı murders, DHKP-C terrorist have targeted and assassinated at least 10 police and military officers, as well as judicial civil servants.

Based upon the above review, it is assessed that the factors of existence, capabilities, intentions, and history are present. This indicates that the appropriate threat level regarding the DHKP-C terrorist threat is High.

B. THE REVOLUTIONARY LEFT’S THREAT AND FUTURE

The analysis has shown that the revolutionary left, especially groups such as Devrimci Sol, owe their existence to Turkey’s economic, political and social instability. In particular the political liberalization of the late 1950s and 1960s, which provided the fertile soil for such groups and their ideologies to germinate and take root. Later liberalization (without developed institutions) following the many military coups allowed for the re-emergence and further development of these groups, as well as their arguments and conflicts. The liberalization of the universities during these periods, coupled with the increased (and mixed rural and metropolitan) student populations provided the expansion of movements and their emergence at the extreme of the political spectrum. In addition, the campuses, and the gecekondus phenomenon created as a result of rapid urbanization, became ample sources of manpower for the eventual armed movements.

Closely tied to the development of these violent groups were the effects of continuous attempts at economic reform and stability. As was discussed, the Turkish Government’s mismanagement of the economy and the resulting crises led to unacceptable inflation and unemployment, not to mention uncertainty. This was magnified more when moves to mechanize agriculture aided in stimulating the urbanization phenomenon of the 1960s and 1970s. Coupled with this was the failure of economic reforms and policies to provide adequate employment for the growing population. The overall effect was a shift in population from the rural areas to the larger cities. For many, the hopes of employment in the large cities never materialized. In lieu of adequate employment, many of those unemployed workers became contributors to the political violence witnessed in the 1970s and 1980s.
During this research, no evidence was discovered that pointed to any serious impact by leftist terrorism, no matter the severity, on Turkish–U.S. relations. Although armed leftist organizations made living in Turkey quite dangerous for U.S. citizens—specifically prior to the 1980 coup and during the 1991 Gulf War—U.S. policy towards Turkey did not appear to be significantly effected. Other, internationally watched issues, such as the Cyprus issue between Turkey and Greece, and the United States government’s reaction to it, had more impact than leftist terrorism did. As terrorism issues go, Turkey’s Kurdish insurgency with the PKK has had a more observable impact between the two nations, especially with the fall of the former Soviet Union. Issues regarding Turkey’s use of U.S. military aid in its fight with the PKK, as well as human rights issues in Turkey have gained greater, longer lasting attention.

While Marxism-Leninism as a ruling ideology was seriously discredited with the fall of the Soviet Union, it remains attractive for some terrorist organizations as a revolutionary ideology. This is especially true with extreme leftist groups, such as the DHKP-C in Turkey. Therefore, partially based upon U.S. demonstrated opposition to such an ideology, groups like DHKP-C remain a potential threat to U.S. interests in Turkey. DHKP-C, although so far not as active or deadly as its ancestor Dev Sol, still espouses hatred for the imperialist U.S., as well as much of the perceived western influence in Turkey; e.g., NATO, the European Community, and the European Union.

An organization’s level of institutionalization is measured in part by its adaptability and complexity.\(^{174}\) This analysis of Turkey’s revolutionary left strongly suggests—based on such measures—a highly institutionalized organization. First, the revolutionary left has proven very adaptable to environmental challenges and age: it has weathered several military interventions survived the ideological blow of the Soviet collapse, and DHKP-C sits atop a 30-year organizational history. Next, DHKP-C is a very complex organization, as its cellular structure illustrates. It is no longer a small, 20 to 30 militant operation like THKP; some sources estimate DHKP-C (and DHKC) membership well into the thousands. In addition, the organization maintains a complex

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\(^{174}\) Huntington, 12-24.
support structure both in Turkey, and in several European countries. Turkey’s revolutionary left is a survivor. Thus, the revolutionary left’s durability and longevity warrants continued research and watching.

It goes without saying that the preservation of key militant leaders outside of Turkey contributed (and continues to contribute) to the revolutionary left’s longevity and ability to re-emerge. This also supported the institutionalization of the organization. Coupled with this, the continued economic difficulties and political turmoil, compound the problem of solving such terrorism. For, until the Turkish population as a whole obtain confidence in employment and a stable living standard, and gain more confidence in a truly “democratic” government, such groups as DHKP-C will appeal to certain sectors of Turkey’s population.

Finally, the issue of Ankara’s human rights record plays to DHKP-C’s favor. The DHKP-C’s establishment of the DHKC offices in Europe and connecting to the Internet has allowed it to take this issue before both European and international audiences. European (and even U.S.) pressure on Turkey during the Cold War regarding such issues was often overshadowed by NATO’s need to have a strong obstacle to possible Soviet aggression in the Middle East. With the Soviet collapse and Turkey’s diminished security importance to many European NATO members, this is not the case. A case in point is Europe’s “oversight” in the case of the February 1999 capture of PKK terrorist leader Abdullah Öcalan. Several European countries voiced their concern over the possibility that Turkey might execute Öcalan. In fact, the European Human Rights Court demanded Turkey allow Öcalan to freely consult with his foreign and Turkish lawyers and that an independent court try him.\(^\text{175}\) Although Turkey did not agree to such a demand, Ankara must weigh the possible impact of its internal affairs on its relationship to Europe, which Turkey’s leaders have attempted to emulate for over 200 years. Possibly supporting Ankara’s concern is its self-imposed moratorium on state-sanctioned

executions. Turkey has not carried out an Assembly approved execution since 1984. Ironically, the last person executed was a revolutionary leftist.

In light of this, what will possibly keep such movements as DHKP-C alive or ultimately signal their end? In addition to issues surrounding human rights, one of the greatest possible assets for the extreme left has been, and will continue to be, the health of the Turkish economy, and the government's ability to meet the needs of its population. As earlier discussed, the Turkish economy has had anything but easy times. With the European Union's decision in 1997 to turn down Turkey's application for permanent membership in the EU came the crashing down of a decades' old dream. Although this decision was reversed in 1999, such an event might have been a blessing in disguise for Turkey.

The EU refusal may be one of the strong motivating forces for further economic development and integration in the newly independent Central Asia states. Although Turkey has had some significant crises with its economy, it still has great potential as a model for the development of democracy and a market economy in this predominantly Islamic region. If Turkey is able to move closer to a more stable economy and integration with Central Asia, and deliver a sounder more predictable economic environment, a great deal of support (both real and potential) for extreme leftist organizations will diminish.

Such developments, coupled with the ideological uncertainties following the fall of the Soviet Union will potentially erode the attractiveness of such groups as DHKP-C. An economically satisfied population will be unlikely to challenge and disrupt the status quo, as advocated by such extreme organizations as the DHKP-C. Running parallel to this would be a diminished terrorist risk to U.S. interests in Turkey.
APPENDICES

The attached appendices provide additional support to this thesis. Appendix A provides a list of abbreviations and acronyms frequently used in the thesis. Appendix B provides the key to the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism Incidents codes used in individual incident sequence numbers listed in Appendix D. Appendix C provides a list of the sources used in construction of the chronology.

Appendix D contains a comprehensive chronology of international terrorist incidents in Turkey from 1968 to 1999. It chronicles leftist (and suspected leftist) attacks in Turkey, specifically those directed at U.S. interests. It also illustrates specifics of Turkey’s revolutionary leftists’ terrorist acts, providing additional insight into the scope of revolutionary leftists’ activities during specific periods, such as THKO and THKP-C operations between 1971 and 1972, or Devrimci Sol actions during the 1991 Gulf War. Appendices E through H provide graphical representation over time, 1968 through 1999. These four graphs depict the terrorist incident data provided in the thesis’ main body in complete form from 1968 to 1999.

In addition, Appendices I through M provide translations or “original” English versions of primary THKP-C, Devrimci Sol, DHKC, and DHKP-C organizational documents. Most are group manifestos, event or issue bulletins, or ransom notes. These documents provide additional insight into original and current “aims” and issues of the revolutionary left’s movement. Of note in these documents is that these groups have continuously voiced their concern and displeasure regarding U.S. presence in Turkey.

Finally, a note on editing. Most of the information and documents contained in these appendices was either taken from already translated sources or directly extracted from the DHKC’s Internet website. Therefore, the author edited these documents very little in an attempt to maintain their original state. Only obvious spelling mistakes were corrected so as not to distract from the documents’ content. Otherwise, documents are provided as discovered.
# APPENDIX A – LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ASALA</td>
<td>Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CENTO</td>
<td>Central Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
| CHP         | Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi  
              (Republican People’s Party or RPP) |
| CIA         | Central Intelligence Agency |
| DCM         | Deputy Chief of Mission |
| DEV GENÇ    | Devrimci Genç  
              (Revolutionary Youth), or  
              Türkiye Devrimci Gençlik Federasyonu  
              (Federation of Revolutionary Turkish Youth) |
| DEV SOL     | Devrimci Sol  
              (Revolutionary Left), or THKP-C-Devrimci Sol |
| DEV YOL     | Devrimci Yol  
              (Revolutionary Path) |
| DHKC        | Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi  
              (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Front) |
| DHKP-C      | Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi  
              (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front) |
| DoD         | Department of Defense |
| DOS         | Department of State |
| DP          | Demokrat Parti  
              (Democrat Party) |
| FBI         | Federal Bureau of Investigation |
| FCO         | Fighting Communist Organization |
| FKF         | Fikir Kulüpleri Federasyonu  
              (Federation of Idea Clubs or Association of Ideas Clubs) |
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>GDP</td>
<td>Gross National Product</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IAB</td>
<td>Incirlik Air Base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBC</td>
<td><em>İksesiz Birlik Cephesi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Unprincipled Unity Front)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IBDA-C</td>
<td><em>İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar-Cephesi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Islamic Great Eastern Raiders-Front)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IMF</td>
<td>International Monetary Fund</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METU</td>
<td>Middle East Technical University</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Orta Doğu Teknik Üniversitesi)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MGK</td>
<td><em>Milli Güvenlik Kurulu</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(National Security Council)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLAPU</td>
<td>Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit, see MLSPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MLSPB</td>
<td><em>Marksist-Leninist Silahlı Propaganda Birliği</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>*(Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit), or THKP-C/MLSPB</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MTMC</td>
<td>United States Military Traffic Management Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non-Commissioned Officer</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PFLP</td>
<td>Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PKK</td>
<td><em>Partiya Karkaren Kurdistan</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Kurdistan Workers’ Party)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPG</td>
<td>Rocket Propelled Grenade (or rocket)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RPP</td>
<td>Republican People’s Party (see CHP)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDB</td>
<td><em>Silahlı Devrimci Birlikler</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Armed Revolutionary Units)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TC</td>
<td><em>Türkiye Cumhuriyeti</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Republic of Turkey)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TBMM</td>
<td><em>Türkiye Büyük Millet Meclisi</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td><em>(Turkish Grand National Assembly)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>---------</td>
<td>-------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THKC</td>
<td>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi (Turkish People’s Liberation Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THKO</td>
<td>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (Turkish People’s Liberation Army)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THKP</td>
<td>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi (Turkish People’s Liberation Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THKP-C</td>
<td>Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Partisi-Cephesi (Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THY</td>
<td>Türk Hava Yolları (Turkish Airlines)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIKKO</td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Köylü Kurtuluş Ordusu (Workers’ Peasants Liberation Army of Turkey)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TIP</td>
<td>Türkiye İşçi Partisi (Turkish Labor Party)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TKEP/L</td>
<td>Türkiye Komünist Emek Partisi/Leninist (Turkish Communist Laborers’ Party/Leninist or Communist Labor Party of Turkey/Leninist)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TNP</td>
<td>Turkish National Police</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLA</td>
<td>Turkish People’s Liberation Army, see THKO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLF</td>
<td>Turkish People’s Liberation Front, see THKC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TPLP</td>
<td>Turkish People’s Liberation Party, see THKP</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRT</td>
<td>Türkiye Radyo Televizyon Kurumu (Turkish Radio and Television Corporation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TUSLOG</td>
<td>The United States Logistics Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USA</td>
<td>United States Army</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAF</td>
<td>United States Air Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USAID</td>
<td>United States Agency for International Development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USCIA</td>
<td>United States International Communications Agency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USIS</td>
<td>United States Information Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USN</td>
<td>United States Navy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VBR</td>
<td>Vinnel, Brown and Root, Inc.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX B – RAND-ST. ANDREWS CHRONOLOGY SEQUENCE NUMBER CODES

This appendix provides the key to the RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism Incidents codes used in individual incident sequence numbers listed in Appendix D. This list is not inclusive, as it only provides the key to codes used in the incident numbers associated with this thesis. In addition, not all incidents have a RAND-St. Andrews sequence number, as the author constructed this chronology using several different terrorism chronologies. Use the following example as an initial guide:

EXAMPLE:

19680810 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410

Two firebombs were thrown at the USIS office in Izmir, causing slight damage. A Turkish communist suspect was arrested.

CHRONOLOGY INDICATORS: The following symbols indicate the type of event and inclusion in what specific chronology.

A1 – International terrorist incidents
A4 – Non-nuclear, energy-related incidents
A2 – Indigenous Group Chronologies
A7 – Maritime incidents

ACTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

B01 – Kidnapping
B03 – Hijackings
B05 – Barricade and hostage
B07 – Significant threats, conspiracies, serious protests, others

B02 – Attacks on installations, including
   grenade attacks, arson, sabotage
   other than by bombing
B04 – Bombings
B06 – Assassinations, shootings

176 Karen G. Treverton, <krent@rand.org>, RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism (1968-1999) Database Sequence Number Key, [E-mail to Michael J. Kenville <mjkenvil@nps.navy.mil>], 17 December 1999.
FATALITIES

F000 (none, or none reported) F001 (one) F002 (two) etc.

INJURIES

I000 (none, or none reported) I001 (one) I002 (two) etc.

TARGETS

T00 – Unknown (including terrorists’ accidents) T01 – Diplomatic T03 – Military T05 – AIRCRAFT T05b – AIRLINE OFFICES T05d – AIRLINE PERSONNEL T06 – Private citizens, communities T07 – Utilities – energy (T07a for oil, T07b for electric), communications facilities T08 – Government, including politicians in and out of office, government buildings, all of the host country T09 – Exiles, immigrants T10 – Religious, ethnic T11 – Other, and nonspecific multiple T12 – Maritime T14 – Towns T15 – Transportation (other than air, sea) T16 – Terrorists, activists as targets T17 – Media

NATIONALITY OF TARGETS and COUNTRY LOCATION OF INCIDENT

Nationality = N0000 State = S0000 ['N' or 'S' preceding - ]

Country Codes (Numerical Order)

GEOGRAPHICAL DISTRIBUTION

REU – Europe
RAS – Asia
RME – Middle East/North Africa/Persian Gulf

PERPETRATORS

0000 – Unknown or claims that are not credible
0110 – Palestine Liberation Organization, general, indeterminate, or unknown
0120 – Black June, Al-Assifa (includes early PLO dissidents) (Abu Nidal, Fatah Revolutionary Council, rg. of Socialist Muslims, Arab Revolutionary Cells, Arab Revolutionary Brigades)
0121 – May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine
0122 – Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution
1210 – Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA)
1216 – Armenian Revolutionary Army
1220 – Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide
1221 – 28 May Armenian Organization
1300 – Libyan, general, indeterminate, or unknown
1400 – Middle East, North African, other than Palestinians, general, indeterminate, unknown
1401 – Palestinian/Shiia collaboration, Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine, Islamic Jihad-Jerusalem
1410 – Turkish, general, indeterminate, or unknown
1411 – Dev Sol
1412 – Dev Yol
1413 – Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit (MLAPU)
1420 – Lebanese, Jordanian, general, indeterminate, or unknown
1422 – Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF)
1430 – Iranian, Iraqi, Syrian, general, indeterminate, unknown
1432 – Amal, Movement of Hope (Imam Musa Sadr) (Shiites in general)
1433 – Kurdish separatists
1434 – Jihad (Struggle) (Islamic Holy War, Hezbollah, Revolutionary Justice Organization)
1545 – USSR Republics (Ukraine, etc.), general, indeterminate, unknown
1920 – Violent Political Demonstrations, incl. students (So. Korea)
2001 – Iran
2009 – Libya
2200 – Asylum-seekers, homesick Cubans, etc.
APPENDIX C - CHRONOLOGY SOURCES

The following sources were used to construct Appendix D, a chronology of international terrorist incidents in Turkey between 1968 and 1999. These sources also provided the data used in the graphs in Appendices E through H. Sources are grouped by organization or author, then by date.

RAND-St. Andrews Chronologies


Karen G. Treverton, <krent@rand.org>, *Incidents of International Terrorism in Turkey from RAND-St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism (1968-1999) Database, [E-mail to Michael J. Kenville <mijkenvil@nps.navy.mil>]} [17 December 1999].

Edward F. Mickolus Chronologies


**U.S. Department of State**


U.S. Department of Transportation


**Foreign Broadcast Information Service Media Translations**


**Other**

APPENDIX D – CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS, 1968-99

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Incident Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 August</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>(19680810 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) Two firebombs were thrown at the USIS office in Izmir, causing slight damage. A Turkish communist suspect was arrested.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 January</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>The car of U.S. Ambassador Robert Commer, who was visiting METU in Ankara, was burned by a group of students. Fourteen students were arrested for their part in the incident.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>18 January</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Leftist students threw a bomb at the U.S. military headquarters causing minor damage and no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 June</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Firebombs damaged the TUSLOG Headquarters facility and six vehicles. No group claimed credit for the attacks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 August</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>(19690825 A1 B04 F001 I001 T11 N666 S640 RME P1420) Two Jordanians attempted to bomb the Israeli Commercial Fair in Izmir but were injured when the bomb prematurely exploded. One died from his injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 September</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19690916 A1 B03 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P2200) A 27-year-old Turkish law student hijacked a THY Viscount airliner with 63 persons aboard, forcing the pilot to land in Sofia, Bulgaria. The student, Sadi Toker, 27, had a history of mental illness. Bulgarian police released the plane with its six-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

177 Prior to the systematic record keeping of international terrorist incidents—the RAND–St. Andrews Chronology being one of the first—only six international incidents of terrorism in Turkey were recorded. Of those six, three were directed at U.S. interests in Turkey, specifically USIS offices in Ankara and Istanbul.

178 The RAND–St. Andrews Chronology of International Terrorism index/sequence number will be giving in parenthesis prior to incident description text, if applicable.
man crew four hours later. (Note – Additional sources stated Toker was involved in the 1967 stabbing of a U.S. seaman during a U.S. Sixth Fleet visit to Turkey. At the time, Toker was declared mentally ill and escaped punishment.)

December

Izmir

Thirteen Americans were injured in Izmir, as militant students protested a port call by five USN ships.

20 December

Ankara

(19691220 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A small bomb exploded behind the USIS building in Ankara, breaking six windows. There were no injuries. No one claimed responsibility for the attack.

1970

1 January

Istanbul

(19700101 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosion of undetermined origin occurred at the entrance of the U.S. Consulate General in Istanbul. Damage was limited to broken windows.

6 March

Ankara

At about 1815, approximately 50 students, with 150 more observing outside, invaded the USIS building in Ankara. Damage was limited to three broken windows and several broken door locks, as well as the destruction of two U.S. flags. No U.S. citizens were injured, but two TNP guards outside were beaten. Riot control police arrived within minutes and removed the attackers.

19 March

Turkey

Turkish students threw three Molotov cocktails at three foreign-owned buildings, causing slight damage.

28 March

Adana

Turkish police apprehended four students carrying dynamite and gasoline in the U.S. Consulate and Turkish-American Association area in Adana. Two of the students admitted intending to bomb the Turkish-American Association and implicated the other two, who were later arrested.

28 March

Ankara

(19700428 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A small group of young men attacked a USAID warehouse on the outskirts of Ankara by cutting the barbed wire to allow entry to the grounds. Molotov cocktails were thrown at equipment and vehicles and they shot at the night watchman.

24 April

Izmir

A bomb exploded in the Pan American office in Izmir. The PSF was suspected.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>25 April</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19700425 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded in the El Al Israel Airlines office in Istanbul. There were no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 August</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19700831 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) TUSLOG Detachment 30, a USAF facility in Ankara, was bombed. Two additional devices that failed to explode were also found in the facility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 September</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Two Dev Genc members, carrying 12 sticks of dynamite, were arrested near the TUSLOG facility</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 October</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>(19701002 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosive device was detonated outside the USAF Commissary in Izmir. A second bomb consisting of seven sticks of dynamite was found outside the commissary.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19701003 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) The U.S. CENTO Headquarters in Ankara was bombed. The bomb shattered virtually all of the glass in the windows on two sides of the building. There were no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 October</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19701003 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosive device was thrown at the USIS offices in Ankara. Damage was slight.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 October</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19701006 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb that failed to detonate was found under the vehicle of a member of the USAF near his Ankara apartment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 November</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19701121 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A small dynamite charge, thrown from a moving vehicle, was detonated outside the fence of the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. There was slight damage and no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19701127 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) Three bombs exploded in the U.S. Officer's Open Mess at a military installation in Ankara. There was minor damage, but no injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 November</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19701127 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) Three bombs were detonated at the U.S. Military Annex in Ankara. There was minor damage, but no injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
15 December  Ankara  Molotov cocktails were thrown at the U.S. Military Exchange Annex. There were no injuries.

24 December  Ankara  (19701224 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1400) Two Ankara University students were apprehended while they were trying to dynamite TUSLOG Detachment 30 in Ankara.

29 December  Ankara  (19701229 A1 B06 F000 I002 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Two policemen outside the U.S. Embassy in Ankara were wounded when fired upon by persons in a fast-moving vehicle.

30 December  Istanbul  The USIS office in Istanbul received a telephone bomb threat. There were no reports of a device being found or detonating.

1971

7 January  Malatya  A bomb slightly damaged a USAF truck. No injuries were reported.

22 January  Ankara  An official USAF vehicle, parked at the Heccettepe University Hospital, sustained minor damage when hit by an explosive device.

23 January  Ankara  (19710123 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Bombs were found on the grounds of the U.S. Embassy Ankara.

23 January  Ankara  (19710123 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Bombs were found on the grounds of the USIS building in Ankara.

25 January  Ankara  (19710125 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Two Molotov cocktails were thrown onto the balcony of the residence of a U.S. Foreign Service officer in Ankara. There were no injuries and only a little fire damage.

25 January  Istanbul  Following an explosion heard elsewhere in Istanbul, Turkish police received a bomb threat against a TUSLOG building. There were no reports indicating an additional bomb was located or detonated.

25 January  Ankara  The USAF NCO Club was bombed. There were no injuries.

29 January  Ankara  Gunfire and explosives hit the TUSLOG building in Ankara.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 February</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>The building, as well as two USAF vehicles, sustained minor damage. An explosive device was thrown into the TUSLOG motorpool. Two military vehicles were damaged.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>A bomb detonated under the private vehicle of a USAF sergeant. The car suffered extensive damage, and the windows in the sergeant’s residence were shattered.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 February</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19710208 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A gift-wrapped package containing four sticks of dynamite exploded inside the apartment of a U.S. soldier, after his son brought the package into the kitchen. Although damage was heavy, there were no casualties. (Note – Additional sources stated the soldier’s POV was vandalized the night before.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19710210 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb was found and defused in an Ankara building occupied by three U.S. military families.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 February</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19710210 A1 B04 F000 I002 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded in a second floor bathroom of the Turkish–American Association in Ankara, causing considerable damage to the USIS library. Two people were slightly injured in the blast.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 February</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19710215 A1 B01 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) An unknown number of TPLA (THKO) militants kidnapped James Finlay (Sergeant), an unarmed USAF security policeman patrolling Balgat Air Station in Ankara. The group made no ransom demands. Reportedly, Finlay had come upon the militants as they were attempting to steal arms from the base. The militants released him unharmed 17 hours after the kidnapping. According to the THKO Manifesto provided during the 4 March 1971 kidnapping of four USAF airmen, THKO opted not to kill Finlay and released him because “he was a Negro.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 February</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19710217 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) At approximately 0100, a bomb was thrown into the lower parking lot of the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. Turkish Police were able to defuse it.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

179 Bolded dates denote a leftist terrorist attack resulting in the death of one or more U.S. person.
17 February  Istanbul  (19710217 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded outside the fence surrounding USAF TUSLOG Detachment 29 in Istanbul. There was no damage.

19 February  Istanbul  (19710219 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 T12 N002 S640 RME P0000 A7) A bomb damaged a USA Detachment 33-1 passenger boat (J-boat) in Istanbul.

19 February  Istanbul  (19710219 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 T12 N002 S640 RME P0000 A7) A second bomb was found in a second boat and defused.

20 February  Ankara  (19710220 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A device made of plastic explosives was found on the grounds of the USIS in Ankara. The fuse had been lit, but the bomb failed to explode.

4 March  Ankara  (19710304 A1 B01 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At 0030, five heavily armed THKO members kidnapped four USAF airmen—Jimmie J. Sexton (Staff Sergeant), James M. Gholson (Airman First Class), L.J. Heavner (Airman First Class), and Richard Caraszi (Airman First Class)—stationed near Ankara. The kidnapping occurred on a road about 10 miles outside Ankara, while the four USAF airmen were being driven (by a Turkish driver) back to Ankara. At 0200, the Turkish Government captured one of the kidnappers, Mete Ertekin, while he was attempting to ditch one of the kidnapping vehicles in front of the Russian Embassy. He later divulged the names of his accomplices, and some 30,000 police and soldiers were mobilized to search for them. At 0830, a note from the THKO was delivered to TRT and other Turkish news agencies, demanding the publication of a THKO Manifesto (via TRT) attacking U.S. imperialism in Turkey, and the payment of $400,000. THKO gave 36 hours for this to be accomplished.

At 2000, a second ransom note was delivered to newspapers address to the U.S. Ambassador, demanding the release of THKO members, publicity for THKO, and it extended the deadline by 12 hours. In addition, letters from the kidnapped airmen and one military identification card was provided. At 0400, 5 March, at METU in Ankara, students armed with guns and dynamite met Turkish security forces. After approximately five hours, 2,000 students were rounded up. On that same day, several student protest demonstrations erupted in Ankara at several colleges. On 7 March, the Turkish press published the
pictures and names of the suspected kidnappers. Between 2100 – 2200, 8 March, Turkish police stopped at the apartment building where hostages were held to investigate an unrelated domestic quarrel. At 2230, hostages ordered to lie flat on floor, with apartment in darkness; the kidnappers then departed the apartment. At approximately midnight, 8 March, the four airmen departed the apartment, took a taxi to TUSLOG billeting and reported their safe return. On 17 March, Deniz Gezmis and Yusuf Aslan were captured Sivas Province while motorcycling toward the mountains of Malatya. On 22 March, Turkish security captured Hüseyin Inan also traveling to Malatya. On 28 April, Turkish Jandarma forces killed Sinan Cemgil while he was attempting to lead a raid on a U.S. radar installation in the Malatya mountains. On 6 May 1972, the three captured were hanged. Each of the three were allowed to make a last statement of revolutionary beliefs and was permitted to kick the chair out form under himself.

