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U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY FOR 2020: U.S. ARMY'S PRESENCE IN JAPAN

BY

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ABSTRACT

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The purpose of this paper is to identify factors that would affect the U.S. Army's presence in Japan and the U.S. security strategy in Northeast Asia for 2020. U.S. policy issues examined include: Regional Alliance between the United States and Japan, Host Nation Support, Bilateral Training Program, Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Japan's Role in Northeast Asia Regional humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. The paper will attempt to develop a strategy for ensuring American interests are maintained and to recommend ways that enhance the role of the security alliance and preserve American regional interests in Northeast Asia.
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I am indebted to the command staff of U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command at Camp Zama, Japan for suggesting this strategic research area and supporting my research trip to Japan. The diverse influences that combined to color my perspective on the issues presented in this paper are too numerous to mention. Military professionals, friends and colleagues in Japan and at the U.S. Army War College have all added to my modest understanding of the strategic issues we could face in Northeast Asia by the year 2020. I am thankful to COL Koichiro Bansho—Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and my classmate (U.S. Army War College Class of 2000)—for coordinating my research with key leaders at the Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Further, I am appreciative to the open discussions held with and insights offered by COL Shigeki Nishimura, Professor and Executive Chief of Strategic Studies, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force Staff College; COL Yoshikazu Watanabe, Chief of Exercise Section, Training Division and Training Department, Ground Staff Office; and COL Kiyofumi Iwata, Chief, 1st Operations Section, Operations Division, Plans and Operations Department, Ground Staff Office. I am grateful to LTC Mike Bosack, Deputy Chief of Staff for Host Nation Activities, U.S. Army, Japan and LTC David E. Retherford, I Corps Liaison Officer, U.S. Army, First Corps at Camp Zama, Japan for their assistance in explaining the unique bilateral relationships between U.S. Army, Japan and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. I also appreciated the efforts taken by Ms. Yukari Muramatsu, Office of Internal Review, U.S. Army, Japan for effectively scheduling all of my meetings with key command staff at Camp Zama and taking care of my transportation and logistical needs while in Japan. I am also grateful to COL Spaulding for his comments on the preliminary draft and his constructive assistance.
U.S. SECURITY STRATEGY 2020: U.S. ARMY'S PRESENCE IN JAPAN

Underpinning [our security] vision is the essential requirement that America remain engaged in world affairs, to influence the actions of others—friends and foes—who can affect our national well-being. Today, there are some who would have us pull back from the world, forgetting the central lesson of this century: that when America neglects the problems of the world, the world often brings its problems to America's doorstep.

—Secretary of Defense William Cohen

The purpose of this paper is to identify factors that would affect the U.S. Army's presence in Japan and the U.S. security strategy in Northeast Asia for 2020. U.S. policy issues examined include: Regional Alliance between the United States and Japan, Host Nation Support, Bilateral Training Program, Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Japan's Role in Northeast Asia Regional humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. The paper will attempt to develop a strategy for ensuring American interests are maintained and to recommend ways that enhance the role of the security alliance and preserve American regional interests in Northeast Asia.

The United States power rest on three pillars of economics, politics and the military. In recent times, Asia, and particularly Japan, has rested its power almost exclusively on economic growth. Prior to the economic crisis in 1997, Asia appeared to be surpassing the United States economically and seemed to be redefining the meaning of international power by rendering traditional, politico-military considerations obsolete. Asia's rapid economic growth overshadowed the need for military competition. Moreover, the United States provided for the military defense of much of Asia. The U.S. military forces served to protect the region's strategic interests, including shipping lanes, while keeping in checks potential regional powers, like China and Russia.¹

One major consequence of Asia's economic crisis is the return of Asia to a more normal, balanced status in the world. China has already returned to a self-image, in which power rests on military and political power as well as economics—consequently, the rest of Asia will likely return to this more traditional understanding. In particular, Japan, the second largest economy in the world, is likely to abandon its reliance on economic growth in favor of a more balanced approach, adding politico-military power with the purely economic. The future of Asia depends on the future of China, the largest country, and Japan, the largest economy.²

Related to these issues are the concerns of the expansion of Japan's military role in Northeast Asia. Will this expansion: lead to the rebirth of Japanese militarism, start a fierce arms race among Asian counties by destroying the balance of power in the Asia Pacific region, or place fear in Asian countries near Japan because of Japan's military action during the Second World War?³

Further, Japan survives in Northeast Asia with four uncertain neighbors (North Korea, China, Russia and South Korea) as the new century has begun. Japan cannot, alone, act as a counterbalance to potentially hegemonic China—and neither can the U.S. by itself. Peace and stability on the Korean
peninsula now and after reunification are of vital interest to Japan and requires continued U.S.
commitment. Japan, alone, can’t handle a Russia gone “out of control”. To maintain a balance with
China and Russia, to cope with whatever the future holds in store on the Korean peninsula, and to
preserve peace and stability in Northeast Asia, Japan needs the U.S. and the U.S. needs Japan.\textsuperscript{4}

**RESEARCH APPROACH**

**WHAT WAS REVIEWED**

In order to identify factors that would affect the U.S. Army’s presence in Japan and the U.S.
security strategy in Northeast Asia for 2020, key assumptions were made. These assumptions were
based on a literature research and discussions with military professionals, friends and colleagues in
Japan and at the U.S. Army War College. Primary assumptions for the year 2020 included that the
Government of Japan will still actively support the U.S.-Japan Security arrangements, maintain a self-
defense capability, conduct multilateral diplomacy, and serve as a key member of western countries.\textsuperscript{5}

The scope of this paper and the review performed was limited to examining issues related to the
Regional Alliance between the United States and Japan, Host Nation Support, Bilateral Training Program,
Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s Role in Northeast Asia Regional humanitarian assistance
and peacekeeping operations.

Qualitative methods used in developing this paper and its the evaluation included performing field
research, examining U.S. Army records and conducting limited policy analyses. The review of current
literature, which includes Internet sites, studies by academia and professional journals, supports the
information presented in this paper; and its sources of information are properly identified as endnotes and
listed in the bibliography.

**RESULTS IN BRIEF**

In the 2020, the U.S. Security Strategy will continue to rely on the U.S. Army’s presence in Japan.
The regional alliance between the United States and Japan will be stronger and the potential for a
trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea maybe in place thus
strengthening the overall regional security interest in Northeast Asia. Although some elements of the
Government of Japan’s Cost Sharing program may have been reduced, host nation funding will pay
approximately 65 percent of the cost requirements to support the U.S. forces in Japan. U.S. Army, Japan
and the 9\textsuperscript{th} Theater Support Command’s Bilateral Training Program continues to exceed the expectations
of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force by furnishing important training that meet the new joint
missions in regional operations. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are not resolved and reunification
between the Koreas remains doubtful. All elements of Japan’s Self-Defense Force are actively engaged
in United Nations’ peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Diplomacy, deterrence and military
preeminence remain central to the United States’ national security policy for Japan.
BACKGROUND

I believe that Japan is critical to the stability of this particular region, and I believe the relatively small number of people we have here is critical to the relationship between the United States and Japan.

