THESIS

KOSOVO - THE END OF THE BEGINNING, OR
THE BEGINNING OF THE END?
EFFECTS OF THE KOSOVO WAR
ON NATO'S VIABILITY,
U.S. COMMITMENTS TO NATO, AND
EUROPEAN DEFENSE COOPERATION

by

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March 2000

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The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

ABSTRACT (maximum 200 words) NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo had a positive impact on long-term viability of the Alliance because it confirmed that NATO was able to redefine itself not only as the core of an enlarged and reshaped security community, but also as a suitable tool for crisis-management in the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, the experiences of the humanitarian intervention demonstrated that the Alliance remains and should remain the central element of the European “security architecture.”

The Kosovo war reaffirmed the United States’ commitments to NATO, and reinforced the positions of the US in the new transatlantic bargain with its European NATO allies. Moreover, in spite of the emergence of the ESDI in NATO and the CFSP in EU, the US remained one of the most crucial players in Europe, on which NATO’s credibility is founded.

On the other hand, political and military experiences of the multinational peace operation called attention to the importance of NATO’s further internal and external adaptation. The above experiences gave new impetus to debates on a more appropriate future distribution of responsibilities, costs and risks among NATO allies; called for a more pragmatic division of labor between multiple institutions of the European “security architecture” (NATO, OSCE, WEU, EU), and raised new demands for revision and further improvement of basic principles of the ESDI and the CFSP.

SUBJECT TERMS
The Balkan, Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), European Union (EU), Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the United States (US), Western European Union (WEU)

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

1. Research objectives:

The purpose of my research is to identify the effects of the Kosovo War on NATO’s long term viability; U.S. commitments to NATO and the European NATO allies; and the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Investigation of NATO’s pre-war and wartime collective action problems would help to detect and prevent further potential difficulties during future humanitarian interventions of the Alliance.

2. Arguments:

1. The end of the Cold War established a new security landscape and transformed the strategic environment of the NATO-member countries. The profound changes raised fundamental questions about the new political and security orientation of several Western democracies, transformed the system of the civil-military relations, and shifted emphases on the tasks, functions, structure, and size of the Western armed forces.

2. The basically successful humanitarian intervention in Kosovo had a positive impact on the long-term viability of NATO because it confirmed that the Alliance was able to redefine itself not only as the core of an enlarged and reshaped security community, but also as a suitable tool for crisis-management in the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, the experiences of the humanitarian intervention demonstrated that the Alliance remains and should remain the central element of the European “security architecture.”

3. The Kosovo war, NATO’s largest out-of-area combat operation in its history, after all reaffirmed core US commitments to NATO and reinforced the positions of the US in the new transatlantic bargain with its European NATO allies. The war has clearly shown that the basic features of the relationship between the US and its European NATO allies changed just slightly as a result of the spectacular external and internal adaptation process of the Alliance: the European NATO-allies remained dependent on the US not only for political
leadership, but also for decisive military effectiveness in this crisis situation. Moreover, in spite of the emergence of the ESDI in NATO, and the CFSP in the EU, the US remained the most crucial factor in Europe, on which NATO’s credibility is founded.

4. Political and military experiences of the multilateral peace operation called attention to the importance of NATO’s further internal adaptation, with the focus on further implementation of the CJTF concept, and further improvement of the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance. Furthermore, the war, which alienated Russia, and sharpened the tensions between the US and China, highlighted dilemmas related to the current “visibility without capability” status of the ESDI, and the lack of a truly effective division of labor between competing multiple institutions of the European “security architecture” (EU, WEU, OSCE and NATO).

5. Neither NATO’s intervention nor the current vague humanitarian commitments of the EU, the WEU and the OSCE could solve and shall be able to settle the basic (political, economic, socio-psychological and security) reasons of insecurity in the region. Consequently, the Balkans will remain one of the “hot points” of Europe and the World in the new millennium.

4. Conclusion:
The political and military experiences of the Kosovo war gave new impetus to debates on a more appropriate future distribution of responsibilities, costs and risks among NATO allies; called for a more pragmatic division of labor between multiple institutions of the European “security architecture.” In addition, the humanitarian intervention raised new demands for revision and further improvement of basic principles of the ESDI in NATO; and the CFSP in the EU.
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I. INTRODUCTION

War has been part of a totality of human experience, the parts of which can be understood only in relation to one another. One cannot adequately describe how wars were fought without giving some idea of what they fought about. (Howard, 1976: x)

A. GENERAL STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM

After the failure of repeated international diplomatic attempts (since the Spring of 1998), and the coercive diplomacy\(^1\) of the United States (US) and its European allies to resolve the conflict in Kosovo peacefully, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) decided on 23 March 1999, to authorize North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) air strikes against strategic targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia. The military objective of the air campaign called “Operation Allied Forces” was “to degrade and damage the military and security structure that President Milosevic (Yugoslav President) has used to depopulate and destroy the Albanian majority in Kosovo.”\(^1\)

The air campaign (from 24 March to 10 June), followed by the suspension and halt of the bombing operations\(^2\) and the launch of “Operation Joint Guardian,” which deployed the Alliance’s UN-mandated international peacekeeping force, the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), raised several questions.

The first set of questions, related to the current events in Kosovo, initiated discussions on the:

1. legality of NATO’s humanitarian intervention from the viewpoint of international law;
2. political and military suitability of NATO to undertake such peace operations;
3. actual “division of labor” between the European allies and the US while the air campaign was prepared and executed;
4. potential barriers of NATO’s effective collective action during the humanitarian intervention.\(^3\)

The second set of questions arose because "...the war demonstrated to allies and potential adversaries alike how much more formidable U.S. military technology has become since the Gulf War. Europeans got a rude awakening when they learned that the gap between U.S. capability and their own had so widened that they now had to rethink their "we'll-build-it-on-the-Continent' mentality." (Sanger, 1999:1) Moreover, difficulties with command, control, communications, computers and intelligence (C^3I) networks and systems during synchronization efforts of the joint forces alerted both the US and the allied European political and military decision-makers to the importance of improving interoperability, greater reliability and enhanced security. Furthermore, the war highlighted several differences between organizational cultures of the militaries of the US and its European NATO-allies.

Political analysts and strategic planners asked a third set of questions regarding further development of the Kosovo crisis, possible future changes of the political system and civil-military relations of the Milosevic-regime. These analysts attempted to identify and evaluate the potential future "hot points" in South and Eastern Europe. These experts asked whether NATO has now committed itself to providing a de facto security guarantee to other states of the Balkans.

The fourth set of questions focused on wider aspects and discussed the likelihood of NATO's long-term viability; the shifted emphases of inter-relationship between the UN, EU, WEU, OSCE and the NATO. Moreover, several experts debated about the US strategic commitments to NATO, its changed role in Europe; the evolving division of responsibilities between the US and its allies during Post-Cold War conflict deterrence.\[ii\]

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and crisis management\textsuperscript{iii}; and the possible impact of the US on development of the European Security and Defense Identity.\textsuperscript{iv}

B. RESEARCH QUESTIONS

The purpose of this research is to determine those factors of the Kosovo War that have directly or indirectly resulted in challenges, or would have positive or negative impacts on NATO's long term viability, U.S. commitments to NATO and the European NATO allies, and the development of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). Consequently, the study sought the answer to the following questions:

1. What are the main challenges and possible impacts of the Kosovo War on NATO's long-term viability?
2. How does the out-of-area operation in Kosovo affect core US commitments to NATO and its European NATO-allies?
3. What impact did the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo have on the development of the European defense cooperation?

C. HYPOTHESES

This study will test three hypotheses regarding effects of the Kosovo War on NATO's long-term viability; US commitments to NATO and the European NATO allies; and the development of the ESDI in NATO and the CFSP in the EU. In my hypothesis:

1. The basically successful humanitarian intervention in Kosovo was a milestone in the history of development of NATO. It had a positive impact on NATO’s

\textsuperscript{iii} According to Casimir A. Yost and Ula Solomon: “An implicit division of labor is developing between the United States and its allies with respect to roles in support of global peace and security. America takes the lead on the military side, and the allies step forward on the foreign assistance and post-conflict side.” (Yost – Solomon, 1999:1)

\textsuperscript{iv} On the history and main features of contemporary European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) see NATO's web-side. \textit{NATO Basic Fact Sheet Nr. 3}. Available [Online]: http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/fs3.htm (8 May 1999)
long-term viability because it has confirmed that NATO was able to redefine itself not only as the core of an enlarged and reshaped security community, but also as a suitable tool for crisis-management in the Euro-Atlantic region.

2. The Kosovo war, NATO’s largest out-of-area combat operation in its history, reconfirmed the US commitments to NATO and reinforced the US’s new transatlantic bargain with its European NATO allies.

3. The political and military experiences of the multilateral peace operation in Kosovo gave new impetus to debates on a more appropriate future distribution of responsibilities, costs and risks among NATO allies; and raised new demands for revision and further improvement of basic principles of the contemporary ESDI in NATO and the CFSP in the EU. These experiences called for a more pragmatic division of labor between multiple institutions of the European “security architecture” (EU/WEU, OSCE, NATO).

D. METHODOLOGY:

This study draws on many sources, including:

1. Archival studies and scholarly analyses (books, studies, essays and other relevant documents) concerning:
   a. Stages and features of development of US and NATO security concepts; the US commitment to NATO; the role of the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM) and unified commands in previous European crisis management processes;
   b. Survey of available materials on Operation Allied Forces (March 24 – June 20, 1999) during the Kosovo war and its aftermath (Operation Joint Guardian with deployment of KFOR, etc.);
   c. Historical forms and development of the organizational and technological structure of the modern and postmodern military organizations. I will focus on similarities and differences between “traditional” militaries vs. militaries with peace-keeping, peace-making and peace-enforcement tasks under UN and NATO supremacy.
2. Cross-national comparative studies based on systematic analysis of experiences of the establishment and application processes of various forms and subsystems of modern military organizations and how these militaries are used for crisis-management during international peace-operations.

3. Historical research on the trends and features of changes in manifest approaches and latent interests of establishing the systems of CFSP in the EU, and the ESDI in NATO.

4. A comparative analysis of the conversion process in the Western European NATO-countries and in the new, post-communist Central and Eastern European NATO-member countries, with focus on Hungary. I will analyze the similarities and differences between these countries regarding:
   a. military-political conversion, such as force reductions and restructuring;
   b. societal conversion, including cultural and psychological reorientation regarding civil-military relations, and
   c. economic conversion, reallocation of economic resources from military to civilian purposes.

5. Qualitative analysis of key texts, including:
   a. documents on the development of concepts of CFSP and ESDI;
   b. published interviews with political and military decision-makers of the US, NATO, OSCE, WEU and EU.

E. SIGNIFICANCE OF THE RESEARCH TOPIC

This thesis has theoretical and practical significance, for the following reasons. First, no comprehensive analysis of the military and political sociological aspects of the Kosovo war exists at this point. For example, the legality, based on international law, of the NATO humanitarian intervention in Kosovo has been challenged. Equally serious, several critics questioned the political and military suitability of NATO to undertake this kind of peace operation.
This thesis is also significant because, before and during the Kosovo war, there were sharp debates about the likelihood of NATO’s long-term viability. The war altered emphases of inter-relationships between the US-led NATO, and such inter- and supranational organizations as the UN, EU, WEU, and OSCE. Furthermore, there are factors which were not emphasized during previous discussions on NATO’s long-term viability.

A third reason why this thesis is significant is that after the political “regime change” (1988-90), and even before the prospective NATO-membership started a general re-structural, modernization and conversion processes in the Hungarian armed forces (1991-1999). The ultimate goal was to establish a modern, “post-Cold-war”-type military organization, which is convergent with its host society, exists under strong civilian control, and in which the dominant values are “not bureaucratic” (Caforio, 1988; Nuciarì, 1994: 17), but “occupational” (Moscos, 1986). Hungary, the only new NATO-member that has common borders with the former Yugoslavia, cares for hundreds of thousands of ethnic Hungarians in the Northern part of Serbia, and is strongly interested in the role that NATO partners would like to assign to it. Will it be the “end-state” and one of the main potential regional providers of peacekeeper manpower of the NATO in the Balkans? In this case how can or should the country transform its abilities to meet the requirements of NATO’s planning goals?

The fourth main reason why this research topic is important is that investigating NATO’s pre-war and wartime collective action problems would help to detect and to prevent difficulties during future humanitarian interventions of the Alliance. Retrospectively, there were various barriers to NATO’s efficacy during the humanitarian intervention. These facts call the attention of the political and military decision-makers of NATO to the importance of improved interoperability in the Alliance, and greater reliability and enhanced security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

The post-Cold War transformation of NATO before the Kosovo war was forced by several strongly connected external and internal factors. Both the internal organizational system of NATO and the Western national militaries reflected the changes of such external factors as the contemporary global non-military (international political, legal, economic, scientific, social and cultural) environment. New challenges came from the transformed supranational, international, regional and local security environment, which changed the enemy images and diffused perceptions of military and non-military security threats.

The two most important internal factors that resulted in significant changes in the development of NATO and the national militaries of its member states were related to the Alliance’s reassessment of the contemporary security requirements; and NATO’s necessary role-modification. Moreover, the new missions, the effects of the accelerated technological development (the “revolution in the military affairs”), and the transformed civil-military relations also helped establish a new epoch in relations between policy, warfare and strategy. Furthermore, the above factors modified tasks, functions, structures, activity forms, rules and sizes of the armed forces, both on Alliance- and national military-level. In addition, the above factors produced significant features of the strategic concept of the Alliance, changed the notion of modern warfare,\textsuperscript{v} national strategic cultures,\textsuperscript{\textsuperscript{5}} and redefined the modern military profession itself.

A. EXTERNAL FACTORS

The fall of the Soviet Union and the “socialist world system” (1988-1992), and the end of the Cold War, radically changed the international political and security system. As a result of the transformation in the strategic environment of NATO and the Alliance-member Western democracies, a new security landscape formed. All countries had to adjust to this alteration. What are the most important features of the non-military component of this new security landscape?

1. General Changes of the Non-Military Environment

   a. Politics and International Law

   The first important characteristic of the non-military component of this new security landscape was a shift from the relative stability of a bipolar international system of the two main political and military alliances (NATO and the Warsaw Pact) to a multi-polar international political system. This resulted in changes in the view, rules and methods of international diplomacy and “political games” (from the world of zero-sum to nonzero-sum games of political posturing).

   The second important feature of this new security landscape is related to the general trend of “globalization” of political, economic, social and cultural relationships and the radical transformation of systems of communication and information. The process of post-Cold War “globalization” has encouraged the development of a “multi-centric world.” This interacted with the multi-polar international system, and produced a new type of “world order” (Kissinger, 1994: 17-28, 804-836; 1996: 173-182). In this new world order—or according to James Gow (1997: 349): the “new world disorder”—the more powerful countries redefined their national interests in a wider, “encompassed” aspect (Goodpaster – Nelson – Deitchman, 1997: 21-22), and called for a “new set of global rules.” For instance, according to Henry Kissinger’s suggestions, if it would not destroy the equilibrium in the international system of balance of power: “It is reasonable for the United States to try to buttress equilibrium with moral consensus. To be true to itself, America must try to forge the widest possible moral
consensus around a global commitment to democracy.” (Kissinger, 1994: 835) (Emphases added by KZL) We know several examples connection with this phenomenon. vi The contemporary events also did show increased importance of certain values and social psychological and psychological factors vii that might deeply affect, mainly during emergent situations in international politics, decisions of political and military elites of the “global players” regarding formulation of foreign and security policy of their countries.

The third alteration to the security landscape was the result of the fact that the political decision-makers faced new challenges to the traditional meaning of “integrity of nation-state.” These challenges arrived not only from supra-national organizations at international and regional levels (e.g. from the changing UN, EU, WEU and OSCE), but also from various ethnic, religious, environmental and regional political movements and organizations in the form of sub-national pressures (Dandeker, 1994: 637-654). The earlier senses and previous international legal concepts of “neutralism” and “sovereignty” also had been questioned. These facts caused confusion, when sovereign states wanted to solve such complex security problems as industrial pollution, migration, and proliferation on their own.

b. Economy (Dilemmas of Globalization and Interdependence)

The fourth important factor, having a great influence on developing the new security system, was that the trend of ‘globalization’ in the economy, which consists of globalization of production, transportation and communication and build-up of a global consumer market. In this global economy we might find attempts for global coordination of national economic policies and the spread of huge “structural adjustment” projects.

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vi See official arguments of the active military intervention of the USA in Panama, Haiti, Granada, Somalia, Iraq and Kosovo; the role of Great Britain during the Falkland Islands crisis; or the role of Germany and France in the crisis-management process in the former Yugoslavia, e.g., in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo.

vii From this point of view would be very important the role of those cognitive errors (Jervis, 1976: 319-406) that might result in not only misperception, but also inaccurate predictions and decisions of political and military leaders of contemporary international political powers during interpretation of current events of the international and domestic policy, and planning of their own actions and reactions.
Furthermore, the new emerging global economy is characterized by a permanent *movement of international trading blocs* and the dominance of *trans-national organizations* (Schuler - Jackson, 1996: 63); a transition from labor- to *capital-intensive organizations*; and the disappearance of old national economies. According to security experts, this change resulted in *sharper differences between “winners” and “losers”* of economic development and are potential sources of new security challenges in the near future.

**c. Science and Technology**

The fifth most important feature of this new security landscape is related to the results of the "*third industrial revolution*" (Dicken, 1986; Kennedy, 1993:47-64). This new "industrial revolution" resulted in new trends in the world economy, characterized by a revolution of information technology and rapid technological innovations (Giddens, 1992:55-78).

The sixth significant source of security conflicts would be the "*third industrial wave of the world civilization.*" This source involves the generation, gathering, processing and dissemination of *information* and may result in a new wave of "revolution in military affairs" (Huntington, 1993; Toffler - Toffler, 1993: 21-22, 200-202).

**d. Socio-Cultural Aspects**

The seventh important change to the security landscape was the increased influence of the neo-conservative religious movements in most of Islamic countries from the middle of the 1980s. When the theological and political leaders of these countries revived ethnic nationalism, it often served as an ideological and ethical base of terrorism (Huntington,1996:109-121).

The eighth most important factor in developing the new international security system is the *change in the social and cultural environment of the militaries*. Generally changed central values, patterns and attitudes of ordinary citizens and their important reference groups, the human intellectuals. In addition, distrust of the social and political institutions exists, particularly in the armed forces (Page - Shapiro, 1992;
Listhaug - Wiberg, 1995). Nowadays the new, “post-materialist and postmodern” meaning of individualism is highly valued by youth in Western post-modern societies. Young people’s expectations of work have changed. As a result, motivating young draftees by such "traditional values,” as altruist patriotism, loyalty, strict work ethic, religious values and national responsibility became quite difficult. These changes would affect, through civil-military relations and their impact on national militaries, the efficiency of NATO itself.

2. Challenges and Options - Regarding Security Policy.

The Main Characteristic Features of the New Security Landscape

a. Dissolution of the Soviet Union and the End of the “Socialist World System”

The former system of bipolar military threats and relative certainty of the management of international military conflicts disappeared after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the disbanding of the Warsaw Pact and the end of the Cold War. In the former communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) satellite countries and in the descendant states of the former Soviet Union, a general political, legal and economic establishment process of democracy began.

The newly independent states started a general political, legal and economical establishment process for the democratic political structures, transformed the previous system of the civil-military relations, and shifted emphases on the tasks, functions, structure and size of the armed forces. Moreover, in the public lived beliefs in expectation of advantages of a peace dividend (Sandler – Hartley, 1995: 279).

After all, representatives of 34 countries of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) signed the “Charter for a New Europe” in Paris on November 21, 1990. This charter officially brought the former adversarial relations to an end and established a political framework for future European cooperation, based on the basic guiding principles of democracy.

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b. New States and Renewed Alliances

After 1989, the profound political regime changes raised fundamental questions about the new political, economical and security orientation of the former Soviet republics and the previous Central and Eastern European socialist satellite countries. All of the post-communist countries redefined their strategic political, military and economic interests.

On the one hand, the majority of the former Soviet republics established the Russian-led Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). On the other hand, the ex-Warsaw Pact CEE countries decided to follow another way. It was, because in the early 1990s the new political and military leaders of these countries were concerned about the possibility that in the coming years, Russia would try to re-establish its hegemony not only over the states of the former Soviet Union (see: role of Russia in the CIS till now), but also sooner or later the Russians would try to apply (manifest or latent) political, economic and military pressure against the CEE countries of the former Warsaw Pact which are still considered within its sphere of interest. From point of view of Samuel Huntington:

NATO expansion limited to countries historically part of Western Christendom, however, also guarantees to Russia that it would exclude Serbia, Bulgaria, Romania, Moldova, Belarus, and Ukraine as long as Ukraine remained united. NATO expansion limited to Western states would also underline Russia's role as the core state of a separate, Orthodox civilization, and hence a country which should be responsible for order within and along the boundaries of Orthodoxy. (Huntington, 1996:162)

In addition, on the basis of results of assessment of their strategic interests, all of the newly independent post-communist Central and Eastern European countries, and some of the former Baltic Soviet republicsix tried to become members of the European Union and NATO, organizations they previously opposed. According to Samuel Huntington, the following are the principles of enlargement of EU and NATO:

ix The following former communist European countries submitted requests to join NATO:
1. Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, who were invited by the NATO heads of states and governments (see: the Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation, approved at the NATO Summit Meeting held on 8-9 July, 1997 in Madrid);
2. Slovakia; the three Baltic states (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania); and five Balkan states (Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania and Slovenia).
In the expansion of EU membership, preference clearly goes to those states which are culturally Western and which also tend to be economically more developed. If this criterion were applied, the Visegrad states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), the Baltic republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and Malta would eventually become EU members and the Union would be coexistive with Western civilization as it has historically existed in Europe. …With the Cold War over, NATO has one central and compelling purpose: to insure that it remains over by preventing the reimposition of Russian political and military control in Central Europe. As the West’s security organization NATO is appropriately open to membership by Western countries which wish to join and which meet basic requirements in terms of military competence, political democracy, and civilian control of the military.” (Huntington, 1996: 161)

Furthermore, Russia was suspicious, and evaluated the NATO enlargement “as a tool of strengthening American power over us”. Moreover, the Russians tried again, unsuccessfully, to seek for “appropriate allies” to establish a new system of balance of power against the US.

This set of potential threats was that made the above mentioned young democracies seek guarantees for their political and military security against such future threats. As a result, most of these countries tried to be new members of formerly opposite political, economical and military alliances (such as the EU and NATO).7 In case of the ‘frontrunners’ of the Central and Eastern European political changes (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic), almost one decade later, we could recognize the first successes: they became members of NATO during the first round of the enlargement of the Alliance, since March 17, 1999.

c. Changing Enemy Image and Diffused Perceptions of Security Threats

The international and national political and military decision-makers faced new uncertainties and risks that needed to redefine security from a wider aspect. Security threats meant danger of war (Karsten - Howell - Allen, 1992: 3-24, 79-87, 118) and threats that arise from politics, economy, environment, international crime and illegal drugs trafficking. Furthermore, because of the complex globalization, an increased level of interdependence resulted in a higher degree of vulnerability in the highly developed modern and postmodern societies.

From the end of the 1980s, a trend from narrow, specific military threats to a wider set of diffuse military and non-military threats existed (Van Nispen, 1997:
365-369; Manigart, 1998:8). Most of the above non-military threats are closely connected to new forms of *internationally organized crime* (the expansion of the mafia in the Balkans, Ukraine, Russia) and *terrorist* threats, such as attempts against American institutions and individuals in the Middle East or Africa.\(^8\) Moreover, there was a shift in emphases of conflicts from inter-state to intra-state level, as shown by disintegration of social cohesion (Hippel, 1997:196) and *regional and sub-regional ethnic conflicts* in Rwanda, Pakistan, and in the territory of former Yugoslavia.

The risk of confrontation with new regional conflicts required a reshaping in organizational and communicational structures, decision-making and task-fulfillment processes, and inter-organizational relationships of all the international organizations. These challenges forced a shift of emphases of international security cooperation in the organizational framework of the OSCE, WEU and NATO and changed the relative importance of the EU and the UN (Meisler, 1995: 257-340; Thornberry, 1997: 376-377).

**B. INTERNAL FACTORS**

1. **NATO’s Reassessment of Security Requirements**

The end of the Cold War resulted in worldwide changes of threat perceptions of nations and alliances. This changed government policies and strategic posture of political alliances. As a result of the changes, fundamental questions were raised about the shifted emphasis concerning the tasks of NATO and the functions, shape and size of the Western armed forces on both sides of the Atlantic Ocean. Strategic cultures of national security policies and many characteristics of civil-military relations were also transformed. This fact had major consequences on military expenditures (Sköns – Allebeck – Loose-Weintraub - Stålenheim, 1998: 214-242). In addition, political and military decision-makers of the NATO allies had to re-examine possibilities and forms of international security cooperation and the use of military power.
The heads of states and governments of the NATO member countries met in London in July 1990, and agreed on the urgent need for transforming the Alliance. According to Rob de Wijk, the political leaders of NATO were motivated by the knowledge that: "History shows that the need for security co-operation diminishes as the threat lessens." (Wijk, 1997:1)

According to assumptions of some critics, mainly from the fields of institutional theory, the Alliance lost its traditional raison d'être with the end of the Cold War and with the disappearance of the Soviet threat. That is why the leaders had to find a new set of goals for NATO, if they wanted to keep the Alliance alive (Walt, 1990: vii).

As I see it, these critics did not take into consideration the fact that the Alliance had been a multifunctional security organization from the date of its establishment in 1949. Nonetheless, the new challenges of the new, post-Cold War security environment "...obliged the Allies to redefine NATO's purposes and to endow it with new roles in addition to its traditional core missions of collective defense and dialogue with adversaries." (Yost, 1998: 72) Furthermore, after the London Declaration, the political leaders of the NATO countries put greater emphasis on political consultation, and stressed demands for a new strategic concept.

The Alliance's New Strategic Concept was agreed upon by the heads of states and governments of the NATO countries in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Rome on November 7-8, 1991. According to the intentions of the writers, the document had to provide "...the basis for the further development of the Alliance's defence policy, its operational concepts, its conventional and nuclear force posture and its collective defence planning arrangements." As NATO's political leaders declared the invariability of the "essential purpose" of the Alliance, they also explicitly recognized political primacy of principles of the UN Charter.

NATO's essential purpose, set out in the Washington Treaty and reiterated in the London Declaration, is to safeguard the freedom and security of all its members by political and military means in accordance with the principles of the United Nations Charter. Based on common values of democracy, human

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rights and the rule of law, the Alliance has worked since its inception for the establishment of a just and lasting peaceful order in Europe. This Alliance objective remains unchanged. xii (Emphases added – KZL)

Because Art. 39, Chapter VII of the UN Charter unambiguously states that “The Security Council shall determine the existence of any threat to the peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression and shall make recommendations, or decide what measures shall be taken in accordance with Articles 41 and 42, to maintain or restore international peace and security.” xiii The above declaration of the New Strategic Concept meant implicit recognition of political primacy of the UN Security Council. Furthermore, the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept roughly outlined the new security threats, risks and challenges, and stated:

*Risks to Allied security* are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe. The tensions which may result, as long as they remain limited, should not directly threaten the security and territorial integrity of members of the Alliance. They could, however, lead to crises inimical to European stability and even to armed conflicts, which could involve outside powers or spill over into NATO countries, having a direct effect on the security of the Alliance. xiv (Emphases added – KZL)

After the NATO’s political and military decision-makers reassessed the contemporary security challenges, risks and requirements for the Alliance, they stated:

Any major aggression in Europe is much more unlikely and would be preceded by significant warning time. Though on a much smaller scale, the range and variety of other potential risks facing the Alliance are less predictable than before. ... The potential of dialogue and co-operation within all of Europe must be fully developed in order to help to defuse crises and to prevent conflicts since the Allies' security is inseparably linked to that of all other states in Europe. To this end, the Allies will support the role of the CSCE process and its institutions. Other bodies including the European Community, Western European Union and

xii Ibid., par. 15.


xiv *The Alliance's New Strategic Concept*, ibid., par. 9.
United Nations may also have an important role to play. (par. 33) \textsuperscript{XV} (Emphases added – KZL)

2. New Missions - Necessity of the New Solutions (Role-Modification of NATO and the Modern Western Military Organizations)

The leaders of the Alliance defined two new principal security roles for NATO. One of these new security roles was pursuing dialogue and cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO nations in new institutions (e.g. under the aegis of the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and Partnership for Peace program). The other new security role targeted a much more effective contribution to crisis management and “peace operations”, beyond the territory of NATO allies, particularly under UN auspices (Yost, 1998:3,72).

Finally, after years of tough inner debates, and shifting emphases of sustaining the Alliance’s core function (the “collective defense”) and its new (“collective security”) roles, NATO redefined itself primarily as the core of an enlarged security community in the Euro-Atlantic region. As David S. Yost emphasized the difference:

Collective defense means maintaining the Alliance’s political cohesion and military capabilities to deter coercion and aggression and, if necessary, to conduct military operations to restore the security and integrity of the territory protected by the Alliance’s commitments. Collective security concepts call upon aspirations for universally shared responsibility for peace and international order. (Yost, 1998: 269).

Furthermore, NATO defined itself as a versatile tool for international crisis-management and peace-operations in and around the region. In the spirit of the changed international security mandate and tasks of the Alliance, the political and military decision-makers of NATO created the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTFs). The NATO leaders hoped that the CJTF concept would provide a better chance for carrying out successful peace-keeping and peace-enforcement operation missions in the future.

\textsuperscript{XV} Ibid., par. 31.
3. Transformed Civil-Military Relations

Several researchers analyzing contemporary military relations note that the modern Western armed forces have gradually transformed from a "state of war alertness" which characterized military relations before the onset of the Cold War to a state of "mutual deterrence."xvi Anticipating further achievements in global development and the Euro-Atlantic integration process that have so far characterized the post-Cold War period, one may reasonably expect that the modern and highly developed, information capital-based, so-called "super-symbolic or postmodern" societies (Toffler, 1993; Toffler – Toffler, 1993: 149-152; Cooper, 1996) of the late 20th and early 21st centuries shall function in a state of "warfare-redundancy." The above trend is also expected to considerably impact the social legitimacy, structure and internal organizational culture of the modern armed forces (Winslow, 1998; Collins, 1998). Likewise, it will affect the set of objectives and tasks undertaken by the militaries of the NATO member countries.

The main causes and aspects of the transformations during the development process of the modern military organizations, and the changes in the civil-military relations were during our century, as follows on Table 1:

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Table 1. Main Factors and Features of Changes in Development of the Modern Western Military Organizations and Civil-Military Relations in the 20th Century

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Dimensions of analysis:</th>
<th>Dominant types of military organizations:</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The military of the pre-Cold War period</td>
<td>The so-called &quot;modern&quot; military of the Cold War era</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The declared source of the greatest threat to security:</td>
<td>Invasion by the enemy</td>
<td>Nuclear war; space war</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The distinctive features of the armed forces in the given period:</td>
<td>War-alertness</td>
<td>Deterrence of potential enemies</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The formal organizational structure of the armed forces:</td>
<td>Mass (regular) militaries</td>
<td>Large professional militaries</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Declared priority objectives for armed forces:</td>
<td>National defense resting on national resources</td>
<td>National defense within the framework of alliances</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant military profession</td>
<td>Combat leaders (&quot;green collar soldiers&quot;)</td>
<td>Manager/technicians (experts) (&quot;blue collar soldiers&quot;)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant mode of internalization of organizational roles and rules inside the military by the soldiers</td>
<td>Institutional</td>
<td>Occupational</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typical external sources of tension within the organization</td>
<td>Immanent roles of service (superior vs. subordinate; fighter vs. supporter, etc.) inside the organizational framework</td>
<td>Struggles in connection with the budgetary supports (from the borders of the military organization)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Impact on defense budget (from the view point of the military)</td>
<td>Positive</td>
<td>Neutral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main items of the defense budget expenditures on arms technology</td>
<td>Weapon-systems of relatively low(er) technological range</td>
<td>Weapon-systems of the high(est) technological range</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main items of the defense budget expenditures on human resources</td>
<td>Aggregated personal expenses, mean-nivellated wage-policy</td>
<td>Individual personal expenses, differentiated wage levels policy</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

xvii When preparing my hypothetical matrix on the main causes and features of transformations in the development process of modern military organizations and changes in the civil-military relations during the "short" 20th century, I was deeply impressed by the following authors: (Janowitz, 1971; Moskos, 1977: 41-54; 1994:147; Cooper, 1996; Jauhiainen, 1998:2-4; Schöfbänker, 1998:101-118; Steinkamm, 1998:5-16).
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main factors:</th>
<th>Before the Cold War</th>
<th>During the Cold War</th>
<th>After the Cold War:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Recruitment of members of the staff of officers</td>
<td>Mainly from higher middle and middle social classes</td>
<td>Mainly from middle and lower middle social classes</td>
<td>Mainly from lower middle and lower social classes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civilian employers</td>
<td>Minor component</td>
<td>Medium component</td>
<td>Major component</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public attitudes toward the military</td>
<td>Supportive</td>
<td>Ambivalent</td>
<td>Negative; skeptical</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Management of protests of conscience against military service</td>
<td>Restriction or prohibition</td>
<td>Permission on a routine way (would be differentiated)</td>
<td>Extension of possibilities and range of types of alternative military service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant attitudes of professional soldiers to reduction of the armament (and/or disarmament)</td>
<td>Hostile</td>
<td>Skeptical</td>
<td>Apathetic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The typical attitudes of political and military decision-makers on setting limits to the human and civil rights of members of the armed forces</td>
<td>“Members of a society disconnected from the mainstream (civilian) society” – that is why their human and civil rights may be restricted extensively, to a significant degree</td>
<td>“Special norms and standards” apply to soldiers – consequently their rights may be partially (to a certain extent) curtailed</td>
<td>“Citizens in uniform” – that is why their rights may only be curtailed to the necessary degree under emergency conditions, and only if restriction necessary for constitutional ends</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nowadays there is an uneasy relationship between the Western military organizations and their host society. The armed forces have to offer more “effective” arguments to legitimize their existence and their claim to the national defense budget. The most common new supporting theories of these interests stress changing roles of modern military organizations, with extended area of responsibilities. According to most theories, the mission of the modern armed forces is to deter a (nowadays explicitly not really well-defined) enemy, and maintain peace with formal authorization of the UN Security Council (Meisler, 1995: 368-370) in that particular region, where the interests of the country or the Alliance are in jeopardy.

