THESIS

THE POLISH ROAD TO SECURITY AND STABILITY: CRUCIAL ROLE OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

by

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March 2000

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difficulties in Poland because of the possibility that Poland might fail. Nonetheless, these problems aside, Polish society
and politics held sure to the sole aim of accession to NATO. This thesis argues that, with the successful accession to
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THE POLISH ROAD TO SECURITY AND STABILITY:
CRUCIAL ROLE OF NATO MEMBERSHIP

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ABSTRACT

Faced at the outset with obstacles of the international system of states and of domestic politics, Poland embraced the tasks of accession to NATO. In this effort, no road map existed for what was an unprecedented situation. Thus, Poland had to resolve domestic and international tasks of accession with national means as well as guidance from the alliance and its members. Poland had to structure a new defense policy in an alliance context. The country had to reform the national security decision-making apparatus, which, in its most dramatic dimension, required the fashioning of democratic civil-military relations. The latter process, also, involved input from the domestic arena as well as those from the alliance members. This process took time as the alliance itself figured out the path forward and there were difficulties in Poland because of the possibility that Poland might fail. Nonetheless, these problems aside, Polish society and politics held sure to the sole aim of accession to NATO. This thesis argues that, with the successful accession to NATO, Poland secured its place in the West, which the events of the 20th century had denied this nation heretofore. Thus, Polish security rests on the stronger foundation, far greater then that possible with national means alone.
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Executive Summary

This thesis analyzes the political and strategic process of the Polish accession to NATO during the period 1989-1999. The work at hand treats the evolution of Poland's integration into NATO within a historical context and reveals the challenges of cooperating with NATO from the perspective of Polish politics and society.

The main purpose of this thesis is to interpret the new foundations of Poland's security policy, and assess NATO's role in the promotion of external security and internal stability in Poland. This thesis seeks to offer but one voice in a substantial debate on the role and effectiveness of external and internal factors in making of national security policy.

This thesis argues that, with the successful accession to NATO, Poland re-secured its place in the West, which the events of the 20th century had denied this nation heretofore. Thus, Polish security in the year 2000 rests on a stronger foundation, far greater than that possible with national means alone.

In the successive chapters this study focuses on the development of diplomatic relations between Poland and NATO, the evolution of the Polish defense policy, and the legal aspects of civil-military relations in Poland.

First, the development of NATO initiatives leading to Poland's political and military cooperation with NATO is addressed. This focuses on the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (1991), the Partnership for Peace initiative (1994-1999), the impact of the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995), and the significance of the decision of the Madrid Summit of July 1997. Here, the thesis argues that by its very
active and consistent course, Poland managed to expand the basically reserved and, at first, unified NATO policy toward the former members of the Warsaw Pact. In the process, NATO developed an approach specific to the unique problems pertaining to Poland.

Second, the development of the Polish defense policy is presented, exhibiting the major areas of this policy's modification, which resulted from the changing strategic environment and the Polish position in Europe. In particular, the principles of the Polish security policy after the Cold War are described with emphasis on the integration into NATO. The challenges facing Poland after joining NATO and restructuring its defense policy and the Polish Armed Forces is further discussed. This point presents how Poland managed to restructure its own defense policy and defense strategy to make them compatible with those of NATO.

Third, the development of legal frameworks of civilian control over the Polish Armed Forces is discussed in detail and then the turbulent transition from where the military was deeply interwoven in the political system to the situation where the democratic civilian authorities control the armed forces is examined. Poland had to adapt to NATO’s practices and customs of democratic civil-military relations. This process involved input from the domestic arena as well as those from the alliance members. This process, also, took time as the alliance itself figured out the path forward and there were difficulties in Poland because of the possibility that Poland might fail. Indeed, one of the most dramatic changes to the Polish military system was its subordination to civilian control, which forced appropriate changes in the structure of the Polish Government.
Finally, this thesis offers a broader conclusion about the NATO expansion, delineating the main problems, which Poland had to address when making the decision to join the Alliance. The thesis argues that the NATO enlargement process in the 1990’s was primarily based on political aspects. The thesis, also, draws the conclusion that since NATO enlargement really concerns the security of the entire Europe, other countries hoping to join NATO may consider lessons learned from the Polish case.
I. INTRODUCTION

Joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was one of the most important events in the history of Poland. The Polish Foreign Minister, Bronislaw Geremek, compared the significance of joining NATO to "nothing less than Poland's conversion to Christianity nearly 1,000 years ago."\(^1\) Although over the centuries Poland has developed a strong sense of national identity,\(^2\) only since joining NATO has Poland been given a historical chance to secure its long-term independence and shape its security on a stable basis.

This thesis analyzes the dynamics of the process whereby Poland joined NATO. It focuses on the development of diplomatic relations between Poland and NATO and the evolution of Polish defense policy, as well as the legal aspects of civil-military relations in Poland.

The second chapter presents the evolution of Poland's integration into NATO within a historical context. It focuses on the establishment of the North Atlantic


Cooperation Council (1991), the Partnership for Peace initiative (1994-1999), and the impact of the Study on NATO Enlargement (1995), and the significance of the decision of the Madrid Summit of July 1997. In this chapter the thesis reveals the challenges of cooperating with NATO from the Polish perspective.

The development of the Polish defense policy is the subject of the third chapter of this work. Presented are the major areas of its modification resulting from the changing strategic environment and the Polish position in Europe. In particular, this chapter describes the principles of the Polish security policy after the Cold War, with emphasis on the integration with NATO and further discusses the challenges facing Poland after joining NATO and restructuring its defense policy and the Polish Armed Forces.

The fourth chapter discusses the development of legal frameworks of civilian control over the Polish Armed Forces. In this chapter we examine the turbulent transition from where the army was deeply interwoven in the political system to the situation where the democratic civilian authorities controlled the armed forces. This chapter also focuses on the frictions between the legislative and the
executive branches, as well as the friction between the elements of the executive branch of the Polish Government.

Now once again Poland has become a part of a vast political system of the Western Civilization, which placed it on a far sounder basis of security then ever before. By its very active and consistent course Poland managed to enrich the initially reserved and unified NATO policy toward the members of the former Eastern block and redirect it toward an approach specific to the unique problems pertaining to a particular country. At the same time, Poland restructured its own defense policy and defense strategy to make them compatible with that of NATO. One of the most dramatic changes to the Polish military system was its subordination to civilian authorities, which forced appropriate changes in the structure of the Polish Government and relations among its elements.
II. DEVELOPMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
BETWEEN POLAND AND NATO

Between the years 1918-1989 Poland’s fate as a European nation was largely sad and tragic. The experiences of bad alliances and abandonment by allies left the country between the hammer and anvil of Germany and Russia leading to the Polish desire to ensure its security by forming more reliable alliances.

For 123 years Poland was divided among Germany, Russia and Austria and did not exist as a sovereign state. With the end of World War I in 1918, it regained its independence. Unfortunately, its geo-political position between Germany and Russia was a sorrowful predicament.\(^3\) Poland tried to ensure its security by signing treaties with Germany (in January of 1934 Poland and Germany signed a ten-year non-aggression pact), and France and Great Britain (in April of 1939 a full military alliance was signed by Great Britain, France and Poland).\(^4\) Nevertheless, the German invasion of Poland on September 1, 1939 resulted in a declaration of war against Germany by Great Britain


and France, but did not trigger any military action on their side. On the other hand, the Molotow-Ribbentrop Pact (the German-Soviet non-aggression pact of 1939) was a great success for the signatories. On September 17, 1939 the Soviet Union invaded Poland from the east, which led to the new partition of Poland between Germany and Russia.\(^5\)

After World War II Poland regained its independence. Unfortunately, at the Yalta Conference on February 4-11, 1945, Poland was placed under the influence of the Soviets along with the eastern part of Germany, Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia, forming a buffer zone between the countries of the west and Russia. In 1955 this situation was formalized when the Warsaw Pact was formed. This sealed the fate of Poland until the end of the Cold War.

At the end of the 1970’s, the Polish national movement, crystallized in the form of “Solidarnosc” (formally a worker’s union but primarily a political party) and became a threat to the current communist state of affairs. On December 13, 1981 General Jaruzelski, also the first secretary of the Polish communist party, as well as the Prime Minister, imposed martial law to preserve

communist rule. From General Jaruzelski’s position the martial law was imposed to "prevent a national catastrophe." Andrew Michta, the US-Polish scholar, wrote,

In the course of the crisis, Jaruzelski and his closest associates replaced the party aparatchiks as the country’s leadership and offered the Soviets the Polish martial law solution as an alternative to an all-out invasion by the Warsaw Pact.

