INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS—A CONCEPT FOR A NEW MILLENNIUM

A MONOGRAPH
BY
MAJOR JAMES E. TAYLOR
UNITED STATES ARMY NATIONAL GUARD

SCHOOL OF ADVANCED MILITARY STUDIES
UNITED STATES ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
FORT LEAVENWORTH, KANSAS

FIRST TERM AY 99-00

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION IS UNLIMITED

DTIC QUALITY INSPECTED 3
School of Advanced Military Studies
Monograph Approval

Major James E. Taylor

Title of Monograph: Integration of the Army National Guard in Force Projection Operations—A Concept for a New Millennium

Approved by:

________________________ Monograph Director
LTC Robert R. Chadwick

________________________ Director, School of Advanced Military Studies
COL Robin P. Swan

________________________ Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

Accepted this 15th Day of December 1999
ABSTRACT

INTEGRATION OF THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD IN FORCE PROJECTION OPERATIONS—A CONCEPT FOR A NEW MILLENIUM by Major James E. Taylor, 41 pages.

In the summer of 1989, following the breakup of the Soviet Union and the ending of the Cold War, the Department of Defense announced plans to modify the structure and size of the armed forces based upon the changing security environment. Of particular interest to the Army was the appropriate balance and mix of combat, combat support (CS), and combat service support (CSS) units between the Regular Army and the Reserve Components. The “Bottom-Up-Review” identified a critical Total Army shortfall in the number of CS/CSS units necessary to enable the United States to successfully conduct military operations in two nearly simultaneous major theater wars, and determined that much of the National Guard’s combat force structure was not necessary based on the contemporary security environment.

Following Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, the National Guard began the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS), to restructure its forces in order to make them more relevant to the needs of the Army, and the present global security situation. As a part of this initiative, the National Guard and the Regular Army created two integrated divisions by using Guard enhanced separate brigades as the subordinate ground maneuver units of two Regular Army division headquarters. The Guard also began the conversion of the ground maneuver brigades of two of its eight combat divisions into combat support and combat service support units in an effort to reduce the critical shortfall identified in the “Bottom-Up-Review.” The remaining six National Guard divisions were teamed with Regular Army divisions in a mutually beneficial training, deployment, and operational support relationship. As a part of the emerging mission of homeland defense, the National Guard also began developing rapid assessment and initial detection teams in order to facilitate the consequence management of weapons of mass destruction incidents.

This monograph assesses the relevancy of the National Guard’s force structure changes with the requirements imposed by the present global security situation. It challenges the historical paradigm that surrounds the employment of National Guard units in force projection operations. The National Security and Military Strategies, Joint Vision 2010, the 1997 report of the National Defense Panel, and the Reserve Components Employment Study (RCE-05) are used as a framework to define the requirements, capabilities, role, and expectations of the National Guard from which to base this assessment. This monograph also shows that the knowledge base and capabilities of the National Guard’s combat, combat support, and combat service support force structure, although capable of sustained land warfare operations, are well suited to stability and support operations. This capability may provide theater commanders with additional options not previously considered feasible. This monograph concludes that while the National Guard’s force structure changes are a positive step, and do succeed in making it a more relevant military force, more change is needed on the part of both the National Guard, and the Regular Army, if the objectives of the National Security and Military Strategies are to be realized.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MONOGRAPH APPROVAL</td>
<td>II</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>III</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TABLE OF CONTENTS</td>
<td>IV</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE PROBLEMS OF INTEGRATION</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROLE OF THE NATIONAL GUARD</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERGING STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE CHANGING WORLD</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGIC ENVIRONMENT</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CURRENT AND EMERGING SECURITY SITUATION</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORCE RELEVANCY</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EMERGING NATIONAL GUARD FORCE STRUCTURE</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Integrated Division</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Guard Division</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Enhanced Brigade</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailored Force to Meet the Threat</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration at the Company or Battalion Level</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Force Integration</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smaller-Scale Contingencies and Stability and Support Operations</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Homeland Defense</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GUARD'S FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Enhanced Separate Brigades and the Integrated Division</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Support and Combat Service Support Force Structure</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL GUARD DIVISIONS AND THE TEAMING CONCEPT</td>
<td>35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Implications of Army National Guard Vision 2010</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

"Our united mission, as we move into the 21st century is to dispel the perception of the 'weekend warrior' and create an environment in which the National Guard, the Reserve, and the active forces can work together, unencumbered by the old notional barriers of the past."—Charles L. Cragin, Assistant Secretary of Defense, 1999.

Since 1989, the global security environment that characterized the employment of our nation's military has undergone a significant transformation. Until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the central theme of United States foreign policy has been based on a bipartisan policy called containment. Conceived by George F. Kennan under the pen name "Mr. X," the primary objective of containment was to present an "unalterable counterforce at every point where they (the former Soviet Union) show signs of encroaching upon the interests of a peaceful and stable world." Within the context of this security environment, the missions and expectations of our military were readily apparent, and easily foreseen. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the subsequent abandonment of containment as a foreign policy, have left our national leaders floundering in their attempts to develop a coherent and comprehensive foreign policy. Conflict abounds when many believed that the fall of the Berlin Wall and the subsequent wave of global democratization would usher in an era of peace. These uncertainties lead to an increase in the number of military missions outside of the traditional environment of sustained land warfare. The complexity and nature of the expanding demands of the military require a force structure and capability that can successfully confront these challenges.

To be successful in the complex global environment that characterizes the next millennium, the United States must be able to employ its military in force projection operations that not only include offensive and defensive operations associated with sustained land warfare, but also a myriad of differing and resource-intensive stability and support operations. The declining strength, resources, readiness, and present operations tempo of the active component necessitate increased reliance upon the National Guard and the Army Reserve if the military is to successfully accomplish the demands required of it. This monograph assesses the relevancy of the National Guard's current and emerging force structure to the contemporary security environment and the National Security and Military Strategies.

The National Guard differs from the Army Reserve in that it has a dual mission. Its Federal mission is to "maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency or as otherwise needed." Its State mission is to "provide trained and disciplined forces for domestic emergencies or as otherwise directed by state laws." As presently organized, the Army National Guard consists of forces (approximately 361,000 soldiers) distributed across the 54 states and territories. Unfortunately, a perception of distrust and a lack of confidence exist between the National Guard and the Regular Army that inhibits the development of a close and cooperative relationship between the two components in force projection operations—particularly in the employment of National Guard combat forces. A solid understanding of its historical foundation is necessary before the relevancy of the current and emerging National Guard force structure can truly
be assessed. This chapter illustrates the historical foundation of the problems surrounding the modern integration of the National Guard and the Regular Army.

Historical Perspective of the Problems of Integration

The National Guard has the distinction of being the oldest component of the armed forces of the United States. The English settlers in the Massachusetts Bay Colony organized the first militia regiment in 1636, and subsequently employed this militia in a war against the Pequot Indians of Connecticut in 1637. The militia concept served as the foundation for colonial defense from 1636 through the conclusion of the Revolutionary War, when the federalists and state's rights advocates held opposing views on the organization and role of the armed forces in the newly independent republic. Federalists sought a large central government with a large standing Army. State's rights advocates sought for a small federal government with a small standing Army—believing that power should be concentrated at the state level, wherein each state would control their individual militias. This conflict was resolved constitutionally by allowing states to appoint officers and supervise the training of their militias, and allowing the federal government to impose standards upon those militias. While the War of 1812, the Civil War, the period of reconstruction and industrialization, and the Spanish American War resulted in the further evolution of the relationship between the militia and the Regular Army, it was after the 1900s that the relationship became strained.

In 1900, the Regular Army was composed of approximately 66,000 soldiers, while the militia consisted of a force of a little over 100,000 soldiers. All militia soldiers served voluntarily, and without compensation. In many cases, soldiers paid unit dues and provided their own uniforms. It was the passage of the Dick Act in 1903 that began the process of modernizing the militia. Under the terms of this legislation, states received federal funding for their militias as long as they attained minimum strength levels, attended twenty-four drill periods per year and five days of annual training, and were inspected by Regular Army officers. This Act also required militia units to conduct maneuvers with the Regular Army and receive training from them. The Dick Act was later amended by the Militia Act of 1908, which subjected the militia to a federal call-up for nine months, and specified that the militia would go to war as units and not as individual replacements. (The subsequent use of National Guard soldiers as replacements in World War I, World War II, and Korea was viewed as a blatant violation of the Dick and Militia Acts, and resulted in violent intercomponent hostility.) In 1908, Secretary of War Luke E. Wright established the Division of Militia Affairs (now the National Guard Bureau) to administer the affairs of the militia. This organization, which was staffed by Regular Army officers, came under the direct control of the Chief of Staff Leonard Wood.

Both the Dick and Militia Acts expanded the capabilities of the state militia, and in 1911, the Division of Militia Affairs oversaw the formation of the militia into standardized infantry, field artillery, coastal artillery, cavalry, engineer, and signal units. By the end of 1916, the availability of federal funding allowed the size of the militia to increase to 132,000 soldiers. The subsequent passage of the National Defense Act of 1916 established the state militia as the Army's primary reserve force. This act required all states to name their militia "National Guard," increased the number of annual drill periods from twenty-four to forty-eight, extended summer camp to
fifteen days, and prescribed qualification standards for officers. Not only did this act allow officers to attend U.S. Army Schools, but also required that each state organize their National Guard units the same as Regular Army units. It was this act that defined the Army as consisting of a "Regular Army, a Volunteer Army, the Officers' Reserve Corps, the Enlisted Reserve Corps, and the National Guard while in the service of the United States." This legislation also introduced the concept of federalizing the National Guard. Ironically, fifteen days after the passage of this Act, a total of 112,000 National Guard soldiers were mobilized to secure the Mexican-American border. This mobilization provided commanders with experience in handling large troop formations that proved invaluable in 1917. It was also during this time frame that the inflammatory writings of Emory Upton precipitated a legacy of hostility between the Regular Army and the National Guard. Shortly before World War I, Upton, a Civil War veteran, argued that the militia should only be used as a last resort since its officers were "utterly ignorant of the military art." Upton further argued that the dual role of the militia prevented its being fielded as an effective military organization. Upton, an advocate for a large standing Army, believed that it was only after "lengthy service" that the "citizen-soldiers" of the militia could become an effective fighting force.

During World War I, 40 percent of the combat strength of the American Expeditionary Force was made up of National Guard units. By Aug 5,1917, all 379,701 Guardsmen (16 divisions) were on active duty being trained and organized for combat. By the end of the war, in November 1918, a total of 433,478 Guardsmen had served in World War I. The National Guard provided almost half (18 of 43) of the American divisions sent to France. During World War I, however, tremendous tension existed between the National Guard and the Regular Army. Rather than enter active duty as unit components, National Guard soldiers were individually drafted into the Regular Army. This allowed these soldiers to be moved to different branches, used as individual replacements, and Regular Army leadership to be placed in command of National Guard units. Thus, a strong tension developed between the two components around the struggle for command positions, branch changes that required re-training, and the implications of Upton's campaign to undermine confidence in the militia. The post World War I strategic environment resulted in the reemergence of a national desire to not maintain a large standing Army, but rather rely on the Reserve forces to protect the nation in future conflict. This desire, which is still prevalent today, generated another source of tension between the Regular Army and the National Guard. This tension increased during World War II.

In the Fall of 1940, two significant events occurred. First, the National Guard was "mobilized" to active duty as units and not as individuals. Second, the nation's first peacetime draft was enacted. In other words, unlike World War I, National Guardsmen were not drafted as individuals, but rather entered federal service as units. Although the draft and the period of mobilization were to last for only one year, in September of 1941 the term of service for activated National Guard solders was extended. All 18 National Guard divisions, approximately 300,000 soldiers, saw service in World War II. As it had on World War I, mobilization in World War II raised four key issues that remain pertinent to the modern integration of the National Guard into the Regular Army. First, Guardsmen resented the assignment of officers from other components to their units. Officers from the Regular Army, as well as the Organized Reserve Corps, were assigned as fillers in National Guard units. Second, Regular Army officers were substituted for virtually all National Guard officers above the rank of lieutenant colonel. Third,
during post mobilization training, Guard divisions became a primary source of individual replacements for active units. This reduced the division's ability to achieve combat readiness due to personnel turnover. Lastly, problems with logistical availability often delayed overseas deployment of the Guard divisions for eleven to forty-seven months. Thus, even though they were combat ready much sooner, the average rate of deployment of a National Guard division following mobilization was twenty-eight months.\textsuperscript{15} Once in theater, however, National Guardsmen distinguished themselves. The 34\textsuperscript{th} Infantry Division made up of Guardsmen from Iowa, Minnesota, and South Dakota claims more actual combat days than any other World War II division.

During World War II, some Regular Army officers voiced similar concerns to those of Upton. General Lesley J. McNair, Commander of Army Ground Forces, complained to Chief of Staff Marshall, "The National Guard General officers, almost without exception, were not competent to exercise the command appropriate to that rank."\textsuperscript{16} In response to McNair's assessment, Marshall directed General John M. Palmer to draft a document to define the nation's post-war Army force structure, and the balance between the size of the standing Army and the reserve components.\textsuperscript{17} Palmer reached four conclusions that have direct impact on the modern integration the National Guard and the Regular Army. First, military leadership must not be exclusively concentrated in the professional soldier class. Citizen-soldiers must develop leadership skills and abilities equivalent to their counterparts in the Regular Army. Second, it is the citizen-soldier, after his or her war service, which forms the basis for molding public opinion on military issues. Third, with a properly organized citizen Army Reserve, "no officers or men need to be maintained in the Regular Army to perform duties that can be performed effectively, and in time, by reservists." Lastly, up until 1944, citizen-soldiers have largely fought American wars—thus, they are a traditional national institution and constitute the "backbone" of America's defense and security. Palmer's study served to mitigate the negative legacies of Upton and McNair.

The Korean War saw the mobilization of 136,000 National Guardsman, who began arriving in the theater in January 1951. Combat divisions, non-divisional engineer, and artillery units participated in the campaign. It was the Korean War deployment that surfaced another significant challenge to the integration of National Guard forces into the Regular Army—qualification in the military occupational specialty (MOS). Because of the Selective Service Act of 1948, soldiers were allowed to enlist directly into the National Guard without receiving active duty training.\textsuperscript{18} Thus, when the Guard divisions were mobilized, only about 27 to 46 percent of their soldiers were fully qualified in their MOS. Also, trained and experienced Guardsmen were again used as fillers in Regular Army units during their post-mobilization training.\textsuperscript{19} These two factors tended to increase the post-mobilization training time before the units entered combat. During the Korean War, National Guard divisions were given approximately fourteen months of post-mobilization training before deployment—a tremendous improvement over World War II deployment timelines. While the Korean War identified the integration challenge of MOS qualification, it was the Kennedy administration in 1961 that brought to light the political implications of mobilizing the National Guard and its integration into the Regular Army.

