ESSAYS
ON
STRATEGY
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ESSAYS ON STRATEGY
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FOREWORD

For the past 15 years, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Strategy Essay Competition has challenged students at the senior- and intermediate-level military colleges to write about the major issues of national strategy in visionary and creative ways. The best of this writing is recognized by publication in Essays on Strategy, which is distributed to a wide reading audience throughout the national defense community. Previous editions have proved to be especially welcome to long-range planners, policy makers, and students and faculty throughout the military educational system.

This edition of Essays on Strategy addresses a characteristically broad range of subjects: Iranian nuclear strategy, no-fly-zone operations, foreign ownership of communication assets, long-range effects of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation on civilian control of the military, the growing influence of Islamists in the Middle East and North Africa, the collision of C4I technology with organizational command structures, the need for new management practices in defense depots to support 21st century operations, and defense reforms that go beyond those recommended in the Bottom-Up Review. All these subjects are of vital interest within the Department of Defense, and the fresh ideas explored in these essays should contribute to ongoing discussions in many areas.

As with past competitions, the authors represent a broad cross section of backgrounds within the Department of Defense in general and the professional military education system in particular. We would like to render a special salute to the Marine Corps University, which entered the competition for the first time this year. It not only hit the beach hard and in force but, by winning two distinguished-essay citations, also established a strong beachhead we hope will encourage those who follow.

ERVIN J. ROKKE
Lieutenant General, U.S. Air Force
President, National Defense University
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NO-FLY ZONE OPERATIONS

TACTICAL SUCCESS AND STRATEGIC FAILURE

JOHN N. T. SHANAHAN

American forces should not be sent into combat merely for the purpose of demonstrating America's resolve and commitment. Such a "demonstration strategy" is no substitute for a clear military strategy designed to defeat the enemy's forces. It will not induce a determined adversary to withdraw or to cease his aggression.

Fred Charles Iklé, Every War Must End

NO-FLY ZONE OPERATIONS MIGHT APPEAR TO BE UNIQUE, IN that they have no obvious historical counterparts to help assess their potential for strategic, operational, or tactical success. Yet in their reliance on forward presence and a persistent threat of military action to help achieve American national security objectives, no-fly zones can be compared to the "gunboat diplomacy" that has been associated with naval power throughout maritime history. Unfortunately, this useful comparison has not yet been widely recognized or

This paper was a First-Place Co-Winner in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition. Major John N. T. Shanahan, U.S. Air Force, was a student at the Naval War College at the time it was written.
accepted, and the novelty and allure of these nascent operations have instead combined to preclude serious analysis of their true effectiveness. This lack of scrutiny has risked creating or perpetuating operations that do not have a satisfactory link between national strategic objectives and tactical results. That is, there exists the potential for an incomplete or flawed application of the operational art that translates strategic objectives into tactical success or, conversely, that ensures that success at the tactical level is related directly to national and theater strategic ambitions.

The no-fly zone is a particularly tempting option for both civilian and military leaders in this era of force reductions and rising aversion to American military casualties, because they are ostensibly inexpensive and low risk when compared to alternative methods of military intervention. Moreover, given the significant advantage in American aviation technology and a general superiority in aircrew training, they appear to promise a high probability of success. The United States will continue to intervene globally in support of national objectives of “enlargement and engagement.” Therefore, the no-fly zone will likely again be considered as an intervention option despite disparate political, economic, and military environments. Indiscriminate use of no-fly zone operations, however, vitiates the indispensable connection between strategy and tactics known as operational art.

To date, the overarching strategic objective in no-fly zone operations has been creation of a stable, lasting security zone (a safe haven) for a repressed minority group. For the air forces involved, the tactical objective has been relatively simple: prevention of flight within specific boundaries. In addition to the potential disconnect between these strategic and tactical objectives, the actual situation has become even more convoluted. In contrast to the explicit rationale offered by the National Command Authority (NCA), military leaders at various levels have linked no-fly zones with objectives as diverse as forward presence, economic sanctions, application
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of political or diplomatic pressure, punishment of rogue leaders and states, and combined force training. While these are important national security issues, they have little to do with the original, explicitly stated strategic goals. For no-fly zones, the consequence can thus be tactical success but strategic failure: a “successful” no-fly zone—as determined by the ability to prevent flight into and provide monitoring above a given area—does not necessarily imply a safe haven on the ground. This highlights the fundamental problem associated with the lack of operational design: absent a connection between results in the air and on the ground, air power risks operating in a political and military vacuum. The no-fly zone then acquires an unacceptably high probability of strategic failure.

This study provide a review of the background of no-fly zone operations and a clarification of terms, then analyzes three current operations and establishes the critical role of operational design when planning no-fly zone operations. (Operational design is the key component of operational art that guides operational commanders toward the most effective method of using available forces and assets to attain tactical and strategic objectives.) In addition, a discussion of the principles of military operations other than war (MOOTW) will show that, while they apply to no-fly zone operations, they are nevertheless incomplete. The strategic success of Operation Provide Comfort, the strategic failure of Operation Southern Watch, and the mixed results of Operation Deny Flight suggest that an additional principle of MOOTW—that of synchronization (and its concomitant, synergy)—is needed. Synchronization is a basic and accepted tenet in large-scale combat operations such as Desert Storm, but when strategic objectives are not so clearly defined or easily achieved, as in no-fly zone operations, this additional principle will provide the operational commander another important tool with which to arrive at the desired outcome (or “end state”).
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While no-fly zone operations will likely continue to be a preferred intervention option and will enjoy almost certain tactical success, true strategic success—as measured by creation of a bona-fide safe haven on the ground—can be achieved only by the synchronization of efforts among air, ground, and sea forces. A security zone should not be enforced by air power alone. Finally, in most operations other than war, the ground contingent should comprise not only military troops, but also some combination of private voluntary organizations (PVOs), nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs) such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

BACKGROUND

Eleven days ago, on April 5th, I announced that the United States would initiate what soon became the largest relief effort in modern military history. . . . I have directed the U.S. military to begin immediately to establish several encampments in northern Iraq.

President George Bush, 16 April 1991

Birth and Development of the No-Fly Zone
The first official no-fly zone was established in northern Iraq in 1991, a result of two momentous products of the hasty end to Operation Desert Storm. The first was a loophole in the cease-fire agreement arranged initially at Safwan (the cease-fire was subsequently expressed formally through United Nations Security Council Resolutions [UNSCR] 686 and 687). The Safwan truce, while banning flight of fixed-wing aircraft, permitted the Iraqis to continue to fly helicopters. Second, the abrupt defeat of Iraq prompted uprisings by the Kurds in northern Iraq and the Shi'as in southern Iraq beginning in early March 1991. The Iraqi government took advantage of the cease-fire loophole to suppress both uprisings by brutally attacking the Kurds and Shi'as with aircraft and helicopter
gunships. The pitiful scenes of streams of Kurdish refugees fleeing to the harsh mountains of northern Iraq commanded immediate international media attention and a demand for American intervention. The U.S. Government, at first highly reluctant to intervene in Iraqi internal affairs, succumbed to international pressure and in April 1991 declared a Kurdish security zone in northern Iraq.7

The security zone became part of a massive Kurdish relief operation known as Combined Task Force (CTF) Provide Comfort. The operation included a new ban on Iraqi fixed-wing and helicopter flights north of the 36th latitude line. This line was a somewhat arbitrary designation, but nevertheless isolated an area containing the majority of the Iraqi Kurdish population and the northbound flood of refugees. The first specific reference to a “no-fly zone” arose from this ban on Iraqi flights into the airspace overlying the proposed Kurdish safe haven. President Bush used UNSCRs 687 and 688 to justify American military intervention: these resolutions condemned the repression of Iraqi civilians and insisted that “Iraq allow immediate access by international humanitarian organizations to all those in need of assistance.”8

The second no-fly zone was created below the 32nd parallel in southern Iraq after the Iraqi government continued to apply ruthless measures against the Shi'a population throughout 1991 and 1992. Unlike the northern no-fly zone, Operation Southern Watch—finally established in August 1992—was not part of a larger humanitarian relief operation. It was simply designed to prevent the Iraqis from using fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft to bomb and strafe Shi'a population centers in the marshlands of southern Iraq. The operation was clearly intended to rectify the disastrous effects spawned by the Safwan helicopter loophole. As with operations in the northern no-fly zone, coalition aircraft still continue to patrol the area south of the 32nd parallel to monitor Iraqi military movements and to ensure that Iraqi aircraft do not fly into the exclusion zone.9
The most recent no-fly zone, Operation Deny Flight, was established in October 1992 and proscribed military flights in the airspace of Bosnia-Herzegovina. In contrast to the Iraqi aerial exclusion zones, Deny Flight received explicit U.N. authorization for the no-fly zone through UNSCR 781 and, because the Bosnian Serbs blatantly ignored the U.N. ban on military flights, through UNSCR 816. (Similar in most respects to resolution 781, resolution 816 embraced stronger wording to impress upon the Bosnian Serbs the grave consequences of continued violations of the no-fly zone.) In December 1995 Deny Flight was absorbed into the larger NATO operation now known as Joint Endeavor.

Strategic and Tactical Objectives of No-Fly Zones
While there undoubtedly will be a wide variety of reasons for creating future no-fly zones,\textsuperscript{10} we can make a reasonable prediction of likely strategic objectives through an analysis of the three current operations. Strategic objectives are likely to include humanitarian assistance to a repressed minority group and prevention of interference by states who seek political or socioeconomic gains by the continued oppression of such minorities. Furthermore, the tactical objectives are likewise straightforward: prevention of flight within a certain section of airspace and, when deemed appropriate, punishment through air strikes to deter further unacceptable behavior or to secure compliance with American conditions or U.N. resolutions.\textsuperscript{11}

Referring to Operation Provide Comfort, President Bush emphasized in early March 1991 that the effort was prompted “only by humanitarian concerns,”\textsuperscript{12} and he again downplayed the military aspects of the operation 11 days later:

[Provide Comfort] is an interim measure designed to meet an immediate, penetrating need. Our long-term objective remains the same: for Iraqi Kurds and, indeed, for all Iraqi
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refugees, wherever they are, to return home and to live in peace, free from repression, free to live their lives.  

The United Nations expressed similar sentiments in resolution 781, stating that the ban on military flights in Bosnia-Herzegovina "constitutes an essential element for the safety of the delivery of humanitarian assistance and a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina." The President's statements and the U.N. resolutions seem to verify that the primary strategic purpose of the no-fly zone has been to protect those on the ground, in effect, to create a de facto safe haven. While no-fly zones have shown manifest success in preventing aircraft from entering prohibited airspace, this success in the air has not equated to security zones on the ground.

OPERATIONAL DESIGN AND THE PRINCIPLES OF MOOTW:
CLARIFICATION OF IMPORTANT TERMS

To think "operationally" means to have that rare gift to think broadly and to understand how each action fits into an overall design to accomplish a given strategic goal.

Dr. Milan Vego, Naval Operational Art

Operational Design
Operational art gives the operational commander the tools necessary to translate national security objectives into an operational design. Despite an increase over the past 5 years in articles in the military literature devoted to operational art, the emphasis continues to be on the ground campaign rather than on naval or air operations. Operational design, however, is as important to the air campaign as it is to major land or sea operations and must be considered as an integral facet of any military operation.

The operational design "should exist to ensure that one's own forces and assets are employed in a coherent manner,
focused on the assigned operational or strategic goals in the theater. An effective design allows the theater commander to maintain the "big picture," forcing observation of the operation with a disinterested view to determine if it is attaining not only tactical but also strategic objectives. In essence, operational design provides the means by which the commander gains operational perspective.

Critical Elements of Operational Design
The actions and conditions that determine or define success in MOOTW are typically vague and at times even enigmatic. In large part this is because of the myriad of nonmilitary influences (political, socioeconomic, and so on) that must be considered when developing operational objectives. The operational commander is nevertheless still responsible for determining "the sequence of actions most likely to produce the [military condition] allowing for the attainment of the operational or strategic goals." Moreover it is crucial that the operational commander interact constantly with national- and theater-strategic levels and reassess continuously the relationship between strategic objectives and tactical results. When the assigned objectives are unattainable, the commander is obliged to make that conclusion clear to his superiors.

The operational commander must comprehend fully the cardinal axiom that the desired end state is "not identical and should not be confused with the campaign's military objective... Desired end state refers to both political and military conditions after the military strategic objective(s) were attained" (emphasis in the original). In contrast to most "conventional" war operations, operational commanders in MOOTW must treat the political and military consequences of his operational design to be of almost equal significance, even though it is possible that they are more uncomfortable with the (perhaps distasteful) political dimensions of military operations. By taking account of both military and political
aspects, operational commanders will be better equipped to anticipate a potential disconnect between tactical success and strategic objectives.

It is also important that operational commanders coordinate closely with senior military and political leaders to ensure that operational guidance, when issued, includes a "clear set of political objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause the strategic vision to become a reality; it should also contain a set of military objectives that will, when achieved, allow or cause the above to happen." Only through such guidance can operational commanders determine if the forces and methods available are sufficient to achieve the overarching, explicit strategic objective—represented thus far by a long-term, stable security zone for a persecuted minority group.

Principles of MOOTW

The principles of war or of MOOTW are valuable not as immutable checklist items to be regurgitated by rote. Instead, they offer convenient reminders to help judge what is needed to enhance the likelihood of operational and strategic success. Combat-seasoned leaders will undoubtedly apply the principles of MOOTW without ever referring to what they might perceive to be pedantic definitions. However, the very novelty of no-fly zones demands that all commanders, regardless of experience and irrespective of service affiliation, address and reassess these six principles—(security, legitimacy, unity of effort, restraint, perseverance, and objective.

Of the six accepted principles, objective has posed a particular challenge in no-fly zones. Lacking a clear connection between the strategic and tactical goals, military commanders have tended to make assumptions regarding implicit national or theater strategic goals. This refers to the tendency to accept the latent objectives of no-fly zone operations to be application of pressure against rogue states,
reconnaissance of enemy territory, and so forth. While very valuable as theater strategic objectives, they do not address the fundamental (and only stated) strategic objective of establishing and maintaining a safe haven on the ground.

An additional MOOTW principle, that of synchronization, is at least as valuable as the other six and must be included when planning security zone operations. Adapted from its conventional definition, which emphasizes solely the military aspects of these operations, synchronization should be added as a principle of MOOTW through the following counsel: Produce maximum relative power at a decisive place and time through the arrangement of military, civil, and political actions in time, space, and purpose. Synchronization demands that "all assets in all elements [be] efficiently combined and coordinated against a properly selected, common objective."²³ This synergy applies not only to war but to MOOTW (and hence no-fly zone operations) as well.²⁴ Synchronization also suggests much more than simply coordination, which can be considered to be a "contributing cause" to synchronization's desired effects.²⁵ Air power employed in isolation may guarantee tactical success, but to reinforce the prospects of strategic success the operational commander must consider this additional principle when developing the operational design and when negotiating with political and military leaders for the forces required to secure and protect a safe haven.

NO-FLY ZONES AND THE IMPORTANCE OF OPERATIONAL DESIGN: SUCCESSES AND FAILURES

[In Southern Iraq] napalm has been dropped on civilian homes, and human rights workers from international organizations report that while air attacks have ceased, ground assaults on the marshes have escalated dramatically since the imposition of the no-fly zone. . . . The ground attacks have been accompanied by
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widespread arbitrary arrests and the torture or execution of detainees.

Hamid al-Bayati, Destruction of the Southern Marshes

The Two-Way Street and the Status Quo
Why is operational design critical when choosing the no-fly zone as the desired intervention option? In short, it not only provides the commanders the tools with which to enhance the likelihood of strategic success, but also establishes the necessary two-way street between the NCA and the operational leadership. The NCA must first provide explicit strategic guidance to the operational commander. If the primary national objectives are other than creation of a safe haven on the ground (for instance, applying military pressure or maintaining a forward presence in theater), the NCA must make those explicit objectives and not force the theater commander to simply deduce the mission's goals or make questionable assumptions. With due respect accorded the constraints imposed by national strategy, if the no-fly zone operation cannot achieve the stated strategic objectives, the commander must in turn demand a modification of either the objectives or of the assets allocated to enforce the no-fly zone. This interaction between the NCA and theater commanders is a vital part of the security zone operation and must be a continuous process.

When enforced by air power alone, a security zone is much more likely to simply preserve the status quo in a given theater than to change significantly those political, religious, or economic grievances that are the root causes of discontent and repression. In addition, such a one-power no-fly zone operation is not likely to halt the persecution of a protected minority group. The absence of a contingent of ground forces to buttress air power's influence can result in half-hearted intervention and a corresponding danger:
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A middle course in intervention—especially a gradual and symbolic use of force—is likely to do little but muddy both sides’ calculations, fuel their hopes for victory, or kill people for principles only indirectly related to the purpose of war. If deadly force is to make a direct contribution to peace, it must engage the purposes most directly related to war—the determination of borders and the distribution of political power. (emphasis added)²⁷

Deadly force is not generally associated with operations other than war, yet the problems associated with such a “middle course” of action are as significant in no-fly zones as they are in more complex and “conventional” combat operations. The application of operational design would illuminate the perils of using air power in a half-hearted manner and would force the operational commander to demand either more explicit strategic guidance or an adjustment to the forces and assets allocated to the security zone operation.

Operational Design in Provide Comfort, Southern Watch, and Deny Flight
Although the three current no-fly zone operations were created under widely different politico-military conditions, the strategic objectives are similar enough to permit comparison of their operational designs. While Operation Provide Comfort continues to experience problems in its termination phase (the no-fly zone is still enforced more than 4 years after its inception), it has been nonetheless largely a strategic success. This operation incorporated all of the principles of MOOTW, to include synchronization and, most importantly, the indispensable elements of operational design. It had a clear objective (relief for and protection of the Kurds in northern Iraq), a definitive end state (a Kurdish enclave and transfer of control of refugee assistance to the United Nations), and excellent strategic guidance. General
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Shalikashvili and his staff successfully translated national objectives—protection of the Kurds—into a mission statement, immediate, mid-term, and long-term operational objectives, and explicit mission tasks. The result was unambiguous operational guidance. Fortunately, General Shalikashvili had available both the political support and the forces and assets necessary to ensure effective synchronization.

In the case of Provide Comfort, the no-fly zone was merely one component of a vast operation that included, at its peak, units on the ground from 11 different countries and comprised American military forces, 50 PVOs and NGOs, and United Nations personnel. The CTF also included three additional, nontraditional components that proved crucial to Provide Comfort's strategic success. The first, Civil Affairs Command, was “tasked to coordinate with the multitude of international relief organizations and private voluntary organizations in providing humanitarian assistance.”

The second, the Military Coordination Center (MCC), encouraged and established “direct face-to-face” contacts between not only coalition forces and humanitarian relief agencies, but between the coalition, Iraqi military, and Kurdish leaders. Medical Command, as the third component, provided the medical facilities required to cope with the flood of Kurdish refugees.

The aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone provide the necessary aerial umbrella to protect the Kurds from Iraqi air attacks (and provided critical supplies through air drops—a vital task early in the operation), but the operational design was successful in achieving theater strategic objectives only because of the symbiotic relationship between forces on the ground and the aircraft patrolling the no-fly zone.

If Provide Comfort is judged to be a strategic success, then Operation Southern Watch must be considered to be a strategic failure. The repression of the Shi'as has continued essentially unabated since the southern no-fly zone was established in
1992. This failure can be attributed to the absence of operational art when translating explicit national objectives (protection of the Shi'a population and creation of a Shi'a enclave) into an operational design. There is little synchronization in Southern Watch. Air power by itself has prevented the Iraqis from flying into the aerial exclusion zone, but there is no substantial force on the ground to deter the Iraqis from persisting in their repression of the Shi'as. To the contrary: “Saddam’s bombardment of the area has, if anything, intensified since the creation of the no-fly zone. Air cover without monitoring on the ground has proved almost as inadequate as not providing any cover.” (emphasis added) In fact, the aerial patrols may even have unintended, demoralizing effects upon the Shi'as. They have described “how allied planes imposing the no-fly zone merely observe—many of them use the term 'supervise'—blatant genocidal attacks on people and their homes.”

One must then ask if the strategic objective in southern Iraq is, as stated by Presidents Bush and Clinton, to protect and provide humanitarian assistance to the Shi'as, or is it simply “a way to tighten the screws on Saddam”? The very presence of this ambiguity of objectives indicates an absence of sufficient strategic or operational guidance and produces unacceptable confusion. One author boasted that “maneuvers carried out by Operation Southern Watch aircraft over Iraq goaded Iraqi defense forces to shoot at U.S. aircraft on several occasions” (emphasis added). This author apparently has failed to comprehend that there has been little connection between tactical or lower-operational success (prevention of flight across the 32nd parallel and application of military pressure against the Iraqi regime) and the overall strategic objective (a safe haven for the Shi'as). Unfortunately, such expressions of confidence concerning no-fly zone results are far from rare and have been expressed at all levels, from those on the 'tip of the spear' (the aircrews patrolling the exclusion zones) to senior political and military leaders.
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Until ground forces were introduced recently in Bosnia-Herzegovina (a promising application of synchronization), Deny Flight had also experienced mixed results. The strategic objective as proclaimed in UNSCR 781—"a decisive step for the cessation of hostilities in Bosnia and Herzegovina"—was certainly not achieved solely through enforcement of the no-fly zone. Without question, "surgical" air strikes in 1994 helped force the Bosnian Serbs to the bargaining table, but it remains to be seen if the air strikes simply persuaded two weary opponents to put off fighting for the winter. Furthermore, the no-fly zone had not even been particularly successful at the tactical level. For example, there were over 650 violations of the Bosnia-Herzegovina no-fly zone between April 1993 and January 1994.\textsuperscript{36} This is a direct result of a flawed operational design that allowed the Bosnian Serbs to fly helicopters essentially unchallenged despite their potentially devastating firepower. The Bosnian Serbs also continued to fly fixed-wing aircraft in strikes of their own against Bosnian Muslim and Croat targets even after heavy retaliatory U.N. air strikes in September 1995.\textsuperscript{37}

The loss of an American F-16 and a French Mirage aircraft was even more significant than these violations of the exclusion zone. As events in fall 1994 demonstrated, the capture of the French pilots almost caused a complete breakdown of the Dayton peace agreement.\textsuperscript{38} If the American pilot had been captured, the results would have been at least as serious (if not more so), as a result of emotions certain to be generated by television coverage of the captured airman. The no-fly zone, as enforced by aircraft and backed up by meager U.N. forces on the ground, also could never have prevented widespread "ethnic cleansing"—chillingly illustrated by the massacre of refugees near Srebrenica in 1994.\textsuperscript{39}

The prospects for achieving the desired end state in Bosnia-Herzegovina—a more peaceful, stable partition—have been enhanced by the introduction of NATO ground forces into the region. New operational guidance is establishing the
necessary synergy of ground and air forces. Air power prevents flight into the no-fly zone and provides air cover for ground forces, while troops on the ground provide the hammer against air power's anvil. Civil-military agencies can help rebuild the region's shattered infrastructure. The United States may not relish the complex role of nation building (particularly in such a volatile area), but adherence to the elements of operational design will help guide NATO's efforts toward creation of a stable and enduring partition on the ground. While surely a difficult task, it is one that would be virtually impossible to achieve by air power alone.

CONCLUSION

Air power is an unusually seductive form of military strength because, like modern courtship, it appears to offer the pleasures of gratification without the burden of commitment.


The United States will continue to intervene around the world to enhance global stability and protect its own vital interests. As a result of an ongoing retrenchment and a continuing reduction of military force levels, air power, viewed as precise, “neat,” and relatively low risk, invariably will be one of the first (if not the first) military intervention options to be considered when trouble flares up somewhere in the world. Air power is highly visible, credible, and usually flexible. Insofar as America preserves its considerable lead in technology and aircrew training, its air power will have enormous intimidation value.40

By definition most military operations other than war will demand not only a synchronized effort between air, ground, and maritime (to enforce the blockade portion of an exclusion zone) combat forces, but also between military forces and humanitarian relief agencies, PVOs, and NGOs. The United States military has made considerable progress toward
accepting this necessary synergy of civil and military organizations, but must continue to emphasize the interagency coordination demanded of MOOTW.  

As the military's new kid on the block, the no-fly zone offers a seductive option. Air power has become the feel-good method of intervention, called upon for its limited liability and high probability of success. Indisputable successes enjoyed at tactical-operational levels must not be allowed to obscure strategic failure, however. The application of operational art, through adherence to both the critical elements of operational design—objective, guidance and end state—and the principles of MOOTW (to include the additional principle of synchronization) will allow operational leaders to consider in advance the difficulties associated with enforcing a security zone solely with air power. In addition, early interaction with the JCS and NCA and frequent operational reassessments are key facets of the operational design. The success of Provide Comfort demonstrated the benefits of such a well-crafted, synergistic operational design. Without question, air power provides a vital forward presence and can apply pressure against rogue states most effectively; however, if these are the true objectives of the operation then they must be stated as such and not simply implied.

Finally, application of operational art will highlight the problems associated with the termination phase of no-fly zone operations. This issue is only now beginning to receive the attention it deserves.  

The desired end state must be articulated by the NCA to determine when and how to end the operation. All three no-fly zone operations continue today with no end in sight. It is disheartening to consider that when the United States finally withdraws from northern or southern Iraq, for financial reasons or as a result of increasing military commitments elsewhere, it will be Saddam Hussein, and not the United States, the Kurds, or the Shi'as, who will emerge as the victor.
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Despite the novelty of no-fly zones, operational design must be applied throughout the spectrum of military activities. At least for the near future, this spectrum will, perhaps ironically, emphasize operations other than war. A thorough study of the “Fundamentals of Campaign Planning” in Joint Pub 5-0 provides an excellent starting point when considering the feasibility of the no-fly zone as a military intervention option. Operational art may not guarantee strategic success or prevent an ungraceful exit in no-fly zone operations, but it will reveal to political and military leaders the conditions for success and the potential for (and consequences of) strategic failure. Moreover, early application of operational design will identify the need for synchronization when enforcing security zones, of which the no-fly zone should be but one complementary component. If the operational commander does not have the assets available to ensure strategic success, he can either insist on an adjustment to the number and type of forces available or recommend that the United States not intervene at all. While the latter would be a difficult choice in this CNN age, it is perhaps better than, as in southern Iraq, a half-hearted intervention.

NOTES

1. See for example, Sir James Cable, “Gunboat Diplomacy’s Future,” Naval Institute Proceedings 112, no. 8 (August 1986): 38-41. Cable defines gunboat diplomacy as “the use or threat of limited naval force by a government, short of an act of war, in order to secure an advantage or to avert loss” (38). Substitution of the term “air power” for “naval force” is useful for the current discussion. See also: James O. Poss, “Air Power: The New Gunboat Diplomacy?” unpublished research paper (Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, 1994). The author argues that air power diplomacy has indeed become the late-20th century equivalent of gunboat diplomacy.

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3. This paper does not address the controversial issue of Turkish repression of the Kurds in northern Iraq. While there are far fewer stories on this sensitive subject than on Iraqi attacks against the Kurds, see for example “America Arms Turkey’s Repression,” New York Times, 17 October 1995, A24:1. See also Charles M. Sennott, “Tools of Suppression, Made in the USA,” Boston Globe, 11 February 1996, B8.

4. Michael R. Gordon and Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (New York: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 466-484. These authors and others attribute the failure to ban helicopter flights to a seemingly innocuous query by an Iraqi military official and a casual reply by General Schwarzkopf—who clearly did not expect the Iraqis to use helicopter gunships against its own population. Tragically, there were no air power ‘experts’ present at Safwan to point out the probable consequences of the Iraqi official’s disingenuous request. See also Robert Burns, “Bush Regrets Not Ousting Iraqi Leader,” Boston Globe, 15 January 1996, 2.


6. Despite the ban on fixed-wing flights, the Iraqis considered the rebellion to be of such a grave nature that they risked U.S. military intervention by using jet aircraft as well as helicopters to suppress the uprising. See for example, U.S. President, “Letter to Congressional Leaders Reporting on Iraq’s Compliance with United Nations Security Council Resolutions,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents (16 September 1992), 1669.

7. President, “News Conference,” 444. There has been a great deal of speculation about the role of the U.S. government in the Iraqi rebellions: while there were no explicit statements pledging American military assistance in the event of Kurdish and Shi’a rebellions, it seems highly probable that the U.S. government at least implicitly encouraged these two groups to rise against Saddam at the end of the war. See for example, Endless Torment, 38-43. One Kurdish refugee noted bitterly: “You broke Saddam’s leg and told us to break his head” (43).

8. Ibid. The creation of the no-fly zone was never approved by the United Nations Security Council or the Secretary-General. Furthermore, resolution 688 does not authorize action under
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Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. For an excellent discussion of the problems associated with 'unilateral' coalition (U.S., British, and French) intervention and the nuances of questionable interpretations of international law, see: Ian Johnstone, *Aftermath of the Gulf War: An Assessment of UN Action* (Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1994). In summary, the American position is that any military action is justified by the fact that Iraq has never fully complied with the provisions of the cease-fire resolution (UNSCR 687).

9. Iraqi troop movement toward the Kuwaiti border in October 1994 caused such a stir that the United Nations passed yet another resolution: Resolution 949 (15 October 1994) demanded that "Iraq not redeploy to the south the units referred to [in a previous paragraph] or take any other action to enhance its military capacity in southern Iraq." Similar to their interpretation of UNSCR 687, the United States has interpreted this resolution to mean that Iraq may not move military forces from above the 32nd parallel to below that line. See Phebe Mar, "Gulf Security and Iraq's Uncertain Future," *Joint Force Quarterly*, no. 9 (Autumn 1995): 50-54. Again, however, resolution 949 does not authorize armed force under Chapter VII of the U.N. charter.

10. The number of future no-fly zone operations will undoubtedly be limited: they will be useless in Third World countries that do not possess aircraft capable of carrying out bombing or strafing attacks, and it is unlikely that the United States would elect to use them against nations with large and capable air forces or that cannot be portrayed as international pariahs.

11. In the current international environment it is highly unlikely that the United States will take unilateral action without first attempting at some length to secure the support of the United Nations.


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15. Even the undisputed military might of American air power and fear of retribution has not completely deterred either the Iraqis or the Bosnian Serbs from frequently violating no-fly airspace. See for example Julia Preston, "Violations Soaring in No-Fly Zone," Washington Post, 15 January 1994, A16:1.


17. Ibid., 2.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid., 3.

20. Ibid., 4.


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32. Hussein al-Shahristani, "Suppression and Survival of Iraqi Shi'is," in Iraq Since the Gulf War, 136. See also Endless Torment, 45-53.


34. Poss, 12.

35. Based on the author's experiences during Operation Southern Watch and from numerous conversations with Navy and Air Force personnel.


40. Intimidation, however, must not be confused with persuasion, which is characterized by significant modification of an adversary's political behavior. The use of air power in half-measures is unlikely to persuade contumacious foes such as Saddam Hussein. "The sprinkling of air strikes over an enemy will harden him without hurting him and will deprive the United States of an intangible strategic asset." See Thomas A. Keaney and Eliot A. Cohen, Revolution in Warfare? Air Power in the Persian Gulf (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1995), 226.

41. For a detailed account of U.S. military resistance to the role of 'civil' in civil-military operations see Richard H. Shultz, In the Aftermath of War: Support for Reconstruction and Nation-Building in Panama Following Just Cause (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, 1993), 19.

42. Apart from the political complications there are other, more subtle consequences. For example, senior military leaders are finally considering (at least publicly) what has long been apparent to the
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aircrews involved in no-fly zone operations; namely, "how the pilots are affected by the training that may have been forsworn to enforce a no-fly zone, [which] was not taken into account." See Inside the Air Force, 1 December 1995, 3.
IRAN'S NUCLEAR STRATEGY

DISCERNING MOTIVATIONS, STRATEGIC CULTURE, AND RATIONALITY

FREDERICK R. STRAIN

Perhaps no subject currently receives more attention from the U.S. nuclear nonproliferation community than the potential threat posed by an Iranian nuclear program. Following the purported "clean-up" of the remaining Iraqi capability and the recent progress made in efforts to turn back the North Korean nuclear clock, policy makers now find more time to tackle another potential threat to U.S. interests and security. Unfortunately, several factors converge in the contemporary international environment that do not bode well for success with this problem.

First, the United States has been unable to forge an international consensus against Iran with respect to the potential nuclear danger. Without such a consensus, the United States can exercise little meaningful economic pressure

Lieutenant Colonel Frederick R. Strain, U.S. Air Force, placed as a First Place Co-Winner in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition with this paper, written while he was a student at the Air War College.
to thwart nuclear ambitions. Particularly troubling is Russia's search for cash and its insistence on resuming the nuclear cooperation program begun by the former Soviet Union. By some estimates the program is reportedly worth $800 million to $1.2 billion and involves the sale of nuclear reactors and additional training for Iranian technicians. Additionally, Pakistan's continued assistance in the training of nuclear technicians further complicates the problem.

Second, the breakup of the Soviet Union and the resultant potential "escape" of fissile materials, technical expertise, and weapons provides a unique opportunity for Iran to procure materials (or complete weapons) not previously available on the open market. For the first time since the birth of the nuclear age, world events highlight the vulnerability of major power nuclear stockpiles. Serious questions now arise over the accountability of former Soviet nonstrategic nuclear weapons and the specter of weapons falling into the wrong hands. In addition to "misplacement" of a weapon because of political chaos, we must also concern ourselves with the motivations of Soviet military personnel who returned to Russia and other states only to find a severe lack of housing and food.

Finally, Iran remains a relatively "closed" society, revealing little to the United States in terms of its national policy, strategy, doctrine, and decisionmaking processes. As Shahram Chubin points out, "The Iranian regime is not easy to understand. There is a gap between its rhetoric and its actions; between its sense of grievance and its inflammatory behavior; and its ideological and national interests." With little or no human intelligence resources remaining inside Iran, U.S. analysts must rely on scattered data from potentially unreliable external sources.

Both Defense Secretary William Perry and CIA Director James Woolsey estimated Iran could achieve an indigenous nuclear weapon production capability early in the next century in spite of current efforts to inhibit its program. Circumstances suggest Iran is certainly capable of achieving
a clandestine nuclear capability if willing to devote the required resources. While not suggesting the United States abandon efforts to head off what may be an inevitable capability, it is time perhaps to explore the potential implications of a nuclear-armed Iran prior to continuing development of U.S. security policy with respect to the region.

Despite the constant bombardment of rhetoric streaming from Iran, very few analysts focus on the question of Iran's nuclear strategy against the background of changes in the overall political environment. The West still knows very little about Iranian military doctrine and, in particular, Iran's beliefs about nuclear weapons as instruments of national policy. Any policy recommendations must therefore be made in the absence of any declared Iranian policy or strategy, let alone definitive knowledge of actual strategy. This leaves few options for policy strategists. Perhaps the best approach remaining involves examining three key aspects of the policy/strategy formulation process: motivations, strategic culture, and the question of governmental rationality in the policy process.

The first step involves speculation on potential motivations. The amount of capital resources devoted to the pursuit of nuclear arsenals these past 40 years is perhaps unmeasurable. Certainly these efforts have been at the economic expense of societies in general. One need only examine Saddam Hussein's multibillion dollar bill (while the population endured shortages to prosecute the Iran-Iraq war) to view the incredible allure nuclear weapons must have. Full understanding of the proliferation problem demands that one attempt to discern what makes pursuit of weapons so desirable.

The second step examines the proposition suggested by Colin Gray that distinctive national styles exist in nuclear strategy and that one can gain insight into strategy by understanding the nature of internal and external influences on national security and the historical precedents shaping policy. This potentially might allow one to speculate on
whether Iran perceives nuclear weapons as military instruments, as useful tools of political coercion, as instruments of prestige, or a complicated combination of the three.

Finally, analysts must recognize the issue is further complicated by the dynamics of Iranian strategy and the particular forces at work in policy development. At least three major players exist in Iran's policy and strategy process: the military, the clergy, and "moderate" civilian political leaders. At work within these centers of influence are potentially different process models affecting the outcome of each group's decisions and the perceived rationality of resultant actions. Graham Allison long ago described conceptual models as a suitable framework for enhancing understanding of decision processes. So, too, might these constructs prove useful in suggesting probable policy in the absence of empirical evidence or declared Iranian nuclear strategies.

MOTIVATIONS

A certain mystique surrounded the possession of nuclear weapons the past 40 years. Nuclear mythology suggests to nations that the "atomic fleece" confers certain powers upon those willing to endure the odyssey. Like most myths in human history, there is a certain vein of truth running throughout the story. As Iranians watched the Titans duel (the United States and USSR) they undoubtedly noticed advantages accruing to each as a result of nuclear programs.

The Quest for Power and a Proposed Framework

Although the superpowers and Iran may share many basic security interests in the contemporary environment, a host of additional incentives define a spectrum as diverse as their respective ideologies. Yet no matter how disparate these motivations appear, one must recognize that ultimately the desire for sufficient "power" to promote specific interests is the crucial objective. As the preeminent political realist Hans
Morgenthau suggested, international politics is mostly a struggle for power that permits a state to achieve its goals.\textsuperscript{11} The desire for effective relational power to a large extent defines us as nations.\textsuperscript{12} It permeates all aspects of human existence, from birth to death, and business to politics. The pursuit of power is the most publicized and often discussed obsession, but perhaps the least understood. This is because the definition and conceptual framework of power is perceived differently by dissimilar cultures. The West long considered power a matter of quantity, especially in military affairs,\textsuperscript{13} perhaps as a byproduct of our Clauzwitzian heritage. In Iran, the concept and utility of power are shaped by the integration of centuries of varying influences provided by conquering nations, religious predominance, and experiences different from our own. Therefore the Iranian paradigm views both the pursuit of power and its relational significance differently from the West.

Attempting to comprehend the different forms of power and how they manifest themselves in nuclear ambitions (given unique cultural biases) is a daunting challenge. It was Maslow who suggested human existence is governed by a graduated scale of motivations or a “hierarchy of needs.”\textsuperscript{14} This author suggested a similar hierarchy exists for examining nuclear ambitions.\textsuperscript{15} The “hierarchy of nuclear motivations” model illustrated the predominant reasons why nations might pursue nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{16} These included: survival, deterrence, prestige, security/hegemony, grand autonomy, and superpower status. The placement of each category within the hierarchy suggests increasing levels of motivational and policy sophistication. A nation residing toward the top of the hierarchy purportedly uses its nuclear capabilities differently (politically and militarily) from a player operating on lower levels of the pyramid,\textsuperscript{17} a key point for this paper if the intent is to gain insight into potential Iranian policy.

The model is important because it allows analysts to identify key indicators that may point to particular nuclear
motivations of a state. Once analysts identify a state's key concerns, one can potentially individually tailor policies to obviate the desire for nuclear weapons. It must be cautioned, however, that "the discriminators and indicators are not always well defined or intuitively obvious . . . and the analysis is further complicated by the fact that the international environment is dynamic."18 One can anticipate states might move up or down within the hierarchy depending on circumstances and may even appear to operate on more than one level during periods of transition. On examination of the key indicators, where might Iran reside on the hierarchy?

Survival

"Survival is the most fundamental and basic of nuclear incentives. It is based on the perceived need to guarantee the very existence of a nation or culture."19 Israel's political use of its undeclared nuclear capability creates ambiguity in the minds of its foes, suggesting it retains nuclear weapons as the "ultimate insurance policy."20 Such concerns about survival understandably stem from a number of historical precedents, including the holocaust and three more recent attempts in the last 30 years to eliminate the Jewish state. Similar survival concerns do not seem appropriate to Iran.

Iran currently faces no foe sworn to eliminate the nation. Following the Gulf War's destruction of most of Iraq's military force, even its historic nemesis no longer has the capability to realistically threaten Iran for some time to come. Although Iranian leaders often mention war with the United States as inevitable,21 they cannot believe this would lead to annihilation, given that they watched much of Iraq's regime remain intact following coalition action. Clearly Iran faces no threats to its survival as a state, even though it perceives the current environment as hostile to its interests.22

Beyond survival as a "state" lies the concept of cultural or religious survival. This view often manifests itself in the search for the "Islamic bomb" so often mentioned in the media. Often thought of as the "anti-Israel bomb," the
literature suggests motivations go well beyond this issue. Although a former Prime Minister of Pakistan often noted that the Christian, Jewish, and Hindu civilizations each had nuclear weapons and it was time for the Islamic civilization to also have a nuclear capability, there are also those who suggest the desire for an Islamic bomb is tied much closer to oil than to Allah. One finds little evidence to suggest Islam is in much danger of extinction despite Iran's rhetoric.

**Deterrence**

When considering the possibility Iran seeks its nuclear capability for deterrent purposes, the case grows more interesting. Some of the indicators suggesting a nation seeks nuclear weapons as a deterrent are:

- The procurement of sophisticated and survivable means of weapon delivery, since a credible deterrent must be survivable
- Open declarations and concerns about a “balance of power,” especially if the nation expressing the concern is weak in relation to its perceived foes
- Continued rhetoric concerning the “shackles” of great power influence
- Residing in a region with confrontational neighbors with excessive military power
- A history of domination or bullying by a superior power.

In its most basic form, deterrence involves preventing action on the part of an opponent by raising the cost a foe must pay to unacceptable levels. Deterrence occurs when the costs credibly exceed the benefits. For the purpose of discerning the motivations of Iran, one must examine two aspects of deterrence:

- The traditional “balance of power” perspective where Iran might desire to counter a perceived threat
- The concept of a desire for sovereignty within the context of deterrence.
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The quest for a balance of power is a basic tenet of international relationships. From a military perspective, this quest historically involved building a big army to counter a foe's big army, a lesson not lost on countries in the Middle East. Having accumulated sufficient force, states assumed an enemy recognized the high cost of engagement. But the advent of nuclear weapons altered the equation in a rather profound manner in the calculations of some states.

At the end of WWII, it appeared military power could no longer be measured in terms of simple numbers because technology provided the world with a great equalizer. Nations like the United States and the USSR could now conceivably offset the quantitative advantage of an opponent by using the threat of nuclear warfare. Advocates of deterrence counted on the menacing effects of nuclear weapons. The United States, for example, relied on this strategy in Europe to counter Soviet numerical superiority. Supposedly, the threat of nuclear warfare deterred Soviet military aggression.

A smaller nation such as Iran must also ask, “How can we make conflict too costly for an opponent?” Building and maintaining a large army can often be out of the question and certainly cannot guarantee success. Even the threat of chemical weapons, often referred to as the “poor man's nuclear weapon,” did not deter the U.S. from action against Iraq. K. Subrahmanyan, a well-known writer in India on nuclear options noted, “The thesis that nuclear deterrence has sustained peace in the industrialized world will make it difficult for leading nuclear-capable developing nations not to adopt the strategy of the dominant nations of the international system.”

Only nuclear weapons seem to possess the magic ingredient required to achieve deterrence. A widely held perspective among smaller nations is that if Saddam Hussein had possessed a nuclear bomb, things might have been different. The evidence these nations point to is almost 50 years of peace between the US and USSR. The suggestion that
nuclear weapons can deter conventional conflict is the rationale often used by India and Pakistan to justify their programs.39

But the nuclear reality emerging from the cold war and understood by the United States and the USSR is that nuclear weapons only deter nuclear weapons.40 Furthermore, opponents must choose to be deterred.41 It was obvious the U.S. nuclear arsenal did little to deter conventional conflict in Korea,42 Vietnam, or Iraq.43 But this argument is of little utility to Iranians who believe they face aggressive neighbors. To states like Iran, nuclear weapons have, and always will provide deterrence44 and therefore remain worthwhile objectives.45

To Iran, a desire for some degree of sovereignty also seems a key motivator.46 “It's the Third World's anti-imperialist revenge on the snooty nuclear club,” noted Tina Rosenberg of the Overseas Development Council.47 The primary utility of nuclear weapons within this context of sovereignty is to provide “freedom of action” with respect to the major powers. The Muslim, a Pakistani newspaper, reflected the general sentiment when it noted, “[our nuclear program] . . . is under attack because we are a Muslim entity with the spine still intact. . . . That's [the call for adherence to the NPT] an excuse to bring us down on our knees, fall in the queue of the vanquished Arabs.”48

A smaller nation like Iran with nuclear capabilities could conceivably create a significant level of apprehension within a superpower's decisionmaking apparatus.49 This provides, to some extent, an effective barrier to major power hegemony50 and intervention, especially in matters judged not “critical to national security interests.” The nondeterrent effect of chemical weapons and large armies in the Gulf War undoubtedly sent Iran seeking alternative ways of keeping larger powers out of regional affairs.
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Prestige
This is not to suggest that Iran seeks nuclear weapons for the deterrent effect alone. As previously suggested, the dynamics of nuclear motivations are such that a state can transition adjacent levels of the model as internal and external conditions change. The result is a state that simultaneously appears to operate on two levels; such is the case for Iran. If the evidence suggests “deterrence” as a motivator, one can make an even stronger case for “prestige/hegemony” as the more sophisticated motivation. The key indicators of prestige/hegemonic-oriented nuclear desires read as a list tailored for Iran.\textsuperscript{51}

- Overt acknowledgment of programs funded for national prestige
- Expressed dissatisfaction with the nuclear double standard
- Growing nuclear programs with significant investment in training and education
- A government controlled by a dictator, monarch, or military regime
- A historic overestimation of the state’s regional importance
- The tendency to attribute more influence to one’s state than is logically supported by the instruments of national power.

Prestige as a motivation for the procurement of nuclear arsenals also manifests itself when discussing the quest for an “Islamic bomb.” This occurs because prestige, especially regional prestige, is an important qualification among Middle East nations.\textsuperscript{52} Although rarely an end unto itself, prestige is an important element of the hierarchy and a definite stepping stone to hegemonic desires.

Hans Morgenthau defined the utility of prestige in international relations in his book \textit{Politics Among Nations}, noting, “Its purpose is to impress other nations with the power one’s own nation actually possesses, or with the power it believes, or wants the other nations to believe, it
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possesses. Thus, Morgenthau suggests prestige can be based on cold hard reality or a creative manipulation of "perceived reality." Historically, the acquisition of powerful, numerically superior military forces served as the primary means of advancing state prestige. But the equation changed somewhat over the past 40 years, a fact certainly verified by the Gulf War in 1991.

Military superiority today is less simply a quantitative measurement, but now includes an important qualitative factor. The affordability of modern battlefield technology tends to narrow the gap between large and small military forces. Small forces equipped with technically superior weapon systems now possess an apparent disproportionate degree of lethality and a proportional increase in influence and prestige in some cultures. Iran's drive to modernize its military force serves more than one purpose. Nuclear submarines, advanced fighter aircraft, ballistic missiles, and nuclear weapons conceivably place Iran on par with a number of key states.

To Iran (and others in the region), a nuclear weapon places a nation at the pinnacle of military capability and, consequently, at the pinnacle of military prestige. The view of lesser powers like Iran is that nuclear weapons appear to provide a level of prestige disproportionate to one's true military position. The publicity and notoriety afforded by the media only serve to reinforce this belief.

Demonstrating one's state is on a technological par with others is another key component of prestige. "Our nuclear programme is not a weapon of attack. It is now our honor," noted one Pakistani. Another author described this need as "a rite of passage out of technological backwardness." Iran's development of an indigenous nuclear program easily becomes a symbol of patriotism and national ability.

On the instigation of the Zionists, the West, particularly the United States, is striving to keep Islamic Iran on the defensive and prevent it from using nuclear energy peacefully. Thus it wishes to keep our elite experts in a
state of technical backwardness in this new field of science and technology.\textsuperscript{59}

Because the official nuclear club remains so small and refuses to admit new members, Iran undoubtedly perceives a potential gain of an inordinate amount of prestige among envious neighbors. In the corporate mind of Iran, it signals an ability to stand as an apparent equal (or at least a contender) with the “advanced” nations. It serves as a challenge to the nuclear hegemony of major powers and is fueled by the contempt openly exhibited for the restrictions imposed by the Nonproliferation treaty (NPT), a treaty viewed by some as one more example of the “haves” versus the “have nots,” imposing a double standard on the world community.\textsuperscript{60}

The cornerstone is thus laid and sets the stage for the second component of the equation.

