PAKISTAN: HISTORY AND ECONOMY

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This collection is dedicated to certain problems dealing with the politics and economy of Pakistan. Pakistan is a young nation which formed after the Second World War as a result of the defeat of the fascist aggressors, a weakening of the position of the imperialist powers in the colonies and the victory of the national liberation movement in India. An altered international situation—a strengthening of the authority of the Soviet Union, the formation in Eastern Europe and several countries of Asia of people's democracies, the mighty development of the neodemocratic revolution in China, the anti-Japanese movement in the countries occupied by Japan during the Second World War—acted as a powerful impetus which strengthened the national liberation movement in India. The struggle of the peoples of India for freedom, particularly in the more highly developed industrial areas, assumed such broad proportions and became so critical that the British imperialists were forced to give up political hegemony in this country, hoping at the same time to maintain their basic economic positions. They gave India dominion status. To some degree this answered the demands of the masses and the interests of the Indian nationalist bourgeoisie. However, wishing to weaken the dominion of India, the English imperialists made broad use of the contradictions between the various groups of Indian landowners and, in particular, conflict between Moslem and Hindu groups. In 1947 India was split up into two nations—Pakistan, which included the areas where the majority of the population were Moslems, and the Indian Union (subsequently—the Independent Republic of India), which included the areas with a majority of Hindu population.

Pakistan was formed of two regions which were separated from one another by 1500 km. : one—in the extreme Northwest and the other—in the East of the Indian continent. At that time Western Pakistan was made up of the following provinces: Punjab, Sind, the Northwestern Frontier Province, Baluchistan, and the princedoms and territories of Afghan tribes bordering along these provinces. The population of West Pakistan (37 million in 1956) is multi-national in composition. It consists of Punjabi, Western Punjab nationalities, Sinds, Afghans, often called Pathans in Pakistan, Baluches, Bragu and other smaller ethnic groups populating the Western part of the Himalayas and eastern slopes of the Hindukush. The second section of
Pakistan is a small (one-fourth as large as West Pakistan) but densely populated (46 million persons) territory. The inhabitants are almost exclusively Bengali, and only in the mountain areas bordering on Burma do Tibetan-Burmese tribes live. This split-up of Pakistan is explained by the fact that the Moslems of India lived in compact masses only in the country's Far Western section and Far Eastern area. The fact that Pakistan is split up into two sections has had a great effect on its economic and political life. Other than religion the populations of West and Eastern Pakistan have no common features. There were never any economic ties between these two Moslem groups, and they differ in language and culture. During the first stages of Pakistan's existence, the government, the head of which at that time was the leader of the Moslem League, Mohammed Ali Jinn, in order to strengthen the ties between the Western and Eastern sections of the country, attempted to make Urdu the national language of Pakistan. However, this attempt was met by such strong resistance on the part of the Bengali population of Eastern Pakistan that the government was forced to back down. The question of nationalities in Pakistan became particularly acute. The Bengali problem is the most complicated. The Bengali of East Pakistan expressed dissatisfaction with the policies of the Pakistan government, feeling that it does not take into consideration the needs of East Pakistan, where the majority of the country's population lives. During its short history Pakistan has already experienced quite a few political changes. The very separation of Pakistan from India was accompanied by bloody conflicts between Moslems on the one hand and Hindus and Sikhs on the other (the massacres of August and September 1947). In West Pakistan, according to figures which are far from complete, no less than one-half million persons were killed during the massacres. During the first years of the existence of the new state, large groups of Hindus and Sikhs emigrated to neighboring India and approximately the same number of Moslems fled from India to Pakistan. As a result both countries had a total of 15 to 16 million refugees, 7 million of which were in Pakistan. The majority of the refugees were concentrated in the large cities and surrounding areas, for example, in Karachi and the surrounding areas.

The first government of the new nation was formed by the Moslem League party, which at that time exerted great influence on the masses. It promised the Moslem workers not only liberation from British hegemony but also from the slavery of the landlords and moneylenders, and painted pictures of the country's rapid economic development. In order *(British spelling: Muslim League)*
to accomplish this, it was necessary for Pakistan first of all to liquidate many dire consequences of the long period of vassalage under the British imperialists. Economically Pakistan was one of the industrially most under-developed countries. The working class represented in factories, transport and on the docks consisted of slightly more than 600,000 persons. There was no heavy industry at all. Feudal remnants reigned in agriculture. The greater part of the land belonged to large landowners. The flow of refugees made the land problem even more critical. The government, expressing the interests primarily of the landowners and the allied bourgeois trader class, was not able to solve the serious economic problems which arose. This caused great dissatisfaction with the policies of the Moslem League government, particularly in East Bengal. In 1954 the Moslem League was defeated at the polls in the Eastern Section of the country. Between 1947 and 1953 the Party composition of the government changed three times. At first the cabinet was headed by representatives of the Moslem League Party, then by a coalition of the National League and the Republican Party, subsequently—the Republican Party.

Certain changes also took place in the domestic policies and administrative organization of the country. In 1956 Pakistan was proclaimed an Islam Republic, and in 1955 the provinces in the Western Section were abolished and one single West Pakistan was formed, which infringed on the interests of the peoples of this area. The national liberation struggle became more bitter. Almost immediately after the formation of Pakistan, a movement began among the Afghans living in the Northwestern part of the country to form of the Afghan regions a separate state of Pushtunistan. This movement found sympathy and support on the part of the government of Afghanistan. Relations between Pakistan and Afghanistan grew tense. After the unification of all the provinces of West Pakistan the national movement grew stronger also in Sind, Baluchistan, and in several regions of Punjab.

Changes also took place in Pakistan's foreign policy. At the moment of the formation of Pakistan, British capital was predominant in its economy and the influence of England on the political life of Pakistan was considerable. However, after this Pakistan established economic relations with other nations, for example with Western Germany, Japan and the United States. American monopolies rapidly began to penetrate into Pakistan. Soon it was discovered that the predominant influence, even on the country's foreign policy, was beginning to be exerted by the United States. Under the influence of the United States, Pakistan signed an agreement with Turkey, and later together with Turkey
and Iran, entered the Baghdad Pact. Along with a few other nations of Asia, it became a member of the aggressive SEATO alliance. On 8 October 1958 a revolution occurred in Pakistan. The President of Pakistan, Iskander Mirza, dissolved all legislative organs and prohibited all parties. Many politicians whom Iskander Mirza considered to be "unreliable" were arrested. On 23 October 1958, the President officially abdicated authority and transferred it to the Commander-in-Chief of the Army Ayub-Khan. It is too early to predict how political events will develop in Pakistan in the future. This collection contains articles dedicated to the working class, agriculture, the nationalities question and certain features of the political life of Pakistan. Acquaintance with the materials contained in the collection will aid in understanding recent events taking place in Pakistan and the situation which shapes these events.

Doctor of Historical Sciences

A. D'yakov
ETNOMIC COMPOSITION OF THE POPULATION OF WEST PAKISTAN

In recent years in the Western part of Pakistan there has been a major movement for the reorganization of the country's administrative structure on the linguistic principle, for the formation of four autonomous provinces: Sind, Pushtunistan, Baluchistan, and Punjab. This movement is directed both against hardened administrative and feudal partitionings which remain from the period of British hegemony and against the unification of West Pakistan into one province, without consideration of the distribution of national groups populating it, in violation of historically consolidated economic and cultural unity of various national regions. The basis of the movement to form autonomous provinces are the aspirations of the main nationalities of West Pakistan toward administrative-governmental unity of the territories which they populate, a situation which would create conditions for a maximum free and unimpeded capitalist development of these regions. Official Pakistan statistics, based on the theory according to which all citizens of Pakistan are members of one nation, do not furnish information on the ethnic composition of the country's population. A simple list of languages spoken by the inhabitants of West Pakistan cannot give a picture of the ethnic composition of the population of this section of the country. In the first place, several nations may speak one language, and in the second place, not every nationality which has its own language is a nation. In addition, data on Pakistan's statistics, as well as materials on the periodic population census carried out by the Anglo-Indian Colonial authorities, are inaccurate, because they are based on the subjective estimates of the government employees who drew up the official reports.1

The census of 1951 shows that the population of West Pakistan speaks almost 20 languages. However, these languages are unevenly distributed: 97%, that is, the great majority of the population, gave one of the following five languages as their native language: Punjabi (including the Lahnda dialects)--20,824,000 persons, Pushtu--5,003,000, Sindhi--3,994,000, Urdu--2,189,000, and Baluchi--943,000.2 All of these languages (except Urdu) are distributed chiefly throughout the territory of individual more or less large geographic regions, and this testifies to the historically developed linguistic and cultural unity of the population of each of these regions. Nevertheless, one cannot come to

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the conclusion that all of the population groups of Western Pakistan living on one territory and speaking one language are nations. As is well known, common language and territory, as well as a common culture, are insufficient for the formation of a nation: what is lacking is a community of economic life, which is formed in the process of the development of capitalism.

Thus, in order to solve the problem of the ethnic composition of the population of West Pakistan, linguistic data alone are insufficient. In addition, information on the social-economic level of development of those groups of the population which occupy a common territory and speak a common language are necessary, as well as on the development of literature and the daily press in the languages of the nationalities of West Pakistan, and, finally, a study of nationalist movements, particularly movements for "regional, cultural and linguistic autonomy," which are taking place in this part of Pakistan in our time. In our opinion, the process of nation-forming among the various nationalities of West Pakistan, due to the unequal development of capitalist relations and the existence of powerful feudal remnants, is at various stages. Without claiming to arrive at any final solution to the problem (since we still lack necessary data for a detailed political-economic study), we shall nevertheless attempt to give a preliminary outline of the ethnic composition of the population of West Pakistan and the characteristic features of the basic nationalities to be found there.

Afghans (Pushtuns)

Afghans (or Pushtuns as they call themselves) within the borders of Pakistan, according to census data of 1951, total 5,002,085. They comprise the majority of the population of the former Northwest Frontier Province, the territory of the tribes and the northern part of Baluchistan (the districts of Zhob, Loralai, Quetta-Pishin. In 1951, in the Northwest Frontier Province and in the tribal belt, 4,635,689 Pushtuns were living, in Northern Baluchistan--268,695, in Punjab and Bahawalpur--24,141, in the Federal District of Karachi--57,284, in Sind and Khairpur--12,470. In the districts of the former Northwest Frontier Province, Pushtuns formed the majority in Kardan (98.4% of the population), Banna, (96%), Kohat (92.4%), and Peshawar (91.4%). In Dera Ismail Khan 22% of the population is Pushtun, and in Hazara--17%. The Afghan language (Pushtu or Pashto) belongs to the Eastern group of Iranian languages and forms several dialects, which can be joined into two groups: the
Northeastern (Peshawar) and the Southwestern (Kandagahra). In spite of certain differences, all of these dialects form one language. The total number of Pashto speakers (in Afghanistan and Pakistan) is approximately 10 to 11 million persons. Literature in the Pashto language has existed for many centuries. Its earliest monuments are dated by scholars to the eleventh-fifteenth centuries. According to legendary genealogy, the Afghans are the descendants of Jews—Ben Israel, settled by Nebuchadnezzar after the destruction of Jerusalem (586 B.C.) in the region of Gura and Bamian. Many scholars in the last century took this legend seriously. According to data which is available to modern science the Afghans are an Eastern Iranian nationality, in the ethnogenesis of which many tribes and nations took part: "There is a strong admixture of several nationalities which passed through Afghanistan, such as the Saki, Yu-Chih and Huns."

In Moslem literature mention of Afghans begins toward the end of the tenth century. The area of distribution of the Afghans at that time was evidently limited to the Sulaiman Mountains. In earliest times the Afghans populated the area of the Gazna plateau and part of the Peshawar Valley, and later, in the first half of the fifteenth century, the area of Kabul and Kandagahra, and in the second half of the fifteenth—beginning of the sixteenth century—the regions of Swat, Kuram and Pyanjkor. Afghan migration was facilitated by the fact that the settled Iranian-Tadzhik population to the south of Hindukush was partially forced back and partially destroyed by incursions by Mongolian-Turk nomads during the time of Gengis-Khan and Tamerlane. In the second half of the seventeenth century the Afghans began to penetrate the area to the North of Hindukush, primarily in the Harata region. The first Afghans in India were mercenary soldiers of Mahmud Gaznevi (998-1030). The triumphant military campaigns in which Afghans took part were accompanied by mass Afghan resettlement beyond the Indus. In all the provinces of Northern India, from Punjab to Bengal, numerous Afghan colonies sprung up. A particularly intensive migration by Afghans into these regions took place during the period of rule in Northern India of the Afghan dynasties Lodi (1451-1526) and Sur (1539-1555), as well as in the second half of the eighteenth century when, as a result of the successful conquests of Ahmad-Shah Durrani (1747-1773) the extensive Durrani state arose on the territory of Afghanistan in Northwest India. In the second half of the nineteenth century population of the Northern Hindukush Valley by Afghans began.

Afghan tribal division has been preserved to the pre-
Afghan tribes, in accordance with legendary genealogy, stemming from a common ancestor, Kais Abduresshid, are divided into four basic groups: Kerlarni, Sarbani, Gur-gusai and Ghilzai. The largest Afghan tribes inhabiting the territory of Pakistan are the Yusufzai, Nomand, Afridi, Orakai, Hattak, Kakar and Pani. Certain Ghilzai sheiks (so-called powinda) spend the summer months in Afghanistan and migrate for the winter to West Pakistan, in the region of the former Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan, Punjab and Bahawalpur.

All Pushtuniares of the Islam faith. The Afghan nationality began to form, evidently in the tenth-eleventh centuries A.D., when the collective name "Afghans" appeared for the first time, and this nationality became known to its neighbors under this name. From that time on a gradual formation of common tongue and culture has taken place with the Afghans. This process received its greatest development as a result of the break-down of the Afghans' clan-tribal structure and beginning of feudal relations. The final formation of the Afghan nationality, consolidation of an historically formed community of territory, language and culture was furthered by the founding of their first feudal states (the prindedoms Akora and Teri on the right bank of the Indus in the sixteenth century, the Kherat and Kandagara princedoms in Western Afghanistan at the beginning of the eighteenth century) and in particular the Durrani empire, uniting with its borders all the territories populated by Afghans. In the second half of the nineteenth century part of the Eastern Afghan lands were, after a lengthy and bloody struggle, taken by force by the English colonists and included in their colonial empire. The Durand line, forced on Afghanistan in 1893 as a political border, was drawn in such a manner that many Afghan tribes (Nomand, Shinvar, Afridi, Wazir, Kakar and others) were split up between Afghanistan and British India. In October 1901, upon the formation of the Northwest Frontier Province, the territory of the Eastern Afghans was split up once more, this time by an administrative border, so that part of the Afghan tribes (Kakar, Pani, Tarin, Shiran) were included in Baluchistan, and the Afghans of the mountain regions were cut off from the Afghans living on the plains. In addition, the Northwest Frontier Province included several regions populated by non-Afghans. This definitely impeded the process of consolidation of the Afghan nation.

Afghan national consolidation was also hindered by separatist movements by the Khans of certain tribes, disassociation and differing levels of social-economic develop-
ment of various tribal groups of Afghans populating mountain regions which were closed off and which possessed little communication between each other. As Professor I. N. Reysner wrote, "the Afghans entered the epoch of capitalism with tremendous carry-overs of the communal-clan structure both in their social relationships as in their entire way of life and in the consciousness of the people." These carry-overs were retained by many Afghan tribes up until the end of the nineteenth century, and sometimes even later. The custom of periodic redivision of land—"wesh"—was abolished in the county of the Yusufzai only after World War I. Certain carry-overs from the clan-tribal organization remain in our time with the Pashtunni. However, the tribal leaders, the Khans and Maliks, for the most part, have already been transformed into large landowners, as formerly all important matters are decided at the jirga, an assembly of the men who are the heads of the families making up the mel. The national consolidation of the Afghans was also hindered by the artificial isolation of Afghanistan, which was caused by the British colonialists after the Second Anglo-Afghan War of 1878-1880, and the colonial slavery of that portion of the Afghan people which were included within British India. However, in spite of all these obstacles with the end of the nineteenth century the penetration and development of elements of capitalism began in those regions populated by Afghans. In Afghanistan itself, as a result of its unification under the authority of the Emir Abdurrahman (1880-1901) favorable conditions were formed for the development of crafts, trade, and commodity-money relations; urban population grew, a commercial bourgeoisie appeared and a small European educated bourgeoisie—landowner intelligentsia appeared. With the end of the nineteenth century modern literature in the Pashtu language began to develop. A Pashtun national bourgeoisie and proletariat appeared on the Afghan lands seized by the British, together with the first industrial and transport enterprises at the beginning of the twentieth century. The forming of these classes of Afghan society due to the colonial status of the Eastern Afghan lands also took place beyond the borders of the territory populated by the Pashtunni, primarily in the close-by regions of Punjab. With the beginning of the twentieth century a gradual forming of the Afghan nation took place, the forming of a national consciousness on the part of the Afghans (the revolutionary events in Russia and the national liberation struggle of the peoples of India exerted great influence on this process). National consolidation was sped up by the war for the independence of Afghanistan (1919),
supported by the armed struggle of the Pashtun tribes along the frontier belt and the anti-imperialist actions by the Pashtun bourgeoisie and intelligentsia of the Northwest Frontier Province. In spite of the dissociation of tribes and the treason on the part of certain representatives of the feudal statum serving the British, the armed uprising of the Pashtuni, which covered the entire border region from Chitrala to Quetta, played an important role in the winning of Afghanistan’s independence. The rebellion continued until 1923 and was put down only after the British government concentrated large numbers of troops in the border region. In spite of the fact that the armed rebellion of the border tribes was drowned in blood, the national liberation struggle of the Pashtuni of the Northwest Frontier Province and the tribal belt did not cease. In subsequent years, in the course of the liberation movement, the first mass political organizations of Pashtuni were formed, the largest of which was "Khudai Khidmatgar" known under the name of "Red Shirts." At that time the first periodical literature appeared in the Pashtu language. Ties were established between the Pashtuni and the All-India national liberation movement. A left, revolutionary-democratic wing of the Pashtuni national movement was formed, which was aided to a considerable degree by the growth in the numbers, organization and consciousness of the Pashtuni proletariat during the years between the two World Wars.

During the Second World War Pashtuni nationalists demanded the formation of an independent Pashtunistan which would include all the Northwest regions of British India populated by Pashtuni. The national movement of Pashtuni under the slogan of the formation of Pashtunistan did not cease after the formation of Pakistan in 1947. Although in 1935–1946 the leadership of the Moslem League, although it made use of slogans of Pan-Islamism broadly in its propaganda, was able to attract the support of some of the Pashtuni ulis and religious leaders, although the basic masses supported the leaders of the "Red Shirts" and other Pashtuni nationalist organizations. The traditions of the long armed struggle against British colonialism for independence and the hate for British imperialism were the main reasons for the failure of the leaders of the Moslem League in their attempts to attract the Pashtuni masses in the struggle to form Pakistan. In June 1947, on the initiative of the leaders of the "Red Shirts" a Pashtuni jirga was convened in Banna, at which more than 500 representatives of various tribes, Pashtuni principalities as well as Pashtuni nationalist or-
ganizations of administrative districts were present. The jirga passed "a manifest on Pushtuni freedom" and demanded the formation of an independent Pushtuni state. In July of the same year, the congress of representatives of the Indian National Congress Department in the Northwest Frontier Province, the organization of "Red Shirts," and the congressite faction of the Provincial Legislative Assembly came out against the inclusion of the Northwest Frontier Province in Pakistan.

The Pushtuni of the administrative districts boycotted a referendum to include their territories in Pakistan (July 1947) and did not recognize its results. The Pushtuni of the border belt also took action. No more than half of the voters participated in the referendum. The leaders of the Moslem League tried repeatedly to break the nationalist movement of the Pushtuni from within. They depended primarily on the large landowners of the administrative districts, as well as on various Khans and Maliks of the border tribes, who had long had ties with the British colonial administration. In the spring of 1947 the rulers of Dir and Swat announced their consent to be annexed to Pakistan, as well as certain Shimir, Orakzai and Monand maliks. Subsequently the heads of the Moslem League were able to make use of various Pushtunikhels in the armed struggle for Kashmir. Making use of the experience of the British colonialists, the leaders of the Moslem League attempted to bribe the tribal leaders of the Pushtuni: Cash subsidies were given to the Maliks and Khans of various hels; however, the struggle for Pushtunistan in the tribal belt and on the territory of the Northwestern Frontier Province did not cease.

At the beginning of 1948 the leader of the "Red Shirts," Abdul Haiffar-Khan, formed on the territory of the Northwest Frontier Province the "People's Party" later renamed the "People's Organization of Pakistan," which demanded the full autonomy of all "linguistic groups" of the population of Pakistan and formation within the framework of Pakistan of three "Socialist Republics." In the Fall of 1947-Spring of 1948, in the Northwest Frontier Province, a mass peasant Pushtuni organization was formed, the "Kisan Jirga," which, together with the struggle for the formation of a democratic Pushtunistan, conducted a struggle to liquidate landlord landownership. Armed conflicts began with the landlords, police and armed forces. The struggle of the peasants was supported by the Pushtuni proletariat: in the cities of the Northwest Frontier Prov-
ince strikes by workers took place. Using severe repressive measures, the authorities were able to suppress the peasant movement. Mass arrests took place. Besides peasant and union leaders, many bourgeois-landowner nationalist leaders were arrested, including Abdul Haffar-Khan. As a result of the repressions the peasant and nationalist movement of the Pushtuni in the administrative districts was dealt a severe blow and the center of the struggle for Pushtunistan was transferred to the tribal belt for a certain period. Pushtuni nationalists brought forth the slogan of the formation of "regional governments" of Pushtunistan. At the end of 1949 and in 1950 such "regional governments" arose in the country of the Afridi (in Tirakh), in Naziristan and in the northern regions of Baluchistan populated by Pushtuni. Recently there have been tendencies to merge the various centers of the nationalist movement, situated on the closed off tribal territories, toward the creation of a unified Pushtuni national organization.

At the end of 1953-beginning of 1954 the Pushtuni populating the regions of the Loralai and Zhob demanded that these districts be joined to the Northwest Frontier Province. In the Spring of 1954, in Quetta, under the leadership of Abdussamad-khan Achakzai, the "Vror pushtun"—"Brotherhood of Pushtuni"—was formed and began the struggle to split up Baluchistan on a "linguistic basis" and to include its Northern regions, populated by Pushtuni. This organization is fighting for equal rights for Pushtuni in all areas of political, economic and cultural life and for the introduction of school instruction in the Pushtu language, in those regions of Northern Baluchistan, the population of which speaks this language (and where teaching is conducted in Urdu and English in schools). After the administrative reform in West Pakistan and the merging of all administrative units of this part of the country into one Province (October 1955), the national Pushtuni organizations—"Red Shirts" and "Vror pushtun"—together with nationalist and democratic organizations of Baluchistan, Sind and Western Punjab, have advocated the abolition of this unification. Fearing that under the conditions of a united province the interests of the national minorities would be infringed even to a greater extent, they demand the formation of West Pakistan of a "zonal federation on a cultural and linguistic basis" with maximum autonomy for those units forming it. Within the framework of this federation it is suggested to form four autonomous provinces: Punjab, Sind, Baluchistan and Pushtunistan. In order to fight for the formation of this federation a "front to oppose the unification" was formed, the organizers of which were Abdul Haffar-Khan (leader of the "Red Shirts"),
Pir Sahib Kanki Sharif (Chairman of the "People's League" of the Northwest Frontier Province), Abdussamad-khan Achakzai (leader of the "Vror pushtun"), G. H. Sayed (leader of the "Sind Popular Front") and other leaders of nationalist and democratic organizations of West Pakistan. The direction of the "Opposition Front" was carried out by the consultative committee formed of representatives of all parties and organizations comprising it. 

In its announcement of 29 February 1956, the consultative committee stated that Pushtunii in Pakistan were deprived of democratic liberties and demanded that they be allowed to elect their own representatives to the country's legislative organs on the basis of universal suffrage. 

Great dissatisfaction on the part of the Pushtuni nationalist bourgeoisie and intelligentsia is caused by the discrimination against their native language and the forceful introduction of Urdu in the Pushtuni regions. The Pushtuni petty and middle bourgeoisie, in addition, is dissatisfied with the increased tax burden and various measures taken by the government, for example, in the area of import licenses, which hinder their economic activities and sacrifice their interests to the importers of Karachi. 

Demanding the formation of Pushtunistan, that is, the elimination of artificial administrative partitioning, which was cutting up the Pushtuni lands, and unification into a single autonomous province, the Pushtuni bourgeoisie and allied strata of petty and middle landowners are endeavoring to clear the road for their own business activities, for the free capitalist development of the Pushtuni territories. As for the peasantry and proletariat, for them the struggle for Pushtunistan is primarily a struggle for an improvement in their difficult economic situation, for national equality and social progress. Repressions against the active participants and leaders of the nationalist movements did not break the will of the Pushtuni people to struggle for the formation of a Pushtunistan. In spite of persecution, the workers' committee of the "opposition front" of the former Northwest Frontier Region resolved on 9 July 1956 to continue the struggle against uniting West Pakistan, for provincial autonomy of Pushtuni and appealed to the people to struggle for a democracy, against the violation of human rights and arrests. 

In many regions populated by Pushtuni, protest meetings broke out against the arrest of the leaders of the "Front." The workers committee of the "Vror pushtun" also appealed to the people to fight for Pushtunistan. Naturally, in respect to development of economic ties and creation of a single national market, the Pushtuni lagged behind such a nation of West Pakistan as the Sindhi. To the present such obstacles stand
in the way of a creation of an economic community for the Pushtuni as political and economic dissociation of their territories, as well as the preservation of remnants of clan-tribal organization. The national Pushtuni bourgeoisie and the working class are still weak and few in numbers. Cultural lag—a carry-over from the recent colonial past—definitely tells in the nature of the Pushtuni nationalistic movement. In 1951 there were 22,776 persons in Pakistan who could read and write in the Pushtu language, and 3,621 persons who could only read this language (of these, 10,692 and 7,076 persons lived in the Northwest Frontier Province respectively, including the tribal belt). In 1956 only 17 periodicals were published in Pushtu in West Pakistan, since many Pushtuni use Urdu as a literary language. There were 310 schools with 25,000 pupils in 1955 on the territory of the tribes with a population of 2.6 million. However, the long struggle carried on by the Pushtuni people for national self-determination, testifies to the high level of national consciousness of the Pushtuni and comparatively high degree of national consolidation achieved by them.

Baluchi

The Baluchi are divided into 18 basic tribes, the largest of which are the Marri and Busti tribes (or Zar-kani). The Baluchi language belongs to the Eastern group of Iranian languages and is broken down into two dialects—the Northeastern and Southwestern. There are approximately 1.5 million Baluchi, more than one-third of which live outside the borders of Pakistan: in Southeastern Iran and Southwestern Afghanistan. A few Baluchi also live on the territory of the Soviet Union, in the Southern regions of the Turkmen SSR, where they emigrated from Iran around 1900. The Baluchi follow the Islam faith. In Pakistan, according to census data of 1951, there were 943,049 Baluchi. Besides Baluchistan, Baluchi live in Sind, Southwest Punjab and the Southern regions of the former Northwest Frontier Province. The Baluchi living in Baluchistan are divided into the "sulaimani" in the Northeast and "mekrani" in the Southwest; the region of Kalat lies between them and is populated by Brahui. According to Baluchi legends, the Baluchi are the descendants of the uncle of the prophet Mohammed—Mir Hamza, and were originally from the area around the city of Haleb (Aleppo) in Syria. The second Omei Caliph Yazid I, ruling in 680-683 A.D., drove them out and they emigrated at first to Kerman (Iran) and later to Mekran. In this last perigrination they were led by a man called
Jalal-khan, from whose four sons and daughters all present-day Baluchi tribes are supposed to have originated.\textsuperscript{32}

The Baluchi appeared on the right bank of the Indus for the first time at the end of the fifteenth century, when Ismai'il-khan and Fath-khan, sons of Malik Zohrab-khan, and Hazi-khan, son of Haji-khan, founded three cities here, which still bear their names, and, conquering the Southern part of present-day Derajat and Muzaffargarh, began to govern here as independent rulers. According to tradition these events took place about 1480.\textsuperscript{33} In the middle of the following century a certain number of Baluchi were resettled by the great Mogul Khumaiun (ruling in 1530-1539 and 1555-1556) in East Punjab, where he distributed land to them for aid lent to him in 1555 when he returned to India from Iran, where he had been in exile. Among the Baluchi populating the area of the Sulaiman Mountains to the South of the 31st parallel and Makran, considerable remnants of family-tribe organizations were preserved. The Baluchi tribe is called "Tuman"; it is divided into clans—"pkhara" (the Malik call it "takar"), which consists of families—"pkhalli". The head of the tribe is the "Trumandar," the authority of whom is hereditary to his family "pkhag-log" (corresponds to "khan-khel" that is the Khan family—with the Pathan). The head of the clan is called "Nukaddam."\textsuperscript{34} Each tribe occupies a territory, the borders of which are strictly determined. Up to the present several tribes have maintained collective ownership of land. For example, the Marri tribe which lives in the Dera-Hazi-Khan region, with a territory of approximately 10,000 sq.km, considers all land communal property and redistributes it every 10 years.\textsuperscript{35} Naturally this collective ownership is only a remnant of the past which masks the real authority of the tribal leaders who long ago became large landowners. The Baluchi preservation of outmoded forms of social organization is furthered by the policies of the family-tribal leaders, who use them to strengthen their rule and mass-class contradictions within the tribe. A definite role is also played by the fact that up to the present a considerable portion of the Baluchi nation has not yet discontinued the nomadic way of life. Of 100,000 persons in the Marri tribe, only one-third engage in farming, while two-thirds—nomadic stockraising.\textsuperscript{36} The policy of the British colonial authorities, who were trying to increase their authority in Baluchistan by fanning inter-tribal enmity and bribing the exploiter tribal leaders, also furthered the preservation of the family-tribal organization. The Baluchi who have emigrated to Punjab and Sind do not have strong family-tribal ties, and these ties are no more than
a recollection of a common ancestor. The fact that the Baluchi do not occupy a single unified territory even in Baluchistan and the fact that in neighboring regions they live in more or less large groups among other peoples, to a considerable degree hinders their national consolidation. They comprise a minority of population in Baluchistan itself—394,023 persons of a population of 1,154,167, or 34%. Numbers-wise the Baluchi predominate only in the districts of Chaghi (60% of the population) and Sibi (54%) and in the princedoms of Kharan (81%), and Mekran (100%). The districts of Quetta-Pishin, Zhob and Loralai are populated basically by Pushtuni, the princedom of Kalat—by Braghui, and the princedom of Las-Bela—by Sindhi. Outside of Baluchistan, the largest number of Baluchi live in Sind, where they totalled 448,300 in 1951 (more than in Baluchistan), and in the district of Karachi (103,200 persons). The number of Baluchi in Sind is growing so rapidly that one may assume that there is a constant migration of Baluchi from Baluchistan to Sind. But even in the regions of Upper Sind, where the percentage of Baluchi is higher than in the other areas of this region, nowhere do they form a majority of the population.

The national consolidation of the Baluchi is also hindered by the tremendous economic and cultural backwardness of Baluchistan—the result of colonial slavery forced on this country by the British imperialists. As has been stated, up to the present the basic occupation of a considerable portion of the Baluchi nation is extensive seminomadic stockraising. In 20 years, between 1911 and 1931, the percent of nomads in Baluchistan dropped from 33.1 to 25.3. In the Union of Baluchistan princedoms only 4% of the population lives in cities, while the majority of city population is non-Baluchi. Therefore the cities have not yet become centers of national consolidation for the Baluchi people. The economic development of the country is proceeding extremely slowly. According to the plan developed by the "Council for the Development of the Kalat Region" at the end of 1956, the government of West Pakistan, for the economic development of this part of Baluchistan, will spend a total of one hundred thousand rupees in coming years; 50,000 rupees of this are allocated for the formation of an "industrial development center" in Kalat; a resolution was also passed to bring electricity to the city of Mastung. In addition, the port of Pasni in Makran is to be enlarged, with the participation of foreign capital, development of the natural resources of Baluchistan is expanding—deposits of chrome and other ores. However, all of these measures are insufficient, and Baluchistan continues to preserve the character of a backward agricultural
country. From a cultural point of view Baluchistan is also one of the most backward sections of Pakistan. In 1941 there were 80 schools of all types, in 1947—113. Although by 1951 the number of schools increased to 230, only 18,276 children were attending them, 3,269 of whom were girls (mainly in Quetta). According to 1951 figures, there were 1,638 intellectual workers in Baluchistan—teachers, physicians, engineers, etc. In all of Baluchistan there were 1,233 persons with higher education and about 6,000 high school graduates. In 1951 only 5.6% of the population of Baluchistan, or 63,000 persons, could read and write, primarily Urdu and English—the main literary languages of this part of Pakistan. In all of Baluchistan there were only 169 persons who could read and write Baluchi (not including 145 persons who could only read this language).

One must keep in mind that the great majority of literate persons live in the districts of the northern part of Baluchistan, and as for the former princedoms, in 1941 there were only 8,393 literate persons, or 1.5% of the population.