Following the Korean War, President John F. Kennedy's partial mobilization of the National Guard and Army Reserve during the Berlin crisis initiated a troublesome cascade of events, whose consequences plagued the Johnson administration during the Vietnam War. During the Berlin crisis, Kennedy mobilized four National Guard
combat divisions, one Reserve training division, and various support units to attain combat readiness in case they were needed against a Soviet offensive. While Kennedy wanted to demonstrate to the world that he had a large source of combat-ready soldiers in the event of a major confrontation, this was not a popular decision. First, many of these soldiers had served during the Korean War and were upset that they were mobilized again in so short a time. Their attitude earned them the contempt of the Regular Army, which had also served in Korea. Second, the lack of an apparent viable mission for these soldiers to perform, combined with the lack of a legitimate national emergency, generated a congressional protest at the political level, and a protest amongst the mobilized soldiers themselves. Within a year, strong pressures arose to bring the soldiers home. Kennedy's Berlin mobilization illustrated that the American people were not interested in active military service unless they were convinced of a direct threat to an American interest. This crisis also heralded the first use of the National Guard as an instrument of diplomacy wherein the United States clearly showed national resolve. Perhaps Kennedy's mobilization of a significant force structure at the onset of the crisis played a key role in preventing a war.

If Kennedy's mobilization of the National Guard and military reserve forces generated significant negative political consequences, President Lyndon B. Johnson's shortsighted political decision to rely on conscripts, and not mobilize the National Guard during the Vietnam War, proved to be disastrous. Johnson debated mobilizing the Guard to ensure that the American people knew of the nation's involvement in a war with the worry that a mobilization would not only be costly and generate an elevated level of congressional scrutiny, but might also send a threatening signal to the Chinese and Russians. Thus, Johnson chose to increase the draft and postpone a decision to activate National Guard units. This decision generated speculation that if the Reserves were mobilized, it would be self-evident that America was going to war, and the administration would have been unable to conduct its silent, politically invisible war. In other words, where Kennedy mobilized the Guard as a deterrent to large-scale armed aggression, Johnson chose not to mobilize them to avoid a provocation, resulting in a major war. However, following the Tet Offensive in 1968, Johnson mobilized thirty-four National Guard units—eight of which served in South Vietnam. The same training, readiness, and personnel problems that plagued the National Guard during Korea also surfaced during this mobilization. Had Johnson mobilized the National Guard sooner, he may have been able to assess the lack of national resolve toward the Vietnam War. Certainly, the experiences of the Berlin Crisis and the Vietnam War describe the political environment that exists surrounding the decision of when one should mobilize the National Guard, and when one should not.

Following the Vietnam War, the adoption of the all-volunteer Army at the conclusion of the draft in 1973 promulgated tremendous change in the military. The anti-military climate made it difficult for the Army to fill its force structure. As a possible solution to this problem, and in a reaffirmation of the National Defense Acts of 1916 and 1920, Secretaries Melvin Laird, James Schlesinger, and Army Chief of Staff Creighton Abrams introduced the Total Force Policy. This policy allowed the Army to satisfy strength shortfalls in its combat divisions with National Guard and other Reserve units. Abrams' vision sought to intertwine the three components in such a way that the President would have to obtain congressional support to deploy the military. Abrams' view of the necessity of congressional approval for military deployment also indirectly ensures that "the will" or the "passions" of the people, as advocated by Clausewitz, also support the war. Because of the Total Force Policy, the President
would be unable to pursue unwise foreign ventures that lack public support—especially when unimportant national security interests are involved.

Abrams' Total Force policy increased the equipment, training opportunities, and deployments of the National Guard. This policy also provided the United States with the possibility of creating an economical, combat ready, and a deterrent force in peacetime—rather than after mobilization. Moreover, if fully implemented, the Regular Army would never again (as in Vietnam) be sent to war without the support of the nation, because of the necessity of mobilizing the National Guard and other reserve forces for even smaller-scale contingency operations. In its pure form, the Total Force policy calls for the early deployment of the reserve component—regardless of the type of contingency. The Regular Army, however, has never fully implemented Abrams’ policy. Rather than activate reserve component units during Operation Just Cause, individual volunteers were activated and placed into composite units commanded by the Regular Army. The hesitancy to fully implement the Total Force policy was again felt during Operations Desert Shield/Storm.

Over 60,000 National Guardsmen were deployed for Operation Desert Storm. In addition to the combat support, and combat service support units, five National Guard combat brigades and one Special Forces group were mobilized. The majority of the combat support and combat service support forces deployed to their respective theaters within weeks of mobilization. This was not true of the Guard’s combat force structure. The 48th Mechanized Infantry brigade of the Georgia Army National Guard was mobilized in November 1990, and underwent certification at the National Training Center. The 155th Armor brigade of the Mississippi Army National Guard was mobilized in December 1990, and also underwent validation at the National Training Center. The 256th Mechanized Infantry Brigade of the Louisiana National Guard was mobilized in November 1990, but was demobilized before its NTC rotation. In contrast, the 142nd Field Artillery Brigade of the Arkansas National Guard was mobilized in November 1990, and served in the VII Corps. Also, the 196th Field Artillery Brigade of the Tennessee Army National Guard mobilized in December 1990, and served with the XVIII Airborne Corps. The 20th Special Forces Group of the Alabama Army National Guard mobilized in February 1991, and deployed for Operation Provide Comfort following validation at Fort Bragg.26

A detailed General Accounting Office investigation into the failure of the active component to deploy the three National Guard ground maneuver brigades identified four important shortcomings.27 First, peacetime training had not adequately prepared the National Guard brigades for combat in terms of formal schooling opportunities and resource availability. Second, the National Guard’s different administrative systems caused difficulties in force integration with the Regular Army. Third, inadequate peacetime medical screening practices prevented soldiers from being deployable. Fourth, post-mobilization training plans were based upon conflicting information. As a result of this report, the Regular Army began developing a validation process for future mobilizations, and committed to resolving incompatibilities between personnel, supply, and maintenance systems between the Guard and active units. While the Guard brigades had significant readiness problems when mobilized, they were validated for deployment to the theater of war three months after their activation. This is an unprecedented achievement compared to the post-mobilization training time from previous mobilizations (WWI, WWII, Korea).28 Perhaps, the contemporary hesitancy to fully implement Abrams’ Total Force policy revolves around two core
issues. First is the time restriction imposed by a Presidential selective Reserve “call-up.” After completing the required post mobilization training and deploying into the theater, only a small amount of time remains before the conflict is either over, or they have to return or be extended by congress. It is easier for planners to use existing force structure already in the theater or Regular Army forces that could be deployed rapidly. Second, the tendency to strip non-deploying National Guard units of soldiers and equipment to bring mobilizing units up to 100% strength caused tremendous problems in later mobilizations of the very units who lost their resources.

Shortly after the success of Desert Storm and an assessment of the contemporary international security environment, a renewed interest surfaced over the restructuring of the nation’s military force. The nation once again decided to reduce the size of the military. In August 1991, President George Bush announced a new military strategy that served as a framework to guide deliberate force reductions sufficient to maintain a forward presence, effectively respond to crisis, and rebuild combat power as needed.29 Bush emphasized that the nation did not need across-the-board force structure reductions—but rather restructuring. This framework served as the foundation for a new National Security and Military Strategy, which are addressed in chapter two.

In addition to the force structure changes inspired by the Bush administration, the Clinton administration, in 1994, caused an evolution in the vital link between public opinion and the mobilization of the Reserve component from that of the Kennedy and Johnson administrations. Clinton used Reserve component mobilization to bolster public support for Presidential initiatives where no clear important national interest was apparent.30 In September 1994, following opposition by the American people to the invasion of and nation building in Haiti, and despite a congressional realization of a lack of an important U.S. interest, President Clinton authorized the mobilization of 1,600 Reserve component soldiers. The following month, he activated an additional 4,100 for the Haiti mission. Again, in December of 1995, following an overwhelming vote of the House of Representatives against sending American ground troops to Bosnia, several thousand reservists were mobilized at a time when public opinion was running strongly against the operation. Both mobilizations resulted in congressional resolutions to support the soldiers—surfacing another modern aspect of Reserve component integration, the generation of public and political support.

In September of 1997, Secretary of Defense William Cohen expressed the goal of a seamless Total Force that provides the “National Command Authority with flexibility and interoperability for the full range of military operations...eliminating all residual barriers to effective integration within our Total Force.” Cohen outlined four principles to make this integration a reality: Commanders taking responsibility for the Total Force; Mission understanding; commitment to resources; and ensuring military readiness.31 Cohen’s goal is realized in the pending deployment of the 49th Armored Division. The 49th Armored Division from the Texas National Guard is training and preparing for a peacekeeping assignment in Bosnia where it will assume command of the U.S. controlled sector (Operation Joint Forge) in February or March of 2000. The 3rd ACR, when it deploys, will serve subordinate to the 49th AD—a true test of the Total Force policy.

Several trends in the integration of the National Guard since 1900 are noteworthy. First, since Operation Desert Storm, the Regular Army has demonstrated an increased reliance upon the National Guard for force projection operations. Second, the time between mobilization and deployment may involve weeks, or months—
complicating the integration of Guard combat units into theater war plans. During World War II, mobilization preceded the nation's deployment by fifteen months. This was necessary since the Regular Army only had three divisions. During the Korean War, mobilization was simultaneous with the nation's deployment. At that time, the Regular Army had ten divisions. During the Vietnam War, mobilization followed the nation's deployment by three years. However, the Army had approximately 18 divisions. Thus, a direct correlation can be drawn between the size of the Regular Army and the need to integrate National Guard combat force structure. Third, until Desert Storm, the historical failure of the regular forces to maintain unit integrity of the Guard upon mobilization caused mistrust, resentment, and conflict. Fourth, the use of the reserve component influences domestic politics. Last, while the failure to deploy Guard combat brigades to the theater during Desert Shield/Storm generated a great deal of discontent between the Guard leadership and the Regular Army, when compared to the 120 weeks of post mobilization training for World War II, the 32 weeks of post-mobilization training for Korea, and the 17 weeks of training for Vietnam, the speed at which 48th Mechanized Brigade attained combat validation is an unprecedented achievement.32

Role of the National Guard

The National Guard is founded upon three constitutional provisions that dictate its role, force structure, and employment. These provisions are found in statutory, constitutional, and common law. The statutory role of the National Guard is to serve as the Reserve of the Army and the Air Force (10 USC, 23 USC). Its constitutional role is to repel invasion, suppress rebellion, and enforce laws (Art I, Section 8, US Constitution, 10 USC 331/32 and 32 USC 101-104). Its common law role is to protect the citizenry against all dangers and threats to their liberties, including their own standing Army.33

National Guard units stand as the "First Line of Defense" (32 USC 102) of the United States. Statutory law requires that no Army Reserve component unit can be mobilized without first mobilizing the National Guard (10 USC 10103 & 32 USC 102). The force structure of the National Guard is a shared responsibility between the President of the United States and the Governor of the respective state. Neither the President, nor the Governor, can change the organization or the existence of a National Guard unit without the concurrence of the other (32 USC 104c/f). Thus, force structure changes must be reached through consensus. By statute, the force structure and equipment modernization of the National Guard must mirror that of the Regular Army and Air Force (32 USC 104(b), 10 USC 3062(b), 32 USC 701).

The historical precedents surrounding the use of the National Guard since the 1900s provide a solid foundation from which to understand its contemporary interaction with the Regular Army. The historical perspective allows one to understand and address the challenges and obstacles inherent in achieving the Total Force vision. Also, recognizing the unique role of the National Guard allows for more efficient integration. This will, in turn, prepare the Total Force for the challenges it faces in the contemporary and emerging security environment.
CHAPTER 2

EMERGING STRATEGIC REQUIREMENTS OF THE CHANGING WORLD

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the requirements and capabilities that military forces must possess in order to effectively respond to the contemporary and emerging security environment. The old paradigm must change. The National Security Strategy, published by the President and the National Security Council, serves as the overarching document that defines both the security threat to the United States and the ways in which the elements of national power (military, economic, diplomatic, and information) will be used to counter that threat. The National Military Strategy, published by the Department of Defense, identifies how the military will meet the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy. These two documents serve as the primary means of defining the expected readiness level, and what type of military force structure must be available to protect American interests.

Two additional documents, although not authoritative, make further recommendations about future security threats and necessary military force structure. The Reserve component Employment (RCE-05) study recommends roles, missions, and capabilities of the Reserve components of all services for the year 2005 and beyond. The National Defense Panel report of 1997 recommends military force structure and capabilities (both active and Reserve) for the years 2010 through 2020. The analysis of these two documents, along with the National Security and Military Strategies, serve as useful criteria to evaluate the relevancy of the current and emerging National Guard force structure. The requirements of each will be examined separately.

National Security Strategy

In his *National Security Strategy for a New Century*, President William Clinton states that the challenge to the nation is to “sustain our role as the most powerful force for peace, prosperity, and the universal values of democracy and freedom.” Clinton intends to sustain that role by “harnessing the forces of global integration,” but realizes that in doing so, this increases the nation’s vulnerability to “extreme nationalism, terrorism, crime, environmental damage, and the complex flows of trade and investment that know no borders.” Clinton’s strategy establishes three fundamental objectives of the Executive Branch of government: enhancing the security of the United States, bolstering America’s economic prosperity, and the promotion of democracy abroad. He intends to accomplish these objectives through expanded military alliances like NATO, Partnership for Peace, Partnerships with Russia and the Ukraine, promotion of free trade, arms control regimes, and multi-national coalitions to combat transnational crime.

Clinton commits to a renewal of American diplomacy and identifies the protection of citizens and critical infrastructure as an essential element of the strategy. In order to accomplish this, Clinton mandates close cooperation between all levels of government—federal, state, and local. Clinton’s strategy is built upon the “imperative of engagement.” Engagement suggests that the United States must lead abroad if it is to be secure at home. Thus, the United States will use all instruments of national power to influence the actions of other states and non-state actors. Clinton believes that through engagement, the United States will “deter aggression, foster the
resolution of conflicts, strengthen democracies, open foreign markets, and protect the environment.” Spreading democracy and free market economies enhances the security and prosperity of the United States. In order to enforce this strategy, Clinton acknowledges that although the United States will be prepared to act unilaterally, many of the security objectives could only be achieved through “alliances or other formal security structures.”

Clinton argues that the actions of outlaw states and ethnic conflicts threaten regional stability and economic progress, causing American economic interests to suffer as foreign markets collapse. Clinton declares that the United States will not “allow a hostile power to dominate any region of critical importance to our interests.” And, before the United States will commit its resources abroad, the national interest must be clear. He defines national interests as vital, important, or humanitarian. Clinton characterized the current global security environment as containing five types of threats to national interests: regional or state-centered threats, transnational threats, spread of dangerous technologies, foreign intelligence collection, and failed states.

