The views expressed in this paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of the Department of Defense or any of its agencies. This document may not be released for open publication until it has been cleared by the appropriate military service or government agency.

IMPROVING THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

BY

CAPTAIN ROBERT C. BARNES
United States Navy

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for Public Release.
Distribution is Unlimited.

USAWC CLASS OF 2000

U.S. ARMY WAR COLLEGE, CARLISLE BARRACKS, PA 17013-5050
IMPROVING THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

by

Robert C. Barnes
United States Navy

Col. Dave Spaulding, USA
Project Advisor

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not necessarily reflect the official policy or position of the U.S. Government, the Department of Defense, or any of its agencies.

U.S. Army War College
CARLISLE BARRACKS, PENNSYLVANIA 17013

DISTRIBUTION STATEMENT A:
Approved for public release.
Distribution is unlimited.
The existing Unified Command Plan (UCP) structure is not optimized to execute the National Security Strategy for the 21st Century. The UCP should be modified to better align the available military resources to the tasks assigned. Future political and budgetary constraints will probably lead to more continental U.S. (CONUS) basing of forces. The standing Joint Task Force concept should be used more to provide warfighter forces and peacekeeping forces to Regional Commanders in Chiefs (CINCs) to accomplish National Security Strategy (NSS) tasks. The Regional CINCs will remain vital to promoting U.S. engagement policies throughout the world.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

ABSTRACT ......................................................................................................................... iii

PREFACE ........................................................................................................................... vii

LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS ............................................................................................... ix

LIST OF TABLES ................................................................................................................ xi

GOALS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN .................................................................. 1

TODAY'S MILITARY TASKS ............................................................................................... 2

UCP HEADQUARTERS RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS .......................................................... 4

TODAY'S PROBLEMS WITH THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN ....................................... 4

CRITERIA FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS .................................................................... 9

PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR 21ST CENTURY .................................................................. 13

CONCLUSIONS .................................................................................................................. 16

ENDNOTES ......................................................................................................................... 17

BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................................................. 19
PREFACE

Dedicated to my wife, Trisha, for all her help and support in preparing this report.
LIST OF ILLUSTRATIONS

FIGURE 1 - 1999 REGIONAL CINC BOUNDARIES

6
LIST OF TABLES

TABLE 1 - 1999 UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEFS...............................................................1
TABLE 2 – SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND JTF COMMANDERS........................................................................3
TABLE 3 - 1999 UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN HQ BILLET AUTHORIZATIONS......................................................4
TABLE 4 – COMMAND STRUCTURE PARADIGMS............................................................................................12
TABLE 5 - MISSIONS OF A OBJECTIVES-BASED STRUCTURE .......................................................................13
IMPROVING THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN FOR THE 21ST CENTURY

I do not believe that the existing Unified Command Plan (UCP) structure is optimized to execute the National Security Strategy for the 21st Century. The UCP should be modified to better align the available military resources to the tasks assigned. Future political and budgetary constraints will probably lead to more continental U.S. (CONUS) basing of military forces. Future world politics will demand that the U.S. continue our policy of engagement throughout the globe. The standing Joint Task Force (JTF) concept should be used more to provide warfighter forces and peacekeeping forces to Regional Commanders-in-Chiefs (CINCs) to accomplish the National Security Strategy (NSS) tasks.

GOALS OF THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The U.S. National Security Strategy (NSS) states that the purpose of the U.S. military is to help deter aggression and coercion, promote regional stability, prevent and reduce conflicts and threats and to serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. This is to be accomplished through overseas presence and peacetime engagement activities such as defense cooperation, security assistance and the conduct of training and exercises with allies and friends. This strategy demands a capability including ready military forces, equipment that is either deployed forward or strategically stationed and the ability by the U.S. to form and lead effective military coalitions.

The National Military Strategy states that U.S. Armed Forces will apply military power to help shape the international environment and respond to the full spectrum of crises while preparing for an uncertain future. The military must employ the right mix of forces and capabilities to provide the decisive advantage in any operation.

The current UCP Commanders-in-Chiefs are divided between regional and functional commands and are located worldwide as shown in the below table:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Staff</th>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Location</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Command</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>Stuttgart, GE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Forces Command</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>Norfolk, VA</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
<td>1277</td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>Honolulu, HI</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Command</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Miami, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Space Command</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>SPACECOM</td>
<td>Colorado Springs, CO</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Tampa, FL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Omaha, NE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>Scott AFB, IL</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TABLE 1 - 1999 UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN COMMANDER-IN-CHIEFS

There are two ways to develop the optimal command structure to control the U.S. Armed Forces – evolutionary and a new start. The evolutionary method has been the approach since the Cold War ended. The abrupt change in the international scene with end of the Cold War did not bring a concurrent
reorganization of the command structure. This could mean that such an incremental approach might be inadequate for the 21st century. The approach begins by starting all over and developing the essential tasks for unified commands to accomplish, and then to identify what type of structure can best accomplish those tasks. One alternative is for the unified combatant commands to be for warfighters, or those directly executing operations rather than those supporting military forces in conflicts and contingencies. Support functions can then be subordinated to unified commands or handled by a joint agency or other organization.\textsuperscript{3}

