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EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY
AND THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

BY

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European Union Security in the 21st Century and the Transatlantic Link

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The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

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ABSTRACT

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This study was composed within the framework of the United State Army War College (USAWC) educational program. Its scope will be limited to the most necessary elements of the European Union (EU) security background, and to a brief historical European course, either as a vision of some leader-figures towards a total EU security system (END), or as a necessity, driven by economic need for a competitive large common market (WAYS). However, the current functions of the relevant security organizations (MEANS), do not seem to have accomplished the dream of a unified Europe, to form a federation, confederation, or even a loose confederation. The intent, after all, is not to provide historical information, but to show continuous and dynamic change in the scene of EU security.

The study will focus particularly on brief sketching of the trends that have prevailed over European interstate relationships and which keep on forming a dynamic polymorph of organizations. Current global economic trends and new security threats, faced by a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the EU and the United States (US), within the new world order may transform values from a national level to a European level, possibly affecting transatlantic western partners in the areas of economics, security and institutions.

An evaluation of the dynamic change of interlocking organizations as a whole will lead to a rough estimate or snapshot, through three main scenarios, about the type of security link between EU-US.

The paper will address the current belief that NATO will remain the sole security organization for Europe in the 21st century. Also the belief that, due to EU's independent development, the transatlantic link may be forced to grow as a result of the will of the homogenous peoples of the western world to face global competition, globalization trends and asymmetric threats. Thus, a new EU-US security system can possibly emerge, in parallel to a new Euro-dollar economic system due to EU-US integration. Within the scope of the latter, the main EU-US national interests, benefits and disadvantages will be generally touched upon.

Which of the scenarios will "prevail" and come true in the future? This is absolutely a personal conclusion to which the reader will come reading the pages of this study.
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EUROPEAN UNION SECURITY IN THE 21ST CENTURY AND THE TRANSATLANTIC LINK

PURPOSE

The purpose of this paper is:

To address briefly the course of the EU Security System within the dynamics of NATO and EU expansions.

To analyze briefly the perspective of the EU Security in the 21st century, based on the main available “tools”, that is, NATO, EU, Western European Union (WEU), Organization for the Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), United Nations (UN) and the Council of Europe, that, as a whole, aim at the preservation of the EU security and its periphery.¹

To project the possibilities of only the EU security in the 21st century and its transatlantic link, through the lenses of three potential scenarios.

ASSUMPTIONS

For the purpose of the current work the following assumptions have been made:

In the long term, none of the EU countries have either the luxury or the capability to pursue or apply a policy of national security without some type of alignment with another country. The types of alignments or alliances may vary, not necessarily always involving NATO. Moreover, NATO must remain effective.

In the short to medium term, an EU Security system without the United States is impossible; hence the transatlantic link projects itself as an imperative for the time being. In fact, NATO today serves the interests of both sides of the Atlantic.

*The protection of the interests of a full economic union with a single currency needs a collective security system with a common defense system.*

DIACHRONIC COURSE OF EU SECURITY

The idea of a unified Europe with a common economy and security system is not new. The historical roots of its unification are attributed to the ancient Greeks, Hypocrates and Aristotle, (the very name “Europe” is Greek), and continued in the times of French monarch Napoleon, who aspired to hegemony over all Europe. During the 1950s, and due to the lessons learned from two disastrous world wars, it was thought better to start a functional commercial integration of Europe instead of a politically unified one, as many demanded. The commercial and economic impetus was imposed as urgency by the international competition and labor distribution, to render the European economies more robust and competitive. Thus, it was the “Atlantic logic” that prevailed rather than the “European logic”. The security of Europe was entrusted to NATO.

But the European interstate system was not homogeneous. Different languages, societies, cultures, traditions, and political systems were obstacles. To overcome those obstacles, members set out with the narrow goal of cooperating on coal and steel production, worked in the 1960s to complete a customs union and to build a common agricultural policy, wrestled during the 1970s with attempts to
agree on common economic policies and to achieve exchange rate stability, focused in the late 1980s on completing the single market, and are now working on their most ambitious project to date: replacing national currencies with a single European currency, the Euro. This does not appear to be a “typical” procedure of integrating state entities, but it was selected for its flexibility. Excessive pressures on the system were avoided allowing for gradual increase of cooperation based on parity/equality and the laborious pursuit of convergence.

WESTERN EUROPE TODAY

An undeniable fact is that the European Union has become the world’s biggest trading power. And although EU member states still actively protect their sovereignty, when it comes to economic issues they already think collectively. This is because the EU is rapidly reaching its full economic union. The evidence of this is: the near completion of the single market, the free movement of people and capital, the power of the Commission to negotiate on behalf of the EU as a whole, and the conversion to a single currency.

The protection of the interests of a full economic union with a single currency needs a collective security system with a common defense system. Instead, today in Europe there is a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture, as developed by the creation of a model of interlocking institutions like NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, UN, the Council of Europe, and the evolving security institutions of the EU. Europeans alone did not create this complex system. It was gradually developed within the American-led defense system of NATO, with reference to European security. However, the Americans never believed that the European countries would ever be able to form a federation or even a political union. Of course, one can not still speak about an authentic European Union security system, since Europe relies on NATO and the United States for its defense.

