Where's Cap Haitien?
Validating the Principles of Peace Operations

A Monograph
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This monograph examines United States Army peace operations doctrine as it was executed by 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) in Operation Uphold Democracy. The 3d Brigade conducted peace operations in Northern Haiti beginning in January 1995. The brigade transferred its operations to the United Nations in late April 1995 prior to redeployed to Schofield Barracks, Hawaii. In hindsight the brigade's operations in Haiti appear successful; the brigade accomplished its mission.

In January 1995, the peace operations doctrine available to the brigade was contained in Field Manual 100-5, Operations, and Field Manual 100-23, Peace Operations. This study examines the brigade's application of this doctrine during Operation Uphold Democracy to determine the validity of peace operations principles described in FM 100-5 and FM 100-23.

An examination of how the commander and staff of 3d brigade conducted operations in Northern Haiti from January through April 1995 provides a means of validating the principles of peace operations. As unit participation in peace operations continues, the examination of criteria used to plan and conduct these operations will assist in determining if current doctrine is suitable for the Army. This topic is important from a historical perspective as well, since this monograph adds to the body of knowledge regarding Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, and peace operations.

Operations conducted by the United States Army during Operations Uphold Democracy in Haiti from January to April 1995 validated the principles of Peace Operations.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

On 19 September 1994, United States forces began a peaceful
deployment to Port-au-Prince and other points throughout the country of Haiti.
Their mission was to establish a safe and secure environment for the legitimate
government to take up its responsibilities of running the government. During the
next several weeks, about 20,000 US troops and a battalion of nearly 300 from
the Caribbean Community (CARICOM) nations, under the command of US
General Henry Shelton, deployed to accomplish this mission.¹

The entry of the 10th Mountain Division (Light) was unopposed by the
Haitian Army. The primary "threat" was not the Haitian Army, but civil disorder
and lawlessness. Haitian-on-Haitian violence was the primary challenge to the
US soldiers in Port au Prince. On 24 September 1994, the United States
Marines killed ten soldiers from the Haitian Security Forces in Cap Haitien when
they tried to resist. This rare engagement was the only Haitian Army resistance.
From September 1994 through January 1995, the 10th Mountain Division
conducted peace enforcement operations in Haiti.

In November 1994, the 25th Infantry Division (Light), located in Schofield
Barracks, Hawaii, received the alert notification to conduct a relief in place of the
10th Mountain in Haiti. 3d Brigade received official notification in early December
1994 to relieve 2nd Brigade, 10th Mountain in Cap Haitien, Haiti in January
1995.² The purpose of the deployment was to maintain a secure environment
and ensure a smooth transition to democracy by professionalizing the military,
training a new Haitian police force, maintaining civic order, and protecting Haitian Government personnel and facilities, as well as the staffs of human rights and humanitarian organizations.

In 1804 Haiti became an independent nation after a revolution, making it the oldest black republic.³ Haiti expanded its empire by conquering Santo Domingo, the eastern portion of the Island of Hispaniola. Santo Domingo eventually broke away from Haiti in 1844 and became the nation of the Dominican Republic. Over the next 72 years, Haiti experienced 22 changes in government because of political and economic disorder. The United States military intervened in Haiti because of political instability between 1915 and 1934.⁴

Francois Duvalier (Papa Doc) and his son Jean-Claude Duvalier (Baby Doc) politically controlled Haiti from 1957 through 1986. The Duvalier’s controlled Haiti through domestic political tension, severe corruption, political repression, and economic stagnation.⁵ Their government was followed by the National Governing Council (CNG), a military regime led by General Henri Namphy, controlled the country until December 1990. This government came to and end when Haiti elected Jean-Bertrand Aristide president. Aristide was a Roman Catholic priest and long-time activist and opponent of Haiti’s former dictatorship. The international community determined this to be the first free elections in Haiti’s history.⁶

Nerette replaced him and established an unconstitutional government with the support of the parliament and the military. In June of 1992, Marc Bazin replaced Nerette when the UN imposed an oil and arms embargo, which brought the Haitian Military to the negotiating table.

General Raoul Cedras, the head of the Haitian Armed Forces, and President Aristide signed the UN-brokered Governors Island agreement on 3 July, 1993, establishing a ten step process for the restoration of constitutional government and the return of President Aristide by 30 October 1993. The Haitian military derailed this process shortly after the signing and the UN again imposed economic sanctions.

In May 1994, the UN and US passed UN Resolution 917, which tightened the economic sanctions against Haiti. The international community suspended all commercial air passenger flights with Haiti at the end of July 1994. In turn, Haiti restricted all travel across the land border with the Dominican Republic. The UN adopted Resolution 940 on 31 July 1994, which authorized member states to use all necessary means to facilitate the departure of Haiti's military leadership and restore constitutional rule, including the return of President Aristide.

The Haitian military and government maintained repression and terror, sanctioned assassinations, torture and beatings in defiance to the international community's. With UN authority, President Clinton sent former President Jimmy Carter, Chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee Sam Nunn, and former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Colin Powell to Haiti on 16
September 1994 to meet with Haitian leadership. Their purpose was to discuss
the departure of the leaders within the framework of goals established by
President Clinton and the UN Security Council. Facing military intervention by
the United States, Haiti's leaders agreed to step down from power by 15 October
1994.


The United States Army published the new Field Manual 100-5,
Operations, in June 1993. Included in this manual was a chapter devoted to
operations other than war (OOTW). In this chapter, principles were outlined
establishing a guide for military actions during OOTW. These principles are
objective, security, unity of command, perseverance, legitimacy, and restraint.
Objective, security, and unity of command come from the principles of war. The
other three principles are supplements to the principles of war more suited to
OOTW.\(^{11}\) In addition, the Army published FM 100-23, Peace Operations, in
December 1994. This manual expands on FM 100-5 by identifying the
fundamentals of peace operations, the command and support relationships
unique to peace operations, the planning considerations, and special logistic
functions of peace operations.\(^{12}\) The publication of these manuals meant that 3d
Brigade had doctrinal resources available with which to conduct peace
operations in Haiti in January 1995.

This monograph examines operations conducted by the United States
Army during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from January to April 1995.
and seeks to determine if that operation validates the principles of Peace Operations.