\textbf{UNDERSTANDING STRATEGIC CULTURE}

Colin Gray notes that strategic culture is a direct descendent of political culture.\textsuperscript{61} It is the framework within which a state debates strategic ideas and finalizes defense decisions.\textsuperscript{62} Strategic culture is subject to a number of unique geopolitical, economic, and historical influences. \textit{“In realpolitik terms,” suggests Gray, most “strategic cultural traits are rational” given the experiences of that nation.}\textsuperscript{63} Moreover, one finds that supposedly different cultures often share some common strategic cultural traits. It is this common ground that provided a basis for a certain amount of mutual understanding on nuclear issues between the United States and the USSR during the Cold War. However, it was the essential differences in strategic cultures that Gray suggests U.S. policy makers completely misunderstood, differences that led to a potentially cataclysmic U.S. nuclear strategy in Gray’s estimation and a lesson the United States must learn with respect to Iran.

Gray found that much of U.S. thought on deterrence, stability, escalation, arms control, and conflict reflected little
more than "the character (strengths and weaknesses) of our own culture." Western theorists and leaders paid little attention to Soviet perceptions, wrongfully assuming the USSR viewed nuclear matters through the same set of tinted glasses. As a result, for example, the West viewed escalation as a “process of political bargaining.” The Soviets simply “approached war as war, not a bargaining process.” Gray rightfully cautions that cultural empathy is not enough to preclude war. War, as we learned from Clausewitz, is a political conflict. Understanding cultural influences is useful, but international security problems are usually complicated and not likely to be “defined solely in terms of misunderstanding.” What influences do we find affecting Iran’s distinctive strategic culture and national style?

The Shah
The current strategic culture and national style is first shaped by the legacy of the deposed Shah of Iran. “His distrust of all potential competing centers of power and the necessity that he remain the center of the state,” his aggressive modernization program, and the strong-arm tactics and repression he condoned became closely associated with the United States, his primary supporter. Additionally, the Shah created an atmosphere where those practicing the art of flattery, pandering, deceit, and treachery survived. “Mistrust became the first line of defense.” It came as no surprise when a severe anti-Western backlash took place following the fundamentalist coup. Unfortunately for Iran, the religious revolutionary strategy quickly distanced Iran from not only the United States, but Western technology, military arms, and military strategy as well. This policy inevitably proved disastrous during the Iran-Iraq War.

The War With Iraq
The 8-year war with Iraq also weighs heavily on Iran’s strategic culture. The military, political, and psychological damage suffered manifests itself in several postwar programs
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and almost all rhetoric. After impressively winning early battles and repelling Iraq, the Iranians foolishly pushed on in an effort to invade Iraq and topple Saddam Hussein in what Shahram Chubin suggests was the first step in exporting revolution outside their borders. Iran quickly found itself outgunned by Iraq's western hardware and outmaneuvered by a more realistic operational strategy.

Additionally, Iran found itself the target of two particularly troublesome Iraqi weapons: tactical ballistic missiles (SCUDS) and chemical weapons. Although capable of responding in kind to the SCUD attacks with its limited supply of North Korean missiles, Iran was ill prepared for chemical warfare. Iran's outrage further intensified as it watched the Western world sit quietly on the sideline during what was a clear violation of international law and chemical weapon treaties, a point Iraq never allows the West to forget. After 8 years of war, Iran found itself with few allies (save Syria, North Korea, and Pakistan), no sources of spare parts for its Western arms, limited ability for naval interdiction, a military strategy found lacking, and no way to deter or respond to attacks by weapons of mass destruction (chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons).

The New International Order
Another key factor shaping Iran's strategy and decision process is the new international order. Iran now finds itself in an environment apparently hostile to its interests. Its ideological nemesis, the United States, emerged as the primary power without any apparent counterbalance to its perceived imperial ambitions. Furthermore, the new economic dimensions of power placed the West in even more enviable positions vis-a-vis smaller, poorer nations like Iran. The magnified importance of economic relationships resulted in what Iran perceives as new U.S.-Arab alliances that now thwart additional Arab-Persian ties so critical to Iran's future strategy. All these facts serve only to confirm Iran's
suspicions regarding U.S. desires for regional hegemony and permanent basing in the Middle East.74

Domestic Failures
Next, Iran's political environment, characterized by internal failures that potentially challenge the fabric of religious beliefs and success of the revolution, also affects its strategic culture. Its strategy of supporting violent religious upheaval and terrorism in foreign states has made Iran a pariah on the international scene. Iran's attempts to disrupt several secular governments and regional monarchies further alienates Iran from those neighbors Iran needs the most. This lack of success, particularly with domestic economic programs, serves as a poor example to those it seeks to attract. The domestic economic decline continues to feed the disruptive effects75 while undoubtedly diverting critical resources from military to social programs, thus exacerbating security issues even further.76

Historical Tradition
Belief that Iran is the best candidate for regional leadership based on a strong historical precedent also pervades the strategic culture. Persian history spans more than 25 centuries and includes periods of conquest over Babylon and Egypt. Persian rule extended to the Nile Valley and almost to Asia Minor before several centuries of Greek, Roman, and Arab invasions shrank the empire. The past grandeur of the Persian Empire, coupled with Iran's geographic position, size, and demographic status, suggests to Iran's leaders that their country rightly deserves the position of dominant state in the region77 and still has a mission.78

 Few analysts doubt that Iran seeks “establishment of a Pan-Islamic bloc dominated by Iran, not Arabs.”79 The current regional role Iran envisions is tied closely to its anti-U.S. posture. “Iran should establish a united anti-imperialist front on the regional level from among the countries opposed to the various policies of the West, particularly the United
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States, notes one editorial. This Iranian-led collective security arrangement would “become the sole authority for maintaining peace and stability without foreign interference.” Should formal security arrangements fail, Iran is not beyond using coercion, subversion, or more subtle variants of its expanding power. As Hoseyn Musavian, Iranian Ambassador to Germany noted: “Iran is a powerful country in the region and has the final say in the world of Islam at present, and is a cultural and political superpower . . . such a country cannot be ostracized.”

Islam

Finally, Islam plays a major role in Iran’s national style, both to unify the nation internally and isolate it externally. The split that occurred in the later half of the seventh century over Islamic leadership, which resulted in conflict between Shi’ia and Sunni, lives on to today. The tradition of martyrdom among Shi’ias that grew out of the assassination of Ali and later his youngest son, lends Iran’s national style a characteristic unique to the region. The belief during the Iran-Iraq war that military success would come from waves of young boys armed only with their faith and a copy of the Koran led to disastrous results. The notion that Islam provides instruction on military affairs, running state economies, and international affairs has landed Iran in a sad condition that some internal pragmatists are just now beginning to recognize. Whether Iranian patterns of thought, behavior, culture, and national style reside more in the past or are founded on contemporary events is not a large issue. What can be determined are the key characteristics of the strategic culture resulting from these influences, including:

- A political environment characterized by internal failures that potentially challenge the fabric of religious beliefs and success of the revolution
- A seemingly insatiable quest for prestige not only within the region but also as the international banner carrier of Islam
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• An assumption that Iran is fighting a struggle against international influences set on the destruction of Islam, a battle worthy of martyrdom
• A belief that Iran cannot have too large or sophisticated a force given the suffering endured, particularly at the hands of Iraq’s chemical weapons and missiles
• A belief that the potential for conflict with the US and Israel is high (if not inevitable)
• A military strategy that is dominated by the ill conceived beliefs of religious and civilian leaders rather than sound doctrine.

Iranian intentions are written in Persian history and recent experience. They become obvious given the geostrategic logic of Iran's security concerns as interpreted by its leadership and cannot be easily deduced simply from overt military preparations. Before drawing conclusions on strategy, one aspect of the analysis remains—the rationality of the security decision process.

POLICY AND QUESTIONS OF RATIONALITY

At issue is which faction within Iran's political apparatus is most likely to have the greatest influence on nuclear matters, particularly with respect to strategy development and whether one can characterize the process involved as "rational." The Iranian revolution has been unable to harness Shi'ite doctrine to a clear structure of political authority. As a result, many competing factions claim legitimacy. As noted in the introduction, three forces currently play a role in Iranian affairs: the clergy (generally fundamentalist or radical), civilian politicos (both moderate and conservative), and, to a lesser extent, the military. What the evidence suggests is a more rational/pragmatic decision making process than previously believed, given Iran's motivations and strategic culture. The test will be to examine the general policies of Iran in three areas: military decisions, foreign policy, and internal affairs.
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The Military
Previously under Khomeini, two branches of the military existed. Much of the “regular” army was purged out of mistrust of the officers potentially loyal to the Shah. To balance the regular army, Khomeini created the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). Mostly radicals with little or no military training, the IRGC was placed in charge of most important matters, including nonconventional weapons. Their utter incompetence was clearly demonstrated in battle when they preferred the “human” component to military hardware during the Iran-Iraq war.

A number of key decisions regarding Iran’s military emerged following the death of Khomeini and the Iran-Iraq and Gulf Wars, decisions suggesting a more pragmatic decisionmaking process as compared to the rule of Khomeini. First, Iran seems to have developed a comprehensive plan for military modernization based on lessons learned during the wars. Over $10 billion has been invested since 1989 in procurement of air and naval assets, capabilities that proved their worth in the region. Additionally, Iran is investing in longer-range ballistic missiles, developing its own version of a Chinese antiship cruise missile called the Silkworm, and planning for a reconnaissance satellite, also produced with the help of China.85

Iran seeks to reduce dependence on third parties for weapons procurement. It has undertaken programs to ease this dependency and recently announced it can produce a modern tank and additional small arms.86 The indigenous production of chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons is also a priority and seems to be coming about in a logical manner. Investment in the infrastructure required to support these activities is receiving priority funding.87 A general reorganization of the military is taking place with an announced consolidation of the regular army and IRGC and a plan to emphasize military professionalism in the new service.
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All these events seem consistent with a rational policy and strategy process within the government. Iran seems to be pursuing the type of capabilities it needs given that it believes a war with either Israel or the United States is inevitable.

Our fight with the United States is definite, and the fate of everything will be determined with this fight and conflict" noted the General Commander of the Guard Corps as late as May 1995. . . One day, ultimately, we must begin our destiny making operations against the United States; hence the forces and the commanders of the Guard Corps must have the necessary capability and readiness. 86

An additional element of pragmatism within the military has also manifested itself within the context of domestic security. The military, both Regulars and IRGC, failed to respond to recent riots in Iran over economic conditions. One well-known general officer actually lauded the clergy's spiritual guidance and then called for the resignation of incompetent government officials and the staging of free elections. The failures within the economy that force the diversion of funds away from modernization and toward solutions for social problems pose a dilemma for the military. Its conventional forces will be unable to achieve the desired objective, leaving only nuclear weapons as the capability that can make Iran into a major regional power. No analysis suggests any degree of irrationality with regard to military decisionmaking. It seems the rational policy model is at play within the military.

Foreign Policy
Scrutiny of the conduct of Iran's foreign policy indicates a definite change. Iranian support for terrorism appears to be diminishing in Western Europe, particularly in Germany and France, Iran's major trading partners, which signals a more pragmatic approach to foreign policy. New cooperative agreements are being sought with the new states on Iran's northern border in an effort to create a "buffer zone" between
Iran and Russia, as well as to head off potential Kurdish issues that might spill over into Iran. New agreements with China seem evident, perhaps betting on deterioration of U.S.-China relations, a split that might portend a new international counter-U.S. bloc of states. Finally, Iran fully cooperated with the United Nations and International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) on all requested nuclear inspections. If one could characterize the foreign policy of Ayatollah Khomeini as reactionary and illogical, the recent trend in Iran seems once again to support a rational strategy.

**Internal Affairs**

Only the decisions made with regard to internal matters seems to suggest a different model of analysis is required. Following the revolution, Khomeini became the head of both government and clergy. In this role he was the final authority in all governmental matters and social issues. In 1979 he stated, "There is not a single topic of human life for which Islam has not provided instruction and established norms." In addition to the 270-seat Majlis (parliament), Khomeini established a number of committees and councils to assist in the decision process. These included councils composed of Islamic scholars who passed judgment on legislation, revised the constitution, and oversaw the revolutionary guards and numerous political matters linked to mosques. This period of the revolution can best be described as reactionary, chaotic, and ineffective.

Following Khomeini's death in 1989, the Irani Government took on a slightly different character. Ali Khamenei emerged as the heir to the clergy while Hashemi Rafsanjani, considered a moderate, became President. Additionally, a number of key interest groups maneuvered for power within Iran. A coalition of pragmatists and conservatives initially emerged, only to be replaced after the economic failures with a coalition of conservatives and radicals. These multiple centers of influence have demonstrated a number of characteristics that suggest, at least
domestically, Allison's organizational process model is at work. President Rafsanjani's first 5-year plan, representing the government's strategy for reconstruction of the economy, was approved only after years of negotiations and compromise among groups. The sheer number of consultative bodies and bureaucratic organizations established to carry out day-to-day affairs in Iran creates a situation where "bureaucratic arrangements become the principal allocative and distributive mechanisms in the economy" and each desires an input into the decision process.

Although seemingly preoccupied with internal matters, one author suggests, "Bureaucratic factors often form an underestimated set of pressures for going nuclear." In India, it was the scientific community that was behind the nuclear program; Mrs. Gandhi did not even discuss the matter with her political advisors. Iran may be on the same track. To date, only scattered accounts exist as to what pressures are brought to bear and by whom. In spite of the clergy's constant reminders that nuclear weapons are an affront to humanity, it is the clergy seemingly most involved in the process. A former energy advisor to the Shah was reportedly told by advisors to Ayatollah Khomeini, "It is your duty to build this bomb. Our civilization is in danger and we have to do it." We also know that Khomeini decided to keep Iran's 15 percent ownership stake in the Rossing uranium mine in Namibia.

This brief look suggests two policy process models may be involved in nuclear strategy development: a rational actor model and an organizational process model. Internal decisions and policies may be naive, but certainly cannot be characterized as irrational. When taken in the context of Iranian motivations and the strategic culture, potential strategy options emerge.
STRATEGY OPTIONS

Three possible nuclear strategies exist for Iran, assuming U.S. analysts perceive the current state of affairs and policy dynamic within Iran correctly. The first closely parallels the traditional East-West deterrent paradigm emerging from the Cold War and is best ascribed to Iranian military planners. The second possible strategy envisions nuclear weapons as tools of compellence, coercion, and hegemony and is conceivably based on a complete misunderstanding of nuclear politics by the civilian leadership. Finally, the third envisions nuclear weapons as logical extensions of Iran’s Islamic revolutionary objectives, another tool in the fight against Zionism and the West and for survival of the faith.

Tools of Deterrence

The least interesting strategy is the one US analysts feel the most comfortable with—nuclear weapons as traditional tools of the military for deterrent purposes. The military, more than other components of the Iranian power structure, seemingly took to heart the lessons of the past two regional wars. In this context, nuclear weapons and sophisticated delivery systems seem but a logical extension of Iran’s weapons modernization program. Nuclear weapons in this regard, act to counterbalance Israel’s capability while complicating the decision process of U.S. military planners.

At least one author suggests that the procurement of nuclear weapons (as tools on the far end of the conflict spectrum) perhaps allows a nation greater freedom of action at the lower end of the spectrum.¹⁰² No longer fearing Israeli nuclear action perhaps provides Iran the opportunity (should it be required) for more aggressive conventional military action, an area where it might prevail. Iran may be taking its cues from its friend Pakistan in this regard. Pakistan, like Iran, believed it faced a hostile, nuclear-armed India capable of thwarting Pakistan’s ambitions. Only after achieving its own nuclear capability did Pakistan feel comfortable enough to challenge India in a number of areas.
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Whether the Iranian military leadership actually believes nuclear weapons deter major conventional attacks is debatable. It most certainly understands that the possession of a long-range delivery capability reduces the effectiveness of a foe's conventional assets. But whether we could expect Iran to transition swiftly to a nuclear option during a conflict, particularly with Israel or the United States, seems to depend mostly on whether it perceives its nuclear forces as vulnerable, whether either state possesses any strategic defense capability, and how resolute Iran's leadership is with respect to exercising nuclear options.

If one believes the military is in firm control of all military matters and the employment of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) is within the jurisdiction of military planners in Iran, then there is reason to believe traditional deterrence theory may apply. The new Iranian military planners, being seemingly rational to date, may realize the military disutility of nuclear weapons. Unfortunately, the available evidence indicates the military has been left out of most WMD decisions.

Tools of Coercion, Compellence, and Prestige
More worrisome is the potential that the civilian leadership might drive Iran's nuclear strategy. As previously discussed, the civilian leadership has been placed in the position of carrying-out key aspects of the revolution. To the extent they have failed, and may seek other paths to glory for Iran on the international scene, they could greatly complicate matters. If one considers the military leadership mostly motivated by the need for a deterrent in the face of more capable foes, it is the civilian leadership that is most motivated by the quest for prestige. In the search for technological prestige, no project remains more illusive (and therefore more desirable) than indigenously developed nuclear weapons. Because the official nuclear club refuses to admit new members, those nations achieving nuclear capability (in spite of the barriers) perceive a gain of immense prestige among smaller states.
Like the Chinese, Iranian leaders may seek indigenous development of nuclear weapons to provide a significant amount of national esteem and send a clear signal to the United States that they no longer feel hostage to the whims of other powers. To the Chinese, their technological achievement, in the words of Chong-Pin Lin, "whitewashed the stain of past humiliation with the dazzling and purifying light of the mushroom cloud." Technological prowess, in this sense, becomes a counter to semicolonial pasts. In the corporate mind of a country, it signals an ability to stand as an apparent equal (or at least a contender) with the "advanced" nations.

There are two additional objectives of prestige: "prestige for its own sake and prestige in support of the status quo or imperialism." The former objective is less important and most often sought for nationalistic reasons, while the latter objective recognizes the dynamics of the foreign policy environment.

Morgenthau points out that "only foolhardy egocentrics are inclined to pursue a policy of prestige for its own sake." This particular tendency emerges from a dictator's (or in Iran's case, the radicals') monopoly on domestic power where the rulers or key leaders revel in the personal influence they wield (a characteristic of Iran's strategic culture). They tend to confuse the international and domestic scenes, regarding "international politics as a kind of personal sport where in the exaltation of one's own nation and in the humiliation of others, one enjoyed one's own personal superiority." The foolishness, Morgenthau illustrates, is that one can afford this at home, but not in international relations where there are dramatic implications for those whose "power is not commensurate with his belief or pretense."

Such is the case with Iran's civilian leadership. They have created an artificial environment for themselves within Iran, an environment that celebrates rhetoric and caters to their inflated prestige. They believe they have "a mission transcending mere national interests." Shi'ia self-
aggrandizement confuses personal glory with the political interests of the nation. Without the power to support perceived prestige, forces can fall to those capable of calling their bluff. The acquisition of nuclear weapons makes it more difficult for states, especially the United States, to call their bluff.

Even more disconcerting is the suggestion one can expect the current radical/conservative civilian coalition to be even more aggressive with regard to military matters than the religious leadership. It is the civilian leadership that most often openly stresses the danger of relying on "the self-restraint of future adversaries or adherence to international commitments." The "political" motive for weapons is at times the more dangerous, because emotion often triumphs over reason. Just as the radicals pressed the attack in the war with Iraq in spite of overwhelming odds, one potentially faces the danger of an emotionally charged leadership desperate to prove their legitimacy. Without a history of intellectual assessment of nuclear politics, nuclear policy under control of an ill-prepared civilian leadership portends disaster. Furthermore, Chubin illustrates a potentially dangerous point with regards to nuclear weapons as political tools: "Attempts to heighten U.S. anxiety and inhibitions by acting irrationally, in order to convert nuclear weapons into a multipurpose instrument of day-to-day diplomacy, would risk releasing the United States from its remaining inhibitions about 'punishing' Iran." Whether Iran's current coalition of radical and conservative leaders is savvy enough to fully appreciate this fact is yet to be seen.

Weapons as Defenders of the Faith
For the clergy, a unique dilemma exists. On one side nuclear weapons and their effects are at great odds with Islamic teachings, and the clergy have noted as much in many official proclamations and sermons. Indeed, Islam's fundamentals stress that God endowed man with the powers and faculties necessary to achieve a life worth living. These powers and
resources are intended to be used for the good of others and the work of God on earth. Moreover, much of Iran's clerical leadership "feels that the key to Iran's strategic posture is in an Islamic bloc . . . that would compel the Arab states to gravitate towards Iran's influence;" not alienate them.

Competing with the peaceful tenets of Islam is the singular belief of Iran's Shi'a clergy that the existence of Israel is an affront to Islam. "Because a Muslim land in the heart of dar al-islam (the abode of Islam) can be ruled properly only by a Muslim authority, Israel . . . must be met with jihad (holy war)." The perceived need to confront the Zionists is strong and many clerics believe the battle is inevitable. One clergyman noted, "The Muslim nation will, God willing, fulfill the prayer of Noah [from the Koran]: 'And Noah said, Lord, leave not a single family of Infidels on the Earth for if thou leave them, they will beguile thy servants and will only beget sinners, infidels.""

While Islam does not recognize divisions between secular and religious matters (they are "two sides of the same coin"), in Iran the beliefs of the religious clergy and desires of the political clergy (my characterization) seemingly appear at odds. Ayatollah 'Ali Hoseyni Khamene'i's transition from President (replaced by Rafsanjani) to head of the clergy illustrates this point.

As President, Khamene'i indicated on several occasions his preference for nuclear weapons. As early as 1987, he urged Iranian nuclear scientists to intensify their work "in defense of your country and your revolution." Bodansky reported that Khamene'i later dispatched several teams to Central Asia in search of nuclear weapons for sale following the breakup of the Soviet Union. Once such a purchase became potentially possible in Kazakhstan, Khamene'i convened a high-level commission to study the validity of the offer. He reportedly put Sayyid Atta'ollah Mohajerani, the Vice President, personally in charge of the effort. Mohajerani aggressively championed the need for nuclear weapons in Iran "as a pan-Islamic undertaking to confront
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Israel.”125 “This regime wants to continue to have the upper hand; one way of doing this is to have a nuclear capability . . . all Muslims, including Iran must reach a high level in the nuclear field in order to confront the Israeli nuclear challenge.”126

At issue is whether Khamene’i now sees nuclear weapons as a theological or political issue and what might a clergy-centered strategy look like. The available evidence suggests a disconnect between the ideals of the common clergy and those actually wielding power. It is hard to believe much beyond pure power politics is at work in this regard. Influenced by the inevitability of a confrontation with Israel and the United States, Khamene’i undoubtedly seeks nuclear weapons to ensure the survival of the faith. As the bastion of Shi’ism, Iran could ill afford to lose face or battles against either state. With nuclear weapons, he potentially achieves a “draw” vis-a-vis Israel. Iran (and Shi’ism) is free therefore to continue the revolution in incremental steps with some certainty it will not be destroyed. A clergy-centered strategy is one of survival and creating an environment of greater freedom of action.

CONCLUSION

Given the existing circumstances in Iran and the historical propensity for some states to seek out new capabilities first and develop strategies only as an “after thought,” it is possible Iran’s leadership has no comprehensive strategy with regard to nuclear weapons.127 While suggesting possible nuclear strategies in this paper, it is perhaps not possible to identify the “official” strategy to any degree of certainty. What is known is the influence of motivation, strategic culture, and perceived rationality result in potentially common threads that weave a picture suggesting a “probable” strategy. The common points are:

• Concern with the political and spiritual survival of Iran in a world changing so fast the revolution is in danger of becoming irrelevant
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- A quest for leadership based on political, spiritual, and military prestige
- A decision process that appears rational given Iran's perspectives, but one which probably gives the military no voice with respect to policies involving unconventional weapons.

Factionalism and interference by religious organizations hinder the formulation and conduct of consistent policy in Iran as evidenced by a number of key failures these past 17 years, as Ahmed Hasmim points out:

Neither president Hashemi nor Supreme leader Ali Khamenei has the stature to dominate decision making as Ayatollah Khomeini did. The two leaders are more and more at odds, and the conservative-dominated legislature, the Majlis, is increasingly obstructionist. The ruling elite is no longer concerned with effective governance, but with ensuring the survival of the regime.

In all likelihood, Iran's coalition of power elites seeks a nuclear weapon strategy that is designed to limit the ability of the United States to operate freely in the region without potentially high costs. Additionally, Iran's strategy must encompass its concerns with regard to potential nuclear attack by Israel. Since it cannot reasonably expect to hold the military capabilities of these two states at risk, the most likely strategy must center on "counter-value" targets. In a crisis, the ability to threaten the destruction of cities of U.S. coalition members could potentially create rifts in alliances that are already tenuous at best. To implement such a strategy, one would expect to see Iran focus on survivable long-range delivery systems. The current emphasis on mobile ballistic missile systems certainly supports this orientation.

Policy makers may take comfort with regard to key points in this argument. First, as has been discussed, one sees little to suggest Iran is irrational in its approach to most key policy issues. No one accuses its government of being particularly brilliant or insightful, but to date Iran's decision authority
generally demonstrates it understands the fundamentals of power and political maneuvering. Second, because of the points outlined in this paper and the likelihood Iran is approaching nuclear policy in a rational manner, those concerned with countering a nuclear-armed Iran may find traditional tools and strategies useful for the challenge. Although often discussed, the suggestion of nuclear terrorism as an Iranian strategy is widely discounted.\textsuperscript{129}

There is a clear link between Iran's domestic politics and its foreign and security policies. Whether it is still possible to thwart Iran's nuclear desires is highly questionable; however, the recent success in turning back North Korea's nuclear clock seems to suggest all is not lost. Much depends on the stability of particular power centers within Iran. If the radical-conservative coalition continues, only additional confrontation may have any effect. Should the pragmatists succeed in moving issues towards the middle ground, Chubin suggests an "olive branch" approach might work.\textsuperscript{130}

Bodansky rightfully noted a profound change in Pakistan's nuclear policy from Ali Bhutto's quest for an "Islamic Bomb" to Zia ul-Haq's view of nuclear weapons as the last resort in Pakistan's survival against India.\textsuperscript{131} The evolution of Iran's nuclear doctrine owes its initial development to its experiences during the war with Iraq, its observations of the Gulf War, and the harsh realities of the new international environment. Should peace endure between Israel and the Arab states, Iran's strategy will undoubtedly mature.

NOTES

1. Until President Clinton's 1995 decision to cease all economic activity with Iran, the United States in 1994 was Iran's largest trading partner. U.S. exports reached in excess of $1 billion (primarily oil drilling equipment), and imports of Iranian oil exceeded $3.5 billion. This suggests previous U.S. policy makers may have taken a more pragmatic view of any potential Iranian threat. See "Tensions over Iran," \textit{World Press Review}, June 1995, 31, and Geoffrey Kemp, \textit{Forever Enemies}? (Washington, DC: Carnegie
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2. Ibid. See also Jon B. Wolfsthall, “Iran, Russia Sign Nuclear Deal, Raising Proliferation Concerns,” Arms Control Today, January/February 1995, 21.


5. Major General Geli Batin, a nuclear weapons advisor to the Russian Republic and former SS-18 brigade commander, best illustrated this concern when noting, “Right now we are putting people out on the street, including large numbers of officers. . . . It’s essential that when we demobilize these soldiers we release them in many widely separated locations and keep them from gathering together in large groups. Weapons should be securely stored away in locked and guarded areas. . . . If soldiers cannot find something to eat, they will figure out other ways of obtaining food. See “Soviet General Says Unrest May Spark Nuclear Terror,” Washington Post, 16 October 1991, A2.


8. However, one may nevertheless still be able to discern a strategy after examining key issues. A similar dilemma faces those seeking China’s nuclear strategy. See Chong-Pin Lin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution (Lexington, MA: Lexington Books, 1988).


13. Ibid.


16. The author acknowledges the dangers of anthropomorphism when suggesting that states pursue certain courses of action based on unique motivations. Yet, it only seems logical that states, and more specifically the leadership and citizenry, must find some reasons for seeking military might more compelling than others. A hierarchy similar to Maslow’s is used as a model for illustrating such situational priorities and is intended to be suggestive in nature.

17. Ibid., 59.

18. Ibid.

19. Ibid.


22. Chubin.


24. Ibid., 49.

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26. For expanded list of indicators see Strain, "Understanding Nuclear Addiction," 61.

27. Military force structure in excess of perceived need.


29. Morgenthau, 161-175.

30. Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's 1984 report to Congress stated: "The critical point in deterring war and preventing aggression is maintaining a balance of forces." Quoted in Steven Kull, "Nuclear Nonsense," Foreign Policy 58 (Spring 1985).


35. Kipper, 226.


38. Bundy, 89.


41. Gray, 14.
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42. Although some suggest nuclear weapons may have played a key role in ending the conflict when the United States suggested to China and North Korea that it might be willing to escalate.

43. Russett, 288-291.

44. Some authors have gone so far as to suggest we encourage limited proliferation on the belief that nuclear weapons will inject a significant degree of caution into regional affairs. See Martin Navias, “Ballistic Missile Proliferation in the Third World,” The Adelphi Papers (Summer 1990): 3, and also “Why We Will Soon Miss the Cold War,” The Atlantic Monthly, August 1990.

45. The belief that nuclear weapons are not fundamentally different from conventional weapons is often covered when discussing the topic of “Perception Theory.” This theory accounts for the general misunderstanding of superpower relationships held by smaller nations. See Kull and Edward N. Luttwak, Strategic Power: Military Capabilities and Political Utility (Washington, DC: CSIS, 1976).


49. The Cuban missile crisis is an example of how proliferation can limit major power actions, especially in times of crisis. See Keith B. Payne, testimony before the U.S. Congress, House Subcommittee on Legislation and National Security of the Committee on Government Operations, Hearings on the Assessment of Ballistic Missile Threats to the United States (and SDI), 1 October 1991.


52. Navias, 10.
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53. Morgenthau, 70.
54. Mahnaz Ispaahani, “Pakistani Dimensions of Insecurity,”
55. Chubin, 34-44.
56. David Jablonsky, Strategic Rationality Is Not Enough: Hitler
and The Concept of Crazy States (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic
57. “Pakistan's Honor Is Not For Sale.”
58. Andrew Hull, “The Role of Ballistic Missiles In Third
464.
60. Bethe, 51.
62. Ibid., 36.
63. Ibid., 34-35.
64. Ibid., xi.
65. Ibid.
66. Ibid., 311.
67. Richard G. Davis, Roots of Conflict: A Military Perspective
on the Middle East and Persian Gulf Crises (Center for Air Force
History, 1993), 38.
68. Graham E. Fuller, The Center of the Universe: The
69. Chubin, ix.
70. Militarily, the infamous “war of the cities” was largely a
disaster for both sides. Few targets of significance were hit, the
effect being mostly against the morale of the citizenry. Some
claim it was the futility of the exchange and realization of
stalemate that eventually forced Iran and Iraq to truce. See Davis,
78.
Tehran IRNA, 4 November 1991. See also “Mohajerani Denies
Tehran Seeks Nuclear Weapons,” Tehran IRNA, 13 November
72. Freedom of navigation is a particularly critical issue since
Iran’s oil, accounting for 95 percent of revenues, must transit the
Gulf. See Chubin and also James Wyllie, “Iran—Quest For
Security and Influence,” Jane’s Intelligence Review 5, no. 7 (July 93):
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311-312.
73. Chubin, 3.
74. Ibid.
76. Despite the diversion Iran still manages to allocate an estimated $2 billion to arms programs. See Wyllie, 311-312, and Chubin, 30.
77. Wyllie, 311-312.
78. Fuller, 241.
82. Chubin, 80.
84. One might assume Iran learned a valuable lesson during the war; however, in a December 1992 response to U.S. and Israeli discussions about Iran’s nuclear program the government responded as follows: “Islam has generated a strength in the nature of the Muslim nations more powerful than any atomic bomb. It is the concentrated energy of the world of Islam, the evidence of which we perceive with our own eyes in every nook and corner of the region. . . . The slightest effort on the part of Tel Aviv . . . will generate a massive and destructive tidal wave of attacks be selfless and martyrdom-seeking forces. See "Power of Islam Said Greater Than Nuclear Weapons," Tehran JOMHURIYE ESLAMI, 7 December 1992, 1.
85. Rational in terms of expecting policy decisions based on logical responses to circumstances and perceived costs/benefits to the state. Rationality must be examined based on the perceptions of the decision makers and their unique environment; not the desires of Western policy makers.
86. Eisenstadt, XX.
88. Eisenstadt, XX.
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92. Ibid., 155.
93. Favors a more realist view of the new international scene, they suggested opening a dialog with the United States and returning to a more civilian-led form of government.
94. Mostly clergy and influential businessmen.
96. Ibid.
98. Ibid.
100. Shyam Bhatia, Nuclear Rivals in the Middle East (New York, NY: Routledge, 1988), 82.
101. Ibid., 83.
102. Gupta, 53.
103. Chubin, 21.
104. The IRGC is in charge of all nonconventional weapons, not the Regular Army. See Eisenstadt.
105. For additional similarities with China see Shahram Chubin, "Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons?" Survival 37, no. 1 (Spring 95): 95-96.
106. Lin, 106.
107. Morgenthau, 75-78.
108. Ibid.
109. Ibid., 76.
110. Ibid.
111. Ibid.
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114. Ibid.
115. Chubin notes that although there is no evidence from the past 15 years that suggests Iran is unaware of power realities. See Chubin, “Does Iran Want Nuclear Weapons,” 98.
116. Ibid.
117. “The Islamic Republic has never been after gaining unconventional and mass-destruction weapons, since it is in apparent contradiction with its Islamic ideology which promotes peace for the cause of the human being and the society.” See “Mohajerani Denies Tehran Seeks Nuclear Weapons,” Tehran IRNA, 13 Nov 91.
118. For a general overview of Islam’s tenets see Abdul A’La Mawdudi, Towards Understanding Islam (Gassim, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Foundation, 1985).
120. Louis Rene Beres, “Israel, Iran, and Prospects for Nuclear War in the Middle East,” Strategic Review 21, no. 2 (Spring 93): 53.
121. Ibid.
122. Mawdudi, 10.
125. Ibid., 2.
126. Ibid.
127. Indeed, one could argue it took the United States some time to initially develop its own nuclear strategy following Hiroshima. Even after 40 years of policy debate, some suggest the United States still misunderstood the nuclear equation. See Gray.
129. For a convincing discussion see Karl-Heinz Kamp, “Nuclear Terrorism—Hysterical Concern or Real Risk?,”
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Aussenpolitik - German Foreign Affairs Review 46, no. 3, 211-219.
130. Chubin, Iran's National Security Policy, 75-78.
131. Bodansky, 2.
FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN COMMUNICATIONS
ARE THE RESTRICTIONS OUTDATED?

DONNA M. DIPAOLO

With passage of the Telecommunications Act of 1996, Congress has gone a long way toward a much-needed opening and reform of the domestic telecommunications market. Among other historic actions, the new law removed regulatory barriers between provision of local and long distance telephone service, and between cable television and telephone service. As Robert Mayer, senior manager of Deloitte Touche, was quoted as saying, "It's the industry equivalent of the Berlin Wall being broken down." However, one area considered for action but ultimately left intact—section 310 of the 1934 Communications Act, as amended, which restricts the holding of radio station licenses by aliens (including corporations) and foreign governments—may be worthy of another look.

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Ms. Donna M. DiPaolo, Department of State, received Distinguished Essay recognition in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition for this paper, written while she was a student at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

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The rapid pace and seemingly endless scope of technological change in communications/information delivery are, of course, worldwide phenomena. Reforms of the domestic market, while essential, may not be sufficient to allow U.S. firms to compete globally and U.S. consumers to receive a complete and truly competitive range of services. With such trends as development of direct broadcast satellite delivery systems, worldwide computer links, and convergence of communications and broadcast technologies, we need to ask whether legislative and regulatory constraints on foreign ownership of common carrier and broadcast licensees have become anachronisms with respect to their original policy goals. More importantly, we need to ask whether existing restrictions on foreign ownership are actually hindering other important policy goals. For example, foreign ownership restrictions may be impeding us from dealing effectively with the growing bilateral and multilateral agenda of "cultural trade" disputes in which some of our largest and most important trading partners try to control communications content beamed across their borders. Possible protectionist motivations notwithstanding, their expressed concern is whether "globalization" of information will in reality mean "Americanization" of their societies and cultures.

In November 1995, after a review of some of these questions, the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted new enforcement standards that permit the relaxation or removal of foreign ownership restrictions on radio common carrier licensees on the basis of reciprocity. Like the abortive congressional debate, FCC action stopped short of reaching broadcast licensees because of traditional political concerns about foreign influence in the American broadcast industry. Was the FCC movement sufficient? While this essay cannot explore all facets of the issue, it will examine whether the original legislative intent—protection of national
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security—of foreign ownership restrictions in communications is still relevant and, if so, whether existing restrictions provide the desired protection or are even practical given the rapid advance of technology. Also covered are the possible benefits of modifying or eliminating these regulatory hurdles to help U.S. firms meet new technological and global competitive challenges.

THE RESTRICTIONS

What Are They?
Section 310 (47 U.S.C.), in relevant part, provides that:

(a) The station license required under this chapter shall not be granted to or held by any foreign government or the representative thereof.

(b) No broadcast or common carrier or aeronautical en route or aeronautical fixed radio station license shall be granted to or held by—
   (1) any alien or the representative of any alien;
   (2) any corporation organized under the laws of any foreign government;
   (3) any corporation of which any officer or director is an alien or of which more than one-fifth of the capital stock is owned of record or voted by aliens or their representatives or by a foreign government or representative thereof or by any corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country;
   (4) any corporation directly or indirectly controlled by any other corporation of which any officer or more than one-fourth of the directors are aliens, or of which more than one-fourth of the capital stock is owned of
record or voted by aliens, their representatives, or by a foreign government or representative thereof, or by any corporation organized under the laws of a foreign country, if the Commission finds that the public interest will be served by the refusal or revocation of such license.

In plain language, 310(a) bars foreign governments and their representatives from holding radio licenses in their own right. Section 310(b) applies to common carrier radio, broadcast radio and aeronautical service licenses, barring private foreign investors and foreign corporations from holding such licenses and prohibiting aliens from sitting on the board or becoming an officer of a licensee. To guard further against foreign control of licensees, the law imposes a foreign ownership limit of 20 percent of the shares of a company holding such a license. That limit is fixed; the FCC has no discretion in its application. However, the statute permits a greater measure of foreign participation, as opposed to control, via parent or holding companies.

While the applicability of the statute’s direct control tests is fairly clear, the interpretation of the section 310(b)(4) public interest test is less straightforward. On its face, it would appear that greater than 25 percent indirect foreign control or ownership would be permitted, unless the Commission finds the public interest would be harmed. However, in enforcing this provision, the FCC has interpreted the provision as a bar to investment, presuming that the 25 percent holding company limit should not be waived unless the potential investor can demonstrate no harm. In the Commission’s own words, section 31 (b)(4) “gives the Commission discretion to allow higher levels of foreign ownership as long as the Commission determines that such ownership would not be inconsistent with the public interest.” The FCC has exercised

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this discretion on several occasions, albeit "usually . . . where the alien . . . influence will be nonexistent or minimal" and the aliens involved are "citizens of close allies" or "even former United States citizens."

Why Are They There?
No matter how they have been interpreted over the years, section 310 restrictions seem to have been clearly grounded in national security concerns. According to an exhaustive legislative history compiled by analyst J. Gregory Sidak, the origins of these concerns date back to the use of wireless communications by the Japanese Navy in the 1904 Russo-Japanese War. Examining the lessons from this war, the Interdepartmental Board of Wireless Telegraphy appointed by President Theodore Roosevelt recommended that the nascent wireless communication industry be brought under government control. The Navy was given responsibility for carrying out the recommendation, but was unable to gain popular and Congressional support for government monopoly of this fast-growing, exciting industry. However, the Navy successfully persuaded Congress of the potential military importance of radio, and foreign ownership restrictions were written into the Radio Act of 1912 to prevent foreign agents from transmitting radio messages, especially during wartime.

Congressional debate prior to passage of the Radio Act of 1927 highlighted opposing points of view on foreign ownership restrictions. While proponents of eliminating loopholes in the earlier legislation viewed the restrictions as necessary to prevent alien activities against the United States in time of war, opponents pointed out that the country already had even greater power—to seize radio stations—"in time of war or peril." Gregory Sidak concludes that the final act indicated that Congress "believed the national security
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interests involved to be sufficient to require heightened safeguards to protect the airwaves from foreign influence.8

The Communications Act of 1934 tightened foreign ownership restrictions by extending their application to holding companies. In making this and other changes, the Act put an end to discussion of outright government ownership of radio and attempted to deal with the now heavy competition for radio spectrum use. Continuing to assert national security concerns in the strengthened foreign ownership limits, Congress drew on “lessons that the United States had learned from the foreign dominance of the cables and the dangers from espionage and propaganda disseminated through foreign-owned radio stations in the United States prior to and during (World War I).”9

What’s Their Impact?
On their face, section 310 (b) restrictions appear to have quite narrow application. Cable television, direct broadcast satellite, subscription television, and subscription video program services are not considered either broadcast or common carrier systems, and thus foreign ownership is not restricted.10 Nor are foreigners restricted from investing in U.S. firms that provide private radio-based services (which may compete with cellular service providers), or in equipment or telecommunications service providers that do not use the radio spectrum.11 The section does not block foreign telecommunications firms from operating or constructing fiber optic facilities, or from resale activity.12 Moreover, it is even possible for foreign carriers to enter the U.S. market through lease and operation of the very broadcast and radio licenses controlled by the provision.13 As recently as last year, Senator Robert Byrd noted that section 310 “has not been very effective and has not prevented foreign carriers from entering the U.S. market.”14

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However, the practical effect of section 310 restrictions is much broader than might be thought given their limited scope, primarily because of two factors—the increasingly integrated and international nature of communications firms, and the law's policy impact vis-à-vis other countries. In 1986, section 310(b) was cited as the rationale for refusing license renewal to 13 television stations partially owned by a Mexican media firm. More recently, BT's interest in a 20-percent acquisition of MCI, and similar interest by Deutsche Telekom and France Telecom in Sprint, generated comments to the effect that the proposed investment levels might have been greater "but for" section 310(b) restrictions. A long-standing complaint by foreign governments is expressed well by the European Commission (EC) in a 1992 statement: U.S. restrictions on foreign ownership of common carriers "virtually preclude (foreign companies) from offering common carrier services in the U.S. using radio communications... because most common carriers need to integrate radio transmission stations and satellite earth stations into their networks." Though brief, these examples indicate clearly that the twin new waves of technological convergence and globalization of service providers were not envisioned in 1934, or even in the not-so-long-ago world of AT&T dominance. In today's market, firms are engaged in a feeding frenzy of strategic alliances and acquisitions in all possible delivery modes, trying to hedging their bets against tomorrow's developments.

The other factor making section 310(b) restrictions perhaps more important than their limited scope might suggest is related to international telecommunications policy and multilateral politics. In its quest for greater multilateral liberalization in trade generally, and in telecommunications services in particular, the United States has repeatedly encountered resistance from other countries, even close trading partners, on the grounds that because of section 310
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the U.S. does not come to the table with “clean hands.” Such resistance is essentially protectionist, based on other countries' concerns about the size and competitive strength of the U.S. industry. Nonetheless, section 310 does impede these negotiations. As Senator Byrd noted, “Even though Section 310 has not prevented access into our market, the existence of the section has been used by foreign countries as an excuse to deny U.S. companies access to their markets.”18 The search for a way around this policy obstacle, in fact, was at the core of the reciprocity proposals explored recently both by Congress and the FCC, under which the United States would use waivers of section 310(b)(4) restrictions as leverage to pry open foreign markets.

However, another policy obstacle is even less amenable to solution. The advance of new communications technologies has added different twists and renewed intensity to what have been traditionally referred to as audio-visual policy disputes, for example, French and U.K. foreign content quotas for television programming.19 In the last few years, proponents have promoted the term “cultural” policies, based on the rationale that protectionist regulation is needed to preserve national “cultural” identity against the onslaught of international (American) programming and other information flows (such as magazines). For example, several such disputes have arisen since 1992 with Canada, our closest neighbor to the north and largest trading partner. Sitting uncomfortably in the shadow of the 10-times larger U.S. market, Canada has imposed prohibitive tariffs against a U.S.-produced Canadian version of Sports Illustrated, ejected a U.S. country-music video cable television channel in favor of a new Canadian one, and built regulatory walls against planned investment by a U.S. direct broadcast satellite firm. In these and other cases, U.S. attempts to assert the underlying economic protectionism of these policies have been countered
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by arguments that the United States itself conducts cultural nationalism through section 310(b) restrictions.

Such “cultural” trade disputes are likely to proliferate rather than decline as the trend toward convergence of communications systems accelerates. They may grow more complicated to solve, as the ultimate source of programming becomes more obscure—for example, video-on-demand brought into the home via Internet? But, for the United States, the policy importance of ensuring maximum market opening for communications exports will remain high. By current measures, the entertainment industry is the second-largest export earner for the United States. To the extent that section 310 restrictions retard export efforts, their policy significance will increase.

THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONUNDRUM

To evaluate the continued validity of foreign ownership restrictions in communications, it is necessary first to review in more detail what in fact were the national security concerns reflected in the two Radio Acts and ultimately in section 310. Indeed, the first question is the definition of “national security”—what does the term means in the context of communications in general, and in the Communications Act in particular?

An Evolving Definition

“National security” is not defined in the Communications Act. Given such concerns, it is perhaps not surprising that governments in general are disinclined toward specific definition. Of course, industry—the probable target of any regulation—prefers specificity and criticizes the lack thereof. The General Accounting Office (GAO) addressed this question in the context of the 1988 Exxon-Florio Amendment to the Defense Production Act,20 which gives the President authority
to investigate and block foreign investments threatening to impair national security. In a 1990 report, the GAO notes that "national security" was not defined in Exxon-Florio, and that legislators expected it to be interpreted "broadly and without limitation to particular industries." The GAO concludes nonetheless that lack of a specific definition did not affect the ability of the review committee established under the law to investigate investments. Likewise, lacking a statutory or regulatory definition of national security under the Communications Act, it is necessary to turn to usage, i.e., how it has been interpreted by the regulator, the courts and Congress.

Initially, the FCC interpreted section 310 to reflect a generalized national security objective, but that interpretation has changed over time. In 1958, in reaction to a court challenge, the Commission was pushed to adopt a somewhat more precise view mirroring the original intent of section 310, to wit, preventing alien activities against the U.S. Government during wartime. Relying on the legislative history of the Radio Act of 1927, the court rejected conflicting contentions that section 310 was a much blunter (and ultimately more expansive) tool, designed to block "foreign influence" or an "alien tinge" generally in U.S. broadcast activities. In 1974, Congress revised section 310, adding nothing new to the definition of national security concerns, but limiting the section's applicability to common carrier, broadcast, and aeronautical radio services, areas that at that time were seen to most directly affect national security.

The Current Congressional View
In the initial stages of Congressional debate over the new telecommunications law finally passed in 1996, both House and Senate members put forward proposals to modify section 310(b), at least with respect to common carriers. While
specific terms of the two bills differed, both houses proposed permitting waivers of the 25 percent limit on foreign investment in common carriers on a reciprocal basis, that is, where the investor's home country allowed equivalent investment for U.S. firms in its own market. The bills generated formal comment by the Administration and other interested parties, mostly geared to the implications of such legislative for the competitive posture of U.S. firms abroad. For example, U.S. Trade Representative Mickey Kantor wrote to Senator Robert Byrd that authority to remove the 25 percent limit "through international negotiations or on the basis of similar levels of openness could lead in turn to the removal of ownership restrictions and monopoly barriers to U.S. countries in key markets abroad."  

However, discussion of national security concerns per se was brief. In large part, this was due to the fact that foreign ownership restrictions in broadcast licensees, as opposed to common carriers, were never seriously discussed. According to staff members on both sides of the political aisle, removal of foreign ownership restrictions in broadcast would have been too sensitive politically, in view of the dominant influence exercised by the broadcast media over news and other information received by the American public. The administration supported this viewpoint with testimony on the need for continuing to treat broadcast and common carriers differently for purposes of section 310 (b) (4) limits. Limiting proposed Congressional action to common carriers, the few comments related to "national security" concerns ranged from political statements such as that by Rep. Gene Taylor (D-Miss) expressing opposition to foreign ownership, to closed-door Administration explanations of law enforcement concerns. The latter were described by Senator Byrd as follows:
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The FBI has indicated to me its grave concern over foreign penetration of our telecommunications market. Foreign governments whose interests are adverse to the U.S., foreign drug cartels, international criminal syndicates, terrorist organizations, and others who would like to own, operate or penetrate our telecommunications market should be prohibited from doing so.25

In response to such concerns, both chambers, in particular the House, would have given the President latitude to block any waiver of section 310(b) restrictions on grounds including national security and law enforcement concerns. The Senate bill also specifically provided that nothing in the new legislation would affect the President's ability under the Exxon-Florio law to block mergers or acquisitions by foreign interests for the sake of national security. However, when House and Senate conferees were unable to reconcile the two versions, both Congressional proposals were abandoned during the final stages of enactment of the 1996 Telecommunications Act.