There are points of deviation, convergence and parallelism among the security architectures that at times were proposed and overwhelmed. However, they can not overshadow the amazing level of security cooperation reached among the European countries since 1989. The momentum of cooperation is such that it is estimated to continue throughout the 21st century. Many wonder how the Europeans tolerate as a security model a complex cluster of so many diverse interlocking organizations. However, the progressive amount of experience in cooperation, based on equality, parity and the laborious pursuit of convergence, will clear up the responsibilities, functions and hierarchy of those organizations in the 21st century. And in any case, due to successes to date and the huge range of missions facing Europe, some overlapping of missions of the organizations, for the time being, is not harmful.

An independent European Security and Defense System can better be justified by and based on an integrated economy (common currency) and an urgent political unification and expansion. But, we are nearer to the end of the beginning than to the beginning of the end. The problem of economic security will be a concern for European planners and citizens through the 21st century, but perhaps also through the next one. Although the European course has been slow towards economic, political and security integration, it is, nevertheless, irreversibly stable. It is also historically realized that economic interests can not be protected and secured and promoted within a state entity, unless that entity develops robust tools,
that is, a military machinery, in order to play a powerful political game in the new extremely competitive and ambiguous international arena.

“MUTUALLY REINFORCED INSTITUTIONS”

Members of those institutions came to a series of summits and addressed changes for practical cooperation – not confrontation. Therefore, NATO is not, and should not - they thought – be the sole player in European security. As the Bosnian war has shown, there is no single institution that can provide all political, economic and military means necessary to manage a crisis. The interlocking institutions, (Figure 1), would support and reinforce one another. Thus the EU member states hope to build a comprehensive security framework for Europe. The Maastricht\(^3\) convention gave a new thrust to the development of a new European architecture of a multi-level and multi-speed complexity. European institutionalization develops on the intersection of multi-levels and multi-speeds, to allow cooperation and policy of different degree of commitment and participation. The system still looks asymmetrical with the power being disparately distributed, so much so that one can classify it as hierarchical and hegemonic. The European ideal tried ambitiously to avoid or surpass the state of being classified as hierarchical and hegemonic. But if altruism does not prevail among the societies and elite of the participating countries, the geo-political and geo-strategic trends developed by the asymmetry will create instability. To understand the system as a whole, we must briefly address the current functions of its main institutions:
The Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) (Figure 2), initially aimed at a political consultative process involving 54 participating states. It was established in 1975 as a result of the Helsinki Act, as a ‘product’ of the cold war, launched to establish a framework for dialogue and consultation between the East and the West. Its work encompasses three areas: security, economics and human rights. However, the OSCE is neither an organization with great military abilities, nor is it a treaty-based organization. A basic catalogue of commitments, to which all members have signed, can form the basis for its conflict prevention activities, within the framework of the following three functions:

a. The creation of norms that relate to international law, human rights, minority rights, democracy, rule of law and market economy.

b. The process of arms control in Europe, including the Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) and the Dayton agreement, as major confidence-building measures.

c. The early warning, conflict prevention and conflict solving supported by confidence building mechanisms, preventive diplomacy and the appointment of a High Commissioner for National Minorities. Such missions were developed during 1992 in Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM), in Moldova and later in Bosnia, Chechnya and Albania.

NATO supports the OSCE in its key roles, and the NATO member countries have stated their readiness to support activities, on a case-by-case basis, under the responsibility of the OSCE. It undoubtedly has its weaknesses. First, the OSCE is handicapped by the small size of its staff. Second, it functions on the basis of a rotating presidency and therefore can suffer from a lack of continuity. Third,
the scope of its membership (now 54 countries) and its decision-making procedure (by consensus or consensus minus one) makes it slow. The OSCE remains an important forum of dialogue with a pan-European and transatlantic dimension, in which Russia participates fully and feels comfortable. However, member states proved to be reluctant to give the organization any extra power. So, the discussions within OSCE on a Security Model for the 21st century are far from setting the basis for a practical wider security community. The Russians recognize OSCE as a better security organization than NATO to deal with security issues in Europe. They dislike and fear NATO’s expansion because they cannot veto the process through the United Nation’s Security Council. Unfortunately for them, they cannot restrain it even through the OSCE.⁴

The Council of Europe (CoE) (Figure 3) was established in 1949 in parallel with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), which administered the Marshall plan, and NATO, which administered security. An important part of its work and a main challenge for the Council of Europe is to help the central and eastern European countries (and Russia) in forming stable parliamentary democracies. Its monitoring process is important in maintaining the high standards of the Council of Europe, especially on human rights. The efforts of the Council of Europe are parallel to NATO’s work in the defense field, where they both try to help the establishment of democratic control with the military.
The European union (EU) today functions in two security dimensions: internally, it serves to bind the larger European powers in offering a stable framework for Germany and France on the one hand and for the young democracies (Greece, Spain, and Portugal) to develop and prosper on the other hand. Externally, it is a profound stabilization process in terms of security, based on economic and political agreements using its common power, means and resources. Moreover, the EU has continued a policy of enlargement by opening negotiations for new members. With the adoption of the 1991 Maastricht Treaty, the EU extended its competence to foreign policy and security issues. Using the language of the treaty, the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) ‘might in time lead to common defense’. The EU has requested the WEU to implement Union decisions that have a defense mission, but WEU has to draw assets from NATO.