Measures undertaken for the development of education and culture are extremely modest. In the region of Quetta six educational centers have opened with 250 students and five centers for adult education, with 60 persons. It is clear that at such a rate decades will be required to eliminate illiteracy in Baluchistan. In 1955 only one daily paper was published in Baluchistan (in Urdu). The number of other periodicals was also small: eight weekly papers, one paper coming out twice a week and four bi-monthlies; all of them are published in Quetta, except for two weekly papers in Urdu which are published in Kalat. It is characteristic that in Baluchistan not one newspaper or magazine is published in the Baluchi language, and the monthly magazine "Um'am", which was published in Baluchi in Quetta a few years ago, folded. The lack of a daily press in the Baluchi language, the very low percent of literate in this language and the fact that the Baluchi use Urdu, Persian and English as a literary language as well as Sindhi in Sind, naturally testify to the slow national consolidation of the Baluchi. In spite of the difficult heritage left by the British colonizers and the general economic and cultural backwardness of Baluchistan, a gradual development of commercial relations is taking place in the country, one of the results of which is a heightening of Baluchi class differentiation. The exploitation of the peasantry and its impoverishment is stepped up, in view of which the peasant movement is also increasing. In 1950 stormy demonstrations took place by the Baluchi peasants in the region of Dera-Ghazi-Khan, which was led by the organization formed by them—"Mazlum Parti" (Party of the Oppressed). This movement
was directed against the feudal-landlord-tribal leaders and ended with the victory of the peasants, who succeeded in causing the abolishment of certain taxes and levies. 47

In recent years a proletariat, although not large in numbers, has formed in Baluchistan. A labor market is forming and a population shift is growing to the economically more developed regions of the country. Due to extremely strong feudal carry-overs which slow down the country's industrial development, there is a considerable population shift of Baluchi to Sind and particularly to Karachi, where in the past few years a rather large Baluchi proletarian stratum has formed. As the 1951 census shows, the majority of Baluchi living in the Karachi federal district are workers from Lakran and Las-bela. 48 Labor organizations have formed such as the "Baluchistan Labor Federation." On the other hand, the Baluchi bourgeoisie is also growing. A Baluchi intelligentsia has also appeared, although very weak and not numerous. The first national Baluchi organizations have formed, in which, alongside representatives of the bourgeoisie and the intelligentsia, large landowners play a significant role. In 1953 the "All-Pakistan Baluchi Conference" was held, which demanded that the Pakistan government take measures to liquidate the cultural backwardness of the Baluchi. 49 The Baluchi nationalist organizations, such as the "All-Pakistan Baluchi League" and the "Student League of Baluchistan" are demanding the formation of a unified province of Baluchistan, including all regions of Western Pakistan populated by Baluchi. 50 The movement to form an autonomous Baluchi province in West Pakistan has become stronger, particularly after 1954, when preparations began to unite all administrative units of West Pakistan into a single province. The "Opposition Front to the Unification" included, besides several nationalistic and democratic parties of West Pakistan, the national Baluchi party "Ostoman holl" (another name for the "Baluch Party"). The leaders of the Baluchi national movement, Abdul Karim and Hulam Mustafa Bhurhari, became leaders of the Consultative Committee of the "Opposition Front." 51 In spite of the fact that on 14 October 1955 the law on the unification of West Pakistan came into force, the struggle of the Baluchi against this unification and for the formation of an autonomous Baluchistan did not cease. 52 Thus, although the process of national consolidation of the Baluchi has certainly not reached completion and although many obstacles stand in its path, it is already possible to speak of the birth of national consciousness on the part of the Baluchi and of their national movement.
In connection with Baluchistan and the Baluchi it is necessary to say a few words on the Brahui. According to the 1951 census there were 218,556 persons in Pakistan, the native language of whom was Brahui, belonging to the Dravidian language group distributed throughout Southern India. There is no literature, and Urdu is usually used for the literary language of the Brahui. The question of the origin of the Brahui and of the manner in which they came to modern-day West Pakistan has not yet been resolved by science. The core of the Brahui (142,842 persons) lives on the territory of the former Kalat principality, where they comprise a majority of the population; in addition, about 53,000 Brahui have settled in other regions of Baluchistan (in the districts of Quetta-Pishin, Sibi, Chagai and in the principality of Kharan) and 22,500 in Sind. As the Baluchi, the Brahui are semi-nomads, retaining considerable carry-overs from the Khan-tribal way of life. All Brahui are Moslems. In the middle of the 18th century the Brahui tribal leaders succeeded in forming an extensive feudal state, the capital of which was Kalat. The Khan of Kalat, Nasi-Khan, possessed Quetta on the north and Karachi on the southeast; in the west it included Bampur and Dizek, and on the east the state bordered with Sind. By the beginning of the 19th century this state broke up into several small feudal principalities, which were seized one after the other by England. During the course of the past decades the Brahui have gradually been assimilated by the Baluchi. Many Brahui participate actively in the nationalist Baluchi movement, for the formation of an autonomous Baluchi province within Pakistan.

Sindhi

The Sindhi is one of the most ancient people of the Indian sub-continent. According to 1951 census data, 3,990,000 persons were living within the borders of West Pakistan, the native language of whom was Sindhi; of these, 3,637,000 in Sind, 186,000 in Baluchistan (principally in the principalities of Kalat and Las Bela) and 157,000 in the Federal District of Karachi. The Province of Sind—the land of the Sindhi—is situated along both shores of the lower reaches of the Indus River; here and also in the principality of Khairpur the Sindhi comprise the great majority of the population (79.8% according to the 1951 census). Sind is an agrarian country; 85.3% of its population lives in villages. There are six cities with a population in excess of 25,000; the largest of these are Hyderabad, Sukkur and Shikarpur. Until July 1948 the Prov-
ince of Sind also included the city of Karachi, which was made later into a special federal capital district.

The majority of the population of Sind and Khairpur (90.5%) professes the Islam faith. This is explained by the fact that Sind was conquered by the Moslems earlier than other areas of India. The Arabs, under the leadership of Muhammed ibn Kasim, penetrated here as early as 711 A.D. and conquered the country from the mouth of the Indus to Multan. During three centuries Sind was under the nominal authority of caliphs, until at the beginning of the 11th century it was conquered by Mahmud Gaznevi (998-1030). However, Sind soon became independent, and up to 1591 it was governed by local Moslem dynasties. The great Mogul Akbar (1556-1605) took Sind into his empire, but after the death of Aurangzeb (1659-1707) local rulers once again came to power. About 1750 the Sind emirs became the vassals of the Afghan shahs, but at the beginning of the 19th century once again they were able to gain their independence.

The British appeared in Sind in the middle of the 18th century (the first factory of the British East India Company was opened in the city of Tatta in 1758). In 1843 this region was annexed by England. The fact that Sind, during the course of many centuries, was actually an independent state, weakly joined with the regions of India, furthered the growth of the cultural unity of its population and consolidation of the Sind nationality. As is evident from the above figures, the majority of the population speaks one language and professes one faith—Islam. It is true that in ten years, from 1941 to 1951, the number of persons speaking Sindhi decreased in Sind by 187,000 persons, or 5.3%, although during these years the population increased 11.9%. In the same period the number of persons the native language of whom was Urdu increased from 32,000 to 476,000 (1,360%), Punjabi—from 61,000 to 151,000 (147%) and Gujarati—from 66,000 to 97,000 (45%). These changes are explained on the one hand by the fleeing of Hindus to India, the native language of whom was Sindhi, and on the other hand—by a considerable emigration from Punjab and India. The Sindhi language belongs to the western group of new Indian languages and breaks up into several dialects, one of which—Kachhi, a language between Sindhi and Gujarati—is spoken on the Kach Peninsula. Literature in the Sindhi language began to develop in the middle of the 18th century, although a rich Sind folklore had existed for many centuries. The greatest Sind poet, Said Abdul Latif (1690-1750), wrote the famous Book of Kings—Shahajo Risalo—on themes from the Sind national epos.

The creation of the material bases for the development of
capitalism, and subsequently the formation of capitalist relations, began in Sind soon after the British conquest. At the end of the fifties of the 19th century, the Karachi-Hyderabad Railroad was built. In 1878 the Hyderabad-Khuntan Railroad was put into operation. The building of the railroads, which joined the Sind coast with the inner regions of northwest India, furthered the rapid growth of the city and port of Karachi. On the eve of the British conquest there were 14,000 inhabitants in Karachi, while in 1881 the number had increased to 68,000. In nine years, from 1847-48 to 1856-57, port turnover in Karachi increased from 430,000 to 14,210,000 rupees. The significance of Karachi as a seaport increased even more after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. In 1891 there were 98,000 persons living here. The development of capitalist relations in Sind received new impetus at the beginning of the 20th century. During these years large-scale irrigation projects were being carried out in Sind, cotton was being expanded and agricultural products were increasing in quantity, and ties between the Sind village and city were becoming more firm. The urban population was growing; in 1921, 11.4% of the population of Sind lived in cities. Cities such as Hyderabad and Sukkur, let alone Karachi, became significant trade-industrial centers. In the cities of Sind, where, on the eve of the British conquest, there was a wealthy and influential trade-moneylender stratum, a young national bourgeoisie and proletariat formed together with the first industrial enterprises. The Sind intelligentsia was forming.

As capitalist relationships formed in Sind, began the consolidation of the Sindhi into a nation and the formation of their national consciousness. At the end of the 19th century contemporary prose began in the Sindhi language, the first significant representative of which was the writer Kalich Beg, the author of several novels. At the beginning of the 20th century Sind journalistic writings began. A rapid assimilation of foreign elements by the Sindhi took place (Baluchi, Brahui, Rajasthani, Arabs, Iranians). Sindhi forced out the languages of the other nationalities living in Sind and became the dominant one. In spite of the fact that under conditions of colonialism in India the national consolidation of Sindhi was slowed down by artificial administrative barriers (until 1935 Sind was part of the Bombay Presidency), the presence of strong carry-overs of feudalism and Hindu-Moslem differences played up by the British colonialists, during the years between the two World Wars, the formation of a national community of the Sind nation continued, as was testified to by the birth and rapid development of the Sind nat-
ionalist movement. In 1935, under pressure by this movement, the British colonialists were forced to separate Sind from the Bombay Presidency into an independent administrative unit. The division of 1947 dealt a bitter blow to the nationalist movement of the Sindhi. Among the city bourgeoisie of Sind, Hindus predominated, sharply protesting the inclusion of Sind in Pakistan; after 1947 the majority of them emigrated to India. In 1941 64% of the urban population of Sind was Hindu, and 33%—Moslem, while in 1951 only 4% of the urban population was Hindu and 93.7%—Moslem, more than half of which (50.8%) were refugees from India. On the other hand, the rapid development of the peasant movement in Sind after 1947, which took place under the slogan of radical agrarian reforms, forced the Sindhi landowners to seek support from the leaders of the Punjab alignment of the Moslem League, being at that time in authority in Pakistan. However, in spite of the contradictions between the individual classes of Sind society, the separation of Karachi from Sind (25 July 1948) brought protest from the entire Sind nation. In the cities of Sind and Karachi demonstrations of protest broke out against the split-off of this city, which the Sindhi view as their national capital. Students took an active part in these demonstrations. The protest of the Sindhi was also caused by discrimination against their native language in Pakistan and attempts to force Urdu on them. It is characteristic that defense of the Sindhi language was undertaken not only by the nationalist and democratic organizations of Sind, but the local affiliates of all Pakistan parties; the heads of the Sind Moslem League were first to recognize this popular movement and, in one of their resolutions, demanded the recognition of Sindhi as the "regional language" for use in court, in government offices, etc. In the struggle against discrimination against their native language, the progressive forces of Sind are achieving a certain degree of success; in the summer of 1956, under the pressure of Sind public opinion, a resolution was passed according to which 60% of the programs broadcast on the Hyderabad radio would be in the Sindhi language. The movement of the Sindhi in defense of their national language testifies to the high level of their national consciousness. The large number of periodicals in Sindhi testifies to the same thing. In 1956 21 newspapers and one magazine were published in this language in Sind; in addition, four dailies and one magazine were published in Sindhi in Karachi. In 1951 there were about 300,000 persons in Sind who could read and write Sindhi, that is, there were five times more persons literate in this language than Punjabi, Pashtu and Baluchi together.
The new development in the nationalist movement of the Sindhi led to an administrative reform in 1955 in West Pakistan. The nationalist and democratic parties and organizations of Sind ("sind awami mahaz"—Sind popular front, "sind khari komiti" and others) strongly opposed the unification of West Pakistan into a single province, fearing an infringement of the national interests of the Sindhi. The leaders of the Sind national movement, Sayed Khairuddin Jatoi and Abdul Majid Sindhi announced that the Sindhi nation would endeavor to have the unification law rescinded. The Sind nationalists are demanding the formation of an autonomous province of Sind. In the middle of 1956 a general front for the struggle of the nationalist forces for Sind autonomy was formed, which included, together with local nationalist organizations, as mentioned above, local affiliates of all Pakistan parties "Awami League" and the Moslem League. The development of the nationalist movement in Sind was stopped neither by persecution of progressive and democratic leaders nor by the closing of several opposition newspapers, nor by other repressions. The size of the Sindhi nationalist movement, which has the slogan of autonomy for Sind, speaks of the high level of Sindhi national consciousness, and of the fact that the process of their national consolidation has been basically completed.

Punjabi

In an ethnic respect the population of West Punjab is quite varied. Besides the nationalities speaking the Punjabi language, there are Rajasthani, Gujarati, Awani, and other ethnic groups, as well as Afghans, Tadzhiks, Iranians and representatives of various Turkic nationalities. In splitting up Punjab Pakistan received the whole of the districts of Multan and Rawalpindi, the greater part of the district of Lahore (regions of Gujranwala, Sheikhpur Sialkot) and part of the district of Gurdaspur; the province of West Punjab was formed of these territories with a total area of 161,200 sq. km. This province existed until the administrative reform of 1955. In 1951 the population of this Province was 18,826,000. In 1947 Pakistan also received the principality of Bahawalpur with an area of 45,500 sq. km and a population of 1,823,000 (according to 1951 figures). The great majority of the population of West Punjab and Bahawalpur professes the Islam faith (20,200,000 of 20,651,000); among the representatives of other religions Christians are predominant; 402,617, among there are 33,000 Hindus in West Punjab and Bahawalpur.
The penetration of Islam into Punjab began in the 7th century A.D. In 664 the Arabs, conquering Herat, went by way of Kabul to the Indus River and descended to Multan; however, this invasion did not lead to the establishment of Moslem reign over Punjab. In the beginning of the 11th century, as a result of the campaigns of Mahmud Baznevi (998-1030), Punjab became one of the Provinces of his extensive empire. After this, right up to the formation of the Sikh state, Punjab was under the authority of Moslem rulers, and the majority of the inhabitants embraced Mohammedism. Up until the split of Punjab between India and Pakistan, its population was divided into two basic linguistic groups, the borderline between which ran along the line 74 E. longitude; to the east of this line the population spoke the Punjabi language, to the west—several differing dialects usually called "Lahnda" (that is, "western"—from the Punjabi word Lahand—"west"), as well as "jatki" or "hindki."

The Lahnda dialects vary greatly from the Punjabi language, but at the same time they are joined with it and with each other by several transitional dialects. The most important Lahnda dialects are Multani, which is spoken in the regions of Multan, Muzaffargarh, Dera-Ghazi-khan, as well as in many villages in Sind, and Bahawalpuri, which is spoken by the majority of the population of the principality of Bahawalpur. By the time of the division of 1947 the total number of Punjabi speakers exceeded 18,000,000 and those speaking the Lahnda dialects—8.5 million. The partition of 1947, which was accompanied by mass resettlement of inhabitants of Punjab from Pakistan to India and vice versa, brought considerable changes in the population distribution existing in this area up to that time. In the first four months of the existence of Pakistan alone, 5.5 million Moslems were resettled from East Punjab to West Punjab, and in the opposite direction—3.5 million Hindus and Sikhs. According to 1951 official figures, refugees in West Punjab, chiefly from the Eastern part of the Province, comprise 26.1% of the total population (4,908,000 of 18,814,000), and in Bahawalpur—20.4% (372,000 of 1,842,000). Official Pakistan statistics do not differentiate between Punjabi and the Lahnda dialects, joining them together. Therefore the data from these statistics make it impossible to draw up an accurate linguistic map of Western Punjab and Bahawalpur. According to the 1951 census, Punjabi (together with Lahnda) was in Pakistan the native language of 20,842,524 persons, 19,498,054 of whom lived in Punjab and Bahawalpur, 1,008,434 in the Northwest Frontier Province, 152,458 in Sind and Khairpur, 99,535 in the Federal District of Karachi and 76,922 in Baluchistan.

It is evident from these figures that in 1951 Punjabi and
Lahnda were the native languages of the majority of the population of West Punjab and Bahawalpur, as well as the main spoken language of this part of Pakistan, because 96% of the population living on this territory usually spoke these languages. In addition, there were 1,742,276 persons in West Punjab and Bahawalpur in 1951 the native language of whom was Urdu, and 44,141 persons the language of which was Pushtu. Urdu was used as the main spoken language by 16% of the population of West Punjab and Bahawalpur. The process of the national consolidation of the Punjabi on the basis of nationality, speaking Punjabi, began comparatively recently. The reasons for this are found in the historical past of Punjab, as well as its economic and political position in our days. For many centuries Punjab was the main route along which conquerors penetrated India from the West. Endless wars, constant change of rulers and political fractioning of the country slowed down the development of economic and cultural ties between the tribes and nationalities populating it (it was not before the first half of the 19th century that almost the whole of Punjab was politically united under the authority of the Maharaja Ranjit Singh). The political fractioning of Punjab was preserved until quite recently: after the British conquest, there were thirteen principalities besides districts, governed by the colonial administration. The national consolidation of the population of Punjab was hindered and is hindered by the sharp religious difference raising serious barriers between the basic religious-communal groups of this country: Moslems, Hindus and Sikhs. Punjab does not yet have a single literary language, which also is the result of feudal and primarily religious carry-overs in the general economic and cultural backwardness of the country. The literary language of the Moslems of Punjab in the middle ages was the Persian language, and after the British conquest it became Urdu, which has retained its status at the present time. The Hindus of Punjab at first used Sanskrit and then Hindi. The first significant literary works in the Punjabi language were written in the 15th century; the development of this literature was joined with the Bhakti movement and the beginnings of Sikhism; at that time the Gurmukhi alphabet was invented, which is used by the Sikhs. Gradually a rich literature was created in Punjabi. The Sikhs were not the only Punjabi people writing in this language; Moslems also wrote in this language, using a modified Arabic alphabet, and the first works in Punjabi written by Moslems were also in the 15th century. In the 18th century poetry in Punjabi was written by the famous Moslem poets of that time, Bulhe-Shah (1680–1758) and
Jaris-Shah (1735-1796). In the 19th century, poems in Punjabi infused with mysticism characteristic for Sufism were written by the poet Hulam Farid (born in 1825 in Charchara, the principality of Bahawalpur). The Kosaems of Punjab writing today in Punjabi also use a modified Arabic alphabet. However, one must realize that although the basic spoken language of the population of Punjab and Bahawalpur is Punjabi and Lahnda, Urdu is the main literary language of this area. In 1951 the number of literate in West Punjab and Bahawalpur (knowing how to read and write) Punjabi was 35,554 (0.2% of the population), while there were 1,514,387 persons who were literate in Urdu (7.3% of the population). The number of literate in Punjabi was small in the Northwest Frontier Province, where persons who spoke this language usually used Urdu as a literary language. In 1956 124 periodicals were published in Urdu in West Punjab and Bahawalpur (including 24 daily papers), 14 periodicals in English and only one monthly magazine in Punjabi. Urdu and to some extent English is also the language of the schools, universities and governmental offices in this part of Pakistan.

Thus, in Punjabi, even in respect to a literary language there was no linguistic unity formed such as in Sind. This along with certain sharply differing spoken dialects, as well as the existence of strong cultural, custom and religious peculiarities of the population of the various regions of Punjab and Bahawalpur, doubtlessly hindered and is hindering the melting of this population into a single nation. Although Punjab is presently one of the most economically developed regions of Pakistan, up to the partition of 1947 there were almost no large industrial enterprises, the bourgeoisie and working class were weak and few in numbers, and semi-feudal relationships existed in the villages. Some nationalities of the western part of Punjab, who speak dialects of Lahnda, have not yet rid themselves of remnants of clan-tribal organization. By the partition there were 725 industrial enterprises in West Punjab, employing 114,021 persons. Even in 1951, when the urban population grew sharply as a result of the influx of refugees who settled chiefly in the cities, there were only six cities in West Punjab with populations in excess of 100,000. The 1947 partition raised new barriers to consolidation of the Punjabi into a nation and causes great economic difficulties which have not yet been overcome. However, in spite of all these difficulties, there is a rapid development of capitalist relations taking place in West Punjab, modern industry is growing (particularly in the regions of Lahore, Lyallpur and Multan), a Punjab bourgeoisie has formed and
also a radical intelligentsia. The bourgeoisie of Punjab is dissatisfied with the obstacles standing in the path of industrial progress, in particular, the rule of the foreign monopolies in the economy of Pakistan. Many representatives of the incipient nationalist bourgeoisie and progressive intelligentsia participated actively in 1947-1956 in the struggle of the people of Pakistan for peace, participated in the activities of various democratic parties and organizations ("Azad Pakistan Party," "National Party," "National People's Party"), which were struggling for the opportunity for the various nationalities of West Pakistan to form their own autonomous provinces; one of these autonomous provinces was to be Punjab. The dissatisfaction of the incipient Punjab nationalist bourgeoisie and intelligentsia is caused by the forced use of the Urdu language in West Punjab and the policy of limitation and discrimination carried out in respect to Punjabi and Lahnda. For the development of the Punjabi language and literature in West Punjab, the "Punjab Cultural Society" was formed, the head of which is the well-known writer and publicist Joshua Fazl Din (born in 1903), author of many short stories and novelettes in Punjabi. This society demands that teaching in the primary schools of West Pakistan be done in the native languages of the peoples of these sections and, in particular, in Punjabi in those regions where the population speaks that language. At the beginning of 1957 the Executive Committee of the Society protested violently against discrimination against Punjabi, demanding the organization of classes with teaching in Punjabi in all secondary schools and colleges of West Punjab and other regions where Punjabi live. The Executive Committee of the Society also passed a resolution to form a "Punjabi Academy" in West Punjab for aid in the development of the Punjabi language, literature and culture. Attempting to force the use of Punjabi and Lahnda as governmental languages, many deputies from West Punjab and Bahawalpur gave their speeches in the West Pakistan legislative assembly, not in Urdu but in their native tongue. The struggle carried on by the progressive forces of Punjab, attempting to change the present administrative break-down of West Pakistan, to form an autonomous Punjab Province, and the movement to defend the language, literature and culture of Punjab testify to the awakening of a Punjabi national consciousness and to the fact that the process of consolidation of the Punjabi nation has begun. However, this process is proceeding extremely slowly due to the relative economic and cultural backwardness of Punjab, the historically formed peculiarities of the various regions.
which have not yet been overcome, as well as due to the
tenacity of carry-overs of feudal relations, manifesting
themselves in particular in the tremendous influence of
religious-communal prejudices in all facets of Punjab life.
The Punjab people will combine into one nation on the basis
of nationalities speaking the Punjab language, or the fur-
ther economic and political development of Pakistan will
lead to a situation whereby national consolidation of sev-
eral other, smaller nationalities will take place on the
territory of Punjab. Only the future will show which it
will be.

The active struggle carried out by the peoples of
Pakistan (both East and West) in the defense of their nation-
als rights, doubtlessly is a result of the progressive proc-
ess of the formation of bourgeois nations in this country.
One of the peculiar features of the nationalist movements
of the peoples of Pakistan is the fact that these movements
as a rule have their greatest development in those regions
which are at the same time regions of anti-feudal peasant
struggle (Sind, Bengal), that is, those places where the
struggle for national equality, against national discrimi-
nation in all its manifestations joins with the struggle
of the peasantry for the liquidation of feudal carry-overs
in the village. Another important feature of the nation-
alist movements of the peoples of Pakistan is their demo-
cratic nature, their anti-imperialist direction.\(^9\) In
our opinion, one of the reasons for the anti-imperialist
direction of these movements is the fact that the nation-
alist bourgeoisie which leads them is interested in the
development of their own national market, in strengthen-
ing the tendencies of independent economic development
manifesting themselves in Pakistan in recent years, in
Pakistan winning its economic independence. This petty
and middle nationalist bourgeoisie has little connection
with foreign monopolies and is endeavoring to protect it-
self from the competition of foreign capital.

The anti-imperialist direction and democratic nature
of the nationalist movements of the peoples of Pakistan
were the political basis on which the organized unification
of nationalist parties and organizations took place, which
headed these movements, with all Pakistan democratic parties
and organizations. The formation of "the National Party"
in the fall of 1956 uniting the nationalist and democratic
parties of West Pakistan, and subsequently in the summer of
1957 the "Nationalist People's Party," uniting the demo-
cratic parties of both sections of Pakistan, shows that
in spite of all difficulties and obstacles an active pro-
cess is going on in the country to consolidate the forces
supporting peace, democracy and social progress. The unity
of these forces will doubtless further the future development of the nationalist movement in both parts of Pakistan, growth of national consciousness of its peoples, the elimination of the survivals of feudalism both in the economic and social-political life of the country and, consequently, a more rapid completion of the process of forming the nations of West Pakistan.
L. R. Gordon-Polonskaya

STATUS OF THE WORKING CLASS IN PAKISTAN (1947-1957)

In the ten years which have passed since the founding of Pakistan, several major changes have taken place in the country. Differences have increased considerably between the various classes endeavoring to strengthen the political and economic independence of the country and the forces acting objectively in the direction of maintaining and strengthening the colonial dependence on the imperialist powers. In view of this major significance is acquired by the problem of the political and economic status of the various classes in Pakistan society. In the final analysis, the path taken in the development of Pakistan depends on the degree of activity and unification of the workers and, primarily, of the working class and the peasantry. This article will examine the peculiar features of the social position of the working class—the most consistent and decisive fighter for the independence of the country. The problems dealing with the labor and union movement are not dealt with here, for they require independent research. In connection with the development of Pakistan industry, the difficult situation faced by the proletariat and the catastrophic dimensions of unemployment with a simultaneous lack of permanent skilled worker cadres attract the attention of Pakistan scientists and statesmen more and more. The authors of the draft First Five Year Plan for the economic development of Pakistan stressed that the significance of the problem of labor and improvement of the material position of the working class grew with the growth of industrial production. Unfortunately, as the authors of that draft note, there are all too few sources for studying the conditions for the formation of the working class, the position of workers, the level and changes in wages during the past decade, methods of hiring, the situation in the labor market, etc. Figures from the 1951 population census as well as from the 1953 and 1954 industrial census, as well as information provided by labor annuals, are not at all sufficient. Information obtained from other sources on this problem is extremely scanty. Due to the lack of materials it is impossible to study the conditions of labor at enterprises belonging to foreign monopolies (except for plantations). Only on an extremely general scope was it possible to study changes in the actual wages of workers. One of the main conditions determining the status of the working class is the level of the country's industrial development. For Pakistan, which inherited a backward agrarian
economy from the colonial past, the creation of a domestic industrial base is vitally important. During the 10 years of independent existence of the country, certain success has been achieved in the development of various branches of industry (see Table 1). However, this development is of a unilateral nature and does not lead to a weakening of the dependence on foreign capital. The primary reason is that foreign monopolies, which have maintained strong positions in the country’s economy, are making it difficult for Pakistan to form its own heavy industry. There are also domestic reasons: financial difficulties, weakness of the bourgeoisie, lack of solution of agrarian problems, etc. In Pakistan mainly the extracting industry and branches connected with the processing of agricultural raw materials are expanding. Using investments, loans and so-called aid which was the main source of financing by the Pakistan ruling circles in 1947-1957, the imperialist countries and primarily the United States influenced the industrial development of the country.

Table 1.
Pakistan Industrial Production*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1956</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Electricity, mil. kwh</td>
<td>129</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal, 1000 tons</td>
<td>241</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Petroleum, 1000 gals.**</td>
<td>17,022</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cement, 1000 tons</td>
<td>324</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Steel, 1000 tons</td>
<td>2.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton yarn, 1000 tons</td>
<td>2.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cotton fabrics, mil. meters***</td>
<td>70.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jute products, 1000 meters</td>
<td>none</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


**1 gallon (English) = 4546 liters.

***Hand-loomed production in 1955 was 417,000,000 mil. meters.

Not interested in strengthening the governmental sector, the objective tendency of which is a weakening of economic dependence, foreign monopolies endeavor to limit the policy of state capitalism. In Pakistan this policy is conducted in the interests of various groups of the upper bourgeoisie, dependent on foreign capital. The exploitation of enterprises built under the control and with the aid of the state as a rule is transferred completely into private hands. As a result, by the end of the first decade of the independent existence of Pakistan, the state owned only a small portion of industrial enterprises; private
enterprise is predominant in industry. The years of British hegemony led to a situation whereby there are very few large factories and plants in the country. The average number of workers at the majority of factory-plant enterprises (which is included in Pakistan statistics for any enterprise with a mechanical motor and more than 20 workers) does not exceed 100 persons. Only certain large cotton and jute mills are exceptions. The industry of Pakistan is distributed unevenly. Factories and plants are concentrated chiefly in West Pakistan, the main industrial centers of which are Karachi, Lahore and Sialkot. Certain large enterprises (chemical, cement plants and sugar mills) are located in the region of Peshawar and Mardan. The main branches of industry of West Pakistan are the textile industry and the food products industry. There are also large railroad depots and shops, a few enterprises of the so-called light metallurgy industry, chemical and cement plants. Jute processing is concentrated in East Pakistan. About one-half of the food products enterprises are also there, as well as all of the country's jute processing plants. The most important industrial centers of East Pakistan are Dacca, Narayanganj and Chittagong. The number of small enterprises (less than 20 workers without a mechanical engine or less than 10 with one), mills and artisan shops is many times greater than the number of large plants. The proportionate weight of production of small enterprises in the country's industrial production is quite significant (for example, about one-half of all textile production). The majority of these enterprises are in East Pakistan.

**Working Class Structure**

The aftereffects of the colonial past, the agrarian nature of the economy, the one-sided industrial development and the continued dependence on imperialist powers are reflected in the structure and members of the working class. In spite of the above-mentioned growth of industrial production, the working class in Pakistan is comparatively small, and the proportionate weight of the factory-proletariat is extremely small. Cottage industry, simple cooperative production and small factories play a large role. According to general data the number of workers employed in agriculture and at small enterprises was several million in 1947-1951. Of these, 1,175,707 worked at small enterprises, concentrated chiefly in East Pakistan (see Table 2). A numerous group of workers in the textile industry are the workers in shops for the
production of homespun clothing--haddi. In 1951 43.3% of workers were engaged in producing yarn and textiles. In 1955 395,541 persons were engaged in home weaving, 7 185,229 in East Pakistan and 210,312 in West Pakistan.

Table 2. WORKERS EMPLOYED AT SMALL ENTERPRISES
(By Individual Branches)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branches of Industry</th>
<th>West Pakistan</th>
<th>East Pakistan</th>
<th>Total Pakistan</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Food and Tobacco</td>
<td>1,400</td>
<td>203,441</td>
<td>209,841</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Yarn and textiles</td>
<td>151,761</td>
<td>417,599</td>
<td>569,360</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carpets</td>
<td>3,165</td>
<td>55,326</td>
<td>58,491</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clothing &amp; subsidiary jobs of textile mills</td>
<td>2,687</td>
<td>22,080</td>
<td>24,767</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewelry</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>25,431</td>
<td>25,918</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Glass blowing &amp; ceramics</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>70,792</td>
<td>76,504</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other artisans</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>445</td>
<td>559</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Production of paper and cardboard</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>803</td>
<td>872</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Woodworking</td>
<td>5,399</td>
<td>159,113</td>
<td>164,512</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leather working</td>
<td>6,611</td>
<td>6,447</td>
<td>13,058</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Metal crafts</td>
<td>2,195</td>
<td>22,427</td>
<td>24,622</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>589</td>
<td>6,614</td>
<td>7,203</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>180,189</td>
<td>995,518</td>
<td>1,175,707</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


British and Pakistan statistics usually include those working in non-registered industry among workers among small enterprises. This certainly does not include all workers engaged in cooperative industry and textile mills. Certain artisan shop employees, leaving out small-scale rural producers, working for buyers, are included among artisans; semi-feudal artisan trades are often joined under the heading "handicraft production" with capitalist small enterprises and capitalist cottage industry. According to the materials of most sources, three to four million persons were employed at home and in small industrial enterprises in 1951-55. In analyzing the data of Pakistan reference books, one should remember the statement by Lenin that
handicraft industry "is a conception absolutely useless for a scientific study, for this usually includes all forms of industry, beginning with cottage industry and handicrafts and ending with hired labor in large enterprises." 9 Doubtless some of the so-called handicraft workers employed at home cannot be included in the proletariat; these are artisans occupying an intermediary position between the small-scale enterprise owners to which they are endeavoring to rise and hired workers which they often become. Speaking of rural handicraft in pre-Revolutionary Russia at the end of the 19th century, Lenin wrote: "Expansion, development and improvement of small-scale peasant handicraft work cannot take place in this social-economic atmosphere without singling out the minority of petty capitalists on the one hand and on the other—the majority of hired workers or 'independent craftsmen' who have it even worse than a hired workman." 10 The same thing can be stated for the rural artisans in Pakistan, where the development of capitalist relations with the preservation of survivals of feudalism takes place, although slowly and in distorted forms. Besides handicraft workers—small-scale producers—there is a considerable proletarian stratum among so-called artisans, whom Pakistan statistics identify completely with the handicraft workers. These included such workers as those who undertake capitalist work at home, that is, home processing of material received from the entrepreneur, on a piece-rate system. As a result of the survivals of feudalism in the Pakistan village and the tight cohesion of capitalist and feudal forms of exploitation, it is sometimes very difficult to distinguish the handicraft worker from the hired worker. The modern industrial proletariat is not numerous: in 1948 there were 625,000 factory-plant, transport and plantation workers, in 1951—810,000 (see Table 3). There are no complete data on the change in the numbers of the working class in 1951-1957. Statistical reference works published after 1951 and commission materials contain information on the growth of the factory proletariat, including figures on railroad workers and mining workers usually referring to 1951. Materials of 1955 studies are as of the present inaccessible to us. Judging from indirect data, (information on the size of the factory proletariat, the development of the mining industry, railroad construction, etc.), certain changes have taken place between 1951 and 1957 in the structure of the working class in Pakistan. The proportionate weight of the factory proletariat has increased, although not to a great degree. The number of dock and transport workers has remained almost the same. In mining and on
plantations the growth of the number of workers is taking place extremely slowly.