At the end of the 1980’s with the erosion of the communist system of the Soviet block, the need to justify the persistence of the Polish martial law weakened. In 1989 the Polish Round Table Talks achieved the first compromises between the communist government and the democratic opposition that led to the elections of June 4, 1989, which broke the power of the communist party. Poland’s transition was a visible sign of the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Poland’s transition also heralded the collapse of the results of the 1945 Yalta conference. Bronislaw Geremek, Polish Foreign Minister compared the subsequent events to the "domino effect." He wrote,

The ‘domino effect’ was in full motion.

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7 Ibid, p. 40.
Several months later, on November 9th [1989] the Berlin Wall crumbled giving way to unification of Germany for the first time since 1918. The Soviet troops left central Europe for good, the Czechs initiated their 'velvet revolution' and the Soviet Empire lost cohesion, which permitted the Ukrainians, the Latvians, the Lithuanians, and the Estonians to speak aloud and demand freedom.  

Although a Slavic country, Poland's own identity and aspirations were always directed towards the Western Civilization and not the East. On the way to securing its future within a new pan-European system Poland recognized NATO as the most effective security alliance for Poland's security and took steps to join the NATO organization.

The history of Poland's cooperation with NATO is rather short and the success of Poland joining NATO was by no means assured as certain and the possibility raised numerous problems. Initially, the directions were not clearly defined on both sides. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the NATO enlargement was not considered a real possibility, neither in the West, nor in the countries of the crumbling Warsaw Pact.

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The first officially expressed signs of NATO's desire for cooperation with the Soviet Union and CEE countries, including Poland, surfaced during the NATO Summit held in London in July 1990. The London Declaration enabled the establishment of diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union and CEE countries and announced the beginning of NATO's broader changes in strategy.\textsuperscript{10} Soon after the meeting, leaders and representatives of the Soviet Union and CEE countries were invited to NATO Headquarters in Brussels, Belgium. One of them was the Polish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Krzysztof Skubiszewski, whose visit on March 21, 1990, launched official diplomatic relations with NATO. At that time NATO membership was not officially declared a priority of the Polish foreign policy. However, the Foreign Minister's secret guidelines for diplomats defined NATO membership as a goal for the Polish diplomacy.\textsuperscript{11}

The next step was the publication of The Alliance's New Strategic Concept (November 1991). It was NATO's first published unclassified strategy policy. In this document NATO acknowledged the dramatic changes in the European security environment and set new missions for the Alliance.


While this document reaffirmed that a collective defense remained the core function of the Alliance, the document also pointed out that NATO was to defend its interests through crisis management and conflict prevention activities on NATO’s periphery. Numerous critics of that policy, including some Western scholars, worried that the collective security missions could undermine the ability of the Alliance to perform collective defense functions.

William T. Johnsen wrote,

-Limited residual force structure may well be consumed with peace support operations, and may not be available to respond to collective defense requirements (e.g., an Article IV mission that suddenly spills over into an Article V mission)

-Limited funds being spent on collective security operations could result in long-term modernization being postponed in order to pay for short-term collective security operations

-Most important, internal political conflicts over NATO’s role in peace support operations (e.g., the current row over Bosnia-Hercegovina) could destroy a consensus within the Alliance.12

On the political side, based on the new policy of dialogue and cooperation, the Allied reached an agreement that made the formal cooperation with CEE countries

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possible. Adaptation of this policy moved the Alliance back to its roots as a primarily political alliance created to protect democratic values. Johnsen also wrote:

The Strategic Concept reverses the priority of the Alliance functions; i.e., political means henceforth will predominate over military considerations.\(^{13}\)

The establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in December 1991 was a direct consequence of this policy.\(^{14}\) The new forum undertook action on two different levels. To address general issues, a framework of regular consultations on political and military topics was created. The NACC held periodic meetings of foreign ministers and ambassadors. In addition, its various bodies, such as the Political, the Military, and the Economic Committees, organized sessions attended by liaison partners. To deal with specific military topics, NACC organized and coordinated detailed discussions by experts of military and defense problems. For this purpose the Council each year drew up work plans in the field of

\(^{13}\) Ibid, p. 4.

defense planning, military strategy, airspace control, defense industry conversion, and civil-military relations.\textsuperscript{15}

Admittedly, cooperation within NACC made Poland familiar with the mechanisms and structures of the Alliance. However, in spite of all the positive elements, the NACC provided only limited opportunities for developing practical cooperation with the Alliance, especially in the military domain. Within a few months the NACC structure, originally designed for cooperation with the six non-Soviet Warsaw Pact countries, was enlarged by all of the Soviet Union's successors. As a result, the Council became a forum affiliating states at very disparate levels of development, with different security priorities. NACC was criticized by some as a mere "talk shop."\textsuperscript{16}

As far as the Polish side was concerned, in 1992, with the changed geo-political situation, Polish President, Lech Walesa made the first Polish attempt to create a platform of cooperation. He presented the controversial idea of the "NATO-bis" structure, which would include Poland, the Czech


Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Baltic States. The President's idea was based on the following premises:

- Preventing the feeling of isolation in the states formed after the disintegration of the USSR
- The absence of opportunities for these countries to join NATO
- NATO's patronage over the agreement was meant to prevent the impression that it would be a repetition of the Warsaw Pact
- A greater feeling of security with NATO membership
- A way to accomplish the objective to create a uniform Euro-Atlantic system
- Poland's engagement in the creation of this structure would increase its chances for membership in NATO.

In addition, this concept created a European armed force, which could be used in peacekeeping operations conducted under the auspices of NATO or the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (renamed in 1994 as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)). Even though this idea seems quite peculiar and has never been taken seriously by either NATO or CEE

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countries, the concept shows the Polish desire to form a new regional security alliance and to circumvent the lack of a NATO enlargement policy.

It should be stressed that Poland desired an individual platform of dialog with NATO and expected to obtain a membership rather than only continued talks called "cooperation." In mid and late 1993, some Polish security experts believed that rapid NATO membership was indeed within their grasp.\textsuperscript{20} The Russian "acquiescence" to Poland's intention to accede to NATO was achieved when Russian President, Boris Yeltsin, visited Poland in August 1993. Unfortunately, almost all the Russian political groups criticized President Yeltsin shortly after his visit when he reneged on his previous public statement that Russia did not object to Polish membership in NATO.\textsuperscript{21}

The idea of a new platform for cooperation with former adversaries emerged at an informal meeting of NATO defense ministers in Travemünde, Germany, in October 1993. The Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was originally

\textsuperscript{19} Ibid, 63.


designed as United States diplomacy to meet the needs for
closer cooperation with NATO, which some non-NATO NACC
members, including Poland, had expressed. But finally, as
David Yost wrote, "It [PfP] has turned out to be a flexible
arrangement capable of accommodating multiple functions." 22

In Poland the PfP was initially seen as deliberately
designed to enable NATO to diffuse the issue of formal NATO
enlargement. Poland, by signing the PfP Framework
Document, formally joined the PfP, without particular
enthusiasm, on February 2, 1994, soon after Romania and
Lithuania. By accepting the PfP Framework Document, Poland
was committed to cooperating in the following areas:

- Facilitating transparency in defense
  planning and military budgets by exchanging
  information on the armed forces and military
  spending with NATO headquarters

- Ensuring the democratic control over the
  armed forces through structural
  transformation, legislative changes and
  democratic procedures in managing the budget
  in accordance with NATO standards

- The maintaining the capability and
  readiness to join the United Nations (UN)
  and/or OSCE peace-keeping operations

- The developing military cooperation with
  NATO, for the purpose of joint planning,
  training and exercises in order to
  strengthen its ability to undertake

22 Yost, David. NATO Transformed: The Alliance's New Role in International
peacekeeping, or search and rescue mission, or other humanitarian operation as may subsequently be agreed upon.