FCC Action—Opening Pandora's National Security Box

Although Congress found itself unable to act in this area, the FCC itself recently completed debate on how broadly to apply section 310 to common carriers, and under what conditions. In its November 1995, Report and Order in the matter of Market Entry and Regulation of Foreign-Affiliated Entities (Docket No. 95-22), it established an "equivalent competitive opportunities" test under which the 25 percent limit on common carrier investment could be waived—similar to the abortive congressional approach. In so doing, however, the FCC also compiled a much more extensive public record of industry views on the national security issue, and itself addressed the question of what national security concerns still apply in this area.
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Taking much the same logical path as Congress and hoping to use new flexibility in section 310(b) as market-opening leverage for U.S. firms abroad, the FCC went even further by expliciting linking economic to national security concerns. In fact, it would appear that the Commission, unlike Congress, looked directly through an economic prism in evaluating the national security implications of a proposed investment. For example, the FCC Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR) in the above-mentioned matter notes:

The original national security rationale for limiting foreign ownership in a parent corporation has less applicability today than it had in the 1930's. Today there is a plethora of service providers. No single licensee which is owned in part by a foreign corporation could take over the wireless or wireline services in the United States in a time of war.26

Further, the NOPR comments that:

In addition, our current approach to considering foreign entry into U.S. radio-based telecommunications and broadcast markets through application of Section 310(b)(4) may not be the most effective means of promoting global competition in these areas. It may be that our decisions in public interest determinations under Section 310(b)(4) should more directly consider how the decision will influence the development of a competitive market for international communications services.27

These questions about the continued relevancy of the original national security rationale of foreign ownership restrictions, and the growing importance of economic concerns, were not new ones. They were the culmination of an academic and policy debate dating back to the Arab oil embargo and OPEC price hikes in the early 1970s, which caused many Americans to question the wisdom of
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permitting large inflows of foreign capital to purchase U.S. real estate and enterprises. The Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) was created in 1975 to provide an interagency review of foreign investment. CFIUS' role was advisory, limited to examining the national security implications of such investments and making policy recommendations. Although CFIUS reviewed fewer than 30 investments between 1975 and 1988 and recommended action against none,28 concerns about foreign investment grew once again in the mid-1980s, reflecting several factors—the emergence of Japan as an economic power, a growing trade deficit, decline of the U.S. dollar, and new technological and competitive challenges facing U.S. industry. In 1988, passage of the Exxon-Florio Amendment gave teeth to the CFIUS process by permitting the President to block a foreign investment which might be harmful to national security.

The debate over the definition of national security was crystallized by the authors of a 1990 study on U.S. National Economic Security in a Global Market, who recommended that the national security community “redefine national security to include economic security”29 and that government and industry “recognize that national competitiveness is a national security issue.”30 Although the authors looked at foreign investment generally, and did not specifically examine the communications industry, their conclusions support the apparent movement by both the FCC and Congress in this direction. However, since both bodies stopped short of a formal redefinition of national security, the debate remains open. What we are left with is the initial question, whether the original national security goals of the Communications Act of 1934 are still served by the foreign ownership restrictions in section 310, plus an additional one—“Even if economic interests should arguably be a component of
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national security, are those economic interests advanced by maintaining foreign ownership restrictions?\textsuperscript{31} Some analysts argue strongly that, in fact, section 310 restrictions (and similar ownership restrictions in other industrial sectors) are protectionist measures, ineffective at best in protecting the initial national security concerns of the legislation and downright harmful with respect to improving the competitiveness of the broadcast industry. In addition, as explored above, the existence of section 310 has proved an impediment in efforts to open foreign telecommunications and audio-visual markets to U.S. firms. As described in the following section, these arguments were also made in force by industry respondents to the FCC’s NOPR.

And Trying To Close It Again
The communications industry took the FCC at its word and responded in volume to the Commission’s invitation to comment on the questions and issues presented. At one end of the spectrum, the Minority Media and Telecommunications Council (MMTC) asserted that “alien ownership in American media would make broadcast owners even more distant from viewers than many of them are now,” so that listeners would not know who was providing programming.\textsuperscript{32} Heftel Broadcasting Corporation rebutted these comments directly, arguing that “America no longer lives in a sheltered, dominating economy, untouched by economic factors beyond her borders,”\textsuperscript{33} and

adhering to the Section 310(b)(4) benchmark as the limit on the indirect equitable interest aliens may have in a company that controls a licensee does more to hurt the broadcast industry than it does help without any countervailing public interest benefit.\textsuperscript{34}
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Heftel also drew the distinction between foreign control and participation, asserting

the issue is not the source of programming, but who decides what programming will be placed on a broadcast station. British programming is a mainstay on public broadcasting, for example, but it is U.S. citizen-controlled licensees who decide whether such programming should be broadcast at all.35

Furthermore, the company compared the freedom of cable television operators (despite the fact that many originate their own programming) to attract foreign investment, with the restrictions faced by broadcasters. Heftel therefore urged that the FCC permit indirect foreign investment in broadcast enterprises on “essentially the same basis” as common carriers.36

The Motion Picture Association of America, Inc. (MPAA) presented even stronger views than Heftel in support of liberalized foreign investment in broadcast. MPAA noted,

Historically, the U.S. Government had been concerned that foreign control of mass media facilities would confer control over the content of widely available broadcast material, which could lead to the possibility of foreign propaganda and misinformation. These fears were not unreasonable during a period when there were relatively few sources of information available to the public. MPAA does not believe that foreign ownership provides the same sort of risk in today’s environment, where sources of information have multiplied tremendously.37

With respect to the FCC’s specific proposal, MPAA supported establishment of a reciprocity test, as least until multilateral commitments on liberalization of basic telecommunications
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and communications services (including audiovisual and multi-media) could be achieved.38

Arch Communications Group took a view similar to MPAA's. While supporting a reciprocity test to encourage opening of foreign markets, Arch noted that "there is less justification" for the national security precautions of section 310 "since there are a variety of service providers" today than when the statute was enacted. "As a result, no single licensee, (partially owned by a foreign corporation or not) could take over all the wireless or wireline services in the U.S. during a time of war."39

In its final Report and Order (adopted November 28, 1995), the FCC summarized industry and Administration comments and concluded that foreign ownership of broadcast licenses continued to present different questions than for other types of radio spectrum licenses. It noted that, "Because common carriers generally exercise no control over the content of their transmissions, . . . commenters (supporting a reciprocity test) find little basis for concern over national security"40 (emphasis added). However, the Commission concluded that the same, albeit diminished, national security concerns that led to the original enactment of section 310 still remained with respect to broadcast. In its view, the central concern is that "foreign control of a broadcast license confers control over the content of widely available transmissions"41 (emphasis added).

Reconciling Intent and Current Reality
Since the determining factor for the FCC was whether foreign control of a licensee conferred control over the content of the transmission, then an analysis of how effective section 310 is in protecting national security goals should focus on that question. For example, looking at the totality of section 310, Greg Sidak notes that ownership restrictions apply only to common carriage, not private carriage, and asks:
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If a foreigner is intent on harming the U.S., how does it possibly advance U.S. national security to forbid him from providing wireless common carriage while allowing him to provide wireless carriage of messages by satellite to and from U.S. territory? A well-financed enemy of the U.S. would be perfectly happy to be licensed to transmit sensitive information by satellite on a private carriage basis and forgo the opportunity to hold out his transmission capacity for hire on a common carrier basis.42

Noting another inconsistency in the law, Sidak comments

It is remarkable that the national security rationale for section 310(b) continues to be cited when Congress in effect compromised, if not repudiated, that objective when it amended the Communications Act in 1971 and 1974 to permit the FCC to license foreign amateur radio operators" (on a reciprocal bilateral or multilateral basis).43

Presumably, national security could be compromised whether the foreign operator presented him/herself as an amateur or professional in the radio field.

However, proponents of section 310 would argue that technological vulnerabilities in one area, whether or not they could be exploited in another, nonetheless remain in need of protection. The 1994 report of the National Communications System on The Electronic Intrusion Threat to National Security and Emergency Preparedness Telecommunications notes:

The telecommunications infrastructure in this country is evolving toward an environment featuring a high degree of interconnectivity between network elements, interconnection of carrier signaling networks, customer control of virtual network configurations, and other types of advanced intelligent network functions. The demand for
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broadband applications, such as video services, over public networks is also creating the need to implement technologies that can deliver these services. Based on previous examples of electronic intruder flexibility and ingenuity, it must be assumed that electronic intruders are poised to take advantage of these new technologies and services as they are implemented in the PSN (public switched network).  

Foreign ownership of key parts of this increasingly interconnected network gives pause to many members of the national security community, which does not have the luxury of dedicated communications. Rather, the communications systems used for Federal Government generally, including for military command and control and for managing emergencies, all depend in whole or in significant part on private industry. Cooperation from the private industry is therefore needed to ensure that national security goals can be met. Concerns along these lines are deeply held: “When the effectiveness of command-and-control communications is in jeopardy, so is the ability to handle emergencies, the capability to prosecute war, and the credibility of deterrence.” Furthermore, there may be some situations today, harkening back to the original Radio Act concerns, where communications from a particular defense installation might be compromised by radio signals from a foreign-owned or controlled transmitter.

A key argument against this line of thought is the assumption that investors of a foreign power with unfriendly attitudes toward the United States would be unlikely to seek FCC licenses to begin with. Presumably, a declared or soon-to-be enemy would not want to engage in a long regulatory proceeding to obtain a base of operations. In any case, the effort would be futile because an obvious enemy clearly would not receive FCC approval. For that matter, even if
section 310 did not exist, such an investment would likely be rejected under the Exxon-Florio investment review process. As an ultimate fallback, the U.S. Government has emergency and wartime powers under section 606 (c) of the Communications Act enabling it to seize radio stations and wireline facilities.

It is unfortunate, albeit understandable, that testimony on this issue by the FBI and other interested agencies has been for the most part classified. One can speculate, however, on the kinds of national security and law enforcement concerns these parties may have raised behind closed doors. One concern might be the possibility of espionage. For example, the foreign owners of a common carrier could install equipment ostensibly to record traffic for business purposes (such as "quality control") and permit monitoring by intelligence operations of their own country or other interests unfriendly to the United States. In an "information warfare" scenario, foreign control of a carrier operating in the United States could open the door to contamination of key domestic switches, giving the foreign power the ability to cause a short (but carefully targeted) or prolonged "crash" of a critical portion of the public switched network, with devastating consequences.

While these two speculative scenarios might give real cause for concern, however, proponents of lowering U.S. legal barriers to foreign investment would point out that maintaining section 310 does not ensure against such espionage or information warfare. Rather, section 310 licensing restrictions merely complicate the job of foreign agents, forcing them to seek out and compel an accomplice employed by a duly licensed carrier to carry out any proposed scheme. Further, the redundancy built into the U.S. network, in addition to its sheer size, does provide at least some protection against direct security threats.

More prevalent (and probably more realistic) than concerns about espionage and sabotage are those about
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psychological warfare and subtle erosion of the national will to fight against a perceived enemy. Even textbooks note that "broadcasting has political and social power because of its unique ability to communicate instantly with an entire nation, ... bypassing officialdom by going directly to the people." It is this particular content concern that led both the FCC and Congress to consider waiving foreign ownership restrictions with respect to common carriers, but not for broadcast entities. And it is this concern which, by virtue of its inherently political nature, is the most difficult to evaluate, especially given the rapid march of technological advance in the communications industry. However, a comment by one analyst gives food for thought: "There is no doubt that foreign propaganda broadcasting can be, and is, effective under some conditions. One condition for effectiveness is that the recipient population does not trust its own domestic broadcasts."

Perhaps the overriding question at this point in time is one which will be addressed in the next section:

As information technology and systems become ubiquitous, is it reasonable to maintain restrictions on foreign ownership of common carriers based on national security concerns, when sensitive information could just as easily be transferred using facilities not based on common carriage? In this context, of course, "sensitive information" should be taken to include political as well as military messages. And with the advent of convergence, does it make sense to differentiate between common carrier and broadcast licensees for this regulatory purpose?
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**NEW TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES**

Whether, as some claim, we are entering a new era, a so-called “information age,” or merely experiencing an incredibly rapid surge in information and communications technology, the questions are the same. Where is the technology taking us, and how will it affect systems, individuals and societies? How will information be conveyed, and who will control the content? Will it even be possible in all cases to trace the origin of a message or program? Since we are still in the midst of this “revolution,” the answers are not readily apparent. But there are at least three trends that are relatively clear, and relevant to the question of the continued validity of foreign ownership restrictions in communications—direct broadcast satellite technology, increasingly global computer links, and the convergence of information and communications technologies generally. As one analyst argued:

> The new information technologies will not single-handedly destroy the state, but they will remove from it the exclusive control over information. The days of the sovereign government, restricting the access of its citizens to ideas about the world they live in, are clearly almost over.90

Direct broadcast satellites have had a dramatic impact on how the world receives both its news and its entertainment. So long as potential viewers are within a given satellite’s “footprint” and have the gadgetry (now down to a small sized dish fitting on a windowsill), the programming carried by the satellite is within reach. Canadian regulators recently learned this lesson, much to their annoyance. Despite regulatory barriers to the delivery of television signals within Canada by foreign-owned direct broadcast satellite companies, thousands of Canadian citizens living near the U.S. border
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defied their government’s policy by purchasing satellite dishes in the U.S. and installing them in their homes. The burgeoning “gray market” helped force a review of government policy.

The well-documented "CNN effect" is illustrative of the power of satellites in conveying news to citizens of the world. More timely than reports via traditional news distribution mechanisms, CNN news broadcasts have had dramatic impact on government decisionmaking from Baghdad to Washington to Tokyo—in time of war, economic crisis, or global celebration. Such global channels, whether owned by U.S. citizens or Libyans, share one characteristic—they "have no respect for political boundaries."[51]

The Internet is the most visible symbol of another technological breakthrough—desktop access to worldwide databases, and desktop ability to communicate via computer to individuals, businesses, and governments around the world. According to one estimate, at least 30 million people, dispersed over 60 percent of the globe, are now using the Internet.[52] Controlling information flows over the Internet is now a major policy focus of many governments, although experience to date in limiting flows has been challenging. For example, the online service CompuServe, Inc., was faced with a technological challenge after German officials undertook an investigation of distributors of on-line pornography. Because CompuServe was unable to block access to a specific geographic location, it temporarily suspended access to the challenged newsgroups for 4.3 million of its users. Service was not restored for almost 2 months, until the company had implemented a blocking device for consumer use. U.S. companies expect similar challenges in their other foreign ventures. Peter Krasilovsky, an analyst with Arlen Communications Inc., stated:
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In France, the whole Internet is considered an American cultural imperialism plot. So to succeed in a market that is critical to them, what U.S. companies have to do is show a real sensitivity to the needs of European users and establish partnerships with local providers to make the path in as smooth as possible.53

The effects of satellite and computer technologies are relatively easy to see, however, compared with the effects of the coming convergence of information and communications technologies. What will happen when individuals can command at-home delivery of news programs through the Internet, or send political messages to a global audience, or receive video on demand? The prognosticators have begun circling, but no one can claim to be blessed with 20-20 foresight in this area. One interesting perspective is that, instead of the opportunities brought by convergence turning people into “citizens of the world,” the opposite may happen:

The proliferation of microbroadcasters may promote a precisely opposite effect of localizing, rather than globalizing, the way world events are viewed—a de-CNNization of perception. Communities of interest, too small to be reached profitably by mass media, could be reached by targeted means. As each community’s version of the news becomes subject to its own filters and slants, manipulating mass audiences will become increasingly difficult.54

In such an environment, how constraining would section 310 restrictions be? In all likelihood, not very (if at all) with respect to the initial national security goals of those restrictions, or even in promoting “economic national security” goals. To the contrary, it seems that the future which technology is bringing us will be a fast-paced one, with furious competition between firms55 and an increasing need
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for international strategic alliances. In this atmosphere, the existence of regulatory constraints such as section 310 restrictions may serve only to slow the ability of firms to compete in the new environment, and to bring new services to American consumers.

CONCLUSIONS

The over-200 year "American experience" has been based on a seemingly inherently contradictory combination of steadfast allegiance to bedrock principles and a taste and talent for dynamic change. Thus, even our most basic laws are continually subject to reassessment. Legislators or politicians have proposed "fundamental" changes to our tax structure so often, just within the last 15 years, that it is difficult to recall the precise number. The "v-chip" provisions of the 1966 Telecommunications Act have surprised (and angered) many strict Constitutional constructionists by threatening government intervention into the content of television programming via a violence-rating code. It is in fact hard to think of any law which passage of time and changed conditions do not make vulnerable to review. Foreign ownership restrictions in communications are no exception; indeed, many would argue that they constitute a prototype of an outdated law. Political sensitivities about broadcast aside, the press of new technologies make this an appropriate, and necessary, time to revisit the need for these provisions.

Despite the cursory nature of the examination in this paper, it should be clear that section 310 restrictions have, in almost every since, outlived their initial purpose. War and communications have changed dramatically since the 1904 Russo-Japanese War, and even since the enactment of the 1934 Communications Act. In a world where former enemies are friends, where Rupert Murdoch attempts a direct broadcast satellite venture with a Chinese company, where Russian
troops work under the NATO flag in Bosnia, where U.S. military forces emphasize their future role in operations other than war, change becomes the norm and not the exception.

Recent movement by the FCC and dialogue in the Congress are both encouraging. However, the question remains whether the reciprocity approach undertaken to liberalize foreign investment in common carriers will permit fast enough openings to keep pace with technology developments. Clearly, the FCC is taking a gamble, predicated on its and the administration's best analysis of the multilateral political dynamic, and whether a reciprocity policy will encourage sufficient and quick market openings in other countries. But the gamble has not been explicitly explored; while industry comments were plentiful, they did not bring into focus the potential policy impacts of new advances in technology.  

At the same time, legislators need to open a dialogue on the broadcast issue. For too long, it has been a "sacred cow" that all participants, industry as well as politicians, have feared to touch. In attempting to redefine national security concerns as "economic national security," or in introducing economic concerns to the evaluation of national security, policymakers have correctly analyzed the fundamental importance of economic strength to the continued viability of the United States. However, for U.S. firms, products and services to be truly competitive on a global basis, we will need to alleviate the concerns of other countries about U.S. "cultural imperialism" being conducted through new information and communications technologies. A first step in that long-range and difficult effort should be to revisit, and perhaps drop, our own outdated and ineffective barriers.

NOTES
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2. The wording of the statute implies that non-radio common carriers are subject to these limitations, but FCC case law has limited the provision's applicability to radio licensees. See Foreign Ownership of CATV Systems, 77 F.C.C. 2d 73 (1980), in which the FCC declined to apply section 310 (b) restrictions to cable television.


8. Sidak, 75.


10. Ennis, 246.


13. Comments of AT&T before the FCC, Docket No. 95-22 (undated), 39.


15. Thierer, 4.

16. Thierer, 4, and J. Gregory Sidak, "Why Limit Foreign Investment in Telecommunications?" On the Issues series, American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research (undated). The same analysts also suggest that the protectionist effect of section 310 (b) is
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quite significant, both in terms of making American firms less competitive, and in restricting the ability of foreign firms to offer capital and expertise to American firms and greater choice to American consumers.

17. Quote contained in Bodea, 7.
20. 50 USC Appendix 2170.
27. Ibid., para 24.
29. Author’s note: “Economic security” is itself an undefined term!
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32. Comments on FCC docket 95-22 by Minority Media and Telecommunications Council, 2.


34. Ibid., 11.
35. Ibid., 9.
36. Ibid., i.


38. Ibid., 3.


40. FCC Report and Order, 72, para 184.

41. Ibid., 74, para 192.

42. Sidak, 113-4.

43. Ibid., 98.


46. Ibid., 2.


49. Bodea, executive summary.


52. Walker.


56. These potential impacts may be brought into focus through France Telecom and Deutsche Telekom AG’s purchase of 20 percent of Sprint Corp. That transaction was approved by the FCC in December 1995 under the new reciprocity rule.

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U.S. military forces must be sized and shaped to deal with the threats of a new security environment, not the old threat which drove our military planning for the last 40 years.

Les Aspin, January 1992

On 1 September 1993, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin publicly announced the results of the DOD Bottom-Up Review (BUR), declaring it was “a product of a comprehensive, broadly collaborative review based on the real dangers that face America in this new time.” Secretary Aspin’s announcement capped the Nation’s second effort to determine a defense structure sized and shaped for a post-Cold War world. Joint Publication 1-02 defines “national security strategy” as “the art and science of developing, applying, and coordinating the instruments of national power (diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve objectives that contribute to national security.” The art and science of defense planning, however, is an imperfect, iterative process, especially in a time of transition and...
uncertainty. Thus, to assess its effectiveness, it is imperative to examine the 1993 BUR, its intent, key assumptions, and the ability of the resulting force structure to support the objectives of the Administration’s National Security Strategy of Enlargement and Engagement. The BUR was based on a number of assumptions that may need to be revisited in order to resolve the emerging shortfalls in U.S. defense capabilities. This will require another defense review, one that builds on the lessons learned from the Bottom-Up Review to ensure the Armed Forces remain prepared to meet the dangers and challenges of the future, in peace and in war.

BUILDING THE FOUNDATIONS

A New Paradigm or “Less of the Same”? The foundations of the BUR were developed during the 1991-92 congressional debates over the Bush administration’s Base Force (appendix A). During the debates, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin emerged as one of the more vocal opponents for additional force cuts and a larger peace dividend. In essence, Aspin declared the administration had failed to take a bottom-up approach to devising a defense structure for the new security environment. From January to June 1992, Chairman Aspin produced a series of papers proposing an alternative force to meet emerging and enduring threats. In a 6 January presentation to the Atlantic Council, Aspin explained the first step to building a post-Cold War defense structure was to define the changing security environment and vital interests Americans would be willing to use force to protect (table 1, appendix B). Aspin followed with a 24 January white paper that declared a fundamental task of force planners was to “identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them,” including countering regional aggressors, combating the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD), fighting terrorism, restricting drug trafficking,
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keeping the peace and assisting civilians.\textsuperscript{5} One month later, Chairman Aspin published four options for a post-Cold War force that were the product of a threat-based methodology. Aspin believed this methodology was especially important in a tight fiscal environment, since “our citizens understandably will be reluctant to pay for defense unless there is a clear linkage between the forces and the threats those forces are designed to deal with.”\textsuperscript{6} The paper reiterated situations for which Americans might want to employ military forces and advocated linking the gross size of the force to the need to counter regional aggressors. Aspin argued requirements for other missions, such as combating the spread of WMD, counterterrorism, restricting drug trafficking, helping civilians, and keeping the peace, were lesser-included cases that would not affect the size of the force significantly.

On 25 February, Aspin presented his four options to the House Budget Committee (figure 1, appendix B). Option A provided the capability to win one major regional conflict (MRC) and pursue a lesser peacetime operation simultaneously. Option B added fast sealift, afloat prepositioning and a Desert Storm Equivalent of air forces, allowing participation in a conventional conflict “in Korea or Europe or elsewhere where our allies have major ground forces at the same time as we ran a full Desert Storm in some part of the world like the Persian Gulf where our allies lacked adequate ground forces.”\textsuperscript{7} Option C provided more forces for a rotation base to sustain a Desert Storm operation and added a package capable of an operation the size of Just Cause, while Option D added capability for a second Provide Comfort operation. Options B through D were based on a strategy of winning one MRC decisively while using airpower to assist coalition partners to stop an aggressor in a second MRC until forces from the first conflict could redeploy. This would later become known as a “win-hold-win” strategy during the Bottom-Up Review.\textsuperscript{8} In a followup letter to House Budget Committee Chairman Leon E. Panetta, Aspin advocated
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Option C for a savings of $12-15 billion for FY93 and $91 billion over the FYDP baseline budget, $41 billion more savings than the latest Bush proposal. While Congress eventually approved a FY93 budget that was only about $3 billion less than requested by the President, sentiment was growing that perhaps Aspin was right when he said “It’s time to start from scratch. It’s time to build defense budgets for a brand new era. And that is not what we’re seeing coming out of the Pentagon so far.”

Key Themes and Assumptions

While Aspin’s white papers did not lead to a significant change in defense spending during the FY93 budget cycle, a number of his key themes were to have a greater impact 1 year later.

- Aspin asserted a new defense review was needed, because the Base Force was based on one and not the two revolutions in the international environment that had occurred since 1989. According to Aspin, the first revolution ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989, while the second was marked by the dissolution of the Soviet Union on 31 December 1991. The Base Force preserved military capability to deal with a resurrected Soviet Union, an event Aspin no longer believed was likely. Instead, Aspin claimed the demise of the Soviet Union meant “the old basis for sizing and shaping our defenses is simply gone.”

- Aspin believed the next force “must be created from the bottom up, not just by subtracting some amount from the old Cold War structure.” Creating a force from the bottom-up entailed defining the future environment, developing a coherent security strategy, and determining what military tasks and forces were needed to secure the nation’s interests. Aspin believed the Bush Administration had engaged in a top-down “salami slicing” effort to realize predetermined fiscal objectives, producing a Base Force
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that was a smaller version of an outdated Cold War force.\textsuperscript{13}

- To be acceptable to Congress and the American people, a post-Cold War force must be threat-based. In his 6 January white paper, Aspin declared "there is no alternative to a threat-based force structure, that is, one that is sized and shaped to cope with the 'things' that threaten Americans... thus, it is critical to identify threats to U.S. interests that are sufficiently important that Americans would consider the use of force to secure them."\textsuperscript{14} Aspin rejected capabilities-based planning methodologies advocated by General Colin Powell during the Base Force defense review, in part because they tend to preserve more forces as a hedge against uncertainty.

- Aspin assumed the size of a post-Cold war force would be driven by the requirements to counter regional aggressors. Requirements for lesser contingencies would help shape, but not significantly increase, the size of the force.

- Aspin believed the DOD should consider the lessons of Desert Storm as it planned for the future, especially the idea that force enhancements, including the procurement of high-tech weapons and adequate support, would allow a smaller force to accomplish the same mission. Aspin embraced the widespread belief that high-tech weapons were the key to the coalition's resounding victory and low casualty rate, as were mobility, logistics, intelligence, and other support forces. Aspin pointed out the relatively small portion of the U.S. combat capability deployed to the desert required a much larger fraction of the total U.S. support capability. Building in sufficient support from the start would yield "a force structure that could deal with multiple simultaneous contingencies. This is why the forces portrayed below, while smaller than the Cheney force structure, would be able to conduct the multiple contingency operations required of them."\textsuperscript{15}
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE 1: ASPIN'S ALTERNATIVE FORCE OPTIONS, FEBRUARY 1992</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>ARMY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cadet Divisions</td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>MARINE CORPS</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>AIR FORCE</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Active Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NAVY</strong></td>
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<tr>
<td>Total Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cruisers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SSNs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assault Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>REALITY</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Past Strait</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active Prepositioning Ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beyond MP-58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>PERSONNEL</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Active</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reserve Components</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Finally, the Nation was due a larger peace dividend to meet pressing domestic needs following the end of the Cold War. While reform in the Soviet Union remained uncertain and Americans were deploying to the Gulf, Congress had little desire to challenge the administration's defense budget. However, 1992 was an election year, the Soviet empire had disintegrated, and pressure for defense cuts was again building.

These key themes and assumptions help explain the underpinnings of Aspin's methodology as well as why he "assigned himself the task of developing an alternative defense budget that can win backing of congressional Democrats and perhaps the party's presidential candidates." While his proposals helped shape Congressional debate over U.S. military capabilities needed for a post-Cold War world, they had an even greater impact on the presidential candidates, especially President-elect Bill Clinton, who nominated Aspin to become his first Secretary of Defense.
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The Mandate
During his Senate confirmation hearings on 7 January 1993, Secretary of Defense nominee Aspin was asked if he could maintain a “Force C position” and realize the $60 billion in additional defense cuts proposed by President-elect Clinton during the campaign. Aspin replied: “You can make the $60 billion cut off the Bush baseline, and do option C; that I’m sure of.” 18 The Senate quickly confirmed Aspin, giving him the opportunity to realize this goal. Within weeks, Aspin had initiated a national security strategy and force structure Bottom-Up Review, assigning responsibility for directing the review to Acting Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Frank Wisner. A 23 February 1993 Wisner memorandum to Aspin clarified the review’s mandate:

The main objective of the Bottom-Up Review is to develop guidelines for reducing and restructuring the U.S. defense posture in the context of a revised U.S. military strategy. This in turn will give you presentational material and analytical backup that you can use to persuade various audiences to support the Clinton-Aspin defense program. 19

Wisner confirmed the overall intent of the BUR was to identify post-Cold War threats, opportunities, security objectives, and develop a coherent strategy and force structure to achieve those objectives. Wisner also informed Aspin the BUR would capitalize on his previous work by following “the same construct you used with the Democratic Caucus last year.” 20

Secretary Wisner divided the BUR into four broad functional areas. Area one would identify national objectives, threats, and opportunities for the post-Cold War era. Area two would define a coherent military strategy and baseline force structures realize these objectives. The product of the first two areas would constitute the DOD input to a National
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Security Council (NSC) document titled National Security Strategy and the Role of U.S. Military Forces in the Post-Cold War Era and provide the baseline for force development. Area three would evaluate modernization and resource issues, options, and costing baselines, while area four would assess the overall balance between forces and modernization. Area four would also “assess a range of force packages in terms of their ability to secure U.S. operational objectives in single and concurrent major regional contingencies (Southwest Asia and Korea)” as well as the need for additional forces to accomplish forward presence and lesser contingencies, such as peacekeeping. The review was to be completed in time to publish a Defense Planning Guidance document in July, which would guide the services’ efforts to revise their FY94-99 budget submissions.

Building the Strategic Foundation
Over the next month, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements Ted Warner and his two key assistants David Ochmanek (Strategy) and Dale Vesser (Requirements and Plans) led the effort to develop the OSD input to the administration’s new national security strategy. Completed on 21 April, the OSD draft established regional instability, WMD, transnational dangers (disease, refugee flows, drug trafficking, and international crime) and dangers to democracy and reform as the four main threats of the post-Cold War international environment, as postulated by candidate Clinton in 1992. OSD proposed a “strategy of engagement” to ensure the U.S. would maintain its influence overseas and help create “new mechanisms for international order and to shape the international environment in ways needed to protect U.S. objectives over the long term.” The strategy’s centerpiece was a “comprehensive effort to strengthen and broaden the coalition of democracies,” reflecting the administration’s belief that democracies that share objectives and respect individual rights adopt policies
that avoid the use of force against other democracies. 23 OSD also proposed redirecting resources towards the domestic agenda by finding "that balance whereby our security leadership is sustained at a lower cost that permits wise investment of our own resources in our own future." 24 The strategy concluded by offering a range of military strategies and capabilities to secure U.S. interests (table 2, appendix B). 25 To deal with the strategy's postulated dangers, OSD advocated U.S. forces must be capable of responding rapidly, fighting on arrival, and be sustainable. Another imperative was to avoid a "hollow" force, which would require "intense training, high readiness, highly qualified and motivated personnel, strategic mobility, and sufficient support and sustainment capabilities" as well as sufficient research and development to retain the nation's technological superiority to meet the changing threats of the future. 26

**Force Packages to Meet New Dangers**

Throughout the rest of April and May, the Joint Staff, OSD, and the services developed force options to meet the requirements of the draft strategy. Notional building blocks included forces for MRCs, land-based overseas presence/crisis response, lesser regional contingencies and "new world focus" missions such as promoting democracy, peacekeeping and peace enforcement, humanitarian operations and disaster relief. On 8 May 1993 the Joint Staff briefed Secretary Aspin on their progress to date. Two points from this "Force for 2000" briefing are pertinent to this essay. First, the Joint Staff had developed three MRC options (table 2). Second, the briefing indicated forces sized for MRCs would also meet the requirements for lesser contingencies. The next step was to evaluate these options against potential threats. On 15 May, the Joint Staff delivered a briefing, "Major Regional Contingency Warfighting Assessment" to Secretary Aspin. The briefing concluded that the second and third "Force for 2000" MRC options were adequate for
fighting two regional conflicts, depending on the desired strategy. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy Ochmanek presented a separate briefing, "Fighting and Winning Future Major Regional Conflicts," that highlighted the critical role of advanced munitions in slowing or stopping an invading enemy force early in a conflict, allowing time for followon forces to deploy. Ochmanek's briefing further reinforced Aspin's faith in the value of advanced weaponry and helped shape the final forces and warfighting concepts recommended by the BUR.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Win 1 MRC</th>
<th>Win 1 MRC with Hold in 2nd</th>
<th>Win in 2 Nearly Simultaneous MRCs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8 AC and 6 RC Divisions</td>
<td>10 AC and 6 RC Divisions</td>
<td>12 AC and 8 RC Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 CVBGs</td>
<td>10 CVBGs</td>
<td>12 CVBGs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 MEBs and 1 RC USMC Div/Wing/FGSS</td>
<td>5 MEBs and 1 RC USMC Div/Wing/FGSS</td>
<td>5 MEBs and 1 RC USMC Div/Wing/FGSS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 AC &amp; 6 RC Fighter Wg</td>
<td>13 AC &amp; 7 RC Fighter Wg</td>
<td>14 AC &amp; 10 RC Fighter Wg</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Making the MRC Decision**

During a 16 June 1993 speech at the National Defense University, Secretary Aspin reviewed the status of the BUR and outlined the campaign planning principles for fighting a regional conflict. According to Aspin, the first task for American forces deploying to a MRC was to "stop the enemy's invading army as quickly as possible." This would help preserve access to critical ports and airfields, decrease the chance that an ally would surrender before U.S. forces could deploy, and minimize territory lost to invading forces. The buildup of combat power would continue during phase two, the precursor to phase three, operations to eject and decisively defeat the enemy. Aspin believed stopping enemy attacks quickly was "the critical element in dealing with multiple contingencies in an era when, first, we don't know where the next conflict will come and second, we won't have sufficient forces on the ground to meet it when it does."
Aspin went on to explain that airlift, prepositioning, advanced munitions, and battlefield surveillance were the key to this operational strategy. As a result, the BUR was taking a close look at these capabilities, especially advanced munitions such as air-dispersed wide area mines, all-weather, anti-tank Sensor Fused Weapons and surface-to-surface missiles that dispensed Brilliant Anti-tank Submunitions. While the speech helped clarify the emerging BUR warfighting strategy, some who heard it believed Aspin had also confirmed another, more controversial change in policy.

On 17 June, The Washington Post reported the details of Aspin’s speech in a front-page article, “U.S. May Drop 2-War Capability,” which focused on the “win-hold-win” MRC option Aspin had mentioned during the speech. While Aspin’s aides responded this had been a “trial balloon” and not a final position, a media firestorm quickly developed over what was believed to be a major shift away from the Bush administration’s two-MRC strategy. The negative comments were not limited to the press. As the Post reported, officers from all the services had criticized this option as risky, because the course of reform in the former Soviet Union was still uncertain. In fact, some senior officers had gone so far as to label the strategy “win-hold-lose.” Even more telling were criticisms coming from U.S. security partners, especially South Korea. According to one anonymous military source, the South Korean government was very concerned because “it means we give up Seoul and them come back and clean it up later.”

The criticism had a significant impact on the final BUR MRC option. During a speech at Andrews Air Force Base on 25 June, Secretary Aspin declared: “After much discussion and analysis, we've come to the conclusion that our forces must be able to fight and win two major regional conflicts, and nearly simultaneously.” Aspin explained this would help deter a potential second aggressor from taking advantage of a U.S. already engaged in a regional conflict, as
well as provide a hedge against future threats. With this decision behind them, OSD, the Joint Staff, and the services spent the next two months resolving remaining issues and assessing the BUR's budgetary impact.

BUR Recommendations
On 1 September 1993, Secretary Aspin released the results of the Bottom-Up Review. The first section of his final report essentially repeated the “strategy of engagement, prevention and partnership” that OSD had submitted to the NSC. The report also explained the BUR's methodology, including the use of scenarios as tools for developing a two-MRC force structure. MRC warfighting phases remained the same as Aspin described at NDU, including the need to stop an enemy invasion quickly. Fighting and winning a single MRC would require four to five Army divisions, four to five Marine Expeditionary Brigades, 10 Air Force fighter wings, 100 deployable heavy bombers, four to five CVBGs, and special operations forces. The report outlined four MRC strategies and force options, recommending the third as “the best choice to execute our defense strategy and maintain the flexibility needed to deal with the wide range of dangers we may face.”

If the U.S. committed to fighting two MRCs, option three would leave “little other active force structure to provide other overseas presence or to conduct peacekeeping or other low-intensity operation.” Furthermore, selected high-leverage assets would have to redeploy from the first MRC to the second, including part of the bomber force. Option three’s “force enhancements” alluded to the need to improve strategic mobility, increase the strike potential of Navy carrier airwings, enhance the lethality of Army firepower by procuring advanced munitions and weapon systems that can be employed early in a conflict, modifying Air Force bombers to carry advanced conventional munitions, and improving the readiness and flexibility of reserve component forces. While option four added forces for lesser missions, the BUR report


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rejected it because it would “require significant additional resources, thereby eliminating any ‘peace dividend’ the American people are expecting as a result of the end of the Cold War.”

TABLE 3: BOTTOM-UP REVIEW MRC FORCE OPTIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strategy</th>
<th>Win One MRC</th>
<th>Win One MRC with Hold to Second</th>
<th>Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs</th>
<th>Win Two Nearly Simultaneous MRCs’ Plus Conduct Smaller Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>8 Active Divisions</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions</td>
<td>10 Active Divisions</td>
<td>12 Active Divisions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Reserve Division Equivalents</td>
<td>6 Reserve Division Equivalents</td>
<td>15 Reserve Enhanced-Battle Divisions</td>
<td>8 Reserve Division Equivalents</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>8 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>10 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>11 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
<td>12 Carrier Battle Groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
<td>5 Active Brigades</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
<td>1 Reserve Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>10 Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>15 Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>13 Active Fighter Wings</td>
<td>14 Active Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>6 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>7 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>7 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
<td>10 Reserve Fighter Wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Force Enhancements</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The BUR report also addressed force building blocks for other missions, including peace enforcement, intervention operations and overseas presence. Forces required for “peace enforcement and intervention” contingencies could “largely be provided by the same collection of general purpose forces needed for MRCs, so long as the forces had the appropriate training needed for peacekeeping or peace enforcement.” The BUR recommended maintaining about 100,000 troops in Europe and 100,000 in Northeast Asia for overseas presence. While the BUR reviewed nuclear deterrence requirements, Aspin deferred major changes in lieu of a comprehensive follow-on Nuclear Posture Review. Added together, the force structure required to fulfill the nation’s security requirements resembled a smaller version of the Base Force (table 3, appendix B).
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Projected Savings
The last section of the report estimated the BUR would save $91 billion over the 1995-99 FYDP, compared to the Bush baseline. Because “the Clinton administration defense budget target for this same period was $1.221 billion,” a difference of $104 billion from the baseline, an additional $13 billion cut, would be spread across the first 4 years of the FYDP (table 4, appendix B). Therefore, in addition to determining “what constituted the best defense strategy and policy for America,” the BUR also fulfilled the President’s campaign promise to cut the defense budget.36

Implementing the BUR
Shortly after releasing the BUR report, Secretary Aspin issued his first Defense Planning Guidance (DPG) document to codify its recommendations. Along with force cuts and specific weapons systems guidance, the DPG established readiness and sustainability as the top priority for resources, followed by force structure, high-leverage science and technology programs, systems acquisition, and infrastructure and overhead.40 The DPG hedged in several areas, including nuclear forces, pending the outcome of follow-on studies. In September 1994 the President approved the recommendations of the Nuclear Posture Review, which established a baseline nuclear deterrent force of 14 SSBNs equipped with D-5 missiles, 450-500 single warhead Minuteman III ICBMs, 20 B-2s, and 66 B-52Hs. Another follow-on analysis titled the Mobility Requirements Study Bottom-Up Review Update (MRS-BURL) examined mobility forces required to support two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Completed 28 March 1995, the MRS-BURL affirmed the BUR’s conclusions that increased airlift, sealift, and prepositioning were required for two nearly simultaneous MRCs. On 7 February, 1994, the President released his first complete budget implementing the BUR (table 4).
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| TABLE 4: FY1995 NATIONAL DEFENSE BUDGET AUTHORITY (CURRENT $ BILLIONS) |
|-----------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|-------------|
| DoD Military    | 249.0       | 252.2       | 243.4       | 240.2       | 246.7       | 253.0       |
| DoE & Other     | 11.9        | 11.5        | 11.9        | 11.8        | 12.0        | 12.1        |
| **Total National Defense** | **260.9** | **263.7** | **255.3** | **252.0** | **258.7** | **265.1** |
| % Real Change   | -9.0        | -0.9        | -5.9        | -4.0        | -0.2        | -0.3        |

The DOD news release announcing the budget noted, “In real terms the FY 1995 budget is 35 percent below FY 1985,” marking the “tenth straight year of real decline for the defense budget.”

While the BUR’s findings quickly became programming and budgeting policy, the new national security strategy did not receive the President’s approval until July 1994. Titled *A National Security Strategy of Engagement and Enlargement*, the strategy maintained the same fundamental underpinnings as the OSD draft submitted to the NSC one year earlier:

- To credibly sustain our security with military forces that are ready to fight
- To bolster America’s economic revitalization
- To promote democracy abroad.

Typical military missions included fighting and winning major regional contingencies, maintaining a credible overseas presence, fighting drug trafficking, combating counter-terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction, and a wide range of peace operations. The strategy stressed economic revitalization at home would maintain America’s prosperity, competitiveness in the global marketplace, and the ability to sustain a military befitting the world’s only remaining superpower. Finally, the strategy declared that promoting democracy abroad would serve all of America’s global interests by helping to create an international environment with fewer conflicts, expanding free market economies, and greater respect for human rights.
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Following the publication of the NSS, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff distributed a new National Military Strategy of the United States of America (NMS) in 1995. Subtitled A Strategy of Flexible and Selective Engagement, the NMS is based on “guidance from the national security strategy articulated by the President and from the Bottom-Up Review conducted by the Secretary of Defense.” As figure 2, appendix B, illustrates, peacetime engagement, deterrence and conflict prevention, and fighting and winning wars are the three broad tasks U.S. military forces will perform to accomplish the two national military objectives of promoting stability and thwarting aggression. Because it is based on the National Security Strategy and the BUR, the new NMS incorporates the assumptions underlying both. Although the NMS acknowledges the increased need to perform peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention missions globally, it also states the nation’s core military requirement is for a force that is capable of fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MRCs. Furthermore, the NMS maintains that DOD will continue to use scenario-based planning exercises and postulated threats to size and shape future forces. The NMS also follows the DPC’s resource priorities, placing modernization after force readiness.

Over the last 3 years, criticizing the BUR has become something of a cottage industry. Credible experts, including former Secretary of Defense Cheney, have declared the BUR’s defense cuts precipitous and risky. Others believe the review preserved more forces than required for the post-Cold War era, especially since the U.S. defense budget is greater than that of Russia, China, Great Britain, France, Germany, the Koreas, Iran, and Iraq combined. As the services continue to downsize, a closer look at the assumptions underlying the BUR and follow-on implementing policies may clarify if the nation is building the kind of military capabilities it will need in the future.
A CLOSER LOOK AT THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

Assumption: Another Defense Review Was Required
Following the Collapse of the Soviet Union
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 convinced many in Congress, including Les Aspin, that the DOD should conduct a comprehensive review of America’s security needs for a post-Cold War world. As the 1993 OSD draft strategy advocated, the nation needed to “take advantage of the opportunity presented by the collapse of communism to redirect some resources toward our pressing domestic agenda.” While another review may have been warranted, it did not result in a significant shift away from the security strategy or the major force elements developed previously. The Bush administration had already moved away from a Cold War strategy of containment towards meeting regional dangers to U.S. security interests. The Clinton administration’s strategy maintained two MRCs as a basis for sizing the post-Cold War force, as well as the need for sustaining a credible overseas presence and the capability to perform a wide range of operations other than war. Furthermore, both strategies established promoting democracy as a fundamental objective, broadening the military’s role in shaping the international environment through operations other than war. While the Clinton administration eliminated reconstitution as pillar of its strategy, its emphasis on preserving the defense industrial base as a means of hedging against uncertainty essentially made this a difference of degree. Although the BUR recommended a significant decrease in the size of the force, it maintained the same major units (carriers, divisions, fighter wings . . .) as the Base Force. Overall, there are more similarities than differences between the strategies underlying the two forces. Even Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell remarked at the official unveiling of the BUR that “the strategy underpinning [it] is quite similar . . .
because the world looks quite similar to us whether you’re wearing Base Force eyes or Bottom-Up Review eyes.”

Assumption: A Post-Cold War Force Must Be Developed via a Bottom-Up Methodology
The methodology developed by Chairman Aspin’s staff in 1991 and 1992 linked national objectives and military tasks to required force structure. As Secretary Wisner explained, the intent was to apply the same methodology to the BUR, without the pressure of a specific savings target. In fact, the February 1994 news release of the FY1995 DOD budget declared “the Bottom-Up Review was undertaken without a precise defense spending target in mind.” While the targets may not have been exact, there is little doubt the Joint Staff and the services understood the administration had issued substantive savings guidelines. Slightly less than one year earlier, the Clinton administration had submitted its first budget proposal that cut $88 billion in budget authority from the FY94-97 Bush baseline, announcing it “cuts Cold War forces and begins to buy the new capabilities we need to meet the new dangers we face.” Under the new budget, Air Force fighter wings would drop from 28 to 24, Army active component divisions would fall from 14 to 12, and the Navy battle force would drop to 413 ships and 12 carriers. Furthermore, both Clinton and Aspin had frequently mentioned savings targets prior to and during the review. These spending targets support assertions that the BUR was not entirely bottom-up, but was, in part, a top-down, fiscally driven exercise to cut forces and realize a greater peace dividend.

Assumption: A Post-Cold War Force Must Be Threat-based
Aspin believed the American people and Congress would not support a military force structure that failed to clearly link U.S. interests to the dangers that threatened them. As a result, Aspin’s Option C and the BUR force were both developed
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using a mixed threat-based and scenario-based planning methodology. In fact, DOD has followed this approach to sizing and shaping military forces since the 1960s. RAND's corporate research manager for Defense and Technology Planning Paul K. Davis offers a succinct explanation of this enduring Cold War-era methodology:

Having sized overall structure largely in terms of the most stressing threat, the original idea was to "fill in" by acquiring specialized capabilities that might be needed for other scenarios, and to establish a strategic reserve suitable for varied contingencies worldwide along with adequate strategic mobility forces (aerial, sealift, and prepositioning ships.53

Threat/scenario-based planning has its advantages and disadvantages. As Chairman Aspin wrote, it does link capabilities to threats in a way that can be understood by the American people. It also offers a systematic means of establishing priorities between national interests and regions, postulating conflict timelines, and defining military objectives. In the negative column, threat/scenario-based planning is reactive and biased towards quantitative data, making it difficult to capture qualitative factors such as enemy morale and training. Scenarios that center on Korea and Southwest Asia have a focus of about 5 to 10 years in the future, a rather limited horizon for developing capabilities that will be in the field for the next 20-plus years. Furthermore, defense analysts who employ threat/scenario-based methodologies may find it difficult to adapt to a rapidly changing international environment.54 As a result, the methodology employed during the BUR may not be adequate for planning for the increased uncertainties of the post-Cold War world.

Dr. Clark Murdock, author of Aspin's Option C, recently wrote that the case for scenario-based planning in an uncertain world is far from convincing. Murdock maintains
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the following unknowns predominate when thinking about
the future security environment:
• What roles will the United States play?
• What are the threats?
• Who will have the capabilities and the will to
  challenge our interests?
• How much of the budget will be dedicated to
defense?"

There are alternative approaches for “planning for
uncertainty.” Generally speaking, they begin with broad
categories of military objectives, identify specific military
tasks to achieve those objectives, and then determine the
capabilities required to perform the tasks. Dr. Murdock
advocates a capabilities-based approach called “mission-
pull.” Mission-pull first identifies future threat environments
and the broad enemy capabilities within those environments,
such as weapons of mass destruction. The next step is to
define the missions, or operational objectives military forces
must accomplish, and then break out the critical tasks within
those missions. These broad capabilities could include deep
strike, land combat, air combat, space operations, sea combat,
information operations, missile defense, and so forth. The
final step is to identify specific force requirements to perform
the critical tasks.