—General Dennis Reimer, Army Chief of Staff

Japan occupies a key strategic location in the Western Pacific—a location vitally important to the United States both economically and military. This offers the U.S. an exceptional opportunity for forward basing and enables the U.S. to deploy power projection forces to potential crisis locations. The U.S. Army in Japan is capable of greatly expanded logistical support role for the Pacific Theater and its military presence in Northeast Asia is critical to maintaining stability in the region. Japan is the most generous of all U.S. defense partners, providing in excess of $5 billion annually for utilities, facility improvements and other costs. The Government of Japan also provides the U.S. Army in Japan rent-free facilities supported by a highly skilled, "cost-free" Japanese national workforce.6

The role of the U.S. Army in Japan has been significant and diverse since its establishment in September 1945 as U.S. Army Forces Far East and IX Corps. The name "U.S. Army, Japan" first appeared 1 July 1957 and came under the command of U.S. Army, Pacific. Since then, U.S. Army, Japan's responsibility and span of control continued to grow as it acquired new missions and functions. The 9th Theater Army Area Command was activated 1 November 1994. U.S. Army, Japan is the Army component command to the subordinate unified command, U.S. Forces Japan, and is a major subordinate command of U.S. Army, Pacific.7

U.S. Army, Japan's missions are to provide forward presence, plan bilateral defense of Japan, serve as Army Component headquarters, and prepare for regional contingencies. The 9th Theater Army Area Command's missions are to provide peacetime combat service support to units in Japan and the Western Pacific, support pre-positioning of critical supplies and equipment, and provide the command and control nucleus for major regional contingency logistics support.8 One U.S. Army major general commands U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command. Subordinate commands include the 17th Area Support Group and the 10th Area Support Group.

The 17th Area Support Group (ASG) provides combat service support to more 40 units on 11 sub-installations and has a wide range of missions that spread from Japan to Diego Garcia. The 17th ASG's mission tasks include the maintenance of Army Prepositioned Stocks 4, ammunition maintenance and storage, fixed and rotary wing mission support, and installation management. The 17th ASG provides wide-ranging support to other DOD services in Japan through interservice support agreements. At Sagami General Depot, the 35th Supply and Service Battalion is the linchpin of U.S. Army, Japan's industrial operations in the areas of supply, storage and maintenance. The 83rd Ordnance battalion provides ammunition logistics to forces in the U.S. Army, Pacific's area of responsibility. It assists in providing a forward presence and a power projection platform in southern Japan. The 836th Transportation Battalion at Yokohama North Dock manages Department of Defense cargo movement on
the islands of Honshu, Kyushu and Hokkaido. It has the capabilities of eight deep-water berths and 10 shallow water berths. The 17th ASG plays a vital role in providing stability to the Pacific region, and support to Far East contingencies.9

The senior Army command on Okinawa is the 10th Area Support Group. The Army on Okinawa is responsible for all critical installation functions for all U.S. Army activities on Okinawa. This keeps the military population mission ready and improves the quality of life. The 10th ASG's major functions include receiving and distributing cargo, distributing the island's military fuel supply and port operations. The 10th ASG provides critical mission support of special operations by the 1st Battalion, 1st Special Forces Group; strategic communications by the 56th Signal Battalion; island petroleum distribution by the 505th Quartermaster Battalion; port operations by the 835th Transportation Battalion; and command and control of space based platforms by Echo Company, 1st Satellite Command Battalion.10

U.S. Army, Pacific has designated First Corps as the Warfighter for Japan.11 To facilitate coordination between I Corps, U.S. Army, Japan and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force, I Corps maintains a liaison officer at Camp Zama who works closely with U.S. Army, Japan's Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations. The United Nations Command – Rear is another unique organization located at Camp Zama, Japan in the U.S. Army, Japan's headquarters. This command is critical to the potential warfight in Korea. In this scenario, United Nation Forces from other countries have access to the U.S. facilities at selected military installations throughout Japan. Each of these facilities in Japan flies the United Nations Flag in front of its headquarters daily to imply this relationship. U.S. Army, Japan is also supported by other Army activities in Japan that include the 500th Military Intelligence Group; U.S. Army Engineer District, Japan; the Center for Health Promotion and Preventive Medicine, Pacific; Japan District, U.S. Army Veterinary Command; U.S. Army Medical Department Activity, Japan; and U.S. Army Dental Activity, Japan.12

RESEARCH IN JAPAN

U.S. ARMY, JAPAN

During the period 20 December through 24 December 1999, onsite field research was conducted at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command and with elements of the 17th Area Support Group on Camp Zama, Japan. Command briefings were attended and discussions were held with key members of the command group that included the Commanding General, U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command; the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Japan; and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Host Nation Activities. Other meetings were conducted with U.S. Army, Japan staff representatives from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineers. Discussions were also held with the 17th Area Support Group's Directorate of Public Works and First Corps Liaison Officer at
Camp Zama, Japan.\textsuperscript{13} Specific research results related to U.S. Army, Japan are identified and presented throughout this paper.

During the subject research trip to Japan, it was determined that the initial research thesis needed to be revised based on similarities of ongoing studies reported to be done by U.S. Forces, Korea; and U.S. Pacific Command—access to these studies wasn’t obtained. Additionally, U.S. Army, Japan disclosed that the Department of the Army's Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, War Plans section was also performing a similar study of U.S. Army, Japan.\textsuperscript{14} The original thesis for this paper assumed that significant security changes would have occurred and that the resolution of tension on the Korean Peninsula would lead to the eventual restructuring of the U.S. presence in Northeast Asia. A future U.S. presence in Northeast Asia should be capabilities-based and not aimed at a specific threat. A credible contingency force must also be balanced among air, naval and ground forces. The original thesis proposed asked:

Should the U.S. Army continue to maintain deployed forces in Northeast Asia after 2020? And if so, What size should those U.S. Army Forces be? How should the command and control headquarters be structured? What missions should those U.S. Army forces have capability to perform—peacetime engagement, crisis response, and fighting and winning maneuver wars?

Given the above factors, the revised thesis was stated as:

To identify factors that would affect the U.S. Army’s presence in Japan and the U.S. security strategy in Northeast Asia for 2020. U.S. policy issues examined include: Regional Alliance between the United States and Japan, Host Nation Support, Bilateral Training Program, Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s Role in Northeast Asia Regional humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. The paper will attempt to develop a strategy for ensuring American interests are maintained and to recommend ways that enhance the role of the security alliance and preserve American regional interests in Northeast Asia.

Additionally, it was determined that the mission of U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command would increase significantly in October 2000. The 9th Theater Army Area Command continues to forge training and mission alignment with the 310th Theater Support Command from Fort Belvoir, Virginia. Actions are ongoing for the 310th Theater Support Command to station a forward cell with nine full-time reservists at Camp Zama, Japan. In October 2000, this cell will grow with both active duty and active guard/reserve soldiers as the 9th Theater Army Area Command and the 310th Theater Support Command integrate into a single, multiple-component theater support command to be designated as the 9th Theater Support Command. Further, U.S. Army, Japan and the 9th Theater Army Area Command cannot accomplish its wartime mission without augmentation. About 125 individual mobilization augmentees integrate with U.S. Army, Japan’s 125 active component soldiers in virtually all staff sections enabling the command to fulfill its role as U.S. Forces, Japan’s Army Component command.\textsuperscript{15}
JAPAN GROUND SELF-DEFENSE FORCE

During the period 21 December through 22 December 1999, onsite field research and discussions were held with key staff at Headquarters, Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in Roppongi-Tokyo, Japan and at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Staff College in Meguro-Tokyo, Japan. At the Ground Staff Office, discussions were held on 21 December 1999 with COL Kiyofumi Iwata, Chief, 1st Operations Section, Operations Division, Plans and Operations Department; COL Yoshikazu Watanabe, Chief, Exercise Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department; COL Kenichi Tampu, Training Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department; COL Yuichi Fukumori, Defense Planning Department; and LTC Masahisa Sato, Exercise Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department. At the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Staff College, discussions were held on 22 December 1999 with COL Shigeki Nishimura, Professor and Executive Chief, Strategic Studies and LTC Goro Matsumura, Associate Professor, Strategic Studies.16

Generally, all discussions held with the Ground Staff Office’s leadership were very open and furnished excellent insight from a Japanese perspective. Views and opinions related to the year 2020 were expressed regarding the Regional Alliance between the United States and Japan; Host Nation Support, Bilateral Training Program, Tensions on the Korean Peninsula, and Japan’s Role in Northeast Asia Regional humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations. Specific research results related to the Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force are identified and presented throughout this paper.17