This monograph is a continuation of research and study that began during the Command and General Staff Officer College as part of the Masters of Military Art and Science Degree program. In that study the author focused on preparing tactical units for the realities of Military Operation Other Than War (MOOTW) in a thesis entitled “Military Operations Other Than War, One Soldier’s Story.” Based on further research questions developed during that study and a historical interest in military operations conducted in Haiti, it has prompted the selection of this topic area for additional research. The monograph uses the participation of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) in Operation Uphold Democracy as the research vehicle by examining the unit’s mission, endstates, operations, and tasks; then, analyzing them in relation to the principles of peace operations.

By December 1994, the United States Army had defined the principles of peace operations in the completed version of FM 100-5, Operations, and FM 100-23, Peace Operations. Both manuals provide a doctrinal base for Army units to conduct peace operations. The 10th Mountain Division and the 25th Infantry Division were the first units to apply the new peace operations doctrine in a real world mission since publication.

The 3rd Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) conducted peace operations in Northern Haiti from January 1995 to April 1995. Analysis of the operations indicate the brigade successfully accomplished its assigned mission in Haiti. Two questions are important. Did the brigade use the principles of
peace operations to help accomplish the mission? If so, did Operation Uphold Democracy validate the new peace operations doctrine available to the Army?

Examining how the commander and staff of 3rd brigade conducted operations in Northern Haiti from January through April 1995 provides a vehicle for assessing the validity of the principles of peace operations. With unit participation in peace operations continuing, it is only prudent to examine the principles used to plan and conduct these operations and validate their suitability for use by the Army. Finally, this topic is important from a historical perspective in that this monograph adds to the body of knowledge regarding Haiti, Operation Uphold Democracy, and Peace Operations.

The research question posed for this study is: Did operations conducted during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from January to April 1995 validate the principles of peace operations established in FM 100-23, Peace Operations?

The monograph examines the principles of peace operations using 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) during the conduct of a peace operation. The monograph begins with a review of the environment in Haiti, followed by a review of the available peace operations doctrine, and the research questions. Army doctrine and archival records establish the basis of the introduction.

This is followed by an examination of the brigade’s mission, concept of the operation, and tasks conducted by the brigade during the operation. This information is found in the archival records from the Operation Uphold Democracy Haiti collection located in the Combined Arms Research Library. The
information is derived from analysis of unit operations orders, fragmentary orders, deployed commanders situation reports, and after action reports.

Unit archival records and interviews with former commanders and staff officers of 3d Brigade assist in establishing what criterion were used to plan the operation. This is analyzed and compared to the doctrine available at the time. Specifically the principles of peace operations found in FM 100-5 and FM 100-23.

The monograph concludes with the answer to the research question, recommendations for doctrinal changes and appropriate operational lessons learned in relation to planning criteria for peace operations.

CHAPTER TWO
THE SITUATION IN HAITI

The Environment in Haiti.

Haiti is located in the Caribbean south east of Cuba approximately ninety kilometers. It occupies the western one third of the island of Hispaniola, with the Dominican Republic comprising the remainder of the island. Haiti is comparable in size to the state of Maryland with a land mass of 28,000 square kilometers. Figure 2-1 shows the country of Haiti, the regions, topography, and major cities.
Haiti is composed of three regions, the northern, central, and southern regions. The northern region encompasses the Plaine du Nord or Northern Plain and the Massif du Nord or Northern Massif. The Northern Plain lies between the Northern Massif and the Atlantic Ocean. The Northern Massif is an extension of the central mountain range of the Dominican Republic and divides the northern part of the island from the central region. The major cities in the Northern Plain are Cap Haitien and Port du Paix. The Central region consists of two plains and two mountain ranges. The two major rivers cutting through the central plains are the Guayamouc and Artibonite. This study focuses on the northern region and the northern half of the central region north of the Guayamouc River.  

The estimated population of Haiti is 6.1 million. It is the most densely populated Caribbean country with a population density of 182 people per square kilometer. Haiti's capital city, Port au Prince is the largest city with approximately 1 million residences. Port au Prince is located in the Southern Region. Cap Haitien is the second largest city in Haiti with an estimated population of 65,000. Cap Haitien was the location of the Headquarters of 3d Brigade (Task Force Bronco), 25th Infantry Division or MNF North.
The population of Haiti is divided into an upper class, a middle class, peasants, and an urban lower class. The upper class consists of 2 percent of the population that controls about 44 percent of the wealth. They hold key positions in trade industry, real estate, and the professions. The middle class consists of 8 percent of the population. The criteria for membership in the middle class included non-manual occupation, a moderate income, literacy, and a mastery of French. Education and urban residence are the keys to upward movement in the middle class. Peasants consist of 75 percent of Haiti's population. Most peasants own land in Haiti unlike many other Latin American nations. The Haiti peasants primarily income and life revolves around agriculture which is the
mainstay of the Haitian economy. Coffee, sugar, cocoa, and cotton are the main cash crops of Haiti. Additionally, corn, sorghum, and rice are raised for individual consumption or sold on the local economy. The urban lower class consists of the remaining 15 percent of the population. They are the poorest strata of the Haitian society and live primarily in Port au Prince.

Religion plays a primary role in Haitian society. Roman Catholicism, Protestantism, and Voodoo are the religions of Haiti. Roman Catholic is the official religion of Haiti but voodoo is considered the national religion. Most Haitians believe and practice some form of Voodoo. Voodoo refers to a kind of dance and the service of spirits, primarily family spirits. The belief is most Voodoo protects and helps the family, especially children. The typical misperception of Voodoo is the idea of zombies and witchcraft. This exists in secret Voodoo societies that practice sorcery and are not commonly found in Haiti. Voodoo lacks a fixed theology or an organized hierarchy. Each Voodoo specialist develops their own reputation for helping people.

The "Threats" in Haiti

When the United States arrived in Haiti to begin operations several internal Haitian threats faced the military. These included the population, the environment, the Forces Armee d'Haiti (FAD'H), and the Revolutionary Front For Haitian Advancement and Progress (FRAPH). The threat from the Haitian population included the common criminal element, and the retaliation and retribution by the Haitian people towards the former FAD'H members. The environment posed health risks to the military with exposure to disease,
specifically malaria and dengue fever. Former members of the FAD'H posed potential security risks in the form of selected violence against the new Aristide government or the US military. The primary threat in Haiti identified by the US military was the security and stability of the country regardless of the political affiliation.23

The existence of any threat was limited to individual acts of violence. Other than rumor, there was never any evidence of an organized attempt to interfere with the US military mission in Haiti.24 There were a few hostile acts involving a fatal shooting of a US Special Forces soldier, the killing of three vetted members of the FAH'd, and the wounding of an International Police Monitor (IPM).25 IPMs and US military forces conducted extensive presence patrols to deter criminal activity and individual acts of violence. The goal of this security strategy was the stability of Northern Haiti.