**TODAY'S MILITARY TASKS**

The UCP describes the organizational linkages of the combatant CINCs to the other elements of the Department of Defense (DoD). The UCP is the vehicle through which the National Command Authorities (NCA) assign missions to combatant commanders. It defines the CINCs' responsibilities and establishes the command architecture through which operational missions are accomplished.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was established as a permanent agency and various unified and specified commands were created by the 1947 National Security Act. These joint commands were established to direct, plan, and coordinate U.S. military operations worldwide. The Army, Navy and Air Force were then dominant in the national security decision-making process and they structured the UCP to institutionalize the command relationships evolving from World War II. The Far East and Europe had Army-led commands. The Atlantic and Pacific had Navy-led commands. Compromises due to disagreement over which major commands should control which areas resulted in smaller geographic commands being established in Alaska and the Caribbean. The 1948 Key West Agreement strengthened the JCS-CINC axis by making the JCS members the executive agents for the unified commands.\textsuperscript{4}

Since then, changes in the international security environment and advances in technology have stimulated the evolution of today's structure. This is a hybrid structure and includes five geographic or regional and four functional unified commands. The Cold War competition between the U.S. and Soviet Union drove the geographic structure. The new CINCs had two main functions. They had to plan for any possible contingency in which U.S. and Soviet interests might clash. Security relationships with other nations needed to be formed and military-to-military relationships needed to be established. Each country in the world was assigned to a specific CINC as his Area of Responsibility (AOR). Unassigned countries, such as Russia, Canada and Mexico, were left to the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) as his responsibility because of their importance to the U.S. The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act mandating greater inter-Service cooperation was the main reason for the establishment of the current functional structure.\textsuperscript{5}

Sub-unified Commanders and standing Joint Force Commanders also exist in the current structure and serve primarily to help limit the span of control required of their superior CINC by having a senior officer directly manage a specific function or area.\textsuperscript{6}
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Sub-Unified Commands</th>
<th>Standing JTFs</th>
<th>Remarks</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Central Command</td>
<td></td>
<td>JTF Southwest Asia</td>
<td>Operations in CENTCOM AOR</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Forces</td>
<td>Iceland Defense Forces</td>
<td>Defend Trans-Atlantic lines of communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Command</td>
<td>U.S. Forces Azores</td>
<td>Defend Trans-Atlantic lines of communications</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTF SIX</td>
<td>Counter-drug operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>JTF Civil Support</td>
<td>Military support to civil authorities in event of attack involving WMD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Command</td>
<td>United States Forces Korea</td>
<td>Dual-hatted as United Nations Command / Combined Forces Command</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>United States Forces Japan</td>
<td>Concentrates on U.S.-Japanese alliance</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Alaska Command</td>
<td>Defends northern approaches to CONUS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency</td>
<td>Counter-drug operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force West</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southern Command</td>
<td>Joint Inter-Agency</td>
<td>Counter-drug operations</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Task Force East</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 2 – SUB-UNIFIED COMMANDERS AND JTF COMMANDERS**

The 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Act stimulated procedural, bureaucratic, and political forces to consider the real question of whether the military services have reached the end of their useful organizational lives. Are new structures going to be required? How do the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps see their role in providing for the nation’s defense in the 21st century? The Services still control the majority of the budgeting authority in DoD, and consequently still wield great power. The Services must now state clearly their evolving role persuasively to the general public, the military membership itself and the U.S. political leadership.  

Seth Cropsey had this to say about the military’s resistance to change:

> Notions of a smaller, purely regional or functional command structure are dramatic and food for thought. The ability to adapt quickly to new circumstances is a hallmark of great military organizations, but the antithesis of large bureaucracies. In an era when innovative decision-making and information systems allow corporations to adjust structures rapidly and fluidly to meet emerging market demands, military command structures also need to quickly and to agilely adapt to new challenges in the international security environment.

Another reason for the military’s resistance to change is that the CINCs jealously guard their responsibilities and resources. It is not necessarily a “win-win” situation for a CINC to accept changes in the UCP even if he is given more responsibilities or countries. Since the CINC’s headquarters manning is not linked at all to the size of a geographic AOR, increases in number of countries assigned may greatly overload existing staff officers.
UCP HEADQUARTERS RESOURCE CONSTRAINTS

Any discussion on various UCP headquarters (HQ) structures and responsibilities must consider the very real problem of obtaining sufficient manpower to accomplish all assigned missions. Currently, DoD Directive 5100.73 of 13 May 1999 directs how DoD major HQ activities shall classify and count joint billets. This new directive allowed the UCP combatant HQ billets to grow by 27% (from 5578 to 7066 billets) in 1999. These changes were generally a result of inclusion of HQ billets not previously counted. The UCP combatant HQs were not assigned any new billets to help lessen existing workloads. The Congress has now directed a 15% manpower reduction in major HQs by Fiscal Year 02 to save on DoD manpower costs. This will cut 1060 billets from the 7066 billets, leaving the nine UCP commands with only 6006 billets. The Chairman of JCS does not presently believe that such cuts are wise, and will request relief from Congress. These mandated cuts to HQ staffs were directed without regard to the existing UCP responsibilities of the CINCs or to any projected changes to the UCP that may require more manpower to accomplish new missions. Such a manpower policy is at odds with a National Security Strategy that requests CINCs to become more engaged, and not less, in their AORs. Enforcing such fiscal restraints on the available HQ manpower for a CINC will tend to favor UCP structures with fewer CINCs. This will then allow for more manpower in the critical J-3, J-4 and J-5 functions that engage outside the Command and do the military-to-military coordination. The below table shows the distribution of the available HQ billets.9