Further, COL Iwata acknowledged that currently the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force has five regional armies (Northern Army, Northeastern Army, Eastern Army, Middle Army and Western Army) with 12 divisions and 4 separate brigades. However, actions to better align resources within the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force will result in a reduction to 9 divisions and 6 brigades.18

POLICY ISSUES

REGIONAL ALLIANCE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND JAPAN

Mr. Morihiro Hosokawa, Prime Minister of Japan from 1992 to 1993, writes that the gulf separating American and Japanese perceptions of the U.S. troops stationed in Japan could jeopardize the alliance between these two important countries. Many Americans see a gracious favor meant to underpin Japan’s security. Most Japanese, while fond of the alliance with the United States, would like to see fewer U.S. troops on their soil. A May 1996 opinion poll in Asahi Shimbun found that 70 percent of the Japanese people supported the alliance with the United States while 67 percent favored a reduction in the number of U.S. military bases. The discriminating public preference is reasonable in today’s Asia.19

Today the international environment has changed as dramatically in East Asia as in Europe. The United States and its allies are no longer squared off against the Soviet Union. Indeed, the Soviet Union is no more. Since its collapse, Russian forces in East Asia have become hollow. A comparison of Japan’s 1989 and 1997 white paper on defense shows a more than 50 percent reduction in the number of
personnel, surface ships, submarines, and warplanes in Asia. Most of Russia’s warships are rusting in port, leaving only a few submarines and surface ships in the Pacific fleet operational. Mr. Hosokawa also states South Korea has a military edge over North Korea. If however, Pyongyang chooses to act irrationally by launching a desperate attack, no amount of military power can deter it. Deterrence assumes reasonable judgment by the enemy. One way to lessen the likelihood of a senseless strike is to avoid cornering North Korea’s leaders and thus driving them into desperation.\textsuperscript{20}

Washington justifies the U.S. presence it has enjoyed since World War II by warning the Japanese about what it wrongly claims is an increase in Chinese military power and the threat posed by Nodong, North Korea’s 600-mile-range missile. Simultaneously, the United States appeals to its own citizens and other Asian nations by claiming that American troops forestall any Japanese inclination to remilitarize. These arguments no longer acknowledge Asia’s reality. Like other advanced countries, from the 19\textsuperscript{th} to the mid-20\textsuperscript{th} century, Japan committed the blunder of taking overseas territory through conquest. It paid dearly for this in World War II, but that precipitated changes that led to Japan’s prosperity today. Japan has no reason to change the status quo. Neither Mr. Hosokawa’s former parliamentary colleagues (nor any bureaucrats or military officers) advocate outmoded ideas of expansionism. Mr. Hosokawa states that Japan’s Ground Self-Defense Force, Air-Defense Force and Maritime-Defense Force can defend the homeland of Japan and protect its maritime traffic for all commercial shipping.\textsuperscript{21}

Mr. Hosokawa states that nuclear deterrence is a different story. Both Russia and China, while weak in conventional military power, hold enough nuclear missiles to destroy Japan. It is legitimate to ask how Japan would counter nuclear blackmail. Tokyo, which accepted unconditionally the permanent extension of the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty in 1995 and renounced development of its own nuclear deterrent, has no choice to depend on the nuclear umbrella of the United States. From Japan’s perspective, friendly relations with the United States, the only remaining military superpower, are vital. Even if all common threats disappeared in the next century, the alliance would still be in Japan’s interest. However, the alliance may be changed to reduce the number of U.S. installations in Japan and the amount of funding given in future Special Measures Agreements. It is the business of senior leaders to be military experts and statesmen to plan for the future. The U.S. military presence in Japan should fade by the 20\textsuperscript{th} century’s end. The time has come for Japan and the United States to discuss an alliance fit for the next century.\textsuperscript{22}

**National Security Policy**

Diplomacy, deterrence and military preeminence remain central to the United States’ national security policy for Japan. The American security alliance with Japan (The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan) serves as the foundation of U.S. security policy.\textsuperscript{23} President Clinton’s October 1998 vision of a new Pacific Community links security interests with economic growth and U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights. This vision defines America’s
role as a stabilizing force in a more integrated Asia-Pacific region through the U.S. core objective of Enhancing Security.\textsuperscript{24}

U.S. military presence remains essential to maintaining the stability that has enabled most nations in the Asia-Pacific region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all. To deter aggression and secure our own interest, maintaining approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the region reinforces our commitment of an active military presence in the region, supports U.S. treaty alliances with Japan and others, and serves as the foundation for America's continuing security role.\textsuperscript{25} Additionally, the maintenance of healthy relations with the Association of Southwest Asian Nations (ASEAN) supports U.S. objectives of regional dialogue on the full range of common security challenges to enhance regional security and understanding.\textsuperscript{26} The current national security policy that supports the U.S. regional alliance with Japan is clearly articulated in the National Security Strategy for challenges to be faced in the year 2020.\textsuperscript{27}

**The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security**

The San Francisco Treaty (signed in 1951) was an important factor in the development of U.S. security strategy for dealing with the Soviet Union in the Far East. Yoshida Shigeru, the Japanese Prime Minister at the time, said that although Japan could retrieve its independence with the Peace Treaty, it does not have enough economic power to possess the armed forces required for the defense of Japan. There is no choice but to depend on the U.S. for Japan's security until Japan's economic power is recovered. Yoshida regarded economic recovery as a matter of the highest priority.\textsuperscript{28}

The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the U.S. and Japan was signed on 19 January 1960. The treaty's key security policies are defined in Article 5 and Article 6. Article 5 stipulates that the U.S. and Japan will take joint action if there is an armed attack against Japan. Under Article 6, U.S. Forces are granted the use of facilities and areas in Japan for the purpose of contributing to Japan's security, as well as peace and security in the Far East. In short, the U.S. is unilaterally obliged to defend Japan; Japan is not obliged to defend the U.S., but only to furnish facilities and areas for the stationing of U.S. Forces in Japan. That is a rather asymmetrical alliance.\textsuperscript{29}

The U.S.-Japan security relationship as of March 2000 and projection of issues to 2020 show that the relationship still remains an essential political and military framework of U.S. strategy. Further, The U.S. Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region describes the U.S.-Japan alliance as the principal basis for securing the peace and security of not only the two countries, but for the entire Asia-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{30}

**U.S. and Japan Bilateral Relationships**

The U.S. and Japan reaffirmed the bilateral security relationship in the April 1996 Joint Security Declaration. The security treaty alliance remains the cornerstone for achieving common security objectives and for maintaining a stable and prosperous environment for the Asia-Pacific region in the 21\textsuperscript{st} Century. In September 1997, the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation expanded
bilateral cooperation for peacekeeping and humanitarian relief operations in areas surrounding Japan and in the types of bilateral training for the defense of Japan.\textsuperscript{31}

Other administration policy actions include the April 1998 revised Acquisition and Cross-Servicing Agreement, and the Special Action on Okinawa (SACO). The implementation of both actions aid in ensuring the maintenance of U.S. operational capabilities and force presence in the Asian-Pacific region.\textsuperscript{32} In addition, U.S.-Japan security cooperation has reinforces universal adherence to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and addresses the dangers posed by transfers of destabilizing conventional arms and sensitive dual-use goods and technologies. U.S. continued progress in assisting open trade between the U.S. and Japan, and broad-ranging international cooperation, still provide a sound basis for security relations into the year 2020.\textsuperscript{33}

**Security Analysis**

Under the existing provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan, the treaty still serves as conduit for implementing the 1998 U.S. security strategy and security policies. The following analysis will examine the feasibility of the treaty in the year 2020 to satisfy United States and Japanese’s interests.

