A Goldwater-Nichols for MOOTW?

Operations Research Paper

By

Kemp L. Chester
Major, US Army

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature: Kemp L. Chester

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Colonel Patrick Sweeney, USA
Faculty Advisor

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This paper examines those aspects of Goldwater-Nichols that made it successful; cites some interagency failures in recent operations and their impact on the operational commander, and identifies some current efforts to improve interagency coordination. It also questions the likelihood that legislation is the best means to solve the problem.

The author finds that the greatest chance for improving interagency coordination lies with carefully crafted legislation that breaks down cultural and institutional barriers to interagency coordination, much like Goldwater-Nichols succeeded in breaking down the barriers between the Services in favor of jointness almost fourteen years ago.
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Introduction

In reflecting upon the almost endless soul-searching the US military is engaged in today, one need not dig too deeply to find a discussion of the myriad issues surrounding the planning, execution, and resourcing of Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW). From the thousands of pages written on the topic, and the hours of discussions that gave rise to them, one undeniable fact emerges. Regardless of the fundamental and enduring responsibility of the US armed forces to fight and win the Nation’s wars, the preponderant task of America’s armed forces for the foreseeable future will be to execute military operations other than war in the pursuit of a range of political objectives in any given corner of the world.

Because such operations usually involve a significant non-military dimension, it is widely acknowledged that one of the keys to success in MOOTW is effective interagency coordination in their planning and execution. Recent history reveals that the record of such coordination is decidedly less than perfect, and the impact of such failures has been felt most sharply at the operational level. Changes in joint and service doctrine, impromptu organizational changes, and even a Presidential Decision Directive have all been put forward in an attempt to address the problem. However, for a variety of reasons all have fallen short of the mark. It appears there is a compelling need to institutionalize a system for interagency coordination for the planning and conduct of MOOTW to better support the operational commanders responsible for their execution.

The current dilemma of poor interagency coordination for MOOTW is not without a historical parallel. In the early 1980s, the US military faced the challenge of enhancing the coordination between the separate armed services and improving their ability to operate as a
joint force. At that time, legislation -- specifically the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act -- proved to be an effective agent of change. Is legislation the best solution to today's problem of interagency coordination for MOOTW? Would operational commanders benefit from another legislative effort, as they clearly have from Goldwater-Nichols? Has the time come for a Goldwater-Nichols for MOOTW?

Goldwater-Nichols: Meeting the Challenge of Change

First, it is important to take a short look back at Goldwater-Nichols; an important object lesson in the power of legislation to enact a fundamental change in the way the US military is organized, trains, and operates.

In the early 1980s, military leaders and defense officials found themselves in a somewhat changed environment. Although the Cold War was still in full gallop, there was general agreement that the US military needed to become more rapid in responding to international crises and more flexible in bringing them to a favorable conclusion. Some of the more forward thinking among the defense establishment openly questioned the ability of the US military, as it was then structured, to meet the challenges offered by the smaller-scale contingency operations that were becoming all too common at the time. In his last appearance before the House Armed Services Committee in advance of his retirement, General David C. Jones, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, offered the following observation:

It is not sufficient to have just resources, dollars, and weapons systems; we must also have an organization which will allow us to develop the proper strategy, necessary planning, and the full warfighting capability. We do not have an adequate organizational structure today ... We have made improvements. However, thus far, improvements have only been made at the margin; we need to do much more.
What followed were years of study and debate, culminating in the signature of the
Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act on October 1, 1986.

It would be difficult to overstate the enormous impact Goldwater-Nichols has had on
the US military in the almost fourteen years since its inception. Former Defense Secretary
William Perry has referred to the Act as "perhaps the most important defense legislation
since World War II." Three distinct characteristics of Goldwater-Nichols warrant its
consideration as a historic legislative accomplishment.

First, in passing Goldwater-Nichols the Congress proved itself to be willing and able
to impose radical change upon perhaps the most tradition-bound and steadfast institution in
the US government -- the military. Four

Second, rather than being motivated by any significant level of constituent appeal,
Congress was moved to act out of "a genuine concern for the nation's ability to equip and use
its military forces." The most compelling argument for some kind of reform of the US
military was provided by the lackluster performance of the US armed forces in several
contingency operations in the early 1980s, specifically the attempted rescue of the US
hostages in Iran, the US intervention in Lebanon, and the invasion of Grenada.