US Military in Haiti

In December 1994, the 25th Infantry Division (Light) received notification to relieve the 10th Mountain Division (Light) in Haiti. By mid January 1995 the 25th ID assumed the Multi-National Force mission in Haiti. The division deployed two infantry brigade headquarters to Haiti. The 2nd Brigade with two infantry battalion task forces conducted operations in the southern region of Haiti that included responsibility for Port au Prince. The 3rd Brigade with one infantry battalion task force, a Caribbean Community battalion, and a Guatemalan battalion conducted operations in the northern region of Haiti that included
responsibility for Cap Haitien. The 3rd Brigade Headquarters (TF Bronco) conducted operations as Multinational Forces Headquarters North (MNF North). Colonel Gary Speer commanded the 3d Brigade during the operation.

Prior to deployment, the 3rd Brigade conducted pre-deployment training focusing on the specific tasks of peace operations as they applied to the conditions of Haiti. The training plan covered two general areas: close quarters combat and specific peace operations tasks. Embedded within each area were the application of the theater rules of engagement (ROE) and the use of graduated response to a threatening situation. During the training, the conditions changed for each task to reflect various levels of difficulty. Unit leaders trained on all tasks prior to conducting collective training. The training plan was aggressive given the constraint of only two weeks training time. This required all leaders to understand the training plan and meet the training standard within the tight time schedule.

The brigade commander's intent for conducting these particular training tasks relates directly to his mission analysis of the situation in Haiti. After completion of his leader's reconnaissance to Haiti and conducting a commander's mission analysis he determined the most significant threat situation the unit was likely to face involved a single armed individual in one room of a building, with one or more noncombatants in the building with him, at night. The commander wanted to focus the training on addressing this worst case event. He felt if the leaders and soldiers could handle this situation, they could easily adjust to other situations they would face. Additionally, the commander wanted
the training to address the specific tasks the units would conduct in Haiti. These included presence patrols, fixed site security, convoy operations, and checkpoint operations. Embedded in all of the tasks were the rules of engagement and the requirement to understand and use graduated response. The commander's intent for this training was to instill confidence in soldiers and leaders, build a cohesive team, and insure that everyone understood the ROE and how to use it with graduated response, and that units were familiar with the tasks they would perform in country.26

The training culminated with platoon and company situational training exercises (STX). The STX focused on four events: platoon fixed site security, platoon presence patrol, platoon convoy operation, and a company cordon and search mission. Within each event the conditions included application of the ROE, interaction with civilians, interplay with the media, and coordination exercises with non-governmental organizations. Each event challenged the small unit leader with the worst case scenario and multiple events to cause the leader to make decisions in a constrained environment. Each STX concluded with after action reviews (AARs) that focused on what happened, why it happened, and how the unit could improve on the tasks. Observer Controllers (O/Cs) from the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC) and subject matter experts (SMEs) from the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) provided feedback and advice to the unit. The participation by JRTC and CALL set a standard for their participation in future predeployment training, such as the Mountain Eagle exercises at the Combined Maneuver Training Center (CMTC) in
Germany. Figure 3 shows the 3rd Brigade training calendar for December 1994 and January 1995. According to MG George Fisher, the commander of the 25th Infantry Division (Light), the focus of the training was about right based on the unit executing virtually all the tasks in Haiti that it trained on during the pre-deployment.

The perception of the Multi-National Force by the Haitians varied depending on social class. A transition briefing to the UNMIH given by the MNF staff in late March 1995 provided a glimpse of the Haitian attitudes of members of the Haitian government, the upper class, the merchants, the lower class, and American citizens living in Haiti.

Members of the GOH prefer and respected the MNF because of US command and leadership. They also believe the US could provide more help financially because the UN had less money. The Haitian elite did not have a preference for the MNF or UNMIH as long as they were able to run their business in a secure environment. Some expressed a feeling of insecurity under MNF and expected the same under UNMIH. In the long run they expected failure because the Haitian population was not educated in democratic principles. The middle class needed security the most and was not convinced the UN could provide it. They felt the US did not deliver as much help as needed, but preferred to see the US in charge of the MNF. They believed the Haitian justice system was corrupt and ineffective because criminals were back on the street too quickly. The merchants were frustrated after seeing the same thief released two or three times. They were sympathetic to spontaneous crowds dealing with
criminals and saw nothing wrong with vigilante justice. They felt it was a necessary response until the justice system was fixed. They believed the IPSF was not a force, may not be police.

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DECEMBER 1994

Prep for Tag, Leader Tag, Vignette Discussions, Driver Tag

Vehicle Prep, Load Scale Inspect (1 Load CONEX)

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Leader Tag, Vignette Discussions.

Vehicle Prep, Load Scale Inspect (1 Load CONEX)

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Vehicle Prep, Load Scale Inspect (1 Load CONEX)

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They felt things promised. MNF.

Overstaffed since Haiti.

The Haitian attitude towards the MNF was favorable because of the short term improvements observed by the Haitian people. The average Haitian attitude towards the future was pessimistic and they looked toward action and tangible results as opposed to empty promises.
The 3d Brigade began deployment to Haiti on 26 December 1994 and assumed responsibility for operations on 17 January 1995. Until the end of March 1995, the brigade conducted peace operations in Northern Haiti. Task Force Bronco assumed the duties and responsibility as headquarters of Multi National Force North (MNF North) located along the northern coast in Cap Haitien, Haiti. This chapter examines the brigade’s mission and endstates, concept of the operation, and the tasks conducted while in Northern Haiti. Through this review the reader can gain an appreciation for the complexity of the operations conducted by 3d Brigade.
The 3d Brigade task organization consisted of the Headquarters of 3d
Brigade with three major subordinate units. Task Force 4th Battalion, 87th
Infantry consisted of about 500 soldiers from 3d Brigade. The Caribbean
Community (CARICOM) Battalion consisted of about 300 soldiers from 12
Caribbean Nations. The Guatemalan Company consisted of about 150
engineers and military police from Guatemala. See Figure 3-1 for the 3d Brigade
Task Organization. In addition to the three major combat units, MNF North
consisted of various combat support and combat service support units to include
the 325 Forward Support Battalion, a Special Operations Detachment
Headquarters (SOCCEE), and a Military Police Company to name a few. In all
the 3rd Brigade controlled approximately 2300 soldiers during the operation.