Ends

The U.S. uses its opportunity and means to help build a prosperous, secure and responsible commonwealth of nations throughout the world and is also committed to political and economic freedom in the region. The U.S. global interest is evident in the objectives of U.S. environment-shaping strategies in the world’s regions. In East Asia, the objective is to defuse the remaining Cold War confrontation in Korea, build a new partnership with Japan, and encourage the transformation, integration, and responsible behavior of more powerful China.\textsuperscript{34}

**Ways**

The U.S. can advance its interests and norms with Japan by continuing to promote free trade, drawing in emerging nations (China and India) and helping ease the abject poverty that can cause states to fail. Similarly, peacetime international engagement of U.S. military forces, as part of a larger strategy, can affect attitudes, conditions, and trends in many ways.\textsuperscript{35} The U.S. can also chart new directions for its alliances in Northeast Asia by trading off America’s active role in the region with an increased acceptance by allied partners to accept greater international security duties in ways that complement U.S. responsibilities.\textsuperscript{36} The presence of U.S. Forces is shaping the international environment within Japan and Northeast Asia in five basic ways.\textsuperscript{37}

- **Deterring Conflict** – Avoids conflict with the large transition states facing the U.S. by showing that U.S. Forces in Eastern Asia don’t threaten China’s national security or imply a strategy of containment—the U.S. assures Beijing that the U.S. and Japan are not aligned against China.
• **Promoting Cooperation** – The awareness of available U.S. Forces convinces Japan and other friends that the U.S. remains steadfast in its interest in their security and in the stability of the Asia-Pacific region.

• **Improving Coalitions** – The U.S. has declined to be the world’s sheriff. Its friends need to bear international security responsibilities commensurate with their wealth and their equity in the core’s health, security, and norms. Without raising worries about Japan’s independent offensive capabilities or overstepping its legal and political self-restraints, Japanese forces could contribute more to both regional security and peace operations within the U.S.-Japan security agreement.

• **Limiting Threats** – U.S. Forces can constrain asymmetric threats by convincing adversaries that attempting to gain an edge is fruitless and risky. The U.S. wants to make clear that its forces would be threatening only if these countries threaten U.S. interests, U.S. friends, or regional and global security.

• **Reforming Defense** – U.S. Forces embody the professionalism, accountability, and efficiency other defense establishments can emulate to benefit Japan, their neighbors, and the U.S. itself.

### Means

Considering the ends and means, U.S. Forces must rely on the proper mix of power projection capacity, information technology, joint doctrine, lethality, and robust forces to meet our security commitments with Japan.\(^{38}\)

The U.S. security commitment is supported by the U.S. Forces (about 60,000 personnel) assigned to and serving at locations throughout mainland Japan and Okinawa. In addition, the Japanese government contributes funding to the U.S. forces operations with Japanese Host Nation Support totaling $3.2 billion in direct support and $1.3 billion for indirect support.\(^{39}\) The current mix of ends, ways, and means for supporting our Japan policy are in balance.

### 2020: Opportunities and Threats

The April 1996 Joint Declaration on Security changed the focus of the U.S.-Japanese alliance away from the defense of Japan and toward cooperation in maintaining regional security. Since the end of the Cold War, economic difficulties, official corruption, doubts about U.S. constancy, and a perception of the potential challenge of rising Chinese power have combined to force a change in the content and structure of Japanese politics. If, as seems likely, present domestic political trends continue through 2020 and if successive Japanese governments can demonstrate that the expanded alliance truly increases Japan’s security, the strength of domestic political leaders who support an expanded role for Japan in regional political and security affairs will grow.\(^{40}\)

External threats throughout 2020 to Japan’s role in core security may diminish; however, regional states (China, North Korea and South Korea) will remain wary of any increases in Japan’s military or security roles. Both Beijing and Seoul understand that even an expanded alliance between Korea and
Japan serves the interest of each by enhancing stability and by keeping Japan firmly tied to core values and norms. The states of Southeast Asia are concerned less about a more active Japan than about the challenges of an emerging Chinese military power, and, accordingly, they see the U.S.-Japan alliance as a means of countering Beijing’s regional influence. Despite the braking effect of historical memory, the trend points toward a more active Japan in the security affairs of the region throughout the period to 2020.41

Another key factor to consider that may impact the U.S.-Japan security treaty is if peace comes to Korea. Japan and South Korea have had their occasional difficulties, but since normalization in 1965 the two countries have gradually deepened their bilateral political and economic relationships. They share democratic values and free-market economies. Japan is the second-largest trading partner for South Korea, and South Korea is the fourth-largest trading partner for Japan.42 Both are non-nuclear weapon states. Their security cooperation, based to a large degree on their respective alliances that each enjoys with the U.S., has developed substantially since the early 1990s. They can be characterized as quasi-allies.43

With the revised Guidelines for U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation, Tokyo and Washington already started to delineate common responses to contingencies surrounding Japan. This language clearly meant to include the Korean Peninsula, and the possibility of a North Korean collapse or invasion of the South, or that the threat no longer exists. Neither the U.S.-Japan nor the U.S-South Korea alliances would lose its relevance. Rather, it seems likely that these two alliances would become more integrated. Transforming the two alliances into a formal trilateral alliance would be not only politically unsustainable but also strategically counter-productive. Nevertheless, it would be quite possible and desirable that the two could work together more closely than before and continue to provide peace and stability in the region.44

Based on these factors, the challenges to Japan’s security role in the region will be internal not external. Fiscal constraints facing the U.S. and Japanese governments may drastically affect the level of U.S. Forces stationed in Japan and the amount of burden sharing funds Japan may give to the U.S. in the support and defense of Japan.

Security Strategy Considerations

The United States should continue with the framework of the current policy of diplomacy, deterrence and military preeminence as the central focus of the United States’ national security policy for Japan through 2020. Based on the new and existing security instruments between the U.S. and Japan, The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan is still valid and doesn’t need to be updated. This security treaty can still serve as the pillar of U.S. security policy through 2020.

Actions to gradually integrate the U.S. alliances with Japan and South Korea into a formal trilateral alliance should be considered when opportunities arise. Initiating actions too soon would probably adversely affect relations with China, but if done over a period of time, it would allow Japan and South
Korea to work together and continue to provide peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region through 2020. Taking this approach links security interests with economic growth and the U.S. commitment to democracy and human rights, while sustaining America’s role as a stabilizing force in the Asia-Pacific region through the U.S. core objective of enhancing security.\textsuperscript{45}

HOST NATION SUPPORT

The Government of Japan’s Cost Sharing Program is the host nation monetary contributions to support the U.S. Forces in Japan. Japan’s host nation funding is programmed in the Japan Self-Defense Budget process. For Japanese fiscal year 1998, host nation contributions to U.S. Forces, Japan were in excess of $4.55 billion and were allocated as follows:\textsuperscript{46}

- Japan Self-Defense Budget – Direct
- Local National Labor ($1,252,000,000)
- Construction ($1,324,500,000)
- Land Rent ($681,700,000)
- Public Utilities ($265,800,000)
- Legal Claims ($400,000)
- Cost Avoidance – Indirect
  - Installation Real Estate ($966,600,000)
  - Miscellaneous Areas ($62,600,000)

For Japanese fiscal year 1998, host nation contributions to U.S. Army, Japan was about $276,800,000. The Government of Japan’s Cost Sharing dollars for Army Direct Support were allocated to Local National Labor ($191,100,000), Construction ($54,200,000), Land Rent ($15,800,000) and Public Utilities ($15,700,000). The U.S. Army, Japan also received Indirect Support for Japanese fiscal year 1998 of $99,000,000 for Installation Real Estate, Import Exemption, Waiver of Petroleum Taxes, Local Procurement Tax, and Landing, Port and Road Tolls.\textsuperscript{47}

The background that fully discusses the history of Japan’s host nation funding program is presented in detail in the following section on Special Measures Agreement. The existing agreement between the United States and Japan will expire on 31 March 2001. The New Special Measures Agreement 2001 (for the period 1 April 2001 through 31 March 2006) is now being formulated for negotiation. As in previous agreements, the New Special Measures Agreement will provide labor and utility financial support for stationing U.S. Forces in Japan.\textsuperscript{48}

Special Measures Agreement

The provisions of the Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan allowed U.S. Forces to employ Japanese citizens in support of base operations. These Japanese citizens are referred to as Master Labor Contract employees. These employees are highly dedicated, motivated and trained professionals that served in critical organizations contributing to the successful accomplishment of America’s Army and its missions in Japan. The following details were summarized

From 1951 to 1977, U.S. Forces in Japan paid all labor costs for its Japanese workforce. During the period 1963 through 1976, the cost of wages for the Japanese workforce accelerated rapidly—in 1975, a single wage increase of 32 percent occurred. As a result, in 1976 the United States Secretary of Defense and Secretary of State took actions to explore labor cost sharing with the Government of Japan for the Japanese workforce employed by U.S. Forces.