In order to effectively respond to these threats, and fully implement his strategy, Clinton established three specific requirements for the United States Armed forces. First, maintain superior military forces at the level of readiness necessary to deter aggression. Second, conduct a wide range of peacetime activities and smaller-scale contingency operations. These smaller-scale contingency operations encompass the “full range of military operations short of major theater war—including humanitarian assistance, peace operations, and limited strikes and interventions.” Smaller-scale contingency operations also require effective cooperation with other governmental organizations (domestic and international), non-governmental organizations, and private volunteer organizations. Third, and preferably in concert with regional friends and allies, win two overlapping theater wars. Clinton recognizes that the United States may need to withdraw from smaller-scale contingency operations in order to prosecute a major theater war.

Clinton described the ability to fight and win multiple theater wars as the ultimate test of the Total Force policy. In order to successfully win two major theater wars, Clinton established three requirements for the Armed forces. First, the military must be able to rapidly defeat initial enemy advances short of their objectives in two theaters—in close succession. Second, the military must be prepared to defeat adversaries that use asymmetric means. An asymmetric mean is defined as an “unconventional approach that avoids or undermines our strengths while exploiting our vulnerabilities.” Third, the military must be able to transition to fighting major theater wars from a posture of global engagement. This may include high levels of peacetime engagement overseas, as well as multiple concurrent smaller-scale contingencies. The National Security Strategy requires the military to “have a force structure and deployment posture that enables the successful conduct of military operations across the spectrum of conflict.”

Clinton acknowledges the essential role that the military plays in shaping the international environment. He specifies the necessity of overseas presence, and peacetime engagement opportunities (defense cooperation, security assistance, training, and exercises) to deter aggression and coercion, promote regional stability, prevent or reduce conflicts, and serve as role models for militaries in emerging democracies. Clinton states that “these important efforts engage every component of the Total Force: Active, Reserve, National Guard and civilian.”
In order to "prepare now" for the future, Clinton stresses force modernization to protect long-term readiness. He commits to exploring "new approaches for integrating the Active and Reserve components into a Total Force optimum for future missions." This includes replacing Cold War-era equipment with new systems and platforms capable of supporting the "full spectrum of military operations." Clinton also acknowledges the essential nature of public support as America wields its power abroad—an issue that is clearly linked to the employment of the Reserve components. As a part of his strategy to address international crime, he intends for the United States to cut drug availability by half over the next ten years, and counts on the military to play a key role in the counterdrug effort. Under the domestic terrorism program, Clinton charges the Department of Defense with maintaining military units to serve as augmentation forces for weapons of mass destruction consequence management.

Clinton concludes the National Security Strategy by identifying specific regional objectives and interests of the United States. An integrated Europe, through the Partnership for Peace and other initiatives with the Newly Independent States, is one of America's strategic goals. NATO represents the anchor of American engagement in Europe and the linchpin of transatlantic security. Second, tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to peace and stability in East Asia. Third, the United States seeks a stable, open, prosperous People's Republic of China. Fourth, the establishment of the Free Trade Area of the Americas in 2005 will cause this hemisphere to become the largest and strongest regional trading block, which is clearly in the strategic interest of the United States. Latin America is already the United States' fastest growing export market. Mexico is the second-largest export market of the United States. Fifth, Clinton commits the United States to maintaining an appropriate military presence in Southwest Asia using ground, air, and naval forces to ensure the continued free flow of Gulf oil, and broader U.S. interests in the Middle East.

In summary, Clinton's desire in the 1998 National Security Strategy is to "construct new cooperative security arrangements, rid the world of weapons that target whole populations, build a truly global economy, and promote democratic values and economic reform." Clinton's strategic priorities are to "promote peace and prosperity, create more jobs and opportunities for Americans, increase cooperation in confronting new security threats, and to strengthen the intelligence, military, diplomatic, and law enforcement tools necessary to meet these challenges." Clinton's 1999 National Security Strategy, while still in draft form, is very similar to the 1998 version. However, there are a few military requirements that are noteworthy.

**Implications of the Draft 1999 National Security Strategy**

The draft National Security Strategy for 1999 includes a requirement for the military to develop a plan to defend American cyberspace by May 2001. This initiative is to be fully operational by December 2003 and is expected to provide the United States with the ability to protect critical infrastructures from acts that would diminish the Government's performance of essential national security missions. This proposal requires the expertise inherent in the National Guard.

Another distinction in the draft 1999 strategy is the assumption that two major theater wars will not occur simultaneously, but rather sequentially. Clinton's strategy is to halt, or delay, the aggressor's advance in the
second theater of war, while the military is conducting decisive operations in the first theater. Critical forces would then shift from the first to the second theater of war. This strategy envisions specialized high-demand and low-density assets routinely shifting between both theaters as needed.

A subtle change in the emphasis of relations in the Western hemisphere is also apparent in the draft 1999 National Security Strategy. This is clearly seen in Clinton's strong commitment to the Free Trade Area of the Americas, his support of the Multilateral Counterdrug Alliance, his work with the Organization of American States and the Summit of the Americas on regional confidence and security building measures, and his military exercises and exchanges focused on peacekeeping. While Europe still plays a dominant role in the draft 1999 strategy, the Western Hemisphere receives increased priority and attention over that of previous National Security Strategies.

National Military Strategy

The current National Military strategy was based upon the 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review and the 1997 National Security Strategy for a New Century. Although somewhat dated, several of its premises do support the present National Security Strategy. General Shalikashvili, author of the current National Military Strategy, describes the purpose of the Armed forces as deterring "threats of organized violence against the United States and its interests, and to defeat such threats should deterrence fail."

He declares that the "foremost task of the military is to fight and win the nation's wars." Shalikashvili acknowledges the necessity of the military's ability to fight and win two "nearly simultaneous" wars, as well as its ability to respond to a wide variety of other potential crises. He views the exploitation of technological advances as critical to the implementation of the National Military strategy.

Shalikashvili, in contrast to Clinton, identifies four threats to America's security: regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational threats, and "wild cards"—a generic "catch-all" for the unexpected. Regional threats are those that intimidate U.S. allies, or pursue interests hostile to those of the United States. Asymmetric challenges are those that include "unconventional or inexpensive approaches that circumvent our strengths, exploit our vulnerabilities, or confront us in ways we cannot match in kind." These include terrorism, weapons of mass destruction, information warfare, and environmental sabotage. Transnational dangers are those that transcend national borders and threaten national interests. These include human emergencies, extremism, ethnic disputes, religious rivalries, organized crime, piracy, massive refugee flow, and environmental threats. Wild cards are future threats that will put American interests at risk. These may include the emergence of new technologies, biothreats, the loss of key allies or alliances, or the unexpected overthrow of a friendly regime. Shalikashvili charges the armed forces of the United States to be able to combat these threats.

The National Military Strategy is based upon two military objectives: promotion of peace and stability, and the defeat of adversaries. To accomplish these two objectives, the strategy contains three essential elements. First, the military will assist in shaping the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation in alliances. Shalikashvili states that peacetime military engagement is vital to the National Security Strategy's objective of shaping the security environment. Through military engagement, the United States hopes to demonstrate commitment, improve interoperability, reassure allies, promote transparency,
convey democratic ideals, deter aggressions, and help relieve sources of instability before they become military crises. Shaping embodies promoting stability, preventing and reducing conflict and threats, and deterring aggression and coercion. Deterrence is the capability to rapidly project and concentrate military power anywhere in the world. Second, the military will respond to the full spectrum of crises. These include everything from humanitarian assistance, the conduct of smaller-scale contingencies, to the fighting and winning of two "nearly simultaneous" major theater wars in overlapping time frames. Third, Shalikashvili commits the military to the preparation for an uncertain future through the transformation of doctrine and "robust modernization that exploits the revolution in military affairs."

The realization of the three elements of the National Military Strategy is based upon four strategic concepts. The first is strategic agility, wherein the military is capable of deploying and concentrating power at a faster speed than that of the adversary. The second is overseas presence, or the visible posture of military infrastructure in key regions. Third is power projection, or the ability to deploy and sustain military power in dispersed locations until conflict resolution. The fourth element, decisive force, is the commitment of overwhelming military power to achieve a political resolution favorable to U.S. interests. In order to achieve the four strategic concepts outlined in his strategy, Shalikashvili directed that "our military must be ready to fight as a coherent joint force—fully interoperable and seamlessly integrated."

Shalikashvili identifies Joint Vision 2010 as a template for future war fighting within the construct of the National Military Strategy. Preparedness in the areas of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection is necessary for military forces to attain full spectrum dominance. The National Military Strategy identifies the characteristics of a "full-spectrum" force as being multi-mission capable, interoperable with other services and selected foreign militaries, and able to coordinate operations with other agencies of government and civil institutions. The ability of a military force to truly function across the spectrum of possible military operations requires a correct mix of capabilities both between and within the services. The National Military Strategy also identifies the baseline force structure that is necessary to accomplish the requirements outlined in the National Security Strategy. According to this model, the Army is to consist of four active corps with ten active divisions (six heavy, two light, one airborne, and one air assault). The National Guard is to consist of fifteen enhanced separate brigades, the appropriately restructured National Guard combat divisions, and other appropriate forces. Of landmark importance, however, is the defining role of the National Guard as identified in the strategy:

Mobilization of the Reserve components has always been an important indicator of the commitment of national will. Guardsmen and reservists are not only integrated into war plans, but also provide critical skills in carrying out contingency operations, as well as augmenting and supporting active units during peacetime. National Guard and other Reserve component elements also provide the NCA with a strategic hedge against uncertainty and with an organized basis to expand our Armed Forces if necessary. Additionally, they also provide a rotational base to ease the tempo of unit and individual deployments for the active component.

The National Military strategy requires the armed forces of the United States to provide the National Command Authority with several capabilities: strategic deterrence, decisive operations, special operations, forcible entry, force protection, the countering of weapons of massed destruction, focused logistics, and information
operations. The challenge facing the contemporary and future design of military force structure is the accurate characterization of the strategic environment.

Strategic Environment

During the last decade, the strategic environment has shifted from the foreign policy of the containment of communism to the promotion of democracy, regional stability, and economic prosperity. Unlike the foreign policy years of containment, since 1989 politicians have lacked a defined enemy upon which to focus. The strategic situation is complicated and unclear. Moreover, current international trends suggest that the United States is entering an era in which the dominant form of conflict will be small and unconventional wars. Smaller-scale contingencies are more likely to occur than major theater war. Limited wars, small-scale engagements, and multiple contingencies in theaters are likely to dominate the missions assigned to the United States military. The Regular Army lacks the force structure to be able to conduct two major theater wars and participate in smaller-scale contingencies. Thus, reliance upon the Reserve components to satisfy these varied missions is both critical and necessary—especially when one considers that short of general war, the ability of the nation to revive conscription is extremely unlikely. Only the Reserve components can rapidly provide the expansible force base that is required in the event of a protracted war.

The current and emerging international environment can be characterized by several different factors. Developing nations will continue the process of democratization and the establishment of free market economies. Although these nations will be unstable for a number of years, global integration will continue—especially in the areas of international governmental organizations and trade regimes. The implications of this integration will either assist or hinder the prosecution of military operations. Ethnic and religious hostility will continue in developing nations, causing mass refugee movements that further strain emerging free market economies, threaten sovereignty, and create regional instability. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction among rogue states and non-state actors will also create a noteworthy security threat. Potential adversaries of the United States will seek to deny military forces information, prevent the buildup of combat power during force projection operations, and seek to inflict mass casualties. While accurate prediction of the exact nature of the future security environment is difficult, it is reasonable to assume that the political decisions made in the 20th century will define the security environment that the United States will face in the 21st century. The way in which the United States reacts to ethnic, religious, and cultural polarization, the redrawing of state boundaries, and non-state actors whose power and resources rival that of states will define this environment of the future.

The contemporary global security situation necessitates several changes to the way that the Army conducts military operations. The regional crises that replaced the monolithic global threat from the former Soviet Union more closely resemble stability and support operations rather than sustained land warfare. Dubik and Sullivan suggest that although new technology has a tremendous capability to modify the modern battlefield in terms of lethality, dispersion, precision of fire, mass, invisibility and delectability, the nature and causes of war will not change. They also suggest that in the next millennium, the military is likely to be called upon to assist in the maintenance of economic relationships and free-market competition through continued presence in alliance.
organizations, multi-national exercises, and partnership for peace/sister state programs. They argue that military power may be used to establish conditions under which economic conditions can flourish. They caution that the increasing tendency to use military personnel for purposes other than armed conflict, or in situations where demonstrably important American security interests are not at stake, has negatively affected both active duty and National Guard personnel. The decision to employ the military must be carefully balanced with the cost and the vitality of the national interest. While Dubik and Sullivan’s analysis provides a cursory assessment of the requirements of land forces in the 21st century, a comprehensive analysis of the future security threat and the potential roles and requirements of the military between the years 2010 to 2020 is found in the 1997 report of the National Defense Panel.


The National Defense panel recommends that in order to confront the challenges of the 21st Century, the United States must rapidly transform its equipment, military strategy, national security institutions, operational concepts, and defense posture by 2020. The panel argues that success in 2020 requires truly joint operations that include not only the armed forces, but also the rest of the National Security establishment. They also suggest that the ability of the military to function in a multi-national environment will characterize future successful military operations.

A major theme of the National Defense Panel report is that the present strategy of fighting two nearly simultaneous theater wars is a low-probability scenario that “consumes funds that could be used to reduce risk to our long-term security.” The panel suggests that the priority of fiscal resources must be applied to preparing for the future, and that the number one requirement for the military between 2010 and 2020 will be the maintenance of regional stability through the fostering of a stable international system. All of the aspects of national power (diplomacy, economic, information, and military) must integrate in order to accomplish this objective. The panel further suggests that the ability of the military to project power into areas that lack forward deployed forces is critical, and that regular global deployments in smaller-scale contingencies will be the norm—and not a distracter from the need to be able to fight two major theater conflicts.