The EU uses visionary process. Its agenda for 2010 includes a new European constitution, which will strengthen the constitutional process in order to make the decision-making process more efficient. The EU vision in terms of economic integration as well as European Security and Defense Identity will be elaborated briefly in the following chapters.
The Western European Union (WEU) grew out of the Brussels Treaty of 1948. It was an Anglo-French initiative aimed at preventing the resurgence of a German military threat. In 1954, the WEU took its present form. It can be viewed as an attempt by France to bind Germany to ensure that war could never again be repeated. The Maastricht Treaty of 1992 tied for the first time the WEU and the EU together. Here, the WEU is given a central role between the EU and NATO in enabling the Union to implement measures, which have defense implications while, at the same time, strengthening the European pillar of the Alliance. The membership categories of the WEU (Figure 5) reflect this dual role.

The Helsinki Summit on 10-11 December 1999 sounded the death-knell for the WEU, since its functions are to be absorbed into the EU from the end of the year 2000. This was somewhat anticipated because according to the Article 17 of the Treaty of Amsterdam signed in October 1997 “the Treaty provides also the possibility of integrating the WEU into the EU, should the European Council so decide”. Moreover, the EU on 14 February 2000 decided to set up a NATO-like mechanism composed of a political committee and a military body. It is actually the beginning of the institutionalization of a common European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) within the EU. Despite these moves, the real state of development of EU defense is still ambiguous. There are elements of ESDI functioning under NATO, and also sometimes ESDI appears functioning under the EU. The relationship of those two functions is unclear. It is unclear how the institutional arrangements are going to work in practice once the WEU disappears.
NATO supports the strengthening of the WEU as long as it does not duplicate the functions or structures of NATO. The January 1994 Summit Declaration expressed NATO's support for the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) and underlined that the Alliance was prepared to make its collective assets available, on the basis of consultations, for WEU led operations. NATO-WEU cooperation was institutionalized in Berlin in 1996 and endorsed by the Madrid Summit, where ministers decided that the NAC would determine what NATO assets could be handed over to WEU-led operations. Besides, Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) is a flexible command and control tool that it could possibly be used for WEU-led operations. The Ministers agreed that ESDI would be developed within the Alliance; in the transatlantic context ESDI could help to rebalance burden sharing and allow the Europeans to shoulder a larger share of defense responsibility without doing it in competition with NATO. The Alliance is now implementing these ministerial decisions. This involves identifying separable - but not separate - assets, capabilities, and command elements needed to command and conduct WEU-led operations. The WEU depends on NATO's internal adaptation. Finally, the main challenge for the WEU today is to find a model for its co-operation with NATO as well as with the EU. France has been at the forefront of recent efforts to strengthen the European defense pillar within the EU. The EU is currently being absorbed within the EU, but it is likely that the EU will stick to those WEU-tasks of the Petersburg Declaration in June 1992 that can be undertaken without US participation. However, there is no authority for action; responsibility remains with the National Capitals.

The international newspapers and magazines during the first three months of the year 2000, gave the impression that American and NATO officials believe the European plan for an independent military force may be a riskier proposition than it seemed by the end of the year 1999, when the 15 EU countries decided to go ahead with the project. Whether it succeeds or fails, they think, the ESDI represents a critical leap of faith that could erode American defense guarantees and leave the continent exposed to new threats of instability. 10 This is an expectation of the European citizens that EU should not stand by watching without reacting to events and conflicts. But in order to react there is a need for new tools. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright summed up American concerns with what she calls the ‘three Ds’ – the European defense initiative must not ‘decouple’ the United States from Europe; it must not ‘duplicate’ NATO structures and capabilities, and it must not ‘discriminate’ against NATO members that do not belong to the European Union. 11

The Clinton administration wants NATO to have a ‘right of first refusal’ in dealing with crises before handing off responsibility to the European Union. But France insists the EU must have exclusive powers to decide when and how it will intervene in any Continental crisis. The French reject any formal consultative link between the EU and NATO, fearing that the United States would smother any effort by the Europeans to become more independent. 12

It seems that the Americans are worried too much about the developments of EDSI in EU. Some of them believe that the European rhetoric does not match their ability to finance their ambitions. Some believe that the Europeans are serious about their ambitions. Both beliefs disturb the Americans.
Because a European defense identity within or outside NATO would fundamentally change the relationship between the US and Europe. A NATO with one big power and 15 medium and small powers is fundamentally different from a NATO with two big powers and a smattering of smaller ones.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was established in 1949 as a defense organization designed to provide an 'insurance' mechanism directed against any territorial threat to any of its member states. NATO's new roles within the EU institutions are guided by four key assumptions: There is no direct threat to NATO countries, the Transatlantic link remains a vital ingredient of European security, co-operative approach to security (NACC/PIP/Russia/Ukraine/Med.), and NATO is viewed as part of a wider institutional architecture (OSCE/UN/EU/WEU, etc.).