Five separate labor cost sharing agreements have been signed since 1978 between the United States and Japan. In 1978, the First Agreement provided that the Government of Japan assume all indirect costs of the Japanese workforce for welfare, insurance, and administrative fees not to exceed 9 percent of the total labor cost. The Second Agreement executed in 1979 tasked the Government of Japan to assume costs exceeding the prevailing practice not to exceed 17 percent of the total labor cost. These additional costs included differential base pay of 10 percent, language allowance, and part of separation and retirement allowances in excess of the Japanese Civil Service System. The Third Agreement executed in 1987 resulted in the Government of Japan assuming all remaining allowances (excluding base pay) not to exceed 54 percent of the total labor cost. These allowances included area adjustment allowance, family allowance, housing allowance, commutation allowance, three bonuses (year-end, summer, and term end), and lump sum separation and retirement allowance. The cost of these allowances was phased in during 1987 and 1990.

In 1991, the Special Measures Agreement was signed and provided for the Government of Japan to assume costs of 100 percent of all base pay subject to funding, plus all allowances for the Japanese workforce employed by U.S. Forces in Japan. The assumption of costs was phased in between 1991 and 1995. The 1996 New Special Measures Agreement (effective 1 April 1996) provided for the continuance of the Government of Japan to pay all costs subject to approved funding levels. U.S. Forces were responsible for all payroll costs that exceeded funded ceilings set by the Government of Japan. The funded ceiling set in this agreement was 23,055 spaces for U.S. Forces Japan. This agreement expires on 31 March 2001.

The Master Labor Contract employees are employed through an indirect hire system in Japan. The Government of Japan is the legal employer of Master Labor Contract workforce and its operations are managed through the Defense Facilities Administration Agency. The Commander, U.S. Forces Japan retains the responsibility for supervision of the Master Labor Contract funded spaces. The respective component commanders manage their allocations of Master Labor Contract employees.

The roles and responsibilities for U.S. Forces to manage Master Labor Contract funded spaces are defined in two contracts and one agreement (the Master Labor Contract for Appropriated Fund Employees, the Mariners Contract for Appropriated Fund Employees providing services to watercraft, and the Indirect Hire Agreement for Non- Appropriated Fund Employees). The Commander, U.S. Army, Japan relies on its Contracting Officer Representative and Labor Negotiation Office to ensure that
contract and agreement provisions are properly enforced to protect the rights of the Master Labor Contract employees.

The Commander, U.S. Forces Japan allocates Master Labor Contract funded spaces to component commanders in Japan annually. The allocations are based on the Japanese Fiscal Year that starts on 1 April and ends on 31 March. For Japanese fiscal year 1998, the Commander, U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command received an allocation of 3,824 funded spaces. The funded spaces included 3,521 Master Labor Contract employees for Appropriated Fund, 6 Master Labor Contract employees for the Mariners Contract for Appropriated Fund, and 297 Indirect Hire Agreement employees for Non-Appropriated Fund.

As executive agent for U.S. Forces Japan, the Commander, U.S. Army, Japan allocates Master Labor Contract funded spaces to Army and DOD activities that support the Army's mission in Japan. For Japanese fiscal year 1998, funded spaces were distributed as follows:


- Tenant DOD activities supporting the U.S. Army in Japan – 102 Master Labor Contract employees for Appropriated Fund.

The U.S. Army's allocation of funded spaces for Japanese fiscal year 1998 is valued at about $191,100,000. The Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management, Cost Sharing Office is responsible for the fiscal accounting of U.S. Army Japan's funded spaces. This office computes the average cost of a Master Labor Contract employee for Japanese fiscal year 1998 at 5,016,394 Yen or about $41,771 (the U.S. Army's budget rate is $1 to 121.17 Yen).

The Commander, U.S. Army, Japan is responsible for making sure its subordinate commands and other U.S. Army and DOD activities use their funded Master Labor Contract authorizations in accordance with mission priorities established.

**Public Utilities and Construction**

The Government of Japan provides a refund for the yen based public utility costs incurred by U.S. Forces in Japan. For U.S. Army, Japan, utility costs are based on consumption of electricity, gas, propane, water, sewage, heating fuels and kerosene. Refunds are calculated by averaging user consumption for each utility based on three prior Japanese fiscal year costs. U.S. Army, Japan manages its utilities efficiently and has received about $16 million annually in reimbursements for the past 6 years.49

The Government of Japan also includes in its Cost Sharing program for U.S. Forces in Japan funds for construction. The Japan Facility Improvement Program (JFIP) is a separate informal agreement
on Host Nation Support and is not part of the Special Measures Agreement. This program is subject to change by the Government of Japan. JFIP is similar to the U.S. Army’s Major Construction, Army appropriation for construction. Facilities are replaced and built by the Government of Japan. Force components of U.S. Forces, Japan recommend projects and priority; then the Government of Japan determines which projects are funded. JFIP doesn’t allow for offensive type projects to be built. The U.S. Army Corps of Engineers District, Japan oversees the design and construction process for the Government of Japan. During Japanese fiscal year 1998, over $54 million in new projects were started for U.S. Army, Japan. Overall, U.S. Forces, Japan received funding for new projects totaling in excess of $1.3 billion during Japanese fiscal year 1998.30

Funding Impacts

The Government of Japan’s Cost Sharing program significantly impacts the cost of U.S. Forces, Japan accomplishing the missions in Japan. The U.S. Army, Japan’s appropriated budget profile to conduct its missions throughout Japan is estimated at $397.7 million dollars in requirements annually. Based on Government of Japan’s continued financial support of $278.8 million in Japanese fiscal year 1998, about 70 percent of U.S. Army, Japan’s requirement was paid for by Japan. Consequently, U.S. Army, Japan’s operating budget was estimated at about $120.5 million. This financial arrangement between the United States and Japan is very helpful with the funding constraints placed on the Department of Defense for the past 10 years. As mentioned earlier, the New Special Measures Agreement is being negotiated. It is anticipated that the new agreement will still financial benefit the United States’ cost of supporting U.S. Forces in Japan. A minor factor affecting the new agreement may include reduction in the workweek for regularly scheduled employees from 56 hours to 40 hours. This requirement would create 68 new unfunded requirements for U.S. Army, Japan. Additionally, some public utility cost may increase due to conversion from “free” well water to “not free” city water, and conversion from heating oil to cleaner but more expensive city propane gas.31

The Government of Japan’s Cost Sharing program has been key to the United States partnership with Japan. From the perspective of the year 2020, discussions with the Ground Staff Office and Staff College personnel showed that most believed that the host nation funding through its Cost Sharing program (Special Measures Agreement and the Japan Facility Improvement Program) will continue to be funded at the appropriate levels for the next twenty years. Further, they all agreed that for the Government of Japan to acquire and maintain a force equivalent to the U.S. Forces in Japan is not economically feasible or politically warranted.32

BILATERAL TRAINING PROGRAM

The U.S. Army, Japan’s regional presence in Northeast Asia and in Japan is vital based on the U.S. treaty with Japan to defend it—a commitment codified by the U.S. Army’s extensive bilateral relationship with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. The United States continues to build upon a unique relationship for over 50 years between two nations that has evolved from postwar occupation to a
mutually beneficial, equal partnership. This security relationship has become America’s most important long-term bilateral relationship that ensures peace and stability for the entire Asia-Pacific region. United States and Japan are actively promoting coordinated operations between the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and U.S. Army in emergency situations through bilateral planning and training. The overall objectives of bilateral training exercises are to seek and to refine key interoperability issues between the U.S. Army and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.\textsuperscript{53}

Engagement

U.S. Army, Japan’s Bilateral Training Program consists of a series of vigorous and comprehensive training exercises with Japan that effectively supports the U.S. Army Pacific’s expanded relations program and the U.S. National Security Strategy and U.S. Pacific Command’s Military Engagement Strategy and Theater Engagement Plan. Commanding General, U.S. Army, Japan is the U.S. Army, Pacific’s Executive Agent for all Army-to-Army contact with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.\textsuperscript{54}

The Bilateral Training Program’s primary goal is to promote security cooperation and enhanced interoperability through increased Army-to-Army interaction and bilateral training. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States of America and Japan (signed 19 January 1960) serves as the basis for the U.S. and Japan to train bilaterally for the defense of Japan from armed attacks.