There are a number of advantages associated with a
“mission-pull” methodology. First, it would encompass the
capabilities needed to perform a broad array of missions,
including operations other than war as well as actual combat.
Second, it would help focus the planning efforts of the
services on the future, and not just the near-term threat.
Third, resources could be prioritized between the various
capabilities and emerging technologies that may be needed to
perform the missions. Furthermore, planners could identify
a mix of forces that maximizes capability for different budget
levels, versus traditional “requirements analysis” methods
that seek the least-cost means to perform specific
requirements. As Paul Davis indicates, requirements analysis "may yield a force mix that is ill-suited to other cases." The BUR analysis performed by the Joint Staff was, in many ways, a classic example of a requirements analysis that may not have produced a force mix suited to the mix of post-Cold War missions required by the NMS.

Assumption: MRC Requirements Should Determine the Size of the Post-Cold War Force

The NMS states "military forces exist—are organized, trained, and equipped—first and foremost to fight and win America's wars." While fighting and winning America's wars rightfully remains the DOD's top priority, it does not necessarily follow that MRCs remain the most stressing case for sizing and shaping military forces in the post-Cold War era. During the latter years of the Cold War, forces sized to deter and defeat Communist aggression worldwide were generally adequate for lesser contingencies and peacetime operations. However, sizing forces against warfighting scenarios may not meet the needs of a post-Cold War strategy founded on remaining engaged globally to shape the international environment, driving up peacetime operational tempos to near-unprecedented levels. As the NMS notes, "In the 5 years since the fall of the Berlin Wall we have deployed our forces to assist in security or humanitarian crises about 40 times—a far greater pace than in the preceding 20 years." Today, over 52,000 U.S. military personnel are deployed in support of 13 operations worldwide, including Bosnia, Turkey, Saudi Arabia, Haiti, Cuba, Macedonia, and the Arabian Gulf. Over the past 8 years, the Air Force has experienced nearly a threefold increase in forces deployed overseas over the past 8 years (figure 3, appendix B). This mirrors the Army's pace of operations, which has increased by about 300 percent over the last 4 or 5 years. The Navy is similarly engaged, with an average of about 25 percent of its ships deployed for extended periods and another 25 percent
underway conducting training or preparing to deploy. While the impact of high operating tempos is situationally dependent, the end result can be units that are not readily available for higher priority missions, including combat operations.

In the event the nation commits to fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs, most active component units engaged in overseas presence and lesser contingencies will have to redeploy to support combat operations. Redeployment times will depend on unit requirements to refurbish, rest, or regain their combat edge. High operating tempos increase wear and tear on equipment, deplete stores of expendables, and accelerate weapon system replacement schedules. Extended deployments can also affect unit morale and degrade combat skills. Combat skills are perishable, and troops engaged in peace operations may not be able to maintain their warfighting edge. The impact is especially severe on high-value, limited quantity intelligence, surveillance, reconnaissance, theater air defense, and support assets. Primitive infrastructures and limited access to adequate airfields and ports in remote operating locations may also delay redeployments and further stress mobility forces. It is for these reasons that the Joint Staff's J-3 Readiness Division briefed the NSC that lesser regional contingencies exacerbate mobility and support force shortfalls, increase risk in the initial phase of an MRC, slow force closures for the counteroffensive, and may even prolong a conflict. While a strategy that stresses global engagement and remaining capable of fighting and winning two nearly simultaneous MRCs is appropriate for the world's only remaining superpower, it imposes costs that the BUR may not have accounted for fully. A capable, flexible, responsive post-Cold War force must be sized to perform the full range of peacetime engagement, deterrence, and conflict prevention tasks required by the NMS, not just fight and win America's wars.
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A post-Cold War force must also be shaped to perform peacetime missions, especially support forces that are in high demand. As the Reserve Forces Policy Board noted:

Peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian assistance, and disaster relief operations place new demands on the Armed Forces. Peacekeeping operations typically require heavier concentrations of combat support and combat service support forces than combat operations. Emphasis is placed on medical, engineering, transportation, civil affairs, and command and control capabilities.62

The BUR maintained a large percentage of these units in the Army reserve component, assuming they would mobilize in time of war (table 5, appendix B). While these units may be able to selectively support the active force engaged in operations other than war, high peacetime operating tempos and multiple simultaneous taskings will severely stress their capacity to do so. Shaping the force for the broad spectrum of tasks envisioned by the NMS might require transferring some of the support units currently in the reserves to the active component.

Enhancements and Adequate Support Permit a Smaller Force to Accomplish the Same Objectives

This was a fundamental assumption underlying Aspin’s Option C and the final MRC option selected during the Bottom-Up Review. With three exceptions, the final option was the same as option two on the May 1993 “Force for 2000” MRC slide. First, the caption on the final option was changed to “Win Two Nearly-Simultaneous MRCs,” from “Win 1 MRC With Hold In Second” in the earlier briefing. Second, the final option contained 12 carriers instead of 10. The BUR report explained that while analysis had confirmed “a force of 10 carriers would be adequate to fight two nearly simultaneous MRCs,” two additional carriers, one active and one
training/reserve, were added for overseas presence. Third, the BUR final report indicated the ability to win two nearly simultaneous MRCs with the selected option depended on key force enhancements, including improving "(1) strategic mobility, through more prepositioning and enhancements to airlift and sealift; (2) the strike capabilities of aircraft carriers; (3) the lethality of Army firepower; and (4) the ability of long-range bombers to deliver conventional smart munitions." The BUR also recommended improving the readiness of Army National Guard combat units, especially the 15 brigades that would supplement active divisions in a second MRC. Because these enhancements constitute the critical difference between win-hold-win and winning two MRCs nearly simultaneously, reviewing their status will help determine if the BUR force is capable of meeting the warfighting objectives of the NMS.

**Mobility.** Despite planned enhancements, the ability of the mobility force to deploy and sustain U.S. forces engaged in two nearly simultaneous MRCs remains questionable. The MRS-BURU completed in 1995 reconfirmed mobility force enhancements are required to support a two nearly-simultaneous MRC strategy. Partially as a result of its findings, in November 1995 Secretary Perry approved the Air Force plan to acquire 120 C-17 airlift aircraft. The backbone of the maritime leg of the mobility force will consist of 36 Roll-On/Roll-Off (RO/RO) cargo ships and 19 Large Medium Speed RO/ROs (LMSRs) when completed shortly after the turn of the century. Eight of the LMSRs are earmarked for afloat prepositioning. Increased overseas land-based prepositioning will also improve force closure times. According to the 1995 National Military Strategy, three additional Army heavy brigade sets will be prepositioned ashore, complementing the brigade set prepositioned on ships. While these mobility enhancements will improve the nation's ability to fight and win two nearly simultaneous MRCs, most originated from the recommendations of the 1991
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Mobility Requirements Study. A 1995 GAO report to Congress noted this study had:

recommended the acquisition of additional C-17 aircraft and sealift ships and the prepositioning of Army equipment on ships. It stated that this recommendation did not provide sufficient capability to handle a second conflict [emphasis added].

Furthermore, the “Force for 2000” MRC slide stated “completion of C-17 buy and purchase of 20 large, medium speed RO-ROs required for all strategies,” including the “Win 1 MRC With Hold In Second” option. Finally, the MRS-BIRU did not analyze lift requirements for a two MRC scenario that required redeploying units from ongoing lesser contingencies or swinging units from the first to the second conflict, both of which would further stress the mobility force. Perhaps it was for these reasons that Senator McCain recently wrote that “when the C-17 airlift aircraft and other air and sealift enhancement programs are completed early in the next decade, they will still not provide the full capacity necessary to quickly deploy the forces required to win a major regional conflict.”

Strike Capability of Navy Carrier Airwings. Current efforts to improve the striking power of the Navy’s carriers include plans to fly additional aircraft to forward-deployed wings in the event of a conflict and procuring additional preferred munitions. The BUR also recommended procuring the F/A-18E/F strike fighter, which will have a slightly greater range and payload capability than the F/A-18C. F/A-18E/Fs will begin to enter the active inventory around the turn of the century, helping to offset the shortfall created by the BUR’s early retirement of the A-6 strike fighter. The Navy will begin to take delivery of the Joint Strike Fighter with its next-generation stealth and weapon systems technologies around the year 2010. While these enhancements are needed,
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fiscal constraints have had an impact on the lethality of carrier airwings. To man its 10 active airwings fully, the Navy requires a total of 30 F/A-18 squadrons (three squadrons for a total of 36 F/A-18s in each wing). Only 26 Navy F/A-18 active component squadrons are funded, leaving a shortfall of four squadrons. The gap is partially met by the Marine Corps, which has integrated three of its F/A-18 squadrons into carrier airwings. While this arrangement may help meet peacetime operational requirements, the continuing F/A-18 shortfall would affect the warfighting capability of the Navy or the Marine Corps in a two-MRC scenario.

Conventional Strike Capabilities of Long-range Bombers. With the post-Cold War shift away from forward basing, forces capable of striking directly from bases in the United States, including bomber forces, are critical to responding to short-notice regional crises. Despite planned enhancements, the ability of the bomber force to effectively respond to two nearly simultaneous MRCs is in doubt. The BUR recommended maintaining a force of up to 184 bombers, 100 of which would be capable of deploying to a single MRC. Ongoing conventional enhancements include modifications “to improve their ability to deliver ‘smart’ conventional munitions against attacking enemy forces and fixed targets.”

The BUR approved Air Force plans to acquire all-weather munitions “to attack and destroy critical targets in the crucial opening days of a short-warning conflict.” As a result, several munitions programs were accelerated and the total planned buys increased. However, as the Air Force’s 1992 Bomber Roadmap indicates, the majority of these enhancements were planned well in advance of the BUR. Furthermore, the BUR did not halt bomber force reductions or recommend procuring additional B-2s, instigating numerous calls to reevaluate the Air Force’s bomber programs. In May 1995, The Center For Security Policy unequivocally declared “the United States urgently requires a larger, more flexible and more stealthy manned bomber force than even the Bottom-Up
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Review envisioned, to say nothing of the far smaller force supported by the Clinton administration's budgets.71 This sentiment was echoed in a letter sent to House Appropriations Committee Chairman Robert L. Livingston by Air Force General (retired) Charles A. Horner. General Horner, architect of the Gulf War air campaign, wrote, "By any measure 20 B-2s are not enough . . . a force of 40 or more B-2s is a reasonable estimate." 72 Finally, the force of 100 deployable bombers for a single MRC recommended by the BUR required bombers to swing from one MRC to a second conflict should one occur. During his 16 April 1995 testimony to the House National Security Committee, Commander of the Air Force Air Combat Command General John M. Loh declared this operational concept untested and risky. General Loh followed by stating the nation needed about 180 operational bombers for two MRCs, excluding aircraft for backup inventory, attrition reserves, and flight test.73 In other words, General Loh was saying DOD's plan to maintain a total of 181 bombers was insufficient for a two-MRC strategy.

Modernization. In order to be able to execute a two nearly simultaneous MRC strategy, the BUR recommended continuing a number of other weapon system modernization programs and procuring additional advanced munitions for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. However, recent events indicate the defense budget proposed by the Administration may be under-funding service requirements. In March 1996, The Washington Times reported Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General John Shalikashvili informed Secretary Perry that "we risk future combat readiness of the U.S. military if we fail to adequately fund recapitalization, starting in 1997 . . . I urge you to set a procurement goal of about $60 billion per year beginning in fiscal year 1998." The proposed FY97 budget contains only $38.9 billion for defense procurement, a $3.4 billion reduction from FY96. Procurement would increase to $45.5 billion by 1998, but would not reach $60 billion until the year 2001. In follow-up testimony to the
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Senate Armed Services Committee, General Shalikashvili remarked "I am very concerned that our procurement accounts are not where... I think they ought to be."24 In a 13 March 1996 House National Security Committee hearing, each of the four service chiefs echoed General Shalikashvili's assessment and recited a number of unfunded requirements. Commandant of the Marine Corps General Charles C. Krulak bluntly stated, "I think all of the chiefs believe $60 billion is where we ought to be."75 Air Force Chief of Staff General Ronald Fogleman told members of the committee, "It's clear that in this budget we have a fiscally constrained modernization program." Asked if he had a "theoretical list" of programs they could use additional funding for, Army Chief of Staff General Dennis Reimer stated "we're short some 40,000 trucks—in excess of 40,000 trucks." Replying to the same question, General Fogleman indicated the Air Force could immediately use over $100 million for advanced munitions. The most telling comment came from Chief of Naval Operation Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda: "I don't have a hypothetical list, I've got a real list, of things that we've thought about, gotten approved, would fund if we had more money, but simply don't have enough."76

The Joint Chiefs' concerns are partially because of the resource priorities established by the BUR. While the BUR mandate was to shrink the post-Cold War force structure, Congress and the Clinton administration were determined not to return to the "hollow force" of the 1970s. As a result, Secretary Aspin established readiness and sustainability as his top resource priorities, followed by force structure, high leverage science and technology programs, systems acquisition, and infrastructure and overhead. These priorities are reflected in the administration's post-BUR budget. Compared to the Bush administration's final budget plan, the Clinton administration stressed operations and maintenance funding, which is directly related to short-term readiness. In 1994, the Congressional Research Service reported: "almost
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all of the Clinton administration’s projected defense savings were due to (1) trimming pay raises and (2) paring weapons acquisition."

| TABLE 5: DIFFERENCES BETWEEN CLINTON AND BUSH LONG-TERM DOD BUDGET PLANS
| (Budget Authority, Current Year $ Billions) |
| Fiscal Year | FY94 | FY95 | FY96 | FY97 | FY98 | FY99 | FY95-99 |
| Personnel | -1.8 | -1.7 | -6.1 | -8.4 | -10.7 | -11.9 | -40.6 |
| Operations/Maintenance | -1.8 | +4.7 | -0.1 | +0.1 | -2.7 | -2.9 | -2.8 |
| Procurement | -13.5 | -18.5 | -15.7 | -16.3 | -14.1 | -14.7 | -82.9 |
| RDT&E | -0.1 | +0.3 | +4.3 | +1.3 | +0.8 | +0.8 | +7.4 |
| Military Construction | -0.4 | -0.7 | -0.3 | -0.2 | -0.4 | -0.2 | -2.3 |
| Family Housing | -121.2 |

These resource priorities may have been appropriate in a period of downsizing when modernization programs were sustained by previously approved funding, but as they enter the eighth straight year of decreasing defense budgets, the services are concerned with the overall balance between current and future readiness, as Admiral Boorda declared to the Senate Armed Services Committee:

As you know, we’ve stressed readiness ... And we have shortchanged modernization to do that. We have a particular problem in the out years, where bills are going to come due to buy things to keep the Navy ready in the future. So it’s really future readiness we’re talking about.78

Army National Guard Readiness-Enhanced Brigades. Evidence suggests the current readiness of the Army’s 15 readiness-enhanced National Guard brigades remains below that envisioned by the BUR. During the Desert Shield buildup
in 1990, President Bush authorized the mobilization of three Army Guard "roundout" combat brigades to join their designated active component units. Because of extensive training requirements, none of the brigades deployed to the Persian Gulf. As a result of the BUR, the Army eliminated the roundup and roundout brigades in favor of 15 enhanced Army National Guard brigades that will, if required, reinforce active units deploying to a second MRC. These brigades are intended to be combat ready within 90 days after mobilization. In 1995 the U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) evaluated the readiness of seven of the enhanced brigades. The GAO determined none met their peacetime training goals and probably could not meet their deployment goals. Estimates of the time required to achieve combat ready status ranged up to 154 days after unit mobilization. While the Army protested that the increased resources provided the units are intended to prepare them to meet their deployment goals by 1998, the GAO maintained "prospects for the brigades to be ready to deploy 90 days after mobilization are uncertain."79

Support Forces. In March 1992, the GAO reported to Congress that Army support forces "were critical to the success of Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm."80 The GAO also concluded that while the Army deployed about 8 of its 18 divisions to Desert Storm, almost all of some types of nondivisional support units were required to support them. This reinforced Aspin's belief that a smaller force provided with adequate support could deal with simultaneous contingencies. While the BUR reduced the number of Army active divisions, there are still significant shortfalls in their support forces. In 1995 the GAO reported "the Army does not have sufficient nondivisional support units to support its current active combat force" for a two-MRC scenario.81 The 1996 Strategic Assessment published by the Institute for National Strategic Studies also concluded, "The Army overall is considerably short of support forces (such as MPs,
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engineers, transportation units, etc.) to prosecute two MRCs. Estimates of the aggregate support deficiency range between 60,000 and 110,000 personnel."82 Even the Army's latest Total Army Analysis study projected a shortfall of 60,000 support personnel.83

As a partial solution to this shortfall, the GAO recommended the Army should consider reallocating some of its National Guard division assets to support the active combat force, based on their assessment that the actual combat role of the divisions was limited:

The Guard's eight combat divisions and three separate combat units are not required to accomplish the two-conflict strategy, according to Army war planners and war planning documents that we reviewed. The Army's war planners at headquarters and at U.S. Forces Command stated that these forces are not needed during or after hostilities cease for one or more major regional conflicts. Moreover, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have not assigned the eight combat divisions or the three separate combat units for use in any major regional conflict currently envisioned in DOD planning scenarios.84

The BUR maintained eight Army National Guard divisions to provide a rotational or replacement base for active forces engaged in prolonged operations, act as a strategic reserve and perform a variety of support missions for civilian authorities within the U.S. Preparing these divisions for actual combat would delay their deployment until well past the time they would be needed to augment the active force in the MRC scenarios the DOD uses to size its forces. Since adequate support is essential for fighting and winning two nearly-simultaneous MRCs with the smaller BUR force, the GAO's recommendation that the Army should consider converting a number of Guard combat units to meet the active component support shortfall may have merit.
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CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

There is no doubt that we must continue to send our soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines into harm’s way. We must ensure, as we draw our forces down, that we don’t end up with a force that is hollow or one that is unprepared for the dangers and challenges of the future.\(^6\)

General Colin Powell

Since the end of the Cold War, two Administrations have conducted separate assessments of the nation’s security strategy and military forces. While both reviews advocated strategies to shape the international environment by engaging globally and remaining prepared to fight two MRCs, the BUR recommended a force structure about 35 percent smaller than the Base Force and reduced funding for modernization significantly. Many believe, with some justification, that the smaller BUR force was actually the product of a top-down, fiscally driven process that was intended to identify the least-cost instead of the most effective means to achieve U.S. security objectives.\(^6\) Furthermore, the DOD employed the same methodology for sizing and shaping forces for regional conflicts it had used for most of the Cold War, assuming this would provide the necessary capabilities for “lesser” missions also. As operational tempos remain the highest they have ever been in peacetime, emerging shortfalls are beginning to degrade the services’ ability to respond to higher priority taskings. These shortfalls will continue to grow as fiscal priorities continue to limit critical enhancements, modernization programs, and support capabilities that are intended to give a win-lose-win force the capability to win two MRCs nearly-simultaneously.

An Ends-Means Mismatch?
In the BUR final report, Secretary Aspin explained the Nation must field sufficient capability to deter a second aggressor
from taking advantage of U.S. forces engaged in an MRC in another region, fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously should deterrence fail, and hedge against larger-than-expected threats in the future. Force enhancements and adequate support constitute the critical difference in capability for the BUR MRC force. Recent evidence suggests that while there has been progress in implementing the BUR's recommendations, fiscal constraints have had a significant impact on fielding the kind of capabilities the nation needs to fight and win two MRCs nearly simultaneously. Despite shortfalls in modernization programs and support capabilities, few would challenge that the BUR force is a credible deterrent to a potential second aggressor. It should also be capable of fighting and winning two MRCs; however, it may not be able to meet the BUR nearly simultaneous timeline. Furthermore, without additional near-term funding for recapitalization, modernization and support, future readiness will be affected and the nation may not have an adequate hedge against the potential emergence of a more robust threat or coalition of adversaries.

Beyond the Bottom-Up Review
There are a number of lessons to be learned from the second effort to fashion a security strategy and force structure for the post-Cold War era. The first step of the next review should be to develop a fully coordinated interagency national security strategy that identifies the environment, likely threats, prioritizes national interests, and integrates all of the instruments of national power. Building a military force without this foundation and interagency participation will not lead to a coherent end product. There may even be value in encouraging the development of competing national security strategies, as President Dwight D. Eisenhower's "New Look" defense review did in the early 1950s. Second, DOD should not conduct the next review under the pressure of realizing a specific peace dividend. While broad fiscal guidance will
always constrain the means available to force planners, the review should focus on maximizing capability for different budget levels instead of seeking the least-cost means to perform different missions. Discarding a traditional threat/scenario-based methodology in favor of capabilities-based planning may help achieve this end, move the DOD away from planning for the last war, and identify requirements for the full spectrum of operations. Depending on the national security strategy, MRCs may no longer be the most stressing case for sizing many of the nation's general purpose forces. Lesser contingencies that induce high peacetime operational tempos may have a greater impact on sizing the force than assumed previously. Resource priorities should also balance current readiness with force modernization. While the credibility of the nation's defense posture would be hurt by a return to the hollow force of the 1970s, maintaining current readiness at the expense of future readiness is a zero-sum game. Finally, the next review should evaluate the reserve component force mix to determine its contribution towards achieving national security objectives in peace and in war. Adjusting reserve forces will remain a politically sensitive issue, but it may be the best way in the near-term to reallocate resources to higher priority needs, including the Army's continuing support shortfall.

By allowing the services to downsize without becoming hollow, identifying key programs requiring continued investment, and cutting defense spending to a level that is more suitable for the post-Cold War era, the BUR has served the Nation well. However, as the end of the 20th century approaches, it is apparent that a troubling mismatch between the means and ends of the National Military Strategy is beginning to emerge. As Secretary Perry recently announced, maintaining a quality force in the future may require the nation to "either cut forces and give up our military strategy, or put in more resources." If changes of this magnitude are necessary, they must not be done capriciously or
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incrementally. Moving beyond the BUR will require another comprehensive review of the capabilities the Nation will need to protect its security interests in the 21st century, a review that builds on the lesson learned from the first two post-Cold War restructuring efforts.

NOTES


4. On September 1991, Aspin tasked two of his key analysts, Dr. Clark Murdock and Joel Resnick, to develop a methodology for identifying capabilities needed for a post-Cold War security environment. The Aspin white papers were largely the work of these two men, including force Options A-C. Dr. Murdock, author's interview, Washington, DC: 15 March 1996.


6. Chairman Les Aspin, "An Approach to Sizing American Conventional Forces For The Post-Soviet Era: Four Illustrative Options" (Washington, D.C.: House Armed Services Committee, 25 February 1992), 2-3. The paper also introduced a building block approach to determining forces required for typical missions. In Aspin's lexicon, a "Desert Storm equivalent" described the capability required to fight a major regional contingency (MRC), a "Panama equivalent" as the force needed to conduct an operation similar to Just Cause and a "Provide Comfort equivalent" as a yardstick for humanitarian assistance missions. A Desert Storm equivalent included "six heavy divisions, an air-transportable early-arriving light division, one Marine division on land and an excess of one brigade at sea, 24 Air Force fighter squadrons, 70 heavy bombers" and four carrier battlegroups. This did not equal the forces that actually deployed to Desert Storm. Aspin excluded a number of Air Force and Marine Corps fighter units that lacked precision attack capability and two carrier battlegroups

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the theater commander-in-chief had not requested. Ibid., 15.
7. Ibid., 21.
8. Dr Murdock confirmed this was the underlying strategy for
Aspin's force options.
Budget: Hearing before the House Budget Committee, 102nd Cong., 2nd sess.,
Office, 1992), 11-12. Option A would save $231 billion, Option B $187
billion, and Option D $38 billion. Aspin used the FY'92 Bush budget
request for FY93-97 as his baseline for calculating savings.
11. Ibid., 15-16.
12. Chairman Les Aspin, "New Era Requires Re-Thinking U.S.
Military Forces," news release (Washington, DC: House Armed Services
Committee, 6 January 1992), 1.
13. Ibid., 2.
a New Basis for U.S. Military Forces," briefing to the Atlantic Council of the
United States (Washington, DC: House Armed Services Committee, 6
15. Aspin, "Four Illustrative Options," 20; Chart IV.
16. Aspin was not the only member of Congress who believed deeper
cuts were feasible. During the budget debate, Senate Budget Committee
Chairman Jim Sasser called for doubling the Bush budget cuts while
Senator Edward M. Kennedy indicated $210 billion in defense spending
could be saved over the next seven years. Senators Bentsen, Bradley, Roth,
Gramm, and McCain also proposed deeper cuts that could pay for domestic
initiatives. In fact, a May 1992 Congressional Research Service report
indicated a total of sixteen members of Congress had proposed alternative
defense spending proposals, including Les Aspin.
17. Ibid., 322.
18. Reuters transcript report of the Senate Armed Services Committee
confirmation hearings for Secretary of Defense, 7 January 1993, 68-69.
20. Ibid., 16.
22. Frank G. Wisner and Admiral David E. Jeremiah, U.S. Navy,
"Toward A National Security Strategy for the 1990s" (Washington, DC:
23. Ibid., 24.
24. Ibid., 5. In other words, it was time for a larger peace dividend.
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25. Ibid., 28-29.
26. Ibid., 30.
27. A number of service representatives assigned to work BUR issues criticized the analysis underlying the assessment, including the assumption that coalition forces would be present to help U.S. forces during both MRCs.
28. Joint Staff J-8 Division, "Force for 2000," an unpublished briefing presented to Secretary Aspin (Washington, DC: 8 May 1993). "AC" means active component; "RC" means reserve component; "CVBG" is the abbreviation for carrier battle group, and "MEB" is a Marine Expeditionary Brigade.
30. Ibid., 3.
31. Ibid., 3-4.
33. Ibid., A7.
36. Ibid., 29-31.
37. Ibid., 30.
38. Ibid., 23.
40. Lt Col Scott Dorff, U.S. Air Force, interview, Washington, DC, 15 March 1996. Lt Col Dorff was a member of Secretary Ochmanek's staff during the BUR.
42. Ibid., 1.
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45. Ibid., iii.
46. Johan Benson, "Conversations with William Perry," Aerospace America, October 1994, 11. Cheney has stated that while the U.S. could still win a Desert Storm-size conflict in the Gulf, military forces could not deploy as rapidly, the war would last longer, and casualties would be greater.
48. Wisner and Jeremiah. Clearly, the world had changed since President Bush first announced the Base Force in 1990. As a result, Secretary Cheney and General Powell had already proposed additional force cuts and program terminations in 1991 and 1992. In fact, General Powell had developed a "Base Force II" by late 1992 but withheld it pending the outcome of the election. Deputy Special Assistant to the Air Force Chief of Staff for Long-Range Planning Dr. Clark Murdock, interview, Washington, DC, 15 March 1996. Dr. Murdock was a key aide to Les Aspin in Congress and during his tenure as Secretary of Defense.
51. OSD and the Joint Staff conducted their force analyses with an approximate budget in mind, often seeking the minimum required force in order to meet fiscal guidance. The author participated in several such "budget drills" as the Air Force representative to the Joint Staff division responsible for bomber force issues during the BUR.
56. Davis, 44.
58. Ibid., 2.
BEYOND THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

60. Nor will planned mobility force enhancements fully compensate for problems created by infrastructure limitations.
64. Ibid., 19.
65. National Military Strategy, 18. Two of the sets will be deployed to Southwest Asia and one in South Korea.
MARK A. GUNZINGER


86. BUR analyses were also constrained by the need to issue meaningful fiscal guidance to the services in time for them to adjust their budgets.


APPENDIX A:
Building a Base Force for the
Post-Cold War Era

We are entering a new era. The defense strategy and military structure needed to ensure peace can and must be different.
President George Bush, 2 August 1990

On 4 November 1990, slightly over a month after assuming the position of Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Colin Powell began brainstorming about the potential course of world events over the next 5 years. According to his memoirs, General Powell believed a neutral Eastern Europe, a unified Germany, and a less-threatening Soviet Union were all plausible futures the DOD should consider as it developed the next Future Year Defense Plan (FYDP). His timing was impeccable. Within a week, the Berlin Wall had fallen and General Powell had presented his strategic vision to Secretary of Defense Cheney and President Bush. The President directed the Chairman to “proceed with caution,” initiating a review that would produce the first U.S. defense strategy for a post-Cold War world. At the beginning of the last decade of the 20th century, the Bush Administration was struggling with record budget deficits, a disintegrating Soviet empire, and the resulting congressional pressure for significant defense reductions. Two days after Powell’s briefing to the President, Secretary Cheney directed the services to plan for a $176 billion budget cut over the next 3 years. While many in Congress were pleased the administration had acknowledged the opportunity to realize a “peace dividend,” others pointed out the proposed cuts were not based on a coherent strategy. Senator Sam Nunn, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, voiced a concern that would be repeated over the next 2 years:

In general, Secretary Cheney and General Powell have begun the process of restructuring our military establishment in response to the fiscal threat, but not yet in response to the changes in military threat...the Congress will have to act if the Defense Department does not.
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The DoD did act. Over the next 8 months, OSD, the Joint Staff and the services refined General Powell’s ideas, developing what became the “Base Force” for a new, regionally oriented national security strategy. One of the more innovative aspects of General Powell’s strategic vision was the concept of moving from a “threat-based” to a “capabilities-based” force sized to perform broad missions. This force would be capable of deterring and defending against uncertain threats to U.S. security interests in critical regions.4 According to General Powell, the Base Force consisted of four basic packages: a force capable of fighting a major conventional conflict across the Atlantic, another to fight a similar war across the Pacific, one that could deploy from the United States to a lesser contingency such as Operation Just Cause, and a smaller but credible force for nuclear deterrence.5 President Bush approved the Base Force on 1 August 1990, with the building blocks proposed by General Powell as its strategic heart. On 2 August 1990, one day before the start of what became America’s first post-Cold War conflict, President Bush unveiled the new national security strategy in a speech to the Aspen Institute.6

A New Security Paradigm
The strategy announced by President Bush discarded a 40-year focus on containing communism in favor of meeting regional challenges to U.S. national interests. Officially published in August 1991, the four pillars of the National Security Strategy of the United States were strategic deterrence and defense, maintaining a credible forward presence, responding to regional crises, and preserving the ability to reconstitute new forces as a hedge against uncertainty.7 The Base Force to meet the requirements of the strategy would result in a 25 percent active component force reduction over the next five years. The administration’s overall intent was to “build down” to meet the new security imperatives, not just preserve a smaller version of a Cold War force. Robust research and development would continue in order to gain the high-tech capabilities the nation would need for the next century. Readiness and force structure received top priority for resources, followed by force sustainability, and science and technology.8
Congressional Reaction
While the Base Force would lead to a 25 percent force reduction, it did not translate into an equivalent cut in the defense budget. The budget presented to Congress by Secretary Cheney assumed force modernization would continue, resulting in a 10 percent decrease in defense spending by FY95 after adjusting for inflation. This was less than half the savings desired by the House and Senate Budget Committees. Although both the administration and Congress were seeking to reduce the budget deficit, the Administration wanted to do so without gutting defense or resorting to new taxes, while Congress intended to minimize cuts in domestic spending. Within a few days, Chairman of the House Armed Services Committee Les Aspin countered Cheney's proposal by publicizing a Congressional Budget Office study illustrating how a 25 percent force cut could translate into a 18-27 percent budget reduction over 5 years. However, given the still-uncertain course of events in the Soviet Union, Congress was unwilling to insist on significantly deeper cuts. After considerable bargaining, the President and Congress compromised at $288 billion in budget authority for FY91 versus $307 billion originally requested in January 1990, with $291.6 billion for FY92 and $291.8 billion for FY93. More importantly, Congress agreed not to tap the defense budget to fund discretionary domestic programs for the next three years. While debate over the new strategy and force structure continued, the budget agreement, combined with the success of Desert Storm, helped forestall initiatives for reducing defense spending until the eve of the next Presidential election year.

Two imperatives emerged from the 1990 defense debate: the need to develop a national security strategy and force structure that recognized the changing environment and cut defense spending. These imperatives were also evident during the FY93-97 budget cycle. The defense budget submitted to Congress on 29 January 1992 proposed $280.9 billion in spending authority for FY93. This $11 billion cut reflected the President's decision to curtail strategic force modernization programs in response to the breakup of the Warsaw Pact. Over the FYDP, the Administration planned to save about $50 billion by buying fewer B-2s, ending Seawolf submarine production, and terminating the mobile Peacekeeper ICBM, mobile small ICBM, and Short Range Attack Missile-II programs. Despite
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the Administration’s proposal, Aspin challenged Secretary Cheney
at a 6 February meeting of the House Armed Services Committee,
declaring “the base force budget you’ve submitted looks to me very
much like a one-revolution budget in a two-revolution world,”
setting the stage for Aspin’s alternative force proposals.13

NOTES

vol. 5, no. 31 (Washington, DC: Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense
for Public Affairs, 1990), 1.
2. Colin Powell, and Joseph E. Persico, My American Journey (New
York: Random House, 1995), 440. Towards the end of his tenure as
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral William Crowe had also
tasked the Joint Staff to develop options for a smaller force.
4. Robert P. Haffa, Jr., “A ‘New Look’ At the Bottom-Up Review:
Planning U.S. General Purpose Forces For A New Century,” Strategic
5. Powell, 452; 458.
6. A concurrent OSD review led by Under Secretary of Defense for
Policy Paul Wolfowitz produced similar strategy and force
recommendations.
8. The final Bush administration regional security strategy, published
in January 1993, added systems acquisition, infrastructure, and overhead
to the resource priority list. Secretary of Defense Richard B. Cheney,
Defense Strategy for the 1990s: The Regional Defense Strategy (Washington, DC:
Influences in Executive Decisionmaking, Post-Cold War, 1989-91,”
Professional Readings in Military Strategy no. 8 (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S.
Army War College Strategic Studies Institute), 29.
Defense?” CRS Issue Brief IB90061 (Washington, DC: Congressional
Research Service, 17 December 1990), CRS-1.
11. President George Bush, from a DOD transcript of a White House
12. This was a decline of about 4.6 percent from the FY92 baseline
budget, after adjusting for inflation.
BEYOND THE BOTTOM-UP REVIEW

APPENDIX B

**TABLE 1: ASPIN’S CHANGING SECURITY ENVIRONMENT**

Chairman Aspin’s concept of the post-Cold War security environment, delivered in a presentation to the Atlantic Council on 6 January 1992.¹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old World</th>
<th>New World</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>AMERICAN PERCEPTIONS</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soviet Military Power</td>
<td>Spread of Nuclear Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Terrorism</td>
<td>Regional Thugs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Drug Traffickers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Soviet Attack</td>
<td>Instability in the Former Soviet</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Republics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Japanese economic power</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic Power Assumed</td>
<td>Declining Defense Budgets</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High Defense Budgets</td>
<td>Domestic Security Concerns</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Global Security Concerns</td>
<td>Paramount</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Paramount</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| THE THREAT                |                                    |
|---------------------------|                                    |
| Single (Soviet)           | Diverse                            |
| Survival at Stake         | Interests/Americans at Stake        |
| Known                     | Unknown                             |
| Deterrable                | Non-deterrable                      |
| Strategic Use of Nukes    | Terroristic use of Nukes           |
| Overt                     | Covert                             |
| Europe-Centered           | Regional, Ill-Defined              |
| High Risk of Escalation   | Little risk of Escalation           |

| MILITARY FORCES           |                                    |
|---------------------------|                                    |
| Attrition Warfare         | Decisive Attacks on Key Nodes      |
| War by Proxy              | Direct Involvement                  |
| High Tech Dominant        | High-Medium-Low Tech Mix            |
| Forward Deployed          | Power Projection                    |
| Forward Based             | U.S.-Based                          |
| Host-Nation Support       | Self Reilant                        |

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FIGURE 1: ASPIN'S FOUR FORCE OPTIONS
Chairman Aspin's four force alternatives to the Base Force, presented to the House Budget Committee on 25 February 1992. Aspin later advocated Congress should favor Option C.²
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dangers</th>
<th>Strategies/Capabilities</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
<td>Deterrence, Defense and Conventional Counterforce</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residual Russian Nuclear Arsenal</td>
<td>- Selective retaliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Regional Aggression</td>
<td>- Ballistic missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Large-scale aggression</td>
<td>- Air defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- State sponsored terrorism</td>
<td>- Disarming attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Internal instability, conflict</td>
<td>Deterrence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Ethnic, religious, other conflict</td>
<td>- Survivable forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>- Subversion, lawlessness vs. friendly</td>
<td>- Selective and large-scale nuclear retaliation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>governments</td>
<td>Deter/defeat regional aggressors</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reversal of reform in FSU</td>
<td>- Timely power projection capabilities</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deterioration of economic ties</td>
<td>- Overseas presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Combined training</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Punitive attacks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Counter-terrorist operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Prevention/resolution of internal conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Intervention, Peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- “Nation assistance”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Non-combat evacuation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Overseas presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Humanitarian operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Disaster relief and recovery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Long-term Preparedness</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Mobilization base</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capabilities to rebuild forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Security partnerships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Overseas presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>- Capabilities to underwrite alliance commitments</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
TABLE 3: BUR RECOMMENDED FORCE STRUCTURE FOR 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Army</th>
<th>10 divisions (active)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>5+ divisions (reserve)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>11 aircraft carriers (active)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1 aircraft carrier (reserve/training)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>45-55 attack submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>346 ships</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>13 fighter wings (active)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7 fighter wings</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 184 bombers (B-52H, B-1, B-2)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marine Corps</td>
<td>3 Marine Expeditionary Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>174,000 personnel (active end-strength)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>42,000 personnel (reserve end-strength)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Nuclear Forces (by 2003)</td>
<td>18 ballistic missile submarines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Up to 94 B-52H bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>20 B-2 bombers</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>500 Minuteman III ICBMs (single warhead)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 4: BUSH BASELINE VERSUS CLINTON FUTURE YEARS DEFENSE PROGRAM

(Billions of Dollars in Budget Authority)

Secretary Aspin estimated the BUR's recommendations would save about $91 billion over the 1995-99 FYDP. Since the President's target was to cut $104 billion from the Bush baseline budget, Aspin mandated an additional $13 billion cut would be spread across the first four years of the FYDP. 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Baseline</th>
<th>FY95</th>
<th>FY96</th>
<th>FY97</th>
<th>FY98</th>
<th>FY99</th>
<th>FY95-99</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Clinton Budget</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>236</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>250</td>
<td>1,221</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reduction</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>104</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
FIGURE 2: ACHIEVING NATIONAL MILITARY OBJECTIVES


FIGURE 3: U.S. AIR FORCE PERSONNEL DEPLOYED OVERSEAS

(exercises and operational commitments)

This graph excludes forces deployed during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm. The Army and the Navy have reported similar increases in their peacetime deployment rates.
The Bottom-Up Review maintained a large percentage of the Army's support units in the reserve component, assuming they would mobilize to support active components in time of war. This may impact the Army's ability to support multiple simultaneous taskings in peacetime.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Unit Type</th>
<th>Number Units</th>
<th>Combined Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army National Guard</td>
<td>Army Reserve</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Water Supply Battalions</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil Affairs Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum Support Battalions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Brigades</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hospitals</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>47</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Groups</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Motor Battalions</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maintenace Battalions</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalions (Combat Heavy)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engineer Battalions (Combat)</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Psychological Operations Units</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Battalions</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Police Brigade</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES
5. Ibid., 107-108. These figures do not include Department of Energy defense-related funding.
7. Data obtained from a briefing prepared by the author for the former Chief of Staff of the United States Air Force General Merrill A. McPeak, updated 16 March 1996.

5

THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA

WHEN TECHNOLOGY AND ORGANIZATIONAL ORIENTATION COLLIDE

GREGORY A. ROMAN

One of the least controversial things that can be said about command and control is that it is controversial, poorly understood, and subject to wildly different interpretation. The term can mean almost everything from military computers to the art of generalship: whatever the user wishes it to mean.

Kenneth Moll (1978)

COMMAND AND CONTROL, A PHRASE VERY FAMILIAR TO THE military, is subject to much confusion and misinterpretation. What does "command and control" really mean and is the current command and control orientation the proper one for an information-age military? These are important questions as the U.S. military grapples with the potentially revolutionary changes brought on by modern

This essay won Distinguished Essay recognition in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition. Lieutenant Colonel Gregory A. Roman, U.S. Air Force, wrote the paper while a student at the Air War College.
information technology. If information-age technology is indeed contributing to a Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), then organizational structures and associated command and control orientation must change. In 1995, the Secretary of Defense stated:

Historically, an RMA occurs when the incorporation of new technologies into military systems combines with the innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptations to fundamentally alter the character and conduct of military operations.²

These organizational changes are occurring in the business world, but can the same be said for the military? The Air Force Scientific Advisory Boards (SAB) 1995 *New World Vistas* report notes:

Even the most casual glance at business history makes it clear that each time a new information infrastructure becomes available (e.g., railroad, telegraph, telephone) the entities which are ultimately most successful are also the first to reshape their structures in order to gain maximum advantage of the new information conduits. The new networks emerging today are “geodesic,” that is global, non-hierarchical, and without any central node.³

The SAB concludes with the optimistic view that “it is a safe bet that our [military] organizations will follow suit.”⁴ However, this may be easier said than done given the historical resistance of military organizations in adapting to new organizational orientations.

The U.S. military services have thus far failed to create the innovative operational concepts and make the organizational adaptations needed for the information age. The U.S. military remains rooted in an industrial-age command and control paradigm, where control is emphasized over command. As
THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA

pointed out in the draft Warfighting Vision 2010, "technological enhancements may have made 'control' an anathema to 'command'". This is certainly true of the modern U.S. military. The dilemma is that for an information-age military the correct organizational orientation may no longer be one of command and control, but one of command or control. Centralized control exercised by hierarchical organizations may no longer be possible or desirable in a fast tempo war. Failure to address this dilemma could result in a military not prepared for the operations tempo of information-age warfare. As Major General J.F.C. Fuller points out, "The highest inventive genius must be sought not so much amongst those who invent new weapons as among those who devise new fighting organizations." However, creating new organizational orientations has never been easy. Brigadier J.P. Kiszely expands Fuller's view:

Without originality, let alone genius, the new technologies will merely be grafted on to existing organizations and doctrines in a way designed to cause the least inconvenience and least unpleasantness in peacetime. The risks of having operated on this principle in the past are as nothing to the dangers of doing so in the future.

Unfortunately, by viewing the benefits of information technology within the current military command and control orientation, technology may be used in a manner that is the exact opposite of what is most desired.

The seductive nature of information technology is in stimulating military organizational orientation towards greater centralized control and more rigid hierarchical organizations, instead of the desired orientation of decentralized control and more flexible organizations. Unless the U.S. military recognizes the danger of succumbing to technological temptation, control functions may take priority over command functions, resulting in both a less efficient and
GREGORY A. ROMAN

less effective military. While this applies to all the U.S. military services, the command or control dilemma particularly impacts those organizations where centralized control is part of doctrine.

This paper will argue that the corrosive effect of an outdated command and control orientation prevents the U.S. military from fully applying the benefits of information technology. Future warfare, characterized by faster operations tempo, requires a new orientation based not on "centralized control," but on greater decentralized control and more flexible organizational orientation. To better understand this, the definitions of "command and control" are examined to explain why there is so much confusion and misunderstanding. Next, organizational orientation theory is discussed to show how the military traditionally responds to new information technology by emphasizing greater centralized control and rigid hierarchical organizational structures. Then, through the use of an information gathering and decisionmaking model, it can be determined why current U.S. military orientation of centralized control and hierarchical organizational structures is not suited for the high tempo operations expected in the information age. Finally, from theoretical and model analyses, some recommendations are given on what the correct military organizational orientation for the future must be.

A FRAME OF REFERENCE

We are so familiar with the words "command and control" that one may believe no problem exists. After all, these two words sound like a perfect marriage, giving the impression of equal weighting, value, and importance. While few would challenge this observation, there is little consensus on what "command and control" really means.5

Attempts to clarify the "command and control" muddle highlight the difficulty in associating these words together. Is
THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA

this word association healthy, and what happens when certain words fall out of favor? One solution is to invent new word associations.9 For example, command and control ($C^2$) has expanded to $C^3$ and $C^4$ (communications), $C^I$ (intelligence), and $C^I^F$ (interoperability).10 One wonders which word will be added next? Perhaps $C^I^D$ (coordination), or $C^I^F$ (cooperation)? Unfortunately, each new word association that tries to describe new thinking or new technology, does so at the expense of the most important word "command," or what Todd calls "$C_I$."11

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) provide little help in clarifying the confusion over the term "command and control." JCS Pub 0-2 defines "command" as:

The authority that a commander in the Military Service lawfully exercises over subordinates by virtue of rank or assignment. Command includes the authority and responsibility for effectively using available resources and for planning the employment of, organizing, directing, coordinating, and controlling military forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions.12

By definition then, "control" is a component of command. Why then is a distinction made between the word "command and the word "control," and why give preferential treatment to the notion of control but not to those of organizing, directing, or coordinating? Perhaps it is because the U.S. military fails to see the difference.

There are many obvious similarities when comparing "command" with the JCS definition of "command and control":

The exercise of authority and direction by a designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission. Command and control functions are performed through an arrangement of personnel, equipment, communications, facilities, and procedures employed
by a commander in planning, directing, coordinating, and controlling forces and operations in the accomplishment of the mission. 13

The differences between these two definitions are italicized. The latter describes organizational orientation, which will be discussed later. For now, let us focus on the italicized word "direction." Does this imply control? If so, then one would logically expect that the JCS definition of "control" to be:

The exercise of direction by a properly designated commander over assigned and attached forces in the accomplishment of the mission.

This would make sense in explaining that command is the exercise of authority while control is the exercise of direction. However, things are not this easy. Control is also exercised by civilian leadership, such as President Kennedy's EXCOM handling of the Cuban Missile Crisis; or military personnel, like air traffic or weapons controllers, as part of their official duties. Thus, control also applies to people in non-command functions.

Unfortunately, the JCS definition of "control" does little to clear up the confusion:

Authority which may be less than full command exercised by a commander over part of the activities of subordinate or other organizations. 14

Is command defined by "authority for full command exercised by a commander," while control is defined as "authority of less than full command exercised by a commander?" And, if so, what exactly does that mean? It would appear that more accurate, unambiguous, and descriptive definitions are the first step in resolving the command or control dilemma.
THE COMMAND OR CONTROL DILEMMA

Perhaps what is needed is a fresher and simpler perspective. The JCS definition of "command" is a good one and already contains all the essential ingredients necessary for accomplishing the assigned mission. Associating command with control is, at the least, redundant, and at worst, creates an incorrect paradigm that impacts how the U.S. military organizes for future warfare. As Todd points out, "If atoms could be split, so could the act of command. Now, commanders would exercise command and control. Eureka! Never mind that command already implied control. Never mind that without control one could not command." JCS Joint Pub 1 reminds us, "The primary emphasis in command relations should be to keep the chain of command short and simple so that it is clear who is in charge of what." Command, by its very eternity, provides that simple orientation that stands the test of time and introduction of new technology.

AN ORGANIZATIONAL ORIENTATION MODEL
While Van Creveld points out that the functions of command do not change over time, the means to carry out that command change quite often. He divides the means of command into three categories: organizations, procedures, and the technical means which help determine the degree of control exercised by that commander. For example, sensor and communications technologies have changed at a more rapid rate than has organizational structures and operating procedures for employing them. Today's military services have progressed from the telegraph to modern age microburst transmitters, but still operate under the same centralized control and hierarchical organizational orientation employed by Frederick the Great and Napoleon. The danger is that this industrial-age command and control orientation corrodes the benefits offered by this new information technology. The primary impact will be felt if a commander's
information gathering and decision making processes do not keep up with the increased operations tempo of future warfare.

A key characteristic of future warfare is an increased operations tempo that stresses a commander’s ability to observe and react to changes in the battlespace. JCS Pub 3-0 acknowledges that “the tempo of warfare has increased over time as technological advancements and innovative doctrines have been applied to military requirements.” Thus, the commander operating at a slower tempo than the opposing commander is at a greater disadvantage because there is a greater degree of uncertainty. This happens because the commander operating at a faster tempo will always be one step ahead of an adversary and is actually setting the tempo. John Boyd addresses the commanders decisionmaking process as a continuous four-step mental process—Observation, Orientation, Decision, and Action (OODA). Using the Boyd model, successful commanders are those with the capability to operate within their adversaries’ OODA loop.