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Old Billets</th>
<th>New Billets</th>
<th>Billets after FY-02 Reduction</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CENTCOM</td>
<td>579</td>
<td>725</td>
<td>616</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUCOM</td>
<td>595</td>
<td>787</td>
<td>669</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>539</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>660</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>1405</td>
<td>1277</td>
<td>1,085</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>389</td>
<td>535</td>
<td>455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SPACECOM</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>432</td>
<td>367</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>567</td>
<td>747</td>
<td>635</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>610</td>
<td>1165</td>
<td>990</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>536</td>
<td>621</td>
<td>528</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTALS</strong></td>
<td><strong>5578</strong></td>
<td><strong>7066</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,006</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 3 - 1999 UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN HQ BILLET AUTHORIZATIONS**

TODAY'S PROBLEMS WITH THE UNIFIED COMMAND PLAN

The U.S. has reduced defense expenditures, decreased in the total force structure, reduced overseas stationing, and put a greater reliance on forces stationed in the U.S since the end of the Cold War in 1990. However, this has brought few changes to the UCP. The primary UCP evolutionary changes since 1990 have been the realignment of missions for the Atlantic Command (now the Joint Forces Command), growth of assigned areas to Southern Command, disestablishment of Forces Command and Strategic Air Command as specified commands, and the formation of the Strategic
Command as a unified command to centralize control of nuclear deterrent forces. No significant changes were made to the other geographic and functional commands.\textsuperscript{10}

There has been no lack of study on the adequacy of the UCP. A 1995 study by the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the UCP concluded that 11 studies were conducted in the past 35 years. Many of the problems cited by the JCS have appeared as reoccurring themes throughout the years.\textsuperscript{11}

Support of the CINCs is the leading objective according to the DoD. The importance of the CINCs' missions helps accomplish a major bureaucratic objective of justifying budgets to Congress. Large budgets are needed to keep pace with the increasing number requirements facing the CINCs. Such an emphasis on the requirements of the CINCs made sense when the U.S. faced a hostile, nuclear-armed Soviet superpower whose ideology sharpened its threat. The Cold War could have turned hot at any time, and the CINCs were the frontline commanders. But today, DoD requires a new direction. There is no longer the overt military threat from the successor state of the Soviet Union. The Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) can allow a technological revolution that will give the U.S. forces a decisive future advantage in all future conflicts. The nation's future security may depend on how well the Services and DoD plan ahead now, just as surely as it once rested on how ready the CINCs were to defend U.S. interests at a moment's notice.\textsuperscript{12}

U.S. Joint Forces Command (JFCOM) succeeded U.S. Atlantic Command on October 1, 1999. JFCOM remains the joint force provider for other CINCs and will be responsible for joint force training. JFCOM will also train Joint Task Force headquarters to enable them to work together more effectively. An aggressive program of joint conflict development and warfighting experimentation will be conducted by JFCOM. JFCOM will also help to establish and enforce interoperability norms for the Command, Control, Communications and Computers for Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems to ensure that they can all communicate with each other. JFCOM is also establishing a Joint Task Force for Civil Support (JFT/CS). This will provide support to lead federal agencies which are not DoD, such as Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) or Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in the event of a Weapons of Mass Destruction incident in the U.S. that requires significant consequence management. A two-star officer from the Army Reserve component will head this effort.\textsuperscript{13}

U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM) assumed responsibility for the DoD Joint Task Force – Computer Network Defense (JTF-CND) that will orchestrate the defense of all DoD computer networks and systems. JTF-CND is currently collocated with Defense Information Systems Agency (DISA) Global Network Operations and Security Center in Arlington, Virginia. SPACECOM is already responsible for coordinating all military space operations that now provide missile warning, communications, navigation, weather and surveillance from DoD, civil and commercial satellite systems.\textsuperscript{14} SPACECOM also assumed responsibility from JFCOM for the Joint Information Operations Center (JIOC) located in San Antonio, TX. This command provides "full-spectrum" Information Operations (IO) support to operational commanders. Full-spectrum IO support includes operational security, psychological operations, electronic warfare,
targeting of command and control facilities, military deception, Computer Network Defense (CND), Computer Network Attack (CNA), Civil Affairs and Public Affairs.\textsuperscript{15}

U.S. European Command will receive responsibility for maritime planning off the coasts of Africa effective 1 October 2000. EUCOM already has responsibility for land and air military planning in all of Europe and most of Africa. Responsibility for waters off the West Coast of Africa will transfer from JFCOM to EUCOM and the waters off the East Coast of Africa will transfer from PACOM to EUCOM.\textsuperscript{16}