U.S. Army, Japan conducts three major bilateral training exercises annually in Japan with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. About 2,000 soldiers from U.S. Army Active and Reserve Component units are given the opportunity to plan, mobilize, deploy, and interact with U.S. Army Commands from outside the continental United States and foreign national forces in Japan to participate in bilateral training. Approximately 4,000 soldiers from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s regional armies and Ground Staff Office train bilaterally with U.S. Forces at these exercises.\textsuperscript{55}

- Orient Shield is a bilateral field training exercise conducted to train basic combat skills from squad to battalion/regimental level.
- North Wind is a bilateral field training exercise conducted in cold weather conditions to demonstrate small unit actions and battle drills for passage of lines and attacks.
- Yama Sakura is a command post exercise that uses simulation to train U.S. Army and Japan Ground Self-Defense Force commanders and staffs bilaterally in the defense of Japan. Exercise participants include the Army Component Commander in Japan (CG, U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command), U.S. Army warfighting units assigned to defend Japan (I Corps), and the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and its regional armies and Ground Staff Office.

U.S. Army, Japan also conducts expanded relations program with the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force through its Bilateral Training Program. These bilateral training exchanges include:\textsuperscript{56}

Officer Exchange Program. Observer teams visit like units in the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and exchange valuable information on current equipment, tactics, techniques, procedures and training methods.


In June 1999, the Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force asked U.S. Army, Japan to expand the Bilateral Training Program to include new types of training so that Japan can meet its increasing role in regional security with the U.S. Army in the 21st Century. The new types of bilateral training included Peacekeeping Operations; Disaster Relief Operations; Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Response Operations; Nuclear Disaster Relief Operations; Joint and Logistical Operations; Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Casualty Treatment; and Anti-Terrorist Operations.57

Army funding for Bilateral Training Program decreased from $15 million in fiscal year 1997 to $9 million in fiscal year 2000. Previous Bilateral Training Program funding shortfalls have been supplemented by the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force (approximately $7 million annually) in order to maintain the high degree of bilateral training. Future Japan Ground Self-Defense Force funding supplements for Bilateral Training Program is programmed at $8 million for the next five Japanese fiscal years.58 U.S. Pacific Command furnished U.S. Army, Japan $200,000 for fiscal year 2000 to identify alternatives so that the Bilateral Training Program can be expanded to accommodate the new Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's bilateral training needs.59

Future Requirements

U.S. Army, Japan should use the Japanese Officer Exchange Program to identify immediate alternatives for better understanding the scope and type of new Japan Ground Self-Defense Force bilateral training requirements. The Japanese Officer Exchange Program provides for an exchange of observer teams from the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force armies to visit U.S. Forces Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, Department of Defense installations and government agencies. This program provides for exposure to the latest information on current equipment and training methods while at the same time allow U.S. Army, Japan to assess the current posture of Japan Ground Self-Defense Force units. This approach to developing and meeting bilateral training needs should still be effective in the year 2020.50

U.S. Army, Japan should request U.S. Pacific Command to coordinate with U.S. Joint Forces Command to determine what training programs and support could be made available to meet the new bilateral training needs for the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force and any future requests. Support for
the Bilateral Training Program should be continued and funded by U.S. Army, Pacific. The funding should be adequate to ensure that the U.S. Army can furnish the high level of bilateral training needed to meet the U.S. Pacific Command's theater engagement plan and the existing and new requirements of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force.¹

From the perspective of the year 2020, discussions with the Ground Staff Office and Staff College personnel disclosed showed that the Bilateral Training Program has been a cornerstone for the growth and development of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force. Although the U.S. Army, Japan has only about 2,000 soldiers assigned in Japan; the mission to coordinate and train bilaterally with the 172,900 members of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force is critical. On 21 December 1999, the Chief of Staff, Ground Staff Office approved Japanese fiscal year 2000 bilateral training exercise budget. The funds approved for training further supported Japan's commitment to partner with the United States in maintaining a strong bilateral training program.²

TENSIONS ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA

North Korea's developments in its nuclear and long-range missile activities have added to the tensions on the Korean Peninsula and with the United States and Japan. Further, assumptions that reunification would occur on the Korean Peninsula don't appear to be likely in the next 20 years.

Security Assessment on the Korean Peninsula

Dr. William J. Perry, serving as the U.S. North Korea Policy Coordinator and Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State, led a North Korea policy team that conducted an extensive review of U.S. policy toward the DPRK during the period November 1998 through July 1999. The team was supported by a number of senior officials from the U.S. government and by Dr. Ashton B. Carter of Harvard University. The policy review team received regular and extensive guidance from the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the National Security Advisor and senior policy advisors. The team also consulted with experts, both in and out of the U.S. government. Dr. Perry kept members of Congress informed and used their comments to refine concepts being developed by the North Korea policy review team. The team also exchanged views with officials from many countries with interests in Northeast Asia and the Korean Peninsula, including U.S. allies, the Republic of Korea and Japan.³

Dr. Perry led the team to North Korea in May 1999 as President Clinton's Special Envoy, to obtain a first-hand understanding of the views of the DPRK Government. The policy review team determined that a fundamental review of U.S. policy was needed due to significant changes in the security situation on the Korean Peninsula since the 1994 crisis. The focus of the North Korea policy review keyed in on the DPRK's nuclear and long-range missile activities. The team reported that the Agreed Framework of 1994 succeeded in verifiably freezing North Korean plutonium production at Yongbyon—it stopped plutonium production at that facility so that North Korea currently has at most a small amount of fissile material it may have secreted away from operations prior to 1994. Without the Agreed Framework, North
Korea could have produced enough additional plutonium by now for a significant number of nuclear weapons.\(^6^4\)

Japan has become more concerned about North Korea in recent years. This concern was heightened by the launch, in August 1998, of a Taepo Dong missile over Japanese territory. Although the Diet has passed funding for the Light Water Reactor being undertaken by the Korean Peninsula Energy Development organization (KEDO) pursuant to the Agreed Framework. The Government of Japan wants to preserve the Agreed Framework, however, a second missile launch is likely to have a serious impact on domestic political support for the Agreed Framework and have wider ramifications within Japan about its security policy.\(^6^5\)

The policy team conferred with U.S. military leaders and allies, and concluded that, as in 1994, U.S. forces and alliances in the region are strong and ready. And are confident that allied forces could and would successfully defend Republic of Korea territory. The team concluded that the DPRK's military leaders know this and thus are deterred from launching an attack. However, in sharp contrast to the Desert Storm campaign in Kuwait and Iraq, war on the Korean Peninsula would take place in densely populated areas. Considering the million-man DPRK army arrayed near the DMZ, the intensity of combat in another war on the Peninsula would be unparalleled in U.S. experience since the Korean War of 1950-53. It is likely that hundreds of thousands of persons—U.S., Republic of Korea, and DPRK—military and civilian—would perish, and millions of refugees would be created. While the U.S. and the Republic of Korea of course have no intention of provoking war, there are those in the DPRK who believe the opposite is true. But even they must know that the prospect of such a destructive war is a powerful deterrent to precipitous U.S. or allied action.\(^6^6\)