Finally, although the majority of Goldwater-Nichols provisions were focused on the
structure of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, many of the real effects
of Goldwater-Nichols far surpassed the composition of the Joint Staff or the mechanics of the
coordination among senior military leaders at the national and theater-strategic levels.
Creating the position of the Vice Chairman, making the Chairman the principal military
advisor the President, and proscribing a single chain of command from the National
Command Authorities to the warfighting CINCs all served to improve the quality of military
advice provided to the President and to enhance the ability of combatant commanders to execute their assigned missions.

However, the true and lasting impact of Goldwater-Nichols, and the one that has genuinely been felt at the operational level, has been the institutional change it has brought to the US military as a whole. The philosophical transformation -- shifting the focus of US warfighting from the Services to the CINCs -- was deftly underwritten by personnel policy. By mandating changes in officer assignment and promotion policies in favor of joint experience, Goldwater-Nichols not only ensured that the services would be compelled to send their very best officers to joint duty, but that future generations of senior leaders with significant joint experience would be more inclined to look past their parent Service’s interests in favor of the needs of the joint force. Testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee shortly after Desert Storm, General Norman Schwarzkopf stated “the quality of the people that were assigned to Central Command at all levels changed dramatically as a result of Goldwater-Nichols.”

Although its latent effects were not felt for several years, the cultural shift spurred by Goldwater-Nichols has proven to be its most notable, and arguably its most beneficial, consequence:

**Need for Reform Once Again?**

Today the US once again finds itself facing the challenge of fundamental change in how its military will be employed to secure the Nation’s political objectives. It goes without saying that the environment under which America’s armed forces are called upon to operate has changed radically in the past decade. But whereas the early 1980s saw the need for
greater integration of the separate armed services of the US military, today there is an imperative for all the elements of US power -- military and nonmilitary alike -- to operate cohesively in planning and executing operations other than war.  

Joint publication 3-08, *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations*, could not be more clear on the point:

The security challenges facing the nation today are increasingly complex, requiring the skills and resources of many organizations. These include USG agencies, partner nations, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), private voluntary organizations (PVOs), regional and international organizations, and the agencies of the host country. Efforts must be coordinated despite philosophical and operational differences separating agencies.

However, clarity of the challenge does not necessarily translate into consistent success in meeting it, and once again recent experience points to the need for marked improvement.

Sound interagency coordination for MOOTW contains three essential elements. First is the capacity of the interagency players at the national level to formulate clear and attainable objectives, coordinate their efforts, determine roles and responsibilities, and de-conflict potential problems in the planning and execution of a contingency operation to ensure unity of effort. Second is their ability to transmit the results of their efforts to the operational level commander responsible for executing the operation, ensuring he clearly understands what is expected of him and has the resources available to complete his mission. And third is the ability of the operational commander to integrate the civilian and military aspects of the operation, and ensure that one is not sacrificed for the sake of the other.

US performance in complex contingency operations since the end of the Cold War has been inconsistent, with the US showing a penchant for ignoring lessons learned from previous operations and failing to institutionalize a system for their planning and conduct.
This has led to a litany of serious and recurring problems in a series of operations in the early 1990s that should have been dispatched handily by a superpower.

_Bosnia._ In some cases, an operation has been noteworthy for a lack of thorough interagency coordination at the national-strategic level, the first element of sound interagency planning for MOOTW. Such was the case with Bosnia in 1995. In spite of a wealth of recent and hard-earned experience in deploying US forces for operations other than war, those lessons seem to have been all but ignored in the planning for the US intervention in Bosnia as part of the NATO implementation force (IFOR). According to Bruce Pirmie, in this case the interagency process essentially “broke down.”\(^{12}\) The operation was organized in a disjointed fashion, with the US assuming leadership for the majority of the military tasks while leaving the civilian aspect of the operation to European nations.\(^ {13}\) During the months following the Dayton peace accords, there was no agreement in Washington over the relationship between the High Representative -- the senior civilian in country -- and IFOR. Additionally, the composition and function of the International Police Task Force (IPTF) were left unresolved.\(^ {14}\) Consequently, “the United States drifted through the first year and a half of operations with no coherent strategy.”\(^ {15}\)