The external adaptation of NATO comprises Enlargement and Enhanced PfP. The message is that the Alliance will remain open for future members although it remains to be seen how far enlargement will go. NATO regards enlargement as part of a wider package of outreach to the East, which includes enhanced Partnership for Peace (PiP), the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC), and co-operation with Russia and Ukraine. Russia has a major contribution to make to European security. There is no security guarantee without a strong, stable, enduring Partnership with Russia. The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed on 27 May 1997 in Paris. This created a consultative mechanism through the forum of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council for the coordination of joint action, and political and military representation based on mutual trust. Its success will now depend on political will from both sides. Also at Madrid in July 1997, NATO signed a bilateral Charter on a Distinctive Partnership between NATO and the Ukraine thus strengthening cooperation and security with that significant region. The Mediterranean Dialogue with those countries of the Southern and Eastern shores of the Mediterranean should help, over time, to learn more about their security concerns and to dispel mistrust about NATO's role vis-à-vis this region.

The purpose of NATO's internal adaptation is to permit rapid and effective responses to local conflicts (under UN/OSCE mandates), while also increasing the European profile within NATO and maintaining the transatlantic link. Bosnia has shown NATO's key role in orchestrating a strong, united response. Command structure reform and enhanced PfP will further develop NATO's capacity for joint action. NATO's significance today relies on the fact that the Alliance is the most effective military structure in Europe. NATO can serve as an attractive model for the Central and Eastern European countries' defense cooperation and prevent the re-nationalization of defense.
The main challenge for NATO is to get its internal and external adaptation right. Also, in light of lack of total war risks, it is difficult to maintain consensus, maybe more so with additional members and to avoid re-nationalization. Finally, NATO must play a balancing role and act in addressing the legitimate security concerns of the Central and Eastern European countries without marginalizing either Russia or Ukraine.

NATO allies and the EU drew several lessons from the Kosovo air war. The strategic aim was to avoid a humanitarian catastrophe by securing the Kosovar Albanians through a swift air war against the Serbs. The air war did not succeed in protecting the Kosovo population. It was not a fast air victory; it became a slow campaign of attrition. Indeed, it worsened and accelerated the humanitarian crisis because the Serbs systematically depopulated the province of Albanians. If limited numbers of highly trained regular NATO troops had been committed to perform the task of the KLA, it is safe to assume that many Kosovar Albanian lives would have been saved and the Yugoslav armed forces would have been exposed to aerial firepower much earlier in the war. The West is faced with refugee resettlement and the containment of Serbia. (Before the air war, there were 45,000 refugees outside Kosovo; after the air war there were 855,000). In the context of humanitarian war, the only real test of victory is successful 'nation-building', and Kosovo is now a wasteland.

It seems that the Kosovo lessons have awakened the EU to address its military shortcomings. But the vision of a new defense system is far away from the reality when it comes to funding especially with the domestic pressures to reduce defense spending. There are key issues to be tackled such as: the
development of EU nuclear doctrine and common nuclear deterrent forces/arsenal. Europeans may insist on acting only with a UN mandate, something that did not deter NATO from launching the Kosovo air war. EU military command and operating standards may or may not be compatible with those forces of NATO. The commercial rivalry between the US and the EU may spill over into the defense sector as well.\textsuperscript{17}

The Kosovo crisis also marks the beginning of a strategic transformation by NATO from a collective regional defense alliance to an Euro-Atlantic organization that is primarily concerned with crisis management. This new NATO may come to be partly based on the 1990 Charter of Paris for New Europe, signed by all OSCE members. This Paris Charter made the primacy of human rights the bedrock of European security. This is a further argument at the level of values. The EU is a community based on respect for universal human rights and which claims to make those rights a touchstone of its policy abroad. Its own model of voluntary integration is seen in many regions as one to which not only Europeans can aspire but other groups of states. Significantly, former NATO Security-General Solana had explained the intervention in Kosovo as an attempt to 'avert a human catastrophe.' This sets an important precedent for citing values as well as security interests as justification for employing force.\textsuperscript{18}

Neither America nor Europe can deal alone with challenges such as Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo. Unfortunately, the Kosovo campaign demonstrated that Europe still could not show its political and economic weight. Although NATO’s European members spend 60 percent of the US defense budget, they flew only 20 percent of the combat missions during the Kosovo conflict (but 85 percent of the NATO-led peacekeeping forces were European troops). Moreover, European militaries lagged far behind the United States in such critical areas as precision munitions, air transport, communications and control, and reconnaissance and surveillance.\textsuperscript{19}

The United Nations (UN) was established in 1945 after the end of World War II with the aim to prevent a third world war. Most of the nations of the world community are members of the UN, and all countries in Figure 1 are signatories. After the end of the Cold War the UN, and in particular the Security Council, has played a more prominent role in the arena of an increased international cooperation. The UN has given itself a more involved role, a mandate it would not have been able to give itself before. As a ‘peacekeeper,’ it has been relatively successful, but in the 1990s it has been problematic for the UN to undertake more pro-active tasks, such as peace enforcement. There are three major concerns about the UN during the post cold war period, especially in terms of peace missions:

a. The UN must have the necessary resources (equipment) to be able to take a more active role, while still ensuring the safety of the UN forces.

b. The operational structure is of critical importance, in both political and military levels, and especially the command and control links between the military forces and their political masters at the UN.

c. The financial backing for UN operations must be in place. The UN suffers constantly from a shortage of funds.
Considering the above concerns, the main challenge for the UN today and in the future is to avoid a mismatch between resolutions and resources.