\textbf{FIGURE 1 - 1999 REGIONAL CINC BOUNDARIES}

\textit{Geographic boundary problems.} The geographic boundaries established by the UCP do not exactly agree with the alignment of regional expert office boundaries in the Joint Staff, Office of the Secretary of Defense and the State Department. This can complicate the coordination and implementation of national security strategy because responsible action officers may not routinely coordinate with each other. The shift to a more regionally focused strategy suggests an even greater need for alignments that promote synergistic interagency cooperation.\textsuperscript{17}

\textit{Training problems.} Donald Loren has identified two training problems that JFCOM may have as the joint force trainer:

The need for forces to be trained as joint task forces before deploying overseas has assumed increasing importance with the advent of a strategy emphasizing contingency operations launched primarily from the U.S. With the deep reductions in deployed forces and training funds, the need for joint training at home has never been greater. Although JFCOM has the responsibility, the Services control much of the training funds, even though the CINCs have access to JCS exercise funds. Other geographic CINCs believe
they should retain sole responsibility for training and task organizing the forces allocated to them. The geographic CINC's are accustomed to dealing with the Services as force providers, as specified in Title 10 of the U.S.C., and they do not perceive a need for an intermediate command such as JFCOM to train and package the forces tasked to their theaters.18

The training issue is further complicated by many CONUS-based forces being tasked to multiple theaters, confronting those units with conflicting training demands from multiple CINC's. JFCOM's concern with its own AOR could become an inherent detractor from its force integrator role. There could be the fear that JFCOM will give the other CINC's training needs less attention than its own. JFCOM has the responsibility to set training standards and develop exercise scenarios, making its AOR a likely strong influence on how the limited joint training funds will be used.19

**Budgeting problems.** The CINC's need more money for the joint training of their assigned forces. A larger share of the defense budget needs to be fenced for managing by CJCS to be used for joint training. The CINC's must use the Joint Exercise Program to nominate their exercise requirements. The Services do traditional collective training, such as preparation for overseas rotations. The Services can also use their budgeting process to control which forces may be used and for how long regardless of what the CINC wants. However, the Services cannot be forced by the CINC's to do the training the CINC's want. There is a provision of the Goldwater-Nichols Act to propose set-aside budgeting for the CINC's in areas such as joint training, but the Secretary of Defense has rarely used that authority.20

**Functional area control problems.** Increased synergy of effort can be obtained by consolidating certain functional areas. SPACECOM and TRANSCOM functions could be assigned to sub-unified commands or joint centers under a new centralized U.S. command. This could be a brand new command or an evolution of the current JFCOM. Some other common functions could be assigned to existing agencies such as Defense Information Systems or Defense Logistics Agency or even to new agencies structured differently. The main benefit to this strategy is that a warfighting CINC would now control the function and should have the best idea of exactly what the functional needs are.21

**Better focus on potential conflict areas.** Standing JTFs in CONUS would have to be prepared for a deployment anywhere in the world, but the most likely areas would remain the traditional hotspots of Korea, Southwest Asia and the Balkans. The standing JTF Commander could focus more on their primary mission than could an existing regional CINC, whose attention must consider all the countries within their AOR.22

CENTCOM demonstrated its ability to project power directly from the U.S. to Kuwait in Operation Desert Fox with only minimal combat forces being permanently stationed in its AOR. This success provides a model for greater reliance on U.S.-based rapid response Joint Task Forces (JTF) to get forces to a remote theater. An improved ability for strategic lift to move even larger forces quickly begins to negate the need for numerous geographic commands to control forces that will now be based in CONUS.23

**Incorporation of reduced readiness forces.** This could be a solution for the many OPTEMPO and PERSTEMPO problems experienced today. This standing JTF command concept accommodates a reduced readiness second Major Theater War (MTW) force. One option would be to assign either largely reserve forces or "stood
down" active duty forces to a second standing JTF Commander with the responsibility of the second MTW or to sustain operations in the First MTW if no second contingency arose. Likewise, the readiness status of the two JTFs could be rotated every six months to ease the deployment strain on the assigned forces. With fewer total months in a highly capable mission status and fewer months of training, there could be notable savings without undue risks to the U.S.\textsuperscript{24}

**CONUS-basing implications.** This will mean expanded prepositioning, improved strategic lift, lighter and more lethal forces to improve mobility and reduce lift requirements, better C\textsuperscript{3}, and greater dependence on air assets for the initial stages of a campaign. Some forward bases would still be needed to be maintained together with extensive equipment sets. A small permanent cadre for administration, maintenance and security would be retained at those bases. For training and deterrence, standing JTF operational forces smaller than those now forward deployed in Europe and Korea could be rotated into the theater for several months at a time. When deployed unaccompanied in a TDY status rather than on a permanent basis, forward stationing costs could be markedly reduced. However, the increased costs associated with better lift and pre-positioning may be greater than the reduced stationing costs.\textsuperscript{25}

**Counterproliferation mission problems.** Counterproliferation has gained importance after the Cold War due to the increasing destructiveness of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). STRATCOM has a deterrent role and SPACECOM has a surveillance role. JFCOM has now been assigned the training role. The regional CINC have the implied "be prepared" role to react and conduct counterproliferation missions. But the real problem is that no CINC has been assigned as the focal point for guiding and directing the various military counterproliferation efforts.