_Somalia._ The second element, the critical need for interagency players at the national level to provide the operational commander with clear objectives and appropriate resources resulting from sound interagency coordination, is aptly demonstrated by the US mission in Somalia beginning in December of 1992. In Somalia US forces, along with their coalition partners, faced the task of coordinating their efforts with “49 different UN and humanitarian relief organizations -- none of which were obligated to follow military directives.”\(^ {16}\) Many of these agencies were in country long before the military arrived and it was only after the
operation began that "there was a rediscovery of the need to consider military, diplomatic, and humanitarian efforts as part of a common whole."\textsuperscript{17} Several civil-military operations centers (CMOCs) were quickly established to coordinate the efforts of the military and nonmilitary aspects of the operation, but that was due more to the innovation of the local commander rather than any level of coordination and leadership from the strategic level. As John T. Haynes offers, "The planners from the 10\textsuperscript{th} Mountain Division understood the value of [civil-military] planning at the operational and tactical levels, but in the absence of political guidance, efforts were reduced to local band aids."\textsuperscript{18} Any groundwork for the civilian aspects of the operation that might have been laid at the interagency level was all but invisible to the commanders on the ground.\textsuperscript{19} One of Kenneth Allard's lessons learned from the operation is, "The [humanitarian relief organizations] can be our allies, but they must at least be part of our planning and coordination efforts."\textsuperscript{20} True enough. But when the total time for planning and deployment of forces is only eighteen days, as was the case with Somalia,\textsuperscript{21} the operational commander cannot be expected to assume the burden of that initial coordination. Interagency coordination at the national level must not only be accomplished, but its results must be provided to the operational commander.

\textit{Haiti:} The importance of the third element, the ability of the operational commander to integrate the civil and military aspects of the operation is evidenced by Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti in 1994. At the strategic level, interagency coordination for Haiti appears to have been adequate in and of itself.\textsuperscript{22} However, little interaction occurred between those conducting interagency planning at the national strategic level and those at the operational level engaged in parallel planning outside Washington.\textsuperscript{23} Consequently, synchronizing the separate efforts of the military and non-military components of Uphold Democracy fell to the
operational level where interagency coordination, particularly in planning the operation, was noticeably lacking. By compartmenting the planning process, the US Atlantic Command (USACOM) never developed an integrated civil-military plan. Ad hoc relationships and close coordination on the ground, especially between the force commander and the ambassador, allowed the mission to succeed. However, poor interagency planning at the operational level made their efforts manifestly more difficult than necessary.

Current Efforts to Enhance Interagency Coordination at All Levels

Substandard interagency coordination for MOOTW is not an unrecognized problem. Currently there is a spate of different approaches, some more promising than others, to improve interagency coordination at all levels for MOOTW and help commanders at the operational level better integrate the civilian and military aspects of these complex and often vexing missions.

Joint Doctrine. Before the publication of Joint Pub 3-08, Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations in October 1996, the multiagency dimensions of military operations were not well addressed in military publications. A detailed two-volume document, Joint Pub 3-08 is the first joint doctrinal manual to deal substantively with interagency coordination. It addresses interagency coordination for military operations at the strategic level -- stating that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is the combatant commander’s representative in the National Security Council System and therefore, by implication, at the interagency level as well. It also addresses interagency coordination at the operational level -- designating the geographic combatant commander as “the focal point for planning and implementation of regional military strategies that require interagency coordination.”

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contains two rather byzantine line and block charts that depict the parallel structures of civilian and military chains of command and how they interface at the various levels: strategic, operational, and tactical. And perhaps most crucially, it reminds the combatant commander of the fundamental difference between dealing with subordinate actors in the military and civilian aspects of an operation under the heading of “Command Relationships”

The National Command Authorities establish supported and supporting relationships ... the relationship between Armed Forces and NGOs and PVOs is neither supported nor supporting, but rather an associate or partnership relationship.

And therein lies the potential for much frustration for operational level commanders. The inherent differences between military and civilian modes of operation become magnified during crises. There are hierarchical and cultural differences between the military and civilian agencies that can frustrate coordination and thwart initiative -- the coin of the realm for military professionals. The military tends to have a lower tolerance for ambiguity than its civilian counterparts, adheres rigidly to a detailed planning process that is often foreign to nonmilitary planners, and tends to have greater resources than its often cash-strapped civilian counterparts. Thus in some cases the responsibility for mission success, even for nonmilitary tasks, often falls to the mission-oriented military by default.