4. Changes in View of Professionalism and the Military Profession

How military personnel look at their professions within the context of a changing Europe is one of the central subjects of studies. Particularly, as many changes affect what have traditionally been regarded as core dimensions of the military officers’ professional identity, dimensions such as defense against a fairly stable threat, a relatively clear definition of missions and means, and a relatively stable support from the civil society, at least in the Western liberal democracies (Weibull, 1994: 59).
Samuel Huntington (1957: 7-18, 54-79) and his followers (Finer, 1962: 1-22; Sarkesian, 1984:149-167) defined the corp of the military officers as a professional group, with such basic characteristics as expertise in the management of violence, responsibility to their major “client,” the government of the state, corporateness, and special ideology of the military mind. This military mind is usually characterized, on the one hand, by emphases on cooperation, subordination of individual motives to group demands, and primacy of order and discipline. On the other hand, this distinctive military mind is often characterized by political conservatism, “institutional” self-perception and identity, continuous latent dissatisfaction by the military’s status and influence on society, and with the perceived level of social prestige of the professional soldiers. As a consequence, Samuel Huntington saw the military profession as necessarily divergent from civilian society.

Morris Janowitz (1971) agreed with this definition and said we could find a “civilianization” trend of militaries, which would be characterized by an increased level of penetration by other (civil) professions and institutions. As a result, the military organizations and their personnel tend to become more and more similar to large civilian organizations, both in levels of organizational stances, values, and attitudes. In addition, the military profession is undergoing a long-term transformation.

Representatives of the Huntingtonian school stressed the importance of the apolitical approach, which would be characterized by avoiding involvement in politics because they were afraid of potential erosion of narrowed military professional skills by corrupting political influences. Consequently, they emphasized isolation from politics and concentration on performance of the basic function of militaries, and the importance of the high level of tactical competence. On the other hand, followers of Janowitz emphasized importance of political-social sensitivity and understanding political-social character of the profession; which severely circumscribed political involvement. They could accept establishment of constabulary forces, as well.

Charles C. Moskos (1977; 1986) questioned any unchanging status for the modern military as a profession by pointing to what he perceived as a shift from “institutional to occupational.” Moskos himself proposed an updating of the two ideal-types, underlining the model’s capacity to explain current international trends, as explained on Table 2:
Table 2. “Institutional” versus “Occupational” Organizational Cultures of the Modern and Post-modern Militaries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Institutional</th>
<th>Occupational</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Legitimacy</td>
<td>Normative values</td>
<td>Market</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Role commitments</td>
<td>Diffuse</td>
<td>Specific</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Basis of compensation</td>
<td>Rank and seniority</td>
<td>Skill level and manpower</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mode of compensation</td>
<td>Much in non-cash form or deferred</td>
<td>Salary and bonuses</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level of compensation</td>
<td>Decompressed *, low recruit pay</td>
<td>Compressed**, high recruit pay</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Evaluation of performance</td>
<td>Holistic and qualitative</td>
<td>Segmented and quantitative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Legal system</td>
<td>Military justice</td>
<td>Civilian jurisprudence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reference group</td>
<td>Vertical, within organization</td>
<td>Horizontal, external to organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Societal regard</td>
<td>Esteem based on notion of service</td>
<td>Prestige based on level of compensation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-service status</td>
<td>Veteran’s benefits and preference</td>
<td>Same as civilian</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Residence</td>
<td>Adjacency of work and residence locales</td>
<td>Separation of work and residence locales</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spouse</td>
<td>Integral part of military community</td>
<td>Removed from military community</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After (Moscos, 1986; Nuciari, 1994: 10)
* “Decompressed”: relevant differences in pay levels from bottom to top ranks, pay is highly stratified.
** “Compressed”: reduced difference in pay levels from lower to higher ranks.

These changes brought about a transformation in the values of military professionals in almost all of the post-Cold War world militaries. Certainly, there would be differences between values of military personnel, according to alterations of such “structural” variables as age, rank, seniority, educational background, service corps and functional role performed. These changes can be defined as a shift from an “institutional” orientation to an “occupational” orientation. Nowadays, three different I/O (institutional versus occupational) trends would be identified in the modern militaries:

1. proletarization is the “intrusion” of other professional or occupational groups and their trade union orientation (Oppenheimer, 1973: 213-227);
2. deprofessionalization is an overall decline in status and power of the professionals (Rothman, 1984: 183-206); with a negative attitude of feeling “role crisis,” or as an “occupationalization” of the military profession;
3. re-institutionalization and bureaucratization is an increased number of professionals employed in organizations experiencing diminished control compared to self-employed professionals (Sorensen, 1994: 599-617; Nuciari, 1994: 7-24).
According to Giuseppe Caforio (1988a), we have to focus on the bureaucracy/profession polarity, who’s dimensions could represent a zero-sum game. However, it seems to me that the stressed dimensions are thus the poles of a unique dimension ranging from totally bureaucratic to totally professional, with possible intermediate positions in a continuum.

The development process of the modern and postmodern military organizations is not unified. It will differ according to degree and results of interactions between the military and the civilian society. This factor might determine the dominant type of the civil-military relations and the development of military profession in the given country.

In almost all of the modern and post-modern societies the basic trends of development of the military organizations seem to justify the long-term validity of the ‘occupational’ model. This model can be characterized by large amounts of interactions between the society and the armed forces, intensive congruence, stronger social integration, and priority of getting social support (Table 3).

Table 3. Results of Interrelations between the Military and the Civilian Society on the Development of the Military Profession

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Main factors of analysis</th>
<th>Degree of external integration and the social legitimacy of the military *</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>low</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>low</td>
<td>“pseudo-institutional” model (E.g., Spain, Portugal, Turkey; post-communist militaries of Russia and other CIS countries; and Slovakia, Romania, Albania, Bulgaria that still would be characterized by divergence, weak inner cohesion and social isolation)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>high</td>
<td>“institutional” model (E.g., in the militaries of the USA and Great Britain in the 1980s, with strong inner cohesion, stressed military professionalism, and carefully defended relative professional and political independence)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Social and normative connections between the civil society and the military organization.
** Interactions on organizational subsystem- and intergroup-level; nature of the normative connections inside the military.

I am afraid, in the case of the three new NATO-member Eastern European countries, political and military decision-makers have to consider possible negative
results of the so-called “pseudo-institutional” development model. The militaries of these countries can be characterized by politically fastened and enforced convergence (which do not based in every aspects on “autopoietical”, organic development of the sub-systems of the given military organizations), and a large amount of civilian employees. Furthermore, we can characterize them with, at least partly, ambiguous results of modernization, structural reorganization and conversion processes. In these countries, where still exist the drafted mass armies-model, the involved draftees serve with strong feeling of the rights of a citizen and struggling to enforce their human and civil rights extensively. In addition, these militaries are usually not so efficient: neither from the viewpoint of the civilian public nor from the point of view of their members.

The attitudes, level of identification with their actual task (e.g., multinational humanitarian intervention, peace-enforcement) and activity of the NATO military personnel in the Kosovo war would have differed, according to results of many factors. Two factors would have been the internal cohesion and external social legitimacy of their militaries. This fact would affect the ability of military personnel to overlook and predict social and political implications of their actions during and after the war in the Balkans or in a wider aspect.xviii

5. Changes of the Organizational Structure and Sub-Systems.

One of the main characteristics of the post-modern military organizations is that it is similar to the results of the recent development of organizations in the private sector. In the private sector, the temporary network of companies usually has a diverse core of competencies that might quickly form a collaboration to take advantage of fleeting opportunities (Schuler - Jackson, 1996: 44).

These very flexible, virtual matrix organizations (Norgan, 1994:29) are characterized by proliferation of joint ventures, absence of massive organizational hierarchy, high technology, a skilled work force and changing tasks. In the postmodern

xviii As Task Force Falcon Chief of Staff, Army Col. Ellis W. Golson sees it, majority of representatives of the approx. 6,000 American troops, who are supporting KFOR's post-Kosovo war activities, have this kind of ability. As Golson said, that is why: "We're asking young sergeants, E-5s and E-6s, 21 and 22 years old, to make decisions that represent the U.S. Army, ...They sit in on local leaders meetings where we're trying to get local people to come together. They resolve conflicts between Albanians and Serbs, and sometimes, Albanians on Albanians." (Kozaryn, 1999a:1) (Emphases added -KZL)

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military organizations, the focus is more and more on flexibility, coordination and cooperation:

1. inside a particular military alliance, such as Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) according to NATO’s New Strategic Concept,
2. between permanent multinational forces (such as the EUROCORPS, or the Belgian-Dutch Navy),
3. between multinational intervention forces (such was IFOR in the recent past, and SFOR and KFOR today), or perhaps even
4. between truly transnational organizations under the control of some particular international organizations (e.g., UN, OSCE).

This kind of structure of modern military organizations has several advantages and some disadvantages. In my opinion, one of the most important advantages of this special kind of virtual matrix organization is based on its horizontal characters. It is because the individual members of expert teams, gathered just for the duration of their special task from different fields and levels of the military organizations, have more considerable tolerance for each other (see experiences of intercultural communication during the Kosovo war).

As a result, the team members are able to carry out their multiple roles and work effectively in special circumstances, such as challenges of the rapidly changing environment, and the loose and unorganized lines of communications. Humanitarian interventions on the Balkans provided related examples regarding this topic. On the other hand, disadvantages would be related to vertical aspects of the working of these military organizations due to potential power conflicts between highly-educated experts in the functional hierarchy (see the case of Russians during and after the Kosovo campaign).

The reserve forces will play a greater role in the postmodern militaries in the future. But their role will be fundamentally different from the roles of reserve forces in the military organizations of the Cold War. As the negative French experiences from the Gulf War showed that the diminution of the immediate threat, the budgetary constrains and the extreme diversity of possible missions would make it almost impossible to recruit, train and retain enough specialists for all the possible scenarios.
6. A Revolution in the Military Affairs?

As the Kosovo air campaign highlighted, nowadays we can register a dramatic change in the combat potential and the effectiveness of military organizations. According to opinions of several experts (Krepinevitz, 1994: 30; Metz - Kievit, 1995; Ek, 1998: 2), this change can be defined as a new (information-based) wave of revolutions in military affairs (RMA). This trend is based on the immediate adaptation of high-tech, close connections with the civilian economy, combined with innovative operational concepts and organizational adaptation.

The use of high technology requires higher educational levels in every field of military organizations generally, and highly specialized, well-educated personnel in some particular units and specific positions. Furthermore, the military decision-makers have to calculate on the fact that the training of the above mentioned specialists is usually long and costly. Their training will be cost-effective only, if they remained inside the organizational framework a minimum period of time (for some years). This fact is one of the main reasons for the reevaluation of the role of draftees and the discontinuance of the system of draft-based mass-armies in almost all Western democracies (Haltiner, 1998:32-35).

Some of the most important aspects of this new revolution of military affairs are connected with the potential threats, activity forms and results of the information warfare. The information warfare is commonly seen as a modern version of the old principle of the “scorched earth”: "...information warfare is whatever you do to preserve the integrity of your own information system from exploitation, corruption, or destruction while at the same time exploiting, corrupting, or destroying an enemy’s information systems and in the process achieving an information advantage if it comes to armed combat.” (Dunnigan, 1996:270)

According to experts on information warfare, the aim of the destruction, paralyzing and corruption of the informational infrastructure of the enemy would be reached by different activity forms and technology (Johnson - Libicki, 1995; Hayes - Wheatley, 1996; Greenberg – Goodman – Soo Hoo, 1999). The most common of these are: cyberwar (cyberspace war and cybernetic war), and netwar. (Table 4)
### Table 4. Information Warfare

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Prioritized dimensions of the analysis:</th>
<th>Dominant sub-types of information warfare:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Goal:</strong> political and military actions to disturb or paralyze both civilian and military command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) systems</td>
<td>strategic-level military actions for disrupting and/or destroying inimical information and communication systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Sub-concepts:</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• propaganda,</td>
<td>• battlefield (cyberspace war; cybernetic war),</td>
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<tr>
<td>• psychological warfare,</td>
<td>• increased strategic level lethality,</td>
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<tr>
<td>• media control,</td>
<td>• RMA</td>
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<tr>
<td>• “reflexive control”</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Conflict-level:</strong></td>
<td>high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>medium-high</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Actors:</strong></td>
<td>state; military; intelligence and counterintelligence;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>“global civil society;” (nation)state; military; paramilitary; terrorist organizations; civil society (e.g., non-governmental organizations /NGOs);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Threat-perception:</strong></td>
<td>Alarmist</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>computer-networks; internet; all media channels</td>
<td>military and civil command and communication systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Channels/ means:</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Deep impacts:</strong></td>
<td>transformation in the nature of warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• “Kulturkampf” (clash of civilizations- from a Huntingtonian sensexix);</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>• transformation in the nature of propaganda and psychological warfare</td>
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In the USA the 1991 (Persian) Gulf War is often cited as the first post-modern information war (Gray, 1997: 36-50, 168-194). Indeed, during this “infowar” various types of high-tech equipment (like laser designators, portable missiles, and sensors) and “intelligent” high-tech weapons, e.g., the Paveway II. and III laser-guided bombs,¹¹ CBU-87/B Combined Effects Munitions (CEM).¹²

In addition, the experiences of the “first post-modern infowar” called attention of military and legal experts to new potential threats and international legal difficulties of the future’s informational wars. One of these new potential threats is the fact that all the units on the battlefield become much more dependent on satellites, local computer

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xix See: (Huntington, 1996).
networks and commercial computer equipment, when they want to pass and rapidly catch data during the fight. The other set of experiences was connected by the trend that the highly industrialized nations would be highly vulnerable to terrorist cyberattacks, because of their dependency on electronic communication and information technology. On the other hand, the “low-tech” opponents (such as Iraq has done with the USA) can rather successfully resist against the internet war, and can effectively interrupt or intercept the communicational system of their opponent (Verton, 1999a).

On the other hand, it appears that some advocates of theories on the changed fundamental nature of war and information warfare are not really familiar with the historical aspects of the basic nature of war (as a complex political, social, economical, cultural, and military phenomenon), and it’s great impact on the civil-military relations in the past two and half centuries. This appears to be the reason why they concentrate almost exclusively on the technological and economical aspects of the war.

From my point of view, both the 1991 (Persian) Gulf War and the Kosovo campaign verified that war itself is a complex political, social, economical, cultural, and military phenomenon, which consists of both constant and varying characteristics (Clausewitz, 1976: 89)! In my opinion, several researchers often misinterpret the difference between war and warfare, when they are trying to carry out “re-classification of modern wars.” Furthermore, these experts several times misunderstand the basic features of the information warfare, netwar and cyberwar, when they over-emphasize the imaginable results of “electronic Pearl Harbors.”

As a result of the findings in the second chapter of this thesis, the following are the most important external and internal factors that affected the forms and functioning of the “post-modern,” NATO-member, Western military organizations before, during and after the Kosovo war:

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Figure 1. Factors that Significantly Determine Forms and Functioning of the "Post-Modern" Military Organizations.
War and warfare from the last third of the 19th century until the end of the 1990s can generally be closely linked with rapid technological development and connected, in turn, with the character of industrial and post-industrial society. Moreover, war and warfare also came to be linked with the fate of military professionalism in our changing world, transforming civil-military relations, and forcing the contemporary trends in international, regional and national geopolitical and security policies.

C. DEBATES OVER NATO’S TRANSFORMATION

After the Cold War ended, heated debates started between the allies about the necessity of NATO’s external and internal adaptation to the new challenges of the transformed security environment.

The key-issues of debates regarding external adaptation of NATO were:

1. the cooperation with former adversaries and other non-NATO nations,
2. the extension of the Alliance by allowing new membership candidates;
3. the enforcement of the Alliance’s functions and position in the renewed European security architecture; and
4. new challenges regarding “out-of-area” crisis-management and peace operations in the transformed security environment.

After the revision of the Strategic Concept of the Alliance in November 1991, which stated that “The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose: none of its weapons will ever be used except in self-defense,” the debates between the allies regarding further internal transformation of NATO focused on:

1. reconciliation of traditional and new roles for the Alliance (collective security vs. collective defense),
2. setting up of new institutions and appropriate processes as part of NATO’s preparation for non-Article 5 type operations, by introducing and testing the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) principle,
3. reshaping military posture and integrated command structure of NATO,

xxi The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, ibid. par. 36.
4. handling the new wave of the independent European defense debate by developing the ESDI concept.

1. External Adaptation of the Alliance

During the Alliance’s external adaptation process, NATO had to enhance its political relationships with the former adversaries from the Warsaw Pact (which was disbanded on 1 July 1991 in Prague) and with other non-NATO nations. In 1991 NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), intensifying its cooperation with the new partners. Moreover, the Alliance launched the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) initiative, and enhanced it through the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) after 1997. In addition, NATO established the Mediterranean Cooperation Group\textsuperscript{xxii} (MCG) and started the enlargement process.

a. Cooperation with Former Adversaries and Other Non-NATO Nations

The NATO member countries were extraordinarily interested in widening the sphere of post-Cold War security with not only defense, but also dialogue, negotiations and cooperation.\textsuperscript{xxiii} During the debates about the “core functions” of NATO, many experts called attention to the fact that the Alliance, in the spirit of the Washington Treaty, always followed a multipurpose activity towards European security—however during the Cold War, just its “defense” function was characteristic. The New Strategic Concept in 1991 added a third, new element (“cooperation”) to the previous two, “classic” elements (“defense” and ”dialogue”). These basic functions were mentioned in the New Strategic Concept, as “fundamental security tasks.”\textsuperscript{xxiv}

The USA, Canada and all the Western European NATO member countries strongly encouraged the establishment of a democratic political system and an effective system of civilian control in the Central and Eastern European former communist countries. Some advisers of the Western political decision-makers stressed the

\textsuperscript{xxii} The NATO Handbook, ibid. page 109.


\textsuperscript{xxiv} The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, ibid. par. 20.
importance of making a tough distinction between Central Europe ("Mitteleuropa") and Eastern Europe that their "political masters" would decide. From this point of view, Central Europe includes:

...those lands which once formed part of Western Christendom; the old lands of the Habsburg Empire, Austria, Hungary and Czechoslovakia, together with Poland and the eastern marches of Germany. The term "Eastern Europe" should be reserved for those regions which developed under the aegis of the Orthodox Church: the Black Sea communities of Bulgaria and Romania which only emerged from Ottoman domination in the nineteenth century, and the "European" parts of the Soviet Union. (Howard, 1994: 102-103)

With the end of the Cold War there was a fundamental uncertainty in NATO about the post-communist Russia, since the Russians had only weak democratic traditions, but still had vast military potential. The basic question for the US, the leading power of the Western world, was as follows: How to deal with the "vanquished opponent"? Theoretically, the West would follow two different paths: either follow the "recipe of peacemaking à la Versaille" (1919) or follow the logic of the "model of the European Concert of Vienna" (1815).

1. The path of the punitive and humiliating peace settlement of Versailles (1919) against the defeated Germany did not seem to be feasible, because Versailles did sow the seeds of national revenge (not only in Germany), resulted in strong German determination for re-establishment of the country's greatness, and finally led to World War II.

2. The European Concert model of Vienna (1815) followed a strategy of reconciliation and cooperation with post-Napoleonic France, because: "...the statesmen at Vienna concluded that Europe would be safer if France were relatively satisfied rather than resentful and disaffected."(Kissinger, 1994: 81)

The political decision-makers of the US and its Western European NATO allies did not choose the first model because they knew: during and after Gorbachev there was a revival of strong, military elite-supported political voices against the administration "that wanted to make the country subservient to foreign interests". In addition, because of the lack of a modern "business class" that would not have any appetite for military adventures, this scenario threatened a danger of nationalistic backlash and an unforeseeable escalation of the conflict, for which NATO was not really prepared.
Consequently, the West had to choose the second model for establishing its new relationships with the Russian Federation, the Ukraine,\textsuperscript{xxv} and with other, still relatively powerful, former Soviet republics. They supported the democratic forces that wanted the economic and political modernization of the country and sought Russia’s cooperation for maintaining security in Europe and all around the globe. The “Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation” was signed in 1997.\textsuperscript{xxvi}

But there remained many other, security related questions: Where are the borders of the West’s willingness “to show understanding for the Russian sensitiveness in its area of claimed strategic interests”? What about the inherent, UN Charter-guaranteed rights of new democracies in former Soviet republics and satellite countries for reaching sovereignty and to decide independently about a “breakaway”, and to join any, not Russian-ruled global or regional political, economic, and/or security organization, like NATO?

In the post-Cold War Russia we could register many changes that resulted in the reshaping of strategic thinking (Arbatov, 1998:83-134) and rethinking of basic concepts of modern war and warfare (Blair, 1995: 59-87). Furthermore, changes had occurred in the transformed systems of the civil-military relations (Tsypkin, 1992: 39-65; Baev, 1996: 52-79). In addition, conceptions on use of military force were modified (Shakleina, 1995: 83-107) and (mainly negative) changes occurred in almost every field of the existence and functioning of the Russian military (Felgenhauer, 1997: 6-20). Moreover, we could register significant changes in tasks, functions, structure, and size of the Russian armed forces, and in the main features of the ‘military mind’ of the body of staff of Russian professional officers and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) (Lieven, 1998: 205). On the other hand, neither its military doctrine from 1993, nor the “National Security Concept of the Russian Federation” from December 1997, gave up the vision of an active foreign policy for regaining the status of a “great power” (Staar, 1998).


Russia strongly opposed NATO's expansion, especially in its "near abroad," beyond the imaginary "buffer zone" of the former empire, however the NATO-Russian Permanent Joint Council (PJC)\textsuperscript{xxvii} tried to reassure Russia that the enlargement did not want to threaten Russia's strategic interests. In addition, the question was raised, whether the PJC will be able to perform its original duty effectively in case of future, Kosovo-like international conflicts and further enlargement of NATO? Moreover, the Russians were and continue to be concerned that NATO's possible future out-of-area operations in the Balkans would result in an \textit{increased level of political and military presence and influence of the US in Europe}. From the Russian point of view, this increased US presence was build up and strengthened through such NATO institutions, as the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program.

NATO created the NACC in 1991, \textit{with the goal of deepening} those diplomatic ties to Central and Eastern European post-communist states that were built up since the London Initiatives. But the Western European NATO allies were not unified regarding core functions of NACC. There were sharp differences between France on one hand, and the US, Great Britain and Germany, on the other. It was because:

Paris saw NACC as \textit{part of a new US strategy for maintaining political dominance in European affairs}. Paris hoped NATO could be limited to providing a strategic insurance policy that would \textit{allow for the enhancement of Western European influence via the European Community and WEU} while OSCE satisfied the need for a comprehensive collective security. The NACC was a suspect because it overlapped with the competence of the OSCE. (Zucconi, 1998:284) (Emphases added –KZL)

In spite of the above concerns, the NACC proved an effective tool for political dialogue and further cooperation between NATO and former Warsaw Pact-member Eastern and Central European states. The militarily not too effective, NACC was replaced by the \textit{Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)} in 1997, which provides until now an "...overarching framework for political and security consultations and for enhanced cooperation under the Partnership for Peace (PfP) programme."\textsuperscript{xxviii}

\textsuperscript{xxvii} The NATO Handbook, ibid., pp. 107-109.

\textsuperscript{xxviii} Ibid., 107.
The PfP program was established in January 1994 for further improvement of military cooperation, transparency and interoperability between NATO and the partner nations. The PfP, as the NATO’s military cooperation program, offers “...a wide spectrum of possibilities, both in the military field and in the broader defense-related but not strictly military area.”

The Program has often been interpreted in the former communist countries, mainly after the establishment of its Individual Partnership Programs for deepening bilateral NATO-partner country relationships, as part of a preparatory process for NATO membership. Furthermore, as experiences of activity of the Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia-Herzegovina have shown since 1995, the PfP proved to be an excellent common training opportunity and preparatory organizational framework for joint actions (e.g. crisis management and peace operations), authorized by UN Security Council resolutions.

b. Crisis-Management and Peace Operations

The Kosovo war revived old, and brought up new debates over legality vs. illegality, and advantages vs. disadvantages of the old and new forms of "interventionism" regarding roles and inter-relationships of the UN, the US and NATO (Glennon, 1999: 2-4; Pfaff, 1999: 20). One of these old debates was related to the fact that the international community was not really successful, when tried to redefine, adapt and restructure the institutions of the UN to the new, post-Cold War security challenges.

It became clear from the beginning of the 1990s that: “The range of conflicts around the world far exceeds the United Nations' capacity to address them; there have been accusations of bias in the choice of which conflicts the UN intervenes in and in the manner in which they are addressed; and states have imposed numerous conditions on their participation in UN operations.” (Roberts, 1996:297) Consequently, the main focus areas of the above debate were the future of UN peacekeeping, the global economy vs. state sovereignty, the problems of failed states and human security, and the new roles and relationships of NATO and other “regional arrangements.”

xxix Ibid., 93.

According to the official UN approach, dated in March 1999, at the beginning of the air campaign in Kosovo, the UN looks at NATO as only one of the altogether 18, such kind of regional security organizations (NATO is actually only next-to-the-last, the 17th on this list). The UN described NATO as a “regional organization/arrangement in the Euro-Atlantic region,” with actual “peacekeeping and peace-support operations-potential.”

Indeed, both NATO, the only efficiently functioning security organization around the globe, and the US, NATO’s leading power, had to define their new roles and engagement regarding the new challenges, which changed main features of the overall security landscape and international conflicts, and demanded new approaches towards use of force. Let us just recall the dilemmas of the so-called ‘post-communist wars’ in the territory of the former Yugoslavia (Fairbanks, 1995: 134-150); or remember the lessons of the second Chechen-war (1994-1996), the victorious Gulf War (Watson, 1991: 213-225); and the bitter lessons of “armed humanitarian intervention” of the US in Somalia (Rotberg, 1997: 229-238; Clarke - Herbst, 1997: 251-252)! The death of the eighteen US rangers in the ill-fated attempt to capture General Aidid in Somalia launched a firestorm in the US Congress, the US media, and the public. Public sentiment became again overwhelmingly anti-UN, and the prestige of the UN decreased significantly.

The current, basically negative, attitude of the US toward the UN has strong historical roots. This statement is true, however in 1945, the organizational system of the UN originally emerged as a creation of the Western World to develop ways of maintaining peace and stability in the post world war world (Meisler, 1995: 20). The founding fathers tried to avoid those serious mistakes committed anno by the League of Nations after World War I (Bennett, 1995: 55). The largest part of the UN Charter embodied the principles of Western liberal democracies. Its rationale was deeply rooted in the values, cultural patterns, aspirations, and hopes of the West (Henkin, 1979: 177).

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The "liberal internationalism" of the United Nations was quite in tune with the post-war idealism of the US (Bennett, 1995: 467).\textsuperscript{xxiii} The optimistic mood of the New Deal and of winning the war was carried over to the long process of the foundation of the United Nations (Bennett, 1995: 43-55; Meisler, 1995:1-20).

During its first couple of years, the UN was seen positively by the US. The veto insured for the US that the UN Security Council could not act inimically to American interests. Moreover, the UN had provided an opportunity to build up a prosperous world order in its own liberal image. As the leading Western postwar military and economic power, the US was the dominant force in the UN during the early years of its existence. Consequently, during this period, the US government viewed the UN as a most useful instrument in the pursuit of its national interests.

But later, during the 1960s, and mainly in the mid-1970s, the relationship between the US and the UN changed dramatically. The change occurred because the Soviet Union could reach a new majority in many important bodies of the UN with approx. two-thirds of the roll call votes of its anti-US allies: the Soviet-supported "developing countries with socialist orientation" from the Third World and the Soviet satellite countries. Gradually, as the "Soviet-Third World action coalition" started to dominate the UN General Assembly, the US approach changed negatively regarding the UN and the "multilateralism"(Scheffer, 1999: 34). In the US Congress had emerged a "reflexively anti-UN camp" with long-lasting influence.\textsuperscript{16}

The tensions between the UN and the US had been sharpened during the first term of President Ronald Reagan. The US Congress significantly cut the US contributions to the UN system, creating a situation, in which the actual US contributions to the UN regular budget and to the specialized agencies fell substantially below legally binding obligations for several years.

During the post-Cold War period, one of the new dimensions of the UN-US relationship was a reviving US demand for redefinition of the general role of the UN, and reform of the UN Charter, regarding international legal authorization and legality of

\textsuperscript{xxiii} According to the UN Charter, the UN has four purposes: to maintain international peace and security; to develop friendly relations among nations; to cooperate in solving international problems and in promoting respect for human rights, and to be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations (Bennett, 1995: 467).
multinational and/or national intervention. This demand became urging after December 1989, when the US invasion in Panama took place, and provoked sharp debates on international legality of such kind of (counter)intervention (Henkin, 1991: 65).

The Persian Gulf War of 1990-91 raised further questions about both the U.S. Constitution and the UN Charter. There were several military, political and international legal lessons learned during the war (Watson, 1991: 213-219). From the point of view of the topic of this thesis, the most important conclusion was as follows:

Although Resolution 688 confirmed that the cross-border consequences of the situation were a threat to international peace and security, the Council purposely did not adopt it as a Chapter VII resolution. Even resolutions expressly invoking Chapter VII can be based upon threats to international peace and security without authorizing the use of military force. (Scheffer, 1991: 146)

One of the leading American authorities in public opinion polling, assessing the public mood following the 1992 presidential elections, wrote as follows:

The public remains ambivalent toward the United Nations—far more positive than in the era when it was dominated by anti-American Third World rhetoric—but still ambivalent. There is no active demand by the American public that the United Nations take more initiative as the world’s policeman. But there is latent willingness to support such policy. If Americans do not want the United States to do the job unilaterally—yet feel some responsibility for getting it done—the United Nations is the most credible candidate for the task. Americans are willing to be sold on this proposition, to have their questions and resistance addressed, and their enthusiasm sparked. This will not happen spontaneously. It will require active leadership. The potential nevertheless exists, if America’s leaders wish to take advantage of it. (Yankelovich, 1992: 10) (Emphases added – KZL)

After the Gulf War, the image of the UN improved markedly in the United States, and it seemed that an US-UN rapprochement was coming. Conventional wisdom proclaimed that the UN, absent the East-West rivalry, was functioning as was originally intended. For a short period during the Bush and Clinton administrations, efforts to clear up the previous US-UN problem areas were undertaken. Serious steps were taken within the UN to constrain the alleged run-away budget process that was so vexing to the United States.

When Boutros Boutros-Ghali got the office of UN Secretary-General in January 1992, a ruling feeling in circles of international political and legal experts and in the United States was that the time of the UN had finally arrived. This feeling was encouraged by the initial successes of UN conflict management e.g., in Namibia, Cambodia, Central America, during the Iran-Iraq war, and in the course of the Gulf War. On the basis of these experiences, Cyrus R. Vance, former US Secretary of State and Deputy Secretary of Defense, and Personal Envoy of the United Nations Secretary-General, said in his statement before the US Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs:

...strengthening the UN's capacity for peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement should be a top priority for the United States in the post-Cold War world. Nothing could more directly serve America's interests, or that of the larger international community, than fulfilling the goal of collective security laid out in the UN Charter forty-seven years ago. (Lee - Pagenhardt - Stanley, 1992: page iii.)

President Bush proclaimed a "new world order," and shortly after President Clinton assumed the presidency. His ambassador to the UN, Madeleine Albright, declared that the end of the Cold War placed the United Nations in the center of international efforts to guide and safeguard "a suddenly chaotic world."

But this euphoria evaporated as the UN efforts in Bosnia, Somalia and Rwanda failed. From this time, the organizational system of the UN17 has gotten just relatively low prestige, particularly in connection dilemmas of efficiency of its peacekeeping activities.18 Furthermore, the House of Representatives passed the National Security Revitalization Act, and radically curtailed American financial contributions to the expenses of the United Nations and other international organizations.

The United States' assessed share of UN peacekeeping expenses - nearly 31 per cent of the yearly total - has dropped by half, from about $1 billion in 1995 to some $400 million in 1997. This equals less than one-quarter of 1 per cent of the annual US military budget.xxxv

A difficult question to most European NATO allies, and many other non-Americans is how the United Nations, which was essentially a creation of the vision and leadership of the US after World War II (Meisler, 1995: 3) came to an end, and in which US influence and direction today are not rivaled, can now be treated with such disdain.

The US public and particular political and economic interest groups generally do not think of their government as dominating the UN, however this evaluation is quite the contrary to the perception held throughout most of the world.

According to the opinion of these groups, conveyed by the media and several scholars, foreign policy interests of the US are subordinated to the United Nations. In addition, as they see it, the UN went through such kind of transformation, which resulted in “threat to vital US national interests” for a period. From point of view of Senator Jesse Helms, Chairman of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations:

As it currently operates, the United Nations does not deserve continued American support. Its bureaucracy is proliferating, its costs are spiraling, and its mission is constantly expanding beyond its mandate - and beyond its capabilities. Worse, with the steady growth in the size and scope of its activities, the United Nations is being transformed from an institution of sovereign nations into a quasi-sovereign entity in itself. That transformation represents an obvious threat to U.S. national interests. Worst of all, it is a transformation that is being funded principally by American taxpayers. (Helms, 1996:2)

Similar questions have arisen in almost every country of the turbulent post-Cold War world - however their formulations were not so tough, as those formulated in the world's number one superpower and the largest contributor of the UN budget.xxxvi

On the other hand, there is no single American or “Western” view regarding the UN and its necessary inner organizational reform.

There is a wide diversity of perspectives, ranging from constructive concern to outright rejection, existing in the US and in its European NATO allies about the UN. These approaches concentrate mainly on the new functions and supranational roles of UN in Europe and around the world, the appropriateness of the current organizational structure and efficiency of work of the world organization.