Table 3.
Size of Working Class in Pakistan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1948</th>
<th>1949</th>
<th>1950</th>
<th>1951</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Factory- plant enterprises</td>
<td>172,429</td>
<td>181,752</td>
<td>178,800</td>
<td>190,870</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining</td>
<td>7,796</td>
<td>9,413</td>
<td>10,000</td>
<td>10,845</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroad transport</td>
<td>125,605</td>
<td>135,357</td>
<td>140,000</td>
<td>210,980</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Docks (approx.)</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>15,000</td>
<td>14,700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plantation (approx.)</td>
<td>80,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>85,000</td>
<td>86,745</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ocean Transport</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>125,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
<td>73,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>River Transport</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>100,000</td>
<td>220,000</td>
<td>222,880</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>625,830</td>
<td>651,522</td>
<td>721,800</td>
<td>810,020***</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Pakistan Labor Year-Book, 1954, p. 3.
**Of these, approximately one-fifth are aseasonal workers.
***In addition, about 100,000 workers are engaged in commercial enterprises and government offices.

After the formation of Pakistan it received the largest plantations of Bengal and Assam—the plantations of Chittagong and Tippera, on which in 1940, 6,114 workers were employed. Of these, 4738 persons were permanently contracted, 498 were inhabitants of local villages—"basti"—and 878—seasonal workers. In 1954-55, according to extremely general figures, the number of plantation workers in Pakistan reached 90,000. The size of the factory proletariat doubled between 1951 and 1955 (see Table 4), and this was caused chiefly by industrial construction. Since the construction of new enterprises is taking place chiefly in West Pakistan, a more rapid rate in the growth of the numbers of industrial workers can be seen here than in East Pakistan. Between 1951 and 1953 the size of the factory proletariat in West Pakistan increased 42% and in East Pakistan—26%.

Table 4
Number of Factory Workers*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1951</th>
<th>1952</th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954-55</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>West Pakistan</td>
<td>129,735</td>
<td>149,138</td>
<td>184,828</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>East Pakistan</td>
<td>59,471</td>
<td>61,669</td>
<td>75,195</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>189,206</td>
<td>210,807</td>
<td>260,023</td>
<td>About 400,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
*Data on the size of the plant-factory proletariat vary in different sources. Therefore, it is extremely difficult to draw up summary tables and comparison of data for different years. (Pakistan Statistical Year-Book, 1955, p. 183).

The nature of the industrial development of Pakistan determines the structure of the factory proletariat. According to the 1953 industrial census, 36% of all factory workers were employed in textile mills; 9% at enterprises engaged in cleaning and pressing jute and cotton, in the food industry—13, at tobacco enterprises—3 to 4, and at various garment sewing shops—about 3%. About 70% of the entire plant-factory proletariat was employed in the food and textile industries (including enterprises for processing jute and cotton). Only about 3% of all factory workers were employed at enterprises of the metallurgical industry, a little more than 2% at chemical plants, and 6% in mechanical, transport and repair shops, at enterprises for spare parts production and agricultural and other machinery parts production. About 15% of all factory workers were employed at heavy industry enterprises. Little more than 15% of all workers were employed in woodworking, hardware, leather and other branches of light industry. Worker concentration in Pakistan industry is extremely low. The greatest concentration is evidenced in enterprises of the textile and jute industry. The average concentration of workers at textile enterprises in 1953 was 1.5 times that of the concentration at metallurgical plants. According to the 1953 industrial census, only 31 enterprises of 987 enterprises in West Pakistan (excluding Karachi) had an average number of workers of more than 250, and 794—with an average number of less than 50 workers. Of 540 Karachi factories, at 26 of these the number of workers was in excess of 250, and at 398—less than 50. Of 46 factories in West Pakistan and Karachi, with more than 500 workers at each enterprise, 31 were textile mills and one was a light metallurgy plant. One of the main features of the structure of the Pakistan proletariat is the high percentage of seasonal workers. In 1950 they comprised more than 30% of all of the country's factory workers. The majority of jute and processing enterprises were seasonal, as were tea and tobacco mills, and sugar mills. East Pakistan, where the majority of small enterprises are located, is distinguished by a higher percentage of seasonal workers, which is much higher than the average percentage for Pakistan as a whole.

In connection with the construction of new enterprises
usually working the year-round and using the labor of permanent workers, the proportion of seasonal workers after 1950 decreased to a considerable extent. In 1953 they comprised 23% of all the factory proletariat, 18% in West Pakistan and 37% in East Pakistan. At present, in spite of changes, the percentage of seasonal workers, particularly in Eastern Bengal, is still quite high. Unskilled workers predominate among the industrial proletariat of Pakistan. In January-February 1955, the ministry of labor investigated 5,000 factories, plants, transport and commercial enterprises. The materials of the investigation showed that about one-half of all bench and office workers were unskilled (see Table 5).

Table 5.
Categories of Bench and Office Workers for the 5,000 investigated Industrial Enterprises in Pakistan*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Category</th>
<th>No of bench and office workers (in thousands)</th>
<th>Percentage to the total no. of bench &amp; office workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Unskilled workers</td>
<td>329</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Semi-skilled &amp; skilled workers</td>
<td>317</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Technical personnel</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Administrative personnel</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>770</strong></td>
<td><strong>100</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The formation of a permanent industrial proletariat is taking place much more slowly than the impoverishment of the direct producers by landowners and commercial-usurer capital—peasants and handicraft workers, deprived of land, implements and means of production. In Pakistan the supply of labor is much greater than the demand. At the same time the country feels a critical lack of skilled workers. Training is expensive and as a rule is not available to most workers. In such branches of industry as the textile, leather, metallurgical, the majority of skilled workers were Hindus. After the partition in 1947 they emigrated to India. The majority of refugees coming from India to Pakistan are peasants, handicraft workers and unskilled workers. The only exceptions are the Moslems—skilled workers of the wool
and imitwear industry who came from Amritsan, Mamnapur, Mojiana and Ambala into West Punjab. "Pakistan is experiencing a critical shortage of skilled workers who are vitally essential for the industrialization of the country," an official Pakistan reference work states: "This shortage is found in the textile, leather and chemical industries and machine shops." In 1955 the Ministry of Labor also noted the necessity of increasing the number of skilled workers. The shortage of skilled workers exerts some influence on the increased use of cottage industry as a supplement to small-scale enterprises and factories. The influx of handicraft worker-refugees from India played a certain role in the growth of the capitalist cottage industry. The majority of former handicraft workers are becoming workers in small capitalist workshops or are employed in capitalist cottage industry. Female and child labor is used extensively in Pakistan. Women and children form a considerable percentage of workers on plantations, in tobacco factories, enterprises for processing jute and cotton, etc. According to the 1953 industrial census, women comprise more than 33% of all workers at small-scale enterprises, and children—about 11%. Official figures on the use of women and child labor at factories are doubtlessly artificially lowered. However, even according to these figures, women and child labor is used in seasonal work on a greater scale than for permanent work. In 1950 women comprised 1.5% of adult workers of permanent enterprises and more than 18% of seasonal workers. Unfortunately, we do not have access to more recent information on the use of women and child labor.

In an ethnic respect the most homogeneous working class is that of West Punjab. The great majority of workers are Punjabi. Among seasonal workers a large percent are Pushtuni, emigrants from the border areas. In East Pakistan there is a small group of workers who are former emigrants from Bihar and Orissa. However, we should note that after the partition of 1947 the working class of Bengal became more homogeneous in a national respect, since many workers who had emigrated from other national areas (together with Bengali who were Hindus by religion) resettled into India. However, in Bengal the Hindu-Moslem butchery and population migration did not assume such catastrophic dimensions as in West Pakistan, and here a considerable number of Hindus remained. The most complicated in composition is the proletariat of Karachi. Between 1947 and 1957 the population of the city increased by more than 400% from 359,000 to 1,500,000, a fact which was caused by the refugee influx from East Punjab, the United Provinces.
and other parts of India. The number of unemployed and partially unemployed increased many-fold. The ranks of handicraft workers, mill workers also became swelled. The size of the factory proletariat during the first years after the formation of Pakistan decreased somewhat in comparison with the pre-war period in view of the resettlement of skilled Hindu workers to India, but subsequently it began to grow. In 1950 only 19,818 permanent workers were employed in the factories and plants of the city, while in 1953 it increased to 47,905. The workers of Karachi are mostly emigrants from Punjab, the Northwest Frontier Province, Baluchistan and even from the Makran Coast and from Afghanistan. Before the formation of Pakistan workers from Kurig,Kathiawar, Radjputani and the United Provinces came to Karachi for permanent and seasonal work. However, at the present time, emigration from these regions of India to Karachi—the industrial center of Pakistan—has been cut off completely.

Thus the structure of the working class of Pakistan completely corresponds to the still prevailing backwardness—the heritage of the colonial past. The working class is few in numbers, a reflection of the agrarian nature of the country's economy. Workers of small enterprises and mills predominate, chiefly in rural areas, as well as agricultural workers. A large portion of the industrial proletariat works at enterprises engaged in the initial processing of agricultural raw materials and at textile mills. A small percentage of factory workers is employed in heavy industry. There is a low worker concentration at individual enterprises and a considerable labor turnover. Many workers do not break their ties with the village. For the majority of the village poor seasonal work as hired laborers in the city and village serves as an important source of supplementary income. All of this testifies to the growth of the relative agrarian population and leads to a decrease in the price of labor.

Influence of the Agricultural Production Crisis on the Formation and Status of the Working Class

The development of the relative agrarian over-population in Pakistan is a result of the limited development of capitalist relations, at first under colonial conditions and in the past 10 years under the condition of the country's preserved dependence. The process of expropriation of the direct producers (peasants and craftsmen) was taking place considerably faster than the transformation of these into the ranks of the proletariat. With the land
in the hands of landlords, a dependence on the imperialist market, a relative agrarian over-population and industrial backwardness, the majority of the impoverished independent peasants or permanent tenants are becoming shackled as metayers, who are in the status of unemployed for a considerable portion of the year. In the villages of Pakistan, the number of totally unemployed, paupers and indigent increases with each day. More than 70% of the peasant landowners of West Punjab and the Northwest Frontier Province are impoverished, owning tiny plots of land. The loss of these plots is one of the forms of dispossessing the peasants of their land. Another, more hidden, form of land dispossession is the increase in the land tax.25

In East Bengal, where as early as the end of the 18th century the British colonialists conducted "artificial expropriation" of the peasants in the interests of the feudal landlords, a class of landowning peasants did not exist until the 1949 Reform. However, a class of peasants was preserved which had received, according to laws passed in the second half of the 19th and 20th century, inherited inalienable rights of tenancy. These tenants, who paid the landlord a fixed sum of money, were by status closer to the petty landowning peasant of West Pakistan than the tenant-metayer who had no rights. About 80% of all hereditary tenants belonged to the village poor possessing sectors of ground of from 2 to 3 acres. These plots do not furnish the peasant family sufficient means for existence, and these tenants are first to seek supplementary income for much of the year. Impoverishment and peasant land dispossession are manifested in the loss of the preserved rights of tenancy. Losing their rights, the permanent tenants do not become agricultural laborers but are forced to become metayers without rights, once again leasing the land under even more shackling conditions. In both East Pakistan and West Pakistan metayage has become the most important form of exploitation and suppression of the peasantry. The great majority of metayers lease tiny plots of from 3 to 4 acres. They cannot feed their family on such small plots of ground and they are therefore forced to seek additional income on the side. Pakistan inherited two types of metayage from the colonial past. In one of these, the metayer possesses livestock and farm tools and is a semi-feudal tenant. In the other case he is deprived not only of land but livestock, farm tools and seed, and supplies his labor as a member of the proletariat. This type of metayer "makes use of" the livestock and farm equipment of the landowner, and it is very difficult to distinguish him from the agricultural laborer who receives
payment in kind. The metayer of the second type (at present this type is predominant) can be viewed as a transitional form from feudal exploitation to capitalist exploitation which, however, will never independently transform into the capitalist form of hired labor and reflects the general economic backwardness of the country. Under conditions of the constant growth of agrarian over-population, the landowner has the opportunity to raise rents. In addition, under the metayage system the personal dependence of the direct producer is considerably greater than under the free capitalist hired labor system. Therefore it is more advantageous both to the Pakistan landowner and the wealthy peasant not to hire agricultural laborers but to lease the land under metayage. Laws passed in Pakistan subsequent to 1949 dealing with agrarian reforms have actually left the status of metayage unchanged. In the Bengali law on tenancy and purchase of landlords lands by the state not a word is said about metayers. Land rent laws passed in Punjab and the former Northwest Frontier Province stipulate a limitation of the landlord's portion to 40% of the harvest under metayage tenancy. However, this limitation does not extend to tenants of state lands and personal lands of landlords. These reforms led to an increase in the number of impoverished and unemployed in the village, since the landlords began to drive tenants en masse from the land. Special laws passed in West Pakistan allow tenants to be driven from the land under "special conditions," which include non-payment by the lease payment deadline, disrespectful attitude toward the landlord, etc. Thus the prohibition of peasants being driven from the land is reduced to zero. The growth of the metayage system is one of the manifestations of the major crisis in the agrarian system and agricultural production.

The increase in the number of metayers accompanied by a slower increase in the number of agricultural laborers is a phenomenon which testifies to the slow development of capitalism in agriculture, to the absence of a strong capitalist economy, to the negative influence of the relative agrarian over-population on the economic development of the country, to the lingering agricultural production crisis, to the slow development of industry and, consequently, to the relative stagnation of economic forms and processes. All of those seeking work can be employed neither in industry nor in agriculture, where the use of hired labor has developed rather poorly. This is a reflection of the most important contradiction between the developing capitalist relations and the feudal survivals which have been preserved. The agricultural laborers suffer to the greatest degree from the agrarian over-population. To use the expres-
sion of Marx, "the agricultural worker is being forced to the very lowest wage level and will always stand with one foot in the swamp of impoverishment." The exploitation of agricultural laborers is heightened by the survivals of the pre-capitalist suppression to a significantly greater degree than the exploitation of the other sections of the Pakistan proletariat. Therefore, agricultural laborers, as all other peasants, are vitally interested in the elimination of the ascendancy of the landlord system—the basis of the feudal survivors. At the same time they have their own class interests which differ from the interests of the rest of the peasantry, but which are common for all the groups in the Pakistan proletariat. The village poor is actually in a status of semi-proletarians and depends on seasonal additional income during much of the year. While the use of the labor of permanent agricultural workers of the capitalist type is developed comparatively poorly the participation of the village poor (both petty independent landowners and hereditary tenants, as well as metayers without rights) in seasonal work as hired laborers has developed on a broad scale. The number of peasant families in Bengal for whom hired labor is the basic occupation is one-half that of the number of families for whom hired labor is a subsidiary occupation. Many completely impoverished peasants, as well as metayers, small peasant landowners and hereditary tenants, leave for the city in search of work. "During the Second World War and the first war years the exodus from the village to the city increased considerably. This holds true also for those cities which form part of modern Pakistan," an official Pakistan reference work notes.

For the Northwest Frontier Province, West Punjab and East Bengal exodus to the industrial centers of India such as Calcutta, Bombay and others has always played a great role. After the partition of India into two states this exodus became impossible in practice and ceased almost completely. It is characteristic that during the first years after the partition there were many clashes between the Indian border guards and the inhabitants of East Pakistan who were travelling to Calcutta and other cities of West Bengal in search of additional income. Now they are forced to seek work in their own or neighboring villages or ports and industrial centers of Pakistan such as Karachi, Chittagong, Lahore. According to Pakistan press data in 1950-1953 about 15% of the rural population of East Bengal and about 10% of the rural population of Punjab went to the city for work each year. The impoverished peasantry of the Punjab villages is one of the basic sources of the
formation of the working class of West Punjab, chiefly Lahore. The exodus from the Sindhi, Baluchi and to a certain degree the Pushtuni regions is not as marked and plays a role chiefly in the formation of the proletariat of Karachi. The impoverished peasants of the Bengal villages swell the ranks of the working class of East Pakistan and, primarily, plantation workers. A considerable proportion of workers is formed from impoverished handicraft workers who constantly increase the army of the city unemployed. In an article in the Indian paper Naya Hindustan devoted to the status of small-scale industry and the handicrafts in Pakistan in particular, the following was included: "The status of handicraft workers who are becoming impoverished and are swelling the ranks of unskilled workers by the thousands is catastrophic."

As a result of the extremely low level of economic development and the process of expropriation of peasants and handicraft workers, Pakistan industry, in spite of the present comparatively rapid rate of growth, is not able to absorb a large proportion of the unemployed labor force. In view of this the open and concealed unemployment in the cities and the lack of occupation on the part of the rural population has assumed catastrophic dimensions. In the villages complete unemployment of large groups of the population has assumed much greater dimensions than previously, a fact which is affirmed by official statistics. The city unemployed have also increased in numbers. Unemployment is made more critical by the refugee problem, which has still not been solved. Between 1947 and 1951 more than 7,000,000 refugees came from India to Pakistan, 6.5 million of them to West Pakistan. They comprise 9.9% of the population of the country and 19.1% of its Western section. This furthered the growth of unemployment in rural areas, particularly in Punjab, where refugees comprised more than 25% of the population. As has been noted above, the problem of refugees in the cities was the most critical in Karachi (here they comprised 49% of the population) as well as in Hyderabad (59%) and Bahawalpur (73%). The employment of refugees and apportionment of land to them depend on the industrial development of the country, the growth of agricultural production and the elimination of the relative agrarian over-population.

According to official statistics, in 1954 there were tens of thousands unemployed in Pakistan. After 1954, an increase in the number of unemployed was noticed, registered at the labor exchange. Only part of the unemployed and poor of the city were registered at the exchange—as for the inhabitants of rural areas, they do not
even know of the existence of these exchanges. The number of persons registered at these labor exchanges is increasing constantly, and the percentage of those receiving work in comparison with all those unemployed registered in a given year is falling steadily, in spite of the growth of industry (see Table 6). According to materials furnished by the Pakistan Ministry of Labor, the total number of persons registered at labor exchanges between 1937 and 1957 was 2,265,610, of whom 433,154 received employment through the exchange (about 19%). A small percentage of unemployed received work without the mediation of the exchange at enterprises belonging to private firms. "Unemployment is growing," is the joyless conclusion made by the Pakistan Times from the communication by the Ministry of Labor.

Table 6.
Number of Persons Registered at Labor Exchanges Between 1947 and 1957 (average monthly figures)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Registered Unemployed</th>
<th>Number of persons receiving employment</th>
<th>Percentage of persons receiving employment in respect to all registered unemployed</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>15,165</td>
<td>4,455</td>
<td>32.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>15,515</td>
<td>4,952</td>
<td>31.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949</td>
<td>18,923</td>
<td>5,974</td>
<td>31.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950</td>
<td>19,256</td>
<td>3,618</td>
<td>19.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>22,121</td>
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<td>14.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>20,312</td>
<td>3,354</td>
<td>16.5</td>
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<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>16,497</td>
<td>1,927</td>
<td>11.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>17,258</td>
<td>2,399</td>
<td>13.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>18,573</td>
<td>2,509</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>129,758</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


The growth of the relative agrarian over-population and increase in the permanent industrial army of unemployed are indissolubly interconnected. The growth of the reserve army of unemployed in the village corresponds to the exodus to the cities. At the same time the closing of many small industrial enterprises, slowing down of operations in individual factories due to lack of electricity,
preservation of a considerable number of seasonal enterprises and the dependence of the country's economy on foreign capital, which slows down its reconstruction on a national basis and which endeavors to maintain the semi-feudal features of the agrarian system lead to an increase in the permanent army of city unemployed. In its turn, this forces many workers to return to the village and to leave their families there, in other words, to maintain ties with agriculture in various forms. The pressure brought to bear by the tremendous reserve labor army causes the great labor fluctuation. Maintenance of ties with the village is also furthered by the pitifully low wage level, which the entrepreneurs can establish under conditions of increasing unemployment. "Simultaneously with the growth of unemployment wages are decreasing, since the capitalists are sure that with such a large army of unemployed they will always be able to find new workers," the newspaper Naya Hindustan noted. The growth of the relative agrarian over-population and permanent army of city unemployed caused the price of labor to be lower than its... 

Status of Plantation Workers

The exploitation of plantation workers is distinguished by specific features. Plantation workers of Bengal and the Sylhet district of Assam are divided into three large groups: contract workers living on the plantation, workers from neighboring villages who maintain their hereditary lands (so-called "basti" or "faltu"), and seasonal workers. The status of contract workers is particularly poor. As early as 1930 the British Labor Commission was forced to admit that "having signed a contract, a worker is obligated to serve a specific period of time at a plantation. If he leaves his job without a valid reason or runs away from the plantation he can be followed like a criminal, and the plantation owner has the right to arrest him." Formal laws of 1915 and 1923 which came into force in the regions of Assam in 1926, as well as an enactment of 1932 which are still in force in Pakistan, forbid such contracts as limit the personal liberties of the worker. However, the same labor commission was forced to admit that after the promulgation of these laws the...
freedom of the plantation worker is not at all complete. In many areas workers live on reservations where outsiders cannot go ... There is an agreement between plantation owners, known under the name of 'Labor Laws' which establish fines for enticing workers from one plantation to another. The manager of each plantation can either not hire the worker who has voluntarily left another plantation, or pay a sum to the former boss covering expenditures connected with recruiting another worker and an advance given to him.36 Plantation owners still maintain guards who see that a contract worker does not voluntarily leave the plantation and they deal harshly with those who leave the job and run away before the contract period is up. The 1946 government commission also noted the shackling conditions of hired labor on plantations and the limitation of the personal liberty of workers.37 Formerly the semi-slave status of the plantation worker was sanctified by law, while now the personal freedom of the worker is limited by debt slavery. In order to leave the plantation the worker must return the advance received from the contractor and return to the plantation owner the sum of money which was spent for his recruitment. Otherwise the plantation owner may pursue the run-away worker as a penniless debtor. The most common form of hiring on plantations is the recruitment of workers in the villages by means of contractor-Sardars or Kangani. There are three types of contractors on Assam plantations. The first type are Sardars who are sent (usually in June) for a specific period of time to their native villages to recruit several parties of workers and who return to the plantation with the last party. These Sardars receive directly from the plantation boss or the district recruiting agent appointed by the plantation owners association, money for travel expenses and for living expenses during the recruitment period and after presenting the district agent with an assessment order-money for delivering the recruited worker to the place of work. The Sardar usually gives advances to the workers from his own personal funds, and receives a commission after returning to the plantation. On the Assam plantations on the eve of the Second World War, average commissions were 12 rupees for a recruited adult male. At certain plantations it was as high as 20 rupees.38 The cost of worker recruitment is comprised of the following: Sardar commission, travel expenses of the Sardar to the recruitment area and return to the plantation, travel costs for the recruited worker to the place of work and a certain part of the living expenses of the Sardar during the recruitment period. According to data by the 1950 commission for investigating labor on plantations, up to 1947
the recruitment of one worker cost from 100 to 120 rupees. A worker who does not return this sum of money, which is usually equal to his yearly wages, as has been stated, does not have the right to leave the plantation.

During the non-recruitment period the Sardar works on the plantation as a guard, overseer or assistant plantation boss. Official government reports usually call the Sardar a plantation worker. However, actually the Sardar cannot be even included in the worker aristocracy. He does not work on the same jobs as the rest of the plantation workers, is usually superior to them and is himself an exploiter, an exploiter of the worst type, joining the functions of a privileged employee and moneylender. Being natives of the same village as the workers recruited, the Sardars use their connections with local landowners and tax collectors, the hopeless status of impoverished peasants as well as their religious and caste prejudices. Rural moneylenders and wealthy peasants often work as Sardars. Some Sardars are former laborers. This type of recruiter is also found on Bengal plantations.

The second type of recruiter is the Sardar, or more rarely, a worker who has finished his contract period at the plantation and has returned to his native village where he recruits new laborers. These Sardars are paid for their transportation to the village and are paid commissions by the local recruiting agent, after the workers have left for the plantation. This type of recruiter is extremely rare. Finally, the third type of recruiters are the employees of regional plantation worker hiring offices, without any ties with specific plantations, who furnish laborers from the neighboring villages to the regional hiring office, who organize the shipment of recruited laborers to the place of work. The regional hiring offices were founded by the Assam Plantation Owner Association on the eve of the Second World War in Bengal, Behar, Orissa, the Central Provinces, Madras and Bombay. As a rule these offices prefer to make use of the services of Sardars without spending money hiring their own employees. In the draft of the First Five Year Plan for the economic development of Pakistan (1955-1960) which noted the extensive use of recruitment through contractors in the country and the use of the labor of contract workers, the following characteristic of this system is given: "There is no doubt that the system of using contract labor, that is, the labor of workers who are recruited and who receive work not directly from the entrepreneur but through middlemen-contractors, opens the way for many abuses. It makes it possible for the entrepreneur to evade many present labor laws and avoid responsibility for the health, safety and decent labor remuneration of those per-
sons working for him. Contract workers are often merci-
lessly exploited by the contractors."42

We see that the system of recruiting for plantations,
the majority of which now belong to foreign monopolies, is
based on moneylender bondage and limitation of the person-
al freedoms of the contracted workers. Under such recruit-
ment capitalist hiring appears in its most backward form,
weighed down by the survivals of the feudal exploitation of
the direct producer. This system of hiring actually removes
the worker from the labor market, reflects the incomplete
formation of this market, hinders the free movement of work-
ers in search of higher wages and furthers the sale of lab-
or at a price much lower than its value. The most exten-
sive form of labor remuneration for plantation workers is
the piece-rate system. The term "hazira" means both the
daily work norm and the sum which he should receive for the
fulfillment of this norm. The term "tilka" (incorrect pro-
unciation of the word "theka" which means "contract") in-
dicates work fulfilled above the norm, as well as contract
work on road clearing, housing repair, etc., that is, jobs
not connected with field work.43 Under the "hazira and
tilka" system work above the daily norm is paid at a high-
er rate. There is also the piece-time rate system. Even
according to official government reports, the daily norm is
extremely high and the length of the work day is not limited
by anything. Working under the burning rays of the sun for
9 and 10 hours a day, the worker receives literally pennies.
According to official data, in 1950 the adult male planta-
tion worker received 7 annas per day and food at reduced
prices for 2 annas, a woman received 6 annas, a child-no
more than 4 annas.44 Part of the wages are given to the
workers in coupons with which they can buy goods only in
the store belonging to the plantation owner. Although
official reports assert that in the stores products are sold
by coupon at lower prices, actually this is not the case;
in addition an attempt is made to sell the workers low-
quality goods. Not having the opportunity to leave the
plantation without the permission of the plantation boss,
the workers are forced to spend the rest of their salary,
paid in cash, in the same plantation owner's shop; the
prices for products bought by workers for cash are estab-
lished at a rate a little bit higher than market prices.
On the eve of the partition of India the adult worker on
a Silhet tea plantation could buy for his wages no more than
one kilogram of rice per day under the conditions that he
would spend every last penny on food, but the worker also
had to buy salt, kerosene, matches and clothing. Between
1947 and 1957 there was no increase in real wages. In-
crease in pay corresponded basically to the increase in
prices, and according to certain sources, increased at an
even slower rate. The worker's salary was subjected to pay-
ment for housing and many fines. If the worker does not
fulfill the daily norm he pays a fine and various penalties,
even as far as corporal punishment. Unfulfilled work is
added to the following day's norm. If by pay-day the work-
ers have norms unfulfilled, the plantation owner can hold
back wages or deprive the worker completely of his earnings.
Days off and days off the job due to illness are not remun-
erated. Labor conditions at plantations are so difficult
that workers often literally have no strength to go to work.
Forced idleness is a normal phenomenon at plantations. In
1947 on the tea plantations of Silhet about 24% of the
workers did not work each day, at the plantations of Bengal
about 27% - 30%. To Thus even the adult worker can hardly
acquire the necessary food and clothing for himself after
deductions have been made from his wages. He certainly is
not in a position to maintain a family. Contract workers
live in mud and reed huts. The mortality rate among plant-
ation workers of Bengal and Assam is considerably higher
than the average mortality rate in the country. The
majority of workers fall ill with malaria and tropic
fever. The height and weight of their children is consider-
ably less than the children of the rural population of
the neighboring regions. The parents are forced to use
children from the age of 3 to 4 at various types of jobs.
The plantation owner has the right to go home only on special permission, after he has
put up a bond of from 100 to 200 rupees to guarantee his
return. All workers are in irremediable debt to the Sahara,
who receive money for usurious operations from the planta-
tion owner and the plantation work boss and divide their
income with them. The personal life of the worker also de-
pects on the plantation owner; without his permission the
worker does not have the right to marry off a son or daugh-
ter. The children of the plantation worker are required to
work for the plantation owner and do not have the right to
seek earnings on the side without the permission of the ow-
er. Some of the contract workers of Silhet lease tiny
plots of ground for vegetables and rice for their personal
use. These plots, called "khett", are usually not more than
two-thirds of an acre. Rent is rather high and equals 10%
to 15% of the gross harvest. The system of giving workers
plots of ground is quite common at present on the planta-
tions of East Pakistan and the Draft Five Year Plan for
economic development recommends its further expansion.
Housing and small plots of land serve as addition-

-49-
Some plantation workers lease their land in metayage to the poor peasants of surrounding villages. As a rule Sadars receive larger plots of ground, which they cultivate with the labor of metayers. Worker "basti" or "faltu" living in neighboring villages receive the same miserable wages as contract workers living on the plantations, but the degree of their personal dependence on the plantation owner is a little less. Thus, although the plantation economy is organized on capitalist bases and the plantations are operated by the labor of hired workers receiving cash wages, capitalist exploitation lives side by side with strong survivals of pre-capitalist forms of suppression, with the limitation of the personal freedom of workers who are forced to sell not only their labor at a much lower rate than its value but the labor of the members of their families. During plantation work, the worker, his wife and children, are actually in the status of semi-slaves. Plantation owners endeavor to maintain the forms of exploitation which formed under colonial conditions. It is characteristic that during the visit of a delegation from the International Labor Organization in East Pakistan, when they attempted to acquaint themselves with labor conditions at the plantations, the majority of plantation owners refused to cooperate with it.