The ability to observe, orient, decide and act faster than your opponent is necessary for future warfare. In War in the Information Age, General Sullivan, a former U.S. Army Chief of Staff, observes that throughout history the tempo of operations caused by the impact of technology in warfare has accelerated (figure 1).

Information technology has decreased the time available for commanders to gather information and make decisions. Notice that the time differential between Orienting (finding out “What is actually happening?”) and Deciding (“What can I or should I do about it?”) has compressed to the point that in information-age warfare, orienting and deciding can no longer be sequential actions but must be simultaneous and continuous ones. Thus, organizational orientation and procedures are critical components in determining the tempo of a commander’s OODA loop.
To better understand this process, it is worth considering the OODA loop in a different paradigm; as really two separate cycles, or processes, operating at the same time. The first cycle is the Information Gathering Cycle, which addresses the commander's need to find out "What is actually happening?" The second cycle is the Decisionmaking Cycle, which addresses the commander's need to decide "What can I or should I do about it?" In this model, the information cycle loosely incorporates Boyd's Observation and Orient functions while the decisionmaking cycle incorporates the Decision and Action functions. With the use of this model, one can examine the impact of tempo and technology on organizational orientation.

The balance between the information gathering cycle and decisionmaking cycle is critical, because it defines a commanders operating tempo. As Boyd points out, from an external viewpoint it is critical for a commander to operate faster than an adversary or within an adversary's OODA loop. The means to do so, however, require internal balance between a commander's information gathering and decisionmaking cycles. Faster decisions can be possible because of faster information technology. Of course, faster does not imply better information, or even better decisions. Even under ideal conditions, it is difficult to always have "perfect" information and to always make "perfect"
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decisions, a state where the information gathering and
decisionmaking cycles are working in harmony. While
friction will always be a factor, it is technology, organization,
and procedures that balances the information gathering and
decisionmaking cycles. It is the balance between information
gathering and decisionmaking that also determines the
amount of uncertainty in the system.

Organizational orientation determines the degree of
uncertainty a commander is willing to tolerate. Van Creveld
declares that the history of warfare is an endless quest of
decreasing the "realm of uncertainty," resulting in a race
between more information and the ability of technology to
keep up with it.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the choice between centralized or
decentralized control involves the distribution of uncertainty.
Van Creveld believes that while centralized control reduces
uncertainty at the top, it increases uncertainty at the bottom.
Decentralized control has the opposite effect.\textsuperscript{24} Thus, it is
human nature for higher level commanders to reduce their
uncertainty, driving organizational orientation to greater
centralized control. However, the cost for less uncertainty at
the top is more uncertainty at the bottom. The cost for greater
control by commanders is less autonomy in the field.

Unfortunately, the greater the level of control, the less
opportunities for initiative and flexibility where it is needed
most to cope with the dynamics of warfare: at the lower
levels of command. Snyder points out that prior to reliable
long distance communications, commanders wrote orders
with objectives at a level high enough to give lower level
commanders the flexibility to adjust their actions according to
current events.\textsuperscript{25} Commanders expected that communications
would be unreliable and planned accordingly. This is not true
today because information technology is making
communications more available and more reliable.\textsuperscript{26} Better
information technology decreases the need for flexibility and
initiative.
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Modern technological advances, particularly in the area of computers and communications systems, increase the likelihood that the information gathering and decisionmaking cycles will be imbalanced. In fact, technology is the contributing factor for having two separate cycles. In pre-industrial warfare, Alexander the Great's personal command style was such that his information-gathering process and decisionmaking cycles were in harmony. He saw what was happening on the battlefield, made decisions and took actions based on his personal observations. This is the classic OODA loop, a very sequential process. In pre-industrial age warfare, technology, organization, and procedures were relatively simple.

One of the major characteristics of industrial-age warfare is movement made possible by the internal combustion engine. Vehicles, and the things they transport, move at high speeds. Armies are mechanized and mounted. There are relevant objects in space and beneath the sea. All these fast-moving objects must be observed for one to properly orient. Thus, faster operations tempo contributes to greater uncertainty. Faster information-gathering capabilities increase the potential for dealing with panoramic, multimedia changes and suspicious, contradictory or incomplete information, making the decisionmaking process more difficult. Technological advances in the information, intelligence, computer, and communications fields are increasing information-gathering capabilities. The result is a technologically driven faster information-gathering cycle, but a decisionmaking cycle that has not gotten appreciably faster since the days of Alexander the Great. Decisionmaking is still very much a human chore.

Unfortunately, advances in decisionmaking technology, such as computer assisted logic tools and artificial intelligence, have not progressed as rapidly as information gathering technology. Technology is making more and more information available, but the commander's ability to process
and act on that information is still limited to how much the commander's brain can comprehend. As Van Creveld states,

> The paradox is that, though nothing is more important than unity of command, it is impossible for one man to know everything. The larger and more complex the forces he commands, the more true this becomes.²⁸

It is organization and procedures that try to reestablish the balance between the process of information gathering and the process of decisionmaking. Technology and operating procedures can either add friction or mitigate it. Both technology and operating procedures are strongly affected by organizational structure and organizational orientation.

As mentioned earlier, information gathering is critical to addressing the problem of uncertainty. As John Schmitt explains, there are two possible responses. One is to pursue certainty as the basis for command and control. The second is to accept uncertainty as a fact of war and function with it.²⁹ The first response is to eliminate uncertainty by creating a highly efficient command and control structure based on the quest for close control:

> In such a system, the commander controls with a “tight rein.” Command and control is centralized, formal, and inflexible... detailed control requires strict obedience and minimizes subordinate decisionmaking and initiative.³⁰

Thus, there may be greater certainty at the top but decreased certainty at the bottom. As Schmitt points out, if war is inherently uncertain, then this kind of orientation attempts to overcome a fundamental nature of war; there will always be some level of uncertainty that one cannot overcome.³¹

This makes the second approach, that of operating with a certain amount of uncertainty, a more pragmatic command and control orientation. Schmitt states that “rather than
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increasing the degree of certainty we achieve, we reduce the degree of certainty that we need." The result is a command and control orientation that is decentralized:

In such a system, the commander controls with a loose rein, allowing subordinates significant freedom of action and requiring them to act with initiative...command and control is decentralized, informal, and flexible...[which] seeks to increase tempo and improve the ability to deal with fluid and disorderly situation.33

Decentralized control allows for some uncertainty at the top to facilitate greater certainty and decisionmaking at the bottom. The greater the degree of control, the less the number of alternatives available to solving a problem.34 For example, numerous laboratory tests indicate that teams placed under increased stress operate more efficiently and correctly when there is less shared uncertainty coupled with decentralized decisionmaking.35 Thus, the ability to gather vital information and make appropriate decisions rapidly is very dependent on the command and control orientation.

The two most common types of command and control organizational orientations, and hence structures, are hierarchical and networked. The traditional military command and control orientation is hierarchical, because traditionally hierarchical organizations required less communications and substantially simplified the planning and control process.36 George Orr describes a hierarchical organization as one that:

Attempts to turn the entire military force into an extension of the commander. Subordinate levels respond in precise and standardized ways to his orders and provide him with the data necessary to control the entire military apparatus. The emphasis is upon connectivity hierarchy, upon global information gathering or upon passing locally obtained
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information to higher levels, and upon centralized management of the global battle.37

The key is that both information gathering and decisionmaking are under the personal control of the commander. Power at each level of command within the hierarchical organization is a function of both how much information and the kind of information controlled.

However, the first problem is that the very nature of controlling information defeats the optimum use of that information. Information gathering and decisionmaking must be made at each level of command before that information is moved on. At each level of command, the information is filtered, added, deleted, and modified. This is a time-consuming process, often resulting in information not reaching the right people or arriving too late to be of use, and creating a cascade effect, as controlled information becomes slow information. This last point is often cited as a failure of "intelligence" not getting to the right people on time. Perhaps the problem is not with the intelligence process, but rather the hierarchical organization it is supporting. Information must move with a degree of freedom at all levels of command to better balance decisionmaking at all levels of command.

A second problem with hierarchical organizations is a tendency to control decisionmaking at the highest levels of the organization. Again, technological advances drive higher levels of centralized control, threatening to stifle ingenuity and initiative at the lower levels. Combating this temptation requires trust in subordinates. During the Civil War, General Grant, though he had the technical capacity to centrally manage the war, was successful because he "trusted subordinates thoroughly, giving only general directions, not hampering them with petty instructions."38 General Eisenhower seemed to support this approach on the art of high command: "He can and should delegate tactical responsibility and avoid interference in the authority of his
selected subordinates." General Schwartzkopf applied this lesson into joint war fighting by attesting, "I built trust among my components because I trusted them. . . . If you want true jointness, a CINC should not dabble in the details of component business." This freedom from interference is extremely important, as Sir William Slim explains:

Commanders at all levels had to act more on their own; they were given greater latitude to work out their own plans to achieve what they knew was the Army Commander’s intention. In time they developed to a marked degree a flexibility of mind and a firmness of decision that enabled them to act swiftly to take advantage of sudden information or changing circumstances without reference to their superiors.\textsuperscript{41}

Thus, faster decisionmaking in response to the faster tempo of war requires an orientation of decentralized control.

Unlike hierarchical organizations, networked organizations offer a decentralized control orientation that makes better use of information technology. John Arquilla and David Ronfeldt, both of RAND Corporation, point out that the advances in computers and information technologies influence related innovations in organization and management theory.\textsuperscript{42} This is reinforced by John Naisbitt, in Megatrends, and the Air Force SAB, which predicts that organizational changes will result as industrial-based society transitions to an information-based society.\textsuperscript{43}

This trend will drive hierarchical organizations in becoming more networked and centralized control yielding to decentralized control. George Orr defines a networked organization as one that:

views the commander as controlling only in the sense of directing a cooperative problem-solving effort. The emphasis in this style is on autonomous operation at all levels, upon the development of distributed systems and
architectures, upon networking to share the elements needed to detect and resolve possible conflicts, and upon distributed decisionmaking processes.44

In a networked organization, the information gathering process is more equally distributed and more information is available at all levels of command. A networked sharing of information is much different than that of the hierarchical control of information. A faster decisionmaking cycle is possible with shared information, because all levels of command have the same level of certainty.45

Another advantage is that troops engaged will have and generate more information than the "headquarters." If warfare is "chaotic," the chaos arises from adding information or energy to a system. Since troops in contact will be the first to observe that information, they must be empowered to use it for their decisionmaking. What appears to be chaotic and uncertain to the headquarters, may be much less chaotic and much more certain to troops empowered to respond to "local conditions." Headquarters, then, can use information technology, as Boyd suggests, to monitor.

The need to balance legitimate requests for information while allowing subordinate commanders the freedom of action is a difficult one. Prussian leader Von Moltke "the Elder" was one of the first to appreciate the value of the telegraph, but also recognized the increased tendency in using it to find out what was happening at the front.46 In his Thoughts on Command, Von Moltke writes:

The most unfortunate of all supreme commanders is the one who is under close supervision, who has to give an account of his plans and intentions every hour of every day. This supervision may be exercised through a delegate of the highest authority at his headquarters or a telegraph wire attached to his back. In such a case all independence, rapid decision, and audacious risk, without which no war can be conducted, ceases.47
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General Patton, reflecting about WWII in his *Diaries*, complained frequently about being tied to the radio and telephone, noting, "The hardest thing I have to do is to do nothing. There is a terrible temptation to interfere." The key to less interference and greater flexibility and initiative lies in an organizational orientation that promotes sharing of information at all levels.

While the principle of sharing information at all levels of command is important, it is modern information technology that makes it possible. With better communications and computer technology, U.S. Central Command forces shared information during Operation *Ernest Will* in the Persian Gulf with great success. Admiral Tuttle, then Director of the Command, Control, and Communications Directorate of the Joint Staff (J-6), provided communications equipment for sharing information with national and theater level commanders:

With the on-scene commander, Rear Admiral Less, the CINC General Crist in Tampa, Florida, and the Secretary [of Defense] and the Chairman [of the JCS] all having the same picture and same databases, the requirement to communicate diminished markedly. By having red and blue forces depicted in one composite picture, the relative urgency for decisionmaking could be readily determined and priorities set more intelligently.

While shared information decreases uncertainty, it has the added benefit of fostering decisionmaking at lower levels of command. General Crist discovered that because the National Command Authority received the same shared information, they did not feel compelled to monitor or control the operation by "skip echelon." As Paul Strassmann writes, "The more people share information, the more its importance will increase."
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Shared information provides the means to faster and decentralized decisionmaking. To achieve faster decisionmaking, it is critical that all levels of command are operating from a shared vision or commander’s intent. Through a unifying commander’s intent, initiative is generated. Boyd supports this assertion:

This is best accomplished by the exercise of initiative at the lower levels within a chain-of-command. However, this decentralized control of how things are done must be guided by a centralized command of what and why things are done.53

U.S. Marine Corps FMFM 1-1 echoes this: “We generate tempo by creating a command system based on decentralized decisionmaking within the framework of a unifying intent.”54 Therefore, the commander’s role establishes the boundaries within which subordinate commanders can make decisions and increase operating tempo.

However, while a networked organization is better for sharing information, it may prove unsuitable for military commanders dealing with tough decisions in combat. Unlike their business counterparts, military commanders must really make life and death decisions and put subordinates at risk. In a networked organization, who among the collaborators will make those decisions? War requires commanders, not collaborators. Thus, decisionmaking may require a more hierarchical process. Decisions need not always be shared.55 Thus, some type of hierarchical organization is needed to support the decisionmaking process, though it can be made more effective.

The answer is a flattened hierarchical organization which greatly facilitates a commander’s decisionmaking process. The German concept of Auftragstaktik eliminates layers of command between the commander and operational forces, by combining a clearly defined commanders intent with
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decentralized control at all levels of command for greater flexibility, ingenuity, and initiative.\textsuperscript{56} \textit{Auftragstaktik} allowed the Germans the ability to operate within the OODA loop of their adversary.

Thus, the ideal command and control organization combines the shared information-gathering advantages of the networked organization with the decisionmaking advantages of a decentralized, flattened hierarchical organization.\textsuperscript{57} John Warden’s experiences from the Gulf War support this orientation:

The coalition managed its own information requirements acceptably, even though it was organized in the same way Frederick the Great had organized himself. Clear in the future is the requirement to redesign our organizations so they are built to exploit modern information-handling equipment. This also means flattening organizations, eliminating most middle management, pushing decisionmaking to very low levels, and forming worldwide neural networks to capitalize on the ability of units in and out of the direct conflict area.\textsuperscript{58}

Thus, to maximize the advantages from information technology, one must redesign the military organizational orientation, where the emphasis is on command, not control. Modern technology can help redesign a military organization based on a theory of “centralized command—decentralized control and execution,” which mirrors the “massively parallel” designs of modern computers.\textsuperscript{59} To support information gathering,

Each [Basic Action Unit] BAU has direct access to the situation model. This is achieved by linking all the units together in a single data net. . .The BAU commander can then access the battlefield model and pull out the information they need to accomplish their objectives.\textsuperscript{60}
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To support decisionmaking,

The command unit does not issue explicit orders but identifies mission objectives and a focus of main effort. . . the BAUs are given wide latitude in conducting their mission. Coherence is achieved because all the units share a common doctrine, a common goal, and a common view of the situation. . . Instead of waiting for exact orders to funnel through intermediate units, each BAU will access its mission order against the common modal and act accordingly. 61

This concept of a shared information-gathering cycle and a decentralized decisionmaking cycle is being discussed among the military services, but there is little consensus on which direction to take.

ORGANIZATIONAL ORIENTATION REALITY

Each military service must respond to the certainty of high-tempo operations in the future, because there is little argument that the operations tempo of Operation Desert Storm will seem slow compared to that of future wars. Yet, among the U.S. military services, organizational orientations for information-age warfare are striking in their contrasts. For example, each military service has a doctrine to define tempo:

Army: "Tempo is the rate of speed of military action; controlling or altering that rate is essential for maintaining the initiative. A quick tempo demands an ability to make tactical decisions quickly, to execute operations that deny the enemy a pause, and to exploit opportunities according to commander's intent." 62

Marines: "Tempo is a rate or rhythm of activity. Tempo is a significant weapon because it is through a faster tempo that we seize the initiative and dictate the terms of war." 63
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*Navy:* "Tempo is the pace of action—the rate at which we drive events. One way of doing this is to exploit the dynamics of warfighting by maintaining a high tempo."

*Air Force:* No mention of tempo in current or proposed Air Force doctrine. However, "speed" is mentioned as a characteristic of airpower.

Why does the Air Force emphasize speed over tempo? Tempo is speed over time—the consistent ability to operate fast. One might well argue that a more accurate description of a desired characteristic of airpower is tempo, not speed. For example, a characteristic of airpower technology is speed, i.e., the speed of the aircraft, or how long it takes to hit the target, but a more accurate characteristic of command and control orientation is tempo. In a 1995 speech, the Air Force Chief of Staff stated that, "Not too far in the next century, we may be able to engage 1,500 targets within the first hour, if not the first minutes, of a conflict." This describes speed, not tempo. The real question is what happens after the first strike? Does the U.S. Air Force have a command and control orientation that maintains and even increases the tempo of operations to keep those 1,500 targets at risk? If Air Force doctrine remains one of "centralized control, decentralized execution," then the answer is no. Much worse is the risk of unsynchronized joint high-tempo operations.

With the exception of the Air Force, every U.S. military service recognizes that increased operations tempo requires decentralized control and decisionmaking to the lowest level. These service observations are clear:

*Army:* "Initiative requires the decentralization of decisionmaking to the lowest practical level."

*Marines:* "In order to generate the tempo of operations we desire and to best cope with the uncertainty, disorder, and fluidity of combat, command must be decentralized."
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Navy: "A rapid tempo requires that commanders be provided ... enough decentralization to allow subordinate commanders to exploit opportunities."\(^{70}\)

Air Force: "To exploit speed, range, flexibility, precision, and lethality that makes air and space so versatile, their organization must make it possible for missions to be centrally controlled. The need to respond to and exploit unforeseeable events requires that these same forces are capable of decentralized execution."\(^{71}\)

In the aftermath of Operation Desert Storm, the Army "Force XXI" and Marine Corps "Sea Dragon" concepts are the respective service's thinking about future warfare that emphasizes decentralized control and decisionmaking. The Air Force has no such new paradigm.

The Air Force is taking a much different direction because it remains rooted to an orientation of "centralized control—decentralized execution," which Eliot Cohen describes as "a catchphrase of Air Force doctrine, much as 'don’t divide the fleet' preoccupied American naval strategists in earlier times."\(^{72}\) Although Air Force doctrine has changed 12 times, based on 50 years of experience (another change is in draft), doctrine is now the basis for increased centralized control through the Joint Forces Air Component Commander (JFACC) concept and the Air Tasking Order (ATO) process.\(^{73}\)

The seductive effect of information technology is seen in those proponents advocating stronger centralized control. For example, some have advocated that future aerospace operations not only require greater centralized control, but increasingly centralized execution. Colonel Jeff Barnett, in his book Future War, argues, "Only a centralized C\(^2\) system has the potential to deconflict these factors in the chaos of war ... decentralized execution, effective in past wars, won't answer this challenge."\(^{74}\) He goes on to suggest that the JFACC has the technology and should conduct all future warfare from
the United States. Unfortunately, this thinking increases the
danger of military micromanagement at a time when just the
opposite is desired. As Eliot Cohen argues:

A general in Washington, an admiral in a command ship or
a theater commander in rear headquarters may have access
to almost the same information as a forward commander,
and in some cases more. Those distant commanders will
often succumb to the temptation to manipulate individual
units in combat accordingly.\textsuperscript{75}

In many ways, the ATO reflects JFACC micromanagement of
airpower through centralized control.

Highly centralized, the ATO is the tool of inflexibility. The
Gulf War Air Power Survey Summary (GWAPSS) Report
notes, “The ATO process used by the air planners and
commanders in Riyadh merely modified an approach long
used within NATO; it also bore a striking family resemblance
to the way American planners had constructed and executed
air campaigns as far back as WWII.”\textsuperscript{76} A common
understanding was, “An airplane didn’t fly unless it was in
the ATO.”\textsuperscript{77} The reaction of one squadron commander to the
ATO was typical: “By day three, the ATO was basically a
historical document that described what we were supposed
to do after we have already done it. Virtually all our tasking
was received by phone and changes were the rule.”\textsuperscript{78} Twenty
percent of all air missions were changed during the few hours
between the printing of the ATO and the time the aircrews
launched. Still more changes were made before the ATO was
officially released or after the aircraft had left their bases.\textsuperscript{79}

Much as our model predicts and as Cohen points out,
“Sometimes these decisions made sense; other times they did
not. In all cases they created great uncertainty among the
pilots flying the missions.”\textsuperscript{80}

The reaction of other services to the slow ATO process
was equally harsh. One U.S. Marine experience described the

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ATO process as "an attempt to run a minute-by-minute air war at a 72 hour pace." U.S. Marine Corps General Moore comments:

It [ATO] does not respond well to a quick-action battlefield. If you're trying to build a war for the next 72 to 96 hours, you can probably build a pretty good war. But if you're trying to fight a fluid battlefield like we were on, then you need a system that can react.

There was even criticism from a U.S. Navy Admiral claiming that the Iraqis had figured out the 72-hour schedule of the ATO and were moving aircraft around within that window. That Saddam Hussein was able to operate within the OODA loop of the Air Force gives him more credit than he deserves and is probably more reflective of service parochialism about the JFACC and ATO process than an accurate characteristic of one of the world's worst generals. However, the Admiral is correct about the ATO process being a dinosaur of industrial-age warfare, because the timeliness of the ATO calls into question its value in a high-tempo war.

Perhaps the concept of "centralized command—decentralized control and execution" is an idea whose time has come. Fast tempo warfare, with the need for balanced information sharing and decisionmaking, requires a new command and control orientation. Cohen describes "a new concept of high command, one that acknowledges that technology inevitably diffuses authority, will have to take root." Certainly, if technology provides the means for transmitting a 300-page ATO, that same technology could be applied in making airpower more responsive. The GWAPSS Report points out that "coalition commanders relied on an air-tasking system whose cycle times...had not changed appreciably from the Vietnam era." It is little wonder then that the U.S. Air Force had much greater success against stationary targets than against the mobile SCUD launchers;
and this was against a relatively benign enemy with a snail-like operations tempo. As U.S. Navy Captain Bien observes, "The 48-hour ATO cycle did not permit rapid response to mobile targets." This becomes critical in the future if the number of mobile targets increase, or if enemies become more agile.

What is required is an organizational orientation that will take advantage of this information technology for faster information gathering and faster decisionmaking cycles. As General Sullivan points out, "The present, regular, 'conveyor-belt' pace of the machine age is over. Only fast-paced, adaptive organizations will succeed." This requires greater emphasis on decentralized decisionmaking at all levels of command. As Lt Col Michael Straight points out,

Decentralized decisionmaking, guided by command's intent, can help keep decentralized execution focused on the JFACC's centralized priorities as the information revolution increases the number of decision-action cycles that occur inside the ATO's two-to-three-day limits.

Are there disadvantages to an organizational orientation that emphasizes less control and decentralized decisionmaking? Of course there are. There are those who argue that airpower is different from land and sea forces, justifying the need for greater, not lesser, centralized control. Straight emphasizes that the Air Force works with a much narrower span of control with less emphasis on a doctrinal concept meant to guard tempo, flexibility, and initiative. However, he also points out that without an Air Force commander's intent, higher operations tempo is difficult because subordinate initiative is limited. Any discussion of decentralized control immediately brings forth historical failures of airpower, such as "penny packets" during the North African campaign of WWII and "route packaging" of Vietnam. Less control and greater
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decentralized decisionmaking increase the danger of fratricide, air-space coordination problems, and missed opportunities. However, these tactical level problems that the ATO addresses need to be balanced with the operational-level benefits. Boyd points out that, at the operational level, the JFACC's primary role is that of "monitoring" and not "controlling." Information technology has come a long way in 25 years, calling into question a 50-year-old process. A fresh organizational orientation is needed that will increase operations tempo and initiative without sacrificing the ability to concentrate effect.

The advantages of decentralized control in the fast-paced tempo of future wars makes it essential for the Air Force to reexamine the ATO process. Former Air Force CSAF General Larry Welch said, "I believe we overcontrolled in Desert Storm. We did focus on the CINC's intent . . . but it took us 5000 pages and 72 hours to produce an ATO." General McPeak, the CSAF during Operation Desert Storm, expressed interest in exploring mission type orders to shorten the ATO cycle:

It is a disgrace that modern air forces are still shackled to a planning and execution process that lasts three days. We have hitched our jets to a hot air balloon. Even when this lackluster C2 system works properly, we are bound to forfeit much of the combat edge we know accrues to airpower because of its flexibility and speed of response.

As one Air Force officer notes, "Mission-type orders are the laxative for constipated communications." However, institutional orientation continues to be that the ATO must be centralized at the top. Thus, the only improvements sought will be in shortening the ATO cycle, rather than looking at alternatives. In any case, there appears to be little interest in the Air Force joining the other services in advocating a new command and control orientation. The high operations
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tempo of future wars demands the Air Force take a fresh organizational orientation perspective.

RECOMMENDATIONS

Technology is a tool and humans decide how they will organize and how they will use those tools. A screwdriver can be used as an icepick and one can pound nails with a laptop computer. Information technology—computer machines and communications devices—enables us to fight more effectively. If fighting more effectively is the goal, the correct organizational orientation—one of more command, less control—is needed. The following actions must be taken:

- Establish useful definitions clarifying the distinction between “command and control.” By reinforcing the importance of “command,” and decreasing the need for “control,” the U.S. military can eliminate the confusion and misunderstanding. In its present context, “command” embraces planning, organizing, directing, coordinating and controlling. Command is also timeless, in spite of organizational and technological change. The U.S. military must resist efforts to hang additional attributes on the function of command because it dilutes the most critical component of war: Command.
- Recognize that information, by its very nature, is most useful when not controlled. A characteristic of military hierarchies is control of information. The U.S. military must take advantage of networked organizational orientation in providing access to shared information at all levels of command. Shared information reduces uncertainty and improves a commander’s decisionmaking cycle. Given the danger of information overload, new technological innovations such as computer smart agents and data mining allows commanders to tailor their information gathering capabilities to meet their specific
needs. Shared information gathering allows for increased operations tempo.
• Create flattened hierarchical organizations that promote decentralized decisionmaking. Eliminating layers of command provides the means for operating at higher tempos. Decentralized control, with the unifying vision of commander's intent, also encourages innovation and initiative at the lowest levels of command.
• Reexamine the doctrine of "centralized control, decentralized execution" doctrine against an information-age adversary. The JFACC and ATO concepts are a product of hierarchical organizations and centralized control, perhaps the last vestiges of excessive concern over "independence." While effective in industrial-age warfare, the limitations centralized control places on timeliness, flexibility, and tempo create potentially serious problems against an adversary operating at a faster operations tempo. The same technology that promotes greater centralized control also applies to decentralized control. Future enemies will be smarter than Saddam Hussein. Defeating them requires synchronized joint operations that promote decentralized decisionmaking and initiative.

In conclusion, Van Creveld points out the relationship between technology, organizational orientation, and procedures. Too often, the U.S. military has failed to exploit the benefits of new technology because it is difficult to embrace a new organizational paradigm. Liddell Hart states that this is not an easy challenge because it takes "inventive genius" to create new warfighting organizations. Yet, in order to fight the higher tempo wars of the future where information technology is critical, the U.S. military must take on this challenge. Otherwise, a true RMA is not possible.

Centralized control, exercised through hierarchical organizations, reflects old and dangerous thinking against future enemies operating at a faster decisionmaking cycle. As
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Carl Builder reminds us, "Each age of warfare required different treasured capabilities. In agrarian-age warfare, strength and cunning were valued. In industrial-age warfare, organization and discipline were valued. In information-age warfare, the treasured capabilities are knowledge and creativity."6 Tapping that knowledge and creativity requires greater access to shared information and decentralized decisionmaking, which are key to operating at the higher tempos required in information age warfare. The U.S. military must have the organizational orientation to take advantage of these treasured capabilities, which requires more emphasis on command and less on control. Failure to do so may result in a U.S. military ill-prepared for information-age warfare.

NOTES

1. In War and Anti-War, Alvin and Heidi Toffler describe the differences among agrarian, industrial, and information age societies and militaries. While some have criticized this categorization as oversimplified, the Tofflers' writings are influential within the U.S. military.


4. Ibid.

5. Warfighting Vision 2010, Joint Warfighting Center, draft (Ft. Monroe, VA: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 August 1995), 19.

6. Maj Gen J.F.C. Fuller, Armament and History (New York: Charles Scribner's and Sons, 1945), 158. Of note, on page 146, Fuller gives a scathing critique of Guilio Douhet's motives by stating, "The secret which Douhet could not grasp was that inventive genius when stirred by the instinct of self-preservation knows no bounds. He was a wonderful salesman, and like many people—a prophet of the ridiculous."

8. In *Command and Control for War and Peace*, Thomas Coakley addresses some of the origins behind these two words. He notes that there is little mention of "control" by the early biographers of the great captains of battle. Control was viewed as an organic function of command. However, the word control appears in literature during World War I and more frequently in WW II literature, possibly from the increased automation and sophistication of weapon systems. This led to a belief that one commands people but controls things. For example, a distinction can be made that one commands the aircrews who, in turn, control nuclear weapons. Others make the distinction that command is strategic and operational, while control is tactical. Analogies have been made with the human nervous system with the command brain controlling the rest of the body. Another view is that command is an art while control is more a science. John Boyd wrestles with the differences in describing the epitome of command, which is to direct, order, or compel, while control means to regulate, restrain, or hold to a certain standard. Boyd goes on to suggest that "leadership and monitoring" are more accurate and descriptive than are "command and control."

9. This word association may be more psychological than practical. My thanks to Lt Col Chancel T. French (ret.) for educating me on a possibility of our habit of word association having historical origins dating to the Battle of Hastings in 1066. One outcome was the mingling of English, French, and Latin words on legal documents and in every day usage. As a result, word associations like Cease and Desist, Have and to Hold, Search and Destroy, and Command and Control are now common jargon. My thanks also to Col Dick Szafinski for explaining the Russian usage of "duty terms" when talking about certain military subjects. "Command and control" is a "duty term."

10. The U.S. Marine Corps is advocating an orientation of "command and coordination" as part of their future warfighting concept called "Sea Dragon," while the Air Force is championing an orientation called C4ISR (surveillance and reconnaissance).
13. Ibid., GL-4 and 5 (italics added).
15. Todd, 14.
18. Ibid., 10.
22. Although Colonel Boyd cautioned against separating these functions in a telephone interview on 20 March 1996, it is just this kind of “analysis” (or destructive deduction) he argues for in his 3 September 1976 “Creation and Destruction” notes, 5-17.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., 61.
26. Martin Van Creveld, in Command in War, points out that the number of radio sets rose from one for every 38.6 soldiers in World War II to one for every 4.5 soldiers in Vietnam, an 857 percent increase. Communications are also more reliable. Campen, in The First Information War, points out that during Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. military had a 98 percent communications reliability rate in handling 700,000 telephone calls, 700,000 messages per day, and
over 30,000 radio frequencies.

27. The volume of data processing is growing exponentially, with capacities doubling approximately every 18 months. The maximum communications throughput of 2 megabits/second in Operation Desert Storm will seem slow when compared to the impending capacity of 30 megabits/second.


30. Ibid.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.


36. Crecine and Salomone, 50.


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40. Joint Pub 1, II-6.


44. Orr, 88.

45. It also eliminates irritants. For example, Admiral Metcalf, Task Force 120 Commander during Operation *Urgent Fury*, remembered his experiences from Vietnam with the “long distance screwdriver.” To prevent recurrence, he worked hard at increasing the confidence and certainty of his superiors by providing them with masses of information during the operation to liberate Grenada. This accomplished the desired effect in allowing Admiral Metcalf to accomplish the mission with minimal interference.


47. Daniel J. Hughes, ed., *Moltke on the Art of War: Selected Writings* (Novato, CA: Presidio Press, 1993), 77. Italics added to highlight the relationship between technology (i.e., the telegraph) and rapid decisionmaking.

48. Roger Beaumont, *The Nerves of War* (Fairfax, VA: AFCEA International Press, 1986), 28. Another viewpoint from Major General Fuller’s WWII experience, “The General became more and more bound to his office, and, consequently divorced from his men, he relied for contact not upon the personal factor, but upon the mechanical telegraph and telephone. They could establish contact, but they could accomplish this only by dragging subordinate commanders out of the firing line that they may be at the beck and call of their superiors. In the World War, nothing was more dreadful to witness than a chain of men starting with a commander and ending with an army commander sitting in telephone boxes, improvised or actual, talking, talking, in place of leading, leading, leading."

49. Ibid., 83.
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52. Ibid., 85.
55. For example, the success of a deception plan usually requires fooling your own troops. During Operation Desert Storm, the U.S. Marines afloat off the coast of Kuwait may have conducted their daily preparations and routines differently, even subconsciously, had they been aware that their amphibious landing preparations were only a ruse. Their subtle changes in behavior or an inadvertent communications transmission might have been detected by the Iraqis, thus compromising the deception plan.
56. During WWII, German counterattacks were often conducted within 30 minutes after losing a position, while American, British, Russian, and French counterattacks usually took hours.
57. I am deeply indebted to Major Patrick Pope, a fellow Air Force 2025 colleague, whose wise counsel, shared interest, energy, and computer wizardry helped channel many of my random thoughts into a coherent pattern.
60. Ibid., 30-31.
61. Ibid.
62. FM 100-5, 7-2 and 7-3.
63. FM 1-1, 72-73.
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66. FMFM 1-1, 32.


68. FM 100-5, 2-6.

69. FMFM 1-1, 61-62.

70. NDP 1, 40.

71. AFDD 1 draft, 24 (italics added).


73. It is interesting that during Operation Desert Storm, the Air Force correctly identified Saddam Hussein's hierarchal organizational orientation with its highly centralized control as a vulnerability. Destroying or disrupting key control facilities and communications paths was key to inducing strategic paralysis at all levels of Iraqi command. Yet, ironically, American-led airpower had a similar organizational orientation and, likewise, similar vulnerabilities.


75. Cohen, 388.


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79. Cohen, 386.
80. Ibid.
81. Keaney and Cohen, 150.
83. Michael R. Gordon and General Bernard E. Trainor, The Generals’ War: The Inside Story of the Conflict in the Gulf (Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1995), 320. Vice Adm Stanley Arthur, senior Navy officer in the Persian Gulf, said that his intelligence officers were telling him that the Iraqis were moving what combat planes remained in Iraq every day or so, having discovered that it took three days to get all but the most critical targets on the allies’ target list.
84. Cohen, 118.
86. McNamara, 131.
87. Gordon and Dubik, 9.
89. Ibid., 44.
90. One of my fondest memories of the Air War College experience is of spirited arguments in the seminar room. None was more heated than over the Air Force doctrinal (or to some, “dogmatic”) issue of “centralized control.” I am deeply indebted to Lt Col Pivo Pivarsky, Lt Col Joe Sokol, and Lt Col Gary Coleman—scholars and warriors all. Their intelligent, and usually emotional, debate helped keep me focused.
93. Lt Col J. Taylor Sink, Rethinking the Air Operations Center (Maxwell AFB, AL: Air University Press, September 1994), 42.
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94. The only officers more stupid than Saddam Hussein were his sons-in laws. They were killed “by angry relatives” shortly after returning from self-imposed exile for denouncing their father-in-law.

95. Mentioned by Carl Builder, a RAND analyst, during one of his many visits to Air University in support of the Air Force 2025 study.
UNDERSTANDING ISLAMISTS
IN THE MIDDLE EAST AND
NORTH AFRICA

RANDAL K. JAMES

For the United States, one of the great national security challenges of the past few decades has been dealing with nations and political movements whose Islamic underpinnings make them difficult for Americans to understand. As a nation with relatively few immigrants from Islamic countries and a small percentage of Muslims, the United States has had neither the opportunity nor need to learn much about a religion practiced by over one billion people. Yet, as the world's only superpower, America in recent years has taken the lead in a variety of international concerns and crises with strong Islamic overtones. These have included brokering the Arab-Israeli peace process, forcefully expelling Iraq from Kuwait, and trying to bring peace to warring factions in the former Yugoslavia. If the United States is to continue to operate on such an international scale, it can ill-afford to ignore the challenge of understanding Islam.

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The resurgent, often revolutionary or radical, Islamic movement now affecting the Middle East could have grave implications for American interests in that region, including world access to oil, the security of Israel, and the on-going peace process. Additionally, the impact of any widespread Islamic movement could be farther reaching than most realize. Though Americans generally equate Islam with Arabs, this ethnic group comprises only 25 percent of the world's Muslim population—over 700 million Muslims live outside the Arab world, in countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, India, and Indonesia, all of which present their own challenges to U.S. policies.

Following the end of World War II, the free world quickly saw Communist ideology and activities as threats to peace and took actions to contain it. With the specter of Communism receding, however, many are now making that same application to Islam. Unfortunately, we often fail to understand Islamic movements that combine religious concerns with secular, political issues in terms of a threat—primarily in the form of terrorism, radicalism or fundamentalism—and then negatively conditioned our response to them.¹ This paper, although it cannot deal in depth with the political Islamic movement, will look in general terms at this powerful phenomenon to gain a greater understanding of some of the major issues and concerns.

POLITICAL ISLAM IN FOCUS
To begin this study, let's sort through the various labels and terms used. For example, one of the most popular and commonly used terms, especially by those critical of the movement, is "fundamentalism." According to Jurgensmeyer, however, this is not the best choice of words for several reasons.² First, fundamentalism is a term clearly considered a pejorative, a term "less descriptive than accusatory: it reflects our attitude toward other people more than it describes them." Second, it is a term to describe a
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Christian reform movement of the early 1900s that emphasized adhering to certain fundamentals of the Christian faith which were being called into question by liberal theologians. However, this term does not exist in Islam, and most Muslims would certainly resent the implication they did not hold to the fundamentals of Islamic faith. A final reason for avoiding this term is that it does not carry any political meaning, as it implies a person "is motivated solely by religious beliefs rather than by broad concerns about the nature of society and the world." Consequently, a more inclusive term should be found for individuals who have fused their religious zeal with concern for societal and political matters.

Others see the current Islamic resurgence as the latest of a number of Islamic revivals over the centuries, hence the occasional use of the term "revivalist." One author takes this a step further and sees in the revivalists—that is, anyone who has contributed significantly to Islam's current revival—four types of individuals: traditionalists, modernists, fundamentalists, and pragmatists. Consequently, rather than finding a more inclusive term, we have a proliferation of terms for various categories within the movements.

There are other terms that could be explored, but the point has been made: there are a number of terms being used to describe the current wave of political Islam. For the purpose of simplicity this paper will use "Islamist" as a general term for someone "seeking to increase Islam's role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state." This definition covers a wide range, but as French scholar Dr. Francois Burgat observes, "Islamists are nothing more than people who connect Islam to political dialogue; so they include the entire range from neo-fascists to ultra-liberals." Some argue against the term Islamist for those in the various Islamic movements, asserting it unfairly allows them to claim "the Islamic adjective for themselves," as if those they oppose were not Islamic. However, most scholars and authorities
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accept this designation, as do the individuals concerned; hence, that is what is used here.

To better understand the religious underpinnings of the Islamist movement, it would be instructive to take a brief look at the origins of Islam⁴ and the doctrine and precepts which guide its adherents. Islam, the world’s third major monotheistic religion (along with Judaism and Christianity), as well as the second largest (after Christianity) and fastest growing religion, has been a major factor shaping the social, economic, and political life of the Middle East and North Africa for almost 1,400 years. Islam is based on the revelation of God given to Muhammad, an illiterate but honest caravan trader from Mecca. These revelations, first received around 610 A.D., continued for a period of 20 years, and as recorded by Muhammad’s wife and friends, constitute the basis of the Koran. Muhammad’s denunciation of the pagan, polytheistic culture in Mecca and his growing popularity among much of the population caused unrest in the city and threatened its enviable and lucrative position as a center of idolatry in the region. Consequently, in 622 Muhammad was forced to flee for Medina, the event referred to by Muslims as the hegira. In Medina, the “Prophet” found ready followers for his message, and after securing this city as a base he succeeded in militarily subjugating Mecca in 630, overthrowing the jahiliyya (the “time of ignorance” of Arabs before Islam).

Islam spread rapidly in the following years, as its adherents fulfilled the call of jihad, a term often associated with “holy war” but which refers more generally to the struggle or striving of Muslims individually or collectively to do what is right and defend the umma (“brotherhood of believers” or Islamic community). The spread of Islam was unaffected by Muhammad’s death in 632, though that event did lead to questions of succession, which eventually produced a split resulting in the formation of the two major sects in Islam, Sunni and Shia. Within 100 years Islam had spread west through North Africa (even crossing the Straits
of Gibraltar for a 700-year stay in Europe; north into Turkey and Central Asia; and east as far as India. During its first few centuries, while Europe was in its so-called “Dark Ages,” Islam produced a rich, brilliant culture centered initially in Damascus, then in Baghdad. Even after the fall of these first dynasties and in spite of wars and empires that continually reshaped the region, Islam has remained a constant and unifying factor.

Islam as it is now practiced is a result of several doctrinal sources. The most important of these is the Koran, considered by Muslims to be the divine word of God. However, as the Koran does not cover all aspects of Islamic life, Muslims look to Hadith (“tradition”) and Sunna (“the way of the Prophet”) as further guides. These are the compilation of sayings and decisions attributed to Muhammad and to the code of acceptable behavior for Muslims as modeled by him. Another source of Islamic doctrine is ijmāʿ (“consensus”), decisions by leading Islamic scholars about issues not specifically covered by the Koran or Hadith-Sunna. A final source of doctrine for Muslims is qiyas (“reasoning by analogy”), the process by which ulama (Islamic judges and scholars) devise a solution to a problem not previously covered based on principles inferred from the Koran, Hadith-Sunna, and ijmāʿ. Using these four sources of doctrine as a basis, Islamic jurists and theologians compiled the Shari’a (“the Way”), the body of sacred laws to govern the life of the umma and individual believers. These doctrinal sources and the Shari’a are very important to the Islamists, as they form much of the religious basis for what they consider the “re-Islamization” of society.3

Two other aspects of Islam have played an important part in motivating individual involvement and participation in the Islamist movement. The first of these is the five pillars of Islam (faraṭḥ—literally, “compulsory duties” or “obligations”) enjoined on all Muslims, under promise of reward by Allah. These are the shahadah (proclamation of one’s faith in Islam),10 salat (prayers, done five times each
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day); *sawm* (fasting during Ramadan); *zakat* (alms to the poor); and *hajj* (pilgrimage to Mecca). However, many Islamists have added a “sixth pillar” to the faith they proclaim, that of the Muslims obligation to *jihad*, in this case the struggle to overthrow secular governments and establish a truly Islamic society.11 Unfortunately, while this struggle can be a spiritual one, it clearly encourages a literal, violent battle.

A second specific aspect of Islam that has strengthened Islamist movements is *ijtihad*.12 This term refers to the practice of independent reasoning and interpretation on matters of Islamic law, traditionally considered authoritative only when exercised by an Islamic jurist. However, many young Islamist leaders, few of whom are Islamic clerics or scholars, are claiming the right to *ijtihad* for themselves. Consequently, the Islamist leader is in a position to interpret matters involving Islamic society and government and authoritatively pass it to his followers. The combination of personal interpretations of Islamic doctrine, combined with followers’ zealous religiosity and willingness to aggressively confront secular authorities presents volatile possibilities.

There are various Islamist movements, including a number of national movements, each with its own historical and ideological perspective. One scholar estimates there are over 300 Islamist groups in the Middle East and North Africa, few of which are identical in terms of origins, goals, activities, or methods.13 Nonetheless, certain factors seem to be generally linked to the genesis of Islamist movements.

First, scholars who have studied the rise of Islamism in the Middle East consistently point to Arabic identity crisis as a major factor.14 Following an age in which Islam and Arab culture combined to form a brilliant and advanced civilization, the Arab world fell into decline, suffering defeats at the hands of the Crusaders, centuries of rule by the Ottoman Turks, and finally, colonial rule by Western powers. Hence, even in the post-colonial period, there was a sense of loss and inferiority, especially in comparison to the rich and
technically advanced West. Though a Pan-Arabist movement of the mid-1900s presented some opportunity to correct this situation, it ultimately fell short because of a lack of Arab unity, failure of secularized governments, and Arab military losses to the tiny, but Westernized nation of Israel. The sense of military impotence created by the 1967 Six-Day War increased the burden of inferiority vis-a-vis the West.\textsuperscript{15} Added to this was the loss of the West Bank and the failure to resolve the Palestinian refugee issue favorably, which was further perceived to be an Arab failure.\textsuperscript{16} Hence, a look into the past and seeing a “golden age” of Arab life under Islamic rule, whether true or not, gives Islamism a strong appeal in a world of failed governments, low national pride, and weakened Arabic identity.

A second factor contributing to the rise of Islamism is the perceived failure of secular ideologies, especially those linked to the West.\textsuperscript{17} In the flush of post-colonial independence, many Middle Eastern and North African nations attempted superficially to imitate the evidently superior West or Soviet Union in their forms of government or economy, with generally dismal results, industrially, agriculturally, and economically. These highly secular and nationalistic regimes, some using a thin veneer of Islam to help legitimize their rule, often degenerated into authoritarian socialist regimes which also failed to provide for the people.\textsuperscript{18} After decades of seeing the failure of irreligious Western ideologies, many Muslims believe there is little of value outside of science and technology to learn from the West. They see in Islam the foundation of a just and prosperous society, no doubt leading to the frequent Islamist campaign slogan, “Islam is the answer.”

A third factor in the rise of Islamism has been the encroachment of the West in Islamic values and culture, what Dekmejian refers to as “modernization and culture clash.”\textsuperscript{19} In many areas of life, Muslim society indulged in mimicry of the West. For many, Islamism is very much a backlash
against what is seen as Western-inspired decadence and immorality and is an attempt to reverse the pollution of Islamic culture. This is not to say, however, that Islamists are against all Western imports. Most Islamists are very much in favor of Western technology and learning, as they are essentially value neutral. Islamists have no problem with modern technology and conveniences, as long as they are not used in a way contrary to Islam. Indeed, one author noted most Islamists would like to increase the number of television sets in society, but only after they had gained control of the broadcasts.\textsuperscript{20}

Another factor in Islamist movement success has been the loss of legitimacy by governing elites and institutions.\textsuperscript{21} Many, if not most of the countries experiencing an Islamist movement are states with a history of single party or individual rule. Acting from weak legitimacy bases, these governments have refused to open the political process to others, resulting in the need for more and more repressive measures when opposition arose. This has been especially true in those cases where the government has failed to successfully implement economic and social policies which address the needs of the people. Additionally, many of these governments are marked by official corruption and incompetence, which further undercuts their legitimacy with the people. Ironically, preventing or eliminating secular opposition movements has strengthened the Islamist appeal, as the only avenue left open for opposition is the mosque.\textsuperscript{22} In some cases, governments have tried to co-opt Islam to reinforce their legitimacy, but with limited success. Though generally seeing Islam as a bar to progress, these regimes have attempted to control the Islamic discourse by claiming to govern by Islamic principles and Shari'a, providing for maintenance of mosques, and appointing and paying the ulama.\textsuperscript{23} Unfortunately, rather than confer legitimacy on the governments, such actions have simply tended to bring into
question the legitimacy of the clerics and the "establishment" Islam.\textsuperscript{24}

A final major factor behind the Islamist movement has been the social breakdown in a number of Middle Eastern and North African countries.\textsuperscript{25} The failure of state socialism, precipitous drops in oil prices since the early 1980s, and failed agricultural and industrial policies have left many nations economic basket cases. Simultaneous with these economic problems, high birth rates and migration from rural areas to cities have swollen urban populations. Consequently, unemployment is rampant throughout the region, particularly in the ranks of the young, even the well-educated, who form the majority of the population in most countries.\textsuperscript{26} Additionally, with the governments failing to meet the rising expectations of the 1960s and 1970s, the gap between the "haves" and "have nots" has grown precipitously, leaving the masses in most countries to face a bleak and uncertain future.\textsuperscript{27}

When looking objectively at the social, psychological, and economic conditions facing the Middle East and North Africa, it is easier to understand the appeal of new ideologies. In the 1950s, 1960s, and early 1970s, the beneficiary of popular discontent was usually Arabist or Marxist movements.\textsuperscript{28} However, with the virtual collapse of the pan-Arabist movement following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War and the growing recognition of the failure of Marxism, the torch was passed to the ideology of Islamism. Thus, while many have assumed the appeal of Islamism is essentially a religious one, this does not appear to be the case. The appeal of Islamism can be linked to its availability as a protest ideology, the fulfillment of psycho-social needs in giving followers a sense of belonging and self-worth, and the provision of social services as much as to its religious aspects.\textsuperscript{29}

Considering the number of causes underlying the rise of Islamism, it is not surprising to find this ideology is embraced by a wide spectrum of people. Though television images of
a black-clad *ayatollah* leading anti-Western mobs may give the impression the Islamist movement is primarily led by the religious establishment, the contrary is generally true. In most countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Islam has been co-opted by the ruling regimes, either through their assumption of the Islamic mantle, as in Saudi Arabia; through state control of the mosques and appointment of religious leaders, as in Algeria; or by proclaiming the state to officially be “Islamic” and guided by Islamic principles and *Shari’a*, such as in Egypt. Since “establishment” Islam is closely identified with the state, “[t]he Islamist movement is not led by clerics (except in Iran), but by young secular intellectuals, who openly claim to be ‘religious thinkers,’ rivals or successors to a class of ulamas who have compromised themselves with respect to those in power.”