Previous negative experiences from Bosnia raised new questions for members of the international community. Are those states (e.g., Europeans) that witness a serious injustice or security threatening active aggression, forbidden to take action, if the UN Security Council is politically immobilized by e.g., a Russian and/or Chinese veto?

xxxvi According to the information of the UN Department of Public Information: “In 1999, the regular budget of the UN amounted to some $1.26 billion. ... The largest contributor – the United States – was required to pay $304,395,555.” (UN DPI, 1999)
Who would be in charge in this case? NATO? OSCE? WEU? EU? If the answer yes to either NATO, OSCE, WEU or EU being in charge, what would be the theoretical and practical guidelines of use of force by “preventive collective defense” (Yost, 1999: 31) means? And finally, what would be the future relationships between UN, OSCE, WEU, EU and the NATO?

c. Place of NATO in the Renewed European Security Architecture

According to the “bicycle theory” of integration (Cottrell, 1999: 72), or in its more sophisticated form, the theory of “disequilibrium dynamics,” regarding “functional spillover”: “…[is] the process whereby one step in systematic integration creates a new situation, in which a further step is now required if the system itself is not to become destabilized.”(Emerson, 1998). At first sight, from the point of view of systems theory of international politics (Waltz, 1979:71) and the functional approach of the European integration process (Gordon, 1998:160-168), this statement seems to characterize structural and organizational drives of current significant changes in the majority of continental members of the European Union (EU).

From the point of view of optimist apostles of the necessary, overall success of the EU, the following should be the organization’s priorities for the first decade of the new millennium, after January 1999, when they could adapt the single, shared currency, the euro:

1. Reforming of the institutions, and internal re-sharing of power in the EU.
2. Integration of the new Central and Eastern European, former communist candidate countries into the EU’s institutions.
3. Managing the economic convergence by maximizing the potential benefits of the European Monetary Union.
4. Building of a true political union based on common foreign policy.
5. Rethinking of the European role in NATO (Cottrell, 1999a: 71,73; 1999b: 63-64).

Consequently, according to this approach, the above mentioned “schedule” would finally result in not only closer political and economical integration, but also more effective (independent) military cooperation of the EU-countries in the next decade. Since 10 December 1991, the establishment of the Treaty on the European Union (TEU,
or Maastricht Treaty) with its explicit “three-pillar” structure\(^\text{xxxvii}\), has revived debates on the potential advantages and disadvantages of an independent European defense option. Since that time, as the French Amaya Bloch-Lainé, the British Charles Grant, and the US researcher, Kori Schake, saw it: “…the United States and the European Union (EU) have been trying to define a new transatlantic bargain that balances Europe’s desire for a broader and more independent political role with its continued reliance on US and NATO military capabilities.” (Schake – Bloch-Lainé – Grant, 1999: 20)

The Maastricht Treaty, itself a result of certain European security concerns,\(^\text{20}\) tried to increase potential power of European institutions on the field of foreign and security policy. The ramification of the Treaty not only meant that the EEC became EU, but also brought new approaches of the Western European NATO-members toward the WEU, as potential future defense mechanism of the EU.

The Maastricht Treaty on European Union, completed in 1991, sought to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) via an ESDI built through a revitalized Western European Union (WEU). The European Union members agreed that a community of 350 million citizens with two nuclear powers should be able to exert influence in security matters and take more responsibility for their own affairs after the Cold War. However, the leading European states split over the form the ESDI would take: Britain wanted it subordinated to NATO, France wanted it fully independent of NATO, and Germany sought to reconcile both views. (Kay, 1998: 124)

There are two main, broadly competing approaches in the reviving theoretical literature on the European integration and the independent European defense issues: the functionalist (or “supranationalist; institutionalist”), and the inter-governmentalist theoretical paradigms. Obviously, both of them carry political and security implications and reflect the contemporary situation of international balance of power.

1. The functionalist (or “supranationalist”) theoretical approach\(^\text{xxxvii}\) dominated the literature during the 1950s and 1960s, but went out of fashion during the first half of the 1970s, as the European integration process stalled, and the debates on independent European defense options died down. According to

representatives of this paradigm, the European integration process is mainly about changing whatever is possible and stretching the limits by setting up institutions, which themselves, by their very existence can have an effect on the perception of common goals. This would propel the process of integration forward (by functional and/or political spillover), and keep the notion of “Europe” alive. The French and German political elite in general, and the French political and strategic culture in particular, traditionally follows this functionalist approach.

Several French leaders, e.g. Jean Monnet, Valery Giscard d’Estaing, Francois Mitterand, Jacques Delors, explicitly supported the setting up of institutions, such as e.g. the European Coal and Steel Community and the European Monetary System. Furthermore, not only the failed Pleven Plan on the European Defense Community (Dec. 1950 - 1954) and the--also failed--Fouchet plans of the early 1960s, were French investments; but also the European Political Cooperation (EPC), which was conceived at the Hague EEC summit of 1969 and came into existence in 1970. Moreover, the French played an active role in the establishment of the 1987 Single European Act, which gave the EPC a place in the EC treaties for the first time. Furthermore, the French were active in the preparation of the 1990-91 European Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) on political union, which concluded at the Maastricht summit of December 1991, and led to the creation of the CFSP.

2. The representatives of the intergovernmentalist approach had been predominant from the second half of the 1970s until the end of the Cold War (Moravcsik, 1993). This paradigm became predominant mainly during the mid-1980s, after the Rome Declaration, when only this approach could provide well-established alternative explanations for reasons, contemporary trends, and likely consequences of the European Community’s and the WEU’s unexpected revival. Representatives of this school emphasized the importance

xxxviii The “functional spillover” would be characterized by successful integration in one area (either by delegation of sovereignty to new central institutions, or the sharing/pooling of sovereignty in common institutions), leading to demands for integration in other areas. In case of “political spillover” the success
of the general unwillingness of states to compromise their core national interests and the importance of *lowest-common-denominator deals*. These scholars tried to consider in a comparative aspect the bargaining processes, and the economic, political and strategic cultural outcomes of these bargains (Anderson, 1995: 454). From their point of view, institutions do not work effectively unless basic common goals, values and norms are shared. This approach has particularly strong historical roots in the British political and strategic culture, in which intergovernmentalist political and military decision-makers tend to take a very careful, pragmatic view of what is possible, and seek to keep the institution-building process within those limits.

After the Maastricht Treaty accelerated the European integrity process, the perceived successes (like the single market; common commercial policy) and the perceived failures (e.g. new challenges of common monetary, foreign and security policy) called for further integration in many new fields. These demands renewed scholarly interests in new versions of the previous functionalist theories.\(^23\)

Those, who deliberate over the future place of NATO in the renewed European security architecture usually raise the following questions: Will the EU be able slowly but surely to become an organized and unified foreign policy actor with increasingly common global interests and with all (including military) means to protect its interests? Or will the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), set up by the Maastricht Treaty, become the victim of the continuously diverging national interests and incorrect self-perceptions\(^24\); historical, political and social differences; and misperceptions among European states in the post-Cold War era? What are the preconditions for the foreign and security policy integration of Europe? What should the relationship be between NATO, the EU and other following elements of the European security architecture regarding the new security conditions?

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\(^{23}\) In institution-building process would lead to greater supranational enterpreneurship and more cooperation (Moravcsik, 1993).
**Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)**

**European Union (EU)**
- Western European Union (WEU)
  - Ireland**

**Partnership for Peace (PfP)**
- Austria**, **** Finland**, **** Sweden**, ****

**Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)**
- **North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)**
  - Denmark**, Netherlands, Luxembourg
  - Belgium, Spain, Portugal
  - Germany, France, Italy
  - United Kingdom, Greece

- **Norway**, **Turkey**, **Iceland**
- **Hungary**, **Poland**, **Czech Republic**

- **Bulgaria**, **Slovakia**, **Romania**
- **Estonia**, **Lithuania**, **Latvia**
- **Slovenia**, ****

**Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croatia, Cyprus, Liechtenstein, San Marino, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Holy See, Monaco, San Marino, F.R. Yugoslavia****

**WEU Associate Member**, **WEU Observer**, **WEU Associate Partner**, **EAPC Observer**, **Suspended Member**

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**Figure 2. Interlocking Political and Security Organizations of Europe**

After: (Messervy-Whiting, 1997: 71)

After the Cold War ended, the idea of an extended European security approach with balanced development of all potential (political, economic, cultural and military) interrelated elements of the security system, which should mutually support each other, were raised. But the “interlocking” cooperation between NATO,
CSCE/OSCE, EU and WEU proved to be too difficult and long-lasting. That’s why this idea had been discredited as “interblocking”.

**d. The Independent European Defense Debate**

To understand drives of the various actors of the Independent European Defense Debate (IEDD) during the 1990s, we must have a short historical overview on NATO’s collective defense origins and preoccupations, and characteristics of the independent European Defense Debate during the Cold War. The following ten events were the milestones during the development process of the above phenomena.

First, 19 September 1946, Churchill called for a “United States of Europe,” which would have had a European army (Young, 1998:74). The idea was supported by the Truman administration, where the political traditions of isolationism still existed in 1947. Furthermore, in Washington:

> It was assumed that the West Europeans would rebuild their defense capabilities and that, after some years, they would bear the major military burdens in balancing Soviet power in Europe. To this end, the United States encouraged the countries of Western Europe to replace rivalry with cooperation and to initiate a process of political and economic integration. (Yost, 1998:29) (Emphases added –KZL)

Second, the Treaty of Dunkirk (1947) resulted in a bilateral mutual defense pact between Britain and France, which “…referred specifically to the possibility of a future German threat…” (Yost, 1998:340)

Third, the formation of the Brussels Treaty of Economic, Social and Cultural Collaboration and Collective Self-Defence, signed by Britain, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands in 1948. Fourth, the Brussels Pact nations initiated talks with the US and Canada about possible defense cooperation in July 1948, after Stalin initiated a blockade on the British, French, and US sectors of Berlin. Fifth, the treaty on NATO was signed on Apr. 4, 1949, when Berlin’s blockade was still under its way. Sixth, the Federal Republic of Germany was founded in 1949. Seventh, the North Korean invasion of South Korea occurred in June 1950, which “put the ‘O’ in NATO.”

Eighth, in September 1950, the United States proposed that West German armed forces should be established. The French wanted to keep under control the
establishment and further development of the German armed forces. For this reason Paris promptly advanced a counterproposal for establishment of a European Defense Community (EDC). This so called Pleven Plan “proposed a European Defense Community (EDC), consisting of a European Army and Ministry of Defence, and a European Political Community.” (Botsford, 1997: 8-9) The Pleven Plan called “… for a European army in European uniform under European command, to be assembled for an indefinite period as proof of solidarity and a bulwark against enemies both within and without.” (Young, 1998: 75)

*Great Britain* (like the Benelux countries and Germany) also apparently advocated “to the principle of joining the European Army” initially. But later the British, because of their basic *strategic interests, and afraid of joint decision making and power sharing in collective international institutions,* refused to place a sufficient number of their soldiers in the “sludgy amalgam” under supranational control. The US saw Britain as:

... an ally whose special agonies in all these European speculations would have made her susceptible to American influence. There was surely a benign kind of syllogism at work. First, *British* policy under both Bevin and Eden was driven by the desire to maintain special links with the US, *keep America in Europe* and strengthen the transatlantic alliance against Moscow. Second, *US policy,* under President Truman and Eisenhower, plus Secretaries Acheson and John Foster Dulles, was to *encourage the integration of Europe under the political leadership of Britain,* Washington’s special ally and nuclear friend. (Young, 1998: 74-75)

According to the British Foreign Office files of the period, Britain did not want to join the Pleven Plan, because: “First, by getting into ‘Europe’, Britain would lose her unique position in Washington, and second, by assisting at such integration, Britain would be an accomplice at what she least desired and the Americans then most wanted, some disengagement of US troops from Europe – ‘letting them off the hook,’ as Roger Makins called it.” (Young, 1998: 75) From point of view of Hugo Young, this “...effectively, ... *drove the French parliamentarians to kill the EDC.*” (Young, 1998: 76) As I see it, there were many *other factors* that also affect the contemporary French debates and decisions on the Pleven Plan between September 1950—August 1954. One of them was the French fear of entire subordination of the national military to a supranational European organization, which might be led by Germans.28
Ninth, the *London and Paris agreements* in 1954 (at Britain’s suggestion, on the basis of the Brussels Treaty, 1948)\(^{29}\) connected to establish the *Western European Union* (WEU). Finally, the *Franco – German Elysée Treaty* in 1963 and its aftermath proved also essential (Yost, 1994: 242). From that time, as James Sperling and Emil Kirchner have summarized:

Specific efforts to establish a common European security and defense policy have failed to be ratified in treaty form, like the *EDC in 1954*, or have been stillborn, like the French attempt in the early 1960s, known as the *Fouchet plan*, and the *Genscher-Colombo plan of 1980*. Subsequently, *for much of the 1960s, 1970s and early 1980s, defence and security policy remained a taboo subject, with EU affairs restricted to the ambit of what Stanley Hoffmann has described as ‘low politics’. The assumption was that the EU, preoccupied with trade and economic issues (low politics), would not be able to engage in issues of defense and security (high politics) which were controlled or influenced by the prevailing bipolar world and were ‘core’ elements of sovereignty. (Sperling – Kirchner, 1997:29)

Indeed, until the end of Cold War, neither the EU nor the WEU played central roles in Western Europe regarding formulation of a common defense and security policy of the countries of the region.

The *WEU remained heavily dependent on NATO throughout the Cold War period*, although the Brussels Treaty, both in its original 1948 formulation and in its revised version of 1954,\(^{30}\) imposed formally demanding obligations of defense solidarity on its signatory states. The reason of this fact is rooted in *international legal, security and political considerations*.

The main *international legal and security* consideration was related to the fact that with the signature of the Washington Treaty of 1949, the exercise of the military responsibilities of the Brussels Treaty Organization (or Western Union) was transferred to NATO. Later the organization was renamed WEU, when Germany and Italy, by signing the Paris Agreements, joined the founders of the organization (to Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom). The transfer of military
responsibilities of the Brussels Treaty to NATO^{xxxix} under Art. 5 of the Washington Treaty seemed to be an obvious solution, because all of the founding members of WEU have been members of NATO, too. Since the founder WEU members wanted to avoid unnecessary duplication of structures: "In December 1950, with the appointment of General Eisenhower as the first Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), the Brussels Treaty powers decided to merge their military organization into NATO, which had become the central element in the West European and North Atlantic security system."^{xli}

The main political consideration related to the fact that, neither in the US nor in Europe (except in Paris), did anyone think that the WEU would seriously address European security and defense matters. Consequently, the WEU dealt for decades with almost all of its original core functions, established by the Brussels Treaty of 1948 – apart from collective security and defense. For instance, between 1954-1973, the WEU played an active role in integration of Federal Republic of Germany into NATO (1954); monitored the Saarland-Referendum (1955); contributed restoration of confidence among Western European countries by assuming responsibility for arms control; and offered an effective consultation forum between the founding member states of the European Community with the UK.

Between 1974-1983 the WEU became a "sleeping beauty."^{xli} Almost all of the organizations’ original responsibilities, defined by the two Brussels Treaties, had been transferred to other European institutions:

When SHAPE was established, military planning was transferred to NATO. WEU lost its role in the areas of economic, social and cultural

^{xxxix} See regarding the transfer of military responsibilities of the Brussels Treaty to NATO the two following documents:


cooperation to the Council of Europe. WEU's Standing Armaments Committee was largely taken over by the Independent European Programme Group. xlili

The “wake-up kiss to the sleeping beauty” came from the Foreign Ministers of WEU-States, who met in Paris on 12 June 1984. They had to reactivate WEU, because:

Despite the creation of European Political Cooperation, the inability to move beyond discussion of the economic aspects of security within the framework of the EC led certain countries to search for alternative solutions. France, supported by Belgium, proposed to reinvigorate WEU.xlili

The Rome Meeting of WEU Foreign and Defense Ministers on the 30th Anniversary of WEU (26-27 October 1984), which was called with the main objective to work on development of a “Common European Security Identity”xliv and the gradual harmonization of defense policies of the WEU-member states, stepped further, when the ministers declared:

Continuing necessity to strengthen Western security, and that better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defense of all the countries of the Atlantic region.xlv

After the Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Reykjavik:”...Jacques Chirac, then Prime Minister of France, suggested that WEU should define a common position on security matters to guide its policy in the rapidly changing international scene.”xlvi Iran and Iraq were in peak of their war with each other, when the Ministerial Council of the WEU met in the Hague on 27 October 1987, and adopted a “Platform on European Security Interests”. In this document the WEU Council stressed the need to adapt specific

xlili Ibid., 5.

xlili Ibid., 7.

xliv NATO Handbook, ibid. 331.


criteria and security conditions as a defense within the Alliance and then called for a greater European role in security politics:

We recall our commitment to build a European Union in accordance with the Single European Act, which we all signed as Members of the European Community. We are convinced that the construction of an integrated Europe will remain incomplete as long as it does not include security and defense.”xlvii

In the Hague Platform the foreign and defense ministers of the WEU member countries reaffirmed the determination of their countries both to strengthen NATO’s “European pillar”, and their willingness to provide a more integrated Europe with a more emphasized security and defense dimension. Furthermore, the WEU Ministerial Council defined WEU’s relationships with NATO and other international organizations; defined conditions of enlargement; and called enhancement of WEU’s role as a forum for regular discussion on Europe-related defense and security issues. Moreover, the Council defined the WEU-EU relationships as relations between two separate institutions that promote to the integration of Europe. In addition, the WEU leaders have decided on undertaking WEU’s first military operations (which consisted of not only embargo-reinforcement and humanitarian assistance, but also minesweeping, mine clearance) in the Gulf war (1988-1990).xlviii

After the end of the Cold War, Western political and military decision-makers had to face several new dilemmas. One set of these dilemmas was connected with demands for early re-definition of security principles (both for NATO, and for their own countries); necessary disarmament and downsizing of military manpower, structural reorganization and effective conversion. Furthermore, the process of internal adaptation of NATO has accelerated; changes occurred in almost every field of the existence and functioning of the Western military organizations.

As the threat of confrontation with a massive “Eastern, communist” attack significantly decreased, both the US and the Western European political and military decision-makers faced new uncertainties and risks that needed the redefinition of the


‘European security’ from a wider, ‘comprehensive’ aspect. Furthermore, increased demands for crisis management skills.

In addition, the beginning of the 1990s brought about a revival of, mainly in France (Kramer, 1994), “...long-lasting aspirations for greater West European autonomy in security affairs, with a view to more balanced European-American relations. In recent years, this has become known as the effort to define an ESDI on the basis of the European Union and the WEU, and has included the definition of new institutional relations between NATO and the WEU.” (Yost, 1998: 207)

Western Europe demanded a greater extent of “Europeanization” (Yost, 1998:72) of transatlantic relationships and further institutional arrangements. During the revived debates on the independent European defense option, we could register quarrels both between the European NATO member countries and between the US and its European allies. Which were the most important milestones in the history of the independent defense debate in Europe after the end of the Cold War?

First, the Copenhagen Ministerial Meeting in June 1991, which resulted in an agreement on NATO’s core security functions in a new Europe. According to this agreement NATO had to provide one of the indispensable foundations for European security; serve as a transatlantic forum on common vital interests; deter and defend against any threat; and preserve the strategic balance within Europe.

Second, the Rome Summit in November 1991, where the signers approved the new Strategic Concept of NATO, which would have been characterized by dialogue, cooperation and collective defense. The new Concept declared a shift to a politically more active Alliance, spelled out roles for NATO’s military in peace and crisis, and called for much smaller, more flexible active force structures.

Third, the Kohl-Mitterand proposal in October 1991 for a “European Corps” based on the Franco-German brigade. The EUROCORPS was created on 21 May 1992, resulting in, rather paradoxically, (at least partial) integration of the French military (through the French 1st Armoured Division) with the German’s (through the German 10th Panzerdivision) outside of NATO. In spite of the fact that the EUROCORPS was
declared “as Forces Answerable to WEU,” xlix both France and Germany (and later Belgium /1993/, Spain /1994/ and Luxembourg /1995/) agreed to allow placing the EUROCORPS under NATO command in case of a crisis in Europe.

Fourth, the Maastricht Treaty on European Union (December 1991), which created an explicit “three-pillar” structure and increased the potential power of European institutions. According to the Maastricht Declarations, the WEU would be developed as the defense component of the European Union and as the means to strengthen the European pillar of NATO.31 At the same time, the European Union decided to ask WEU to undertake military tasks on its behalf. On the other hand, some European allies started hard debates about the role of the WEU.

For example, there was a debate in 1992 over whether a joint WEU military force could be deployed for peace-keeping missions and the provision of armed escorts for humanitarian aid. The use of force was circumscribed by a division between Britain, which insisted on a strictly peace-keeping function, and France, Germany and Italy, which argued for a peace-making mission and that involvement in the Balkans would be a first major step towards WEU as a component of CFSP. (Sperling – Kirchner, 1997:53)

Many experts disputed, how the WEU as a “hinge” would carry out its missions, not only as the defense component of the EU and the potential military tool of the CFSP, but also as a “European pillar of NATO.” It was because in practice, the WEU had neither its own forces32 nor its own permanent command structures!33

Fifth, the Oslo Ministerial Meeting (4 June 1992), where political leaders of NATO agreed to support CSCE peacekeeping activities on a case-by-case basis, and announced readiness to support peace-keeping activities in the former Yugoslavia.

Sixth, the Petersberg Declaration of the WEU’s Council of Ministers34 on 19 June 1992. According to the “Petersberg tasks”: “...military units of WEU member States, acting under the authority of WEU, could be employed for: humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks; and tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.” (Yost, 1998:209) France has argued for establishment of an enhanced, independent military structure for WEU with clear distinction of responsibilities between NATO and an ESDI within WEU, “…one in which NATO’s role

would be limited to collective defense (Article 5 task) while the ESDI would be responsible for the more probable contingencies of crisis management and peace operations (non-Article 5 tasks) and could draw on NATO assets via CJTF arrangements." (Yost, 1998:209-210) But, after long discussions, at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Berlin (June 1996), other members of the WEU finally agreed that WEU would not create its own independent military command structure and explicitly agreed “to build a European Security and Defence Identity within NATO”\(^1\)--and not within WEU. On the other hand, the WEU members urged the Alliance to identify those assets of NATO that could be made available on a case-by-case basis to WEU.

Seventh, the Brussels Summit (10-11 January 1994), where the political decision-makers of NATO reaffirmed that the Alliance is open to membership of other European states through the Partnership for Peace (PfP), and the Alliance also endorsed the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces. As a result, NATO materially expanded its ties to the rest of Europe through the PfP initiative.

Eighth, the Kirchberg Declaration by the WEU’s Council of Ministers on 9 May 1994, which not only supported an independent European satellite system, but also pushed towards further development of ESDI and the generation of a WEU Maritime Force. In addition, the ministers reaffirmed endorsements that all member nations would supply forces needed to complete any WEU-led military operations under the Petersberg Declarations, voted to allow associate partnerships to be given to nine, post-communist countries and decided on conditions for associate membership.

The WEU took a new step in the process of build-up a virtual framework, in which increased number of European countries become associated in activities of the organization. At present, there are 28 countries in the WEU’s organizational framework. But not all the participating nations have equal rights and privileges within WEU.\(^{1i}\) Although, the other 18 countries have been increasingly associated with WEU’s activities,


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but only the 10 Member States have full decision-making rights in WEU. Currently there are *four different types of legal status* within WEU. There are “member states”, “associate members”, “observers” and “associate partners.” (Table 5).

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<th>Member states:</th>
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<td>Members of both the EU and NATO.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Observer states:</td>
<td>Associate partners:</td>
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<td>Members of the EU.</td>
<td>Members of neither the EU nor NATO.</td>
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After: (NATO, 1999: 336)

In 1991, at Maastricht, WEU Members invited those states that are already members of the EU to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in accordance with Article XI of the modified Brussels Treaty, or to become observers if they wish to do so. In 1995 Greece became the tenth *Member State* of WEU (Table 6.).

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Ireland, Denmark and Finland became *Observer* in the WEU in 1992. Austria and Sweden became *Observers* in 1995, following their accession to the EU.

European Members of NATO were invited to become *Associate Members* of WEU in a way that would enable them to participate fully in the activities of the WEU. Iceland, Norway and Turkey became Associate Members in 1992.
The Associate Partner status was created in Kirchberg in May 1994. It covered those CEE countries that have signed a Europe Agreement with the EU. Thus WEU welcomed as Associate Partners the 10 new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia from 1994. On 23 March 1999, the WEU Permanent Council made the decision on Associate Membership for the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, following their accession to NATO membership.

The independent European defense debate got new impetus after the decisive US intervention, Operation Deliberate Force, which aimed to effect a cease-fire in Bosnia between August and December 1995. On 16 December 1995, NATO launched its largest military operation to date in support of the Bosnia Peace Agreement. In Simon Serfaty’s opinion:

In the fall of 1995, the Dayton agreement was more about saving NATO from dissolution than it was about saving Bosnia from partition and the Balkans from war. Without an agreement, NATO was explicitly at risk. ...At Dayton, Bosnia was a test of transatlantic solidarity in the absence of sufficient unity in Europe; beyond Dayton, Bosnia may have become a test of European unity with the proper measures of transatlantic solidarity. (Serfaty, 1998: 90-91)

The Berlin accords on the CJTF concept formalized a compromise within NATO by allowing for European NATO members to execute military missions under leadership of WEU. As Gerald B. Solomon summarized the results of debates between European NATO-allies in Berlin: “The European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), to be credible, with the WEU serving as the defense arm of the European Union, must be developed within the NATO and, hence, with the United States, as was explicitly affirmed by all NATO members in Berlin on June 3, 1996.” (Solomon, 1998: 127) Consequently, “...in fact, Paris’s desire for a tangible, acknowledged European entity within NATO was not met at the 1996 Berlin NAC.” (Zucconi, 1998: 286)

The Amsterdam Treaty revised provisions of the EU’s CFSP. The Treaty was signed on 2 October 1997 and came into force on 1 May 1999. The document stressed importance of a strengthened European CFSP and “…the inclusion of the so-called Petersberg Tasks into the Treaty as an important step in the direction of a common European security policy equipped with operational capabilities provided by the Western
European Union (WEU)... From this point, accelerated the preparation process of the transfer of WEU’s functions to the EU, with the exception of Article V of the modified Brussels Treaty.

On 8 July 1997 NATO invited the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland to Madrid to begin negotiations toward those nations becoming NATO members. The three “newcomers” joined NATO on 12 March 1999. The end of 1998 accelerated those events that have created urgent needs for further re-balancing of transatlantic relationships:

1. The “Blair Initiative” on the EU’s informal council in Pörtschach (October 1998) called for a closer European defense cooperation with the maintaining of the transatlantic relations and the Alliance, and urged for a wholesale merger of WEU into EU. France, after all, showed its willingness to lead a NATO force that would be prepared to extract OSCE observers from Kosovo;

2. The first-ever meeting of defense ministers of the EU in November 1998;

3. An accelerating process started that later led to the revision and update of NATO’s Strategic Concept and launch of the Defense Capabilities Initiative

4. The Franco-British Joint Declaration on European Defense, which was signed in St. Malo on 4 December 1998, called for greater European capabilities for more autonomous action, backed by credible forces and a much more effective decision-making process:

In order for the European Union to take decisions and approve military action where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged, the Union must be given appropriate structures and a capacity for analysis of situations, sources of intelligence and a capability for relevant strategic planning, without unnecessary duplication, taking account of the existing assets of the WEU and the evolution of its relations with the EU. In this regard, the European Union will also need to have recourse to suitable military means (European capabilities pre-designated


Although the declaration of Tony Blair and Jacques Chirac emphasized the continued commitment to NATO, it also left open the possibility of an autonomous multinational European military action “outside the NATO framework.” As the French Amaya Bloch-Lainé, the British Charles Grant and the US researcher Kori Schake have agreed, it has happened because, as a lesson learned from Iraq, Bosnia and Kosovo: “From the European perspective it is important to retain the option of a ‘purely’ autonomous European military capability, as a means for pressuring Washington to cooperate in the development of ESDI within NATO.” (Schake – Bloch-Lainé – Grant, 1999: 24)

Consequently, the EU itself has undergone considerable task expansion, which was determined by the earlier negative experiences. This transformation and task expansion process has basically been successful in political, economical and social terms, but it was not so successful in terms of security policy and the military. From the latter point of view, it retrospectively would have been characterized by a gap between capabilities and expectations (Sperling – Kirchner, 1997:49). Nevertheless, the US, however rather ambivalently, but officially, in every high-level NATO documents, always supported both enlargement of the Alliance and the establishment of a stronger ESDI inside NATO.\footnote{See also: Washington Summit Communiqué, ibid. par. 8, 9 a-e, 10 a-d.}

During the Washington Summit, in April 1999, while NATO’s air campaign has been on its way against the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) from 24 March, political leaders of the NATO countries finally agreed on detailed arrangements to lend military headquarters, multinational staffs, and the necessary equipment to European NATO allies if the Europeans decided to undertake operations the US prefers to avoid.\footnote{Joint Declaration on European Defence, par. 2, Franco-British Summit, Saint-Malo, 3-4 December 1998. Available [Online]: http://www.ambafrance.org.uk/db.phtml?id=1950 (15 February 2000)}

\[58\]
2. Internal Adaptation of the Alliance

a. Redefinition of Collective Defense

During the internal debates over NATO’s transformation there was a fear that the over-emphasized new roles of the Alliance (crisis-management and peace-operations) may weaken the NATO’s cohesion and would undermine the Alliance’s ability to carry out its traditional mission, the collective defense.

After heated internal debates, NATO allies unofficially agreed that: “If NATO is to remain relevant, the Alliance must squarely address four fundamental issues: the de facto downgrading of collective defense; the practical limits to NATO’s assumption of collective security functions; the continuing central role of the United States; and the need for lucidity in pursuing a two-track policy encompassing NATO’s new roles as well as its traditional collective defense function.”(Yost, 1998: 272)

b. Reconciliation of Traditional and New Roles

Since the NATO summit in January 1994, the Alliance finished redefining NATO’s goals, reconciling of the Alliance’s traditional and new roles; and started reforming NATO’s command structure. For organizing NATO peace-operations on the regional or sub-regional level, the political and military decision-makers had to decentralize the Alliance, and assign more responsibility for specific elements (e.g. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps) of its peace-keeping and/or peace-enforcement operations mission to particular organizations.

The ongoing Balkan crisis in Bosnia and Herzegovina prompted the US to realign NATO’s operational functions. It became clear that, NATO had to establish new institutional mechanisms with greater flexibility for the ad hoc improvisation of effective “coalitions of the willing”(Yost, 1998:72). For this purpose the US proposed concept of the Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF).

The essential purpose of CJTFs was to facilitate the organization of effective “coalitions of the willing”, particularly for non-Article 5 operations (that is, operations other than those to honor the binding commitment to collective defense in the case of external aggression against the Alliance). The operations would in all likelihood be conducted by “combined” (multinational) and “joint” (multiservice) formations. Although the formal institutionalization of the CJTF concept would take years to accomplish, a de facto CJTF was established at the end of 1995 in the form of the Implementation Force (IFOR)
for Operation Joint Endeavor, the instrument for the enforcement of the military aspects of the Dayton peace agreement in Bosnia. In addition to the Allies, IFOR ultimately included eighteen non-NATO countries, fourteen of which were NACC and PfP members. (Yost, 1998: 76)

With the approval of the CJTF concept, the Alliance took steps to create a more responsive military structure, and tried to establish a bridge between NATO and the WEU. The CJTF concept facilitated the dual use of certain NATO command structures for both NATO and possible WEU operations. NATO offered to make CJTFs and other, “separable but not separate capabilities” available to the WEU. Moreover, the concept provided an opportunity the PfP countries to integrate their efforts into NATO-run operations.

In addition, the CJTF concept gave NATO an enhanced flexibility to respond to new missions in and around Europe. The failure of the French and Belgian efforts for mediation in Rwanda, and the humiliation of Dutch forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina also called the attention of the importance of well-prepared use of CJTF.

