1977 WHITE PAPER ON BELGIUM'S NATIONAL DEFENSE

By

PAUL VANDEN BOEYNANTS

Reproduced From
Best Available Copy

U. S. JOINT PUBLICATIONS RESEARCH SERVICE
NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and other characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets [] are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as [Text] or [Excerpt] in the first line of each item, or following the last line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22151. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
White Paper on Belgium's National Defense, 1977

Joint Publications Research Service, Arlington, Va

27 Jul 77
NOTE

JPRS publications contain information primarily from foreign newspapers, periodicals and books, but also from news agency transmissions and broadcasts. Materials from foreign-language sources are translated; those from English-language sources are transcribed or reprinted, with the original phrasing and characteristics retained.

Headlines, editorial reports, and material enclosed in brackets are supplied by JPRS. Processing indicators such as (Text) or (Excerpt) in the first line of a brief, indicate how the original information was processed. Where no processing indicator is given, the information was summarized or extracted.

Unfamiliar names rendered phonetically or transliterated are enclosed in parentheses. Words or names preceded by a question mark and enclosed in parentheses were not clear in the original but have been supplied as appropriate in context. Other unattributed parenthetical notes within the body of an item originate with the source. Times within items are as given by source.

The contents of this publication in no way represent the policies, views or attitudes of the U.S. Government.

PROCUREMENT OF PUBLICATIONS

JPRS publications may be ordered from the National Technical Information Service, Springfield, Virginia 22161. In ordering, it is recommended that the JPRS number, title, date and author, if applicable, of publication be cited.


Indexes to this report (by keyword, author, personal names, title and series) are available through Bell & Howell, Old Mansfield Road, Wooster, Ohio, 44691.

Correspondence pertaining to matters other than procurement may be addressed to Joint Publications Research Service, 1000 North Glebe Road, Arlington, Virginia 22201.
BIBLIOGRAPHIC DATA SHEET

1. Report No.  JPRS 69499

2.  

3. Recipient's Accession No.  

4. Title and Subtitle  1977 WHITE PAPER ON BELGIUM'S NATIONAL DEFENSE

5. Report Date  27 July 1977

6.  

7. Author(s)  Paul Vanden Boeynants


9. Performing Organization Name and Address  Joint Publications Research Service
                                         1000 North Glebe Road
                                         Arlington, Virginia 22201

10. Project/Task/Work Unit No.  

11. Contract/Grant No.  

12. Sponsoring Organization Name and Address  

13. Type of Report & Period Covered  

14.  


16. Abstracts  

The report contains information and particulars on the defense policy pursued by Belgium civil and military authorities, and an objective accounting of reforms initiated and status of armed forces to date.

17. Key Words and Document Analysis. 17a. Descriptors  

BELGIUM  
NATO  
Defense  
Security  
Logistics  
Nuclear warfare  
Ground Forces  
Personnel Management

17b. Identifiers/Open-Ended Terms  

17c. COSATI Field/Group  15C, E,F, G

18. Availability Statement  Unlimited Availability  

Sold by NTIS  
Springfield, Virginia 22151

19. Security Class (This Report)  UNCLASSIFIED

20. Security Class (This Page)  UNCLASSIFIED

21. No. of Pages  103

22. Price  6

THIS FORM MAY BE REPRODUCED
1977 WHITE PAPER ON BELGIUM'S NATIONAL DEFENSE

Brussels LIVRE BLANC DE LA DEFENSE NATIONALE 1977 in French 1977 pp 1-147

[Book by Paul Vanden Boeynants]

CONTENTS

PREFACE ................................................................. 1
CHAPTER 1. East-West Situation--Alliances ....................... 3
CHAPTER 2. Relative East-West Force Levels .................... 12
CHAPTER 3. Belgian Defense Policy ............................... 27
CHAPTER 4. Belgian Armed Forces ............................... 32
CHAPTER 5. Defense Expenditures ................................ 49
CHAPTER 6. Personnel Matters ..................................... 66
CHAPTER 7. Armed Forces Assistance to the Nation ............. 90
CHAPTER 8. Armed Forces Assistance to Other Countries ..... 94
CHAPTER 9. Conclusions ............................................ 96
PREFACE


At that time, this book was an original publication designed to meet the expressed need for many directly or indirectly interested citizens for objective information and particulars on the defense policy pursued by Belgian civil and military authorities.

Today's White Book is meant to meet a similar need. Our primary desire was to give an unambiguous and honest answer, supported by facts, texts and figures, to those questions elected national officials, parents, teachers, youth and all citizens conscious of their rights and duties frequently ask themselves, and rightfully so, about the way our democratic society fulfills its primary duty and its most sacred mission, namely protecting our freedoms and securing the survival of our population.

I have been responsible for the Ministry of National Defense for the past 5 years. I now deem it essential to account for my action in that position as well as for the most judicious use made each year of the substantial financial resources the nation allocates to the Belgian armed forces.

Since 1972, important reforms have been made in those forces. To maintain our troop strength at levels required by the Atlantic Alliance, we have adopted a recruitment policy based on volunteer personnel as a means of offsetting successive reductions in the length of compulsory military service.

In addition, our military equipment and infrastructure facilities are being progressively replaced and modernized to meet technical efficiency and standardization requirements.

On the social level, I must also underscore the new concept now governing human relations within our armed forces. Chain of command relationships have been relaxed and disciplinary regulations radically modified so as to raise military personnel to the status of citizens entitled from every standpoint to the same rights as other public service personnel.
The harmonious integration of the armed forces within the nation has been demonstrated periodically over these past 5 years by the prompt and effective support and assistance they have furnished the Belgian community on the occasion of such natural disasters as floods or drought, and also in connection with cultural and athletic events.

In this final quarter of the century, we must fully recognize the fact that since World War II it has been possible in Europe for a generation to be born in peace and, without ever experiencing war, give birth to a second generation for whom even the Cold War belongs to history.

This phenomenon prompts me to make two observations.

The first is that this absence of war in Europe would have had much less chance of continuing if in the face of Soviet expansionism there had not been an Alliance in the West stoutly resolved to defend itself against all aggression and cognizant of the fact that vigilance is the price of liberty.

I am convinced nothing has basically changed in this respect, despite the constant individual and collective efforts of that Alliance's members to promote detente and disarmament.

Certainly neither the disillusionments of Helsinki, nor the stiffening of the ideological struggle by international communism, nor the strengthening of the Soviet bloc's military posture could persuade me to believe otherwise.

My second observation is that everything today combines to make the task of governments conscious of their defense responsibilities more difficult, if not insurmountable.

Confronted with the obvious persistence of threats hanging over the very survival of our society, over the maintenance of our freedoms and protection of our independence, never has the cost of an effective defense been so high. Furthermore, never have the peoples privileged to enjoy these freedoms been so reluctant to pay the price for them. And yet weakness is never the ideal foundation of security.

It is within this particular and most difficult context that we must evaluate the effort made for several years now to rationalize Belgian national defense budgets, and the constant desire of defense officials to keep the public informed as fully as possible on defense budget policy followed in all Western countries and in Belgium more specifically.

Such, in a word, is the purpose I had in deciding to publish this book which constitutes an objective accounting of the reforms we have initiated and an accurate picture of the status of our armed forces to date.

(Signed) P. Vanden Boeynants
Minister of National Defense
CHAPTER 1. EAST-WEST SITUATION—ALLIANCES

[Text] Introduction

1. In this final quarter of the century, East and West confront each other and are at odds over many ideological, political, economic or military issues. Countries involved in this confrontation are spending considerable sums on defense. There is no indication that world peace based on general and balanced disarmament can be expected in the near future.

2. Faced with this situation, some persons question the validity of our defense policy and even go so far as to wonder whether the West should not consider disarming unilaterally.

These questions, these doubts, these misgivings deserve an answer based not on wishful thinking but on facts.

3. One day the West became united in an Alliance to safeguard its civilization, its heritage and its freedom.

It stands to reason that the West cannot now become disunited without risking the loss of these values.

4. This first chapter on the East-West situation will present a comparative analysis of the ideology of the opposing alliances, followed by discussion of their strategy, and—in Chapter 2—relative East-West force levels.

Nature and Ideology of the Alliances

Member Countries

5. The opposing alliances are composed of most of the communist countries of Europe on one side and Western countries on the other. The following countries are members of the Warsaw Pact: Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, German Democratic Republic, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and the Soviet Union. Atlantic
Alliance members are Belgium, Canada, Denmark, United States, France*, Greece*, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Portugal, Federal Republic of Germany, United Kingdom and Turkey.

6. In the Soviet Union's view, the Atlantic Alliance and the Warsaw Pact are comparable in nature.

The two alliances do, in fact, have some common points: two superpowers are each protecting a group of small and medium-sized countries in Western and Eastern Europe, countries that by themselves would not be able to maintain the balance of forces and provide for their own security.

7. There are, however, essential distinctive differences between the alliances. These differences should be recognized because they are indicative of deeply divergent ideological, political and military views.

Effect Dissolution of the Alliances Would Have

8. The North Atlantic Treaty is the first and sole defense agreement uniting the United States and Canada on the one hand, and West European countries on the other. In contrast, the Warsaw Pact merely covers a series of bilateral treaties already linking several East European countries to the Soviet Union.

This situation leads to one imperative primary conclusion: dissolution of the alliances as advocated by some would produce a glaring imbalance in Europe, inasmuch as Western countries would find themselves isolated versus the Soviet Union and its allies still united through bilateral agreements.

Democratic Character of North Atlantic Treaty

9. Consistent with the principles of the civilization it defends, the North Atlantic Treaty is the product of freely conducted negotiations by its signatories and also of extensive and searching parliamentary discussions.

Warsaw Pact: Hegemonic Instrument

10. True to its ideal, the Atlantic Alliance respects the sovereignty of states and any attempt to intervene in their political life would be keenly resented and censured within the Alliance under the pressure of parliaments and public opinion.

*France withdrew from the Alliance's military organization (NATO) while Greece's status is currently under discussion within the Alliance.
On the other hand, the Warsaw Pact was imposed on countries in which governmental authority exercised by a single party, the Communist Party, actually precluded any possibility of discussion. The sole reason for the Warsaw Pact was to establish a hegemony over the satellite countries through a system so designed as to place their armed forces under Soviet command.

Communist Order

11. The North Atlantic Treaty permits free expression of varied ideas, and divergent opinions within the Alliance are not rare.
In contrast to this freedom and the resultant diversity, the bloc of communist countries displays a rigid and more stable order which excludes free expression of ideas contrary to the official ideology. This order also precludes any alternating democratic assumption of power by majorities professing diversified opinions or pursuing political plans distinct from those of the government.

Defense Motivations

12. The society and armed forces of communist countries are totally impregnated with ideological indoctrination on defense matters. The result is real defense motivation which, despite communist proselytism, is even further reinforced by resolute nationalism fostered by, among other things, memories of the "Great Patriotic War" against Naziism. In our countries, the democratic and liberal order is untainted by any form of militarization. Determination to defend our countries rests not on indoctrination but definitely on the citizen's firm support of the state's fundamental order.

Warsaw Pact Policy

Identity of Warsaw Pact Policy With Soviet Policy.

13. It is not possible to separate Warsaw Pact policy from Soviet policy. Past policy tallies with the objectives the Soviet Union assigned itself when concluding the treaty. It is dictated above all by that country's interest.

14. The USSR, armed with Marxist-Leninist ideology, does not conceal its objectives:

a. Maintain its political, economic and military posture at a high level to safeguard the security of Warsaw Pact countries;

b. Steadily consolidate its superpower status by expanding its influence westward and toward China while enhancing its guiding role in the international communist movement.

Armed Forces: Instrument of Foreign Policy and Domestic Policy

15. Warsaw Pact forces are not only instruments of Soviet foreign policy, they are also an essential element of the communist system at the domestic level. This latter role gives them another reason for existing and expanding. This interdependence of the communist system and the armed forces is highlighted by the existence of political officers down to the lowest military echelons.

Peaceful Coexistence of East and West

16. It should be noted that the Warsaw Pact's vaunted principle of peaceful coexistence accommodates itself strangely enough to continuous enhancement of the Pact's military capability and tolerates--indeed, even occasionally instigates--various limited conflicts that periodically erupt here and there in the world.
The following recent statement on this subject by General Heinz Hoffmann, East Germany's minister of defense, is quite revealing: "Even in the atomic age, a just war is possible.... Up to now there has been no instance in history of a successful socialist revolution in which cannon have not had to intervene or at the very least be prepared to do so."

Warsaw Pact Strategy

Principle of Initiative and Offensive Action

17. The first principle of Soviet strategy for waging war is the necessity to have the initiative and take the offensive.

This strategy was formulated mainly by Marshal Sokolovski in 1963 when he was Soviet armed forces chief of staff.

This strategy is still applicable.

18. Making maximum use of the principle of initiative and surprise, and employing powerful conventional as well as nuclear means, Soviet strategy is meant to enable a swift breakthrough to produce conditions propitious to achieving a "fait accompli." ("The Offensive--Soviet View," by Sidorenko, Frunze Military Academy, 1970). Soviet military doctrine has not yet adopted the flexible response strategy. These past few years, however, Soviet strategists have become interested in flexibility in the employment of tactical nuclear weapons.

In view of the large range of options available with such weapons, it is possible that the initial Soviet offensive moves may well be accompanied by employment of nuclear and conventional weapons.

19. According to Marshal Sokolovski: "Forces must be strategically deployed and permanently combat ready in peacetime; they should also be able to take the offensive at the very outset of war."

European Theater

20. Europe is considered the most important theater in the event of war.

In the view of Eastern strategists, the European theater includes not only Europe proper but also the Arctic seas and countries open on the Mediterranean.

Furthermore, they believe Switzerland and Sweden would also be drawn into a European war should such a war break out.
Soviet Capabilities

21. The Warsaw Pact is capable of carrying out any type of aggression ranging from subversive warfare and limited conflicts to nuclear warfare. Each of these types of aggression are conceivable in the following contexts:

a. First and foremost of all, war between the "imperialist camp" and the "socialist camp;"

b. Secondly, "unjust" imperialist wars, unjust because they are wars of conquest directed against the people;

c. Lastly, "just" wars, i.e. revolutionary wars or wars of national liberation.

Subversive Warfare in Peacetime

22. Subversive warfare is designed to weaken the defensive capability of Western democracies in peacetime:

a. Hence, at the present time, the Warsaw Pact, while increasing its offensive military capability, is making every effort to have public opinion in our countries believe it has become weaker and renounced all aggressive designs upon the West;

b. Furthermore, the fact that citizens in the West can take issue with the military establishment gives the Warsaw Pact a marked advantage. Needless to say, such disagreement is banned in communist countries and punishable by the most severe penalties. The same is true with conscientious objectors who are permitted in West European countries but prohibited in the East.

NATO Policy

Defense and Detente

23. NATO policy is still determined by the decisions taken in 1967 by ministers of the different member nations and confirmed by the "Declaration on Atlantic Relations" signed by the Alliance's heads of government on 19 June 1974.

24. By virtue of those decisions, the Alliance was assigned two main functions:

a. First, deter aggression and other forms of pressure by maintaining adequate military strength and political solidarity;

b. Secondly, in the climate of security thus obtained, pursue the search for progress toward a more stable relationship in which the underlying political issues can be solved.
Difficulties Encountered by the Alliance

25. Two factors seriously counter pursuit of the defense and detente policy thus defined:

a. First of all, the continued increase in the Warsaw Pact's offensive military capability (see chapter on relative force levels). In this connection, the following March 1976 statement by Marshal Gretchko, former Soviet defense minister, is noteworthy: "During the past 5 years, Soviet armed forces have attained a high state of operational readiness and will continue to increase their combat capability."

b. Secondly, the differences of opinion that may exist between some member countries of the Alliance and which affect the solidarity so essential to the credibility of NATO defense.

NATO Strategy

General Objective: Defense

26. NATO policy has a twofold objective: defense and detente.

NATO military strategy attaches primary importance to the first of these, namely defense, and in the case of Europe, forward defense.

27. NATO's general defense concept aims at safeguarding peace and maintaining the security of the North Atlantic treaty area through the existence of a credible deterrent and the capability of taking action to preserve or restore the Alliance's integrity in the event deterrence fails.

Definition of the Concept of Deterrence and Flexible Response

28. Deterrence consists in having military forces both qualitatively and quantitatively adequate to persuade any potential aggressor that war will not pay if he initiates offensive action against the allied forces.

29. The attainment of strategic nuclear weapons parity led the Alliance to adopt the concept of flexible response.

The basis of this concept is that NATO must always be capable of deterring the enemy and defending itself against any aggression if deterrence fails. Thus deterrence can be secured only by having a well-balanced mixture of conventional and tactical and strategic nuclear weapons. This balanced mixture must permit a flexible range of responses based on two principles: meet any aggression at a level sufficient to contain the attack and, if the defense level fails, be in a position to escalate while continuing to remain master of the situation politically.
The aggressor must be convinced NATO will use nuclear weapons if necessary, but he must remain uncertain regarding the timing and circumstances in which they would be used.

Obtaining Sufficient Time for Allied Consultation

30. To do this, the Alliance must be able to hold the timely political consultations that any possible indications of attack would require and also hold timely consultations prior to employment of nuclear weapons.

Necessary Forces

31. To be able to implement this strategy of deterrence, the Alliance must have adequate forces and simultaneously maintain:

a. A direct defense capability of deterring aggressions of minor importance (conventional forces);

b. A credible controlled escalation capability of deterring larger scale aggressions (tactical nuclear weapons);

c. A credible general nuclear response capability as the ultimate means of deterrence (strategic nuclear weapons).

32. Should deterrence fail, NATO must be capable of:

a. Countering at the very outset of hostilities any aggression below the major nuclear attack level by employing available direct defense means, including nuclear weapons if necessary;

b. Initiating controlled escalation if the attack cannot be contained or the situation brought under control by direct defense;

c. Meeting the attack with an appropriate major nuclear response if the magnitude of the aggression so demands.
CHAPTER 2. RELATIVE EAST-WEST FORCE LEVELS

[Text] General Considerations

Purpose and Limitations of the Comparison of Forces

1. The Major development in the relative levels of Atlantic Alliance forces and Warsaw Pact forces is the continuous and alarming growth of the latter.