The panel calls for Reserve and National Guard units to prepare for a variety of ongoing worldwide operations in which they will relieve Regular Army units and reduce the operational and personnel tempos of lengthy deployments. The panel also illustrates the critical nature of the military’s emerging homeland defense mission. It proposes that the United States may be threatened by terrorism, information warfare, ballistic and cruise missiles, transnational threats, attacks on critical infrastructure, or nuclear attack by a superpower or other entity. It suggests that traditional nuclear policies may not be sufficient to deter nuclear, chemical, or biological attacks by a rogue state. It argues that information superiority as well as offensive and defensive information capabilities are critical to success in future operations. The vulnerability of the United States to an unconventional attack is a major theme of the report. The panel posits that greater mobility, precision, speed, stealth, strike ranges, and a reduced logistics footprint are necessary for military success in the emerging global security environment. It cautions that the continued procurement of legacy systems by the Army does not support Joint Vision 2010. Nor
does the present military structure adequately protect the United States from possible future security threats. The panel suggests that four possible future security environments will characterize the world between 2010 and 2020.52

The first environment is called “Shaped Stability.” In this security environment, international cooperation on economic development and security issues has created a fairly stable international order. Possible frictions between states include shortages of natural resources, ethnic tension, and weapons of mass destruction. The military’s role in this environment is to augment diplomatic, economic, and political efforts to ensure their success. The second environment is called “Extrapolation of Today.” This security environment is characterized by the projection of today’s uncertainties into a competitive and increasingly politically diverse world. Many countries will remain disadvantaged while the global economy continues to expand. In this environment, rogue states and non-state actors have the means of delivering weapons of mass destruction, and the sustained political, economic, and military dominance of the United States is uncertain. The third environment is called “Competition for Leadership.” In this security environment, the international community adopts balance of power as their foreign policy. Thus, regional alliances will rise to challenge the United States. The United States, serving as the “balancer,” will form security relationships to counter these challenges. Although ethnic and humanitarian tensions are lessened due to the increase of state interactions, increased military spending characterizes this security environment. The fourth environment, “Chronic Crisis,” is characterized by deteriorating global economic conditions and the breakdown of international institutions that result in fluid and unpredictable alliances. Not only will nationalism and ethnic hatreds place many states in crisis, but the widespread availability of weapons of mass destruction, unchecked massive migrations, and failing municipal infrastructure will accelerate chaos. The United States will lose much of its will and ability to influence international events.

The panel suggests that in each of the four futures, asymmetric threats may oppose military forces by attacking the nation’s will to fight, employing imaginative tactics and techniques, denying access to forward locations, exploiting weapons of mass destruction technology, targeting fixed installations and massed formations, and moving the fight to urban areas. The panel argues that the future survival of the United States is based upon the ability of the military to shape, respond, and prepare for these environments, and to form cooperative and interoperative relationships with friends and allies. Additionally, future military force structure must be able to respond to the new challenges of information attacks, the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilian and commercial targets, space operations, lack of access to forward bases, deep inland operations, and mass population problems.53

Based upon the critical importance of regional security in the next millennium, the panel made several key recommendations about future force structure. First, military units must be restructured to specifically deal with smaller scale contingencies such as stability and support operations. Employment of Reserve component units in these missions will alleviate personnel tempo pressures upon the active component. Also, agencies of the national security apparatus must be involved as an integrated team in crisis response. To be successful in 2010-2020, military units need to be fully “joint” and able to operate from small, dispersed, supply points.
The National Security Panel concluded their report by recommending that future conventional forces should place far greater emphasis on the following characteristics: systems architectures, information system protection, information operations, automation, small logistics footprints, mobility, stealth, speed, increased operational and strike ranges, and precision strike capabilities. To achieve this, they proposed the shifting of funds away from legacy systems, to the generation of land forces that are more expeditionary, fast, capable of exploiting shock, and able to operate in urban environments. The report proposes that future military forces must be easy to move and support. They must be lighter, have greater range, and more lethal fire-support systems. This will allow “above the line” units to evolve into smaller operational elements with greater lethality. The panel also identified six national security challenges of 2020: homeland defense, regional stability, power projection, space operations, information operations, and the countering weapons of mass destruction. It concluded, “The National Guard has a key role to play in addressing these threats.”

The National Security and Military Strategies, combined with the 1997 report of the National Defense Panel establishes the current and future requirements of the armed forces. These documents, and the historical precedence of National Guard integration in the last century, allow the effective analysis of the relevancy of the current and emerging National Guard force structure as the nation enters a new millennium. In the next chapter, the monograph describes the modifications that the National Guard has made to its force structure in order to respond to the requirements of these strategies and studies.
CHAPTER 3
NATIONAL GUARD RESPONSE TO THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE CURRENT AND EMERGING SECURITY SITUATION

During the summer of 1989, the Army announced plans to decrease its force structure based on the breakup of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The plan, named “Quicksilver,” was based upon the assumption that no legitimate global threat would develop without providing defense planners adequate strategic warning. Rather than reduce the size of the Regular Army and retain a reservoir of combat power in the National Guard, the Army concluded that many Guard and Reserve units were unneeded, and should also be cut along with the active component forces. The Pentagon, under Secretary of Defense Cheney and General Colin Powell, proposed a new force structure called the “Base Force.” The Army’s “bottom-up-review,” which was aligned with the “Base Force” plan, posited that a force of ten active divisions and fifteen enhanced readiness brigades in the National Guard were sufficient to win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. Should the Army be required to participate in a smaller operation in addition to the two major conflicts, then the force requirement increases to twelve active divisions and eight Reserve divisional equivalents. Under the “Base Force” plan, successful mission accomplishment was based upon the assumption that forces involved in smaller-scale contingency operations could be redeployed to a major theater war. Another assumption was that sufficient strategic lift assets would be available to shift specialized or unique assets from one conflict to another.

In Operations Desert Shield and Storm, the Regular Army deployed nearly, and in some cases, all of its combat support and service support units to support the eight divisions in the theater. This included all of the terminal operation, heavy truck, and water supply units, and almost all of the prisoner-handling, postal, and medium truck units. The requirement to provide logistical support to the present active force structure of ten divisions and four corps headquarters in the prosecution of two nearly simultaneous major theater wars will present even more difficulties than those encountered during the Gulf War. The 1995 GAO audit of the Department of Defense “bottom-up-review” identified a shortfall of 238 combat support and combat service support units necessary to support the combat units participating in the first major theater war, and 654 units should two major theaters of war function simultaneously. The requirement for this support force structure presumed the employment of all fifteen Guard enhanced separate brigades and 22 other Guard brigades (presently organized as eight divisions) as the basis for rotational forces in extended crises and domestic missions.

The Military Force Structure Review Act of 1996 directed that the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review examine the defense strategy, force structure, and force modernization plans to establish a revised defense program through the year 2005. At the same time, the Army developed Army Vision 2010 in which General Reimer established five priorities for the Nation’s land force. Three of these are particularly appropriate to the present discussion: “modern equipment for the entire force…the ability to respond to the nation’s needs, and …changing the force to meet the needs of the 21st century.” At the time that Reimer published his initiatives in 1996, President Clinton publicly expressed his desire that “as we reduce our forces in the wake of the cold war, a strong role for the National Guard makes more sense, not less.”
In June of 1998, Secretary of Defense Cohen directed the Department of Defense and the Joint Staff to conduct an employment study on the use of the nation’s reserve forces. The purpose of this study was to look at alternative concepts for future employment. The study focused on three areas: homeland defense, smaller-scale contingencies, and major theater wars. The recommendations of this study will be used in the analysis of the force relevancy of the National Guard.

**Force Relevancy**

The National Guard force structure currently consists of eight combat divisions (three ground maneuver brigades each), fifteen enhanced separate brigades (eSB), and three separate combat units (two separate brigades, and a scout group) in addition to engineers, military police, military intelligence, transportation, and other support units. Guard combat forces that are not included in theater war plans are assigned secondary missions such as wartime rotational forces, deterrent forces to future adversarial regimes, and support to civil authorities in their respective states. While the requirement to maintain combat capability within the National Guard is statutory, the composition of the force structure deserves careful analysis.

The National Guard possesses a combination of three unique strengths that separates it from their military peers: people, presence, and purpose. The National Guard is comprised of citizen-soldiers who are the embodiment of trained professionals and good neighbors. In many cases, they are community leaders. The National Guard is dispersed into units and armories throughout the nation and territories of the United States. The National Guard mission is to serve the community, state, and nation. The National Guard is deeply rooted in communities, and it is well known for its assistance in disasters and emergencies. The duality of being a citizen first, and a soldier second, fosters tremendous grass root public support of the National Guard. The public recognizes the National Guard as an extension of themselves, and this relationship fosters both public support and political pressure that is unheard of throughout the rest of the armed forces. These strengths, unique to the National Guard, play a key role in the question of the relevancy of its force structure. To ensure the continued relevancy of its force structure, National Guard leadership chose to focus their priorities on eleven subject areas as a part of Army National Guard Vision 2010. These include the issue areas of manning, organizing, equipping, sustaining, training and readiness. If fully implemented, these initiatives will increase the ability of the Guard’s force structure to “seamlessly integrate” with the Regular Army.

As a part of their Vision 2010, leadership at the National Guard Bureau (NGB) committed to becoming a “full spectrum” land force that possesses operational and strategic flexibility. It follows that National Guard elements can operate within the offense, defense, stability and support (ODSS) framework from sustained land warfare to disaster relief, peacekeeping, and humanitarian assistance. Leveraging the unique mix of civilian acquired skills available within the National Guard creates a knowledge infrastructure that may be a decisive advantage to the theater commander operating in today’s complex and unstable multi-polar security environment.
Emerging National Guard Force Structure

Two fundamental issues face the Army National Guard as it seeks to ensure force relevancy in the 21st Century: force sizing and mix. The Guard (Table 1) is presently comprised of a relatively balanced mix of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. The Guard, in possession of the majority of the nation's combat power, decided to address the Regular Army's lack of sufficient combat support and combat service support forces to respond to two nearly simultaneous regional threats as identified in the Commission on Roles and Missions study.

The Commission recommended that the Army reorganize lower priority reserve component forces to fill shortfalls in other higher priority areas. On the heels of that recommendation, the Army conducted Total Army Analysis-03 (TAA-03) in late 1995 to identify potential shortfalls in the implementation of the National Military Strategy. As a result of TAA-03, the Army determined that it needed an additional 124,800 combat support and combat service support personnel. Based upon these two findings, the Army National Guard commissioned the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study (ADRS) to examine ways it could address this shortfall in CS and CSS personnel. The ADRS study recommended the conversion of a number of units from combat to combat support and combat service support formations.

As a result of the division redesign study, twelve National Guard divisional combat brigades and their associated divisional slice elements will be converted from combat to combat support (CS) and combat service support (CSS) units during the period FY 99-12. Under the terms of this study, the Army National Guard will continue to maintain a force structure of eight combat divisions, but with the following changes. Three of these divisions will remain as currently organized. In three others, one maneuver brigade will be inactivated, and replaced by an enhanced separate brigade. The structure of the remaining two divisions will be converted into combat support and combat service support units, creating composite organizations. In total, up to twelve combat brigades will be converted to CS/CSS or composite divisions. This conversion will occur in four phases. A total of six combat brigades, three in each phase, will be converted during phases one and two. The remaining six brigades in the two Guard divisions affected by the redesign will be converted during phases three and four. The cost of this conversion, over a nine-year period, is approximately $5 billion. Thus far, the conversion of three brigades has cost $1.1 billion. The conversion of the equivalent of twelve National Guard maneuver brigades should satisfy, in part, the combat support and service support unit shortfall of the Regular Army. National Guard leadership justified the necessity of retaining eight divisions in the force structure on the basis of three foundational premises:

1. First is their use as a deterrent hedge.
2. Second, they are to assist in enhancing mobilization.
3. Third, they are...
available in the event of general war. Interestingly, these three premises do not figure into any concept plans of the Unified Commands.

Another aspect of the Army National Guard Division Redesign Study involved the integration of the Regular Army and National Guard combat organizations. To that end, the study called for the formation of two new integrated active component (AC)/Army National Guard (ARNG) divisions. These divisions consist of an active component division headquarters with three enhanced separate National Guard brigades as the maneuver elements. Similarly, additional AC/ARNG initiatives involve the integration of National Guard maneuver companies into active component battalions, and the exchange of battalion commanders between components. The ADRS study was enthusiastically received by the National Guard as a whole, and the Secretary of the Army, Togo West, accepted its results on May 23, 1996.  

The redesign of Army National Guard divisions provides the military with a force structure that will enhance the overall ability of the Army to satisfy its requirements in the National Security and Military Strategies. This is especially critical when one considers that the Army has increased its operational tempo by 300 percent since the conclusion of the Cold War—while reducing its end strength and number of forward-deployed units. Since Operation Desert Storm, successful military operations have been those in which military power has been employed with precision in order to complete the mission in the shortest time possible with the least cost in lives and resources. The force structure and skill-set associated with National Guard forces are assets to the theater commander in responding to these challenges—particularly in stability and support operations. More important, however, are the implications of this force structure modification on the future needs of the Army. The current Total Army Analysis study (TAA-07), although not finalized, appears to complement the division redesign study in that it seeks to use a quantitative and qualitative analysis to determine the Total Army force structure requirements for the years FY 2002-2007. TAA-07 is expected to generate large-scale functional and organizational changes within the Army, and will incorporate Force XXI organization designs.

The Integrated Division

The AC/ARNG integrated divisions were created to increase premobilization proficiency and reduce the postmobilization training time of the enhanced separate brigades in order to get them ready for deployment prior to the present goal of 90 days. The premobilization training focus of the eSB is at the platoon level for combat arms units, and the company/battery level for combat support and combat service support units. Commanders and staff officers train to proficiency at their respective organizational levels by focusing on the battlefield operating systems and the management control functions from company through brigade. The METL training priorities of the enhanced brigades assigned to the integrated division include movement to contact, attack, and defend. A major benefit of the integrated division concept is the resources available to an active component division headquarters that allow multi-echelon training opportunities for the enhanced brigades.

To create the integrated division, the Army reactivated two division headquarters, the 7th and 24th Infantry Divisions. The 7th ID (Light) in Fort Carson, CO, includes separate enhanced brigades from Arkansas, Oklahoma, and Oregon. The 24th ID (Mech) in Fort Riley, KS, consists of separate brigades from Georgia, North Carolina,
and South Carolina. A Division Headquarters (Forward) is located at Fort Jackson, South Carolina. The formal memorandum of understanding establishing these two divisions was executed on 12 October 1998. This memorandum stipulates that the divisions will be fully operational by October 1999 and that the division headquarters will supervise the training of the three eSBs assigned to them. In the future, these integrated divisions will either be incorporated into war plans as fully deployable combat divisions or remain as sets of enhanced separate brigades. Division commanders are active Army major generals selected pursuant to 32 USC 104(d).

When the concept of the integrated division was first proposed to the Adjutants General Association of the United States in January of 1996, it enjoyed a unanimous resolution of support. The foundation of this overwhelming support was "...to build mutual trust and confidence that are critical in wartime by assigning responsibility for the readiness of those units to the officer who would command them in combat..." A central theme that dominated the discussions leading up to the resolution was the desire to never again encounter "surprises" like those which occurred during Operation Desert Storm.

The creation of the integrated AC/ARNG divisions is scheduled to occur in two phases, which end in 2007. During phase one of the conversion, the enhanced separate brigades still deploy to the theater of war independent of the division headquarters upon mobilization. Thus, the focus of phase one is training and readiness oversight that obligates the active component division headquarters to “maintain properly trained and equipped units available for prompt mobilization for war, national emergency, or as otherwise directed.” Phase two, whose end-state is a fully deployable division, requires the augmentation of additional combat, combat support, and combat service support force structure to generate a warfighting division. The structure, operational procedures, and mission of the deployable integrated warfighting divisions will be formulated when the divisions are approved for transition to phase two. However, a strong case can be made against the need for the integrated division to ever enter phase two when most analyses suggest that only the ten rapidly deployable active duty divisions are needed to support the National Security and Military strategies. Furthermore, there is presently insufficient combat support and combat service support force structure to support the ten active divisions should they fight two nearly simultaneous theaters of war. Who would provide the support to the additional combat force structure of the Guard?