However, regardless of the often-wide disparity in the abilities of military and nonmilitary components of an operation, operational commanders nevertheless have the responsibility of ensuring “that their joint operations are synchronized in time, space, and purpose with the actions of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations.” Thus the operational commander has the responsibility to integrate the nonmilitary aspects of his operation without the commensurate authority over its practitioners. The success of interagency coordination then becomes dependent upon little more than personal rapport,
flexibility (usually on the part of the operational commander), and the good offices of all involved. So while joint doctrine has finally come to address the matter of interagency coordination, it essentially punts the issue to the operational commander to make it work with flexibility and charisma rather than a formal architecture or any level of statutory authority.

CMOCs. Another approach to enhancing the level of interagency coordination, especially at the operational level and below, finds its modern roots in 1991’s Operation Provide Comfort in Northern Iraq -- the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC). A CMOC is an ad hoc organization staffed by military and nonmilitary personnel to coordinate the day to day aspects of a contingency operation. CMOCs were successfully employed in Somalia, Haiti, and Rwanda, and have since found mention in joint doctrinal publications. There is no established size or composition of a CMOC, it is structured based upon the situation at hand or the tasks to be accomplished by the military and civilian components of a contingency operation. As a visible manifestation of interagency coordination at the operational level and below, the CMOC is not only a clearinghouse for information but also a physical location where the ground commander can affect the coordination necessary to ensure all aspects of the operation are synchronized. Field experience with CMOCs indicates they are generally considered a valuable tool for both the military commander and the representatives of other US agencies, NGOs and PVOs participating in a contingency operation.

However, instead of being a solid answer to the problem of interagency coordination for all contingency operations, the ad hoc nature of CMOCs threatens to make them only as successful as the particular commander wants them to be. And in this regard they present no
greater a solution to the problem of interagency coordination than does joint doctrine. Gibbings et.al. offer that experience shows that “ad hoc organizations are inherently inefficient.” They recommend the creation of more permanent interagency operations centers (IOCs) with more established structures and staffing that will be able to “anticipate, shape, and respond to crises better than the current ad hoc response has permitted.” Colonel Swan et.al. seem to agree; “the CMOC alone is not an adequate forum for the full range of NGO-military exchanges necessary … the possibilities for systematic leadership development, planning, and coordination at the operational level should be pursued by both NGOs and the military.”

*Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56).* The most ambitious effort to date to enhance interagency coordination for some types of MOOTW was initiated in May 1997 when the White House issued PDD-56. This directive was specifically designed to address the first and second elements of sound interagency coordination for MOOTW: coordination at the national-strategic level and communication with the executors at the operational level. The intent of the PDD is to institutionalize the lessons learned from previous operations, incorporate them into the planning and execution of future operations, and ensure unity of effort across the US government.

The centerpiece of PDD-56 is the Executive Committee (EXCOM) formed by the National Security Council Deputies committee “with appropriate membership to supervise the day-to-day management of US participation in a complex contingency operation.” When the US anticipates participating in such an operation is anticipated, the EXCOM will be tasked to develop a detailed politico-military (pol-mil) plan and to assign relevant agencies with specific tasks as part of a coordinated interagency effort. The PDD also
directs that an interagency review/rehearsal of the pol-mil plan take place to deconflict key issues and ensure detailed coordination before the operation, at critical junctures during the operation, and prior to its termination.48 Finally, PDD-56 directs that detailed after action reviews be conducted following every complex contingency operation to internalize lessons learned, and charges the NSC with the responsibility to work with both military and nonmilitary government educational institutions to provide training for mid-level managers in the development of pol-mil plans for complex contingency operations.49

Of all the approaches for improving interagency coordination for MOOTW, PDD-56 would seem to hold the most potential. However, for a variety of reasons it appears that thus far it has fallen short of achieving many of its lofty goals.

To begin, PDD-56 procedures cover only peace operations, humanitarian interventions, and foreign humanitarian assistance operations under its definition of “complex contingency operations.” That suffices for the Somalias, Haitis, and Bosnias, but PDD-56 explicitly does not cover domestic disaster relief, small-scale operations, or other operations such as noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).50 Since such operations often require a great deal of interagency coordination in and of themselves, or have the potential to transmogrify into more complex operations, one is left to wonder how PDD-56 can aid operational commanders under such circumstances.