Under present circumstances, therefore, deterrence of war on the Korean Peninsula is stable on both sides, in military terms. While always subject to miscalculation by the isolated North Korean government, there is no military calculus that would suggest to the North Koreans anything but catastrophe from armed conflict. This relative stability, if it is not disturbed, can provide the time and conditions for all sides to pursue a permanent peace on the Peninsula, ending at last the Korean War and perhaps ultimately leading to the peaceful reunification of the Korean people. This is the lasting goal of U.S. policy.\(^6^7\)

Acquisition of the DPRK of nuclear weapons or long-range missiles, and especially the combination of the two (a nuclear weapons device mounted on a long-range missile), could undermine this relative stability. Such weapons in the hands of the DPRK military might weaken deterrence as well as increase the damage if deterrence failed. Their effect would, therefore, be to undermine the conditions for pursuing a relaxation of tensions, improved relations, and lasting peace. Acquisition of such weapons by North Korea could also spark an arms race in the region and would surely do grave damage to the global nonproliferation regimes covering nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles. A continuation of the DPRK's pattern of selling its missiles for hard currency could also spread destabilizing effects to other regions,
such as the Middle East. Dr. Perry’s team concluded that the urgent focus of U.S. policy toward the DPRK must be to end its nuclear weapons and long-range missile-related activities. 68

Japan’s interests are not identical to those of the U.S., but they overlap strongly. The DPRK’s August 1998 Taepo Dong missile launch over the Japanese islands abruptly increased the already high priority Japan attaches to the North Korea issue. The Japanese regard DPRK missile activities as a direct threat. In bilateral talks with Japan, the DPRK representatives exacerbate historic animosities by repeatedly referring to Japan’s occupation of Korea earlier in the 20th century. For these reasons, support for Japan’s role in KEDO is at risk in the Diet. The government’s ability to sustain the Agreed Framework in the face of further DPRK missiles launches is not assured, even though a collapse of the Agreed Framework could lead to nuclear warheads on DPRK missiles, dramatically increasing the threat they pose. Japan also has deep-seated concerns, such as the fate of missing persons suspected of being abducted by the DPRK. The U.S. strongly supports these concerns. 69

What If No Reunification Occurs?

Reunification on the Korean Peninsula is not likely to occur before the year 2020. Many assumptions made prior to 1994 and as late as August 1998 would have you believe that peace would come to the Korean Peninsula. All hope that reunification would come as it did with West Germany and East Germany. However, the German Model of Reunification doesn’t apply to the Korean Peninsula. What does matter is that many see the Cold War in Korea continuing. Discussions with military professionals, friends and colleagues in Japan and at the U.S. Army War College disclosed that most believed reunification would not happen on its own and the status quo could continue beyond the year 2020.

COL Yoshikazu Watanabe, Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force said during an interview on 21 December 1999, that reunification on the Korean Peninsula would come with a price for both the United States and Japan to pay. COL Watanabe offers some excellent advice to consider about a new Korea. Let us hope that future policy makers consider his questions in the year 2020 when formulating U.S. National Security Strategy. COL Watanabe said that a unified Korea would present new security issues. And that these issues may vary in magnitude if the new Korea has a strong alliance with China, stands neutral on China, or continues its strong alliance with the United States. Other regional security concerns could be directly related to how the future China will act in the year 2020. Will it be friendly as it portrays itself today in the year 2000, or will it be neutral or worst case hostile? Each these actions will compound the security alliances needed in Northeast Asia. Further, COL Watanabe said that you can not ignore a potential China/Russia alliance. If unification comes to the Korean Peninsula, who will decide if U.S. troops stay in Korea and how many? Rhetoric today from the Republic of Korea about maintaining an U.S. presence may be totally different in the year 2020. The United States must remember its own history with Iran and Iraq—allies one day, enemies the next. South Korea has had contact with the United States for a little over fifty years. Both Koreas have had dealings with China in excess of a thousand years. COL Watanabe said that he people of Japan wish for peace in Korea.
However if reunification occurs on the Korean Peninsula, the United States must remember that the new Korea must want and ask for your assistance in order for your military presence to remain.  

JAPAN'S EMERGING REGIONAL ROLE IN NORTHEAST ASIA

The U.S.-Japan alliance remains the linchpin of our security strategy in Asia. The end of the Cold War changed the security environment in Asia and challenged some assumptions about the purpose and role of the alliance. The United States and Japan recognize the fundamental and contributing contribution of the alliance to the defense of Japan and regional peace and stability.

Strengthening the Alliance

In April 1996, President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto issued the U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration on Security, which reaffirmed the continued and growing importance of the alliance to the security of both nations and to the stability of the Asia-Pacific region. The Joint Declaration established a vision for preserving and strengthening the bilateral security partnership. The September 1997 release of revised Defense Guidelines marked a new era in U.S.-Japan relations and regional security. Besides further outlining bilateral cooperation during normal circumstances and for the defense of Japan, the new Guidelines provided the basis for more effective bilateral cooperation during a regional crisis that affects Japan's peace and security.

In the new Guidelines, Japan has set forth a more definitive role in responding to situations in areas surrounding Japan that will have an important influence on Japan's peace and security. The revised Guidelines outline Japanese rear area support to U.S. forces responding to a regional contingency. This support may include providing access to airfields, ports, transportation, logistics, and medical support. Japan would also be able, as applicable, to cooperate and coordinate with U.S. forces to conduct such missions and functions as minesweeping, search and rescue, surveillance, and inspection of ships to enforce United Nations' sanctions. By enhancing the alliance's capability to respond to crises, the revised Guidelines are an excellent example of preventive diplomacy; they contribute to shaping the security environment by improving deterrence and stability in the region.

Defense cooperation under the Guidelines will remain consistent with rights and obligations set forth in the U.S.-Japan Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security, the limitations of Japan's Constitution and basic principles of international law. The United States and Japan will determine independently whether to cooperate, consistent with the Guidelines, in the event of a regional contingency. This decision will be based on the nature of the situation. As such, the concept "situations in areas surrounding Japan" embodied in the revised Guidelines is not geographical but situational.

These Guidelines allow for the expansion of the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force to play a greater role in United Nation peacekeeping and humanitarian operations.

Fears of the Unknown

Will the emergence of Japan's expanded role in regional security raise concerns of the expansion of Japan's military role in Northeast Asia? It cannot be denied that there are arguments against the
expansion of Japan’s military role. These can be divided mainly into three categories based on asking the following questions. Will this expansion lead to the rebirth of Japanese militarism? Will it start a fierce arms race among Asian counties by destroying the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region? Or will place fear in Asian countries near Japan because of Japan’s military action during the Second World War?  

First Question: Will the expansion of Japan’s military role lead to the rebirth of militarism, and Japan will grow into a superpower? To be sure, the prewar constitution contained a fault, that military authorities could conduct military operations outside of political control; the government could not participate in military command. Presently in Japan, in contrast, the Japan Self-Defense Force is totally under civilian control. This is entirely different arrangement than its predecessor had. Today, the Japanese Prime Minister, on behalf of the cabinet, holds the authority for supreme command and control of the Japan Self-Defense Force. Therefore, there is virtually no possibility that militarism will revive in Japan, unless the majority of Japanese were to want it. As to that, there is no doubt that democracy in Japan is firmly instilled and that the international community recognizes the permanence of Japan’s democracy.