The National Guard Division

Based upon the premise that National Guard divisions would not be deployable until after the conclusion of the two major theater wars, the 1995 Commission on Roles and Missions advocated their elimination. The specific concern was twofold: first, National Guard divisions may require up to a year of post mobilization training to prepare them for combat; second, they may not be able to fight well in modern combat once they are deployed. Another reason that the Guard's eight combat divisions are presently unavailable for deployment is due, in part, to a failure of Army officials to determine how much post-mobilization training they require. Until the post-mobilization training requirement is quantified, the divisions can't be integrated into theater war plans. In contrast, the Guard's enhanced separate brigades are incorporated into several war plans since they have an established 90-day post mobilization timetable. Two of the specific recommendations of the Reserve component Employment
The REC-05 study calls for the development of timelines for the deployment of Guard divisions and the development of standards and guidelines to validate Army National Guard divisions by February 2000.73 The speed at which a National Guard division can deploy to a theater of war is based upon the mission of the division, its peacetime training and readiness, the availability of training sites and personnel, and the prioritization of the division’s resourcing relative to that of the eSBs. The division’s post mobilization training time can be reduced if its subordinate battalion and brigade task forces are able to train simultaneously at multiple sites. The Institute for Defense Analysis has concluded that Army National Guard Divisions can be fully combat ready within 140-180 days of mobilization if sufficient training areas and resources are available.74 This estimate clearly suggests that Guard divisions can be employed in the second major theater of war.75 It is also possible that extenuating circumstances may exist where the urgency of need, or the low anticipated threat, would permit the deployment of National Guard divisions prior to full combat validation. These situations may include stability and support operations such as disaster relief, post-conflict operations, or humanitarian assistance missions. This is especially true of deployments that require only battalion or brigade-level combat validation to enable mission accomplishment. The divisions given these missions could deploy to the theater before completing full division-level combat validation. If necessary, division-level combat validation could be accomplished after arrival in the theater.

The REC-05 study also calls for the redefining of the strategic Reserve. During the Cold War, all National Guard divisions played critical roles in deliberate war plans as a strategic Reserve in the event of global war. Post Cold War Department of Defense strategy and planning documents reveal that there is no official requirement, or employment of the concept of a strategic Reserve.76 This does not seem entirely prudent. Participation in two nearly simultaneous theater wars may generate unexpected crises or other requirements. Where will the Army draw combat power if all fifteen enhanced separate brigades and its ten active divisions are committed in the two theaters? Asymmetric attacks, or poor operational art, may also generate requirements for force structure above that which is currently programmed in the war plans. Post-conflict stages of the major theater war may also require additional force structure. Moreover, mobilization and deployment for two theater wars will generate tremendous support requirements that include substantial base generating and force containment packages, that exceed that which is apportioned in existing operations plans. Also, under the concept of a base support structure, National Guard divisions can provide unit level replacements at the company, battalion, or brigade level to forces committed to the two theaters. However, a coherent argument against the retention of the Guard combat divisions in the force structure is the present CS/CSS unit shortfall to support the simultaneous employment of ten active divisions. If insufficient force structure exists to support the active land combat forces, can one reasonably question who is going to support the Guard divisions if they also deploy?

A possible solution to this dilemma may be the concept of division teaming, another aspect of force integration between the Guard and the Regular Army. The concept of teaming allows a Guard division to join an active division in a mutual support relationship.77 This includes the augmentation of each division with units and soldiers from the other, for both deployments and training, as needed. This may include training support for the active component division when it deploys, or participates in, an NTC exercise. The converse also holds true. The
The concept of division teaming is currently being used as a part of the NATO Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia. Under the plan, National Guard and active component units rotate to Bosnia for 6-12 month periods under a single integrated command structure, commanded by either an Active or National Guard division headquarters. Command of the SFOR alternates between the active and Guard teamed divisions.

The NATO stabilization force missions will clearly demonstrate the ability of Guard combat forces to relieve the operations tempo of active component units in maturing theaters. The utility of Guard combat divisions in the contemporary security environment is, therefore, five-fold. They serve as an expansive base force to provide unit level replacements to the ten active divisions. They provide a strategic capability to double the combat power of the Army in the event of a general war. They provide flexibility to theater commanders to compensate for unexpected complications due to poor operational art or unexpected contingencies. Lastly, they are a logical choice for stability and support operations in smaller-scale contingencies.

**The Enhanced Brigade**

The fifteen enhanced separate brigades of the Army National Guard are the principal Reserve component ground combat maneuver force of the Army. These forces originated from the separate brigades, which were used to “roundout” active duty divisions under the Total Force concept. During the Cold War, the National Guard separate “roundout” brigades were assigned theater defense and follow-on missions—including the possibility of serving as cadres to form new divisions. The term “enhanced” characterizes their receipt of increased resources, manning priorities, and improved training strategies relative to other units in the National Guard force structure.

Enhanced brigades, unlike Guard divisions, participate in NTC rotations. The 278th ACR from Tennessee is scheduled to go to the National Training Center in 2002, and the 30th enhanced Heavy Separate Brigade from the North Carolina National Guard is scheduled for its rotation in 2003. These brigades are organized and equipped to be employed and sustained by any US Army corps or division. Their small size and capability of independent operations make them a unique resource for global contingencies. The 1993 Bottom-Up-Review of strategy, force structure, and other aspects of military strength, placed the separate brigades in the deployment queue ahead of the Guard divisions because they could be ready to fight in 90 days. The GAO audit of the “bottom-up-review,” however, revealed that neither the brigades’ specific roles during wartime, nor exactly when they were to be utilized in the theater was identified.

The Army National Guard Fiscal Year 2000 Posture Statement declares that the fifteen enhanced separate brigades will meet established readiness goals by October 1999. While the heavy and light enhanced brigades are designed to reinforce active units in a regional conflict, they are two years away (2002) from being able to fully accomplish this mission due to their lack of modern equipment. It is also important to note that within the “two nearly simultaneous theater war” model, the desire of strategic planners to win a decisive victory in a short amount of time in the first major theater war presupposes the likely employment of the eSBs in the second theater of war.

The availability of sufficient post mobilization training site precludes the simultaneous deployment of all fifteen Guard enhanced brigades. Current training sites and resources (Fort Irwin, Fort Hood, Yakima, and Fort Polk) allow only the training and validation of four brigades at one time. Thus, four eSBs will be ready 90 days
after mobilization, and four additional brigades will be mobilized 35 days later, in order to be ready for deployment in 140 days. Existing war plans envision deploying eight of the fifteen eSBs to fight in either the first or second major theater war within 140 days after mobilization. The remaining seven eSBs will cycle through training and validation sites using the same timelines. Thus, deployment of all fifteen brigades requires more than 180 days.

The Reserve components employment study also addresses the mobilization, deployment, and use of the Guard enhanced brigades. In particular, the study recommends against the popular suggestion to use the eSBs as “round-up” units wherein they become a fourth ground maneuver brigade to selected active component divisions. The current multi-apportionment of many Regular Army divisions in the war plans presents difficulties in fostering solid benefits from a long-term round-up relationship. Due to the eSB deployment timeline, they can realistically establish only “round-up” relationships with divisions fighting the second MTW. This, however, is incompatible with multi-apportionment, since most active divisions could fight either in the first or second major theater war. Moreover, a concrete “round-up” relationship could also limit the flexibility of the theater commander during a conflict who may determine that an eSB could be useful in performing a different mission such as LOC security or service as the TCF—complicating the parent division’s operations plan.

A brigade-based combat force structure, such as the enhanced separate brigades, presents the National Guard with several advantages. First, unlike six of the eight Guard divisions, the brigade force structure doesn’t cross state lines. Second, it is easier and less resource intensive to train at the brigade level than it is to train at the division level. Secretary of Defense Schlesinger stated, "We know from experience that a Reserve component brigade can be made ready for deployment much sooner than a Reserve component division. Hence, the emphasis is being placed on brigades, rather than division for the early deployment role." It follows that a brigade-based force structure is more relevant than the Guard divisional force structure when considered purely from a standpoint of resource availability.

Brehm argues an alternative role for the enhanced brigade force structure based on the Guard’s demonstrated ability to support active component combat forces in Desert Shield/Storm with CS/CSS units. He suggests the conversion of National Guard combat units, particularly the separate brigades, to Field Artillery and combat support or combat service support units. This would clearly satisfy the CS/CSS shortfall of the Regular Army. Similarly, the demonstrated performance of the Guard artillery units in Desert Storm suggest that the number of active component artillery units can be reduced and migrated to the National Guard. Under Brehm’s model, regardless of future military downsizing, the retention of Guard divisions would satisfy the statutory requirements of retaining the nation’s Reserve combat power in the National Guard, at the same time providing a capable support force to the present National Military Strategy.

**Tailored Force to Meet the Threat**

The United States can conserve combat power by assigning the National Guard combat brigades and divisions with missions that support the National Security Strategy. It is entirely self-evident that retention of existing combat power in the National Guard is far more profitable than the creation of additional combat power when the need arises. The National Guard combat force structure represents a military force that can be tailored to
meet a variety of threats within the context of the contemporary security environment. For example, should a major theater war occur in Southwest Asia, National Guard divisions can backfill locations vacated by forces deploying from Europe. If trained for this in advance, they could deploy as quickly as possible within the constraints of strategic lift and conduct post mobilization training in Europe. This will allow the V Corps to be involved in a contingency without disruption to NATO responsibilities. Enhanced brigades can also augment and balance the two corps that are operating in the theater by providing additional combat capability to the theater commander. This precludes the need to diminish the combat power of the Regular Army, or joint forces, for theater missions such as theater reserve, theater area or line of communication security, and support for other services or coalition forces. During Desert Storm, the 1st Cav Division and a brigade from the 82nd Airborne served as the theater reserve. The use of National Guard eSBs as this Reserve would have allowed the forward corps to retain their combat power and still allow the theater commander to affect the outcome of the battle. Enhanced brigades can also be used to augment Marine divisions or coalition forces during sustained land warfare operations by compensating for shortfalls in the relatively light marine expeditionary forces. Enhanced brigades can operate independently, secure a flank, provide shock power, secure key areas in the rear, counterattack, or conduct a pursuit. National Guard units that receive these theater level missions may even deploy early and complete their post-mobilization mission in theater.

Another argument for the relevancy of National Guard combat power is the inherent design of the two nearly simultaneous theater war model itself. Although the National Defense Panel considers the simultaneous involvement of the United States in two major theater wars as improbable, should the nation be obligated to fight in two major theater wars, all of the combat power of the Regular Army will be committed in one or the other theater. There is no remaining combat force structure capable of reacting to smaller-scale contingencies, humanitarian, or other missions. Thus, the entire land combat capability of the United States will consist of the National Guard divisions and eSBs. Perhaps, National Guard divisions could be designated and trained in the roles of stability and support operations suitable for smaller-scale contingencies. This is an ideal mission due to the Guard’s authoritative mastery of military support to civil authorities, since it gains experience by participating in these operations in the routine execution of its state mission. Thus, a National Guard division could easily assume the mission of an active division participating in a smaller-scale contingency in the event of an outbreak of a major theater war.

The debate over the relevancy of Guard combat force structure does not extend to its combat support and combat service support units. At present, 218 ARNG combat support and combat service support units are designated in the force support package to support the two “nearly simultaneous” theater wars. This package is divided into two discrete elements. Force support package one supports 5 1/3 divisions, one full corps headquarters, one theater element, and one theater-opening element. Force support package two supports the remaining crisis response forces. One of the central recommendations of the RCE-05 study is to shift echelon above division Reserve component CS/CSS elements designated for employment during the second MTW to the first MTW. This proposal would allow increased use of the scarce active component CS/CSS units for meeting
contingency operational requirements during peacetime. This is a feasible planning shift since the National Guard leadership committed to maintaining the readiness of the force support package units at the C-1 level.

The characteristics of a "full-spectrum force" as defined in the National Military Strategy are existing attributes of the National Guard. The Guard can very easily satisfy the "full-spectrum" force requirements of joint operational concepts, doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures. The Guard differs from all other services in that it is fully joint at the state level. Disaster support operations are always conducted jointly between the Army and the Air Guard. A joint staff plans, executes, and supports these operations. The Guard can also attain the institutional, organizational, intellectual, and system interoperability envisioned by Shalikashvili in that it is structured to operate coherently at the strategic, operational, or tactical levels. Peacetime military engagement is also an appropriate use of the Guard. The civilian-acquired skills inherent in the soldiers comprising the Guard force structure exceed those found in the Regular Army. In a strategic context, National Guard units and armories also serve as power projection platforms in times of emergencies. The National Guard's location in more than 3,300 communities provides capabilities for training, command and control centers, and assembly areas for people or materiel. These capabilities play a key role in peacetime deterrence.

Integration at the Company or Battalion Level

Since Desert Storm, a significant debate has ensued over the tactical level at which integration of Guard and active combat units should occur. The Marine Corps integrates at the regimental level with Reserve battalions and companies. This system appears to have worked well in Desert Shield and Desert Storm. There are a number of advantages to integrating at the company and battalion level over integration at the brigade and division level. First, unit readiness and the synchronizing of the various arms and services of the Army are easier as unit size decreases. Without doubt, the complexity associated with the synchronization of a modern division may simply exceed what one can reasonably achieve in a monthly drill period. Second, it is easier for companies to attain readiness standards than battalions and larger formations, although the Guard can theoretically attain readiness levels at the battalion or brigade level, if it is properly equipped and resourced. General Burba, in his capacity as Commander in Chief of Forces Command, testified to the training challenges associated with Reserve component combat units following Desert Storm:

Combat units, such as cavalry, infantry, and armor have maneuver skills and complex synchronization skills at company level and higher that are difficult to train during weekend drill periods. The training of these combat units at company level and higher integrates not only maneuver skills, but those of Army aviation and Air Force lift and fire support, artillery, air defense artillery, engineer, signal, military intelligence, maintenance, supply, transportation, medical, military police, chemical, and a whole host of others.