Additionally, on December 6th the Washington Times reported that a study conducted for the Joint Chiefs of Staff by A.B. Technologies found that PDD-56 was simply not being implemented. According to the Times, the study found the “NSC is not stepping forward in the leadership role” in ensuring that the spirit and intent of PDD-56 are being met as vigorously as possible.51 Apparently, the study made special note of noncompliance with
PDD-56's training requirement, finding that none of the military's senior-level schools are "directly engaged in the training effort."\(^{52}\)

There is evidence that the Department of Defense (DoD) is moving forward with efforts to bring PDD-56 to practical life. Certain geographic combatant commanders are in the process of developing operations plan (OPLAN) annexes to be forwarded for interagency review and possible refinement into established pol-mil annexes -- a direct result of PDD-56 directives. Additionally, a detailed August 1999 report prepared for the Director for Program Analysis and Evaluation in the Office of the Secretary of Defense examines ways in which DoD can better analyze the critical tasks required under the framework of PDD-56 and estimate force requirements for smaller scale contingencies.\(^{53}\)

This is illustrative of the fundamental problem with interagency coordination for MOOTW, and shows why efforts like PDD-56 alone will almost assuredly meet with anemic results. True interagency reform cannot be accomplished if only one agency is serious about bringing it about, and the Department of Defense and the uniformed military are presently far ahead of the rest of the interagency in pursuing the full potential of PDD-56. The genesis of the interagency problem in MOOTW lay in the fact that poor coordination at the national-strategic level was proving to be burdensome to commanders at the operational level. The Department of Defense and the operational military have not been the consistent weak link in this process, and they alone do not have the power to bring the improvement that is unquestionably necessary. Not surprisingly, the problem of improving interagency coordination requires nothing less than a true interagency effort.
Is Legislation the Answer?

Given the fact there is plainly room for improvement in how the US plans and executes contingency operations of all kind, and given the fact that doctrinal solutions, ad hoc work-arounds, and even a Presidential Decision Directive have thus far failed to bring a permanent solution to a pervasive problem, are we left with only a legislative solution to improve interagency coordination for MOOTW?

First, one must ask what the scope of such a legislative effort would be. Clearly there are some areas that should remain well beyond the purview of legislative mandate. To offer one example, it is true that CMOCs have proven to be valuable tools to enhance interagency coordination at the operational level and below. It is equally true that their greatest weakness lies in their completely ad hoc nature, and institutionalizing the creation and structure of the CMOC or an IOC would prove enormously beneficial to future operational commanders executing MOOTW. However, to paraphrase Clausewitz, if politics should not determine the posting of guards, then the Congress should not determine the staffing of CMOCs.\textsuperscript{54} That task is better left to the writers of joint and service doctrine and not the drafters of public law. And as joint and service doctrine move farther in that direction, practice at the operational level will inevitably follow. The process might be slower than optimal, but nonetheless probably does not merit a legislative solution.

Other efforts to enhance interagency coordination, however, do lend themselves to more serious consideration for potential legislative action. One approach would be to simply take the PDD-56 model, which is floundering due to a lack of strong leadership from the executive branch, and mandate it by legislation. This approach would be similar to one offered back in 1993 by Admiral Paul David Miller in his book \textit{The Interagency Process}. 

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Admiral Miller envisioned an Act that essentially overlaid the central themes of Goldwater-Nichols, "designating responsibility and authority, a focused planning process, and the efficient use of resources," on the civilian interagency structure to "formalize current interagency approaches, while addressing the unique demands of the multi-agency environment." In this case, the creation of the EXCOM, the development of pol-mil plans, rehearsals, after action reviews, and NSC sponsored training would all be required (and one would hope funded) by the Congress. Congressional oversight would thus be the mechanism to ensure that US performance in the planning of such operations, and its preparation for the inevitable operations of the future, would be less inclined to suffer from the inconsistency of years past. Operational commanders would then be better assured of thorough interagency planning at the national-strategic level before being sent forth to execute a complex contingency operation.