The figures given later in this chapter justify the concern of Western government officials who cannot help but note the flagrant contradiction between the USSR's talk of peaceful coexistence and the unabated expansion of its military apparatus and more specifically its offensive capabilities. It is difficult, however, to make a scientific comparison of the combat capabilities of NATO and Warsaw Pact forces, because numerous factors cannot be calculated or weighed. For instance, such human factors as combativity or leadership ability cannot be calculated. Such factors as differences in technology, organization, training standards, proportion of regular and draftee personnel, etc. cannot be weighed.

Nevertheless, the absolute figures quoted in the following paragraphs will give an adequate idea of the disturbing imbalance that continues to exist—if not increase—between the two blocs.

General Developments

2. Overall Comparison

Before examining the relative levels of strictly military forces, a moment or two should be devoted to the other power factors.

Some of these are difficult to quantify, such as the lag of Eastern countries in electronics and data processing. Others can only be estimated because available statistics are too frequently fragmentary, such as general budgets and defense budgets. Some are hard, indisputable facts.
It can be said, however, that NATO's economic capacity is roughly twice the Warsaw Pact's capacity.

On the other hand, the European part of NATO is highly vulnerable because of the high density of its population, the heavy concentration of its industries and its lengthy lines of communication with the American continent.

Nor can we overlook the fact that it is totally dependent on foreign sources for its energy supplies.

3. Geostrategic Situation

NATO's European territory is characterized by its location on the fringe of the European continent and its lack of depth. By contrast, it is much easier for the Warsaw Pact to execute strategic military movements.

The United States and Western Europe are linked mainly by sea lines of communication. These lines are 10 times longer than the land route from the USSR to the Iron Curtain.

Table 2. Geostrategic Situation

4. Population

NATO has a total population of 554 million, the Warsaw Pact 358 million.

It is estimated that by 1980 these figures will have reached 600 and 380 million respectively.

NATO's European population of 318 million is less than the Warsaw Pact population however.

5. Raw Materials and Energy

Another power factor is the natural resources of the opposing blocs.

The USSR, the United States and Canada are the only powers that can be almost self-sufficient. Even though they have numerous trade treaties with Western Europe, the latter is the one who suffers the most from this dependence.

The many attempts made to lighten the weight of this dependence are still quite far from being successful.

Europe's subjection to outside countries is especially striking where energy generated from oil is concerned. A mere glance at the accompanying map (Table 3) is enough to convince us of this.

Table 3. Oil Shipments to North America and Western Europe in 1974
(in millions of tons)
Comparison of Military Forces

General Situation in Europe

6. NATO and the Warsaw Pact have the major part of their forces stationed in Europe as indicated by the following percentages:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Divisions</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>85 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tanks</td>
<td>70 percent</td>
<td>80 percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Aircraft</td>
<td>50 percent</td>
<td>85 percent</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The situation is extremely different, however, depending on whether we look at the northern and southern flanks or at Central Europe.

7. Northern Flank

Although armed forces of both blocs are relatively weak on the northern flank, it must be noted, however, that Warsaw Pact ground forces are numerically six times larger than NATO ground forces stationed in these areas.

8. Southern Flank

The number of NATO and Warsaw Pact divisions in these areas are about the same at the present time.

But while Warsaw Pact military capabilities are increasing, the capabilities of the Italian, Greek and Turkish forces are greatly affected by regional difficulties of either an economic or military character.

As for the air forces on this flank, the Warsaw Pact has three times more aircraft than the number available to NATO.

NATO does, however, have an undeniable edge in naval forces, thanks to the presence of the U. S. 6th Fleet in the Mediterranean.

Yet the Soviet Union is unremittingly continuing its effort to increase its influence in this region so as to be able to support its armed forces there from Syrian and African ports and air bases.

9. Central Europe

This is where the Warsaw Pact maintains its highest level of troops, weapons and equipment. Consequently, those Western nations directly threatened are obliged to maintain adequate forces to provide deterrence pursuant to the NATO strategic concept and to counter any aggression if necessary.
Strategic Nuclear Capabilities

10. A Few Definitions

The Soviet Union has closed the former gap between it and the United States and in some instances has even greatly surpassed the United States in number of strategic nuclear delivery means.

The latter are generally categorized as follows:

a. **ICBM**: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile; maximum range: 13,000 kilometers;

b. **IRBM**: Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile; maximum range: 4,000 kilometers;

c. **MRBM**: Medium Range Ballistic Missile; maximum range: 2,000 kilometers;

d. **SLBM**: Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missile; maximum range: 7,800 kilometers.

e. Strategic bombers.

Certain ICBM's can be armed with multiple nuclear warheads and can also be employed at varying ranges below their maximum range (VRBM [Variable Range Ballistic Missile]).

The USSR's capability is still somewhat qualitatively inferior to the American capability, but the SALT negotiations should bring about a certain stabilization or balance between the two blocs by the 1980's.

11. ICBM

The graph below shows the USSR has 1.5 times more ICBM's than the United States.

![Graph showing the number of ICBM's for USA and USSR from 1965 to 1975.](image.png)
12. IRBM-MRBM

The United States no longer has any IRBM's or MRBM's.

The Soviet Union already had approximately 600 of them prior to 1970, and a new version, the SSX-20, is currently in the final testing stage.

13. SLBM

The USSR has almost twice as many strategic submarines as the United States and some 100 missiles more than the United States.

Table 5

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Submarines</th>
<th>Number of Missiles</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

14. Strategic Aircraft

Here the situation is not as clear.

Although at one time there was, in fact, a reduction in the number of aircraft on the Soviet side, this reduction has been both quantitatively and qualitatively offset since 1970.

On the other hand, the reduction in number of American aircraft has been much greater.
Once again the geographic factor has its part to play: the United States has retained 500 strategic heavy bombers compared with 160 in the USSR. In contrast, the USSR has 600 strategic medium bombers versus some 60 in the United States.

These Soviet medium bombers are a formidable supplement to the 600 Russian IRBM's and MRBM's. Furthermore, the new Soviet Backfire bomber now becoming operational will have no equivalent until sometime in the 1980's when the American B-1 bomber becomes operational.

Troop Strength

15. In 10 years time, total Warsaw Pact forces have increased by more than 1 million men while NATO forces have decreased by as much.

On the European continent, the East has an overall strength of about 2 million more men than NATO.

In the region of Central Europe—as defined in paragraph 16 below—Warsaw Pact ground forces have increased by 80,000 men since 1965. The ratio of Warsaw Pact ground forces to NATO ground forces is 1.8 to 1.

During this same period, paramilitary forces—border guards, "intervention" police, etc.—have increased 20 percent.

Ground Forces


In defining the geographic area to which the numerical comparisons of most direct interest to Belgium apply, it is especially important to define that area from the standpoint of the ground forces. We have limited these comparisons to the area of the MBFR [Mutual and Balanced Reduction of Forces] talks. We have, however, extended it eastward to encompass regions adjacent to the Russian-Polish border because an appreciable number of units capable of quickly intervening in the MBFR zone are stationed there.

Hence in the rest of this book, the term "Central Europe" will refer to the area defined as follows (see Table 6):

a. Benelux, Federal Republic of Germany (with the forces of the U.S.A., Great Britain, Canada, Belgium and the Netherlands stationed in the FRG*);

*Although they are not included in the MBFR, the French Forces in Germany cannot be completely overlooked.
b. The German Democratic Republic, Poland, Czechoslovakia (with the Soviet forces stationed therein), and adjacent regions: Baltic, Byelorussia and the Carpathians.

Table 6

Tableau 6.

It is also necessary to associate a "mobilization and intervention time" factor with this geographic area. We shall, therefore, distinguish between forces and equipment available within 48 hours and those capable of reinforcing the former within approximately 2 weeks.
17. Number of Large Units

We have never been able to align more than 23 to 27 divisions—the number has varied over the years—against some 80 Warsaw Pact front-line divisions.*

The comparisons that follow pertain to the principal combat forces and highlight this imbalance in an even more striking fashion. Although our divisions have about 20-25 percent more manpower than their Warsaw Pact counterparts, this does not mean they actually have that much greater combat strength. This situation stems solely from different concepts of logistical support. Such support is more decentralized in our forces than in the Warsaw Pact where most of the division support responsibility is assigned to a higher echelon. The following graph depicts the steady build-up of Warsaw Pact divisions from 1965 to 1975.

*Obviously we refer to the number of divisions that can be brought to combat-ready status within a very short time. If we assume this time to be 2 weeks, then we would have to add another 10 or so divisions coming primarily from adjacent areas of the USSR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Some publications mention even higher figures (more than 100 divisions), but they include therein units stationed deep in the USSR and whose activation and forward movement times are more difficult to estimate. At any rate, these divisions are outside the area of consideration we initially defined.
18. Major Ground Forces Equipment

In less than 48 hours, the Warsaw Pact can deploy in Central Europe 3.7 times more tanks and 3.5 times more tanks than NATO. It has total superiority in multiple-rocket launchers (1000 to zero). If we consider tanks and artillery available in about 2 weeks, these ratios rise to 3.8 and 4.4 respectively.

In Eastern Europe (up to the Urals), tank strength increased by some 2,000 between 1974 and 1975. These additional tanks were assigned mainly to Soviet troops stationed in the GDR, Poland and Czechoslovakia.

Table 8

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>NATO</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>25000</td>
<td>21500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>20000</td>
<td>15000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>15000</td>
<td>10000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>10000</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Includes about 4,000 tanks in adjacent areas of western USSR.

Air Forces

19. Numerical Ratio

Three trends favorable to Warsaw Pact air forces must be mentioned: the increase in the number of aircraft, the enhanced quality of their aircraft, and the expansion of their offensive capabilities.
Warsaw Pact combat aircraft sharply outnumber such NATO aircraft in Central Europe by 3,800 to 1,700.

Although it is true that our numerical weakness could be offset by the rapid arrival of American reinforcements, the same is true for the USSR which, furthermore, has a greater number of redeployment airfields. The latter are also much less congested.

20. Technical Improvements

From a qualitative standpoint, we note the East's introduction of four new versions of high-performance aircraft: SU-19, MiG-25, MiG-23 and SU-17.

This introduction of modern aircraft was not accompanied by any reduction in the total number of aircraft. This is in sharp contrast with NATO countries where replacement of obsolete aircraft these past few years has been accompanied by a reduction of some 20 percent in total aircraft strength.

Furthermore, the aircraft production rate is disturbing. Some 200 new type aircraft have been introduced in Eastern Europe over the past 12 months.

We also note a steady increase in Soviet aircraft production. For instance, more than 700 new aircraft were added to the operational inventory of the Soviet forces in 1 year.

This trend will lead the USSR to produce more than twice as many aircraft as the United States by 1980.

21. Enhanced Warsaw Pact Offensive Capabilities

The Warsaw Pact has taken the following steps to enhance the tactical offensive capabilities of its air forces:

a. Deployed a larger number of fighters on forward bases;

b. Trained and qualified pilots to conduct both offensive and defensive missions;

c. Increased air defense capabilities of the ground forces thus enabling a greater number of fighters to be employed in offensive missions.

d. Adopted systematic use of electronic countermeasures in all offensive and air defense operations.

N.B. Performance characteristics of new Soviet aircraft—particularly their increased range—enable them to engage in offensive operations without having to redeploy.
Notes: 1. It is assumed that:

a. Fighter aircraft—including fighter-bombers, but excluding SU-19's—take off from their forward bases in the GDR;

b. Medium bombers and SU-19's take off from their forward bases in the USSR.

2. The range of the following older aircraft are indicated: MiG-17, SU-7, MiG-21, MiG-21 Recce, TU-16, TU-22;

The range of the following newer aircraft are indicated: SU-17/20, MiG-23, SU-19, MiG-25 Recce.

Naval Forces

22. Relative Force Levels

NATO surface naval forces still definitely have a superiority in tonnage over Warsaw Pact forces. But while the latter have been slowly but surely increasing since 1967, NATO navies have lost nearly half of their ships. Moreover, Warsaw Pact ships are more modern particularly with respect to naval surface-to-surface missiles.
Soviet progress is most dangerous in the field of attack submarines because of NATO's geostrategic situation and the fact that NATO has only two-thirds as many such submarines as the Warsaw Pact.

Table 10 depicts the communist build-up (exclusive of strategic submarines).

Warsaw Pact naval forces are organized into four major commands: Northern Fleet, Baltic Fleet, Black Sea Fleet and Pacific Fleet.

The Northern and Pacific Fleets have the greatest strategic importance.

The other two fleets pose the most direct threat to Europe, particularly the Baltic Fleet whose movements can be coordinated with ground operations against Central Europe. This fleet would sorely test the West German and Danish navies who actually have only half as many submarines and only one-fourth as many surface ships.
The presence of a marine division in the Baltic must also be noted.

23. Conclusions

a. Since 1970, the USSR has more than doubled its number of guided-missile cruisers.

b. The naval air arm is now equipped with the Backfire strategic bomber which has twice the range of its predecessor.

c. Submarines continue to be quantitatively and qualitatively improved.

d. Most submarines are assigned to the Northern Fleet and, therefore, constitute a direct threat to the Atlantic Alliance's sea lines of communication.

Summary Table of Warsaw Pact-NATO Forces

24. Situation as of early 1976 (most important figures)

Table 11

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces and Equipment</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Strategic Nuclear:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ICBM</td>
<td>(USSR)</td>
<td>(USA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TRBM-MRBM</td>
<td>600</td>
<td>-0-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SLBM</td>
<td>750</td>
<td>650</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic submarines</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>45</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic heavy and medium aircraft</td>
<td>760</td>
<td>560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2. Ground Forces Troop Strength</td>
<td>ratio of 1.3 to 1</td>
<td>ratio of 1.8 to 1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In Central Europe</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3. Ground Forces Equipment</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>a. Divisions combat-ready in 48 hours</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Europe</td>
<td>115*</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Central Europe</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>23-1/3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>b. Divisions combat-ready in 2-3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Europe</td>
<td>155*</td>
<td>75</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Central Europe</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>c. Tanks combat-ready in 48 hours**</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Europe</td>
<td>36,000</td>
<td>7,500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Central Europe</td>
<td>22,000**</td>
<td>6,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>d. Tanks combat-ready in 2-3 weeks</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Europe</td>
<td>45,000**</td>
<td>9,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-In Central Europe</td>
<td>26,000**</td>
<td>6,700</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Excluding divisions in the far-north and south of "European Russia."

**Including adjacent regions of western USSR.
[Table 11 continued]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Forces and Equipment</th>
<th>Warsaw Pact</th>
<th>NATO</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>4. Tactical Aircraft</td>
<td>3,800</td>
<td>1,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Attack Submarines</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Conclusions

25. The East has quantitatively and qualitatively improved its armed forces, their equipment and their training, and is continuing to do so.

These past few years, the USSR has emphasized expansion of the offensive capability of its conventional forces and creation of a global naval force.

Warsaw Pact forces are clearly in excess of the Pact's defensive requirements.
CHAPTER 3. BELGIAN DEFENSE POLICY

[Intext] Introduction

1. Belgians in general are poorly conversant with Belgian defense policy. First of all, because it rarely is the subject of extensive debates open to the public. Secondly, because the Belgian people seem to widely believe that a small country can no longer pursue its own defense policy and has no choice but to necessarily bind itself to the policy of the larger countries.

2. Admittedly our country can no longer pretend to provide for its security by itself alone.

Nevertheless, the defense policy Belgium has chosen was not imposed upon it and is adequately designed to protect its vital interests.

A succinct analysis of its foundations, principles and implementation will show it is a sound and coherent policy.

Foundations of Belgian Defense Policy

Convergence of Belgian Interests With Interests of Neighboring Countries.

Our geographical location and our economic situation produce a convergence of interests with neighboring countries. Any blow to the economy or security of our neighbors strikes us too. Hence, the primary foundation of our defense policy is recognition of the obvious interdependence of countries and specifically of Belgium's interdependence with surrounding countries.

Necessity of Peace

4. Belgium's prosperity is closely tied to its export capacity which cannot suitably expand without the existence of international order based on peaceful relations between nations. Thus our fundamental objective is the maintenance of peace.

Yet the conditions under which peace is achieved have to be recognized. There are two such distinct and imperative conditions.
a. Maintenance of stability between nations at the regional level: this condition involves Belgium and its neighbors.

b. Maintenance of stability at the global level: this condition flows from the balance of forces between the great powers, a balance that can directly or indirectly affect our security.

The first of these imperative conditions poses no problem. Neither Belgium's relations with its neighbors nor relations between Belgium's neighbors themselves are such as to threaten regional stability. Furthermore, the current process of European integration cannot help but promote exchanges and an irreversible interdependence.

Threat

6. The second condition contrastingly gives rise to apprehension and demands very special attention. The global and European policy currently followed by the Soviet Union is for Belgium and its allies the soul source of concern from a defense standpoint.

Principles of Belgian Defense Policy

Deterrence Through Alliances

7. In the face of Soviet power, Belgium sought to protect its security, first by acceding to the Brussels Treaty (1948) and then to the North Atlantic Treaty (1949).

As a result, Belgium participates in the general strategy of deterrence adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). It will be recalled that this strategy requires the Alliance to maintain both conventional and nuclear forces and members of the Alliance to be actuated by an adequate spirit of solidarity.

The continued build-up of Warsaw Pact military strengths precludes giving any possible consideration to questioning the validity of the Brussels Treaty and North Atlantic Treaty. On the contrary, it strongly prompts us to remain faithful to those treaties.

Contribution Proportionate to Our Resources

8. We demonstrate our solidarity by the importance of our contribution which expresses not only our political resolve to cooperate in the strategy of deterrence but also our sincere desire to share in the common burden on an equitable basis as must be the rule among partners having equal rights.