THE EUROPEAN ARMY

Talk of the development of a European army started in the late 1940s and early 1950s, when the idea was first discussed in Germany and France. Since the Petersburg Declaration in June 1992 several experimental military units have conducted joint operations among EU member states. Known collectively as the Forces Answerable to WEU (FAWEU), they include a British-Dutch amphibious force and two bodies consisting of personnel from France, Italy, Spain and Portugal: a 20,000-strong Rapid Deployment Force (EUROFOR) headquartered in Florence and designed for humanitarian or peacekeeping operations in the Mediterranean area, and a non-permanent European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR). The WEU also runs a 50-person planning cell with representatives from 12 countries, which is charged with providing rules for engagement, designing operational procedures and planning exercises.

The most likely candidate for a European army, though, may be the Eurocorps, created in May 1992 by Germany and France to replace an experimental Franco-German brigade set up in 1990. Headquartered in Strasbourg, the 50,000-member Eurocorps has been operational since November 1995 and has been joined by contingents from Belgium, Spain and Luxembourg. It was conceived as a step towards the development of a European army that would give substance to the CFSP, give the EU an independent defense capability and provide insurance for Europe should the United States decide to withdraw its forces from Europe.

Germany insists that the Eurocorps would complement NATO, and that it would be placed under NATO's operational command in the event of a threat to western European security, but Britain, the Netherlands and the United States have suspected the intentions of France since the time of de Gaulle. France obviously would like to displace US dominance of NATO. Britain would prefer Eurocorps to operate under the auspices of the WEU, while France apparently prefers to see the WEU and Eurocorps as the basis of an EU defense wing, and favors the WEU merger with the EU. Obviously, the European Union military capability can not match that of the United States, although some decisive steps have been taken lately in that direction.

On March 3, 2000 defense ministers from the EU member states endorsed in Sintra, Portugal, a timetable for creating a rapid reaction force of 60,000 troops with the capability of being deployed within 60 days of notice and sustainable for one year. The force, which will be in place in 2003, will serve not only as defenders of the EU territory, but also as peacekeepers beyond the EU borders. In the mean time in the summer of 2000 the six-nation Eurocorps, a contender to be the headquarters for any future Europeans-only missions, is to take temporary day-to-day charge of the NATO-led peace keeping operation in Kosovo. If nothing else, this will be Europe's first big military reality-check. The under-
rehearsed, over-fragmented Eurocorps will have to borrow skills and men from outside its own ranks and hope that there is plenty of peace to keep, since it is not equipped to manage a serious fight.¹²

POTENTIAL TIGHTENING OF THE EU-US SECURITY/ECONOMIC LINK

EU VISION

Between the years 2005-2010 the Europeans expect the Union to become an economic superpower with a common currency, the ‘Euro.’ It will continue to expand its trade and economic cooperation over the globe and develop mechanisms to protect its own global economic and security interests (ENDS), which are more or less similar to those of the US. To that end, the EU will develop and improve its Common Foreign and Security Policy (WAYS). It also envisions the rapid consolidation and application of a European Security and Defense Identity, by comprehensively formulating the EU independent military machine (MEANS). These developments would have dramatic implications for the Euro-Atlantic security link.

THREATS

Today, non-state actors, who neither acknowledge country borders nor respect countries’ sovereignty, manipulate information technology and economic globalization trends. National economies can be at risk overnight, security interests may change rapidly toward a merciless and dangerous antagonism. In an ambiguous global environment the combination of economic and security malfunctioning would render the world a dangerous place. The following, is a list of potential threats and dangers that neither the United States alone nor the European Union can tackle in the future:

- Aggression by current rogue states, and the emergence of new rogue actors.
- Numerous clashes over resources, or a global economic collapse that produces extreme poverty, widespread frustration, and less political cooperation.
- Increasing ethnic warfare and violence from numerous failed states.
- Accelerating proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and missiles, which may be acquired by non-state actors, such as terrorist individuals/groups.
- Spreading terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.
- Military development that erodes US superiority and encourage regional aggression.
- Authoritarian rule in Russia or other major countries coupled with militarism and imperialism.
- An anti-Western global coalition of rogues and malcontents.
- Geopolitical rivalry with Russia and / or China.
- Emergence of a strong Islamic alliance in the Greater Middle East that seriously challenges Western interests.
- Disintegration of Western alliance system, renewed nationalism and re-nationalization of defense.
In our global age, the key priorities are not only security issues but also socioeconomic and cultural. The illusion of the American isolationist, due to geography in the past, has no place in the current strategy of engagement within an interdependent world. Today technology has replaced geography. And yet, technology alone does not solve all above problems. A new global geo-strategic dynamic is emerging. It suggests the need for a global focus in US strategy, rather than maintaining a regional focus. After all, globalization is making the world a single entity. The world could become more stable and peaceful, if today's integrative trends succeed both in economics and security' (INSS US Strategic Assessment 1999).