Material Status of Industrial Workers and Forms of Exploitation

The growth of the agrarian over-population and industrial reserve army forces the factory and transport proletariat to sell its labor at a rate much lower than its value and leads to a decrease in the standard of living. Between 1939 and 1947 a constant increase in primary producer goods prices could be observed. The cost of living for the skilled worker increased 484%. At the same time wages, according to data furnished by the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions, increased only 2 to 3 times. The cost of living for the basic mass of unskilled workers increased 3.5 to 4 times, although wages increased only 1.5 to 2 times. After the formation of Pakistan the increases of prices for primary consumer goods did not stop, while a more rapid price increase was noted in 1948-1949. For example in Lahore between 1947 and 1948-1949 the cost of living of the industrial worker, according to official statistics, increased almost by 40%. In Sialkot—25%. In 1948-1950, certain price decreases were noted, although a new increase began in connection with the famine in several regions of Pakistan. Between 1950 and 1953 prices for wheat, barley and corn more than doubled, rice increased 30%.
to 35%, etc. In 1956-57 considerable price increases were noted for food. Even according to official sources, the standard of living index for industrial workers, which decreased somewhat in 1949-1950, began to rise again after 1950. At the same time the food products price index increased on the average 28% in Karachi in January 1957 in comparison with 1950-1951, in Lahore, 24% and in Sialkot—30%. In connection with the increase in food prices the most significant rise in the cost of living index for industrial workers was noted in 1951-52 and 1952-53, and in 1956-57 (see Table 7). In 1956-57, in spite of the significant increase in the cost of living, there were no wage increases to meet the increased cost of living. As many Pakistani trade union leaders noted, wages of various categories of workers, particularly railroad workers, were not changed at all after 1949. "The cost of living indices for industrial workers, published periodically by official institutions, have an extremely limited significance, since they include the cost of a scant minimum of products which are essential for the existence of the worker," one of the editorials noted in the newspaper Pakistan Times in May 1957. "But there is a more reliable index of the high price level, appearing in the form of the increasing dissatisfaction on the part of industrial workers . . . prices for grain products and other foods, as well as for the most important manufactured goods, and payment for various services (transport, medical coverage, factory training, rent, etc.—author) increased constantly and reached an extremely high level."55

Table 7.
Industrial Worker Cost of Living Index for 1949-50 to 1956-57
(April 1949-May 1949 = 100)*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<td>104</td>
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<td>106</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>108</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Even according to official data, during the first years after the formation of Pakistan, worker wages in various branches of industry remained extremely low (see Table 8).
### Table 8.
**Minimum and Maximum Average Monthly Wages for Various Worker Categories in 1948-1949 (rupees)**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Branch of Industry</th>
<th>Unskilled Workers</th>
<th>Semi-Skilled Workers</th>
<th>Skilled Workers</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mini- Maxi- mum</td>
<td>Mini- Maxi- mum</td>
<td>Mini- Maxi- mum</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport, excluding railroads</td>
<td>26 37</td>
<td>26 45</td>
<td>30 150</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railroads</td>
<td>28.5 30</td>
<td>38 45</td>
<td>60 80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mines, daily</td>
<td>1 1.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1.5 2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machine shops</td>
<td>80 100</td>
<td>90 440</td>
<td>150 175</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wool</td>
<td>58 66</td>
<td>66 113</td>
<td>113 193</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textile</td>
<td>44.5 60</td>
<td>60 72</td>
<td>120 180</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Economy of Pakistan (1950), p. 133.

According to information furnished by the press, in 1950 the majority of unskilled workers earned no more than 25 to 30 rupees per month, and railroad workers even less; 18 to 20 rupees. Only at certain textile mills and machine shops were the wages of unskilled workers greater than 50 rupees. Skilled workers in factories earned about 100 rupees, skilled railroad workers—60 to 80 rupees, janitors—no more than 50 rupees. Wages were particularly low for women and children, who work chiefly at enterprises of light industry and in mines, and receive no more than 20 rupees per month. Unskilled workers, comprising about one-half of all workers, could not assure their family of a minimum existence. In order not to die of hunger, their wives and children had to work. But even if two or three persons per family worked, the total wages would not exceed 50 to 90 rupees. This sum was subjected to income tax and various official and semi-official levies for government funds such as the Kashmir fund, the refugee fund, etc. In addition the workers were also forced to pay a special islam levy, as well as railroad, post and municipal levies. All of these taxes often amounted to 30% of the wages of workers. Rent comprised a high percentage. The newspaper Pakistan Times provides the following data on the worker family monthly budget.

**Expenditures for Basic Necessities**

- Wheat and rice: 40 rupees
- Animal fats: 6
- Vegetable fats: 3
- Milk and sugar: 5

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-52-
Heat, vegetables, salt | 6 rupees
Rent | 10
Heating | 10
Kerosene, matches, transportation and school | 1 rupee, 8 annas
Clothing | 8 rupees
Soap and other cultural-household needs | 6

Total | 95 rupees 8 annas

Ninety-five rupees and 8 annas were necessary in 1950 for the minimum expenditures of a worker family. We see that real wages for the unskilled worker and the members of his family, could not even assure the reproduction of labor. We must consider that in calculating the budget of the working family, the most modest consumption norms were taken. The basic food is wheat and rice, while butter, meat and milk are consumed in small quantities. The unskilled worker, who saves primarily on clothing, fuel, light and study (the majority do not send their children to school) spend more than 80% of his budget on this miserable food. Even for the skilled worker, expenditures for food comprise about 60%. This testifies to the low standard of living of the workers of Pakistan. In 1950 the skilled factory worker had about 100 rupees after all deductions, the railroad worker—40 to 60 rupees, the miner—no more than 40 rupees. Consequently, the worker in a machine shop or skilled textile worker could provide his family with the essentials at correspondingly low consumption norms. However, he also was not able to pay for the trade training of his children, let alone secondary or higher education. Unexpected expenditures for weddings, medical expenses, fines, etc., forced even the comparatively highly paid worker to turn to the moneylender. As for the skilled railroad worker or miner, he could not at all assure the necessary existence minimum for his family. According to materials gathered by the 1953-1954 industrial census, the average yearly earnings of Pakistan workers of the majority of branches of industry, with the exception of the tanning and chemical industry, increased slightly. As a whole the average yearly earnings of factory workers between 1948 and 1954 increased 32% (710.1 rupees in 1948 and 932.4 rupees in 1954).

But average figures do not give a picture of the status of skilled and unskilled workers at individual enterprises. Comparing the increase in average wages with the official commodity price index, one can draw the conclusion that there was a certain increase in real wages.
However, as a rule, this conclusion does not conform to reality. In the first place, in many branches of industry wages for the majority of categories of unskilled workers increased less than 32%. In the second place, judging by information contained in the press, in view of the price increases between 1950 and 1954, expenditures by workers for essential items almost doubled. Thus, there can be no talk of an increase in real wages. One should also take into consideration that Pakistan statistics still proceed from the subsistence minimum which was established during the colonial period and do not correspond to conditions of an independent country. This is recognized also by official sources. At present there is a question of working out a new minimum wage, corresponding to changed conditions. In recent years this demand began do be voiced by trade union organizations and striking workers. However, even now the cost of labor is equal to the level of the colonial period, and in the majority of cases wages do not even correspond. As the draft Five Year Plan notes, "workers cannot take advantage of the fruits of liberty, as a result of poverty, hunger, unsanitariy and extremely difficult living and working conditions." Wages of workers in Pakistan, according to the authors of the draft, were considerably lower than the wages of workers in other countries. Judging from unofficial data, they are increasing more slowly than prices. One of the proofs of this is the constant demand of the workers of all branches of industry to introduce cost of living adjustments in wages. Less than half of all industrial workers are provided with housing at government and private enterprises. The price of so-called public housing was from 3 to 8 rupees at the beginning of 1950, and was not much cheaper than private housing. As a rule the housing did not provide the elementary conveniences. Often worker districts had no water supply and it was necessary to use municipal wells which were located far from the housing. A considerable percentage of workers, not being able to pay the high cost of housing, live on the streets. In the evenings, along the streets of the major industrial centers of Pakistan, workers' families settle down for the night. Here the women cook dinner, children are born and people die. Labor conditions at factories are also extremely poor. Labor protection does not exist at all. According to information carried by the Pakistan press, the number of accidents increased between 1947 and 1951 by 167.7%. In these four years there were 84 fatal accidents, 1,626 serious injuries, and 3,604 minor industrial accidents. There were a total of 10,314 accidents, the majority of which took place at seasonal enterprises.
According to official data, a 42-hour work week was established only at a few enterprises. The normal was the 10 to 12-hour workday. One should note that the factory proletariat is still caught up in various survivals of pre-capitalist oppression. There is a considerable number of contract workers at almost all industrial enterprises. Many entrepreneurs still use the services of contractors in hiring laborers. Sources available to us lack data on the forms of exploitation of workers in small-scale enterprises. It is therefore necessary to limit ourselves to a few general remarks. The exploitation of workers at small enterprises is of a more rapacious character than exploitation at large factory enterprises. It is at small enterprises and plantations that moneylender bondage and various survivals of feudal oppression have their greatest development. As a result of extremely high norms of labor exploitation, simple capitalist cooperative production and small enterprises are distinguished in Pakistan by comparative stability. Labor conditions are particularly poor at small-scale enterprises situated in the rural areas.

We see that in Pakistan that level of labor cost is maintained which was established during the colonial period, while wages frequently do not even correspond to this level. "A lower than minimum level of labor cost is formed by the cost of those goods without the daily influx of which the bearer of labor, man, would not be able to renew his vital processes, that is, the cost of the physically essential means of life. If the price of labor falls to this minimum, it falls below cost, since under these conditions labor can maintain itself and be manifested only in a sickly form." Analysis of the material status of the various groups of the working class in Pakistan shows that worker wages have been brought down to the lower limit of the cost of labor, and wages of agricultural, plantation and non-skilled workers are often lowered below the limits of the physical minimum. Non-appearance at work and even death from exhaustion are common occurrences not only among agricultural and plantation workers, but among a considerable portion of factory workers. Payment for labor which is lower than its cost also leads to a shortage of skilled workers, since the majority of workers not only cannot spend money on vocational training for their children but they themselves cannot receive any training. Such labor payment is possible only under conditions of continued dependence on imperialist powers, which hinder the growth of the national economy and a solution to the agrarian problem, under conditions of relative agrarian over-population and a huge permanent reserve army of unemployed. The sale of labor below cost leads to a preservation of the ties be-
tween the worker class and the village and increases the relative agrarian over-population. "Excessive labor by the occupied portion of the working class increases the ranks of its reserves," Marx notes, "and increased pressure exerted by the competition of the latter for the position of employed workers forces them to excessive labor and subordination to the demands of capital."66 The growth of unemployment in Pakistan is joined not with progress and technology and an increase in the organic composition of capital as in capitalist developed countries, but with economic dependence on imperialist powers, with an increased crisis of agricultural production, an increase in worker exploitation, weakness of industrial development and increase in government expenditures for militarization in view of Pakistan entering aggressive military-political blocs.

The number of indigent and unemployed in the cities and villages of Pakistan is equal to and even exceeds, according to certain sources, the number of workers employed in agriculture, plantations, in industry and transport. At the same time the tendency is growing in Pakistan to establish a new labor caste, corresponding to the conditions of an independent country. An increase in labor costs will depend primarily on the nature of the class struggle. The status of the proletariat is determined to a great degree by the degree of maturity of its class consciousness. At the same time the peculiarities of the material status of the working class do much to influence the nature of the labor movement. The low concentration of workers at various factories, the atomization of small-scale industrial enterprises, labor fluctuation and the existence of a large contingent of seasonal workers, hinders the organization of the Pakistan proletariat. The small percentage of skilled workers, the maintenance of various forms of ties with the village, and constant swelling of the ranks of the proletariat by former peasants and handicraft workers, among whom petty bourgeois illusions and religious prejudices are particularly strong, make it easier for bourgeois ideology to penetrate the worker milieu, as well as theories of the so-called "Islam Socialism" which is actually "Islam" reformism, and "healthy trade unionism," based on the principles of Islam, etc., and hinders the formation of worker class consciousness. In the largest industrial center, Karachi, the problem of worker organization is made difficult by their multi-national composition and the presence of a large number of Moslem refugees from India.

As a result of this only a comparatively small percentage of workers are members of trade unions. The presence of various union centers weakens the union movement. According to the 1953 industrial census, in 1950-1953 there
were about 150,000 union members, that is, slightly more than 18% of all factory, transportation and plantation workers. The best organized were the railroad workers, 30 to 40% of whom were members of unions. The largest union centers are the Pakistan Confederation of Labor, uniting the East Pakistan Federation of Labor (with its center in Narayanganj) and the West Pakistan Federation of Labor (with its center in Karachi), and the Pakistan Federation of Trade Unions (with centers in Dacca and Lahore), led by Communists. In addition, there are various Muslim labor organizations and unions, organized by entrepreneurs. Reformist tendencies in the trade union movement are extremely strong. The insufficient level of class consciousness on the part of the Pakistan proletariat and difficult labor conditions are the reason for the fact that partial demands are the primary ones brought up by workers. At the same time, the constant attack by entrepreneurs on the standard of living of workers (both skilled and non-skilled, as well as seasonal) forces the proletariat to unite in the struggle for the improvement of their material situation. The great dependence of Pakistan on imperialist powers determines to a great extent the difficult situation of the working class. The shackling forms of the so-called aid by the United States, competition by foreign capital and products force Pakistan entrepreneurs, in order to increase their own profit, to step up the exploitation of workers. The proletariat of Pakistan also feels the dependence on imperialist powers directly—in the form of military loans and military expenditures. In addition, a certain portion of the workers are subjugated to cruel exploitation at the same industrial enterprises and plantations which have belonged to foreign capital up to the present. The lack of solution of the agrarian problem also reflects directly on the status of the working class, creating conditions under which capitalist exploitation is burdened by pre-capitalist forms of oppression. All of this leads to a situation whereby the working class of Pakistan is vitally interested in the liquidation of domination by foreign monopolies in the country and the survivals of feudalism in its economy.
Agriculture is Pakistan’s most important branch of economy. Its portion in the country’s national income, according to figures from 1955-1956, is more than five times greater than the percentage of industry. An absolute majority of the gainfully employed population is employed in agriculture—75.5%. Therefore, the problem of the development of agriculture and increase of its productive capacity is one of the most vital problems of Pakistan domestic life. The characteristic feature of agrarian relations in Pakistan is the domination of large-scale feudal landlord landownership and small and exceedingly small-scale peasant land use. In West Pakistan, according to figures released during various official studies, approximately three-fourths of all land under cultivation belongs to landlords. In East Pakistan until recently almost all arable land was in the possession of landlords. Historically the systems of landownership and land use developed differently in both sections of the country; due to this they possess several features differing from one another. But they have one thing in common: a small class of landlords who make use of their land monopoly acquiring gratis a tremendous percentage of agricultural production—the country’s main source of wealth—and tens of millions of indigent peasants, oppressed by the yoke of semi-feudal exploitation, cultivate tiny plots of land. For example, in East Pakistan, of 28.4 million peasants, 26.4 million (93%) cultivate plots of less than 10 acres, 22.1 million (78%) of them—less than 5 acres (1950). During the period of independence peasant landownership has occupied a comparatively minor position in the total privately owned land. They were maintained predominantly in the areas of Punjab and the former Northwest Frontier Province. However, one should note that among landowning peasants poor and extremely poor peasants predominate. For example, in Punjab, according to 1949 study figures, of 1,350,000 landowning peasants, 1,133,000 owned less than 10 acres (84%), including 906,000 (67%)—plots of less than 5 acres. The supremacy of landlord landownership in the Pakistan village, the two centuries long yoke of British capital, have slowed the development to an extreme degree of the productive forces of agriculture, leaving it on a level characteristic for the feudal method of production. When Pakistan received its independence, the technical basis of its agriculture was extremely back-
ward. The basic agricultural implements were the wooden plow, the wooden harrow, the hoe and other tools made of wood. Agricultural methods from the middle-ages prevailed in agriculture. For example, the United Kingdom Industrial Association which studied the economic life of Pakistan in 1950, gave the following characteristic of agricultural methods in Pakistan: "Present methods of cultivating land are unbelievably primitive. Most land is still cultivated by the "scratch plow," made of wood, with the exception of a small metal tip." When the peasants attempted to use iron plows imported from Europe and designed specially for harnessing to a pair of oxen, it turned out that the Pakistan oxen could not pull these plows. "In Punjab wheat is sown by an apparently primitive but perhaps extremely effective four-drill seeder, made completely of wood. In all other areas seeds, both wheat and cotton, are usually scattered by hand. They say that as a result of this, harvests are poor . . . weeding and irrigation ditches, as well as canal bank propping is done by hand, while the multi-purpose tool used on these jobs reminds one of a hoe with a broad tip. Harvesting is done by hand, threshing—with oxen, winnowing—by 'sifting the chaff by hand.' We should like to note here that this method has been preserved basically to the present time. However, it would be incorrect to speak of the technical basis of agriculture in Pakistan only on the level of its general backwardness. Development of capitalism and the formation of a rural bourgeoisie in the Pakistan village, which began several decades ago—when the areas forming part of Pakistan comprised an inalienable section of the British colonial empire—was accompanied by many changes in the technical equipment of certain groups of entrepreneur bosses. These changes were expressed in the fact that a portion of the representatives of the rural bourgeoisie gradually began to replace antiquated wooden tools with improved ones and to incorporate advanced methods of agriculture. Without dealing with the question as to the degree to which this process has touched the entire stratum of rural bourgeoisie in Pakistan, we shall give some figures on the distribution of improved tools. The most significant in this respect are figures for Punjab—the area with the most highly developed agriculture in Pakistan. Improved agricultural equipment first appeared in Punjab at the beginning of this century, when, through the British Department of Agriculture, several dozen imported iron plows, reapers and chaff-cutters were sold in the villages, According to figures from agricultural equipment census, the number of iron plows in 1935 amounted to 2,123, and in 1945—55,550, or 2.2% of the total number of plows in the villages, During the period of independence iron plows were distributed apparently at a much
slower rate, and their number perhaps even decreased. According to an estimate by the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee, made in 1952, in all areas of West Pakistan less than 5,000 "meston" iron plows were used in West Pakistan in agriculture—the most common improved plow in the country. We shall also note that official data, listing the types of improved tools used in agriculture, as a rule do not mention iron plows. The most common improved equipment are chaff-cutters and sugar cane presses. According to the figures of the above committee, on the eve of the partition there were no less than 50,000 chaff-cutters in Punjab, most of which were concentrated in regions annexed to Pakistan. As for sugar cane presses, there were 55,913 of them in 1945 (in 1935—46,184). Of other perfected implements used broadly in Punjab, we should note seeders (for sowing cotton and wheat) as well as harrows with steel teeth and other similar equipment (mattock frames, cultivators, etc.). Certain technical improvements are also being introduced into well irrigation equipment. The traditional wooden "Persian" wheel, with the aid of which water is drawn from a well, "was improved to some extent by the introduction of roller bearings and iron buckets," replacing former clay pots. Modern mechanical equipment is also appearing in well irrigation: pumps run by kerosene engines or electric motors. The number of well mechanisms has increased to a certain extent in recent years, when virgin lands in semi-desert regions of Tal began to be cultivated (a portion of these lands should be irrigated with the aid of deep wells) and in the region of Rasulpur. In other areas of Pakistan (except for Punjab) the technical basis of agriculture has been subjected to change to a considerably lesser degree. In unpartitioned Bengal, for example, on the eve of the independence of India and Pakistan, there were only 15,256 iron plows (0.35% of the total number), of which less than half were in East Bengal. Although there are no exact statistical data on the spread of improved technology in this, Pakistan's largest province, during the years of independence various sources testify to the fact that the use of certain types of improved equipment has apparently increased somewhat. In 1945 there were only 99 irrigation pumps with mechanical motors in non-partitioned Bengal, and in 1957 the number of these pumps in East Bengal alone increased to 600. (This number, however, is quite small if one considers the size of the province.) One should note that agricultural technology in East Pakistan is distinguished by particular backwardness. According to information furnished by various reports and reference books "no large locally produced improved implements are used" in the province, and "primitive and archaic
methods of cultivating land" are in almost exclusive use. 17 During the period of independence, besides several types of ordinary equipment, tractors have appeared more and more in Pakistan villages. This represents perhaps a more characteristic phenomenon than the development of capitalist enterprise in agriculture. The following figures testify to the growth of the number of tractors: 18

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Tractors</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>500</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952</td>
<td>2069</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>3117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954</td>
<td>3989</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1955</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Including tractors used in agriculture:
- 1063
- 1748
- 2523
- 3000
- 3806

As these figures show, the total number of tractors in Pakistan increased significantly during the years of independence. A particularly intensive growth took place during the last indicated five years, when the number of tractors used in agriculture increased by almost 500%. We should mention, however, that the distribution of tractors between all sections of the country is extremely uneven. The great majority are concentrated in West Pakistan. For example, in 1952 East Pakistan had less than 5% and in 1956—14% of all tractors. 20 As for domestic production of agricultural implements, ordinary peasant tools are usually produced by handicraft workers. There are many castes of such handicraft workers even at present in the Pakistan village. In Punjab these are carpenters, blacksmiths, etc. The formation of an entrepreneur stratum in the village, forming demand for improved tools, the production of which was not within the capabilities of the village handicraft workers, caused the birth and growth of industry for producing agricultural equipment. As early as the 70's and 80's of the last century, small enterprises began to appear, and later—small centralized enterprises specializing in the production of various tools. The development of this industry did not go beyond the small-scale enterprise stage during the colonial period. It has also maintained this level during the 10 years of independence. As for the distribution of the agricultural tool production industry, it is characteristic that it is concentrated in the most highly developed agricultural regions (chiefly in Punjab). The basic centers of this industry in Punjab before its partition were Batala and Ombala. In connection with the formation of a large entrepreneur stratum on the newly irrigated lands of Punjab, the production of improved tools is developing also in Lyallpur. According to available data
(evidently slightly exaggerated), Lyallpur enterprises now produce 90% of all improved equipment produced in West Pakistan.

Local industry has now begun producing several types of iron plows, chaff-cutters, sugar cane presses, well equipment, including deep-well equipment (motors, pipes, etc.) and certain other equipment. The scale of local industrial production can be estimated according to the following data. The total value of annual production of improved equipment in Pakistan (except for motors) was 200,000 rupees in 1953, and for motors used in agriculture—80,000 rupees (the production capacity of existing enterprises, according to official estimates, is sufficient to produce 1.5 million rupees worth of equipment and 10 million rupees worth of motors). Evidently the situation has not improved since then. A considerable portion of modern agricultural tools and all machinery (tractors, etc.) is imported. The following figures show the size of these imports (in thousand rupees):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>1953</th>
<th>1954</th>
<th>1955</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total cost of agricultural tools and machinery</td>
<td>5,306.5</td>
<td>7,617.2</td>
<td>6,541.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Including cost of tractors</td>
<td>4,151.2</td>
<td>6,920.8</td>
<td>5,711.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is obvious that local industry presently satisfies only a comparatively small proportion of the domestic market's demand for agricultural equipment (predominantly demand for the simplest improved equipment). Among those groups of agricultural entrepreneurs who used improved tools, we should differentiate the entrepreneur class of the peasantry. As a rule these are small landowners and lease landlord's land only in exceptional cases. The many collections Household Budgets which were periodically published by the "Punjab Bureau of Economic Studies," furnish many examples of the use of improved tools by wealthy peasants. This holds particularly true for large-scale sowers of wheat and cotton on the newly irrigated lands of Punjab. For example, according to the studies of a prominent British official, at the beginning of the 30's, in one of the tax districts of Lyallpur, which includes 17 villages, "almost all, perhaps 90%" of landowners owned chaff-cutters and many peasants possessed seeders. In other areas of Pakistan improved equipment is used to a less degree in peasant households than in Punjab. This is for a good reason. In Punjab, in comparison with other regions, the peasant entrepreneur class stands out more boldly. On the other hand, in East Bengal, where small and extremely small land use has a particularly large proportionate rate, this stratum is considerably weaker.
This also accounts for the lesser degree of distribution of improved tools in this province. The same thing holds true for the regions of the former Northwest Frontier Province. In Sind, where almost all land belongs to landlords, the group of landowning peasants, among which rural entrepreneurs are chiefly to be found, is extremely small. Therefore, in this area the use of improved tools in peasant households is insignificant. It is necessary to note that, independent of the degree of dissemination of improved technology among the peasants of various regions, its application in peasant households is usually limited to simple tools. With few exceptions, peasants are not in a position to acquire complicated agricultural tools and machinery. Besides the wealthy landlords, improved agricultural technology is used by landlords, who form their own capitalist farms on certain portions (usually quite small) of the land belonging to them. These farms, particularly in areas in West Pakistan, began to appear long ago. Detailed descriptions can be found in economics literature and official British sources dealing with the 20's and 30's of this century. During the period of independence the growth of capitalist enterprise among the landlord class has accelerated to a certain degree, and what is extremely important—the capitalist farms of landlords are gradually beginning to equip themselves not only with ordinary tools but machinery. Particular attention in this respect should be given to figures of the distribution of tractors among landlord farms. The Economic Appraisal Committee, which published its report in 1953, notes that "the largest landlords of Sind, Bahawalpur and Punjab are using tractors." Later reports testify to the fact that tractors are beginning to penetrate even in such backward regions as Baluchistan where "a year ago nobody had ever seen a tractor," and now "Zamindar-enthusiasts" have bought several machines for 10,000 rupees apiece. According to figures given by the United Kingdom Industrial Commission in Pakistan, in 1950 there were less than 100 tractors on all landlord estates, while in 1956, as the Pakistan Planning Committee reports, there were already "several thousand" tractors in the hands of private property owners (landlords). In order to start a capitalist farm, the landlord has no other path to take but to "liberate" certain lands leased to peasants, at which the tenant farmers become hired hands. One should pay close attention to the following question: Is there any equilibrium maintained between the number of impoverished peasants and the number of peasants becoming hired hands? It is a well-known fact that the incorporation of contemporary agricultural technology, primarily machinery, leads to a considerable mass of live
labor being forced out of the process of production. The Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee established that replacement of primitive methods of agriculture by modern methods, based on the use of tractors, is forcing out of production two of every three workers engaged in cultivating each unit of land. The increase of machinery use in landlord estates, maintaining peasant land use under the conditions of a continuous increase in land shortage in the village, heightens the contradictions between the peasantry and the landowning class, contradictions which are developing on the soil of the landlord-type capitalist evolution. We should not over-estimate those steps which have been taken by landlords toward capitalist development, nor their "successes" in the mechanization of capitalist farms. As a whole, the incorporation of modern technology in these farms is proceeding extremely slowly. The majority of landlord entrepreneur farms is based for the time being on the use of primitive methods of agriculture and extremely backward technology, which have been used for centuries. We must add that the increased number of machines in the hands of landlords does not always mean a capitalist use of machinery.

The United Kingdom Industrial mission, studying several landlord estates in West Pakistan, included in its report several typical examples of the use made by landlords of tractors. One of these landlords, a large-scale Zamindar in the irrigated regions of Bahawalpur, does not at all maintain his own farm, but leases all of his land in metayage (according to the Batai system to more than 1000 tenants. He keeps tractors only to plow his land carefully once every three years and keep it free from weeds which the peasant tools cannot do. The tenants, according to the landlord, pay only for the cost of fuel. According to the conclusion of the mission, such cases of tractor use are quite characteristic for large-scale Zamindar estates, but they are still in the experimental stage and are not firmly established phenomena. It is obvious that in maintaining the small-scale peasant farm as the basic economic unit, the landowners in this case, by tractor use, are endeavoring to increase the absolute dimensions of rent from their tenants and this is achieved by a slight increase in productivity for each individual peasant household. In this case the rent includes not only land rent, but a certain portion of the cost replacing the capital put out by the landlord and including profit. In an economic respect, this system of joint farming by the landowners and their tenants is one of the many transitional forms from the feudal method of production to the capitalist method.

As for degrees of agricultural mechanization in the
country as a whole, according to the estimate of the United Kingdom Industrial Mission, in order for one-fourth of all land cultivated to be cultivated mechanically, at least once every three years, "on a very moderate scale," Pakistan would need 10,000 more tractors; of the 4,000 tractors in the country, a significant portion of them are used inefficiently, and evidently no more than one-third or one-half of the total number of tractors are used regularly. In spite of a certain decrease in the use of machinery during the period of independence, the conclusion of the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee is still completely valid that mechanization of the country's agriculture is still at "its initial stages." Another important index of the condition of the technical basis of agriculture is the level of fertilizer use. It is well-known that organic fertilizer is the most widespread and until recently, the only fertilizer used in the peasant farming of Pakistan. These are primarily fertilizers formed as by-products of farm production, manure, waste-products of the processing of certain plants (for example, oil bearing seeds, etc.). However, the scale of the use of these fertilizers is insignificant and they certainly cannot correspond to the needs of the land for necessary "nourishment." In the report on the study of one of the typical Punjab villages—Duranmangan (Multan district)—it was noted that "as an average one-fifth of the land under cultivation is fertilized. The lack of fertilizer is one of the main factors limiting the development of intense cultivation and proper crop rotation." It is important to note that even on farms employing much hired labor, a small proportion of land under cultivation is fertilized. According to the figures in the same report, on one extremely large peasant farm, only 13 acres of 31.9 were fertilized, that is, 25% of the land under crops, including basic crops: wheat—4.5 acres (of 12.6), fodder crops—6.9 acres (of 25). In another large peasant farming unit only 10.1 acres of 62.3 were fertilized, that is, 16% of the land under crops, including 2.8 acres of wheat (of 23.5 acres) and 6.2 acres of fodder crops (of 21.4 acres); cotton (9 acres) was not fertilized at all. These figures are for the middle of the 50's, that is, during the time Pakistan was still a British colony. However, the degree of organic fertilizer supply to the country's agriculture after the attainment of independence has remained basically the same. The great shortage of fertilizers of this type was indicated in the report by the Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee (1952). The same fact was noted later in the draft First Five Year Plan for Pakistan.
A new phenomenon on the path toward increasing the technical equipment of agriculture is a certain growth in the application of mineral fertilizers. During the colonial period these fertilizers were used in infinitesimal quantities. For example, in 1938, in all areas in Pakistan, a total of 6000 tons of ammonium sulphate was used, a basic type of mineral fertilizer. At the beginning of the 40's 15,000 tons of mineral fertilizers were expended yearly in Pakistan; 75% of them were used on the tea plantations in East Bengal. During the period of independence the scale of use of these fertilizers increased considerably, particularly since 1952, when the state began to import large quantities of mineral fertilizers (ammonium sulphate). Beginning with the end of 1952 to December 1956 307,700 tons of ammonium sulphate were imported to Pakistan, 120,500 tons in 1956 alone. However, the quantity of fertilizer per unit of land is still infinitesimal. Up to 1952 there was less than 0.5 kg of mineral fertilizer per acre in Pakistan. Between 1952 and 1956 the average level of fertilizer used increased to about 1 kg per acre of cultivated land (2.5 kg per hectare). As a whole the total quantity of mineral fertilizer expended on the average during the course of a year is hardly sufficient to take care of 5% of cultivated land. Mineral fertilizers are used by, besides tea plantation owners in East Pakistan, only certain groups of wealthy peasants, as well as some landowners forming their own capitalist farms. They are loaning these fertilizers to their tenants. The great majority of peasants naturally cannot acquire expensive imported fertilizer.

In connection with examining data on the technical basis of agriculture it is necessary to treat briefly the question as to the stage of capitalist development of agriculture in Pakistan. As we have seen, in spite of a certain increase in the use of modern agricultural technology, primitive methods of agriculture still predominate in Pakistan, methods which have been consolidated during the course of the many centuries of the existence of the feudal method of production. It is just as typical for the modern Pakistani village as it was during the period of British rule to find entrepreneurs who are using hired labor to a greater or lesser degree, but running their farms with the use of old technology. We shall once again treat the question of the dissemination of improved equipment, particularly iron plows. In 1935 in Punjab the proportion of iron plows to the total number of plows in the villages comprised 1.8%, and in 1945--2.2%. During this 10-year period the total amount of land cultivated by these plows evidently does not exceed 2 to 3 and perhaps 4% of all land under cultivation.
If we assume that all iron plows were in the hands of the forming rural bourgeoisie and consider that even in the 20's the latter concentrated approximately 20 to 25% of the cultivated land in the village, it becomes clear that the great majority of rural entrepreneurs were using wooden tools. Moreover, during the period 1935-1945 the total number of plows in Punjab increased by 199,180 units, 11,427 of which were iron and 187,753 were wooden. Consequently, iron tools were responsible for approximately 5% of the total increase in plows. It is quite clear that the majority of new farms, including entrepreneur farms, arose on the former technological basis. There are no analogous figures for the period of independence for Pakistan as a whole for individual regions. However, numerous official statements make it possible to assume that rural entrepreneurs are acquiring modern agricultural technology extremely slowly. "In spite of efforts up to the present to produce and distribute improved tools," the Economic Appraisal Committee noted (its report was drawn up in 1953—author), "farmers are still failing to use them to any great extent." "Only a few farmers are using improved tools," the Pakistan Planning Committee affirmed.

All the above data served not only as testimony to the technical backwardness of agriculture, but also reflect clearly the low organic composition of industrial capital functioning in Pakistan agriculture. Land, livestock and human labor form, as previously, the basic material elements of agricultural production in Pakistan. In order to illustrate this situation, we shall provide data on a large capitalist farm belonging to one of the Punjab landlords. These figures refer to the colonial period, but in a political-economic sense they have maintained their significance up to the present (See table 1).

Even in this capitalist farm, equipped with improved tools to a comparatively great degree, and in this respect exceedingly rare among entrepreneurs' lands, an extremely high percentage belongs to variable capital (more than half) of total production capital. Capital expenditures for improved agricultural equipment comprise no more than one-tenth of the capital expended for labor.
Table 1.

CAPITAL BREAKDOWN OF LYALLPUR LANDLORD CAPITALIST FARMS*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Capital Breakdown</th>
<th>Size of Capital (in rupees)</th>
<th>Percent of Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Constant Capital:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Improved agricultural equipment**</td>
<td>269.5</td>
<td>5.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seed</td>
<td>219.4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock***</td>
<td>624.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Livestock maintenance</td>
<td>1123.8</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2236.7</td>
<td>49.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Variable Capital:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm hand wages</td>
<td>2112.0</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Day labor wages</td>
<td>215.6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>2327.6</td>
<td>51.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Capital</td>
<td>4564.3</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*H. R. Stewart, Some Aspects of Batai Cultivation in the Lyallpur District of the Punjab, Lahore, 1926, p. 30-32.