From this point of view, our contribution must, therefore, be proportionate to our economic, financial and manpower resources. It must also be a stable contribution and not subject to fluctuations in the domestic political climate.
Search for International Detente

9. In conformity with its need for international stability, Belgium is participating fully in efforts to improve the global situation, efforts made within the framework of the defense and detente policy adopted by the Alliance.

Specific European Defense

10. Given our foreign policy objectives relative to European unification, Belgium recognizes the need for a specifically European defense policy. It is collaborating in the various efforts to satisfy this need but recognizes this is a complex problem.

Implementation

North Atlantic Treaty as General Framework of Belgian Military Policy

11. In acceding to the North Atlantic Treaty, our country firmly established the framework of its defense policy and particularly of its military policy.

In fact, Article 5 of this treaty states: "The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against all Parties."

NATO as Framework of its Military Organization

12. To give the military organization stemming from this Treaty maximum effectiveness, Belgium agreed to integrate its ground, air and naval forces in a vast allied force deployed from North Cape to the Caucasus and from the Iron Curtain to beyond the Atlantic Ocean (NATO).

In addition to securing unity of action in the employment of allied forces and hence their enhanced effectiveness, this integration is also a clear indication to any aggressor of the reality of the West's common determination to defend itself and of the quality of the Western deterrent.

Within this general framework, the Treaty specifies that security of the national territory and logistical support of our forces remain a national responsibility.

13. Thus the main deterrent and defense effort is an allied effort. Under these circumstances, there is currently no alternate solution to the security provided by the nuclear weapons of the United States and the presence of North American troops on our continent.

Belgium's efforts to establish a European defense are, therefore, in keeping with our membership in the Atlantic Alliance since forging a more efficient European military instrument contributes to balancing and strengthening that Alliance.
Participation in European Defense Efforts

Eurogroup

14. Eurogroup's Specific European Character

Eurogroup is a group formed within NATO. Its members are the defense ministers of the European countries of the Atlantic Alliance with the exception of Iceland and France. These two countries are free however, to join if they wish. Eurogroup is thus specifically European.

15. Purpose

Its purpose is twofold: first, strengthen the Alliance's security by seeking ways and means of improving contributions by European countries; secondly, enhance the feeling of trust between European and American members of the Alliance.

These objectives have become more urgent than ever now that inflation is impairing the economy and sapping the defense efforts of most Western nations.

16. Activities

That is why Eurogroup member countries have focused particular attention on finding common solutions that can satisfy their needs at the best price. Problems handled by the group are essentially technical. They cover a broad range of activities from coordination of orders for equipment to elaboration of common tactical concepts and doctrines.

17. Belgian Participation

Not only is Belgium collaborating in the work of the different subgroups that have been formed, but in 1976 its defense minister served as Eurogroup chairman.

Independent European Program Group

18. The fact that France, our continent's second ranking armament producer, was not a member of Eurogroup prompted Europeans to seek an independent forum that would permit better utilization of the capacity of European armament industries and establish conditions favorable to a more fruitful exchange between the two sides of the Atlantic. That is why the European countries of the Alliance, France included, met in Rome in February 1976 for the purpose of promoting greater cooperation in this subject area.

19. Objectives.

The group defined its objectives as follows:
a. More efficient use of funds allotted for production of military equipment;

b. Increased standardization and interoperability of military equipment so as to enhance cooperation in its employment;

c. Survival of a European industry possessing a technological base of sufficient magnitude to enable Europe to be a strong partner in its relations with the United States.

20. Belgian Position

Although Belgium has no powerful interests in the arms production field, our country does view formation of the Independent European Program Group as an important event capable of constituting one of the first stages recommended by Leo Tindemans in his report on the European Union submitted to the European Council. This report specifically recommends: "Cooperation in armament production as a means of reducing defense costs, increasing Europe's autonomy and the competitive status of its industry."

The report also states: "A current effort to furnish European countries of the Alliance with an organization for the standardization of armaments through common armament programs will have an important impact on industrial production."

Western European Union (WEU)

21. Member Countries

WEU membership includes Western Europe's principal industrialized countries: France, United Kingdom Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxembourg.

22. Military Assistance Commitments

In signing the Brussels Treaty in 1948, these countries committed themselves in extremely precise terms to act collectively should any one of them become the object of an armed attack. Article 4 of the Treaty states: "If any of the High Contracting Parties should be the object of an armed attack in Europe, the others will afford the Party so attacked all the military and other aid and assistance in their power." This treaty is, therefore, binding on the signatory countries and is for them a significant element of cohesiveness in building the Europe of tomorrow.

23. WEU as Forum for Political Consideration of European Defense Matters

The WEU also has institutions—the Council and Parliamentary Assembly—that make it a suitable forum for valuable political consideration of European defense matters.
CHAPTER 4. BELGIAN ARMED FORCES

[Text] National and International Obligations

1. In signing the North Atlantic Treaty, Belgium firmly established the framework of its defense policy and particularly of its military policy.

Consequently, Belgian forces are for the most part integrated into NATO's land, air and naval forces pursuant to commitments made to the Alliance.

However, internal security of Belgian territory and logistical support of all Belgian armed forces remain a national responsibility.

General Organization

2. The Ministry of National Defense (MDN) consists of the minister's private staff (cabinet), an administrative and technical secretariat, the Central Administration, and the General Civil Administration.

3. The Armed Forces essentially include the following: the General Staff, Army, Air Force, Navy, Medical Service, joint activities, and Belgian personnel assigned to allied headquarters and agencies.

Central Administration

4. The head of the Central Administration is directly responsible to the minister of national defense for administrative support of the armed forces. He is assisted by a central secretariat, general personnel department, general finance department, and field offices.

5. General Personnel Department

This department is assigned responsibility for such military personnel matters as administrative regulations, "pecuniary" regulations, disciplinary regulations, master personnel register, social and human relations studies and surveys, etc. The department's subordinate activities include the Central Personnel Register and Records Office, and the Ministry of National Defense Documentation Center and Central Library.
6. General Finance Department

This department is responsible for such matters as budget estimates, budgetary procedures, accounting for expenditure of appropriated funds, payment of vendor invoices and contracts, data processing, payment of personnel, internal audit, financial and budgetary studies and surveys. Its subordinate activities include the Data Processing Center, Central Civilian Personnel Pay Office, and Central Military Personnel Pay and Allowances Office.

General Civil Administration

7. The head of the General Civil Administration is directly responsible to the minister of national defense for legal matters and for matters relative to administrative control of National Defense Department civilian personnel. He is assisted by the Methods Office, Legal Affairs Administration and Administrative Affairs Administration.

8. The Legal Affairs Administration is responsible for general legal and statutory matters, legal and administrative matters in dispute, etc.

9. The Administrative Affairs Administration is responsible for matters relative to enforcement of civil service regulations and management of National Defense Department civilian personnel and non-civil service workers. It is also assigned responsibility for general administrative matters and specifically for matters relative to the use of official languages, translations, accidents and claims, military requisitions, chancery and general services. Its subordinate activities include the Central Records Depot and the Directorate of Non-Civil Service Personnel in the Federal Republic of Germany.

General Staff

10. The chief of the general staff is directly responsible to the minister of national defense for the readiness and performance of the armed forces in accordance with plans drawn up in coordination with the chiefs of staff of the three services and the chief of the Medical Service.

The chief of the general staff is assisted by an integrated joint staff composed of:

a. The first deputy chief of staff who is responsible for coordinated establishment of policies, plans, programs and doctrines applicable to all the armed forces.
b. The second deputy chief of staff who is responsible, within the purview of the approved program, for joint matters in the personnel, intelligence operations and logistics fields.

Alongside the integrated staff there are four special staffs, the army, air force, navy and medical service staffs whose chiefs are responsible to the chief of general staff for management of their respective services within the purview of the approved program.

Army

Missions

11. General

The army participates with most of its troops in implementing the NATO strategy designed to maintain peace through deterrence. It remains prepared, should this strategy fail, to combine its operations with those of its allies in an effort to repel the enemy as close as possible to the line of demarcation between Western and Eastern Europe.

Furthermore, in time of war, the army maintains the internal security of our national territory and in particular the security of Belgian and allied lines of communication crossing our country.

Lastly, the army furnishes necessary assistance to the country's civil authorities, particularly in the case of disaster.

12. Participation in the Alliance

"The defense of Belgium is one with the defense of Europe. We no longer defend ourselves on the Albert Canal or in the forts of Antwerp, but with our allies along the Iron Curtain."

It was in application of this principle that the Belgian I Corps was placed under the command of the Northern Army Group and assigned responsibility for an operational sector in the FRG.

The army also participates in the air defense of Western Europe with its HAWK surface-to-air missile battalions positioned in the air-defense belt along the Iron Curtain.

Lastly, the army has a reinforced para-commando battalion assigned to Allied Command Europe's Mobile Force (AMF). This force is available for dispatch to one of the threatened flanks of the European Theater for the purpose of deterring a potential aggressor by demonstrating the Alliance's solidarity.
13. Security of National Territory

Security of our national territory is a responsibility of the Internal Defense Forces ("Forces of the Interior") in time of war. These forces attend to the inviolability of our borders and provide ground defense while protecting lines of communications and Belgian and allied cantonement areas.

General Organization

14. The army commanded by its chief of staff is organized into two major commands, Belgian I Corps (I (BE) Corps) and the Internal Defense Forces (FI).

Belgian I Corps

15. Mission

I (BE) Corps, positioned in the FRG alongside its allies, is responsible for the defense of its sector against all attacks of any type or size. It, therefore, has to be able to fight in a conventional as well as a nuclear conflict and must permanently maintain well-trained and well-equipped forces capable of going into action without delay.

16. Organization

I (BE) Corps has two divisions, the 1st and 16th, each with a peacetime strength of two brigades and a wartime strength of three brigades.

To the four active-duty brigades—1st, 4th, 7th and 17th—and two reserve brigades—10th and 12th—must be added the corps troops that furnish the combat and logistical support essential to employment of the divisions.

The brigades each comprise two armored infantry battalions, one antitank battalion, one or two tank battalions, one artillery battalion, one engineer company and various logistical support units.

Under their peacetime establishment, corps troops include reconnaissance battalions, field artillery battalions some of which have a nuclear capability, antiaircraft artillery battalions including HAWK surface-to-air missile battalions, engineer and signal battalions, light aviation squadrons, and logistical support battalions and companies.

Under its wartime establishment, I (BE) Corps is substantially reinforced with combat and logistical support units. Its peacetime strength of ± 34,000 men climbs to 62,000 in wartime.

17. Stationing of Units

To be able to react rapidly to a threat of aggression, most I (BE) Corps units are stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany close to their operational zone. The housing in Germany of families of regular military personnel has created a Belgian community of nearly 60,000 persons requiring intensive sociocultural support facilities including schools, medical and social services, cultural services, etc.

For many years after World War II, almost all Belgian forces assigned to NATO were stationed in the FRG. In 1973, a first brigade began redeploying into Belgium. Its transfer was completed in 1976. The return of a second brigade is scheduled over the next few years. These unit transfers required renovation of the camp at Leopoldsburg and construction of a new camp near Marche-en-Famenne.

18. Training

Instruction and training of military personnel are conducted in schools, training centers, as well as in the units of I (BE) Corps and the Internal Defense Forces.

Combat training is the primary preoccupation of military leaders. Consequently, battalion exercises, periods of weapons firing in camps, maneuvers with troops and command post exercises follow each other at a fast rate. Training inspections and tests are conducted periodically by special national and allied teams.

I (BE) Corps can pride itself in having always placed highly in competitions held among partners of the Alliance.

19. Equipment

The combat efficiency of I (BE) Corps depends not only on its level of training but also on the quality of its weapons and equipment.

Despite budgetary limitations, the quality of I (BE) Corps armament is improving year by year. At the present time, reconnaissance units are almost entirely equipped with the new CVRT [Combat Vehicle, Reconnaissance, Tracked] light armored vehicle produced jointly by Belgium and Great Britain. Belgian armored units can rely on the effectiveness of the Leopold tank that has already made a name for itself.

A special effort is being made to improve the army's antitank capability. The first phase of this improvement program was initiated recently with the introduction of the JPK tank destroyer, the short-range LAW antitank missile and the long-range Swingfire antitank missile. This program is to continue with procurement of the medium-range Milan antitank missile.
Replacement of the M-75 and AMX-13 infantry personnel carriers with infantry armored combat vehicles is under study.

Cargo trucks and other wheeled transport vehicles are being replaced with new equipment.

In the next few years, the artillery's nuclear capability will be enhanced with the introduction of Lance surface-to-surface missiles as replacements for the Honest John rocket. The antiaircraft artillery is to be equipped with the extremely modern and highly effective twin 35-millimeter gun Gepard weapon system. Other modernization programs in progress include battlefield surveillance equipment, bridging equipment, communications equipment, etc. A new item of battlefield surveillance equipment, the Belgian-made Epervier battlefield reconnaissance drone was issued to the army during 1976.

Internal Defense Forces.

20. Mission

The Internal Defense Forces have a triple mission.

First, they are responsible for furnishing general assistance to the army in training, heavy [general and depot] logistical support and mobilization preparations.

Secondly, they are responsible for internal security of the national territory in wartime and particularly for protection of Belgian and allied lines of communication.

Thirdly, they provide partial logistical support to the air force, navy, medical service and gendarmerie.

21. Organization

In peacetime, the Internal Defense Forces comprise all units and troops participating in general support of the army.

It has a peacetime establishment of 27,000 men and a wartime establishment of nearly 82,000. It has a single command organized into three major divisions: operations and training division, logistical division, and mobilization division.

22. Operations and Training Division

It consists of combat troops, schools and training centers.

In peacetime, aside from the para-comands regiment, its combat troops are few in number. They are limited to light infantry, engineer and signal units. They are reinforced in wartime by light units of all types.
The para-commando regiment is the army's general reserve. It can be assigned various missions: security of the national territory in wartime, participation in the NATO Mobile Force (AMF), and reinforcement of Belgian I Corps under certain conditions.

Schools and training centers in Belgium proper are specifically responsible for the instruction and training of regular personnel—officers, noncommissioned officers and enlisted men—and the basic and specialized training of non-regular officers and noncommissioned officers, and draftees. These training facilities are utilized by I (BE) Corps as well as the Internal Defense Forces.

The schools also conduct refresher training for regular officers and NCO's to help them maintain a high level of professional knowledge and enable them to successfully pass examinations that are a prerequisite for certain promotions.

3. Logistical Division

This division is responsible for both heavy support of the entire army and direct support of units stationed on national territory. It also provides partial support of the other services and the gendarmerie.

Heavy support consists in repairing, overhauling, rebuilding, and to a certain extent, manufacturing equipment. It also involves issuance of supplies to logistical units.

Direct support consists of different activities on behalf of the most varied units: equipment repair, troubleshooting, spare parts management, resupply, transportation and services.

The logistical division has a peacetime strength of some 10,000 persons, 2,000 of them civilians. They are assigned to arsenals, depots and shops. Its personnel strength increases greatly under its wartime establishment.

24. Mobilization Division

Its responsibility is to prepare for placing the army on a war footing. It operates mobilization centers, detachments and depots. It performs regular maintenance on mobilization stocks of weapons and equipment. It is also responsible for processing reserve units periodically recalled to active duty. These recalls are essential to maintaining the combat efficiency of these units.

Air Force

Missions

25. The air force's role is based on the NATO strategic concept, namely deterrence of any aggression and should that deterrence fail, defense of the common territory. To implement this strategy, the air force is assigned the mission of participating in the air defense, the counteroffensive against enemy air forces both in the air and on the ground, and in ground support of NATO forces.
It also has elements assigned to SACEUR's [Supreme Allied Commander, Europe] Mobile Force (AMF).

The air force's national mission includes tactical and transport support of all three services, land and sea rescue operations, and coastal surveillance. It also participates in certain public works projects requiring use of specialized equipment.

Organization and Equipment

26. The air force consists of a staff and three major commands; Tactical Air Force, Instruction and Training Group, and Air Force Base Command.

27. The Tactical Air Force contains all combat units assigned to NATO in peace-time. It consists of: an all-weather fighter wing equipped with the F-104G; a fighter-bomber wing with the F-104G; a fighter-bomber wing with the Mirage 5B; a wing comprised of a fighter-bomber squadron and a reconnaissance squadron equipped with the Mirage 5B; two NIKE surface-to-air missile wings; a wing comprising a tactical transport squadron with C-130H aircraft and an air communications squadron equipped with Boeing 727, HS-748, Falcon 20 and Merlin 3A aircraft; a helicopter squadron equipped with the Sea King and S-58; two early warning and control radar stations, a weather wing; a communications wing; and various support units.

28. Instruction and Training Group

This group is responsible for the training of rated (air crew) and non-rated (ground crew) personnel. Its facilities include: a basic flight training school with Marchetti 260 M aircraft; an advanced flight training school with Fouga Magister and T-33 aircraft; a military training school for officers and NCO's; a military training center for drafted and volunteer personnel; and a technical school.

29. Air Force Base Command

This command is responsible for logistical support of the entire air force. It is organized into four logistical wings specializing in aviation and electronics equipment, ground hauling and handling equipment, ammunition and explosives. The command also has various support units.

All these units provide direct logistical support to operational units so as to maintain continuity of operations. In this capacity, they are also assigned to NATO. It should be noted that for more than 10 years, this logistical support has been controlled and monitored by a computer connected to all operational units.

Personnel

30. Implementation of the armed forces reorganization plan is keeping overall troop strength in a state of flux. In the air force, this strength will reach
17,500 regular personnel in 1978. Some 4,000 draftees will be added to this number each year for a 6 month tour of duty. Regular personnel will include some 1,630 officers, 8,900 NCO's and 7,000 enlisted men. There will be 580 officers on flying status (rated) and 1,050 on non-flying status (non-rated).