Brigade Task Organization

TF Bronco
HHC, 3 BDE
4-87 IN
   2/C/1-62 ADA
CARICOM Bn (TACON)
Guatemalan Co (TACON)
C/65 EN (L) (DS) (-)
3/58 MP CO (DS)
1/A/125 SIG BN (+)
DPSE 22
   TPT 221
   TPT 223
CATPT – 2/416 CA BN
SEC/351 AG CO (POSTAL) (DS) (-)
MIST 2/125 MI BN (DS)
325 FSB (FLE) (DS)

Figure 3-1. 3d Brigade Task Organization
3d Brigade’s chain of command extended upward through the Headquarters of the 25th Infantry Division, commanded by MG Fisher, to the Headquarters of Atlantic Command (ACOM) located in Norfolk, Virginia. ACOM controlled and directed the operations in Haiti beginning with the planning and intervention the previous year. The mission of ACOM in Haiti included the tasks of: protecting and, if required, evacuating US citizens, designated Haitians and third country nationals; maintaining a stable and secure environment in which the Government of Haiti (GOH) could return to governance; providing logistic support to the international mission; and professionalizing the military component of the Haitian Public Security Forces. When ordered, ACOM was to hand over responsibilities for any or all operational tasks and functions to the U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).33

The 25th Infantry Division (Light) identified its mission tasks in Haiti as: deploy the division; relieve the 10th Mountain Division (Light); as MNF Haiti, conduct peace operations to maintain a stable and secure environment that facilitates the return of functional governance; and, on order, transition to UNMIH.34

For MNF North the 3rd Brigade mission tasks consisted of: conduct relief in place of elements of the 10th ID (L) NLT 31 January 1995; and, conduct peace operations to maintain a stable and secure environment that facilitates the return of functional governance.35

Additional specified tasks assigned by the division headquarters to 3rd Brigade included:
1) Conduct pre-deployment training.

2) Deploy the brigade.

3) Conduct reception staging and onward movement in theater.

4) Conduct relief in place with the 2d Brigade Combat Team (BCT) of the 10th Mountain Division (Light).

5) Patrol in sector.

6) Conduct fixed site security to protect the force, designated facilities, activities and key Haitian leaders.

7) When ordered, implement a weapons buy back program.

8) Conduct show of force operations.

9) Be prepared to conduct non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO).

10) Be prepared to conduct civil military operations (CMO) in conjunction and cooperation with Haitian security forces.

11) Be prepared to assume responsibility for civil order in Northern Haiti.

12) Be prepared to disarm and detain disruptive military and paramilitary elements.

13) Be prepared to provide emergency humanitarian assistance to the populace.

14) Exercise operational control of designated coalition forces.

15) Coordinate the execution of IPM and IPSF patrol in conjunction with the brigades security operations.
16) Monitor and track all IPM and IPSF activity in sector. The endstate envisioned by ACOM included:

1) Conditions that returned the Government of Haiti to functional governance.

2) A stable and secure environment that existed throughout Haiti.

3) Professionalization of the existing FAD'H by refocusing, restructuring and reforming.

4) Provide the logistic support for the Multi-National Force (MNF) and subsequently, the entire United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH).

The 25th Infantry Division (Light) defined endstate was:

1) The creation of a secure and stable environment nationwide, sufficient to facilitate both the restoration of democracy and a rapid transition to UNMIH.

2) Development of a military component of Haitian public security forces. The security forces have been fully exposed, both on an individual and institutional basis, to the norms commonly held by militaries in a democratic society. It is refocused into new mission areas responsive to the needs of society as a whole and is institutionally reformed with the Government of Haiti (GOH) mechanisms in place to provide for its overall sustainment and basic needs of its members.

3) Protecting U.S. soldiers, providing them with realistic training, a decent quality of life, and suitable living conditions while deployed.
The 25th Infantry Division (Light) centers of gravity for the operation were: the safety of the President of Haiti; a secure and stable environment (both fact and perception); a professional police and functional judiciary; a loyal and proficient military; a positive U.S. Military image in Haiti, and a cooperative relationship with UN and coalition partners. These centers of gravity lead to the strategy developed by the division and subsequently 3d Brigade. 3d Brigade did not further refine the division centers of gravity for Northern Haiti.

The 25th Division security strategy for Haiti included a tiered approach in both the urban and rural areas using a variety of forces. In the rural areas it included use of Special Operations Forces (SOF) presence and out of sector missions by conventional operations in support of SOF units. In urban areas joint patrolling with IPM, IPSF, and MPs, a well-publicized weapon buy back program, street sweeps, and saturation patrolling periodically as a show of presence.

The 3rd Brigade operations in Haiti were divided into four phases: pre-deployment training during phase I; deployment of the brigade and conduct of the relief in place during phase II; brigade operations in Northern Haiti during phase III; and transition of operations to UNMIH and redeployment during phase IV.

The brigade focused its operations in Northern Haiti into four categories. These included: administrative, escort, civil affairs, and show of presence.

Administrative and escort operations were support primarily within the brigade. Administrative operations included reoccurring events such as maintenance standards, fitness standards, standards for handling hazardous material, and standards for uniform just to name a few. The brigade conducted
escort operations throughout Operation Uphold Democracy for a variety of visitors to include: the former President, Jimmy Carter; the future commander of the UNMIH; various United States State Department representatives; and military commanders from coalition nations.

Civil affairs operations and show of presence operations were focused on the brigade's area of operation and were both used by 3d Brigade to maintain a secure and stable environment. Show of presence operations helped to promote security, while civil affairs operations served to provide long term stability.

The purpose of the 3d Brigade show of presence strategy throughout Northern Haiti was to demonstrate MNF commitment to a secure and stable environment and to assess and influence progress towards the restoration of governmental infrastructure. The brigade intended to conduct show of presence operations in areas where they were needed based upon METT-T. The brigade identified and prioritize its mission requirement from information provided by Special Operation Forces, country teams, and other sources. The brigade then established a standardized operational, transportation and logistics plan to reduce the time lag between the identification of requirements and the conduct of the mission. Coalition forces were integrated into the plan as soon as possible to extend the assessment and presence missions throughout the AOR. All of this was conducted to facilitate and maintain a secure and stable environment.

3d Brigade’s method included identifying and prioritizing requirements, developing targets, tasking subordinate units, and then coordinating assets as
required. Targeting was based on continuous assessment and feedback of conditions throughout Northern Haiti and was synchronized into the overall operational scheme of maneuver. Infantry companies conduct approximately 2-4 day missions to specified areas as a show of presence. The subordinate units developed standardized deployment techniques and packages to enhance flexibility. Coalition units participated in these missions to increase the brigade's ability to cover a larger area.