On its surface, there appears to be some merit to this approach. After all, procedures considered worthy of a PDD should be equally worthy of public law. Moreover, a legislative mandate to adhere to the letter and intent of PDD-56 would simply be a means to ensure its institutionalization and continued implementation, even after the cyclic personnel changes in the executive branch. However, there is no guarantee that the methods that worked so well for the military in Goldwater-Nichols would meet with equal success with civilian bureaucracies. The military is a unique institution where authority rests with command and not with consensus. Because each President is free to choose who he wants sitting at the interagency table, it follows that the rules under which they operate should bear his personal mark as well. While the desire to impose a measure of discipline upon the interagency process is an admirable objective, legislation to bring it about might be simply be too
unrealistic, and one should be careful about mandating restrictive legislative guidelines upon the interworkings of the executive branch.

Another approach would be to direct the creation of new interagency organizations out of whole cloth. One model is offered by Lieutenant General Steele and is similar to the Marine Corps’ Chemical/Biological Incident Response Force (CBIRF). Lieutenant General Steele envisions a set of interagency task forces that bring together “a variety of government agencies, as well as nongovernmental actors … to offer their particular contributions to crises that are increasingly multidimensional in nature.”

He writes that such task forces would be fashioned in response to specific crises that require interagency action, but would “be formed around a standing command structure.” The military would not automatically lead such a task force, simply because any given crisis would probably not be purely military in nature. The task force commander would be from the lead agency most naturally aligned with the crisis and would ensure that “no individual agency dominates the response to a contingency.”

While General Steele’s concept is intriguing, and would definitely go a long way toward bringing some measure of structure and focus to the interagency process, he freely admits that he does not see such fundamental change coming about from congressional action anytime soon. Perhaps he is correct. But more to the point, if interagency coordination is lacking in the organizations currently in existence, one must consider the likelihood that it would be much improved in entirely new ones.

There is however one legislative approach to solving the problem of better interagency coordination for MOOTW that holds the most promise, and it springs from that aspect of Goldwater-Nichols that has brought the most endemic and lasting change to the US
military -- creating the mechanisms for cultural change. The lesson of Goldwater-Nichols, that legislation can foster a transformation in attitudes and behaviors within an institution, can be applied to that portion of the US government that routinely deals with the planning and conduct of MOOTW.

The US military did not become a true joint force on October 2nd, 1986. The transformation took years, and some would even argue the military has not yet reached its full potential in this regard. Change came about over time because officers were forced to complete tours of duty on joint staffs, where out of necessity they shed their natural Service parochialism and became focused toward supporting operational level joint commanders. Recreating those very same conditions today for the interagency are not only possible, but also ultimately beneficial for the military and the civilian interagency. Title IV of Goldwater-Nichols mandated that officers must complete joint duty prior to assuming senior leadership positions in the military. Title IV could be expanded to award full joint credit to mid-level officers who complete a tour of duty in a government agency that is routinely involved in MOOTW such as the State Department, the US Agency for International Development, or the US Information Agency. In that capacity, they would not only bring their military expertise to the organization, but would also enhance their understanding of that particular agency and gain valuable experience in its operations for the benefit of the military. Or as an alternative, officers could be given the opportunity to split their joint tour between a civilian agency and a joint headquarters, a year or eighteen months at each, giving them the unique opportunity to work current issues from both sides of the fence. In either case, the result would undoubtedly be a greater level of understanding between the practitioners of the
military and nonmilitary elements of national power, and how they can be brought together in contingency operations.

A similar requirement could be levied upon mid-level civilians in key agencies as well. Just as title IV requires joint duty as a prerequisite for senior level leadership in the military, those aspiring to senior positions in civilian agencies -- such as ambassadorial rank in the Foreign Service, or the deputy assistant secretary level in cabinet agencies -- could be required to serve a tour of duty in a joint headquarters or graduate from one of the military’s senior service colleges.

The foundation for such an initiative is already in place. Currently, several US government agencies allow selected personnel to attend military colleges, and that opportunity should be broadened. Also, geographic combatant commanders currently have political advisors (POLADs), provided by the State Department. POLADs are key players who work directly for the commander and use their vast experience to help him navigate through the civilian foreign policy bureaucracy. However, as Gibbings et al. point out, “the State Department priority for filling positions at each CINC’s headquarters is low, which can leave the key post of political advisor unfilled.”61 This is not unlike the situation within the military before Goldwater-Nichols when the Services fought tooth and nail to avoid offering their officers up for joint duty. It was not until a law made them do so, and the officer’s career was ransomed to it, that the Services became serious about meeting joint duty obligations. That same level of dedication can be imposed upon designated agencies within the interagency today by much the same means.