The personnel strength breakdown per major command is as follows: Tactical Air Force, 68.5 percent; Instruction and Training Group, 11.5 percent; Air Force Base Command, 13 percent; joint activities and Belgian and allied staffs, 7 percent.

Equipment Modernization Outlook

The air force periodically replaces or modernizes equipment as required by the aging of operational aircraft or changes in defense plans. In the next few years, F-16 aircraft will replace the F-104G's and Alpha Jet trainers will replace the T-33 and Fouga Magister.

An electronic countermeasures program is underway on the Mirage 5B aircraft, some versions of which will shortly be equipped with more modern reconnaissance systems.

To protect aircraft on the ground, shelters have been built on operational bases. These bases will also be defended by all-weather surface-to-air missiles in addition to the existing light antiaircraft guns.

Control equipment is to be modernized by the acquisition of a three-dimensional radar and airfield approach radars in 1977. Ground and air-ground communications facilities will also be improved.

Navy

Missions

32. Within NATO

The navy's primary mission is to participate, within NATO, in the protection of our sea lines of communication in the English Channel and the southern part of the North Sea. The shallow approaches to our ports and the southern part of the North Sea are very vulnerable to mine attack.

The Channel approaches and certain parts of the North Sea admirably lend themselves to submarine attacks. Our navy's protection of these sea lines of communication involves three main tasks: antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, coastal and off-shore defense. NATO and national aspects of these missions merge in that access lanes to our ports are also those of Belgium's allies.

Protection of merchant shipping against submarine attack will be the role assigned to the four frigates under construction.
These frigates are to be assigned such NATO tasks as detection and destruction of enemy submarines, convoy escort duty in the Channel, North Sea, and eastern part of the Atlantic.

The navy's minesweepers and minehunters are assigned the task of protecting merchant shipping against mines.

Coastal and off-shore defense specifically covers Belgium's own maritime approaches, coastal waters and coastline, including military port installations.

33. National Missions

In peacetime, the navy must also handle many other missions in the interest of the civilian population and other governmental departments. These missions include, among others:

a. Fishery protection service which also comprises medical and technical support of Belgian fishermen in those distant waters where this service is provided;

b. Control of sea pollution from hydrocarbons and participation in studies of problems caused by this form of pollution;

c. Sea-rescue service with assistance to shipwrecked persons, merchant ships, fishing boats and pleasure boats

d. Aid given in specialized medical facilities at Ostend to civilians injured in skindiving accidents;

e. Participation in the training of merchant marine officers;

f. Assistance given the gendarmerie in curbing smuggling in our territorial waters;

g. Assistance to maritime police authorities;

h. Mine disposal service charged with neutralizing or destroying submarine mines washed ashore or retrieved by fishermen, and munitions uncovered in the coastal region.

Organization

34. The navy consists of a staff and three groups or commands:

a. The naval staff assists the naval chief of staff in carrying out his responsibilities for the readiness and performance of the navy in consonance with its assigned missions, structures and means;
b. The Operation Group (COMOPSNAV) is responsible for the conduct and control of operations and the training of seagoing units. Its facilities include the naval bases of Ostend, Nieuwpoort, Zeebrugge and Antwerp.

c. The Instruction and Training Group (COMIENAV) stationed at Sint-Kruis bij Brugge is responsible for the specifically naval aspect of the training of navy personnel. The Belgian-Dutch Mine Warfare School in Ostend trains mine warfare specialists.

d. The Logistical Group (COMLOGNAV) is responsible for the maintenance, repair, and supply—i.e. logistical support—of the navy's seagoing and shore-based units.

Equipment

35. The mine warfare fleet consists of: two command and logistical support ships the Zinnia and the Godetia; 7 ocean minesweepers-minehunters; 7 coastal minesweepers; 7 coastal minehunters; and 14 inshore minesweepers.

36. The antisubmarine warfare fleet will consist of four frigates. These will enable the navy to participate in the protection of merchant shipping against the submarine threat.

37. The remainder of the fleet includes: two scientific research ships, the Zenobe Gramme and the Mechelen; six river patrol boats; some 10 auxiliary ships and service craft; and four liaison helicopters.

Personnel

38. In peacetime, 70 percent of the navy's personnel are regulars. Most of the draftees serving in the navy are seaman first class.

There are three categories of naval personnel: "deck" personnel, "technical" personnel, and "service" personnel.

To man its operating forces and shore establishment, the navy has 4,615 men: 3,193 regulars, 1,269 draftees, and 153 civilians. One third of this personnel, with the exception of civilians and regular female personnel (DAMARS), serve on ships. The remainder are assigned to duties in different shore installations or are in training.

Instruction and Training

39. Instruction of Personnel

Being a very technical service, the navy requires highly qualified personnel both for the conduct of operations and the maintenance of ships. Effort is focused primarily on instructing personnel in mine warfare operations and escorting convoys of merchant ships.
Instruction in minesweeping and minehunting is given in schools operated by the navy's Instruction and Training Group and in the Mine Warfare School.

At the present time, officers and crews earmarked for assignment to the frigates are receiving instruction and training almost entirely in foreign navies or in civilian firms. In the future, when the frigates are in regular service, most of this training will be conducted in Belgium.

The commander of the Operations Group is responsible for the training of regular and reserve personnel on board ships in active service.

40. Operational Training

The annual training program of the navy's ships comprises three phases. Phase 1 is devoted to basic individual ship training, phase 2 to national group training and phase 3 to international group training.

a. Basic Individual Ship Training

Each ship's individual training lasts 1 month. It is refresher training in all crew tasks and activities and is designed to form a coherent group thoroughly familiar with all of the ship's capabilities and qualified to make maximum use of those capabilities.

b. National Group Training

Upon completing their individual training, ships are assigned to a group. The group commander is responsible for the practical application of those tactics necessary to enable each ship to contribute to the effectiveness and autonomy of his group. This integration is put into practice during training cruises. After that the groups participate in a national exercise organized and directed by the commander of the navy's Operations Group (COMOPSNAV). The ships then have attained the necessary level of training permitting them to work with allied nations. The latter is done during the third phase.

c. International Group Training

Tactics common to all allied navies and to NATO constitute the dominant element of operations. This training is conducted by participating in bilateral exercises, about two per year, and by participating in two large-scale NATO naval exercises. In addition, each year one Belgian ship is attached to the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) which also includes British, Dutch, German and Danish ships.

Outlook

41. The navy is to simultaneously have antisubmarine warfare, mine warfare, and coastal and offshore defense capabilities plus an infrastructure appropriate to its operational tasks.
42. Frigates

The navy has initiated construction of four frigates for the primary task of protecting merchant shipping against submarines. These 2,340-ton ships, built in Belgian shipyards, are scheduled for delivery to the Navy at 6-month intervals beginning in late 1976. They are to become operational as of 1979.

43. Mine Warfare

The navy participates, within NATO, in protecting sea lines of communication against mines.

In 1980, all of the navy's mine warfare ships will be more than 20 years old. Some of them over 25 years old will even have to be decommissioned.

To make it possible for Belgium to continue to carry out its NATO missions, it is essential for the navy to have by that date the first of a new series of mine warfare ships. France, the Netherlands and Belgium have signed a cooperation agreement for this purpose and are currently making the necessary studies for construction of a new type of minehunter ship.

A program to convert minesweepers into minehunters is underway. It is designed to equip present ocean minesweepers with modern mine detection and disposal gear.

44. Infrastructure

The navy is implementing a reorganization plan aimed at concentrating naval bases at Ostend, Antwerp and Zeebrugge and retaining the training center at Brugge.

Construction of the new base at Zeebrugge began in 1968 with a view to absorbing the Nieuwpoort base and the old Zeebrugge base located above the locks. With its wet dock and logistical support facilities, the new base will serve as home port for the navy's larger ships for which the port of Ostend is too congested.

Medical Service

Missions

45. Basic Missions

a. Inform and advise commanders at all echelons on medical matters.

b. Practice preventive medicine: medical screening of recruits, medical supervision of training and physical education activities, sanitary and prophylactic measures.
c. Take remedial action as soon as health is affected.

d. Provide medical supplies and instruct personnel of all services in medical and sanitation matters.

46. NATO Missions

The Medical Service furnishes the following support to all NATO-assigned units of the Belgian armed forces:

a. First echelon support, i.e. seeking and collecting casualties, giving them essential emergency treatment and preparing them for evacuation to a higher echelon;

b. Second echelon, i.e. evacuation from first echelon aid stations, triage of patients to determine each patient's priority in the evacuation system, and treatment needed to condition him for further movement;

c. Third echelon, i.e. evacuation from second echelon triage stations and treatment in a forward hospital facility having necessary medical equipment and personnel capable of performing primary operations, taking resuscitation measures, and providing necessary postoperative care.

47. National Mission

The Medical Service provides:

a. To units of the armed forces under national command, including the gendarmerie: the same support as to NATO-assigned units;

b. To all units of the armed forces, including the gendarmerie: supplementary medical support known as fourth and fifth echelon support and consisting of evacuation from third echelon hospital units to fixed medical treatment facilities equipped and staffed to provide definitive care and treatment.

It should be noted, however, that casualties from units stationed in Belgium proper are evacuated from first echelon aid stations directly to fourth and fifth echelon hospital facilities.

Organizations

48. Medical detachments and medical companies, responsible for first and second echelon support respectively, are organic units of the forces they support.

Units and facilities responsible for third, fourth and fifth echelon support are organic to the Medical Service which employs them in support of all the armed forces.
To ensure smooth coordination between operations of supported major commands and the Medical Service, the latter is organized:

a. In peacetime: into two major Medical Service commands, the Medical Command of the Belgian Forces in Germany and the National Territorial Medical Command;

b. In wartime: into three major Medical Service commands, the Forward Combat Area Medical Command, the Rear Combat Area Medical Command and the National Territorial Medical Command.

Facilities

49. In Peacetime

The Medical Command of the Belgian Forces in Germany operates two military hospitals, two ambulance companies, and a medical depot company responsible for furnishing medical supplies to all Belgian units in the FRG.

The National Territorial Medical Command operates four military hospitals, a neuropsychiatric center, a medical statistics and records center, and a central military pharmacy. The hospitals, pharmacy and neuropsychiatric center are responsible for the administration and mobilization of reserve Medical Service units.

50. In Wartime

The Forward Combat Area Medical Command consists of medical group headquarters (or staffs), mobile and semimobile hospitals, ambulance companies, a preventive medicine company, a professional services company, and three medical supply Platoons.

The Rear Combat Area Medical Command comprises semimobile evacuation hospitals, field hospitals, ambulance companies, a blood bank, and a medical supply platoon.

The National Territorial Medical Command consists of hospital group headquarters (or staffs), military hospitals with a +45,000-bed capacity, two convalescent centers, a central laboratory, two military blood transfusion services, a central military pharmacy, ambulance companies, and hospital trains. The Medical Service's peacetime personnel strength of 6,000 (civilian personnel included) increases to +24,500 in wartime.

Instruction and Training

51. For the training of its personnel, the Medical Service has the Royal Medical Service School.
Each year the Medical Service holds competitive examinations through which it recruits a certain number of officer candidates to become doctors, pharmacists, veterinarians, and dentists. Selected candidates sign a contract committing them to serve in the armed forces. They are allowed to attend the university of their choice. Throughout their university career, they are assigned to the Medical Service Officers School to which they report regularly as a group for military training. Upon graduation from the university, they are given a period of additional military and medicomilitary instruction at the Medical Service Basic Medical Officers School, another branch of the Royal Medical Service School.

In addition, each year the Medical Service authorizes a certain number of medical officers to take advanced training to become specialists.

This same school provides medicomilitary instruction and training for reserve officer candidates, regular and reserve NCO candidates, volunteer candidates and draftees.

The initial instruction received at the Royal Medical Service School is supplemented by training in medical units and facilities where, in addition to their routine daily activities, personnel receive training in their wartime duties during exercises and maneuvers.

Outlook

52. Neder-over-Heembeek Military Medical Center

As part of the "domanial" renewal plan, a center is being built at Neder-Over-Heembeek to house the following:

a. A 550-bed general hospital center that will replace the present Brussels military hospital;

b. A 200-bed neuropsychiatric center consolidating activities of the Brussels military hospital's present department of neurology plus the neuropsychiatric center currently located in Antwerp;

c. A 250-bed observation and transient center for military personnel or military candidates who have to be given a series of medical or diagnostic tests and examinations but do not actually require hospitalization.

d. A recruiting and selection center replacing the present center;

e. The Royal Medical Service School presently situated in Ghent;

f. An administrative, logistical and sports complex conveniently servicing the whole medical center.

This new military medical center is scheduled to become operational in early 1979 with the exception of the Royal Medical Service School.
58. Miscellaneous

In 1976 a distinctive bottle-green uniform was adopted for Medical Service personnel.

There are also plans for:

a. Initiating a transport-vehicle replacement program in 1977 for active Medical Service units;

b. Procuring model-900 ambulances in 1977-1980 as replacements for vehicles currently employed in certain Medical Service units in the FRG;

c. Install in 1977, two-way radios in ambulances assigned to military hospitals.

Joint Activities

54. In addition to the units, facilities and agencies organic to the army, navy, air force and Medical Service, the armed forces also have joint schools, services and agencies that support all the armed forces. Included among these joint activities are:

a. Royal School of Cadets, Royal Military School, War College Military Administrators School, etc.

b. Military Justice Department, Chaplain's Service, General Purchasing Service, General Construction Service, General Cadre Assignment Service, General Intelligence Service, etc.

c. Recruiting and Selection Center and the Military Social Psychology Center;

d. Royal Armed Forces Museum, etc.

Allied Activities

55. The Belgian armed forces have representatives assigned to various NATO headquarters, staffs, and agencies or contribute to the manning of these activities.

Civilian Personnel

Although military personnel do outnumber civilian personnel in the Ministry of National Defense, the latter's civilian personnel strength numerically ranks immediately after such large ministries as Finance and Economic Affairs. In other words, civilian personnel in the Ministry of National Defense already constitute by themselves a very large ministry.

Defense civilian personnel are of three major categories: civil service personnel, 4,075; contract personnel, 548; and civilian workers in the FRG, 2757. Grand total 7,380 persons.
CHAPTER 5. DEFENSE EXPENDITURES

[Text] Introduction

1. It appears advisable to define at the very outset two terms that will be used in this chapter.

The term "national defense budget" covers "specifically military expenditures." On the other hand, the term "defense expenditures" encompasses all defense-related expenditures and the word "defense" is employed here in its broadest accepted sense.

The main advantage of using the term "defense expenditures" as defined by NATO is that this term makes it possible to compare the defense efforts of the different countries of the Alliance.

This term covers not only those "military expenditures" included in the national defense and gendarmerie budget but also certain other expenditures such as draftee allowances (Ministry of Interior), military pensions, etc.

"Civil defense" expenditures do not fall within the NATO definition of "defense expenditures." (NATO definition).

Table 12—Different Contributions to Defense—Expenditures as Defined by NATO* (in millions of Belgian francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MDN</td>
<td>21,800</td>
<td>23,085</td>
<td>24,719</td>
<td>25,468</td>
<td>28,648</td>
<td>30,502</td>
<td>33,573</td>
<td>36,535</td>
<td>41,886</td>
<td>52,059</td>
<td>59,215</td>
<td>66,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gendarmerie</td>
<td>2,784</td>
<td>2,856</td>
<td>3,120</td>
<td>3,399</td>
<td>3,783</td>
<td>4,281</td>
<td>4,900</td>
<td>5,945</td>
<td>6,858</td>
<td>8,250</td>
<td>9,347</td>
<td>10,795</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Ministries</td>
<td>3,585</td>
<td>4,395</td>
<td>4,480</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>4,957</td>
<td>4,887</td>
<td>5,667</td>
<td>6,461</td>
<td>8,651</td>
<td>9,627</td>
<td>10,883</td>
<td>13,433</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*See accompanying text ** Tentative figures
3. Relative Value

Defense expenditures expressed in absolute value terms do not give an immediate picture of the relative value of a given country's defense effort.

As a matter of fact, although this effort depends primarily on the country's willingness to devote specific resources to the security or defense of values it deems essential, it is also a function of the country's economic capabilities and the more or less large share of resources it decides to allocate to this security and defense.

It is generally agreed that the gross national product (GNP) is the objective reflection of these capabilities.

That is why Table 13 shows Belgian defense expenditures expressed as a percentage of GNP.

This table clearly indicates our country's defense expenditures tend to represent a steadily declining share of GNP.

4. Comparison Between Defense and GNP

In NATO, the share of GNP allocated to defense expenditures is used to compare the defense effort of the various countries of the Alliance. Table 14 shows that our country whose defense expenditures fluctuate between 3 and 3.5 percent of GNP, holds 10th or 11th place among NATO countries.

However, attention must be drawn to the regularity of our defense effort.

In fact, since 1967 the national defense budget has increased 4 percent annually, computed at constant prices.

Some years, additional funds are allocated for certain specific programs, such as:

a. EDIP (European Defense Improvement Program) approved by the different European NATO countries to offset costs of stationing American troops in Europe;

b. Program for transferring back into Belgium two Belgian brigades stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany;

c. Implementation of the "professionalization" plan (gradual reduction of compulsory term of service to 6 months and drafting only one brother per family).