Long-term development of the armed forces and their preparation for collaboration with the forces of the NATO states by maintaining close contacts with NATO command centers and modifying the command system, communications, logistics, weaponry and training to NATO standards.²³

Soon thereafter, on April 25, 1994 Poland became the first partner to submit the Presentation Document to NATO Headquarters, outlining the scope of its intended cooperation, including:

- Command and communication systems
- Defense planning, standardization
- Defense infrastructure
- Military education and training.²⁴

In the same document Poland stressed clearly that it treated the PfP as a mechanism leading to its future integration with NATO.²⁵

Despite the fact that Poland was not, in the beginning, satisfied with two general frameworks of the PfP, on July 5, 1994, Poland still became the first partner to sign an Individual Partnership Program (IPP). The list


of activities proposed by Poland and others in the Partnership Work Program was growing dynamically. Initially, Poland took part in 41 activities, and later (in 1997) the number of annually conducted enterprises grew to 450. The number of activities and their quality were growing greatly. Many of those activities were military exercises involving representatives of both NATO and non-NATO PfP participants. In 1995, these were nine exercises; in 1996, 21; in 1997, 25 exercises. Although their subject matters were narrowed only to the issues of preparing and managing peacekeeping operations, (and later extended to include peace-enforcing operations), search and rescue operations, and humanitarian missions, the experience gained was undoubtedly highly important in achieving inter-operability with the NATO countries' armed forces.


A good example of the Poland's contributions to the PfP was the participation of the Polish infantry battalion in The Implementation Force—IFOR (1995-1996). The decision to send a military unit to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BH) was undertaken by the Polish government in December 1995, and the battalion was deployed there in January 1996. Poland also joined a follow-on to IFOR, the Stabilization Force—SFOR, with a similar unit in the same region of BH. Shortly before joining NATO, the Polish military contingent in the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR), included the 16th Airborne Assault Battalion from Krakow, as a part of the Nordic-Polish Brigade, and additional Polish personnel at the brigade levels, for a total strength of 500 officers in 1999.

Apart from adding a momentum to the Polish military cooperation with NATO, the PfP had also strengthened political connections. A Liaison Office between Poland and NATO had been appointed, and Polish diplomats had regular access to the NATO Supreme Headquarters. Moreover, Poland had delegated officers to the Partnership Coordination Cell


(PCC) which was set up in 1994.\textsuperscript{31} The PCC established in Mons, Belgium, at Supreme Headquarters of the Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) had coordinated and implemented joint ventures undertaken in Poland and NATO partner countries.

The Planning and Review Process (PARP), launched in 1995, added to the dynamics of the whole program. Under this process, which mirrored NATO’s long-standing defense planning, Poland could familiarize itself with NATO’s planning and review cycle. PARP had been developed to provide Poland and other partner countries with the opportunity to designate and adequately prepare selected military units for non-Article 5 operations conducted jointly with NATO. Poland took part in two cycles of PARP. In the first cycle, between 1995-1996 Poland’s efforts centered on preparations of selected military units to meet requirements of inter-operability. The following units and resources were then declared for cooperation:

- One airborne battalion, one air-cavalry regiment, one headquarters hospital
- Land forces division and brigade-level commands and staff
- One air-force unit and two search

and rescue vessels.\textsuperscript{32}

The second two-year PARP cycle covering 1997-1998 was designed to bring the Polish and other partners' planning as close as possible to methods and procedures used in the allied defense planning process. In this cycle Poland declared subsequent forces and resources for the PfP operations. These included:

- Two land brigades, three battalions (including Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian battalions)

- Selected elements of military infrastructure (two airfields, two ports, two storage facilities).\textsuperscript{33}

Poland has managed effectively to use PARP as a means of advancing its strategic aim of achieving full membership with the Alliance. All the PARP undertakings were pursued as priority projects. Accession to PARP was of paramount importance for the Polish military and it significantly deepened the dialogue with NATO. It is enough to say that the number of inter-operability objectives achieved by units and formations rose from 17 to 41 in the second cycle.\textsuperscript{34} They involved such areas as:


\textsuperscript{33} Ibid, p. 9.

\textsuperscript{34} Mrożewicz, Robert. "Od współpracy do integracji" In Mysł Wojskowa. Wydanie specjalne. No. 4, Warszawa: Bellona, p. 47.
- Command and control
- Tactics and operations
- Navigation and air-management procedures
- Logistics.\textsuperscript{35}

In addition, Poland has been engaged in many bi-
lateral and multi-lateral activities with NATO's partner
countries. Spectacular examples of Poland's cooperation
with other partner countries evolved during the PfP and two
bi-lateral battalions: one with Lithuania, and one with the
Ukraine. They were designed for international peacekeeping
and peace enforcement missions, as well as for assistance
in civilian emergencies organized by the UN, OSCE, the
Western European Union (WEU) and NATO.\textsuperscript{36}

After the Madrid Summit in late September 1997, Poland
submitted to NATO Headquarters its reply to the Defense
Planning Questionnaire (DPQ)—the basic planning and
reporting document used in the process of force planning
for the integrated military structure. This meant Poland
would become part of the allied defense planning system.
The Polish reply contained a comprehensive description of
the Polish Armed Forces and a program for their

\textsuperscript{35} Ministry of National Defense of the Republic of Poland. Report on Poland's

\textsuperscript{36} Both Battalions became ready to act at the beginning of 1999. Found in "The
Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. Partnership for Peace. International
Forces." The Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland. The Multimedia Guide-
development, along with financial plans for the following five years. In the DPQ, Poland had presented its intentions and abilities regarding contributing its forces to NATO. It had declared its willingness to commit all operational forces to NATO's integrated military structure.\(^{37}\)

With regard to the PfP Poland's position needed to be emphasized. Any skepticism on Poland's side did not concern the PfP as a program in its own right. This skepticism ensued because Poland regarded the PfP as a substitute for NATO enlargement. By joining the PfP, Poland demonstrated clearly that it was aiming to achieve full membership in NATO, in order to participate in NATO's political and military structure. It should be stressed, however, that applicants to NATO had to deal initially with a rather discerning and cautious NATO attitude. These nations were not given precisely stated guidelines for reforming their military doctrines, defense planning, or for reforming democratic control of their militaries and armed forces. Nevertheless, this "over-interpretation" of the PfP goals by Poland did not raise any obstacles during

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the negotiations leading to the acceptance of Poland's IPP.\textsuperscript{38}

Except for the United States, only Germany had largely similar views of the PfP.\textsuperscript{39} Polish and German views stemmed from similar security concerns, and both saw the PfP from the beginning as a proper preparatory step for Poland on its way to NATO. Thus, clearly the German-Polish relationship would be an important factor effecting cooperation within the PfP frameworks.\textsuperscript{40}

To conclude it is necessary to underline that Poland's initial reservations had changed after the scope and depth of the Partnership activities developed. The PfP proved to be an excellent platform for Poland, as well as for Hungary and the Czech Republic on their road to joining NATO. Poland as a NATO member continues its active participation in the PfP. Furthermore, Poland considers an enhanced PfP the core of the Alliance's practical cooperation with


\textsuperscript{40}'Germany pushed a definition of PfP as 'not an alternative to enlargement,' In: Szayna, Thomas S., and Ronald D. Asmus. The RAND Document Briefing. German and Polish Views of the Partnership for Peace. Santa Monica: RAND, 1995, p. 11.
partner countries and a mechanism to assist interested countries to prepare for possible NATO membership.

In September 1995, NATO published the "Study on NATO Enlargement." This outlined the Alliance's expectations for future members. The document stated clearly that all new members should prepare themselves to become full members of the Alliance and that there is no "fixed or rigid list of criteria for inviting new members to join the Alliance" but in Chapter V there were listed minimum political requirements. Paragraph 72 states:

Prospective members will have to have:
- Demonstrated a commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentism claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means, as referred to also in paragraph 6 of Chapter I.
- Shown a commitment to promoting stability and well-being by economic liberty, social justice and environmental responsibility.
- Established appropriate democratic and civilian control of their defense force.
- Undertaken a commitment to ensure that adequate resources are devoted to achieving the obligations described in section A and C.41

Although Chapter V of the study listed political and military expectations to be fulfilled by new members, the

study did not suggest by name which countries were to be invited first or when. Following the procedures provided by the Study, Poland started a series of meetings with the Alliance within the intensified Individual Dialogue in the formula of “16 NATO countries plus 1 partner.” Five sessions of the dialogue with Poland were held, including four in 1996, and one in 1997. These meetings allowed Poland to present the main issues linked with its aspirations to NATO membership. From the Polish perspective the study appeared to be in accordance with the Polish philosophy of treating the NATO enlargement as an element of a broader question of structuring the new security architecture in Europe.