Furthermore, it became clear that these subsystems should have enough experts, who are able to bring the recalcitrant parties to the bargaining table, help guarantee any resulting settlements, and are able to deliver humanitarian assistance. On the one hand, I am partly agree with opinion of Joseph Lepgold that: “As much as possible, CJTF headquarters commanders should be given the responsibility for planning operations that are carried out under the auspices of their headquarters and then should be held accountable for the results.” (Lepgold, 1998:105)

c. Preparation for Crisis-Management and Peace Operations

NATO’s involvement in the Yugoslav crisis began at sea 16 July 1992 with Operation Maritime Monitor. This involvement gradually escalated by launch of Operations Deny Flight, Deliberate Force and Sharp Guard; and led to establishment of NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) and Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

The NATO involvement raised many international legal questions, and shown certain practical limits of NATO’s political and military crisis management and peace operations capabilities. In connection with these facts, experts stressed the
importance of the humanitarian reasons, and the necessity of maintaining of immediate readiness for involvement into the more and more complex peace support operations of the UN, which are usually divided into "observer operations"- and "operations involving the use of armed-forces units"-type operations\(^{38}\) (Table 7).
Table 7. Two types of UN peace-keeping operations:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Factors:</th>
<th>Operations of peacekeeping forces</th>
<th>Operations of collective-security forces</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Objective of use of them:</td>
<td>1. <em>before</em> the end of Cold War: to <em>keep the peace</em> using measures short of armed force, generally without recourse to arms, at the invitation of a host country on whose soil they are stationed with prevention of fight (negotiating); observing; acting as a buffer force; keeping or restoring order; maintain a cease-fire (do not defeat an aggressor)(^1);</td>
<td>1. <em>since 1990</em>: protection of <em>refugees</em>, supervision and delivery of <em>humanitarian assistance</em>, verification of <em>troop withdrawals</em>, surveillance over the <em>demobilization and disarming of irregular forces</em>, supervision of <em>elections</em>, overseeing of transitions to new governments, monitoring of <em>referenda</em> on national self-determination, establishment and training of <em>police</em> forces, (in extreme cases:) use of force against factions that threaten law and order</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. <em>after</em> the end of Cold War: <em>multidisciplinary operations</em>, with additional rules, as e.g.: protection of <em>refugees</em>, supervision and delivery of <em>humanitarian assistance</em>, verification of troop withdrawals, surveillance over the <em>demobilization and disarming of irregular forces</em>, supervision of <em>elections</em>, overseeing of transitions to new governments, monitoring of <em>referenda</em> on national self-determination, establishment and training of <em>police</em> forces,</td>
<td>2. <em>possible additional objectives</em> (<strong>hypothetical</strong>): military <em>back-up of economic sanctions</em>, arms <em>embargoes</em>; preventive, stabilizing <em>deployment of troops</em> to a given country (territory) under acute threat; creating and defending a <em>demilitarized zone</em> to keep warring factions apart; <em>evacuation of foreigners</em> from a country torn by civil war; <em>defense of sanctuaries</em> declared by the UN; <em>punitive action</em> to end escalatory processes; <em>offensive retaking</em> of territory seized by an aggressor; <em>occupation of territory</em> to keep conflicting parties under control and prevent serious hostilities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manpower recruited from:</td>
<td>UN-member medium and smaller powers (whose neutrality was unquestioned by the disputants)</td>
<td>mainly from the <em>great powers</em> <em>(permanent members of the Security Council)</em> or alliance(s) (e.g. NATO)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required behavior:</td>
<td>have to <em>avoid conflicts</em> by the disputants</td>
<td>have to avoid conflicts* by the disputants - but not for every prize</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Required attitudes:</td>
<td>maintain neutrality, impartiality; <em>toleration</em> regarding the adversaries</td>
<td>maintain neutrality, impartiality; regarding the adversaries - however <em>toleration</em> would be not so important requirement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Use of weapons:</td>
<td>use of weapons only for <em>self-defense</em></td>
<td>use of weapons <em>not only</em> for self-defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deployment of military forces:</td>
<td>yes, possible</td>
<td>yes (under command and control of <em>rapidly deployable mission headquarters</em>(^b))</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Label&quot;:</td>
<td>1&quot; generation (classic) of peacekeeping <em>(Chapter VI. and half)</em></td>
<td>2&quot; generation of peacekeeping <em>(Chapter VI. and quarter)</em></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Examples:</td>
<td>UNEF, ONUC, UNSF, UNTEA, UNIFCYP, UNEF-II, UNDOF, UNIFIL, UNTAG, MINURSO, UNPROFOR, UNTAC, UNOSOM, ONUMOZ, UNIKOM, UNISOM-II, MINURSO, MINURCA, MIPONUH, UNDOF, UNMIBH, UNMOP, UNMOT, UNAMIR</td>
<td>UNSCOB, UNTSO, UNCI, UNMOGIP, UNOGIL, UNYOM, UNIPOM, UNTSO-SC, UNGOMAP, UNIMOG, UNAVEM, ONUCA, UNIKOM, ONUSAL, UNAVEM-II, UNAMIC, UNTAC, UNOMSA, UNOMUR; UNOMIG, UNOMSIL, IFOR, SFOR, KFOR</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^1\) When I have prepared my hypothetical matrix on the main similarities and differences between the operations of peacekeeping forces, and the contemporary and future operations of collective security forces, I was deeply impressed by the writings of the following authors: (Bennett, 1995: 154-157, 176; Lee - Pagenhardt - Stanley, 1992: 123-145; Roberts, 1996: 297-320).
Briefly, these new missions, carried out as *multidisciplinary operations*, usually have a *constabulary* nature. These constabulary forces are, as Morris Janowitz predicted several decades ago, "... continuously prepared to act, committed to the *minimum use of force, and seeking viable international relations rather than victory.*" (Janowitz, 1971: k)

The political and military decision-makers of NATO had to take into consideration the results of contemporary empirical comparative researches too. According to the results of these surveys, both the Western European, and Central and Eastern European professional military officers generally tend to prefer non-military tasks that are rated positively by the public opinion. These are, for instance "*tasks concerning the protection of the environment*, "*fighting against drug dealing*", and "*assistance in policing state borders, especially in case of mass immigration.*" On the other hand, it was a warning sign for many national and NATO-level political and military decision-makers that the responding professional military officers in almost every representative national samples, generally expressed their reluctance about the following possible, non-military tasks:

1. deployment to replace civilian workers on strike and build up civil infrastructure (e.g., road reconstruction);
2. programs against illiteracy, *harvesting and assistance for refugees; or*
3. maintaining internal security (i.e., police tasks) (Kuhlmann, 1994:98).

*a. National Debates within the Alliance*

After the end of the Cold-War, Western political and military decision-makers had to face three main sets of new challenges:

1. The first set of these challenges was related to the basic standpoint of the given countries to the political, economic, social, cultural and security integration process in Europe, determined by the country's national interests.
2. The second set of challenges was connected with those *broader* requirements for *re-definition of security principles* (both for the NATO, and for their own countries); and managing and solving simultaneously potential contradictions
between *new political, economic, social and military demands* that would result in serious conflicts in the given society.

3. The third set of challenges was connected with challenges of necessary *disarmament and downsizing of military manpower, structural reorganization* and effective *conversion*.

There were many similarities and some significant differences between the three main European NATO allies (the United Kingdom, France and Germany), regarding their approaches towards the above challenges. One of the main *differences* between the three significant European powers based on their divergent approach towards the security aspects of the European integration process (Sperling – Kirchner, 1997:234-264):

1. The main goal of the *French* political decision-makers was to make Europe a “global power” (certainly under French leadership!), with a genuine European defense policy, which should be based on combined efforts of all European nations, and on integration of EU and WEU.

2. The political elite of the unified Germany also favored a full European integration in a united Europe, but (officially) did not dream about Europe, as a new “global power.” As the Franco-German Defense Agreement, signed on 9 Dec 1996 in Nuremberg, has declared, the Germans preferred subordination of the WEU to EU.

3. The political leaders of the United Kingdom had a rather different view of the post-Cold War Europe, WEU and EU’s CFSP. From their point of view, a future Europe should be really based on a partnership of nations, but – if it is possible – without strong “super-institutions.” Consequently, they preferred to maintain WEU separately from the EU; tried to retain control over commitment of national armed forces to EU; and backed the US suggestions to reinforce European security capabilities *inside* NATO’s organizational framework (ESDI).

The *security*-related situation of the United Kingdom, Germany and France did show many similarities because the British, German and French national political and military decision-makers had to:
1. take into consideration those requirements, which were based on the interests of their own national defense policies and defense industries (and were relatively often affected or influenced by current changes in domestic political life and national public opinion);

2. meet all the specific requirements, based on NATO-membership of their country;

3. re-balance requirements of general demands for the new kind of "software-hardware-compatibility" of the entire Western defense structure. It was, because after the end of the Cold War several Western European political and military decision-makers had to recognize that contemporary changes initiated in the military "hardware" (which might have been characterized by a massive restructuring process of the organizational structure of the militaries, disarmament, and conversion of both defense industries and defense-related areas) would not be carried out fruitfully without significant change of the relevant societal contexts (the "software" of theories and institutional framework that embodies the 'hardware').

In the public of all Western liberal democracies livened up beliefs in expectation of advantages of arms limitations and real disarmament, and raised the question, whether the spread, and continuous advance of democracy would introduce an era of relative world peace? These expectations were stimulated mainly by prestigious groups of human intellectuals with Kantian and Wilsonian liberal hopes in a new, more peaceful and "better-ordered" international system of the futurelvi. According to their logic:

Real disarmament offers a range of opportunities and potential economic benefits. Disarmament is likely to contribute to peace, and, in turn, peace itself makes an immediate contribution to the peace dividend. In addition, resources released from defense will eventually become available for alternative uses elsewhere in different economies. (Sandler – Hartley, 1995: 260)

Politicians, researchers and professional military personnel looked opportunities and theories of conversion rather different from the way, than they did

lvi "Kant predicted that over the long run, humans would evolve beyond war for three reasons: the greater destructiveness of war, the growth of economic interdependence, and the development of what he called republican governments and we call today liberal democracies."(Nye, 1997:194)
before, during the Cold War (Brzoska, 1999: 132). The new approaches of ‘conversion’
focused mainly on the calculation of real and potential advantages and disadvantages of
the complex transformation process of quantitative and qualitative disarmament and
demilitarization. In opinion of several scholars (Adelman - Augustine, 1992: 26-47;
Cooper, 1995: 129-132), the efficiency of conversation might determine not only the
success of changes of the organizational structure and size of the armed forces, but also
would result in positive economic and social benefits (Russett – Slemrod, 1993: 1022-
1033).

In the US there were experts, who also calculated the total amount of
“national peace dividend.” For instance, according to calculations of Tamar A. Mehuron
(1999), the total amount of the US peace dividend between 1985 and 2004 will be some
US$ 2.1 trillion.

At the same time, several experts called the attention of the political and
military decision-makers to the fact that: “…the prospects for a peace dividend in the
aftermath of the cold war are clouded by substantial political incentives and economic
interests that may oppose or retard military retrenchment.” (Chan – Sommer,1996:70).
Moreover, according to findings of comparative researches on relationship between
defense expenditures and budgetary allocations: “... budget tradeoffs are complex and
reflect different priorities across countries. Increases in deficits can either offset or
reinforce changes in defense spending. Defense and socio-economic tradeoffs vary
considerably depending on whether the country spends relatively a lot or little on
defense.” As a result: “...there are probably some long-run costs associated with ...
cutting growth intensive programs to accommodate defense.” (Looney – Frederiksen,
1996: 93)

For a while, the political and military decision-makers chose the broader
interpretation of conversion, as an investment strategy, and focused on the process of
reallocating resources released from the armed forces and defense industries to the
civilian economy (Sandler – Hartley, 1995: 289). The conversion process of the defense
system after the end of the Cold War focused on three main areas. Politicians and experts
talk about military-political conversion (force restructuring); economic conversion
(reallocating of economic resources from military to civilian purposes) and societal
conversion (cultural and psychological reorientation). This conversion process can be characterized by several failures and successes in the 1990s, as showed on Table 8.

Table 8. Failures and successes of the structural reorganization and conversion process of the Western European defense systems

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversion issue area</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Military-political</td>
<td>• strong civilian control; well-balanced civil-military relations;</td>
<td>• in the first half of the 1990s: the Western European liberal democracies would have been characterized by hesitation while seeking for new functions for NATO and national armed forces of the alliance; missed unambiguously identified fundamental national security principles; and also missed clearly defined security and military doctrines and strategies of the NATO and its members;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>restructuring</td>
<td>• built up defensive military structures (&quot;defensive defense&quot;);</td>
<td>• frequent inconsistent management of qualitative aspects of disarmament and conversion;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• the quantitative disarmament resulted in significant reduction in almost all spheres of military organizations (reduction of number of ABC and traditional weapons; personnel; expenditures and base closures. In Germany, for instance, after the unification did release 12,228 armored vehicles /including 2,761 tanks/; 768 aircraft /including 368 combat aircraft/; 2,199 artillery systems and mortars (Roessler, 2000);</td>
<td>• high political price of (semi-)legal transfers (or illegal export) of surplus conventional weapons from Western countries to 'hot points' of the world politics (threat of 'boomerang effect' when some of these weapons are used by international terrorists);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Economic conversion</td>
<td>• (relatively limited) reallocation of financial resources (&quot;peace dividend&quot;) in many countries (e.g. in Western part of Germany, the Netherlands, Belgium);</td>
<td>• partly successful restructuring process of closely defense-related military industries and implementation of an 'integrated European market' for defense products; lack of creating enterprise zones and venture capital investments;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(reallocation of</td>
<td>• emerging willingness of Western governments for revitalization of national defense industries (from the second part of 1990s);</td>
<td>• there is not yet a common position on drawing up an integrated European armaments policy, which could cover not only intra-European transfers, public procurement and common customs arrangements, but also a common action plan for (Western and the three new NATO-member Central) European defense industries;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>economic resources)</td>
<td>• (early stage of) cross-border defense industrial consolidation (mainly in form of international joint ventures and consortia, rather than European industrial integration, basically in the aerospace and electronic sectors);</td>
<td>unsuccessful struggle for integration of European military-industrial capabilities, and ad hoc actions against negative effects of concentration process in the US arms industry (after huge takeovers and 'market-extension'-type mergers among top US arms-producing companies, mainly in aerospace, military electronics, and military vehicle sectors[lixx]);</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• successful diversification[42], and reorientation of research and development (R&amp;D) capacities for dual-use (civil and military) purposes, technology transfer, and reuse of know-how (esp. in the WEU-member countries) (only from the second part of 1990s: partly);</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Conversion issue area</th>
<th>Successes</th>
<th>Failures</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
| Economic conversion         | • relatively significant revenues from (rather successful) disposal of old-fashioned surplus conventional weapons (exported them mainly into countries of “newcomer” NATO-members and the PfP-countries), and successes during building up a long-term dependence of the above countries⁹x  
  • success of first stages of projects for re-use of nuclear materials  
  • successful redevelopment and land-use projects after base closures, with land reclamation, tourism developments, road projects, alternative uses of vacant sites (for instance residential, leisure use, food superstores in Great Britain, Sweden, Western part of Germany, the USA); | • general reduction of closely defense-related civilian research establishments and facilities (because of lack of further governmental financial support for such kind of civil R&D projects); slow and contradictory progress in integration of R&D facilities with production facilities;  
  limited applicability of R&D to civilian purposes because of rapid development in civilian (mainly computer-related) high technology;  
  • tightening international competition between companies of Western European countries and the USA in the arms industry (e.g. for leading positions on new markets of ‘newcomer’ and prospective NATO-member countries)  
  • lack of greater international exchange of knowledge-elements, guidance of special crisis-management skills and experiences of adjustment during conversion |
| Societal conversion         | • idea of the “citizen in uniform” (“Staatsbürger in Uniform”)  
  • “civilization and humanization” of military organizations;  
  • efforts for establishment of employment information centers⁹x, civil service jobs, special funds and services for veterans’ employment and training services for help of reintegration of former professional soldiers and redundant civil personnel (e.g. in the Belgium, France, the Netherlands). | • just partly successful reintegration of former professional soldiers. For example, in the reunified Germany 82,200 former professional military officer and NCOs of GDR were dismissed, and only 10,800 were accepted for further service from the originally serving, all together 93,000 professional military personnel (Roessler, 2000). The results: unemployment; relatively often mental problems of ex-combatant individuals; decreased level of average living allowance in the families of "victims of unification, disarmament, and demobilization." |

It appears that from the middle of the 1990s, official declarations on the needs of international collaboration, licensed (co)production, standardization, and managed competition in the Western European NATO-countries have revived. For example, as the “Joint Declaration on European Defence of the Franco-British Summit,” signed in Saint-Malo (4 December 1998) stated:

⁹x “For the suppliers it is important to introduce at least some military products into service in Central and Eastern Europe, if necessary almost free of charge in the interests of building up a long-term dependence. ‘Whoever gets in first will have a lock for the next quarter century,’ said a US Aerospace Industries Association official.” (Sköns – Allebeck – Loose-Weintraub –Weidacher, 1998: 213).

⁹xi The organizers of these efforts tried to adapt positive experiences of the wide network of U. S. Office of Personnel Management Federal Employment Information Centers (Cline, 1995: 111-114).
The Heads of State and Government of France and the United Kingdom are agreed that: Europe needs strengthened armed forces that can react rapidly to the new risks, and which are supported by a strong and competitive European defence industry and technology. lxii

There are signs of early stages of cross-border defense industrial consolidation, mainly the in form of international joint ventures and consortia, rather than European industrial integration, basically in the aerospace and electronic sectors.

A large number of cross-border partnerships were established in 1996 and 1997 between the leading British companies BAe and GEC, the French Lagardère group, and several German and Italian companies. In the aerospace sector consolidation advanced with the inclusion of the German DASA Dornier in the Franco-British Matra Marconi joint venture and in the missile sector with the formation of Matra Bae Dynamics. In late 1997 the governments of Germany, Italy, Spain and the UK signed an agreement to start the production investment phase of the Eurofighter 2000 programme. In the field of military electronics, a number of West European industrial alliances were formed in 1996 and 1997, a process which is likely to accelerate after the establishment of a new Thomson-CSF and the sale of Siemens' military branch to Bae and DASA.” (Sköns – Allebeck – Loose-Weintraub – Weidacher, 1998: 206-207)

We could recognize shifting emphases in the territory of research and development (R&D) activity, as well. Until the middle of the 1980s, the products of the military industry were usually technically more advanced because the research and development (R&D) activity was highly supported, and the producers could receive concentrated resources. The speed of technological transfers from the military to civilian sphere (e.g., in fields of jet travel, telecommunications, early information technology) was measurable in the 1990s, however, the length of time decreased continuously from the middle of the 1990s (Brzoska, 1998: 9-10).

III. MILITARY AND POLITICAL LESSONS OF THE KOSOVO WAR

A. THE PRELUDE TO THE KOSOVO CONFLICT

1. Historical Roots of the Conflict

The Illyrian Dardanians, who spoke proto-Albanian, were likely the native population of the region, we know today as Kosovo (Malcolm, 1999: 40). The territory was under Bulgarian-Macedonian, Byzantine, and later (from the seventh century) under Serb rule. lxiii Under the Serb rule, the Albanians became a declining and assimilating minority (Malcolm, 1999: 55-56), until the (first) great battle of Kosovo in 1389, where Prince Lazar was killed by the Ottoman Turks and a new legend was born in the Serbian Orthodox church (Kohl – Libal, 1997: 9-12).

After the victorious battle, the Ottoman Turks invaded the region and the Turkish rule lasted for some 500 years. The legendary Skanderbeg tried to keep up his resistance to the Ottoman forces, but his campaign had little military impact on the whole Kosovo. Furthermore: “... the greatest military significance of Skanderbeg for the history of Kosovo is a negative one: it consists of his narrow failure to join up with the army of Janos Hunyadi, which penetrated as far as Kosovo Polje in 1448 and was destroyed there by the Turkish Sultan.” (Malcolm, 1999: 88)

Under Turkish rule, most of the Albanians left their original Christian belief, and converted voluntarily to be Muslim because they wanted to enjoy the advantages of the zimmi (“people of protection”)-status (Malcolm, 1999: 107-108). The Serbian Orthodox Christian church has never forgiven this fact (and the lost tax) to the Albanians. Furthermore, the Serb church and population denounced their behavior, because they could reach administrative positions under Turkish rule and became “slaves of Turks, and ruthless lords of the Serb” peasant population.

lxiii “Just over 800 years separate the arrival of the Serbs in the Balkans in the seventh century from the final Ottoman conquest in the 1450s: out of those eight centuries, Kosovo was Serb-ruled for only the last two-and-a-half - less than one-third of the entire period. Bulgarian khans or tsars held Kosovo from the 850s until the early eleventh century, and Byzantine Emperors until the final decades of the twelfth.” (Malcolm, 1999: 41).
At the end of the 17th century the Habsburg Empire grew stronger in the north and loosened the grip of the Turks. The Balkan political boundaries had been redefined by the Treaty of Berlin in 1878. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania became independent, and the principality of Bulgaria was created. Slovenia, Croatia stayed under the rule of Austro-Hungarian Empire, which also took control of Bosnia-Herzegovina (Kohl – Libal, 1997: 20-21).

At the beginning of the 20th century, the power of the Ottoman Empire was declining. A wave of nationalist uprisings swept through the oppressed nations of the Balkans. War broke out in 1912, when Montenegrin troops moved across the border into the Ottoman empire. Later Serbia, Bulgaria and Greece also joined the war. The Balkan allies drove the Turks out of Kosovo, Macedonia and Albania, and Albania then declared its independence. Later, the Serbs turned against their Bulgarian allies and occupied Macedonia and Kosovo (Vickers, 1998: 62-85).

In 1914, Franz Joseph, Emperor of Austria-Hungary, who governed Bosnia-Herzegovina, sent his son, the emperor’s heir Franz Ferdinand to quell the unrest. He wanted to promote the idea of other southern Slavs to play a greater role in the Empire as a bulwark against Serbian expansionism, but he was shot down in Sarajevo by a Serb nationalist student. On 28 July 1914, Austria-Hungary declared war on Serbia, which led to World War I.

Austria-Hungary was defeated in World War I. The peace treaties of Versailles cut the Empire into parts, and drew new state boundaries in the Balkans. “The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes” was proclaimed on 1 December 1918. King Alexander I changed the name of the state to Yugoslavia (“Land of the Southern Slavs”) in 1929 (Malcolm, 1999: 264). The Albanians and Croats had feelings of resentment against the Serb-dominated, authoritarian monarchy. Alexander died a violent death in 1934.

Zogou (Zog), (with Mussolini’s approval) the “King of the Albanians,” played a contradictory role until April 1939, when the Italians invaded Albania with a 30,000-strong Italian army (Vickers, 1998: 103-143).

During World War II, troops of the Axis-powers troops invaded Yugoslavia. The Germans were welcomed by Croatian fascists. Hitler rewarded the Croats with a nominally independent puppet state, which also incorporated Bosnia. Serbia came under
the control of German troops, while the Italians occupied Montenegro. During the war there were widespread atrocities, committed by all sides. In Croatia, Serbs, Jews, gypsies and anti-fascist Croats were killed in concentration camps. Rival partisans under the communist Josip Broz Tito and under the Serb nationalist Dragoljub Mihailovic fought the Germans - when not fighting each other. Kosovo was occupied by Albanian and Italian troops while the Bulgarians invaded Macedonia.

Tito, the new Yugoslav communist leader, was able to deal with national aspirations by creating a federation of six nominally equal republics (Serbia, Croatia, Montenegro, Slovenia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, and Macedonia). In Serbia the two provinces of Kosovo and Vojvodina were given autonomous status in 1974. Tito’s unifying rule restored stability. The country’s well-balanced, delicate foreign policy resulted in relatively good relations with the West, and ensured continuous stream of Western loans and investment. Later, however, national and ethnic tensions increased due to unequal development and a growing burden of debt. When Tito died in 1980, many expected the federation to break up, but Yugoslavia was able to survive for another ten years. As the Serbian Predrag Simic, the former Director of the Institute of International Politics and Economics recalls it:

Kosovar Albanians’ mass demonstrations following Tito’s death disturbed the ethnic balance in the former Yugoslavia and triggered the rise of nationalist movements in the republics. Their subsequent boycott of Serbian elections and political institutions allowed the homogenization of Serbia – causing the political crises of present and former Yugoslavia. (Simic, 1999: 136)

From the late 1980s Kosovo was increasingly affected by tensions between rising ethnic Albanian and Serb nationalist sentiments. After Slobodan Milosevic gained power in Serbia in 1987, the autonomy given to Vojvodina and Kosovo was revoked in 1990. In Kosovo the Provincial Assembly and Government were dissolved, many Kosovo Albanians were removed from important state posts, and a state of emergency was declared (Ismajli, 1997: 195-206).
B. External and Internal Causes of the Events in Kosovo

In 1990-91 the Yugoslav Federation started to fall apart. The influence of nationalism and the wish for political independence increased in most of the former Yugoslav republics. Firstly Slovenia, and then Croatia broke away, but only at the cost of renewed conflict with Serbia. The war with Slovenia took only six days, but in Croatia led to hundreds of thousands of refugees and re-awakened memories of the brutality of the 1940s.

*Bosnia declared its independence in 1992.* The Bosnian Serbs were determined to remain within Yugoslavia and to help build a greater Serbia. They received strong backing from extremist groups in Belgrade. Muslims were driven from their homes in carefully planned operations that become known as 'ethnic cleansing'. By 1993 the Bosnian Muslim government was besieged in the capital. Sarajevo was surrounded by Bosnian Serb forces that controlled about 70% of Bosnia's territory. In Central Bosnia, the basically Muslim army was fighting a separate war against Bosnian Croats who wished to be part of a greater Croatia.

The presence of UN peacekeepers (UNPROFOR) to contain the situation proved ineffective. The US pressure, based on UN Security Council resolution, led to the end the war.

After two months of tough negotiations between the three sides sponsored by the United States at the USAF base at Dayton, Ohio, peace was finally reached after 44 months of war and more than 200000 dead. Bosnia-Herzegovina was to become a single state with international legal personality composed of two distinct entities with equal rights and endowed with large autonomy: the Muslim-Croat Federation and the Republika Srpska. (Andreatta, 1997: 13)

The *Dayton agreement*, signed in November 1995, created two self-governing entities within Bosnia - the Bosnian Serb Republic and the Muslim(Bosnjak)-Croat Federation. The main goals of the settlements were to bring about the reintegration of Bosnia and to protect the human rights. But the Dayton agreement has been criticized for not reversing the results of ethnic cleansing.
The Muslim-Croat and Serb entities then established their own governments, parliaments and militaries. The NATO-led Implementation Force (IFOR) was charged with implementing the military aspects of the peace agreement, and carry out peacekeeping missions by securing the Inter-Ethnic Boundary Lines (IEBLs), overseeing the separation of forces and monitoring the collection of heavy weapons. The IFOR was also granted extensive additional powers, including the authority to arrest indicted war criminals, when encountered in the normal course of its duties.

The OSCE provided supervision for local, regional and nation-wide elections to help reactivating the democratic process in the country. The ad hoc War Crimes Tribunal, established in the Hague, started jurisdiction against war criminals. "Finally, the European Union, in concert with the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank, was made responsible for the efforts at civilian reconstruction and economic revitalization." (Andreatta, 1997: 13)

Croatia, meanwhile, took back most of the territory earlier captured by Serbs when it waged lightning military campaigns in 1995 which also resulted in the mass exodus of around 200,000 Serbs from Croatia.

In 1998, nine years after the abolition of Kosovo's autonomy, the Kosovo Liberation Army, supported by the majority ethnic Albanians, came out in open rebellion against Serbian rule. On the one hand, the international community, while supported their claims for greater autonomy, opposed the Kosovo Albanians' demand for political independence. On the other hand, grew the international pressure on Slobodan Milosevic, to bring an end to the escalating violence in the province.

Threats of military action by the West over the crisis culminated in the launching of NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia in March 1999, the first attack on a sovereign European country in the Alliance's history.
B. FAILURE OF THE COERCIVE DIPLOMACY

1. Failure of the UN-diplomacy – Inefficiency of the International Law

The events regarding the Kosovo crisis have shown the failure of game-theoretical calculations of Milosevic. The Serb president hoped for the dissolution of the political unity of NATO countries in the long run, and tried to divide the international community (Robertson, 1999:6). According to his calculations, based on previous experiences from Bosnia, certain European NATO ally countries had shown a lack of real political incentives from the side of governments to mobilize appropriate public support for NATO’s out-of-area interventions, and participate by provision of the necessary military capabilities. Experiences of Bosnia proved to him also that there would be certain Western European NATO ally governments, who could decide that the expected internal political risks of the given NATO security action might be significantly higher for their government or country, than the likely foreign relations-related utility.\textsuperscript{lxiv} He has overestimated the importance of those basic dilemmas of international community, which so often paralyze pass of final decisions regarding real humanitarian intervention because: “It is difficult for international institutions to threaten credibly in advance to intervene, on humanitarian grounds, to protect groups that fear for the future. Vague humanitarian commitments will not make vulnerable groups feel safe and will probably not deter those who wish to repress them.” (Posen, 1993: 44)

Unfortunately, none of the Kosovo crisis-resolutions of the UN Security Council brought real solutions, either before, during, or after the Kosovo war. Furthermore, the different UN Security Council resolutions,\textsuperscript{lxv} and the negotiations in Chateau Rambouillet, identified a difficult cooperation problem. In addition, the Rambouillet negotiations demanded special coordination for mutual benefits of Serb policies on military presence in Kosovo, and US and NATO policies on aid to the KLA – and

\textsuperscript{lxiv} Regarding NATO’s collective action problems in Bosnia-Herzegovina, see: (Andreatta, 1997: 15)

provided many lessons for those political decision-makers that would prefer to use tools of coercive diplomacy.

2. **Dilemmas of the Diplomatic Efforts of the EU, WEU and OSCE**

It seems to be useful to define the cooperation problems during the negotiations using *game theory terminology*. The agenda before the reach of the Rambouillet Agreement implicitly defined not only withdrawal of Serb FRY forces\(^{43}\) and termination of US aid to the KLA as *cooperative strategies*, but also their opposites, *non-cooperative or defecting strategies* (threat by US-led NATO-air strikes).

As I see it, the *bargaining problem* can be analyzed in terms of the *formal game models* that have been developed in the *theory of international cooperation*. The final results of the negotiations (urged mainly by the US), generally confirmed realist and neorealist arguments about the potential difficulty of international cooperation, especially on security issues.\(^{44}\)

The negotiations during the Kosovo war included on the one hand, representatives of the *Kosovo Albanians and the Contact Group-members\(^{lxvi}\) with (subsequent) UN-authorization. On the other hand of the table sat representatives of the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia and their Kosovan Serb (numerical minority) “clients” in Kosovo (hereafter: *Serbs*). We should take into consideration the fact that, each actors (players) had various inner divisions of interests and conflicts (e.g., conflicts inside the US-led Kosovo *Verification Mission*, or Russian efforts both inside and outside the Contact Group for almost continuously limiting effectiveness of *coercive diplomacy* of the US and NATO).

The preferences of the players changed over time and the individual actors learned from their experiences. Several of the actors had different images and misconceptions about the others, and often evaluated the approach of the other side by misperceptions. In addition, we should not forget the fact that the basically US-led NATO-members of the Contact Group first tried to use an almost full scale of different *non-military strategies* before they decided on the latent exclusion of Russia, and the
gradual deployment of all the three subtypes of coercive diplomacy. NATO just finally decided to start bombing, as a last resort.

The international community “drew a line” for Serbia in 1991. Then they imposed sanctions against Serbia between 1992-95, because the Serbs fought wars against other former republics (Slovenia, Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina) of the one-time Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (S.F.R.Y.). During this time the Serbs tried ethnical cleansing and to seize control of significant parts of territories of their adversaries. In addition, the Serbs violated collective rights of their Albanian minority citizens, too. The ethnic Albanians in Kosovo, in defiance of the Serbian authorities, proclaimed independent the “Republic of Kosovo” and started non-violent resistance movement to the oppressive rule from Belgrade.

After October 1997, when the Serb police crushed demonstrations of Kosovo Albanians students, the US-led NATO, the EU, and the OSCE tried to warn the Serbs again. They indicated that any further action by excessive use of Serbian police forces against civilians in Kosovo would provoke a stronger response by the international community. In the first quarter of 1998 the EU and the US then, rather defensively, tried to buy time to explore a negotiated settlement before contemplating more forceful strategies.

This lasted until 31 March, when the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1160. This resolution condemned the excessive use of force by Serbian police forces against civilians in Kosovo, and established an embargo of arms and material against the FRY. As I see it, from this time, we could recognize more determined efforts of retaliation and carefully measured reprisals by the international community. From this point of view, April 29, 1998 would be an important date. This was when the Contact Group members (except Russia) agreed to re-impose some of the sanctions on Former Yugoslavia that had previously been lifted, and initiated several new sanctions against Belgrade. According to several critics of the policy of the US and its EU-member NATO-allies, the events in July 1998 would be evaluated as an engagement of a relatively low-level, carefully controlled “test of Serbian (domestic political and military) capabilities”.

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1xvi The members of the Contact Group were as follows: the US, Great Britain, France, Germany, Italy — and Russia.
According to the literature, the first type of coercive diplomacy (A) was: "...a defensive strategy that is employed to deal with the efforts of an adversary to change a status quo situation in his own favor" (George, 1994:8). This would be the persuasion of the opponent to stop short of its goal (see e.g., of the text of the UN, which called for cease-fire on August 16, 1998, after the Serbian forces announced capture of last big rebel stronghold, the mountain town of Junik).

The second type of coercive diplomacy (B) would aim to persuade the opponent to undo its action. See e.g., the text of the Clinton-Yeltsin summit meeting on Sept. 2, 1998, when the Secretary of State Albright and Russian FM Ivanov finally issued a joint statement to Kosovo calling on Belgrade to end the anti-KLA offensive and for the Kosovo-Albanians to engage with Belgrade in negotiations. But, according to several experts, the US tried to reach certain changes in the composition of the Serbian government and in the nature of the regime, when they tried to support opposing political and military forces (e.g. Zoran Djindjic; KLA).

Rather than attempt to identify a single preference ordering for each actor, I have tried to identify four orderings on each side, each of which reflects both different subgroups and different images held by the opposing side. Consequently, in the following, rather simplified negotiation analysis I comprised of sixteen two-by-two games of an "empirically derived behavioral model", which would have been defined by preference orderings in case of general assumption of "rational" opponents. With this analysis I want to explain how changes in one side could cause coalitions to shift on the other and could have altered other aspects of the bargaining process right before the Kosovo war.

From my point of view, the UN Security Council resolutions and the negotiations in Chateau Rambouillet theoretically defined both cooperative (C) and defecting (D) strategies for each side. The outcomes, results from the choices of both sides, were referred by the strategy pairs: CC, DD, CD, and DC. Since the strategy choices available to the two sides in the case of the Kosovo war were not identical, I had to adopt case-specific labels for the strategies and outcomes.

The above mentioned international security agendas defined the Serb strategy as stopping violence in Kosovo and withdrawing the Serb troops" (W, the cooperative
strategy) or "keeping the troops in Kosovo" (K, the defecting strategy). On the other hand, the potential US-NATO and Kosovo Albanian strategies were defined as either seeking ways of peaceful negotiations (N, cooperative) or starting the promised NATO-air strikes (A, defecting). From this point of view, 23-24 September, 1998 is an important date.

On September 23: "The UN Security Council approves (with China abstaining) Resolution 1199, which is calling for immediate cease-fire and political dialogue. The resolution demands a cessation of hostilities and warns that, 'should the measures demanded in this resolution . . . not be taken . . . additional measures to maintain or restore peace and stability in the region' will be considered."