14 March Istanbul (19710314 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A small bomb was thrown over the back wall of the U.S. Consulate.

15 March Ankara (19710315 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) Members of the TPLA bombed the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. There was considerable damage, but no injuries.

15 March Ankara Members of the TPLA bombed a branch of the American–Turkish Trading Bank (as well as offices of the right-wing Ankara newspaper Dünya). There were no reported injuries.

25 March Izmir (19710325 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A pipe bomb exploded at the rear of the U.S. Consulate in Izmir. There was no damage or injuries.

28 March Izmir (19710328 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded in the garden of the U.S. Consulate General’s residence in Izmir, causing no injuries or property damage.

2 April Ankara (19710402 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N996 S640 RME P0000) Five bombs with fuses still smoking were discovered outside the CENTO secretariat building in Ankara; a bomb exploded outside the CENTO Headquarters in Ankara.

2 April Ankara (19710402 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) Four young Turks attacked the U.S. Officers’ Open Mess in Ankara. They threw two black powder bombs into the
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>A device exploded in an empty lot beside the Turkish-American Association Theater. No damages or injuries resulted. Three unexploded dynamite sticks were found on the sidewalk adjacent to the theater.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>Ten minutes after the explosion outside of the Turkish-American Association Theater, an explosion occurred in front of the Maltese-American facility, breaking windows and slightly injuring the Turkish guard.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 May</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19710504 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded at the TUSLOG Detachment 30 airmen's billet in Ankara, shattering all the windows in the building, which was unoccupied at the time.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19710517 A1 B01 F001 I001 T01 N666 S640 RME P1410) Members of the TPLF (THKC) kidnapped Ephraim Elrom, the Israeli Consul General in Istanbul, and demanded the release of all guerrillas being detained by the Turkish Government. The Turkish Government rejected the demand, launched a house-to-house search, and found Elrom's body in an apartment on May 23. He had been shot to death. Police later cornered two of the kidnappers and in the ensuing gunfight, one was killed and the other was captured. The captive escaped but was killed by police on 27 March 1972.</td>
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<tr>
<td>10 October</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>A bomb exploded in a TUSLOG building. The explosion caused no injuries or damages.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12 October</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19711012 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) Turkish terrorists bombed a car belonging to an employee of the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul, as well as the vehicle of the Consulate General. This attack was believed to be related to an upcoming visit of U.S. Vice President to Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 October</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>Turkish police reported that Dev Genç was considering kidnapping diplomats, including the U.S. Ambassador.</td>
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<td>1972</td>
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<tr>
<td>26 March</td>
<td>Ünye</td>
<td>(19720327 A1 B01 F003 I000 T06 N396 S640 RME P1410 FB002) In the evening, five armed THKO and THKC members kidnapped two British (Gordon Banner and Charles Turner) and one Canadian (John Law) NATO radar technicians from</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
the Çarşamba installation, near the town of Ünye. The hostages were taken 60 miles away to the village of Kızılder. On 28 March, the Turkish court ordered postponement of three THKO members’ execution. At 0530, 30 March, negotiations began at Kızılder between Turkish security and the kidnappers. The Turkish Government demanded an unconditional surrender. The kidnappers demanded the three THKO militants be released. When they received no response they requested safe passage out of Turkey to the Syrian border in exchange for the hostages. The government refused to bargain with the kidnappers or allow them safe passage out of the country. At 1610, Turkish security forces reportedly heard explosion in the house where the kidnappers were held up. Assuming the hostages were already dead, security forces rushed the house. Many shots were fired and tear-gas was used. Upon entering the house, authorities found everyone inside dead, including the three hostages. According to Turkish security, the hostages were bound and had been shot at close range. Nine dead militants were located in the house: THKC militants Mahir Çayan, Ahmet Atasoy, Ertan Saruhan, Lieutenant Saffet Alp, Kazim Özdügoğru, Selahattin H. Kurt, and Nihat Yılmaz; and THKO militants Cihan Alptekin and Omer Ayna. The following day, former Dev Genç President and THKC leader Ertugrul Kurkçu was found hiding in a barn.

3 May  Ankara  (19720503 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) Four armed individuals planted bombs at the parking lot of the U.S. Base Civil Engineering facility in Ankara. The bombs failed to explode.

3 May  Turkey  (19720503 A1 B03 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1410) Four Turkish students who were members of the TPLA hijacked a Turkish airliner to Sofia, Bulgaria, where they surrendered to Bulgarian authorities. The hijackers had demanded the release of three prisoners in Turkey. The crew and passengers were released on 4 May.

17 June  Ankara  A bomb placed at the U.S. Base Civil Engineers building failed to detonate.

17 June  Ankara  Members of Dev Genç held a USAF policeman and a Turkish watchman at gunpoint while they planted bombs at the TUSLOG Detachment 30. The fuses on the bombs failed to detonate.

22 October  Istanbul  (19721022 A1 B03 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1410)
Four men hijacked a THY B-707 (from Istanbul to Ankara) to Bulgaria and threatened to blow up the plane and its 69 passengers if Turkey did not release 12 terrorist prisoners, restore the right of workers to strike, and reorganize the universities. The four hijackers surrendered to Bulgarian authorities on 23 October, after Turkey refused their demands. The hijackers were identified as university students Haji Yüzdemir, Ahmed Maden, Yüdzel Zoskurt, and Derviş Elmadjoğulu. The pilot and one passenger were reported wounded in the hijacking.

14 November Ankara The U.S. Information Center in Ankara was sabotaged.

1973

No Incidents Listed in Sources for 1973.

1974

30 October Ankara (19741030 A1 B06 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) The residence of a U.S. serviceman assigned to the U.S. Defense Attaché’s Office (DAO) in Ankara was the target of automatic weapon fire. Thirteen bullets hit the front of the residence and at least two entered the residence. No injuries were sustained.

1975

10 March Istanbul (19750310 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) A packet of explosives was hurled into the garden of the U.S. Consulate, only partially exploding. No damage was caused. The Mahir Çayan Suicide Group claimed responsibility. The bombing was reportedly in protest to the U.S. Secretary of State’s visit to Turkey.

22 May Istanbul (19750522 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded, heavily damaging a USA truck on an Istanbul street. No injuries were reported.

22 May Istanbul (19750522 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) An explosion at a joint U.S.-Turkish supply depot caused no injuries or property damage. A previously unknown Marxist group claimed responsibility.

24 September Istanbul A bomb caused minor damage to the Ataköy Hotel, which was being used by U.S. and British servicemen taking part in
28 September Ankara (19750928 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N230 S640 RME P0000) A stick of dynamite was thrown into the garden of the Ankara residence of the Spanish Ambassador.

11 October Ankara (19751011 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb was thrown from a passing car into the parking lot of an Ankara building occupied by the U.S. Base Civil Engineer Detachment.

11 October Ankara (19751011 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosion occurred at the Ankara Officers’ Club, occupied by U.S. servicemen. No injuries were reported, although there was property damage.

28 October Ankara At approximately 2315, a bomb exploded on the rear patio of the U.S. Officers’ Club. There was damage to the building, but no injuries.

28 October Ankara Fifteen minutes after an explosion at the U.S. Officers’ Club, another bomb exploded at the building housing TUSLOG Detachment 30.

29 October Istanbul (19751029 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P0000) A dynamite bomb exploded in the parking lot of the British Consulate. There were no injuries.

29 October Istanbul (19751029 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N630 S640 RME P0000) Two Molotov cocktails exploded in the Istanbul garden of the Iranian Consulate. There were no injuries reported. Police speculated the attack was to protest the visit of the Shah of Iran.

29 October Istanbul (19751029 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N630 S640 RME P0000) A dynamite bomb exploded in front of the Turkish–Iranian Friendship Society in Istanbul. Police speculated the attack was to protest the visit of the Shah of Iran.

1976

28 January Ankara (19760128 A1 B04 F000 I001 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded under an unoccupied U.S. GOV in Ankara, causing extensive property damage. The truck was parked in front of a U.S. military transient building, Merhaba Palas. The desk clerk was slightly injured.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>19 March</td>
<td>Ortakoy</td>
<td>(19760319 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) A fire that resulted from arson destroyed a building at the Ortakoy U.S. Army installation. A Turkish terrorist group was believed responsible. There were no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19760327 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) Two small bombs exploded in front of an apartment building housing U.S. military personnel and dependents. No injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 March</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>A bomb exploded at an Italian bank building. There were no reported injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19760331 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded outside the office of Philips Electronics in Ankara.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>31 March</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19760331 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded outside the entrance to the Pan American Airlines office in Ankara causing extensive property damage but no injuries. No group claimed credit for the bombing.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19760424 A1 B04 F000 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded at the entrance to the American Language and Trade Institute in Istanbul, causing some damage. The facility was a private girls’ school funded by the American Board Mission and the YWCA.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 April</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19760424 A1 B04 F000 I004 T5b N630 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded at the Iran Air ticket office in Istanbul, causing extensive damage and injuring four people. The bombing was believed connected with the visit of the Shah of Iran to Izmir.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>A car belonging to a civilian employee at TUSLOG Detachment 133 was firebombed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>(19760506 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A pipe bomb exploded in the yard of the U.S. Consul General’s residence, causing minor property damage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 May</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>(19760506 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) The automobile of a DoD instructor at a USAF facility in Izmir was set on fire and destroyed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 August</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19760811 A1 B02 F004 I020 T5c N666 S640 RME P0110) Two members of the &quot;Dr. George Habash Organization&quot; [PLO]</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
threw a hand grenade and sprayed submachine gun fire at a line of passengers waiting to board an Israeli El Al Airlines B-707 jetliner (Flight 582) at Istanbul's Yeşilköy Airport. Four persons were killed in the explosion: one American (Harold W. Rosenthal, staff aid to U.S. Senator Jacob Javits), one Japanese, and two Israelis. Twenty additional persons were injured. After the hand grenades were detonated and submachine guns were fired at the passengers, there was a scattering of people and the terrorists took a Turkish policewoman hostage. After an hour-long standoff, the terrorists surrendered. A Turkish criminal court sentenced the two guerrillas to life in prison. The attack was regarded as revenge for the Israeli rescue raid on Uganda’s Entebbe airport on 3 July 1976.

1 October Izmir
A bomb damaged a U.S. military vehicle.

16 October Izmir
(19761016 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) A cleaning woman found a bomb on top of an air conditioner of the Pan Am office in Izmir.

6 November Istanbul
(19761106 A1 B04 F000 I001 T5b N666 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded in Istanbul at the El Al Airlines office. One person was injured. A group professing to be followers of the late Mahir Çayan.

6 November Istanbul
(19761106 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N210 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded in Istanbul at the offices of Dutch a business firm. A group professing to be followers of the late Mahir Çayan claimed responsibility.

6 November Istanbul
(19761106 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N630 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded in Istanbul at an Iranian business firm. A group professing to be followers of the late Mahir Çayan claimed responsibility.

6 November Istanbul
(19761106 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N651 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded at the Egyptian Consulate. A group professing to be followers of the late Mahir Çayan claimed responsibility.

13 December Istanbul
A terrorist, suspected of being with the Abu Nidal "Black June" group, attempted an unspecified action against the Syrian Consulate in Istanbul. Two Palestinian students were arrested.

1977
13 February Izmir
A 17-year-old police cadet, Aslan Mintaş, hijacked a THY DC-
9 with 51 passengers destined from Izmir to Istanbul directed it be flown to Yugoslavia. The pilot and a stewardess were slightly wounded. A passenger sneaked up and disarmed the hijacker as the plane was landing. Police later arrested Mintaş.

18 February  Izmir
(19770218 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded in the early morning hours at the USIS library in Izmir. The detonation caused moderate property damage, but no casualties. Several other bombings occurred in widely scattered areas of Izmir the same night, all apparently against Turkish targets. Several Turkish youths, believed to be members of the Acılciler faction of the TPLP, were arrested in late May and charged for the bombing and a 29 March attack on the U.S. Consul General’s residence.

6 March  Ankara
(19770306 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N645 S640 RME P1400) A bomb exploded outside the Iraqi Embassy in Ankara, causing only minor damage to the building. According to a leaflet left at the scene, the attack was "in memory of Arab patriots and Kurds."

19 March  Diyarbakir
(19770319 A1 B03 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1410) Two Turkish youths armed with pistols hijacked a THY B-727 from Diyarbakir to Ankara. They were armed with pistols, demanded $300,000 in Turkish lira, and ordered the plane flown to Lebanon. The hijackers demanded a visit to the nearest Palestinian refugee camp. Shortly after the aircraft’s arrival in Beirut all 174 passengers, including two Americans, were released unharmed. The hijackers surrendered later the same day and were taken into custody by Lebanese authorities.

29 March  Izmir
(19770329 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) Unknown persons fired an automatic weapon from a passing car at the U.S. Consul General’s residence in Izmir. The attack caused considerable property damage but no injuries. The Consul General and his wife were in the residence at the time of the attack. An unexploded pipe bomb was found in the street behind the house. Turkish police viewed the attack as part of a Turkish terrorist campaign to commemorate the 30 March anniversary of the death of terrorist Mahir Çayan. Several Turkish youths, believed to be members of the Acılciler faction of the TPLP, were arrested in late May and charged with responsibility for this attack and the 18 February bombing of the USIS library.

30 March  Ankara
About 50 youths threw several dozen rocks at the USIS
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<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>30 March</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>A pipe bomb destroyed a car owned by a DoD school teacher. The first explosion damaged another American-owned car.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>19 May</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19770519 A1 B04 F005 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A small bomb exploded in the U.S. Consulate compound. The explosion caused only slight property damage. The persons responsible were not known.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19770529 A1 B04 F005 I42 T5c N640 S640 RME P1221) A powerful bomb exploded in Istanbul's Yeşilköy airport, killing five persons and injuring 42. One of the injured was a U.S. citizen. Damage to the building was extensive. A similar bomb exploded the same afternoon in the Sirkeci train station, causing one death, approximately 10 injuries, and heavily damaging the terminal building. In an anonymous telephone call to the French press agency in Athens, a group calling itself the &quot;28 May Armenian Organization&quot; claimed responsibility for the bombings.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>17 June</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19770617 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N210 S640 RME P1920) A small bomb was thrown into the compound of the Netherlands Consulate General. The incident occurred during a demonstration protesting Dutch policy toward the South Moluccans. Several windows were shattered, but no one was injured.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(19770700 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07 N994 S640 RME P0000 A4) An explosion along the Turkish–Iraqi oil pipeline stopped the pipeline from functioning for two weeks. As a result of tests and analyses carried out by a firm in Germany on pieces of metal collected immediately after the explosion, it was determined that the explosion was an act of sabotage.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 July</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19770702 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P0000) Five unidentified men forced their way into the grounds of the French Ambassador's summer residence in Istanbul. They cut telephone lines linking the gate to the residence and fired at the gate guard. The men fled when the guard returned their fire.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 July</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>(19770729 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded in back of the U.S. Consulate, causing minor damage but no injuries. A second undetonated bomb was discovered on the Consulate grounds.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
2 August Izmir (19770802 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) The U.S. Consul General’s residence in Izmir was raked with automatic weapon’s fire during the early morning hours. There were no injuries. (Note – The Department of State reported the left-wing group Acılciler, a faction of the TPLP/F was responsible for the attack.)

6 August Istanbul (19770806 A1 B02 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410) The Intercontinental Hotel in Istanbul, owned by Pan American Airlines, was raked with automatic weapon fire. Several windows were broken, but no one was injured in the attack. Twenty-three members of the Acılciler faction of the TPLP-F were arrested in late August for involvement in this incident as well as numerous bombings and several bank robberies.

10 September Adana (19770910 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded in front of the Turkish—American Association, shattering all the glass on the building’s ground floor. No injuries were reported. The persons responsible were not known.

9 October Istanbul (19771009 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb was thrown into the residences of U.S. Army personnel in Yeşilyurt. Three other USA personnel occupied the dwelling, located in the “American House” apartment complex. The bomb, composed of plastic explosive material, did not detonate, but a small fire started, causing minor damage. There were no injuries. No reason for the attack was known.

15 October Izmir The NATO Hunting and Riding Club in the Bayraklı district of Izmir was fired upon and bombed.

20 October Antalya (19771020 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N255 S640 RME P0000) An explosive device was thrown at the West German Consulate. Following this incident, the office was set on fire. Furniture was damaged but no injuries were reported.

25 October Turkey (19771025 A1 B02 F000 I003 T01 N255 S640 RME P1920) Two bombs thrown at the West German Cultural Center caused several injuries and extensive damage. The explosions occurred as about 40 young people, protesting the deaths of three German terrorist leaders, gathered in front of the center. Two Turkish bus drivers, waiting to take school children home, were injured.
10 December  Istanbul (19771210 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) Two bombs were thrown at buildings used to house U.S. military personnel. No injuries were reported. (Note – DOS further details the apartments as the Pansion House and the American House.)

29 December  Ankara A bomb was discovered at the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara.

1978

8 January  Izmit (19780108 A1 B02 F000 I000 T07 N640 S640 RME P1220 A4) An Armenian revolutionary group claimed responsibility for several attacks which it said took place in Izmit, Turkey. An anonymous caller described the attacks as explosions at an oil refinery and attacks at bus and train stations. The Turkish Under Secretary in Ankara denied any attempted sabotage, but the group which called itself "May 28 Group, Branch of the Central Organization of Justicers of Armenian Genocide," claimed responsibility for several attacks on Turkish Consulates motivated by the Turkish army's "massacres" of whole populations in 1915.

8 January  Istanbul A USAF military truck was bombed.

22 January  Ankara (19780122 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosive device was thrown into the U.S. Cultural Center in Ankara. According to a TRT correspondent, the windows of the center were broken but no one was injured.

22 January  Ankara At approximately 2145, the building housing the Turkish–American Association—located near the Deputy Chief of Mission’s (DCM) residence—was bombed but received only minor damage.

25 January  Izmir (19780125 A1 B02 F003 I003 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) A van belonging to the U.S. military was fired upon with automatic weapons as it was being driven on a mountain road near Izmir. An American enlisted man and two Turkish nationals, the van driver, and a cook from the installation, were attacked by several men who searched the victims and the van before returning to their car, firing more shots and fleeing. The American and the van driver were hospitalized; the cook received minor injuries. A Turkish official advised that the "Begumcans Cell" was responsible for the incident and was
known to plan acts of anti-American terrorism.

25 January  Izmir  A USAF airman's vehicle was stoned as he tried to leave a vehicle inspection station. The airman was in uniform at the time of the attack, and, although his vehicle was damaged, he was not injured.

27 January  Ankara  At approximately 2200, the TUSLOG Base Civil Engineering building was raked with 30 rounds from individuals in a moving car. The building, which is located about 2 miles from Ankara Air Station, also contained Boeing services and the base maintenance contractor. Damage was limited to vehicles parked in front of the building. The neighborhood where this attack occurred had witnessed a number of bombings and rakings of bus stops. In 1977, members of the left-wing terrorist group Acıciler were arrested in the neighborhood.

16 February  Ankara  (19780216 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosion at the USIS building resulted in broken glass. No injuries were reported. The incident took place following an unauthorized demonstration by local left-wing and right-wing groups.

17 February  Izmir  A bomb was defused in front of the Turkish–American Association building.

19 February  Izmir  A vehicle belonging to a USAF airman was bombed.

23 February  Ankara  Shots were fired at a USAF vehicle.

25 February  Ankara  Shots were fired at the USSR Trade Mission. It is believed that the intended target was the U.S. Embassy.

12 March  Adana  (19780312 A1 B04 F000 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded under a car belonging to the principal of the Tarsus American School in Adana. The fender of the car was blown off and windows of nearby buildings shattered. There were no injuries. A typewritten letter, signed "TIP," was received the same day saying that other explosives had been placed about the campus of the school. A Turkish police search did not disclose any additional devices.

30 March  Adana  A vehicle belonging to a USAF civilian employee was bombed.

2 April  Bostancı  A USAF vehicle was set on fire.

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5 May  Ankara  (19780505 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded between two buildings in Ankara. One of the buildings housed the USICA. No injuries resulted and property damage was limited to broken windows. No person or group claimed responsibility.

12 May  Istanbul  (19780512 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N220 S640 RME P1400) A bomb, apparently set by leftists protesting French involvement in Western Sahara, exploded in front of the French Consulate, shattering windows and wrecking the entrance to the building. There were no injuries reported. An anonymous telephone caller told United Press International, "We revolutionaries, protesting the latest massacres of French imperialism against the Polisario Liberation Front guerrillas, have bombed the French Consulate."

30 May  Adana  (19780530 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Several rounds were fired at the U.S. Consulate. Local police chased but lost the perpetrators in traffic. Five bullet holes were found between two windows, one of which displayed a sign for the U.S. Consulate. There were no injuries.

31 May  Ankara  A hotel housing USAF families was bombed. Damage was light and there were not injuries.

15 June  Ankara  A U.S. DOS official was robbed. It was later determined that the incident might have been an attempted kidnapping.

15 June  Adana  At approximately 2230, the personal vehicle of a USAF airman was bombed. The vehicle was parked in front of the Stadium apartments, about one block from the Turkish–American Association building.

14 July  Ataş  The Mobile Oil refinery was bombed. Damage was light with no injuries.

21 July  Ataş  Terrorists attempted to bomb the Mobile Oil refinery, but the bomb failed to detonate.

30 September  Istanbul  (19780930 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N651 S640 RME P0000) A bomb was thrown at the Egyptian Consulate, causing slight damage. The attackers had approached using a boat.

30 September  Istanbul  (19780930 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb detonated near the U.S. Consulate. There was no damage to the building and no injuries were reported; however, there
was minimal damage to nearby buildings.

1 October
Istanbul
(A19781001 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N666 S640 RME P0000) A bomb was thrown at the Israeli Consulate, causing no injuries.

1 October
Istanbul
A bomb exploded near the U.S. Consulate. Damage was minimal with no injuries.

15 October
Izmir
The gate of a USAF depot facility was raked. That same day, eight shotguns were stolen from the NATO Rod and Gun Club.

20 October
Istanbul
(A19781020 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosion at the offices of Pan American Airlines in Istanbul caused property damage. No injuries were reported and no group claimed responsibility.

26 October
Istanbul
(A19781026 A1 B02 F000 I001 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410) A mob of left-wing Turkish youths attacked a van carrying U.S. Cultural Attaché John F. Ritchotte, ordered him and two aides out and then burned the vehicle at a busy Istanbul intersection. No one was hurt but one of the attackers was wounded in a brief exchange of gunfire with police. An anonymous caller told a news agency that the leftists were protesting the reopening of U.S. bases in Turkey. (Note – Department of State reported this incident took place on 25 October.)

27 October
Adana
Three members of Dev Genco confessed to entering an American military officer’s apartment for the purpose of obtaining funds for their organization.

21 November
Izmir
An armed individual (15 years old) attempted to hijack a USAF school bus with NATO plates. The bus was carrying elementary school children of American personnel of the Izmir NATO Headquarters. The individual, who was trying to seek the release of a group of Turkish anarchists who had pirated a ferry in Istanbul on November 20, was eventually overpowered and arrested.

26 December
Izmir
(A19781226 A1 B02 F000 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) The car of an American in Izmir was firebombed, causing no injuries.

26 December
Izmir
(A19781226 A1 B02 F000 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) The car of a second American in Izmir was firebombed, causing no injuries.
1979

29 January Ankara (19790129 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P0000) At approximately 2015, a high-powered explosive device was thrown into the Turkish–British Cultural Center in Ankara, causing damage to the building but injuring no one.

17 February Istanbul An explosive device was thrown at a U.S. military vehicle. Damage was minimal and there were no injuries.

19 February Izmir (19790219 A1 B02 F000 I000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb, thrown from a passing car, exploded outside the Pan Am office in Izmir. The explosion broke windows in the office and in various offices in the hotel located above the offices. No injuries were reported and no group has claimed responsibility.

20 February Izmir Youths attempted to burn the vehicle of a USAF airman.

20 February Izmir (19790220 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N396 S640 RME P0000) The car of a U.S. serviceman attached to the southeast NATO Headquarters in Izmir was firebombed. (Note – Some sources report that shots were also fired at the vehicle.)

21 February Izmir At approximately 2200, Turkish police defused a bomb found under a camper belonging to a U.S. serviceman.

21 February Izmir At approximately 2315, a bomb exploded near a U.S. sergeant’s private vehicle. The explosion broke windows of a nearby U.S. housing unit.

22 February Izmir A bomb exploded in a parking lot, breaking 40 percent of the 250 windows in an adjacent U.S. housing unit.

23 February Istanbul A Cypriot student, was shot to death in the Aksaray section of Istanbul. The person firing the shot kidnapped his colleague, and another group beat another of his friends. The secretariat-general of the National Unity Party blamed the incident on fighting between extremist groups.

9 March Ankara (19790309 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosive device was thrown onto the patio of the Ankara Officers’ Mess. Gunfire was heard and shell casings were found across the street. There were no injuries and damage was minimal.
11 March  Izmir  One jug of gasoline was placed in front and two jugs were placed behind a building housing the offices of the USA detachment and the Turkish Area Exchange. The jugs were not detonated.

11 March  Izmir  (19790311 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A Molotov cocktail was thrown against the front of the American APO (military post office) in Izmir. A fire resulted, damaging the wooden front doors; no injuries were reported. An American high school located in the same building was the target of rock throwing by unknown persons. No injuries were reported. (Note – Other sources report that about 200 Turkish nationals were present during this incident, chanting anti-U.S. slogans and carrying signs.)

12 March  Tarsus  At approximately 2015, automatic weapons fire was directed at the first- and second-story windows of the director’s residence at the Tarsus American College. Three British teachers and a Turkish business manager of the school also were living in the building. Although the building was occupied at the time of the attack, there were no injuries.

12 March  Izmir  A stick of dynamite was found in front of a U.S. military bowling alley. The Turkish police bomb squad removed the dynamite.

25 March  Izmir  At approximately 0530, USAF officer’s POV was set on fire. Though there were no injuries, the car sustained extensive damage. A 12-inch-wide sign, which was found 40 feet from the car, read: “Go home Yankee” and included the words “Che ile Mahir [Che with Mahir].” Police believed the two words refer to Che Guevara and Mahir Çayan, and that a faction of Dev Genc was responsible for the attack. Police killed Çayan on March 30, 1972.

26 March  Ankara  (19790326 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N666 S640 RME P1410) An explosive device was thrown at the Israeli Embassy. Turkish Revolutionaries claimed responsibility, protesting the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty.
27 March  Ankara  (19790327 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded at the entrance of a USICA Associated Cultural Center. No injuries were reported, although there were over 100 persons present. Damage was limited. No group claimed responsibility. (Note – Additional reports of this incident state there were about 180 people in the building watching a movie during the incident.)

28 March  Istanbul  At approximately 2140, unknown assailants threw a bomb into the parking lot of the U.S. Consulate, which resulted in minor damage but no injuries.