A breakthrough moment in the process of Poland’s integration with NATO was the Summit in Madrid in July 1997, which adopted the decision to open accession procedures for three EEC candidate countries: Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary. Paragraph 6 of the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation states:

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Today, we invite the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to begin accession talks with NATO. Our goal is to sign the Protocol of Accession at the time of the Ministerial meetings in December 1997 and to see the ratification process completed in time for membership to become effective by the 50th anniversary of the Washington Treaty in April 1999. During the period leading to accession, the Alliance will involve invited countries, to the greatest extent possible and where appropriate, in Alliance activities, to ensure that they are best prepared to undertake the responsibilities and obligations of membership in an enlarged Alliance. We direct the Council in Permanent Session to develop appropriate arrangements for this purpose.43

Finally, the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland were invited, while at the same time NATO confirmed in agreement with Article 10 of the North Atlantic Treaty, that the alliance shall remain open to new members and the alliance further expected to extend subsequent invitations in the coming years.

In autumn of 1997 in Brussels, Belgium, representatives of the Mission of the Republic of Poland at NATO and WEU, and a group of national experts, were granted the possibility of regular participating in the meetings of the North Atlantic Council at the level of permanent representatives.

Poland took part in four sessions of the Accession Talks. During meetings, held in September and October of 1997, Poland declared its desire to assume the entire political, defense, legal, and financial obligations related to participating in NATO. In particular, Poland reaffirmed its commitment to all the political goals of the North Atlantic Treaty and the principles guiding the foreign policies of NATO members. These policies including democracy, the rule of law, promotion of stability and well-being, settlement of international disputes by peaceful means, and refraining from the threat or use of force. Also, considering enlargement as a gradual process of extending the zone of stability to the East, Poland declared its support for NATO’s policy on further enlargement. Poland expressed its intentions to continue its active role in the PfP, aimed at deepening the interaction, cooperation, and stability in Europe.\textsuperscript{44} It is worth stressing that Poland declared the desire to participate fully in the allied collective defense system, as well as in missions going beyond Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, and to make all its operational forces

available for the Alliance.

During the meeting of the North Atlantic Council on May 29, 1997, in Sinter, Portugal, ministries took into account the profound changes that had taken place in Europe since 1991 when the Alliance’s Strategic Concept was adopted. The ministers decided to "examine" the document.45

Bearing in mind that the updated Strategic Concept would be a political platform of the already enlarged Alliance’s activities and would define the NATO defense posture for the coming years, Poland became active in the discussion. It was not, however, certain whether NATO would approve the new strategic concept after accepting new members.46 At that time, Poland was fully aware that integration with the Alliance not only ensured the security of the country, but also included participation in all NATO missions, and thereby included new tasks resulting from the current international security situation. Therefore, after signing the Accession Protocols on 16 December 1997, Poland focused on updating the NATO Strategic Concept, further enhancing the PfP, and developing new mechanisms to intensify cooperation with countries aspiring to become


46 Ibid, p. 393.
members of the Alliance.\textsuperscript{47} Thus, the decision to unveil the new NATO Strategic Concept during the Washington Summit on 23 and 24 April 1999 was not a surprise for Poland, a six-week-old NATO member.

During 1998, the sixteen allied countries ratified the Polish, Hungarian and Czech’s Protocols of Accession according to their national procedures. Politically, the US Senate’s approval was the most important factor. After many months of preparations, and sometimes dramatic disputes, the US Senate ratified the Protocols on April 30, 1998. As such, with the majority of 80 votes for, and 19 against, this was considered a huge success for NATO’s enlargement advocates.\textsuperscript{48}

After all the allied countries accepted the protocols and the United States was notified, on January 29, 1999, Secretary General of NATO, Javier Solana, formally invited Poland to accede to the North Atlantic Treaty. This enabled the ratification process to take place in Poland. On February 17, 1999, first the Sejm (the lower chamber of the Polish Parliament), and then the Senate accepted the


bill, and authorized the Polish President to ratify the North Atlantic Treaty. The Sejm passed the bill with an overwhelming majority of 409 votes for, 7 against and 4 abstentions. The Senate approved the bill with a 92 out of 100 majority. On February 26, 1999 the President signed the ratification act and the Polish ratification procedure was over.

After that on March 12, 1999 Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary formally entered NATO in Independence, Missouri, where the Foreign Ministers of those three countries deposited the Protocols of Accession to the North Atlantic Treaty. In this way Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary become NATO members a few weeks earlier than the Madrid Declaration of July 1997 envisioned. The dream of long-lasting security for all three countries materialized.

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III. EVOLUTION OF THE POLISH DEFENSE POLICY

The Polish desire to join NATO raised numerous problems. Adapting the Poland’s national procedures, rules, and standards to NATO’s was among them.

A. THE PRINCIPLES OF POLISH SECURITY POLICY AFTER THE CHANGE OF 1989

Due to the events that changed the political map of Europe in the late 1980’s, a number of questions arose related to Poland’s relations with the outside world. First, Poland had to face the challenge that the collapse of the communist states created. With the end of their security institution—the Warsaw Pact—which by June 1990 existed in name only, Poland had to redefine its previous military commitments.\(^5\)

Since then, the Polish security policy concept has been based upon three principal premises: good-neighbor relations, participation in European and UN peacekeeping activities, and integration in the EU, WEU and NATO.\(^5\) These three basic directions in Poland’s policy had been

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treated not as three different options but as elements that, through performing different functions, had been interlocking and complementary.

The first of those directions has been the development of friendly bi-lateral relations, especially with neighboring nations, and regional cooperation. Poland signed treaties on good-neighbor and friendly relations, with all its neighbors. In particular, these treaties have confirmed the inviolability of the existing frontiers and the renunciation of any territorial claims by the signatories.

Before the signing, the eastern border was viewed as a potential problem to Polish security. Many Polish experts believed that the national conflicts, and various territorial claims and tensions between the Soviet successors could, as Andrew Michta wrote, "become a perpetual source of crisis and instability."\(^{52}\) Poland feared that the German government or the German minority in Poland would dispute its western border. But nothing like

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that happened and the border was recognized in a bi-lateral agreement, which Germany signed in 1990.\textsuperscript{53}

At the same time these treaties established a defined system for protecting the national minorities. Particularly momentous changes have taken place in relations with Germans. For example, in 1993, a poll made by a major Polish newspaper revealed that, 68 percent of Poles had a fear of Germans, even 5 percent more than their fear of Russians.\textsuperscript{54} Even though historical bias played a role in shaping Poles’ attitudes towards Germans, another poll that took place in 1997 showed that, 73 percent of Poles were in favor of a durable reconciliation between Poland and Germany.\textsuperscript{55}

In further effort to establish regional cooperation, Poland has become an active member of regional arrangements, such as the Visegrad Group, the Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA), the Council of the Baltic Sea States, and the Central European Initiative.

\textsuperscript{53} Ibid, p. 76.


The role of the Visegrad Group (called the Visegrad triad, until Czechoslovakia split in two in 1993) deserves particular attention as it was the first step, made in February 1991, toward security cooperation by Poland, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia beyond the hitherto Warsaw Pact. The Visegrad Group’s cooperation helped with practical problems caused by the withdrawal of Soviet troops from those countries, and the problems related to the dissolution of the Council of Mutual Economic Cooperation, and the economic cooperation body of the communist countries. Despite the controversial Polish idea of “NATO-bis” the Visegrad Group has never become either an alternative to or an adjustment stage before membership in the EU or NATO. This was clearly in accordance with the Czech Republic and Hungarian attempts to adopt an individual country-by-country approach in the accession to European economic and security structures.\(^5^6\) The Visegrad Group was to be primarily a consultative body serving to complement other multilateral bodies, such as the CEFTA.

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Three months before CEFTA was organized in March 1993, the Visegrad countries agreed to create a free-trade zone.\textsuperscript{57}

The second direction in the Polish security policy has been participating in European cooperative arrangements, and supporting the UN global security systems. Poland has traditionally participated in peacekeeping operations conducted under the UN flag. Since 1953, Poland has taken part in 39 peacekeeping missions in different regions of the world. Over 30,000 soldiers and the Ministry of Defense civilian employees took part in those activities conducted both within the UN and different organizational frameworks.\textsuperscript{58} Poland has also been supporting OSCE. Particular attention has been paid to the arrangements on confidence-building measures, arms control, and disarmament worked out in the OSCE forum or under its auspices. Among these agreements are the Vienna Documents on Confidence and Security Building Measures, the Treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), the Concluding Act on Limitations


of the Personnel Strength of Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE-1A) and the Treaty on Open Skies.  