**20% of the total cost of equipment (cost, including depreciation and repair expenditures during the year.)

***20% of the total cost of livestock (annual sinking fund).

Thus the most characteristic feature of the process of capitalist evolution in Pakistan agriculture consists in the fact that agricultural capitalism is here at the first stage of its development, that is, at a stage whereby it subordinates the great mass of labor, but still has not changed the technical conditions for production. What is the reason for the fact that industrial capital for agriculture in Pakistan has been kept in its development at the lowest stages and in extremely rare cases is making the slow transition to higher forms? It is a well-known fact that during its two-century-long rule in India British imperialism carried out a systematic destruction of old, feudal forms of the economy, but this process was not accompanied by the appearance of new, capitalist forms of production. More and more persons, deprived of their traditional occupations, were removed from the production process, but under existing conditions only a minority of them were drawn into the sphere of capitalist economy as hired workers. The majority were a product of "non-proletarian" impoverishment and were reduced to the status of paupers. Both in the
Indian and Pakistan village a tremendous relative overpopulation developed which exerted more and more pressure on the labor market. The tremendous excess of labor supply over demand led to such a decrease in the price of labor that it became disadvantageous to use machinery. The extremely low cost of labor was one of the main reasons which hindered an increase in the level of the technical basis of agriculture in India and Pakistan. "The burden on the excessive number of semi-unemployed non-able bodied labor," modern India's greatest economist, Radhakamal Mukerjee, wrote in the 30's, "lowest productivity in agriculture slows down the introduction of scientific production methods and machinery." As for the situation developing in Pakistan after independence, the tremendous relative overpopulation in the Pakistan village, which developed in the colonial period, continues to be a serious obstacle in the path of renovating the technical basis of the country's agriculture. Noting that "the mechanization of Pakistan agriculture is proceeding slowly since the partition," the Economic Appraisal Committee states directly that "the problem of labor economy is not an important concept for Pakistan farmers," in view of the fact that "labor in Pakistan is cheap and abundant." In spite of the measures taken by the state in order to aid in the country's economic development, it was powerless to stop the growth of the relative overpopulation. Under modern conditions relative overpopulation increases not only due to new detachments of impoverished peasants, but due to natural population increase, the rate of which far exceeds the possibility of using it in the process of production outside the realm of agriculture. For example, the population of Pakistan was 73.6 million in 1948, 75.8 million in 1951, 80.2 million in 1954 and 84.7 million in 1957. In other words, in the course of 9 years the population of Pakistan increased more than 11 million. The size of the working class employed in factory industry between 1950 and 1955 increased only 200,000 by 1955, and totalled 390,000. According to optimistic estimates by the Pakistan Planning Committee, the increase in workers employed at factory enterprises will be 195,000 by 1959-60. In 10 years factory industry will draw about 400,000 (1.5 million together with families) into the production process. A certain proportion of the new population will be drawn into small-scale industry. But it is perfectly obvious that at present rates industry will swallow only a comparatively insignificant percentage even of the natural population increase. At present it is impossible to speak of cutting down already existing "excess" population.

In view of this, how is the problem to be solved by
the ruling classes of Pakistan on the ways and means of mechanizing agriculture? The basic course in the solution of this problem was suggested to the Pakistan government by the United Kingdom Industrial Mission which stated in its report: "It should be clear that the usual basic motives for mechanizing agriculture: labor economy and accompanying lowering of production costs or expanding the scope of economic activities—cannot hold true for Pakistan. As a rule so much surplus labor exists in the country that fear of unemployment in agriculture will cause in certain areas strong opposition to all mechanization and in the foreseeable future, such a situation can hardly be changed to a significant extent by industrialization." The Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee adopted the viewpoint of the United Kingdom Industrial Mission. Pointing out the already "surplus" population, it stresses that complete mechanization of agriculture would cause many more people to be forced out of production. "Such a change in agricultural economy could cause a serious unemployment problem. Since industrial development will require a considerable amount of time to absorb surplus labor, care should be taken to avoid too rapid mechanization in populated areas. We should introduce mechanization in such a manner that it would meet our local conditions." This opinion was recognized as the only correct one subsequently by The Economic Appraisal Committee. The Pakistan Planning Committee gave just as definite a statement on this problem: Enumerating the reasons forcing the government to "limit" the mechanization of agriculture, the following is the most important: "In Pakistan there is a large able-bodied population, the majority of which is engaged in production only part of the time. In addition there is open unemployment. Population increase is characterized by a high rate. Therefore the requirements are constantly growing to find work for those persons who are part-time engaged in production, as well as the younger generation which each year fills out the ranks of the able-bodied population." This is why the Planning Committee, as previous official commissions and committees, considers that the use of tractors and heavy agricultural machinery "can be justified" only in cultivating virgin and fallow land, as well as erosion prevention and marshing prevention, moisture retention, etc. Machinery has just begun to be used in agriculture, and the ruling classes during the entire period of the independent existence of Pakistan have constantly appealed to a "limitation" of machinery use. Such an attitude toward the idea of mechanizing agriculture on the part of the ruling circles is easy to understand.

As we have seen, in the village large-scale feudal-landlord landownership has been maintained, which, slowing down the
development of both agriculture and industry, hinders the absorption by production of the millions of "superfluous" persons; under these conditions the development of capitalism in agriculture on the basis of the broad use of machinery presupposes the forceful removal from the land of many millions of peasants and inevitably would lead to a new increase in "surplus" population. This bears a direct threat of a sharp heightening of the class struggle. The ruling circles of Pakistan are taking into consideration those irreversible consequences which would result from the broad mechanization of agriculture on the basis of maintaining landlord landownershit and transforming landowners into large-scale agricultural entrepreneurs. Therefore, they appeal for the "limitation" of the introduction of machinery in agriculture within such a framework which would not increase the threat against the political and economic rule of the landowning class. These are the appeals of the ruling circles. These are the most desirable principles of economic policy from their viewpoint. However, practical activities by the state for increasing the productive capacities of agriculture are in somewhat of a contradiction to these principles. In Pakistan the tendency toward developing capitalism along the path of landlordism is making more and more progress. The state is not at all indifferent to what kind of capitalism becomes entrenched in the country's agriculture. Viewed objectively, it is aiding with all the means at its command the establishment of landlord capitalism. It is therefore not surprising that the maximum benefits from the measures introduced by the government in the area of agriculture are enjoyed primarily by the landowning class of Pakistan, as well as a group of the largest entrepreneurs (such as the owners of tea and sugar plantations in East Pakistan, etc.). To a certain degree these benefits are enjoyed by certain groups of the more well-to-do peasantry, evolving into a rural entrepreneur class.

The contradiction between these principles of the government economic policy and its practical content proceed from the class nature of the government authority of Pakistan. On the one hand, the ruling landowner-bourgeois bloc, pursuing the goal of strengthening the basis of its rule, found it necessary to solve a national problem— that of increasing the productive capacities of agriculture, and on the other hand, in solving this problem, if objectively viewed, cannot count on any other class except for the landowner class. Consequently, the practical policy of the government to the degree to which it aids in the transformation of landowners into large-scale capitalist rural entrepreneurs, inevitably presupposes coercion by the landowning class against the peasant masses, that is,
does not hold back but on the contrary furthers the aggrava
tion of the class struggle in the village. This aggrava
tion of the class struggle should become even more ad
canced as the transformation of the landlord class into an
entrepreneur class becomes more intensive. If one considers
only the technical side of the problem of mechanizing agri-
culture, naturally in economically underdeveloped countries
such as Pakistan, where a tremendous relative over-population
has developed, and where small-scale farms prevail in agri-
culture, the solution of this problem cannot but have many
peculiar features which were unknown, for example, to de-
developed capitalist countries during the period when they
began to mechanize their agriculture. But this does not
change the heart of the problem which is the following:
in countries such as Pakistan, only by mechanization is it
possible to effect a transformation in the productive
forces of agriculture. The methods and rate of carrying
out this transformation, as has been mentioned above, are
determined completely by the nature of the social-economic
structure, the nature of government authority in the country.
In Pakistan the way of mechanizing agriculture on the basis
of capitalist development with tremendous land centraliza-
tion in the hands of the landowner class—is a way which is
extremely slow and hard on the masses, and success is un-
thinkable without years of struggle by the landowner class
against the peasants. The experience of the popular revo-
lution in China (where "over-population" of the village was
no less than in Pakistan) furnishes a brilliant example of
another method of transforming the productive forces of
agriculture in economically underdeveloped countries. After
nine years, when "the Socialist revolution in the area of
means of production has won a basic victory," the Communist
Party of China, at the Second Session of its VIIIth Congress,
posed the primary task of a maximum rate of transforming
the country's productive forces (primarily the technical
basis of agriculture), proclaiming the slogan: "Away with
technical and cultural backwardness," "... transfer the
country's economy, including agriculture and handicrafts,
to a new technical basis, to the technical basis of mod-
ern large-scale production . . . ."60 The emancipation of
the great revolutionary energy of the Chinese nation, ac-
chieved in the course of carrying out People's Democratic
Reforms (including the total liquidation of feudal-land-
lord landlordship), carried out at present as a result
of the Socialist revolution, makes it possible for the
Chinese People's Republic to carry out this grandiose
task in a historically minimum period of time.

In the system of government measures for developing
the productive forces of agriculture in Pakistan, certain
attention is devoted to the "intelligent" use of tractors. A considerable percentage of the total number of tractors in the country is concentrated in the hands of the state: at the beginning of 1956 state organizations possessed about 700 tractors (including 550 in West and 140 in East Pakistan). These tractors are used chiefly for clearing and plowing virgin and fallow lands, which are becoming accessible for cultivation as a result of the operations of several new irrigation systems. For example, 300 tractors are operating on the project for reclaiming lands in the region of Thal (Punjab). Smaller groups of tractors are distributed in other areas (12 in Baluchistan, 30 in the tribal belt of the former Northwest Frontier Province, etc.). The state is also taking certain measures to encourage the use of tractors on the estates of landlords. Imported tractors are freed from customs duties and sales tax. In certain areas of the country, stations are being organized to rent tractors to large-scale Zamindars, sometimes on terms which are extremely favorable. In the tribal belt, for example, the agricultural department is paying half the expenditures for tractor use on landlord estates. The system of state subsidy of these expenditures has been adopted at the rental stations of East Pakistan. With the aim of improving service to landowners using tractors, the state planned the formation of seven small tractor repair shops (six in West and one in East Pakistan), where machinery operators are to be trained simultaneously. In 1957 three of these shops were set up (in Quetta, Peshawar, with a branch in Dera-Ismail-Khan and Tandojam). In addition, agricultural organs distribute various types of improved tools among entrepreneurs, sometimes paying for part of the price of these tools. The total sum of state subsidies for the purchase of improved equipment by the rural bourgeoisie was 273,000 rupees in 1956. In East Pakistan a system was practiced of presenting tools to entrepreneurs (mostly irrigation pumps) on a rental basis. However, one should not exaggerate the scale of state aid in the area of distributing modern agricultural equipment among the rural entrepreneurs. For example, one of the latest official reference books indicates that up to the present, "no measures have been taken to encourage the use of machinery and equipment on farms." It mentions the high cost of machinery, the lack of spare parts and organization of service facilities. The fact is that for the above reasons the state apparently is not endeavoring to do much about introducing complicated agricultural technology in the village. In this area, it limits itself basically to the role of observer, taking a minimum of necessary measures. This is also testified to by the modest sums of governmental capital investments in the
dissemination of new agricultural technology in the village. According to the 1955-1960 draft Five Year Plan, 32.4 million rupees (of a total sum of 886.1 million rupees for the development of agriculture) were to be spent on the mechanization of agriculture; the concept "mechanization" does not include the incorporation in agriculture of any complicated agricultural machinery. In the opinion of the Pakistan Planning Committee, "replacement of the local plow with modern tools and the wooden Persian wheel with an iron one or introduction of improvements in other tools operated by livestock, such as well implements, sugar cane presses and threshing mechanisms—all of this can be called improved mechanization." The government devotes considerably greater attention to the introduction of mineral fertilizers in agriculture. This is not a chance occurrence. According to an estimate by the Planning Committee, with the proper application of fertilizer the crop yield for basic crops in Pakistan can be increased 50%. In addition, and this is very important, the use of fertilizer has nothing to do with forcing part of the employed population out of production (such as is inevitable with mechanization).

Among measures directed at encouraging the use of fertilizers, government financing of fertilizer purchases by entrepreneurs has been of particularly great significance until very recently. The government allocated a special fund in its budget, which covered 50 to 70% of the sale price of fertilizer (66-2/3% in sales during the first year, 50% in subsequent years; the percentage of subsidies was established also in relationship to the size of crop yield increase, etc.), that is, fertilizer was sold at one-half to one-third of its cost. However, experiencing constant financial difficulties, the state several times cut off the fund for subsidizing the sale of mineral fertilizers. According to the Six Year Development Program (1950-1956), this fund was established at 92 million rupees. However, by the middle of 1956 the state had actually expended only 23 million rupees of this fund. At the beginning of 1958 the system of state financing of purchase of mineral fertilizers by entrepreneurs was abolished. As has been mentioned, extremely high prices for mineral fertilizers, even with large-scale state subsidies, hindered the broad use of this important means of raising the agrotechnical level of agriculture. The Economic Appraisal Committee made the following gloomy statement in 1953: "Present methods of distributing subsidized fertilizer by means of government institutions has not led to an increase in the volume of sales and use of fertilizer." In East Pakistan, for example, in the period 1949/50-1954/55, it was planned to furnish farm owners, on the basis of 50%
subsidy, 24,000 tons of ammonium sulphate, 18,000 tons of oilcake, 15,000 tons of lime, 30,000 tons of bone fertilizer and super-phosphates, while actually only 10,000 tons of ammonium sulphate were distributed, and 11,000, 4,000 and 2,000 tons of the other types of fertilizer. These figures testify to the extremely small scale of state measures for distributing fertilizer in this province for the period of time mentioned. In West Pakistan, such measures, thanks to the presence of a larger entrepreneur class in the village, had greater success. However, during the last 2 or 3 years, when the drop in production in agriculture has become particularly noticeable, the state began to distribute mineral fertilizer in the village more energetically. In East Pakistan, in 1956 55,000 tons of ammonium sulphate were imported, and in 1957 it was decided to import about 81.5 thousand tons of this fertilizer (during the first half of 1957 about 47,000 tons of mineral fertilizers were distributed in Bengal villages). For the 1957/58 economic year the state has planned to import 180,000 tons of mineral fertilizers into Pakistan. Time will tell how the government organs propose to distribute this fertilizer in the villages, having abolished the system of subsidizing the sale of fertilizer. In recent years the state has been making serious efforts to set up a domestic mineral fertilizer industry. The construction of a plant for producing ammonium sulphate in Daudhel which was begun several years ago (50,000 tons annual capacity) was finished at the beginning of 1958. In the same year the construction of a small superphosphate enterprise was completed in Lyallpur (6,000 tons per year). In 1957 the state began to build two large plants for processing ammonium sulphate in Multan and Silhet (East Pakistan). The planned annual capacity of each of them has been determined at 250,000 tons and 1960 has been designated as the deadline for construction.

We might add to the above that the state is endeavoring to stimulate the introduction of crop rotation which would include the cultivation of such crops as would enrich the soil (bean crops and grasses rich in nitrogen and phosphorous). In particular, the state places preferential land and water taxes on land where these crops are being grown. Naturally, small-scale farmers cannot take advantage of these privileges, for their land is not sufficient even for providing them with sufficient food, and only the most well-to-do peasants can take advantage of this, as well as landlords; possessing various means of coercion, the latter can force their tenants to plant those crops which they consider advantageous. Among measures taken by the state to develop agriculture, certain attention is devoted to in-
creasing the production and distribution of improved seed. At present the production of such seed is carried on either at farms belonging to the state or on private entrepreneur farms, the production of which is bought up by state agricultural organizations. The improved seed fund which is concentrated in the hands of the state is distributed (at market prices) usually among representatives of the landlord class, as well as well-to-do peasants. However, one should not exaggerate the scale of distribution of this seed. Until recently the use of improved seed was limited basically to regions in Punjab and the former Northwest Frontier Province. In 1953/54 there were 11,000 tons of improved seed of various crops collected in Pakistan (in 1955-56 in West Pakistan, for example, about 6,500 tons of improved seed were obtained), while the minimum requirements of agriculture for this seed is estimated to be 104,000 tons. At present 34 farms in West Pakistan are engaged in producing improved seeds. They cultivate a total of 20,000 acres. Specialized seed farms in East Pakistan began to develop comparatively recently. In accordance with the state plan for the development of agriculture in this province, 20 small seed farms are to be set up (100 acres apiece) and two large farms (3,000 acres apiece). By the middle of 1957 work was begun on setting up one large and 16 small seed farms. The most important link in the system of state measures for increasing productive capacities of agriculture is the construction of irrigation systems and cultivation of new lands. The government is devoting the most attention to West Pakistan, where, due to climatic conditions it is impossible to farm most of the territory without irrigation.

In 1947-49, of 26.1 million acres under cultivation in West Pakistan, 19.9 million acres were irrigated from sources of all types (76.3% of the total). By 1955, when land under cultivation totalled 27.5 million acres, each year an average of 21 million acres was irrigated (76.4% of the total in West Pakistan.) The great majority of land irrigated with the aid of irrigation equipment is situated on the upper and middle reaches of the Indus and its main tributaries—Jelum, Chenab, Ravi, Setlej. These irrigation systems, most of which were modernized or completely built by British capital between the 70's of the 19th century and the 40's of the 20th century, reverted to the Pakistan government after the formation of Pakistan. The development of irrigated agriculture during the period of independence has proceeded extremely slowly. Between 1947 and 1955 less than 1 million acres of new, virgin lands were irrigated and put under cultivation. More substantial measures in the field of irrigation and expansion of cultivated land were to be taken by the state in
1955-60. In accordance with rough drafts for the First Five Year Plan, 2,545,000 acres of newly irrigated land were to be put under cultivation in West Pakistan and the irrigation system on 2,683,000 acres of land already under cultivation was to be improved. At the beginning of 1956 the construction of one of the largest irrigation systems was completed—the lower Sind dam (or, as it is called in official documents the "Gulyam Muhammed"). With its aid 1.5 million acres of virgin land are to be put under crops and the irrigation system on a territory of 525,000 acres is to be improved. At the beginning of 1958 construction was completed on another dam on the Indus—the "Towns Dam," which will allow the cultivation of 43,000 acres of virgin lands and will improve the irrigation of 667,000 acres of land already under cultivation. Due to limited space we cannot examine the problem of distributing the newly irrigated land. We shall note only that the landlord class of Pakistan has resisted strongly distribution of the new lands to peasants and is conducting an energetic campaign to seize these lands. As a result, tremendous quantities of fertile virgin lands which have been ready for cultivation for more than two years still lie unused. One may assume that the same fate awaits the land in the region of the Towns Dam. The interests of the entire nation, the interests of the development of productive forces in an extremely important branch of Pakistan economy, are being sacrificed to the selfish interests of the landlord class. This has been a brief enumeration of the measures used by the ruling classes to attempt to cure the illness without eliminating its causes—to increase productive capacities of agriculture while preserving landlord landownership.

Under modern conditions only the peasantry and not the landlords are capable of raising the productive forces of agriculture in a comparatively short historical period. The state, due to its class nature refusing to break up landlord landownership to the advantage of the peasants, cannot create the primary and basic condition for emancipating the forces of production. It is therefore understandable that in the Pakistan village, parallel with certain increase in the use of modern technical means and development of irrigated agriculture another process is taking place—the destruction of the productive forces of agriculture. The predominant primitive, predatory methods of cultivating land in the village which do not allow the observance of the elementary rules of agronomy are shallow plowing, an insufficient quantity of fertilizer and increase in the cultivation of intensive crops, violation of traditional crop rotation, etc. These are the
ulcers of small-scale farming, which have matured during
the course of the lengthy rule of British imperialism, and
which have had a particularly strong effect on agriculture
in the modern period. Large areas of one-time fertile cul-
tivated land, as a result of erosion, bogging up and salt-
ing, become unsuitable for further cultivation. The sit-
uation is worsened by the fact that the ruling classes of
modern Pakistan are not taking serious measures (drainage,
etc.) to preserve the country’s land resources. The pro-
cesses of breaking down the soils are taking place parti-
cularly intensively in the regions of West Pakistan. Ac-
cording to official statistics, in this province, erosion in
its various forms has seized to one degree or another, be-
side land under cultivation (21 million acres), the re-
mainling 97 million acres of arable land. The soil struc-
ture of the irrigated land, which forms the basis of agricul-
ture in West Pakistan, is deteriorating at a catastrophic
rate. (See table 2).

Table 2.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Land Under Cultivation**</th>
<th>Eroded</th>
<th>Excess Salinization</th>
<th>Undergone bogging up</th>
<th>Undergone salinization or is threatened by this***</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>4.4</td>
<td>7.1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Statistical Digest of Pakistan 1950, Karachi, p. 26-
27; Agriculture In Asia and the Far East, FAO, Rome, 1953,
p. 75; Pakistan 1955-1959, p. 149.

**Average stable land (that is, excluding land left
fallow).

***Land where salinization has taken over at least
20% of the total area (figures are only for Punjab).

****Water is situated 1.5 to 3 meters from the sur-
face on 6,750,000 acres.

As is evident from the above figures (established by
a special study by the Food and Agricultural Organization
of the UN), in two of the largest regions of West Pakistan
the processes of erosion and soil salinization have taken
over no less than one-half (perhaps considerably more than

-78)
one-half) of land under cultivation. These figures are affirmed by other sources. According to official estimates, in West Pakistan, 50,000 acres of irrigated land become useless each year due to salinization. According to figures by the director of the American International Cooperation Administration in Pakistan, at existing rates of salinization, by 1961 no less than 100,000 acres will become useless for agriculture each year. Naturally the ruling classes of Pakistan are making attempts to thwart the threat of ruin to the country's land under cultivation. However, the measures taken by them have been insufficient to lessen this threat to any degree. Between 1947 and 1955, 423,000 acres of bogged-up, formerly cultivated land, were reclaimed; in West Pakistan land reclamation saved 185,000 acres, but during the same period no less than 450,000 acres of fertile irrigated land became useless as a result of salinization and marshing. One official reference book notes: "At present the rate of soil destruction is advancing more rapidly than soil renovation by land reclamation projects."

For the period of 1955-60, Pakistan's first Five Year Plan provides for a development in land reclamation projects which would make it possible to reclaim 50,000 acres each year which is obviously insufficient even to maintain the "status quo" of land under cultivation. The Pakistan government does not have funds to carry out conservation work on a broader scale (including erosion and salinization projects), since the government does not dare touch the colossal profits gained by the landlord class.

The most striking expression of the crisis experienced by agriculture in Pakistan is the decreased productivity of the basic agricultural crops (particularly food crops). The average productivity of food crops from 1949/50-1951/52 to 1952/53-1955/56 decreased as follows: for rice, from 9.2 metric centners per hectare to 8.8 (4.4%), wheat, from 8.8 to 7.5 (14.6%). "Besides the influence of unfavorable natural factors," the Pakistan Government Budget Commission ascertained, "the decrease in productivity is explained among other things, by a loss in fertility, caused by the absence of proper crop rotation, the spread of erosion and marshing, a placing of the qualitatively best land under technical crops and insufficient use of fertilizer." As a result the ruling classes of Pakistan cannot solve even such a vital problem as the food problem. For example, the following data furnished by the UN fully testify to this (Table 3). The total harvest of agricultural crops in the years under study increased to a certain degree. But this increase was chiefly due to increased planting of technical crops. Harvests of the basic food crops—grains, occupying,
as is well known, the predominant position in agricultural production in Pakistan—did not increase at all during the period under study (an increase in grain production was observed only during the years preceding the Declaration of Independence, when it increased by 13 points, but subsequently the harvest of grain crops remained at an unchanged level and even decreased). Without removing the main obstacle standing in the path of agricultural production, the ruling classes cannot make agricultural production (primarily grain) per capita attain even the pre-war level. And yet this was a level of impoverishment, starvation existence of tens of millions of persons. In addition, as the figures show, during the past five years, the productivity index for all food crops (in particular grain) per capita has had a tendency to decrease. It is not surprising that famine has become a common phenomenon in a country where about four-fifths of the population is employed in agriculture. At present only the constant import of grain makes it possible for Pakistan to feed its constantly growing population.

Table 3.

Agricultural Production Productivity Index*(1936-1938 = 100)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years</th>
<th>All Crops</th>
<th>Food</th>
<th>Grain</th>
<th>Per Capita Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Food Crops</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948/49</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>97</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1949/50</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950/51</td>
<td>107</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951/52</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1952/53</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>98</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953/54</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>93</td>
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<tr>
<td>1954/55</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>120</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>94</td>
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<tr>
<td>1955/56</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956/57</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>121</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>89</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


We can draw the following conclusions from the above figures. The development of capitalism agriculture in Pakistan is leading to a certain renovation of the technical basis, which testifies to a certain growth in
the productive capacities of this extremely important branch of economy. The government is making certain efforts to increase the productive capacities of agriculture (development of irrigation; putting new land under cultivation and restoring old land; financial aid to certain classes of entrepreneurs by furnishing them with various types of tools, fertilizer, seed; construction of mineral fertilizer enterprises, etc.). Under modern conditions the state occupies the leading position in the transformation of the technical basis for agriculture, and not any specific class in Pakistan society. It would not be incorrect to see another facet of the present condition of agricultural productive capacities; their destruction, manifested in land exhaustion, extension of erosion and soil marshing, decrease in productivity and basic crop harvests. The main reason for this process is the role of outmoded, semi-feudal forms of production, based on the preservation of landlord landownership. Solving the problem of improving agriculture by the extremely slow adaptation of the agricultural methods of the Middle Ages to the requirements of developing capitalism, the ruling classes are slowing down the renovation of its technical basis. Herein lies the reason for the excessive technical backwardness of agriculture. This is why the measures taken by the government to develop productive capacities cannot attain their goals.
The People's League Party

The change in the alignment of class forces in Pakistan as a result of the transition of authority from the British colonizers to the Pakistan landowners and the upper stratum of the bourgeoisie led to an undermining of the ideological and political rule of the Moslem League and the rise of new parties. The People's League ("Awami League") became one of Pakistan's largest parties. This article will examine the activities of the People's League in 1951-1957, whereby particular attention will be devoted to the period of its ascension to power (September 1956 - October 1957), when the class nature of this party was manifested most clearly.

The People's League Before Ascension to Power

The People's League was formed in January 1951 as a result of the unification of two small parties in opposition to the Moslem League—the Bengal People's Moslem League, the leader of which was Suhrawardi, and the Punjab Jinnah Moslem League, headed by large-scale landowner Khan Mammad. Both leaders of the new party had previously held executive posts in the Moslem League. Suhrawardi headed the Provincial Government of Bengal during the British colonial rule; on the eve of the partition of India, and Mammad was the first chief minister of the Pakistan province of West Punjab in 1947-1948. Having lost the struggle for power, which had taken place for leadership of the Moslem League after the death of Jinnah, Suhrawardi and Mammad, together with their few supporters, left the ruling party. The "principle" basis for uniting the Mammad and Suhrawardi groups, in the words of former general secretary of the Punjab People's League, Kadri, was only the "endeavor on the part of the leaders to have one powerful opposition party" instead of two weak ones.1 The People's League, up to the time it was prohibited in 1958, did not have one official all-party program, nor did it have a manifest or charter. One can form a judgment on its purposes only according to speeches by its leaders and resolutions by the party's executive organs. As early as the first years of existence of the People's League its leaders, in opposition to the government, criticized the domestic and foreign policies of the Moslem League. Demands to democratize the governmental structure, to improve the status of the peasantry, to remove Pakistan from the British Commonwealth and to follow an independent course in foreign policy aided in the growing
popularity of the party leaders. However, until 1953 the party had few members and was not a serious political factor. In 1952 the largest Provincial organization of the People's League—the Punjab organization—consisted of no more than 6,000 persons, had supporters only in the city of Lahore and "had no influence in the rural regions or within the Province of Punjab." Until June 1953, leadership of the Punjab organization belonged to Mandot's group, closely joined with the landlords. The East Bengal Provincial organization of the party, second in size and importance consisted of less than 1,000 members in 1952. The leadership of this organization (the Suhrawardi group) was joined with bourgeois circles. The positions of the People's League in the Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Baluchistan were even weaker. On the whole the People's League at that time was obviously a landowner-bourgeois party both in nature and composition. In this respect it differed little from the Moslem League.

The weakness of the People's League in 1951-1953 was explained not only by the predominance of landlord elements in its executive branch, but by the general political situation in Pakistan, which was unfavorable for the activities of parties opposing the Moslem League. During the first years of the existence of Pakistan, the Moslem League exerted tremendous influence and possessed great authority. It was surrounded by the aura of fighter for Pakistan's independence—the promised land for Indian-Moslems, and the masses believed that the Moslem League, as the ruling party, would improve their status. A strengthening of its influence was aided greatly by the wave of religious fanaticism which was caused by the partition of India. The leaders of the Moslem League attempted to make use of the political backwardness of the masses and, with the aid of religion, to play down the class differences in the country: (the preaching of "Islam socialism" pursued this goal). The differences between the ruling classes (landowners and developing bourgeoisie), their various strata and national groupings did not develop enough prior to 1958 to lead to the formation of parties which would be strong enough to struggle for power against the Moslem League. The turning point in the history of the People's League was 1953-1954. During these years a general worsening of the economic situation in Pakistan took place. In connection with the crop failure of 1952-1953, the food problem in the country became particularly critical. As a result of an end to the economic boom which was caused by the Korean War, the prices on basic export goods—jute and cotton—dropped sharply. The non-equivalent nature of exchange between Pakistan and the imperialist countries became more and more
obvious. The increase in the trade balance deficit forced the government of Pakistan to introduce rigid controls on imports (import licenses) which primarily affected small-scale industry and artisans, depriving certain branches of essential raw materials and equipment.

Farming, increased prices for essential consumer items, the mass driving of the peasants from the land, an increased rate of capitalist exploitation and impoverishment of handicraft workers sped an end to the illusions of the masses in respect to the Moslem League. Differences between the landlords and bourgeoisie of Pakistan also became heightened, as well as between various national bourgeoisie-landlord groups. This found expression in the increased fighting between the factions in the Moslem League. Under conditions whereby all internal differences between the ruling party of Pakistan were increasing, the problem as to the path to take for the further development of the country became particularly critical. Differences of opinion due to the draft constitution, economic development plans, agrarian reforms and government policy in respect to the nationalist movements of the peoples of Pakistan show that there was no unity in respect to these vital problems among the ruling classes. An increase in the dissatisfaction by the masses, including a portion of the nationalist bourgeoisie and even landowners, with the domestic and foreign policies of the government of the Moslem League, created favorable conditions for increasing the activities of various opposition parties and organizations. Taking this into consideration, some People's League leaders with the aim of increasing the influence of the party, proposed a broad program of democratic reforms in their speeches at meetings and in the press, including a "radical agrarian reform." The change in tactics led to bitter struggle for party leadership. In July 1953, at a session of the Labor Committee of the People's League Nial's group was thrown out of the party "for anti-party activities expressed in opposition to agrarian reforms, support of landlord organizations and under-the-table negotiations with the Moslem League." By removing the extreme rightist landlord group from the People's League, the position of democratic elements within the League was strengthened, grouped around the East Pakistan Youth League (an organization of progressive youth, chiefly students). However, almost all the executive posts in the party were seized by backers of Suhrawardi, closely joined with the bourgeois-landlord circles of East Pakistan, who were infused with opposition tendencies. In view of the change in tactics by the People's League, its membership began to grow rapidly, as
did its influence. The second reason for the transformation of the People's League into a mass party is the participation of its provincial organizations in the nationalist movements of the peoples of Pakistan—Bengali, Sind, Sindhi, Pushtuni. At the end of 1953 the People's League took active part in the organization of the front of opposition parties of East Pakistan and the drawing up of its program. The "twenty-one points" of the united front were the general platform on the basis of which, during elections to the provincial legislative assembly, heterogeneous elements—from Communists to the Right Opposition Parties ("Nizam-i-islam," "Krishak shramik") united against the Moslem League. At the same time the United Front program began in 1955 to be the official program of the provincial organization of the People's League in East Pakistan. Being the only, although not all-party, program document of the People's League the "twenty-one points" present particular interest in studying its history, especially since in East Pakistan they usually censure the activities of ruling parties previously part of the United Front, equating the policy of the government with the program of the front. The "twenty-one points" is primarily the program of the Bengal Nationalist Movement. Recognition of Bengali as the national language of Pakistan, parity between both sections of the country, ending any and all discrimination against East Pakistan, broadening the autonomy of the province and limitation of the authorities of the Center only to questions of defense, foreign relations and currency—these are the basic points of this program.