Another detailed comparison of defense expenditures is given in Table 15 (Per Capita GNP) and Table 16 (Per Capita Defense Expenditures).
TABLE 13—Comparison of Defense Expenditures With GNP (NATO Definition)  
(in billions of Belgian francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Defense expenditures</th>
<th>GNP</th>
<th>(a)</th>
<th>(b)</th>
<th>(c)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>20,589</td>
<td>374,0</td>
<td>5,51</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>20,707</td>
<td>391,7</td>
<td>5,29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>17,857</td>
<td>414,5</td>
<td>4,31</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>17,887</td>
<td>443,0</td>
<td>4,04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>19,232</td>
<td>469,0</td>
<td>4,10</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>19,254</td>
<td>472,4</td>
<td>4,08</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>19,658</td>
<td>483,4</td>
<td>4,07</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>20,209</td>
<td>513,7</td>
<td>3,93</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>20,641</td>
<td>539,9</td>
<td>3,82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>22,341</td>
<td>576,5</td>
<td>3,88</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>23,596</td>
<td>618,2</td>
<td>3,82</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>26,241</td>
<td>691,9</td>
<td>3,79</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>26,606</td>
<td>756,7</td>
<td>3,52</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>28,169</td>
<td>804,8</td>
<td>3,50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>30,336</td>
<td>859,4</td>
<td>3,53</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>32,319</td>
<td>923,0</td>
<td>3,50</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>33,754</td>
<td>1,025,3</td>
<td>3,29</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>37,388</td>
<td>1,143,6</td>
<td>3,27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>39,670</td>
<td>1,255,8</td>
<td>3,16</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>44,140</td>
<td>1,413,0</td>
<td>3,12</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>48,941</td>
<td>1,611,2</td>
<td>3,04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>57,395</td>
<td>1,889,3</td>
<td>3,04</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>69,936</td>
<td>2,138,7</td>
<td>3,27</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>79,445 *</td>
<td>2,353,0**</td>
<td>3,38</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>90,695 **</td>
<td>2,688,0**</td>
<td>3,37</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Tentative figure
**Estimate
### TABLE 14—Comparison of Belgian Defense Effort With Effort of Other NATO Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>(1) 3,5 (10) 3,5 (10) 3,5 (10) 3,3 (10) 3,3 (10) 3,3 (10) 3,2 (11) 3,1 (11) 3,0 (11) 3,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>(12) 3,3 (12) 3,4 (13) 3,1 (13) 2,8 (12) 2,8 (13) 2,6 (13) 2,5 (13) 2,3 (13) 2,3 (2,3) 2,3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>(13) 3,2 (13) 3,1 (11) 3,3 (11) 3,0 (12) 2,8 (12) 2,0 (12) 2,8 (12) 2,5 (12) 2,8 (12) 3,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>(4) 6,1 (4) 6,1 (4) 5,7 (5) 5,1 (5) 4,9 (6) 4,7 (6) 4,5 (5) 4,4 (5) 4,3 (4,6) 4,6</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>(6) 4,7 (6) 5,0 (7) 4,1 (7) 4,1 (9) 3,7 (8) 3,8 (7) 3,9 (7) 3,9 (7) 4,0 (4,1) 4,1</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>(7) 4,1 (7) 4,9 (5) 5,3 (4) 5,5 (4) 5,4 (4) 5,3 (4) 5,1 (4) 4,6 (4) 4,5 (7,1) 4,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>(10) 3,8 (10) 3,5 (11) 3,3 (11) 3,0 (11) 3,0 (10) 3,2 (10) 3,4 (10) 3,2 (10) 3,2 (3,0) 3,0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>(14) 1,5 (14) 1,2 (14) 1,0 (14) 0,9 (14) 0,8 (14) 0,9 (14) 0,9 (14) 0,9 (14) 0,9 (1,1) 0,9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>(7) 4,1 (8) 4,3 (8) 4,0 (9) 4,0 (8) 3,8 (8) 3,8 (8) 3,8 (8) 3,7 (8) 3,7 (3,9) 3,7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>(7) 4,1 (9) 3,9 (8) 4,0 (7) 4,1 (7) 4,0 (7) 3,9 (8) 3,8 (8) 3,7 (9) 3,5 (3,7) 3,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>(2) 6,9 (2) 8,0 (2) 8,1 (2) 7,4 (2) 7,9 (1) 8,2 (1) 7,7 (1) 6,6 (1) 8,1 (*1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>(5) 4,8 (5) 5,1 (6) 5,1 (6) 4,8 (6) 4,7 (5) 4,9 (5) 4,7 (5) 4,4 (6) 4,1 (*1)</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>(3) 6,5 (3) 6,5 (3) 6,2 (3) 5,8 (3) 5,6 (3) 5,7 (3) 5,9 (3) 5,5 (3) 5,6 (5,5) 5,5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>(1) 9,2 (1) 10,3 (1) 10,2 (1) 9,6 (1) 8,7 (2) 7,7 (2) 7,3 (1) 6,6 (2) 6,7 (6,7) 6,7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Not available

### TABLE 15—Per Capita GNP (at factor cost) (in thousands of Belgian francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>84,6</td>
<td>89,9</td>
<td>96,2</td>
<td>106,7</td>
<td>118,7</td>
<td>129,4</td>
<td>145,3</td>
<td>165,4</td>
<td>193,0</td>
<td>212,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>106,1</td>
<td>111,5</td>
<td>122,6</td>
<td>129,8</td>
<td>137,8</td>
<td>148,5</td>
<td>162,9</td>
<td>187,5</td>
<td>215,9</td>
<td>233,6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>87,7</td>
<td>94,9</td>
<td>102,9</td>
<td>116,5</td>
<td>127,4</td>
<td>138,2</td>
<td>155,0</td>
<td>177,5</td>
<td>200,9</td>
<td>220,9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>71,8</td>
<td>77,0</td>
<td>84,9</td>
<td>96,1</td>
<td>107,3</td>
<td>118,0</td>
<td>131,4</td>
<td>147,8</td>
<td>172,1</td>
<td>187,2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>108,9</td>
<td>109,1</td>
<td>120,0</td>
<td>131,5</td>
<td>149,9</td>
<td>164,7</td>
<td>178,9</td>
<td>198,5</td>
<td>213,7</td>
<td>224,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>26,1</td>
<td>28,7</td>
<td>30,8</td>
<td>34,6</td>
<td>38,9</td>
<td>43,2</td>
<td>49,1</td>
<td>63,4</td>
<td>77,6</td>
<td>89,0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>40,6</td>
<td>44,1</td>
<td>47,6</td>
<td>52,3</td>
<td>53,2</td>
<td>63,3</td>
<td>69,6</td>
<td>82,1</td>
<td>97,4</td>
<td>111,7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>98,7</td>
<td>99,6</td>
<td>108,6</td>
<td>124,3</td>
<td>145,4</td>
<td>144,2</td>
<td>158,5</td>
<td>184,1</td>
<td>213,3</td>
<td>202,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>78,2</td>
<td>84,9</td>
<td>92,2</td>
<td>104,2</td>
<td>114,9</td>
<td>127,3</td>
<td>142,8</td>
<td>160,9</td>
<td>130,3</td>
<td>195,1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>90,1</td>
<td>99,0</td>
<td>104,9</td>
<td>112,4</td>
<td>125,2</td>
<td>138,4</td>
<td>151,4</td>
<td>171,0</td>
<td>198,7</td>
<td>226,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>18,3</td>
<td>20,5</td>
<td>22,8</td>
<td>25,0</td>
<td>27,9</td>
<td>31,6</td>
<td>37,1</td>
<td>45,5</td>
<td>54,2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>7,3</td>
<td>7,8</td>
<td>8,4</td>
<td>9,1</td>
<td>10,5</td>
<td>13,4</td>
<td>16,1</td>
<td>20,4</td>
<td>27,9</td>
<td>33,4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>55,7</td>
<td>58,5</td>
<td>62,4</td>
<td>65,4</td>
<td>71,8</td>
<td>80,6</td>
<td>90,1</td>
<td>104,2</td>
<td>120,0</td>
<td>150,5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>136,9</td>
<td>143,1</td>
<td>153,6</td>
<td>163,2</td>
<td>170,6</td>
<td>181,9</td>
<td>198,4</td>
<td>220,5</td>
<td>236,2</td>
<td>249,6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**
1. GNP's expressed in U.S. dollars were converted into Belgian francs at the 1974 exchange rate of U.S. $1.00 = 38.9508 Belgian francs.
2. Figures for 1975 are estimates.

52
### TABLE 16—Per Capita Defense Expenditures (in thousands of Belgian francs)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>5.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Denmark</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.3</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRG</td>
<td>5.2</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.6</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>9.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greece</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>2.5</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.5</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Italy</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Luxembourg</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>2.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Netherlands</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>7.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Norway</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Portugal</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Turkey</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>—</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Great Britain</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>United States</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>14.8</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTES:**
1. GNP's expressed in U. S. dollars were converted into Belgian francs at the 1974 exchange rate of U.S.$1.00 = 38.9508 Belgian francs.
2. Figures for 1975 are estimates.

5. Soviet Union's Defense Effort

Each year, the Supreme Soviet (Soviet Union's parliament) discusses and approves the proposed budget submitted by the minister of finance.

One sentence in this budget has to do with national defense expenditures.

Article 5 of the state budget law for 1976 states: "Funds allocated for the country's defense in the USSR's 1976 budget are fixed at 17.43 billion rubles: (law of 4 December 1975).

At the ruble's official rate of exchange established by the State Bank—1 ruble = 1.31 U. S. dollars—this sum indicates a 1976 defense budget of 23 billion dollars.

This figure is unreliable. It is high enough to convince Soviet public opinion that the government is not relaxing its vigilance, and low enough to have the West believe Soviet international policy is fundamentally peaceful.
What expenditures are considered in determining the Soviet Union's defense effort? The answer to that question can only be fragmentary.

A substantial number of expenditures are not included in the official defense ministry budget. A good number of large expenditures are included in the budgets of other ministries and even a searching analysis of these budgets will not reveal all these sums.

Such is the case, among others, with military pensions, scientific research, and premilitary training.

The "military service law" requires secondary and higher educational institutions to take necessary action to give their students premilitary instruction (for example, construction of rifle ranges). Young persons who leave school also receive veritable basic training, but in this case it is their factory, their "sovkhоз" or their "kolkhoz" that must provide the necessary equipment and facilities.

Furthermore, the Soviet armed forces operate farms and industrial plants in which many of the numerous expenditures relative to the movement of men and equipment are chargeable to transportation ministries: Ministry of Civil Aviation, Ministry of Maritime Fleet and Ministry of Railways.

Lastly, the economy also furnishes a large contribution.

The "military service law" approved by the Supreme Soviet 12 October 1967 prescribes that each discharged draftee can—depending on the reserve category to which he belongs—be recalled for periods of 10 days to 6 months of training. The law specifies that for the duration of his recall to active duty for training, 75 percent of his average pay remains chargeable to his employer and that he cannot be dismissed from his job during this period.

It follows that the officially published version of the defense budget remains definitely below actual defense spending.

Based on known data, it can be concluded that in 1975 the Soviet Union spent between 50 and 60 billion rubles on defense.

From 1970 to 1975, the average annual growth in defense spending at constant prices proved to be some 4 to 5 percent, and the share of GNP spent on national defense was between 11 and 13 percent.

Belgian National Defense Budget

Trends

6. Absolute figures and comparison with total government expenditures.
Table 17 shows the trend in the national defense ministry's (MDN) budget since 1939 in absolute figures and also compare that budget with the total government budget.

It is normal for the MDN budget to have "peaks" in periods of emergency, for instance, during mobilization in 1939-1940 and after the outbreak of the Korean War in 1952 and 1953.

It is obvious that the national defense share of the total government budget has continuously declined since 1954.

TABLE 17—MDN Budget Compared With Total Government Budget

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>MDN (a)</th>
<th>Government (b)</th>
<th>(a) --- % (b)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1939</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>20.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>25.5</td>
<td>31.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>90.4</td>
<td>7.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>7.9</td>
<td>80.8</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>14.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>20.1</td>
<td>100.8</td>
<td>19.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>94.5</td>
<td>19.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>16.6</td>
<td>96.5</td>
<td>17.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>14.5</td>
<td>95.3</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>96.6</td>
<td>14.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957**</td>
<td>16.3**</td>
<td>107.5*K** 15.2**</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>118.5</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>17.8</td>
<td>135.3</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>17.6</td>
<td>145.4</td>
<td>12.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>16.1</td>
<td>141.7</td>
<td>11.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>151.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>20.9</td>
<td>170.2</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1964</td>
<td>21.2</td>
<td>178.8</td>
<td>11.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965</td>
<td>22.2</td>
<td>210.1</td>
<td>10.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22.85</td>
<td>227.0</td>
<td>10.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>23.31</td>
<td>255.4</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>25.54</td>
<td>283.1</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>304.7</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28.24</td>
<td>344.5</td>
<td>8.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31.09</td>
<td>374.2</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>35.53</td>
<td>436.8</td>
<td>8.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>36.77</td>
<td>491.4</td>
<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>42.51</td>
<td>586.3</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>51.22</td>
<td>698.9</td>
<td>7.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>59.29</td>
<td>833.8</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977***</td>
<td>66.47</td>
<td>938.7</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Adjusted budget = initial budget plus adjustment "installment."

** Without the 4.3 billion payment by the FRG and inserted in the MDN budget for technical reasons.

***Initial budget.
7. Comparison With Other Ministries

Table 18 is highly illustrative of this situation.

The percentage increase in the MDN budget is less, especially since 1971, than the percentage increase in the budgets of departments having a comparable budget.

It follows that it is with a relatively lesser amount of funds that the MDN must maintain a military establishment whose responsibilities from the standpoint of both military requirements and the cost of the latter have not decreased in the slightest.

TABLE 18—MDN Budget Compared With Budgets of Other Ministries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Billions of Belgian Francs</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[Key]
1. National Education
2. Social Affairs
Analysis of Requirements and Military Expenditures

8. Requirements

The Belgian forces have specific NATO missions to perform.

These missions are what primarily determine the forces that must be established. Or in other words, these missions define what the military requirements actually are.

These requirements can be categorized as follows:

a. Manpower or what is more generally referred to as "personnel."

b. Fuel, ammunition, spare parts, etc. and performance of services, in other words, what is necessary for the training of personnel and the operations of units.

c. Combat materiel, ships and installations that have to be replaced or modified regularly to keep pace with the very rapid technological change in weapons system.

9. Overall Expenditures

Meeting these requirements demands that necessary resources be obtained.

This means approval of defense expenditures which may be divided as follows: personnel expenditures, operating expenditures, reequipment and infrastructure expenditures.

The amount of these expenditures naturally has a direct relation to requirements and to those resources (forces and equipment) that it is determined have to be employed to successfully perform assigned missions.

Table 19 outlines subdivision of the national defense budget into personnel, operating, reequipment, and infrastructure expenditures.

These subdivisions are explained in detail in the pages that follow.

10. Personnel Expenditures

Personnel expenditures are those expenditures listed in the MDN budget under the heading of "Pay and Social Insurance Contributions" (Article 11). They cover pay and allowances, including clothing and ration allowances.

The increase in personnel expenditures is primarily due to pay increases which themselves are the result of the rising cost of living (tied to the consumer price index). It is also due to participation in the nation's growing prosperity, notably by adoption of the "social program" applicable to government employees (including military personnel).
To the above must be added a steady increase since 1974 stemming from systematic implementation of the "professionalization" plan (recruiting of short-term volunteers).

11. Operating Expenditures

These expenditures include purchase of nondurable goods and services as well as "fund transfers."

These expenditures are mainly general outlays for expendables, equipment and building maintenance, fuel and transportation costs, and the costs of stationing forces in Germany.

By "fund transfers," we essentially mean payments owed the SNCB [Belgian National Railroads] for military transport, compensation paid to third parties, our country's contributions to NATO, funds for the operation of certain allied headquarters, staffs and agencies, plus subsidies to certain semipublic agencies such as OCASC [Central Social and Cultural Action Office], IGN [National Geographic Institute], and ORAF [Office of Information and Aid to Military Families].

The nature of the operating costs mentioned above clearly shows that these kinds of expenditures are directly influenced by the increased cost of living or by inflation. The consumer price index is not fully representative for our area of interest.

In fact, the factors of numerous operating expenditures specific to the MDN are higher than the factor of the consumer price index.

It follows that part of the automatic annual increase of 4 percent (at constant prices) in the MDN budget is absorbed by the rise in operating costs.

12. Reequipment and Infrastructure Expenditures

It would be logical for these expenditures to be proportionate to the value of the present infrastructure and of equipment currently in use so that these could be replaced on a regular basis.

There is theoretical acceptance of the principle that annual reequipment and infrastructure expenditures are equal to the up-to-date value of the infrastructure and equipment inventory divided by the service life of that inventory.

It is solely by this method that continuous replacement of equipment can be achieved.

Sporadic replacement of combat equipment creates insurmountable difficulties and leads to unacceptable situations.
### TABLE 19— Breakdown of Personnel, Operating, Reequipment, and Infrastructure Expenditures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Total expenditures (in billions of Belgian francs)</th>
<th>Number of regular personnel (in thousands)</th>
<th>Expenditures detailed (in billions of Belgian francs)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Columns in billions of (a)+ (c)+ (e)+ (i) Belgian francs</td>
<td>Annual increase (in percentage)</td>
<td>Personnel Expenditures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-------</td>
<td>--------------------------------------------------</td>
<td>------------------------------------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>22.85</td>
<td>+ 3.16</td>
<td>62.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1967</td>
<td>23.31</td>
<td>+ 2.01</td>
<td>63.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1968</td>
<td>25.54</td>
<td>+ 9.57</td>
<td>60.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1969</td>
<td>27.11</td>
<td>+ 6.15</td>
<td>58.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>28.24</td>
<td>+ 4.17</td>
<td>58.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1971</td>
<td>31.09</td>
<td>+ 9.70</td>
<td>60.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>35.53</td>
<td>+14.38</td>
<td>59.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1973</td>
<td>36.77</td>
<td>+ 3.49</td>
<td>57.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974</td>
<td>42.51</td>
<td>+15.61</td>
<td>54.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>51.22</td>
<td>+20.49</td>
<td>56.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1976</td>
<td>59.29</td>
<td>+15.76</td>
<td>61.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>66.47*</td>
<td>66.66**</td>
<td>33.24</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* is appropriations; ** is an estimate
Employment of worn or obsolete equipment not only generates inordinately high maintenance costs but also the risk of having this equipment become un-serviceable at the most inopportune moment and consequently place units employing it out of action.