**Nuclear deterrence mission problems.** Strategic nuclear weapons that directly threaten CONUS are possessed only by Russia and China. If both nations were combined into the same AOR, our strategic nuclear forces could then be assigned to the same CINC. The establishment of a standing JTF just for U.S. nuclear forces would reduce the need for STRATCOM and its function could be accomplished by the smaller command of a standing JTF. The trend in strategic arms limitation treaties continues to reduce strategic nuclear force levels, so a smaller command structure should also be feasible. The CINC for such a standing JTF could be the current JFCOM, since they have the mission as the principal force supplier and integrator.

**Existing treaty problems.** The NATO senior commanders are also regional CINC. The Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic (SACLANT) has a dual hat as JFCOM and Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) has a dual hat as EUCOM. Coordination of the NATO alliance military effort demands that these officers be 4 star commanders. NATO business tends to keep these commanders fully engaged and in separate buildings or geographic locations from their U.S. staffs. This practice devolves unto the U.S. Deputy CINC to essentially run the U.S. unified command, keeping the CINC informed of U.S. national interests through regular staff briefings or video teleconferences. JFCOM's new increased role as force trainer and integrator will demand more CINC attention. This could lead to a shifting of some of his NATO responsibilities to other CINC or other 4 star officer such as CINC Atlantic Fleet, so he can concentrate on the critical joint force training aspects of JFCOM.\textsuperscript{26}
The funding of joint strategic mobility requirements and overseas pre-positioning of equipment may be another area in which the CINC's require a stronger voice. The Air Force and Navy are the principal developers of strategic mobility assets, but are not the primary consumers of those assets. Similarly, all Services are forced to make unwelcome tradeoffs in allocating resources to overseas pre-positioning. These costs contribute little to day-to-day operations and readiness, but can contribute greatly to deterrence and overall crisis response capabilities. A formula whereby the CINC's can exercise a greater voice in the budget's distribution, giving them collective authority to require the apportionment of funds for strategic mobility and pre-positioning seems necessary to assure a balance among readiness, sustainability, force structure and research and development.27

Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) problems. MOOTW operations, most generally peacekeeping operations, are becoming more frequent. They are conducted to prevent conflicts that could cost thousands of lives and billions of dollars. MOOTW missions are the responsibility of the regional CINC's. The U.S. could better prepare for this mission by placing peace operations in a distinct category. The establishment of a maximum peace keeping force level will allow for better planning in the number and size of peacekeeping operations that the U.S. can conduct. Training costs of the peacekeeping force can be lower if they are not required to have advanced warfighting skills that are not necessary for the MOOTW missions. This means that they will need to be retrained and given additional equipment for general warfighting and will not be immediately available. However, successful MOOTW missions should prevent general war.28

CRITERIA FOR ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS

The Joint Chiefs of Staff 1995 internal study issues paper found six main problems with the current UCP and Donald Loren essentially restated these problems.

Problem 1: Opportunities may exist to reduce the number of unified commands by consolidating geographic areas of responsibility or functional responsibilities.29

JFCOM's force integrator role constitutes another opportunity for consolidating CINC functions. TRANSCOM, SPACECOM and SOUTHCOM, as providers of support and trained forces to other CINC's, fall into a category similar to JFCOM. This suggests bringing them together as sub-unified commanders under JFCOM can better integrate all military assets supporting the geographic commands and STRATCOM. This would allow the services a single joint point of contact as joint providers and would ease the coordination of priorities, resourcing and joint force integration.30

Problem 2: Differences in operating procedures and C4I software among unified commands complicate mutual support among CINC's and transit across CINC boundaries.31

As forces have declined after the Cold War, the number of units assigned to multiple contingencies has increased sharply, illuminating the differing operating procedures and C4I software generated by unified commands and Service components. The UCP does not say how CINC's are to coordinate when crossing each other's boundaries for operations, so the geographic CINC's use Command Arrangements Agreements (CAAs) coordinated between each other to detail specific procedures to be followed when crossing AOR boundaries. However, the UCP does direct the formation of a task force
when significant operations overlap AOR boundaries. Additionally, the Secretary of Defense will decide to which CINC such a task force will report. The formation of such an ad hoc joint task force headquarters, and then requiring a formal forces and mission assignment decision from a distant official seems unduly ponderous and risky, particularly during times of conflict.\textsuperscript{32}

The current process of funding CINCs for C4I software development encourages initiatives to streamline or tailor common software development. This effect has created new seams in software between the CINCs. An attendant problem is the variance in operating procedures and C4I software among combatant forces assigned to the CINCs. The variances occur chiefly between the Services, requiring forces to be employed along Service lines in large formations for proper command and control. This needlessly limits the flexibility of CINCs in organizing smaller forces for contingency operations.\textsuperscript{33}