The third group of directions in Poland's security policy has been mirrored in Poland's desire to integrate the country's security and economic system and to adjust it to the standards binding in NATO, WEU, and EU. After joining NATO, Poland is still interested in a closer cooperation with WEU in order to develop the European defense concept as the NATO's second pillar. After joining NATO, negotiating Poland's membership in EU became a priority of Polish foreign policy. The third group of directions concerning EU, WEU, and NATO remained important, as Poland has not finished the integration process with the NATO alliance's political and military structures simply through the accession.

There is still much to be done in adapting the Polish Armed Forces to NATO standards and to reaching full interoperability. For example in 1998, NATO gave Poland a set of the sixty-five Target Force Goals to be implemented before 2003. Poland accepted 50 of them, partially


accepted 14 others and agreed to take the final one under serious consideration.\textsuperscript{61} The list included everything from adapting communication systems to the NATO standards to soldiers learning English. Poland achieved 17 of those goals before joining NATO.

As far as military integration is concerned a highly important issue here is restructuring the defense system and full adapting it to NATO standards. For this a program to modernize the Polish Armed Forces must be realized. This, labeled "Army 2012," was drawn up in 1997, during negotiations with NATO on the Target Force Goals.\textsuperscript{62} In general, gradually implementing this long-term program will result in a smaller but more mobile and well-equipped force capable of contributing to NATO's collective defense and new missions. The program envisages deep reforms of the organizational structures, the functional principles, especially of the chain of command and finally, modernizing the military. In particular, the program will reduce the total number of troops from 241,830 (as of 1 July 1997) to 180,000 in 2004.\textsuperscript{63} The conscription system is to remain,


\textsuperscript{63} Ibid, p. 14.
but the number of professional military is to reach about 55 percent in 2012. The terms of conscription have already been reduced from the previous 18 months to 12 months. The structure of job positions for professional military will be as follows: about 30 percent for officers, 30 percent for ensigns, and 40 percent for non-commissioned officers. The number of contract soldiers is expected to increase about 20 percent in the officer corps, 40 percent in the ensigns, and 55 percent of non-commissioned officers. However, the program does not seem to address the most important problem facing the Polish Armed Forces at the moment, namely the shortage of money. According to Janusz Onyszkiewicz, the Polish Minister of Defense, the dissonance between defense needs and economic capabilities is caused by the fact that Poland is "embarking on an extensive range of reforms in the civilian sector."  


The first Polish attempt at a new defense policy appeared in January 1990, based on the changed political

context. Initially, the Polish approach to the issue of eventual NATO membership was unclear. It took two years after the 1989 elections, the first free ones in Poland since World War II, to discuss the new security arrangements and accept new concepts into a “government white paper” outlining the country’s defense policy for the years 1993-2000. In the white paper, membership in NATO was first declared as a priority goal of the national defense policy. Two sections of the white paper were adopted by the National Defense Committee on November 2, 1992, one document in the white paper dealing with the guidelines of the Polish security policy and the other document concerning the security policy and defense strategy of Poland. All the provisions of those documents were signed by the Polish President, Lech Walesa, in the same month and published for both external and internal use as the “Guidelines of the Security Policy of the Republic

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67 Michta, Andrew A. Poland and NATO: The Road Ahead. http://www.is.rhodes.edu/Publications/Michta.html (2 Jan. 00).

of Poland” and the “Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland.”

Since then, the Polish defense policy has been strictly defensive in nature, with a principal goal of defending the security and territorial integrity of the country. The principal goal of this policy has been to govern in accordance with international law, in particular the Charter of the United Nations, and other bi-lateral and multi-lateral agreements. To achieve this goal it has been crucial to refrain from any territorial disputes with neighbors, and to respect the freedom and political independence of other nations.

For a country of Poland’s size and means, participation in an alliance was the only feasible way of ensuring the country’s security. Obviously, Poland by joining a collective security system rather then by depending solely on national military resources was much more economical. NATO is the most effective and capable political-military organization created in many centuries.


This is why in an effort to ensure security from external threats, Poland had a strategic objective and set out to achieve membership in NATO. NATO expansion distinctly reduced a “gray zone of security” in CEE countries and contributed to the sense of security and safety of Poland and other states in the region. It should be stressed that when setting up the membership as a goal, Poland did not mean to oppose anyone. Poland has not regarded NATO as a “war machine,” but as a sphere of stability. The Polish desire was to enhance the security and stability in Europe by joining NATO.⁷²

Before joining NATO, Poland’s defense strategy was understood as a part of the state’s defense policy and had to rely on its own resources in case of a military conflict. The defense strategy did not provide for the existence of a specific enemy or pre-defined scenario, but was oriented toward managing and resolving military crisis situations. In resolving any contentious issues, Poland gave priority to the use of all available political measures, such as negotiations, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or international court proceedings. Only in cases of the inability to prevent a conflict by applying

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these mediation measures, was a use of the armed forces envisioned.\textsuperscript{73} Obviously it was not a very promising approach for the country's security but was the only available option at that moment. Because of its geo-strategically disadvantageous location, Poland wanted NATO to hasten the nation's acceptance into the alliance.

Intent on full integration with NATO structures, and the WEU (as NATO's European pillar), as well as integration with the EU, Poland launched a comprehensive program of political, military, and economic reforms without waiting for the West's decisions on NATO enlargement. At the same time, Poland began cooperating with the United States and some of its European Allies.

Developing of Polish-American ties was seen in Poland as the most important factor affecting Poland's preparations for integration with NATO.\textsuperscript{74} For a number of reasons Poland had been seen in America as distant and small but nevertheless a natural ally. On the other side of the Atlantic, Poles saw, for example, the US-sponsored PfP as an answer to Poland's need for guidelines to lead


the country to NATO. When the President of the United States, Bill Clinton, visited Poland in July 1994 strong implications for further cooperation with NATO were felt worldwide. Addressing the Polish Parliament on July 7, 1994 President Clinton stated:

As I have said, [NATO expansion] is no longer a question of whether, but when and how. And that expansion will not depend on the appearance of a new threat in Europe. It will be an instrument to advance security and stability for the entire region . . . And now what we have to do is to get the NATO partners together and to discuss what the next steps should be.75

This statement was welcomed in Poland with great satisfaction.

Another example of Poland’s determination to achieve regional peace and cooperation has been developing since the early 1990’s. Since then Poland has been pursuing defense cooperation with Germany. Also since 1991, Polish-French cooperation has developed the framework of the Polish-German-French “Weimar Triangle.” This tri-lateral political and military cooperation has been conducted both on ministerial and expert levels. The Triangle has been

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functioning on the OSCE forum and has included joint exercises and exchanges of observers.

Another example of tri-lateral cooperation was initiated in 1994 by cooperation between Poland, Germany, and Denmark. The most spectacular result of the cooperation to date has been the creation of a multi-national corps, undertaken in August 1997 by the three Ministers of Defense. The Multi-national Corps North-East was activated after Poland’s accession to NATO. The corps consists of Germany’s 14th Armored Division, Poland’s 12th Szczecin Mechanized Division and Denmark’s Mechanized Division. It is the first joint unit of three NATO states deployed on Polish territory. The Headquarters and communication section is based in Szczecin, Poland. Other elements of the Corps’ national contingents are based in their respective countries.\(^76\)

Prior to that, the Polish Ministry of Defense began to build a framework of cooperation with the other NATO members by signing formal agreements with them. In 1992, Poland signed its first formal agreement on defense cooperation with NATO member country—France. Subsequently,

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several agreements on military cooperation were signed (with the Netherlands, Denmark, Belgium, Spain, the United Kingdom, Portugal, Norway, and Italy) in 1993-1996.\textsuperscript{77}

Those bi-lateral and tri-lateral agreements definitely outdistanced contacts with the alliance as a whole and later facilitated the integration process. Poland realized that bi-lateral cooperation could contribute to the integration process, but it couldn’t provide the full security guarantee. Only with full accession can Poland reach that aim.

\section*{C. THE CHALLENGES FOR THE POLISH NATIONAL DEFENSE POLICY AND DEFENSE STRATEGY AFTER JOINING NATO}

After entering NATO the new strategic situation of Poland required adopting a new national defense policy and national defense strategy. Assumptions that had existed previously had prepared Poland for the temporary conditions of strategic independence and thus Poland had already fulfilled its mission.\textsuperscript{78}


For the purpose of this work the following factors which contributed to shaping a new national defense policy are taken into consideration:

- national interests expressed in Poland’s 1997 Constitution,
- external security circumstances including Poland’s geo-strategic location,
- national defense strategy and its correlation with NATO’s strategic concept.