28 March  Izmir  A food can containing a bomb was found in a planter on the sixth floor of a building approximately 30 yards from the U.S. Base Exchange (BX)/Commissary and other U.S. facilities. The sixth floor of the building housed the offices of Pet-Kim, a state petrochemical enterprise. On the third floor of the building are several U.S. military offices. Turkish Police deactivated the bomb, comprised of four sticks of dynamite with a fuse and battery.

29 March  Istanbul  (19790329 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) The POV of a U.S. Consulate official was hit by five gun shots and a gasoline bomb in the garage of his residence in Istanbul. Windows were broken and fire caused extensive damage but there were no injuries reported. No group claimed responsibility. (Note – Additional reporting indicates that an eyewitness saw a man running from the area after the attack. Though no group claimed credit for the attack, it was thought this incident was connected to either the signing of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Accord, or in observance of the March 30, 1972, death of left-wing terrorist Mahir Çayan.)

29 March  Izmir  At about 0615, a USA soldier’s wife awoke to see a sign draped over a wall located across from their residence. The sign read: “Yankee Go Home,” and had other writing in Turkish. When the soldier left for work (0715), he took the sign with him to show his supervisor. An hour later, the soldier’s wife noticed a package in her driveway containing what appeared to be a bomb, which TNP later disarmed. The bomb consisted of a low-grade commercial dynamite that had been wrapped in paper and masking tape. A lit cigarette had apparently been attached to the fuse, but burned out before it could ignite the device. In inspecting the sign, the other wording read: “people
of Kizildere city do not die,” and “THKP-C cannot be defeated, Damn American Imperialism.”

(19790330 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Two explosive devices were left on the grounds of the U.S. Chancery in Ankara. One exploded near a fence; the second was found nearby but did not explode. No injuries were reported and damage was minimal to the ground near the fence. No group claimed responsibility. (Note – Additional sources reported the incident was to commemorate the death of leftist terrorist Mahir Çayan or to protest the Egypt–Israel Peace Accord. In addition, approximately 15 explosion were set off around Ankara on the same day, with no additional U.S. facilities or persons affected.)

31 March  Ankara

At approximately 2200, a USAF officer’s POV parked in front of his house was doused with gasoline and set on fire. A banner mentioning Kizildere and Dev Genç was placed behind the officer’s vehicle.

31 March  Izmir

At approximately 0255, a USAF sergeant and his family were awakened by gunfire. The sergeant looked out the window to see his car on fire. A total of seven shots were fired; six entered the sergeant’s apartment. The seventh shot entered an apartment above, owned by a Turkish national. It appeared the sergeant’s car was doused with gasoline and then set on fire. It was believed Dev Genç was responsible for the attack.

1 April  Istanbul

(19790401 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0140) A bombing attempt was made on the Israeli El Al office in Istanbul.

8 April  Ankara

(19790408 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N666 S640 RME P0140) A bomb exploded in the Israeli Consulate in Ankara. There were no injuries.

12 April  Izmir

(19790413 A1 B06 F001 I001 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At approximately 1715, two USAF NCOs were walking home along Mustafa Enver Boulevard, an area of the city with a large number of U.S. military support facilities for NATO and apartments occupied by Americans. Two unidentified gunmen attacked the two airmen, Edward Claypool (Master Sergeant) and Geoffrey Vail (Staff Sergeant). Claypool was killed and VAIL was seriously wounded. According to eyewitnesses, the assassins were parked along Mustafa Enver Boulevard, and, as the two airmen walked past the militants’ car, the gunmen got out, and one of them shot the two men at pointblank range.
using a paratroop assault-style AK-47 rifle firing 7.62 rounds. The other terrorist may have been armed with a handgun. Before returning to their car, one of the terrorist went up to Claypool and attempted to fire another shot into his body, but the gun jammed. The gunman then walked toward his vehicle in a slow and casual manner despite the fact that at that hour of the day, traffic was at its heaviest, and the streets were filled with people. The gunmen then drove off at normal speed. Police later found the vehicle, which was stolen, in a scrap metal dump near a major highway. The THKP-C Eylem Birliği (Action Unit) of the claimed credit for the attack. Though these Americans had traveled the same route every day since 17 March 1979, it was believed they were targets of opportunity because they were in uniform and in an area with a large U.S. presence rather than being targets specifically singled out for attack in advance.

14 April Diyarbakir (19790414 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb detonated on a street in Diyarbakir, damaging a U.S. General Electric employee’s POV. There was extensive damage to the car and street; no one claimed responsibility.

28 April Adana (19790428 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosion outside the apartment building where the U.S. Consul General resides resulted in broken windows. There were no injuries reported. Authorities believed the blast was in protest against the presence of the U.S. Consulate. No group claimed responsibility. (Note – Some reports state that several members of the prominent Sabancı family lived in the same building. Turkish Police believed that the bomb was aimed at both the Sabancı Corporation and the U.S. Consul General.

1 May Adana A bomb slightly damaged the home of the U.S. Consul General.

1 May Kayri (19790500 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1433 A4) The Turkish–Iraqi pipeline near Kayri village was bombed by Kurdish militants who, when captured in early 1982 claimed that they been sent by the Kurdish National Unity Party leader Jalal Talabani in Syria. The pipeline carried Iraqi oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Iskenderun.

4 May Ankara (19790504 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) Unknown individuals burned two cars in Ankara. The cars were parked outside the residence of U.S. Embassy personnel.

5 May Tarsus (19790505 A1 B02 F000 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Unidentified persons fired shots into the home of the director of Tarsus American College in Tarsus. No injuries resulted.

(19790506 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5c N640 S640 RME P0000) Two explosive devices were detonated at the international terminal of the Yeşilköy Airport in Istanbul. There was extensive damage but no injuries were reported.

11 May

(19790512 A1 B06 F001 I001 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At approximately 0740, about 21 USA enlisted personnel were waiting for a bus in front of the Ataköy Hotel, a temporary facility for U.S. military personnel. The bus made regularly scheduled runs between the hotel and Çakmaklı military base. At this time, two masked gunmen, hiding in thick underbrush across a four-lane highway opposite the hotel, appeared and opened fire with high-powered rifles. The gunmen killed Thomas Mosley (Private First Class) and wounded another soldier. Other soldiers outside took cover in a nearby drainage ditch, avoiding Mosely’s fate. The gunmen fled in a waiting taxi occupied by two other terrorists. The taxi, which was stolen, was found 35 miles from the hotel abandoned in a wooded area. The assistant manager of the hotel had complained to Turkish authorities about the lack of protection for the soldiers prior to Claypool’s death (12 April 1979) and again following it. After the second assassination, Turkish Army regulars began patrolling the hotel entrance. One eyewitness advised police that he had observed the same vehicle used by the gunmen three days earlier near the site of the incident during the early morning. The MLSPB, a faction of the THKP-C, claimed responsibility for the attack. The U.S. servicemen were attached to a NATO munitions supply depot jointly run by Turkish and American military in Çakmaklı. A telephone caller said the victims were mercenaries serving at U.S. installations in Turkey. Hours before the attack, TNP had raided a MLSPB safe house. Documents recovered showed the group was planning a number of attacks on U.S. targets, such as the U.S. Consulate and TUSLOG Detachment 7 (Corlu Army Installation). TNP speculated this raid may have prompted the attack on the hotel. On 6 June, the Istanbul Security Department said 13 extremists were captured in connection with the attack and were also suspected of other terrorist acts.

14 May

A plan to kidnap the Israeli and U.S. consuls in Istanbul was discovered. Two terrorists were killed and two were arrested.

15 May

Shots were fired at the Israeli Embassy.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>17 May</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>A USAF serviceman’s POV was firebombed outside his residence.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 May</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19790528 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosion occurred near a building housing the offices of the USICA. Damage was minor. No injuries were reported.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19790529 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A pipe bomb exploded at the Turkish-American Association. No injuries were reported and damage was minor.</td>
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<tr>
<td>29 May</td>
<td>Iskenderun</td>
<td>(19790529 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) An explosive device was thrown over the wall of a U.S. military compound in Iskenderun. There was minor damage; no injuries were reported. No group claimed responsibility.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 June</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>(19790602 A1 B06 F001 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) Two THKP-C gunmen shot and killed a U.S. schoolteacher—David Goodman—in the southeastern Turkish town of Adana. The victim had been running a private English language school for two years. The two gunmen shot Goodman to death as he opened his apartment in response to a knock. THKP-C claimed Goodman was a “wealthy imperialist.”</td>
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<tr>
<td>3 June</td>
<td>Tarsus</td>
<td>(19790603 A1 B02 F000 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P0000) The off-campus residence of a U.S. faculty member of the Tarsus American College was raked in Tarsus. No injuries were reported. (Note – Other report attributed this attack to the THKP-C.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 July</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19790713 A1 B05 F003 I001 T01 N651 S640 RME P0122) Four Arabic-speaking men leaped from a car and started firing; their first victims—two Turkish guards at the Egyptian Embassy in Ankara—were killed instantly. The terrorists jumped over the Embassy’s fence and headed for its entrance, spraying automatic rifle fire and tossing a grenade as they ran. After a sharp gun battle with police in which one policeman was wounded, the four attackers had the Embassy with about 20 hostages, including Ambassador Ahmed Kamal Olama, under their control. The gunmen identified themselves as the &quot;Eagles of the Palestinian Revolution.&quot; They threatened to blow up the Embassy and kill their hostages unless several demands were met: they wanted Turkey to recognize the &quot;Palestinian state,&quot; cut diplomatic relations with the government of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, and give them safe conduct out of the country. They also called for the release of two colleagues from Egyptian jails. The terrorists freed one</td>
</tr>
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hostage, Olama’s Turkish secretary; the next morning two hostages escaped from a ground-floor window; two other men jumped from a window on the third floor (one, landing on his head, died later in the hospital). After an all-night negotiating session with Turkish officials, the guerrillas agreed to unconditionally surrender. The four Palestinians, Mervan Shebanu, 24, Hussein Suleiman Abdullah, 23, Mohammed Abourezat, 19, and Mustafe Besheishi, 19, were sentenced to death on 25 October 1979, by a martial law court in Ankara. An appeals court ruled that their offense was not covered by martial law and sent the case back for retrial in October 1980. In December 1980, the four Palestinians were sentenced to die; a Turkish civilian who aided them was sentenced to 21 years in prison.

14 July Ankara Weapons fire was directed at a housing facility for U.S. military personnel. The building, located between the U.S. and Egyptian Embassies, sustained minor damage.

22 July Ankara Bombs exploded in the Kauakaklidere section of Ankara, close to the residence of the U.S. DCM. Two other bombs exploded downtown in the Kizilay area of Ankara. It is believed that the apparent targets were offices of the Ford Tractor Company, IBM, and the agents for General Motors. Damage was very light.

24 July Istanbul (19790724 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded in the Istanbul offices of the U.S. Wells Fargo Bank, causing damage but no injuries. Dev Sol claimed credit. The bank had been involved in a controversial loan of $125 million to Turkey, secured against various Turkish agricultural exports. The government was forced to repeal the agreement following accusations that it was mortgaging the country’s products. (Note – Additional reports state that seven to eight men entered the office and demanded petty cash and copies of documents between Wells Fargo and the Turkish Government. They then locked the employees in an office and detonated the bomb in the director’s office.)

24 July Ankara A bomb exploded in the offices of the American Board, which is a publishing house run by the U.S.-based Quaker Church. The assailants, who wore masks, entered the fourth floor of the building and put the employees (4-5 Americans and 11 Turks) in a room. After placing the hostages in another section of the building, the terrorists detonated a bomb, causing minor damage and no injuries.
28 August  Istanbul  (19790828 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N630 S640 RME P0000) Two unidentified persons threw a bomb at the Iranian Consulate. Security forces defused it before it could explode.

3 September  Ankara  (19790903 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N620 S640 RME P0000) At approximately 1940, explosives were thrown at the Libyan Embassy in Ankara. The windows of the embassy and surrounding buildings were shattered during the explosion.

15 September  Istanbul  A U.S. Consular official was slightly wounded when he was caught in the middle of a gun battle between Istanbul police and terrorists.

25 November  Turkey  (19791125 A1 B07 F000 I000 T10 N328 S640 RME P1410) Mehmet Ali Ağca, a Turkish right-wing terrorist, escaped from prison and threatened to assassinate Pope John Paul during his three-day visit to Turkey. Ağca was accused of murdering journalist Abdi İpekçi. Ağca said the attack would be "revenge" for the attack in Mecca.

14 December  Istanbul  (19791214 A1 B06 F004 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1413) At approximately 1545, a blue Turkish vehicle stopped near a U.S. military bus stop in Florya, a section of Istanbul. Several Turkish men exited the car and took positions one block in either direction of the bus stop. Another care with three Turkish men and a female driver was parked 30 yards away. The three Turks in the car exited and hid behind a nearby shed. After two hours, a USA minibus approached the bus stop. As the driver got out of the van to open the baggage compartment, the two terrorists hiding behind the shed, approached the minibus. The third terrorist positioned himself on top of the shed armed with an AK-47. One of the terrorist ordered the four U.S. persons—James E. Smith (Sergeant), and civilian contractors Elmer Cooper, Robert French, and Jim Clark—off the bus. The Turkish bus driver and Smith ran for cover. The terrorist on top of the shed fired at Smith and missed. Smith was also chased by one of the other terrorists who shot him in the back and then walked up and shot him several more times at close range. At this time, a retired Turkish Army colonel who lived in a nearby apartment heard and saw what was happening. He went out on his balcony with a shotgun and fired at and wounded the terrorist who killed Smith. At that instant, the remaining three U.S. citizens were shot and killed in their attempt to escape. The three terrorists immediately departed in
the care driven by the female—later identified as Nalan Guarates—and also believed to be the leader of the operation. The MLSPB claimed credit for the attack stating, “guerrillas of the cell sought to punish the Americans, because of America’s manipulation in Iran and elsewhere.” All four worked at the USAF Çakmaklı base, one with the Boeing Corporation. A follow up TNP investigation revealed that a landlady at one of the apartments noticed an unidentified car parked in front of her apartment near the bus stop 3 – 4 days prior to the attack. On 12 February 1980, the Istanbul Martial Law Command announced the arrest of the alleged assassins. The authorities claimed that the four Americans were killed "as the result of a an armed attack against U.S. citizens assigned to Istanbul."

20 December  Ankara  A bomb caused minor damage to a USAF vehicle parked in front of the residence of the manager of the Boeing Services International Communications site.

1980

2 January  Istanbul  (19800102 A1 B06 F001 J000 T5d N666 S640 RME P1413) The MLSPB claimed responsibility for the slaying of an Israeli head [Abraham Elazar] of an El Al Airlines office in an Istanbul suburb. The slaying of Elazar was "designed to retaliate against the Israeli massacre of Palestinians." The organization claimed that Elazar was an agent of the Israeli state security organization.

4 January  Istanbul  Two men and a woman entered a U.S. military motorpool, poured gasoline on several cars and around the motorpool office building, and then set them on fire. The building was destroyed and several cars were damaged.

24 January  Istanbul  A leftist group protesting U.S.-Turkish cooperation firebombed five banks in Istanbul, burning one branch down but causing no injuries in the early morning attacks.

24 January  Istanbul  Three men and a woman entered a U.S./NATO military motor pool near Yeşilköy Airport in Istanbul’s Sefaköy district, poured gasoline on several vehicles and around the building, and ignited it. Several vehicles were damaged, and the building was destroyed, but no injuries were reported, as a Turkish employee was able to escape the building in time. A banner left on a gas pump read: “Victory for the THKP-C.”

17 February  Ankara  Two cars belonging to U.S. military personnel were set on fire.
18 February Ankara (19800218 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) The home of two U.S. Embassy counselors was bombed. There was minor damage but no one was injured.

18 February Izmir (19800218 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N396 S640 RME P0000) Terrorists used gas-soaked rags to set fire to two cars belonging to two U.S. soldiers stationed with NATO Headquarters in Izmir. No one was hurt, but due to this additional terrorist incident, the National Security Council of Turkey agreed to extend the period and scope of present martial law, including outlying areas that had been victims of continuing unrest.

20 February Ankara Two vehicles belonging to U.S. military personnel were set on fire.

22 February Ankara A bomb detonated outside a hotel housing U.S. military personnel. Damage was light and there were no injuries.

23 February Istanbul A homemade bomb exploded on the grounds of the Soviet Consulate, causing no injuries.

16 April Istanbul (19800416 A1 B06 F003 I004 T03 N002 S640 RME P1413) At approximately 0830, USN Petty Officer Sam Novello and Turkish friend, Sabri Baytar, a former Turkish Navy Chief Engineer, were leaving Novello’s apartment. As both men were about to enter Novello’s pickup truck, two MLSPB terrorists shot and killed them. A third terrorist was on a waiting motorcycle. A police car patrolling the area heard the shots and rushed to the crime scene. The police gave chase and finally caught up with the terrorists at Emirgan, a small town on the Bosphorus, three miles from the attack site. A gunfire ensued, and one of the terrorist, later identified as Hakki Kolgu, was fatally shot. The other assailants, Ahmet Saner and Kadir Tandoğan, were eventually captured. As a result of the gun battle, one passer-by was accidentally killed. Kolgu died of his wounds in a hospital, and on 25 June 1981, Tandoğan and Saner were hanged at Istanbul’s Uşkudar Paşakapısı Prison. According to the TNP, the three terrorists were involved in a number of terrorist incidents prior to the murders of Novello and Baytar. On 3 April, the three had killed four owners of a small factory, and on 7 April, they killed a father and a son in their grocery store. The trio was also involved in numerous jewelry store robberies. It is interesting to note that shortly after Novello moved into his apartment (early January 1980),
he admitted in two Turkish youths on the pretext of their looking for a lost bird. As one of the youths went out on the balcony pretending to look for the bird, the other youth stayed inside the apartment and appeared to be surveying it. It has been a well-known practice for Turkish terrorist groups to use young people for logistical support; e.g., surveillance.

31 May  
Izmir  

*Dev Yol* claimed credit for bombing the NATO Rod and Gun Club. Damage was minimal and there were no injuries.

1 June  
Kayri  

(19800600 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1433 A4) The Turkish-Iraqi pipeline near Kayri village was bombed by Kurdish militants who, when captured in early 1982 claimed that they been sent by the Kurdish National Unity Party leader Jalal Talabani in Syria. The pipeline carried Iraqi oil from Kirkuk to the Turkish port of Iskenderun. The two Kurds arrested were allegedly responsible for a similar bombing of the pipeline in May 1979.

31 July  
Izmir  

Unidentified men threw Molotov cocktails into the home of a USAF sergeant in Izmir. One of the bombs struck the sergeant, resulting in burns on over 22 percent of his body. The other bomb caused only minor property damage. The sergeant's spouse, child, and a Turkish friend were inside the house at the time of the attack. No group claimed credit for the attack.

8 August  
Istanbul  

A bomb was discovered in front of the Israeli Consul's residence in Istanbul.

27 September  
Turkey  

(19800927 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1430 A4) A pipeline that carried oil from northern Iraq to the Mediterranean was blown up in Turkey. The oil industry reported Kurdish rebels carried out the attack but leaflets left at the scene claimed the Iraqi Liberation Army conducted it. The pipeline had been blown up six times since it was opened and all the attacks have been in the Kurdish region of Turkey. This explosion occurred only a few miles from the Syrian and Iraqi borders. The resulting fire caused the halt of the oil flow through the pipeline. The pipelines were the only oil outlets still available to Iraq, because of the fighting at the head of the Persian Gulf, since the start of the Iran/Iraq war.

2 October  
Izmir  

Bombs were discovered in the stairwell of a building housing U.S. military personnel and in the doorway of the APO located a few blocks away. Though they exploded before police had time to defuse them, there were no injuries and damage was

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<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2 October</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>A bomb exploded at a local Pan Am Airlines office.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 October</td>
<td>Izmir</td>
<td>Devrimci Sol claimed responsibility for placing a bomb under a USAF airman’s POV. Though the car was extensively damaged, there were no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>13 October</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19801013 A1 B03 F001 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1432) Four armed Moslem extremists hijacked a THY B-727 with 155 persons aboard. The jet was bound from Istanbul to Ankara, having originated in Munich. They demanded to be flown to Teheran, Iran, but the pilot refused, insisting he had to refuel and could not fly to Iran because it had been designated as a war zone. Other demands were not reported, but during the hijacking the hijackers announced that, &quot;(the plane) is now under the control of the Sheria (the holy Islamic law).&quot; They forced women on board to cover their heads Islamic style. The plane landed in Diyarbakir to refuel and the hijackers released 40 passengers. The plane was surrounded by Turkish troops. The hijackers set a deadline and demanded to be flown to Saudi Arabia or they would blow up the plane. The Turkish authorities refused to grant any demands and the deadline passed without incident. At dawn on the next day, Turkish commandos cut a hole in the back of the plane and entered the aircraft in a flurry of shooting. They used automatic weapons with blanks and revolvers with live ammunition. Later a military communiqué stated all passengers were rescued and all four terrorists were captured. The four hijackers were wounded in the storming, as well as six passengers and one flight attendant. The statement did not indicate any deaths but the passengers said they believed one hostage was killed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 October</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19801030 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb blast at the Turkish–American Cultural Center near Ankara caused extensive damage (some estimates put damages at $100,000) but no casualties. It was the first attack on an American building since the 12 September military coup.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 November</td>
<td>Ankara</td>
<td>(19801108 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A U.S. military aircraft support depot in the Emek district of Ankara was bombed. The bombing caused considerable damage, but no injuries.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 November</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>(19801115 A1 B06 F001 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) At approximately 0550, as two USAF airmen—William C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

155
Herrington (Sergeant) and Jay M. Perry (Senior Airman)—were backing out of a driveway onto Atatürk Boulevard, two unidentified men approached the front of their car on the driver’s side. At this point, one of the men pulled out a handgun from under his sweater and started firing at the Harrington, who was driving. After the first shot was fired, Perry got out of the car on the passenger’s side and ran towards two apartment buildings as the two gunmen were shooting at him. Perry was able to escape unhurt. After the attack, police found 13 shell casings from a 9mm parabellum [sic] round at the crime scene. Herrington was hit nine times. Both men were in uniform at the time of the attack. Herrington was the first U.S. citizen to die in Turkey since a military coup on 12 September, which launched an all-out offensive against terrorism. The MLSPB claimed responsibility for the killing.

27 November  Izmir
Two men entered the NATO Rod and Gun Club and held the guards while they planted a bomb. The device exploded causing minor damage. A banner left at the scene was signed Dev Sol.

10 December  Izmir
A bomb exploded at the Pan Am Airlines office causing minor damage and no injuries.

1981

6 April  Malatya
A USAF vehicle carrying two U.S. airmen, a U.S. civilian, and a Turkish Air Force enlisted man to their work site near the city of Malatya was fired upon by two men using automatic weapons. No one was injured, but the vehicle sustained substantial damage. Though the occupants of the vehicle saw only two men firing at them, police found 23 spent cartridges, and an analysis of the crime scene indicated that as many as four men may have been involved in the attack. The MLAPU claimed responsibility for the attack.

24 April  Istanbul
(19810524 A1 B03 F000 I007 T5a N640 S640 RME P1411) Four leftist gunmen hijacked a THY DC-9 en route from Istanbul to Ankara as it left Yeşilköy International Airport. They ordered the pilot to land at the small military airfield at Burgas, Bulgaria. The hijackers demanded $500,000 and freedom for 47 prisoners in Turkish jails. They threatened to kill five American bank executives among the 112 passengers aboard and also to blow up the plane if their demands were not met. Twenty-five women, children, and men with "chronic ailments" were allowed to leave the plane at Burgas, a resort
city on the Black Sea, leaving 91 passengers still in the plane, plus a crew of six. The Turkish Government refused to negotiate and asked Bulgaria to keep the plane from leaving Burgas. Two passengers escaped by jumping from the plane through an emergency exit. Bulgarian officials maintained contact with the hijackers by radio. The hijackers threatened to kill the five American passengers if their demands were not met by a specified time. This deadline was extended, then finally abandoned. The hijackers then asked for 200 envelopes and a quantity of paper so that the hostages could write farewell letters. The Turkish Government continued to refuse to accede to the demands of the terrorists and threatened to execute the 47 jailed leftists if the hijackers carried out their threat to blow up the plane. Twenty-four hours later, on May 25, a dramatic end came to the hijacking. Two of the terrorists were lured from the plane by the promise that they could make a statement to the press. Once on the ground, they were immediately overpowered. In an escape set up by hand signals, the pilot of the jetliner sent the plane lurching forward, knocking everyone standing in the plane off their feet. Some of the passengers then took advantage of the confusion to overpower the two gunmen left. One terrorist lost his weapon and either jumped or was thrown from the plane. All 91 passengers were freed. Five incurred minor injuries when one of the attacked hijackers began to shoot his pistol wildly. Two of the hijackers were also wounded. The gunmen were identified as members of Dev Sol, whose members had been severely cracked down on by the Turkish military authorities. The latter had seized power in September 1980, saying the elected government had been unable to quell violence between the left and right. Since then, thousands of suspected political extremists had been arrested.

16 May

Istanbul

The May 15 Arab Organization for the Liberation of Palestine bombed the Israeli El Al offices in Istanbul, shattering windows but causing no injuries.

8 August

Malatya

(19810808 A1 B06 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000)
Two or possibly four men armed with automatic weapons opened fire on a USAF pickup truck carrying three U.S. nationals, two of whom were USAF airmen, and a Turkish national on the road just outside Malatya City. None of the truck's occupants was injured; the truck sustained some damage.

6 October

Istanbul

(19811006 A1 B05 F000 I003 T01 N630 S640 RME P1430)
Anti-Khomeini forces shot up and ransacked the Iranian
Consulate to protest the mounting number of executions and oppressions of the Khomeini regime. Three people were wounded in the shooting during the seizure. The 26 masked Iranians, said to be students, held the consulate for about 50 minutes before Turkish police surrounded the building and broke the siege. The Consul General and eight staff members had been taken hostage at gunpoint and led to the basement, while the dissidents threw out furniture and caused extensive damage to the interior of the consulate.

1982

6 January, Idil

(19820106 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1400 A4) An explosion was reported in the Iraq–Iskenderun pipeline which carried crude oil from Kirkuk (Iraq) to the Mediterranean terminal of Yumurtalik. The explosion occurred 7 kilometers from Idil, a town in Mardin Province. No one claimed credit for the attack.

8 January, Turkey

(19820108 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07 N645 S640 RME P1400 A4) An explosion for the second time in a week cut an Iraqi oil pipeline. Turkish authorities said the 625-mile pipeline that brings Iraqi oil to Turkey's Mediterranean coast exploded 42 miles inside the Turkish border and sabotage was suspected. No one claimed credit for the attack.

9 January, Istanbul

(19820109 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0121) The Arab May 15 Organization for the Liberation of Palestine claimed responsibility for a bomb attack on an Israeli El Al airline office.

18 June, Ankara

(19820618 A1 B02 F000 I000 T5b N002 S640 RME P0000) Two men and two women set fire to the Pan Am Airlines office in Ankara in protest against Israel's invasion of Lebanon. There were no casualties, although there was extensive damage. The perpetrators drove away unhindered.