Furthermore such technologically out-of-date equipment will be outdone by the enemy's modern capability, with all the resultant fatal consequences.

Nor can our infrastructure be neglected. Communications, air control, port facilities, buildings, depots and runways are equally indispensable elements of an adequate defense.

Equipment Expenditures

These expenditures are for procurement of durable goods (Article 13 of the budget): This procurement involves chiefly equipment programs with long-term production phases ranging from a minimum of 2 years to even 10-12 years in the case of major items of equipment.

In addition to equipment for operational units, this budget item covers modernization or replacement equipment for schools and training centers, and generally new equipment for modernization of medical facilities in military hospitals.

In this connection, the equipment replacement and modernization efforts made since 1972 deserve special mention.

The following are among the most noteworthy projects:

a. Replacement of several types of vehicles by the CVRT family of vehicles;

b. Modernization of antitank weapons: procurement of JPK tank destroyers and Law, Milan and Swingfire antitank missiles;

c. Improvement of the air defense capability through acquisition of 35-mm AA guns mounted on armored vehicles;

d. Enhancement of the artillery by procurement of surface-to-surface Lance missiles;

e. Introduction of battlefield observation equipment with construction of the Epervier [drone] by Belgian industry;

f. Implementation of different phases of a master plan for replacement of the military vehicle fleet ranging from jeeps to heavy trucks and from general purpose vehicles to special purpose engineer vehicles;

g. Construction in Belgium of the Britten-Norman aircraft to replace the Dornier;
h. Development of a modern communications system tailored to current requirements;

i. Total replacement of the air transport fleet: C-119 aircraft by the C-130H, DC-6 by the Boeing 727, DC-3 by the HS-748, Pembroke by the Merlin, and the old Sikorsky helicopters by new Sea Kings;

j. Procurement of modern F-16 combat aircraft to replace the F-104G;

k. Improvement of the Mirage aircraft's armament system by installation of modern advanced electronic equipment;

l. Completion of an extensive airfield protection program;

m. Modernization of training aircraft needed for student-pilot training, through acquisition of Alpha Jet trainers;

n. Completion of the "Escorteurs" program: ships that will soon be placed in service within the Belgian navy;

o. Conversion of minesweepers into minehunters;

p. Participation in the design and development of a new minehunter for the 1980's (MCMV).

Infrastructure Expenditures

These expenditures cover mainly the necessary modernization of various barracks and buildings both in Belgium and Germany, and specifically such troop and family housing needs as quarters, sanitary equipment, furniture, heat, lighting, etc.

These expenditures also cover settling-in and housing allowances for Belgian families in the FRG.

In addition to national infrastructure costs, they also encompass Belgian contributions to NATO infrastructure construction programs. These fixed NATO installations may be either in Belgium or in the territory of other NATO partners but must support and serve all NATO forces. They include pipelines, seaport and airport installations, communications facilities, depots, etc.

Defense Expenditures and "National Economy"

13. Although defense expenditures do not have to justify themselves by their economic impact, this aspect does deserve mention.

Defense expenditures do, in fact, have significant favorable direct and indirect repercussions on the country's economy.
Direct repercussions include the immediate effects of personnel, operating, land acquisition, infrastructure, and equipment expenditures on various sectors of the national economy.

Indirect repercussions are the effects resulting from purchases which those sectors obtaining direct military orders and contracts make in other sectors of our economy.

This cumulative impact is what is known as the multiplier effect.

In the case of indirect repercussion, it is commonly agreed that the multiplier effect is, on the average, a factor of at least 1.3.

The direct repercussions of different types of defense-related expenditures may be described as follows:

Personnel expenditures account for the employment of more than 90,000 persons.

By itself alone, the "professionalization" plan which calls for the recruiting of short-term volunteers, can absorb some additional 20,000 persons from the labor market and thus considerably bolster the effort to reduce unemployment.

About three-fourths of the expenditures for expendables (consumer goods) are purchases made annually from firms in all sectors of the economy, thus involving almost all activities of our national economy.

For certain major purchases that can be made only from foreign firms, provisions are made for economic offsets. These offsets permit the Belgian economy to obtain both quantitatively and qualitatively important orders and contracts.

Expenditures for acquisitions of land, infrastructure facilities and major items of equipment fall into the category of current expenditures as well as of capital expenditures.

As a matter of fact, in the MDN, because of the economic apportionment of the budget, only land acquisition is considered investment spending.

These expenditures have an important impact on the country's economy.

Even though a large part of these expenditures, principally for major equipment procurement, are in the form of contracts awarded to foreign firms, the amount of direct repercussion on the Belgian economy these past few years has been between 70 and 100 percent of the amount of the expenditures. This is true both in the case of economic offsets and coproduction possibilities (see Table 20).

Thanks to the multiplier effect which is as high as 1.5 in some sectors, returns from practically all major equipment procurement programs are greater than the initial expenditure, whether it be for procurement of tanks, combat vehicles, general purpose vehicles, aircraft, ships, or weapon systems.
### TABLE 20—Industrial Offsets

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Large Contracts</th>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Offset Contractual Obligations</th>
<th>Achieved as of 31 Dec 75</th>
<th>Target Completion date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>(a)</td>
<td>(b)</td>
<td>(c)</td>
<td>(d)</td>
<td>(e)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LEOPARD tanks</td>
<td>1967</td>
<td>100 %</td>
<td></td>
<td>12%</td>
<td>43%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MIRAGE aircraft</td>
<td>1968</td>
<td>70%</td>
<td></td>
<td>10%</td>
<td>40%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CVRT armored vehicles</td>
<td>1970</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HERCULES aircraft</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>33%</td>
<td></td>
<td>15%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESCORT ships</td>
<td>1971</td>
<td>.85%</td>
<td>55%</td>
<td>5%</td>
<td>12.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JPK tank destroyers</td>
<td>1972</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>20%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALPHAJET aircraft</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>80%</td>
<td>45%</td>
<td>7%</td>
<td>10%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GEPARD 35-mm AA guns</td>
<td>1973</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MAN 4-ton trucks</td>
<td>1974</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td>58%</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F16 aircraft</td>
<td>1975</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td>100%</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Percentage of industrial contracts signed as of 31 August 1976.

63
In economic offset and coproduction matters, the Ministry of National Defense works closely with the Industrial Administration and Industrial Offsets (Compensations) Service in the Ministry of Economic Affairs.

Given their broad scope and their distribution among practically all sectors of the economy, defense expenditures may also be said to be of exceptional importance to a large number of our country's small and medium-sized firms.

Summary

14. The financial requirements stemming from the present structure of the armed forces, a structure determined on the basis of approved missions, when compared with the financial resources allocated to the armed forces in past years, reveal a certain imbalance between requirements and resources.

This situation can be corrected only if the amount of funds allocated the Ministry of National Defense is annually increased by a fixed and adequate percentage:

a. A "fixed" percentage so that the MDN can responsibly program future expenditures;

b. An "adequate" percentage so as to be able to meet mounting costs and ensure maintenance of a valid defense posture.

To offset reductions in the force structure—Intervention Force cut from six to four active brigades—NATO was promised in 1967 that our budget would annually be increased 4 percent at constant prices.

Successive governments since 1967 have always accepted this principle.

This annual augmentation is allotted almost exclusively to qualitative improvements in the status of personnel and equipment:

a. First of all, it covers additional personnel costs resulting from increases granted in pay and allowances because of the nation's growing prosperity and as part of the social program for government employees;

b. The remainder is devoted to reequipment or replacement of equipment and to indispensable maintenance and modernization of the MDN's real property.

The limited increase in the MDN budget means that:

a. The ministry is compelled to tailor its annual requirements to allotted resources, if necessary by stretching some programs over a period of several years;

b. The conversion from constant prices to current prices must be accomplished as realistically and accurately as possible. Studies are underway within NATO in an effort to determine to what extent and in what manner a "corrective factor for rising costs" specific to defense expenditures might be defined and kept up-to-date;
c. Each new mission creating new requirements demands new forces, equipment or facilities and hence additional expenditures.

15. In conclusion, the above considerations cumulatively show that, within its allotted resources, the Ministry of National Defense is constantly taking necessary action to guarantee the nation maximum return from defense expenditures and to efficiently provide for the specific personnel, operating and reequipment needs of the armed forces.
CHAPTER 6. PERSONNEL MATTERS

[Text] General Considerations

1. As part of the government program to rationalize the armed forces and reduce compulsory military service obligations; personnel policy calls for:

a. Gradual lowering of the term of compulsory military service to 6 months;

b. Gradual application of the rule limiting compulsory service to one person per family;

c. Lessening the period of military service obligations;

d. Modification of legislation governing officer personnel so as to replace old out-of-date legal provisions with uniform, economically and administratively sound provisions designed to meet foreseeable officer personnel requirements of the armed forces and satisfy the aspirations of officer personnel;

e. Determination of a long-range personnel policy by structuring officer and NCO career patterns and formalizing the status of temporary-service personnel;

f. Opening military service to women volunteers;

g. More thorough organization of social advancement opportunities.

These various measures are supplemented by the integration of the armed forces into the socioeconomic environment of a constantly changing society, particularly by suitable modification of disciplinary regulations and the introduction of unionization into the armed forces.

Gradual Reduction of Term of Compulsory Service

Basic Principles

2. The plan for lowering the term of compulsory service is based on the following principles:
a. Belgium's obligations to the Atlantic Alliance will be fully respected when implementing the plan. Thus, as emphasized in the government's April 1974 statement, any such reduction presupposes offsetting enlistment of short-term volunteers, men and women.

b. As recruitment and availability of temporary personnel permit, the term of service for draftees will be gradually reduced from 12 months to 6 months. Based on recruiting possibilities, it will take an estimated 5 years to fully implement the plan.

c. Operational forces assigned to the Alliance will be composed almost entirely of volunteers.

d. Forces under national command will consist mainly of draftees whose term of compulsory service will be gradually lowered to 6 months.

e. Funds needed to carry out the plan are allocated outside the budget.

Personnel Strength at Start of Plan

3. Prior to approval of the plan to reduce the term of compulsory military service, a plan for rationalization of the armed officers was underway. Its goal was to attain the following personnel strength by end 1975:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>NCO's</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Total Regulars</th>
<th>12-month Draftees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>4,000</td>
<td>13,500</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>27,500</td>
<td>31,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,580</td>
<td>8,700</td>
<td>4,300</td>
<td>14,580</td>
<td>5,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>340</td>
<td>1,540</td>
<td>1,050</td>
<td>2,930</td>
<td>1,400</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>720</td>
<td>780</td>
<td>2,070</td>
<td>2,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,490</td>
<td>24,460</td>
<td>16,130</td>
<td>47,080</td>
<td>40,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

4. Changes made in this rationalization goal because of implementation of the plan for reduction of draftee service were as follows:

a. A 4 percent increase in the number of company grade officers to offset the loss of reserve officers.

b. A 2 percent increase in the number of NCO's to offset the loss of reserve NCO's.
c. An increase in the number of volunteers commensurate with the loss of draftees resulting from the shorter term of service. This increase is to be made in such a way as to keep the total combined draftee-volunteer personnel strength unchanged. In specific terms, the increase in the number of volunteers is some 20,320.

Plan's Ultimate Goal

5. Application of these changes means the plan's goal for its final stage (theoretically December 1978) is now as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>Officers</th>
<th>NCO's</th>
<th>Volunteers</th>
<th>Total Regulars</th>
<th>6-month Draftees</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>4,119</td>
<td>13,770</td>
<td>26,640</td>
<td>44,529</td>
<td>23,050</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>1,627</td>
<td>8,874</td>
<td>7,010</td>
<td>17,511</td>
<td>3,730</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>350</td>
<td>1,571</td>
<td>1,800</td>
<td>3,721</td>
<td>1,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical</td>
<td>584</td>
<td>734</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>2,318</td>
<td>4,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>6,680</td>
<td>24,949</td>
<td>36,450</td>
<td>68,079</td>
<td>32,200</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Timetable

6. The following timetable was established for reducing the term of service from 12 to 6 months over a 5-year period:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Duty Station</th>
<th>Term of Service (in months)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Germany</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Belgium</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The decision to move on to the next stage in the timetable is made at a year-end cabinet meeting, providing the prior and necessary number of offsetting volunteers has been obtained. The reduction decision becomes effective in principle on 31 December of the year in question.
If the plan follows the established timetable, the 6-month term of compulsory service will, therefore, become effective on 31 December 1978. In a word, this means all draftees having completed a minimum 6 months of service as of that date will be released.

Procedure for Implementing Plan

7. The number of volunteers to be recruited annually to offset the loss in draftees due to the planned reduction in term of services is determined on the basis of the number of that year's group of draft-eligible persons ("contingent") who are qualified and available to man units, and the distribution of these draftees between units in Germany and Belgium.

On the date the reduction in term of service becomes effective (in principle, 31 December) the sudden and sharp drop in the number of trained draftees on active duty must be offset by a number of volunteers that have been recruited throughout the year in such a way as to at all times maintain the combined draftee-volunteer troop strength at the level required to fulfill our international obligations.

This procedure is illustrated in Table 24. It became necessary because of Belgium's determination to fully abide by its commitments to the Atlantic Alliance. That phase of the plan calling for increased numbers of volunteer personnel will terminate only at the conclusion of the last stage of the plan, i.e. in principle December 1978. From that time on, troop strength need only be kept at the prescribed level. This will require recruiting some 3,500 volunteers, men and women, each year.

Progress of Plan to Date

8. The plan to recruit an offsetting number of volunteers began in early 1974. Backed by a suitable recruiting drive, its results have been as anticipated. Hence at end-1974, end-1975, and end-1976, the government was able to officially reduce the term of service according to the established timetable. At the present time, the term of copulsory military service is 8 months for draftees assigned to units stationed in the Federal Republic of Germany and 10 months for those assigned to units stationed in Belgium.

Status of Drafted Officers and NCO's Under the Reduction Plan

9. The term of service for drafted NCO's is similar to the term for ordinary draftees. The resultant loss to the armed forces is offset by a 2 percent increase in the number of regular NCO's.

Reserve officers of the class of 1976 have had their term of compulsory service reduced and now serve 14 months. This term is to be cut to 13 months for the class of 1977.
TABLE 24—Timetable for Reduction in Term of Service

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Draftees</th>
<th>Volunteers*</th>
<th>Combined draftee-volunteer strength</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>10 mos FRG</td>
<td>40,000(1)</td>
<td>80,130(1) *</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>12 mos Belgium</td>
<td>36,450</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 mos FRG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>11 mos BE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 mos FRG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 mos BE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 mos FRG</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 mos BE</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Goal of rationalization plan scheduled to be attained by end-1975.

**When the plan to reduce the term of service was initiated the rationalization plan was already advancing toward its goal of 16,130

Subsequently their term of service will again be gradually reduced until it reaches 11 months in the final stage of the plan.
Conclusion

10. The principal positive aspects of this plan are:

a. Operational units are progressively being manned by young volunteer personnel. This cannot help but enhance the quality of those units and stabilize their personnel-strength levels.

b. The compulsory service burden imposed on Belgian youth is being substantially lightened.

c. The large majority of young 6-month draftees are being assigned to units stationed in Belgium.

One Draftee Per Family

11. The law of 30 July 1974 calls for action to be taken in successive stages to limit compulsory military service to one brother per family.

Each December, the minister of interior, in coordination with the minister of national defense, publishes in the MONITEUR BELGE those categories of draftees who may request exemption from military service for moral (compassionate) cause on the basis of a brother's service. A ministerial decree then defines the specific eligibility requirements relative to family composition and maximum income.

12. This eminently social measure was first applied in 1975 to families having at least 6 living children and meeting established income limitations.

Approximately 1,600 young persons received exemptions under this measure.

13. Its second stage of application added the provision that a draftee of the class of 1976 could be granted an exemption if a brother or sister had served on active duty and if he belonged to:

a. Either a family in which at least one member had been killed in action or had died while on active duty, had been a prisoner of war, a political prisoner, a member of the Resistance movement, a deportee, or had participated in a Belgian army campaign;

b. Or a family with at least five living children and on condition that the combined income of the father and mother is not over 156,000 francs plus 39,000 francs per each dependent.

Approximately 400 additional youths obtained exemptions under this measure in 1976 thus raising the total recipients of an exemption to 2,000 for the class of 1976.
14. The third stage applicable to youth of the class of 1977 covers families with four children and a maximum income pegged to the cost of living.

15. In its final stage, an estimated 7,000 young persons will be able to benefit from this measure. Coupled with deferments and other forms of exemption from active service, this measure constitutes an additional substantial reduction of military service obligations.

TABLE 25--Persons Liable, Qualified and Available for Military Service--1976 Levy (Situation as of 31 December 1976)

Composition of Levy

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Composition of Levy</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Age group (class of 1976)</td>
<td>73,579</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early call-ups (class of 1977)</td>
<td>2,762</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons previously deferred</td>
<td>133,231</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons previously deferred for medical reasons</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous*</td>
<td>1,397</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL LEVY</strong></td>
<td>210,984</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TO BE DEDUCTED FROM LEVY

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TO BE DEDUCTED FROM LEVY</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Deferments</td>
<td>112,628</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions</td>
<td>16,890</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exemptions for nonmilitary service</td>
<td>256</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>in developing countries</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Released to the reserves</td>
<td>3,729</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical exemptions and deferments</td>
<td>9,691</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>plus cases pending</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Voluntary enlistments</td>
<td>4,536</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Early call-ups (attached to class of 1975)</td>
<td>2,519</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relinquishment of deferments (attached to class of 1975)</td>
<td>19,175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miscellaneous**</td>
<td>3,468</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL DEDUCTIONS</strong></td>
<td>172,892</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

LIABLE, QUALIFIED, AND AVAILABLE: 38,092

*This figure includes:

a. Registrants "excluded" (because of criminal records) from previous levies or discharged from the armed services prior to expiration of term of service, and who, having been "reinstated," now have an obligation to serve in the armed forces.
b. Registrants who have failed to report for interviews and examinations and have not yet been declared qualified for military service.

c. Volunteers whose enlistment has been cancelled but who still have a service obligation.

d. Foreigners who have become Belgian citizens.

e. Registrants who have been declared qualified for military service but have not yet been ordered to report for duty.