The mission categories each have specific types of tasks associated with them. Figure 3-2 provides a list of the specific tasks associated with the show of presence mission conducted by 3d Brigade. These are not all inclusive of all show of presence missions but only reflect those conducted in Northern Haiti.

Peace Operations Tasks

- Cordon and Search
- Fixed Site Security
- Presence Patrols
- Convoy Escort
- VIP Escort
- Check point operations
- Message Broadcasts
- Area Assessments
- Election Support
- Haitian Police Support
- Joint Patrolling

Figure 3-2. Tasks Conducted by 3d Brigade

The purpose of the civil military operations (CMO) conducted by the brigade was to enhance stability in Northern Haiti by identifying, planning, coordinating, and assisting in some of the projects. The CMO projects of interest
to the brigade served to enhance public works, public health, public education, agriculture, and public safety. Each area needed immediate attention in Northern Haiti due to years of neglect by the previous government of Haiti (GOH). Everything needed to be fixed immediately by the current government of Haiti. The goal for the brigade was assisting the GOH without undermining the legitimacy of the new government. This fine line between advising, supporting, supervising, and doing was important to the future stability of Northern Haiti.

Figure 3-3 shows the types of civil military operations of concern to 3d Brigade. Figure 3-4 shows the specific types of CMO projects 3d Brigade during its operations in Northern Haiti.

**Civil Military Operations**

- Public Works (Sanitation, roads, and power)
- Public Health (Immunization, health education, and food distribution)
- Public Education (School infrastructure, GOH accreditation, and community support)
- Agriculture (Erosion control and reforestation)
- Public Safety (Law enforcement and fire services)

Figure 3-3. Types of civil military operations of concern to 3rd Brigade

**Specific CMO projects**

- Power plant security and assessment
- Water line assessment
- IPSF support (patrolling, security for pay)
- Submission of funding requirements to United Nations and Other organizations for projects in Cap Haitien.
- Sanitation (streets, market, sewers)
- Waste Water sites
- Light project (night-lights for school kids to study by)
- Election support
- Schools (IAW GOH regulations)
- Reforestation (fast growing trees)
- Fire Station (renovation and repair of vehicles)
Four of the brigade tasks are highlighted here that were important to the operations success. These are presence patrols, message broadcasting, Haitian Police support, and joint patrolling. The brigade conducted several patrolling types. There were day and night, mounted and dismounted patrols within the city limits of Cap Haitien, to local villages close to Cap Haitien, and to distant cities throughout Northern Haiti. The purpose of the patrols was maximum presence or saturation of the area of operations. During a patrol units conducted checkpoint operations, checked the side streets and alleys. One key to the patrols was communications with the local population through interpreters.

Message broadcasting was an important task conducted by the psychological operations personnel of the brigade (DPSE 22 and its two subordinate broadcast teams, see Figure 3-1 for task organization) and supported by the infantry units. These broadcasts provided information to the local population on the current status of the MNF operations, the government in Haiti, and on the future transition to the UNMIH. These broadcasts were useful to the brigade in getting information out quickly to the population since radio in Northern Haiti was limited and television non-existent.

The brigade supported Haitian police operations and conducted joint patrols in Cap Haitien and throughout Northern Haiti. Initially, the brigade assisted the international police monitors (IPM) in the selection and training of personnel for the new Haitian police force. Joint patrols were conducted with the interim special police force (IPSF), whose personnel were, in reality, vetted
FAH'd members. These joint patrols enhanced the safety and credibility of the IPSF with the Haitian people. This key mission was the corner stone to developing a secure environment and future stability in Haiti without outside assistance.

SUMMARY

25th Infantry Division headquarters gave 3d Brigade 16 specific tasks to conduct during operations in Haiti with the purpose of establishing and maintaining a secure and stable environment. From these the brigade focused it's operations towards civil affairs operations with the purpose to build stability for the future and show of presence with the purpose of maintaining a secure environment.

The brigade used a several methods and variety of specific tasks to achieve the purpose of a secure and stable environment in Haiti. These were determined based on continual assessment and "targeting". The next chapter examines how the brigade determined the appropriate tasks to achieve the desired purpose of security and stability for Northern Haiti.
In the previous chapter, reviews of the 3d Brigade tasks revealed operations focused on achieving a stable and secure environment in Northern Haiti. How did the brigade go about achieving this purpose when the training and operations prior to the deployment to Haiti focused on combat operations? Peace operations are much different than combat operations and the methods used by tactical units are also different. This chapter examines how the brigade planned its operations, the available peace operations doctrine, and tries to determine if the brigade demonstrated the doctrine to accomplish its purpose in Haiti.

The brigade planning process, or cycle, consisted of three parts: area assessment, targeting, and mission focus. The brigade conducted an area assessment of all Northern Haiti to determine the "threats" to security and stability. These "threats" were individuals, groups, actions, events, or conditions that could influence security and stability. Brigade concerns over security fell into two categories; threats to MNF North and threats to the GOH. Brigade concerns over stability fell into a short term and long term category. One short-term example was the restoration and the ability to maintain power in Cap Haitien. Another was accurate information about MNF and GOH activities needed to be disseminated to the population to dispel rumors. In the long-term GOH infrastructure needed to be restored and maintained. Police and fire services, sanitation services, city upgrade projects, and the restoration of a judicial system all were part of the long-term goals of stability. The brigade conducted its area
assessment with a variety of resources available to its command. Special Operating Forces living and working in the rural areas, subordinate tactical units conducting reconnaissance throughout Northern Haiti, division intelligence sources, town meetings with local government officials, and information provided by non-governmental and private organizations. All information gathered about the brigade's area of operations passed through the civil military operations center (CMOC) to the brigade operations center in order for the staff to begin the targeting process.

The brigade targeting process focused the efforts of the brigade operations section, the intelligence section, the special operations headquarters detachment, and the civil affairs section to template the threats identified by the area assessment. The brigade targeting prioritized the levels of threats and made recommendations on how soon the threat needed to be addressed.

Once the brigade identified a threat, or potential threat, then brigade assets were assigned to address the threat. One example given earlier was the continued power shortage in Cap Haitien. The brigade assigned its rifle companies the responsibility to increase the presence patrols around the power plant to deter potential violence against the power plant. Civil affairs staff officers worked through governmental organizations to assist in the purchase of new equipment and fuel for the power plant. The brigade commander worked through the division headquarters to have the GOH assign competent leadership to the power plant to keep the power consistently on in Cap Haitien. This combined strategy led to the restoration of power and a consistent, though very low, output
over time. In this case, restoration of power was directly related to future stability of the Cap Haitien City infrastructure.