1 August, Istanbul

Three terrorists were arrested before carrying out a planned attack on either the Israeli Consulate or Israeli El Al airlines office.

7 August, Ankara

(19820807 A1 B02 F009 I078 T5c N640 S640 RME P1210) Armenian terrorists attacked the Ankara Esenboğa Airport. Nine people were killed and 78 injured in the bomb and machine-gun shootout between the Armenians and Turkish security forces. The dead included a U.S. citizen [Jean
Bosworth] and a West German passenger. ASALA claimed responsibility for the attack and stated the attack was against the "Turkish fascist occupation of our land," and warned of suicide attacks in the United States, Canada, England, Sweden, and Switzerland unless 85 prisoners held in those countries were not released within seven days. ASALA is one of two Armenian terrorist groups responsible for the assassination of several Turkish officials and members of their family since 1973. A caller to the press stated that the "Martyr Kharmian Hayrik Suicide Squad" staged the operation. Hayrik was not further identified. An Armenian terrorist was apprehended and put on trial at the Ankara Martial Law Command 3d Military Court on September 8. Levon Ekmekjian, a French national of Lebanese extraction, was wounded during the attack and admitted that he was an accomplice in the killing and that it had been planned for some time. When he was on the stand, he said, "I came here motivated by belief, however, after this incident understand how ridiculous and wrong that belief was...." Ekmekjian was sentenced to death, but was expected to appeal the sentence. Claims later made by ASALA maintained that there were two assault teams and that the first unit struck the headquarters of the Turkish military police near the airport and then took over the passenger terminal. ASALA claimed there were more than 30 fatalities and 102 injuries in the two operations.

1983

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>16 April</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(19830416 A1 B03 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1411) A Turkish hijacker surrendered to antiterrorist authorities in Athens, Greece, after commandeering a THY flight with 114 passengers, who were not hurt. The hijacker appeared to be mentally disturbed; he threatened to set the plane on fire unless he was given safe passage to Sydney, Australia. According to authorities, the man belonged to Dev Sol. (Note – FAA reports this incident occurred on 15 April and was aboard a THY B-727.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>16 June</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19830616 A1 B02 F003 I027 T06 N640 S640 RME P1210) Five bombs exploded in front of the Grand Bazaar in Istanbul and two men shot into a crowd killing two people and wounding 27. One of the attackers was also killed. ASALA claimed credit for the incident which coincided with the anniversary of a 1970 workers’ revolt in Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 November</td>
<td>Corlu</td>
<td>At approximately 6:15 p.m., a U.S. serviceman dressed in</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
civilian clothes was waiting at a bus stop. He was approached by a Turkish national who asked him in English, "Where are you from? Where do you live? What is your name?" The serviceman stated that he was an American and did not speak Turkish very well. As the American began to walk away, the Turkish national grabbed him and tried to force him into a car with two or three other Turkish males. One of the men in the car grabbed the American's leg and attempted to help the other man force him into the car. Fortunately, the American was able to break free and run away. Since the serviceman was black and was waiting at a bus stop that is frequented by U.S. military personnel, it was easy for the Turks to identify him as an American. Though no further information developed on this incident, it is no known if this attack was criminal, terrorist, or personal in nature.

(19831220 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1410) Turkish police found a car loaded with high explosives in a parking lot near U.S. and French facilities in Izmir. The car was discovered abandoned about 100 yards from the U.S. Officers' Club and a seaside hotel frequented by U.S. servicemen.

(19840426 B10 F000 I000 T01 N640 S640 RME P1210) ASALA warned Turkish Prime Minister Özal, that if he went ahead with plans to pay an official visit to Iran, a major operation against Turkey would be staged. The threat, issued to the Teheran offices of Agence France-Presse, came in the wake of recent attacks on Turkish diplomats serving in Teheran, which injured two of them. The number of Armenians taken
into custody as the result of these incidents was reported to have reached 13. Turkish sources indicated that some of those arrested would soon be tried and most likely shot by the Islamic Government of Iran, which was known for the harsh sentences.

18 June  Istanbul
Three incendiary devices were discovered in Istanbul and disarmed. One device was discovered in front of the offices of the American Express Bank. The other devices were found under vehicles belonging to TNP and the Jandarma. Police believed *Dev Sol* was responsible.

3 September  Istanbul
(19840903 A1 B04 F002 I000 T16 N640 S640 RME P1216) Two Lebanese were killed in a car bomb explosion at a parking lot near the Topkapi Palace in Istanbul. The Armenian Revolutionary Army claimed responsibility for the blast. Authorities speculate the two died when their bomb prematurely exploded. The pair entered Turkey from Syria to conduct a sabotage operation.

1985

28 June  Turkey
A THY B-727 destined for Istanbul from Frankfurt (West Germany) was hijacked. Perpetrator(s) and objective(s) were unknown.

24 July  Ankara
(19850724 A1 B06 F001 I000 T01 N663 S640 RME P0120) Jordanian envoy Ziyad Sati was shot three times in the head as he stopped at a red light in a residential area of Ankara. The gunman escaped on foot. An anonymous caller said that Sati was killed because of his "services to imperialism." Black September also claimed responsibility. In October of 1986, six confessed members of an Abu Nidal terrorist cell were arrested and held responsible for the assassination. In November 1986, a Syrian diplomat indicted for organizing the murder was recalled to Damascus.

20 August  Istanbul
(19850820 A1 B06 F001 I000 T16 N630 S640 RME P0000) A former colonel in the Iranian police, Behruz Shahverdi, was found murdered at home in Istanbul. He was one of the leaders of the Iranian national resistance movement directed from Paris by the Shah's former prime minister, Shapur Bakhtiari. Authorities claim Shahverdi was involved in planning an attack on Iran's spiritual leader, Ayatollah Khomeini. Shahverdi had earlier been suspected of being a double agent, but he managed to clear himself of suspicion. He was then instructed to find out who was betraying the movement from within and try to send
the double agent to Paris. He was assassinated shortly after all of this had occurred, and the killer was not been identified. (19850828 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P1434) A bomb exploded near an office of the Israeli El Al Airlines office, shattering its front window but causing no injuries or other damage. Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility.

20 December Istanbul (19851220 A1 B06 F001 I000 T16 N630 S640 RME P2001) Hadi Aziz Murad, an Iranian commando colonel, was assassinated at his home in Bakirkoy, Istanbul. Murad was a representative in Turkey of the Nesebenti resistance organization, a supporter of the Shah, and it was he who was reportedly waging an anti-Khomeini struggle in Turkey. Agents of the Iranian National Intelligence and Security Organization (SAVAMA) were believed responsible.

1986

11 April Istanbul In Istanbul, police arrested eight Turks and two Tunisians who were plotting to sabotage and assault the Turkish–Iraqi oil pipeline, the U.S. Consulate, the Iraqi Consulate, and other targets. One pistol and bullets were found during searches of the suspects' homes and offices. According to authorities, an unnamed Mediterranean Arab country had paid $3 million to the would-be terrorists.

18 April Ankara (19860418 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1300 P2009) An attempt by five Libyans to bomb a U.S. officers' club in Ankara was foiled by Turkish police, who stopped two of the Libyans outside of the club. One of the suspects attempted to throw away a bag which contained grenades and other explosives. The incident occurred on a Friday night when the club was usually full of U.S. families, who used the dining facilities. There was speculation the Libyan Ambassador was involved. The Ambassador reportedly had a long history of involvement with Libyan terrorist operations, including an assassination campaign against Libyan dissidents residing in the United States. Three of the five Libyans charged were protected by diplomatic immunity and could not be prosecuted. Two Libyans were given five year jail terms.

18 April Istanbul A bomb was found in the basement of the KOÇ-American Bank (formerly American Express). An anonymous telephone caller stated that a bomb was located on the bank premises. TNP found the bomb in a large trash container in the basement parking garage of the building. No group claimed credit for the
attempted bombing.

19 April  Istanbul  TNP discovered another bomb at the KOÇ-American Bank. The bomb, which was placed in front of the building, consisted of a soda can filled with black powder. According to eyewitnesses, two youths were seen running away from the bank. Though no group claimed credit for the attack, the construction of the bomb was similar to those previously used by Dev Sol.

29 May  Ankara  In letters sent from Italy to news agencies in Ankara, Islamic Jihad threatened to attack Turkish missions world-wide unless Turkey withdrew its support of Iraq.

6 September  Istanbul  (19860906 A1 B02 F022 I003 T10 N995 S640 RME P0120) During services, two Arab terrorists attacked Istanbul's main synagogue, killing 22 and wounding three others. They opened fire on the worshipers and then doused their victims' bodies with gasoline and set them on fire. Next a grenade exploded, and two of terrorists were killed. It was unclear whether the grenades were thrown accidentally or whether it was suicide. Both the Palestine Revenge Organization and the Northern Arab Unity Organization claimed responsibility for the attack. The Islamic Resistance claimed it had masterminded the action in retaliation for a recent Israeli raid on a guerrilla base in southern Lebanon. On 6 November 1986, Turkey's state security court released an indictment claiming the Abu Nidal group had definitely been responsible for the attack. Two members of Abu Nidal who are linked to this incident were arrested in Italy in June 1987.

20 September  Turkey  (19860920 A1 B07 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P1430) Three Iranians were arrested after an attempt to smuggle a briefcase wired for explosives aboard a THY flight to northern Cyprus. While no actual explosives were found inside, the handle was wired to explode if touched and the mechanism set off alarms at security checks.

19 October  Mardin  (19861019 A1 B02 F000 I000 T03 N396 S640 RME P0000) An unidentified group of armed men attacked a NATO radar station in Mardin, in southwestern Turkey. This was the first attack against a NATO installation in Turkey. Damage was minor.

24 October  Istanbul  (19861024 A1 B06 F001 I000 T16 N630 S640 RME P0000) The former bodyguard of the late Shah of Iran was shot at point
blank range and killed in an Istanbul suburb. Colonel Ahmad Hamed Monfared was the third former Iranian army officer to be killed in Turkey in 17 months. Sources said the former officers were known to be in touch with army officers inside Iran working to overthrow Ayatollah Khomeini.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
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<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>3 November</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>The local representative of the Colgate-Polmolive Company received a threatening note from a group called the Turkish Republican Army (TRA). The note read in part, “…murder American, Americans out, no Americans no problems.” The businessman stated that a group of Americans who lived across the street from him were employed at Incirlik Air Base, and, perhaps, the note was intended for them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 March</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19870305 A1 B06 F002 I000 T03 N667 S640 RME P0120) The Abu Nidal organization claimed to have executed by hanging two Palestinians who they accused of being members of Jordanian intelligence. The executions of Nathem Abd Ahmed Abu Sbeih and his uncle, Khaled Muhammad Ali Musalam Abu Sbeih occurred in Istanbul, Turkey.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 April</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(19870409 A1 B07 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1434 N666 T01) Four men with links to Islamic Jihad were arrested by TNP after the discovery of a plot to bomb a U.S. air base and Israeli diplomatic facilities in Turkey. Two of the men were Turkish, one was Iranian, and the other was Lebanese.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>28 July</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19870728 A1 B06 F001 I001 T09 N630 S640 RME P0000) Iranian exile Mansuri Mohammad Hasan was murdered in his home by an unknown gunman who fled in a Mercedes suspected of belonging to the Iraqi Consulate. Benhan Fadil, first secretary at the Iraqi Foreign Ministry, was visiting Hasan at the time of the murder, and was himself seriously injured by the assassin.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19870911 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded outside of the Citibank office in Istanbul. The June 16 Organization claimed the attack to protest alleged torture of Turkish prisoners. (Note – This group first surfaced in August 1987, when it attacked a police station in Istanbul.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 September</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19870911 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded outside of the Sheraton Hotel in Istanbul. The June 16 Organization claimed the attack to protest alleged</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
torture of Turkish prisoners.

11 September  Istanbul  (19870911 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded outside of the Ramada Inn in Istanbul. The bomb was described as a half-stick of dynamite, and detonated outside the building. The June 16 Organization claimed the attack to protest alleged torture of Turkish prisoners.

1988

10 March  Istanbul  (19880310 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N670 S640 RME P0000 N002) A bomb detonated outside the Saudi–American Bank. The bank was affiliated with Citibank. The KOÇ-American Bank (affiliated with American Express) was also housed in the same building. No group claimed credit for the attack.

14 April  Istanbul  (19880414 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000) A time bomb was defused in front of the Israeli El Al Airlines office in Istanbul.

21 July  Ankara  (19880721 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N670 S640 RME P1432 P2001) A bomb was discovered near the Saudi Arabian Cultural Mission in Ankara. A group called "Black Friday" claimed responsibility for planting the bomb. The group was believed to be made up of pro-Iranian terrorists whose name symbolizes the date of the previous year's religious pilgrimage to Mecca when hundreds of Iranian radicals were killed. The attempted bombing coincided with the current year's pilgrimage.

9 September  Ankara  (19880909 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N645 S640 RME P1400) A bomb exploded outside of the Iraqi Cultural Center in Ankara. No casualties resulted.

18 September  Ankara  (19880918 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N645 S640 RME P1400) A bomb exploded in the courtyard of the Iraqi Embassy. The Ka’ba Liberation Organization-Muhammad Al Sadr claimed responsibility.

7 October  Istanbul  (19881007 A1 B05 F000 I000 T01 N155 S640 RME P0000) After forcing their way into the Istanbul office of the Chilean Honorary Consul, four gunmen threatened him. It is unclear how long the Honorary Consul was held before the gunmen fled, firing one shot into the floor.

21 October  Istanbul  (19881021 A1 B06 F001 I000 T17 N002 S640 RME P0000

165
FA001) An American who had just arrived in Istanbul for a language conference was murdered in a park. The victim was a translator for Radio Liberty, a Munich-based U.S. network that broadcasted to the Soviet Union. No one claimed responsibility for the murder.

23 October Turkey
(19881023 A1 B01 F000 I000 T16 N630 S640 RME P2001)
Five Iranians (including two diplomats) were arrested after trying to smuggle an Iranian dissident back to Iran.

25 October Ankara
(19881025 A1 B06 F001 I000 T01 N670 S640 RME P1434 P2001) The Islamic Jihad-Hijaz claimed responsibility for assassinating a Saudi Arabian diplomat in Ankara. The Second Secretary of the Saudi Embassy was killed as he was approaching his home around 2100 hours.

28 October Turkey
(19881028 A1 B02 F000 I000 T06 N770 S640 RME P0000 T01) A gasoline bomb was thrown into the playground of a Pakistani Embassy school. The school serves the children of diplomats from Moslem countries.

30 October Izmir
(19881030 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb went off in a car owned by a U.S. teacher at the DoD school for dependents in Izmir. There were no injuries and no one claimed credit for the attack.

22 December Turkey
(19881222 A1 B06 F001 I000 T01 N235 S640 RME P0000) The Second Secretary at the Portuguese Embassy was found stabbed to death on the Tarsus-Ankara Highway.

1989

27 January Istanbul
(19890127 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411) See Next Entry.

27 January Istanbul
(19890127 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411) See Next Entry.

27 January Ankara
(19890127 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411) Dev Sol carried out coordinated bomb attacks against three U.S.-Turkish business concerns in Istanbul and Ankara. In each attack, groups of five armed terrorists tied up office employees, sprayed slogans, and set off explosives in unoccupied areas of the targeted buildings. While property damage was extensive, there were no casualties.
17 February Istanbul A British Airways plane carrying 117 passengers and 8 crew landed at Munich’s Riem Airport after a bomb threat against the Ankara-Istanbul-London flight. No bomb was found after the plane was evacuated. The caller told British airlines authorities in Istanbul that the Turkish-Kurdish People’s Struggle had planted a bomb.

20 March Istanbul (19890320 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N699 S640 RME P0000) A bomb exploded in front of the United Arab Emirates Airline office. There were no casualties.

2 April Ankara (19890402 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P1432) Moslem Fundamentalists were suspected of bombing a British Embassy vehicle. The attack followed continued threats against British interests in connection with the Salman Rushdie affair.

2 April Ankara (19890402 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P1432) Moslem Fundamentalists were suspected of bombing the British Cultural Center. The attack followed continued threats against British interests in connection with the Salman Rushdie affair.

23 August Istanbul (19890823 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N666 S640 RME P1433) A bomb went off at the Israeli Consulate. A group calling itself the Armed People's Unit, believed linked to the PKK, was believed responsible.

11 September Istanbul (19890911 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1411) An explosive device was thrown at the U.S. Consulate. Authorities arrested a female medical student believed affiliated with Dev Sol. (Note – Additional sources stated that at 0705, Pembegül Bindir, threw a pipe bomb that hit the top of the Consulate wall and bounced back. She immediately picked up the device and hurled it with greater force, this time hitting the Consul General’s car. The device bounced off the windshield of the car and exploded a few feet away. Preliminary investigation indicated the device consisted of dynamite and metal. Shrapnel hit the main building, a house, a security vehicle, and the Consul General’s vehicle. Pieces of the shrapnel narrowly missed two members of the Consulate guard force. The assailant was arrested at the scene. Although no group claimed credit for the attack, 12 September was the ninth anniversary of the military takeover of the Turkish Government in 1980.)
16 October Ankara

(19891016 A1 B04 F000 I001 T01 N670 S640 RME P1434 P2001) A Saudi diplomat was seriously injured when a car bomb exploded outside the Saudi military attachés office in Ankara's Cankaya district. Hezbollah claimed responsibility, saying the bombing was in retaliation for the recent Saudi execution of 16 Kuwaiti nationals involved in the Mecca bombings the previous July.

9 November Izmir

A pipe bomb detonated in the rear of the USAF commissary. The commissary was closed at the time of the incident, and no employees were present. There was no claim of responsibility for this action.

10 November Izmir

(19891110 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1411) A bomb went off outside a U.S. military shop in Izmir. Dev Sol was believed to have been responsible.

14 November Istanbul

(19891114 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1411) An U.S. office in Istanbul was bombed. Dev Sol was suspected.

6 December Istanbul

(19891206 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410 A7 T12) A boat belonging to the U.S. Consulate was destroyed by a bomb claimed by the "Warriors of the 16th of June Movement." The group received its name from a workers' protest movement that paralyzed Istanbul on June 15 and 16, 1970. The action was carried out to protest Turkish economic policies. (Note − Additional sources reported that at about 1830, two men detonated a firebomb on the rear deck of the Hiawatha, a 15-meter wooden motor launch owned by the U.S. Government. No one was aboard the boat at the time of the attack. The local fire department put out the fire, but not before the boat was severely damaged. A 2-meter-long pole was found in the water next to the Hiawatha, and had probably been used to put the device on the boat. Approximately 98 hours after the incident, the Turkish newspaper Tercüman received an anonymous call in which the caller claimed credit for the attack on behalf of the June 16 Organization. The caller went on to say, "These kinds of attacks will go on. We are against the IMF and price increases. We will fight for the Turkish Kurds."

1990

14 January Ankara

(19900114 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N670 S640 RME P1432 U5) A car belonging to a Saudi Arabian diplomat was bombed in Ankara. Pro-Iranian terrorists were suspected.
23 February  Adana  (19900223 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410 U5) Suspected leftists firebombed the American Cultural Center in Adana.

7 March  Istanbul  (19900307 A1 B06 F002 I000 T17 N640 S640 RME P1432 U2) An Islamic fundamentalist group claimed responsibility for the assassination of a leading Turkish journalist critical of Muslim fundamentalists. His driver was also killed in the attack which took place outside the journalist’s home in Istanbul.

14 March  Istanbul  (19900314 A1 B06 F000 I001 T16 N630 S640 RME P1432 U5) Suspected pro-Iranian gunmen shot and wounded an anti-Iranian government activist while he drove to Istanbul’s airport.

21 May  Istanbul  (19900521 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000 U1) A small bomb went off outside of the Israeli El Al Airlines office in Istanbul. (Note – According to FAA reports, an unidentified individual contacted local newspapers and claimed the bombing on behalf of the Armed People’s Unit, believed to be a sub-unit of the Turkish Revolutionary Communist Party/Unit.)

8 June  Istanbul  A small bomb detonated at a U.S. DoD motorpool. The U.S. company VBR, which also held the current base maintenance contract for Turkey, owned the site. A subsequent investigation of the device determined it was more of a noise bomb, which could not have caused property damage or injuries.

10 July  Istanbul  (19900710 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P14__) A group calling itself the Resistance Movement bombed a McDonald’s restaurant in Istanbul. (Note – Additional reports state that at 1100, four men entered the McDonald’s in the Bayazit section of the city. The men ordered drinks, and then began smashing windows and mirrors using sticks and clubs. Before fleeing, the men threw three or four Molotov cocktails at the restaurant. No injuries were reported, but material damage was substantial. A handwritten note was discovered at the scene containing a message in English stating, “Go home, Yankee,” and was signed Resistance Movement. This attack may have been related to a recent visit to Turkey by the U.S. Secretary of Defense.

20 July  Ankara  A previously unknown Muslim militant group, the Brotherhood
of Martyrs, threatened to sabotage the Thai Embassy and airline in Turkey, if Thai authorities took action against rioting Shi’ite Muslims in southern Thailand. Reuters received the group’s threatening letter.

15 August  Turkey  (19900815 A1? B06 F001 I000 T06 N630 S640 RME P2001 U4) Iranian Government agents were believed to have assassinated Ahmad Kashefpour, an opponent of the Iranian regime.

24 August  Istanbul  (19900824 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N230 S640 RME P0000 U1) A bomb hidden in a bag exploded in the fourth floor doorway of the Spanish Consulate in Istanbul. No group claimed responsibility.

16 September  Ankara  A man claiming Abu Nidal membership telephoned the Kuwaiti Embassy and warned that Embassy personnel would be killed unless they recognized the Iraqi takeover of their country.

18 October  Istanbul  At 2000, an improvised explosive device exploded at the McDonald’s restaurant in the Nisantasi section of the city. The bomb, contained in a soda can, was placed on an outside window ledge at the rear of the building.

18 October  Istanbul  At 2015, a second device explode in a trash can located inside the restroom of the McDonald’s restaurant at Taksim Square, causing some material damage but no injuries. An unidentified man telephoned the press 2 hours after the attack, and stated that the Revolutionary War Cells was responsible for the bombing (including the one at 2000). The caller further stated that “our aim is to protest the American Sixth Fleet visit to our country—everything is for the THKP-C (Turkish People’s Liberation Party-Front), everything is for the victory.”

18 October  Istanbul  Twelve to 14 students from the Technical University, armed with sticks and clubs, attacked six U.S. crewmen from the USS Saratoga. One crewman was reported injured. The only identifiable word spoken by the attackers was “Saratoga.” According to press reports, the attackers burned a cardboard U.S. flag and shouted, “Damn American imperialism.”

10 November  Izmir  At approximately 1800, five to six youths threw bottles at a Turkish bus transporting USN personnel from the Güzelbahçe dock to Izmir. At the time of the attack, the U.S. Aircraft Carrier USS Kennedy and the cruiser USS Gates were in port.
The following day, leaflets were found in the parking lot of an apartment building occupied primarily by U.S. military personnel, as well as on the windshield of some 10 cars (with foreign civilian license plates) parked in the lot. The leaflets read: "Yankee go home, condemn American Imperialism," and were signed by a heretofore unknown group called Socialist Youth. It is believed that this incident was related to U.S. actions in the Gulf.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1 January</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>At 0130, a pipe bomb exploded a the Ramada Hotel. The explosion caused minimal damage. Though shrapnel hit a passer-by in the leg, the time of the explosion and the fact the device was placed in an unused doorway indicated the perpetrators did not intend to cause injuries. According to police, the device consisted of a metal pipe with a partial stick of dynamite inside. The pipe was sawed through in several sections so it would fragment upon detonation. Prior to the bombing, the hotel received two phone calls asking the hotel to cancel a party, because the holiday espouses behavior contrary to the Moslem faith.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7 January</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>At 0900, a DoD contractor’ was set on fire. The fire caused minor damage but no injuries.</td>
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<tr>
<td>13 January</td>
<td>Adana</td>
<td>An unknown individual poured flammable liquid on the rear of a car owned by a U.S. citizen at Incirlik Air Base and set it on fire. The individual then shouted, &quot;No war,&quot; and fled the area. Only the paint on the car was damaged.</td>
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<tr>
<td>17 January</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Two hours after the Gulf War began, a group of individuals telephoned local newspapers to inform them that they had &quot;placed an explosive in the U.S. Consulate in the Galantasaray quarter of Istanbul and the explosive will detonate in 30 minutes.&quot; No bomb was found.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>21 January</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19910121 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1411 N396) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for an explosion which severely damaged a U.S. military customs clearance depot in Istanbul. The group said the action was taken to protest U.S. imperialism and the use of force in the Persian Gulf. (Note – Additional reporting stated that at 1955, a bomb exploded outside the U.S. MTMC, causing extensive damage but no injuries. The office was on the ground floor of a four-story building. In a call to the Turkish newspaper Milliyet, Dev Sol...</td>
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</table>
23 January Istanbul

claimed credit for the attack, stating that it was to “protest against the imperialist forces in the Gulf.”

(19910123 A1 B04 F000 I001 T10 N002 S640 RME P1411) A woman was injured when a bomb detonated at the American Board of Foreign Missions (ABFM), part of the U.S.-based United Church of Christ. *Dev Sol* claimed responsibility. (Note – Additional reports stated three men entered the ABFM building at 0910, overpowered the guard, and placed the employees in another room before setting off a pipe bomb.)

23 January Istanbul

(19910123 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411) A bomb went off at the office of the American Bureau of Shipping (ABS) in Istanbul. *Dev Sol* claimed responsibility. (Note – Further information claimed four men entered the ABS building at 0900, overpowered the guard and the staff, and then set off a pipe bomb that caused minor damage and no injuries. The assailants wrote anti-Gulf comments on the walls and verbally protested U.S. action in the Gulf to the guard and staff.)

23 January Mercan

During the early morning, armed men attacked a U.S. financial consulting firm in Mercan. After overcoming the guards, they threw explosives in the buildings and escaped. Extensive damage—but no casualties—was reported.

25 January Ankara

(19910125 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb discovered at an American bank in Ankara was safely defused. (Note – Additional reports stated a guard discovered the bomb behind the Citibank building. The device consisted of a 500-gram can filled with a liquid explosive and safety fuse ignited by a match. It appeared the fuse burned out before reaching the can.)

26 January Adana

(19910126 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb damaged a car outside of the U.S. Consulate. No injuries were reported. The attack occurred in Adana, which is near Incirlik Air Base, which was used by U.S. aircraft in the war with Iraq. (Note – Additional reports stated the bomb at the Consulate damaged two cars that belonged to Turkish occupants of the building that houses the Consulate. Several windows of the building in which the Consulate was located were blown out. The Turkish newspaper *Milliyet* received a call immediately after the bombing in which the caller claimed the attacks in the name of *Dev Sol*. The caller stated that “the U.S. should take its hands off the Middle East….The Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East—we claim credit
for the bombings in Adana....You [read Milliyet] will be informed by a written notice later.”