**This figure includes registrants who:

a. Are deceased;

b. Need to be recalled to the Recruiting and Selection Center for further interview or examinations!

c. Are "excluded" because they have a criminal record;

d. Have lost their Belgian citizenship;

e. Have withdrawn their request for early call-up;

f. Are attached to the class of 1976 through deferment and have voluntarily enlisted during past years;

g. Have deferment or exemption applications on which no final ruling has yet been made; plus conscientious objectors who are exempt from all military service.

Reduction of Draftees Post-Active Duty Military Obligations

16. Up until 1974 inclusive, draftees who had completed their term of compulsory military service remained subject to military obligations (recall) for 14 years.

As of 1 January 1975, these obligations have been reduced to 7 years after completion of active service. Thus the period of possible recall to active duty has been cut 50 percent. As a result, the administrative workload of the armed forces has been reduced from maintaining 450,000 individual personal records to maintaining 250,000 such records.

Modification of Legislation Governing Personnel Officer

17. Laws establishing the peacetime and wartime officer personnel strength of the armed forces—the organic laws governing the armed forces—had remained unchanged for very many years, whereas the organizational structure of the Armed forces had been modified many times.
The law governing the army's officer and NCO personnel strength dated back to pre-World War II days. Similar laws governing air force and navy officers and NCO's were more than 20 years old.

These laws, passed at different times under different circumstances and often amended, were not uniform in concept. Consequently, they produced inequalities between officers of the army, air force, navy, and medical services.

Lastly, these laws, one of which dated back to 1937, were not designed to concordantly account for the assignment of Belgian officers to duties in such international and allied organizations as the United Nations and NATO.

18. The present government, therefore, took the initiative of introducing new officer legislation meeting the needs of armed forces that must retain their vitality so as to adequately keep pace with present-day changes in ideas and equipment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Services</th>
<th>General Officers</th>
<th>Field-Grade Officers</th>
<th>Company-Grade Officers</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>1,000</td>
<td>3,093</td>
<td>4,119</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Air Force</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>395</td>
<td>1,222</td>
<td>1,627</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>350</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Medical Service</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>230</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>39</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,710</strong></td>
<td><strong>4,931</strong></td>
<td><strong>6,680</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This bill became the law of 13 July 1976 which in essence:

a. Completed a large part of the rationalization program undertaken within the armed forces;

b. Furthered the establishment of a long-term promotion policy for officers who serve for over 30 years;

c. Gives officers of the different service not only comparable career opportunities but also reasonable chances of promotion.

It should also be noted that the same principles prompted the new decrees governing the status of noncommissioned officers, decrees that have been in effect since 30 May 1974.

Formalizing Status of Temporary-Service Personnel

Need for Temporary Personnel
19. For many years now, there has been a definite need for temporary personnel in the armed forces. Thus, step by step, the following categories of personnel became full-fledged members of the armed forces: "permanent" active-duty reserve officers and NCO's ("complement"), auxiliary rated (air crew) air force officers, reserve officers voluntarily serving as cadre personnel, and temporary NCO's. Temporary-service for volunteers had also become an accepted fact since it was only after completing 10 years service that this category of personnel was entitled to continue serving until they reached retirement age.

Temporary personnel became a more strongly established category as need for their services mounted because of either insufficient recruiting of regulars or the necessity of finding the additional necessary young personnel lacking among regular personnel.

Since 1974, the reduction in military service obligations with the resultant decline in the efficiency of drafted officers, NCO's, corporals and privates, has substantially increased the armed forces requirements for not only young but temporary personnel, if personnel making a career of the service are to have reasonable chances of promotion.

This plan calls for the following allocation of personnel:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Categories</th>
<th>Regular personnel</th>
<th>Active Duty Reserve personnel</th>
<th>Temporary personnel</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Officers</td>
<td>4,740</td>
<td>800</td>
<td>1,140</td>
<td>6,680</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCO's</td>
<td>19,959</td>
<td>1,497</td>
<td>3,493</td>
<td>24,949</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Corporals &amp; privates</td>
<td>10,935</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>25,515</td>
<td>36,450</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL</td>
<td>35,634</td>
<td>2,297</td>
<td>30,148</td>
<td>68,079</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

20. Thus temporary-service personnel are no longer an occasional source of supplementary manpower but have now become a vital requirement of the armed forces.

Such personnel should, therefore, be systematically organized, not only because they are indispensable, but also because the armed forces have become indebted to that portion of this personnel they will have to release once this period of temporary-service is over. This naturally leads to the problems created by temporary-service, particularly the problem of absorbing one part of this personnel into more stable military categories and reclassifying the other part into the public and private sectors.
Active-Duty Reserve Officers and NCO's

21. Lastly there is the problem of where "permanent" active-duty reserve officers and NCO's should fit into this temporary-service category. Some people have even questioned the need for such personnel.

In this connection, we should remember that this class of personnel does exist, that it has earned its full standing in the armed forces by the services it has rendered, and that it contributes significantly to the manning of units with sufficient officers and NCO's. Furthermore, through its stable employment status, it is an important element in promoting social advancement or upward mobility by enabling deserving NCO's to become officers and deserving corporals to become NCO's.

Enlistment

22. Enlistment as temporary military personnel is open to all categories of personnel: officers, NCO's and volunteers.

All young persons, men and women, can enlist as temporary military personnel as long as they are at least 17 years old.

They can also enlist at 16 for assignment to a military training center.

Temporary personnel serve for successive terms of enlistment and reenlistment. The minimum term of the initial enlistment is 3 years for officers and NCO's, and 2 years for volunteers. Subsequent reenlistments are for 1 to 5 years at the enlistee's discretion. To ensure that temporary personnel do not subvert the purpose for which they are recruited, their maximum period of active service is very strictly limited to 10 years for each category. This limitation precludes having temporary personnel actually become permanent personnel through successive reenlistments.

Training

23. Inasmuch as temporary military personnel are recruited mainly for operational tasks, their school training is kept to a minimum: 1 year for officers and NCO's, a few months for volunteers.

Furthermore, provision is made for exempting certain persons from part of this training, namely those individuals whose civilian education and skills can be used directly by the armed forces, such as doctors, pharmacists, computer specialists, technicians, etc.

Temporary personnel have the same promotion opportunities as regular personnel.
Pay and Allowances

24. Temporary personnel receive the same pay and allowances as regular personnel of similar grade and length of service. They may also receive enlistment and reenlistment bonuses. The actual amount of the bonuses and requirements to qualify for them are established by the King.

Given the limited length of their service, temporary personnel are not entitled to a pension, except when granted a physical disability discharge.

However, all service in the armed forces by temporary military personnel is creditable for purposes of computing their future pension, whether they remain in government service or begin a new career in the private sector upon completion of their voluntary enlistment.

Reclassification

25. It would be virtually impossible to expect to recruit and retain temporary personnel for 10 years if at the end of that period the government were to desert them and discharge them into the ranks of the unemployed. Consequently, there are provisions for reclassifying and finding employment for such personnel within or without the armed forces.

Temporary military personnel of all categories may under certain conditions be upgraded to regular or "permanent" active-duty reserve status and as such be assured of a full military career. Applicants for such upgrading who have received favorable efficiency ratings from their superiors are entitled to take competitive qualification and selection examinations once they have completed 6 years service as temporary personnel.

In addition, upon completing their maximum term of service (10 years), temporary military personnel who have not been reclassified for employment within the armed forces, may, upon their personal request, be granted preference in obtaining employment in a government department, public or "public-interest" agency or service.

Lastly, those who do not wish to pursue a government career upon expiration of their term of service are still young enough to begin—with all the odds in their favor—a new career in the private sector where their armed forces training and experience will be most useful.

Enlistment of Women Volunteers

Background

26. Implementation of the plan to reduce military service obligations, the new officer and NCO personnel structure, and particularly the expansion of temporary military service, demand a special recruiting effort. Hence the armed forces cannot afford to overlook any possible source of manpower in this
recruiting effort. With this idea in mind and given the changing social environment in which we live, the armed forces decided to open military service to women. The first step in this direction was taken in 1974 by allowing female personnel to enlist at troop level (as privates).

Present Situation

27. Henceforth, however, women will have access to all grade levels in the military establishment, not only through temporary service but also through direct recruitment as regular officers and NCO's. Thus, like male personnel, female personnel will be able at the very outset to choose either a full military career or a temporary enlistment.

Female military personnel have the same rights, duties and obligations as their male counterparts. Duties to which women may be assigned will be determined by the King. Upon completing their active military service, women are not subject to any type of recall to active duty.

Special Benefits

28. In addition, female military personnel are entitled to the special benefits authorized all government female employees. For example, under legislation protecting working women, certain types of heavy, dangerous, and unhealthy work are banned for women in the military service. Female personnel are also entitled to maternity leave. In addition, a pregnant woman can, if she wishes, receive an immediate and permanent discharge from the armed forces. Women may also request to be placed on inactive status for family reasons so as to care for their very young children.

This series of measures should help attract numerous candidates for military service. The number of recruits inducted since 1975 and the many applications for enlistment permit facing the future with confidence.

Social Advancement

General Considerations

29. This important reform in legislation governing military personnel would not be complete if it failed to deal with the problem of social advancement or upward social mobility of men and women.

It must first be emphasized that the armed forces have always had a personnel policy fostering social advancement and upgrading by permitting each person in the service to rise to the highest grade within his capabilities.

This policy includes, for example:
a. Free instruction and training at all levels for all military personnel;

b. Courses offered in military installations to prepare NCO's and volunteers for officer-candidate examinations;

c. Allowing military personnel to prepare for these examination during on-duty time;

d. Possibility of moving up from a short-term career to a full career.

New Measures

30. Each year, more than 20 percent of all new officers are obtained from the NCO and volunteer ranks. Such officers pursue a full career and may attain all military grades.

A new regulation on such matters has just been approved. It enables deserving NCO's and volunteers, no matter what their educational level, to become officers or NCO's under certain conditions. Candidates are selected from among personnel with approximately 10-20 years of service. They receive professional education and training designed to adequately and smoothly integrate them into their new environment. Table 28 schematically depicts those current social advancement and upgrading opportunities within the armed forces available to both female and male personnel.

Raising Regular NCO Candidates (CSOC) Who Are Not Technicians to the A2 Educational Level.

31. Beginning with the 1976-1977 school year, CSOC's who are not technicians will have their level of education raised to A2 as was previously done for CSOC's who are technicians.

They will attain this level after 3 years of training, including 2 years of general school training and 1 year of branch-specialized school training.

Discussions are in progress with the two ministers of national education [Flemish and French] to equate the diploma awarded upon completion of these 3 years to the diploma awarded in the civilian sector upon completion of the upper stage of secondary education.

Those CSOC who, because of the limited number of openings or the selection standards, do not attain the A2 level will be trained at the A3 level. This procedure is also applicable to CSOC's who are technicians.

Entrance Examination for Royal Military School

32. Since 1975, young persons from the eastern cantons [German-speaking districts in the eastern part of Liege Province] are allowed to choose German as
their second language for the entrance examination. If they desire, candidates may also take the examinations on general subjects in German. These measures are such as to facilitate their admission into the Royal Military School and training to become regular officers.

33. The format and content of the entrance examinations have also been brought into line with provisions governing university education. As a consequence, candidates with a diploma entitling them to enter a university are not required to take examinations in history, geography, physics, and chemistry. This change reduces the Royal Military School's entrance examinations and places candidates in a position as close as possible to that of applicants for admission to civilian universities.
34. Entrance requirements were broadened in 1975 to allow candidates to take the competitive entrance examinations up to age 33. All family-status conditions were also eliminated. These measures unquestionably have a social aspect and are an effort to even further democratize the Royal Military School.

Establishment of the Grade of Corporal First Class

35. Unlike other categories of active-duty personnel, privates and corporals, prior to 1973, were not covered by any legislation specifically governing their status. They were, in fact, governed solely by the "coordinated" laws on the militia and some of the decrees implementing those laws.

Upon recommendation of the minister of national defense, the houses of parliament put an end to this abnormal situation by passing a law governing the status of privates and corporals on active duty in the armed forces.

One very important provision of this law accomplished something privates and corporals had long sought. It established the grade of corporal first class, thereby enabling volunteers to have a real career.

Corporals are promoted to this new grade by seniority, at the present time, after 14 years of service as a corporal. Since 1974, more than 8,000 corporals have been promoted to this higher grade.

Discipline

36. In 1975, disciplinary regulations applicable to the Belgian armed forces were profoundly modified. On 14 January of that year, a law was promulgated which prescribed "Disciplinary Regulations" for the armed forces.

It should be noted that the "Disciplinary Regulations" in effect up to that date had been adopted during the Dutch regime [prior to 1830]. They had been partially modified now and then.

Principal Modifications and Innovations

37. Duties

The new disciplinary rules accentuate "duties" rather than prohibitions. This principle makes the serviceman face up to his responsibilities. It makes him conscious of his duties instead of listing a whole series of things he must not do.

38. Political Rights

With the exception of members of the gendarmerie, military personnel may join the political party of their choice.
The positions they may hold in a political party are limited, however, to those of expert, advisor, or member of a study center. All other active or public participation in political life in any other capacity is prohibited, even when off-duty.

39. Labor Unions

With the exception of members of the gendarmerie, active-duty military personnel may join either recognized associations of military personnel, or labor unions recognized as representatives of civil service personnel.

All members of the armed forces are still prohibited from engaging in any kind of strike.

40. Punishment

Solely the superior who exercises functional authority is invested with the right to prescribe punishment.

a. Punishments for breaches of discipline are lightened and diversified.

b. Punishments are almost the same for all categories of personnel. Punishment by imprisonment or detention in a disciplinary barracks has specifically been abolished and replaced by close arrest.

Open arrests become a major punishment for officers.

41. Procedure

Disciplinary procedures set forth in the royal decree of 4 February 1972 remain wholly in effect, and notably the safeguards established for the defense's rights, stay of proceedings, statute of limitations, and removal of punishments from records. These provisions are the subject of a new royal decree now in preparation and better adapted to the terms and conditions of the "Disciplinary Regulations."

42. Disciplinary Action After Conviction

A serviceman cannot be given disciplinary punishment for the very same acts of which he has been convicted under the penal code or for acts of which he has been found not guilty.

The only actions that may be taken in this case are the statutory measures provided for in the laws on the status of military personnel and the "coordinated" laws on the militia. Those statutory measures (formerly known as disciplinary measures) not restated in these laws have been abolished.
Unionization

Participation

43. The concept of participation [in decision making] within the Belgian armed forces is not new, far from it. In fact, one need only consider the different existing committees, boards or councils to be convinced of this fact: mess or housekeeping councils, safety and health committees, contact and information committees, the Armed Forces-Youth Board, and the Military Personnel Advisory Board.

44. Up to now, this participation has taken place within these varied committees and boards in the form of consultation and dialogue, in other words, through an exchange of views which produced recommendations. To take a new forward step in the area of "participation" and have military personnel truly participate with military authorities in decision-making on certain well-defined matters, new structures had to be provided, structures patterned after those existing in the civilian world or even integrated with them.

Unions

45. Legislators realized that military personnel were no different than other categories of personnel in their desire to obtain participation in its most effective form. So that is why paragraph 1, Article 16, of the law of 14 January 1975 on "Disciplinary Regulations" for the armed forces contains the following provision: "Active-duty military personnel of the army, air force, and navy may affiliate with either recognized associations of military personnel or labor-union organizations recognized as representatives of civil service employees."

Thus military personnel now have new ways and means of protecting their interests.

Legislation Governing Military Unions

46. Creating the instrument for participation is not enough. The way that instrument may be utilized must also be defined. A bill currently under study will formalize relations between the authorities and the labor union organizations military personnel may join.

This bill will conform to similar legislation applicable to civil service personnel while giving due consideration to the peculiar characteristics of the armed forces. It will consist mainly of provisions indispensable to determination of:

a. Levels of negotiation and coordination, plus matters to be dealt with at those levels;

b. Standards of representativeness to be applied to the different labor union organizations and necessary attendant control measures;
c. Prerogatives of labor union organizations.

OCASC

47. Establishment

Over the years, various organizations were formed to meet the social and cultural needs of military personnel and also the needs created by the installation of a very large number of Belgian families in the FRG. To improve coordination of these activities, the law of 10 April 1973 established the Central Social and Cultural Action Office (OCASC) for the benefit of the military community.

The OCASC is a public interest agency consolidating the activities of such older social and cultural organizations as Logis Militaire [Military Housing], Cantine Military Centrale [Central Military Canteen], Famille-Jeunesse FBA [Family-Youth Association of Belgian Forces in Germany], Familvac [Family Vacations], Loisirs et Culture [Leisure and Cultural Activities], Mars and Vivat.

48. Summary of 1975 Activities

Cultural and Sports Activities in the FRG

a. The OCASC supported social welfare associations, women's movements, youth hostels, cultural centers, and athletic clubs.

b. Day camps and winter-sports schools in Switzerland were organized for the children;

c. RTB-BRT [Belgian Radio and Television-French and Flemish Services] programs were rebroadcast in the FRG.

Leisure Activities

a. Some 1,250 different films were shown in moving picture theatres in the FRG and Belgium;

b. A total of 130 plays and variety shows were produced.

c. Many libraries were maintained in units and in garrisons in the FRG;

d. Some 1,000 newspapers and periodicals were distributed in units.

Central Military Canteen (PX)

A total of 35 stores supply 60,000 persons in the FRG.
Military Housing

A total of 2,349 rental units are available for military personnel. An additional 500 units are under construction.

Vacations--Tourism

a. Some 11,400 persons utilized vacation camps in Belgium;
b. Young persons spent a total of 11,244 nights in youth hostels in France and Corsica.