The targeting process is familiar to military planners and is addressed in Army doctrine. This process, when applied to peace operations, is not addressed completely in the peace operations doctrine. In the preface of FM 100-23, it states:

Commanders will face ambiguous situations and uncertainty in peace operations. They are obligated to set clear objectives, define the mission, firmly guide operations, and measure progress and success. In order to assist commanders and their staffs, this manual explains the principles and tenets of peace operations and their applications; describes likely peace operations; and discusses command, control, coordination, and liaison requirements and other unique planning considerations.  

FM 100-23 goes on to briefly discuss mission analysis and gives one example of linking a security mission to a clearly defined endstate. Since security is a principle of peace operations, as we will see later in the chapter, and Army units practice it in peace operations and combat operations, this portion of a unit’s task is familiar. In the case of 3d Brigade, FM 100-23 is helpful when planning for the "secure" half of its purpose. FM 100-23 does not address the "stability" half of 3d Brigade's purpose leaving it up to the commander and staff to determine how to accomplish this task.

The measure of success in peace operations, defined in the introduction of FM 100-23, is settlement and not victory. The doctrine indicates settlement is rarely achieved through military efforts alone. Peace operations are designed to create or sustain the conditions in which political and diplomatic activities may
proceed. This sounds a lot like stability but, again, there is no discussion of stability addressed in FM 100-23.

The principles of operations other than war (OOTW) objective, unity of command, and security are the same as the principles of war outlined in earlier chapters of FM 100-5. The remaining three: legitimacy, perseverance, and restraint are specifically related to OOTW. FM 100-5 states the relative application of the principles will vary depending on the specific operation.” It goes on to say “a commander must balance these principles against the specific requirements of their mission and the nature of the operation.” Finally the doctrine says “these principles are not immutable, they serve as guides for action.”

Earlier in FM 100-5, the doctrine states the principles of war “are a general guidance for war,” “are the enduring bedrock of Army doctrine,” and “have withstood the test of time.” Oxford's Dictionary of Current English defines a principle as a “fundamental truth or law as the basis of reasoning or action.” Principles are necessary to interpret a theory into guidance for action.

A tenet as defined by FM 100-5 is “a basic truth held by an organization.” Oxford defines a tenet as a doctrine or principle. FM 100-23 outlines the tenets of peace operations as versatility, initiative, agility, depth, and synchronization. According to Army doctrine the tenets of peace operations are the same as the tenets for combat operations.

A further review of FM 100-5 describes fundamentals of offensive and defensive operations. In the chapters outlining each type of operation, the
framework for discussion is a description of the purpose, characteristics, forms of tactical offense or defense, forms of maneuver, and a discussion of operations in depth.\textsuperscript{51} FM 100-5 does not describe Operations Other Than War using this framework even though chapter 2 indicates “the prime focus of the Army is warfighting, yet the Army’s frequent role in operations other than war is critical.”\textsuperscript{52} This gives emphasis to the importance of OOTW, yet the doctrine described later in FM 100-5 and FM 100-23 is not complete leaving the execution of peace operations open to the interpretation of the commander.

Did the brigade demonstrate the principles of OOTW based on the tasks conducted in Northern Haiti? A link can be made between the brigade’s actions and the principles of war. The objective defined by the brigade was a stable and secure environment. The secure half is clearly definable, decisive, and attainable. Stability can be definable but is not as decisive nor is it easy to attain or even attainable for the military alone.

The brigade demonstrated a military unity of effort within the brigade and with coalition forces. Since 3d Brigade was MNF North, responsibility fell to that headquarters to coordinate and synchronize all activities in Northern Haiti. Once again, the military alone cannot accomplish all the necessary tasks for stability and the GOH and the US government organizations fall outside the purview of the brigade. Other than establishing and securing a location for coordination, future stability lay in the hands of the other governmental organizations. The other elements of power - diplomatic, information, and economic - begin to take precedence over military actions. By definition, the military ceases to be the
primary instrument of national power in use when the conditions are set for continued political and diplomatic activities, as mentioned earlier. In the case of Haiti, the military began operations after a diplomatic settlement. The military requirement focused establishing the conditions necessary to sustain the diplomatic settlement. A military unit can establish the secure environment but does not have the resources, training, and typically the time to establish long term stability.

Legitimacy was initially established for the brigade with the UN mandate. The brigade built on this by working through the GOH and establishing the conditions that allowed the establishment and functioning of the government. Deliberate actions to act impartial during elections, support in training a new police force and a continuous information campaign designed to keep the population informed all enhanced the legitimacy of the brigade. The brigade conducted operations within the theater rules of engagement. By design, the ROE, in conjunction with a graduate response to threats restrained the actions of the brigade. Additionally, the size and composition of the force, types of weapons employed, and the deliberate non-threatening attitude displayed towards the Haitian population demonstrated restraint. The brigade fired no shots in anger during the deployment to Haiti.

Perseverance, by definition, is the measured, sustained application of military capability in support of strategic aims. Once again the brigade accomplished this for the security of its area of operation. Since stability takes
longer and the US military strategy was short duration, perseverance was not demonstrated completely.

The doctrinal definition of security indicates a unit should never permit hostile factions to acquire an unexpected advantage. The brigade experienced only one incident where a hostile faction killed three former FAH'd policemen in the town of Limbe. The brigade maintained a high level of security throughout Northern Haiti with its show of presence strategy, use of SOF, and information campaign. No hostile actions were directed at coalition forces as part of the MNF during the deployment. The threat in Haiti, especially the 3d Brigade sector, was very low.

The brigade demonstrated the principles of OOTW based on the tasks conducted in Northern Haiti. The brigades operations indicate the use of each principle throughout the conduct of operations. By pre-design or simply based on the types of missions and tasks conducted, given the environment in Haiti, the OOTW principles are all represented during 3d Brigades time in Haiti.

CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Operations Uphold Democracy in Haiti was the first peace operation conducted by the United States Army since the publication the Army's peace operations doctrine. The environment the Army faced in Haiti was complex and presented numerous challenges. Haiti required a secure environment to enable
the re-established government of Aristide to resume control. Virtually all the infrastructure of Haiti, from public works to public education, needed to be re-established before long-term stability could be realized inside the country. Only then could a future under democratic conditions exist for Haiti.