Article 5 of Poland’s 1997 Constitution specifies the fundamental values that reflect the basic national interests and goals:

The Republic of Poland shall safeguard the independence and integrity of its territory and ensure the freedoms and rights of persons and citizens, the security of the citizens, safeguard the national heritage and shall ensure the protection of the natural environment pursuant to the principles of sustainable development.\(^79\)

Citizens’ rights, national independence, and the integrity of Poland’s territory are priorities, and they constitute essential national interests. These values should be secured and protected by all possible means, including the use of warfare. The fulfillment of all these values and the recognition of them by other nations and the efficient use of international structure helps maintain

\(^{79}\) Article 5 of the Constitution of the Republic of Poland.  
Polish national interests. Also shaping guaranteed conditions for their realization is the most common national goal of Poland today.\textsuperscript{80}

From the security point of view, international relations, which determine Polish external defense strategic needs have a double character. First, there are challenges requiring strategic adaptations to a changing international environment. These challenges include achieving allied requirements to take advantage of the opportunities created by the partners. Second, there are also threats of crises, perceived as dangerous politico-military situations, to include military conflicts in the vicinity of Poland, as well as war threats—threats of direct aggression against Poland and its allies’ territories.\textsuperscript{81}

Joining NATO has given Poland great opportunities to strengthen its security. At the same time, NATO acceptance creates many challenges that must be met in order to make these opportunities real. First of all, these challenges involve the requirement of Poland’s defense adjustment to


\textsuperscript{81} Ibid, p. 6-7.
NATO standards. This means compatibility and interoperability, enabling Poland to function effectively within the coalition’s multi-national structures. The success of the Polish performance within the alliance depends on a great degree of military cooperation. This requires developing and implementing a common doctrine, training, and the ability to operate smoothly as a combined, integrated force. According to signed agreements, all operational forces of the Polish Armed Forces are a part of the Joint Allied Forces of NATO. It obligates Poland to make complex and systematic changes in all fields of the armed forces. Adaptation of logistics to cooperate with NATO has been continuing since the 1990’s.\textsuperscript{82} One of the main concerns of these reforms is that no universal rules to achieve the best solution exist. The changes that have been introduced into the defense policy and the Polish Armed Forces have to ensure Poland’s appropriate contribution to a collective defense of NATO countries and Poland’s participation in peacekeeping operations.

The strategic location of Poland within the NATO area also brings challenges of a different kind. Poland is

situated on the main strategic NATO area that links NATO with some of the alliance’s most important partners, such as Russia and the Ukraine. Because of this, Polish security is mainly a function of reliable relations between NATO and these two countries. The challenge for Polish defense policy is to take part in the process of shaping these relations in a way that reduces possible tensions, and promotes cooperation and the establishment of a wider common security system.

Poland is a country located at the edge of NATO’s area of responsibility along the alliance borders, which has implications for its national security. Poland, thus, may be an object of different kinds of dangerous actions aimed against the country, but also pointed against other NATO countries nearby. Being that kind of strategic “shield” is a factor, creating a new dimension for threats against Poland. Hence, for example, in case of a war on the Polish territory the role of the Polish Armed Forces would be especially important in the initial stage of such a war. At the same time Poland faces an important challenge—to act

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on behalf of further NATO enlargement, by backing up other countries in their attempts to join NATO. Accepting the new members would minimize Poland’s disadvantage of being the sole bordering country.

As a member of NATO, Poland faces supranational challenges relating to the commonwealth of the allied states as a whole. This means the necessity of carrying the additional burden of participating in different military and non-military actions outside Polish territory. These actions can be required because of a common defense against aggression on any member of the alliance, or within the framework of a coalition reaction to crises. Being active in these operations can magnify indirect reprisals pointed against our citizens and infrastructure, not only on the territory of Poland but also abroad.

The Polish national defense strategy consists of three main parts. The first part is a concept of preventive strategy. This concept is aimed at preventing conflicts and at creating a secure environment for Poland. This concept has to be seen as a basic element of the wider strategy of international efforts, being undertaken by NATO, OSCE, and the UN. The second part of the national

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defense strategy is a concept of crisis reaction strategy—
including crisis management and protecting the community as
a result of crises. In this area Poland has decided to
contribute to international efforts by actively
participating in the process of solving crises both near
and far. Furthermore, Poland must be able to react to
paramilitary and non-military transnational threats. The
third part of the national defense strategy is war
strategy—the preparation and conduct of the war. Being a
NATO member, Poland accepts only one possible kind of war,
which a country could be involved in, namely, a "coalition
war." According to the Polish defense strategy such a war
can be distinguished in two ways:

-Response to direct aggression on the Polish
territory
-Participation in fending off an aggression
on NATO outside Polish territory. 86

According of Polish national and NATO strategies is
one of the main prerequisites of the national defense
strategy efficiency and credibility. The three main parts
of the Polish defense strategy has to be suitably
correlated with NATO's coalition strategy. Particularly

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86 Ibid.

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important to mention is Poland's need to correlate precisely the second basic part of the Polish defense strategy to NATO's crisis management strategy. For example, all the recent Balkan conflicts demonstrate that this part of modern strategy is the most dynamically developing element of security strategy. Stanislaw Koziej, a Polish military expert on strategy of NATO and Poland, wrote:

Without doubt the current 'dominance' of crisis threats over war threats will significantly increase the role of this element of strategic interest. 87

According to Bronislaw Geremek, the Polish Foreign Minister, Poland must be prepared for local conflicts because at the present there is no threat of global or pan-European conflict. 88

All the stages of formulating and updating the existing principles of the Polish national security strategy and defense strategy have been described in this chapter before the Polish government adopted the document, "The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland"


on January 4, 2000. The guidelines for defense strategy will soon be revealed by a document the Polish Ministry of Defense is preparing. According to an announcement made by the Minister of Defense, the work is ongoing for the new project of Poland's Contingency Plan.

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IV. EVOLUTION OF LEGAL FRAMEWORKS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS IN POLAND

The process of establishing the legal frameworks of civilian control over the armed forces in Poland has been continuing since 1989. The standards of effective democratic control functioning in the NATO countries has been implemented in the unique Polish political system.

The first tentative forms of civilian control over the armed forces were introduced as a result of the Round Table agreement on April 8, 1989. The most sizable change involved the agency of the National Defense Council (NDC). Until that time, the NDC was ruled by the communist Polish United Worker’s Party and controlled the defense and the interior ministries as a supra-governmental agency. The Round Table agreement changed the NDC role to a collegial state organization subordinated to the parliament.91

The situation was complicated by the fact that the president was the chairman of the NDC. During the parliamentary election campaign in June 1989, the lawmakers agreed that the president should be responsible for outlining the defense policy. However, the point was not to increase the powers of the president, but to enforce the

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powers related to the functions of the chairman of the NDC.⁹²

At the time, the defense minister was under the supervision of the Council of Ministers. On the other hand, the president who was the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland should also supervise the minister. Politicians agreed that a civilian defense minister should not be the commander of the armed forces; however, he had to oversee the military. This meant that all soldiers should be under the minister's supervision. This effort was mainly an attempt to reach a compromise over the division of powers between two elements of the executive branch of the Polish Government, namely, the president and the Council of Ministers.

During the initial period of establishing the civilian democratic control over the Polish Armed Forces, the main goal was to prevent the military from obtaining autonomy within the evolving system of the new democratic state. We have to keep in mind that until October 17, 1992, the main legislative act that regulated the place and the role of the armed forces was the Polish Constitution passed by the parliament in 1952. This dated back to the time of the

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⁹² Ibid, p. 53-54.
communist system. During this time, the government had no formal or legal means to control the armed forces and the new political elite had to seek control over the military through indirect ways.\(^3\)

After the parliamentary elections held on June 4, 1989, which brought about revolutionary changes in the Polish political arena, Tadeusz Mazowiecki was appointed as the first non-communist prime minister. In order to depoliticize the military, he initiated the reforms of the Ministry of Defense (MOD). The Main Political Directorate, which scrutinized the officer’s corps ideological correctness, was dismantled and was replaced with the Central Education Board (later renamed the Department of Education). This entity no longer has the power to look into the political attitude of the officers. On April 3, 1990 two Solidarity civilians, Bronislaw Komorowski and Janusz Onyszkiewicz, became defense minister deputies, responsible for educational training (formerly socialist political indoctrination) with the Polish Armed Forces and international military affairs respectively.\(^4\)


After Lech Walesa was elected president in 1990, power began to shift from the parliament, which then had a two-thirds communist majority, to the president. Walesa replaced the NDC with the National Security Council (NSC) at the end of 1991. The NSC had a similar role to its predecessor but was now financed by the President’s Office. In an effort to expand the presidential control in security affairs, Walesa created the National Security Bureau to replace the NDC Secretariat.