Particular attention was devoted to the economic development of the Province. The program demands "the industrialization of East Pakistan." Point four mentions the necessity of "improving conditions for small-scale and handicraft industry." "The economic and civil rights of industrial workers should be guaranteed in accordance with the conventions of the international labor organization." An important part of the agrarian section of the program, (Point Two) is the demand to abolish without compensation all income connected with the receipt of land rents, and to distribute surplus land among peasants who own little land. The sense of this demand consists in the fact that it is actually proposed to abolish without compensation all rights of the privileged stratum of landlords—permanent Zamindars, as well as the numerous middlemen who do not farm their own land. Without stipulating the complete liquidation of landlord landownership, the program of the United Front—People's League proposed a radical path of eliminating those feudal survivals which were the main obstacle to the
development of capitalism in the Pakistan village (and in particular, in the landlord economy). Parallel with this, the program stipulated a decrease in land rents, abolition of the certificate system, and development of agricultural cooperatives, that is measures which would lead to improvement in the status of the peasantry and an increase in agricultural production. With the aim of preventing floods and famine, the program proposed to improve the system of irrigation. A special point in the program (third) demanded the trade in jute to be nationalized. This was motivated by the necessity of protecting the interests of the jute producers. The program demanded an investigation in view of jute speculation which had reached large dimensions during the regime of the Moslem League, and demanded as well that those persons guilty for the fact that jute producers were not receiving "the actual price" for their product be made to answer for it, and to confiscate property amassed as a result of this speculation. The program did not specify who was meant by the term "jute producers"—the peasants or landlords. In any case it is doubtful that the nationalization of the jute trade, eliminating numerous middlemen from the local markets—these were small-scale buyers and speculators—would correspond to the interests of the Bengal peasantry and particularly its upper stratum. At the same time it is advantageous to the owners of jute mills, since it makes it possible for them to receive raw material much cheaper. As for the landlords, nationalization of the jute trade would affect them as receivers of rent and speculators, but at the same time it would be advantageous to them as "jute producers," if they operated their farming on "has" land with the aid of metayage or capitalist methods. Finally, the program included several general democratic demands: separation of judicial authorities from the executive, liberation of all political prisoners arrested on the basis of various decrees and laws on public security, guarantees of political freedom, a cutting down of the great cleavage in salaries paid to various categories of government employees, elimination of corruption, nepotism (favoritism and protection in assigning posts) and bribe-taking in government institutions, introduction of free and obligatory primary education in the native language, etc. At first acquaintance with the program of the United Front-People's League it is possible to note two of its peculiar features. In the first place, the interests of the Bengal National bourgeoisie are expressed more completely in it. In the second place, the program is drawn up in order to receive the support of the various strata among the population of East Pakistan. All economic demands in the program are of the bourgeois nature. Analysis shows that the aim of
the program was the creation of more favorable conditions for the development of capitalism in East Pakistan. This conclusion is also suggested by the sense of the evaluation of the "economic program of the United Front," given in the magazine Karachi Commerce—organ of the "leading commercial and industrial circles of Pakistan." The demands of the Bengal Nationalist Movement, expressed in the program, corresponded to the interests of the bourgeoisie of East Pakistan which was endeavoring to strengthen its economic and political position in a struggle with a stronger rival—the powerful bourgeoisie of Punjab and Karachi. This explains the thread running throughout the program which indicates that East Pakistan should have autonomy in all respects and be independent from West Pakistan, that it should be a "self-sufficient" Province, which could satisfy all of its economic needs by its own resources. However, being bourgeois by nature, this program expressed to a decisive degree the aspirations of the masses of East Pakistan, who were interested in eliminating feudal survivals, wiping out national discrimination against Bengali and democratization of the governmental structure. Therefore the "twenty-one points" also assured the parties of the United Front of a brilliant victory over the Moslem League at the March 1954 elections to the provincial legislative assembly. 223 candidates of the United Front were elected to the assembly, not including deputies which aligned themselves to the Front, who had been elected in religious-communal election curias of Hindus, Untouchables and Christians, while the Moslem League received only 10 mandates of a total of 309. After the defeat at the poles the position of the Moslem League in East Pakistan was shaken at its foundations, and the parties of the United Front came to power in this Province despite all of the manipulations on the part of the leaders of the Moslem League. The People's League, occupying within the United Front a more decisive and consistent position than its leaders, who were members of the landlord-bourgeois parties "Krishak shramik" and "Nizam-i-islam" soon became one of the most popular and influential parties in East Pakistan. The People's League began to attract peasants, workers, representatives of the petty city and rural bourgeoisie and the radical intelligentsia. The change in the composition of the People's League of East Pakistan led to the formation of a strong left-wing headed by Maulana Bhattachari. Bhattachari's supporters acquired great influence in the East Pakistan Youth League, various student and peasant organizations, as well as in several trade unions in the Province. Beginning with 1954 the influence of the People's League increased also in West Pakistan where its local organizations began to play a sig-
significant role in the nationalist movements of the Pushtuni and Sindhi, in their struggle against the administrative unification of West Pakistan which had been pushed through by the Moslem League government. The People's League gathered up many Red Shirts, members of the "Hari Committee" of Sind, including its former president Kazi Faiz Mohammed. In the provincial organizations of the People's League in the Northwest Frontier Province, Sind and Karachi, as well as in East Pakistan, a left wing formed, the most prominent leaders of which were Pir Manki Sharif, Kazi Faiz Mohammed and Mahmud-ul-Hal Usmani.

In June 1955 elections took place for the second Constituent Assembly. The Moslem League, which received 25 mandates of 80, was deprived of an absolute majority in the Central Parliament of Pakistan. Of 40 representatives of East Pakistan in the Constituent Assembly, only one was a member of the Moslem League. In order to remain in power the leaders of the party were forced to form a parliament coalition with the United Front of East Pakistan. The agreement between the leaders of the United Front and the Moslem League on the formation of a coalition government of Choudhary Mohammed Ali served as an impetus for the People's League to leave the Front. The majority of members of the People's League were against the members of the coalition, considering that they did not guarantee the opportunity for the existence of the program of the United Front. The agreement caused dissatisfaction among a considerable portion of the Bengal bourgeoisie. Therefore, the rightist leaders of the People's League, after certain wavering, considered it to be more tactically advantageous for themselves to remain among the opposition. However, two extreme rightist factions of the People's League, expressing the interests of the Province's petty and middle landlords—the People's League of Abdus Salam Khan and the People's Moslem League of Rafik Hussein—left the party and joined the United Front. The position taken by the main opposition party both in the Constituent Assembly and in the East Pakistan Legislative Assembly under conditions of a growing political crisis in the country, made it easier for the leaders of the People's League to win the support of the masses. An important role in changing the balance of power between the parties in Pakistan was played by the discussion of the draft Constitution in the Constituent Assembly in January-February 1956. Debates in the Assembly showed that the governing coalition of the Moslem League-United Front had taken the reactionary position on problems extremely important for Pakistan (agrarian reforms, democratization of government structure, etc.). These debates served as clear proof of the fact that the leaders of
the United Front, who were in the Party "Krishak shramik" having divided their power and certainly not equally, with the Punjab Moslem League faction, refused not only to carry out the most important democratic reforms but to carry out the basic demands of the Bengal Nationalist movement, which was contained in the program of the Front. At the same time speeches by the representatives of the People's League and the Constituent Assembly did much to further the growth of its political influence.

We should pause and examine these speeches for the following reasons; in the first place, they played a part in that political program with which the People's League came to power, in the second place, the leaders of the People's League, in particular Suhrawardi, although they were deputies to the Constituent Assembly from East Pakistan, should have represented the whole party and not only its East Bengal Provincial organization. Finally, the struggle which took place in the Constituent Assembly over the draft Constitution forced the leaders of the People's League to state their position on questions which were not touched by the platform of the East Pakistan United Front.

What was the political program presented by the leaders of the People's League in the Constituent Assembly? Realizing the popularity of Socialist ideas and the very word "Socialism" in Pakistan, the leaders of the People's League proclaimed that the goal of their party was the development of "Islam Socialism" in their country. "Islam Socialism" in their words, means the liquidation of the capitalist economy, under which people live poorly, "an end to worker oppression," as well as "a comfortable living for all." Nothing was said of the method to be used for developing "Islam Socialist Republic" in Pakistan. The concrete demands made by the representatives of the People's League in the Constituent Assembly, did not stipulate Socialist but bourgeois reforms, which went no further than the platform of the United Front. The leaders of the People's League generally made broad use of this platform which was popular in Pakistan in fighting against all political enemies (for example, criticizing the draft Constitution). But the most important points of the platform, which touched the basic interests of the ruling classes (in particular, the section on the agrarian reform, the point dealing with the nationalization of the jute trade), as has been mentioned, were formulated in such a way as to make it possible to come to various interpretations. Going into detail and developing these points, the leaders of the People's League viewed them in accordance with their class positions.

Speaking on the agrarian reform question, the representatives of the People's League and the Constituent Assembly
explained that they were seeking only abolishment of the system of Zamindar and Jagirdari, that is, "liquidation of the privileged feudal rent-receiving class."21 The following basic arguments are characteristic for them. 1. The systems of permanent Zamindari and Jagirdari do not stimulate the development of the farms of large-scale landowners, cause absenteeism among landlords and hinder "enterprise" in agriculture. 2. Jagirdari and Zamindari serve as a main obstacle in the path of transforming Pakistan into a "flourishing country"; the consequences are the impoverishment of the peasantry and the backwardness of agriculture. 3. Agrarian reforms are necessary in order to avoid social upheaval.22 The interpretation of the second point of the United Front platform, as given by the leaders of the People's League, as well as the augmentation of this interpretation, show that the leaders of the party proceeded primarily from the interests of the bourgeoisie and that section of the landlords who wished to engage in "enterprise" in agriculture.23 But at the same time, in order to assure themselves of the support of the peasantry, the leaders of the People's League portrayed the abolishment of the rights of the privileged landlord uppercrust as the liquidation of the landlords in general.24

New in comparison with the "twenty-one points" of the United Front is the demand to guarantee the rights of tenants and preserve them from being driven from the land. Similar proposals had been made earlier, but in 1955-1956, in connection with a worsening food situation in the country and the growth of the peasant movement, they received broad support from various parties, including the provincial organizations of the West Pakistan People's League.26 The implementation of this demand would have limited the arbitrary actions by landlords and would have improved the position of peasant tenants. At the same time it would further the development of capitalist forms of rent and would be dictated by economic necessity: It would be necessary to find measures to solve the food problem and for this—to increase the interest on the part of the tenant in the development of his farm. In addition, speaking from the rostrum of the Constituent Assembly on the necessity of improving the position of the peasants, the leaders of the People's League counted on their political stock going up.

In the summer of 1953 the General Secretary of the East Pakistan People's League, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, asserted that his party, in case it came into power, intended to nationalize the basic branches of industry.27 However, subsequently this demand, apparently borrowed from the platform of the Moslem League, was not included in the "twenty-one points" of the United Front and was not reflected
in the speeches of the leaders of the People's League at the Constituent Assembly. It is difficult to say what caused this—tactical or other considerations, but it was significant that in recent years the powerful Pakistan bourgeoisie, connected with the leaders of the Moslem League attempted to remove from its platform the point on the nationalization of the basic branches of industry. Speaking of the necessity to go all-out to aid the state in developing national industry and handicrafts, the representatives of the People's League particularly stressed the industrialization of East Pakistan with the aid of state subsidies and budget allocations. They also demanded the tariff and customs duty system, which was not advantageous for East Pakistan, be changed, and that this Province be granted additional licenses for importing foreign goods, particularly industrial equipment, and that its portion of the military aid received by Pakistan be increased. Criticizing the draft Constitution, the representatives of the People's League both in the Constituent Assembly and outside it demanded the democratization of the governmental structure of Pakistan to be included in the platform of the United Front. It also insisted on public security laws being rescinded, the elimination of all limitations of civil liberties and general elections at an early date, based on the system of joint candidate lists.

The leaders of the People's League were trying to get included in the draft Constitution all the demands of the Bengal Nationalist Movement, formulated in the "twenty-one points" of the platform of the United Front. The matter of the demands by the Nationalist Movements by the peoples of West Pakistan was more complicated. There were sharp differences of opinion in the People's League on the problem dealing with the attitude of the Party to the administrative unification of West Pakistan. Local organizations of the People's League in Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province attempted to achieve the restoration of the former provinces of West Pakistan. The People's League of the Northwest Frontier Province, headed by Pir Manki Sharif, took active part in the movement for an autonomous Pashtunistan. In East Pakistan the majority of the Party members were sympathetic to the movement for autonomy by the peoples of West Pakistan. However, the Suhrawardi group, depending on the right wing of the Party in East Pakistan and Punjab, did all it could to prevent the speeches by the People's League against the unification of West Pakistan. The leader of the party, Suhrawardi, forbid its members to speak publicly on this problem before the convening of the Special Conference of the West Pakistan People's League. As for for-
eign policy, both local organizations and the central party leaders spoke in favor of Pakistan leaving the British Commonwealth, SEATO and the Baghdad Pact before the party came into power, and for supporting the liberation movement in the countries of Asia and Africa, particularly in Moslem countries, for the development of cultural, economic and political ties with the countries of the socialist camp, for improving relations with India. But even during the discussion at the Constituent Assembly of the question of ties between Pakistan and England, representatives of the People's League, in spite of previous statements by party leaders, voted for Pakistan to remain in the British Commonwealth.

Speeches by leaders of the People's League in Parliament, at meetings and in the press in 1955-1956, that is on the eve of its ascension to power, contained an extremely broad program of bourgeois-democratic reforms. This program assured the People's League of support by various strata of the population, particularly in East Pakistan. The peasants hoped to receive the landlord land without compensation from the People's League. To achieve decreases in rents and taxes, as well as guarantees of the rights of tenants. The workers were promised recognition of their trade unions and a review of wage levels. Handicraft workers, in case the People's League would come to power, could count on economic aid from the state. The members of the Bengali, Sind and Pashtuni Nationalist Movements believed that the People's League, as the governing party, would satisfy their demands. As the political crisis developed in Pakistan, a considerable portion of the representatives of the ruling classes, dissatisfied with the domestic and foreign policy of the government of Choudhary Mohammed Ali, began to place more and more confidence in the People's League. Bourgeois-landlord circles supporting the People's League, considered that this party upon coming to power, would be able to improve the food situation in the country, to secure an expansion of the domestic market and to protect national industry from foreign monopolies. Together with this they hoped that the People's League would succeed in solving the nationalities problem, in smoothing down the class differences and in weathering the political crisis in Pakistan.

Naturally, various elements supporting the People's League had various attitudes towards its political platform, and in the Party itself, extremely heterogeneous in social composition, there was no unity in respect to its basic tactics. The Rightist leadership of the People's League, orienting itself on the bourgeois-landlord circles of East Pakistan, were not at all eager to carry out in toto the
political program endorsed by the Party. Certain democratic slogans of the People's League were considered by it to be only a tactical means in the struggle for power. This was demonstrated by the secret negotiations between Suhrawardi and the leaders of the Moslem League in the summer of 1955, as well as the Party leader's refusal to accept the demand to have Pakistan leave the British Commonwealth. In addition, one might mention the participation of Suhrawardi in 1955, in the government of Mohammed Ali Bohr, where he, as Minister of Justice, carried out the unification of West Pakistan and prepared the draft Constitution, which caused great dissatisfaction among the adherents of the Left Wing of the People's League both in West and East Pakistan. Finally, we should indicate the disagreement between the leaders of the organizations of the People's League and the Northwest Frontier Province and in Sind, and its central leaders due to the administrative unification of West Pakistan.

Nevertheless while the People's League was in the opposition, the internal contradictions and differences of opinion within the Party which reflected the contradictions between those social forces upon which it based itself, were not manifested sharply. However, the situation changed when the leaders of the People's League assumed the reins of government. But before we discuss the domestic policy of the People's League as the ruling Party and compare it with the political platform, thanks to which it came to power, it is necessary to elucidate under what circumstances and conditions the People's League came to power. The People's League came to power under circumstances of a serious political crisis. In the spring and summer of 1956 the dissatisfaction of the masses grew rapidly against domestic and foreign policies of the government of Mohammed Ali. Manifestations of this dissatisfaction were the large-scale strikes, the July march of tenant farmers who were removed from the land in Lahore which found broad response throughout the country, the agitation among the famine-ridden peasants in East Pakistan in August, and, finally, the numerous demands to alter the foreign policy of the government, particularly in respect to Egypt, Algeria and other Moslem countries who were struggling for their national independence. On the other hand, the break-up came of the governing coalition of the Moslem League-United Front which finally discredited itself by drawing up a constitution which progressives in Pakistan characterized as "reactionary and anti-democratic." The headlong decline of the influence of the United Front in East Pakistan and the Moslem League in West Pakistan, the withdrawal of the democratic party "Ganatantri Dal" and the Hindu bourgeois-
landlord parties—the Pakistan National Congress, the United Progressive Party, the Federation of Untouchables from the United Front in January–March 1956: the split in the Moslem League as a result of which the republican party was formed in May, and an increase in the factional struggles among the ruling parties—these were the basic external manifestations of the crisis within the coalition in power. The political crisis was particularly severe in East Pakistan, where as early as July the Provincial Government of Sarkar found itself isolated and maintained power only thanks to the emergency status decreed by the President and the support of Governor Fazlul Hak. On 27 August the opposition party in the Province headed by the People's League organized meetings in all the cities of East Pakistan, as well as demonstrations and hartals under the slogans: "Down with the present government of the Province!" "Get rid of Sarkar and Fazlul Hak!" The participants in the demonstrations demanded an immediate convocation of the Provincial Legislative Assembly. The formation of the People's League government and an improvement in the food situation. On 31 August, after pressure by the mass movement, headed by the People's League, the Provincial Government of Sarkar was forced to resign. For several days negotiations took place in Dacca between the leaders of the various parties and the formation of a new cabinet, The Central Government, the President, the Governor and the Rightist Parties of the Province attempted to form a coalition parliament which would make it possible to retain power in the leaders of the United Front. However, the leaders of the People's League categorically rejected the proposal to form a bloc with the United Front. Considerable influence on the outcome of these negotiations was exerted by the demonstration by hunger-ridden peasants and a general hartal in Dacca, which took place on 3-5 September, as well as the threat by the leaders of the Left Wing of the People's League to organize a campaign of civil disobedience if the Central Government would not increase the import of food into East Pakistan.

On 4 September, after unsuccessful efforts to form a government even with the participation of the United Front, Governor Fazlul Hak officially proposed the formation of a new cabinet to the leader of the parliament faction of the People's League in the Legislative Assembly of the Province, Ataur Rahman Khan. During the first half of September a parliament coalition assumed final shape in East Pakistan, headed by the People's League. This coalition also included the "Ganatantri Dal," the national Congress of Pakistan, the United Progressive Party, the People's Moslem League, the Federation of Untouch-
ables. All of these parties except the "Ganatantri Dal" occupied positions to the right of the People's League. For example, the representatives of the United Progressive Party and the Untouchables Federation in the Constituent Assembly voted together with the Moslem League against agrarian reforms in Pakistan. However, in view of the famine in the Province and the great dissatisfaction on the part of the public with the policies of the government of the Moslem League—United Front, these bourgeois-landlord parties were forced to reckon with the mood of the masses in East Pakistan and form a bloc with the party which had come to power thanks to a broad platform of democratic reforms. In the Provincial Legislative Assembly this bloc had about 200 mandates, 99 of which belonged to the People's League, and 11 to the "Ganatantri Dal." The Rightist opposition (Moslem League and United Front) consisted of 85 to 90 deputies. With such a distribution of power, the bloc of bourgeois-landlord parties with the People's League strengthened the positions of the Suhrawardi-Ataur Rahman Khan group. The Ataur Rahman Khan government was able to find support not only by the Right Wing of the People's League but also by these parties. The Provincial Government of the People's League was even dependent on the Rightist Parties in the coalition, since the People's League—"Ganatantri Dal" group possessed approximately one-third of the seats in the Assembly and in case of necessity could not gain a vote of confidence for the government. The class nature of the government of Ataur Rahman Khan was determined by the fact that it depended on a political coalition of the bourgeois and landowners of East Pakistan, the leading force of which was the People's League. The basis for the formation of this coalition was the dissatisfaction on the part of the various strata of the Bengal bourgeoisie and some of the landowners with the policy of robbery against East Pakistan, which was pursued by the Central Government in 1953-1956, in the interests of the Punjab landowners and groups of big industrial and commercial magnates, close to the leaders of the Moslem League, Ispahani, Walibhai, Adamji, the group of Amin, Anwar, etc. The Bengali bourgeoisie, interested in the creation of more favorable conditions for the development of capitalism in the Province, was not satisfied with the insignificant economic and political concessions it was able to win from the coalition government of Mohammed Ali. It is also necessary to consider the national situation, broadly used by the leaders of the People's League. The growth of the already strong Bengal nationalism was aided by the policy
of the Pakistan government which denied the existence of a Bengal nation, ignored the culture, language and national traditions of the Bengali, and under the banner of a single nation of Pakistan Moslems, carried out discrimination against Bengali in government offices, the army and the police. A characteristic of the bourgeois-landlord party bloc, upon which the People's League Provincial Government depended, consisted in the fact that the industrial bourgeoisie was "poorly" represented. This is explained by the historical peculiarities of the formation of the Bengali national bourgeoisie, in which, as Soviet Indologists have indicated in their works, merchants predominate, often operating as compradors, moneylenders and with ties with the landlords. The Rightist leaders of the East Pakistan People's League from the group of Suhrawardi-Ataur Rahman Khan, had originated in the uppercrust of the Bengal bourgeois intelligentsia, closely joined with these merchants and landlords, a fact which inevitably was expressed in the policies of the Provincial Government and the tactics of party leadership.

The ascension of the People's League to power in East Pakistan made it possible for its leaders to form a new political combination in the Pakistan National Assembly—the People's League-Republican Party. The leaders of the Republican Party expressing primarily the interests of the landlords of West Pakistan, at first wanted to refuse the proposal of Suhrawardi to form a coalition government. The leaders of the Republican Party preferred not to have dealings with the People's League and up to 6-7 September nurtured plans of forming a coalition with the United Front and the Hindu-bourgeois landlord parties of East Pakistan, intended to place Mohammed Ali at the head of the new government. However, it soon became clear that such a combination could not achieve the formation of a stable government in Pakistan, and the leaders of the Republican Party were forced to form an agreement with the People's League to form a coalition government headed by Suhrawardi. The Republican Party did not assume any obligations in respect to the People's League. Speaking at a press conference on 28 September, the General Secretary of the Republican Party, Mir Abdul Kayum, stated that his party... "has no union with the People's League. Dr. Khan Sahib (leader of the Republican Party—author), in accordance with the wishes of the majority in the Party, gave permission only to form a government on principles of equality with the People's League." Abdul Kayum's remark about "basis of equality" did not correspond to reality. In the parliamentary coalition, which supported the government of Suhrawardi, on 14 September 1956, of 52 deputies in the National Assembly
30 were members of the Republican Party, 14—of the People's League, 7—of the Sindhi bourgeois-landlord parties of East Pakistan and 1—of the "Ganatantri Dal." Therefore, the Republican Party directed and controlled the activities of the Suhrawardi government through the parliamentary coalition in the National Assembly. On 29 September Mir Abdul Kayum stated in Lahore: "Mr. Suhrawardi is dependent on us, and we can deprive him of power when we wish." By September 1956 the People's League had become one of the most influential parties not only in East Pakistan but throughout the country. The party leaders were able to make use of the great dissatisfaction on the part of various strata of the population in order to come into power both in the province and in the center of the country. But they received this power in coalition with landlord-bourgeois parties, agreeing to conditions which were deliberately formulated to make agrarian reforms and other important democratic reforms stipulated by the platform of the United Front-East Pakistan People's League impossible.

A question arises: Why did the leaders of the People's League accept a coalition under such disadvantageous conditions? We have no direct statements by Party leaders on that score at our disposal. But, considering the situation forming within the country and the power relationships within the People's League, one can assume that the party leaders were afraid that democratic elements would become stronger within the Party. The Rightist leaders of the People's League undoubtedly thought that by maneuvering between the Republicans and the adherents of the Left Wing of their Party, they would be able to gain concessions from the former in the favor of the bourgeoisie and the landlords of East Pakistan and could prevent an increase of the influence of the latter, maintaining control of the Party in their hands. This supposition is supported by the fact that the representatives of the People's League in the parliament coalition and in the government, supporting the various pretensions of the Bengal bourgeois-landlord circles sought support by the Left Wing of their Party, but when the local organizations of the People's League demanded the incorporation of the promised democratic reforms, radical agrarian reforms, a change in foreign policy, etc., Suhrawardi and his adherents pleaded that they comprised a minority in the parliament coalition and that it was only because of this that the government policies could not always correspond to the goals and wishes of the Party.

As a result the leaders of the People's League in the government and in the National Assembly of Pakistan found themselves in a very complicated and contradictory position in respect to the Left Wing of the Party which
represented its mass basis. On the one hand Suhrawardi's supporters could not and did not want to carry out all the demands of the Leftists, included in the platform of the East Pakistan People's League. On the other hand, they needed constant mass support, the support of the Left Wing of the Party for maintaining their position as the ruling coalition and in order to be in a bargaining position in respect to the landlords of West Pakistan—members of the Republican Party to gain various concessions favoring the bourgeoisie and landlords of East Pakistan. But in the final analysis the coalition with the Republican Party increased the dependence of the policies of the leaders of the people's League on the landlords of West Pakistan and in many respects predetermined the results of these policies.

A Summation of the Domestic Policies of the People's League

Forming a bloc with the landlord parties primarily had a direct expression in the agrarian policy of the leaders of the People's League. When the leaders of the People's League came to power, the landlords who had joined the Republican Party and the Hindu Party of East Pakistan fought tooth and nail against proposals for new agrarian reforms in correspondence with the platform of the United Front—People's League of East Pakistan. In West Pakistan, on the initiative of the leaders of the Republican Party, an "agricultural federation" arose, openly proclaiming as its goal the defense of the interests of landlords and resistance against any attempts to carry out land reforms. In East Pakistan, at the Conference on Agrarian Reforms in Dacca (January 1957), proposals to abolish landlord compensation brought categoric objections by the representatives of the Pakistan National Congress, the People's Moslem League and the Rightists in the People's League itself. The Rightist leaders of the People's League, not wishing to begin open conflict against the landlords, capitulated on the question of carrying out agrarian reforms and, in particular, on the question of compensation. Therefore, after the People's League came to power, there were no changes made in agrarian legislation. The leaders of the People's League even rejected attempts to change the wording of article 15 of the Pakistan Constitution, which gave judicial organs the right to review in each specific case the sum and method of compensation payments for property acquired by the state, a fact which in practice made it possible for landlords to delay into infinity the execution of the 1949 law on the abolition of the Zamindar system in East Pakistan.

It is true that the Provincial Government of Ataur
Rahman Khan attempted to speed up the purchase of Zamindar lands in East Pakistan by the Government. The leaders of the People's League considered that as soon as the Provincial Government would begin to receive the incomes of the feudal land leasers Zamindars and middlemen, the Government would be able to amass sufficient capital to finance various industrial development plans, irrigation and agricultural projects in East Pakistan. Evidently it was due to these considerations that the government of Ataur Rahman Khan, without even waiting for the specific compensation plan to be established for the various land leasers, in the summer of 1957, hastened to announce the transfer to the state of Zamindars lands and Wakfa lands, comprising an area of about 74,4 rupees. However, here also the Rightist leaders of the People's League made a major concession to the landlords, which to a great degree nullified the significance of this operation. Counter to the platform of the United Front, they obligated themselves to pay each year to the landlords one-sixth of the net income before the compensation due to them was determined, that is, until the beginning of purchase payments. When the documents necessary for determining the compensation price in each specific case would be drawn up and verified, nobody knew. The government of East Pakistan refused to name a specific date for completion of this work. If we also consider the increase in expenditures for the tax and administrative apparatus (in view of the fact that the state took over the collection of rents-taxes from the Zamindar lands which had not yet been purchased), it becomes clear that the actual increase in income flowing into the Provincial budget as a result of agrarian reform carried out by the People's League government was not so substantial. The main reason for the bankruptcy of the agrarian policy of the Rightist leaders of the People's League consists in the fact that they, contrary to their previous promises, did nothing to improve the position of the peasantry. The agrarian reform of 1949 in East Pakistan, carried out by the government of Ataur Rahman Khan, did not give the peasants land and did not lead to an extension of their rights, and rents and taxes were not only not decreased as the platform of the United Front demanded, but in many regions, for example, in Silhet, were even increased. In their agrarian policy the leaders of the People's League as the representatives of all parties in power in Pakistan in recent years devoted particular attention to the food situation. The deficit in the country's food balance which had risen as a result of the chronic agricultural crisis, at the moment when the People's League came to power had attained such
alarmed dimensions that the shortage of food products was perhaps the most critical and important problem of all problems faced by the government of Suhrawardi. Up until September 1956 the leaders of the People's League had said much and said it correctly about the fact that in order to overcome the food crisis it was necessary to change the conditions which had engendered it, and the first thing to do would be to carry out radical agrarian reforms. Having become prime minister, Suhrawardi, speaking for his government, solemnly promised to solve the food problem quickly and to decrease prices on food products. However, failing under the pressure of the landlords to carry out agrarian reforms and not creating the conditions necessary for strengthening and developing peasant farming, the coalition government of Suhrawardi was unsuccessful in all its attempts to increase the intensity of agriculture and to solve the food problem throughout the country. Even in East Pakistan where the People's League headed the provincial government and therefore bore particular responsibility before the public for the results of its policy. During the time that the Suhrawardi government was in power, the leaders of the People's League achieved a significant increase in state budget assignments for the development of the agriculture of East Pakistan. Tens of millions of rupees were expended in this Province for various agro-technical measures, irrigation, a so-called campaign to increase food production, dissemination of modern scientific methods of conducting agriculture, import of artificial fertilizers and sale of these fertilizers to the peasantry at decreased prices, etc. The government of the People's League gave massive credits and various advantages to individuals and cooperatives in the Province which were running capitalist farms.

In accord with the platform of the People's League of East Pakistan, the Provincial government formed the Corporation for Jute Trade in December 1956, with a capital sum of 80 million rupees. In the words of Ataur Rahman Khan, the main task of this corporation was the purchase of jute and "protection of the interests of its producers, who previously were exploited due to market price manipulations." However, neither dissemination of modern methods nor advantageous credits could lead to any major improvement in agriculture or liquidate the food prices. Under the agrarian relations existing in the Province, modern methods of farming could attract the interest only of the top stratum of hereditary tenant-rayats and those few landlords who farmed their own land, without leasing it out. In addition, government aid (for example, for fertilizer) had to be paid for with cash, and this was out of the ques-
tion for most of the peasants. Government aid in financing agriculture by loans, credits and in the organization of product marketing was also accessible only to the landlords, the far from numerous rural bourgeoisie and a small part of the peasantry. In spite of the unusually favorable climatic conditions, and the absence in 1956-1957 of the floods which had become customary in the Province, a certain expansion in rice plantings, caused by the price increases for basic food products, East Pakistan ended 1957 with a food balance deficit which amounted to 460,000 tons according to official estimates.59 During the first months after the ascension to power, the leaders of the People's League proposed to cover this deficit partially by importing food from West Pakistan. However, a further aggravation of the agricultural prices and spring typhoons led to a rapid worsening of the food situation even in West Pakistan. As a result Pakistan, the lands of which previously were considered to be the breadbasket of the Indian sub-continent and the agriculture of which employed 75% of the population, was forced in 1957 to import no less than 1.1 million tons of rice a week, that is, almost as much as had been imported in 1956.60

The failure of the attempts to overcome the agricultural crisis and solve the food problem had a negative effect on all aspects of the economic policies of the government of Suhrawardi and placed the People's League as the governing party in a very difficult position. Due to the food crisis, the leaders of the People's League could not fulfill their promise "to prevent famine in East Pakistan and to decrease prices on consumer goods. During 1957 alone about 500,000 tons of rice and wheat were imported to East Pakistan for which the state spent 560,000 rupees.61 Nevertheless the food situation in the Province remained extremely critical and some of its regions were struck by famine. Hashani, taking a trip in April 1957 through the districts of Maimensingh, Bogra, Pabna and Faridpur, said: "... want reigns in this area ... 60% of the rural population can hardly make ends meet, eating low-grade rice with various admixtures. The remaining 35% of the population--small-scale landowning peasants--cannot secure the necessary means for supporting themselves and are going hungry."62 During the period that the People's League was in power, prices for primary consumer goods in Pakistan continued to rise. Average market prices for wheat between May 1956 and May 1957 increased, according to official figures, 4.7% in Dacca, 7.3 in Multan, 9.4 in Karachi, 19.1 in Lyallpur.63 Even the "cost of living indices for industrial workers" published by the government, which,
according to the newspaper the *Pakistan Times*, "do not
give a full picture of the movement of prices in the coun-
try," show that on the average the cost of living for a
worker in Pakistan in April 1957 was 18% higher than in
1948-1949. According to unofficial figures, prices for
food products in Pakistan for 1955-1957 increased from 25
to 575% and the cost of living during the same period rose
in Karachi by 50%, Lahore and Dacca—30, in small cities,
15%.65

All attempts by the government to stop the rise in
prices for primary consumer goods by combatting speculation,
the formation of a special state price bureau, the intro-
duction of a ration system and so-called "price control"
had no effect. For example, in Dacca, due to the shortage
of food and famine, rice sold for 40-45 rupees per mound,66
in spite of the introduction of a "controlled" price—
20 rupees per mound. The rise in the cost of living caused
disappointment on the part of workers, peasants and the
petty bourgeoisie and aggravated the political situation
in the country. It also cut down on the domestic market
for Pakistan industry. In 1956-1957 complaints increased
both by individual business men as well as chambers of com-
merce due to the fact that as a result of price increases
and a drop in the public buying power, they were experienc-
ing more and more difficulty in marketing their products.
Particularly dissatisfied with the results of the agrarian
policy was that part of the national bourgeoisie which was
connected with the production and marketing of consumer
goods and which depends primarily on the domestic market.
The bankruptcy of the agrarian policy of the government of
the People's League shattered the hopes of the Pakistan
bourgeoisie and the party leaders, not only for an expan-
sion of the domestic market. Colossal expenditures for
food imports led to an increased deficit in the Pakistan
balance of payments and an exhaustion to the gold and cash
reserves.68 This compelled the leaders of the People's
League to give up their plans to increase government cap-
ital investment in industry. As early as October 1956 the
state bank and the Ministry of Finance recommended that
the government of Suhrawardi cut down on allocations for
industry due to the increase in food imports to East Paki-
stan.69 In view of this, the government was forced to can-
cel the construction of several enterprises, decrease cap-
ital investments in enterprises already under construction
and review the Five Year Plan for the economic development
of Pakistan for 1955-1950. In accordance with the Five
Year Plan reviewed in April 1957, the total volume of capital
investments was decreased from 11.6 billion rupees to 10.8
Finally, in view of the fact that food imports during the time the People's League was in power had swallowed up two-thirds of all of Pakistan's foreign trade expenditures, the government of Suhrawardi was forced to limit the import of equipment, raw materials and semi-finished products essential for Pakistan's industry. The capitulation of the leaders of the People's League before the landlords on the question of agrarian reforms struck in the final analysis against national industry, threatening a break-down in Pakistan's economic development Five Year plan. No less of an influence on the policies of the government of Suhrawardi in the area of industry and trade was exerted by the Rightists leaders of the People's League who were oriented toward the imperialist SEATO and Baghdad pact blocs and by the position taken by the party leaders in respect to foreign monopolies. Without going into detail on the foreign policy of the Suhrawardi government, which should be the subject of an independent study, it is necessary to note that after the ascension to power, the leaders of the People's League, counter to previous party lines, did nothing to change the foreign policy of Pakistan. The Rightist leaders of the People's League pulled Pakistan even closer to the military bloc imperialist powers. This put an additional obstacle in the path toward achieving economic independence in Pakistan, had a disastrous effect on its economy and heightened the difficulties of creating a national heavy industry. High military expenditures limited the opportunities to finance various plans for the development of Pakistani industry. But the most important thing consisted in the fact that as a consequence of its foreign policy, the Suhrawardi government could not protect national industry from the competition of foreign monopolies.