Second Question: Will expanding Japan’s military role stimulate a fierce arms race among Asian countries by destroying the balance of power in the Asia-Pacific region? The expansion of Japan’s military role would be continuously reviewed under the Japan-U.S. security relationship, and its purpose would be only to establish military postures that effectively support U.S. operations for the maintenance of peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan does not need such an expansion of armaments as would destroy the balance of power there. Besides, Japan has no intention of possessing strategic weapons, such as nuclear weapons, intercontinental ballistic missiles, ballistic submarines, or offensive aircraft carriers. Japan will continue to depend on the United States for power projection and nuclear deterrence in the future.

Third Question: Would Asian countries near Japan be afraid of a greater Japanese military role because of Japan’s military action during the Second World War? Certainly China, North Korea and the Republic of Korea have a sense of unease about the expansion of Japan’s role in both political and military matters, although the countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations are generally in sympathy. It is no wonder that China and North Korea, as communist countries, denounce it as a rebirth of Japanese militarism. They would use the situation for political propaganda, and for this reason Japan would not attach much importance to their objection. However, Japan should listen to the Republic of Korea, which has long felt antagonism toward Japan because of the unhappy history of Japan on the Peninsula. In recent years, the relationship between Japan and the Republic of Korea has strengthened not only politically and economically but also militarily.

Japan will continue to be a partner with the U.S. ensuring the security interests of both nations into the future. Fears of Japan rebirth of militarism in the 2020 will not occur as long as the existing U.S.-Japan security alliance remains in place in Northeast Asia.
CONCLUSIONS

Diplomacy, deterrence and military preeminence remain central to the United States’ national security policy for Japan in the year 2020. The U.S. security strategy will continue to rely on the U.S. Army’s forward presence in Japan. The regional alliance between the United States and Japan will be stronger. The potential for a trilateral alliance between the United States, Japan and the Republic of Korea may be in place thus strengthening the overall regional security interest in Northeast Asia. Although some elements of the Government of Japan’s Cost Sharing program may have been reduced, host nation funding will pay approximately 65 percent of the cost requirements to support the U.S. forces in Japan. U.S. Army, Japan and the 9th Theater Support Command’s Bilateral Training Program continues to exceed the expectations of the Japanese Ground Self-Defense Force by furnishing important training that meet the new joint missions in regional operations. Tensions on the Korean Peninsula are not resolved and reunification between the Koreas remains doubtful. All elements of Japan’s Self-Defense Force are actively engaged in United Nations’ peacekeeping and humanitarian operations. Japan’s consistent application of democracy values reinforces its proper use of the Self-Defense Forces in meeting regional contingency needs with the United States.

WORD COUNT: 10,913
ENDNOTES


2 Ibid.


4 LTC Mike Bosack, Deputy Chief of Staff for Host Nations, U.S. Army, Japan, interview by author, 20 December 1999, Camp Zama, Japan.


7 Ibid.

8 Ibid.


10 Ibid.

11 Ibid.

12 Ibid.

13 During the period 20 December through 24 December 1999, the author of this paper, Mr. Donald J. Ripp, Student, U.S. Army War College—Class of 2000 traveled to Camp Zama, Japan to perform field research sponsored by U.S. Army, Japan. Research and review of Army records was conducted at Headquarters, U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command and with elements of the 17th Area Support Group on Camp Zama, Japan. U.S. Army, Japan’s Command and Public Affairs briefings were attended on 20 December 1999 and were presented by LTC David E. Retherford. Discussions were held with key members of the command group throughout the period 20-24 December 1999. Meetings were held with: MG Joseph R. Inge, Commanding General, U.S. Army, Japan and 9th Theater Army Area Command on 22 December 1999; COL Dale E. Roth, the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, Japan on 20, 21, 22 and 23 December 1999; and LTC Mike Bosack, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Host Nation Activities on 20, 22 and 23 December 1999. Other meetings were conducted with U.S. Army, Japan staff representatives from the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations (MAJ C. Snyder, Chief of Field Training Exercises Branch on 21 and 22 December 1999; and LTC Lynn N. Bowler, Chief of Training Division on 21 December 1999); Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Resource Management (Ms. Joyce Carpenter, Program Analyst, Cost Sharing Division on 20 and 21 December 1999); and Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Engineers (Mr. J. Strollo, Chief, Installation Management Division on 22 December 1999). Discussions were also held with LTC M. Gladbach, 17th Area Support Group’s Directorate of Public Works at Camp Zama, Japan on 23 December 1999; and with LTC David E. Retherford, First Corps Liaison Officer at Camp Zama on 20, 21, 22, 23 and 24 December 1999 at Camp Zama, Japan.
14 LTC David E. Retherford, First Corps Liaison Officer, interview by author, 21 December 1999, Camp Zama, Japan. During this interview, LTC Retherford said that LTC Albert S. Wilner, from the War Plans Section (DAMO-SSW) of the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations and Plans, Headquarters, Department of the Army was conducting a similar study to the author's original thesis. LTC Wilner's e-mail address (willnas@dcsopsp03.army.mil) was furnished, but no contact was made by the author to gain any additional information about the ongoing DA study.


16 During the period 21 December through 22 December 1999, the author of this paper, Mr. Donald J. Ripp, Student, U.S. Army War College—Class of 2000 traveled to Tokyo, Japan to perform field research at Headquarters, Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in Roppongi-Tokyo, Japan and at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Staff College in Meguro-Tokyo, Japan. At the Ground Staff Office, discussions were held on 21 December 1999 with COL Kiyofumi Iwata, Chief, 1st Operations Section, Operations Division, Plans and Operations Department; COL Yoshihiko Watanabe, Chief, Exercise Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department; COL Kenichi Tampu, Training Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department; COL Yuichi Fukumori, Defense Planning Department; and LTC Masahisa Sato, Exercise Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department. At the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force's Staff College, discussions were held on 22 December 1999 with COL Shigeki Nishimura, Professor and Executive Chief, Strategic Studies and LTC Goro Matsumura, Associate Professor, Strategic Studies.

17 Ibid.

18 COL Kiyofumi Iwata, Chief, 1st Operations Section, Operations Division, Plans and Operations Department, Ground Staff Office, interview by author, 21 December 1999, Roppongi-Tokyo, Japan.


20 Hosokawa, 2-3.

21 Hosokawa, 3-4.

22 Hosokawa, 4-5.


25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 42.

27 Ibid.


29 Kawano, 12.

31 Clinton, 42.

32 Ibid.

33 Ibid.


36 Ibid., 26.

37 Ibid., 26-31.

38 Ibid., 32-35.

39 Ibid., 40.

40 Ibid., 39-40.

41 Ibid.


45 Clinton, 41.


47 Ibid.

48 Ibid.

49 Ibid.

50 Ibid.

51 Ibid.
52 During the period 21 December through 22 December 1999, the author of this paper, Mr. Donald J. Ripp, Student, U.S. Army War College—Class of 2000 traveled to Tokyo, Japan to perform field research at Headquarters, Ground Staff Office, Japan Ground Self-Defense Force in Roppongi-Tokyo, Japan and at the Japan Ground Self-Defense Force’s Staff College in Meguro-Tokyo, Japan. Ibid.


54 LTC Lynn N. Bowler, Chief, Training Division, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, Japan, interview by author, 21 December 1999, Camp Zama, Japan.

55 MAJ C. Synder, Chief of Field Training Exercises Branch, Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, U.S. Army, Japan, interview by author, 21-22 December 1999, Camp Zama, Japan.

56 Bowler, Ibid.

57 Bowler, Ibid.

58 Synder, Ibid.

59 Bowler, Ibid.

60 Bowler, Ibid.

61 Bowler, Ibid.

62 Iwata, Ibid.


64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid.

67 Ibid.

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 COL Yoshikazu Watanabe, Chief, Exercise Section, Training Division, Education and Training Department, Ground Staff Office, interview by author, 21 December 1999, Roppongi-Tokyo, Japan.


72 Ibid.
73 Ibid.
74 Kawano, 18-19.
75 Kawano, 19.
76 Ibid.
77 Ibid.
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