Problem 3: Since the Goldwater-Nichols Act was enacted, significant strides have been made to increase the voice of the CINCs in the budgeting process; however, further adjustment may be necessary to alleviate conflicts between joint and Service-specific requirements.\textsuperscript{34}

Problem 4: UCP boundaries complicate regional strategy, impede joint training and operations and dissipate the focus of commanders and staffs charged with addressing the Nation’s most serious security concerns.\textsuperscript{35}

Two CINCs deal with Israel and its neighbors (EUCOM has Israel and CENTCOM has all the Arab nations), two CINCs deal with the Indo-Pakistani dispute (CENTCOM has Pakistan and PACOM has India and two CINCs deal with sub-Saharan Africa (EUCOM in the west, CENTCOM in the east). This can possibly cause fragmentation of U.S. regional planning.\textsuperscript{36}

Additionally, areas of the world traditionally not assigned to unified commanders are taking on increased importance in regional operations. Mexico’s current security situation and use as a narcotics transportation corridor to the U.S. suggests assigning planning responsibility for Mexico to a CINC.\textsuperscript{37}

Problem 5: Joint Forces Command role as joint force integrator and provider has not been adequately developed and is perceived by other CINCs as an unnecessary link between themselves and the Services for training and task-organizing forces.\textsuperscript{38}

Problem 6: UCP Structure Does Not Adequately Accommodate New Missions.\textsuperscript{39}

Donald Loren believes that the following ten assumptions should serve as guidelines for establishing a baseline from which potential changes to the UCP should be considered. Any adjustments to the UCP must preserve the proven keys to success and confine changes to areas with evident problems.

1. The shift in the national security strategy from a global to a regional focus anticipates the future security environment.

2. U.S. armed forces must maintain the capability to fight globally, or in regional conflicts, as well as in contingency operations, and to conduct routine forward-presence operations and involvement in MOOTW.
3. As a superpower with global influence and interests, the U.S. cannot afford to abandon the regional focus afforded by geographic CINCs.

4. Reductions in the permanent forward deployment of U.S. armed forces will require adoption of a force-projection strategy from the U.S.

5. Increased U.S. basing and the reduction of forces available for overseas commitment require a greater level of joint training and interoperability to meet the force requirements of all CINCs.

6. Increased U.S. basing of joint forces creates the opportunity to improve joint force training under unified command and direction.

7. Crisis response continues to be a primary responsibility of regional combatant commands.

8. CINCs will continue to plan for and execute joint operations in support of regional interests and objectives ranging from major regional contingencies to humanitarian assistance.

9. Limited defense resources will constrain the number and availability of forces for joint military operations.

10. Reduced force structure will limit the assignment of dedicated forces to specific regions.  

Charles Robb developed yet a third set of essential criteria to develop the best type of UCP structure:

1. Effectively execute national military strategy.

2. Maintain a logical and unambiguous chain of command

3. Minimize duplication except to enhance wartime survivability and endurance.

4. Balance responsibilities evenly across commands

5. Provide clear objectives and a manageable span of control for each command.

6. Prove to be cost-effective, flexible, and adaptable.

Charles Robb developed nine theoretical ways to organize UCP commands as shown in Table 2, the Command Structure Paradigms. The far left hand column shows the nine various alternatives and the bolded command titles shows how the current hybrid UCP structure of regions and functions fits into the table.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>By Service</th>
<th>Army</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>Air Force</th>
<th>Marine Corps</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>By Region</td>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>Atlantic</td>
<td>South / Central America</td>
<td>Europe / Africa</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>PACOM</td>
<td>JFCOM</td>
<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>EUCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Function</td>
<td>Warfighting</td>
<td>Transportation</td>
<td>Communications</td>
<td>Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Operational Medium</td>
<td>Ground</td>
<td>Sea</td>
<td>Air</td>
<td>Littoral</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Conflict Level / Type</td>
<td>Presence</td>
<td>Peace Operations</td>
<td>Low intensity Conflict</td>
<td>Theater (Conventional)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>by Operability</td>
<td>High</td>
<td>Medium</td>
<td>Low</td>
<td>STRATCOM</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Basing</td>
<td>U.S.</td>
<td>Mobile</td>
<td>Forward</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Threat</td>
<td>Opponent A</td>
<td>Opponent B</td>
<td>Opponent C</td>
<td>NBC Weapons</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>By Strategy Objectives</td>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
<td>Fight and Win 2 MTWs</td>
<td>Protect vital interests</td>
<td>Counter NBC</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 4 – COMMAND STRUCTURE PARADIGMS**