(19910126 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb caused moderate damage at a Turkish-American Club. No injuries were reported. The attack occurred in Adana, which is near IAB, which was used by U.S. aircraft in the war with Iraq. (Note – Additional reports stated the TAA suffered damage to the building’s front door area, and numerous windows in the adjacent area were blown out. The Turkish newspaper Milliyet received a call immediately after the bombing—and the earlier bombing at the U.S. Consulate—in which the caller claimed the attacks in the name of Dev Sol. The caller stated that “the U.S. should take its hands off the Middle East…. The Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East—we claim credit for the bombings in Adana....You [read Milliyet] will be informed by a written notice later.”


(19910127 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N220 S640 RME P1411) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb that went off at the Air France agency.

(19910129 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N220 S640 RME P1411) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for an explosion at the French Consulate. The explosion destroyed three cars, while damaging two others. The French Consulate is near the U.S. military-operated Kordon Hotel.

(19910129 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1411) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb at a U.S. depot. The explosion occurred outside the U.S. military’s engineering warehouse, causing extensive damage to a number of cars, one of which belonged to a U.S. serviceman.

(19910129 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1411) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb at the American Cultural Center. At 0700, a U.S. Consulate roving security patrol discovered a sports bag placed next to some propane gas tubes at the back of the building. The police were called and the device detonated while being removed. Three policemen were slightly injured and a number of windows were broken in the center’s building.
29 January  
**Istanbul**

A bomb exploded at the International Catholic Migration Commission. Damage was minimal and no injuries occurred. No group claimed credit.

29 January  
**Ankara**

At 1927, unknown individuals poured a flammable liquid on three vehicles owned by U.S. military personnel. The flammable liquid was lit, causing extensive damage to two of the cars and minor damage to the third. No one was hurt in the incident. At the time of the attack, the cars were parked at an off-base apartment building near Ankara Air Station. The vehicles had blue-and-white license plates identifying them as belonging to non-diplomatic foreigners.

29 January  
**Ankara**

*Devrımcı Sol* bombed the offices of a British insurance company.

6 February  
**Istanbul**

At 1830, two men approached the Proctor and Gamble factory and placed a fake banner bomb that stated “Workers fight against imperialist war,” and signed by the Turkish Communist Party. Before departing the area, they threw a Molotov cocktail toward the factory, which resulted in no damage or injuries.

7 February  
**Adana**

(19910207 A1 B06 F001 I000 T06 N002 S640 RME P1411 FA001) On February 7, 1991, Bobbie Eugene Mozelle, a Customs Specialist with VBR, at IAB, Adana, Turkey, became the first American killed by terrorists during Operation DESERT STORM, and the first terrorist-related American death in Turkey in 12 years. At Approximately 0715, Mozelle exited his house carrying a coffee cup in one hand and an attached case and a gas mask in the other. He walked to his car—a green 1963 Mercedes—that he always parked in front of his apartment building. When he approached the passenger side of his vehicle, he placed the attaché case and gas mask on the ground, and with the coffee cup still in his left hand, he proceeded to unlock the car door. At that point, a man in his mid-to-late 20s approached Mozelle from the rear of his vehicle and shot him five times with a 7.65mm handgun. Crime scene evidence indicates that the gunman fired the first three shots from a distance of 5 - 7 feet, and moved in closer for the last two shots. Given Mozelle’s size—6 feet tall and over 300 pounds—the last two shots fired at close range were most likely “the coup de grâce.” At the same time, a second gunman commandeered a taxi that happened to be passing by the attack site. The terrorist pulled the taxi driver out of the taxi and
attempted to put the car in reverse. When he failed to do so, both gunman fled the area on foot. Shortly before noon on the day of the attack, anonymous calls to various local newspapers claimed the attack in the name of Dev Sol and the MLSPB. The caller for the MLSPB state that “We punished a CIA agent... Turkish lands are not an American base.... We want them [United States forces] to leave immediately.” According to the Dev Sol caller, “We are calling in the name of Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Units. We have punished a CIA agent in Adana, Turkey. The bases cannot be used for U.S. imperialism. Turkish and Kurdish people are not the servants of American imperialism.... We will not be the tools of the bloody games of the United States.” On June 17, 1991, Turkish police raided a Dev Sol safe house in Adana, and arrested four individuals. Among those arrested were Ali Sahin and Adnan Temiz. Sahin admitted to shooting Mozelle and Adana Regional Jandarma Commander Brigadier General Temel Cingoz on 23 May 1991. Among the weapons found in the safe house was the 7.65mm pistol which ballistic tests matched to the Mozelle and Cingoz murders. Tactically, the early morning hours present the best opportunities for a terrorist group to attack. At that time of the day there is little pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Additionally, the potential target lacks alertness and situational awareness. At this time of the day, the assassins are reasonably certain of two key elements—the location of the target and his next move. The principle was not lost on Dev Sol. Of the 51 lethal attacks—which resulted in 73 deaths—carried out by Dev Sol against retired and active TNP officers, military, and government officials from January 1990 to December 1993, 23 were carried out in the morning hours while the victim was at or near his residence or en route to work. Of the 17 attempted assassination of retired and active Turkish police, military, and government personnel during the cited period, 10 occurred while the victim was at or near his residence or en route to work. Excluding those blind indiscriminate attacks (i.e., raking police cars, shooting police in tea houses, etc.) by Dev Sol against police in response to significant raids on its safe houses that began in July 1991, the percentage of attacks carried out at or near the victim’s residence or while en route to work dramatically increases to 72 percent. Almost all the Dev Sol assassinations were carried out on week-days when the targets’ movements were more predictable. The weekday morning pattern changed when a story in the Turkish press highlighted Dev Sol’s penchant for weekday attacks. Thereafter, Dev Sol carried out it first lethal weekend attack when it assassinated retired Turkish Army General Memduh Ünlüterk on Sunday, 7
April 1991. Prior to the assassination of Ünlütürk, only one of Dev Sol’s previous 19 violent attacks had taken place on a weekend. On Sunday, 26 August 1990, Dev Sol gunmen attempted to assassinate Adnan Özbey, a retired army major who had served at Metriş Military Prison during the September 1980 military takeover.

7 February  Izmir  (19910207 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N396 S640 RME P1411) A bomb was thrown into the garden of a NATO (6th Allied Tactical Air Force Command) command post in Izmir. Damage was minimal and there were no injuries. Devrimci Sol claimed responsibility.

7 February  Izmir  At approximately 2000, a bomb detonated at the USAF-leased park and recreation facility at Bayraklı Park causing minor damage and no injuries. The park was closed at the time of the attack. Dev Sol claimed responsibility.

8 February  Istanbul  (19910208 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N220 S640 RME P1411) A bomb exploded in the garden of the French Consulate. Devrimci Sol claimed responsibility.

10 February  Istanbul  A bomb exploded in the garden of the Baraka building, which housed the offices of Digital Equipment and Corporation, and Kodak. There were no injuries. The Turkish Revolutionary Communist Union claimed credit in a phone call to several newspapers.

24 February  Istanbul  At 2115, an unknown person or persons threw two Molotov cocktails into the McDonald’s restaurant in the Kadıköy section of Istanbul. The devices burned, but did not detonate. Patrons in the crowded restaurant broke windows in order to escape as the devices rolled near them on the floor.

28 February  Izmir  (19910228 A1 B06 F000 I001 T03 N002 S640 RME P1422 N396) Three weeks after the assassination of Mozelle, Devrimci Sol struck again, when militants attempted to assassinate USAF Lieutenant Colonel Alvin Macke. At approximately 1700, while Macke was waiting for the elevator in the lobby of his apartment building, the building janitor, another American who lived in the building, and two unidentified Turkish men, joined him. When the janitor asked the two Turks what they were doing in the building they indicated that they were conducting a survey and distributing questionnaires. When the elevator arrived, Macke, the other American, and the two Turks entered the elevator. Upon
reaching Macke’s floor, Macke and the two Turks got off the elevator. The other American stayed in the elevator and went up to his floor. The two Turks walked past Macke as if they were going to visit someone on the floor. With his back to the men, his attaché case in his left hand, and his keys in his right, Macke began to unlock the door to his apartment. Then, for some inexplicable reason, Macke turned his head to the right. Unbeknownst to Macke, one of the men had a gun pointed to the back of his head. By turning his head, Macke avoided being shot in the back of the head, and the bullet hit him just under the right ear and jawbone. Through wounded, Macke grabbed his attaché case with both hands and threw it at the terrorists in self-defense. Macke’s actions startled the two terrorist, but before descending the stairwell, the gunman fired two more rounds at Macke. These hit the wall across from the elevator. As the two men fled down the stairs, Macke chased them to the foot of the stairs, but collapsed from loss of blood. An anonymous caller telephoned the local press after the attack and claimed the operation in the name of Dev Sol. The caller further stated, “We have punished one more senior imperialist officer…. We will carry on until imperialism gets its hands off the region.” A subsequent police investigation helped police identify Kahraman Altun and Bulent Sari as the two men involved in the attack against Macke. On 16 March 1991, Altun was killed when a bomb he was placing prematurely detonated in Izmir. On 6 April 1991, Sari was arrested by the police while boarding a bus in the Balcova district in Izmir. Sari indicated that Altun shot Macke, and that he (Sari) was just involved in the surveillance. Sari was eventually charged with participation in a number of terrorist incidents, as well as being an accomplice in the shooting of Macke.

3 March Istanbul

At 2010, an unidentified male attempted to throw a Molotov cocktail through the front window of the McDonald’s restaurant in the Nisantasi section of Istanbul. The device broke the outer section of the double-pained window and ignited. Damage was minimal and no injuries occurred.

15 March Izmir

(19910315 A1 B02 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) An individual who threw an explosive into a U.S. warehouse in Izmir was killed in the attempt.
16 March

16 March

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16 March

A bomb detonated behind the building housing the offices of IBM. The explosion caused minor damage and no injuries. The company shared a building with non-American-affiliate companies.

A bomb exploded outside an office building housing General Dynamics. The company shared a building with non-American-affiliate companies.

A bomb exploded near the Turkish American Association, shattering windows. No injuries were reported.

A bomb detonated in a high-rise building office outside the eighth-floor office of the American Life Insurance Company. The explosion blew the front door off its hinges and shattered a number of windows. No injuries were reported.

A bomb exploded in the parking lot of the Bank of Boston. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

A bomb detonated in front of the building housing Sky Courier International, an import/export company. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

A bomb exploded on the unoccupied fourth floor of an office building housing the offices of the American Publication and Distribution Center. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

A bomb exploded inside a Coca-Cola factory. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

A bomb exploded in front of the Pepsi-Cola computer center. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

A bomb exploded in front of the Genoto building. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

180 U.S. Department of State, Significant Incidents of Political Violence Against Americans: 1991, 39. On 16 March, an unidentified male called the offices of the Turkish newspaper Milliyet and stated Devrimci Sol claimed credit for all the bombings on 16 March. The caller further stated, "I am calling in the name of Dev Sol/Armed Revolutionary Units...American imperialism continues its worldwide massacres. The final one is the massacre of the people of the Middle East. We bombed the American companies to protest the visit of James Baker. The Middle East belongs to the people of the Middle East. U.S., get out of the Middle East."
16 March  Istanbul       A bomb exploded on the street in front of the Cigna SA Insurance Company, a joint American-Sabanci insurance company venture. The explosion caused minor damage but no injuries.

16 March  Izmir          At approximately 2000, one bomber was killed and his accomplice was injured when a bomb they were placing prematurely detonated. The intended target was either an American-owned car, or a Turkish auto parts company that carried General Motors and Detroit Diesel parts. The car was parked in front of the auto parts company at the time of the attack. The dead man was identified as a Dev Sol member.

16 March  Izmir          A bomb exploded outside the front door of the Military Transport Management Command Office causing minor damage.

22 March  Istanbul       (19910322 A1 B06 F001 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411 FA001 T03) At approximately 12 noon, three men rang the doorbell at the VBR office in Istanbul. The secretary looked through a peephole and noticed that one of the men was wearing a police uniform and let them in. The uniformed officer asked to speak to the person in charge. The three were directed into the Deputy Site Manager's office. They engaged him in conversation about the security situation in Istanbul and asked if any Americans worked in the office. The Deputy Site Manager indicated that the Site Manager (John Gandy) and the secretary were Americans. At that point one of the terrorist dressed in civilian clothes asked to speak to the Site Manager. When Gandy came into the Deputy Site Manager’s office, one of the terrorist dressed in civilian clothes asked the American secretary and a Turkish co-worker to join them in the office. With all four of them in the office, one of the terrorists drew his handgun and told them to kneel on the floor. As the hostages were being tied up, the gunman indicated that they were members of an Armed Revolutionary Unit of Dev Sol. Once the hostages were tied up, the terrorists took Gandy back to his office. Inside Gander’s office, the terrorist wrote slogans on the walls, seated Gandy on a chair, and bound and gagged him before shooting him three times, twice in the head and once in the chest. Written (all in Turkish) on the wall closest to Gandy was the statement, “We are determined and we shall win. Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit.” On the adjacent wall was written, “The Middle East belongs to the Middle East people…. It cannot be divided. Dev Sol.” A third slogan was written on the office's outer wall which read, “We are sending an
American to Bush with Özal.” Following the attack, a woman called the local press in Istanbul and stated, “We are giving one of Bush’s kids to Özal to take with him to the U.S., in order that he does not go without anything.... Today, in Yeşilyurt we punished the American working on the NATO base of the U.S.... We claim the attack in the name of Dev Sol Armed Revolutionary Unit.” At the crime scene police found three 7.65mm shell casings near Gandy’s body. Though the murder weapon was never found, it was determined that Gandy was shot with a gun equipped with a sound suppressor. Since Gandy lived only two blocks from the his office, it appeared that Dev Sol purposely shot him in his office to demonstrate its ability to penetrate a “hardened” area and instill fear throughout the foreign business community by killing a businessman in the one place he would feel safe—his office. The terrorists also carefully noted and took operation advantage of the fact that it was the Islamic Holy month of Ramadan when many practicing Moslems fast. In addition, the attack occurred when the janitor at Gandy’s building—as well as those in the surrounding buildings—could be expected to be at the local mosque for prayer.

25 March Ankara

(19910325 A1 B04 F000 I001 T01 N645 S640 RME P1434) The Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility for a bomb which detonated in the car of the Iraqi trade attaché in Ankara. The diplomat, who was accompanied by his four children, was slightly injured in the attack.

26 March Istanbul

(19910326 A1 B04 F000 I000 T07a N210 S640 RME P1410 A4 T02 P1411) A bomb went off in front of the Istanbul office of Shell Oil. THKP-C claimed responsibility, as did Dev Sol.

26 March Istanbul

(19910326 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410 P1411) The Citibank branch in Istanbul was bombed. One person was injured in the Izmir attack. THKP-C claimed responsibility, as did Dev Sol.

26 March Izmir

(19910326 A1 B04 F000 I001 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410 P1411) The Citibank branch in Izmir was bombed. No one was reported injured. THKP-C claimed responsibility, as did Dev Sol.

27 March Istanbul

A private, 24-passenger General Aviation aircraft MI-8 helicopter was destroyed by fire resulting from an explosive device put on board. The helicopter was unoccupied at a heliport when four gunmen tied up the watchman and placed
the device. *Dev Sol* claimed responsibility because of a failure to compensate laid off workers in a factory owned by the company. No injuries were reported.

9 April  | Istanbul  | (19910409 A1 B02 F036 I007 T15 N350 S640 RME P0000) Sabotage of a Greek tourist bus in Istanbul resulted in the deaths of 36 tourists. Seven people were injured.

13 April | Istanbul  | *Dev Sol* claimed responsibility for two separate pipe bomb attacks at the offices of Pacific Aviation and Istanbul Airlines in Istanbul. The reason given for the attacks was that the airlines, by operating domestic flights, were weakening a workers’ strike against Turkish Airlines. The bombings caused considerable damage but no injuries.

22 May   | Bursa     | At 2215, an explosive device went off behind the office of IBM. The bomb broke some windows behind the single-story building, but caused no injuries. A man called the local press and stated *Dev Sol* was responsible.

24 May   | Istanbul  | (19910524 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P0000) Molotov cocktails were thrown at the British Consulate.

22 July  | Istanbul  | (19910722 A1 B02 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411) *Dev Sol* terrorists threw petrol bombs at the premises of Coca-Cola in Istanbul.

22 July  | Istanbul  | A bomb exploded at the branch office of General Electric. Damage was minimal. *Dev Sol* was believed to have conducted the bombing.

2 August | Van       | (19910802 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06 N255 S640 RME P1422) The PKK kidnapped ten German campers near the border. They were reportedly released on 9 August.

19 August | Istanbul | (19910819 A1 B06 F001 I000 T02 N200 S640 RME P14___ P____) A British executive—Andrew Blake—with a Turkish—British insurance company was assassinated. A single gunman shot him as he was riding in the Istanbul office elevator. *Dev Sol* and the Turkish wing of Islamic Jihad both claimed credit. The victim's company had been on the *Dev Sol* "hit list" that was discovered in a raid on a safe house in July. It is speculated that *Dev Sol* mistook Blake as a U.S. citizen.

30 August | Erzurum   | (19910830 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06 N996 S640 RME P____) Five tourists—three Americans, one British and one
Australian—were kidnapped while traveling by car from Erzurum to Bingol. They were released 20 September.

12 September  Kars
Two U.S. and two Mexican citizens, along with their Turkish guide, were detained after armed men in uniforms near Kars in northeastern Turkey stopped their minibus. After breaking windows in the minibus and burning the luggage, the gunmen, who were believed to be members of the PKK, ordered their captives to follow them into the hills. Due to medical problems, one of the U.S. women remained behind with the minibus. After three hours, when it appeared the remaining hostages could not keep up with the gunmen, they were released unharmed.

28 October  Ankara
(19911028 A1 B04 F001 I001 T03 N002 S640 RME P1432) A bomb went off under the car of a U.S. serviceman in Ankara, killing USAF Staff Sergeant Victor Marvick and injuring his wife. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, saying they "would not allow the imperialist powers to divide up the Middle East at the peace summit."

28 October  Ankara
(19911028 A1 B04 F000 I001 T01 N651 S640 RME P1432) An hour after a bomb blast killed a USAF sergeant, a bomb went off under the car of an Egyptian diplomat as he prepared to drive his daughter to school. The victim was seriously injured by the blast. The Turkish Islamic Jihad claimed responsibility, saying they "would not allow the imperialist powers to divide up the Middle East at the peace summit." A Turkish newspaper reported the group had carried out the assassination because the victim had decoded Islamic Jihad's communication computer codes.

8 November  Istanbul
(19911108 A1 B02 F000 I000 T02 N740 S640 RME P1433) Suspected Kurdish extremists hurled petrol bombs at a Japanese-owned Toyota dealership.

1992

3 February  Turkey
The PKK sent a letter to newspapers warning it would target German interests in Turkey and urged Germans not to visit Turkey, officially or as tourists.
7 March  Ankara
(19920307 A1 B06 F001 I000 T01 N666 S640 RME P1434 B04) A car bomb killed the regional security officer of the Israeli Embassy. The Islamic Revenge Organization claimed responsibility in protest to Israel’s 16 February assassination of Hezbollah secretary-general Sheikh Mousawi in Lebanon.

13 March  Istanbul
At approximately 2345, TNP cordoned off the area around the U.S. Consulate based on a telephone call they received that a car bomb was parked around the vicinity of the Consulate compound. During the sweep of the area, TNP identified a stolen car parked on the back street directly behind the Consulate. Inside the trunk of the car police found two gas cylinders containing explosives. Police were able to deactivate the devices. No one claimed credit.

16 April  Istanbul
(19920416 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P0000) A rocket attack during the night damaged the U.S. Consulate. At 2115, an RPG-type device was fired at the rear of the Consulate from a small park some 150 meters from the Consulate. The projectile broke up when it hit a tree located in the Consulate garden. Shrapnel from the device peppered the building and shattered a window on the third floor of the building. No one was injured. An anonymous caller to the Turkish newspaper Hürriyet stated Dev Sol claimed credit for the attack.

4 June  Istanbul
The Iranian group Mojahedin charged that their member, Mansur Amini, had been kidnapped in Istanbul by the “diplomat-terrorists of the Khomeini regime’s embassy.” Amini’s body, with his fingernails pulled out and genitals mutilated, was found in a shallow grave.

6 June  Istanbul
Turkish police disabled bombs found under two cars belonging to the Iranian People’s Mojahedin in Istanbul.

11 June  Muş
A 6-year-old Iranian child was killed and six Iranians and three other people injured when separatist terrorists attacked a passenger train during the night in eastern Muş Province near Kurtkale station.

11 July  Izmir
(19920711 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1411 N255) Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb attack at a U.S.-German owned GM/Opel showroom in Izmir. At approximately 2130, a pipe containing 1.5 kilograms of explosive material exploded near the door to the service entrance of the building. The building suffered extensive damage, as did 30 cars. One person in the general area of the
explosion was slightly injured. Following the attack, a local newspaper received two telephone calls in which the caller claimed the attack in the name of a *Dev Sol* SDB.

11 July  
Istanbul  
(19920711 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1411)  
*Dev Sol* fired a RPG at the U.S. Consulate. At 2140, *Dev Sol* terrorists fired a rocket at the Consulate. Damage was minimal and no one was hurt. The rocket was fired from the same location as the April 16 rocket attack. The rocket launcher and a piece of paper with the *Dev Sol* symbol were found at the scene. Following the attack, an anonymous caller to the local press stated that he was with the SDB of *Dev Sol*, and that, "We destroyed the U.S. Consulate in memory of our martyrs of July 12, 1991." On 12 July 1991, Turkish security personnel raided eight *Dev Sol* safe houses in Istanbul that resulted in the death of 12 *Dev Sol* members, and the arrest of 12 others.

11 July  
Istanbul  
(19920711 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1411)  
Police defused a *Dev Sol* bomb planted under the car of a U.S. education official, mistaken for a U.S. military official. At 1745, just after the U.S. citizen, head of the American Board Mission, left his apartment by car, the caretaker of his apartment building noticed a paper bag in the spot where the American had parked his car. On closer examination, a bomb was discovered inside the bag. It appeared the bag fell off the car as the American drove off. Though no group claimed credit for the attack, it was believed *Dev Sol* was responsible.

14 July  
Istanbul  
Four or five rounds of shotgun fire were directed at the IBM building. No one was hurt.

14 July  
Istanbul  
A Molotov cocktail was thrown at the KOÇ-American bank. Damage was minimal and no one was hurt.

16 July  
Istanbul  
(19920716 A1 B02 F000 I000 T5b N666 S640 RME P0000)  
The offices of the Israeli El Al Airlines were attacked.

27 August  
Adana  
(19920827 A1 B02 F000 I000 T5a N640 S640 RME P0000)  
A Turkish airliner bound for Saudi Arabia was shot at while taking off from Adana. Despite a number of bullet holes in the fuselage, the plane continued on safely to its destination.

28 August  
Istanbul  
(19920828 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P1433)  
A bomb went off at the British Consulate. The PKK claimed responsibility.
1 September  Diyarbakir  (19920901 A1 B02 F000 I000 T07 N210 S640 RME P1411 T02) Members of Dev Sol set fire to an oil storage tank near Diyarbakir which was owned by a subsidiary of Royal Dutch Shell.

11 September  Sason  (19920911 A1 B02 F003 I001 T07 N210 S640 RME P1433 T02 N002) The PKK attacked a joint U.S.-Turkish Shell Oil facility. The guerrillas, dressed in military uniforms, forced their way into the offices and separated managers from the other staff. They then opened fire on the managers. Three people were killed and a Dutch manager slightly wounded. (Note – DOS reports state this incident occurred on 9 September in Sason (Batman Province), at a Mobile Oil exploration site, and the three killed were Turkish. In addition, that five workers were wounded (no Americans).

22 September  Istanbul  19920922 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb went off at the U.S.-owned Bank of Boston. (Note – According to DOS reports, TPLP-F/PRS claimed responsibility for the attack on Boston Bank.)

22 September  Istanbul  (19920922 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) Bombs were defused at a Coca-Cola factory. (Note – According to DOS reports, the press reported erroneously that the defused bomb was at Coca-Cola factory, when it was actually the Isma bottling plant, which did bottle Coca-Cola products.)

22 September  Istanbul  (19920922 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000) Bombs were defused at the U.S.-Turkish KOÇ-American Bank in west Istanbul.

22 September  Turkey  (19920922 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N742 S640 RME P0000) A bomb was defused at the Japanese-Turkish automobile company Toyota-S.A.

4 October  Batman  (19921004 A1 B02 F000 I000 T07a N002 S640 RME P1433 T02 A4) PKK guerrillas attacked a U.S.-operated Mobil Oil facility in Southeastern Turkey. The attack damaged two fuel tanks, but caused no injuries.

4 October  Batman  PKK guerrillas attacked a Mobil Oil remote power distribution center in Batman Province. The attack caused extensive damage, but no injuries.
5 October Istanbul At 2030, a bomb was left at the entrance of a building housing the offices of McCann-Erickson advertising agency. The bomb shattered some windows in the entrance way. No one was injured. The agency occupied the top two floors of the building and a Turkish holding company called Çukurova was located on the ground floor.

18 November Batman (19921118 A1 B02 F000 I000 T07a N002 S640 RME P1433 T02 A4) PKK attacked a Mobile Oil facility. Four generators were knocked out in the attack, but no one was injured.

22 November Turkey (19921122 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N366 S640 RME P1433) A firebomb planted at the Russian Consulate was disarmed. The PKK claimed responsibility.

11 December Ankara At 2030, a bomb went off in the car of Yas Panjurman, the Second Secretary at the Indian Embassy, causing no casualties. The blast damaged three vehicles and shattered windows in nearby buildings.

20 December Ankara At 2000, an IED detonated at the U.S. Embassy. The explosion resulted in minor damage and no injuries. No group claimed credit for the attack.

20 December Ankara At 2000, an IED detonated at the French Embassy. The explosion resulted in minor damage and no injuries. No group claimed credit for the attack.

27 December Turkey (19921227 A1 B04 F001 I000 T12 N996 S640 RME P1411 P1410 A7) Both the TPLP-F and Dev Sol claimed responsibility for a bomb that exploded on a tourist boat. A Sri Lankan was killed.

28 December Istanbul (19921228 A1 B01 F000 I000 T16 N630 S640 RME P0000) Iranian Abbas Golizade was kidnapped in Istanbul. The victim, an Iranian opposition activist, was reportedly a bodyguard of the former Shah of Iran.