In 1991 the parliament established a weak and heavily fragmented right-wing coalition government. The ambiguity of constitutional provisions and differences in interpretation concerning command and control over the military contributed to the downfall of the first civilian Defense Minister, Jan Parys, and subsequently, of the government. Although the new Defense Minister, Janusz Onyszkiewicz, initially cooperated with the president and progress was eventually made in restructuring the MOD, his efforts to reform the General Staff headed by General Tadeusz Wilecki failed. This failure arose from the legal situation that was unclear and favored for the armed forces

\[95 \text{Ibid, p. 58.}\]
to gain autonomy within the state system. And, as Simon wrote,

...[Wilecki] effectively played off the civilian defense ministry against the president. ⁹⁶

On top of that, the distrust existed between the high-ranking military officers and the politicians. Although the officer corps claimed strong approval for professionalism and ranked an apolitical attitude as a desirable value, it was predominantly “center-left” oriented. ⁹⁷

After the elections in 1989, the parliament’s efforts were aimed primarily at improving the efficiency of the supreme state authorities until a new constitution for Poland would be ratified. On October 17, 1992, the parliament passed the relevant act, which was called the “Little Constitution.” This act provided grounds for implementing civilian control over the military. The new-regulations determined the supervisory powers of the president. These powers included the general supervision over the external and internal security of the state;


appointing and recalling, in consultation with the defense minister, the chief of the General Staff; and appointing and recalling, on the defense minister's request, the deputy chiefs of the General Staff, commanders of types of the armed forces, and commanders of the military districts.\textsuperscript{98}

In practice, implementing these constitutional prerogatives gave the president and the high-ranking officers a powerful incentive to bypass the civilian part of the ministry.\textsuperscript{99} At that time, the structure of the Ministry of Defense was divided into two parts: The General Staff, and the civilian division. The General Staff had all the powers concerning management over the armed forces, including financial and human resources policy. The civilian division, struggling with personnel problems, was unable to establish adequate cooperation with the General Staff. This artificial division led to many conflicts between the MOD and the chief of the General Staff.

The weakness of the civilian oversight over the military manifested dramatically at the so-called Drawsko

affair of 1994. During a high-profile dinner at the Drawsko Pomorskie training ground, the general officers and President Walesa allegedly approved a vote of no confidence for the Defense Minister, Piotr Kołodziejczyk. Walesa was disappointed with the new Prime Minister’s (Waldemar Pawlak) independent personnel policy, and the defense minister’s opposition to subordinate the General Staff to the president. When the issue was investigated later in 1994 by the Sejm Defense Committee, the generals denied that they voted, but Kołodziejczyk said, “the President ordered a vote [on the question should the defense minister be dismissed]. All hands except two went up.”

The Committee’s report on the Drawsko affair concluded,

Despite discrepancies in individual accounts, the generals in Drawsko had not disobeyed Kołodziejczyk, but they did criticize him.

Though the report distinctly criticized President Walesa for his role in the affair, he dismissed Kołodziejczyk on November 10, 1994. In response, in early

101 Ibid, p. 83.
102 Ibid, p. 84.
1995, Walesa's option to subordinate the General Staff directly to the president was finally rejected by the Sejm.  

The question of to whom the General Staff should be subordinated—the president or the defense minister—remained a core issue of the defense reforms launched after the election of the new President of Poland, Aleksander Kwasniewski in 1995. With his election, the balance of power shifted decisively to the civilians and the MOD. One of the successes of the reform of 1997 authored by the Defense Minister Stanislaw Dobrzanski and deputy Defense Minister Andrzej Karkoszka establishing a separate command headquarters for each of the armed forces: Navy, Air Force, and especially the Land Forces. The later formed the major part of the Polish Armed Forces and comprised nearly two thirds of its fighting strength. On the other hand, because of the Polish navy and the air force's small size and supportive character, this part of the reform was especially criticized by the General Staff for implementing


the US military pattern "without much regard for the real conditions and needs of the Polish national defense."\textsuperscript{105}

The main legislative bill, which subordinated the chief of the General Staff and the military intelligence and counter-intelligence services to the defense minister, was the Law of the Office of the Defense Minister.\textsuperscript{106} The bill was passed by the parliament in June 1995, but was subsequently vetoed by President Walesa in August. Finally, in February 1996, the bill came into effect after the new President of Poland, Kwasniewski, signed it.

The bill consolidated the activities of the minister’s office for the first time. Earlier, a separate legislative bill did not regulate the Ministry’s activities. The bill, followed by the statutes and the rules of procedure of the MOD, clearly settled two matters of fundamental importance. First, the legislation established the defense minister as the supreme state administration authority with regard to state defense. Second, the bill defined the scope of the minister’s powers in regards to the supervision of the overall activities of the armed forces.


\textsuperscript{106} Ibid, p. 95.
The reforms initiated by the bill ended in December 1996. Since then, the minister has directly supervised the work of the MOD. In this task he is assisted by the state secretary who is the first deputy minister, the Secretary of the Secretaries of State, under-secretaries of state, and the chief of the General Staff.\textsuperscript{107} As far as the armed forces are concerned, the command functions are performed by the chief of the General Staff who carries out the relevant decisions made by the defense minister. Thus, the chief of the General Staff commands the armed forces on behalf of the defense minister.

The minister and his office are responsible not only for the armed forces, but also for the central, civilian organization that is in charge of monitoring and evaluating the state defense system. At the same time, the office of the defense minister initiates the necessary decisions to be made by the appropriate state authorities (the parliament, the president, and the Council of Ministries), and then coordinates and supervises the implementation of these decisions.

The current legal and constitutional status of the civilian and democratic control over the armed forces was

shaped in the Constitution Bill passed by the National Assembly on April 2, 1997. The articles of the new constitution refer to state security and defense matters and states that the Polish Armed Forces shall serve to protect the independence of the state, and that they shall maintain a neutral attitude on political matters, and be subject to civilian and democratic control.\textsuperscript{108}

Following the model of many NATO countries, the president has the authority to supervise and direct the armed forces. The president is the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of the Republic of Poland.\textsuperscript{109} In the time of peace, the president exercises his control over the armed forces through the defense minister.\textsuperscript{110} The president appoints the chief of General Staff and the commanders of the services of the armed forces.\textsuperscript{111} It is up to the president to appoint the commander in chief of the armed forces in the time of war.


The powers of the Council of Ministers include ensuring the external security of the state. The Council of Ministers are responsible for the general supervision over defense matters, and for determining the number of citizens to be drafted into active military service every year.\textsuperscript{112}

The constitution regulates matters related to supervision over the armed forces in emergency situations, and in particular during war.

The right to declare war and to conclude peace on behalf of the Republic of Poland is vested in the Sejm.\textsuperscript{113} It is the Sejm, which shall adopt the resolution declaring a war in case of a military aggression against the territory of Poland, or when an obligation of joint defense against an act of aggression is required by international agreements. If the Sejm cannot hold a meeting, the president declares a state of war.\textsuperscript{114}

Following the relevant request by the Council of Ministers, the president has the power to declare martial


law in part or in the whole of the territory of the state in case of threat or armed aggression against the territory of Poland,115 or when an obligation of joint defense against an aggression is required by international agreements.

The constitution regulates the use of the armed forces outside the territory of Poland. Article 117 stipulates that the principles of using the armed forces outside the territory of Poland are specified by ratified international agreements or by legislative acts.

In addition, the constitution sanctions the model of the parliament’s involvement in the exercises of civilian democratic control over the armed forces, which has been shaped recently. Similar to the executive authorities, the parliament is equipped with control powers in regards to all the defense matters. Most of the work in this area is performed by the Sejm National Defense Committee and, to a lesser degree extends, to the similar committee of the Senate. The hearing of candidates for the position of defense minister, and the power to pass a no-confidence vote concerning the policy implemented by the minister regarding the armed forces, constitutes a vital element of parliamentary control.

Parliamentary committees perform their supervisory functions in direct and permanent ways. In this respect, cooperation between the MOD and the Sejm National Defense Committee is of key significance. This cooperation takes place in several areas, but its most important aspect is the exchange of experience and materials concerning defense.

The MOD as an element of the central executive authorities of the state is obliged to provide the Sejm National Defense Committee with access to the documents which are at the ministry's disposal, or which the ministry prepares, and are of interest to the parliament. The Sejm National Defense Committee on its part provides the minister with access to its drafts of bills, the text of resolutions and recommendations, as well as opinions on the draft drawn up by the ministry.