A purely objective UCP structure has the following characteristics and missions according to the following table prepared by Charles Robb. Each command would be assigned one or more key objectives as identified in the National Military Strategy. A "Strategic Defense Command" would protect the U.S. homeland. It would combine all of the essential missions for this purpose, including strategic nuclear strike, national missile defense, strategic warning and North American air defense. The "First and Second Theater Commands" would fight and win two Major Theater Wars (MTW). Special Operations Command would focus on countering the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and terrorism. They would also maintain their traditional focus on low-intensity conflict, counterinsurgency, and foreign internal defense. A "Stability Enhancement Command" would strive to preserve regional stability through MOOTW missions. This would include both peace operations and disaster relief efforts. ⁴³
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Command</th>
<th>Objective</th>
<th>Missions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Defense Command</td>
<td>Deter and prevent and, if necessary, respond decisively to a military attack on the U.S. homeland</td>
<td>• Strategic nuclear warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SDC</td>
<td></td>
<td>• National missile defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• North American air defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Strategic warning</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Theater Command</td>
<td>Deter and prevent and, if necessary, fight and win, one major theater conflict where vital U.S. interests are at stake, and lesser regional conflicts where resources allow</td>
<td>• Major theater warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FTC</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Lesser regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Second Theater Command</td>
<td>Deter and prevent and, if necessary, fight and win, one major theater conflict where vital U.S. interests are at stake, and lesser regional conflicts where resources allow</td>
<td>• Major theater warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STC</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Lesser regional conflicts</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
<td>Provide military support, directly and indirectly, to allies and friends of the U.S., as well as democratic institutions</td>
<td>• Low-intensity conflict</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SOC</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Foreign internal defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Psychological operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Stability Enhancement Command</td>
<td>Deter and prevent regional instability that is inimical to important or vital U.S. interests</td>
<td>• Counterproliferation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEC</td>
<td></td>
<td>• Counterterrorism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Counternarcotics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Presence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Peace enforcement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Peacekeeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Civil Affairs</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarian support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Disaster relief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>• Military-to-military exchanges</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**TABLE 5 - MISSIONS OF A OBJECTIVES-BASED STRUCTURE**

**PROPOSED STRUCTURE FOR 21ST CENTURY**

I believe that the current blend of functional and regional CINCs has served the nation well in the past and can continue to do so in the 21st century with few major changes. The major change that should be considered is the melding of the functional approach of notional major theater commands (Robb’s First and Second Theater Commands) through the development of standing JTFs. These units would be CONUS-based, under JFCOM control, and train together in representative scenarios to be ready to respond to the most plausible regional crisis. Training methods could utilize virtual methods to link electronically actual units and simulation centers, battle laboratories and actual CINC command centers to train the forces and various staffs. Quality training of such standing JTFs could help reduce the
number of existing forward-deployed forces required by a CINC to accomplish his UCP-assigned missions.

Designation of United States Forces Korea (USFK) as a standing JTF could be the first step in developing the large warfighter standing JTF even though it would be based outside of CONUS in Korea. The JTF commander could develop excellent coordination with JFCOM to ensure that the warfighting forces that would be assigned as reinforcements to his theater are properly trained in the relevant scenarios. This would also simplify the PACOM command relationships, as he would always be subordinate to CINCPAC as a standing JTF commander. Success with the designation of USFK as a standing JTF could lead to extension of that concept and turning United States Forces Japan into a standing JTF.

Formation of a standing JTF Africa under EUCOM control should be done to simplify the CINC's current overly large span of control. The JTF commander would take on the load now done by the EUCOM staff in Germany. His warfighters could consist of some of the forward-deployed amphibious shipping in the Mediterranean Sea and eastern Atlantic Ocean and supplemented by JFCOM forces trained to his unique scenarios.

I consider the most critical contribution of the current UCP to the NSS to be the engagement portion. As the worldwide military superpower, no part of the world is unimportant to our interests. Just as the Department of State covers the countries of the world with embassies to manage our diplomatic issues and consulates to manage our economic interests, the U.S. military needs to engage the militaries of the world on the critical issues of national defense.

The regional CINC's currently do this job well, but further improvements are necessary. The regional CINC will never have enough manpower to conduct all the engagement tasks desired, but needs instead to coordinate the overall effort and leverage off other organization's efforts. As an example, the CINC's have staff officers responsible for military-to-military contacts within each country assigned to their AOR. The CINC also needs to closely coordinate with the U.S. military attachés assigned to that country to enhance defense cooperation and security assistance. Another example exists in the current support for the Partnership for Peace (PfP) program in the EUCOM AOR by the U.S. reserve component. Each PfP country has been assigned to a specific U.S. state whose reserve component units help manage that nation's individual PfP training and exercise program over the years. This continuity builds trust and a network of contacts that the CINC's country officer can leverage on. An aggressive, multi-faceted, military-to-military engagement policy should help to defuse tensions around the world and reduce the likelihood of open fighting, thus lessening the U.S. needs for combat forces.

The regional CINC's deter aggression and coercion by having credible forces quickly available for use. CENTCOM's recent Operation Desert Fox rapid deployment of CONUS-based troops to Kuwait was an excellent model of the way forward. JFCOM has been directed in the latest UCP to package and train combat forces for use by the regional CINC's. This process needs to be enhanced. Standing JTFs need
to be established under JFCOM command similar to the current Joint Inter-Agency Task Forces (JIATF EAST, WEST, SOUTH) used for drug interdiction.