1993

26 January Istanbul (19930126 A1 B06 F001 I000 T17 N640 S640 RME P1433 P1432) A well-known leftist journalist, Ugur Mumcu, was killed when a bomb exploded under his car in Istanbul. He often criticized Islamic fundamentalism in his columns for the newspaper Cumhuriyet. Eleven people were arrested. Among them were four Iranians and a Syrian. A Kurdish separatist group and three Islamic groups all claimed credit.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Location</th>
<th>Event Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>28 January</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>Police bodyguards foiled an attempt to ambush the motorcade of a prominent Jewish businessman and community leader in Istanbul. Police recovered an RPG-18 rocket at the scene. On 30 January, police arrested two of the terrorists as they fled toward the Iranian border.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>23 April</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19930423 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N200 S640 RME P1410) A bomb exploded while being carried by a man near the British Consulate in Istanbul. The man shouted slogans of an illegal leftist group as he was being arrested. Police found a gun and a light-anti-tank rocket in the bag.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>27 June</td>
<td>Antalya</td>
<td>(19930627 A1 B02 F000 I026 T02 N640 S640 RME P1433 N255 N380 N375 T06a) A tourist hotel in Antalya was the target of a bomb which was thrown onto the grounds. Twenty-six people were injured including Germans, Swedes, and a Finn. PKK was suspected, especially because they had warned of such attacks after being &quot;spurned by the government during a self-imposed truce.&quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(199307?? A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N220 S640 RME P1433 T15) The PKK kidnapped four French tourists from their bus in Southeastern Turkey. The PKK said the tourists would be held until the Turkish government ceased operations against them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 July</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(199307?? A1 B04 F000 I003 T06a N997 S640 RME P1433) A small bomb exploded near the Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) Cathedral Museum. It was planted in a trash can near a bank. Three tourists were injured. The PKK was suspected.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 July</td>
<td>Guroymak</td>
<td>(19930705 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 N200 N900) PKK guerrillas kidnapped two cousins—one British and the other Australian—while they were touring southeastern Turkey on bicycles. They were released on 10 August 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>24 July</td>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(19930724 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N220 S640 RME P1433) PKK rebels kidnapped four French tourists from a tour bus. They were released on 9 August 1993.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25 July</td>
<td>Istanbul</td>
<td>(19930725 A1 B04 F000 I004 T06a N640 S640 RME P0000) Three tourists and a Turk were injured when a bomb hidden in a litter bin exploded near the 6th Century Aya Sofya (Hagia Sophia) cathedral.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
30 July Kusadasi (19930730 A1 B04 F000 I018 T06 N640 S640 RME P0000 T06a) Eighteen people, including six foreign tourists, were wounded when a bomb exploded in a rubbish bin in a street in Kusadasi.

10 August Istanbul (19930810 A1 B02 F000 I000 T02 N996 S640 RME P1433) Suspected PKK separatists threw a grenade into a tourist-filled restaurant in Istanbul. The grenade failed to explode, thus causing no injuries.

12 August Batman At 1630, a utility crew of four Mobil Oil contractors and three third-party contractors (none Americans) were reported missing while en route to Batman. The minibus was eventually found empty near the Batman-Diyarbakir highway. According to Turkish press reporting, the workers were released on the weekend of 21-22 August 1993. PKK rebels were suspected.

15 August Turkey (19930815 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 N255 N920) PKK guerrillas kidnapped three male foreign tourists—two Germans and a New Zealander—in eastern Turkey.

18 August Istanbul (19930818 A1 B02 F000 I011 T06a N310 S640 RME P1433 T15) An explosive was thrown at a Hungarian tour bus in the Laleli district of Istanbul. Three Hungarians on the bus were injured as well as eight bystanders, including one Hungarian and one Azerbaijani. Authorities suspect PKK separatist involvement. (A teenage boy is suspected.)

21 August Turkey (19930821 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 N325 N225) PKK guerrillas kidnapped four foreign tourists—three Swiss and one Italian—near the Iranian border.

22 August Batman (19930822 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06 N700 S640 RME P1433) PKK rebels kidnapped four ethnic Turks from Afghanistan from a bus at a roadblock in Batman Province.

25 August Turkey Four terrorists, masquerading as Turkish security officials, kidnapped Iranian dissident Mohammad Khaderi from his residence. On 4 September, his body was discovered on the side of Kişşehir-Böztepe Highway.

25 August Istanbul (19930825 A1 B02 F000 I006 T06a N255 S640 RME P1410) A Molotov cocktail was thrown at a group of German tourists in the Topkapı district of Istanbul. Six women in the group sustained minor injuries.
28 August Ankara (19930828 A1 B06 F001 I000 T06 N630 S640 RME P0000) A gunman, speaking Farsi, shot to death an Iranian dissident at the victim’s home in Ankara.

1 September Batman (19930901 A1 B01 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1433) The PKK kidnapped and released seven employees of a U.S. corporation in Batman Province. The group was taken from a bus at a roadblock and held for several days.

12 September Turkey (19930912 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06 N996 S640 RME P1433 N765 N630) The PKK kidnapped six Bangladeshis and two Iranians in Southeastern Turkey. This occurred as the PKK was releasing three other foreign hostages.

9 October Erzurum (19931009 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06 N996 S640 RME P1433) The PKK kidnapped an American and a New Zealander in eastern Turkey. They were eventually released unharmed on 18 November 1993.

14 October Turkey (19931014 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N210 S640 RME P1433) The PKK kidnapped a Dutch tourist. He was released on 14 November 1993.

2 December Adana At 1330, an IED damaged a U.S. Government van used by VBR at Incirlik Air Base. No one was hurt. The van was parked in front of VBR’s office at the time of the explosion. Following the attack, an anonymous caller contacted several local newspapers and claimed the attack in the name of the Mesopotamia Army.

1994

4 January Corum Iranian state agents were believed responsible for the assassination of a member of the Iranian Kurdish Democratic Party Central Committee in Corum.

19 January Istanbul (19940119 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P1410 R14;20) A series of bombings rocked Istanbul, including one at a McDonald’s restaurant. A group calling itself IBDA-Islamic Retaliation Detachments claimed responsibility.

19 March Istanbul A bomb exploded in the Haydarpaşa train station in Istanbul, injuring a Singaporean.

24 March Istanbul (19940324 A1 B04 F000 I004 T06 N360 S640 RME P0000 R1) A time-bomb exploded in the neighborhood surrounding
the Covered Bazaar on Kapalicarsi's Yağlıkçilar street. Four persons were injured, including two Romanians. The PKK was suspected. They had recently announced a campaign against tourists in Turkey.

28 March  
Istanbul  
(19940328(27) A1 B04 F000 I003 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 R5) A bomb exploded at the St. Sophia religious shrine and tourist attraction in Istanbul, injuring three European tourists from Germany, Spain and the Netherlands. The PKK claimed responsibility for the bombing as part of its campaign to ruin Turkey's tourist industry.

2 April  
Istanbul  
(19940402 A1 B04 F002 I015 T06 N996 S640 RME P0000 R1 N616 N230) A bomb exploded in the Covered Bazaar in Istanbul. Two people died, one Spanish and one Tunisian. Twelve people were wounded including several foreigners—a Tunisian, two French, a Lebanese, and Spanish and Belgian tourists. This incident was part of a PKK campaign to dissuade tourists from travelling to Turkey. (Note—DOS reports state that the two fatal victims were Spanish and Belgian.)

10 April  
Ankara  
(19940410 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410 R20) Demonstrators upset by reports of Serbs using chemical weapons against Bosnian Muslims attacked the U.S. Embassy. The demonstration began outside the UN building across from the Embassy before targeting the U.S. site. The protesters threw rocks, jumped the fence, hung banners and kicked down a security door.

20 April  
Ankara  
(19940420 A1 B04 F000 I000 T01 N345 S640 RME P1410 R1) The car of the First Secretary to the Embassy of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was the target of a bombing. The bombing occurred outside his residence. A group calling itself the IBDA claimed responsibility.

21 June  
Fethiye  
(19940621 A1 B04 F000 I010 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 R2 N200 N305 N255 N640) See Next Entry.

21 June  
Fethiye  
(19940621 A1 B04 F000 I010 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 R2 N200 N305 N255 N640) Two bombs exploded in Fethiye, 60 miles from Marmaris, wounding 10 tourists. An Austrian, two Germans, three Britons and four Turks were among those injured. The Kurdish Patriotic Union was suspected.

22 June  
Marmaris  
(19940622 A1 B04 F001 I021 T06a N996 S640 RME P1433 N200 R15;2) Bomb explosions in Marmaris injured 21 people,
among them five British tourists. One of the British tourists died a few days later. The Kurdish Patriotic Union announced it was responsible for the bombings.

26 June Istanbul (19940626 A1 B04 F002 I000 T02 N002 S640 REU P0000 R20) A bomb planted in a McDonald's restaurant in Istanbul was discovered, but exploded while being defused, killing one TNP officer and fatally injuring another.

27 July Adana (19940727 A1 B04 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P0000) A bomb planted on the fuel pipeline leading to the joint U.S.-Turkish IAB was defused just before it was to explode.

8 August Turkey (19940808 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N375 S640 RME P1433 R1) PKK rebels kidnapped two Finnish tourists travelling in eastern Turkey, stating the tourists did not have "entry visas for Kurdistan." They were released soon afterwards.

12 August Istanbul (19940812 A1 B04 F001 I008 T15 N996 S640 RME P0000 R1;?) One Romanian was killed, and a Czech and a Swede (one source reports a Swiss national) were injured, along with six Turks, when the International Topkapi Bus Terminal in Istanbul was bombed. (Note – DOS reported the Romanian killed was a consular official.)

14 September Ankara (19940914 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 REU P0000 R20) A bomb was found and defused at a McDonald's restaurant in Ankara. No claim of responsibility was made.

12 December Istanbul (19941212 A1 B04 F000 I008 T06a N360 N640 S640 RME P1410 R20) A bomb exploded in Istanbul injuring eight persons, four of whom were Romanian tourists. The PKK was suspected.

25 December Izmir (19941225 A1 B04 F002 I002 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000 R20) A car bomb, hidden in a parked taxi, exploded in front of the Hilton Hotel. A second bomb found in the car was defused. No one claimed responsibility. Two people were injured in the explosion and four vehicles were damaged.

1995

15 January Istanbul (19950115 A1 B01 F002 I000 T06 N630 S640 RME P1433 R24) Two Iranian men were kidnapped from their house in Ataköy section of Istanbul. Their tortured bodies were found two weeks later in the Silivri section of Istanbul. The PKK
claimed the kidnapping and killings. The PKK claimed the men had provided Turkish authorities with a list of Turkish Kurds who supported the PKK.

18 January Ankara (19950118 A2 B01 F000 I000 T03 N002 S640 RME P1420 R12;5) A previously unknown group—the Lebanese Freedom Fighters—claimed to have kidnapped a U.S. military officer and his son. They demanded Israel release Mustafa Dirani, a Lebanese cleric, whom they had kidnapped from Lebanon to use as a trade for Ron Arad, an Israeli soldier held since 1986. On 24 January 1995, the two were found alive after being lost in snow-covered mountains. They had not been kidnapped.

19 January Turkey The PKK published a warning in the Kurdish news agency KURD-A, threatening to attack German facilities in Turkey. The groups warned against vacation visits in Turkey.

21 April Istanbul (19950421 A1 B04 F001 I000 T00 N630 S640 RME P0000 U1 R25) A tow truck driver was killed when a bomb exploded inside a car he was removing from an Istanbul car park, in the district of Sarayburnu. No claim was made and the intended target was not clear but the location was a tourist area, and was also the home of a left-wing newspaper and the Iranian Consulate General.

28 June Diyarbakir A U.S. civilian employee of Lockheed Martin, working at Pirinçlik Air Station, a radar surveillance station, was shot and badly injured in an armed attack on a brothel near Diyarbakir. Turkish police suspected the PKK.

14 July Siirt (19950714 A1 B01 F000 I000 T06a N740 S640 RME P1433 R2:23 U4) Kurdish separatist kidnapped a Japanese tourist from a bus near Siirt. They stopped the bus, robbed the passengers and then took the Japanese man with them. He was released on 17 July 1995. The PKK was suspected.

14 July Istanbul (19950714 A1 B05 F000 I000 T06a N996 S640 RME P1410 R27) DHKP-C terrorists seized the Galata Tower, an historic tourist site in Istanbul, and held 30 people hostage including 16 foreign tourists. Three of the hostages were U.S. citizens. The DHKP-C militants hung banners from the top floor restaurant protesting the detention of those who occupied the New Democracy Movement offices the previous day.

27 August Istanbul (19950827 A1 B04 F002 I030 T06 N663 S640 RME P1433 R14) Two bombs planted in trash cans exploded in central
Istanbul killing two people, including a Jordanian woman, and injuring 30 others, including an American, an Austrian, an Italian, and a Jordanian. The Kurdistan Islamic Unity Party claimed responsibility.

27 August  Istanbul  (19950827 A1 B04 F000 I008 T02 N370 S640 RME P0000 R14) A bombing at a restaurant in the Aksaray district of Istanbul injured eight people, including six Ukrainians.

20 October  Adana  At approximately 1210, unknown individuals fired at a bus contracted to transport USAF military personnel between Incirlik Air base and leased military housing in Adana. The bus was the second of two buses traveling together some 50 yards apart from each other. One round hit the bus and shattered a window, but none of the three occupants (two Turks and a USAF member) were hurt in the attack. No one claimed credit for the attack.

20 October  Istanbul  (19951020 A1 B04 F000 I000 T02 N002 S640 RME P0000 R20) A bomb exploded at a Coca-Cola warehouse in Istanbul. No group claimed responsibility. (Note – According to DOS reports DHKP-C claimed responsibility for the attack.)

27 October  Adana  At approximately 0215, a bomb exploded under a car belonging to the Turkish manager of a Pepsi-Cola bottling company. No one was hurt in the attack, and no group claimed credit.

28 November  Bursa  (19951128 A1 B06 F001 I000 T02 N640 S640 RME P1434 R14;23 U2 JT) A Turkish Jewish businessman was shot to death in Bursa. A caller claimed that the murder was in retaliation for the killing of Islamic Jihad Movement in Palestine leader, Fathi al-Shaqqaqi in Malta in October. Hezbollah claimed responsibility. Police suspect a contract killing related to business dealings.

1996

16 January  Trabzon  (19960116 A1 B03 F000 I001 T12 N366 S640 RME P1410 JT) Turkish–Abkhazian supporters of Chechen separatism hijacked a ferry—the Avrasya—sailing under the Panamanian flag and threatened to blow up the vessel unless Russian forces allowed Chechen gunmen free passage from a siege in the Dagestani village of Pervomaiskaya. Of the 160 passengers on board, 114 were Russian. A security guard was injured during the initial assault on the vessel. After being refused entry to Istanbul because of the suspected quantities of explosives on board,
Turkish authorities, in association with the Chechen foreign minister, negotiated an end to the hijack. Nine men were arrested at the port of Eregli and the ship then continued its journey. It arrived in Sochi, Russia, on 23 January 1996.

20 February  Istanbul  
(19960220 A1 B06 F002 I000 T09 N630 S640 RME P2001) Two Iranian dissident members of *Mujahedin-e Khalq* were killed in Istanbul. A number of Iranians and Turks were arrested in April 1996, in connection with the killing. Islamic militants among the group claimed Iranian diplomats had ordered the assassinations.

28 April  Istanbul  
(19960428 A1 B04 F000 I000 T5b N365 S640 RME P1545 P1410 AA JT) A bomb exploded near to the Russian *Aeroflot* International Airlines office in the Beyoğlu district of Istanbul. There were no casualties but the doors and windows of the office were destroyed. A previously unknown group calling themselves the Organization for Solidarity with the Chechen Resistance Fighters claimed responsibility.

12 May  Istanbul  
An unexploded IED was discovered in the international section of Istanbul’s Atatürk Airport. The device was discovered in a bathroom after a bomb threat had been called in and the bomb squad alerted. The device was described as “rudimentary.” No one took credit for the bomb.

24 September  Bingol  
Gunmen from the PKK stopped a passenger bus along the Bingol-Elazığ Highway and took three foreigners—an Iranian, a Polish man, and his fiancé off the bus and kidnapped them. The three were eventually released unharmed on 27 September 1996, in Bingol.

26 October  Istanbul  
(19961026 A1 B02 F000 I000 T01 N710 S640 RME P0000 U1 R27) An explosion near the Chinese Consulate in Istanbul caused no damage.

17 November  Istanbul  
(19961117 AA B07 F000 I000 T5a N255 S640 RME P0000) An Airbus 320 owned by the German airline Aero Lloyd was forced to land in Sofia, Bulgaria, after a bomb warning. The flight, with 100 passengers on board, was diverted en route from Istanbul to Frankfurt and searched at Sofia. No bomb was found.

17 November  Istanbul  
(19961117 A1 B01 F017 I040 T6a N370 S640 RME P1410 R20) A fire at a hotel in Istanbul killed 17 Ukrainians and injured 40 other people. An electrical fire was initially blamed
but Turkish Islamic Jihad later claimed responsibility for the incident.

28 November Bursa (19961128 A1 B06 F001 I000 T06 N995 N640 S640 RME P1410 U3 R4) Gunman killed a Jewish businessman when they opened fire on his car while he traveled in Bursa. The gunman claimed the attack in retaliation for the assassination in Malta of the leader of a militant Islamic group. Reportedly Israeli agents assassinated the Islamic leader.

1997

10 January Istanbul Turkish police defused an IED found 5 meters from the Aksaray McDonald's restaurant. No one claimed responsibility.

12 May Izmir A Molotov cocktail was thrown at the American Girls School, which offers “Western-style” education to a largely Turkish student body. No one was hurt in the attack. Four members of the illegal Turkish group IBDA-C were arrested in connection with the attack. The members were protesting the mandatory 8-year education system being implemented in Turkey.

26 September Istanbul Two pipe bombs exploded outside of a General Electric appliance outlet. There were no injuries or property damage. A flag from a group called TKEP/L was found at the scene.

5 October Istanbul (19971005 A7 B04 F000 I000 T01 N002 S640 RME P1410 R20) Two explosive devices were found outside the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul. They were put there by the TKEP/L. Flyers and a flag were left with the devices. The flag had the initials “TKEP/L.” Written on the flyers in Spanish and Turkish was: “Revolution Forever-Che,” and “Che- Revolutions are coming.”

13 October Turkey Nine PKK terrorists kidnapped two Bulgarian and one Turkish engineers from a coal mine. The Turkish engineer was found dead, but the Bulgarians were released unharmed on 16 October.

10 December Mersin A bomb was found inside an empty gas canister as it was being unloaded from a truck near the Ataş Oil refinery. The Ataş refinery is a joint venture of Mobil Oil, British Petroleum, and Royal Dutch/Shell Oil. No one claimed credit for the bomb.
A man and a woman, allegedly members of DHKP-C, were caught in Adana. According to the Turkish Police, the two planned to attack Incirlik Air Base and a police station in Osmaniye. U.S. military personnel and aircraft are stationed at the base. The police search of the two militants’ house discovered two hand grenades, two hand-make bombs, a sketch depicting “the act of terrorism planned” for Incirlik Air Base, a cellular phone, and DHKP-C documents.

A lone hijacker seized control of a THY Avro RJ100 aircraft with 63 passengers and five crew members shortly after takeoff from Adana. The flight was enroute to Ankara. The hijacker—male—claimed he had an explosive device hidden in a stuffed panda bear and demanded to be flown to Tehran, Iran. The police convinced the hijacker to allow landing at Diyarbakir Airport in Turkey, where 20 passengers were released. The passengers overpowered the hijacker while on the ground and the he was taken into custody. It was believed the hijacker was protesting the oppression of Muslims in Algeria.

Two PKK members on a motorcycle threw a bomb into a park near the Blue Mosque in Istanbul. The explosion injured two Indian tourists, a New Zealander, four Turkish civilians, and two Turkish soldiers. On 12 April authorities arrested the two PKK members involved in the attack.

Armed PKK militants kidnapped a German tourist and a Turkish truck driver at a roadblock in Ağrı. The German tourist was found unharmed the next morning near the kidnapping site, but the truck driver remained missing.

A man hijacked THY Flight 145 (Airbus A-310) enroute from Ankara to Istanbul and diverted it to Trabzon to protest the Turkish Government’s ban on women wearing the traditional Islamic head covering, or chador, at universities. Although he claimed to have a bomb, it was later reported that the hijacker had only a plastic toy gun. The flight had 76 passengers, all of which were released unharmed when the hijacker surrendered to police.

A man with a handgun and a grenade hijacked THY Flight 487, which had departed Adana at approximately 1940. enroute to Ankara. The B-737 carried approximately 40 passengers and crew. The hijacker demanded to be taken to Lausanne,
Switzerland, but agreed to the pilot's request to land at Sofia, Bulgaria, for refueling. The pilot, however, landed at Ankara's Esenboğa Airport, while the hijacker believed they were in Sofia. The hijacker told the passengers he was protesting the Turkish Government's "dirty war" against ethnic Kurds. The pilot also read a statement from the hijacker demanding to be taken to Lausanne because it was there that the modern Turkish state was created in a treaty signed 75 years earlier. (The hijacking occurred during the 75th anniversary celebration of the Turkish Republic.) The hijacker's statement also praised "Chairman Apo," Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of the PKK. Although negotiations were conducted, the hijacker did not release any passengers. Approximately seven hours after the plane landed TNP special action teams stormed the plane through the rear door, evacuated some passengers, and killed the hijacker in the cockpit. There were no other injuries. It is not known whether the hijacker acted on his own or on behalf of the PKK. Coincidentally, one week earlier this same plane was prevented from taking off in Strasbourg, France, by protesters trying to prevent the deportation of a Kurd to Turkey.

17 December Ankara

A group of approximately 50 demonstrators from the Turkish Workers Party held a peaceful demonstration in front of the main gate at the U.S. Embassy in Ankara. This incident was in response to U.S. Operation DESERT FOX against Iraq, between 16-19 December 1998.

20 December Istanbul

Some 300 people representing the Freedom and Solidarity Party staged a peaceful demonstration in front of the U.S. Consulate. This incident was in response to U.S. Operation DESERT FOX against Iraq, between 16-19 December 1998.

1999

4 June Istanbul

Turkish police killed two DHKP-C militants during an attempt to attack the U.S. Consulate in Istanbul with a "Light Anti-tank Weapon" or LAW. The two apparently had set up at a construction site, from where they intended to launch the LAW at the Consulate. According to the police, the two militants had two Lama-type hand guns, magazines, and 15 rounds of ammunition, one LAW, a hammer, a knife, and a pair of surgical gloves. In an Internet statement attributed to the DHKC Press Bureau, the attack was attempted because the U.S. had been "bombing the People of Yugoslavia for months because it want[ed] to break it up and establish its domination."
APPENDIX E – INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN TURKEY, 1968-99

Sources: See Appendix C
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APPENDIX I – TÜRKİYE HALK KURTULUŞ ORDUSU MANIFESTO\textsuperscript{181}

The following is a translation of the Manifesto provided by Türkiye Halk Kurtuluş Ordusu (THKO) or Turkish People’s Liberation Army, following the kidnapping of four USAF airmen on 4 March 1971.

MANIFESTO OF THE TURKISH PEOPLES’ LIBERATION ARMY

THE TURKISH PEOPLES’ LIBERATION ARMY’S CALL TO ALL THE PEOPLES OF THE WORLD AND TO THE PEOPLES OF TURKEY

This is the voice of the People’s Liberation Army of Turkey.

1. The Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey believes that the liberation of our people and the independence of our country will be achieved by armed struggle and that this course is the only course.

2. The Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey calls all patriots to the ranks of this sacred struggle and declares that it will continue to fight to the last man in its struggle against the traitors.

3. Our aim is to liquidate American and all foreign enemies, destroy the traitors and establish a fully independent Turkey cleared of the enemy.

4. The Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey is the vanguard force of our oppressed peoples and will not enter any movement beyond the liberation of our people.

5. We announce to our people: don’t pay attention to the wealth of the enemy, its number, resources and terror. Don’t succumb to the enemy; we shall forcibly extract our rights because they take everything from us by force.

TO ALL PATRIOTS:

Rather than living dishonorably, die honorably. Instead of pleading, resort to force. Have confidence in yourself and those like you, and not in orders.

Our slogan is not to succumb to traitors wherever and whatever form they take.

\textsuperscript{181} Krahenbuhl, 106-11.
Revolutionaries: Abandon the methods of struggle by peaceful means. Join the ranks of the Peoples’ Liberation Army in armed struggle which is the basis of the policy of violence which will lead the peoples’ masses to liberation. Let us all together wave the peoples’ banner of national liberation war against the aggressive policy of imperialism.

Workers, peasants: the Gendarmerie and police of the herd of traitors continue to plan new crimes every day. We have not yet taken the revenge of our brothers who were shot and tortured in commando attacks in the east, on the June 16 incidents, at Bossa and many other places. Let us all raise the banner of revolt against the herd of traitors who are exploiting our sweat and blood.

Teachers, minor officials: do not ask for mercy from the lackeys who are reluctantly paying you the equivalent of a piece of dry bread but who banish you from place to place when they don’t like it and who exploit you like a servant. The only path of liberation of the oppressed is a sacred revolt against the oppressors.

Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey assumes the responsibility of the incidents which took place within the short period it has engaged in its struggle and makes its first declaration to our people:

1. On the night of December 29, 1970 the policemen of the riot squad on duty in front of the American Embassy were shot. This incident gave confidence to the revolutionaries and to the people and for the first time in Turkey the traitors were faced with a terrorist act of the revolutionaries.

2. On January 11, 1971, the Emek branch of IS bank was robbed and 24 thousand liras were taken. The objective of the robbery was to upset the business mechanism of the banks that secure the continuation of the system of exploitation on the one hand, and to secure arms in order to be able to fight better with the enemy on the other hand. For this reason, after the robbery the enemy has increased its pressure on the people and our fighters with an unprecedented savagery. After one month of pursuit, the enemy failed to catch our fighters, but helped them to become heroes, in a short time.

3. In mid-February an American launch was bombed and was saved from sinking with great difficulty.

4. On the night of February 20 two policemen of the riot squad were shot. This action was carried out for the same reasons as the shooting of the policemen in Ankara.

5. On the night of February 16 the American base at Balgat was entered. The base remained under the control of our fighters for four hours. The base was entered for the purpose of [obtaining] [sic] ammunition; no weapons were found on the guards. Upon departure our fighters took along with them an American sergeant on guard duty, but gave up shooting him when it was seen that he was a Negro, and he was released after securing necessary information [intelligence] [sic] about Americans in Ankara.
The incidents proved the following:

The enemy is cruel, but also an extreme coward in appearance. Although it appears strong it is weak. We are the strong, brave and courageous ones. For the past month and a half the police organization of the traitor administration has bowed to a handful of our fighters. Despite all pressure and violence, not one of our fighters has be caught, but in order to deceive the people and to appear successful some revolutionaries who had no connection with the incidents were arrested and tortured.

The Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey has taken hostage four American NCO’s stationed at TUSLOG Det 18 American base.

The hostages are:

S/Sgt. Jimmie J. Sexton

A/1c James M. Gholson

A/1c L. J. Heavner

A/1c Richard Caraszi

The Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey is giving 36 hours to release the Americans it has taken hostage. Within this period government officials should announce through TRT and the press that the conditions set forth shall be complied with. All developments should be made public through the same media by the authorities. If such an announcement is not made, it will be considered that the conditions are not accepted. At the end of the period stipulated the hostages will be shot.