The tendency toward economic development which, in particular, found its expression in the growing contradictions between the national bourgeoisie and foreign monopolies, aroused the government of Suhrawardi to take certain measures to protect Pakistan trade and industry—the granting of import licenses, establishing of protective tariffs, direct state support of large-scale national, (particularly East Pakistan) capital in foreign trade, shipbuilding, insurance, the jute industry. The same tendency was manifested in the attempts by the Suhrawardi government to change the basic trends in foreign capital export to Pakistan in order to use foreign investments as much as possible for developing industry, primarily heavy
industry. The leaders of the People's League stated many times that they were not about to nationalize any privately owned foreign companies and appealed to foreign investors "not to be afraid" and to increase their capital investments in Pakistan. 73 Hoping to direct these capital investments toward industry, the Suhrawardi government offered foreign and particularly American monopolies even more advantageous conditions for capital investment than the Moslem League government. 74 However, the calculations of the leaders of the People's League on aid from the United States and England to build up the industrial enterprises which were essential for Pakistan's economic independence did not turn out to be justified. It is possible to achieve a change in the trend of foreign investments as the experience of India and Egypt showed, only under conditions of an independent foreign policy, the use of economic ties with countries in the socialist camp, a more consistent protection of the interests of national industry. However, the Rightist leaders of the People's League, depending primarily on the commercial bourgeoisie of East Pakistan, were incapable of fulfilling these conditions. The policies of the People's League-Republican Party coalition led to an increase in economic dependence of Pakistan on imperialist powers, primarily the United States, and even ministers in the Suhrawardi government—Malik Firoz Khan Nun and Sayed Amjad Ali—were compelled to admit this. In the words of Nun, American aid (primarily military and foodstuffs) comprised 40% of the Pakistan budget for 1956-1957. 75 Naturally under such circumstances the Suhrawardi government was powerless whenever the interests of bourgeoisie of Pakistan ran counter to the basic interests of the British and American monopolies. For example, Pakistan representatives attempted at length and unsuccessfully to gain financial and technical aid from the International Reconstruction and Development Bank and from privately owned American firms for building a steel mill in Multan. At the same time as India, thanks to an agreement with the USSR for the construction of a steel mill in Bhilai, had the opportunity to begin construction of two more mills with the aid of British and German firms, the Suhrawardi government could not make any progress in the matter of building a domestic metallurgical base in Pakistan.

The goal pursued by the party leaders—to use foreign capital for developing heavy industry—was not achieved. The basic directions of the export of British and American capital in Pakistan did not change. This was as previously basically the sphere of circulation, agriculture, transport, irrigation and light industry. However, as a consequence
of the definite foreign policy course by the leaders of the People's League and the advantages given to foreign capital by the Suhrawardi government, the positions of foreign monopolies in several branches of the economy became even stronger. Making a transition directly to the policies of the leaders of the People's League in the field of industry and trade, it is necessary first of all to note that its basic tasks, as the party leaders themselves stated, were the creation of more advantageous conditions for capitalist enterprise, the speeding-up of industrial development rates and the "industrialization." of East Pakistan. After the People's League came to power the government offered Pakistani industrialists and merchants all types of advantages in taxes, credits and various forms of government aid. The Pakistani Minister of Finance, Sayed Amjad Ali, once stated in the National Assembly that his government "was trying to aid the middle-classes as much as this was in their power to do." With this aim the government established an advantageous income tax for capitalist entrepreneurs receiving between 5,000 and 12,000 rupees annual income. The sum of annual income exempt from taxation was increased from 4,500 to 5,000 rupees "to the advantage of the middle-class." In addition, the Suhrawardi government exempted from taxes 10% of industrial investments "belonging to representatives of the middle-class" who were stockholders. Industrialists and contractors were also exempted from income tax, who were employed in the production of construction materials for private enterprises, housing and various government buildings. The Suhrawardi government took measures to offer credit on favorable terms to industrialists, setting up an industrial credit bank with the aid of private capital ("Industrial Credit and Investment Company of Pakistan"). The economic policy of the People's League leaders was criticized constantly from the Right, by representatives of the various landlord parties and organizations (People's Muslim League, "Nizam-i-islam," "Agricultural Federation"), who asserted that this policy corresponded more to the interests of the capitalists than the landlords.

With the cooperation of the representatives of the People's League and the government and parliament, the Pakistan bourgeoisie was able to secure a certain extension of its rights, primarily in the area of local self-government and economic management. In view of this, we should also note measures such as budget increases and increase in the authorities of district bureaus and municipalities in East Pakistan, the reorganization of chambers of commerce and industry in the summer of 1957, the broadening of the representation of the Pakistan bourgeoisie in
various government departments, the formation of new government organs—an economic council, provincial planning bureaus, government corporations, banks, etc. The basically bourgeois nature of the People's League was manifested in other aspects of its domestic policy. For example, the reform of the educational system carried out by Ataur Rahman Khan in East Pakistan in accordance with the platform of the United Front, had as its goal the admission to college of members of the petty and middle bourgeoisie and an improvement in the training of technical cadres essential for the development of industry in this province.80

The leaders of the People's League did much especially for the bourgeoisie of East Pakistan. Coming to power, the leaders of this party achieved a revision in the Five Year Plan for the economic development of Pakistan in the interests of the Bengali bourgeoisie and landowners. The portion of East Pakistan in total government capital investments in industry and transport was increased considerably. But perhaps the ties between the economic course taken by the government parties and the interests of certain groups of Pakistan bourgeoisie and landowners was manifested most lucidly in the import policy of the Suhrawardi government. Soon after the People's League came to power, its leaders announced a "new policy" in imports, whereby particular attention would be devoted to the needs of East Pakistan. With the general decrease in industrial imports, the portion of East Pakistan in total imports increased both relatively and absolutely.81 The merchants and industrialists of East Pakistan gained the most from the redistribution of import licenses carried out by the Suhrawardi government, and in West Pakistan—certain big business men in Karachi, as well as entrepreneurs, merchants and government contractors from large landowner circles and the tribal aristocracy of the Northwest Frontier Province, Sind, Bahawalpur, and having close ties with the leaders of the Republican Party. However, the leaders of the People's League were not able to reach a solution of those tasks which they had assumed. Without carrying out agrarian reforms or changing foreign policy, it was impossible to create more suitable conditions for capitalist enterprise and to speed up the rate of industrial development. Instead of an upswing in the rate of industrial development in Pakistan, during the People's League stay in power the first general drop in the level of industrial production took place, beginning in 1948. The results of the policies of the leaders of the People's League in the area of industry and trade shattered all the hopes of the leaders of this party and caused disillusionment on the part of a considerable portion of the Pakistan bourgeoisie. The mouth-
The leaders of the People's League were not able to solve the tasks faced by them in the field of agriculture and in the field of industry and trade. During the period the Suhrawardi government was in power, the economic situation in Pakistan became even worse, and was expressed in an intensification of the food crisis, the drop in industrial production, the disorganization of state finances. The party of the Rightist opposition and, pri-
marily, the Moslem League and the "Krishak shramik" attempted to shove all the responsibility for this over to the People's League. Certain members of the bourgeoisie and landlord class who were "injured" by the Suhrwardi government viewed as the main reason for the crash its economic policy in the redistribution of import licenses, defective planning, corruption, etc. All of this actually did take place and was evident in the results of the activities of the leaders of the People's League. However, the decisive role, as democratic public opinion in Pakistan noted, was played by the fact that the economic policies of the leaders of the People's League actually differed little from the policies pursued up to September 1956 by the party of the landlords and Pakistan powerful bourgeoisie—the Moslem League and the "Krishak shramik." This policy aroused strong dissatisfaction in Pakistan and became one of the main reasons for the crisis in the People's League. The policy of the Rightist leaders of the People's League on the nationalities question led to equally serious consequences. The nationalities question is particularly significant for the People's League, for, as we have mentioned, this party was able to secure mass support and come to power to a great degree due to the participation of its provincial organizations in the nationalist movements of the Bengali, Sindhi and Pashtun. We should note that these movements, headed by the nationalist bourgeoisie of the peoples of Pakistan, are of a dual nature. On the one hand they are directed against national discrimination and therefore have a general democratic content. On the other hand they reflect the differences between the various nationalist bourgeoisie landlord factions and make use of them in the struggle for state power.

Before the formation of the Suhrwardi government in Pakistan a landlord and allied Punjab bourgeoisie bloc reigned. The representatives of this bloc controlled the Pakistan apparatus of state and had seized the majority of the most important civil and military posts. The Punjab landlords and entrepreneurs used their power in order to secure for themselves various economic advantages and privileges, in respect to the budget, tariffs, non-budget financing, import policy, etc. The interests of the landlords and merchants of Punjab were represented more consistently by the so-called Lahore Moslem League group, which came to power in this party in 1954. During the time the Lahore faction was in power, the government of Pakistan carried out repressions against the members of nationalist movements and carried through the administrative unification of West Pakistan. The policy of the Lahore faction on the national question was supported by the top
bourgeois stratum in Pakistan. The majority of the big financiers, merchants and industrialists came to Pakistan from India after the partition and settled in Karachi and Punjab, where conditions were more suitable for capitalist enterprise. Therefore, the top stratum of the Pakistan bourgeoisie was interested in increasing the inequality of economic development of the various areas of Pakistan, in transforming East Bengal and, to a certain degree, Sind, into purely agrarian regions, in order to obtain foreign currency which was essential for the industrial development of Punjab and Karachi. In addition, the consolidation in East Pakistan, Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province of the petty and middle bourgeoisie, which was endeavoring to make use of British provincial autonomy in order to strengthen its economic and political positions, ran counter to the interests of the merchant-industrial magnates, who had close ties with the leaders of the Moslem League. The ideological weapon of the Moslem League in its fight against the nationalist movements was the "two nation theory." The coming of the People's League to power meant the failure of the attempts by the Punjab landlords and upper bourgeoisie of Pakistan to use repressions in order to stop the development of the nationalist movements. In addition it testified to the flimsiness of the "two nation theory."

A task arose before the People's League as an all-Pakistan Party, but at the same time representing various nationalist movements—Bengal, Sind, Pashtunia—to find the right approach to the solution of the nationalities question in order to assure the most favorable conditions for the development of the economy and culture for the peoples of Pakistan and to stabilize the political situation in the country. The members of the nationalist movements placed great hopes on the People's League, considering that it as the governing party would satisfy all of their basic demands, and primarily, the demand to form autonomous linguistic provinces in West Pakistan and to increase the autonomy of East Pakistan. Two basic tendencies were noted in the nationalist policy of the People's League as early as the eve of its ascendency to power. The representatives of the Left Wing of the Party, in spite of the nationalistic speeches of several of its leaders, devoted basic attention to the overall democratic demands of the nationalist movements, to the fight against national discrimination and provincial inequality. Demanding broad autonomy for their province, the recognition of their national language, they were sympathetic to the nationalist movements of other peoples of Pakistan. The position of the Left Wing of the party in the nationalities
question was close in many respects to the line of the bourgeois democratic party "Azad Pakistan," and subsequently to the line of the Pakistan National Party.

As for the People's League leaders from the Suhravardi group, in their national policy, they were guided primarily by the interests of the Bengal bourgeoisie, endeavoring to secure for it various economic and political advantages and privileges and to secure the East Pakistan market for it. After the formation of the Suhravardi government, the leaders of the People's League gained several important economic and political concessions from the Republican Party to the advantage of the bourgeoisie and landlords of East Pakistan. Among these we should first indicate the redistribution of government appropriations and import licenses, an expansion of the provincial autonomy in those economic questions which were within the direct sphere of interest of the Bengal bourgeoisie, a greater drawing of Bengalis from the property classes to civil and military service. In addition, in accordance with the platform of the United Front—People's League of East Pakistan, the government of Ataur Rahman Khan promulgated a law on the use of Bengali as an official language in the province and formed conditions for the development of Bengali literature, moving pictures, radio. However, in view of the strong resistance by the landlords and the upper bourgeoisie of West Pakistan, the leaders of the People's League could not meet two basic demands of the Bengali nationalist movement: they could not achieve "complete regional autonomy for East Pakistan" and abolish discrimination of Bengalis in the apparatus of government.

The concessions which the leaders of the People's League were able to wring away from the Republican Party were to the liking of the landlords and upper bourgeoisie of East Pakistan, but they did not satisfy the majority of participants in the Bengali nationalist movement, including a majority of the provincial organization of the party. Therefore, the Left Wing of the East Pakistan People's League continued to insist on the immediate satisfaction of all the demands of the Bengali nationalist movement, and in April 1957, organized within the province "a week of struggle for complete regional autonomy," accompanied by numerous hartals, meetings and demonstrations. On 2 April 1957, at the initiative of the leaders of the democratic wing of the People's League, the provincial legislative assembly passed a resolution which demanded immediate and full autonomy for East Pakistan. Only foreign relations and questions concerning armed forces and currency were to be left within the competence of the central
government. The demands of the Left Wing of the People's League of East Pakistan and, in particular, the resolution of the Provincial Legislative Assembly, threatened the government coalition with disaster. The Rightist Parties of West Pakistan—the Republican, Moslem League, "Jamiat-i-Islami" and others, as well as many non-party politicians including President Iskandar Mirza, asserted that this resolution "presents a great danger not only for the unity, but for the very existence of Pakistan," directed against its ideology and supposedly a maneuver by the Communists.

The crisis of the Suhrawardi government came to a head. The Rightist leaders of the People's League, for the sake of preserving power, and the coalition with the Republicans and in general with the upper bourgeoisie and landlords of West Pakistan, preferred to capitulate and give up attempts to implement the Resolution of the Provincial Legislative Assembly on autonomy for East Bengal, as well as corresponding Resolutions by the Party. The refusal of Suhrawardi and his followers to struggle for regional autonomy for East Pakistan, that is, in the words of Bhashani, the main plank in the platform of the United Front, caused sharp dissent in the provincial organization of the People's League. Bhashani made a statement in the press that the position taken by Suhrawardi in this question was contrary to the Program and will of the Party. In the final analysis the dissatisfaction of the majority of members of the People's League of East Pakistan with the policies of its Rightists leaders in the nationalities question served as one of the main reasons for the crisis and schism in the party organization in this Province. The policy of the leaders of the National People's League in West Pakistan led to the same result. Two or 3 months after the formation of the Suhrawardi government sharp differences arose in the organizations of the West Pakistan People's League, between the supporters and opponents of the administrative unification of this part of the country. The party organizations in Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province supported the plan of forming in West Pakistan a zonal Federation of Linguistic Autonomous Provinces, and contrary to the instructions of the party leader, Suhrawardi, continued to remain in the "Front for the struggle against the unification of West Pakistan." Supporters of administrative unity in the Province comprised a minority in the People's League and occupied a more or less firm position only in its Punjab organization, but the landlords, merchants and industrialists of Punjab stood behind them, as well as almost the entire bourgeoisie of Pakistan. All Islam parties and organizations, the Republican Party, a considerable number of members and leaders of the Moslem League, the majority of
officers and government functionaries came out against autonomy for the peoples of West Pakistan. Finally the supporters for the unification of West Pakistan made use of external aid and support, primarily from the United States, which was stated frankly by several Pakistan politicians, including Suhrawardi. A dilemma arose before the central leaders of the People's Party: either allow the party to advocate the autonomy of linguistic provinces in West Pakistan and, consequently, make a break with the Republicans, lose power and be deprived of the opportunity to form a bloc with the parties of Punjab landlords and the upper bourgeoisie of Pakistan, or make a split in the People's League and lose the support of the Nationalist movements of West Pakistan. The leaders of the Right Wing would not agree to do the first, and they did not wish to do the second. Therefore Suhrawardi, without coming openly for or against the administrative unification of West Pakistan, did everything he could to hinder the participation of his party's provincial organizations in the Sind and Pushtuni Nationalist movements.

However, this tactic, as might be expected, ended in failure. Suhrawardi and his supporters were not able to block the development of nationalist movements, nor were they able to stop the activities of the People's League organizations of the Northwest Frontier Province and Sind against the administrative unification of West Pakistan. Various maneuvers undertaken by Suhrawardi and his supporters served only to discredit them and hasten the party split. In March 1957, after Suhrawardi was forced to come out openly for maintaining the administrative structure of West Pakistan, in view of the growing movement for autonomous linguistic provinces and the governmental crisis in West Pakistan, the People's League lost the support of the Nationalist movements and mass support in this section of the country. The People's League as the party in power was not able to solve the nationalities problem in Pakistan. The Rightist Party leaders, governed chiefly by the interests of the top stratum of the Bengali bourgeoisie, turned out to be incapable of leading the struggle of the people of Pakistan for national equality and provincial autonomy. Both in East and West Pakistan the policies of the Suhrawardi government caused the disenchantment of the participants in the nationalist movements (including the majority of the petty and middle bourgeoisie). As a result the People's League lost its support. Beginning with the Spring of 1957 the Nationalist movements of the people's of Pakistan developed in spite of and in opposition to the People's League, which was one of the main reasons for the fall of the Suhrawardi government.
Split in the People's League and Fall of the Suhrawardi Government

Being in power for more than a year, the government of the People's League did not carry out the promised democratic reforms. Even from the viewpoint of a considerable part of the national bourgeoisie, the People's League had been incapable of solving those tasks of domestic and foreign policy which had been placed before it as the party in power in Pakistan. The result of this was an increase in differences within the Party, and as early as January 1957 the Pakistan press began to write more and more frequently of the "crisis within the People's League." In the opinion of the Pakistan Times, the main reason for this crisis was the "difference between the policies of the leaders of the People's League and the basic principles of the Party." The crisis of the People's League was manifested in the loss of support of the masses, the loss of support by the majority of the national bourgeoisie, an increase in differences of opinion within the Party, which led to its split and, finally, the refusal of the Suhrawardi government to use the methods of bourgeois parliamentarianism and more and more frequent attempts to settle internal differences in Pakistan with police repressions. The failure to carry out agrarian reforms led to the disenchantment of the peasantry, which had hoped that the People's League would give them land. A part of the workers, who were supporters of the Party, did not expect from it only "Islam Socialism" but an improvement in the workers' position. Handicraft workers did not receive that economic aid from the state which was considered so essential in the platform of the United Front-East Pakistan People's League.

In addition, the state of the masses in 1956-1957 had grown worse due to the food prices and price increases for primary consumer goods. Famine was rampant in East Pakistan. Tenant farmers were still being driven from the land in West Pakistan. The economic policy of the Suhrawardi government led to a decrease in industrial production and an increase in unemployment. As has been mentioned, the People's League was unsuccessful in its policy on the nationalities question, as a result of which it lost the support of the Nationalist movements of the people of Pakistan. The great dissatisfaction on the part of the various strata of the population was also caused by the foreign policy of the Suhrawardi government, which ran counter to the official line which the Party had maintained until September 1956. In the final analysis the People's League lost the support of the masses. In spite of the attempts made by the Rightist Party leaders beginning in the
Spring of 1957, the labor movement became more powerful in Pakistan. In many regions of Punjab and East Pakistan, in the former Amb principality and other areas, peasant demonstrations took place. Trade unions, peasant and student organizations which had previously been under the influence of the People's League, began to criticize more and more frequently the domestic and foreign policies of the Sukrawardi government. In 1957 the People's League lost the support of a considerable portion of the national bourgeoisie of Pakistan—that class which was its primary source of support. The change in the attitude of the national bourgeoisie of Pakistan toward the People's League was manifested in sharp criticism of the policies of its central leaders by chambers of commerce and industry, various associations and unions of capitalist entrepreneurs.

During the course of 1957 many industrialists and merchants left the People's League for other parties. Some of them had formerly occupied prominent positions in the party. For example, the People's League lost the owner of several Punjab transportation companies, Sheikh Hisa-muddin, who at one time was a member of the organization committee of its provincial organization in West Pakistan. One of the major manifestations of the crisis in the People's League was the increase in inner-party differences and factional strife within it. We should discuss this in a little more detail, since it was the inner-party struggle which led to the consolidation of the Left forces of the People's League and the exposure of the basic differences between the Democratic elements and the supporters of Sukrawardi in the party. The differences began due to foreign policy, because it was in this area that it became clear before anything else that the Rightist leaders of the People's League did not intend to fulfill their previous promises. Meeting growing opposition within the Party, Sukrawardi and his supporters worked out a plan to reorganize the People's League with the aim of subjugating it to their influence and isolating the most popular leaders of its Left Wing.

The implementation of this plan was connected with systematic violations of internal party democracy and various intrigues. The General Secretary of the West Pakistan People's League, Usmani, was thrown out of the party, for he sharply criticized the foreign policy of the Sukrawardi government and demanded that Pakistan withdraw from all military blocs. The election organs of the People's League in West Pakistan were dissolved. After the session of the working committee of the People's League, which took place on 7-9 January 1957 in Karachi, differences increased on various organizational questions. The main reason for this, according to the apt definition of the former Secretary of the provincial Sind
party organization, Kazi Faiz Mohammed, consisted in the fact that Suhrawardi was running the People's League like a dictatorships, and feared that the party would become more mass in nature. 91 Beginning in February 1957, differences on the nationalities question moved to the forefront. Provincial party organizations in East Pakistan, Sind and the Northwest Frontier Province spoke out against the nationalities policy of the central party leaders. Finally, in the Spring and Summer, the struggle within the party extended to all basic problems of the Government's domestic policy. The leaders of the Left Wing and local organizations of the People's League demanded that the central government carry out the promised reforms, primarily agrarian reforms, effective measures for combatting the high cost of living, a solution to the food problem, economic aid to the peasantry and artisans, a change in the import policy, general elections, etc.

Besides the complaints against the party leaders which were common for the entire democratizing wing, we might mention the demands which are characteristic only for certain of its organizations. In the Resolutions of the Sind People's League working committee, particular attention was devoted toward protecting the interests of small-scale tenant farmers. Various district organizations of the party in Sind and Punjab stressed the necessity of changing the import policy and state aid to small-scale industry, particularly the production of products of artificial silk. 92 President of the East Pakistan People's League, Bhashani, demanded the position of the Bengali peasantry to be improved. As for urban artisans, small-scale merchants and industrialists in East Bengal, the party "Ganatantri Dal" took up the defense of their interests. 93

One should consider that many Left Wing leaders, in criticizing the economic policies of the central leaders of the party, pursued the aim of gaining the support of the masses in the struggle which developed in the Spring of 1957 in the People's League on the nationalities question. For example, in all public speeches by Bhashani, public welfare and social justice were always joined with the slogan "full regional autonomy for East Pakistan." 94 Bhashani himself stated subsequently that his basic differences with Suhrawardi were connected with foreign policy and with the question dealing with the autonomy of East Pakistan. 95 In the struggle against the democratic wing of the party, the Rightist leaders of the People's League began to seek support more and more openly from the landlords and upper merchant bourgeoisie. In order to consolidate their position, they attempted to draw them into the party, using the so-called campaign to recruit new members which was organized in the spring of 1957. During this campaign the Rightist leaders
of the People's League bribed their new supporters with money, import licenses as well as various privileges and advantages to commercial and transportation companies. The fact that landlords were joining the party caused great dissatisfaction among its rank and file members, particularly in those organizations which had many peasants as members. For example, on 21 May 500 persons left the People's League of Sind at one time and transferred to the National Party. In the words of the former Secretary of this Provincial organization of the People's League, Kazi Faiz Mohammed, one of the main reasons causing him to leave the party was the fact that "Mr. Suhrwardi's people chased after the Jagirdars to draw them into the People's League." 96 In April 1957 when a fierce struggle was going on for leadership in the Bengal provincial party organization, Suhrwardi and Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman proposed to join the People's League with the party of landlords and wealthy merchants of East Pakistan, "Krishak shramik" and with the Republican Party. The development of internal party differences and the drawing of the central leaders of the People's League toward the Rightist parties led to a consolidation of the democratic elements in the League. This is testified to by the trip taken by Bhashani in April to West Pakistan, where he conducted negotiations with leaders of the Left Wing of the local People's League organizations and leaders of the National Party. As a result of these negotiations direct contact was established between the leaders of the Left Wing and the People's League in both parts of the country and the idea arose to convene a conference of all democratic political figures in Pakistan in July 1957.

In the internal party struggle the supporters of Suhrwardi sought allies among the landowners, wealthy merchants and their parties, the leaders of the Left Wing of the People's League attempted to gain the support of peasant organizations, trade unions and the radical youth. Characteristic in this respect are the speeches by Bhashani and Ali Ahad, Secretary of the East Pakistan People's League on organizational questions, at meetings and gatherings of peasants, workers, students, members of the Youth League; the attempt by Bhashani to form a peasant party at the North Bengal Peasant's Conference which took place on 18-19 May in Bogra; the "week of struggle for lowering prices in East Pakistan," which was organized by the leaders of the Left Wing, as well as the 7-day hunger strike by Bhashani as a sign of protest against the failure of the food policy of the government, and "lack of attention by it to the needs of the peasants." 97 The struggle between the Leftists and the Rightists in the People's League developed
in the following manner: In the West Pakistan People's League, the Rightists gained ascendency over the democratic forces, and as a result of the so-called reorganization of the Party they were enabled to seize key positions in the majority of its provincial and district committees. Some of those dissatisfied with the policies and tactics of the central leaders transferred from the People's League to the National Party. Some local organizations, including the entire Provincial organization of the Northwest Frontier Province, refused to bow before Suhrawardi and his henchmen.

In the People's League of East Pakistan, where the Left Wing was more powerful and influential, the struggle was fierce and swung constantly one way and the other. The February session of the East Pakistan People's League council in Kagmari, in spite of all intrigues by the Rightists, ended in defeat for Suhrawardi and his supporters. The resolutions passed by the council censured the participation of Pakistan in military blocs and contained a demand to give full regional autonomy to East Bengal. On Bhashani's proposal, the council also threatened with disciplinary action (up to expulsion from the Party) those ministers and deputies of the National Assembly from the East Pakistan People's League who would not carry out its decisions. The Rightist leaders did not follow these resolutions and attempted to remove from the leadership of the East Pakistan People's League all those who actively fought the reactionary course of Suhrawardi in domestic and foreign policy. Suhrawardi, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and Ataur Rahman Khan, by means of behind-the-scenes intrigues, obtained the expulsion from the party of one of the leaders of its Left Wing, Ali Ahad, and withdrawal from the East Bengal provincial organization working committee of 9 supporters of Bhashani.

On 17 May 1957 on the eve of the session of the Baghdad Pact Council in Karachi, Suhrawardi publicly accused Bhashani of aiding the enemies of Pakistan and hinted that he was a paid agent of India. This statement served as a signal for a smear campaign against the Left Wingers of the People's League, which was taken up in the newspapers with close connections to the central leaders, as well as connections with the Rightist parties. According to the Indian newspaper, Delhi Times, during the session of the Baghdad Pact Council which took place on 2-6 June in Karachi, representatives of the United States and Great Britain -- Henderson and Lloyd -- "recommended that Suhrawardi take repressive action against the Left Wing of the People's League." After this the Rightists in the People's League went over to the attack against the democratic wing.
of their party. A decisive clash between the Leftists and the Rightists took place at the Plenum of the East Pakistan People's League Council in Dacca on 13-14 June. At the moment the session in Dacca convened the Rightists were successful in seizing the most important posts in the party apparatus of the East Pakistan People's League. This made it possible for Suhrawardi and the general secretary of the provincial organization, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman, under various excuses, to exclude from the session many council members who were supporters of the Left Wing. The most popular leader of the Leftists, Bhashani, was in the hospital. Many persons were planted at the council sessions, who were not members of the council, but who nevertheless voted for the resolutions of the Rightist leaders. Under pressure by Suhrawardi, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman and Ataur Rahman Khan, the council passed five important resolutions directed against the Party's Left Wing. 1. On endorsing Suhrawardi's foreign policy. 2. On endorsing the food policy of the provincial government of Ataur Rahman Khan. 3. On forming a People's League parliament faction office in the East Pakistan legislative assembly. (From that moment on the activities of the parliamentary faction of the People's League were directed not by the council of its provincial organization as previously, but by this office, which included only supporters of Suhrawardi.) 4. On ratifying the report given by Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahman on organizational questions and on the expulsion of Ali Ahad from the Party. 5. On the immediate withdrawal of all Party members from the Youth League. "The organization of progressive youth of East Pakistan, the Youth League, worked from the moment of its formation in 1949 closely with the Left Wing of the People's League. Suhrawardi, at a council session in Kagmari, attempted to isolate the Bhashani group from the Youth League and split up the Left Wing of the East Bengal Party organization, but at that time his attempts met with failure."

On the whole the results of the People's League council session in Dacca was viewed by the Pakistan press as a major victory of the Rightists over the democratic forces in the Party. However, this was a "Pyrrhic victory." It led to a split in the East Pakistan People's League, and the Party lost, together with Bhashani and his supporters, the Youth League, peasant organizations and trade unions. The People's League "adjusted to the Right," became more obedient and easy to manipulate for Suhrawardi and Ataur Rahman Khan, but it was deprived of its mass support in East Pakistan. The loss of the mass support weakened the position of its Rightist leaders in the coalition government in the Pakistan National Assembly. Along with this,
the East Pakistan People's League council session in Dacca split up the consolidation of the country's progressive forces. After Dacca all active People's League members who were actually interested in carrying out its political program realized that the party leaders were not going to carry out their former promises. On 14 June, that is, on the day the session ended, Bhashani sent a telegram to Usmani with the request to come immediately to Dacca together with Pir Manki Sharif and leaders of the National Party Mian Irtiharuddin and G. M. Sayed to discuss the new turn of events. These negotiations, which took place in the hospital, where Bhashani was staying, resulted in an agreement that on 25-26 July in Dacca an all-party democratic conference would convene, which would "work out a course of action having as its goal the formation of a new party." The decision to mobilize all progressive elements in both parts of Pakistan at the All-Party Conference was achieved by the leaders after they discussed all facets of the possibility of uniting the progressive forces of both sections of the country on a common platform, and the joint statement issued by the participants of the negotiations stated.

After the East Pakistan People's League council session in Dacca, the party disagreements went into the final and culminating phase. In view of the beginning preparations for the All-Pakistan democratic conference a clear-cut delineation of forces took place between the Right Wing and the Leftists in the People's League. The majority of local organizations of the People's League, as well as the National Party, "Ganatantri Dal" and all progressive civic leaders in Pakistan greeted the convocation of this conference and took active part in preparations for it. At the same time the Rightist leaders of the People's League refused to participate in the democratic conference, and their newspaper Ittefak, printed in Dacca, began to print regular articles and caricatures with slanderous attacks against the conference and its organizers. It is characteristic that the same position in reference to the conference was taken by all the Rightist Parties of Pakistan — the Moslem League, Republican Party, "Krishak shram-ik", "Nizam-i-Islam," — independent of whether they supported the government or were in the opposition. The democratic conference, which took place in Dacca on 25-26 July, proclaimed the formation of a National People's Party, which united all of the country's progressive forces. It also included the entire Left Wing of the People's League. The formation of a new party and a more clear-cut delineation of political forces in the country had other, very important consequences for the People's League. First of all, the
split in the People's League and the new membership of a large number of landlords and wealthy merchants led to a change in the social break-down of this party. The League became bourgeoisie-landowner in composition, and ceased to differ greatly in nature and tactics from such Rightist parties as the "kirshak shramik." The split undermined the influence of the People's League, particularly in Sind, the Northwest Frontier Province and East Pakistan, where many of its local organizations joined the National People's Party en masse.