The average Islamist leader is more likely to be a young college professor, lawyer, or engineer exercising his “right” to *ijtihad*, than a cleric. Indeed, though a few clerics are involved in the Islamist movement, most would be considered irrelevant at best to the Islamist. Roy notes,

> The Islamists reproach the *ulamas* for two things. One is their servility to the powers in place, which leads them to accept a secular government and laws that do not conform to the *Shari’a*. The other is their compromise with western modernity: the *ulamas* have accepted modernity where the Islamists reject it (acceptance of the separation of religion and politics, which necessarily leads to secularization).

In many cases, establishment clerics perceived to have compromised with secular regimes are considered traitors to Islam, with several having been assassinated by radical Islamists.

Though Islamist leadership tends to be young professionals interested in combining political and religious goals, they represent only a small, albeit important, part of
these movements. The majority of those involved in Islamist causes comes from other groups particularly susceptible to the appeal of Islamism. Though some variations exist throughout the region, it is possible to identify those who are likely to heed the Islamic revivalist call. For example, one of the most fertile recruiting grounds is among the youth of the region. As previously noted, high birth rates and poor economic performance have left many nations with large populations of unemployed youth with few prospects for the future, even among the college-educated. Social inequities, identity crises, and the other problems facing Middle Eastern and North African nations seem to hit the youth especially hard. As a result, many Islamist organizations have a high percentage of youth as members.

A second source of Islamist strength is among the newly urbanized elements. Recent decades have seen a great migration from rural areas as a consequence of flawed government policies favoring industrialization and urbanization over agriculture and because of the appeal of a supposedly better life in the cities. Governmental inability to provide services, housing, and jobs to people already experiencing culture shock has left the field open to the Islamists promising a better life and social-spiritual security.

Islamism has also successfully appealed to a variety of political malcontents and those to whom Dekmejian refers as “nativist-traditional elements.” Among the political malcontents one finds a variety of individuals and ideologies, such as leftists, Arabists, nationalists, etc., who have found Islamist movements to be the most effective means of voicing their protests. The nativist-traditionalist elements are composed primarily of the religious, middle classes of Islamic society who have seen their status and numbers shrinking as a result of governmental social and economic policies and who perceive their religion under attack from both Western culture and their own secularized governments.
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A final major group susceptible to Islamist ideology may be referred to as the "disinherited."34 This mass includes urban poor (which overlaps with newly urbanized elements and youth), tribesmen, and peasants. As the most traditionalist sectors of society with respect to their Islamic heritage, and because of their low socio-economic status, this amorphous group is particularly receptive to the vision offered by Islamist ideology. According to Dekmejian, this group, along with the youth and the middle-class nativist elements, are most likely to provide the "cannon fodder" for an Islamist seizure of power.

Despite the attempt by some to portray the Islamist movement primarily as a monolithic, fundamentalist religious movement, examination of the goals of the various Islamist groups gives lie to this claim. Though a few individuals speak of a supranational umma,35 virtually all Islamist groups focus on national problems and have a national agenda.36 These groups, though occasionally aided with training or money by Islamists in other countries,37 have arisen in response to national or even local conditions and are aimed at dealing with issues at these levels. In general, Islamists are attempting to reverse what they see as a trend of dividing life into secular and spiritual, especially at the national level. Though the West has a well-established tradition of separating state and religion, this is not the case in much of the Muslim world. Islam is viewed as a comprehensive way of life for its adherents, affecting not only spiritual matters, but social, economic, and political life as well. The idea of separating faith and the nation is inconceivable to a pious Muslim.38 The attempts by many Middle Eastern and North African governments to emulate the Western concept of "separation of church and state," especially in view of the economic and social failures of these regimes, have helped create a backlash of support for making Islam the foundation of society. The Islamist view is the various problems affecting their nations would be corrected under the implementation of
a true Islamic regime. Even such conservative Islamic states as Saudi Arabia have come under attack for being too close to the West and not being sufficiently Islamic.

Yet, even with the general goal of "re-Islamizing" society, there is no consistent view on how that is to be achieved. In some cases, the goal may be simply to increase the influence of traditional Islam on the governments. For instance, some believe the mullahs who led the overthrow of the Shah of Iran in 1979 would have actually been content simply to regain the influence their predecessors possessed—essentially a consultative and veto role—at the turn of the century. In some countries the goal is to do away with secular, Westernized laws and establish the Shari'a as the sole law of the land. Others see an Islamist society that rejects the corruption of the current system and in which justice—economic, political, legal, and social—is founded on the Koran and is extended to all members of society. For others, the goal is to destroy modernism, the secularizing force they see attacking society's traditional Islamic roots and culture. Even democracy is frequently proclaimed as an Islamist goal. Of course, it is not clear Islamists are as committed to democracy when they are in power as they apparently are when out of power, nor is it clear what form democracy might take in an Islamist regime; there is simply no track record from which we can judge.

One author probably reflects the view of many when he simply states the goal of Islamists is power, control of the state, and maintenance of power. But, again, we have little upon which to base such a cynical view, and even if true, this is the same goal of virtually every Muslim regime in the region. Ultimately, it may be the Islamists themselves do not always know what they want. Esposito notes,

Islamist movements ... often tend to be more specific on what they are against than what they are for. While all may speak of an Islamic order or an Islamic state,
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implementation of the Shari'a, . . . a society grounded more firmly on Islamic values and mores, the details are often vague. After the electoral victory of Algeria's Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), when Abbasi Madani was pressed for his program he described it as broad. When pressed for its practical steps, he replied, "Our practical program is also broad." 

Yet, if the goals of Islamists are highly varied, the means they have available to achieve those goals are constrained. Despite the view that Islamists groups are violent by their very character, the facts indicate most would prefer to work within the system to create change and gain power and influence. Many Islamist groups, such as Algeria's FIS and the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, have attempted to work from the bottom up, that is develop their support among the population as a whole then work within the political system as normal opposition groups. Unfortunately, this avenue generally has been closed off to the Islamists, as their popularity and success in political organization have made them viable alternatives to ruling regimes. Consequently, Islamist groups are often banned once a government perceives the "threat" they represent. Indeed, it is unlikely these groups would have ever been legal except for the fact that many governments, notably in Egypt, Jordan, and Syria, used Islamists to successfully counter the appeal of Marxism, Communism, and other ideologies in recent decades. Once these threats had receded, however, it was usually only a short time until the Islamists were again outlawed.

Once the possibility of successfully operating as an opposition party within the political system is closed to moderate Islamists, they essentially have two options. One is to retreat to the mosque and continue to surreptitiously recruit followers and agitate peacefully for change. The other option is to join the ranks of the more radical Islamist groups and resort to violence and terrorism. As noted previously, the
idea of violence is not foreign to the Islamist, as the very concept of jihad implies the struggle of a good Muslim to protect the Islamic community. Indeed, some of the more radical Islamist groups see in modern, secularized society the same state of jahiliyya which existed prior to the coming of Islam and are thus enjoined to fight against it and against the Muslim "apostates" who support this system. Unfortunately, when governments outlaw or attempt to destroy Islamist organizations, the usual result is to radicalize their ranks, leading to the escalation of violence. Few governments have been completely successful in eliminating Islamist violence, and many have made their situations worse by causing further radicalization. The fact is that violence—whether by the Irish Republican Army, Tamil rebels, or Islamists—gives power to a relatively small group of people and grants them influence well out of proportion to their numbers. Islamist violence serves a variety of purposes (intimidation, economic warfare, destabilization, etc.) and will undoubtedly continue to be a problem as long as other means of expression are closed off.

Islamism is one of the key factors in the political landscape of the Middle East and North Africa. It is a diverse movement, composed of hundreds of groups which have arisen in response to local conditions and problems and which seek to solve them at the national level. They have a variety of goals, always with the idea of a state more in line with Islamic doctrine, laws, and values. Though not numerous, Islamists are drawn from all segments of society and are strongly committed, even to the point of violence, to their ideals. Though Islamism does not currently pose a serious threat in most countries—Algeria and Egypt being two notable exceptions—it is still a growing movement and not likely to go away.
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CHALLENGES FOR THE UNITED STATES

An interesting paragraph in a recent DOD publication reads:

The United States does not presume to instruct Middle Easterners or anyone else on their religious beliefs. Rather, we try to work with our friends in the region to address the causes of extremism and channel potentially destructive impulses toward more peaceful, productive ends. At the same time, we must be prepared to counter, by force if necessary, violent manifestations of radicalism that endanger our interests.55

Though this paragraph is speaking in general terms and is necessarily vague, it raises some interesting points. It wisely points out that the United States should not get involved in others' religious problems. But, then it states the United States will work with its “friends” in the region, which is, of course, another way of saying “friendly governments.” Further, the statement commits the United States to using military force to counter “violent manifestations of radicalism” if they should threaten our “interests” (a vague term, whether intentional or not). The implication is clear: the United States intends to maintain secular, nondemocratic governments in place, as long as they support American interests in the region, and protect them from the obvious (to Americans) threat of a violent Islamist takeover. However, judging by the hornets nest stirred up with the American public when troops were committed to Bosnia to support U.S. “vital national interests,” it is reasonable to assume commitment of U.S. assets or military forces to battle Islamists or prop up Middle Eastern regimes will cause similar concerns. Consequently, it would be wise to ask about America’s responsibilities and capabilities in the region, if any, and best course of action in light of the Islamist challenge.
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This question can be answered only by adding, "and to whom?" or "and to what?" Islamism, as defined here, is a political movement which seeks to increase Islam's role in society and politics, usually with the goal of an Islamic state. As noted previously in this paper, this definition covers a wide range of movements and ideologies, from relatively moderate to extremely radical. For the sake of argument, we will assume a worst case—that is, a radical, violence-prone, anti-Western Islamist movement fighting for control of its nation.

First, does such an Islamist movement threaten the United States? The answer has to be no. Currently, there is no country or combination of countries in the Middle East or North Africa that represent a physical threat to the United States even under the most radical Islamist control. This is quite different from Russia, for example, where a rise to power of a radical nationalist or neo-Fascist government and the continuing presence of nuclear weapons could represent a valid threat. Obviously, continuing regional programs for development of weapons of mass destruction represent a potential threat in the years to come; even so, it will be a long time before an Islamist regime is truly able to threaten America. This is not to underplay the dangers of terrorism presented by an anti-West or anti-American Islamist state. But terrorism, no matter how unsettling or deadly, will not represent a major threat to the United States.

If Islamism does not represent a threat to the United States, does it represent a threat to American interests? The answer to this question is, at strongest, maybe. Vital U.S. interests in the Middle East and North Africa can probably be limited to just a few. The two most important are access to Middle Eastern oil, for the United States and the rest of the world, and the security of Israel. If oil is the concern, however, the United States should not be too worried, as no matter who is running a country, they will continue to sell their oil. As noted by one author, even a totalitarian
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government with a powerful army is constrained by international economics. "Fundamentalists the Iranians may be, but they want to sell oil to the West as desperately as any Saudi prince." Considering the amount of oil on the world market and the difficulties OPEC has in enforcing quotas, it seems unlikely an Islamist regime would present a threat to the availability of Middle Eastern oil.

An Islamist threat to Israel’s security is more likely, though still doubtful. Though some Islamist groups do use anti-Israeli rhetoric, it is not clear how much is posturing or if words would translate into action if such Islamists came to power. Additionally, during a recent audience with a high-ranking Israeli official, an Air War College class was told Israel felt confident it possessed the ability to defeat any regional nation or combination of nations. It is possible an Islamist regime in Egypt, Jordan, or Syria could derail the tenuous peace process, but that in itself does not represent a threat to Israel; the primary threat to Israel continues to be potential weapons of mass destruction in the hands of an unfriendly regime, with Iraq or Iran being the most probable candidates.

Two other important interests in the region might be stability and the promotion of democracy. National stability, however, can be achieved under Islamist regimes as easily as under authoritarian governments, many of which have experienced quite a bit of instability over the years. Admittedly, regional stability might be threatened if Islamist regimes exported trouble to neighboring states, as Iran and Sudan are currently accused of doing. Yet, secular governments in the region have histories of stirring up trouble for their neighbors, and it is not obvious an Islamist government would represent a particularly odious threat.

Neither is it clear Islamists represent a threat to democracy in the region, considering one can count the current number of democracies on no hands (excluding non-Islamic Israel). Indeed, several abortive attempts at
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democracy in Sudan contributed greatly to the instability that finally resulted in its current Islamist regime, thus making democracy appear less than desirable.\textsuperscript{56} While Islamists may or may not be committed to democracy, it is not clear anyone else in the region is either. The fact that many who professed democratic ideals actually supported the military intervention that kept the FIS from assuming power in Algeria might cause the Islamist to question who is really committed to democracy.\textsuperscript{57} Consequently, this should be a major concern for the United States only if we take the position that current regimes are authoritarian and may move over time toward democracy, while a radical Islamist regime would be totalitarian and would not become more democratic. Of course, this may not be an untenable position; even now, opposition groups are being elected to the Jordanian parliament, and Saudi Arabia has established a majlis al-shura ("consultative council") to "advise" the King.

If Islamism represents a true threat, however, it does so more to the people under its rule than anyone else.\textsuperscript{58} Unquestionably, the more radical elements of Islamism advocate ideas with which the West and many Muslims would disagree. Most of these relate to the status of women in society, the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, and the implementation of Shari'a as the sole source of law. The abuses that have been witnessed in Iran and Sudan should give anyone pause. However, this may simply argue for the importance of opening dialogue with the more moderate Islamic groups, as the more radicalized the movement becomes, the more of a threat any subsequent regime would be.

The easiest thing, and for many the most tempting, would be to simply assume that one authoritarian government in the Middle East is as good as another and that we have no business involving ourselves in their internal problems. The United States has observed tragedies unfold in other parts of the world—Cambodia in the 1970s and Rwanda in 1994, for
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example—without taking action. Why should the various Islamist movements throughout the Middle East necessitate U.S. interest and activity? There are at least three general reasons for America to stay involved.

First, the United States has some moral responsibility in the region because American foreign aid, economic and military, has contributed at least in part to the internal struggle between governments and Islamists. Indeed, in some cases (such as Egypt), U.S. aid abetted governments in avoiding making adjustments in their economic systems that might have helped alleviate conditions contributing to Islamist movements.\textsuperscript{59} Also, military aid strengthens a regime in the face of an Islamist challenge, whether intended to do so or not. Finally, a large number of the Islamist fighters in the Middle East were actually trained by the United States or its proxies to fight with the mujahideen against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan.\textsuperscript{60} So, while the American contribution to the conflict has been limited, it exists and provides moral grounds for at least trying to help resolve the situation.

The second reason for U.S. involvement is a practical one: a radical Islamist takeover in one nation is likely to have negative effects for its neighbors, which could ultimately draw the United States into the problem. Iran is a major sponsor of unrest in the Middle East and terrorism throughout the world. Sudan's military Islamist government is similarly accused of exporting Islamist ideology and terrorism, especially toward Egypt. A radical Islamist takeover in Algeria would likely send hundreds of thousands of refugees fleeing into Tunisia, Morocco, Spain, and France, causing major problems for those countries. If American involvement can help ameliorate the conditions furthering Islamist radicalism or could help regimes and Islamists resolve their differences peaceably, that would clearly be a case where an ounce of prevention would beat a pound of cure.

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The final and most basic reason for American involvement in the region is to protect, to the extent necessary, U.S. national interests. The United States has made it clear for a number of years that the security of Israel and world access to Middle Eastern oil are vital national interests. Though it is not clear Islamist gains would threaten those interests, being involved early and peacefully might help assure they were protected. Other interests in the region might include stability, promotion of democracy, preventing an unfriendly nation from establishing hegemony, or simply maintaining the status quo. As discussed above, while Islamist regimes, even the most radical, would not automatically threaten U.S. interests, it only makes sense to remain engaged with the nations and organizations of the region.

The short answer, unfortunately, is, not much. Virtually all writers on the subject of the Islamist movement in the Middle East have to acknowledge the United States has very little influence with the regional governments and virtually none with the Islamists. While the United States has done little to affect the Islamists directly, America is seen as the leader of the West which has offended Islamists by its modern culture, its colonial past, and failed ideologies. Additionally, Islamists believe that if Americans are not actually hostile to Islam, they are distrustful of it. Consequently, Islamists have little interest or confidence in what the United States thinks. As for governments, the United States generally does not have the historical ties or interests in the countries to have gained much sway. Additionally, America seems unwilling to put pressure on threatened regimes for fear of encouraging their Islamist opponents, or because of the very real likelihood of being ignored. Nonetheless, there are a few things the United States can do.

- Recognize the diversity of the Islamist movement. There are literally hundreds of Islamist movements in the Middle East alone, different in size, goals, and methods. The United States cannot simply lump them all together
as "fundamentalists" or "radicals" and treat them as if they were a monolithic threat. Many of these groups serve useful societal functions, give voice to the unrepresented masses, and should be considered relatively moderate. The conditions that have provoked the Islamist revival are not going to disappear any time soon, and it is important to realize some of the Islamist organizations can be dealt with in a reasonable way.

- Recognize Islamism is produced by factors other than theocratic zeal, then work to alleviate those conditions. As noted earlier, there are a variety of factors which work together to help produce Islamist movements. Once the United States has acknowledged those factors, it can help to ameliorate them. For example, while the United States could never provide enough aid to correct economic difficulties in so many countries, it could encourage positive trade and industrial policies, help in agricultural development, and provide expertise in appropriate areas. Just as there are a variety of contributing causes, there are undoubtedly a variety of possible solutions.

- Encourage governments to open political systems to both moderate Islamists and secular political opposition. This is a tough one simply because most governments probably prefer the status quo; they have power and they are not interested in sharing it. Obviously, if a regime chooses to be repressive enough, it can greatly lessen an Islamist threat; Syria and Libya are good examples. Yet, it is unlikely opposition to authoritarian, single-party states will go away in the near future, and the Islamists will continue to be the beneficiaries of this opposition. It would be better to convince governments to co-opt and integrate these elements before they become radicalized and more violent. Many regimes may fear opening the political process too quickly, seeing what transpired in Algeria when the single-party government suddenly opened the political system to opposition groups
following riots in 1988. The Islamists were the only ones capable of producing a viable opposition and by 1991 were on the verge of taking over the government democratically. The military stepped in, however, cancelling elections and banning Islamist parties, provoking a civil war that has resulted in an estimated 50,000 deaths. Governments could learn from that experience, however, and open the political process more slowly than did the Algerian Government (allowing multiple parties to develop) and make pre-election agreements limiting the initial victories by new parties. Governments could also learn from the example of Jordan, where Islamists are active in politics and have been elected to that country’s parliament. Giving opponents a stake in the system is infinitely preferable to repressing and possibly radicalizing them.

- *Expect some volatility and instability when authoritarian governments open their political systems.* As Entelis noted regarding the process of Algerian democratization in the late 1980s,

  Whatever else was happening in the weeks and months prior to the apparent FIS electoral victory, Algerian politics was bursting with vital energy, political discourse and competition, exchanges of ideas, and points of view, and, not surprisingly, strikes, demonstrations, and street rallies. In virtually all democracies, especially emerging ones with little history of legitimate contestation, the first experience with freedom and liberty is always volatile if not violent.

If that is the case, we should expect it, not be unduly scared of such activity, and encourage moderation when liberalizing systems experience some initial upheaval.
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- Offer to mediate or establish a forum for mediation. While many Islamists may not entirely trust the United States, most would undoubtedly deal with us if it worked in favor of them having at least the chance of sharing power. Consequently, if a government was willing to work with the Islamist (and/or other) opposition, the United States could offer to help, much as it has done with Israel and Egypt, Syria, and the Palestinians. If participants preferred not to have direct U.S. participation, America could work with other nations to establish a forum for talks to take place.

- Continue to work to prevent proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. One of America's greatest international priorities is to stop the spread of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. It is not obvious an Islamist government with such a weapon would be any more dangerous than any other. Nonetheless, if a Middle Eastern or North African nation had weapons of mass destruction and seemed to be threatened by an Islamist insurgency, it would clearly worry neighboring states, Israel, and the United States, possibly provoking some sort of intervention. Preventing the development of weapons of mass destruction might keep a troublesome situation from becoming a disaster.

- Distinguish between Islamist rhetoric and reality. Despite what Islamists often say to garner support and encourage their followers, they tend to be fairly pragmatic once in power. Islamist movements are, above all, political movements, so the United States should be as careful taking what Islamists say at face value as it would any secular politician. Entelis wants Islamist leaders and groups judged "by the same criteria as any other potential leaders or opposition party... [Most Islamist governments] will generally operate on the basis of national interests and demonstrate a flexibility that
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reflects acceptance of the realities of a globally interdependent world.\textsuperscript{67}

Just as there are things the United States can do to help with regards to the Islamist challenge facing the Middle East and North Africa, some things must be avoided:

- \textit{Avoid compromising moderate Islamists.} At least one author cogently argues that if moderate Islamists exist, the worst thing the United States could do would be to talk with them and, consequently, compromise them in the eyes of their constituents or more radical colleagues.\textsuperscript{68}

While this view seems extreme, it does point out the United States, as the leader of the West, is not completely trusted in much of the region. Very likely, one of the worst things we could do to a government or opposition group would be to dote on them too much. If we engage moderate Islamists, we should carefully demonstrate they have kept their independence from the U.S. in fact and appearance.

- \textit{Do not get involved in someone else's insurgency.} Any time the United States helps a regime fight against its internal opposition, we are going to anger someone, and that someone might just wind up in power. We would be far better off to try to mediate disputes than get involved in them. If a truly friendly or valuable government was about to fall to Islamist insurgents, perhaps we could justify getting directly involved. Even that, however, could backfire, as putting U.S. forces on Middle Eastern soil, could cause a further backlash against the inviting government. Even after Iraq invaded Kuwait, there were a number of Muslims who resented the Saudi Arabian decision to allow U.S. and other Western forces in their country. The politics and religion of the region would dictate the United States get involved only in the most critical of circumstances.

- \textit{Do not fall for simplistic arguments.} During a recent trip to the Middle East, the author heard top officials in Syria,
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Jordan, and Israel state the Islamist threat was directed by forces external to their countries, and it seems likely most governments in the region would make similar claims. Though undoubtedly containing a grain of truth in some cases, such a statement also sounds much better than admitting your internal policies and problems have generated an Islamist opposition. Claiming an external threat, such as Iran, is also a better way of garnering American support in most cases, just as a country claiming an insurgency was Communist received more American attention during the Cold War. Even non-Islamic governments are not immune to broad, simplistic arguments. For example, until recently France said of Algeria that no moderate Islamists existed, no middle ground existed between the government and the Islamists, and no compromise was possible, all points that are patently untrue. The United States must be careful about accepting such statements at face value.

- Do not give friendly governments a free ride. A number of the governments the United States supports in the region are guilty of human rights abuses and violations as serious as those committed by Islamist groups, yet the American government says little, at least publicly. While the United States is properly concerned about human rights and freedoms under an Islamist regime, we do not seem to hold authoritarian governments to the same standard. Such attitudes simply reinforce Islamist beliefs that they have little hope of competing legitimately for power.

Ultimately, there may be very little the United States can do with regards to the Islamist movement in the Middle East and North Africa. Though it is not clear Islamist groups pose a serious threat beyond that to the ruling regimes in their respective countries, the potential for problems is there. The United States has limited influence in the region, but what exists can be put to good use, if done with care.
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CONCLUSION

Islamism is a challenge that is not going to go away. French political philosopher Olivier Roy has argued persuasively in The Failure of Political Islam that Islamist movements will fulfill neither the goals of their leaders nor the hopes of their followers. Wherever Islamist governments come to power in the Middle East or North Africa, according to Roy, the nations will remain mired in the turmoil and debilitating conditions which currently plague them. Even if this assessment proves correct, the conditions which have helped propel Islamic revivalism into prominence cannot be corrected quickly, even if the various regimes seriously attempted to do so—and many of them will not. Consequently, with a dearth of competing ideologies or opportunities for legal political opposition, Islamism will continue to attract support from the masses.

The challenge to the United States will be to use what little influence we have in the Middle East and North Africa—with both the governments and the opposition—to help build prosperous nations that respect political pluralism and human rights. The alternative, in many cases, will be to sit back, watch the disintegration, then help pick up the pieces.

NOTES

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9. Husain, 43.
10. Ibid., 297: “There is no God but Allah and Muhammad is His Prophet.”
11. Jurgensmeyer, 60.
13. Ibid., 55.
14. Husain, 164-166.
15. Dekmejian, 28.
18. Turabi, 3.
20. Francois Burgat and William Dowell, The Islamic Movement in North Africa (Austin, TX: Center for Middle Eastern Studies at the University of Texas, 1993), 19.
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31. Ibid., 37.
33. See Dekmejian, 46-49, for an excellent summary of the Islamist’s target audiences.
34. Esposito, 32.
35. Deeb, 87.
36. Jurgensmeyer, 47.
37. Iran in particular has been accused of aiding militant Islamist groups, most notably those operating in Lebanon and Israel.
38. Dekmejian, 41.
39. Though the economic and societal failures of revolutionary Iran has given pause to some Islamists, its example can be glossed over by the largely Sunni Arab Islamists because it is a non-Arab, predominately Shia nation.
40. Jurgensmeyer, 177.
41. Deeb, 98.
42. Keppel, 146, 193-194.
44. Interestingly, Jurgensmeyer notes religion may be necessary for democracy to develop, “for without the legitimacy conferred by religion, the democratic process does not seem to work in some parts of the world” (202).
45. Halliday, 402.
46. Esposito, 30.
47. Keppel, 34, 46.
48. Jurgensmeyer notes one Islamist concluded peaceful means for fighting apostasy are inadequate, so any means—including deceit and violence—are acceptable, and such actions are incumbent on all true Muslims (60).
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50. AbuKhalil, 679.
51. Syria is one notable exception, having quashed a violent Islamist challenge to the regime of President Assad. However, this "victory" was achieved by the virtual destruction of the town of Hama at the cost of thousands of innocent lives. Fortunately, few governments are prepared to go to these lengths as yet.
54. Ibid., 6-7.
60. Entelis, 17.
61. For instance, when President Zeroual publicly snubbed the French government, his government's primary sponsor, he had a tremendous popularity boost among the Algerian people. "Populist Zeroual," 46.
63. Deeb, 88.
64. Tal, 150.
66. Tal, 150.
67. Esposito, 40.

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UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF GOLDWATER-NICHOLS:
THE EFFECT ON CIVILIAN CONTROL
OF THE MILITARY

CHRISTOPHER M. BOURNE

Within the United States armed forces no tradition is more highly regarded than subordination to civilian authority. For two centuries, the supremacy of the elected politically responsible civilian over the appointed soldier has been the foundation of American civil-military relations. Today, no tradition is eroding faster.

Ironically, diminished civilian control stems not from a would-be military dictator or from armed forces bruised by defeat in war. Instead, reforms passed by Congress in 1986 and seemingly validated in the Persian Gulf War overturned the historic relationship between soldiers and the state they serve. Intended to correct the strategic errors of the Vietnam

The original version of this essay won Distinguished Essay recognition in the 1996 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Strategy Essay Competition. Major Christopher M. Bourne was a student at the Marine Corps Command and Staff College at that time. Subsequently, Maj. Bourne had the opportunity to expand his original essay into the fuller exposition presented here.
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War, the Goldwater-Nichols Act legislat ed sweeping changes in the day-to-day procedures under which the military operates. Those working-level changes have gone largely unnoticed in the afterglow of victory in the Gulf. Their net effect, however, has been to reverse the long tradition of civilian authority over military affairs.

When the Senate Armed Services Committee held its first hearings to consider reorganizing the Department of Defense in July 1983, Senator Barry Goldwater opened the proceedings thusly:

The question is, can we, as a country, any longer afford a 207-year-old concept that in military matters the civilian is supreme? Now, I realize the sanctity of the idea of the civilian being supreme. It is a beautiful thing to think about. The question in my mind is, can we any longer afford to allow the expertise of men and women trained, at terrific expense . . . to be set aside for the decisions of the civilians whose decisions have not been wrapped in war[?] We lost in Korea, no question about that, because we did not let the military leadership exercise military judgment. We lost in Vietnam. . . . If that is the way we are going to do it in the future, I think we are in trouble.¹

The question should give officers pause—it stands the common perception of civil-military relations on its head. With that Senator Goldwater set the tone of the debate. Many did not recognize it at the time, but the act that bears his name would fundamentally alter civil-military relations. Goldwater-Nichols overcompensates for the aftereffects of previous defense reorganization efforts, invests inordinate authority in a single military officer and staff, and, by reducing the checks and balances within and between the executive and legislative branches of government, weakens civilian control of the military.

In practical terms, Goldwater-Nichols empowered the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to become the de facto
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equal of the politically accountable Secretary of Defense; it empowered the Chairman to become the de facto commander of the armed forces; it empowered military officers to formulate and influence policy far outside their proper sphere; and while expressly stating its intent to the contrary, it took a long step toward creating an overall Armed Forces General Staff. Intending to improve efficiency, but failing to fully comprehend the complex interrelationships that affect civilian control, Congress failed in its responsibility to provide for the common defense with an establishment that reflects the values of American government.

CIVILIAN CONTROL DEFINED

In Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass the White Queen, when asked the meaning of a word, replied, “Mean? It means what I mean it to mean; no more and no less.” And that is the way it has been with “Civilian Control” of the U.S. military.²

The phrase “civilian control of the military” is very much used, but it is not very well defined and is even less understood. With a rare lack of foresight, the framers of the Constitution failed to directly address the issue. That oversight becomes understandable when one considers that in their day the army was composed primarily of civilians pressed into militia service for a particular emergency. Each of the framers fully expected to don an officer’s uniform and lead that army, should the need arise, intending to return to their civilian pursuits once the emergency had passed. Indeed, many of them had done just that during the Revolution. So, for them the issue of civilian control was moot; the military was all civilian.

Endeavoring to avoid the despotism prevalent in Europe, the Founding Fathers’ main concern was to ensure a
separation and wide dispersal of powers. In that vein, they designated the President the "Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States," but retained for the Congress the authority: "To declare War...; To raise and support Armies...; To provide and maintain a Navy; To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;... To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers."

The framers granted the President the office of Commander in Chief rather than the function of commander, allowing that he could command those forces provided by Congress in war, but could not determine the size or composition of those forces. They clearly intended that the President would not enjoy the royal prerogative of total political and military power like that exercised by the monarchs of Europe, and held true to George Mason's dictum, "The purse and the sword ought never to get into the same hands." By that, however, they ensured a continuing controversy concerning civilian control. The Constitution effectively precludes the polar extremes of a government where no civilian control exists—as in a military dictatorship, and where total civilian control exists—as in Stalinist Russia, but it fails to define precisely where the authority of the office of Commander in Chief ends and where the authority of the Congress begins. The President and the Congress have struggled since the beginning of the Republic over the limits of their authority.

So, civilian control as it is understood by the Executive and the Legislature "means what they mean it to mean; no more and no less." To the President, civilian control often means control by him (either directly, or through his executive agent) as the civilian leader of the country. Congress, on the other hand, considers that the office of Commander in Chief makes the President the Nation's "first soldier" and maintains that civilian control means control by
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the people's representatives. Sometimes more power accrues to one branch, sometimes less, depending on personalities, politics, and the national security situation. Our type of government ensures that the balance never comes to rest. The Joint Chiefs of Staff has been enmeshed in this controversy since its inception.

To better understand the dynamics involved at the critical interface between soldiers and civilians, one must further define the concept of civilian control. Samuel Huntington identifies two types of civilian control: subjective and objective. Under subjective control, the military becomes the tool of a particular civilian group (or groups). Subjective control assumes military participation in institutional, class, and constitutional politics. The military becomes part of the political system, and civilian groups seek control of the military as a means to increase their power relative to other groups and thereby increase their influence over national strategy. In 18th-century England, for example, the Crown controlled the military. Parliament argued for "civilian control" as a means of increasing its power and influence relative to the Crown. Similarly, in 19th-century Europe the aristocracy and bourgeoisie struggled for control of military forces. As just discussed, the constant ebb and flow of control of the military between the Congress and the President represent a struggle over subjective control.³

Objective control, on the other hand, seeks to maximize the professionalism of the military and became possible in the United States only with the advent of the standing professional army that came into existence after the Civil War. According to Huntington,
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Civilian control in the objective sense is the maximizing of military professionalism. More precisely, it is the distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps. Objective civilian control is thus directly opposed to subjective civilian control. Subjective civilian control achieves its end by civilianizing the military, making them the mirror of the state. Objective civilian control achieves its end by militarizing the military, making them the tool of the state... The antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics [emphasis added].

Civilian control as it pertains to the United States is not generally concerned with a potential military coup. While not absolutely ruled out, that possibility is unlikely in the foreseeable future given the long and deeply held tradition of subordination to civilian authority among officers. The issue is more subtle: on one hand, one of the fundamental principles of the American form of government is the separation of powers, which demands a wide dispersal of powers between and within the branches of government. However, the separation of powers results in inefficiencies within decisionmaking bodies. The trick here is to balance the constitutional requirement for a separation of powers with a managerial desire for efficient decisionmaking.

At the same time, the hybrid form of civilian control that has developed in the United States causes a constant dynamic tension between the two elected branches of the government and between civilian and military leadership. Those dynamic relationships can be represented by the intersection of two polar contests. The first pits the Executive and its definition of the limits of its authority over the policies that govern the military against the Legislature and its conception of the
responsibilities inherent in its constitutional duty "To raise and support Armies" and "To provide and maintain a Navy." The second is a contest between the resultant civilian decisionmaking structure and the uniformed military leadership.

Though bound by a strong tradition of subordination to civilian authority and a desire to remain neutral in the struggle between the civilian branches of government, the senior military leadership nonetheless attempts to define a military sphere of decisionmaking and to limit civilian policy direction within that sphere. Key to understanding the importance of the second contest is the realization that the American concept of civilian control of the military is not specifically mentioned in the Constitution, nor is it explicitly codified in law (though it can be derived from the command relationships set by Title 10). It began with the citizens turned soldiers turned citizens again who founded our government and is maintained by the complex confluence of the separation of powers and the tradition of military subordination to civilian authority.

Each of the reorganizations of the Department of Defense has had civilian control of the military as subtext. As represented in figure 1, the National Security Act of 1947 shifted relative power away from the President toward the Congress (movement along the horizontal axis), while the advent of the JCS as a separate locus of power capable of influencing political decisions shifted the military toward more subjective control (movement along the vertical axis). The amendments to the National Security Act in 1949, 1953, and 1958 gradually shifted the balance to the Executive Branch by empowering the Secretary of Defense while the military, through the growing influence of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, continued to accrue political power, and moved farther away from objective control. The latest reform, the Goldwater-Nichols Act, was intended to shift the balance away from the Executive, hence Senator Goldwater's line of
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questioning. However, in the process it made inordinate political power available to the military itself by elevating the Chairman nearly to the level of his nominal superior, the Secretary of Defense. That unintended consequence of Goldwater-Nichols jeopardizes civilian control of the military.

FIGURE 1.

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THE NATIONAL SECURITY ACT
AND ITS AMENDMENTS
Late in the Second World War, Congress became concerned that it had abdicated some of its responsibility in granting the President near total control of the Armed Forces and moved to correct the imbalance. The solution Congress began to
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consider in the spring of 1944 would, in its estimation, address two issues that loomed on the horizon. The first arose with the advent of the airplane and the understanding that the air had become a third environment in which war could be conducted. Prodded by President Truman, Congress recognized a need to unify the War and Navy Departments and to provide a separate department for the air forces. Underlying that ostensible motivation for unifying the departments was the second issue: Congress' concern with the immense power the President wielded as Commander in Chief, and its determination to check and balance that power by establishing a separate, civilian department head confirmed by and dually responsible to the Congress.

The most visible and easily understood issue, of course, was that of unifying the War and Navy Departments. Presaging by 40 years and with almost eerie accuracy the issues that would ultimately lead to the Goldwater-Nichols Act, Truman argued in his 19 December 1945 Message to the Congress that the defense establishment should:

1. Have integrated strategic plans and a unified military program and budget
2. Realize the economies that can be achieved through unified control of supply and service functions
3. Adopt the organizational structure best suited to fostering coordination between the military and the remainder of the Government
4. Provide the strongest means for civilian control of the military
5. Organize to provide parity for air power
6. Establish the most advantageous framework for a unified system of training for combined operations of land, sea and air
7. Allocate systematically our limited resources for scientific research
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8. Have unity of command in outlying bases
9. Have consistent and equitable personnel policies.

Truman's primary dissatisfaction with the existing structure was that it forced upon the President the "whole job of reconciling the divergent claims of the Departments" with regard to strategic plans and budgeting. With the ascendance of the Air Force as a separate arm, Truman felt that he could not and should not personally coordinate the services. He had little desire to be the Nation's "first general and admiral" in the manner of his predecessor.

The National Security Act of 1947 interposed a relatively weak Secretary of Defense between the President and the armed forces, diluting executive authority. Truman incorrectly thought that interposing a civilian Secretary subject to the President and Congress would increase civilian control. In fact, the establishment of a Secretary of Defense neither added to nor detracted from civilian control overall. In keeping with the principle of separation of powers, it merely divided the power that had formerly reposed in one politically accountable civilian official between two, and thereby tipped the relative balance of civilian control in favor of the Congress.

The Secretary of Defense was designated the principal assistant to the President in all matters relating to national security, but could only establish "general" policies and programs and exercise "general" direction, authority, and control of the separately administered services. The Act established the Department of the Air Force and preserved the executive level status of the service Secretaries, and formalized the previously ad hoc Joint Chiefs of Staff, designating it, as a corporate body, the principal military advisor to the President. Though unrecognized at the time, by formalizing the Joint Chiefs of Staff the Act established a potential third locus of power and influence in the civilian control arena.
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On the recommendation of the sitting Secretaries, in 1949 and again in 1953 the President proposed and the Congress agreed to strengthen the office of the Secretary of Defense by granting the office more autonomy and by subordinating the military departments to the Department of Defense. The 1949 amendments also began the process of unifying the uniformed leadership of the military by establishing the Chairman as "first among equals" within the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff. Additionally, increasing the power of the Secretary of Defense while simultaneously reducing the service Secretaries from Executive Department status to military department status caused the powers formerly dispersed among three cabinet level officials to coalesce into a single office.

So, whereas Executive Branch authority over the defense establishment had formerly been exercised with more widely separated powers (conforming to the constitutional principle), coalescing those powers into one office increased the coherence of Executive Branch authority, and hence increased the power of the Executive Branch relative to the more dispersed power and authority of the Legislative Branch. In the interim between the 1949 amendments and the 1953 amendments, the United States again went to war, and during the course of that conflict experienced what is widely perceived as a serious challenge to civilian control.

Most historians have tended to view President Truman's relief of General MacArthur in rather simplistic terms: the General would not submit to civilian authority, so the President relieved him. On the surface, that is what happened. However, on closer examination a subplot emerges, on which rested the credibility of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the key interface between the nation's civilian leadership and its commanders in the field. Throughout the war, MacArthur routinely challenged or ignored the authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. He was senior to each of the members in rank (except that after the Inchon landing General
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Bradley was promoted to five stars, his personality and experience predisposed him to expect more autonomy and direct contact with the Commander in Chief, and he was leery of a committee of his juniors giving him orders. As a newly formalized entity within the national command structure, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as the JCS), on the other hand, sought to assert its authority and practically define its limits.

The corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff (hereafter referred to as the Joint Chiefs) were responsible for translating President Truman's strategic direction into operational orders for the combatant command in Korea. The crucial limitation was Truman's desire to avoid war with China. For his part, MacArthur understood the Joint Chiefs' role as the translator and transmitter of the President's direction, but he habitually tried to circumvent the orders they conveyed. Finally, after MacArthur made public statements contrary to United States policy, the White House instructed the Joint Chiefs to issue a warning. The Joint Chiefs cautioned MacArthur against making public statements and ordered him to clear future statements through them. The cable was a direct order, and MacArthur disobeyed it. He openly criticized administration policy in a letter to a member of Congress, and on 6 April 1951, the Joint Chiefs met to review MacArthur's actions. After deliberating for 2 hours, they agreed to recommend to the President that MacArthur be dismissed.7

The role of the Joint Chiefs in MacArthur's dismissal is often ignored. It marked a turning point in the evolution of the Joint Chiefs of Staff from an ad hoc committee to a formal element of the national military command structure that stood between the Commander in Chief and the combatant commanders. The issue in question in early 1951 was not whether the Joint Chiefs would act to assure civilian control of the military (which was never in much doubt), but whether subject to the President's direction they would assert their own authority. The JCS had been formed in 1947, but on 6

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April 1951 it began to realize the full potential of its power and established itself in the chain of command, its members exercising an informal form of command authority related to and derived from the statutory authority of the President.

Shortly after he took office, Eisenhower submitted his “Reorganization Plan No. 6 of 1953” to the Congress. It further unified the civilian leadership of the defense establishment by consolidating the functions of three separate agencies (the Munitions Board, the Research and Development Board, and the Defense Supply Management Agency) under the Secretary of Defense, and provided six additional assistant secretaries (raising the total to ten). The Plan also strengthened the authority of the Secretary of Defense over the service Secretaries. Finally, the Plan authorized the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to approve officers selected to serve on the Joint Staff and transferred the “functions of the Joint Chiefs of Staff with respect to managing the Joint Staff and the Director thereof”8 to the Chairman. The plan went into effect on 30 June 1953.

On 3 April 1958, President Eisenhower submitted further recommendations for the reform of the Department of Defense, telling Congress:

1. We must organize our fighting forces into operational commands that are truly unified, each assigned a mission in full accord with our over-all military objectives.
2. We must clear command channels so that orders will proceed directly to the unified commands from the Commander in Chief and Secretary of Defense.
3. We must strengthen the military staff in the Office of the Secretary of Defense in order to provide the Commander in Chief and the Secretary of Defense with the professional assistance they need for strategic planning and for operational direction of the unified commands.
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4. We must continue the three military departments as agencies within the Department of Defense to administer a wide range of functions.
5. We must reorganize the research and development functions of the Department in order to make the best use of our scientific and technological resources.
6. We must remove all doubts as to the full authority of the Secretary of Defense.9

Two weeks later, he submitted draft legislation to carry out his recommendations, and through the summer Congress conducted hearings on the issue. Failing to comprehend the synergistic effect that would result when this latest legislation combined with the earlier reforms, Congress passed it with only slight modification, and Eisenhower signed the Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 into law on 6 August.

So, in little over a decade, the Department of Defense had been formed and subsequently reformed three times. For an organization that large and complex, the tempo of change was dizzying. The effects of one reform could barely be measured before the next round of reform began. Taken together, the reforms completely upended the delicate balance the National Security Act had achieved between the unified command of the armed forces required for military success, the unified direction of the Department necessary for budgetary efficiency, and the separation of powers demanded by the Constitution.

Through it all though, Congress had been wary of “the man on horseback”—the powerful military leader who might take over the government. It had ensured that the uniformed side of the Department of Defense did not become strong enough to present a threat to civilian control. For that reason, it had specifically disallowed the formation of a national general staff and ensured that the Chairman remained weak relative to the Secretary of Defense. However, it failed to
recognize that, should he appear, the man on horseback might wear a suit rather than a uniform. The rapid-fire succession of short-tenure Secretaries during the period ensured that none of them could begin to grasp fully the significance of what they and Congress had wrought. It would take a man with a genius for organization and process and a contempt for the judgment of senior military officers to wield fully the awesome power that had accrued to the Office of the Secretary of Defense. It did not take long for that man to step forward.

THE AMENDED NATIONAL SECURITY ACT: UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES

By the time Robert Strange McNamara was sworn in as Secretary of Defense, the power of that office had grown immensely. In contrast to his predecessors, McNamara was responsible by law for the nation's strategic planning and the operational direction of its forces in the field. Soon after taking office, President Kennedy had assured the Joint Chiefs that he desired their advice to reach him "direct and undiluted," but in practical terms, under the amended National Security Act the Joint Chiefs of Staff became an advisory body for the Secretary of Defense. As amended, the National Security Act provided few checks against the possibility that a strong-willed Secretary might ignore or suppress advice from the Nation's senior military leadership.

The first consequence of the amended National Security Act occurred almost immediately after Kennedy's inauguration. The Bay of Pigs operation had been conceived during the last year of the Eisenhower administration, and Eisenhower had approved the plan in March 1960. The CIA conducted its initial preparations throughout that year in complete isolation, but by late 1960 the operation came to the attention of General Lyman Lemnitzer, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Lemnitzer immediately ordered an
investigation of the proposed operation, which concluded in January 1961 that without the full support of the Cuban people and the promise of American military intervention, the likelihood of the operation's success was very slim.

Lemnitzer presented the report and his pessimistic opinion to President Kennedy and the National Security Council on 22 January 1961. The President directed Lemnitzer to reevaluate the plan, but this time the CIA was supposed to cooperate with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in its analysis. The CIA refused to provide more than a broad outline of its plan, however, and based on the incomplete analysis that resulted, the Chairman issued the Joint Chiefs' findings that the operation might succeed if it had air and naval gunfire support, and then only if it was accompanied by an internal uprising against Castro. Kennedy clung to the advice of the more "can-do" members of the NSC, including Secretary McNamara, who discredited the Joint Chiefs' opinion. The NSC asserted that the United States could maintain the appearance of noninvolvement only if the military did not participate, and that the operation would succeed as the CIA had planned it.

As a complex amphibious operation planned and conducted by civilians, the Bay of Pigs invasion was doomed to fail from the start, but the Joint Chiefs had been prevented from participating in the planning process and effectively precluded from providing constructive advice. In the words of Admiral Arleigh Burke,

At every meeting of the National Security Council and every meeting the President had with the Joint Chiefs, he emphasized that the Cuban affair was not a military operation and the Chiefs were not permitted to do anything other than give their personal advice as to its feasibility, and this without the benefit of ever having the details.¹⁰
Afterward, the Joint Chiefs received more than their share of blame for the failure, and President Kennedy became convinced that he could not get useful advice from the Joint Chiefs. He then further marginalized the Joint Chiefs by recalling General Maxwell Taylor from retirement and installing him in the White House, first to head the investigation of the Bay of Pigs fiasco, and subsequently to provide advice as the President’s Military Representative.

The Cuban Missile Crisis occurred 6 months after the Bay of Pigs operation. By then, President Kennedy had appointed General Taylor as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Secretary McNamara continued to exercise his authority under the revised National Security Act to provide operational direction. On one occasion he entered the Navy Operations Center, and after a cursory look at the situation, gave detailed instructions to reposition a particular picket ship. On another occasion he gave commands to a single destroyer and demanded to speak to its commander by telephone. Early on, McNamara developed in himself and his civilian subordinates the habit of providing detailed operational instructions while ignoring or overriding the advice of uniformed officers. The trend was to continue with tragic results during the Vietnam War.