NATIONAL' SECURITY AND EU-US ECONOMIC RELATIONS

The US National Security Strategy calls for 'constructive peacetime engagement' with all nations, aiming at the following general goals:

- To enhance US National Security.
- To promote and protect US economic prosperity.
- To promote democracy abroad.

It is worth noticing that the US has not stopped perceiving the EU countries as separate states in terms of economics and security. Moreover, in the 1950s and 1960s the US tried to promote democracy abroad by economic aid/influence rather than by military might projection. Many now believe that the US’s military might is disproportionate to its economic power.

The Security Strategy of the EU has set general goals that are similar to the US's. But the EU applies economic integration and strong market economy as a better means of gaining 'national' power and prestige than increasing military power. To 'promote and protect economic prosperity', the EU has set out economic programs to attract wealthy countries. At the same time the EU emphasizes social, humanitarian and economic special links and programs aimed at 'promoting democracy abroad' in underdeveloped and developing countries. The Europeans tried their politico-military unification in the past unsuccessfully. The unifying key motive was absent; that is the economic leverage which determines security guarantees and commitments. The latest effects of the ESDI and the creation of the EU rapid reaction force have increased their prospects for EU security integration. For the time being, however, the EU security integration or defense identity seems to evolve within the US-led NATO framework. Consequently, all European Allies apart from the French accept currently that the ESDI is not an alternative to NATO but should complement and strengthen it.

The EU has become the single biggest source of official development assistance in the world. Its member states collectively accounted for 45-50 percent of the total in 1998. This is much more than the 20 per cent provided by the United States and the 18 per cent by Japan. Most EU aid goes to sub-Saharan Africa, but an increasing proportion is going to Latin America. At the same time the EU provides emergency humanitarian aid, a large proportion of which has gone in recent years to the victims of conflicts in Afghanistan, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Tajikistan. The EU has also become the second largest
provider of food aid in the world after the United States, supplying food worth about 600 million Euros per year. It is the world’s largest economic bloc. With just 6.4 per cent of the world’s population, it accounts for 28 per cent of global GNP. It is the world’s biggest trader, accounting for nearly 37 per cent of world exports, compared with nearly 20 per cent for NAFTA and 5.9 per cent for Japan. Six of the EU member states rank among the world’s ten largest importers and exporters.23

The US is no longer the sole economic superpower. The EU is the biggest market in the industrialized world (with a population of more than 370 million), and one of the most open. Multinational corporations have found it essential since the Second World War to sell to the US market in order to maximize their profits. Now, the European market is becoming increasingly important and easily accessible thanks to the removal of internal trade barriers under the single market program. Not only has the creation of the single market led to the reduction of internal and external barriers to trade, but the EU has overtaken the US as the primary champion of global trade liberalization under the auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO).

Americans believe that European integration may plateau some time in the future. The surrender of national sovereignty in defense will take a long time if it happens at all. Some Europeans think that this is already happening and is irreversibly consolidating. The last obstacles for a more independent EU defense system will be overcome with the application of recent proposals about the strategic assets/capabilities of European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), such as command and control structures, strategic lift, space-based intelligence, communications, automation-information processing systems and Europeanization of EU member states’ nuclear weapons.

NATO

Although NATO has served the security needs of the US and Europe, the new post-Cold War era and the need for a new world order has changed its role, which even though revised, is questioned around the world and sometimes in Europe. NATO may not be dissolved in the short term, but its strongest source of cohesion is now gone, no matter how many solemn re-affirmations emerge from the endless parade of NATO summits. There are numerous reasons, but the following three are prevalent. First, the Soviet threat is gone. Second, the new generations of American and European elites are not committed to the idea of an Atlantic community as in the past. And third, America’s economic stake is not in Europe any longer, (when it was, it reinforced America’s strategic interest in European prosperity).

AN EDUCATIONAL TRANSATLANTIC LINK

However, the EU and US societies are equally modern and still face the same structural challenges. Europeans can learn from the popular American capitalism, which is undoubtedly an economic marvel based on basic principles, such as, emphasis on competitiveness, deregulation and transparent corporate governance. In the post-cold war era, the world would have been a much more chaotic place without the United States. The American mission is still of a universal nature. If it fails to meet its global responsibility, the American system will be a dangerous model. On the other hand, what
the Europeans may offer is: the deep knowledge of the good life, familiar cultural forms, educational systems, the reinvention of politics, and the redefinition of sovereignty through the mechanisms of the EU. But the global requirements in the 21st century are increasing geometrically. Neither the US nor EU will be able to accomplish them alone or to be safe by themselves.