Such JTFs would deploy as a package to the CINCs who needed them and supplement their existing limited overseas force presence. These Standing JTFs could either be used for standing combat forces that are used in a peacetime garrison function or as combat reinforcements. The standing JTF would train on scenarios approved by the probable gaining regional CINC, but implemented by JFCOM. Multiple scenarios from multiple CINCs would be sent to JFCOM, who would consolidate them as much as feasible. Scenarios for Military Operations other than War (MOOTW) would also be considered since this continues to be a growth area. Our CONUS-based forces need to become more specialized with peacekeeping operations. It should become a major focus of some units, such as it is today for the 10th Mountain Division. I do not believe our Federal budget will allow the military the luxury of training and equipping our forces to be able to do all missions, so specialized peacekeeping troops and their equipment sets need to be devised. The proper split of the peacekeeping force between the active and reserve component still needs to be decided. Revised readiness standard must be developed to accurately gauge the ability of the peacekeeping troops to do the peacekeeping job. A retraining and re-equipping plan needs to be devised to retool this force for conventional combat if events require their use.

As the nature of the modern battlefield evolves, the density of the soldiers per unit area continues to drop, even though the effective area of the battlefield continues to enlarge. The U.S. tactic of massing weapons effects rather than troops can allow for fewer combat forces to achieve the same ends. Such savings in combat forces can allow for a larger number of troops to be trained for MOOTW operations.

I do not believe the proponents of converting the current functional CINCs into functional suppliers for a centralized U.S. Forces Command, such as JFCOM may become, have yet built a strong case. For example, the rationale for a joint logistics type command, combining both the transportation networks of TRANSCOM and the warehouses and distribution networks of the Defense Logistics Agency, appears weak to me. I believe such an organization would be so large as to be unwieldy.

The model presented by the success of the Special Operations Command holds great potential for its use in the continuing evolution of JFCOM. SOCOM was given almost total responsibility and authority (including budgetary) to further the worldwide deployment and operations of all the Service's Special Forces. Few doubt the marked improvement that has been seen in the Special Forces capability because of SOCOM. The peacetime operations of Special Forces have become vital to the regional CINC's efforts in engagement through training and exercises. SOUTHCOM made extensive use of Special Forces for nation-building expertise to the Haitian government and currently for counter-terrorist expertise to the Colombian government.

The designation of JFCOM as the joint experimentation testbed allows them to be evolutionary in nature as they attempt to better combine the various Service capabilities and support functions together in search of greater capability and efficiency. The Standing JTF concept offers a structure that can readily incorporate any function of force under a CINC. The use of JTFs allows the CINCs to use a
“flatter” management structure with less inherent bureaucracy to achieve the same capability. Additionally, current manpower policies do not include the manpower in a CINC’s standing JTF as part of the CINC’s HQ Manning. These commands are generally treated as “below the line,” but the Services must still provide the manpower to fill them, which raises the proportion of their manpower dedicated for joint duty, and this problem still needs to be addressed.

Criticisms of this UCP proposal should revolve around the fact that it is not radical enough. No new UCP commands have been recommended that consolidate existing commands. Future evolving missions such as a National Missile Defense (NMD) can initially be handled under the Standing JTF concept. Such a JTF can then be easily assigned to the CINC who is finally assigned the mission, be it JFCOM, SPACECOM or STRATCOM. JFCOM’s JTF for Civil Support is already assigned some of the responsibilities inherent in a Homeland Defense concept, especially in the consequence management area. A number of standing JTFs, all reporting to JFCOM, may seem to be too complex, but it has great unity of command ability. The CINC can direct his subordinate JTFs to coordinate between themselves on whatever issues are pertinent.

CONCLUSIONS

One would think that how the United States organizes its military command structure to execute its National Security Strategy (NSS) would be of great interest and many published studies would have been conducted, but my research has found the opposite. Articles in military professional journals espousing one idea or the other appear rarely and then only in clusters followed by years of silence on the subject. The last wave of military journal articles proposing changes to the UCP were written in 1995-97. A two-year review cycle has been chosen to make changes to the UCP that have come from changes to the NSS and NMS, so this has forced the Joint Staff to reconsider the UCP on a regular basis. UCP 99 has even included a new appendix that gives the Chairman’s vision for future trends in the UCP.

I have drawn heavily on Senator Charles Robb’s and Donald Loren’s UCP articles as I believe they provide good analytical processes to evaluate the future direction of UCP changes proposed by the Joint Staff. An evolutionary approach using the standing Joint Task Force concepts as building blocks for adding new capabilities to the regional CINC has appeared the best plan to me.

WORD COUNT = 6368
ENDNOTES


8 Ibid.

9 Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint HQ Update".

10 Loren, 11.


12 Cropsey, 10.


17 Loren, 12.

18 Ibid.

19 Ibid.


21 Robb, 88.
22 Ibid., 92.
23 Loren, 12.
24 Robb, 92.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid., 93.
30 Ibid.
31 Ibid., 8
32 Ibid.
33 Ibid.
34 Ibid., 10.
36 Ibid.
37 Ibid.
38 Ibid., 7.
39 Ibid.
40 Loren, 14.
41 Robb, 86.
42 Ibid., 87.
43 Ibid., 88.
BIBLIOGRAPHY