Secretary McNamara’s disregard for military advice and excessively close direction of U.S. efforts in Southeast Asia are now well known. The Joint Chiefs of Staff disagreed vehemently with McNamara’s operational direction of the war. However, the amended National Security Act made it possible for a Secretary of McNamara’s ilk to prevent JCS advice from reaching the President. On those occasions when JCS advice did reach President Johnson, McNamara took pains to align enough senior civilian opinion on his side to ensure that Johnson, who had a penchant for ignoring the Joint Chiefs anyway, discounted the military advice.

Nevertheless, in 1967, Congress became aware of the divergent civilian and military opinion on the conduct of the
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air offensive, and held hearings that August. The Joint Chiefs finally had an opportunity to present their views. Their testimony led the Preparedness Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee to conclude that

the civilian authority consistently overruled the unanimous recommendations of military commanders and the Joint Chiefs of Staff for a systematic, timely, and hard-hitting integrated air campaign against the vital North Vietnam targets. Instead, for policy reasons, we have employed military aviation in a carefully controlled, restricted and graduated buildup of bombing pressure which discounted the professional judgment of our best military experts, and substituted civilian judgment in the details of target selection and the timing of strikes.

As between these diametrically opposed views of the Secretary of Defense and the military experts and in view of the unsatisfactory progress of the war, logic and prudence require that the decision be with the unanimous weight of professional military judgment.

It is high time, we believe, to allow the military voice to be heard in connection with the tactical details of military operations.12

The committee failed to note that the 1958 amendments to the National Security Act had granted the Secretary of Defense the authority to substitute “civilian judgment” for the “professional judgment of our best military experts” in the “tactical details of military operations.” It failed therefore to take meaningful action on its findings or to recommend a systemic solution, but it had at least identified the problem.

President Johnson and Secretary McNamara failed in their duties as the National Command Authorities by confusing “their ultimate responsibility for our military direction with who should be doing it.”13 They ignored the advice of the institution responsible for translating their political decisions into military objectives. Under the amended National
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Security Act, however, the Secretary of Defense was authorized to provide operational direction for the armed forces. McNamara was acting in full accordance with the law when he substituted his own judgment for the expertise of the nation's senior military leadership. His willfulness, combined with President Johnson's lack of strategic vision, led to our worst military failure.

Despite the findings of the 1967 hearings, the tendency for civilian policy makers to substitute their judgment for that of military officers persisted throughout the Vietnam War and for many years afterward. During the abortive attempt to rescue the Americans held hostage in Tehran, for example, operational decisions down to the detail of the number of helicopters to be employed were made in the White House. Likewise in Beirut, over the objections of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Marines were assigned the ambiguous mission of "presence" and placed in a militarily untenable location with unrealistic rules of engagement established by the President and members of the National Security Council and acquiesced in by Congress.

So, the result of the whirlwind reorganization of the Department of Defense from 1947 to 1958 was a command structure that marginalized the professional judgment of senior military officers and contributed to the string of military failures from the Bay of Pigs Invasion to the Vietnam War and on to Beirut. Presidents Truman and Eisenhower thought that their amendments to the National Security Act would improve civilian control by granting vast powers to their appointed Secretaries of Defense. That is how it appeared in the legislation and the resultant organizational charts, but the unintended consequence of the amendments was a grossly distorted civilian control. To return to Huntington, after 1958 the amended National Security Act resulted in near total subjective control by the executive branch (figure 1). In that light, it is easy to understand Senator Goldwater's question, "can we, as a country, any
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longer afford a 207-year-old concept that in military matters the civilian is supreme?"

THE MISGUIDED SOLUTION

In the early 1980s, hoping to mitigate the unintended consequences of the amended National Security Act, but failing to fully comprehend the root cause of those consequences, certain members of Congress began to press for change. They were backed by reformers from academia and the military who likewise misunderstood the problem but who seized upon high visibility anecdotal "evidence" (much of it ultimately untrue or unrelated to the central issues), from contemporary military debacles in the Iranian Desert, Grenada, and Beirut as well as widely publicized acquisition scandals. They were determined to fundamentally alter the authority of the Secretary and the manner in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff operated.

The United States has enjoyed a string of military successes, both in operations other than war and in combat operations, since the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Beginning with Operation Just Cause, the first operation after Goldwater-Nichols, the U.S. Armed Forces have demonstrated impressive operational capabilities. Service interoperability and cooperation have improved, and at last a truly "joint" perspective is beginning to be imbued in the officers of each of the services. However, the Goldwater-Nichols reforms were implemented during a period of unprecedented peacetime military spending, and it is not at all clear whether America's decade of military success was due more to organization or to modernization.

However, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has failed in its objectives of strengthening civilian authority and improving military advice to the President. First, how an organization looks on paper does not always coincide with how it functions in practice, and under Goldwater-Nichols the civilian side of
the Department of Defense is demonstrably weaker than the military side. Second, criticism that the most significant military advice provided to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense—that involving the actual use of force—was of poor quality or late is not wholly supported by the facts. As discussed in the preceding section, the history of America’s use of military force from the Bay of Pigs to Beirut shows that often JCS advice did not support the course of action the President favored and was simply ignored. While it is certainly the President’s prerogative to accept or reject any advice the Joint Chiefs of Staff provide, the indictment against the quality of their advice was “in many cases a euphemism for ‘news [he] didn’t want to hear.’”

The Goldwater-Nichols Act and Civilian Control
The fundamental changes in the relationships between the key players in the national military command structure caused by the Goldwater-Nichols Act have had a profound effect on civilian control. The national security related duties and responsibilities of the President and Congress assigned by the Constitution, and their derivatives in the U.S. Code, are purposely broad and unrestricted. The people of the United States should not want it any other way, in the execution of his duties as Commander in Chief, the President should be able to use any legal means and any legal organizational scheme he deems necessary. Likewise, the Congress, in the execution of its responsibilities to “raise and support Armies” and “provide and maintain a Navy” should be bound only by the requirement that its actions be legal. The U.S. Constitution has stood the test of two centuries precisely because it flexibly applies a few simple concepts such as the separation of powers and pluralism to the complex problem of government.
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As the Commander in Chief responsible to the people for the security of the nation, the President must not be unnecessarily bound by legislation that intrudes on his constitutional responsibilities. The Goldwater-Nichols Act, however, does just that. It prescribes how the Commander in Chief shall organize his command; how the Commander in Chief shall communicate with his subordinate commanders; with whom the Commander in Chief must consult in the development and implementation of his orders and directives; and whom the Commander in Chief may appoint as his subordinate commanders. A military commander similarly restricted would be a commander in name only.

The Act's defenders will argue that it gives the President a great deal of flexibility in areas such as the establishment of command relationships. They are correct; in prescribing the chain of command, the Act says this:

Unless otherwise directed by the President, the chain of command to a unified or specified combatant command runs—(1) from the President to the Secretary of Defense; and (2) from the Secretary of Defense to the commander of the combatant command. [10 USC, Sect. 162(b)] [emphasis added].

It adds that,

the President may—(1) direct that communications between the President or the Secretary of Defense and the commanders of the ... combatant commands be transmitted through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; and (2) assign duties to the Chairman to assist the President and the Secretary of Defense in performing their command function [10 USC, Sect. 163(a)] [emphasis added].

So, Congress has allowed that the Commander in Chief may establish any chain of command he sees fit, communicate within that chain of command any way he might like, and
assign such duties to his principal military subordinate as he desires. Of course, the President always possessed that authority.

Similar dubious passages occur throughout the Act, begging the question, "Why did Congress bother?" One answer is that the Congress recognized a President could simply ignore stronger provisions and would be on firm constitutional ground in doing so. An alternative is that Congress was attempting to legislate competence in national security decision-making. But a President worth the title Commander in Chief would, as a matter of course, organize his command rationally, transmit his orders coherently, and use the best and most experienced people to implement his national security policies. The legislative passages above show that with Goldwater-Nichols, Congress was attempting to correct—decades too late—what it had failed to correct during the Vietnam War.

By establishing the Chairman as the principal military advisor to the President, and by giving the Chairman control of the Joint Staff, Goldwater-Nichols established a de facto national general staff. The effect of such a structure on politically responsible civilian authority is dangerous. The scope of responsibilities of the Commander in Chief require that he be presented a full range of alternatives when confronted with national security issues. While a corporate body is designed to generate and consider diverse viewpoints fully, the purpose of a general staff is to weed out alternatives ruthlessly. Limiting the diversity of advice to responsible civilian authority streamlines the decisionmaking process, but it also reduces the practical exercise of civilian control of the military and threatens to make civilian authority a "meaningless formalism, with little function beyond rubber-stamping the action of the military."15

The provisions concerning the relative authority of the Secretary, the Chairman, and the Joint Staff are equally damaging. The Secretary's overall charge has essentially
remained unchanged since the inception of the office in 1947, but Goldwater-Nichols reduced the Secretariat dramatically, and transferred several key functions to the Chairman. The Secretary is now essentially limited to formulating general defense policy. The Department of Defense Organization and Functions Guidebook lists the Secretary's duties as "the formulation of general defense policy and policy related to all matters of direct and primary concern to the DOD, and . . . the execution of approved policy." 16

At the same time, the Act gave the Chairman control of the Joint Staff and made him responsible for key strategic functions, including: 1) strategic direction; 2) strategic planning; 3) contingency planning; 4) requirements, programs, and budget; 5) doctrine, training, and education; and 6) roles and missions[10 USC, Sect. 153]. In other words, with a strong and focused staff organized on military staff lines and answering to him, the Chairman is responsible for the most salient decisions relating to national security.

Defenders will assert that in carrying out those functions, the Chairman is "subject to the authority, direction, and control of the President and the Secretary of Defense," [10 USC, Sect. 153] and that the Chairman only makes recommendations to the Secretary and the President. They are correct, of course, but those familiar with bureaucratic processes will recognize that, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Les Aspin, "whenever you have a decision to make in the government, the side capable of making the best arguments will normally prevail." 17 And those even remotely familiar with bureaucratic decision making will also admit that the "best arguments" are not always correct.

Compared to its civilian counterparts within the Department of Defense and to the various congressional committees charged with overseeing the Department, the Joint Staff is supremely capable of "making the best arguments." Though comprising officers from each of the
services, as Congress intended, it operates in accordance with the military principle of "unity of command" under the direction of a single officer. It is ideally suited to provide unified, coherent proposals in response to particular issues, while on the civilian side the various secretariats and congressional committees are more fractured. As in combat, the side capable of coherent, unified effort will almost invariably succeed over a disjointed opponent.

The Commission on Roles and Missions, examining the issue of quality on the civilian side of the Department of Defense concluded that "political appointees in [the Office of the Secretary of Defense] and in the Military Department staffs often lack the experience and expertise in national security and military strategy, operations, budgeting, etc. required by the positions they fill." The Joint Staff's relative effectiveness may be exacerbated by the short tenure of political appointees and a side effect of the ethics reforms Congress has implemented to prevent Defense Department officials from profiting from their contacts once they move into the private sector. The ethics regulations may have had the effect of discouraging top quality candidates for civilian posts within DOD. According to Secretary Aspin,

There's been a shift in the quality of people working on the military versus the civilian side. Because of Goldwater-Nichols, the quality on the military side has gone up tremendously, where the reverse has happened on the civilian side. Revolving-door restrictions have made government service so unattractive that the pool from which you can pick political appointees is not as rich as it once was. The result of the above is a system in which the Chairman is responsible for establishing policies concerning the most important national security issues, and has sole authority over
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a military staff that is more effective than its civilian counterparts.

Compounding the above, the Act has effectively cut the service Chiefs out of the decisionmaking process. Goldwater-Nichols makes the Chairman alone the "principal military advisor to the President, the National Security Council, and the Secretary of Defense" [10 USC, Sect. 151]; in the past, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as a corporate body, performed that function. To allow divergent views to be heard, the Act permits a member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff who disagrees with the Chairman's position to submit separate advice, and allows that the President, the National Security Council, or The Secretary of Defense may request that a dissenting member of the Joint Chiefs provide alternate advice. Once again, however, those familiar with bureaucratic processes and organizational dynamics will understand that a dissenting member of the Joint Chiefs could present a divergent position to the NCA (either on his own initiative or on request) perhaps once or twice during his tenure and still remain effective within the organization. In that regard, the Act has had a "chilling effect" on dissent and has undercut the philosophy of multiple sources of advice to politically responsible authority.

Moreover, the Act has reinforced that "chilling effect" by granting the Chairman control of the agenda of Joint Chiefs of Staff meetings, thereby making it possible for him to control the issues the Joint Chiefs can consider. The Joint Chiefs now primarily deal with the routine and mundane. An examination of agenda items reveals that during the operation to evacuate U.N. forces from Somalia, for example, the Joint Chiefs spent most of their time in the "Tank" discussing matters of such importance as commissaries and child care. A member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff recently remarked that to wean the Joint Chiefs from involvement in meaningful issues, the Chairman "very cleverly quit having substantive Tank sessions" and that, "the construct that says a lot of major
decisions get made in the Tank is starting to break down’” [emphasis added].

In addition to allowing the Chairman to exclude the other members of the Joint Chiefs from the consideration of meaningful issues, the Act has also allowed the Chairman, singularly, to become more ensconced in the chain of command. As quoted above, the Act states that the chain of command runs from the President to the Secretary and thence to the commanders in chief. The Act goes on to state that the NCA may communicate through the Chairman, and also states that the Chairman outranks all other officers of the armed forces. Moreover, it also established a Vice Chairman, and gave him seniority over the other Joint Chiefs, second only to the Chairman. Literalists will disagree, but the result of the above places the Chairman in the chain of command and gives him great authority over the combatant commands, diminishing significantly the impact and authority of the other Chiefs.

The Chairman’s authority in the chain of command derives from the statutory authority of the National Command Authorities. As the first military officer below the NCA, the Chairman receives their political directives, translates them to operational orders, and transmits those orders to the combatant commanders. Those functions impart a degree of command authority, which is informal rather than statutory but it is no less real. If the Chairman is to have any credibility, that authority must exist, otherwise combatant commanders could circumvent orders they disagreed with and appeal directly to the NCA as General MacArthur attempted in 1951. The Joint Chiefs’ role in General MacArthur’s relief is one example of that informal or residual command authority, and now the Chairman alone exercises that authority.

Likewise, assertions that the Joint Staff is not a national general staff are gossamer thin. In its essence, a general staff is characterized by
a single national chief of staff with command authority over
the military forces of the nation, as well as personal control
over an independent general staff . . . comprised of elite
career staff officers possessing intermittent experience with
the operational aspects of military endeavor. Their
influence and authority supersede the services as well as
the field commands, and provide the principal source of
recommendations and advice to the national chief of staff as
principal advisor to politically responsible authority.\textsuperscript{21}

Despite congressional intent that it “not operate or be
organized as an overall Armed Forces General Staff”\textsuperscript{10 USC,
Sect. 155}, the Joint Staff has gradually come to resemble one,
which was inevitable, given that the Act reduced the Secretary
of Defense’s staff without abolishing corresponding functions.
Wherever a vacuum has occurred, the Joint Staff has stepped
in. The Joint Staff has even come to influence resource
decisions, like its prohibited progenitor the German General
Staff.

Taken together, the effects of the Goldwater-Nichols Act
on the powers and functions of the Secretary and the
Chairman have resulted in a decisionmaking structure that
mirrors that which existed during the Vietnam War, with one
difference. During that conflict, the Secretary and his
assistants and staff were empowered by the amended
National Security Act to exclude the expertise of the nation’s
senior military leadership. Under Goldwater-Nichols, the
Chairman has been similarly empowered to minimize
participation in the deliberative decisionmaking process at the
national level. The root problem is the same, only the attire of
the key players has changed. Combining the power of the
Chairman with the relative effectiveness of the Joint Staff
versus its civilian counterparts sets all the necessary
conditions for military usurpation of civilian decisionmaking
authority.
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NATIONAL SECURITY DECISIONMAKING AT
THE SEAT OF GOVERNMENT

Whenever there are strong differences of opinion or
difficult problems, there is a human tendency to seek the
one-man solution. Our generation has had painful
opportunity to observe the dangers of this course. 22

With those simple sentences, Mr. Ferdinand Eberstadt,
Chairman of the Hoover Commission Task Force on National
Security, which studied defense reorganization in the late
1940s, summed up the motivation for unifying the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (as Goldwater-Nichols has done) and its inherent
dangers. The military decisions that must be made at the seat
of government are manifestly different from those that are
made at lower levels. The primary danger to which Eberstadt
alluded was the tendency of general staff organizations to
turn inward, stifle debate, and make erroneous strategic
decisions. The challenge is in establishing a structure that can
weigh the complex issues of the American security problem
and arrive at decisions in a manner consistent with the
American traditions of governance.

The arguments in favor of unifying the Joint Chiefs under
a powerful Chairman are many, but in essence they boil down
to military efficiency. The desire in the early 1980s, and
indeed in some quarters since 1947, has been to organize the
entire military command structure along the lines of a combat
command. Reformers who argued for and won a simplified
command structure, organized on military staff lines, fail to
understand the fundamental difference between
decisionmaking at the operational and tactical levels, and
decisionmaking at the strategic level. A military staff
organization is designed for the express purpose of allowing
a commander to reach a decision and act quickly. Its
"principal faculty is the swift suppression, at each level of
consideration, of alternative courses of action, so that the man
at the top has only to approve or disapprove—but not to
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weigh alternatives." It works extremely well on the battlefield, but is altogether inappropriate at higher levels.

Mistakes at the tactical and operational levels can usually be corrected before they do serious damage to a particular campaign or the outcome of a war. On the other hand, strategic level errors—fundamental mistakes in force structure and the objectives of national policy—are usually irretrievable and often fatal. Mistakes at the strategic level impact millions of people for generations; consider the aftereffects of the Vietnam War. Those responsible for decisions at the seat of government must carefully consider all issues, and the only way that can happen is if those most familiar with them are allowed a voice in the debate. At the critical interface between national policy and military action that is the Joint Chiefs of Staff, dissent born of honest judgment must be considered. Deliberative decisionmaking is frustrating for those who miscomprehend the complexity of strategic issues and prefer simple and clear-cut answers, but strategic level questions offer no such easy answers. Rather, "at the top levels of government, where planning precedes, or should precede, action by a considerable period of time, a deliberate decision is infinitely preferable to a bad decision."24

Some decry the potential for JCS deliberation to result in "split decisions," but a split decision should serve as a signal that the issue in question should be decided by a politically responsible civilian. Returning to Mr. Eberstadt's findings, a split decision "would normally imply that the issue is beyond solution by the resources of military technology and experience, and is, therefore, within the competence of civilian judgment and authority."25 Though it may rankle some military officers, when the recommendations of the Joint Chiefs diverge, particularly when the issue in question is one upon which the future of the Nation may hang, then it is clearly the responsibility of the Secretary of Defense or the President, as politically responsible authorities, to adjudicate the issue.

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Finally, proponents of Goldwater-Nichols argued that it was necessary to eliminate interservice rivalry and to force interservice cooperation. They point to failures in the Iranian desert and in Beirut and operational difficulties in Grenada as evidence of a need for unification. They make great use of Eisenhower’s assertion that “separate ground, sea, and air warfare is gone forever.” But the idea that unifying the efforts of all arms is a key ingredient for success has been a guiding principle (and a major challenge) for commanders since the Peloponnesian War, when Athens waged a joint naval and land campaign against Sparta. It is also irrelevant to the issue of military decisionmaking at the seat of government. Joint interoperability and the deliberative direction of national strategy are not even remotely related.

Given the above, it is clear that arguments in favor of unifying the Joint Chiefs of Staff as necessary for “military efficiency” are a red herring. At no time in our history, before or after Goldwater-Nichols, have the Joint Chiefs been responsible for split-second, life-or-death decisionmaking. That argument was fallaciously raised during the height of the Cold War, but even then the United States had a combatant commander responsible for those decisions. Taken to its logical conclusion, that argument would “justify the elimination of Congress and the Supreme Court in order to achieve more direct and rapid governmental processes under direction of the executive branch.”

GOLDWATER-NICHOLS GOES TO WAR

The Persian Gulf War was seen by some as a vindication of the reforms instituted by Goldwater-Nichols. On the contrary, rather than vindicating the reform effort, the Gulf War illuminated serious flaws in the national military command structure. First, as discussed earlier, the stellar tactical and operational performance of U.S. forces in Southwest Asia can more likely be attributed to the Reagan
era buildup, which thoroughly modernized the operating forces, made possible a complete revamping of doctrine, and improved the quality and training of personnel at every level. Second, the Act would have precluded civilian authorities from playing a part in military decisionmaking and shielded the theater commander from the inputs of meddlesome Department of Defense officials and Pentagon staff officers. But the idea for the brilliant operational maneuver to envelop the Republican Guard was originally conceived by an assistant to the Secretary, a civilian who in an earlier era might have been derided as a "whiz kid" or a meddlesome DOD official.

Third, throughout the war, the theater commander failed to fully grasp the political significance of the Iraqi SCUD attacks on Israel as opposed to their military significance—or more accurately, insignificance. Accordingly, he was loath to allocate scarce assets to help the Israelis defend against them, an objective of dubious military utility given the technology available and the fact that even a damaged SCUD must eventually fall to earth. The Chairman, nominally precluded from anything but the transmission of NCA approved orders to the theater commander, intervened and sent Patriot missile batteries to Israel. Finally, early in the conflict the theater commander's staff proved incapable of developing a plan for an air offensive that capitalized on the overwhelming strength of the American (and later coalition) air forces. The plan that finally emerged was developed not by the combatant commander's staff nor by the Joint Staff, as Goldwater-Nichols would have it, but by the group of officers most expert in the employment of air power, the Air Staff—a Service Staff under the cognizance of the nation's most experienced military aviator, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force.28

The above examples are not intended as criticisms. Rather, they illustrate what thoughtful observers intuitively understand—that warfare in general, and in particular as it is
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waged by the United States, is a vast and complex undertaking, the direction of which is beyond the abilities of any individual or small group. Desert Shield and Desert Storm succeeded partly because the NCA and the Department of Defense ignored the constrained operational command structure established by Goldwater-Nichols.

Fortunately for the outcome of the Persian Gulf War, the NCA could disregard the operational command relationships dictated by Goldwater-Nichols. As a brief crisis in which decision cycles were relatively short, it was a simple matter to recognize the shortcomings of the system and to take steps to avoid them. In the strategic questions that the same insular system addresses, decision cycles are much longer, and a conceptual failure similar to those averted in Desert Storm by involving diverse expertise and ideas will take longer to become apparent. During the Persian Gulf War, it was relatively easy for the Secretary and the Chairman to see where the combatant commander was going wrong and to make necessary corrections; in strategic matters, the NCA and the American people might not realize that a particular policy is misguided until it is too late.

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One of the central purposes of Goldwater-Nichols was to ensure that those responsible for aspects of national security at the strategic and operational levels have commensurate authority to implement their decisions, thus the furor over ensuring that the regional CINCs had sufficient command authority over the forces assigned to them to carry out their responsibilities. The service Chiefs similarly struggle to balance their Title 10 responsibilities to raise and equip their services, and to provide ultimately properly organized and trained forces to the CINCs, with the authority granted by law to determine how those forces will be organized, trained, and equipped. Clearly, a mismatch between responsibility and
authority, at either the CINC or service Chief level, degrades the outcome of their respective efforts.

Proponents claimed that Goldwater-Nichols would resolve the apparent conflict of interest caused by the service Chiefs' simultaneous responsibilities for raising and equipping their services and for joint strategic decision making. As the argument goes, the "dual-hatting" of the service Chiefs made them incapable of honest judgments in the national interest and unable to provide unbiased joint advice when the interests of their particular service were at stake. The idea, then, was that disassociating the service Chiefs from joint decisionmaking would improve strategic advice. But if strategic advice consists of that advice concerning the organizing, training, and equipping of the services combined (and, ideally, matched) with advice concerning the employment of those resultant forces, can disassociating one from the other really improve the overall advice? To answer that question, one must understand the process by which strategic advice is developed.

In its essence, strategic advice to the NCA answers two questions: what to do (or plan to do) and what to buy. The questions are simple, but the answers quite difficult, because of, as discussed earlier, the complexity of national security issues. Ideally, the answers to both questions should match so that the Nation buys no more than it needs and attempts or plans no more than it can afford. The surest way to make the answers match is to have the person or agency responsible for execution also be responsible for advice. That is essentially how the services, organized under the Department of the Navy and the Department of War, operated during World War II. Then there were two theaters, one generally naval, one generally continental, and the Chief of Naval Operations and the Chief of Staff of the Army advised President Roosevelt on what to do (developing that advice within the nascent JCS) and through their respective Secretaries, also advised him on what to buy.
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Things are a bit more complex now, and the World War II executive agent system no longer works. Under the amended National Security Act, functional and combatant CINCs employed the forces, while the Joint Chiefs of Staff provided the advice. The Joint Chiefs of Staff was established to synthesize the operational plans developed by the CINCs with the longer term strategic concepts developed by the Joint Chiefs, and from that basis advise the NCA on what to do, while simultaneously consolidating the CINCs' force and material requirements with JCS developed future programs to make recommendations to their respective Service Secretaries on what to buy. The service Secretaries, after receiving guidance from the Secretary of Defense, then submitted their budget recommendations to the Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the President's budget.

The Secretary of Defense was then responsible for ensuring that what the uniformed side planned matched what the civilian side had programmed, and vice versa. One strength of that system was that it observed the key principle of American governance, the separation of powers; it ensured that the hands that wielded the sword, the military, were separate and distinct from the hands closest to the purse, the civilian leadership of the Defense Department. The primary weakness was that the system offered ample opportunity for a mismatch between plans and programs, a real or perceived duplication of programs, or the development of “pet” programs irrelevant to national security needs. These were the chief criticisms of the system when Goldwater-Nichols was being considered, and Congress responded by granting the Chairman more power to influence the programming process.

Under Goldwater-Nichols, the CINCs employ the forces, as before, but now the Joint Staff synthesizes the plans and requirements of the CINCs, and develops the recommendations the Chairman submits to the NCA. Additionally, due to the measures implemented under
Goldwater-Nichols that strengthen the power of the Chairman at the expense of the Service Chiefs and the Service Secretaries, the Chairman now enjoys increased influence on decisions concerning what to buy as well. As discussed above, strategic advice consists of plans (what to do) and programs (what to buy). The division of labor in developing that advice has the military -- formerly the corporate Joint Chiefs, but now primarily the Chairman -- responsible for planning, and the civilian leadership of the military departments responsible for programming. The Secretary of Defense guides both efforts by issuing the Defense Planning Guidance for programs and by providing guidance which the Chairman incorporates into the Chairman's Guidance to the Service Chiefs and CINCs for plans. The Service and military department staffs cooperate to develop complementary plans and programs, but in the case of a particular issue the staffs cannot agree upon, then The Secretary of Defense, or depending on the issue, the President, acts as final arbiter.

So, can disassociating the service Chiefs from joint strategic advice improve that advice? No, it cannot. The reality of the matter is that if the two elements of strategic advice are to be in any way relevant to one another, then someone has to be dual-hatted. Effective strategic advice consists of complementary programs and plans. The CINC's develop requirements for programs and force capabilities and employ joint forces in the execution of operational plans. The capabilities of the forces are developed by the service Chiefs, who organize, train, and equip their respective services and develop service programs. Setting aside the role of the Chairman for a moment, it follows, then, that either the service Chiefs will wear a service hat for their programs and a joint hat as force providers, or the CINC's will wear an operational theater hat and a joint programs hat. However, as the Nation's warfighters, the CINC's should focus on their operational responsibilities. With staffs organized for warfighting, increasing CINC responsibilities in areas outside
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their primary focus detracts from their operational effectiveness. Additionally, the CINC's operational responsibilities tend to drive them to a relatively short-term outlook. The development of strategic advice however, is a long term process. "Dual-hatting" the CINCs could result in conflicting short- and long-term interests, not the ideal condition for developing strategic advice that may affect the long-term security of the Nation.

Returning to the role of the Chairman, and the changes under Goldwater-Nichols, the CINCs now submit their requirements to the Chairman (rather than to the corporate JCS). Two CJCS policy memorandums have established procedures to provide opportunity for the incorporation of service views, but as discussed below, Goldwater-Nichols allows the Chairman to develop and submit his own planning and programming advice to the Secretary of Defense, bypassing the service Chiefs and service Secretaries. Setting aside the service roles now, strategic advice can be developed strictly within the joint structure. Again, that approach results in dual-hatting the CINCs, with the same conflicting interests of short-term operational and long-term strategic concerns.

So, the development of joint strategic advice inevitably results in dual-hatting. Rather than eliminating the phenomenon, Goldwater-Nichols has simply spread it into the operational structure. Undeniably, the conflicting interests caused by dual-hatting complicated the decisionmaking processes of the service Chiefs. However, if indeed the service Chiefs were hard pressed to balance their service and joint responsibilities, then it is not unreasonable to assume that the CINCs will have similar difficulty separating the short term operational issues of their theaters from the long term strategic needs of the Nation.

The Act's defenders will downplay the significance of the Chairman's authority to bypass the services and military departments in the development of strategic advice, but
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Section 153 of the Act makes the Chairman responsible for “Advising the Secretary on the extent to which the program recommendations and budget proposals of the military departments and other components of the Department of Defense . . . conform with the priorities established in strategic plans.” Additionally, the Act makes the Chairman responsible for “Submitting to the Secretary alternative program recommendations and budget proposals” [10 USC, Sect. 153].

With those clauses, Congress came close to unifying the planning and programming processes under the Chairman. Section 153 rationalized those processes and improved their overall efficiency, but it has also damaged civilian control. The military side of the Defense Department now develops the plans and their resultant requirements, as before. At the same time, through the Joint Staff and the Joint Requirements Oversight Counsel (JROC), which only began to exploit fully the provision within the last few years, the military side also heavily influences the programming decisions of the civilian side. In fact, the law sets up the questionable situation whereby the work of the service Secretaries, nominally senior to any member of the military, is checked by the Chairman.

Consider the above in conjunction with former Secretary Aspin’s remarks that the Joint Staff has proven more capable than its civilian counterparts at presenting bureaucratic arguments, and it is clear that Goldwater-Nichols has set the conditions whereby the military can set the terms of the national security debate. With the CINCs increasingly involved in resource issues, and the service Chiefs and service Secretaries increasingly cut out of the loop, Congress, too, has lost some ability to fulfill its constitutional responsibilities—its primary “contact points,” the service Secretaries and service Chiefs, no longer control the machinery. Evidence of Congress’ difficulty can be seen in the increased incidence of CINC testimony (taking them away from their primary duties); Congress seems to be grasping for control.
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For their part, the service Chiefs, still responsible under Title 10 to organize, train, and equip the forces, have responded to their lack of influence within the system by attempting to shape congressional opinion from the outside. Hence the proliferation of articles that are essentially issue papers generated for the press, with the consequence that the services have become more politicized. Additionally, the JROC, intently focused on a few issues, can always beat the Congress to the punch regarding programs, putting Congress in the position of having to oppose a well organized and coordinated campaign in favor of the Chairman's proposals. Finally, while the Secretary can overrule the nominally subordinate Chairman, what political appointee will risk the political fallout of appearing to be consistently at odds with the Nation's senior soldier?

As demonstrated by the recent case of the additional B-2 bombers that Congress favored but the JROC opposed, Congress is now constrained in its ability to affect long term strategic issues. Though criticized by many as simply a "porkbarrel" program designed to spread jobs to the districts of influential members of Congress, it is precisely through programs like the B-2 that Congress influences the long term strategic direction of the defense establishment. During Truman's Presidency, Congress overrode an administration decision to terminate funding for aircraft carriers because, contrary to the Secretary and the civilian and uniformed leadership of the Army and Air Force, it saw a continued need for naval power projection. That, too, was criticized as "porkbarrel politics," but the history of American responses to crises over the last 40 years has proven the soundness of that decision.

In Goldwater-Nichols, critics of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff found a deceptively simple answer to a complex problem. The national security problem faced by the United States is vast in scope and complex in detail. It in no way resembles the security problem historically faced by
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Germany, essentially continental and amenable to a relatively simple solution like the Schleiffen Plan, or Israel, which, like Germany, knows precisely who its potential enemies are and from where they might attack. Each of its major theaters presents the United States with relatively simple security problems like those faced by Germany and Israel, but overall, the problem for the United States combines competing requirements of global complexity with the added challenge of deploying for war to nearly any spot on the planet. The solution to such a complex problem requires careful, balanced deliberation—the strength of the corporate JCS system that Goldwater-Nichols eviscerated.

During the Cold War, the United States focused its efforts on deterring the Soviet Union or defending Europe if deterrence failed. Given that focus, it is understandable that some came to see the American security problem in simplistic, bipolar terms. It is equally unsurprising that the two principal military critics of the corporate JCS system would be two officers (General Edward Meyer and General David Jones), who had spent their careers preparing to fight the Soviets in Europe. In a perfect example of the need for diversity in strategic advice, the critics of the corporate Joint Chiefs of Staff focused on only one aspect of the American security challenge and attempted to solve its perceived problems with a system better suited for simpler national security situations. As a consequence, the current national military command structure has become inordinately focused on the shorter term operational concerns of the combatant CINCs, to the detriment of long-term strategic concerns.

CONCLUSION

Goldwater-Nichols may have made the system more efficient, but that efficiency has come at the cost of the Secretary's and the Congress's ability to exert civilian control and has dangerously politicized the military. In reference again to
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Huntington and the model presented in figure 1, Goldwater-Nichols has caused the military to become immersed in politics, making civilian control of the military even more subjective. Like the law it replaced, Goldwater-Nichols has given the United States a national military command structure that violates the constitutional principle of separation of powers. The amended National Security Act consolidated previously dispersed powers into one office, unintentionally setting the conditions where an arrogant and headstrong Secretary of Defense was able to abuse them. As discussed in this paper, the Goldwater-Nichols Act has done essentially the same thing, but it has consolidated formerly dispersed powers into the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. As a result, the Act has set the conditions whereby the military might usurp some of the authority of its civilian leadership.

By establishing a system whereby military advice at the seat of government is presented as unanimous positions, Goldwater-Nichols offers the illusion that national security decision making can be made easier. However, in practice such advice can amount to de facto decisions by a single officer and could make mere figureheads of responsible civilian authorities. At the same time, Goldwater-Nichols has also allowed civilian authorities to abdicate some of their responsibilities. National security decision making is a complex and difficult business. Long-term strategic decisions are the responsibility of politically accountable civilians, namely, the President, the Secretary, and the Congress. Those decisions are difficult and politically risky, but they are the decisions the Nation’s civilian leaders are paid to make.

The military’s role is to advise the decisionmakers and to execute their decisions. The military risks its relationship with the American people, one unique in history, when it becomes intimately involved in decisions that fall outside its proper sphere. The United States and its Armed Forces have already experienced the disastrous consequences of allowing
excessive power to accrue to the civilian head of the defense establishment, and they can ill afford to suffer the potential consequences of allowing inordinate authority to accrue to the Nation's senior military officer.

Civilian control is an ongoing process rather than an accomplished fact, a work in progress rather than a finished product. As such, it depends very much on the situation and the personalities involved and on the procedures under which they operate. The central issue in civilian control in the United States is the "relative weight or influence of the military in the decisions the government makes, not only in military policy and war, but in foreign, defense, economic, and social policy (for much military policy can have vast implications for various aspects of national life)."

Goldwater-Nichols allows the military to have inordinate influence on the decisions the government makes, and contrary to its intent, weakens civilian control.

Finally, those who would argue that the American military's tradition of subordination to civilian authority ensures that the military would never misuse its powers miss the point. The American form of governance is based on the premise that accumulated powers will eventually be misused. The separation of powers, while inherently inefficient, is the only sure defense against their misuse, and Congress must carefully and deliberately evaluate any initiative to consolidate powers and functions in the name of efficiency.

As General George C. Marshall, America's most distinguished soldier-statesman, eloquently illuminated in late 1942, civilian control of the Armed Forces of the United States requires eternal vigilance on the part of both soldiers and civilians. At the time, General Marshall had begun to look forward to the defeat of Germany and Japan, and to contemplate what the reconstruction of those shattered nations would require of the U.S. military. He established a Civil Affairs Division to oversee the training of officers for the task of administering military governments, and in his
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instructions to its director he provided enduring guidance for soldiers and legislators alike concerning the military's place in American society and the fragility of civilian control:

I'm turning over to you a sacred trust and I want you to bear that in mind every day and every hour that you preside over this civil affairs venture ... we have a great asset, and that is our people, our countrymen, do not distrust us and do not fear us. Our countrymen, our fellow citizens, are not afraid of us. They don't harbor any ideas that we intend to alter the government of the country or the nature of this government in any way. This is a sacred trust ... and I don't want you to do anything ... to damage this high regard in which the professional soldiers in the Army are held by our people, and it could happen, it could happen ... if you don't understand what you are about.31

NOTES

1. Senator Barry Goldwater, Hearings before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, July 28, 1983.
4. Huntington, 83.
7. Perry, 34.
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15. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.) and others, *Report by the Committee on Civilian-Military Relationships* (Indianapolis, IN: Hudson Institute, 17 September 1984), 37.
19. Aspin, quoted by Kitfield.
20. Senior military official, remarks during a nonattributable address to the Command and Staff College.
21. General Lyman L. Lemnitzer, USA (Ret.) and others, first addendum, 1.
24. Ibid.
25. Ferdinand Eberstadt, quoted by J.D. Hittle. 721.
27. Hittle, 720.
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29. CJCS Memorandum of Policy (MOP) 7, The Joint Strategic Planning System, and CJCS MOP 9, Policy of Action Processing, provide for Service input. MOP 9 however, requires the Joint Staff to coordinate with the Services only when “they have an interest, their views would be useful, or [when] they have requested the opportunity to coordinate.” The discretion implied by that language has led Service staff officers to believe that “selective coordination” on the part of the Joint Staff has occurred.


At the conclusion of the Cold War, we found ourselves with too much of not the right stuff, outdated information management tools, and organic capabilities that didn't address contemporary needs. The passing of the Cold War and the strategy we embraced to fight it—if nothing else—demands a fundamental rethinking of our supporting logistics systems, processes, capabilities, and inventories.

Paul G. Kaminski, Department of Defense

The body politic of America has decreed victory in the Cold War with the former Soviet Union. With the determination of that victory has come the attendant reduction of American military forces that has been the hallmark of every postwar period in the United States.

This essay, written by Lieutenant Colonel Billy J. Adams, U.S. Army, while a student at the Marine Corps War College, won Distinguished Essay recognition in the 1996 Chairman, JCS, Strategy Essay Competition.
Because of congressional inability to agree on which military bases should be closed in conjunction with the reduction of forces, Public Laws 100-526 and 101-510 included language authorizing Base Closure and Realignment Commissions (BRAC) to determine those bases no longer necessary for the defense of the United States.

The BRAC Commissions were chartered to review the necessity of bases. However, there was no authority in the congressional language that authorized the respective Commissions to comment on force structure of U.S. military forces. As a result, force structure decisions, as supported by Title 10 U.S.C., have remained the purview of the service Secretaries in consultation with the senior military leadership in the respective service. Each service, by way of the budget appropriation, receives manpower guidance for each budget year. As an example, the Army goal for military manpower for FY 96 end strength is 495,000 personnel. In addition, there are civilian manpower goals.

The services are generally achieving military and civilian manpower reduction goals in line with congressional legislation and current Office of the Secretary of Defense manpower workyear ceilings. The BRAC Commissions ensured the closure of numerous unnecessary installations, but the focus on personnel reductions has centered in the field forces, while base closures have cut across all lines of the Department of Defense. As a result, the defense wholesale logistical maintenance management force structure, while taking some cuts, exceeds the level required to support the remaining forces in the field.

The major logistical maintenance management commands of the respective services are oversized in relation to the remaining logistical maintenance complex. Although personnel reductions have been ongoing for several years, these commands could be reduced or eliminated by consolidation of all wholesale-level maintenance related activities under an activity similar to the Defense Logistics
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Agency (DLA) or some other suitable organization that could provide depot-level maintenance management capability to the entire force in a more efficient manner. This action is comparable to the consolidation of wholesale-level supply activities that occurred previously. Before making a decision on the construct of such an agency, there are some key questions to answer.

- Can manpower savings truly be accomplished by consolidation?
- Can an adequate wholesale-level maintenance management force structure be developed within a suitable defense agency (or other organization) to accommodate the needs of the services under consolidation?
- Is it possible to determine if such a force structure would be more efficient as well as cost effective?
- Are there valid reasons for retaining the existing wholesale-level maintenance structure?

In downsizing the military complex, funding reductions require a force structure in balance with existing facilities and the tax payer's propensity to pay the bill. While it is imperative that America maintains a sound defense capability, it must be done without unwarranted expense. Reducing or eliminating excess wholesale logistics overhead may contribute to a more effective and efficient defense structure without penalizing the tax payer.

With the current strategic concept of fighting no more than two major regional conflicts (MRCs) at one time, reduction of the wholesale maintenance management structure should have no negative impact on U.S. national security. The BRAC Commissions established a baseline for defense industrial maintenance capacity. The reduction of personnel from the existing overhead structure brings manpower authorizations more in line with remaining industrial base requirements.
BILLY J. ADAMS

To understand the current issues and proposed structure of depot maintenance management for the future, it is helpful to understand the history of this subject.

RECENT CONSOLIDATION EFFORTS

Efforts to streamline depot maintenance in the Department of Defense are not new. In 1958, the Office of the Secretary of Defense issued DoD Directive 4000.19, Basic Policies and Principles for Interservice, Interdepartmental, and Interagency Support. The focus of this directive was on economies which could be achieved by “contracting” work from one service to another which had better or excess capacity to perform the required function. During the next few years, several follow-on directives were issued by DOD designed to improve consistency in depot maintenance reporting procedures relating to the various services. These directives did not preclude the services from developing service-unique maintenance costing and reporting procedures.

In 1970, two key events occurred:
- Publication of DOD Directive 4151.1 specified that public-sector, depot-level maintenance generally be limited to no more than 70 percent of the gross mission-essential depot maintenance workload requirements, with a facility capacity loading at a minimum rate of 85 percent during a 40-hour week, one shift, 5 days per week.
- In July of the same year, a Blue Ribbon Defense Panel submitted a report to the President, recommending that all logistical services, including depot-level maintenance, be consolidated and assigned to a unified logistical command. The Department of Defense and the services, however, took no actions toward consolidation into a unified logistics command.

In 1973, the General Accounting Office (GAO) published a report, Potential for Greater Consolidation of Maintenance Workloads in the Military Services, that found that:
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- Each of the services had overemphasized developing its own depot-level maintenance capability rather than using existing sister service capabilities.
- The best way to control depot maintenance interservicing would be to remove direct control from the services and centralize it [emphasis added].

The report recommended that either an independent agency similar to DLA be established to assume responsibility for depot-level maintenance of all commonly used items, or a single manager be assigned for maintenance of specific classes of items. The DOD response to the GAO report was that the single manager concept had merit and would be studied further. Additional DOD Directives were published concerning streamlining of depot activities, and GAO studies recommending "centralization" were conducted from 1974 through 1977 without much impact.

In 1978, a GAO report, Aircraft Depot Maintenance: A Single Manager is Needed to Stop Waste, was highly critical of excess public-sector, productive, depot-level maintenance capacity and unnecessary duplication of facilities, equipment, and skilled personnel. The GAO concluded that a master plan was needed and that only a single manager would have the perspective, objectivity, and motivation to develop and maintain such a plan. DOD responded that "there may be benefits to be had from a single manager who could facilitate further reductions in unutilized and underutilized capacity . . . but additional preliminary work would be required prior to making any decision to study the recommendation further."  

The pattern at this point was now clear. Regardless of the source of recommendation for consolidation, DOD consistently studied it further. It is unclear how much, if any, influence was exerted by the individual services in opposition to consolidation. There were initiatives at cross-servicing common items (e.g., the Army is responsible for depot rebuild of Marine tanks); however, the consolidations recommended by GAO have not occurred.
Between 1978 and 1981, the "Single Manager" option for aeronautical systems recommended by GAO made no meaningful progress within DOD. In the summer of 1981, Deputy Secretary of Defense Frank Carlucci tasked the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Reserves, and Logistics (ASDMR&L) to conduct a 90-day review to determine the desirability of a "Single Manager" for aeronautical depot maintenance. At the time, only two options were considered viable by the services—status quo or the single manager. As the study was initiated, the services and the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) preferred the status quo, although OSD, the Department of Defense Inspector General (DODIG), and GAO voiced reservations about the status quo option. Tasked by the ASDMR&L to prepare the report, the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DASD(L)) completed the review in fall 1981 and recommended that all aeronautical maintenance be consolidated under the Air Force as the single manager. Unsatisfied with the study results, the ASDMR&L directed that the DASD(L) reconsider the recommendation; subsequently, a recommendation went forward to Mr. Carlucci that did not support the single manager concept "at this time."11

Between 1981 and 1988, substantial discussions occurred within DOD concerning single managers and consolidation, but little was accomplished. Service reports continued to be published, showing an increase in interserving for depot maintenance, but the amounts were small in comparison to total capability and opportunity.12 From 1988 forward, considerable discussions occurred between and among the services and DOD concerning consolidation and single managers. The 1989 Defense Management Review called for consolidation of depot maintenance into three single managers—one for air systems, one for land systems, and one for water systems. Again, the services opposed the concept. In 1990, a Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC) was
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established, and a Corporate Business Plan was developed claiming substantial savings for the outyears, none of which can be currently measured. Finally, in 1992, the Air Force submitted another single manager plan for review by the Secretary of Defense and the services. But once again, the services could not agree on which service should be responsible for which task, or if a single manager should be used at all.13

While much discussion occurred between 1958 and 1992, it is clear that there was no real progress leading to an acceptable resolution of depot maintenance consolidation or identification of single managers for maintenance dependent systems (ground equipment, aircraft, water craft, and communications). More recently, from 1993 to 1995 five significant documents were produced that indicate the possible options for depot maintenance and management in the future. The following chapter highlights the basic premise of these documents and provides personal insights from DOD logisticians to clarify further the potential future of depot maintenance management.

VIEW FROM THE INSIDE

Previous studies concerning depot maintenance consolidation focused internally to DOD and the services, and concepts and options were discussed without consensus. Recent studies continue the same consolidation debates, but greater consideration has surfaced concerning privatizing depot maintenance workloads. Between 1993 and 1995, three DOD studies focused on consolidation while two agencies external to DOD produced reports recommending maximum privatization of depot maintenance workloads as an alternative for reducing costs within DoD.
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Consolidation
Although widely discussed during the past 40 years, there is no consensus within the services as to how consolidation should be accomplished or which service should be responsible for what systems. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Depot Maintenance Consolidation Study, hereafter called the Went Study after study chairman General J. J. Went, USMC (Ret), concluded in January 1993 that while the services were doing many things right, the current system is inefficient. In addition, costs have not come down in concert with the declining force reductions; there is multi-Service duplication of effort; efficiency gains must be realized out of overhead expenditures; competition and interservicing offer the greatest potential for additional efficiencies; current excess capacity exceeds requirements by 25 to 50 percent; and significant savings can be realized by cross-Service consolidations.\(^\text{14}\)

The Went Study indicates that there is a better way of doing business than the current depot maintenance management structure. However, during the course of discussions with DOD personnel, it was readily apparent that the services are not interested in letting one service become responsible for the management of a commodity that crosses all service lines or establishing a consolidated maintenance command. Captain Spence Robbins, Head of the Industrial Facilities Policies and Resources Branch (N431), Department of the Navy, stated that the Navy prefers to outsource or privatize all of its maintenance requirements.\(^\text{15}\) The Air Force also prefers to maximize privatization of depot maintenance workloads when based on sound business practices that will result in the best value to the government and is seeking legislative relief.\(^\text{16}\) Some service officials appear to believe that a private contractor would exhibit more loyalty and responsiveness to service programs than the sister services.
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The Integrated Management of Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities Study, completed in October 1993, identified four alternatives for depot maintenance management for the future:

- Empowered Defense Depot Maintenance Council (DDMC)
- Executive service Management with an Empowered DDMC;
- Joint Depot Maintenance Command
- Defense Depot Maintenance Activity.

Based on evaluation of the four options by the services, JCS and OSD, the preferred option of this group was the Empowered DDMC. Briefly, this option broadens the charter of the DDMC, expands the membership to include the J-4 and senior logisticians of the JCS, vests in the DDMC a well-defined authority to conduct business, develops a structured decisionmaking process, and continues decentralized service operational control of depot maintenance operations. Four reasons were provided by the services, JCS, and OSD for selecting this alternative:

- A balance is struck between centralized management and decentralized operations
- Service Secretary oversight is retained
- Interface between the war fighters and the depot maintenance communities is retained
- No additional bureaucracy is created.17

While there is a Defense Depot Maintenance Council, there is no indication that the DDMC has received any special or additional empowerment as a result of this study.