3d Brigade assumed the mission to maintain a security to enable stability in Northern Haiti after relieving units from the 10th Mountain Division (Light). The brigade had a short three months to execute its mission prior to a transition to the United Nations Mission in Haiti in early April 1995. 3d Brigade employed show of presence and civil military operations to achieve its objectives. The show of presence focused the brigade’s efforts on the short-term requirement for security while civil military operations focused on the longer-term goal of stability. This monograph reviewed the wide variety of tasks, integrated by the brigade, to implement the show of presence strategy to gain and maintain security and in the conduct of CMO to achieve stability. What the brigade was able to do successfully was establish a secure environment in Northern Haiti that allowed work to begin on the infrastructure needs for the long-term success of stability. The brigade was well equipped to succeed with the first task, but did not have the time to see through to completion the success of long-term stability in Haiti.

The doctrine available to the brigade covering peace operations included discussion of operations other than war in the Army’s capstone doctrinal manual FM 100-5, Operations, and in a manual specifically discussing peace operations, FM 100-23. In both manuals, doctrine described the principles, tenets, the environment, and the types of peace operations as they related to military
operations. The doctrine was descriptive, but gave little suggestion on how to conduct operations other than war. The doctrine provided the foundation and some guidance on the conduct of peace operations within the framework of Army operations.

Military operations conducted by 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) during Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti from January to April 1995 validated the principles of peace operations. The previous chapter analyzed the brigade’s actions in Haiti while conducting peace operations. The brigade’s operations, subsequent strategy, and specific tasks conducted demonstrated the use of the principles of peace operations throughout. These principles remained sound in their application during Operation Uphold Democracy.

Since Operation Uphold Democracy, the United States has deployed ground forces in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo to conduct peace operations. The need to review and update doctrine on peace operations clearly exists. Five years and three major operations have passed since peace operations doctrine was last published. Enough information exists to conduct an analysis of peace operations to determine if refinements, additions, or deletions to the existing doctrine are needed. It is incumbent on the Army to update peace operations doctrine, since Army participation in future peace operations is very likely.

What areas of peace operations doctrine can be improved? There are six areas the Army can improve its peace operations doctrine. The first is the framework in which peace operations is discussed inside of doctrine. In FM 100-5, Operations, offense and defense are discussed in the framework of
The discussion of peace operations should be described in the same framework as offense and defense. By framing the discussion of peace operations in a manner similar to both the offense and defense, the reader can better understand the doctrine. For example, forms of peace operations can take the place of activities, and the type of missions (security and stability) can replace forms of maneuver. Operations in depth can be discussed as operations over time and operations as a complex system involving many aspects. Planning and preparation can address the unique aspects of peace operations in a manner similar to the discussion about offense and defense. Finally, conducting peace operations can describe the specific types of tasks unique to peace operations.

The second area to be improved is the refinement of peace operations doctrine to reflect imperatives instead of principles. Imperatives are obligatory or essential things according to the Oxford dictionary. The Special Operations Forces doctrine in FM 100-25 provides a list of army special operations
imperatives to consider when applying peace operations doctrine. The imperatives outlined in FM 100-25 are directly related to peace operations. Figure 5-1, Special Operations Imperatives provides a list without definition of the imperatives.59

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Understand the Operational Environment</th>
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<tr>
<td>Recognize Political Implication</td>
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<td>Facilitate Interagency Activities</td>
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<td>Engage the Threat Discriminatory</td>
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<tr>
<td>Consider Long-Term Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure Legitimacy and Credibility of Special Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anticipate and Control Psychological Effects</td>
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<tr>
<td>Apply Capabilities Indirectly</td>
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<tr>
<td>Develop Multiple Options</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ensure Long-Term Sustainment</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide Sufficient Intelligence</td>
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<tr>
<td>Balance Security With Synchronization</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

Figure 5-1. Army Special Operations Imperatives

The third area to be improved is the inclusion of the method on how to develop a strategy with which to conduct peace operations given a particular environment. This would discuss the techniques a unit employs in taking its mission, the environment, and the doctrine and turning it into a strategy for success. Strategy development is important not only to the initial success of a peace operation, but also to the long term achievement of the overall goals of the operation.
The fourth and fifth areas for improvement are the description of the security and stability missions and their related tasks. Adding the two types of missions into current doctrine help promote an understanding of these mission requirements. While some discussion of security missions currently exists, no similar discussion of stability mission is available.

Finally, a task list is needed to define the tasks related specifically to peace operations. This task list is necessary to describe the actions Army units perform in peace operations. The tasks defined in FM 101-5-1, Military Symbols and Definitions, pertain to combat operations. A void exists in the area of peace operations definitions. Figure 5-2 provides a suggested list of peace operation tasks. The suggested tasks can help clarify the meaning of missions given to subordinate units and help in the overall understanding of the task to be performed. The suggested list is not all-inclusive, but a recommended start for further refinement and addition into the doctrine.

Peace operations occur in a complex and dynamic environment. They require very flexible commanders and staffs well versed in the conduct of peace operations. Doctrine is the basis for the development of the requisite leaders to carry out the missions assigned in peace operations. It is the framework used in the Army school system, followed by the guide for training by units at home station or at the Combat Training Centers (CTC). Review and update of the doctrine requires time and a dedicated commitment to producing a product usable by the soldiers and leaders who will execute these tasks under ambiguous situations.
Figure 5-2. Suggested Peace Operations Task List.

The story of 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light) was one of many peace operations stories played out in the 1990's by the Army. If the recent past is an indication of the near future, the Army will continue conducting peace operations. Current doctrine is the start point in preparing leaders and units for the execution of these operations. 60