At the same time NATO issued ultimatum to Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to stop violence in Kosovo or face air strikes. Furthermore, "...NATO takes the first formal steps toward military intervention in Kosovo, approving two contingency operation plans -- one for air strikes and the second for monitoring and maintaining a cease-fire agreement if one is reached."\(^{lxxvii}\)

The Contact Group meeting in London (8 October 1998) gave US envoy Richard Holbrooke a mandate for his mission to Belgrade to secure agreement to the requirements of UN SCR 1199. On 13 October NATO agreed Activation Orders for air strikes. The same day Holbrooke reported to NATO that Milosevic had agreed to the deployment of an unarmed OSCE verification mission to Kosovo and to the establishment of a NATO aerial verification mission. Following negotiations with senior NATO military representatives, the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) authorities also agreed to reduce the numbers of security forces personnel in Kosovo to pre-crisis levels. On 27 October, NATO agreed to keep compliance of the agreements, which were underpinned by UN Security Council resolution 1203, under continuous review and to remain prepared to carry out air strikes should they be required, given the continuing threat of a humanitarian crisis. The negotiations also addressed the timetable for the withdrawal of

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the Serbian armed forces, but in the end it became clear that this “pseudo-issue” was used by the Serbs to delay or accelerate the agreement.

The possible combinations of the above mentioned two pairs of strategies (W or K, versus N or A) defined at least four likely outcomes. The results produced by a pair of strategies could vary, depending on the number and effectiveness of the Serbian troops, the effectiveness of US-NATO coercive diplomacy, and many other residual factors. Interestingly, both the Serbs and the UNSC followed continuous rather than discrete strategies. For example, from the Serbian side: efforts to get just partial withdrawal of their military forces; from UNSC-side: the ambiguous phrase on the priority of “...taking full account of the Rambouillet accords and the principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia”\textsuperscript{lxviii} – which was officially not challenged by the negotiating Kosovo Albaninans, and was manifestly agreed on by the US-NATO side, as well. The payoffs from each outcome could also vary with endogenous changes in preferences or the development of linkages between Kosovo and other arenas of negotiation between the major international players.

On the other hand, it is fact that the US-NATO side tried to follow rather discrete, more unambiguous strategies, when they – after the failure of the initial “try-and-see” and “gradual turning of the screw” variants of the coercive diplomacy - used first different forms of “tacit” ultimatum, and after that addressed full-fledged classic ultimata (George, 1994: 18) to the Serbs.

The strategy pair KA is the status quo of mutual defection, which I would call War. In this strategy the Serbian troops remain, and the US-led NATO troops start the air strike (as it has happened, in fact). The UNSC-preferred process implicitly aimed at reaching WN, the cooperative outcome (“Rambouillet accords”, or simply: “Raimbouillet”).

At least at the start of the negotiations, each side would have preferred a version of the outcome known in the literature as exploitation (DC). For the Milosevic-regime, exploitative victory would have been represented by KN (“failure of the NATO’s US-led

political intervention" /AC/), under which Belgrad could maintain its troops in Kosovo indefinitely and external aid to the rebel KLA-resistance would end.

During the negotiations, the US-NATO side manifestly preferred WA, the Serbian Capitulation (SC), wherein the Serbians would withdraw their troops and KLA would (partially) reach its goals with international political aid: autonomous self-government inside the borders of Yugoslavia. However, it would be presumed that there would have been an additional, latent goal (Kosovo’s full political independence and/or reunion with Albania, on a long run) behind the UNSC and US-NATO-G8 efforts. The UN Security Council Resolution on Kosovo seems to support this suspicion, when it states: “Facilitating a political process designed to determine Kosovo’s future status, taking into account the Rambouillet accords (S/1999/648).”lxix But at the very beginning of the Rambouillet negotiation process no one considered either exploitative outcome really feasible.

After overlooking all the mathematically possible preference orderings and imaginable combinations of outcomes of games for each side, we could find a simplified logical framework for calculations of possible negotiations and the likely policy options on each side. From my point of view, in the case of Kosovo, these options would be related to:

• the definition of Serbian and Albanian national interests;
• what the order of preference should have been for the possible outcomes of negotiations;
• the possible internal and external effects of withdrawal of the Serbian troops from Kosovo and/or
• termination of political ( economical and/or military) aid to the remaining Serbian resistance in Kosovo after the withdrawal (see bitter lessons of Bosnia-Herzegovina for the Serbs);
• possible effects of strategy pairs on the ultimate military-political outcomes; and

- the "intentions" (the inferred order of preference) of the other side (e.g. the Serb fear of loss of Kosovo, the nation's "holy land"\textsuperscript{1xx}).

After taking into consideration the minimally necessary (basically symmetrical) presumptions\textsuperscript{45} from the point of view of the Theory of Rational Decisions, we could make the following matrix with overview of possible preference orderings for negotiators at the Rambouillet accords (Table 9):

### Table 9. Preference Orderings for Negotiators at the Rambouillet accords

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ordinal Payoff</th>
<th>Serbs (in Yugoslavia and in Kosovo)</th>
<th>US-NATO and Kosovo Albanians</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Deadlock</td>
<td>Prisoners' Dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3</td>
<td>War</td>
<td>Ramb.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Ramb.</td>
<td>War</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>SC</td>
<td>SC</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dominant strategy</td>
<td>Keep troops (K)</td>
<td>Keep troops (K)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. on possible outcomes:
   - War = (KA);
   - Ramb. = Rambouillet accords (WN);
   - AC = Failure of the NATO's US-led political intervention (KN);
   - SC = Serbian Capitulation;
2. meaning of numbers of ordinal payoffs (on an ordinal scale): 4 (most preferred)... 1 (least preferred).

The above mentioned symmetrical assumptions eliminate most of the 24 possible orderings among the four main alternatives. Of the five likely preference orderings that remain for each side, one is the equivalent of the game of Chicken, in which War is the least preferred outcome for each side. The Chicken-model provides a model of brinkmanship, but it can be eliminated from the analysis of this "low-intensity" regional conflict (Oye, 1986:25-57). The above matrix shows the four preference orderings for each side, in order from most to least aggressive.

1. The first position ("deadlock") corresponds to the kind of game in international politics when there is no possibility of cooperation.

\textsuperscript{1xx} On the deep historical roots of this feeling, and the sources of old national misperceptions between Serbs and Albanians, see: (Kaufman, 1999; Hedges, 1999)
2. The second ordering on each side would be the so called "prisoners' dilemma", which has been exhaustingly analyzed as the prototype of the cooperation problem (Goodby, 1996: 238). In my opinion, both of these preference orderings embody classical "zero-sum game" notions of Cold War conflicts: capitulation of the other side was the most preferred outcome, and one's own capitulation was the least preferred. In these cases the actors usually show unconditional preference for a forward policy (or a role), and follow dominant strategies (what they often prefer regardless of their opponent's strategy). In addition, these positions often correspond to the "enemy image" described by attribution theory, and this fact would also result in difficulties during negotiations.

3. The third preference ordering would have been the so called "assurance or stag hunt"\textsuperscript{lxxi}. The US officially preferred Rambouillet compromises to all other outcomes because it would have been a step towards further institutionalization of cooperation between the US-led NATO, EU and the UN. On the other hand, however (according to critical voices of current dominant roles and possible future aspirations of the US in Europe), it is likely that the US still preferred war to the capitulation of the Serbs. From this point of view, it was because the US political and military decision-makers wanted to demonstrate to their European NATO allies, whose contemporary desires revived to assume greater autonomy for their security through a strengthened CFSP that "who is still the ruling power" in Europe.

4. The fourth ordering theoretically corresponds to the game of "harmony", which would have been a real agenda in the case of similar preference order of the players on both sides of the negotiation table. This orderings theoretically resemble Richard Herrmann's (1992: 432-65) strategies of "disengagement," if the perceived military threat is low; or "fortress," if the perceived military threat is high.

From this point of view, it was extraordinarily interesting how the emphases have shifted in the domestic political life of Serbia quieted the voice of those forces of Serbian

\textsuperscript{lxxi} See: (Jervis, 1978: 167-214; 1988: 317-349)
political opposition, who considered necessary withdrawal of Serbian troops from Kosovo (W, the cooperative strategy). On the other hand, raised the question, how and why the voice and preference ordering of self-image of “Fortress-Serbia” became dominant? (Table 10.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>US-NATO (and Kosovo Albanian) Positions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dead-lock</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W 2,2 1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K 4,1 3,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Prisoners’ Dilemma</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W 3,2 1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K 4,1 2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stag Hunt</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W 4,2 1,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K 3,1 2,3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Harmony</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>W 4,2 2,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>K 3,1 1,3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes:
1. pairs are: (Serb ranking: US-NATO & Kosovo Albanian ranking)
2. on possible preference orderings:
   - upper left: cooperative strategies :
     - W (withdrawing the Serb troops);
     - N (seeking ways of peaceful negotiations);
   - lower right: defective strategies :
     - K (keeping the troops in Kosovo);
     - A (NATO-air strikes);
3. meaning of numbers of ordinal payoffs (on an ordinal scale): 4 (most preferred)... 1 (least preferred).

Since I would like to avoid the methodological mistake of post-facto “explanations”, I have to close my game theoretical analysis at this point. There are only two additional points that I would like to emphasize.

Firstly, experiences of the development of conflict situation showed that there were many additional situational-contextual factors. These were, for instance, the behavior of the entire UN; current interests of the UNSC-members (mainly the US, Russian and Chinese governments); and the changing attitudes of the NATO-allies.
(Germany and Greece), which made almost indeterminate outcomes of strategic interactions during the pre-war period.

Secondly, the war-time experiences emphasized the extraordinarily important role of members of the corpus of political elite (in both the US and Serbia), and the influence of several social psychological and personal psychological factors that might deeply affect the foreign policy-making practice of the elite during emergency situations. Moreover, we can recognize that international actions and political intentions of states sometimes can be different from those that the political elites think and declare they will or would do. Furthermore, the Kosovo-war showed that—in spite of Robert Jervis’s thesis (1976: 54)—expert observers are not always able to accurately define, characterize, and predict possible intentions and behavior of political and military decision-makers.

Thirdly, majority of experts on international politics and apologetics on the practical usefulness of game theoretical models believed until almost the last minutes that the dealing players finally would reach the mutually preferred cooperative outcomes through various bargaining tactics. Most of them thought probable to reach positive outcomes by using various bargaining tactics, based on different possible combinations of "stug hunt" and/or "harmony" preference ordering. This evaluation was common, in spite of the fact that, last mission of the U.S. special envoy to Belgrade proved to be unsuccessful on 22 February. It was, because President Milosevic refused the classic ultimatum delivered by US Special Envoy Richard Holbrook, and did not allow the 28,000 NATO troops in Yugoslavia to implement the broad interim autonomy for Kosovo. But the Serbs declared their willingness to further compromise on the next day.

At first sight, the Serb declaration of 23 February seemed to be a hopeful, cooperative signal and a certain indication of willingness to compromise. It was because the Serbs, after enhanced political pressure of the international community, declared in Paris that they would support a political agreement, and would accept broader autonomy for Kosovo Albanians. But the Serbs attached to a change of certain conditions and wanted the omission of several “humiliating stipulations of the military annex” of the planned agreement.

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According to information of the British *The Independent*, the American negotiator, Christopher Hill, attached "Appendix B", the special military appendix, to the original peace package over the European Contact Group-member Russian negotiator, Boris Mayorski's head. He has done it just at the last minutes of negotiations, when the Serbs have already accepted all the political demands of the peace agreement, offered by the Contact Group. As the Serbs saw it, the military annex, which was backed by the American Robin Cook, but was charged by the Russian representative in a written objection on international legal bases, demanded the virtual NATO occupation of not only Kosovo, but all Yugoslavia.

The full annexes demanded NATO rights of road, rail and air passage across all of Yugoslavia, the use of radio stations, even the waiving of any claims of damages against NATO. For any state – even one as grotesque as Serbia – this would have amounted to occupation. (Fisk, 1999: 2)

Furthermore, the Serbs charged the peace deal because, from their point of view, it has been changed at the last minute to suit the best interests of the Kosovar Albanian side in comparison with the original proposals of the February meetings in Rambouillet. The Kosovo Albanian delegation unilaterally signed the peace deal. As the Serbs retrospectively see it, "Appendix B" was a "casus belli", a "Trojan horse" for the already prepared military intervention against Yugoslavia because:

In any event, when NATO commanders met the Serbs for the 'military-technical agreement' at the end of the war – after thousands of Kosovo Albanians had been murdered by Serb forces and as many as 1,500 civilians killed by NATO bombs – the supposedly crucial military annex was never mentioned. Miraculously, NATO – with 40,000 troops to move into the province (10,000 more than originally envisaged) – no longer needed appendix B. Not a single NATO soldier moved north of Kosovo into the rest of Serbia. (Fisk, 1999: 2)

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C. FORCE DEPLOYMENTS AND THE KOSOVO WAR

1. Priorities of NATO-diplomacy

NATO has consistently represented the same position throughout the prelude and further development of the crisis in Kosovo. From the end of 1997, NATO, alongside with the UN, the EU, the OSCE and the Contact Group focused regularly on prevention of further negative development of the crisis situation in Kosovo.

In December 1997 Foreign Ministers of NATO countries confirmed that NATO’s interest in Balkan stability extended beyond Bosnia to the surrounding region, and expressed concern at the escalating ethnic conflict in Kosovo. This concern was re-emphasized in a statement by the North Atlantic Council (NAC) in March 1998, following the killings by Serbian forces of some 30 Kosovo Albanians in response to a KLA attack near Drenica.

Throughout 1998 diplomatic efforts to find a peaceful, negotiated solution were taken forward by the Contact Group, which consisted of representatives of the US, UK, France, Germany, Italy and Russia. But the international community became aware that this would not be enough. That is why NATO also tried to play a very active diplomatic role to prevent further escalation of the crisis. As participants of the Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) summarized in Luxembourg on 28 May 1998:

We are in close consultation with the governments of Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia about the measures involving their countries. We have informed Partners of the development of NATO’s thinking prior to this meeting. With Russia, we have consulted in a special meeting of the PJC. We will use the meetings of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the NATO-Ukraine Commission and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, both here in Luxembourg and in the future, with a view to seeking the cooperation of Russia, Ukraine and our other Partners with our efforts to help achieve a peaceful resolution of the crisis in Kosovo. We have invited the Secretary General to inform the UN Secretary General, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the WEU Secretary General and other appropriate international organisations with a view to suggesting the coordination of the activities of the various international organisations involved in Albania and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia.\textsuperscript{1xxiv}

Furthermore, participants of the Ministerial Meeting of NAC declared: "We will continue to monitor closely the situation in and around Kosovo and we task the Council in Permanent Session to consider the political, legal and, as necessary, military implications of possible further deterrent measures, if the situation so requires."\textsuperscript{lxv} The Defence Ministers of NATO countries tasked NATO military planners to produce a wide range of air and ground options, for military support to the diplomatic process. For instance, regarding a potential air campaign of NATO: "Throughout the summer of 1998, SACEUR Clark oversaw development of as many as 40 different versions of contingency airstrike plans." (Grant, 1999) The results of planning activity of military thinkers had been reviewed by the NAC by early August. NATO also carried out air and ground exercises in the neighboring countries of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY) to demonstrate the Alliance’s ability to rapid power-projection into the region.

In spite of the original hopes, the Serbian ethnic cleansing continued, following original imaginations of the covert Serbian plan (code name “Operation Horseshoe”) for expelling Kosovo Albanians from their homeland. As a result, by mid September 1998, approximately 250,000 Kosovo Albanians had been driven from their homes. It was clear that many of them would die in the coming cold winter. Finally, on 23 September the UN Security Council adopted Resolution 1199 (UN SCR 1199), which urged a cease-fire between the KLA and the Serbs, and demanded the start of real political dialogue for avoiding the impending human catastrophe. NATO Defense Ministers met in Vilamoura (Portugal) on the next day, 24 September, and affirmed their determination to take not only diplomatic, but also military action, if it would be required. The ministers also agreed to begin the formal build-up and readying of forces to conduct air strikes.

But despite an initial trend towards stabilization of the situation, the ethnic cleansing continued. After the massacre in the village of Racak on 15 January 1999, NATO increased its state of readiness for action. On 28 January, NATO issued a new combined diplomatic and military “solemn warning” to both Milosevic and the KLA leadership. On 29 January, the FRY/Serbian and Kosovo Albanian leaderships were summoned to talks at Rambouillet in France. After the initial success of negotiations, the

\textsuperscript{lxv} Ibid., par. 7.
second round of talks (15-19 March) in Paris had been suspended because of the FRY/Serbian sides refusal to negotiate. When the Serbians started a massive FRY security force counteroffensive against the KLA, the OSCE Chairman-in-Office, the Norwegian Foreign Minister, Knut Vollebaek, announced the immediate withdrawal of the OSCE verifiers. The verifiers withdrew from Kosovo during the night of 19/20 March.

As British Defence Secretary George Robertson retrospectively saw it, after the failure of the Holbrooke-mission to Belgrade on 22 March, it became clear for political and military decision-makers of NATO that:

His failure to honour the terms of the Holbrooke agreement, the FRY/Serbian dismissal of the Rambouillet Accords – which gave Belgrade a continuing role in Kosovo – and, above all, the increasing level of repression by Milosevic’s security forces made action by the international community necessary. A new Serbian offensive was already under way and there were good reasons to believe that he would embark on a further onslaught that would cause yet more civilian casualties, destruction and displacement. (Robertson, 1999: 3)

After final consultations with the Allies, Javier Solana directed NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) to initiate air operations in the FRY on 23 March.

Consequently, Operation Allied Force started as a short, sharp response to the final collapse of Rambouillet negotiations. According to the official sources, the following were NATO’s objectives for President Milosevic during the operations:

President Milosevic must:

- Ensure a verifiable stop to all military action and the immediate ending of violence and repression in Kosovo;
- Withdraw from Kosovo his military, police and paramilitary forces;
- Agree to the stationing in Kosovo of an international military presence;
- Agree to the unconditional and safe return of all refugees and displaced persons, and unhindered access to them by humanitarian aid organisations;
- Provide credible assurance of his willingness to work for the establishment of a political framework agreement based on the Rambouillet accords.

---

2. The Preparation of the Operations

Who was that ferocious enemy, against whom the NATO prepared so cautiously and sent into battle all together more than 1000 aircraft, between them over 500 fighters and bombers, during the 79 days long war?

According to information of the British International Institute for Strategic Studies, at the start of the war over Kosovo the air force of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (Serbia-Montenegro) was made up of 15 MiG-29, 47 MiG-21F/PF/M/bis, 17 MIG-21U combat aircraft, and altogether 52 armed helicopters. In addition, as the military experts of the BBC pointed: “Yugoslavia also has a considerable number of ground troops and a defence network, which is well equipped for air defence.” Indeed, the Yugoslav Army had 85,000 people (37,000 conscripts); the Navy had 7,000 people (including approx. 3000 conscripts), and the Air Force made up 16,700 personnel (from which 3000 were conscripts) before the war.

Furthermore, according to information of the Military Balance 1999-2000, the Yugoslav air defense had eight surface-to-air missile (SAM) air defense battalions, equipped with SA-2 Guideline, SA-3 Goa, SA-6 Gainful, SA-10 Grumble strategic surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) that would have cover long range up to 100km. In addition, the Serbs had had SA-9 and SA-13 two tactical air defense missiles (mid-range up to 20km); and almost all of the army units were equipped with SA-7, 16 and 18 single shot shoulder launched, man-portable missiles with up to 6 km range, too.


Since March 1989, when Serbian tanks ringed the ringed the building of the Kosovo assembly and forced the legislators to vote to revoke the province’s autonomous status, Milosevic had garrisoned Yugoslav army and paramilitary police forces in Kosovo (Bennett, 1995:100). These forces consisted of the following elements until the end of 1998: altogether 22-23,000 troops (12,000-13,000 Army and approx. 10,000 Police troops); totally approx. 250-260 armored personnel carriers/infantry fighting vehicles (APCs), from which 190 were Army-, and 60-70 were Police-subordinated APCs; 197 Tanks of the Yugoslav Army; 266 Army Mortars/artillery pieces, larger than 100 millimeter; and 110 Police (82 mm) mortars (Grant, 1999)

NATO’s initial plan envisioned a few days of air operations against a carefully chosen set of about 50, previously politically approved military targets. These military target categories included air defense sites, communications relays, and fixed military facilities, such as ammunition dumps. In this initial stage of the campaign there were not approved civilian targets on the list of strikes either in downtown Belgrade, or around the country. Air planners had data on much more than 50 militarily important targets, but the political consensus in NATO was not strong enough to support action with wider aims.

Milosevic ignored the NATO airstrikes, just as he had flouted NATO-backed diplomacy, by accelerating the ethnic cleansing. His goal was to use his forces to push ethnic Albanians and the KLA out of Kosovo before NATO could react.

When the air campaign started, the Serb forces had battlefield dominance in Kosovo over the KLA. The estimations of the strength of Milosevic’s forces were different. For example, according to Rebecca Grant:

The Yugoslav army reportedly numbered about 90,000 men, equipped with 630 tanks, 634 armored personnel carriers, and more than 800 howitzers. The Yugoslav 3rd army was assigned to Kosovo operations, along with reinforcements from 1st and 2nd armies. About 40,000 troops and 300 tanks crossed into Kosovo, spreading out in burned out villages and buildings abandoned by the refugees. Paramilitary security forces from the Interior Ministry were engaged in multiple areas across Kosovo (Grant, 1999).
3. Operation Allied Force

The NATO air strikes began on 24 March 1999, and continued for 78 days, until its official termination on June 20, 1999. During this time, at least\textsuperscript{lxxxi} 37,465 sorties were flown by allied aircraft; and approximately a quarter of the total number of the sorties flown (at least 9,500) were strike targets in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.\textsuperscript{48}

When the airstrikes began, there were 112 US and 102 Allied strike aircraft committed to the operation. Within eight weeks \textit{13 of NATO’s 19 nations sent} altogether 277 aircraft (192 fighters/bombers; 63 support and 19 reconnaissance aircraft, and 3 helicopters) to participate.\textsuperscript{lxxi} At the end of the conflict all together 720 US and 325 Non-US, (mostly European NATO ally, and some Canadian), aircraft were committed to the operation (Table 11).

Table 11. NATO Aircraft Force, as of 2 June 1999

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type</th>
<th>US</th>
<th>Non-US</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Fighter, bomber</td>
<td>311</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>550</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support aircraft</td>
<td>270</td>
<td>63</td>
<td>333</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Reconnaissance</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>23</td>
<td>57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Helicopters</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>105</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>720</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>1,045</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From: (Tirpak, 1999: 4)

Twelve European Allies and Canada provided forces for Operation Allied Force. It was, because Iceland, Luxembourg and Greece abstained, and the three new NATO members, Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic – however, because of different reasons – did not joint. Hungary had to be careful because of the ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina. On the other hand, the Czech Republic and Poland simply did not want to participate in an “unjustified military operation against a sovereign European country.”

\textsuperscript{lxxi} Unfortunately, the official sources of NATO, the US and the main contributors of the operations in Kosovo (the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany and the Netherlands) provided rather different, sometimes significantly contradictory data. Consequently, in the future, where it is possible, I will use as a basis of my analysis those data, which were provided by US official sources (e.g., by the US House of Representatives or by the Pentagon).

Later, in spite of the potential risks, Hungary offered its air space, air defense system and airfields for the NATO action, and several military aircraft used this opportunity. Many of these aircraft were from the US Air Transport Force, which provided a high level of support to the operation by more, than 500 Hercules C-130, VC10 and TriStar sorties being flown into the Balkans theatre during the period of the conflict. At the end of May, the US armed services provided 52 per cent of the strike and 70 per cent of the strike support capabilities (Table 12).

Table 12. Cumulative Sorties during Operation Allied Forces, as of 27 May 1999*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Contributor/Activity</th>
<th>US services</th>
<th>Other NATO</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>No.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strike</td>
<td>3,600</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>3,350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>14,150</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>6,150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>17,750</td>
<td></td>
<td>9,500</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* DoD reported June 9 that total sorties had topped 34,000.

After (Tirpak, 1999a:5)

In spite of the above fact, General Del Court, the French Chief of Defense, stated the significance of united efforts of UK and France during the Kosovo operations:

I would first like to emphasize the fact that the UK and French force contributions are comparable in size, not identical but very complementary. Put together, they represent 20% of the air assets of the Alliance, and 50% of the European contribution.\textsuperscript{lxiii}

Indeed, the 67 British\textsuperscript{49} and the 66 French\textsuperscript{50} aircraft provided at least two-thirds of the altogether more than 320 aircraft, provided by the European NATO allies. Furthermore, according to the final, post-conflict assessment of the French MoD on the summarized European contribution to the Kosovo campaign, the most significant European contributors to the NATO operation were France (28%); the United Kingdom (16%), the Netherland (16%), Italy (13%), Germany (8%) and Belgium (7%).\textsuperscript{lxxiv}


\textsuperscript{lxxiv} According to the French data source, Turkey, Spain, Danemark and Norvegia did not provide significant sources or assets for the NATO operation (their summarized contribution are calculated, as 3-3 per cent). Source: Ministère de la Défense, “Le Dossier. Les Enseignements du Kosovo,” Annexe “L’effort des Européens” Available [Online]: http://www.defense.gouv.fr/actualites/dossier/d36/index.html (17 January 2000)
As the British retrospectively saw it: “1,618 sorties were flown by UK aircraft, of which 1,008 were strike sorties.” (Robertson, 1999:4) The French sources provided a total of 2735 sorties flown by French aircraft, from which 1261 were strike sorties.\textsuperscript{xxxxv}

There was a significant lack of balance between the US and its European NATO allies. As the so-called Kosovo Burdensharing Resolution, passed by the US House of Representatives on 30 July 1999, summarized, after they took into consideration all the military efforts taken by NATO in general, and the US in particular during the Kosovo war:

- The allied air forces totaled approximately 1,051 aircraft, of which 724 were United States aircraft.
- United States aircraft flew 53 percent of the strike sorties during the operation and 66 percent of the total number of sorties.
- The United States provided 79 percent of the aircraft utilized for refueling and logistical support and 68 percent of the total number of aircraft involved in the operation.\textsuperscript{xxxxvi}

On the basis of the above facts, the Resolution of the US House of Representatives called for a much more equitable sharing of the costs associated with the reconstruction, peacekeeping, and UN programs in Kosovo. This claim seems to be justifiable, since the US provided the most significant portion of the participating manpower (altogether 31,600 personnel, from which 13,200 were afloat and 18,400 were ashore). To say nothing of the fact that certain European allies simply lacked the organizational, technical, and manpower-managing abilities to field those forces that they have previously offered to NATO for purposes of Operation Allied Force. The shortcomings of the European side caused delays during force deployment:

Two months after its initial deployment on 12 June, the force had still not reached its target of 52,000 NATO personnel. It is a startling reality that only perhaps 2-3% of the personnel under arms in Europe are available for deployment on missions such as KFOR and the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. (MB, 1999: 290)  


Furthermore, the US provided the overwhelming majority of Naval assets, too. The total Naval contribution of the European NATO Allies to Operation Allied Force were only one French and one British aircraft carriers; one British submarine; altogether six destroyers (provided by the UK, France, Greece, and Italy) and 10 frigates (UK/SP/TU/IT/NL/GE/GR) – while the US Naval forces consisted:

1. Cruisers USS Vella Gulf (CG 72), Leyte Gulf (CG 55);
2. Destroyers USS Gonzales (DDG-66), USS Ross (DDG-71), and USS Peterson (DD969);
3. Aircraft Carrier USS Theodore Roosevelt (CVN 71);
4. Submarines Albuquerque (USS 706), and USS Boise (SSN 764).
5. Furthermore, the US Kearsarge Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) also contributed to the campaign by providing of such assets as the USS Kearsarge (LHD 4), USS Ponce (LPD 15) and the USS Gunston Hall (LSD44).\textsuperscript{1xxxvii}

The air campaign itself seemed to follow previous suggestions of those US air force experts, who have urged for establishment of a new Air Force doctrine specifically for US peace operations. These experts suggested the use of \textit{coercive airpower} of the US and its allies through a \textit{unified approach}, which would be based on a \textit{gradual build-up} of the destroying capabilities, and the integration of the following four main aspects:

A coercive campaign will integrate aspects of

- \textit{denial}: reducing or eliminating an adversary’s ability to resist;
- \textit{punishment}: destroying those things the enemy values most;
- \textit{risk}: short, measured attacks on high-value targets, followed by a pause for an adversary to reflect on what continuing conflict is likely to cost;
- \textit{decapitation}: attacking leadership and command and control (C2) targets, perhaps including direct attacks against the leadership of an adversary organization.” (Thomas – Cukierman, 1999: 30-31)

Operation Allied Force began with strikes on air defense targets across the FRY and a limited range of military targets in Kosovo and elsewhere in southern Serbia. In late March, when Milosevic showed no sign of responding to the first, opening phase of the coercive air campaign, the range of NATO attacks was widened to cover militarily carefully selected targets of high military value across the FRY.

NATO’s targeting policy was under strict political control both on national and Alliance-level. For instance: “Within NATO, SACEUR consulted the Secretary General

closely throughout the campaign to ensure that the target selection process took proper account of the political direction given by the NAC.” (Robertson, 1999:4) It was emphasized, because all the national political and military decision-makers of the particular NATO-allies and NATO itself stressed their intent to minimize civilian casualties.

The political imperative and international legal obligation for reduction of “collateral damage or civilian casualties” turned upon a wide scale of heated debates and decisions regarding targeting, the means of attack, and weapons selection (e.g. use of a higher percentage of precision-guided munitions). In spite of this fact occurred unavoidable damages to civilian properties, death and/or injuries of civilians. The Human Rights Watch organization counted approx. 150 incidents in which civilians were injured in NATO attacks. In addition:

On the basis of its investigation, Human Rights Watch has found that there were ninety separate incidents involving civilian deaths during the seventy-eight day bombing campaign. Some 500 Yugoslav civilians are known to have died in these incidents. We determined the intended target in sixty-two of the ninety incidents. Military installations account for the greatest number, but nine incidents were a result of attacks on non-military targets that Human Rights Watch believes were illegitimate. (HW, 2000:2)

In turn, as that the not really pro-NATO Human Rights Watch also had to acknowledge, the NATO allies tried to avoid overuse of “psychological warfare strategy of harassment of the civilian population” (HW, 2000:9), and were eager to follow public expectations when decided about next targets. (This willingness accelerated mainly after the “mistaken” bombing on the Chinese Embassy, the destruction of a train that crossed a bridge during an air attack, and the death of some Kosovar civilians in NATO air strikes in the vicinity of Korisa). For instance, the US government:

After the technical malfunction of a cluster bomb used in an attack on the urban Nis airfield on May 7 (incident no. 48), the White House quietly issued a directive to restrict cluster bomb use (at least by U.S. forces). Cluster bombs should not have been used in attacks in populated areas, let alone urban targets, given the risks. The use prohibition clearly had an impact on the subsequent

lxxxviii For instance, before the bombing of the Serb Radio and Television headquarters in Belgrade on 00April 23; the New Belgrade heating plant, and seven bridges: “There was considerable disagreement between the United States and French governments regarding the legality and legitimacy” of the targets (HW, 2000:8).
civilian effects of the war, particularly as bombing with unguided weapons (which would otherwise include cluster bombs) significantly intensified after this period. Nevertheless, the British air force continued to drop cluster bombs. 

In addition, in each case NATO launched investigation of the causes and made public as much of the details, as it was possible. This open approach of NATO was in a stark contrast with Milosevic’s rather successful information warfare, based on distortion, propaganda, and various forms of information warfare (netwar, cyberwar).

Charging NATO aircraft were initially restricted to operating below 15,000 feet because of the multitude of the Yugoslav air defense weapons, anti-aircraft artillery and shoulder launched SAM systems. This resulted in certain difficulties for pilots to use their precision guided bombs with higher accuracy within difficult weather conditions.

However, the near “invulnerability” of NATO aircraft operating at medium level and effective use of EA-6B Prowlers for jamming the enemy’s radar significantly reduced likelihood of effective use of crucial elements the Serb Integrated Air Defense System (IADS). Consequently, the Serb opportunities to exploit propaganda from shooting down or capturing any NATO aircrew had been also minimized.

3. Specific Military Factors

According to several experts, the Yugoslav Army and paramilitary forces quite effectively used former Soviet and contemporary Iraqi experiences and tactics for preserving their resources. For instance, by widespread use of camouflage; dummy tanks and military vehicles; usage of military vehicles to transport refugees; usage of civilian vehicles to transport troops into cities and villages that NATO was reluctant to strike (Evans, 1999). From the point of view of several harsh critiques of the air campaign of the Allies:

...despite the thousands of bombing sorties, they failed to damage the Yugoslav field army tactically in Kosovo while the strategic bombing of targets such as bridges and factories was poorly planned and executed. Changes are being considered within NATO, including the radical overhaul of how strategic targets are identified and considered for attack. (Butcher – Bishop, 1999:1)

The final NATO battle damage assessment is not available yet. In spite of this fact, there are some reports that suggest that the damage caused by air-strikes of the
Alliance could be really only a significantly smaller portion of the Yugoslav armed forces than was estimated in that previously published intelligence reports.51 (Table 13.)