In April 1994, the Defense Science Board published the recommendations of the Depot Maintenance Management Task Force:

- Replace current legislative restrictions with a concept consistent with core policy
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- Keep core requirements in-house and move noncore workload and DOD directed modifications to the private sector
- Aggressively pursue financial management initiatives
- Further strengthen the DDMC.\textsuperscript{18}

An October 1994 Addendum to the April report made several recommendations on how to improve management activities and results at the depot level, but it did not address management control or consolidation of activities under one Service.\textsuperscript{19}

Concerning consolidation, there are members of Congress waiting for the introduction of the Single Manager Executive (SME)\textsuperscript{20} concept of depot maintenance so legislation or riders may be introduced to preclude DOD from using the SME concept, because it is viewed as a threat to jobs in congressional districts. The SME concept also has winners and losers based on perceptions of the various services. The Air Force perceives itself as a winner, the Navy and the Marines see themselves as losers to the Air Force and Army, respectively, and the Army is a minimal gainer from the Marines. Efforts to convince the services to accept the SME concept have generally fallen into the “too hard” box for political and parochial reasons. In addition, there is a lack of commonality in data systems for consolidation and comparison activities. And finally, there are those that argue that the span of control would be too great.\textsuperscript{21}

The SME concept is not exactly dead in the Army. There are opportunities for cross-Servicing in some commodities. The Army currently repairs most helicopters and helicopter engines for all services at Corpus Christi Army Depot (CCAD). Mr. Robert T. Mason, in the Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy, is convinced that all helicopter repair could be done at CCAD as a “joint depot.” At the same time, he believes it makes sense for all fixed wing aircraft to be repaired in the Air Logistics Centers (ALCs) as joint depots. Others disagree, but the
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Army already repairs tanks for the Marines. The DDMC has discussed initiatives and opportunities for some time on what type of cross-servicing should occur, such as all communications-electronics repair work conducted at Tobyhanna Army Depot and missiles repaired at Letterkenny Army Depot. While opportunities exist, the services are a long way from a fully implemented SME concept.  Recent actions taken by the DDMC may prolong or preclude BRAC-directed consolidation of ground electronic equipment maintenance at Tobyhanna Army Depot.

When asked about down-sizing and/or consolidation of Army Materiel Command, Air Force Logistics Command and the Navy depot maintenance management structures into a single logistics command and downsizing some of the 50 percent of the DOD budget located in the logistics area, Mr. Mason indicated that, besides the normal parochial and political issues, the services are afraid of losing command billets. On that same issue in a subsequent interview with Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Army, LTG Johnnie E. Wilson, he stated,

The first problem is that Title 10 places responsibility for equipping the force on the respective service Secretaries. A legislative change is required before another entity would be allowed to take over that mission. The second problem is that the CINC's look to the services to provide materiel resources. If another agency took over the materiel provisioning mission, there is a question as to whether they would be responsive to the services or the CINCs.

Mr. Mason is not the only senior individual in the Pentagon who believes that making changes quickly will be difficult. LTG Wilson stated,

It is my assessment that if these changes come, it will be slowly, in an evolutionary manner. It will be a long time

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and will be driven by changing circumstances and requirements that can't be foreseen today.\textsuperscript{26}

As previously noted, the services have made significant reductions in installations, facilities, and some missions for all sectors of the force during the four rounds of BRAC process. However, significant logistics structure remains within all services. Within the Army, the largest wholesale logistics structure is Army Materiel Command (AMC). When asked if there were any reason, logistically, why AMC depots could not be merged with similar elements of the Air Force and Navy to establish a joint defense maintenance management agency under a reduced structure, Major Yolanda Dennis, Office of the Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Maintenance Plans and Policy Directorate, responded:

These agencies could be consolidated based on the few remaining depots in each service and the declining maintenance workload in comparison to existing capacity. In fact, there is a study called the Integrated Management of Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities which identified a similar option as a result of the study. However, none of the four options identified in the study were recommended for implementation. Right now, that issue is in the "too hard" box for parochial and political reasons.

Major Dennis concluded by stating that no one wants to discuss consolidation because this study indicates it is not necessary.\textsuperscript{26}

The reports listed above were primarily focused on consolidation in some form or another. However, a fundamental shift in recommendations concerning depot level maintenance is on the horizon. In May, 1995, the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces released its report. In regard to depot-level maintenance and management, the recommendations were clear. The Commission recommended
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privatization of all depot-level activities while creating a special office of Assistant Secretary of Defense to oversee the privatization process. Following release of the Commission's report, in July 1995, the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) produced a report which also provided convincing arguments for maximum privatization of the depot-level maintenance process.

Privatization
Privatization is the current “buzzword” concerning more efficient conduct of depot-level maintenance for DOD. It is not a new concept; however, its current vogue dates to May 1995, when the BRAC Commission recommended the closure of Kelly (Texas) and McClellan (California) Air Force Bases. President Clinton voiced strong objection to these closures. However, forced to accept all or none of the BRAC Commission recommendations, the President agreed to the closures, but vowed to keep the jobs from these two installations in the respective geographical areas through “privatization.”

Commenting on this issue, Mr. Mason said,

Privatization will reduce overall personnel costs by lowering outyear retirement benefits. In addition, it would reduce unneeded overhead in the short term and provide flexibility to add or terminate positions as required without worrying about civilian RIFs [Reduction in Forces] and associated timing of RIFs. The IG has previously stated a concern related to regaining previously outsourced workloads. Once outsourced, the jobs would be difficult to bring back in house if the contractor defaulted or if the workload was so small that no contractor wanted to pick it up. The service would lose both the personnel skills and the facilities/equipment related to the maintenance function. Depots can do soup-to-nuts [top to bottom] maintenance today. In privatization, contractors would act
as the contract manager and outsource some or all functions of repair or new acquisition to subcontractors.\textsuperscript{30}

Mr. Mason described additional drawbacks. In the past, Original Equipment Manufacturers (OEMs) have been abundant during hard times (downsizing) and therefore available and competing with DOD for workload. However, in prosperous times, OEMs have been scarce, if existent at all, to accomplish work because they are chasing the most lucrative contracts, which may or may not be defense-maintenance related. In order to attract OEMs to take on depot maintenance workload, long-term incentives (10 to 15 years) are required. There are three types of people/organizations that most likely would be interested:

- The organization specializing in a particular repair function, such as jet engine repair maintenance, that would take a defense contract and move the workload to the OEM plant location.
- The General Motors type organization, which wants to move in and take over all functions related to maintenance and acquisition.
- The new entrepreneur who has experience in a specialized function, but has no facilities/equipment and wants to take over the facilities at the closing/available installation.\textsuperscript{31}

LTG Wilson, commenting on privatization, said,

That's a key issue with the current administration. Candidates are being reviewed, such as the ICPs [Inventory Control Points], where we have six ICPs at various locations. There are possible opportunities here. In addition, we are looking at opportunities to privatize the Defense Reutilization and Marketing Offices. Some of the opportunities lead to delicate and difficult situations.\textsuperscript{32}
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LTG Wilson expressed an additional reservation:

My concern is that privatization could lead to the loss of the wherewithal to sustain the warfight. If a soldier can go downtown and quickly get parts for unit equipment, that helps short term readiness. However, the Army loses visibility of the “demand” which subsequently erodes the support base. Then when we go to war, there is no supply structure to support the requirements in the area of operations.35

Major Dennis of Army ODCSLOG Maintenance Policy Directorate reports that, within the Army,

Privatization efforts are on hold. The Army was looking at privatization, particularly at places like Red River Army Depot. However, there are parochial and political issues which affect these actions. The Texas congressional delegation wants the jobs lost as a result of realignment of Red River Depot to remain in Texas instead of going to other depots or privatization as directed by the 1995 BRAC Commission. However, the Army has not found any way to ensure that the jobs would stay in East Texas if the workload was put out for competitive bid. This issue is being worked at the senior officer level in all services. The Air Force and the Navy are impacted in the same manner.34

The services believe their operational forces have been reduced as far as possible while still supporting the two MRC concept. The major untouched "overhead" in the services is the logistics tail. With Congress still looking for areas for budget reductions, it is only a matter of time before the services will be required to reduce logistics overhead.35

When asked how the Navy will accommodate further reductions in logistics positions if not through consolidation, Captain Robbins stated,
The Navy strongly supports the concept of privatization. Currently, 50 percent of our shipbuilding rework is done through outsourcing and privatization. And, we would gladly do more except that we are precluded by law based on core competency requirements. Our goal is reduced costs and increased or sustained readiness. The Navy believes it will only achieve those goals by doing the work in-house or outsourcing/privatizing to private industry. We believe it is impossible to achieve these goals by contracting to the other services.35

But there are limits as to how much workload can be contracted out or privatized. By law, the services may utilize no more than 40 percent of available funds for depot-level maintenance by non-Federal Government employees. Historically, the balance of the funds available for depot-level maintenance (60 percent) is utilized by organic service capabilities. Workload identified as "core" work required to ensure completion of service missions is not currently subject to privatization. While it has been the Army intent to stay close to the 60/40 split, the Army is currently at a 65/35 split (consistent with its historical average of 66/34). This was reinforced at the Secretary of Defense/Deputy Secretary of Defense level when they recently announced that no waivers would be granted to allow for increased privatization in excess of the 60/40 split.37 Under current and projected budget restraints, the Air Force seeks legislative relief for the 60/40 requirement.38

Existing legislation is a substantial impediment to privatization. In previous circumstances, there was little cause for concern that this legislation would be changed, thus providing the depot maintenance system a degree of security concerning future workloads. But the world has changed significantly in the past 6 years. The demise of the Soviet Union as a peer competitor and threat to national security, reduction of U.S. Armed Forces, domestic employment issues as a result of base closures and other economic influences, and

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the diminishing number of Members of Congress with military service are combining to increase pressure for legislative change to allow increased, if not complete, privatization of the depot maintenance workload. These political issues, internal and external to the Department of Defense, are explored in the next section.

REAL POLITICS

There are two perspectives of politics that impact the potential reduction of the logistics structure in DOD and consolidation of depot-level maintenance into a single organization. One perspective is internal to DOD and relates to service disagreements on whether and how to consolidate. The second perspective is external to DOD and concerns the impact Congress may have in changing the manner in which depot-level maintenance is performed and managed.

One of the goals of the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act was to increase inter-service operability and create a basis for “jointness” within the services. However, despite the Act, service parochialism persists, and the Act did nothing to prevent congressional members from practicing pork barrel protectionism for constituents. Each of the five principal studies conducted from 1993 to 1995 possessed its own particular “flavor,” depending on the composition of the study group and the amount of influence which could be applied either by congressional or service interests. As discussed earlier, the services favored the Integrated Management Study for a variety of reasons, but it should be noted that it had essentially no impact on the existing depot maintenance management structure. The Integrated Management Study provides the basis for maintaining the status quo, while the Went Study suggests that consolidation of depot maintenance management is a better solution.
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When asked what prevented, if anything, a joint maintenance organization similar in nature to DLA, Mr. Mason stated,

There are pros and cons about establishing a defense maintenance organization. On the positive side, it would be a single agency responsible for acquiring resources to execute the program and focus on maintenance. In addition, I believe that defense readiness would benefit. Finally, the agency would own all of the people responsible for execution of the programs. On the negative side, there is too much political heat instigated by the military services for self-protection.39

Mr. Mason continued by explaining that the services believe they would lose opportunities for command of depot-level activities. The Army Materiel Command (AMC) and Industrial Operation Command (IOC) type activities (for all services) could be downsized or eliminated under a consolidation or privatization plan except for the ensuing political heat or parochialism. The maintenance management organizations for the Army, Air Force, and Navy Major Commands (AMC, Air Force Logistics Command (AFLC), and Navy wholesale level activities) could be integrated into a defense organization similar to DLA. As a result, at least one or two four star billets could be eliminated. One four-star billet could be used to take command of an enhanced defense maintenance and supply agency with a three-star deputy on each side with the command aligned along functional, not Service, lines. Functions in the command would be multiService staffed to ensure that all views were represented during development of maintenance or supply related actions.40

Another option is to establish a defense maintenance command with a two- or three-star commander. This would not affect several organizations resident in AMC, AFLC, and the Navy logistics activities, which are concerned with
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materiel development and acquisition, as opposed to depot-level maintenance.41

Current outyear budget projections for the Army indicate a continued decrease in Total Obligation Authority (TOA) funding. The President's proposed budget for 1994 indicated a turnaround increase for the Army of more than $60 billion, while the Army budget for the Program Objective Memorandum (POM) years of FY96-01 shows a level budget of less than $60 billion. Senior Army officials doubt that the budget will increase during this period, and most officials believe the budget will actually decline further.42 The same sentiment concerning declining future budgets was expressed by the Navy.43 On March 4, 1996, the President submitted his 1997 proposed defense budget to Congress requesting $242.6 billion, $10 billion less than the 1996 defense budget.44

In reality, Congress and the budget process will drive the direction of consolidation and/or privatization for the services. With less than 40 percent of the current Congress having any military experience and with the strong congressional drive for a balanced budget, the services are losing a substantial base of program support. Budget battles rage over deficit spending and balancing the budget by FY2002, so it is not unrealistic to believe that service budgets will continue to decline. As senior congressional leadership gives way to younger members, it is reasonable to expect that, in the absence of a clear threat to national security interests, younger Members of Congress will focus their concerns on domestic issues affecting constituents with less emphasis on defense spending.

The 1995 BRAC Commission recommendation directed the movement of all Red River Army Depot (RRAD) maintenance missions, except for that related to the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System (BFVS), to other depot maintenance activities, to include the private sector. This could result in the loss of jobs from Red River if the workload is moved, and there would be a corresponding loss of jobs at Anniston Army
Depot (ANAD) if the RRAD workload is not moved to ANAD (the Army selected ANAD to pick up the maintenance missions lost at RRAD). The congressional delegations of Texas and Arkansas want to hold those jobs in Red River and keep the employees in place, even if that means privatization.\textsuperscript{45} When the President pledged to keep the Air Force jobs at Kelly and McClellan Air Force Bases,\textsuperscript{46} California, he also opened the door for privatization at Red River. Unfortunately, privatization does not guarantee that the jobs will remain at the closing or realigning locations. The winning contractor could move the jobs to a location more suitable for the private company. If that happens, jobs at both Red River and Anniston could be lost.\textsuperscript{47}

But before the services can fully privatize, legislative changes are required. The services are attempting to redefine core maintenance requirements, and DOD is attempting to recompute core requirements. As noted previously, current law requires that no more than 40\% of money authorized by Congress for depot maintenance be used for contractor performance, with the remainder performed by government employees in government facilities. Some leaders in DOD want to reduce or possibly eliminate the in-house requirement thus opening the door for full privatization. There is strong disagreement between those who want to change the legislation and those who desire to maintain the status quo, but there is little likelihood that the legislation will be changed in the immediate future.\textsuperscript{48}

Political in-fighting within both DOD and Congress continues concerning consolidation and privatization. At stake within the services are structure and positions of power. At stake for some Members of Congress are potential jobs for constituents and opportunities for further reducing the Defense budget. It appears that these two competing entities may clash in the near future.
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THE FUTURE

After 50 years of maintaining the largest standing defense force in the Nation’s history, the services find themselves in a dilemma. The Armed Forces are faced with declining budgets, an increasingly less friendly Congress, no peer threat, and potentially expanding military operations other than war. While those outside the Department of Defense continue the debate about how much of an armed force is required, the services are increasingly required to do more with less. Inside the Department, there are two senior leaders who espouse a logistics vision for the future—the Honorable John P. White, Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Dr. Paul Kaminski, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology. The Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, under the Chairmanship of Mr. White, strongly encouraged privatization of every aspect of depot-level maintenance possible, leaving in-house only those missions that could not be privatized because of lack of commercial capability or lack of interest. Mr. White’s position on the future of depot maintenance appears clear.

Dr. Kaminski’s logistics vision is equally adamant. In a recent speech, he remarked,

Today we are developing a vision for other major changes in warfare—it is called a Revolution in Military Affairs or RMA. We need a complementary vision for the logistics concepts that will support the style of warfare the RMA envisions in our future.49

Dr. Kaminski’s speech focused on “dominant battlefield awareness” with an ability to “see” the entire battlefield, including logistics, at one time; tailoring capabilities to be able to operate within the “dominant battle cycle time” exploiting existing technology; and pursuing widespread private sector participation in depot maintenance as well as disposal and distribution to the maximum extent consistent with readiness.

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and cost effectiveness. He further stated that the time for testing the concept with pilot programs at the margin of our logistics infrastructure is past, big payoffs of privatization are yet to be realized, and we must think more broadly of privatization and outsourcing—much broader than depots and privatization in place. A clear direction is espoused by Dr. Kaminski concerning depot maintenance operations.

In his speech, Dr. Kaminski extolled the virtues of the Air Force lean logistics concept that reduces transportation time and inventories at the installation level. He envisions a flexible, modernized logistics information infrastructure which can be the catalyst for fundamental changes required to evolve from the “just in case” logistics environment to a lean and adaptable “just in time” environment. The purpose of this change is to reduce or eliminate our current stovepipe functionality and inability to communicate information across functions and among echelons of command. A modernized information structure is required to facilitate joint operations, provide timely access to data, enable an electronic interface with the commercial sector and support the flexibility required to adapt to the dynamic environment of the post-Cold War period.

Dr. Kaminski noted that Operation Desert Shield/Storm was a prime example of the battlefield of the future supported by the cumbersome logistics systems of the past—a strictly Cold War logistics effort that substituted brute force and deployment of massive quantities of materiel in place of a well managed logistics system. The services must have total asset visibility to overcome this. In summary, Dr. Kaminski stated,

My vision for the revolution in logistics is enabled by improved information systems and faster and cheaper transportation systems. Since the technology is largely developed, what we need is the vision, leadership, commitment and stakeholder engagement on the part of the
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warfighters, logisticians, developers, and industry to make this revolution a reality.\textsuperscript{54}

The Army is taking a radical approach to the reduction of its institutional headquarters and its major commands. This includes divesting itself of nonessential functions, removing layers, consolidating some functions of the secretariat and the staff, and moving some responsibilities of the headquarters to the field. The Army believes that while headquarters should articulate policy and oversee resource management, it should rarely exercise operational responsibility. The philosophy is that operational functions related to warfighting, training and logistics should be performed in the field, not the headquarters.\textsuperscript{55} This radical approach does not penetrate to depot maintenance management.

Depot maintenance management has not changed and is not likely to change on the basis of current recommendations postulated by the Army. Several studies recently conducted and referenced earlier achieved no consensus on how to proceed with the management of depot maintenance. The Army recently published a booklet entitled *Depot Maintenance Management* in which the Army declares the only acceptable management practice to be the current system, whereby the services maintain control of their own depots.\textsuperscript{56} Support for this decision is cited by referencing the Defense Science Board Depot Maintenance Task Force Study, which supported service retention and ownership of depots and congressional language in the 1994 Defense Authorization Act, which precluded the consolidation of defense depot maintenance under a single entity.\textsuperscript{57}

In May 1994, Deputy Secretary of Defense John Deutsch issued a memorandum precluding further public/private and public/public competitions for depot work load, as it would be impossible to achieve on a fair playing field or make accurate costing comparisons for solicitations. In addition, he indicated that the Department can no longer assume that new
systems will eventually transfer to an in-house depot maintenance facility.\textsuperscript{58}

During and after the American involvement in the Vietnamese conflict, private contractors supported defense operations forward on the battlefield. That is true today in Bosnia, but with an added perspective. For the peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the Army hired a private contractor, Brown and Root, to establish and run base camps responsible for cooking food, washing clothes, base camp operations, and entertaining troops. Brown and Root hired 750 local Hungarians to perform the work and is only one of hundreds of contractors supporting Operation \textit{Joint Endeavor}. Since 1992, Brown and Root has conducted operations in support of U.S. deployments to Somalia, Zaire, Haiti, Saudi Arabia, Italy, and now in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{59} In addition to providing support for weapons system operations, the services, and in particularly the Army, are moving more and more to contractor-assisted operations in operations other than war. It is realistic to expect to see this same type of support occurring during a period of armed conflict.

But initiating change in the manner in which the services conduct business is different when the services to be performed are relatively low skill, nontechnical, or overseas (such as Brown and Root in Bosnia) than when they are high-skill operations such as depot maintenance (which represent good wages in the local community). Organizational structures take on a life of their own and therefore become resistant to any change which would reduce the size of the organization or structure (self preservation). In order to change, there must be strong commitment from the top leadership of the organization. In service structures, there is resistance to privatization because this is life threatening to the organization. Privatization threatens the targeting of federal funds to a specific location/activity and is therefore a threat to congressional delegations who see the activity as a source of jobs and therefore a basis for reelection. Delegations
opposed to privatization are primarily maintenance workload “gainers” in their respective state or district as a result of BRAC actions, while delegations in favor of privatization are primarily BRAC maintenance workload losers. Privatization “in-place” cannot be guaranteed, thus creating resistance to change. However, in today’s environment, there are forces at work which make privatization an acceptable alternative to the complete loss of jobs in an area or region.

The consolidation of service activities is most cost effective when equipment and/or personnel are being seriously underutilized. Without these circumstances, consolidation may not reduce costs. In fact, when implemented in operations already vast, consolidation can create a system that is less responsive to the consumer and therefore, as in the case of military logistics and support functions, less sufficient for sustaining warfighting capabilities.

On the one hand, arguments can be made against consolidation of defense maintenance operations (to the benefit of the service’s position) while on the other, there are arguments for privatization, which cannot be accomplished without legislation (also to the benefit of the services). The recent Commission on Roles and Missions report stated,

There are many objections to outsourcing offered by DOD managers, many of which were accompanied by assertions of cost savings. In addition, there is an asserted right of government employees to compete for government work with the private sector, now deeply embedded in Office of Management and Budget Circular A-76 and in law. There are differences in defining differences in cost related to incomparable accounting systems, lack of profit and loss mechanisms, and uncertainty of future workloads. Additional objections assert that contractor support is unreliable. We have found these concerns are not well founded. Finally, the largest practical obstacles to outsourcing involve fears that these initiatives will disrupt lives and economies. After consideration of all the
arguments presented against outsourcing, we urge the Department to proceed without delay to make reliance on private sector support activities a central tenet of the Department's policies. The Secretary should direct outsourcing of existing commercial type support activities and all new support requirements, particularly the depot-level logistics support of new and future weapons systems.  

Regarding depot maintenance, the Commission on Roles and Missions recommended that DOD
- Move to a depot maintenance system relying on the private sector
- Establish a time-phased plan to privatize essentially all existing depot-level maintenance
- Create an office under the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Economic Security) to oversee privatization of depots
- Direct support of all new systems to competitive private contractors.

The Commission further recommended that DOD should retain organic depot maintenance capability only where private sector alternatives are not available and cannot be developed reasonably. Where privatization is not feasible, the Commission recommended that DOD consider collocation and consolidation of weapon systems used by multiple services to streamline acquisition and management costs.

In order to accomplish the Commission's concept to achieve additional efficiencies in government, particularly defense-depot maintenance, the following legislative actions are recommended by the Commission:
- Repeal Section 2464, Title 10 USC (Core Logistics Functions)
- Repeal Section 2466, Title 10 USC (Limitations on the Performance of Depot-Level Maintenance of Materiel)
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- Repeal Section 2469, 10 USC (Contracts to Perform Workloads Previously Performed by Depot-Level Activities of the Department of Defense)
- Repeal Section 2461, Title 10, USC (Commercial or Industrial Type Functions: Required Studies and Reports Before Conversion to Contractor Performance).\textsuperscript{56}

If this all seems like a merry-go-round, it would be an astute observation. The arguments against consolidation and the arguments for privatization provide the services a convenient cover for preventing institutional change. But as previously discussed, forces appear to be realigning that will challenge the status quo for both depot maintenance and depot maintenance management. That said, the questions are now, “How do we get off the merry-go-round, and where do we go from here?”

CHANGING THE STRUCTURE

The services are strongly opposed to a consolidated maintenance structure under DOD, and they are adamant about not forming any structure resembling DLA. These feelings were clearly articulated in the previously referenced studies. However, under a “consolidated and privatized” scenario, the most likely structure would be one similar to that recommended in the 1993 Went Study. The preferred structure would be a Defense Maintenance Agency (DMA) or a Joint Depot Maintenance Command (JDMC). The Went study concludes, in a comparison of attributes, that the JDMC offers the greatest flexibility by keeping the services directly involved in the process.\textsuperscript{57}

The Integrated Management of Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities Study offers a similar alternative as a viable option (one of four options studied). The JDMC structure in this study authorizes a four-star commander as Commander in Chief, Depot Maintenance (CINCDM), directly reporting to the Chairman of the Joint
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Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). This places the CINCM on equal footing with the combatant command commanders as well as with the commanders of the existing service logistics commands. However, for the relatively small number of personnel under CINCM's command, this appears to be grade overkill. A more reasonable approach, given the reduction in force structure, is to consolidate all defense-depot maintenance activities under a two-star commander from the consolidation of service depot maintenance commands, with a one-star deputy for each of the ground/electronics/missiles, air and sea systems.

The consolidation of the service depot maintenance command staffs could notionally result in the elimination of approximately 60 percent of the existing combined overhead structure. The remaining structure would be slightly larger than any one of the previous single staffs since each commodity would bring some unique requirements to the resulting organization which were not available on other service staffs. A proposed JDMC headquarters structure is located at figure 1. At the same time the JDMC is created, the DLA structure should be reduced from a three-star to a two-star director for the same logic that JDMC has a two-star commander—the existing force structure does not support a three-star billet. Both organizations could report directly to the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics or the CJCS. Previous conversations with personnel supported by DLA revealed displeasure at the lack of DLA responsiveness. Responsiveness may be improved if both DLA and the JDMC reported directly to the CJCS.

Any number of alternatives could be developed and implemented for the consolidation of defense depot maintenance. However, in order to be effective, it must be consolidated into a joint organization with ties to each service without reporting to the Chief of the service and must have a single commander/executive with overall responsibility for program execution. The Defense Depot Maintenance Council
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has not made the hard choices on reductions for efficiencies in the past. There is still too much service influence and parochialism in a DDMC for it to be as effective as a JDMC. While there are arguments for consolidation of depot maintenance activities under one service based on commodities (Army for ground and electronic systems, Navy for sea systems, Air Force for aircraft), consensus of the interviewees for this report, as well as service expressions during the referenced studies, indicate a tremendous fight would erupt among the services on this issue. Plainly, the services do not now, nor will they likely ever, trust each other to embrace such a system. While each service claims to have a better idea on how to do depot maintenance, it is clear, based on past efforts at consolidation, that the better idea is “status quo.” Unfortunately, status quo is not likely to be acceptable after the next round of budget cuts.

The future of defense-depot maintenance management, surely to be forced on the Department of Defense as a result of budget constraints and politics, is a consolidated joint maintenance command with a military commander reporting to the DUSD(L) or the CJCS. The command will employ approximately 1,200 personnel, with approximately 10 percent of the command comprising military personnel and the balance DOD civilians. The number of maintenance depots existing today will see further reductions to achieve additional efficiencies with a substantial portion of the existing depot workload transferred to private contractors who can add or subtract manpower more efficiently based on program budgets. Quality assurance processes and programs already exist in the current structure for both private and public operations. These activities may change in size, but little will change with the process or programs.

Development of the budget for a JDMC will be based on analysis of projected workloads for public depot activities in conjunction with projected workload requirements now completed by private contractors. Management, as always,
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would be one of the many functions included as an overhead cost in the budget formulation process along with utilities, projected capitalization requirements, direct labor, acquisition costs, and other non-direct labor hour costs. The budget would be prepared in consultation with the respective services and submitted through the Deputy Secretary of Defense for inclusion in the DOD budget. Measurement of productivity would be based on analysis of execution of program to budget in conjunction with initial comparison of depot billing rates against the previous system billing rates. Subsequent rates would be analyzed/measured against previous year rates within the new system. The objective is declining customer billing rates with improved quality of maintenance.

The efficiency of the new system would be predicated and dependent on the cross-service assignments to the JDMC structure, because depot structures would remain essentially unchanged. It would be reasonable to see some degree of multiservice representation at each depot installation that supports multiservice programs. Gains from the depot level will be primarily a function of the number of reductions of depots because the consolidation of workload within the remaining depots should increase the size of the work force to the optimum level of efficiency workloaded to 85-90 percent capacity. The remaining 10-15 percent of capacity would be available for surge exclusive of multishift operations.

As always, there is a concern on behalf of warfighters that the depots remain responsive to combatant command requirements. However, changing the management structure of the defense-depot maintenance system does not change the relationship of the service-owned depot to the warfighter. Directly associating the warfighter to the wholesale-level maintenance base (echelons above corps) is like linking an automobile owner directly to General Motors or Ford headquarters when the car owner needs vehicle repair or support. If a Ford needs maintenance, one goes to the local
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Ford dealer; this is synonymous with the warfighter taking his equipment to his associated direct-support (DS) maintenance company or general-support (GS) maintenance company, depending on the item to be repaired or replaced or parts needed. While nothing prevents a Ford owner from corresponding directly with the Ford headquarters about a car, or a warfighter from going directly to the depot about equipment, that interface is rare. It is the responsibility of the Ford dealer or the DS/GS maintenance unit to provide the interface between the warfighter and the wholesale level of logistics. And, there is nothing about a JDMC that precludes the depot representative from visiting the warfighter unit if special requirements exist or organizationwide equipment problems occur beyond the scope and capability of the DS/GS maintenance unit. The bottom line is that the wholesale level of logistics in DOD should be transparent to the warfighter, who should care only that received repaired equipment or repair part was received without regard to how it occurred. The warfighter should be focused on fighting the war, not repairing equipment. The end result is that the person managing depot-level maintenance should have no negative impact on the warfighters, while reducing costs for services provided. Figure 2 depicts a notional interface between the JDMC and the respective service wholesale logistics structure.  

Any effort to reduce outyear budgets must do so with the objective of achieving a balanced force, something the BRAC procedure was not designed to accomplish. The BRAC process is concerned with the closure or realignment of installations and have no authority over directing force structure changes. Any reductions to force structure as a result of BRAC were incidental and more a function of how the services interpreted and executed the BRAC Commission recommendations. It is the purview of the services, based on congressional budget authorizations, to determine the size and structure of their respective forces.
FIGURE 2. COMMAND INTERFACE
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Are these the only possible solutions to the defense depot maintenance issue? No, and for good reason. DOD has been struggling with this issue for over 40 years and has made changes only at the margin during that period of time.73 For as many vested interests as there are in the process, each represented organization in the process believes that it has the "correct solution" to the issue and everyone else is wrong. Until there is one strong organization with control over all of the defense-depot maintenance assets, there will be no meaningful progress on this subject, and there will be no coordinated, effective planning on how to make such an organization work. As a result, when Congress directs DOD to develop and implement such an agency, the services will fight it until the flag is raised on a JDMC. The planning to put it together will be hurried and muddled through to meet a time limit rather than focused on developing the best possible organization to accomplish the defense depot maintenance mission. Someone must take the lead now to do the planning in order to implement an effective and efficient organization in the future, even if that plan temporarily resides on a shelf prior to implementation. The services will not accept that responsibility now because it is tantamount to admitting that there is a more efficient and effective manner in which to conduct depot maintenance. Therefore, it falls on the shoulders of Congress and OSD to make the changes for the future, and it appears the services will not be prepared when the future arrives.

CONCLUSION

Research conducted for the preparation of this paper and the collective experiences of over 22 years of military service reveal a simple, if unstartling, conclusion concerning the direction of defense depot maintenance in the 21st century: change to the current system will, most likely, be evolutionary and not revolutionary, and it will be instigated from sources
external to the services. There is little incentive for the services to initiate changes that could result in substantial savings, since any savings realized are generally taken from the service by the Office of the Secretary of Defense or Congress to be applied to other programs or used as a means to reduce the outyear budget expenditures. If the services cannot use savings accrued as a result of efficiencies developed by their own initiatives, the ensuing result is maintenance of the status quo and continued squabbles with the other services for a larger piece of the budget.  

With the emphasis on deficit reductions and balancing the Federal budget, it seems clear that the defense portion of the Federal budget will shrink in the outyears because it represents 50 percent of discretionary federal funds. In order to increase service programs, the services will be required to compete among themselves for a larger share of an increasingly smaller budget. It is not inconceivable that the outyear defense budget could fall to approximately $200 billion annually in execution year dollars by FY2002. In order to stay within limitations, the services would be placed in the unpleasant position of most likely reducing manpower and placing acquisition programs on hold. The probable end result will be the reduction of two more active Army divisions, five active Air Force wings, and at least 100 fewer ships for the active Navy. But these reductions by themselves will not achieve the overall savings required. In addition, there will be a required corresponding decrease in civilian manpower within DOD.

While reductions have occurred as a result of reorganizations and BRAC recommendations, the only significant opportunity for further reductions that do not threaten America's security in the DOD budget is in the area of logistics. As a result, Congress will be forced, sooner rather than later, to target the logistical structure of the armed services for substantial reductions in order to achieve desired savings. Since nearly two-thirds of the military (retail)
logistical structure of the Army is in the reserve forces, and the Air Force and Navy logistical military manpower is small in relation to the balance of manpower in those services, the most reasonable target for additional reductions is in the civilian sector of DOD. It does not require a wide stretch of the imagination to visualize Congress requiring the Department of Defense to consolidate service depot maintenance functions after forcing privatization of the maximum possible amount of depot level maintenance workload. It is unrealistic to believe that every single piece of equipment in the defense inventory could be turned over to private industry for cradle-to-grave maintenance. There will undoubtedly be some commodities so low in volume or so economically unprofitable as to fail to attract private interest. These commodities would remain in the defense depot maintenance system by default.

The requirement for privatization could easily result in original equipment manufacturers (OEMs) conducting all repairs above intermediate maintenance level on ground and electronic/missile equipment, rotary aircraft, fixed-wing aircraft and naval vessels. However, since the acquisition process generally requires an open bidding process, it is possible for these contracts to go to the low bidder who may not be the OEM (best value contract award). Whether the contracted workload stays in the previous depot area or moves to the contractor location cannot be predicted. However, if the preponderance of workload is moved to the private sector, the resulting reductions to the current depot-maintenance structure would be substantial.

Four questions were asked in the first section:
• Can manpower savings truly be accomplished by consolidation? If the services are asked, the answer is no. If agencies external to the services are asked, the answer is yes.
• Can an adequate wholesale level maintenance management force structure be developed within a
suitable defense agency or other organization to accommodate the needs of the services under consolidation? If asked, the services again answer no. Agencies external to the services again answer yes.

- Is it possible to determine if such a force structure would be more efficient as well as cost effective under such a structure? It is difficult to make such a determination without actually putting such a structure into operation. However, the logical answer is yes according to the 1993 Went Study.

- Are there valid reasons for retaining the existing wholesale-level maintenance structure? The services argue span of control, unnecessary layers of management in a consolidated structure, and close coordination with war fighters as reasons not to change. Agencies external to the services say change is necessary, and there are only reasons of politics and service parochialism for retaining the existing structure.

While the services retain the existing system of depot-maintenance management for the present, change is on the horizon and approaching rapidly. Forces for consolidation and privatization are gaining momentum, and it is only a matter of time before the services will be forced by Congress, by senior DOD officials, and by the budget process to accept a new method of conducting depot maintenance and depot maintenance management. This paper neither supports or opposes privatization or consolidation. It represents a view of the changing nature of the challenge to depot-level maintenance management for the 21st century. In order to meet this challenge, DOD should direct the formation of a project team with the direct mission of designing a new Joint Depot Maintenance Command or similar activity. The project team should be multiservice with civilian participation, constituted for 1 year and appropriately budgeted, and with all due respect to the Generals and Admirals, headed by a Colonel who can leave politics and parochialism out of the
process. If DOD and the services do not take the opportunity to influence the nature of depot-level maintenance management in the future, the services may soon be required to live with an unworkable and illogical system presented fait accompli by Congress and pressures of the budget. The time to prepare for the coming change is now.

NOTES


3. Dennis J. Wightman, Robert L. Jordan, and Larry M. Rosen, Logistics Management Institute, Characterizing the Maintenance Workforce, LG404RD1, McLean, VA, December 1994, 2-1 and 4-1. Between 1989 and 1993, the number of military maintenance personnel was reduced by 21 percent across the force (589,400 to 465,000) while civilian blue collar maintainers were reduced by 16 percent (141,800 to 118,600) and white collar maintenance personnel were reduced by 11 percent (50,400 to 44,800). Civilian maintenance personnel in DOD constitute 18 percent of the total DOD civilian population.


5. Mason, 3.

6. Ibid.


9. Ibid.

10. Ibid., 6.

11. Ibid., 7-8.
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12. Samuel Munroe, HQ Air Force Materiel Command, Interservicing Office, Wright-Patterson AFB, OH. As an example, Mr. Munroe states that in 1989, the Air Force established an interservicing goal to move from 3 percent to 10 percent of workload. However, through 1995, the best interservicing rate achieved by the Air Force was approximately 4 percent. Achieving a 10 percent rate is the height of optimism according to Mr. Munroe.


17. Integrated Management of Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities, Office of the Deputy Undersecretary of Defense (Logistics), Pentagon, Washington, DC, October 1993, 5-18 and 6-4. During initial scoring of the four options, the services and OSD preferred the Empowered DDMC while the JCS preferred the JDMC. However, the JDMC was least preferred by OSD.


20. Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, "Directions for Defense," Washington, DC, 24 May 1995, 3-20. This concept is not new to the services and has been debated for years without resolution. Most proponents of the Single Manager Element (SME) concept are external to the services.

21. Robert T. Mason, SES, Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Maintenance Policy, personal interview, Pentagon, 12 December 1995. In a subsequent conversation with Mr. James Woodard of Army Materiel Command (AMC), Mr. Woodard states that he would prefer consolidation to privatization
due to fears that truly civilian contractors will not respond to battlefield requirements, although DYNCORP, LSI, Brown and Root, and others supported operations in Vietnam during America's involvement; however, that conflict was not like World War I, World War II, or Korea. Mr. Dan McDavid of AMC believes all the consolidation that can be done, has been done, and that little savings are left. He states that national centers for technical excellence do create efficiencies, but that the recent BRAC decision to leave workload at Red River Army Depot goes against that concept.

22. Mason, interview.

23. Daniel McDavid, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, Headquarters, Army Materiel Command, Alexandria, Virginia, telephone interview, 26 February 1996. The Air Force is opposed to moving the ground electronics maintenance workload from Sacramento AFB, California to Tobyhanna Army Depot (TOAD), Pennsylvania as directed by the 1995 BRAC Commission. The Air Force proposed delaying workload transfer until the last year of BRAC execution FY2001 which the DDMC has accepted. The probable result is the loss of skilled civilian employees at TOAD while those jobs remain in California. This was confirmed by Ms. Susan Bauer of the Army BRAC office who further clarified that "privatization prior to FY2001 could possibly preclude these jobs from moving at all." The end result could be the thwarting of the BRAC Commission recommendations while precluding the directed consolidation of activities for efficiencies. In a recent joint meeting of AFMC and AMC personnel concerning the transition of workload from Sacramento to Tobyhanna, it was agreed that no key decisions would be made by this group concerning the timing of the transition of that workload.

24. LTG Johnnie E. Wilson, USA, Army Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, personal interview, Pentagon, 3 January 1996. Subsequent to the interview, LTG Wilson was promoted to the rank of General and assigned as the Commander, Army Materiel Command (AMC), Alexandria, VA.

25. Wilson, interview.

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29. While privatization may retain jobs in the area of closing installations, it circumvents the BRAC Commission intentions to eliminate excess capacity within the force structure. As a result, those installations which were to receive the workload from closing installations now retain excess capacity which would have been eliminated by workload consolidation. The bottom line is that there will still be five full-sized air logistics centers sharing a workload which is optimal for only three air logistics centers.

30. Mason, interview.

31. Ibid.

32. Ibid.

33. Ibid.

34. Dennis, interview.

35. Privatization has become a prominent topic during the course of Congressional budget hearings for FY 1997. The Secretary of Defense, the service Secretaries, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Comptroller (Dr. Hamre) were all queried at some length during the various Congressional Budget hearings from 5-8 March 1996 concerning where DOD and the services were headed with privatization. The party line supports privatization where it makes sense while maintaining a core workload for critical items in-house in conjunction with additional infrastructure reductions (the Secretary of Defense and the CJCS indicated another round of BRAC may be necessary). In addition, all the defense leaders asked for relief from the 60/40 legislative limitation on contracting out. It appears that Congress is factionalized into three groups concerning privatization: 1) Members who have no interest for or against; 2) members who are losing depot maintenance in their state/district and therefore support privatization; and 3) Members who would gain maintenance workload based on recent BRAC initiatives and therefore oppose privatization. This change represents a fundamental shift in Congress which potentially opens up the door for a full-scale assault on the current method of depot maintenance.
management. With the President, the senior defense and service leadership and now important congressional leaders supporting privatization, those opposed to the concept will have a difficult time in preventing the reduction of in-house depot workload. If this occurs, the remaining depot-level maintenance workload does not justify the multiservice maintenance management overhead currently in place. Finally, there are congressional leaders (most notably Senator McCain) who are calling for another round of BRAC that will place further pressure toward consolidation.

36. Robbins, interview.
37. Dennis, interview.
38. Rizotte, interview. “Core” maintenance workload is not a function of the 60/40 legislation. In a subsequent discussion with Mr. Mark Van Gilst of the Department of the Air Force, Mr. Van Gilst revealed that in January, 1996, the DDMC approved a new methodology for determining the amount of organic “core” capability which requires giving the private sector a major role [in depot-level maintenance] if risk is low and it is a best value to the government.
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. LTG Paul E. Blackwell, USA, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, United States Army, “America’s Army … Trained and Ready for Victory,” presentation, Pentagon, 4 January, 1996.
43. Robbins, interview.
45. LTC Todd Blose, USA, Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Installations, Base Realignment and Closure Office, Pentagon, Washington, DC, personal interview. LTC Blose explained recent discussions during which the Texas and Arkansas congressional delegations expressed strong support for privatization and changing the “60/40 legislation” in order to accomplish privatization. A senior member of the Alabama delegation also supports the 60/40 legislative change as long as Anniston Army Depot is allowed the opportunity to compete for the workload. These revelations represent a significant change in position of Congressional members who normally would not support legislative change, but who now
see it as a preferable alternative to losing the jobs in their congressional district.

46. Steve Gibson and Sam Stanton, "Top-level pledge on McClellan jobs," Sacramento Bee, Sacramento, CA, 21 August 1995, 1. This newspaper article announces that Air Force MG John Phillips, outgoing commander of Sacramento Air Logistics Center and McClellan AFB, has been named as the new Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Logistics (DUSDL) in the Pentagon. The article also discloses a White House and Pentagon pledge to retain the 8,700 jobs at McClellan AFB until 2001 rather than move a large number of them to Tobyhanna Army Depot and goes on to quote MG Phillips, "It is clear that privatization is the wave of the future and we've got excess capacity. Why not begin to exploit it? My job is going to be to try to facilitate that." MG Phillips' appointment was announced by Deputy Secretary of Defense John White. MG Phillips retired from the Air Force to accept this DOD civilian position.

47. Wilson, interview. A recent decision by the Secretary of the Army (April 1996) keeps the Multiple Launch Rocket System carrier at RRAD for repair even though the program manager, DAOODSLOG, and Army Materiel Command stated that it was not part of the Bradley Fighting Vehicle System. This decision brought immediate outrage from the Alabama congressional delegation, and as with other previous BRAC directed moves, the Secretary's decision may be challenged in court.

48. Wilson, interview. In addition to these issues, U.S. Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) and U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) have been designated as "reinvention centers." This means that they can virtually ignore existing rules and regulations, but not laws, in an effort to identify or develop a more efficient method of achieving a desired end result. This may have a positive impact in the near term, but it will have a negative impact in the long term concerning loss of structure and budget for contracting. Contractors are drying up and following more lucrative contracts away from defense. There are some low density requirements previously supplied by contract for which there is no in-house capability. Now the contractor is out of the business and there is no source for the requirement.

49. Kaminski, address.
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50. Ibid.
51. Ibid. The object is to alter the “just in case” supply mentality to the “just in time” supply mentality.
52. Ibid.
53. Ibid.
54. Ibid.
55. U.S. Department of the Army, Secretary of the Army, Memorandum to the Deputy Secretary of Defense, subject: Commission on Roles and Missions Recommendations on Restructuring Military Department Staffs, 16 October 1995.
58. U.S. Department of Defense, Deputy Secretary of Defense, Memorandum, subject: Depot Maintenance Operations Policy, 4 May 1994. This memorandum was overcome by events when Congress passed what is now Section 2470 of Title 10, U.S.C., which re instituted public-private competition for depot-level maintenance workloads. However, no new competitions have been initiated as a result. In addition, no such competition can be conducted until Defense Finance and Accounting service certifies that adequate financial systems are in place to identify and track all costs (GAO Report to Congress “Closing Maintenance Depots,” March 1996, 7-8). See bibliography and endnote 69.
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There is an inevitability about this [privatization] that people are recognizing."


64. Ibid., 3-6 to 3-9.
65. Ibid., 3-19 to 3-20.
66. Ibid., A-4 to A-6.
68. Integrated Management of Department of Defense Depot Maintenance Activities, 6-5.

69. Rizotte, interview. Mr. Rizotte confirmed that the DDMC does not have the authority to compel a service to take its workload assignment decisions to the DDMC for approval on non-BRAC directed actions. The 1970 Blue Ribbon Panel Report addressed the decisionmaking process for the Joint Chiefs of Staff, which can equally apply today concerning the DDMC, when the Panel stated, on page 128, "The process militates against the likelihood of the Joint Chiefs of Staff clearly facing up to difficult and potentially divisive issues. The repetitious, committee-type negotiations tend to reduce issues to a level of compromise which will either avoid the potential conflicts or substitute a solution that can be accepted on a quid pro quo basis." The DDMC evaded the hard question of rapidly moving workload from McClellan AFB to TOAD (for ground electronic equipment) as was directed by BRAC by delaying the move to the last possible instant. By then, the remaining jobs may be privatized precluding few, if any, in the public sector.

70. Some interviewees during the course of the preparation of this paper stated there were no guarantees that a JDMC would be any less parochial than the DDMC. While that may be possible, the real issue is putting a single leader in charge who will make the tough decisions rather than settle for mutual consent which maintains the safe, but probably less cost effective, status quo. It is difficult to argue that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has not become the dominant leader of the military services as a result of Goldwater-Nichols, just as the law intended. The same result, with appropriate safeguards, could be achieved with a JDMC.
71. It has been stated that BRAC has been concluded and no further cuts in depot infrastructure are planned. However, excess infrastructure (of several types) still exists in the services. Privatization will further exacerbate the problem leading to another round of BRAC sometime after the Presidential election in 1996. Because of budget pressures, a new round of BRAC will be initiated regardless of which party wins the election.

72. The structure depicted in figure 2 as the JDMC is similar in nature to a national structure proposed in the Integrated Depot Maintenance Management Report. This is logical because all service depots generally operate on a commodity line basis. Horizontal integration of land, sea, and air systems for depot maintenance is counterproductive.

73. For further reading on the lack of progress on interservicing and depot workload consolidation, a recent GAO report entitled *Closing Maintenance Depots: Savings, Workload, and Redistribution Issues* published in March 1996 offers additional insight acknowledging the services’ minimal efforts to consolidate or cross-service maintenance requirements.

74. Deputy Secretary of Defense White recently informed the services that they may retain savings accrued from “efficiencies” from outsourcing to use for force modernization. However, the services must fully justify their methodology for determining the savings and show where it was applied in their respective modernization account. Unfortunately, this does not preclude Congress from taking those savings from the services and directing the application of those savings against other defense or non-defense programs.

75. Discussions are ongoing within DOD and the services concerning what maintenance significant items should be retained within the depot system as “core” maintenance items for warfighting security. While it is understandable that the services consider the private sector unlikely to provide these items in time of war, it is the private sector which produces these maintenance significant items initially. As long as there is a monetary incentive for private industry to provide “warfighting equipment,” these items will be available (new or refurbished). Only when such items are no longer profitable (usually at the end of their respective service life), will it then be necessary to establish an in-house depot
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maintenance facility to repair them if such items are still necessary in the inventory.
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