Integration of the Guard and Regular Army at a smaller unit level presents a clear advantage to strategic planners in that it places pressure on the national political leadership to mobilize the Guard at the onset of a conflict. The linkage between the active duty and National Guard units will require early mobilization. The Force XXI divisions and the Army After Next force structure models will demonstrate the effectiveness of this concept in time.
Successful deployments of National Guard infantry companies and Apache helicopter units to Southwest Asia and Bosnia suggest both the capability and feasibility of combat integration at the company and battalion level. Based on the availability of training areas and resources, it is reasonable to assume that a National Guard company can train for, and achieve, a C-1 readiness rating. Similarly, National Guard battalions and brigades may be able train and maintain a C-2 rating. However, in order to do so, they will require extensive full-time manning. The possibility of battalion level integration is certainly supported by the recent and exemplary performance of the 1st Squadron, 221st “Wildhorse” Cavalry of the Nevada National Guard at the National Training Center. This squadron is a “round-out” unit to the 11th ACR. Achieving pre-mobilization proficiency at the company level allows the rapid attainment of post-mobilization proficiency at the battalion and brigade level. This suggests that unit-level integration should occur at the company and battalion levels. Brigade level integration for sustained land warfare operations should only be considered in extenuating circumstances. Achieving a high level of readiness in Guard divisions is difficult due to geographical limitations. Only two National Guard divisions are located in one state. The remainder crosses state boundaries. Their ability to attain high combat readiness levels is virtually impossible due to limited multi-echelon training opportunities and the lack of suitable maneuver training areas.

**Total Force Integration**

In order to achieve true integration between the National Guard and the Regular Army, mutual confidence must exist that Guard units are trained, equipped, and ready to serve when called. A truly integrated force leverages the strengths in each component. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen identified four fundamental principles that must be attained in order to achieve integration of the Army’s components. First, senior leadership must clearly understand and accept responsibility for the concept of the Total Force. Second, there must be a clear and mutual understanding of the mission for each unit (active, Guard, and Reserve) for both service and joint/combined operations during peace and war. Third, the services must commit to provide the resources needed to accomplish the assigned missions. Fourth, the leadership of the senior commanders of both the Guard and the Regular Army must ensure the readiness of the Total Force. Cohen’s principles are especially applicable in light of the emerging roles of the reserve components as outlined in the National Military and Security Strategies, and the RCE-05 study.

The RCE-05 study recommends a 25 percent increase in the participation of the Reserve components in joint experimentation activities as a part of the “prepare now” portion of the military strategy. As an enhancement to the shaping or responding portion of the strategy, the study recommends the development of a standardized database of individual civilian-acquired skills available within the reserve component that would facilitate improved support of information operations and other stability and support operations. The study also recommends increasing the number of Reserve component slots in the Joint Professional Military Education II course at the Armed Forces Staff College by ten percent, and the subsequent integration of the Reserve component into corps and echelon above corps positions. In order to integrate Reserve component leadership more fully into the Department of Defense, the study recommends increasing the number of full-time National Guard soldiers assigned to the joint and unified command headquarters.
Stability operations, as defined by FM 100-23 (1994), are those in which security forces (military, paramilitary, and police forces) carry out operations for the restoration and maintenance of order and stability. The military has a difficult time prosecuting stability and support operations because estimation of the size and composition of the force necessary to successfully carry them out is difficult. Stability and support operations are, in essence, a Clauswitzian campaign that seeks to reach the "hearts and minds" of people. In many cases, groups of these people are often traditional enemies. The National Guard possesses a wealth of experience and expertise in this area, both through its force structure and the civilian-acquired skills of its soldiers. National Guard soldiers, who also happen to be police officers, educators, city councilmen, state legislators, and successful businessmen, can literally assist in societal reconstruction.

Another difficulty of stability and support operations is that they may require a long-term military commitment, especially in cases where neither faction cares to compromise. Multi-national forces, or allies, may be either unable or unwilling to participate with, or to replace United States' forces after initial operations. Moreover, Western governments are historically unwilling to support long-term stability and support operations. The cost of these protracted operations often exceeds the expected benefit. It is generally accepted, however, that units will conduct intervention operations in six-month increments, such as is evidenced by the Sinai and Macedonia deployments. Rotation of this responsibility through the National Guard force structure will lessen the public outcry against a stability and support operation that is likely to require a number of years to complete. The employment of Reserve component soldiers for peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and similar operations will allow the leveraging of strategic and tactical airlift, civil affairs, medical, engineering, military police, transportation, and similar skills that largely reside in the Reserve components.

The RCE-05 study also explores the role of the Reserve component in smaller-scale contingency operations. A significant recommendation was the alternating of active and Reserve component rotations during international peacekeeping operations. The validity of this recommendation is currently being tested with the National Guard divisions participating in the NATO stabilization force missions in Bosnia. This recommendation is important because the Department of Defense illustrative planning scenarios for 2005 include a requirement for two interpositional peacekeeping operations similar to the Multi-Force Observer mission in the Sinai. The divisional force structure of the National Guard is suited for these missions because light or medium weight infantry battalions are the preferred force structure to accomplish them. At present, there are approximately 39 light infantry battalions in the National Guard. This is enough to provide a battalion for two six-month missions per year without significant degradation to the overall operational readiness of the Guard. Similarly, the study also recommends increased reliance upon the Reserve components to compensate for the shortfall in high-demand, low-density units (such as the PATRIOT) within the Regular Army.

Stability and support operations place a tremendous resource drain on active component units. Based on the present active component force structure, one-fifth of the force may be deployed at any given time on stability operations. An active battalion, participating in a six-month stability and support rotation, may go twenty-four months between stability operational deployments. Thus, an active battalion that has participated in a stability and
Support operation really only has a little more than a year to complete a retraining cycle for its combat mission of sustained land warfare in a major theater war before it deploys for another stability and support operation. Stability and support missions also impact the battalions that are not deployed. For example, a brigade that has lost its battalion to a stability and support operation may not be able to train at the brigade level. If a maneuver brigade is out of commission, then it follows that its parent division is also unable to train at the division level. However, the employment of National Guard battalions in stability and support operations will relieve the operations tempo of the active component and allow it to maintain combat readiness for longer periods. Activation of the National Guard for these operations may also assist in bolstering failing public support for an unpopular intervention on the part of the National Command Authority.

The RCE-05 study cautions against the exclusive use of the Reserve component in continuous rotational large peace implementation operations like Bosnia, preferring instead to alternate the responsibility between components. It also strongly cautions against meeting initial smaller-scale contingency requirements with only active component forces—preferring a Total Force approach where both active and Reserve component forces enter the contingency together. As mentioned in chapter two, the National Security Panel concludes that the varied nature of modern military operations demand increasing levels of specialization. Even lesser military threats may present difficult challenges to the armed forces, especially when they occur in operational environments (urban, contaminated locales, refugee flow) that do not fit with the way that military forces are structured. Specialized skills that already reside within the National Guard can make a significant contribution in tailoring contingency forces to deal with emerging security challenges. This is especially true concerning domestic security threats.

Homeland Defense

The 1997 National Defense panel recommends that the National Guard, as a part of the homeland defense mission, train local authorities in chemical and biological weapons detection, defense, and decontamination. In addition to these tasks, the Guard is also to assist in casualty treatment and evacuation, the quarantine of affected areas and people, and the restoration of infrastructure and services. The homeland defense mission is not a new concept to the National Guard. The Guard has conducted a form of homeland defense for many years as a part of their CONUS air defense, counterdrug, and border control/surveillance missions. The Air National Guard is responsible for the air sovereignty and air defense of the continental United States. Similarly, for the past decade, Army Guard personnel have lent assistance at points of entry into the United States by inspecting packages and bundles for controlled substances. They also monitor known illegal high-traffic areas along the border.

In May of 1998, following the publication of the National Defense panel report, President Clinton established ten rapid assessment and initial detection (RAID) teams consisting of twenty-two highly skilled, full-time National Guard personnel who act as the “tip of the national military support spear” in response to homeland defense issues. These teams, which are located in each of the ten FEMA regions, will be fully operational by 5 January 2000 and will assist local first responders in determining the precise nature of a weapon of mass destruction attack, provide medical and technical advice, and assist with the identification and arrival of other state
and federal response assets—accomplishing each recommendation of the RCE-05 report. Existing National Guard chemical and patient decontamination force structure provides additional rapid response support to civilian authorities. Moreover, seven additional RAID teams will be fielded in the FY 2000 defense appropriation. The remaining thirty-seven states and territories will establish "light" RAID teams from existing force structure. Future RAID team missions involve the integration of Guard medical force structure in response plans to provide medical advice, triage support, and casualty evacuation. Other homeland defense initiatives within the Reserve Component Employment Study call for the manning of ground-based interceptors, X-band radars, and upgraded early warning radars under the national missile defense system.

The National Guard is ideally suited for the critical mission of homeland defense as identified in the National Security Strategy because of its presence in more than 3,300 communities. Also, in 45 percent of the states, the Adjutant General is also the State Emergency Management Officer. This alone provides a direct link between the Guard and the state agencies it supports during a disaster or crisis. National Guard leadership is familiar with local emergency response plans and have well established links to the fire, police, and emergency personnel—who are always to first to arrive at the scene of an incident. The consequence management effort of weapons of mass destruction response necessitates robust information management and communications architectures. The Emergency Information System software used by FEMA is fully fielded on the National Guard Distributive Training Technologies network and the Reserve component Automation network. This capability provides a national communications and information capability for local, state, and federal agencies that are involved in weapons of mass destruction response.

The National Guard is also suited to provide cyberterrorism defense, as outlined in the draft 1999 National Security Strategy as a part of the homeland defense mission. National Guard soldiers possess civilian-acquired skills that are well suited to the protection and defense of information and information systems. This capability satisfies one of the recommendations of the RCE-05 study for the establishment of a 400-person joint integrated "virtual organization" for information operations and information assurance. The National Guard has proposed a cyberterrorism defense force structure that interfaces well with the RCE-05 recommendation.

One of the fundamental questions that the RCE-05 study addresses is whether or not Reserve component units are capable of performing homeland defense missions in addition to their existing mission of fighting the nation's wars, or does the homeland defense mission detract from the primary warfighting mission, and thus require the creation of additional military units? A similar debate ensued several years ago over whether or not counterdrug missions should be conducted incidental to training or as stand-alone missions. Where present force structure already exists in each State, the study determined that dual missioning for the homeland defense requirements was indeed possible. The study also calls for a reduction of the active component's participation in JTF counter-drug operations and an increase in Reserve component participation in these operations—expanding present homeland defense responsibilities. This will relieve resource shortfalls and operational tempo for the active component at a reasonable cost.

In conclusion, the National Guard possesses skills that uniquely qualify it to respond to the changing global security situation. Its very mission has created flexibility within its force structure that allows for creative
possibilities in uncertain situations. The key task of senior National Guard leadership is the oversight and
evaluation of the effectiveness of force structure changes with existing and future military requirements and likely
security threats.
CHAPTER 4
EFFECTIVENESS OF THE GUARD'S FORCE STRUCTURE CHANGES

The purpose of this chapter is to evaluate the effectiveness of the changes to the National Guard’s force structure in view of the contemporary and emerging security environment. The evaluation criteria used in this analysis are drawn from the requirements, security assessments, strategies, studies, reports, and conclusions contained in chapters two and three of this monograph. A synthesis of this information reveals a series of evaluation criteria that can be used to assess the effectiveness of the evolution of the current and emerging National Guard force structure.

The first of these criteria is increased deployability, which is characterized by reduced post mobilization time and smaller strategic transportation requirements. Second is increased flexibility, which is defined as the ability to execute the specific military operation required to accomplish the mission. Third is increased relevancy, or the capability of the force to satisfy the requirements of the National Military and Security Strategies within the context of the contemporary and emerging security environment. Fourth, strategic risk is characterized as the ability to compensate for unexpected contingencies or to a threat that exceeds the two MTW model. Fifth, balanced force structure is defined as the percentage of combat, combat support, and combat service support forces within the Guard. Sixth, full-spectrum operations are defined as the ability of the force to perform both its state and federal missions. Seventh, interoperability and integration is defined as the ability of the force structure to interface with, and conduct operations with, active or joint forces. Eighth, information operations are defined as the ability to protect against cyber warfare. Ninth, homeland defense represents the ability to satisfy the weapons of mass destruction consequence management and initial detection requirements. Tenth, sustained land warfare is characterized by the ability of the force to conduct offensive and defensive operations. Eleventh, smaller-scale contingencies are characterized by the ability of the force to conduct stability and support operations.

The changes to the National Guard force structure, specifically the enhanced separate brigades, the integrated divisions, the combat support and service support structure, and other capabilities will be analyzed separately using the criteria mentioned above. This analysis will be followed by the implications of Guard Vision 2010, which contains, in part, the desired end-state of the Guard’s force structure and procedural changes.

Enhanced Separate Brigades and the Integrated Division

The enhanced separate brigade’s ability to complete post mobilization training and deploy to a theater of war within 90 days clearly makes it a more deployable force than a Guard division, which requires more than six months to deploy. Moreover, the ability of the eSB to conduct independent operations makes it a more flexible force than a Guard divisional brigade. Its design and structure allow it to integrate at the division, corps, or theater level. This alone provides a large number of options to the theater, corps, or division commander in terms of the missions assigned to it. In other words, its ability to operate in the environments of major theater wars and smaller-scale contingencies make it a relevant force within the context of the National Military and Security Strategies. Enhanced separate brigades can also participate in joint and combined exercises or other operations to “shape” the
international security environment as outlined in the National Military Strategy. More important, however, is the
fact that the enhanced separate brigade force structure does not cross state boundaries as do six of the National
Guard divisions. This makes the eSB an extremely feasible force in that facilitates training and personnel
management issues.

Enhanced separate brigades also represent a balanced force in that they contain combat, combat support,
and combat service support force structure. They are a "full-spectrum" force, able to accomplish assigned federal
and state missions. The eSB is postured to be fully interoperable with the active component forces due to its
modernization program and the level at which it receives fiscal and personnel resources. It is clearly the most
interoperable of the National Guard combat force structure. This capability makes it a true Reserve combat force
for the Nation. The availability of fifteen enhanced separate brigades to war planners also reduces strategic risk in
that they represent a rapidly deployable, and very capable, combat force that can be used either for unexpected
contingencies, or in the event of poor use of operational art, in the early prosecution of the two nearly simultaneous
major theater wars.

The enhanced separate brigades, however, lack the ability to conduct information operations or rapid
assessment and initial detection in weapons of mass destruction consequence management incidents. Although
individual soldiers within the brigade may possess this capability through their civilian-acquired skills, the force
structure as a whole is simply not designed to accomplish these two important missions. However, within the
context of the Guard’s homeland defense responsibilities, the eSBs represent a force pool for security or quarantine
operations. Nevertheless, they are unable to protect against cyberterrorism or perform the mission of a RAID team.

The integrated division concept appears to create the training environment and provide sufficient
resources to ensure the integration and interoperability of the Guard enhanced separate brigade. An active
component division headquarters can provide training resources and facilitate multi-echelon training opportunities
that are simply not available within the Guard force structure. This is clearly an ideal peacetime organization for
the enhanced separate brigades. However, based upon the contemporary and emerging security environment, there
does not appear to be a need to ever initiate phase two of the integrated division concept in order to create fully
deployable warfighting divisions. It appears that the only advantage to this force structure conversion is the ability
to deploy two additional divisions to a major theater of war in 90 days, instead of 180 days when a regular Guard
division could be brought into the fight.