Table 13. Final vs. Initial Assessment of Results of Operation Allied Forces During the Humanitarian Intervention in Serbia (24 March –20 June, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Targets</th>
<th>Successful strikes(^{xxxix})</th>
<th>Multiple strikes(^{xc})</th>
<th>Decoy strikes(^{xci})</th>
<th>Unconfirmed strikes(^{xcii})</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs)</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>317</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military vehicles</td>
<td>339</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>219</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Artillery and mortars</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>416</td>
<td>857</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After: (Clark – Corley, 1999)

Nevertheless, according to the official assessment of the US Department of Defense (DoD), the air campaign proved successful both in military and political terms. Their calculations are based on preliminary results of targeting during Operation Allied Force in Kosovo, as of 10 May 1999, when the Serb withdrawals had begun, and bombing had been suspended\(^{xciii}\). According to these assessments, the NATO air and missile strikes destroyed all the petroleum refining in Serbia, and all the Serbia-Kosovo rail corridors. In addition, the successful air strikes destroyed 70 per cent of the Serbian aviation equipment assembly and repair facilities, and approx. two third of the ammunition production capabilities of the Serbs. (Table 14)

\(^{xxxix}\) "Successful strikes: on-site findings and assessed strikes. A successful ‘strike’ means the weapon impacted a valid target." (Clark – Corley, 1999)

\(^{xc}\) "Multiple strikes:
1. First phase analysis: strikes on the same day against the same type of target within 2 nm.
2. Second phase analysis:
   • Tanks/APCs: strikes against the same type of target within 2 nm over the entire 78 days;
   • Artillery/mortars/military vehicles: strikes against the same type of target within 2 nm over a 3 day period." (Clark – Corley, 1999)

\(^{xci}\) "Decoy: Decoy assessment based on any single source of intelligence. Decoys are not included in final strike assessment." (Clark – Corley, 1999)

\(^{xcii}\) "Unconfirmed strikes: Based on the methodology, there is not enough evidence beyond the mission report to support a successful strike." (Clark – Corley, 1999)

\(^{xciii}\) The entire bombing campaign was halted at 10:50 a.m. EST 20 June, 1999.
Table 14. Assessment of the US DoD Regarding Results of Targeting of Serbian
Fixed Targets During Operation Allied Force (as of 10 May, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Sub-system</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Defense Industry and Infrastructure</td>
<td>Explosives production</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ammunition production</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Aviation equipment assembly &amp; repair</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored vehicle production &amp; repair</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Petroleum refining</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1st Army facilities</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2nd Army facilities</td>
<td>20%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3rd Army facilities (Kosovo)</td>
<td>60%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Electric power</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia-Kosovo road corridors</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Serbia-Kosovo rail corridors</td>
<td>100%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 8 After: (Tirpak, 1999b)

The US DoD official assessment also declared that the NATO allies could destroy 60 per cent of the 3rd Army capabilities in Kosovo. According to this information, most of the destroyed mobile Serbian military weapons (e.g., tanks, armored personnel carriers, artillery and mortars) belonged to the 3rd Army. On the other hand, the published official assessment on the results of destroying surface-to-air missile (SAM) systems seemed to be very impressive, but a little bit contradictory.

Table 15. Official Assessment of the US DoD Regarding Results of Targeting Serbian Mobile Targets During Operation Allied Force in Kosovo (as of 10 May, 1999)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>System</th>
<th>Sub-system</th>
<th>Number Destroyed\textsuperscript{xciv}</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Mobile Serbian Military Weapons</td>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Armored Personnel Carriers</td>
<td>222</td>
<td>33%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Artillery &amp; mortars</td>
<td>454</td>
<td>50%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Defense Fighters</td>
<td>MiG-29 fighter</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>85%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>MiG-21 fighter</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Surface-to-Air Missile Systems</td>
<td>SA-2 battalion</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>67%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-3 battalion</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>70%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>SA-6 battery</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After: (Tirpak, 1999b: 3)

As David Atkinson (1999) saw it, the Yugoslav air defense forces rather successfully adopted a “duck-and-hide” strategy to counter US and European NATO-ally approaches to the “suppression of enemy air defenses” (SEAD). The Yugoslav air defense

\textsuperscript{xciv} “Numbers were provided by DoD on June 10 and subsequently confirmed by Army Gen. Wesley K. Clark, Supreme Allied Commander Europe.” (Tirpak, 1999b:3)
defense units were not eager to use their radar and only gradually intensified their air defense fire, because they did not want to provide primary sources of emissions to guide high-speed anti-radiation missiles (HARM) to themselves. According to the official US DoD sources, the Serbs fired only approx. 700 air defense rockets during the 6950 strike sorties of NATO.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Air Defense System Elements</th>
<th>Missiles Fired</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Radar-guided SA-6</td>
<td>266</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Radar-guided SA-3</td>
<td>175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IR man-portable</td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Unidentified</td>
<td>126</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>673</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

On June 2, DoD said observed firings totaled nearly 700.
From: (Tirpak, 1999a:6)

There were other similarities among Iraqi and Yugoslav air defense tactics (e.g. when many Yugoslav aircraft tried to tempt surface-to-air missile /SAM/ traps NATO combat aircraft). From the point of view of several experts, this similarity is not accidental, since there was lively trafficking of military experts and information between Yugoslavia and Iraq just prior to the beginning of Operation Allied Force (Gertz, 1999: A12). Consequently, it is likely that Baghdad shared many of its experiences about potential tactics, flight and fighting patterns of the aircraft of the US and its European NATO allies\textsuperscript{xcv} - and this knowledge could also help the Yugoslav military leaders to avoid more serious casualties.

Moreover, regarding these experiences, it is likely that potential future adversaries of the U.S. and its European NATO member allies will learn a lot from mistakes of others. These adversaries are likely willing to use lessons of the Gulf War, Somalia, Bosnia and Kosovo when developing countermeasures for potential U.S. and NATO actions and techniques. Furthermore, according to information of Robert Burns (1999), Belgrade sold the wreckage of the downed B-2 Stealth fighter to either Russia or China. Certainly, in this case, it is very likely that either of these powers might use the obtained information to update their passive radar system against stealth technology of the US!

In the US the Kosovo war was often described as a new *post-modern information war* (Grant, 1999). According to Lt. Gen. William Donahue, the Air Force’s director of communications, the Kosovo campaign was the “first real cyberwar” (Verton, 1999b). Indeed, during this second “*infowar*” various types of high-tech equipment (e.g. laser designators, portable missiles, and sensors) and “*intelligent*” high-tech weapons (e.g., Paveway III laser-guided bombs,\(^{52}\) or the BLU-114/B soft bombs to short circuit electrical distribution centers\(^{53}\) ) were used.

During the war in Kosovo the US and its allies used a wide range of methods of modern *psychological operations, command and control, and electronic warfare*. Furthermore, the US and some of its allies planned intensive use of hackers, as guerrilla “*cyber-warriors,*” on international computer networks. During the first stages of the Kosovo campaign,”...the Pentagon considered hacking into Serbian computer networks to disrupt military operations and basic civilian services, but officers finally decided not to because of legal uncertainties of the kind described in the general counsel’s report of May.”\(^{xcvi}\)

The Pentagon, because of legal uncertainties, mentioned in the “Assessment of International Legal Issues in Information Operations”(Verton, 1999d) and highlighted in the recommendation of the Pentagon’s Office of General Counsel, officially denied NATO’s anti-Serb info warfare attempts. The Pentagon declared its intentions to avoid to use either attacks by computer-network attacks (e.g., by electromagnetic pulse devices) or information operations (IO) tactics, like IO attack based on deception and perception management technics (communication of false, computer-generated images to enemy field commanders in the name of their superiors, etc. /Verton, 1999d/). However, Army Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, finally acknowledged some months later, in October 1999 that: “...the *U.S. military conducted an offensive form of computer warfare* against Yugoslavia as part of NATO’s air war.”\(^{xcvii}\)


\(^{xcvii}\) Ibid.
The Serbian counter moves caused a sort of surprise. As Lt.Gen. William Donahue, the US Air Force top network communicator later evaluated it: "In addition to being characterized by an extensive use of commercial IT products, including commercial satellite access and World Wide Web-enabled processes, Operation Allied Force saw one of the first concerted cyberwar campaigns against U.S. systems." (Veron, 1999b) Furthermore, Donahue confirmed that "coordinated cyberattacks" started against the United States and NATO allied forces during the Kosovo air campaign from almost all over the world. For instance, (probably Serbian) anti-NATO computer hackers successfully paralyzed the main World Wide Web server, which supported the public affairs apparatus of the US-led NATO operation in Kosovo. Others tried to break into several public Pentagon Web sites and the internal network of the White House. Significant portion of other attacks were launched from Chinese government-controlled Internet addresses, mainly after the "accidental" bombing of the country's embassy in Belgrad, to "hell-bent on taking down NATO networks." (Brewin, 1999)

Moreover, as Chris Scheurweghs, head of NATO's Integrated Data Service that is responsible for providing public information on the NATO operation over the Internet, acknowledged Serbs carried out very successful attacks against the Web-server of NATO headquarters in Brussels too (Veron, 1999c). The unsuccessful countermeasures of the experts in Brussels raised the question whether would it be safer both for the US and its allies if NATO ask for assistance from the US Defense Information Systems Agency’s Joint Task Force for Computer Network Defense (Veron, 1999c). This incident highlighted a new field of the RMA technology gap between US, and its European NATO allies.
E. CONSEQUENCES OF THE KOSOVO WAR

1. The Effects on UN

As I see it, the Kosovo war resulted in significant changes in the external relationship of the UN with both NATO and the US. In addition, experiences of the war regarding poor UN (and EU, WEU, OSCE) performance called attention of unavoidable necessity internal transformation of the organizational system and capabilities of the world organization.

Before the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo the practice of NATO followed requirements of Art. 53, Chapter VIII, the UN Chapter, which stated: "The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council..." Consequently, until Kosovo, when the Russian and Chinese veto in the UN Security Council created a stalemate situation, NATO acted as a "subcontractor" of the UN.

However, as contemporary examples of failures of UN crisis management efforts showed it not only in Kosovo, but also in Rwanda, Bosnia, East Timor and Chechnya, presently the UN is unfortunately not really well-prepared for either effective political crisis-management, or undertaking "post-Cold War-type multidisciplinary operations."54

Before the end of Cold War the 'traditional peace-keeping functions' meant mainly keeping the peace between the conflicting actors using measures short of armed force. The usual activity of UN peacekeepers were observing; negotiating; maintaining cease-fires by acting as a puffor force for prevention of fight between adversaries; and keeping or restoring order - without recourse to arms. The UN peacekeepers were usually officially invited into the "host" country at least with one of the conflicting parties. The UN peacekeepers had to, as far as it was possible, be involved into armed conflicts, and were prohibited seeking to defeat of a potential aggressor.

After the end of the Cold War emerged several new, additional rules for UN peacekeepers. These were related to more emphasized protection of refugees, supervision and delivery of humanitarian assistance, verification of troop withdrawals, surveillance
over the *demobilization and disarming of irregular* forces, supervision of *elections*, overseeing of transitions to new governments, monitoring of *referenda* on national self-determination, and establishment and *training of police* forces.

To undertake this new kind of "post-Cold War" missions, the UN should carry out a significant internal reform. The US and its European NATO member allies usually suggest the leaders of the UN to give serious attention to the following five areas for a successful transformation:

1. Security Council restructuring;
2. collective responsibility in peace and security;
3. collective responsibility for sustainable development and human security;
4. managing the collective effort; and
5. financing the collective undertakings.

Unfortunately, during the 1990s the UN did not carry out the objective required modernization of the organizational and budgetary management, and did not increase cost effectiveness of the organization, neither under Boutros Boutros-Ghali (1992-1996), nor under Kofi Annan (since 1997).

The question after Kosovo is: whether what would constitute "significant reform" that would satisfy the US and other displeased (e.g., European) UN members? Since the US is the largest financial contributor to the UN's regular and peacekeeping budgets, a diminishing and less-active American involvement in the United Nations would result in serious consequences in the future of the world organization.

2. The Effects on EU and WEU

Political and military experiences of the Kosovo intervention shocked several European leaders, and initiated a two-folded process. On the one hand, the political leaders of the EU harshly demanded for a broader and more independent political role for Europe in the new transatlantic bargain during the European Council's meeting in Cologne on 3-4 June 1999. On the other hand, only two months later, the same political leaders, presumably after better-founded reckoning of real military and political capabilities of their countries, struck a much more low-keyed chord regarding principles

xcviii “Charter of the United Nations. Chapter VIII on Regional Arrangements.” In: (Bennett, 1995:481)
of Europe’s future CFSP, when they adopted their “Millennium Declaration” during the European Council’s meeting in Helsinki.

In Cologne, Germany, the leaders of the EU decided to enhance the EU’s effectiveness as a global diplomatic actor. As the Guiding Principles of the “Presidency Report on Strengthening of the Common European Policy on Security and Defence” clearly stated after the meeting of the European Council in Cologne, on 3-4 June 1999:

The aim is to strengthen the CFSP by the development of a common European policy on security and defence. This requires a capacity for autonomous action backed up by credible military capabilities and appropriate decision making bodies. ... The development of an EU military crisis management capacity is to be seen as an activity within the framework of the CFSP (Title V of the TEU) and as a part of the progressive framing of a common defence policy in accordance with Article 17 of the TEU.\textsuperscript{xcix}

According to vision of the EU leaders, the above “credible military forces” military forces should have command headquarters, staffs and forces of its own for peacekeeping and peacemaking missions in future regional crises, like those in Kosovo and Bosnia, even if their biggest NATO ally, the United States, decided not to intervene. Moreover, political leaders of the 15 EU member countries agreed to absorb the functions of the WEU. In addition, they said the Western European Union’s 60,000-troop force, EUROCORPS, would be put at the disposal of the new, more assertive Europe that is taking shape under the European Union.\textsuperscript{55} "In that event," they said, "the WEU as an organization would have completed its purpose."\textsuperscript{56}

US diplomats have welcomed Europe’s newfound willingness to do more for itself. But they remain skeptical about whether the European NATO allies will actually be willing to spend the billions of dollars it would take to build the stronger European defense pillar that US defense secretaries have been saying they wanted for decades.

The EU declaration made clear that the Europeans recognized that there is still a lot of work ahead of them to create the kind of military decision making and planning ability that NATO has had for many years. As a first step, French President Jacques

Chirac suggested that the **WEU’s general staff and military committee**, both based in a small headquarters in the center of Brussels some distance from NATO’s, **should be transferred to the EU** and presided over by its **new foreign and security policy coordinator**, Javier Solana of Spain, former Secretary General of NATO.

In addition, the **French President, Jacques Chirac sent an "action plan"** at the end of July 1999 to the other European Union countries, including four EU-members that do not belong to NATO and **proposing both civilian and a military standing committees for a new European defense system**. According to some observers, the hidden aim of the “Chirac-plan” is that with establishment of a European general staff and a council of 15 European Union ambassadors France will be able to keep Solana from making European defense policy more deferential to NATO than the French would like. The "Chirac-plan" also called for an "...European military staff progressively organized to assume the triple functions of oversight, analysis and planning." As Christopher Patten of Great Britain, the organization's new commissioner for external affairs, said in Brussels on 10 October 1999:

> What we're trying to do is to make sure the European voice is heard at the same strong decibel level as when the European Union speaks as the world's biggest trade bloc and the biggest foreign aid donor, ...Kosovo has made us think, and so it should, about how to coordinate research and development, about the European armaments industry, and our spending priorities, but it also makes us think about other areas where we could also be coherent, such as conflict management, peacekeeping and conflict resolution,... (Craig, 1999a)

On the other hand, the EU’s new commissioner for external affairs also emphasized that increased cooperation among the member countries on defense could only strengthening the European component of the Alliance because, as he added: "I don't think the debate will be resolved anywhere else but within NATO...." (Craig, 1999a)

Two months later, the urgent demands for establishment of a significantly strengthened common European policy on security and defense issues have faded. This is due to the fact that the European Council adopted its Millennium Declaration at their meeting in Helsinki, between 10 and 11 December 1999. The new tone of the EU Council meeting and declaration has been determined two weeks before Helsinki by strong statement of the British Prime Minister on his “pre-harmonizing” meeting with French
President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. Tony Blair emphasized on the press conference of the Franco-British Summit that:

Let me make one thing quite clear. This is not about creating some single European army under a single command, it is not an attempt in any shape or form to supplant or compete with NATO. ... It is about strengthening Europe’s military effectiveness and capabilities in a way which will both reinforce and complement the NATO Alliance as the cornerstone of our defence, whilst enabling Europe to act effectively in situations where the Alliance as a whole is not engaged. (Emphases added –KZL)

Consequently, although Nicole Fontaine’s Presidency Conclusions contained covered critiques about the legality of the Kosovo intervention, the overall tone of the Millennium Declaration of the EU Council proved much more calm, than of the Cologne Declaration was earlier. The second chapter of the Millennium Declaration on the future “Common European Policy on Security and Defence” echoed Blair’s above cited words, when stated:

The European Council underlines its determination to develop an autonomous capacity to take decisions and, where NATO as a whole is not engaged, to launch and conduct EU-led military operations in response to international crises. This process will avoid unnecessary duplication and does not imply the creation of a European army. (Emphases added –KZL)

On the other hand, the European Union, in the spirit of the “pre-harmonization efforts” of the two weeks earlier Franco-British Summit, at least on paper, made a new step toward objective independence in military matters, when the European Council declared:

Building on the guidelines established at the Cologne European Council and on the basis of the Presidency’s reports, the European Council has agreed in particular the following:

- cooperating voluntarily in EU-led operations, Member States must be able, by 2003, to deploy within 60 days and sustain for at least 1 year military forces of up to 50,000-60,000 persons capable of the full range of Petersberg tasks;
- new political and military bodies and structures will be established within the Council to enable the Union to ensure the necessary political guidance and

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strategic direction to such operations, while respecting the single institutional framework;

- modalities will be developed for full consultation, cooperation and transparency between the EU and NATO, taking into account the needs of all EU Member States;

- appropriate arrangements will be defined that would allow, while respecting the Union's decision-making autonomy, non-EU European NATO members and other interested States to contribute to EU military crisis management;

- a non-military crisis management mechanism will be established to coordinate and make more effective the various civilian means and resources, in parallel with the military ones, at the disposal of the Union and the Member States. 

3. The Effects on the US, and on the US’s Position in NATO and Europe

As Helsinki has shown, after Kosovo, there emerged a broader consensus between the main European actors about the necessity of increased autonomy for Europe in security and defense. On the other hand, the leading European powers reaffirmed their idea that both NATO’s, and implicitly, its leading force, the US’s, role is still essential in Europe. This statement seems to be true, in spite of the fact that France still plays the role of “the reluctant, anti-American ally in NATO” (Yost, 1994:240), and differences remained between the viewpoints of the French and the British, as well as between the French and the Germans.

Moreover, recent scholarly theories and political statements on equitability of the US’s demands for renewed burden-sharing arrangements, and advantages of existing US – Western European economic interdependence could receive larger publicity. On the other hand, some of the scholars made it clear that there is no independent regulative function in NATO that would guarantee members’ “escape” from direct American pressure, in case of internal conflicts of the Alliance (e.g. between Greece and Turkey).

As contemporary events of the Balkans “powder keg” (Elsie, 1997) proved for political leaders of the European NATO allies, changes of the international (political, military, economic, social and cultural) environment resulted in new, more complex and diffuse threats in South-Eastern Europe. These threats demand much more active future participation of Western Europe.

cii Ibid., 28.
But Bosnia and Kosovo have also shown that there are many differences between *risk perceptions and threat assessments* of the NATO allies, not only on both side of the Atlantic, but also within Europe. This fact would result in *divergence* between NATO allies in *intentions of use* of tools of coercive diplomacy and military force for appropriate *expression of national interests*. This would lead to further quarrels regarding the reorientation of NATO’s command structure to address the perceived threats, and might result in a *growing North-South, and East-West strategic disconnection* within the Alliance.

Furthermore, there are *difficulties in defining national interests clearly, lack of knowledge of strategic and foreign policy cultures, historical sensitivities and national biases of other Allies*. There is also a declining interest in foreign affairs in the US Congress; and there exist certain trends toward American *neo-isolationism* (Rudolf, 1996: 175-195). Moreover, there are differing views about the organization of *multilateral cooperation* and its *institutional framework*.

There is an increasing gap between the *technological levels* of the US and its European NATO partners, because of the lack of European political will to spend the necessary resources. In addition, as aftermath of Kosovo has shown, there is a need for more appropriate *distribution of responsibilities, costs and risks* between NATO allies.

The European NATO allies received the message of the US House of Representatives, sent by the “Kosovo Burdensharing Resolution” of 30 July 1999, which openly called for a much more equitable sharing of the costs associated with the reconstruction, peacekeeping, and UN programs in Kosovo:

> It is the sense of the House of Representatives that in view of the *disproportionately large share of the costs* of the military air operation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) in the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia that *were borne by the United States, the United States should not pay more than 18 percent of the aggregate total costs* associated with the military air operation, reconstruction in Kosovo and, when conditions permit, in other parts of the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Kosovo peacekeeping force, and programs of the United Nations and other international organizations in Kosovo (para 1) (Emphases added – KZL)
A demand for a more pragmatic division of labor between Europe’s multiple institutions (EU, OSCE, WEU, NATO) exists. Different and competing ideas and several unsolved questions about the ultimate purpose of an ESDI in NATO and CFSP in EU; and their relationships exist. There are certain intra-European disagreements about roles, internal division of tasks, and future desired relationships among NATO, WEU and EU components of future “security architecture.” For instance, regarding the role of the WEU, Great Britain supported a more autonomous role of the WEU as the European pillar of NATO; France called for a tight WEU/EU incorporation; and Germany suggested the absorption of the WEU into the EU.

4. The Effects on NATO

During and after the Kosovo war there started a new transatlantic bargain “...that balances Europe’s desire for a broader and more independent political role with its continued reliance on US and NATO military capabilities.” (Schake – Bloch-Lainé – Grant, 1999: 20). This new bargain tries to make the US commitment to European security sustainable; seeking consensus in the NAC on issues and possible organizational challenges of decision-making in NATO vis-à-vis the CEDP within CFSP of the EU. On the other hand, as a result of this bargain, there emerged many new external, organization-related challenges and threats:

The first set of these challenges is related to the fact that there are basic differences between strategic cultures of the US and its European NATO allies. Today the Western European governments, because of competing foreign and domestic priorities, and the political culture of dependence fostered by the Cold War, tend to avoid using coercive diplomacy and the military force itself, as central policy tools. Furthermore, many European NATO allies seem to be unwilling to make the necessary institutional changes and spend the necessary sums of money that an independent strategic role would require. This fact motivate questions regarding two phenomena current institutional irrelevance and military futility of the EU/WEU on the one hand, and long term external legality, inner balances, manageability and political-military effectiveness of NATO, on the other hand because:

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iii The Kosovo Burdensharing Resolution, the US House of Representatives, ibid.
The European tendency to eschew the use of force as a central policy tool makes Europe unwilling, and increasingly unable, to play a strong military role in defending common interests. This means that the burden falls disproportionately on the US, even in cases where Europeans agree that force is necessary. (Schake – Bloch-Lainé – Grant, 1999: 21)

The second main set of challenges rooted in the risk of potential inability of the Alliance to balance leadership in crisis management. It is because: "Understandably, Americans fear military actions that Europeans would start but could not finish, thereby having a trigger effect on the United States – or military actions that Europeans would want to command even before they explain how they will contribute.” (Serfaty, 1997: 91)

The third main set of questions is related to NATO's enhanced area of responsibility, the Alliance’s enlargement. In addition, there is a fear that NATO’s out-of-area crisis management attempts might undermine consensus between the allies, or would cause lack of public support, as it happened in case of the Greek public regarding US led NATO action in Kosovo,civ This raised a new question: Where is the ultimate border of the further NATO enlargement?

Furthermore, experiences of Kosovo led to a new question: Would it result in risks transforming NATO from a well-organized collective defense alliance into a new general European collective security institution?

Moreover, there are new challenges of the internal adaptation of NATO, too. The first set of questions reflected worries about potential state competitions within NATO (see: Greece vs. Turkeycvi) and fears of institutional gridlock and bureaucratic redundancy in NATO in the long run. The second set of questions regarding NATO’s internal adaptation have been related to new implementation of the CJTF and ESDI concept; and dilemmas of the ESDI’s current “visibility without capability” status (Yost, 1998: 211). The third set of new internal challenges was related to the urgent task of

restructuring of the system of NATO’s regional and sub-regional command
headquarters; and regional integrated headquarters; and effective preparation for non-
Article 5 type operations.

In addition, the prospects for significant improvements in the functioning and
effectiveness of the CFSP seem to be quite limited, because many of the member states of
the EU perceived that the cost of the (at least, partially) lost sovereignty and prestige
would exceed the perceived benefits of the integration. As a result, these states are (not in
declarations, but in practice) usually reluctant to adopt all of the institutional adjustments
that would be necessary to significantly enhance the real effectiveness of the EU’s CFSP.

F. CONCLUSIONS OF LESSONS LEARNED AND LOOKING TO THE FUTURE

There are many lessons of the Kosovo war. From my point of view, political
decision-makers of both the US and the European NATO ally countries can rely on some
of the following international legal and political collective action-related lessons, when
they start to improve the Transatlantic relationships for securing NATO’s long term
viability. In addition, there are some strategic, operational and tactical level military
lessons of the campaign that the military decision-makers can employ in future.

1. Main Challenges and Possible Impacts of the Kosovo War on NATO’s
   Long-Term Viability

As experiences of the Kosovo war have highlighted, and fresh findings of systems
management and operational analysis of the campaign have proven, NATO’s long-term
“viability” depends on many political, economic, social, cultural and security/military-
related factors. Among these factors are the strategic, operational and tactical levels of
military effectiveness. From this point of view, the war was evaluated as a highly
effective “post-modern war.” But the fact that the Alliance was able to perform its new

CV “Anti-American sentiment is strong in Greece. Many Greeks believe the United States, although a
NATO partner, favors Turkey in territorial disputes and war-divided Cyprus. Thousands of Greeks

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crisis-management role effectively in military terms is only one aspect of verification of NATO’s viability.

As the events and the aftermath of the war have shown, NATO’s long term viability heavily depends on the commitment of its members to the Alliance. As experiences of EU-related diplomatic preludes of the Kosovo NATO’s campaign did show it, the only verbally existing willingness and the detailed arrangements regarding European use of NATO assets “in case” is not enough, since: “... these arrangements exist only on paper so far. In reality, when the NATO allies decided to use air power to try to force Yugoslavia to accept a settlement in Kosovo, only the United States had the hundreds of airplanes to throw into the battle and intelligence satellites and weaponry to mount a campaign with minimal risk to pilots.” (Craig, 1999b)

As I have recognized, Kosovo demonstrated that NATO was able to perform its new roles effectively, and the military operations were really a success, but there were some collective action problems that had negative effect on operations.

a. International Legal Lessons

While the majority of NATO-member countries found the idea of the “Blair-doctrine”cvi implicitly reasonable and carried out their “humanitarian intervention” in Kosovo, the humanitarian intervention caused heated debates, based on international legal and moral principles. It is fact that, from point of view of international law, the UN Security Council did not authorize NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo:

The UN Security Council found the existence of a threat to peace and enjoined Serbia to reduce troops in Kosovo but did not specifically authorize the use of force. UNSC Resolutions 1199 and 1203 affirmed that the deterioration of

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cvi In his speech to the Chicago Economic Club on the new “Doctrine of International Community,” British Prime Minister Tony Blair stressed the need for a new set of global rules for the 21st century at April 22, 1999. According to the “Blair-doctrine” outside (UN, NATO) military interventions in the internal political affairs of any dictatorship would be internationally justifiable on the ethical basis of priority for protection of human and civil rights. Consequently, this “doctrine” considers traditional requirement of inviolability of national sovereignty, as only a secondary factor. Furthermore: “…Blair said he sought an overhaul of the world financial system, a new push on free trade, a reconsideration of the role, workings and decision-making process of the United Nations and the Security Council, changes in the way NATO works, closer cooperation on the environment and a serious examination of Third World debt.” (Morrison, 1999)
the situation in Kosovo constituted a threat to the peace and security of the region. But unlike resolutions regarding Kuwait, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia, these resolutions did not authorize the use of armed forces. UNSC 1199 did call for a ceasefire in accordance with Chapter VII. UNSC 1203 demanded cooperation with the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe verification mission.” /OSCE/ (Shotewell – Thachuk, 1999: 2)

The NATO member countries gave priority to protecting the human and civil rights of a particular group of citizens over the principles of inviolability of national sovereignty and territorial integrity of states. There were, who openly argued for creating a “new, customary international law” to legitimate further operations as “opinio juris communis” (“accepted by sufficient nations as international law”) because, from their point of view:

…it is clear that the Kosovo mission differs qualitatively from previous humanitarian missions. While the principle of the sovereign equality of states has been the underlying legal basis for the international system since the Treaties of Westphalia in 1648, recent events have led to what amounts to a serious rethinking of the strict adherence to non-intervention in the domestic affairs of states under certain circumstances. A new norm is emerging that views legitimacy of the sovereign as derived from the people; sovereignty, therefore, is forfeited by the most egregious violations of the fundamental rights of people, such as genocide. (Shotewell – Thachuk, 1999: 3)

In my opinion, there are some lessons of the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo that would have been learned by representatives of the international community (e.g. UN, WEU, EU, OSCE).

First, the international law and the use of force evolved into a new stage of their development, and were challenged by several factors and experiences of the Post-Cold War “new world order.” On the other hand, it seems to me that there is no chance in the short run to find solutions, which would definitely solve all the debates concerning the UN Charter’s Article 2 (4) versus Article 51 in a world of new nation-states, and revived national identity.

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cvii According to the Charter of the United Nations, Chapter I., Article 2 (4): “All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” (Bennett, 1995: 480)

cviii The Charter of the United Nations, Chapter VII., Article 51 declares: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations, until the Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain
Second, from my point of view, the idea of peace enforcement has not yet been permanently discredited. However, I am pessimistic in connection the future success of heroic efforts for solving dilemmas, which were originally based mainly on the existence of national borders. Moreover, I am afraid, we are destined to return to the world of Article 2 (4) vs. Article 51 in the next decades.

b. Political Collective Action Lessons

As I could recognize, during the militarily successful humanitarian intervention there were several political collective action problems, which should be addressed in the future. The first set of these new challenges is related to certain cognitive errors of political and military leaders of both sides. The second set of political collective action problems was highlighted during cooperation of the US and its European NATO allies. The third set of these political collective action lessons is related to Russia and other potential adversaries.

(1) Cognitive errors. As an empirically-oriented sociologist it would be extraordinarily interesting for me to find any data in connection with those cognitive errors (Jervis, 1976: 319-406) that might result in misperception, inaccurate predictions and decisions of political and military decision-makers during interpretation of international and domestic political and military crisis situations. From my point of view, the reason for several inaccurate predictions in international politics, which were relatively often made by top-level political decision-makers about their own, and their country’s and/or alliance’s future behavior would be based on the following facts:

1. Many events occured that they simply could not imagine. That is why they did not plan their potential reactions at all – consequently the change of world politics would take them by surprise and they would be unprepared. It happened in case of Milosevic, who did not expect that NATO would launch a powerful military attack without any legal authorization from the UN Security Council.

international peace and security. Measures taken by Members in the exercise of this right of self-defence shall be immediately reported to the Security Council and shall not in any way affect the authority and responsibility of the Security Council under the present Charter to take at any time such action as it deems necessary in order to maintain or restore international peace and security.” (Bennett, 1995:480-481)
2. Another example would be when political decision-makers know it is probable *that an event will happen*, but they also know that their reaction will be strongly influenced by several unpredictable details of the given international context. An example for this kind of cognitive error would be find behind the hesitation from the side of leaders of Western liberal democracies in the case of unexpected brutality of Milosevic’s “ethnic cleansing” in Kosovo and their response for the urging CNN-effect.

3. Another source of possible cognitive errors are inaccurate predictions and misperceptions that would be based on the fact that: “Even when an event is likely, important, and the detailed circumstances are not apt to be decisive, decision-makers may not think about how they will react because the choice is politically or intellectually too difficult” (Jervis, 1976:54). One example for occurrence of such kind of cognitive error would be the case of the new NATO-member Hungary, from where several actions had been launched against Serbia during NATO’s air campaign. The international responsibilities and certain domestic political disagreements made it almost impossible for the Hungarian government and the military experts to discuss openly, how should Hungary react in case of a Serbian military attack on the common Hungarian-Serbian borders, or what would be the Hungarian response in case of escalation of the Serbian ethnic cleansing efforts from Kosovo to the basically Hungarian-populated, but Serb-ruled Vojvodina.

4. In some cases several top-level political decision-makers may think that they know how they will react under given international circumstances, but their predictions might prove to be incorrect, because of several possible reasons:

- they are misjudging the degree to which events would stir their *attitudes and emotions* on a given international political phenomenon, and their actual reaction might bear little resemblance to their previous calm calculations (as it has happened e.g. in case of the British political leaders, who had to face with moral and political challenges from the side of international and domestic public, and felt themselves uncomfortable, when Britain’s Law Lords decided on Augusto Pinochet’s ‘sovereign immunity’, who was
accused of such ‘universal crimes’, as genocide, torture and cruel, and unusual punishment. According to opinion of George Melloan: "Dealing with former heads of state and with terrorists is necessary a political matter, which is why the leaders of Britain, Germany and Italy are so uncomfortable." (Melloan, 1998:A23)

• another reason for a possible inaccurate self-prediction would be that given events may lead top-level decision-makers to *re-think their goals and values, and might stress them to neglect several previous plans*. An example of this phenomenon is the behavior of the Clinton-administration in connection with the previously strong willingness to use American land-forces in Kosovo, when they also re-evaluated their previous goals when confronted with *changes in domestic contexts* (shifted characters of public attitudes after shocks, and recalculation of further risks of possible unpleasant choices after imprisonment of three American GI’s on the Macedonian border).

5. Some of the political and military decision-makers do not follow the path of previously planned acts when *the context* in which the current event takes place in international relations *significantly differs from what they expected*. This fact would result in *disregarding with previous analysis* (as it has happened in case of Kosovo, when the leaders of the USA and the NATO tried to justify their external military intervention with such "*unique circumstances*" as to endanger hemispheric stability and abuse human rights (Glaberson, 1999). After that the emphases shifted from charges of unique military targets to "civilian targets with highly valued economic importance".