MAIN OPTIONS (SCENAROS):

A. FUTURE EU-US economic and security relationships remain the same as in the 1990s. Economic competition increases. The EU, the US and Japan resort to no better than reactionary economic and security measures, as they used to do in the past. The defense systems of NATO and ESDI/EU continue to evolve and co-exist side by side. The world continues to live in uncertainty, ambiguity, with hundreds of conflicts and flash points around the globe.

B. EU DEVELOPS INDEPENDENTLY ITS ECONOMY AND DEFENSE SYSTEM. The Euro challenges increasingly the dollar. This causes extended paralysis of the economies of the two economic superpowers, the EU and the US. Unilateral protectionist economic measures then deteriorate the situation. EU-US friction may lead to major tensions in their security relationship. The worldwide impact may have a tremendous negative effect. Poverty, disease, and conflicts may soon be out of control. A global economic collapse is imminent, coupled only with the fear of terrorist attacks and the use of WMD by non-state actors or rogue states. A potential collapse of the global economic system may drag even the superpowers to a merciless catastrophe. The transatlantic defense system of NATO is at the verge of breaking, and the existing military superpowers are unable to co-operate and respond to the absolute world disorder.

C. THE GLOBALIZATION IN ECONOMICS and numerous asymmetrical threats may force the two transatlantic super-entities to use the logic of an ever-increasing closer cooperation. Even the logic of experimenting on a new transatlantic union can be put on the table and agreed upon. To that end, the EU and the US take radical steps in order to formulate a phenomenal economic and security cooperation, so dynamic and evolutionary, that may, in time, lead to a 'kind of a new EU-US union,' as the only radical solution to tackle the multi-dimensional, multilevel and multifaceted problems and threats of our age of stunning change. Once they are committed, objectives would include reform and integration of NATO/ESDI-EU under a legitimacy scheme of the also reformed UN. The mechanisms will be dynamic and evolutionary. They will progressively, painlessly and harmlessly integrate the two parties into cooperative economic and regional security. A new ultra-power will emerge. Its economic and defense might will be indisputable and undefeated. No one will be able to argue any more against a 'sole US-country-superpower and its unilateral actions'. The EU-US democratic set of values will easily propagate the western civilization through humanitarian, economic, and scientific programs. No currency will be able to challenge the new 'Euro-dollar.' No country or coalition will be able to compete with the new 'ultra-union' in terms of technology, science, and military-political-economic power. But most importantly, the world economy will be managed better. The application of international law on world order and environmental protection will make our globe a better place to live.
CONCLUDING REMARKS

A common global trend today, both in economics as well as security, is practical cooperation, and integration, instead of the maintenance of separate entities that perform similar functions. Today in the EU, there is a new Euro-Atlantic security architecture, as developed by the creation of a model of interlocking institutions like NATO, EU, WEU, OSCE, UN and the Council of Europe. According to the experience gained from the Yugoslav and previous wars, there is not currently a single organization that in itself can provide all political, economic and military means required to deal with crisis management. Thus, NATO is not the only important security organization in Europe. However, the Western world had commonly viewed NATO as the most reliable organization for the resolution of security and mainly military problems. It is estimated that the US will never abandon NATO, in which plays a dominant role. Europe will also probably stay in NATO for the indefinite future.

As noted earlier, NATO announced on 22 January 2000 that Eurocorps, a six-nation European military organization will head the Kosovo International Security Force (KFOR) for a six-month period. This is the first instance in which a non-NATO entity has been selected to lead a NATO operation. It marks a significant step in a larger process that could change the dynamics of not only the American-dominated alliance but also US involvement in ongoing Balkan peacekeeping missions. This signifies a major political victory in the European effort to develop its own military capability and exert its own defense identity. Eurocorps might very well form the basis for such a force. The EU called for the creation of an independent European defense identity – initially within NATO – able to operate when NATO chooses not to intervene.  

Current US policymakers appear to view the enhancement of the ESDI as a positive advantage in the transatlantic burden-sharing debate. However, while many in the US appear to have been reassured that an enhanced ESDI will not undermine NATO and will not serve to exclude the US and other allies from key decision-making, opinion in US Congress and elsewhere appears more divided and sometimes hostile.  

The US supports burden sharing but fears decoupling of US from significant European security structures. An essential element of ESDI is the creation of an integrated European defense industry, something the US is likely to view with suspicion.

In fact, European leaders in 10-11 December 2000 committed themselves to improve their forces for the full spectrum of military crisis management operations. Since December 1999 Javier Solana never stopped reassuring everyone that ESDI will not threaten the cohesion and function of the NATO alliance.

Strategists in the United States seem to worry about the development of ESDI, but EU strategists worry about the American nuclear missile defense program that US leaders appear determined to push forward despite vehement objections by Russia. Russia has warned that it would consider such deployment a violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty and it reacted with fury to two – unsuccessful– tests of dummy warheads over the Pacific Ocean.