CONDITIONS:

1. In order to secure the release of all the hostages, USA shall pay a ransom of $400,000 (four hundred thousand) dollars to the Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey. (The method of pickup shall be relayed later.)

2. The declaration of the Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey entitled “To All the Peoples of the World and to the People of Turkey” and the conditions shall be broadcast over TRT on 0730, 1300, and 1900 hours news bulletins in their entirety.

3. No revolutionary shall be arrested because of this incident during the time American hostages are in custody.

Note: The period stipulated begins at 5:00 o’clock on the morning of March 4, 1971 and expired at 1800 hours on March 5. It should be known that any search campaign to be undertaken by the police shall endanger the lives of the hostages.
Officers, students, technicians: Use the weapon in your hands for the sake of the liberation of our country. Oppose the commanders under orders to NATO and the interest of the traitors fed by American.

Small tradesmen, artisans, orphans, widows and pensioners: you are in need of protection to live as human beings, to be considered as human beings. Poverty bends you more with each passing day. You look to the future with fear. Your salvation is not separate from the salvation of all of our people. Until the end of the traitors who have put you into this state comes, you will know no comfort.

All patriots:

Because of America and the traitors in her services, we have become step-children in our own country. No one is certain of the future. Our lives pass in hunger and want, without doctors, medicine, without schools, roads. We cannot leave the homeland to the coming generation in this state. It is our most sacred duty to rebel against the handful of traitors who suck our life blood, and against America behind them. As long as this order of pillage continues we will be the ones who die of hunger, who are without work, who are not treated as human beings, who groan under high cost of living and increased prices, and who are mistreated.

Until now we always begged but we did not get anything. As we asked for little we were dragged towards a precipice. We waited for help from them, but gained nothing but harm.

Therefore:

There is no other course but to rebel against the traitors.

If we are weak today it is because we are not united, for they throw us against each other. Let’s open our eyes well and see the real enemy all together. The real enemy is America, the treacherous bosses, the agas, the usurers, the money-lenders.

Let us not be afraid:

It is a debt of honor to fight for salvation of the country and besides we have not life left to lose.

Already, from the police to our president, no one sleeps easily in their homes: they cannot come and go comfortably to their homes. They know very well what will happen tomorrow and that the Peoples’ Liberation Army of Turkey, which is a handful of fighters today, will tomorrow become thousands and millions and they wonder what they will do then.

We repeat: Do not take heed of the numbers of the enemy, its wealth, its terrorism and the means it has. When we take away the weapons and means in its hands there will be
no power left to stop us. Let us get rid of the lack of confidence we have in ourselves and in those like ourselves. Let us know well that no force is capable of withstanding the peoples' power, that is to say, our power. Let us take up our sacred duty in this honorable struggle.

The Turkey of tomorrow will become a paradise for us, the dungeon for the enemy.

The Peoples' Liberation Army of Turkey declares that it will continue this struggle to the last breath and to the last drop of its life-blood.

WE ARE GIVING ÖZAL ONE OF B.U.S.H’S CHILDREN SO THAT HE DOES NOT GO TO AMERICA EMPTY-HANDED.

Özal, who opened all the country’s doors to the American war machine during the imperialist were waged against the peoples of the Middle East and turned the bases into headquarters of murder, is going to meet Bush. To get the payoff for his ‘servitude’ to America, to turn the country into an arsenal for the U.S. in the Middle East, and to sign new agreements with the imperialists.

We repudiate all agreements that strengthen imperialism. We stand against the whole economic, political and military presence of imperialism in our country. We want the U.S. and NATO bases to be closed and all the bilateral agreements to be annulled.

Our aim is an independent and democratic Turkey. This is what we are fighting and struggling for. But Özal wonders ‘What are we good for?’ He should have learned this a long time ago. However, if he still hasn’t, while he is in the U.S. he can ask Bush, from whom he always seeks advice, and learn what we are good for. He knows us from Vietnam, Angola, Nicaragua, Salvador, and Palestine. Who knows those who struggle against imperialism better than Bush?

Yes, we say an independent Turkey is a country where the people control their own destiny. In this country, there is no place for collaborators! But servants of imperialism, like Özal, pretend not to hear this. And they have the audacity to say ‘What are we good for’!

Our actions will definitely teach Özal what we are good for!

In order not to go to the U.S. empty-handed, he can take one Bush’s children with him. He can tell Bush that we say, ‘Either Turkey is to be independent or imperialists will continue to collect their dead friends.’

This action of ours is only a warning.

\[182\] Ibid., 247-8.
We will continue to target imperialist bases, U.S. installation, agents and officials unless the imperialist murderers take their hands off our country and leave. We will not agree to turn Turkish lands into arsenals and war bases for imperialist in the Middle East. We will make it impossible for the imperialist murderers and their collaborators to live in our country.

Our anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic struggle will continue until we create an independent, democratic, and socialist Turkey.

We carried out the attack against John Gandy, the manager of TUSLOG and the American firm of Vinnel-Brown and Root for this reason.

DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM!

WE DO NOT WANT IMPERIALIST BASES AND TREATIES!
APPENDIX K – *DEVRIMCI SOL COMMUNIQUÉ ON OPERATION DESERT STORM*¹⁸³

*Devrimci Sol* Communiqué, undated. In the following communiqué *Devrimci Sol* speaks of the group’s opposition to the U.S.-led military Operation DESERT STORM.

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**DO NOT KEEP SILENT ABOUT THE ARAB VICTIMS!**

**FIGHT IMPERIALIST AGGRESSION!**

Right now, terrible mass murder is taking place in the Middle East. The people in Iraq are being exterminated. The imperialists are perpetrating a bloodbath in the Middle East with weapons that were brought to the area months earlier. Iraq was turned into a hell by the bombardments of the so-called allied forces. The western mass media, controlled by the imperialists, are broadcasting false information. But not even these lies can hide the cruel suffering they themselves have caused.

This war is being waged in the interest of the oil monopolies and oil sheikhs. Blood is flowing for the sake of the imperialist thieves. Imperialism does not accept anything that goes against its interests in this oil-rich region. The reason for the oppression of the people in the Middle East is that the imperialists insist on playing a dominant role. While the war is going on, they want to destroy the national and social movements in the region.

Beside the intervention by the U.S., France, Britain, and Saudi Arabia, other imperialist nations are preparing for action. The Turkish government, which has been playing the role of warmonger from the beginning of the crisis, allows its country to be used as a base for attacks on Iraq and is preparing for a second front in which Turkey can play an active role in the war.

In spite of the propaganda of the imperialist press, there is a growing awareness among the people of the world of why and in whose interests this war is being waged. Everywhere in the world, protests are increasing. The rage of the people in the Middle East is growing, and so is their resistance. The imperialists will not gain their objective through genocide. They will suffer severe reverses, as history has shown in Vietnam, Algeria and Angola. The fascist Özal regime collaborates with the imperialists. The offer to use the Incirlik NATO base for U.S. bombing raids against Iraq is simply an attempt to drag Turkey into the war.

Özal participates in the frontal attack on the Arab population. Strengthen the resistance to the fascist Özal regime!

SMASH THE IMPERIALIST WAR!

IMPERIALIST TROOPS OUT OF THE MIDDLE EAST!

DO NOT KEEP SILENT ABOUT THE MASS MURDER OF ARAB POPULATIONS!

BU.S.H, MAJOR AND MITTERRAND ARE MURDERERS!

ALL PEOPLE IN THE WORLD ARE BROTHERS AND SISTERS!

OUR STRUGGLE CONTINUES!

DEVrimCI SOL GÜCLER
(Revolutionary Left Forces)

Silahlı Devrimci Birlikler
(Armed Revolutionary Units)
APPENDIX L – *DEVRIMCI SOL* ‘NEWS BULLETIN’ NO. 3


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OUR LAND IS NOT A BASE FOR IMPERIALIST MURDERS!

The NATO and U.S. bases located in Turkey were among the centers of aggression used against the peoples of the Middle East. American bombers taking off from Incirlik, Erhac, and Batman bases carried death to the people of Iraq. With the tens of thousands of bombs used in Iraq, people were savagely massacred without any civilian-military discrimination, and all the economic and cultural wealth of Iraq was destroyed.

Despite all the effort spent to conceal the facts, today the reality of how the imperialist powers massacred thousands of people is slowly revealing itself. A massacre was brought about in the Middle East with the use of all the advances of technology.

We will never forget this massacre!

The Özal government collaborated in the criminal actions of imperialism against the Iraqi people by allowing the use of Turkish soil as a base for this massacre. The Özal government is at least as responsible as imperialism for the burning to death of thousands of women and children in shelters.

Özal’s policies have been those of creating animosity between peoples. As a result of this policy and under the guidance of U.S. imperialism, Turkey has turned into a new Israel.

The war made it apparent that the U.S. and NATO bases fulfill no other function than strengthening the presence of imperialism in our country and reinforcing its dependence; the importance of closing down the U.S. and NATO bases, annulling all bilateral agreements that reinforce imperial dependence and withdrawing from all imperial pacts—primarily NATO—has become obvious once more.

Thanks to the Özal government acting as a servant of imperialism, the imperialist murderers are now able to act in our country as if it were theirs. While totally neglecting the safety of its own people, the government has mobilized all its forces for the Americans.

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184 Alexander and Pluchinsky, 245-6.
This will not be forgotten!

TURKEY IS NOT A PLAYGROUND FOR IMPERIALIST!

We will hold the Özal government responsible for its policy of national dishonor and for being the servant of imperialism. The dishonor of promoting interests by shedding the people’s blood will not go unpunished.

‘FIGHTING AGAINST THE ÖZAL GOVERNMENT IS FIGHTING AGAINST IMPERIALISM’ will be our battle cry in our struggle for an independent and democratic Turkey.

Today the imperialists are enjoying their victory of having destroyed Iraq and massacred its people. It is futile to boast about this, for they have been unable to overcome a people’s struggle led by revolutionaries. Their only success is in having the Saddam administration, which they once co-operated with and supported, accede to their demands. That such administrations cannot resist imperialism even if they fight it from time to time is not a new phenomenon.

The war against imperialism in the Middle East is not over!

The U.S. should not think that the war is over because it beat Iraq. The war will continue even more fiercely with the participation of Arab, Turkish, Kurdish and Persian peoples, who will bring an end to their collaborator administrations, supported by imperialism, and destroy the status quo imposed on the peoples.

The people of Iraq, after gaining power themselves, will succeed in organizing the resistance against imperialism and defeating it.

The reality is that the U.S. attacked Iraq, not to liberate Kuwait, but to impose its control over Middle Eastern oil, that it wants to enslave people by usurping their resources, that it wants to convey to the world a message – ‘either you obey me or you will be bombed to destruction’ – and that imperialism’s aggression knows no boundaries.

But the people will not yield to imperialism!

The terror and massacres of imperialism will not stop the anti-imperialist fight for independence and freedom.

We will continue our actions against imperialism and the Özal administration!

We will hold the Özal administration responsible for co-operating with imperialism, for acting as its hired gunman—working in exchange for dollars—and for massacring the Arab people.
We will demand an explanation for turning Turkish and Kurdish lands into bases of aggression of imperialism against the people.

The American Lieutenant-Colonel Alvin Macke, stationed at the NATO headquarters in Izmir, has been punished by our organization.

THE U.S. AND NATO BASES SHOULD BE CLOSED DOWN IMMEDIATELY!

DOWN WITH IMPERIALISM AND THE ÖZAL COLLABORATOR GOVERNMENT!

THE PEOPLES’ FIGHT AGAINST IMPERIALISM WILL CONTINUE!

Revolutionary Left
Armed Revolutionary Units
APPENDIX M – DHKC'S “PEOPLE’S PARTY” PROGRAM

The following is an “English” version of the “Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party’s Program”. This particular version was taken from DHKP-C’s “public affairs” (DHKC) Internet website.

DEVRIMCI HALK KURTULUŞ CEPHESI

Revolutionary Peoples Liberation Front

The Revolutionary People's Liberation Party's Program

We are fighting for the liberation of our people: Turkish, Kurdish and all other nationalities; We are fighting for justice, equality, and conditions of life that are fit for human beings.

LET U.S. FIGHT AND BUILD OUR PEOPLE'S POWER

OUR PARTY'S ULTIMATE GOAL

Our party's world view is Marxism-Leninism, and we are fighting to this end. The ultimate aim of the DHKP is the creation of a society without exploitation and without classes. Our immediate aim, however, is to establish the revolutionary power of the people - the power of all the people's forces that are against oligarchy and imperialism.


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WHAT KIND OF REVOLUTION DO WE STRIVE FOR?

Our revolution is anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic in character. This is based on the economic, social and political analysis of our country. It is not feudalism which is dominant in our country, but capitalism. But in our country, capitalism has not developed on its own basis, as in the United States, Japan or Europe. Rather, capitalism was introduced and developed here as a result of imperialism and dependency. That is why the imperialist crisis has hit our country in such an unbearable way - just like it has every other neo-colonial country.

The domestic ruling class is the principal ally of imperialism in our country. It is the monopolists and the bourgeoisie who are collaborating with imperialism. The domestic ruling class was in league with imperialism from the beginning. In order to maintain its regime of exploitation politically, economically and ideologically, the monopolists need to work together with "pre-capitalist elements" (big landowners, profiteers and merchants). The classes who are oppressed in this regime based on extreme exploitation are, in the first place, the workers, the landless peasants and the rural petty bourgeoisie.

The social and political powers which are holding back the development of the productive forces are imperialism and the oligarchy.

This short summary presents a picture and shows the character of our revolution.

THE PATH TO LIBERATION

In our country, a distorted form of capitalism holds sway. The country is under the economic and political hegemony of imperialism. It is ruled by a fascist type of state. This state has always brutally and bloodily suppressed the struggles of the masses for basic rights, justice and equality. The political parties and organisations which exist and are active within the framework of this system were created by the regime in order to strengthen the system and to hinder the politicisation of the people's struggles, to divert it away from the struggle for power.

They try to neutralise any kind of mass resistance against the brutal exploitation of imperialism and the oligarchy by any means necessary - including large scale massacres.

The economic and political hegemony of imperialism encompasses all regions of our country. It controls and dominates the collaborationist regime.

In our country, which is dependent on imperialism and ruled by fascism, it is impossible to change the character of the regime by means of elections.

This is the reason why armed struggle is the only way to destroy the fascist power which is controlled by imperialism and the oligarchy.
The people’s war - carried out with arms - under the leadership of the revolutionary party and front, will grow in rural and urban areas through armed propaganda. It will be strengthened and will develop into guerrilla war, and a guerrilla army will be created. Together with the growing movement of the people and local uprisings, a people’s army will develop. The people’s war will eventually destroy the oligarchy’s state through a total uprising and will establish the revolutionary power of the people. Our party sees the first phase of this people’s war as a guerrilla war fought by the vanguard, on the basis of armed propaganda.

Armed struggle is the basis of the people’s war, but it is not the only way to fight. This war is being fought according the PASS, the Politicised Military Strategy of War, which corresponds to the conditions and circumstances in our country. The guerrilla war in rural and urban areas is the basis for the revolutionary struggle. In addition to the guerrilla war, short-term rights and freedoms are fought for and defended. Any idea which detracts from the revolution and causes it to deviate from its line, is fought against ideologically. While our party takes part in the everyday economic and democratic struggles of the people, it also makes it clear that final liberation cannot be achieved through these struggles alone, and makes clear the aim of conquest of power.

Economic and democratic struggles are subordinate to the armed struggle - they strengthen the people’s war.

The aim of the people’s war is to destroy the economic and political power of imperialism, the oligarchy and the fascist state, and to establish the revolutionary power of the people.

The revolutionary power of the people is the revolutionary power of all classes and strata that are not part of imperialism and the oligarchy.

THE STRATA AND CLASSES AMONG THE PEOPLE

In the war for the establishment of the revolutionary power of the people, our party relies principally on the following forces: the working class, impoverished and small peasants, civil servants and all other working people, small producers in the cities and in the countryside, small traders, craftsmen, students, intellectuals and everyone who has not lost their national values, who wants independence for our country and liberty for our people, and who is against exploitation and oppression.

EXTERNAL FORCES WHO SUPPORT OUR REVOLUTION

Our revolution is also a revolution in the Middle East and in the Balkans. This is why it is above all the proletariat and people of this region who are the friends and allies of our revolution. In other countries all over the world, our friends and allies are the proletariat, the revolutionary and democratic people, and the forces of national and social liberation.
after the fall of revisionism, there are new friends and allies which have emerged from
the dynamics of the new socialist movements.

THE ENEMIES IN THIS WAR

Our enemies in this war are:

first of all, U.S. imperialism and all imperialist forces, together with their military,
economic and political bases, their offices, and their secret service bases set up under the
guise of providing "aid";

the monopolists and merchants, the profiteers, the big landowners and their private armed
forces;

all those in positions of political and bureaucratic responsibility in the government and
the state, along with the members of parliament and the parties which defend the regime;

the repressive apparatus of the state, the army, the police, the secret service, the counter-
guerrilla and the "village protectors";

all political parties which have taken their place within the oligarchic structure and which
support the regime, are fascist, or want to hinder the revolutionary people's war;

all state and private institutions which support imperialism and the oligarchy, and which
are used as a means to hinder the revolutionary war;

all spies, agents, agents provocateurs and their organisations which serve the regime in
order to hinder the revolutionary war.

While the Revolutionary People's Liberation Party fights against these enemies of the
people, it also strives to win over or to at least neutralise those strata among the people
who have been misled by the enemy or who have fallen victim to their own short-term
interests. Our Party strives to broaden the people's front and to strengthen the unity of this
front against the enemies of the people.

THE TASKS OF REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S POWER

Just like the other peoples of the world who are oppressed and exploited, our peoples, the
Turkish and Kurdish nation and all other nationalities, are exploited and oppressed by
imperialism and its tool, the collaborationist ruling classes. Dependency on imperialism
is not a new phenomenon.

It began at the time of the Ottoman Empire through classical colonialism, and continued
at the beginning of the 20th century with imperialist colonialism. The peoples who lived
under the Ottoman Empire were exploited by imperialism until they had shed their last
drop of blood, and they were oppressed militarily, politically and culturally. In the years
after the first imperialist war, Anatolia was occupied by several imperialist states. This was the start of direct imperialist exploitation and oppression. Through the policy of so-called "divide and rule", the people's living in Anatolia were incited to "tear each other apart".

This dependency on imperialism was brought to an end for a limited period of time through the war of liberation waged by the people's and nations of Anatolia in fraternal solidarity with each other. However, because of its class character, the petty bourgeoisie, which was the class which led the struggle for liberation, followed a capitalist line, and imperialism trapped the whole world - except for the Soviet Union - in a pincer movement. Imperialism had enough power to once again entrap countries which had won their political liberation. For this reason, in our country a new process of colonisation began after the second imperialist war, a process which accelerated in the years which followed.

The result was that our country became a cheap policeman for NATO, and especially for the U.S. Hundreds of army bases were built in our country and the army was placed under the command of U.S. and NATO generals. Governments could only survive with the agreement of the U.S. They became a tool for carrying out the political and economic plans of imperialism.

Political domination was supplemented by economic domination. Imperialist economic institutions like the IMF, the World Bank and the OECD determine the economy of our neo-colonial country. In addition, imperialist culture was foisted upon our country. Everything is influenced by imperialism's degenerate consumer culture: music, cinema, the press and television, and even the ways of thinking and living that the people adopt on all social levels.

Imperialism is backed by the oligarchy and its fascist state in implementing the covert occupation and open exploitation of our country. The collaborationist and exploiting minority are the henchmen of imperialism. To get a piece of the cake, which is soaked with the blood of our people, it collaborates with imperialism and sells the whole country, together with its commodities, its cultural values, its dignity, its independence and even the life of the people itself to imperialism.

In our country, the state - along with its army, police, bureaucracy and ideological institutions - is a tool in the hands of imperialism and oligarchy for the oppression of the people. The fascist state is a weapon, looking after the interests of imperialism and the oligarchy, and holding the working people hostage through terror, intimidation and demagoguery. This deadly weapon is above all used against the Marxist-Leninist movement along with every progressive, patriotic and democratic movement.

Our country has been occupied by imperialism through this fascist state. We will put an end to this regime of bloody exploitation through the anti-imperialist revolution, and we will establish the power of the people. The power of the people will implement revolutionary and democratic transformation.
A) ON THE POLITICAL LEVEL

a - REVOLUTIONARY POWER OF THE PEOPLE AND PEOPLE’S DEMOCRACY

The revolutionary power of the people will destroy the fascist state, the oppressing instrument of imperialism and the oligarchy, with its army, police, bureaucracy and all its ideological, cultural and other institutions.

The revolutionary power of the people will establish a new kind of state on the ruins of the old system.

This state will not be bourgeois, but rather will be placed under the hegemony of the proletariat. This means democracy for the forces of the people and dictatorship over the oligarchy and imperialist forces. The state will not be alienated from society, but will adapt to its internal and external conditions.

Even though the main aspect will be the hegemony of the proletariat, the revolutionary power of the people will at the same time be the power of the other strata and classes of the people. This is why the class struggle of the proletariat and other working classes and strata who want to lead the revolution on towards socialism is inevitable within the revolutionary power of the people. This fight will be directed against all conservative forces which want to stop the development of the revolution. The form of this struggle will depend primarily on the internal balance of forces, and secondly on the external balance of forces.

In this people’s democracy, the people will elect, control and dismiss representatives in all social and political organisations. This principle has nothing to do with bourgeois democracy, where one of the bourgeois parties always rules. People’s democracy means the self-determination of the people. The party of the proletariat, the leading force in the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution, will also be in a leading position under the revolutionary power of the people. The parties and organisations which have taken part in the people’s front as representatives of the other people’s forces, will also have their place under people’s democracy.

The highest representative and decision-making organ is the people’s parliament. The members of the people’s parliament are elected through free elections. The people can dismiss the representatives of their region through elections at any time.

The revolutionary power of the people hands over supervision and direction of the media to the people and its organised forces. The media will be run in the interests of the revolution and the people in the fields of education, vocational training and culture. In
addition to this, they will be used for the ideological activities and the social organisations of the people.

The revolutionary power of the people will abolish all restrictions that hinder the organisation of the people's forces. The right to organise economically, culturally, socially and politically will be guaranteed to all strata and classes of the people, to the peasants, to the civil servants, to the small traders, to women, to the youth, and above all to the working class. Their organisations will be supported and protected.

Any counter-revolutionary organisations and activity against the revolution will be punished without pity. The forces of the oligarchy and imperialist will be given no kind of freedom.

The representatives of the state who have committed crimes against the revolution, along with everyone who has oppressed the people, torturers, civil fascists and imperialist agents will be punished.

All political prisoners will be set free. The inhuman fascists, torturers and everyone who has committed crimes against the revolution are excluded from this measure. The prisoners who have committed crimes because of the influence of ideologically and culturally degenerate values will be granted an amnesty and reintegrated into society.

b - DEFENCE OF THE PEOPLE AND THE REVOLUTIONARY PEOPLE'S ARMY

The revolutionary power of the people will abolish the fascist army and the special forces for internal security like the secret service, the police and the counter-guerrilla. These are based on slave-like discipline, are permeated by a conservative ideology, and have the aim of supporting the interests of imperialism and the oligarchy. The revolutionary power of the people will derive its power from the armed people, and will defend the interests of the revolution and of the people against any enemy, internal or external.

The defense of the people will be guaranteed primarily through a part of the armed people, the revolutionary people's army, strengthened in the course of revolutionary war. Its power and its roots lie in the people. It is a defensive army, for protection against all kinds of counter-revolutionary sabotage and imperialist attacks.

The revolutionary people's army will not be based on the slave-like discipline of the fascist system, but on revolutionary discipline and on comradely relations. It will be aware of the interests of the revolution and of internationalist duties.

The revolutionary people's army will not be a burden on society but instead will take part in production itself, without neglecting its tasks, and will always be a part of the people.

So long as imperialism exists, it will be necessary to have a people's army equipped with modern arms and techniques. Its training and equipment will match the standards of the permanent development of military needs.
The revolutionary people’s army is a specific way of organising the armed people.

In addition to the revolutionary people’s army, the armed people will form people’s militias, secret services and services for internal security. These organisations will protect the interests of the revolution under the supervision of the political organs of people’s democracy.

c - INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND FOREIGN POLICY

Any relation based on political, economic, military or cultural dependency on imperialism will be ended. The independence of our country will be the central issue. On the international level, a policy of independence will be followed.

All relations with neo-colonial economic institutions like the IMF, World Bank and OECD will be terminated.

Our country will leave all imperialist and aggressive alliances, above all NATO. Every bi-lateral agreement with the imperialists in pursuit of aggressive aims will be publicized and declared void. U.S. and NATO military bases will be confiscated in the name of the people. Army equipment and credits which create new forms of dependency will not be accepted.

Our international relations will not be governed by unprincipled pragmatism. The foreign policy of the revolutionary people’s state will develop fraternal relations as well as solidarity and friendship between peoples. It will defend these principles and put them into practice.

The revolutionary power of the people will defend the people’s right to self-determination without making any concessions.

The revolutionary power of the people will develop relations based on equality, in accordance with the principles of friendship and mutual respect with all countries, especially with neighbouring countries.

The revolutionary power of the people will resist imperialism’s "divide and rule" policies and will defend the rights of the Turkish and the Greek people in the Aegean Sea. In order to ensure that both peoples live in peace and like brothers and sisters, the revolutionary power of the people will deal with all problems without prejudice and on the basis of friendship and solidarity. It will try to make the Aegean sea a sea of peace which both peoples will be able to use freely.

On the other hand, the revolutionary power of the people will resolutely resist any attempts to turn Cyprus into an imperialist base. It will immediately withdraw the Turkish
army of occupation. It will render any support it can for the establishment of a free and independent Cyprus where the Greek and Turkish peoples can live like brothers and sisters. In addition to this, the right of self-determination for the island's inhabitants will be defended unequivocally.

The revolutionary power of the people will show solidarity with socialist and anti-imperialist states, national liberation movements and progressive proletarian movements in the capitalist countries, and will unequivocally defend the principle of equality.

The revolutionary power of the people will confront imperialist attacks on the peoples of the world. On the international level, it will pursue a policy to expose imperialism and reaction. The revolutionary power of the people is aware that real peace can only be established if imperialism is wiped out all over the world, and will therefore take action to support the oppressed peoples' struggles for independence.

The revolutionary power of the people will be a military base in the fight against imperialism, which will fiercely defend and practise internationalism.

d - FREEDOM OF THE KURDISH PEOPLE

The ruling classes have been denying the existence of the Kurdish people for years. They have tried everything to wipe out the Kurdish people. The Kurdish uprisings in support of nationalist demands have been suppressed with terror. A policy of assimilation is being pursued, using terror, laws of settlement and cultural assimilation, with the aim of eliminating the Kurdish people altogether.