The natural argument against such proposals is, of course, the dearth of people that exists in all sectors of the government, military and nonmilitary alike. And this is a powerful
argument if one views an officer working in a civilian agency, or a civilian working in a joint headquarters, as a loss. But the short-term investment of freeing professionals to work outside of their parent agencies, requiring a not insignificant level of sacrifice, will unquestionably bring long-term benefit in reducing the mutual cultural and operational ignorance that has made interagency coordination, at all levels, so extraordinarily painful in the past.

Conclusion

Legislation is not the entire answer to the challenge of improving interagency coordination for MOOTW, but it certainly has a place in any serious consideration of finding a permanent solution to the problem. And Goldwater-Nichols provides an appropriate model.

Current approaches to enhancing interagency coordination for MOOTW -- emerging joint doctrine, CMOCs/IOC, and PDD-56 to name a few -- focus on structure and process, much like many of the major provisions of Goldwater-Nichols did almost fourteen years ago. And one would hope that at least some of them would meet with equal success in the near future without prompting from the Congress.

But drawing upon one of the clear lessons of Goldwater-Nichols -- that legislation can affect long-term cultural change within an institution -- reveals the best opportunity to ensure greater interagency coordination at all levels in the years to come.

The future of interagency coordination lies more in the people who will affect it, and less in the mechanisms by which they will do so. And so it is there, with the people who are the future interagency players, both in and out of uniform, that the effort to break down institutional and cultural barriers and improve interagency coordination must be focused. A
well-drafted law that expands title IV for officers, and provides similar incentives for their
civilian counterparts, can make a demonstrable difference. One simply needs to ask which a
future operational level commander would rather have when planning and executing a
contingency operation -- a rule book that tells him how to integrate the military and
nonmilitary aspects of the operation, or a headquarters full of people with personal
experience in the interagency working side-by-side with civilians who have spent time in a
joint headquarters.

Goldwater-Nichols taught us that cultural change takes time, but once begun is almost
impossible to reverse. And the enormous contribution of Goldwater-Nichols in ushering in a
new era of jointness in the armed forces offers an example of how fundamental cultural
change can take place, and how it can enhance the ability of the armed forces to secure the
Nation’s political objectives regardless of how it is called upon to do so.
End Notes

2 Ibid. It should be noted that not everyone in the defense community shared Jones' point of view. In particular, the Secretary of Defense and the Service Chiefs were vehemently opposed to any sort of radical reform of the US military. However, Jones' parting shot served to spur the growing academic discussion over the future of the US military at the time. That controversy continued well after Jones relinquished the Chairmanship to General John Vessey in June of that year, and culminated in the passage and signing of the Goldwater-Nichols Act in October 1986. See Thomas McNaugher and Roger Sperry, Improving Military Coordination: The Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization of the Department of Defense (Washington D.C.: Brookings, 1994), 225-226. See also Katherine Boo, "How Congress Won the War in the Gulf," The Washington Monthly, October 1991, 34.
4 In her Washington Monthly article, "How Congress Won the War in the Gulf," Katherine Boo writes: "For the first time in 45 years, Congress — Congress — managed to neutralize parochial interests and increase strategic efficiency in one of the most entrenched and self-serving bureaucracies in America." She further points out that "Goldwater-Nichols testifies to the legislative branch's ability to take on a bureaucracy that the White House hesitates to touch." See Boo, "How Congress," 32-33.
5 McNaugher, Improving Military Coordination, 247.
6 The 1981 Iranian hostage rescue mission that tragically ended in the deserts of Iran laid bare the inability of the services to operate in a coherent and joint manner. The investigation of the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut indicated a confused command structure and an anemic Joint Chiefs of Staff. Moreover, Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada displayed not only a general paralysis of the US joint command structure but a lack of interoperability among the services and their equipment as well. See McNaugher, Improving Military Coordination, 225.
7 McNaugher, Improving Military Coordination, 219.
9 William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford of the Institute for National Strategic Studies offer the following viewpoint: "From the perspective of the unified command, this new strategic environment has made it critical that the military learn to work effectively with multiple US Government agencies to overcome regional instability and counter the threat of regional war. Requisite for the military commander's strategic vision is a concept for integrating interagency resources in contingency planning as well as a concept for supporting other agencies of government for their planning and operations." See William W. Mendel and David G. Bradford, Interagency Cooperation: A Regional Model for Overseas Operations, McNair Paper 37 (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 2.
11 Bruce R. Pinnie, Civilians and Soldiers: Achieving Better Coordination (Santa Monica: RAND, 1998), 11.
12 Ibid., 13. Prine writes of one particular scene after the signing of the Dayton Peace accords: "...when the Joint Staff briefed its plan to implement Annex 1A [the military portion of the plan], military officers expected to learn how the civilian departments intended to implement other annexes. They were astonished to discover that no other department had produced a plan. It appeared that no one was leading a planning effort in Washington and the State Department was at odds with itself" See Pinnie, Civilians, 70.
13 Ibid.
14 Ibid., 70.
15 Ibid.
17 Ibid., 66.