Combat Support and Combat Service Support Force Structure

The conversion of twelve National Guard divisional brigades to combat service and combat service
support structure, as outlined in the divisional redesign study, directly satisfies a critical shortfall in the Regular
Army’s ability to satisfy their requirement to conduct two simultaneous major theater wars. This conversion of
divisional combat power, which is considered excess in view of the contemporary security environment, to combat
support and service support force structure is clearly relevant to the National Military and Security Strategies.
Moreover, combat support and service support force structure is well suited to the accomplishment of the Guard’s
federal and state missions. In other words, these units play critical roles in disaster response at the state level, and stability and support operations overseas.

Combat support and service support structure is also more deployable than the enhanced separate brigade or the division. They are also flexible in that they can be used in either sustained land warfare (offensive and defensive operations) or stability and support operations. They are indeed a full-spectrum force. Their ability to attain high readiness levels though a combination of their home station training, and state active duty missions, makes them a very feasible force. They are easier to integrate into the active component than combat forces and can directly satisfy the Guard’s new responsibilities of information warfare and homeland defense.

The cost of the generation of this force structure is the loss of the maneuver brigades of two National Guard combat divisions. Under the eight-division force structure, the nation was able to double the size of its Army in six months to a year. Now the Army is only able to expand its size by 75 percent in the same time frame. This does slightly increase the level of strategic risk to the nation—especially in the event of protracted or global war. However, not only is the possibility of global war unlikely, but the immediate benefit of additional combat support and service support units in the force structure to both the National Guard and the Regular Army clearly outweigh the slightly elevated strategic risk associated with the generation of this force structure.

National Guard Divisions and the Teaming Concept

The National Guard divisions require two to three times the post mobilization training time of the enhanced separate brigades, nor are they presently integrated into any theater war plan. Thus, their ability to conduct offensive and defensive operations within the projected timelines of the war-planners in the two nearly simultaneous major theater wars is questionable. Moreover, six of the eight divisions cross state boundaries—creating training, personnel, and readiness challenges. In short, they are much less deployable or feasible than the enhanced separate brigade.

They do, however, represent a balanced and a full spectrum force in that states are able to draw forces from the division to accomplish state active duty missions. Their ability to serve as a base generating force and conduct stability and support operations makes them relevant to the National Security and Military Strategies. They are an ideal force to use in “shaping” the international environment through the conduct of exchanges, or the participation in joint or combined exercises. Indeed, the missions of the armed forces of many nations more closely resemble that of the National Guard than the Regular Army, whose emphasis is on power projection. Thus, the Guard division is a logical resource for the theater commander’s engagement strategy.

The lack of modern equipment as compared to the enhanced separate brigades, however, may cause challenges to the ability of the Guard division to integrate with active component forces. Also, like the enhanced brigade, they are not designed to conduct the kind of information operations envisioned in the National Security and Military Strategies, the RCE-05 study, or the report of the National Defense Panel. They do, however, contain resources that would facilitate the Guard’s conduct of its rapid assessment and initial detection of weapons of mass destruction incidents. Central to the relevance of the Guard division, however, is the argument of whether or not
the United States expects to fight a protracted or global war. Guard divisions play a key role in the nation’s response to protracted or global warfare.

Implications of Army National Guard Vision 2010

In an effort to link the National Guard to Army Vision 2010, the Army After Next, and Joint Vision 2010, the National Guard Bureau published Army National Guard Vision 2010. As a part of that vision, the National Guard Bureau is fully committed to implementing the joint operational concepts of dominant maneuver, precision engagement, focused logistics, and full-dimensional protection. A central theme to Army National Guard Vision 2010 is that the uncertainty of the global security situation requires the Army to have the ability to rapidly expand to meet security challenges in order to deter threats. Thus, the National Guard has adopted a force structure that represents a balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support units. These units provide both a capability to expand the force structure base of the Army, as well as providing their respective States a variety of options and capabilities in domestic support missions. This conservative and balanced view truly facilitates the establishment of a “full-dimensional” force that is able to operate in stability and support operations, sustained land warfare, as well as domestic missions in their respective states.

Army National Guard Vision 2010 is founded upon the premise that Guard combat structure will be both integrated and relevant. This vision makes the unparalleled commitment that Guard force structure that would serve the Total Army in other capacities will be “redesigned, and equipped for new missions.” This is happening with the twelve divisional combat brigades that are being converted to CS/CSS units. Additionally, the National Guard commits to using emerging communications infrastructure and distributive training technology to its fullest in order to reduce the historical training challenges of time and distance. As a part of its distributive training initiatives, the National Guard will use linked simulations and simulators to create a “common synthetic theater of war.” These simulations will actually coach the soldier and leader through each of the training scenarios. Distributive training in the National Guard will occur in four areas: virtual and distance learning (supporting individuals); virtual (supporting crews/teams); constructive (supporting leader/staff training); and live simulation (validating the unit through individual, crew/team, leader and staff performance). These training initiatives seek to improve the agility of the National Guard in the reduction of the startup time from mobilization to deployment.

Another fundamental tenet of Army National Guard Vision 2010 is the commitment to a mutually supportive relationship with the other armed forces as a Base Operations Support (BASOPS) provider. Underneath the “Fort State” concept of the National Guard, each state will provide support to the active Army, Army Reserve, Marine Corps, Coast Guard, Air Force, and other Federal agencies. In this manner, the Guard will complement Shalikashvili’s vision that the services become “fully joint: institutionally, organizationally, intellectually, and technically.” Implementation of Army National Guard Vision 2010 is limited only by modernization challenges and other resource limitations. However, the fifth goal (integration and interoperability of the Reserve components) of Caldera’s Army Modernization Plan ensures the necessary resource framework for the Guard to realize Army National Guard Vision 2010. The full realization of this Vision will ensure the relevancy and successful integration of the National Guard in force projection operations in the new millennium.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

The monograph assesses the relevancy of the National Guard’s force structure changes to contemporary and emerging security environment and the National Security and Military Strategies. The changes that the National Guard has made do indeed make its force structure relevant. This is a very positive step. Also, in the last decade, the Guard has been increasingly used in force projection operations with the Regular Army. However, more change is needed.

Since the early 1900s, a paradigm of mistrust and hostility has plagued the National Guard and the Regular Army. This paradigm must not continue. Like Lucius Quinctius Cincinnatus in the 5th century BC, the National Guard soldier serves as the backbone of America’s security. Cincinnatus was a farmer who, in 458 BC, answered the call to serve Rome at a time when the Aequi and Volsci armies had trapped the Roman consular Army on Mount Algidus. Cincinnatus, who was given sufficient dictatorial power to save the situation, is said to have defeated the enemy in a single day. Following a celebration in Rome, he took “an affectionate leave of his gallant Army and returned to cultivate his four acres with the same hands which had so gloriously defended the liberties of his country.”

Similarly, a few weeks after British troops left American soil, and three months after signing the treaty that ended the Revolutionary War (December 23, 1783), General George Washington tendered his resignation to the representatives of congress. He stated, “Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theater of action; and bidding an affectionate farewell to this August body under whose orders I have so long acted, I here offer my Commission, and take my leave of all the employments of public life.” Such attitudes exist in the National Guard today; it is this singular characteristic from which the Guard derives its greatest strength—people committed to the service of their communities and nation.

As long at the National Command Authority continues to use the military as frequently as it has demonstrated its willingness to do so in the last decade, then the Army of the future must include a larger role for the National Guard. Although the Regular Army may continue to decrease in size, it is not likely that the size of the National Guard will decrease much more. Congress simply won’t consider removing Guard units from the communities where they are presently located. It follows that Army war planners should accordingly increase the level of Guard integration. The reserve component, and especially the National Guard, can serve as a bridge between the American people and the military. History has shown that, although the Regular Army may deploy, the nation doesn’t go to war until the National Guard or Army Reserve is mobilized. Moreover, as Abrams posited nearly 30 years ago, the necessity to mobilize the Reserves instills a sense of responsibility and accountability upon the National Command Authority—perhaps assuring that the military will only be used when a legitimate national interest is at stake. The National Military Strategy has a real weakness in that it may further isolate the Regular Army from the American people. The average citizen will know and care little about those who serve. Reserve component soldiers, who often are in leadership positions in their professions and their communities, are a positive link between the military and the American people.
The National Guard has played, and will continue to play, a vital role in the defense and security of this nation. The increased focus on readiness and the redesign of the Guard combat force structure is definitely a positive step toward force relevancy. However, in order for Army National Guard forces to be truly relevant, they must mirror those in the active component. The forces must be interoperable. Can the legacy systems presently fielded in the National Guard operate with advanced warfighting experimental forces under the Force XXI model in an efficient manner? Furthermore, force relevancy is directly proportional to readiness and realistic deployment schedules. Until a solid deployment and validation timeline is established for Guard divisions, and they are included in theater war plans, one can seriously question the relevancy of these forces. The nation cannot afford to keep military force structure that has no mission. Possible missions for the National Guard divisions are stability and support operations, like the Bosnia SFOR mission, where the units are not fully validated for combat operations. The SFOR mission will illustrate the ability of the Guard division to operate in a joint and multinational environment. Additionally, the lack of resources presents several challenges to the post mobilization training of Guard combat elements. However, the plan in Guard Vision 2010 to leverage technology to overcome the time and distance challenges to training will assist in enhancing training and the attainment of realistic readiness goals.

While the increased use of Guard units in force projection operations is a positive step toward integration, employment of the National Guard for missions that fall short of true national emergencies negatively impact the soldier, their families, and employers. This is especially true of self-employed soldiers. The time of a citizen-soldier in the National Guard is precious in that two careers are in the balance. Deployments to areas that do not involve a serious threat to a vital national security interest will ultimately be self-defeating. High quality soldiers who possess the skills and experiences that will render them successful in prosecuting future military operations in today's complex security environment will conclude that they do not have the time to both stay in the Guard and fulfill their commitment to their civilian career and their family. In other words, the type of soldier that our nation needs to form the backbone of its future combat leadership will simply not be available. Thus, the quality of the National Guard, and indeed the entire Reserve component, will decrease and, as a consequence, so will the ability of the military to protect the vital interests of our nation.

The debate over what level integration between the National Guard and the Regular Army is to occur is an intriguing puzzle. Does integration work better at the individual, platoon, company, battalion, brigade, or division level? As shown in chapter one, a major source of historical tension between the National Guard and the Regular Army involved the use of National Guard units as fillers and replacements. Therefore, individual integration is clearly not an option. Arguably, unit effectiveness is proportional to the degree of cohesion among its members. Many National Guard soldiers spend their entire career in the same unit. Therefore, the cohesion of a Guard unit exceeds that which can be routinely developed in active duty with their high turnover rate. Moreover, National Guard combat forces are presently training at the platoon and company level and have also successfully demonstrated battalion level integration at the National Training Center. While battalion and brigade level integration is possible, company level integration seems to be the most reasonable if one is considering the use of Guard divisions as a base generating force for unit-level integration with their teamed active divisions.
Adoption of a total brigade-based force structure as proposed by Brinkerhoff may be an advantageous move for the National Guard. Certainly, the multi-state division is unwieldy, inefficient, problematic, and of questionable relevancy if one is to confide in contemporary security assessments. National Guard divisions with their legacy equipment, low MOS training percentages, and the time and distance problems associated with multi-echelon collective training are simply unable to serve as combat forces in the timelines associated with the two major theater war model. However, they are completely suited for stability and support operations. Perhaps, then, a new paradigm governing their deployment should be developed. Army planners should use the National Guard divisions as a resource pool for stability and support operations or theater security operations. National Guard divisions not needed for stability and support missions could be converted into additional enhanced brigades, since it is the enhanced brigade that presently serves as the primary combat Reserve force of the nation.

Conversely, the National Guard division is extremely relevant in a protracted or general war. Before a decision can be made to focus these divisions on stability and support operations, one must decide whether or not the United States will ever fight another general war. While security assessments indicate that the norm will be smaller-scale contingences and limited war for the next thirty years, it would be a foolish nation who aspires to maintain its global superpower status, which sacrificed their capacity to wage general war. Therefore, it may be necessary for the United States to retain the capability of fighting a protracted war wherein strategic planners allow for sufficient time for Guard divisions to attain appropriate levels of combat readiness. Based upon this necessity, the Guard divisions are clearly a relevant force—despite their questionable relevancy in the contemporary security environment.

Using the assessment of the National Defense Panel and Joint Vision 2010 as guidelines for a force to be relevant in the next two decades, it must be able to respond to: information attacks, the use of weapons of mass destruction against civilian and commercial targets, space operations, lack of access to forward bases, deep inland operations, and mass population problems. These requirements, outlined in the National Security imperatives for 2010-2020 are clearly within the grasp of the emerging force structure of the National Guard. On the whole, it remains a relevant force. The integrated division concept should be expanded so that all National Guard enhanced separate brigades are integrated with an active component command. This will ensure training accountability, multi-echelon training opportunities, and wartime mission focus. Perhaps more of the National Guard divisional structure should be converted to early-deploying units such as artillery and air defense. Other divisions, not needed for sustained land warfare, should be trained and organized for stability and support operations. Because the operations tempo of the heavy forces in the Guard often exceeds the capabilities of the drill status soldier, a medium brigade-based force structure, such as that proposed by Shinseki, may also be appropriate to the National Guard.

The National Guard can play a decisive role in the shaping of the international environment by focusing on stability and support operations. Its vast experience base in disaster response and domestic support exceeds that of any branch of the armed forces. The National Guard is simply the best at these missions. National Guard divisions that formerly held a strategic Reserve role should be given a clear peacetime mission in shaping the international environment. They should actively be involved in Partnership for Peace, assisting in the
SOUTHCOM, or other unified command's theater engagement strategy. A tremendous resource is at the disposal of the nation—however, care must be taken in how it is applied. A real danger to both the Regular Army, as well as the full-time National Guard leadership, in their desire to implement the Total Force policy of the future is to attempt (subconsciously perhaps) to make active, career soldiers, and National Guard soldiers mirror images of each other. This is simply outside of the realm of the possible. If a National Guard soldier wanted to dedicate the time required to maintain the military operations tempo of the active component, he or she would have either joined the Regular Army or the full-time National Guard. Also, one must carefully consider the potential impact the deployment of a Guard unit will have at the community level—particularly in the case of the small-unit integration of combat forces. The benefit must justify the cost.

The paradigm of employing the Army National Guard in force projection operations must change if the military is to successfully accomplish its requirements as outlined in the National Security and Military Strategies. Sadly, integration efforts between the Air National Guard and Air Force and the Army National Guard and the Regular Army are worlds apart. The average Air Force officer, when asked how many fighter wing equivalents exist in the service, will say, “Twenty.” It is unlikely that he or she will say, “Thirteen active and seven reserve.” The average Army officer, when asked how many divisions the Army has, will say, “Ten.” But, that is not true; the Army has eighteen divisions—ten active and eight National Guard. This paradigm must be overcome, or Abrams’ vision of the Total Force will be as “sounding brass and tinkling symbols.” The National Guard is a strategic asset. If employed correctly, it can directly impact the successful realization of the National Military and Security Strategies as our nation enters a new millennium.
Endnotes

1 Charles L. Cragin, "Building the Total Force of Today and Tomorrow," *The Officer*, Jan/Feb 1999, 35. At the time Cragin made this quote, he was the acting Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. Previously, he had been serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs.