Under these circumstances, it is the duty of the Marxist-Leninists to promote confidence among the nations in struggle, to fight against national oppression, and to unify all members of the working class - and above all the proletariat - of the Turkish and Kurdish nations, along with all other nationalities, in the fight against imperialism and the oligarchy. To fulfil this task it is not enough just to pursue a revolutionary struggle against imperialism and the oligarchy. It is equally important to create confidence between both nations in the struggle against the chauvinism of the oppressing nation and the nationalism of the oppressed nation.

It is the Kurdish and Turkish proletariat who have the power to fulfil this task.

As the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution is carried out under the hegemony of the proletariat, it will also solve the national question of the Kurdish people, and will not allow the hostile seeds of chauvinism to be sowed anew.

The people's anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution will abolish the social basis of national oppression by ending the rule of imperialism and the oligarchy, and will create the objective basis for the right of peoples to self-determination. Without destroying and taking over the central state power, no nation will gain freedom.
The revolutionary power of the people will solve the national question according to the principle of self-determination of the people.

It will guarantee the right to self-determination of the people. This also includes the right to secession.

The revolutionary power of the people is of the opinion that the nations should unify under the roof of one state - in which there is the right to form a separate state - rather than founding individual, independent states. The division of the nations into several small states would make the working classes of the different nations captives of bourgeois prejudices. The peoples' confidence in each other would be damaged. This leaves the peoples in a weaker position with respect to imperialism. In addition to this, unifying under the roof of one state in order to end the economic and cultural backwardness of the oppressed nation and to put real equality into practice is a revolutionary solution, which assists both nations to be a unified force against imperialism, which is in the interests of both nations.

In the event that the Kurdish nation insists on the creation of an independent national state, despite the revolutionary solution, the revolutionary power of the people will support this under the condition that the Kurdish nation does not support imperialism, and that it does not oppose either the interests of the Kurdish and Turkish proletariats or the interests of both nations.

The revolutionary power of the people will take all measures needed for the economic, social and cultural development of the Kurdish nation. In order to abolish inequality as a remnant of the old regime, economic, social and cultural development will be the primary factor. Special efforts will be made to achieve this.

In the interests of the proletariat and the people, the revolutionary power of the people will support the demand for the unification of the Kurdish nation, which has to live in different countries. It considers this fight as an important step towards revolution in the Middle East. It will fight for this on every level: political, diplomatic and military.

The revolutionary power of the people will guarantee the national minorities (Arabs, Circassians, Georgians, Armenians) their social and cultural rights such as the protection and promotion of their language and culture.

The revolutionary power of the people will fight against all counter-revolutionary activities as well as against all activities that hinder the revolutionary solution to the national question, such as petty bourgeois and bourgeois nationalism. Based on the hegemony and the power of the revolutionary proletariat, it will try to convince the petty bourgeoisie and fight against its national prejudices.

Nationalism does not lead nations to freedom.
e - THE JUDICIAL SYSTEM

The revolutionary power of the people will establish a new judicial system on the ruins of the old, rotten judicial system, which has defended the interests of imperialism and the oligarchy. This new system will defend the interests of the revolution and of the people.

Together with the people, a judicial system will be established which will guarantee that the people will participate in the setting of all sentences.

The new judicial system will institute proceedings, make inquiries and decide punishment in cases of problems and crimes that occur among the people. It will do so on the basis of revolutionary values and social rights.

The new system intends to establish a dictatorship over the counter-revolutionaries, and every counter-revolutionary will be found out and punished.

Jurisdiction will be free. The accused will be guaranteed the right to defend themselves.

The judicial system will function also as an educational institution in which people who have committed crimes will be won back for society again. They will become productive and thinking people. Those who are re-integrated into society will immediately be set free, no matter how long there sentences are. Measures will be taken to support them so that they can lead a life in conditions which are fit for human beings. Prisons will no longer serve to destroy human personality. All inhuman actions in prisons will be banned. No punishment will be ordered which does not correspond to human dignity. The prisons will be cleansed of all traces of the oligarchic regime, which is based on torture and humiliation. Any kind of torture will be severely punished as a crime against humanity.

B - ON THE ECONOMIC LEVEL

The anti-imperialist, anti-oligarchic revolution will put an end to the economic hegemony of the oligarchy and imperialism because they hinder the development of the productive forces and the economic growth of the country. It will take action to ensure that all resources and products will serve to increase the wealth of the people, and it will make possible the free development of the productive forces.

The revolutionary power of the people will develop heavy industry in order to eliminate the negative effects of distorted capitalism and to establish an economy able to meet the basic needs of the people. Agriculture will be modernised and adapted to the needs of industry. A just system of taxes will be established, taking into account the individual level of income. Tax revenue will be used to increase the wealth of the people. The basis for a socialist economy, which ends exploitation and turns final liberation into a reality, will be created. In areas where the conditions allow it, the transition to the socialist mode of production will be created.
Although it is under the hegemony of the proletariat, the revolutionary power of the people will take into account the interests of all classes and strata taking part in the revolution when carrying out its economic measures.

The revolutionary power of the people is the period of the transition from capitalism to socialism. The proletariat will start to realise socialism in this transition period. The transition to socialism is no sudden event, but an aim realised in the course of time. Therefore this transition phase cannot be planned mechanically. The economy, which is not socialist in character at the beginning, will develop its socialist character as the hegemony of the proletariat increases. However, small scale manufacturing on a capitalist basis will continue to exist in this increasingly socialist economy.

a - TRADE AND INDUSTRY

All property belonging to imperialism and the oligarchy - factories, companies, banks, real estate, power stations, financial assets - will be confiscated and nationalized.

The alliances with the EC and links to imperialist institutions of exploitation like the IMF, World Bank and OECD, will be terminated. All debt to imperialist states, banks and companies will be annulled.

The revolutionary power of the people will hand over control of the confiscated production units to the proletariat. Production will be carried out with socialist consciousness, for the benefit of the people. Counter-revolutionary activities, speculation and exploitation will be forbidden. Small scale production, which will persist for some time, will be changed and supported according to the needs of the planned economy.

Production will be carried out in accordance with a plan worked out by the revolutionary power of the people. Heavy industry will be dealt with as the primary factor in building up new factories. The production of consumer goods will in no way be neglected, taking into account the needs of the people. Inventions will no longer be carried out according to the capitalist rule of profit, but will be adapted to the needs of the planned economy, which will create social change.

In order to foster the expansion of the planned economy, fraternal and equal relations will be established with the socialist countries. Under the control of the revolutionary power of the people, the only economic relations which will be pursued will be those which neither create dependency on the developed capitalist states nor jeopardize the independence of the country.

All former privately and state owned banks will be amalgamated into the national bank. The national bank will serve the interests of the planned economy and the needs of small scale production and socialist agriculture.
Foreign trade will be monitored by the revolutionary power of the people. Domestic trade will be shaped in accordance with the needs of the people. Profiteering, the black market and speculation will be forbidden and punished.

No measures will be taken against small and medium sized firms which work for the benefit of the people, in accordance with the planned economy, maintaining the interests of the people and which do not support counter-revolutionaries.

b - AGRICULTURE AND LIVESTOCK BREEDING

The land and the means of production belonging to the big landowners will be confiscated. In this way the size of the maximum size of land holding will be determined in accordance with the actual situation. The remnants of feudalism will be completely eradicated.

The landless peasants and peasants who do not have enough land will be given land to work on, with the reservation that the land remains the property of the nation. An extensive land and agricultural reform programme will be carried out.

The capitalist farms and estates will be confiscated, and will be made into large-scale production units under the control of the rural proletariat. The large-scale production units under the control of the rural proletariat will develop into the socialist mode of production in the course of time.

The distribution of land and the organisation of collective production will be carried out at the same time.

Land granted by the revolution power of the people must not be transferred to anyone else.

Leasing of land will be forbidden. Land is to be given to those who work on it.

The peasants’ debts and mortgages to big landowners, profiteers and the banks will be annulled.

Agricultural machinery will be held collectively at the disposal of farmers, in order to achieve modernisation and increase the size of crops. Farmers will receive cheap credits, fertilizer, seed and chemicals. They will be guaranteed minimum prices that will be determined by the people, taking into account production costs. The revolutionary power of the people will also take care of the rural infrastructure.

Land that is not fertile will be improved and made fit for agricultural use through specially developed projects.

Livestock and pasture lands belonging to the big landowners and capitalists will be confiscated and used in large-scale production units.
Small scale livestock producers will be supported with fodder, pasture land and breeding animals. Their organisation into collective units will be supported.

c - NATURAL RESOURCES

All raw materials and productive units which exploit raw materials will be state owned. The imperialist monopolies will have no rights to search for and exploit raw materials. The exploration and exploitation of raw materials will be placed under the control of the revolutionary power of the people.

The forests are the property of the people. On this basis, the revolutionary power of the people will ensure that the farmers will be able to use the crops of the forest and will protect the interests of the forest farmers.

Natural resources like the seas, lakes and rivers are owned by the people. Capitalist firms which exploit these resources will be confiscated. Profiteers and swindlers will be dismissed from the existing co-operatives. Small firms will receive support, and their unification into collectives will be supported.

d - BEACHES AND NATURAL SITES

The capitalist plunder of the beaches will be terminated. The tourist firms and institutions belonging to the small minority which exploits the beaches will be confiscated. Destruction of beaches through building will be prevented. All beaches will be redeveloped and placed at the disposal of the people.

Natural sites (natural parks, green areas and deer reservations) are the property of all mankind. This is why our natural sites, destroyed and wasted by capitalism, will be revived and protected. Programmes and plans will be drawn up for the development of these beautiful sites and the creation of new ones all over the country.

C - SOCIETY AND SOCIAL CLASSES

In the oligarchic regime of today, the working people do not have organisations like trade unions, associations and co-operatives to protect and further their interests. The organisations that exist have been stripped of their functions.

The people do not have a secure future. They live in poverty. Unemployment, homelessness and the lack of basic necessities mean that the impoverished people suffer from social deprivation. They are forced to steal and commit crimes in order to survive. Those who find work experience great difficulties in finding a place to live and getting enough to eat.

The working class, the leading force of the revolution, has no stake in the current regime. The workers are not protected in case of accident. They are either not organised in trade
unions, because they are afraid of being sacked, or they are organised in unions controlled by the bosses, and they receive ridiculously low wages. The politicians oppose wage increases. They increase inflation, taxation and the prices of consumer goods. In so doing, they further increase the exploitation of the proletariat. This is all carried out in order to increase profits for the capitalists so that they can live a life of luxury.

Those who cannot find work in the cities find "jobs" like porters, butlers, servants and street dealers. Millions manage to survive and avoid starvation in this way. They are deprived any kind of social security.

Compared with the impoverished masses, the situation of the petty bourgeoisie is better. But the petty bourgeois masses are also relentlessly exploited by imperialism and the oligarchy. The mechanisms of capitalist exploitation force them down to the level of the proletariat and the impoverished masses through bankruptcy. Under the oligarchic regime, however, there are also mechanisms to replenish the ranks of the petty bourgeoisie and replace those who are driven down socially.

It is true that the petty bourgeoisie, which is made up of employees, civil servants, small employers, doctors, lawyers, engineers and university students, is bound to the existing system. But many are unsatisfied. Those who face being pushed down the social scale take the side of the proletariat and socialism. Only a small part, which is able to climb the social ladder, is for the continuation of the present system.

The situation of the middle bourgeoisie and the non-monopoly bourgeoisie is different, however. As they lose the major part of their value added to imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie, they try to compensate for their losses through increased exploitation of the workers. In small firms, the workers are brutally exploited. They have to work under the worst conditions and earn minimal wages. They are deprived of any kind of social security and are frequently sacked.

Even though this bourgeoisie is able to survive by exploiting the workers, it has renounced its mission as the representative of independent capitalism in neo-colonies like Turkey. It has become the henchman of the monopoly bourgeoisie. In spite of its conflicts with imperialism and the monopoly bourgeoisie, it supports the present regime. Only a small part, at risk of being driven down into the small bourgeoisie, might support the revolution, while another part may remain neutral.

The size of the rural proletariat in the large capitalist and state owned estates is increasing because of the development of capitalism in agriculture. The rural proletariat, however, works without any organisation, and without any social security. In many parts, the conditions of the rural proletariat can be compared with that of serfs in feudal times.

The impoverished peasants - the semi-proletariat - constitute the majority in rural areas. They own very little land and means of production, and therefore have to work certain months of the year as rural proletarians. The labourers and lumberjacks, exploited under feudal conditions in Kurdistan, also belong to the ranks of the impoverished peasants.
The rural petty bourgeoisie is also very widespread in Turkey. Its members own enough land and means of production to survive. They are also exploited in many ways. On the one hand, they are exploited by the state through taxation, low prices for their products and increasingly high prices for fertiliser and means of production. On the other hand, big landowners, big merchants, profiteers and the banks oppress the petty bourgeoisie. This is why the rural petty bourgeoisie experiences the same kind of poverty as the petty bourgeoisie in the cities. Many members of the petty bourgeoisie are forced into the ranks of the proletariat and are replaced by new people.

Except for a small minority, which is able to climb up the social ladder, the rural petty bourgeoisie is discontented. They will take part in the revolutionary struggle under the leadership of the proletariat. The layer of small peasants can even be won for socialism.

The rural middle bourgeoisie and the rich farmers live from the exploitation of the rural proletariat. There are, however, conflicts with the big landowners and the monopoly bourgeoisie. In spite of this, they will not support the revolution, except for a minority.

The above mentioned classes and strata are exploited by imperialism and the oligarchy. The social gap between the oligarchy and the people is getting wider and wider every day. It can be seen in unemployment, homelessness, poverty, moral degradation, prostitution, social crime and the need to live "with something to eat and some clothes."

The anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution will completely transform this social situation. The revolutionary power of the people will promote all forms of social and cultural development of the people, and work relentlessly to improve the material and cultural level of the people. It will carry out the necessary revolutionary changes so that everyone will have the same social opportunities.

CLASSES

The revolutionary power of the people will disband the political and economic organisations of the oligarchy (TÜSİAD, TISK, TOBB, TZOB ...) and ban lockouts in capitalist enterprises that continue to participate in these organisations.

The revolutionary power of the people will take all measures to ensure that the working class - the leading class in the anti-imperialist and anti-oligarchic revolution - will be able to direct and control the production and distribution of goods from all factories, coal mines, power stations, capitalist and state owned estates and all big production units. It will permit all workers to develop materially and culturally through its wage policy. It will enable to proletariat to organise itself in trade unions, and to organise itself socially and culturally in rural and urban areas.

It will create conditions for the maximum possible reduction in working hours.

Professional training opportunities and opportunities for cultural development will be created for the workers.
The right to strike will be guaranteed.

The risk of accidents at the workplace will be minimized through appropriate measures.

The social security of the workers will be guaranteed.

Those unable to work will be guaranteed the best standard of life possible.

The revolutionary power of the people will also strive to solve the problems of workers who have migrated to foreign countries. It will take all necessary measures to eradicate the economic and social conditions which give rise to emigration.

Child labour will be banned.

Impoverished peasants will be given land. They will be supported with means of production and credits.

Measures will be taken so that the millions of impoverished people and the unemployed masses will be able to take part in production. Those who are willing to work and who do not get a job in spite of searching for one, will be guaranteed social security through unemployment insurance.

The debts of urban and rural small producers to the state, the banks and big companies will be annulled. Small scale production will be supported with credits, means of production and fixed minimum prices. The right of small scale producers to organise themselves will be protected and their unification into co-operatives will be supported.

The intellectuals, teachers, and self-employed professionals (doctors, engineers, artists, writers ...) working for the interests of the people will be supported. Institutions will be created for them to contribute to social change and to enable them to apply their experiences and abilities to the benefit of the people. The intellectuals will play a very important role as part of the struggle for the society of the future and the creation of socialist men and women.

b - YOUTH

The revolutionary power of the people is aware that it is the youth who will create the future. For this reason, it will create all kinds of opportunities for them. The aim is the creation of healthy, productive, and revolutionary women and men.

Youth organisations will be formed all over the country to deal with the problems of the youth and give them the opportunity to take part in leading the country. Possibilities will be created for the development of relations and common activities with revolutionary youth organisations from other countries.
The youth will be given the right to vote at the age of 18, and the right to stand for election at the age of 21.

Education of the youth will be one of the most important tasks of the revolutionary power of the people. The education system will be shaped in co-operation with the youth.

Opportunities will be created for the mental, physical and cultural development of the youth. The aim is to educate healthy, creative, dynamic, patriotic revolutionaries, committed to internationalism and the equality and fraternity of all the peoples of the world. To this end, the necessary schools, gymnasiums, sports stadiums and cultural centres will be established. The youth will be able to take advantage of all opportunities to develop themselves.

c - WOMEN

Economic, political, social, tradition and any other kind of oppression of women will be eradicated. They will participate productively and creatively in society as respected people. Their role as second class citizens will be brought to an end.

Effective measures will be taken to ensure that women can develop their consciousness, their organisation and their level of activity. Women will be guaranteed full participation in the leadership of the country in all spheres.

Exploitation based on gender discrimination will be ended.

Women and men will be equal in all spheres of society. Social conditions will be created to liberate women from the role of unpaid slaves in the household. There will be practical equality between men and women.

It will not be permitted for women to be used as objects for advertising or as commodities because of their gender. All official and unofficial brothels will be closed. The economic and social basis of prostitution will be destroyed. The dignity and esteem of women will be raised. The capitalist moral code, which humiliates women and only regards them as sex objects, will be eradicated. Instead, a new morality will be created, based on love and respect.

The traditional feudal conception, which hinders the development of women, will be fought against. There will be a struggle for democratization within the family.

Whereas the positive characteristics of the family, which was formed in accordance with the cultural and moral values of our society, will be protected, the economic independence of individual family members will be striven for. All types of relationship based on conservatism and economic dependency will be eradicated. All measures will be taken to ensure the development of the family such that it does not separate its interests from that of society as a whole. Society will regard the family as the smallest unit of a new society based on honesty, mutual love and respect.
Kindergartens and day-nurseries will be established in the knowledge that being a mother and raising children is a social task. The burden of housework will be lifted from the shoulders of women and will be viewed as a social task. In this way, women will have the opportunity to participate fully in production.

d- EDUCATION

The revolutionary power of the people will take into account the role of education in the stabilisation of political and social change and in the development of society. Its education policy will aim at the further development of the productive forces and the creation of socialist men and women. For this reason:

The individualistic, reactionary, fascist system of education will be destroyed and a collective, patriotic, revolutionary education system will be built up, where everyone will get the opportunity to be educated in their mother tongue.

A campaign will be launched to make the entire people literate. The aim of this campaign will be not only to teach people to read and write, but also to further the development of society and to foster the all round education of the people.

Attending school will be compulsory for all children at the primary and secondary levels.

All forms of educational privilege will be ended. Private schools will be closed. Education will be free everywhere.

Education in rural and urban areas will be based on science. At all schools, from secondary level education up to universities and colleges, education will be oriented towards production in order to educate the people in accordance with the needs of the new society. To achieve this, accelerated programmes will be instituted.

Education will be seen as a whole, comprising mental, physical, psychological and technical education.

Every young person will be guaranteed the opportunity and the right to university education. Universities and colleges will be reorganised so that they no longer work for the exploiting classes but instead for the people.

Children from working class or peasant families will get prior access to universities and colleges. People’s universities will be founded.

e - HEALTH CARE AND SOCIAL SECURITY

The revolutionary power of the people is convinced that health and a secure life is a human right from birth onwards, and will therefore implement all measures necessary for
the health and social security of the people. To this end the following measures will be adopted:

The health of the people, which was seen as a business, will be placed above everything else. The health service will be free for all people. This will be a basic issue for the revolutionary power of the people.

A special training programme will be developed to raise awareness about health. Taking into account the inequalities in medical provision, fully equipped hospitals will be built all over the country. The first hospitals will be built in regions where they are most needed. People trained in these hospitals will be stationed in all places as health teams. The health service will set up preventative medicine centers.

Pharmaceutical production will be nationalised. In addition, medication for the sick will be free.

Social security will be guaranteed to all working people. People unable to work, the elderly and the handicapped, will be guaranteed a good standard of life. The revolutionary power of the people will guarantee the best possible standard of life to those who have become unable to work through their role in the revolutionary struggle.

Child labour will be banned. The only work children will have to do will be to study. The revolutionary power of the people will also create special nutritional and health services.

The revolutionary power of the people will strive relentlessly to provide healthy living conditions for all. All the means at the disposal of the state and the people (real estate, labour power, finance and machinery and tools) will be utilized in order to be able to build housing facilities. The shanty towns (gecekondu), which are a reality in our country, will be remodelled in accordance with a new building plan, or the inhabitants will be given new flats.

The revolutionary power of the people will confiscate the oligarchy’s luxury estates. The big building companies will be nationalised and reorganised in order to solve the housing problems of the people.

Transport and communications will be reorganised in accordance with the interests of the people. The means of communication, as well as the means of transport on land, water and air will be nationalised.

The revolutionary power of the people recognises that recreation is a right for the people and will therefore reorganise the existing recreational institutions for the use of the people in addition to creating new recreation areas.

The construction of factories which pollute the environment and which are harmful to the people’s health, will be forbidden. For existing factories, all measures needed for the protection of the environment will be adopted. The people’s awareness that the
environment has to be protected will be developed and supported. Special organisations will be created in order to protect the environment.

Any losses suffered by families or by regions as a result of counter-revolutionary attacks or unintentionally through the revolutionary war, will be compensated. These families and regions will be the first to be taken care of in the reconstruction programmes.

f - SPORTS

Mass participation in sports will be developed in order to help raise a healthy and dynamic people. Sports shall not be regarded as a commodity to be bought and sold, but as something which should serve the mental and physical welfare of the people, and help bring up the people in a spirit of collective endeavour and solidarity.

Every member of the people will have access to sports facilities. Professional elite sports will be abolished and amateur sports will be supported instead. New facilities will be developed.

Everyone will have the opportunity to practise sports in the productive sphere.

Appropriate measures will be adopted to create a new consciousness so that sports will not become a new opium for the people.

D - CULTURE

Imperialism and the oligarchy are trying to push through a universal imperialist "culture" in order to undermine and destroy the national culture and the culture of the workers.

For years there has been a kind of propaganda in Turkey aimed at fostering hostility between the nations. National hatred in Turkey is stirred up above all against the Greek and Kurdish nations, along with other national minorities. What the oligarchy calls "nationalism" is bourgeois chauvinism, which generates hostility between the nations and has nothing to do with patriotism. The oligarchy's relations with imperialism are not shaped by patriotism but by subservience. They try everything in order to create a positive image of imperialism. In international relations, the oligarchy tramples on national dignity. It pursues a humiliating policy devoid of identity. The oligarchy has created the space for the immoral cosmopolitan "culture" of imperialism. It tires to shape the culture of the Turkish people's according to its interests through the TV, radio, and all other means. The oligarchy also uses religion to this end. It takes advantage of the various religious cultures and moulds them according to the needs of capitalism. All manner of reactionary and imperialistic cultures work hand in hand in shaping the people in a capitalist way. The oligarchy supports religious denominations and opens Koran training lessons and religious schools as a means of combating the revolutionary struggle. The people are supposed to be religious, but for the capitalists religious principles are null and void.
The oligarchy maintains the old traditions and patriarchal ways in order to maintain its exploitation. It uses the people's belief in fate in order to render any criticism of the present system impossible. The people are imbued with the idea that men are not equal, and therefore that equality is impossible. The oligarchy also falsifies history in order to serve its fascist propaganda. Class struggles in history are not presented for what they were, but are portrayed as struggles of one people against another. Any uprising in Turkish history is presented as barbarism, and its suppression as heroism. The people are kept silent and are distracted from dealing with their present and future problems through propaganda about "victories", "heroic deeds" and "the importance of the Turkish nation".

Every institution is used to this end by the oligarchy. From primary education up to university, this line is drummed into students. This education system poisons the minds of millions of students.

The revolutionary power of the people is conscious that cultural development and cultural activities are important preconditions for establishing a humane, productive and revolutionary society. Culture will be regarded as of major importance for the creation of productive, creative socialist men and women, who act collectively in accordance with scientific concepts and methods. The roots of individualism and capitalist culture will be eradicated through a revolutionary and democratic cultural policy. At the same time the cultural level of the people will be raised and in this way a new society will be achieved. The national, revolutionary and democratic elements in the culture of the people will be developed until a socialist culture is formed.

a- CULTURE AND ART

The revolutionary power of the people will pursue a revolutionary and patriotic cultural policy. Everyone, from the youngest to the oldest, will be taught revolutionary culture in education and training programmes. The hegemony of imperialist culture will be brought to an end.

All cultural institutions promoting racism, chauvinism, colonialism and moral degeneration will be closed. All forms of such propaganda and activity will be forbidden.

The revolutionary and democratic elements of the national cultures, of the cultural heritage, which is thousands of years old, of the local folklore and works of art, and of the land and the architectural treasures on Anatolian land will be protected and will serve the people. The revolutionary power of the people will also strive relentlessly to secure the return of historical treasures stolen and plundered by the imperialists. In this way, cultural treasures will be preserved and recreated instead of losing their importance.

Artistic and cultural activities will no longer be the privilege of a few intellectuals - they will be accessible to all strata in all parts of the country, and will be united with the creativity of the people.
The cultural riches and achievements of the different nations and peoples, the cultural treasures and works of art that have been created through the efforts of mankind, will be made accessible for the people. The contacts and understanding developed in this way will contribute to the creation of a world without war and exploitation. Cultural understanding between the Turkish and Kurdish peoples have a special significance in this context. These will increase the unity of the two peoples on the path to final liberation.

The participation of the masses in cultural activities will be supported.

b - RELIGIOUS FREEDOM

The revolutionary power of the people will guarantee the religious freedom of everyone. It will protect religious sites and take care of the social security of religious officials. It will treat belief as a private affair.

The revolutionary power of the people will ban all institutions which use religion as a means to create a conservative, theocratic state.

c - HONOUR OF THE MEN AND WOMEN KILLED IN THE REVOLUTIONARY STRUGGLE

The revolutionary power of the people will commemorate the men and women killed in the struggle for the liberation of the workers. Their heritage - their determination and selflessness, their attachment to the cause and their courage - will live forever in the consciousness of the people.

Among the people as a whole, especially in the new generations, the memory of those killed in the struggle against imperialism and the oligarchy will live on.

The revolutionary power of the people will take care of the families and the children of the fallen. They will be given priority when it comes to the necessities of life and education.

We say:

The revolutionary power of the people is the only way to create an independent and free country, where the people can live without being exploited and where they can live in friendship. Only a people united under the leadership of the DHKP-C will be able to destroy the state apparatus of imperialism and the collaborationist oligarchy. The liberation of the people is only possible through the revolutionary power of the people.

Historically and politically, this is the task of the proletariat and its vanguard. We will successfully fulfil this task. The party of the revolutionary power of the people is fighting for this goal.
Long live the revolutionary power of the people!

The path to freedom is the path of the Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front!

Struggle until liberation!

DHKP
Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Partisi
Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party
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