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The EU will only be able to create a military equivalent to that of the US if it overcomes its financial limitations. Moreover, European resources and security mechanisms are highly committed to and interlocked with NATO functions and structure. NATO currently is a huge organization having in its subordination a cluster of functional sub-organizations, such as WEU, PIP, and EAPC. With much experience in its institutional / functional infrastructure, gained many years, NATO can not be thrown away unless a better substitute is in place. It remains to be seen whether the EU can compete militarily with the US, a traditional ally that has contributed so much to European security and protection, a clear, sole superpower with the most modern military. The US is developed, after all, on the same western civilization and it is based on the same values of democracy, freedom, religion, and it initiated/propagated the successful concept of a free market economy. The latter, though, may become an area of gradual competition with possible antagonism and even friction. An extreme EU-US competition in economic, political and security issues may not be excluded completely. That would certainly lead to a catastrophic adventure with disastrous consequences for the rest of the world. History has taught us that behind all (overt and covert) causes of conflicts and wars, economic reasons prevail. Thus, there is a possibility that an economically robust EU will stand up against the US. In order to do that, the EU would have to create its own defense system.

Economic globalization and numerous asymmetrical threats may force the two transatlantic superpowers to use the logic of increasing closer cooperation, even the logic of experimenting on a new transatlantic economic and security union. That may seem inconceivable to people on both sides of the Atlantic now, but should that happen the world order, prosperity and security will be dramatically improved.

Word Count=5,674
ENDNOTES

1 “From the Atlantic to its borders with Turkey and Russia, Europe at the turn of the millennium comprises 38 countries: the 15 members of the EU, three other western European states (Switzerland, Norway and Iceland), 12 eastern European states, six former Soviet republics and two Mediterranean states (Malta and Cyprus).” Definitions of the ‘European continent’ differ from scholar to scholar. People of different countries can also debate the definition of the European periphery. For the purpose of this study it is generally assumed that, of the above mentioned, all non-EU states are on the European periphery and of course in the European Continent. See: John McCormick, Understanding the European Union, (St. Martin’s Press, New York, 1999), The European Union Series. p. 43.

2 Ibid. p. 43-44.

3 The Maastricht Treaty of December 1991 included agreement on the development of a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), including the eventual framing of a common defense policy which might in time lead to a common defense. See: Panagiotis, Iفاistos, European Defense and European Integration: Europe of many speeds and categories against the European Ideal, (Maastricht Treaty Prelude-Title V p.190, Athens, May 1994).


5 Panagiotis, Iفاistos European Defense and European Integration: Europe of many speeds and categories against the European Ideal. (Maastricht Treaty Prelude-Title V p.190, Athens May 1994).


10 Javier Solana, NATO’s former secretary general, who is now High Representative for the EU’s military initiative, he is also Secretary General of the WEU and Secretary General of the Council of the EU, vowed that “European security system is not intended to duplicate NATO due to economic restrictions. A larger and more influential Europe will continue to work closely with the United States. The aim is to have EU-led operations but only where NATO as a whole is not engaged.” The Los Angeles Times, World Perspective: The Growing Clout of Europe; Continent will expand its economic power and military role in this decade, (Cal.; 7 January 2000).

11 On the other hand, Alexander Vershbow, the US ambassador to NATO stated that “if the Europeans fail to spend sufficient money to reach the Helsinki goals, that will create a major internal crisis for the alliance. It could lead to a two-tier alliance in which the Europeans only focus on low intensity situations such as peacekeeping, while leaving NATO to do the dirty work at the high end of the spectrum. That would not be healthy for the Trans-Atlantic relationship”, International Herald Tribune, US Seems Increasingly Uncomfortable With EU Defense Plan, (6 March 2000), p. 8.
12 Douglas Bereuter, a member of the US House of Representatives said that “the worst of all outcomes would be to walk through the 21st century with a European foreign and security policy that competes with NATO and with allies whose military contribution to NATO continues to decline.” International Herald Tribune, US Seem Increasingly Uncomfortable with EU Defense Plan, (6 March 2000), p. 8.


14 To all American fears expressed through the media or by American officials, Sir Christopher Meyer, ambassador at the British Embassy in Washington, reassures that “US should not confuse ‘autonomous military’ – which we neither need nor seek – with autonomous decision-making arrangements, which NATO clearly can not provide for European operations. The United States should not speak of European forces as ‘light peacekeeping functions’ and complain that their relationship with NATO is ‘completely unclear.’” Wall Street Journal, Letters to the Editor: Europe Isn’t Jumping NATO Ship, (New York; 15 Feb 2000), p. A 27.

15 The French Defense Minister Alain Richard said: “Kosovo is an ongoing operation of which only the first round has been won. The western allies did not learn from Bosnia. Human rights violations can not be stopped from a distance and destruction can not be avoided unless ground troops are committed. The second round has not yet been won. The allies have yet to win the peace.” The Washington Post: On the Offense over European Defenses, (Washington, 23 February 2000).

16 Evans, Michael, Dark Victory, Australian Defense Force Academy, (University of New South Wales, September 1999), p. 37.


18 Evans, Michael, Dark Victory, Australian Defense Force Academy, (University of New South Wales, September 1999), p. 34.


26 Ibid., p.27.

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