2 Mr. X, "The Sources of Soviet Conduct," *Foreign Affairs* 65, Spring, 4 (1987): 852-868. Kennan's classic article was actually published forty years earlier under the pen name of "Mr. X" during his embassy service in the Soviet Union. This article, published as a State Department "leak," became the foundation for America's foreign policy of containment.


4 John K. Mahon, *History of the Militia and the National Guard* (New York: Macmillan, 1983), 261-267. Mahon illustrates the historical tension between the professional soldiers between the Regular Army and the National Guard from its colonial origins through the creation and implementation of the Total Force policy in the 19070's. By charting the evolution of the National Guard's role, force structure, and political influence, Mahon provides a solid and authoritative background on the positive and negative aspects of its employment in military operations.


6 Michael D. Doubler, "A Militia Nation Comes of Age," *National Guard*, September 1999, 82-85. Major General Charles W.F. Dick is considered the Father of the Modern National Guard for his championing of the 1903 Dick Act and its subsequent 1908 amendments. While serving as a member of congress and later as a Senator, Dick also commanded the Ohio Division of the National Guard with the rank of Major General. In 1902, he was elected president of the National Guard Association of the United States—an office that he held for seven years.

7 Jerry Cooper, *The Rise of the National Guard: The Evolution of the American Militia, 1865-1920* (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1997), 112-116. The Division of Militia Affairs oversaw the training of National Guard units, and determined their "worthiness of the designation of 'organized militia.'" Officers serving in the Division of Militia Affairs emphasized property accountability and the militia's preparation for war. Cooper's historical analysis describes how modern war, the growing power of the general staff, and the expanding role of the federal government influenced the evolution of the National Guard from 1865-1920.


9 Emory Upton, *The Military Policy of the United States* (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1917), 15. Upton's acerbic writings had a cascading effect that established the foundation for the negative relationship between National Guard units and the Regular Army. Upton sought a military system that was controlled by professional officers whose emphasis was the preparation for war during times of peace. Upton stated, "Only a military system that place the organization and direction for war under the control of a professional Army could overcome the military ineptitude of the past."

10 National Guard Bureau, *History*, 5.

11 Doubler, 82-85. Doubler's writings present a concise history of the Army National Guard's participation in armed conflict from 1900 to World War I.
Bruce Jacobs, *Historical Perspectives: Tensions Between the National Guard and the Regular Army* (Fort Leavenworth: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1990), 15. Jacobs, a retired Major General with the National Guard, describes the effects that drafting the National Guard into the Regular Army force structure had on relations between the two components.

Charles E. Heller, *The New Military Strategy and Its Impact on the Reserve Components*, Strategic Studies Institute (U.S. Army War College, 1991), v. Heller suggests that after each war, the United States attempts to adjust the optimal size of its standing Army to compensate for the perceived inadequacies of the mobilization effort. Congress, however, not the Department of Defense, determines peacetime end strength.


William W. Kaufmann and Martin Binkin, *U.S. Army Guard and Reserve: Rhetoric, Realities, Risks* (Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989), 40-41. Kaufmann and Binkin’s analysis of the relationship between logistical resource availability and the length of post mobilization training is interesting in that the same challenges confront the National Guard enhanced separate brigades today. The availability of training areas that can support the maneuver of a heavy brigade is extremely limited.

Jacobs, 6.


Ibid., 10-12


Lyndon Baines Johnson, *The Vantage Point: Perspectives of the Presidency, 1963-1969* (Austin, TX: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1971), 145-147. While much has been written about Johnson’s decision to use conscripts and not reservists in the Vietnam War, his personal writings do a masterful job of describing his debate and struggle with this important decision.


Joseph H. Pistorious and John D. Stuckey, “Mobilization for the Vietnam War: A Political and Military Catastrophe,” *Parameters* 15, Spring (1985): 35. Most National Guard units, upon mobilization, were rated C-4 (not combat ready). In some cases, 49 percent of unit personnel were not fully MOS qualified. Combat readiness of the National Guard units for the Vietnam conflict required seven months of post-mobilization training—a tremendous improvement over World War II and the Korean War.

Lewis Sorley, “Creighton Abrams and Active-Reserve Integration in Wartime,” *Parameters* 21, no. 2 (1991): 46. Sorley quotes Abrams as saying to General Walter Kerwin, "If we're ever going to war again, we're going to take the Reserves with us."


29 George H. Bush, "Remarks by the President at the Address to the Aspen Institute Symposium" (paper presented at the Aspen Institute Symposium, Aspen, CO, August 2, 1991). This landmark address is considered by many to be the genesis of contemporary force restructuring.


31 Russell C. Davis, "Guard Forces are Needed in Future Year's Defense Plan," *The Officer,* Jan/Feb 1999, 61-63. LTG Davis was appointed as the Chief of the National Guard Bureau on 4 August 1998. His involvement of the National Guard in the State Partnership for Peace Program seeks to link the unique strengths of the Guard to the National Security Strategy through full spectrum exchanges between emerging republics, such as the Baltic States and South American democracies.

32 Kaufmann, 60-61. Kaufmann and Binkin’s analysis shows both the post-mobilization training requirements imposed upon the National Guard and the length of time it took to satisfy those requirements. During WWII, the division level post-mobilization training requirement was 32-44 weeks. However, it took an average of 120 weeks for the units to deploy. During Korea, the requirement was 28 weeks—which most divisions achieved in 32-35 weeks. Similarly, during the Berlin crisis, the post-mobilization training requirement was initially 27 weeks, and later compressed to thirteen. ARNG units attained the standard in thirteen weeks. During Vietnam, the post mobilization requirement was fifteen weeks—which most units achieved in fifteen to seventeen weeks. However, during Vietnam the limiting factor was the time required to fill the unit to 100 percent strength.


36 Ibid., 22.

37 Ibid., 12.

38 Ibid., 23.

39 Ibid., 18.

Ibid., 18.


Ibid., 3.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 5.


Ibid., Strategy, 16.

Ibid., 18.

Jeffrey Record, Ready for What and Modernized Against Whom? A Strategic Perspective on Readiness and Modernization (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, United States Army War College, 1995), 6.


Ibid., 1.

Ibid., 10.

Ibid., 13.


United States General Accounting Office, “Bottom-Up Review: Analysis of Key DOD Assumptions,” (Washington D.C.: U.S. General Accounting Office, 1995), 20. For a single theater war, the largest shortfalls occurred in five types of units: medical (84 units), engineer (33 units), quartermaster (20 units), military police (40 units), and transportation (29 units) for a total of 206 out of 238 units. For two theater wars, this increases to a total of 338 of these same units out of a possible shortfall of 654.


William J. Clinton, “Remarks to the National Guard Association of the United States,” Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents 32, no. 36 (1996): 1643. Clinton argued the value of the citizen soldier by...
quoting Congressman John Randolph, who in January of 1800 on the House floor stated, “When the citizen and soldier shall be synonymous, then you will be safe.”

59 William S. Cohen, Reserve Component Employment Study 2005, vol. 1 (Washington D.C.: Department of Defense, 1999). The study was directed by a senior steering group co-chaired by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Threat Reduction, the Director, Joint Staff J-8, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. It consisted of representatives from all components of the Services, the Coast Guard, the Service Secretaries, the National Guard Bureau, and the Assistant to the Chairman for National Guard and Reserve Matters. The study focused on potential reserve component missions within and outside of CONUS, alternative employment roles and force-mix concepts, range of combat and support roles, and the resourcing for current and future requirements. The study is not authoritative in nature. Although not authoritative in nature, it provides recommendations to the Department of Defense.


61 Schultz, Frontier, 1.


63 National Guard Bureau, Information, 1.

64 Brian R. Calvert, “Redefining the Army Guard Divisions: Operations and Integration Accelerate Despite Resource Drag,” National Guard, August 1999, 22. Calvert’s article addresses the conversion of combat force structure to combat service support force structure in an environment of scarce fiscal resources.

65 United States General Accounting Office, Conversions, 13. The GAO study questions the disconnect that exists between a Regular Army committed to a force structure of ten active divisions and the lack of missions for National Guard divisions in CINC war plans.

66 National Guard Association of the United States, Army National Guard Appraises Sec Army's Army National Guard Division Redesign Initiative [Press Release] (National Guard Association of the United States, 18 June 1996 [cited 20 August 1999]); available from http://www.ngaus.org/division.html. Secretary Togo’s acceptance of the proposal of the ADRS enjoyed unanimous support of the National Guard Association of the United States and the Adjutant General’s Association of the United States—arguably two of the nation’s most influential lobbying organizations. Major General Warren G. Lawson, then President of the AGAUS, stated that the "leadership of the National Guard has proven that the ARNG is willing to change in support of the Nation and the Army. The plan solves the reported CS/CSS shortfalls of the Army, increases integration with the Active Army, and places the ARNG in a leadership program in the debate over 'relevancy' and the defense budget."


68 Clavert, 22.


72 Calvert, 23.

73 Cohen, 17.


75 Ronald W. Krisak and John R. Brinkerhoff, “Guard Readiness,” Parameters 26, no. 4 (1996-1997): 143. This preliminary estimate of the length of post mobilization training is based on a study sponsored by the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Reserve Affairs. It is conservative because it gives no credit for the benefits of peacetime collective training. It suggests that the training time for full combat readiness is more a factor of the availability of external resources than any flaw in the National Guard divisions. The authors also suggest that, in reality, a National Guard division can be ready as fast as the Army needs it.

76 Cohen, 19.

77 Calvert, 22. Under the concept of division teaming, the 4th Infantry Division in Fort Hood, TX, teams with the 40th ID (Mech) in California in a mutually supportive fashion. Should the 4th ID deploy from Fort Hood, the 40th will assist. Similarly, if the 29th ID (L), a National Guard division, responds to a state emergency, the 10th Mountain Division, its teamed active division, will assist.


79 Jones, 1.


81 United States General Accounting Office, “Bottom-Up Review”, 8. The GAO concluded, based on 1992 and 1993 training data, that the Guard separate combat brigades did not meet premobilization training and readiness goals that were critical in determining wartime deployability.


83 Cohen, 14.

84 James R. Schlesinger, “Report of the Secretary of Defense to the Congress on the FY 1975 Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program,” (Washington, DC: Government Printing Office, 1974). Schlesinger’s argument that the Guard brigades can deploy much easier than Guard divisions rings true. Many Guard divisions are composed of forces from three to five states, whereas the entire force structure of a National Guard brigade can exist on one state.

85 Philip A. Brehm, Restructuring the Army: The Road to a Total Force, Vol. 13, Strategic Studies Institute (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 1992). Brehm posits that the conversion of ARNG combat structure to CS/CSS structure would allow the Regular Army to remain focused on its combat mission of sustained land warfare in two major theater wars.

86 Brinkerhoff, Conservation, 8. Brinkerhoff posits a model for the inclusion of National Guard combat power in both major theaters of war. His model is both rational and visionary.

Edwin H. Burba, "Statement to the Defense Policy Panel of the House Armed Services Committee," (Washington D.C.: 1991). Burba testified to the readiness and deployability of the combat support and combat service support structure relative to that of the combat structure of the reserve components. He suggests that combat readiness at levels larger than company is difficult to attain within the confines of the drill weekend and annual training period. Burba opines that turnover rate, lack of training resources, and limited drill periods make division level readiness standards an impossibility to attain, brigade level readiness extremely difficult, battalion difficult, and company level readiness possible.

Aaron R. Kenneston, "From Cowpens to the California Desert: Integrating Reserve Component Units into Tactical Operations," Armor, May-June 1998, 17-19, 53. Both the Nevada National Guard leadership and the 11th ACR were committed to seamless integration. The 11th ACR commander, COL Guy Swan, initiated a training plan to bring the 1-221 Cav up to high warfighting standards. The proximity of the 1-221 Cav to the 11th ACR facilitated a mutual training relationship.

Cragin, 32. Cragin argues that, until the senior leadership of all Army components accepts Cohen's principles of integration, integration of the National Guard and the Regular Army is impossible.

Cohen, 29. Presumably, the integration of Reserve component officers at the theater level will assist commanders in leveraging the unique individual skill-set associated with these forces. Obviously, these positions should be incorporated into planning staffs.

Duncan, 215.

Quinlivan, 67.

Cohen, 10-12.

National Defense Panel, 20. The recommendations of the National Defense Panel concerning the homeland defense mission appear to be satisfied by the existing skill set of the National Guard.

Russell Davis, "Bringing the Guard's Priorities into Focus," National Guard Review, March 1999, 5. Davis' vision is for every state and territory to have the capability to respond to a WMD attack with a rapid assessment and initial detection (RAID) team. "Heavy" RAID teams will consist of 22 full-time soldiers. "Light" RAID teams will be drawn from existing full-time and drill-status positions in the states and territories.

Cragin, 34.

Cohen, 4.

Schultz, Vision, 1. While Army National Guard Vision 2010 appears to interface well with Joint Vision 2010 and the multi-component implications of Army After Next, its full realization will depend on fiscal, personnel, and resource availability, cooperation of the Regular Army, and the state Adjutants General.
101 Louis Caldera, *Statement by the Honorable Louis Caldera* (1999 [cited 3 Aug 1999]); available from http://www.house.gov/hasc/testimony/106thcongress/99-03-25caldera.htm. Caldera’s statement illustrated a “snap shot” of the Army and the path that the Army needs to travel in the future. The focus of modernization will be on the “first to fight” basis. Caldera stated that the Army will ensure that deployable active and Reserve component units are equipped with the latest equipment to ensure full interoperability—particularly in the area of digitization, the backbone of command, control, and communications.


103 Ibid., 3.

104 James Kitfield, “Guard Controversies: The Air Force and the Army Demonstrate Two Very Different Cultures Where the Total Force is Concerned,” *Air Force Magazine*, April 1998, 8. Kitfield describes the complete integration of the Air National Guard with the Air Force—to include Air Guard officers commanding regular Air Force units. The willingness of Regular Army units to be commanded by National Guard officers will be tested in the integrated Bosnia SFOR mission.
Bibliography


Cragin, Charles L. "Building the Total Force of Today and Tomorrow." The Officer, Jan/Feb 1999, 31-35.

Davis, Russell C. "Guard Forces are Needed in Future Year's Defense Plan." The Officer, Jan/Feb 1999, 61-63.

_____. "Bringing the Guard's Priorities into Focus." National Guard Review, March 1999, 5.


Doubler, Michael D. "A Militia Nation Comes of Age." National Guard, September 1999, 82-85.


Ledgerwood, Ralph. "Army XXI Corps Redesign Conference."