The second way in which the parliament exercises its control function with regard to the armed forces is through direct personal contacts with the defense minister. Depending on the current circumstances, these contacts may involve the defense minister, the secretary of state in the MOD, under-secretaries, as well as the chief of the General Staff and his deputies. These individuals' participation
in meetings of the Sejm Committee is restricted to meetings held to discuss new bills relating to defense matters or the overall security of the state, as well as those meetings during which reports are presented on the ministry's activities.

Every time representatives of the Ministry of National Defense are invited to attend a given meeting of the Sejm National Defense Committee, they participate in the Committee’s working meetings as experts, advisors, or as representatives of the Ministry or of the General Staff. This applies to individuals, and to whole teams, which often include civilian staff of the armed forces, officers, or even persons having no direct connections to military institutions.

Control powers are vested in particular members of Sejm and of the Senate who have access to the Ministry’s documents, and who visit the institutions, premises, and posts supervised by the Ministry. These powers are stipulated by acts on duties and powers of the Sejm deputies and senators.

It is necessary to emphasize that the shaping process of the Polish model of civilian control is integrally connected with the changes in political system. These
changes have determined and still determine the tempo and
direction of the evolution of democratic civil-military
relations.

Establishing suitable legal solutions is of vital
importance for the implementation of democratic civilian
control over the Polish Armed Forces. Although notable
progress has been made, the process has not yet been
completed. Only recently the Chief of the National
Security Bureau, Marek Siwiec, addressed the Council of
Ministers and made allegations that the consultations with
the president were insufficient before the new Security
Policy was adopted on January 4, 2000. This situation
demonstrates that in order to complete the model of
civilian control in Polish circumstances, the powers of the
president, as the Supreme Commander of the Armed Forces of
the Republic of Poland must be codified in an appropriate
legislative act. The governmental draft of such a statute
is currently being discussed in the Sejm.

116 Marek Siwiec, the Chief of the National Defense Bureau's interview of
January 21, 2000 for Trybuna. (Available in Polish)

117 The governmental proposal of a statute on the president's authority, as a
Superior Commander of the Polish Armed Forces of October 12, 1999. (Available
V. CONCLUSION

Since NATO's acceptance of Poland was primarily based on political aspects (the military element was secondary,) several conditions of integration were mandatory. These conditions of membership were as follows:

- Respect for human rights and good, neighborly relations
- Implementing the principles of democratic civilian control of the armed forces
- Readiness to participate in international peacekeeping operations and humanitarian missions
- Adapting privatized economies and maintaining budget stability.

One of the important steps undertaken in Poland to fulfil these conditions was the initiation in 1989 of the efforts on the defense policy. In November 1992 these efforts resulted in adopting two important documents: "The Guidelines of the Polish Security Policy" and "The Security Policy and Defense Strategy of the Republic of Poland." Both of these documents declared the integration with NATO.
as the primary objective of Poland. Thus, Poland’s first steps towards NATO integration were taken within the realm of the domestic policy. In addition, these documents directed the development of Poland’s good-neighborly relations and regional cooperation in Central and Eastern Europe. Free of territorial disputes and ethnic conflicts, Poland now regulated its relations with all neighbors.

Along with the broadening of Poland’s cooperation with other countries, the implementation of democratic civilian control of the armed forces was launched in 1989. As a result of this program, a democratic oversight and management of the Polish military was established. It enacted the following:

- Division of powers between the president on one side and the prime minister and the defense minister, on the other side
- Parliamentary oversight of the military through control of the defense budget
- Peacetime civilian oversight of the General Staff and military commanders through the defense minister.  

The spectrum of internal reforms and external operations carried out by Poland internationally has been significant. Since 1992 Poland has implemented a multitude of reforms in politics, the economy, its culture and its military. Such actions were taken because this process of integration with NATO required that the international community maintain a sterling opinion about Poland. Indeed, the Allies had to know that Poland was a politically stable and ethically structured country, which was engaged in solving the vital problems of the region, as well as developing its economy according to western patterns.

The political consensus in Poland to join NATO received the esteem of the Western political establishment. This esteem was especially important from 1994 to 1996 when the socialists won the parliamentary and the presidential elections in Poland. This was important because the new shift in power in Poland posed no threat to the integration with NATO.

From the beginning of the required political transformations, Poland clearly expressed its readiness to assume partial responsibility for maintaining peace and security in the world. This Polish declaration to meet
these responsibilities was, in fact, fulfilled by Poland’s numerous humanitarian and peacekeeping activities, and subsequently Poland received the full acceptance of the NATO allies and the international community.

A highly important test of credibility was Poland’s participation in the military missions conducted in the UN and NATO peace operations in Europe, especially in the Balkan conflicts (1991-1999). Starting from UNPROFOR and IFOR, SFOR to AFOR to KFOR, Poland has been perceived as one of the most important countries trying to solve the Balkan conflict peacefully. The unquestioned stabilizing role of the Polish military should be stressed. One can assume that Poland’s increase in international activities to assure world security, especially implementing the military contingents, has been perceived by NATO as the true test of Poland’s credibility. Indeed, all missions that Poland has carried out under NATO patronage conform to the Alliance’s practice and customs.

Retrospectively, from 1995 to 2000, one sees that the Partnership for Peace concept has played a prominent role because the PfP provided Poland with the guidance to gain membership status. One can state that the ventures carried out in the PfP framework have become the foundation for
cooperating with the Alliance. Poland's accession to NATO was supported by:

- Wide political cooperation in the frame of the PfP, not only with the NATO armies but also with the neighboring armies of Poland as well.
- Implementing the first NATO standards and requirements connected with realizing the PfP program. This was made more intense by collaborating with neighboring countries, such as Ukraine and Slovakia.

When considering future challenges for the future, it is highly important to underline that Poland, by initiating the Polish-Ukrainian and Polish-Lithuanian battalions, has created a new quality of security cooperation in Eastern Europe. Those formations were the first multinational units created in this part of Europe since World War II. These formations also played a significant role in creating good relations between those countries.

The gradual expanding of security and military cooperation has been an essential condition of the NATO integrating process. The initial formal meetings eventually grew into pragmatic cooperation. Here one must highlight the objectives achieved through the framework of
the "Planning and Review Process" and in preparing the "Questionnaire of Defense Planning." For the NATO partners, these activities were the first test of meeting the Alliance's standards. The ability to prepare these works was a fundamental criterion for the countries aspiring to NATO in the 1990's.

Besides achieving credibility, overcoming numerous internal restrictions, and proving their readiness for integration, Poland also had to allocate proper economic and financial expenditures.

Clearly the insights gained from the Polish experience in achieving NATO membership may be helpful for other countries planning to join NATO. Among these insights which aided Poland in attaining membership was decisive countrywide support for the democratic reforms that NATO mandated. In Poland this support included enacting the required procedures, accepting the philosophic principles, and enacting the national laws expected by NATO.

One can assume that in addition to the decisive political conditions of gaining NATO membership by Poland, there were also military requirements. Indeed, initiation of reforms within the Polish Armed Forces and the
consequence of implementing these reforms was an additional factor affecting entrance into NATO.

The execution of the tasks caused by the integration also forced Poland to prepare a suitable number of personnel to command and control in accordance with NATO procedures. The Polish Ministry of Defense authored national field manuals and national military planning documents which were comparable to NATO’s. In addition, Poland conducted the following actions:

- English courses were widely initiated.
- Military personnel from the levels of command were sent to take part in courses and training in NATO schools and training centers.
- Different operational, training and technical tasks connected with integration to NATO were fulfilled parallel.
- The educational training on tactical operational and strategic levels based on NATO manuals were implemented.
- The Polish Armed Forces adopted NATO standardization agreements and implemented new goals for the Polish Armed Forces, including
the assignment of particular military units to work within the NATO structure

- Passage from the level of training exercises to real operational cooperation

The above-presented experiences and conditions certainly do not encapsulate the vast problems connected with Polish integration to NATO. The process of integration to NATO for any nation is multilevel and the results also affect all spheres of internal life in the state and beyond. Polish membership in NATO is important politically, economically, and militarily, as well as morally, but of utmost importance, NATO membership placed Poland on a far sounder basis of security then ever before.

Finally, it should be stressed that Poland has not finished the integration process with the NATO Alliance’s political and military structures simply through the accession but has definitely begun the next step of a long-term process of adaptation, which is presently ongoing.
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