6. A different kind of possible failure is a kind of *wishfulness*, that “may lead decision-makers to *overestimate the chances of success of the policy they have adopted*” (Jervis, 1976:366), when they *anticipate the circumstances* that surrounded an expected event. In this case, political analysts often found significant *correlation between desires and misperceptions based on various dangerous stereotypes*, which are relatively often used for *self-justification of certain political reactions and help external justification of international*
political actions. Moreover, this kind of behavior would not only result in *misperception of incoming information*, but also might intensify the use of social psychological apparatus of *cognitive dissonance reduction* in the domestic and international political life. Robert Jervis characterized the work of this social psychological phenomenon in the international political life, as follows:

The central contribution of the theory of cognitive dissonance is the argument that people seek to justify their own behavior—to reassure themselves that they have made the best possible use of all the information they had or should have had, to believe that they have not used their sources foolishly, to see that their actions are commendable and consistent....But in constructing defensible postures to support their self-images, people must often rearrange their perceptions, evaluations, and opinions. To see that their decisions were correct may involve increasing the value they place on what they have achieved and devaluing what they sacrificed. By spreading apart the earlier alternatives and heavily weighting sunk costs, inertia and incrementalism are encouraged. Each steps in the process of developing a policy adds psychological pressures to take further steps....Ironically, then the drive to see one’s self as a better, more rational decision-maker will reduce the person’s rationality by impairing his ability to utilize information and examine his own values. (Jervis, 1976:406)

This kind of cognitive error would result in serious consequences during *international political bargaining*. For instance, *oversimplification, overgeneralization* and *use of false analogies* (e.g. efforts of the public relations staff of the White House during and after the Gulf War to classify and show similarities between Saddam Hussein and Hitler) made it (among other things) almost impossible to arrive at an agreement with him later on the ethical basis of the question: “*Can we bargain with a Hitler?*” Maybe, my feeling of *déjà vu* is not accidental, when I recall “*Hitlerization*” of Milosevic in the American media before the war (Judt, 1999: 16). That would also contribute to the difficulties of bargaining with him before, during or after the successful NATO military intervention in Kosovo.

As a summary, I would like to emphasize the significance of the above mentioned cognitive errors, mainly the importance of the *influence of desires and fears on attitudes, thought, perception and language of arguments*. In addition, it seems to be necessary to carry out a deeper analysis of how the political and military decision-makers of those countries bargained before and during the Kosovo war, which were involved pro or con into the crisis-management process in Kosovo.
(2) Lessons for the US political leadership on necessity of balance of strategy, national interests and budgets. From the view point of Daniel Gouré and Jeffrey Lewis, one of the most important lessons of the Kosovo campaign for the political decision-makers of the US should be that the war clearly showed: "...the result of a failure by the Clinton administration to balance strategy, national interests and budgets. This failure is rooted in the administration's flawed vision of the international security environment that foreseen a future dominated by humanitarian disasters and limited threats from rogue regimes (Tanter, 1999: 249-274) that would not require the level and character of military might marshaled during the Cold War. As a result, defense spending and manpower were slashed, while the tempo of operations accelerated." (Gouré--Lewis, 2000:1-2)

The basic features of threat perception of the newly elected Clinton administration were articulated by the late Les Aspin, then Secretary of Defense, who identified four main dangers to the U.S. interests during his confirmation hearing. 62 From his point of view, these threats were ethnic conflicts, nuclear proliferation, a reversal of domestic reforms in Russia, and slow economic growth. Interestingly, the Clinton administration's first Secretary of Defense did not mention the potential threat of a major regional power that would threaten the US or a vital US ally, e.g. a NATO-member country.\textsuperscript{cix}

William S. Cohen, the Clinton administration's third Secretary of Defense, made up for this omission, where he declared in his Annual Report to the President and Congress that "the foremost regional danger to U.S. security" would be a threat of cross-border aggression against any of the key U.S. allies. On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense also emphasized the importance of maintaining the "multi-mission capabilities" of the US military. According to the report of the Secretary of Defense:

\textsuperscript{cix} On the other hand, some years later, in 1997, one of the most important conceptual templates for future joint war-fighting by the US military, the Joint Vision 2010, has emphasized that: "... the US must prepare to face a wider range of threats, emerging unpredictably, employing varying combinations of technology, and challenging us at varying levels of intensity." Source: (JV2010:11) Furthermore, according to another important document, "A National Security Strategy for a New Century": "Smaller scale contingency operations... will likely pose the most frequent challenge for U.S. forces and cumulatively require significant commitments over time." (NSS, 1998:21)
U.S. forces must be multi-mission capable, and they must be trained, equipped, and managed with multiple mission responsibilities in mind. ... U.S. forces must be able to withdraw from smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, reconstitute, and then deploy to a major theater war within required timelines. Although in some cases this may pose significant operational, diplomatic, and political challenges, the ability to transition between peacetime operations and warfighting remains a fundamental requirement for virtually every U.S. military unit. Over time, sustained commitment to multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingencies will certainly stress U.S. forces – for example, by creating tempo and budgetary strains on selected units – in ways that must be carefully managed (Cohen, 1999).

The approach of the Secretary of Defense reflected basic assumptions of authors of the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO). These authors has expected future US involvement (normally as a part of a multinational force) not only in potential large-scale combat contingencies; but also in different kinds of non-traditional missions, like foreign humanitarian assistance efforts; noncombatant evacuation requirements and various types of peace operations.63

In addition, during and after the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo many questions have arisen in various forums regarding future US commitments abroad. In the heart of the debates stood a simple question: when, why, and how should the US send its troops abroad in an attempt to resolve conflicts, if those conflicts neither threaten the nation's physical security, nor jeopardize (directly or indirectly) national interests of the US?

3. Lessons for the US political leadership on challenges regarding increasing US military involvement around the world. In the 1990s, during the first decade of the post-Cold War era--or, as Tamar A. Mehuron has characterized it, in the "Age of the Military Operations Other Than War" (Mehuron, 1999)—the US has been engaged in simultaneous management of several regional conflicts, which demanded lengthy development of US forces.

On the other hand, while the tempo of new operations accelerated (many of them were non-traditional deployments, as in Haiti, Somalia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Rwanda, Kosovo), the defense spending, military manpower and force
structure of the US armed forces decreased significantly.\textsuperscript{cx} According to calculations of James R. Schlesinger, former Secretary of Defense and former director of the CIA:

U.S. military force structure has shrunk by more than 40 per cent in comparison with that which existed at the end of the Cold War. The smaller force has been stretched thin to meet ambitious foreign policy goals. Over the entire duration of the Cold War, the United States engaged in only 16 smaller-scale contingency operations. Between 1990 and 1997, the U.S. military has conducted 45 such operations. These commitments are increasingly open-ended, requiring a long-term commitment of money, men, and material. The war in Kosovo and the subsequent peacekeeping operation are estimated already to have cost the United States more than $5 billion. (Schlesinger, 1999:xi)

The most serious concerns about the real effectiveness of contemporary US military operations other than war (MOOTW) are related that the following so called "non-traditional missions." (Table 17.)

\textsuperscript{cx} As Kenneth H. Bacon, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs, has highlighted: "It is clear that in the last ten years, after the end of the Cold War, the basic tempo and structure of our deployments has changed dramatically. We don't have 300,000 troops sitting in Europe waiting for a Soviet attack. Instead, what we have are much smaller groups of troops operating much more intensely in spots around the world." (Bacon, 1999:1) (Emphases added – KZL)
Table 17. Post-Cold War US “Military Operations Other Than War”

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Operation (Location)</th>
<th>Mission</th>
<th>Began</th>
<th>Ended</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Provide Comfort (Turkey, Northern Iraq)</td>
<td>Humanitarian, Sanctions</td>
<td>04/05/91</td>
<td>12/31/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Promise (Bosnia)</td>
<td>Humanitarian</td>
<td>07/02/92</td>
<td>01/04/96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Watch (Saudi Arabia, So. Iraq)</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>08/02/92</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Restore Hope (Somalia)</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention</td>
<td>08/14/92</td>
<td>03/25/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deny Flight (Bosnia)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>04/12/93</td>
<td>12/20/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uphold Democracy (Haiti)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>09/09/94</td>
<td>10/12/94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deliberate Force (Bosnia)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>08/30/95</td>
<td>09/21/95</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Endeavor, Guard, Force (Bosnia)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>12/21/95</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Northern Watch (Northern Iraq)</td>
<td>Sanctions</td>
<td>01/01/97</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Allied Forces (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Humanitarian intervention</td>
<td>03/24/99</td>
<td>06/10/99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operation Joint Guardian/KFOR (Kosovo)</td>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>06/11/99</td>
<td>Ongoing</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

After:
- USAF Historical Research Agency, Joint Staff History Office, Air Force News Service
- (Mehuron, 1999b); (Grant, 1999)

There are several experts in the US, who are afraid that the "non-traditional" (e.g. peacekeeping, peacemaking, peace-enforcement) missions would erode the readiness of US forces for major theater wars in the long run (Gouré – Lewis, 2000: 4). In addition, there is a common view in the contemporary US regarding further involvement of the basically US-led NATO into such kinds of “non-Article 5” operations that “...the new roles may weaken the Alliance’s cohesion and undermine its ability to carry out the core traditional mission of collective defense.” (Yost, 1998: 271)

Moreover, the United States cannot afford to concentrate on near-term crises to the exclusion of long-term national interests, said Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Army Gen. Henry Shelton, speaking at a conference on strategic responsibilities in Washington, Nov 2, 1999: “We have gained considerable experience in this area in the past few years,” he said. “We have found that sorting the ‘good guys’ from the ‘bad’ is not easy, and that getting in is much easier than getting out, … that deeply
rooted, ancient hatreds cannot be resolved with the short-term application of military force." (Garamone, 1999)

(4) Europe still needs the US. During the first half of the 1990s, several American politicians and many scholars were afraid that the long-term relationship of the US with its NATO allies would change dramatically. According to their assessment, the Western European nations and their leaders would likely not feel the presence of the US in Europe to be so essential any more after the collapse of the Soviet block, post-Cold war prosperity of their countries, and advanced state of the European integration process. It is because "...the process of European integration has brought not only unprecedented prosperity and economic well-being to the countries but also created a security community. This term is taken to mean that high levels of interdependence and common institutions have made war among the countries of Western Europe unthinkable." (Staden, 2000:148) Consequently, as these scholars saw it, there was a real possibility that the European NATO allies do not already feel the necessity of either the previous protector (protecting against the potential threat from the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact countries), or the pacifier (internal stabilizing or reassuring roles of the United States in Europe) as during the Cold War (Joffe, 1984:74).

Before the Kosovo war, representatives of the neo-isolationalist political and strategic thinking in the US condemned the Clinton administration for its "too heavy commitment to Europe". They urged for more determined assertion of national interests because, according to their empirically rather controversial assessment, the economic, political and military power of the US already shows a relatively declining trend (Layne, 1997: 86-124). Moreover, there was who characterized the deterrence strategy of the US as overextended and rapidly eroding (Gordon, 1997: 87). There is a stream of opinion that the cumulative costs of the continuation of US overseas commitments may be high over the long term and might hurt domestic priorities (Layne, 1997: 122). Many of these experts condemned Europe as lacking real military capabilities e.g., appropriate command, control, computer, communication and intelligence (early warning) (C4I) systems, wasteful duplication of national logistical and transport facilities, and an unnecessary addiction to US military potential. In addition, some politicians
suggested that the US should turn its back on Europe if its European NATO allies would either refused to participate in US actions aimed at protecting joint Western interests (e.g. assurance of free flow of oil from the Middle East), or undercut American efforts to punish “rogue states” (e.g. by seeking profitable commercial deals with those rogue states).

During and after the Kosovo war, according to James A. Kitfield, many politicians and military experts from the US side were “disturbed by the widening gap in capabilities between the air forces of the United States and its NATO Allies that was revealed during Allied Force. The American forces shouldered the lion’s share of the operational burden in areas as critical as Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance; command and control; airlift; and Electronic Warfare.” (Kitfield, 1999)

After the Kosovo war, in spite of the harsh tone of the Cologne declarations, observers recognized the worries of the political and military elite of the European NATO-ally nations that the US might leave Europe, if the Europeans wanted too much. The Western European political and military decision-makers were afraid, because neither the EU, WEU, OSCE; and other interlocking European institutions, nor the individual European countries themselves, proved to establish effective common security and defense policies, or would be able to efficiently accommodate and implement large-scale military operations.

It was clear to every serious Western European political and military decision-maker that “The Alliance’s future depends above all on the United States. Without a continuing U.S. engagement, NATO will have no credibility, cohesion, or future.” (Yost, 1998: 291) How would the European NATO allies and the EU themselves be able, without having any credible military force, to pacify the FRY and the region, or reach all the five main NATO goals, stated by the North Atlantic Council on 12 April, 1999?cxi Furthermore, certain considerations of security and power still motivate the Western European nations in their state-to-state relations (Art, 1996: 1-39; Woollacott, 1997:15) As Alfred van Staden summarized:

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The main reason for the repeated demonstrations of European impotence in recent crises (the Gulf, former Yugoslavia, and in Africa) stems from the lack of political and military leadership in Europe. To put it bluntly: larger European states may have been in favor of a common foreign and security policy but their commitment to this goal meant hardly more than paying lip-service because they proved unwilling to concede leadership to one another. In most cases the United Kingdom, Germany but even France seem to have concluded that it is better to be led by the Americans than to defer to other Europeans. They were able to agree (although France did so reluctantly) on US leadership but not on leadership by one of their own. Therefore, US leadership in Europe may be called “leadership by default.” (Staden, 1999:149-150)

Before Kosovo, the NATO-allies believed themselves in a dual trap-situation in their post-Cold War relationships with each other. This relationship would have been characterized as follows:

Europeans face the dual problem that they should avoid creating the impression of wanting too much on the one hand and too little on the other. If they are perceived as wanting too much (i.e., the development of a too independent European defense structure), then Americans might think that they surreptitiously do intend to get rid of NATO. However, if Europeans are seen as wanting too little, then they are under suspicion of being free loaders never willing to call the shots. On the other hand, Americans must recognize that they cannot ask Europeans to perform more military tasks while denying them the influence inherent to greater responsibility or accusing them of gang up against the US as they grope for greater unity. (Staden, 1999:156-157)

(5) The US still needs Europe. During the first years of the Clinton administration, many politicians and strategic analysts suggested shifting the emphasis of future US foreign and economic policy from Europe to Asia. There were others who formally refused the idea of “Fortress America”, but suggested an “offshore approach in commitment” for future US political and military actions. According to principles of this suggested new “grand strategy”, “offshore balancing” would mean that the US will abandon its permanent heavy engagement in the security affairs of Europe and of East Asia through a strengthened framework of multilateral alliances. In this case the US would provide just its overwhelming air and naval power (without ground forces) to combat (Layne, 1997: 86-124).

Both experiences of Bosnia and Kosovo made it clear that “...an offshore balancing strategy would increase rather than lower the risk of US involvement in a major war. Indeed, one may argue that it is less costly and safer for the United States
to retain its security commitments and, in so doing, deter wars from happening rather than to stand on the sidelines only to be compelled to intervene later under more difficult circumstances.” (Staden, 1999:157)

Indeed, from a pure military standpoint, the US should not give up its security posture abroad. *By providing security for its allies* (either in Europe, the Middle East, or in the Pacific Rim), *the US also “purchases” security for itself*, “...because its prevents worse: arms races, nuclear proliferation, actual conflicts that might draw in bystanders.” (Joffe, 1997:27) In addition, as Philip Gordon (1996:43) pointed out, the existence of NATO provides the American military command with various *European assets* (e.g. military bases, pre-positioned equipment, and vital elements of military infrastructure) that would be essential for carrying out US operations in other parts of the world, especially in the Middle East. Furthermore, as Alfred van Staden summarized:

> Apart from the moral consideration that power exacts responsibility, which requires policies that transcend naked self-interest, the point is that by fulfilling leadership roles the US buys a large quantity of political influence and prestige. ... Strategic withdrawal from Europe would oblige future US administrations to conduct a pure realpolitik, which is hard to reconcile with the American idealistic tradition. (Staden, 1999:153-154)

> Given the challenges of globalization, the political and economic interdependence between the US and the EU, and the historically strong European cultural roots of the US political elite, a future with better-balanced cooperation between the US and Europe would prevent, or at least lighten the “loneliness of superpowerdom” (Huntington, 1999: 48). In addition, from a realist position, the US simply could not afford to disengage from Europe because in this case it would risk losing its control and influence on the current course of the accelerated integration process on the “old continent”.

> Additionally, certain arguments would be misleading on lack of military capabilities of the European NATO-allies, because of their “lost habit of external military action” (Hoffmann, 1994:9-10) and negative results of their national budget cuts. First, no one should forget that the major European NATO-allies (Great Britain, France, and Germany) still have a significant military potential to carry out various kinds of military actions independently and successfully. Only three examples: experiences of the
military operation of the Franco-British coalition during the Suez crisis (1956); the British “long-distance campaign” against Argentina for the Falkland (Malvine) islands, in 1982; and the Italian peacekeeping action in Albania. Second, in spite of the relatively significant national budget cuts: “The combined West European defense budget, while only about two-thirds that of the United States, nonetheless remains the second largest in the world and could provide for an adaptable force to be developed over time.” (Roper, 1998:218-230)

(6) Lessons learned regarding Russia. According to the London Daily Telegraph, one of the NATO preliminary reviews concluded that: “NATO’s bombing campaign against Yugoslavia had almost no military effect on the regime of President Milosevic, which gave in only after Russia withdrew its diplomatic backing.” (Butcher – Bishop, 1999) Lt. General Mike Jackson, Commander of Kosovo Force (COMKFOR), himself, also admitted the important role of Moscow during the crisis management process, when he declared: “The Russian troops are an integral part of KFOR and we particularly welcome their participation, given the vital part that Russia played diplomatically in bringing about the end of the conflict.” (Jackson, 1999: 17)

On the other hand, the Kosovo war showed the fragility of the West’s relationship with Russia. Furthermore, the conflict alienated not only Russia, but also China, and would result in their rapprochement in the future. The Russian political leaders did play a crucial role in finally persuading Milosevic to withdraw his troops from Kosovo. But Russia did not cover its negative attitude and sharp criticism on NATO’s intervention, and ostentatiously supported Belgrade. Furthermore, it seemed to me that the Russian boycott of NATO’s 50th anniversary gathering in Washington was not simply a domestic posture.
(7) Lessons for the political leaders of the European NATO allies. On the one hand, there is a common Western European, particularly EU, standpoint that, after declaring strong commitment of Western Europe towards Southeastern Europe, emphasizes:

*The peoples of the Balkans have to resolve their conflicts themselves* before they can join the European Union. *They should not think that they could import them into the EU, so that the EU can resolve their conflicts for them.* (Varwick, 2000:7)

The Western European countries have to contribute to far-reaching political, security and economic reconstruction in Southeastern Europe. But they will not be able to contribute to the real solution of the problems in the Balkans, if they do not take into consideration historical roots of current insecurity in the region that can be attributed to at least four, strongly interrelated and mismanaged sets of factors (Simon, 1998):

1. Political and state-building challenges (before/under/after the communist rule);
2. Challenges regarding current state of these economies, and their prospective development;
4. Social and psychological factors, which are rooted in history, and shape projected and perceived national identity, patterns of ethnocentrism; typical models of auto- and hetero-stereotypes regarding other ethnic groups and the ruling nation.

In my opinion, until these factors will not be handled simultaneously by a much more comprehensive and coordinated strategy from the side of the leading countries and institutions of the European “security architecture,” there is not real chance for reconciliation and peaceful development in the Balkans.
c. Military Lessons

(1). Military lessons for the military leaders of the European NATO allies. As I see it, the Kosovo campaign provided at least five set of important lessons for the military leaders of the European NATO allies:

1. The first set of these lessons was related to those operational weaknesses of the European NATO allies that were caused by failures of training, or problems during use of the given assets (weapons and equipment capabilities). From the European only the British operated a cruise-missile capability by "...first operational use of UK Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles, launched from HMS SPLENDID..." (Robertson, 1999: 4). However, the UK fired 20 of the altogether 240 Tomahawk Land Attack Missiles launched during the air campaign, but did occur certain minor problems during the launching, and the direction of the missiles, what the British have to fix. The other European NATO allied had to recognize shortage of "...air-delivered Joint Direct Attack Munition (JDAM), and air- and sea-launched cruise missiles." (MB, 1999: 289)

2. The second set of lessons was related to certain interoperability and compatibility problems of the currently existing command, control and communication systems of the European allies.

3. The third main cluster of challenges came from current problems regarding data gathering and associated data handling during intelligence activity; surveillance and target acquisition. Experiences regarding use of European Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAV) (e.g., the French Crecerelle, the British Phoenix, the Belgian Epervier and the Italian Meteor Mirach 150) called the European NATO allies' attention to upgrade their system – for at least to mach the level of US CL-289, not to mention the Predator and Hunter (MB, 1999:288).

4. The fourth set of lessons was a result of experiences about national and alliance-level quarrels about land-force deployment capabilities. The operation called attention to the lack of specialists (e.g., IO experts, engineers, communication and medical staff).

5. The fifth set of lessons was related to the lack of appropriate number and quality of combat-support aircraft and precision-guided weapons. As Lt. Gen. Michael C. Short, NATO's joint force air component commander for Operation Allied Forces retrospectively recognized, experiences of the Kosovo war made clear not only for military experts around the table at the Combined Air Operations Center in Vicenza, Italy, but also for national political and military decision-makers of several European NATO allies that:

Many of them have neglected their air forces and not invested in technology needed to conduct a modern air war.... "I don't think there's any question that we've got an A team and a B team now," Short said. Those nations

that failed to invest in precision guidance or nighttime capabilities or beyond-visual-range systems were "relegated to doing nothing but flying combat air patrol in the daytime; that's all they were capable of doing," he said. (Tirpak: 1999c)

Because of the above shortages, it became clear for every European NATO allies that: "The American forces shouldered the lion's share of the operational burden in areas as critical as intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance; command and control; airlift; and electronic warfare.” (Tirpak, 1999c)

(2). Military lessons for Potential Adversaries. There are critics, who reproached NATO for its “inability” to deter Milosevic, and concluded: “In the former Yugoslavia, NATO found that it had lost its credibility. No longer could it deter the other side.” They backed their evaluation with the following argument:

The North Atlantic Treaty of 1949 had established NATO to prevent the outbreak of war, to deter potential adversaries — specifically the Soviet Union — from starting a war in Europe. In all those decades, NATO forces never had been obliged to open fire on the legions of the Soviet empire — which showed either that the threat from the East had not been real, which was difficult to believe, or, as the world, with reason, did believe, that NATO's was a colossal success story. … In the former Yugoslavia, NATO had not done what it was meant to do and what it had succeeded in doing for forty-five years until then. Maybe it wasn't NATO's fault, but it had failed to deter. (Fromkin, 1999) (Emphases added --KZL)

In my opinion, this approach shows only one half of the real picture. As I see it, the Serbs played for time for almost a year, while tried to execute the ethnic cleansing, accompanied by killing and human right abuses (as they have done it previously against the Croatians and in Bosnia-Herzegovina for years). They did it because they have calculated the impotence of the UN Security Council to decide (because of the likely Russian and/or Chinese veto). They calculated with likelihood of inability of most of the “interblocking” European political and security institutions (e.g. EU, WEU, OSCE) to find an immediate and just solution, backed by credible force.

That's why the US and NATO was obliged to play out the forceful hand. Since it was done so successfully, at least NATO's credibility became restored not only in Europe, but in global terms too.
Consequently, the core of Kosovo’s message for potential future adversaries is that however political decision-making bodies of the Alliance might work very slowly because of requirements of cooperation between democratic countries. But NATO, the only contemporarily effectively functioning security organization, already has the political willingness not only for deterrence, but also to use its huge military capabilities if the situation would require it.

(4) Military lessons for the US military leadership. One of the strategic level lessons of the Kosovo war for the U.S. was related to the tenability of the concept that required the U.S. armed forces to maintain the “ability to fight and win nearly simultaneously two Major Theater Wars (MTW).” Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, stated in their joint statement on the Kosovo After Action Review before the Senate Armed Services Committee on 14 October 1999 that: “As a global power with worldwide interests, it is imperative that the United States, in concert with its allies, be able to deter and defeat large-scale cross-border aggression in two distant theaters in overlapping time frames. In short, we must be able to fight and win two major theater wars nearly simultaneously.”

There were several experts who challenged the positive evaluation of the Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen and Gen. Henry H. Shelton, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in their joint statement on the “Kosovo After Action Review.”

Assembling this formidable armada required the diversion of many key assets from important missions. During Operation Allied Force, the United States military was unable to fulfill all of the missions currently underway. This raises serious questions about the feasibility of meeting current commitments, let alone fighting two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. (Gouré – Lewis, 2000: 9)

From the point of view of the critics, the humanitarian intervention in Kosovo held too much U.S. and allied force, above all: “almost an MTW-worth air assets,” on the Balkans. According to Paul Richter’s data, from the US side, all together

approx. 730 aircraft or about 44% of the combat-ready fighter aircraft of the national inventory were deployed to Kosovo, which represents a higher percentage than e.g., during Operation Desert Storm (41%) (Richter, 1999:6). This experience called attention to the fact that:

The United States military was woefully short of ‘low-density’ air assets that perform specialized missions such as strategic airlift, electronic warfare, and airborne battlefield command, control, and communication (ABCCC). Operation Allied Force required a large percentage of the total U.S. inventory and forced the U.S. to reallocate aircraft from other theaters and missions. (Goure – Lewis, 2000: 18)

When Daniel Gouré and Jeffrey Lewis collected all the information regarding total drain on specialized air assets of the US, used during the Kosovo campaign, they found the following data:

Table 18. Total Drain on US Specialized Air Assets, Used during Operation Allied Force

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asset</th>
<th>Inventory</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Kosovo*</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F-117</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>44</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-15E</td>
<td>201</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>30</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F-16 C/J</td>
<td>217</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3 AWACS</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E8-C JSTARS</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>100</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-130E “ABCCC”</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>57</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EC-130H “Compass Call”</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>23</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>U27</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>14</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC-135</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>223</td>
<td>35</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>KC-10</td>
<td>59</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>12</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EA-6B</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>25</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC-135 “Rivet Joint”</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

- Numbers at the height of deployment during Operation Allied Force.
  From: (Goure – Lewis, 2000: 1)

On the list of the critics, the following are those shortages that resulted in several disadvantageous consequences:

1. Temporary loss of the constant aircraft carrier presence in East Asia (because of the demand to deploy aircraft carriers to the Adriatic Sea, as a part of the naval operations related to Operation Allied Forces - and to maintain carrier presence in the Persian Gulf to warn Saddam Hussein). After the withdrawal of the US aircraft carrier from East Asia, naval skirmishes brake out between North and South Korea.
2. Loss of an F-117 Stealth fighter on the fourth night of the operation due to its operating without electronic warfare covering. In the early phase of the air campaign there were only 12-15 EA-6B Prowlers available in the area that could carry out assistance of jamming of enemy radar (Fulghum – Scott, 1999: 28). Later, the US temporarily reallocated several EA-6B Prowlers from Operation Northern Watch over Iraq. This fact pressed the CENTCOM to temporarily suspend enforcement of the requirements of the northern “no-fly zone” over Iraq. Afterwards, the Navy had to detach a squadron of Prowlers from the USS Constellation. According to the evaluation of Robert Holzer, this action resulted in a potentially dangerous situation, because deprivation of maintenance and support crews left the carrier operating without onboard electronic jamming support (Holzer, 1999: 4). Furthermore, there were problems rooted in the shortage of EA-6B pilots. Challenges regarding the provision of EA-6Bs with the appropriate amount of spare parts existed. This called attention to the current dilemmas of personal and material shortages of the military in potentially critical areas.

3. The Pentagon had to reduce U.S. contribution to IFOR in Bosnia by a third. Furthermore, the currently deployed two army divisions received only the lowest possible combat readiness rating (C-4). This fact raised questions not only about the practical usefulness of these particular divisions in case of accidental escalation of a local conflict into a major regional conflict, but also regarding current deeper training, personnel and equipment shortfalls of the US military, in general.

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cxiv The NATO-led Stabilization Force (SFOR), consisted of 30,000 international troops during the Kosovo war. Because of withdrawal of necessary forces during the Kosovo war, the number of the American contingent started to decline from 6200. As U.S. DoD personnel announced on the press conference of Army Lt.Gen. Ronald Adams, SFOR commander in Sarajevo, on 2 November 1999, the final number of U.S. personnel will be reduced, “in line with the overall one-third reduction of the total number of SFOR” to about 4,600 personnel until April 2000. (Kozaryn, 1999b: 1)

cxv One of them is the U.S. Army 10th Mountain Division (Light Infantry) of Fort Drum, N.Y., which serves as the headquarters element of Multinational Division North. The other U.S. division is the Army’s 1st Infantry Division of Fort Riley, Kansas (Graham, 1999: A01).
4. Crashes of two AH-64 Apache attack helicopters, as a result of inadequate pilot training (esp. flying at night), because of "...declining resources and resource constraints, in terms of funding for training and equipment", as Brigadier General Richard Cody, the Deputy Commander of Task Force Hawk, identified the main reasons before the House Armed Services Committee.\textsuperscript{cxvi} Indeed, the battalion of 24 Apache helicopters of the 1st Cavalry Division could receive only a C-3 ("unit is degraded by personnel or equipment shortfalls") rating (Scarborough, 1999: A1).

2. Commitment of NATO Members to the Alliance's New Roles in the Wake of Kosovo:

\textit{a. US Commitments to NATO and its European NATO- Allies}

From the point of view of military and political sociology it is clear that the US still needs NATO. It is because NATO represents for the US not only a collective defense organization in Europe, but also a stabilizing force and a useful tool for collective security purposes in the entire turbulent post-Cold War Transatlantic region.

To be sure, according to the 1998 survey conducted by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations on American public opinion, the American public remains strongly committed to NATO. The survey reveals that 59 percent want to keep the current level of commitment to NATO the same, with another 9 percent favoring an increase. Among American leaders, support for maintaining the current level of commitment to NATO has risen from 57 percent to 64 percent since 1994 (when the previous survey was conducted).(Rielly, 1999: 25-26)

There are currently three competing broad strategic schools of the U.S. "grand strategy." These are:

1. "conservative internationalists", who were proponents of NATO enlargement, because they "want to preserve American primacy against any potential hegemonic power in Europe, East Asia, and the Middle East". From

their point of view, any "...exclusive European security structures have to be prevented";

2. "nationalist unilateralists", who do not trust the validity of "democratic peace theory" (Russett, 1993:11). "In their view, the United States should reduce its international role drastically, and act as a classic balancing power with as much strategic independence as possible. Thus, NATO is no longer an asset, but has become a risk." (Rudolf, 1996: 176)

3. "liberal internationalists", who are not so much afraid about rising hegemons in the above key regions of US strategic interests, because they tend to believe in the validity of the "democratic peace theory." That is why: "...they envisage a less costly international role for the United States: multilateral leadership"— and "they accept that NATO might lose its primacy in European security" (Rudolf, 1996: 176);

In Henry Kissinger's opinion, if the US would like to remain a superpower in the increasingly interdependent world, it should maintain and control such a balance of power system in international relations, which must follow the path of the "Bismarck model", instead of the approach of the traditional British "Palmertston/Disraeli model." From his point of view, the "Bismarck style of operating the balance of power" system in international politics will require that the US should not wait passively until the balance of power would be threatened directly. On the contrary, the US should actively prevent challenges from arising by establishing close relations with as many partners as possible. Consequently, for the US, "The most creative solutions will be to build overlapping structures, some based on common political and economic principles as in the Western Hemisphere; some combining shared principles and security concerns as in the Atlantic area and Northeast Asia; others based largely on economic ties as in the relations with Southeast Asia." (Kissinger, 1994: 835) (Emphases added- KZL)
b. Impact of the Humanitarian Intervention on Commitment of European NATO allies to NATO, and Development of the European Defense Cooperation

Examples of Bosnia and Kosovo showed for many Europeans that in practice, NATO had changed very little. *Europeans remained dependent on the US for political leadership and military effectiveness in a crisis.* Furthermore, experiences of Bosnia and Kosovo proved that in the long run *the US remains the critical player in Europe, on which NATO’s credibility is still founded.*

On the other hand, it is also important for the political and military elites of the European NATO countries that the Alliance provides both a forum for discussing new security arrangements in Europe and a tool to keep the United States committed to the continent, *“thereby inhibiting the ‘renationalization’ of European security policy”* (Walt, 1997:170) One set of lessons from the Kosovo operation would be those findings that would shape new military and diplomatic approaches of potential adversaries regarding *how inefficiently Europe could deal with maverick leaders and rogue states, when it tried to use only tools of international diplomacy.*

Furthermore, as the experiences of “management” of the Bosnian and Kosovo crisis proved, the CFSP practically did not endow the EU with the capacity to deal quickly and effectively with external crises. It is due to the fact that the CFSP did not have a significant effect on European foreign and security policy cohesion and effectiveness in a real crisis-situation.

3. Toward a New Division of Labor between Multiple Institutions of the European Security Architecture (OSCE, EU/WEU, NATO)?

There are political analysts, who are afraid that future autonomous European actions would be limited from the side of the US in the future too because of the prevailing US administrations would be always attached to the so-called “three D” (Decoupling, Duplication and Discrimination) criteria:

- *“No Decoupling”* means that the development of the ESDI must not lead to the decision-making processes in Europe happening separately or even in competition with NATO.
• “No Duplication” refers, in particular, to military command structures and staffs used in particular for European-led operations. Such duplication would, from an American point of view, lead to unwanted competition or even to separation, and would also undermine interoperability.
• “No Discrimination” means above all that the eight NATO members which are not EU members are to be included as far as possible in EU-led operations if they so wish. These concepts make it clear that in the end the United States wants to remain the decisive factor of European security policy through NATO, and that it is willing to cede autonomy to the Europeans only inasmuch as this does not negatively influence the transatlantic interlocking, and thus also that the influence of the United States is not undermined. (Gustenau, 1999: 4)

On the one hand, for a first approach this kind of evaluation seems to be right, because—from viewpoint of pure organizational sociology—development of an independent, permanent European military structure would really endanger NATO’s integrated command structure.

After Cologne and Helsinki several experts and politicians tried to find at least theoretical solutions for the following, seemingly unsolvable questions: What will be the relationship between NATO and the EU, if the EU would absorb WEU’s military structure? How will the six non-EU allies (Canada, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Norway, Poland, Turkey and the United States) of NATO be involved? Will the capabilities of the EU be interoperable with NATO? What will be the status of the neutral EU members?