Aid to the Handicapped

Some 1,700 families used the services of such various activities as:

a. Vacations in France and Belgium for handicapped children;
b. The Vivat Foundation which provides services and operates training, work lodging, and recreational facilities;
c. The General Cornet Foyer [Home] in Nivelles.

Armed Forces and Gendarmerie Social Service

49. Purpose

The Social Service is a public service and mutual aid institution that provides psychosocial personal assistance to active and retired personnel of the armed forces and the gendarmerie, and their families.

Its purpose is to develop the harmony which should exist between the individual and his family on the one hand and the armed forces or gendarmerie on the other.

50. Organization

a. Its legal title is "Office of Information and Assistance to Military Families" (ORAF). It is a semipublic Category A public service institution currently known under the name of "Armed Forces and Gendarmerie Social Service."

b. The Social Service is organized into a main office and 11 regional offices.

(1) The main office is in Brussels.

(2) There is a regional office in the capital of each of the provinces.

(3) Two regional offices serve the Belgian Forces in Germany. One is in Weiden, the other in Soest.
51. Operation

a. The Social Service tries to achieve its objectives by enhancing relations between the individual, his family, and the professional community to which he belongs.

b. It maintains contacts with the persons it serves through:

   (1) Permanent staffs available for consultation in regional offices and outside such offices in units, garrisons, military hospitals, prisons, or wherever the situation demands;

   (2) House calls, telephone contacts, and correspondence.

c. Contacts with persons seeking its help are, if necessary, supplemented by interviews with appropriate individuals of the same professional or family circles.

d. All contacts and interviews are designed to establish, in cooperation with the person seeking assistance, not only a suitable and favorable course of action but also see that it is successfully pursued.

52. Types of Assistance

a. Information

The service furnishes information on specifically military questions as well as general social information.

b. Advice and Recommendations

Upon request of commanding officers or the military authorities, it furnishes advice and recommendations on the psychosocial aspects of problems related to such facets of military service as transfers, discharges, assignments, etc.

c. Financial Assistance

Financial aid in the form of a grant or loan is possible if the applicants are faced with difficulties they are unable to resolve with their own resources despite all their precautions.

d. Non-Financial Assistance

If deemed desirable, psychosocial guidance is available for the individual and/or his family.

If necessary, this guidance can be given in close cooperation with the unit commander, social and cultural information officer, chaplain, and when advisable, other appropriate specialized persons and agencies.
53. Persons Eligible for Social Service Assistance

a. Regular military personnel;

b. Members of the gendarmerie;

c. Non-regular personnel on active duty;

d. Former military personnel and members of the gendarmerie receiving retirement pay because of active service during which their pay was chargeable to the budget of the Ministry of National Defense;

e. Military personnel with peacetime disability discharges;

f. Widows, orphans and parents receiving either a survivor's pension or compensation based on services rendered by military personnel or members of the gendarmerie;

g. Dependents of persons listed in a through e above.

54. Request for the Social Service's Assistance

a. Practically anyone may refer a case to it:

(1) The individual seeking such help himself;

(2) Relatives of that individual;

(3) His military superiors;

(4) Civil authorities;

(5) Military professional organizations.

b. Application procedure: by request made in person or in writing directly to the regional office.

It should be noted that the Social Service will intervene only with the agreement of the person needing assistance.

Civilian Personnel Social Service

55. Purpose

The Civilian Personnel Social Service was established by the royal decree of 4 June 1964 for the benefit of civilian personnel and military workers of the Ministry of National Defense. Its purpose is to furnish its beneficiaries the most adequate type and amount of social and material assistance they may need in their professional life as well as their private life.
The question arises as to why such a service was necessary for civilian personnel when the Armed Forces Social Service was already providing for the needs of military personnel and civilian employees assigned to the Ministry of National Defense. Even though the Armed Forces Social Service was always considered a highly commendable activity, it never succeeded in dispelling the feeling that civilian personnel faced their own peculiar problems which differed from those confronting military personnel.

Furthermore, legislation governing unionization of government employees specifies that labor-union organizations represented on a governmental department's union advisory committee shall participate in the administration of social services and activities established by that department.

Such was not the case with administration of the Armed Forces Social Service.

Consequently, it is understandable that civilian employees—who are quite numerous—should insist on settling their own problems themselves.

That is one of the reasons for which the minister of national defense recommended establishment of the Civilian Personnel Social Service and agreed that the association be administered by the union organizations.

56. Field of Action

The Civilian Personnel Social Service's field of action covers all personnel who are actively employed or on the inactive list for whatever reason, plus retired employees and widows and orphans of former employees.

Assistance is furnished in numerous ways ranging from moral support and simple advice to more direct aid such as special assistance or a loan to an individual. Financial aid is given solely to those persons unable to overcome difficulties in their lives with their own financial resources. Such aid is not furnished automatically but only on the basis of a thorough investigation conducted by a social worker.

57. Financial Resources

The association's resources include grants from the Ministry of National Defense, possible interest on association funds, and contributions from persons eligible for family vacations and children's vacations.

In 1976, Defense Ministry grants to the association totaled 10.2 million francs: 8.8 million francs for aid to be furnished the needy and 1.4 million for operating costs. In 1976, the defense ministry had more than 5,000 employees.

58. Summary of 1976 Activities

Activities in 1976 may be separated into two categories, individual aid and collective aid.
a. Individual Aid.

This aid is given directly to eligible personnel who request any kind of help. Support may be in the form of a grant or a loan. The association rendered assistance chiefly in cases of serious illness, hospitalization, medical care and treatment, placement of mentally deficient children, serious family financial problems, insufficient pension, and other unusual circumstances covered by Article 5 of the association's bylaws.

In 1976, 356 requests for assistance were submitted—after due investigation by social workers—to the association's board of directors who either approved or denied the request.

b. Collective Aid

This aid covers all eligible personnel and is given on the basis of criteria established beforehand.

Principal activities receiving this aid included preventive medicine, legal aid, family vacations and children's vacations.

Under the family vacations program, 629 families were able to take 2-week vacations in 1976. Some 158 children of eligible personnel were sent to vacation camps in Belgium or outside the country.

Capital investments for family vacation facilities in the "Val de l'Ourthe" park in Tohogne are also financed from collective-aid funds.
CHAPTER 7. ARMED FORCES ASSISTANCE TO THE NATION

[Text] 1. General Considerations

Assistance furnished the nation by the armed forces is twofold: indirect and permanent assistance, and direct, irregular and required assistance.

Indirect permanent assistance consists primarily in lending equipment, facilities, etc. to social or philanthropic institutions and youth organizations. Such assistance also includes services rendered by military personnel to the aforementioned groups.

The following statistics provide a better insight into the assistance given youth: each year, the armed forces furnish an average of 400 counselors to youth camps, and about 10,000 children from some 230 groups are housed in camps equipped by the armed forces. An additional 30 counselors are provided for handicapped children.

Alongside this significant type of assistance, the armed forces also furnish direct aid to the nation. The latter consists mainly of projects in the general interest. The nature and form of the support given is defined by an agreement concluded between the Ministry of National Defense and other ministries.

Responsibility for the direct assistance given the nation by the armed forces and required by civil authorities was divided among the services—army, air force, navy and medical service—according to the special capabilities of each of these services.

2. Army

The army helped in countering the serious effects of unexpected weather conditions: torrential rains in late 1975, floods in January 1976, and the drought from June to August 1976. Army assistance was also required for bomb-disposal operations.
Army assistance in harvesting the potato and beet crop from 17 October to 23 December 1974 covered almost all of Belgium except the province of Antwerp. Army troops worked a total of 1.371 million hours on this project and military vehicles logged 1.063 million kilometers in transporting troops. Some 15 tracked vehicles were employed on this project for 13 days.

During the drought in June, July and August 1976, army troops served as firemen, kept certain communes supplied with water, and transported fodder in the provinces of Antwerp, Liège, Limbourg, Luxembourg, and Namur. Troop labor totaled more than 20,000 hours and 30 6-ton trucks with trailers hauled 540,000 bales of hay over a total distance of 250,000 kilometers.

The January 1976 floods required army troops to work in the Moerzeke area of the province of East Flanders and the Ruisbroek, Wallem and Willebroek areas of the provinces of Antwerp. This aid totaled 126,000 hours of troop labor and use of some 90 vehicles for 28 days, plus employment of such special equipment as barges, boats and cranes.

Each year from 1970 to 1975, the average workload of army bomb disposal units was as follows: 255 tons of explosive ordnance and 20 tons of gas munitions removed, nearly 300 tons of ordnance destroyed, more than 3,500 requests for assistance, and 188,800 kilometers traveled.

3. Navy

The navy permanently conducts mine-clearance operations, participates in sea rescue missions, oceanographic research and pollution control measures in waters off our coast, helps in combating smuggling in our territorial waters, treats victims of skin-diving accidents, participates in towing operations, dumping operations in the open sea, and surveillance of coastal waters, rivers, ports and fishing in the Atlantic Ocean.

In the past 5 years, the navy has carried out nearly 3,000 mine-clearance missions and neutralized 130 tons of explosives, 28 aircraft bombs and 26 submarine mines.

In 1975 and 1976 the navy conducted about 500 missions for the Interministerial Scientific Programming Committee as part of the program to combat pollution in waters off our coast.

Helicopters and ships conduct approximately 30 pollution control missions per year at sea and on the Schelde River.

Sea rescue requires 200 hours of helicopter flying time per year and the daily participation of two ships of the MSI [Minesweeper, Inshore] class.

As part of its assistance to the gendarmerie and maritime police, the navy conducts an average of three antismuggling missions per month.
The Hyperbaric Medicine Center in Ostend treats civilians injured in skin diving accidents. It provided such treatment to 30 civilians between 1973 and 1976.

Approximately 50 times per year, the navy assists Ostend-Dover passenger and car ferries to dock and also to leave the port. Fishery-protection tasks and national and international responsibilities for control of fishermen in the Atlantic require the presence of a fishery-service vessel 135 days per year. Technical and medical assistance is rendered fishermen at sea about 25 times a year.

4. Air Force

Our air force assists regularly in transporting young disabled thalidomide victims to Corsica for vacations on the Mediterranean coast. In late July 1976, it returned to Belgium the 42 victims of an accident involving a Belgian tourist bus in Grenoble. Four aircraft—2 C-130's and 2 DC-6's—logged 15 hours of flying time on this mission.

5. Medical Service

In connection with this same bus accident, the Medical Service was assigned the task of transporting the bodies of the victims from Melsbroeck [Brussels airport] to Soignie. Some 40 ambulances and 80 servicemen were employed in this operation.

The Medical Service also assisted in recovering the remains of the victims of the aircraft accident at Aarsele on 2 October 1971 (4 ambulances and 20 men).

On 12-13 July 1976, 200 patients were moved from the Hestre civilian hospital to the Tivoli Hospital Center in La Louviere by 40 servicement, 8 ambulances, 2 trucks and 1 bus.

The Medical Service also supplies, on a reimbursable basis, approximately 1 million francs worth of medical equipment, drugs and medicine annually to institutions for the mentally ill, the SNCB [Belgian National Railroads], and the Navy's Central Administration.

6. National Geographic Institute

Founded on 26 January 1831 to provide necessary mapping support to the defense establishment, the Military Geographic Institute has also worked many years for various government agencies and persons having no connection with the armed forces.

Under the law of 8 June 1976, the old military institute was reorganized into the National Geographic Institute (IGN), a semipublic type B agency under the general supervision of the minister of national defense.
This change gives the institute the financial management flexibility demanded by its industrial character and the marketing of its internationally renowned products and services. It also facilitates national-level planning and coordination of the institute's manifold cartographic and topographic activities.

This law was prompted by the desire to enable an institution that had rendered the nation valuable service for nearly a century and a half to perform its public service mission even better in the future. The institute demands a high degree of skill from its personnel so as to obtain maximum efficiency and results from its highly specialized machines and instruments.
CHAPTER 8. ARMED FORCES ASSISTANCE TO OTHER COUNTRIES

[Text] In addition to their direct and indirect assistance to the nation, the Belgian armed forces also participate in humanitarian aid operations in other countries.

These operations are financed by the General Development Cooperation Administration.

Alone, or with other national or international agencies, the Belgian armed forces furnish personnel transportation, and certain items of equipment.

In these past 5 years, such Belgian military assistance to other countries included 10 major operations.

From 19 December 1970 to 15 March 1971, our armed forces furnished medical assistance to victims of a cyclone and floods in the Galachipa region of Pakistan. A detachment of 30 servicemen provided these people with supplies, drugs and medicine valued at 2.7 million francs and treated 27,000 patients.

Between 2 February and 15 December 1971, our Air Force flew several missions with DC-6 aircraft in support of India and Pakistan, areas of which had been devastated by a tidal wave.

In August 1971, 10 million francs worth of equipment for a surgical hospital was furnished Chile in the wake of an earthquake that had ravaged that country.

Our Sahel 1 mission assisted in bringing relief supplies to the peoples of Niger, Mali, Chad and Upper Volta during the drought from 2 June to 20 October 1973. From 27 June to 4 September 1973, four teams from the Paratrooper Training Center successively (15 days each) participated in parachute and air-drop operations during which 520 tons of relief supplies were delivered. From 2 June to 25 October 1973, a convoy of 15 MAN trucks and 2 Unimog vans traveled overland to the Sahel where it was assigned the task of hauling 1,385 tons of relief supplies. More than 4,000 tons of cargo and 1,200 persons were transported by air in 20 missions flown by C-130 aircraft that logged a total of 1,250 hours of flying time.
Our Sahel 2 mission participated in drought relief operation in Niger from 25 March to 16 August 1974. A convoy of 12 MAN trucks and 3 Unimog vans was again sent to overland to Niger. This detachment traveled 221,861 kilometers, and in the area itself transported 4,000 tons of supplies and 1,746 persons. The detachment's medical team provided free care and treatment to the stricken population. Our C-130 aircraft flew a total of 518 hours in 23 missions transporting 1,200 tons of cargo and 239 persons. Military medical equipment valued at 375,000 francs was also delivered.

The 1-5 October 1974 Honduras aid operation assisted victims of a tidal wave. The 15th Air Transport Wing carried 28 tons of food, drugs, and blankets to that country in two missions flown by C-130 aircraft that logged a total of 79 hours flying time.

The 8-18 October 1973 Sudan aid operation transported relief supplies furnished by the Netherlands. It delivered 240 tons of cargo in two C-130 missions totaling 115 hours of flying time.

On 25-26 June 1974, a C-130 aircraft transported 17 tons of equipment to Monastir, Tunisia.

In July, August and October 1975, 87 tons of machine tools were transported in five missions flown by C-130 aircraft.

From 17 to 20 October 1975, our C-130 aircraft flew four missions in support of Angola, transporting relief supplies and refugees in the Luanda region.
CHAPTER 9. CONCLUSIONS

[Text] International Situation

1. Nothing indicates world peace based on general and controlled disarmament can be obtained in the foreseeable future.

Despite all the current negotiations designed to create a climate of détente, East and West continue to clash on multiple problems of an ideological, political, economic or military nature.

From a military standpoint, it is obvious that the continuous build-up of Warsaw Pact military forces is not conducive to creating a feeling of trust, nor is this build-up in the spirit of the Helsinki agreement.

Hence we must base our judgement on facts and not on wishful thinking or declarations of intentions.

In view of the disappointing results of negotiations and faced with the growing imbalance between Warsaw Pact and NATO conventional forces, it is essential, therefore, for Belgium to abide by its commitments to the Atlantic Alliance.

Europe

2. Europe is attempting to unify itself in all fields, the defense field included.

Within NATO too, European members are seeking to strengthen their unity in an effort to find common and economical solutions to their military requirements. Increased equipment standardization and interoperability is one of their major objectives designed to enhance the effectiveness of their armed forces, produce equipment under the most economical conditions possible, and thus enable Europe to be in a favorable position to initiate a true transatlantic dialog with its American partner.

It is in this spirit that Belgium is participating in the deliberations of Eurogroup, the Independent European Program Group, and the Western European Union.
National Defense Effort

Utilization of Financial Resources

3. To make maximum effective use of the financial resources allotted the Ministry of National Defense, efforts have been focused on three main areas these past few years: personnel and organization, reequipment of the forces, and infrastructure.

4. Personnel and Organization

Savings have been achieved in personnel through:

a. Reorganization and reduction of command and support elements.
b. Elimination of certain elements.
c. Merger of elements.

These reductions were accomplished without any cutback in operational forces.

5. Reequipment

These manpower savings enable more funds to be allocated to reequipping the forces and thereby increasing their operational effectiveness.

The funds available are not sufficient, however, to fully implement all equipment plans. For that reason, some procurement programs have to be stretched-out while others are postponed.

6. Infrastructure

Major projects are underway in this field as part of the domanical renovation plan.

This plan is designed essentially to rationalize and modernize the defense establishment's fixed installations located in Belgium so as to achieve greater economy of operation and better adapt them to current living standards. Under this plan, military organizations and facilities are to be grouped within major complexes situated outside the large urban centers. Such siting of these complexes will meet modern city-planning and territorial development requirements.

The master plan calls for successive completion of the following major projects:
a. Replacement of approximately 120 installations by construction of five large complexes at Peutie, North Evere, South Evere, Rocourt, and Neder-Over-Heembeek;

b. Enlargement of medium-sized installations;

c. Renovation of small-sized and less important facilities.

Program costs will be financed by funds obtained from the sale of installations and facilities being inactivated and also by funds allotted from the defense department's regular financial resources.

Social Measures

7. Measures taken to reduce military service obligations include: gradual lowering of the term of compulsory military service, gradual limitation of such service to one person per family, and shortening the time during which a person is subject to recall to active duty. Certain actions have already been taken for the benefit of volunteer personnel, and others are in preparation: modification of legislation governing officers and NCO's, formalization of the status of temporary-service personnel, opening military service to women volunteers, promotion of upward social mobility, and unionization.