LIST OF ACRONYMS

AAFES  Army Air Force Exchange Service
AAR  After Action Review
ACOM  United States Atlantic Command (now Joint Forces Command)
ADVON  Advance Party
AFR  Armed Forces Radio
AO  Area of Operation
ATC  Army Training Center
BCT  Brigade Combat Team
<table>
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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
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<tr>
<td>CA</td>
<td>Civil Affairs</td>
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<tr>
<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARICOM</td>
<td>Caribbean Community</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CARL</td>
<td>Combined Arms Research Library</td>
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<tr>
<td>CMO</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMOC</td>
<td>Civil Military Operations Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Combined Maneuver Training Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CNG</td>
<td>National Governing Council</td>
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<tr>
<td>CPT</td>
<td>Captain</td>
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<tr>
<td>CQC</td>
<td>Close Quarters Combat</td>
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<tr>
<td>CS</td>
<td>Chemical Smoke</td>
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<tr>
<td>CSI</td>
<td>Combat Studies Institute</td>
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<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<tr>
<td>ETS</td>
<td>End of Time in Service</td>
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<tr>
<td>FAH'd</td>
<td>Forces Arme d'Haiti</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FRAPH</td>
<td>Revolutionary Front For Haitian Advancement and Progress</td>
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<tr>
<td>FSB</td>
<td>Forward Support Battalion</td>
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<tr>
<td>GOH</td>
<td>Government of Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>HUMMV</td>
<td>High Mobility Medium Utility Vehicle</td>
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<td>IG</td>
<td>Inspector General</td>
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<td>IPM</td>
<td>International Police Monitors</td>
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<td>IPSF</td>
<td>Interim Police Security Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>IRT</td>
<td>Individual Readiness Training</td>
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<tr>
<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LST</td>
<td>Landing Ship Tank</td>
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<tr>
<td>LT</td>
<td>Lieutenant</td>
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<tr>
<td>LZ</td>
<td>Landing Zone</td>
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<tr>
<td>MAJ</td>
<td>Major</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEDEVAC</td>
<td>Medical Evacuation</td>
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<tr>
<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>METT-T</td>
<td>Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Troops, Time</td>
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<tr>
<td>MNF</td>
<td>Multi National Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War</td>
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<tr>
<td>MOUT</td>
<td>Military Operations in Urban Terrain</td>
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<tr>
<td>MP</td>
<td>Military Police</td>
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<tr>
<td>MRE</td>
<td>Mission Rehearsal Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTP</td>
<td>Mission Training Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major Theater War</td>
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<td>MWR</td>
<td>Morale Welfare and Recreation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NCO</td>
<td>Non Commissioned Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
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<tr>
<td>NVG</td>
<td>Night Vision Goggles</td>
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<tr>
<td>OAS</td>
<td>Organization of American States</td>
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<tr>
<td>OC</td>
<td>Observer Controller</td>
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<td>OOSM</td>
<td>Out of Sector Mission</td>
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<td>OOTW</td>
<td>Operations Other Than War</td>
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<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
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<td>OPTEMPO</td>
<td>Operational Tempo</td>
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<tr>
<td>PCS</td>
<td>Permanent Change of Duty Station</td>
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<tr>
<td>POI</td>
<td>Program of Instruction</td>
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<tr>
<td>POM</td>
<td>Preparation for Overseas Movement</td>
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<tr>
<td>PSYOPS</td>
<td>Psychological Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>QRF</td>
<td>Quick Reaction Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>R&amp;R</td>
<td>Rest and Relaxation</td>
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<tr>
<td>RDC</td>
<td>Rear Detachment Commander</td>
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<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<tr>
<td>RTO</td>
<td>Radio Telephone Operator</td>
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<tr>
<td>S-2</td>
<td>Intelligence Officer</td>
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<td>S-3</td>
<td>Operations Officer</td>
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<tr>
<td>SAW</td>
<td>Squad Automatic Weapon</td>
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<tr>
<td>SF</td>
<td>Special Forces</td>
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<tr>
<td>SFC</td>
<td>Sergeant First Class</td>
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<tr>
<td>SJA</td>
<td>Staff Judge Advocate</td>
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<tr>
<td>SME</td>
<td>Subject Matter Expert</td>
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<td>SOCCEE</td>
<td>Special Operations Detachment Headquarters</td>
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<td>SOF</td>
<td>Special Operations Forces</td>
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<td>SOP</td>
<td>Standard Operating Procedure</td>
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<td>SSC</td>
<td>Small Scale Contingencies</td>
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<td>STX</td>
<td>Situational Training Exercise</td>
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<tr>
<td>TAC</td>
<td>Tactical Administration Center</td>
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<td>TACSAT</td>
<td>Tactical Satellite</td>
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<tr>
<td>TOC</td>
<td>Tactical Operation Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>TRADOC</td>
<td>United States Army Training and Doctrine Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
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<tr>
<td>UNMIH</td>
<td>United Nations Mission in Haiti</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACGSOC</td>
<td>United States Army Command and General Staff Officers College</td>
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<td>USAIC</td>
<td>United States Army Infantry Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>VTC</td>
<td>Video Tele Conference</td>
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<td>WWII</td>
<td>World War Two</td>
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2 Department of the Army, Headquarters, 3d Brigade, 25th Infantry Division (Light), MNF Cap Haitien, Haiti, APO AE 09320-3080. Brigade Executive Summary, 27 March 1995.


5 Ibid, 231.


7 Ibid, 18.

8 Ibid, 19.

9 Ibid, 14.

10 Ibid, 23.


15 Ibid, 244.

16 Ibid, 245.


19 Ibid, 297.


21 Ibid, 266.

22 JTF-190 Operation Uphold Democracy, Oral History Interviews, 83.

23 Ibid, 91.

24 Ibid, 89.


26 Authors interview with BG Gary Speer, October 1998.

27 The Mountain Eagle Exercises were mission rehearsal exercises for unit preparing to deploy to operations in Bosnia.


30 This training calendar is from the author’s personal records. The calendar also appears in the author’s thesis, Stanley, Bruce E., “Operations Other Than War, One Soldier’s Story.” Master of Military Art and Science Thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, KS 1999, 22. This thesis provides a detailed discussion of the pre-deployment training conducted by the brigade from the point of view of the author.

31 The following Caribbean Nations contributed to CARICOM: Antigua and Barbuda, the Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Dominica, Grenada, Guyana,
Jamaica, St. Kitts and Nevis, St. Lucia, St Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad and Tobago.


33 Ibid, 11.

34 Ibid, 11.


36 Ibid, 25.

37 Ibid, 11.


39 TF Bronco Operations Brief, March 16, 1995, Cap Haitien Haiti. Slides from briefing packet located in the CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

40 Deployed Commanders SITREP, 3BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID(L) TF Bronco-OPSUM Jan 95, 201200 – 211200 Jan 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.


44 Ibid, 13-3.


The brigade deployed to Haiti with all its crew served weapons (mortars, TOW, Dragons, and machine guns), though kept them in the base camp arms rooms. The presence patrols deliberately postured (weapons always pointed to the ground or in the air) to demonstrate a non-aggressive posture. Artillery or armored vehicles were not deployed to Northern Haiti.


55 Ibid, 16.

56 Deployed Commanders SITREP, 3BDE, Haiti MNF, 25 ID(L) TF Bronco-OPSUM Feb 95, 141200 – 151200 Feb 95. CARL Archives, Haiti Collection, Fort Leavenworth, KS.