Ibid., 37. To be completely fair to the USACOM, they did host a six-day training session for soldiers and civilians in Haiti prior to turning the mission over to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). However, it appears that this was due in part to the force commander’s directive that “85 percent of his staff be in country and trained” prior to the turnover of the mission. See See Pirnie, Civilians, 66.


Hayes and Wheatley, Interagency, 43.

Ibid., 37.

Opinions vary on the appropriate mechanism for improving interagency coordination for MOOTW. Some see the need to draw lessons from Goldwater-Nichols and apply them to a wholly new effort to enhance interagency coordination for MOOTW. Major Christopher Schnaubelt writes: “Changes in individual service thinking and modes of operation -- required by Goldwater-Nichols -- were largely driven from the top down. Changes in doctrine, terminology, and culture had to be, and were, overcome. Similar efforts may be necessary to train military leaders to operate in interagency environments. Now that the Cold War is over, the US military can expect to receive greater demands to participate in operations other than war...” See Major Christopher Schnaubelt, “Interagency Command and Control: Planning for Counterdrug Support,” Military Review (September-October 1996), 23. Others, like Lieutenant General Martin Steele, see the new imperative for greater interagency coordination as little more than an extension of jointness itself: “We must spend more time closing the interagency gaps between cabinet departments, expanding the notion of “jointness” to include a new level of governmental coordination, and forging new collaborative partnerships with ... nongovernmental organizations.” See Lieutenant General Martin Steele, “Deep Coalitions and Interagency Task Forces,” Naval War College Review LII (Winter 1999), 19.

Mendel and Bradford, Interagency Cooperation, 18.

Joint Publication 3-08, II-6.

Ibid., vii.

Ibid., III-4, III-7.

Ibid., viii.

Joint Pub 3-08, I-5.

Pirnie, Civilians, 15.

Haiti provides a prime example. When the civilian aid agencies proved themselves incapable of providing the promised aid to the Haitian people in the early stages of the operation, that task fell to the military which "picked up the shortfall." See Haynes, “A Comparative Study,” 127.


Ibid.

The need for a fundamental reassessment of tasks and responsibilities for contingency operations was expressed as early as 1995, when Antonia Chayes and George Rauch of the Institute for National Strategic Studies wrote: "It would be most useful if the process of [a] review were to produce a Presidential Decision Directive that would authoritatively assign responsibilities to government departments and organizations and identify those responsibilities the government would leave for private organizations." See Antonia Handler Chayes and George T. Rauch, *Peace Operations: Developing an American Strategy*. (Washington D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1995), 19.


Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 4.


PDD-56 White Paper, 1.

Rowan Scarborough, "Study Hits White House on Peacekeeping Missions," *Washington Times*, 6 December 1999, pg. 1. The half-hearted effort to implement PDD-56 speaks to a level of ambivalence about its long-term objectives and purposes. Naturally, the military would like a more robust and disciplined detailed planning and coordination process for the interagency when confronting complex contingency operations. Although many on the civilian side of the interagency favor the same, at least in theory, there seems to be a reluctance to completely abandon the ad hoc, flexible, situationally dependent process that is more akin to the way civilian bureaucracies operate on a fairly regular basis.

Ibid.


Ibid., 22.

Ibid.

Ibid., 17.


Sources Consulted