But I have to agree with the British Charles Grant, Director of the Centre for European Reform in London; the French Amaya Bloch-Lainé, Research Associate at the Fondation pour les Etudes de Défense, and the American Kori Schake, Senior Research Professor of the Institute for National Strategic Studies in Washington, D.C. who found that:

While European and American leaders have been unable to find a solution, a tacit division of labour is emerging: Europe takes responsibility for ‘soft power’ issues like foreign aid, while the US takes responsibility for ‘hard power’ with the use of force. (Schake –Bloch-Lainé –Grant, 1999: 21)

As I see it, this kind of division of labor would really inspire certain debates about burden-sharing, and could result in frictions in the transatlantic relationship. But, as the above researchers correctly pointed out, the cooperation is necessary between the US and its European NATO allies because:
The common argument that a stronger, more assertive Europe will undermine NATO as well as US interests is simply wrong. A Europe that remains allied to the US because of its own weakness is of limited value in the current strategic environment, and probably unsustainable politically. Europe’s current inability and unwillingness to assert its security interests is more damaging to the transatlantic relationship than a broad-shouldered Europe demanding to be considered in American calculations. In any event, unless Europe becomes more unified, it will likely be unwilling to take on the greater responsibility for common transatlantic interests that Washington wishes it to assume. (Schake – Bloch-Lainé –Grant, 1999: 21-22)
IV. CONCLUSION

A. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

This thesis focused on the effects of the Kosovo war on NATO's viability, US commitments to NATO, and the European defense cooperation. The major conclusions of this analysis are:

1. The end of the Cold War established a new security landscape and transformed the strategic environment of the NATO-member countries. The profound changes raised fundamental questions about the new political and security orientation of several Western democracies, transformed the system of the civil-military relations, and shifted emphases on the tasks, functions, structure, and size of the Western armed forces.

2. NATO’s humanitarian intervention in Kosovo had a positive impact on the long-term viability of NATO because it confirmed that the Alliance was able to redefine itself not only as the core of an enlarged and reshaped security community, but also as a suitable tool for crisis-management in the Euro-Atlantic region. Furthermore, the experiences of the humanitarian intervention demonstrated that the Alliance remains and should remain the central element of the European “security architecture.”

3. The Kosovo war, NATO’s largest out-of-area combat operation reaffirmed the United States’s commitments to NATO, and reinforced the positions of the US in the new transatlantic bargain with its European NATO allies. The war has clearly shown that the basic features of the relationship between the US and its European NATO allies changed just slightly as a result of the spectacular external and internal adaptation process of the Alliance: the European NATO-allies remained dependent on the US not only for political leadership, but also for decisive military effectiveness in this crisis situation. Moreover, in spite of the emergence of the ESDI in NATO, and the CFSP in the EU, the US remained the most crucial factor in Europe, on which NATO’s credibility is founded.
4. Political and military experiences of the multilateral peace operation called attention to the importance of NATO’s further internal adaptation, with the focus on further implementation of the CJTF concept, and further improvement of the New Strategic Concept of the Alliance. Furthermore, the war, which alienated Russia, and sharpened the tensions between the US and China, highlighted dilemmas related to the current “visibility without capability” status of the ESDI, and the lack of a truly effective division of labor between many competing institutions of the European “security architecture”: EU, WEU, OSCE and NATO.

5. In addition, I am afraid that neither NATO’s intervention nor the current vague humanitarian commitments of the EU and OSCE could solve and shall be able to settle the basic (political, economic, socio-psychological and security) reasons of insecurity in the region. Consequently, the Balkans will remain one of the “hot points” of Europe and the World in the new millennium.

6. The political and military experiences of the Kosovo war gave new impetus to debates on a more appropriate future distribution of responsibilities, costs and risks among NATO allies; called for a more pragmatic division of labor between multiple institutions of the European “security architecture.” In addition, the humanitarian intervention raised new demands for revision and further improvement of basic principles of the ESDI in NATO; and the CFSP in the EU.

7. Consequently, the final answer for my original question regarding the Kosovo war and its aftermath (“proved the war to be the end of the beginning, or the beginning of the end?”) is that the Kosovo war was not the end of the beginning. It was neither the beginning of the end of NATO, nor the end of US commitments to NATO, nor the end of European Defense Cooperation. In the contrary, as I see it, the war in Kosovo proved to be the end of the beginning stage of a new development in the new transatlantic relationship between NATO and the UN, and the US and its European NATO allies.
Furthermore, the war gave new impetus to the development of the European defense cooperation process, and accelerated the process.

B. RECOMMENDATIONS

From my point of view, there are several lessons of the Kosovo War, which would be useful for the political and military decision-makers of NATO:

1. We have to make the Alliance politically more decisive, and militarily more cohesive. For this reason political and military decision-makers of NATO have to improve more detailed analysis on role of the NATO’s Supreme Allied Headquarters Europe, and its relationship with CJTF headquarters.

2. For organizing NATO peace-operations on the regional or sub-regional level, the political and military decision-makers have to decentralize the Alliance, and assign more responsibility for specific elements (e.g. Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps; CJTFs) of its peace-keeping and/or peace-enforcement operations mission.

3. I would like to suggest execution of an explanatory-level cross-national comparative survey. The aim of this survey would be to find out and analyze those factors that would affect willingness of political and military decision-makers of the NATO allies on both side of the Atlantic Ocean to be involved into non-Article 5 operations. Unfortunately, detailed and published comparative analyses about willingness of different NATO allies to carry out peace operations did not happen until now. Consequently, we can just hypothetically formulate our suspicion, on the basis of our previous knowledge regarding the literature, about the logic of collective action that there would be some “free-” or “easy-riders” (Olson, 1965: 36-39; Cornes – Sandler, 1984: 580; Simon, 1999) inside NATO. These players would like to enjoy the benefits of the membership and collective actions of the Alliance without any serious contribution to the costs of the “common goods”, e.g. involvement into risky peace-keeping or peace-enforcement operations.
4. As experiences of the Kosovo war have shown, armed forces of the future have to increasingly concentrate on their primary missions (the prevention and management of organized violence by a core of full-time specialists). They have to contract out the remaining (logistical and other supporting technical) functions and/or use highly trained, immediately available reservists as a temporary workforce. In my opinion, the postmodern military organizations will also use more and more civilians, because their employment is usually cheaper, and in some functions, roughly as effective as the employment of highly trained military specialists.

5. Since 1990 a general modernization and structural conversion process started in the former communist Eastern European countries. The ultimate goal was to build modern Western-style militaries, which are convergent with the host society, serving under strong civilian control, and based on dominant 'occupational' vice 'institutional' values of highly professional military members. The (quite controversial) process of modernization accelerated in the Polish, Czech and Hungarian militaries from the middle of the 1990s. This modernization process runs in parallel to those modernization programs which have recently been launched in the militaries of highly developed Western liberal democracies.

6. Furthermore, the CJTF headquarters have to be prepared for different kinds of operations, which have been required from collective-security forces with UN mandates. These operations would be related to such tasks, as protection of refugees, supervision and delivery of humanitarian assistance, verification of troop withdrawals, surveillance over the demobilization and disarming of irregular forces, supervision of elections, overseeing of transitions to new governments, monitoring of referenda on national self-determination, establishment and training of police forces, (in extreme cases:) use of force against factions that threaten law and order.

7. In addition, we can at least hypothetically calculate some possible additional objectives for these rapidly deployable CJTF mission headquarters. These would be military back-up of economic sanctions, arms embargoes; preventive,
stabilizing *deployment of troops* to a given country (territory) under acute threat; creating and defending a *demilitarized zone* to keep warring factions apart; *evacuation* of foreigners from a country torn by civil war; *defense of sanctuaries* declared by the UN; *punitive action* to end escalatory processes; *offensive retaking* of territory seized by an aggressor; *occupation of territory* to keep conflicting parties under control and prevent serious hostilities.
V. ENDNOTES

1 On current challenges, and several theoretical and practical dilemmas of coercive diplomacy nowadays see e.g.: (George, 1996: 1-22; Gordon-Lauren, 1995: 23-52).

2 The exact time of initial attack was: 2:00 p.m. EST, 24 March 1999. From 10:00 a.m. EST of 10 June 1999 the Allied Forces suspended the air campaign, following the confirmation that the full withdrawal of Yugoslav military, police and paramilitary forces from Kosovo had begun. The entire bombing campaign was halted at 10:50 a.m. EST of 20 June 1999. Source: "Operation Allied Force" Available [Online]: http://www.defenselink.mil/specials/kosovo/ (23 August 1999)

3 NATO’s action in Kosovo was called on many different ways. From my point of view, this out-of-area operation was a humanitarian intervention, which held features of multilateral peace-operations. In spite of the fact that several pro-NATO officials flatly denied to call the event a war, I have to agree with Gen. Richard E. Hawley, head of the Air Combat Command (headquartered at Langley AFB, Va., US), who has characterized the very basic feature of the NATO action, which required commitment of more than 800 aircraft, as follows: it "...is certainly from an air perspective-this is a Major Theater War." (Kreisher, 1999:2) Consequently, during analysis of NATO’s Kosovo action, I will use not only the expression of “humanitarian intervention” and “multilateral peace operation”, but also (at least) “war”.

4 For instance, according to Edward N. Luttwak, a senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies, who is a member of the National Security Study Group and acted as expert in the Eaker Institute’s post-conflict assessment panel, during the Kosovo campaign it was clear to many national political and military decision-makers that NATO’s long-term viability was at stake, since: "The largest dramatic fact is that NATO could have failed. ... When the bombing started, and if Milosevic hadn't moved and hadn't expelled Albanians, I believe two crucial European governments [of Germany and Italy], without which the war could not be pursued, would have insisted on the suspension of the air war. ... If Milosevic hadn't solved the problem for us by sending out the Albanians, this war could have ended and been a fiasco. ... In other words, there were big risks in this war." (Kitfield, 1999)

5 The changes of national strategic cultures resulted in transformation in values, attitudes, and patterns of behavior of national political and military elites on such issues as e.g., the use of force in international politics, threat perceptions, civil-military relations and strategic doctrines in the post-Cold War world (Booth, 1990: 121-128).

6 According to military thinkers of the U.S. Army’s Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), with the appearance of the microchip, started the 11th main wave of revolutions in military affairs (RMA) from the beginning of the 1990s (Adams, 1996:56). However, I am afraid that the military thinkers of TRADOC concentrated mainly on tactical- and operational-level evolution and RMA, and did not always take into consideration the strategic-level of the “RMA-related” changes.

7 As Samuel Huntington saw it: “In the expansion of EU membership, preference clearly goes to those states which are culturally Western and which also tend to be economically more developed. If this criterion were applied, the Visegrad states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary), the Baltic republics, Slovenia, Croatia, and Malta would eventually become EU members and the Union would be coexistive with Western civilization as it has historically existed in Europe.” Moreover, from his point of view: “With the Cold War over, NATO has one central and compelling purpose: to insure that it remains over by preventing the reimposition of Russian political and military control in Central Europe. As the West’s security organization NATO is appropriately open to membership by Western countries which wish to join and which meet basic requirements in terms of military competence, political democracy, and civilian control of the military.” (Huntington, 1996: 161)


10 ‘C2W is an application of info(rmation) war(fare) in military operations and is a subset of infowar.’ (Joint Vision 2010, I-4) See: (Van Creveld, 1991: 197) See also: quotations from the Joint Doctrine for Command and Control Warfare (1996), an unclassified doctrinal document released the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the USA in (Schönbücker, 1998:106-118).

11 See description of the military experts of BBC about the Paveway II and III laser guided bombs, which were dropped from Harrier GR-7 aircraft during Operation Desert Storm. Available [Online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/nato_strikes/paveway.stm (16 February 2000)


13 See e.g.: the NDU Press Book written by experts of the Center for Advanced Command Concepts and Technology (ACT) of the National Defence University, Washington D.C. The title of the above mentioned book is very meaningful: "Operations Other Than War (OOTW): The Technological Dimension."

14 On the dilemmas regarding potential misinterpretations based on improper use of such definitions, as eg. (thermonuclear) war, warfare see mainly: (Lider, 1983: 78-81). In connection with the main and typical counter-arguments against over-dimensionnation of imaginable results of an 'electronic Pearl Harbor', a possible attack from unidentified enemies "armed" with computers connected to the global computer network for causing disruptions in the country's major telecommunication systems, see e.g.: (Smith, 1998: 68-73; Gray, 1998: 130-136).

15 The expression of "human security," based on the new, broad approach of security. According to this viewpoint point security means not only "security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust." (UNDP, 1994: 22) - but also should reflect growing problems of socio-economic inequity, poverty, environmental degradation, population pressures, human rights deprivation (Lewis, 1995).

16 Only two example regarding contemporary "anti-UN" congressional measures:
- the Kemp-Moynihan Amendment of 1979, which prohibited the US to pay its share of UN funds for liberation movements such as the PLO, and
- the Kassebaum Amendment of 1985 that prescribed a 20 percent cut in American contributions to international organizations unless their budgetary procedures were sharply reformed.

17 The United Nations has six principal organs. Five of them — the General Assembly, the Security Council, the Economic and Social Council, the Trusteeship Council and the Secretariat — are based at UN Headquarters in New York. The sixth, the International Court of Justice, is located at The Hague, Netherlands. Detailed introduction of the principal organs of the United Nations is as follows. Available [Online]: http://www.un.org/overview/ organs/index.html (17 January 1999)

18 For instance, senator Newt Gingrich characterized the United Nations as a failed institution with "grotesque pretensions, a totally incompetent instrument any place that matters." His speech has been quoted in Newsletter of Americans for the Univerisity of UNESCO, Vol. 11, No. 1, March 1995.
19 According to the Maastricht Declarations, the explicit ‘three-pillar’ structure of the EU consists of the following elements:
- The first pillar called the ‘Community pillar’, based upon the Treaties of Paris and Rome, as modified by the Single European Act; and governed by the Community legislation.
- The second pillar is the new Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which replaced the Single Act provisions in this field.
- The third pillar based on codification of roles of the Co-operation in the field of Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) within the EU.

20 From point of view of Alfred van Staden, director of the Netherlands Institute of International Relations: “It is true that the great push for closer European Union in the early 1990s, culminating in the Maastricht Treaty, cannot be explained by economic considerations alone; the general desire for constraining the newly unified Germany also played a significant part.” (Staden, 2000: 148)

21 As Philip H. Gordon has characterized: “The functionalist set of theories emphasizes the process by which power is gradually transferred to a ‘new center’ as integration in some areas makes it more necessary in others; institutions, once set up, push to expand their power; leaders and people call for integration in new domains as they see its success in others; and transnational elites and interest groups tend to ‘socialize’ and develop common views and interests. Ultimately, as power is transferred to the new, central institutions, people come to transfer their expectations and loyalty to the new institutions.” (Gordon, 1998:161)

22 The Rome Declaration, which led to an acceleration of the rejuvenation process of the WEU, called for greater political voice for Europe and defined European security identity and gradual harmonization of defense policies. “Continuing necessity to strengthen Western security, and the better utilization of WEU would not only contribute to the security of Western Europe but also to an improvement in the common defense of all the countries of the Atlantic Region.” These stated objectives were to work on the European Security Identity, and the gradual harmonization of its members’ defense policies.


24 As Sir Henry Tizard, chief scientific adviser at the Ministry of Defense, bitterly noted on the incorrect British self-perception and wishes for European leadership: “We persist in regarding ourselves as a Great Power, capable of everything and only temporarily handicapped by economic difficulties. We are not a Great Power and never will be again. We are a great nation, but if we continue to behave like a Great Power we shall soon cease to be a great nation.” (Quted by Young, 1998: 24)


26 Furthermore, after his impressive speech at the University of Zurich, when Churchill urged Europe to become united under a forum for association between sovereign governments (named Council of Europe), he took two other historical, although later ambivalently evaluated speeches. One of them (with title "Let Europe Arise") was addressed to the Primrose League on 18 April 1947, the other was delivered at the first Congress of Europe in The Hague on 7 May 1948 (Young, 1998: 18-24). On the other hand, according to Harold Macmillan’s viewpoint, Churchill unfortunately: “...had no clear or well-defined plan”. Moreover, in Macmillan’s opinion, Churchill merely wanted to “...give an impetus towards movements already at work.” (p.22) In addition, quite contrary Churchill “…continued to assure the Americans that ‘only the English-speaking peoples count; that together they can rule the world’.”(Young, 1998: 25)

On the one hand, Churchill called for a European army, under unified command, against all aggressors, at the birth of the Strasbourg Assembly, in August 1950 (Hugo, 1998: 4). On the other hand, he was, who attacked the Pleven Plan in Paris in 1952, and cried his famous sentences: “European Army!
European Army! It won’t be an army, it’ll be a sludgy amalgam... What soldiers want to sing are their own marching songs.” (Cited by Young, 1998: 76)

27 That is: “...to persuade the Allies to organize an integrated military command structure in peacetime and to establish the presumption of a large, long-term U.S. military presence in Europe.” (Yost, 1998: 29) Eisenhower became the 1st SACEUR (Dec 1950) at Allied Command Europe (ACE – from Apr. 1951) and the Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE) at Roquencourt, France.

28 “During a harsh debate from 1950-54, French proponents of the EDC presented it as the only alternative to a new Wehrmacht. EDC opponents in France argued that it would reconstitute German armed forces while subordinating the French military to a supranational European organization. U.S. and West German support for the EDC made it appear suspect in the view of many of the French as well.” (Yost, 1998:30)

29 “Italy and West Germany were admitted to the Western European Union (WEU), together with the original Brussels Treaty signatories – France, Britain, and the Benelux countries. West Germany renounced the production of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons on its territory, and accepted numerous restrictions on its conventional armaments – all within the WEU framework. Britain, Canada, and the United States promised to maintain ground and air forces in Germany, subject to certain conditions. With these assurances and others, France at last agreed to the Federal Republic’s entry into NATO and the establishment of West German armed forces in 1955.” (Yost, 1998:31)


31 States which are members of the European Union have been invited to accede to WEU on conditions to be agreed in the modified Brussels Treaty, or become observers if they wish. European Members states of NATO were invited to become associate members of WEU in a way which would give them the possibility to participate fully in WEU activities.

32 However, of course, just on paper, the following multinational forces are answerable to WEU (FAWEU):

1. The EUROCORPS (European Corps);
2. The Multinational Division (Central);
3. The UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force;
4. The EUROFOR (Rapid Deployment Forces);
5. The EUROMARFOR (European Maritime Force);
6. The Headquarters of the 1st German-Netherlands Corps;
7. The Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force;
8. National units.

The source detailed the number of personnel of the Secretariat-General, Situation Centre, Military Staff, Institute for Security Studies, WEAG (Western European Armaments Group), WEAO (Western European Armaments Organization, Office of the Clerk of the Parliamentary Assembly.

34 In the Petersberg Declaration the WEU member states declared their preparedness to make military units available from the whole spectrum of their conventional armed forces for military tasks conducted under WEU authority, and decided that military units will be drawn from forces of WEU member states, including forces with NATO missions. WEU member states will develop capabilities for development of WEU units by land, sea and air; all planning and execution of tasks will be necessary to ensure collective defense of all Allies, apart from contributing to common defense IAW Article 5 of the Washington Treaty and the
Modified Brussels Treaty. Military units of WEU states acting under the authority of WEU can be employed (3 Petersberg Tasks); established a Planning Cell.

35 After the Amsterdam Treaty was born, the European intentions for developing a CFSP including “…the eventual framing of a common defence policy… which might lead to a common defence…” became much more clear. See mainly Art. 17 of “Consolidated Version of the Treaty on European Union” (which is based on Art. 1.7.2-3 of the Maastricht Treaty (2 October 1991). Available [Online]: http://europa.eu.int/eur-lex/en/treaties/dat/eu_cons_treaty_en.pdf (7 January 2000)

36 As Article 5 of the Defence Capabilities Initiative stated: “The initiative emphasises the importance of the resource dimension of this work as well as the requirement for better coordination between defence planning disciplines; takes into consideration the ability of European Allies to undertake WEU-led operations; addresses ways to improve capabilities of multinational formations; and considers issues such as training, doctrine, human factors, concept development and experimentation, and standardisation.” (Emphases added –KZL) Source: Defence Capabilities Initiative, NATO Heads of State and Government (Washington, D.C., 25 April 1999). Press Release NAC-S(99)69. Available [Online]: http://www.nato.int/docu/press/1999/p99s069e.htm (13 January 2000)

37 See the following documents regarding official US support toward establishment of a stronger ESDI inside organizational framework of NATO:


38 “According to a report issued by the President of the General Assembly and the Secretary General in 1965, United Nations peacekeeping operations may be divided into two categories: observer operations and operations involving the use of armed-forces units.” (Bennett, 1995: 480-481) According to classification of Bennett, from the 38 peacekeeping missions only 16 were “armed-forces type", and 22 were “observer-type" operations before 1995.

39 However, according to LeRoy Bennett: "...they may be permitted or requested to move beyond the traditional peacekeeping principles into peace-enforcing actions.” (Bennett, 1995: 154).

41 "United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s has been characterized by multidisciplinary operations encompassing a wide range of elements to enhance peace. These include the supervision of cease-fire agreements; regrouping and demobilization of armed forces; destruction of weapons surrendered in disarmament exercise; reintegration of former combatants into civilian life; designing and implementation of demining programmes; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons; provision of humanitarian assistance; training of new police forces; monitoring respect for human rights; support for implementation of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; and support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction."

42 From view point of Peter Southwood, one of the most important feature of conversion is the diversification, what he characterized as follows: "The entry of a firm into a substantially different business field, either through internal changes or through acquisition, without abandoning its original business field. In the case of military firms, this implies a widening of the base of activity – alternating military and nonmilitary work for uncovered capacity." (Southwood, 1991:9)

43 Later the document of "Military Technical Agreement between the International Security Force (KFOR) and the Governments of Federal Republic of Yugoslavia and the Republic of Serbia" defined in a detailed form what the international community meant under this category. According to their approach: "FRY forces: includes all of the FRY and Republic of Serbia personnel and organizations with military capability. This includes regular army and naval forces, armed civilian groups, associated paramilitary groups, air forces, national guards, border police, army reserves, military police, intelligence services, federal and Serbian Ministry of Internal Affairs local, special, riot and anti-terrorist police, and any other groups or individuals so designated by the international security force (KFOR) commander." Provided by the Associated Press. Available (Online): http://www.nytimes.com/library/world/europe/061099kosovomilitary-text.html (12 January 2000)

44 Glenn H. Snyder and Paul Diesing have developed a methodology for the application of such games to the study of specific international crises. See else: (Wight, 1996: 180-232)

45 From point of view of theory of rational decisions we have to assume that each side would prefer reach as advantageous positions for itself, as it is possible – and wants its opponent's capitulation to its own; neither of them loves war for its own sake, or has martyr complex.

46 According to information of the Military Balance 1999-20040, from the altogether 52 armed Yugoslav helicopters there were 44 Gazelle, 3 Mi-14, 3 Ka-25, 2 Ka-28 helicopters (MB, 1999: 103).

47 NATO has provided a different set of data on the "enemy forces" at the beginning of the conflict. See: "Operation Allied Force. Combatants." Available (Online): http://www.defenselink.mil_specials/kosovo (28 October 1999)

48 Source of the US data: The Kosovo Burdensharing Resolution, introduced by the US House of Representatives (30 July, 1999) (H. RES. 268 IH) Available [Online]: http://rs9.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/dbase TEXT=Person: Lord Robertson of Port Ellen, Britain's former Defence Secretary during the Kosovo crisis, the exact numbers were: "38,004 sorties were flown, of which 10,484 were strike sorties." (Robertson, 1999)

The French calculations gave the following data: the total number of sorties was 58,574 from which 10,434 were strike sorties. Source: Ministère de la Défense, "Le Dossier. Les Enseignements du Kosovo," Annexe "Bilan participation français." Available [Online]: http://www.defense.gouv.fr_actualites/dossier/d36/index.html (17 January 2000)
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Aircraft Contributing to Operation Allied Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HARRIER GR7</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEA HARRIER FA2</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TORNADO GR1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3D</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NIMROD</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRISTAR</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VC10</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinook helicopter</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Puma helicopter</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lynx helicopter</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>67</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>French Aircraft Contributing to Operation Allied Force</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>F 1 CT</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE 2000 C</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE 2000 D</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JAGUAR</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSALL C 160 Gabriel</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SA 330 PUMA CSAR (Combat Search and Rescue)</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE F1CR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C 135 FR</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>E3F-SDCA</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE IV P</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>66</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The Kosovo strike assessment intelligence reports based on analysis of various information sources, e.g.:
- On-site findings of actual equipment on the ground
- Aircrew mission reports
- Forward air controller (FAC) interviews
- Cockpit videos
- Witness reports
- Human intelligence reports
- National capabilities
- pre-strike and post-strike imageries of pilots (bomber, fighter, U-2, tactical reconnaissance /TACRECE/)
- pre- and post-strike imagery of Predators, Hunters, and NATO unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)

52 See description of the military experts of BBC about the Paveway II and III laser guided bombs, which were dropped from Harrier GR-7 aircraft in Kosovo. Available [Online]:

53 On the BLU-114/B Soft Bomb, used by USAF, see “Hi-tech war over Kosovo,” and the BBC’s summary regarding ordnance system of NATO during the Kosovo campaign, provided by British military experts. Available [Online]: http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/english/static/nato_strikes/soft_bomb.htm (12 January 2000)

54 “United Nations peacekeeping in the 1990s has been characterized by multidisciplinary operations encompassing a wide range of elements to enhance peace. These include the supervision of cease-fire agreements; regrouping and demobilization of armed forces; destruction of weapons surrendered in disarmament exercise; reintegration of former combatants into civilian life; designing and implementation of demining programmes; facilitating the return of refugees and displaced persons; provision of humanitarian assistance; training of new police forces; monitoring respect for human rights; support for implementation of constitutional, judicial and electoral reforms; and support for economic rehabilitation and reconstruction.”

55 “All 10 members of the W.E.U. - Britain, Belgium, France, Italy, Spain, Portugal, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Germany, and Greece -- already belong to both NATO and the European Union. Denmark does, too, but has only observer status in the smaller European defense organization, as do four other European Union members, Austria, Ireland, Finland and Sweden, which are neutral or nonaligned and do not belong to NATO. These countries would be able to join future European Union peacekeeping or military operations, but only if they wanted to, the leaders agreed today, saying they would also welcome participation by other European countries.” (Whitney, 1999: June 4)

56 Ibid.

57 According to Francois Heisbourg, a former adviser to the French Defense Ministry, who often writes about military alliances, the European NATO-allies do not like the plan, because: “It is unacceptable for Europeans to be spending 60 percent as much as Americans spend on defense but getting in return only a small fraction of the defense capability the Americans get for their money.” Quoted by Whitney, 1999b)

58 Quoted in: (Whitney, 1999b)


60 British Prime Minister, Tony Blair, and President Jacques Chirac and Prime Minister Lionel Jospin of France agreed on 25 November 1999 in London that:
“Par 5. Our top priorities must therefore be to strengthen European military capabilities without unnecessary duplication. We call on the European Union at the Helsinki Summit to:
• Set itself the goal of Member States, cooperating together, being able to deploy rapidly and then sustain combat forces which are militarily self-sufficient up to Corps level with the necessary command, control and intelligence capabilities, logistics, combat support and other combat service support (up to 50,000-60,000 men) and appropriate naval and air combat elements. All these forces should have the full range of capabilities necessary to undertake the most demanding crisis management tasks.
• Urge the Member States to provide the capabilities to deploy in full at this level within 60 days and within this to provide some smaller rapid response elements at very high readiness. We need
to be able to sustain such a deployment for at least a year. This will require further deployable forces (and supporting elements) at lower readiness to provide replacements for the initial force.

- Develop rapidly capability goals in the fields of command and control, intelligence and strategic lift. In this respect:
  - We are ready to make available the UK's Permanent Joint Headquarters and France's Centre Operational Interarmées and their planning capabilities as options to command EU-led operations. As part of this, we intend to develop standing arrangements for setting up *multinationalised cells within these Headquarters*, including officers from other EU partners.
  - We want European *strategic airlift* capabilities to be strengthened substantially. We intend to work urgently with our allies and partners on ways to achieve this. We note the common *European need for new transport aircraft*. We have today taken an important bilateral step by signing an agreement on logistics which will include arrangements by which we can draw on each other's air, sea and land transport assets to help deploy rapidly in a crisis.

Par 8. ...the strengthening of our armaments industry will foster the development of European technological capabilities and will allow transatlantic cooperation to develop in a spirit of balanced partnership.

Par 9. We are committed to the efforts being made to harmonise future defence equipment requirements.

The successful *cooperation between the UK and France, together with Italy, on the Principal Anti-Air Missile System* - which will provide world class air defence for our Navies well into the next century - is a good example of how we work together. So too are the French SCALP and the UK's Storm Shadow programme for a long range precision guided air to ground missile, which is based on the proven French Apache missile. We are partners too with Germany on the future medium range anti-armour weapon for our respective infantry.


61 According to Chapter I., Art. 2 (4) of the Charter of the United Nations: “*All Members shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.*” (Bennett, 1995: 468) Furthermore, according to the Chapter VII, Art. 51.: “Nothing in the present Charter shall impair the *inherent right of individual or collective self-defence if an armed attack occurs against a Member of the United Nations*, until the *Security Council has taken measures necessary to maintain international peace and security.*” (Bennett, 1995: 480).


63 The authors of the Concept for Future Joint Operations (CFJO) expanded those new operational concepts that were contained in the Joint Vision 2010 document, and provided a more detailed foundation for follow-on capabilities assessments, when stated: “From a strategic perspective, patterns of conflict that we have experienced since about 1989 will likely continue into the 21st century. We expect to be involved—normally as part of a multinational force—in large-scale combat contingencies such as the Persian Gulf Conflict, 1990-91; foreign humanitarian assistance efforts such as Operation SEA ANGEL in Bangladesh, 1991; noncombatant evacuation requirements such as Operation ASSURED RESPONSE in Liberia, 1996; peace operations such as those in Bosnia and Haiti; and various other types of operations requiring US military capability. Although the threat of large-scale worldwide conflict is less likely than during the Cold War, such conflict remains possible in a world made increasingly smaller by sophisticated transportation and communications. Strategic nuclear deterrence, therefore, will remain a key pillar of our NMS.” (CFJO, 1997:7)

64 Only some data, to show volume of this economic interdependence between the US and the EU-countries: “The United States remains the EU’s largest trading partner, accounting for 19.7 per cent of exports and 19.4 per cent of imports…” (McCormick, 1999: 219) Furthermore, as Gregory Treverton has highlighted: “The EU is the source for over half the foreign investment in the United States, a share that has
been rising in recent years. Almost half of the American investment abroad is in Europe – about nine times the share accounted for by Japan. About 30 percent of all U.S. exports to the EU are to European subsidiaries of American firms, and 15 percent of EU exports to the United States are from such subsidiaries.” (Treverton, 1998: 55-56)

On the other hand, the demographic composition of the US society is changing dramatically. This kind of change would result in shifting emphases in composition of the US’s political elite during a 20-30 years span, from dominance of political elite members with European ethnic roots to a national political elite with a significantly higher portion of decision-makers with Asians and Hispanic Americans ethnic backgrounds. From Samuel P. Huntington’s point of view, this fact would contribute to changes in the approach and emphases on foreign politics of the new elite that will be less Europe-focused (Huntington, 1997: 28-49).

In August 1999 the Air Force Magazine provided the following summary on the activity of the all together 883 NATO (581 US, and 302 Allied) aircraft, with reference to the DoD and Gen. Clark: “On March 24, the number of NATO aircraft committed to the air campaign numbered 400, of which 120 were strike aircraft. By the end of the war, the numbers were 883 and 550, respectively. US forces provided 581, or about 66 percent of the total.” Source: John T. Correll, “Echoes From Allied Force”, Air Force Magazine, August 1999 Vol. 82, No. 8. Available [Online]: http://www.afm.org/magazine/0899force.html (28 August 1999)

Two months later, on October 21, 1999 Air Force Lt. Gen. Michael Short, the air chief of NATO’s air campaign during Operation Allied Force provided a little bit different data in a Senate Armed Services Committee hearing, when stated that from the side of the NATO all together: “More than 900 aircraft, two-thirds American, flew more than 14,000 strike and 24,000 support sorties.” Quoted by: (Kozaryn, 1999b)
The list of various kinds of aircraft provided by the participating NATO-members is as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country (Service)</th>
<th>Type of Aircraft</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>US (Other)</td>
<td>EA-6B (Navy), F-14 (Navy), F/A-18 (Navy and USMC), KC-130 (USMC), P-3C (Navy), Hunter UAV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>F-16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Britain</td>
<td>E-3D, GR-7, GR1, L-1011K, Tristar, VC-10, aircraft on HMS Invincible</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>CF-18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>F-16A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>Tornado PA-200H/E, UAV CL289</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>AMX, Boeing 707T, F-104, PA2001, Tornado ADV, aircraft on ITS Garibaldi</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>F-16A, F-16AM, KDC-10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO Common</td>
<td>E-3A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>F-16A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>F-16A</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spain</td>
<td>CASA, EF-18, KC-130,</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>F-16, KC-135, TF-16C</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From: (Grant, 1999)
Moreover, the Navy had to promise "two-for-one guarantees" for its pilots, because of shortage of skilled manpower (Eisman, 1999: A1). Furthermore, the Air Force had to invoke a "stop-loss order" to prevent and block leaving of personnel with key importance skills. "The order, ..., affected 40 percent of USAF skill specialties, or over 120,000 persons, but specifically applied to about 6,000 persons who had requested retirement or separation since December 1998 and had planned to leave after June 15." John A. Tirpak, "Victory in Kosovo," Air Force Magazine, July 1999 Vol. 82, No. 7. Available [Online]: http://www.afa.org/magazine/watch/0799watch.html (17 January 2000)

"The peak U.S. deployment to Bosnia of about 20,000 troops occurred in December 1995 with the activation of the NATO's peace implementation force, or IFOR. U.S. involvement fell to 8,500 troops with the establishment of the NATO stabilization force in December 1996. When SFOR downsized in June 1998, the U.S. contingent dropped to its current /6200/ level." (Kozaryn, 1999:2)
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