At the same time there was a more obvious list to the right in the domestic policy of the leaders of the People's League. Beginning in May 1957, both the Central government of Suhrawardi and the provincial government of Ataur Rahman Khan, attempting to remain in power, began to make use of large-scale police repression against the democratic movement. The main blow was directed against the National People's Party and the trade unions. Hundreds of leaders of local organizations of this party and active participants in the labor movement were arrested, exiled from those cities where they had been residing, deprived of passports, limited in right of movement. The secret police, on the orders of Suhrawardi, set up constant surveillance of Bhashani, Ali Ahad and other former leaders of the Left Wing of the People's League, who had now become leaders of the National People's Party in East Pakistan. The newspaper Ittehad, which was published in Dacca, asserted that "in certain circles of the party in power, the People's League, a plot has been hatched to murder Maulyana Bhashani, president of the National People's Party." In order to facilitate the struggle against the democratic movement, the Suhrawardi government and Pakistan's President, Iskander Mirza, were successful in extending until April 1958, the law on public security, on the basis of which the Federal police could arrest and detain in prison without trial any Pakistan citizen. In addition, in August 1957, when the position of the People's League government in East Pakistan became unstable, certain leaders of this Party attempted to restore the provincial law on public security which had been rescinded in October 1956, in order to hinder the formation of local National People's Party committees with its aid. With the same goal, certain districts in East Pakistan were placed under martial law and freedom of assembly was rescinded at the same time as conferences of local national People's Party organizations were to convene.

Not satisfied with this, the leaders of the People's League organized a series of provocations in July-October 1957, directed against the supporters of the National People's Party, as well as beatings and murders of its party.
workers and active participants of the trade union movement in Pakistan. The transition by the leaders of the People's League to a policy of mass police repressions and terrorist acts against the democratic movement is a multiple phenomenon. As has been mentioned, the People's League came to power with slogans of democratizing the government structure and political life in the country. During the first months in power the People's League government did something in these respects in East Pakistan. A provincial law on public security was rescinded, about 80 political prisoners were set free, local self-government was expanded, a system of joint candidate lists for parliamentary elections was introduced instead of the former religious-communal election curias. Until approximately April-May 1957, the government of the People's League conducted a more liberal policy than the Moslem League government in respect to the labor and peasant movement.

The question arises as to what caused this? Some measures taken by the People's League government and particularly its pre-election promises can be explained by pressure by democratic elements in the party on the central leaders. One may also note that numerous appeals by the Rightist Party leaders to "defend democracy" were common tactical maneuvers designed for acquiring political capital, a maneuver which the leaders of the People's League cleverly used in the struggle against their political opponents. However, this is not all. Constant statements, even by the Party's Rightist leaders on the necessity of developing democracy and expanding political liberties reflected definite political strivings by the forming Pakistan bourgeoisie. Dissatisfaction grew among the petty and middle bourgeoisie against that monopoly on power which belonged to the bloc of landlords and big capitalist businessmen. In view of this, the differences increased and the struggle grew graver between the bourgeoisie and landlords for power, as well as between the various groups within the Pakistan bourgeoisie. In addition, certain representatives of the ruling classes believed that in order to strengthen their political position in the country and to hinder the growth of the labor and peasant movement it was necessary to carry out a more flexible policy than that which had been pursued by the Moslem League government up to 1956.

The democratic slogans proclaimed by the People's League, intended for the Party's Left Wing and the peasants, workers, petty bourgeoisie and radical intelligentsia which supported it, were often joined with Utopian conceptions of the people's sovereignty and even of socialism, while the Rightist leaders such as Suhrawardi saw in bourgeoisie parliamentarian democracy the best means for playing down
class differences and extending the political power of the
Pakistan bourgeoisie. The Leftist leaders of the People's
League were ardent supporters of the British parliamentary
system, which opened up broad opportunities for political
swindling of the masses. However, attempts by the leaders
of the People's League to strengthen their positions with
the aid of the methods of bourgeois parliamentarianism, to
use the democratic movement in the interest of the Bengal
commercial bourgeoisie; and to obtain an alleviation in
the class struggle by preaching socialism and increased
opportunism in the labor movement, failed completely. The
policy of the People's League as the party in power led
to a general worsening of the country's economic situation;
to an aggravation of all internal differences in Pakistan,
and, primarily, class differences. This caused a change in
the methods of exercising power by the People's League gov-
ernment. The leaders of the People's League were stripped
of the opportunity to mask themselves with bourgeois demo-
cratic freedoms and began to use methods against the grow-
ing democratic movement which in Pakistan itself were char-
acterized as dictatorial and even fascist. 112

This utterly discredited the People's League in the
eyes of the masses and undermined its influence even more.
At the same time the change in the methods of exercising
power testified to the crisis in the People's League and
the coalition of bourgeois-landlord powers which were in
power at that time in Pakistan. The aggravation of the
political crisis in the Spring and Summer of 1957 was ex-
pressed in the feverish attempts by the leaders of the
People's League and the Republican Party to strengthen the
position of their government by forming a bloc with parties
of the Rightist opposition (this was the direction taken by
the negotiations in the Summer of 1957 between the People's
League, the Republican Party, the Moslem League, "krishak
shramik," "Nizam-i-islam," and President Iskander Mirza). 113

The lengthy (from March to July 1957) crisis in the Repub-
ilic Provincial government and the presidential adminis-
tration in West Pakistan testified to the development of
the political crisis, as well as the introduction of mar-
tial law in East Pakistan after the democratic conference
in Dacca, the removal of I. A. Gurnani from the position of
governor of West Pakistan, attempts by the leaders of the
People's League to appoint one of their supporters as gov-
ernor of East Pakistan instead of Fazlul Hak (former pres-
ident of the "Krishak shramik"). 114 In view of this,
President Iskander Mirza and certain leaders of the Repub-
lican Party and the Moslem League, with the aim of strength-
ening the dictatorship of the landlord and upper bourgeoisie
bloc which was ruling in Pakistan, began to seek a way out by
changing the existing constitution and governmental structure. At the end of March 1957 Iskander Mirza proposed that the existing system of governmental structure be replaced with "presidential administration of the American type." The sense of this proposal consisted in extending the authorities of the President at the expense of the rights of the parliament, in creating a situation whereby the government would not be responsible to parliament but to the President, that is, a centralization of power. This proposal received support from a considerable number of army officers and government functionaries, as well as by certain big financiers from the Republican Party and the Moslem League. On 25 March the organization "Congress for the struggle for a presidential government" was formed which began to be active in both parts of Pakistan. Its members demanded that the President be granted the right to disperse provincial legislative assemblies at his own discretion. In August 1957 the leader of the Republican Party, Khan Sahib, proposed a plan to form in Pakistan a "Revolutionary council" to govern the country for five years and at the same time to dissolve all political parties and organizations. Finally, among the landlord-members of the Republican Party there were supporters of the restoration of the monarchy in Pakistan, offering the crown to the "strongman" -- Iskander Mirza. On 17 September 1957 Republican Pirzada Shahnawaz stated in the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly: "... democracy has failed and a monarchy is necessary in Pakistan. General Iskander Mirza should become the monarch." All of these plans were motivated by the necessity of overcoming the "weakness" or "lack of stable political system" in Pakistan. However, they caused opposition on the part of the country's democratic forces and strong opposition within the bourgeois-landlord parties themselves. According to various motivations, among which fear of political discredit was not the last, important groups in the Moslem League, the Republican Party and the leaders of the People's League came out against any constitutional changes. The leaders of the People's League feared, in addition, that the establishment of an open dictatorship in the form of "presidential government," "revolutionary council" or monarchy would take away their ministerial portfolios and would lead to damage of the interests of the bourgeoisie and landlords of East Pakistan. After the formation of the National People's Party the status of the People's League in the then-ruling coalition became sharply aggravated. It lost 36 mandates in the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan, two of the thirteen mandates belonging to it in the National Assembly, as well as losing the support of the "ganatantri dal" party in both parlia-
ments. But the main reason for the weakening position of the People's League, as has been mentioned, consisted in the fact that it lost its mass support and suffered a loss of the support of the democratic movement in Pakistan.

By the end of the summer of 1957, in view of the aggravation of the political crisis in Pakistan, differences increased between the leaders of the People's League and the Republican Party in the parliamentary coalition and in the Suhrawardi government. The leaders of both of these parties attempted to strengthen their positions at the expense of their ally in the parliamentary coalition and at the same time attempted to slough off the responsibility to the other for the failure of the domestic and foreign policies. Under these conditions a break-up of the government coalition and fall of the Suhrawardi government were merely a question of time. By the end of August differences due to provincial gubernatorial replacements almost caused a government crisis and only the full capitulation by the leaders of the People's League to the Republicans in this question put off the fall of the Suhrawardi government. Not long before the convocation of the October session of the National Assembly, at which, on the demands of the opposition the question of forming a federation of autonomous provinces in West Pakistan was to be examined, the leaders of the Republican Party announced that this party would no longer support the administrative unity of West Pakistan, "if the people are against it." The maneuver taken by the leaders of the Republican Party had as its purpose a weakening of factional strife within the Party, a strengthening of the position of the reorganized Republican provincial government in West Pakistan and a speed-up in concluding an agreement in forming a bloc in the national assembly with the Moslem League. The leaders of the Moslem League, also from tactical considerations, supported even earlier the proposal to abolish the administrative unity of this part of the country. Although neither the Republicans nor the leaders of the Moslem League had any intention of taking serious steps in this direction, the maneuver by the leaders of the Republican Party placed the People's League in an extremely difficult position, where the latter, after the formation of the National People's Party, had occupied an openly inimical position in relation to the nationalist movements of the people's of West Pakistan. The People's League was in the position of a united, large All-Pakistan party, which had openly endorsed the continuation of the former nationalist policy, which was extremely unpopular with the public in West Pakistan, and it was forced to settle accounts with the Moslem League and the Republican Party. The leaders of the People's League began an agi-
tation campaign to preserve the administrative unity of West Pakistan. During this campaign, Suhrawardi, Inayat Ulla Hassan, Lundhor and other leaders of the People's League attacked not only the National People's Party and the Moslem League, but also the Republican Party for "the harmful intention of abolishing the United Province and the terrible consequences of this step." Wishing to frighten the Republicans and preserve his government, Suhrawardi stated that: "an attempt to destroy the administrative unity of West Pakistan... may lead to a situation whereby Pakistan's best friends abroad will refuse to support it."125

The campaign against "treason" and "intrigues" by the Republican Party, conducted by the leaders of the People's League, caused a sharp reaction by the Republicans. In October, obtaining the preliminary support of the Moslem League, "Nizam-i-Islam" and factions in the "Krishak Shramik" party, headed by its President, Hamid-ul-Hak Choudhuri, the Republicans officially refused to support Suhrawardi and the People's League both in parliament and in the government. A governmental crisis broke out, as a result of which the People's League lost power in the central government. Power was transferred to a new coalition consisting of four parties — The Republican, the Moslem League, "Nizam-i-Islam" and "Krishak Shramik." All attempts by the leaders of the People's League to organize a mass campaign to preserve the Suhrawardi government led to nothing. The People's League was forced to transfer to the opposition. The fall of the Suhrawardi government testified to the serious weakening of the position of the People's League. The crisis of the People's League continued after its move to the opposition, at the very least until the end of 1957. This is shown by the criticism against the tactics by the Central party leaders voiced by several of its local and district organizations in West Pakistan, as well as statements appearing in several newspapers in November 1957 on disagreements and a power struggle among the leaders of the People's League in the provincial government of Ataur Rahman Khan.126 However, one should not exaggerate the weakened position of the People's League at that time. Having lost power in the central government, it maintained power in East Pakistan. As a result of the split, the People's League became more homogeneous in a social respect, which in and of itself must have furthered a decrease of contradictions and differences of opinion within the party. In addition, the transfer to the opposition changed the conditions for the activities of the People's League and created the prerequisites for overcoming its internal crisis. Without hav-
ing to answer directly now for any unpopular measures taken by the central government, the People's League once more had the opportunity to criticize its policies in order to restore its political capital to a certain degree.

We should mention one other circumstance which is extremely important for the East Bengal provincial party organization. The fall of the Sukhrawardi government led to a general weakening of the political position of the bourgeoisie and the landlords of East Pakistan, a fact which was reflected immediately in the economic policy of the central government. As a result of the redistribution of budget allocations which took place at the end of 1957-1958, as well as the redistribution of import licenses, the portion of East Pakistan was cut sharply, and new taxes were introduced in the Province. Those economic concessions which the Bengali bourgeoisie had won during the term in office in the central government by the representatives of the People's League were cancelled out to a great degree. This aroused the provincial government of Ataur Rahman Khan to insist even more definitely on the economic and political interests of East Pakistan. Although the leaders of the People's League had in mind primarily the interests of the property classes in the Province, their criticism of the domestic policy of the central government could not but find support and sympathy on the part of extremely varied strata of the population of East Pakistan.

It is difficult to say to what degree the leaders of the People's League were successful under conditions of growing economic difficulties and aggravation of the general political crisis in the country in using these circumstances to strengthen the position of their party. The military coup which took place on 7 October 1958, led by former president of Pakistan Iskander Mirza and General Ayub Khan, changed drastically the internal political situation in the country. The 1956 constitution was abolished and the government of Ataur Rahman Khan in East Pakistan was dissolved, and all parties including the People's League were prohibited. The fall of the Sukhrawardi government wound up a definite stage both in the development of the People's League and the entire internal political development of Pakistan. The People's League was the first All-Pakistan party coming to power not only with slogans for the defense of Islam and Pakistan, but also with extremely nebulous promises of social reforms, and also a definite program of bourgeois democratic reforms. The inability of the party leadership to carry out this program, reflecting the political narrow-mindedness and weakness of those bourgeois landlord groups of East Pakistan upon which the party leaders depended, led to a crisis and
party split. During the crisis of the People's League a more clear-cut political alignment of class forces in the country took place. On the one hand a bloc of landlord and landlord-bourgeois parties arose, within which a constant power struggle went on. On the other hand, in 1957 the unification of the democratic organizations in Pakistan into the national People's Party took place, headed by that portion of the national bourgeoisie which was interested in liquidating the hobbles of feudalism and in the further progress of Pakistan toward independence. The term in power of the People's League was not without benefit for the people's of Pakistan. The fall of the Suhrawardi government and aggravation of the political crisis in 1956-1957 showed that now not one ruling party can maintain its influence among the masses and stay in power without carrying out democratic reforms and changing the course of Pakistan's foreign policy.
The political history of Pakistan in the first decade of its independent existence was characterized by extreme complexity and tension. Constant changes in governments at the capital and the provinces, martial law, party splits, continuous changes in the party composition of legislative organs, intrigues, machinations, unprincipled compromises made by political parties and refusal to abide by these compromises at the first opportunity, corruption in government—all of this was quite the common thing for Pakistan. Increasing differences of a social-economic nature found their expression in the fierce political combat which was being undertaken among the numerous parties in Pakistan. The situation also became complicated due to the internal party struggles between various factions and individuals for power. Unprincipled politics were a rule. Not having a platform which actually corresponded to the country's national interests and providing measures for improving the position of the masses, the bourgeois—landlord parties resorted to the most shameless demagoguery. A major influence on all facets of Pakistan's domestic life was exerted by the growing penetration of foreign imperialism, predominantly American. Under these circumstances, certain political problems acquired great significance, and became the reason for a stubborn struggle of many years' duration. We should first mention the question of general elections. The legislative organ of Pakistan—the constituent assembly—was formed in the summer of 1947 as a result of the partition of the Indian Constituent Assembly into two sections (one for the Indian union, the other for Pakistan). The Deputies from the regions appended to Pakistan formed a legislative organ for the new state. The complete master in the Constituent Assembly was the Moslem League—a party of landlords and the upper Pakistan bourgeois. All the Moslem seats belonged to it (more than 60). Twelve deputies from the Hindu religious minority made up the "opposition." Christians, Buddhists, Parsee and other groups did not have representatives in the Constituent Assembly. The Moslem League was in full control in the provincial Legislative Assemblies also.

Formed undemocratically, the reactionary constituent assembly immediately was subjected to severe criticism by the public. With each year the voices increased their demands to dissolve the existing legislative organ and conduct
general elections with the participation of the entire adult population. At first the Moslem League did not entertain serious doubts as to the outcome of an election. However, elections to the provincial Legislative Assemblies shattered these illusions and demonstrated the decrease in the influence of the ruling party. The Moslem League suffered a devastating defeat in East Bengal, where it received only ten of 309 deputy mandates. The results of the elections were extremely significant: they showed that the majority of the population had refused to place confidence in the ruling party. Under these conditions the movement to dissolve the Legislative Assembly grew in strength, for the composition of the assembly clearly did not reflect the changing power relations in the country. The authorities attempted to present matters in such a light whereby the elections in Bengal would not be of great significance and could not have any influence on the situation in the capital. Moreover, the Moslem League government, making use of a provacatory statement printed in the American newspaper New York Times, dissolved the East Bengal legislative assembly in May 1954, forced the government of the United Front which had come to power as a result of the elections, to go into retirement and established a gubernatorial system in the province. The authorities used cruel and repressive measures against the country's democratic forces. In the summer of 1954 the Communist Party was prohibited first in the East and then in the Western part of Pakistan, many prominent figures in the trade union movement were imprisoned, as were the leaders of peasant organizations. At the same time, under conditions of a worsening political crisis in the country, the party in power was forced to make certain concessions. The Moslem League could no longer ignore the demands to dissolve the Constituent Assembly; by a decree of the governor general on 24 October 1954, the Pakistan Constituent Assembly was dissolved. The decree noted that the Assembly had "lost the confidence of the people and could no longer function" and that elections for a new legislative organ "must be carried out as soon as possible." Until the elections the entire governmental authorities were concentrated in the hands of the governor general and the government. The Pakistan Constituent Assembly, after 7 years of activities, could not carry out its basic tasks. The country remained without a representative organ and without a constitution.

The political situation at the end of 1954-first half of 1955 became even more critical in view of the intent of the government to unify the provinces and principalities of East Pakistan into one single province. This resolution by the leaders of the Moslem League caused great dissatis-
faction in the country and serious opposition on the part of the various nationalities of West Pakistan. All three problems -- general elections, a constitution and the change in the administrative division of the Western part of the country -- were closely interconnected and to a considerable degree determined the political situation in the country. Having dissolved the constituent assembly, the politicians in power continued to ignore the basic demands of the masses to hold general elections. The events in East Bengal in the Spring of 1954, the by-elections of provincial assemblies and elections of local organs of authority in West Pakistan clearly demonstrated the drop in the influence of the party in power. Under these circumstances the Moslem League government would not hold general elections, fearing an outcome which would be disastrous for itself. The second Constituent Assembly was formed in the summer of 1955 by the same non-democratic method as the first: As if in order to convene a new representative organ as rapidly as possible, its deputies were elected not by the entire population but by the provincial legislative assemblies. As in the previous supreme organ of authority, each of the 80 members of the new constituent assembly represented 1 million constituents. The peculiar feature of the second assembly was the equal representation between the Western and Eastern parts of the country. But even with such an election system the Moslem League was able to win only a plurality (25 seats). Only six of the 13 members of the government were elected. Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bagra obtained his deputy's mandate with great difficulty. The parties then in opposition to the Moslem League -- the United Front and the People's League -- received 16 and 13 seats respectively. With the formation in April 1956 of a new party -- the Republicans, which included many members of the Moslem League -- the latter was reduced to third place in number of deputy mandates. After the formation of the new constituent assembly and the unification in October 1955 of the Provinces of West Pakistan, the only "obstacle" in the path of holding general elections was the constitutional problem, since the government of Pakistan announced that elections would be held only after the constitution was passed. (It is not difficult to note that this decision not only led to a considerable delay in holding the elections but made it possible for the government to exert pressure on the opposition to ratify the constitution).

The constitution of the Islam republic of Pakistan went into force on 2 March 1956. It seemed that nothing more could block a rapid holding of general elections, especially since all parties, both the governmental and op-
position parties, as well as all leading politicians, constantly were stating that the only way out of the severe political crisis was to hold elections as soon as possible.17 However, even after the constitution was passed, the problem of general elections continued to be unresolved. All promises to this effect had not been kept. Tentative election dates were put off time and time again.18 The representatives of the government circles blamed the difficulties with which preparations for elections were connected and, primarily, difficulties in drawing up candidate lists. Actually the drawing up of the lists (according to preliminary data, 25 million persons were to go to the polls in East Pakistan and in West Pakistan — 20 million)19 was a rather complicated affair and required a considerable amount of time. But naturally this could not explain or justify the fact that in Pakistan general elections had not been held during the more than 10 years of independent existence, when we assume that a general population census would be even more complicated and labor-consuming, but one was held in 1951. Actually everything could be explained by the deliberate policies of the parties in power in Pakistan. Under conditions of growing discontent with the domestic and foreign policies of the government, under conditions of a severe economic and political crisis, general elections frightened the rulers of Pakistan and their foreign patrons. "The handful of people who run the country are sure that they will lose their power if elections are held,"20 prominent opposition, Abdul Haffar-Khan, said at a meeting in Lahore. The bourgeois-landlord parties in power in Pakistan had neither plan for program for improving the lot of the masses. In their past activities there was nothing which could draw the masses on their side.21 It is therefore not surprising that these parties did anything in their power to avoid holding elections.

Preparation for elections began only in the second half of 1956. Up to this time nothing had gone further than pointless talks. The election commission and commission for drawing up election districts, which were formed in the Summer of 1956, immediately were faced by many difficulties. The election commission was constantly short of funds and personnel, in spite of the fact that the government constantly promised it comprehensive aid.22 As a result, work in drawing up election lists was delayed again and again. But the real stumbling block in the path of holding general elections was the artificially created and artificially aggravated problem of the form of elections. The problem consisted in the question as to whether common unified lists should be drawn up or whether the electors should be broken down by religious-communal curias.
according to religious faith. This problem had long occupied the center of attention of the Pakistan public and by 1958 had become particularly critical. Passions aroused around this question were fanned by certain groups which were endeavoring to obtain benefit from it. This problem, as many others, was inherited by Pakistan from the period of British hegemony in India. Pursuing their traditional policy of "divide and rule," British imperialists sowed discord and enmity between the two largest religious communities in India -- the Hindu and Moslem -- and fanned the flames of hatred. They supported the separatist demands of the Moslem upper stratum and encouraged them to aggressive action. An effective means of building up religious-communal antagonism and a split in the national-liberation movement was the British policy in respect to the election system. By a 1909 law ("the Morley-Minto reforms) a system of elections according to religious-communal curias was introduced for the first time in the history of India. Special seats were reserved for Moslems in representative organs. Later legislative acts, the "Montegue-Chelmsford" reforms in 1919 and the 1935 constitution, consolidated this system and extended it to a great degree. In accordance with the "communal law" of 1932, incorporated in the 1955 constitution, the following curias were established -- Hindu, Moslem, Sikh, Christian, European, Untouchables, Anglo-Indians and backward regions. In addition, class curias were established -- commercial, industrial, landowner, university and labor. Special curias were formed for women within the religious-communal curias.

It is extremely important to note than in the distribution of deputy mandates the Moslems were put under the more advantageous conditions: Hindus, comprising 70% of the population, received only 55% of the seats, and Moslems (25%) -- 33% of the seats. As a result of this policy by the British imperialists, religious differences in India grew into a bitter political struggle between communities and, primarily, the Hindu and Moslem communities. The Moslem ruling clique was able to strengthen its influence over a considerable collection of Moslem workers. This made it difficult to draw the Moslems into the common national liberation movement of the peoples of India. The First Constituent Assembly of Pakistan changed the 1955 Constitution, proclaiming the right of the entire adult population of the country to participate in elections and abolishing curias. The Moslem curias and those of the religious minorities of Pakistan were preserved, and a new curia of Buddhists was formed. In the 1952 draft constitution the holding of elections for pro-
vincial legislative assemblies and the parliament was examined on the basis of individual election lists for Muslims, Hindus, Untouchables, Christians, Buddhists and Parsees. A definite number of seats 27 was reserved in the government organs for all of these religious groups. The principle of separate elections was maintained in subsequent draft constitutions. Hot debates on this question broke out in the Pakistan constituent assembly during the discussion of the final variation of the constitution in January-February 1956. The Moslem League-United Front coalition, being in power at that time, passed a compromise resolution, fixed in the 145th article of the 1956 constitution.

In accordance with this article, the Constituent Assembly of Pakistan received the right "after elucidation of the opinion of the provincial assemblies and in consideration of their opinion by means of legislative enactments, to determine whether elections to the national assembly and provincial assemblies should be held on the basis of a common list or individual elector lists..."29 It is easy to note that this formulation opened vast possibilities for delaying the elections. In the first place, it presupposed and caused a bitter and lengthy struggle in the provinces and, in the second place, the law and the principle of election passed on the basis of article 145 was not a constitutional statute but only a parliamentary enactment, which could be rescinded by a simple majority of votes of the deputies. Under conditions of constant change in party composition of the National Assembly of Pakistan and sharp conflict of opinions on this question within the various parliamentary factions, this could and did become a major obstacle in the matter of solving the problem of the principle of drawing up elector lists and holding general elections. Democratic public opinion in Pakistan was expressed from the very beginning against separate elections correctly judging them to be a reactionary heritage of British rule. Sharply criticizing the anti-democratic draft constitutions drawn up by the leaders of the Moslem League, the Communist Party of Pakistan devoted particular attention to the danger of maintaining curial elections, which inevitably led to the heightened dissociation of the population according to religious belief, as well as to an increase in tension between communities. At the same time the Communist Party steadfastly demanded the holding of general elections at an early date with the broad participation of the masses. The socialist party of Pakistan, "Azad Pakistan Parti" (free Pakistan party), "Samatantri Dal" (democratic party), as well as certain democratic organizations (for example, the East Pakistan Youth League)
and the nationalist parties of West Pakistan also came out against separate elections. In East Pakistan, where the non-Muslim population was basically concentrated, the religious minority parties such as the National Congress, the Untouchables Federation, the United Progressive Party, also came out in favor of joint elections. Deputies from religious minorities of East Bengal in the Constituent Assembly constantly protested against separate elections, which would "lower non-Muslims to a status of second-class citizens," and "make them political Untouchables." In recent years Pakistan's largest party -- "Awami League" (People's League) -- has come out in favor of general elections. The Moslem League, frankly reactionary Pan-Islam organizations "Jamiat-i-Islami," "Jamiat-ul-ulema-i-Islam," "Nizam-i-Islam" etc., were bitter opponents of united elections. West Pakistan's largest party -- the Republican Party -- and the East Bengal "Krishak shramik" party, (the so-called workers and peasants party) fluctuated somewhat on the question of election form. However, on the whole the former came out in favor of joint elections and the latter -- for separate elections. We see that the deeply reactionary slogan of separate elections caused considerable protest on the part of the country's democratic forces. At the same time, the stubborn struggle around the principle of drawing up election lists went on also between the upper bourgeois-landlord parties of Pakistan (People's League, Moslem League, etc.) This struggle was one of the manifestations of those serious differences which existed within the ruling classes, between various social and national strata and groups of Pakistan bourgeoisie and landowners.

Opposing each other on the question of the election forms, these parties endeavored theoretically to find well-founded bases for their positions. The Moslem League and its allies did everything they could to evade, play down and distort the true sense of separate elections in unpartitioned India, "forgot" the goals which the English had pursued in doing this and tried to prove that separate elections introduced on a basis of the notorious "two nations theory" as if in the interests of the country's Moslem population, the means of defense against the Hindu majority. Subsequently the "theory of two nations" and the idea of separate elections grew into a demand to form a separate Moslem state. One of the leaders of the Moslem League called separate elections the "Mother of Pakistan." As it turned out, to oppose separate elections was to oppose Pakistan. This caused the shouts of danger to the existence of the Moslem state in case of introduction of joint elections, shouts of treason to
Islam; increase of the "Hindu danger," etc. The supporters of separate elections stated that the "two nations theory" would remain in force after the formation of Pakistan, and, consequently, separate elections were essential. In addition, the Moslem League and the parties supporting it brought in one more bit of evidence in favor of separate elections, but of an entirely different nature. This type of elections, they stated, were in the interest not only of the Moslems but the Hindus. Religious minorities comprising a small percentage of the population, particularly in West Pakistan, under joint elections might lose their representation in the supreme organ of power, which with separate elections would be assured by reserving a definite number of seats for them. Opponents of separate elections, recognizing the justice of the "two nations theory" in the past (for non-partitioned India), asserted that with the formation of Pakistan, the "two nations theory" lost its force due to the fact that the population of Pakistan now forms a single nation — Pakistani. "We are Pakistani," the leader of the People's League Mujibur-Rahman stated in the East Pakistan legislative assembly. "We are Pakastani through and through." The opposite viewpoint, asserted the supporters of unified elections, means in the first place a blow at the integrity and unity of Pakistan and a strengthening of separatism and, in the second place, it leads to the conclusion that Pakistan is a national fatherland only for Moslems and that religious minorities are threatened by danger on the part of the majority, since they need a special guarantee in the form of separate elections. The opponents of "the two nations theory" and curial elections stated that this does not correspond to actuality and contradicts the constitution, which proclaims equality of all citizens before the law. Supporters of unified elections stated further that recognition of the "two nations theory" and the principle of separate elections could form a basis for religious minorities in the country on analogy with the Moslems of unpartitioned India, to demand the right to secede from Pakistan and form their own state. Finally, acceptance of the curial election system would inevitably lead to a worsening of relations with small Moslem sects.

The Moslem League and its allies did everything it could to prove that separate elections were in accordance with the principles of Islam. In the opinion of the opponents of the Moslem League, separate elections placing religious minorities in an unequal status are contradictory to Islam, which guarantees all, not only Moslems, democracy, freedom, equality and social justice. In addition, to say
that Islam demands separate elections "àšŠàš", Suhrawardı and his colleagues from the People's League stated many times "to reproach those Moslem countries where there are no separate elections (Indonesia, Egypt, Syria, Lebanon, etc.). Finally, joint elections occur in Pakistan: Moslems and Hindus -- deputies to the legislative organs -- together elect a president, a speaker of the house, a deputy speaker, etc., and this is not protested by the supporters of the curial elections. But this same principle suddenly acquires an anti-Islam nature when it is a matter of speaking of elections to the legislative assemblies. Thus both the supporters and opponents of unified elections marched under the banner of loyalty to Islam. Both made frequent references to the heritage of the "great founder of Pakistan" -- Mohammed Ali Jinna -- and found in his speeches "weighty" arguments in their favor. However, the problem of "two nations" in general, and the form of elections in particular was not an object of mere theoretical arguments and discussions. This problem was closely joined with one of the most important matters in modern Pakistan -- the nationalities problem. The clash of interests of various social forces was reflected in the fierce struggle. The exploiters of Punjab, who were ruling the country in an economic and political respect, carried out a policy throughout the entire period of the existence of Pakistan of discrimination in respect to the minorities of West Pakistan and the population of East Bengal. Political parties which expressed an interest of the Punjab landowners and the upper bourgeoisie (primarily the Moslem League) needed an ideological weapon which would justify this policy. The "two nations" theory and the principle of an Islamic unity to the nation was this weapon.

The "two nations" concept proceeds from the fact that religion is the only national symbol, and that all Moslems, independent of their linguistic, cultural, economic and other differences, form a solid and indivisible unity. "Moslem unity is considerably stronger than their differences." National characteristics, traditions and interests are incompatible with Islam ideology and "an end should be made to them." In other words, the "two nations theory" actually negates the right of the people of Pakistan, Moslems by religion (Bengali, Sindhi, Baluchi and refugee Tamils, Marathi, etc.,) to protect their social and national interests, to develop their agriculture, language, to preserve their way of life, customs, etc. This concept served as an ideological basis for uniting the Provinces of West Pakistan, done exclusively in the interests of the upper bourgeoisie and landlords of Punjab. Making use of the "two nations theory" and the thesis that "Islam does not
know geographic, linguistic and racial barriers, the landlords and bourgeoisie of West Pakistan strongly opposed autonomy for the various nationalities in the country and stubbornly endeavored to make Urdu the national language in all provinces. The ignoring of national peculiarities and demands by Bengali, Pushtuni, Sindhi, Baluchi, caused great dissatisfaction and protests from them. The nationalist movement in East Bengal was particularly strong. Peasants, workers, artisans, and representatives of the Bengal bourgeoisie took part in it. The Moslem League realized the force of this movement as early as March 1954, when the opposition parties gained a smashing victory at the polls, campaigning under slogans which corresponded to the national democratic demands of the Bengali. Under these conditions the "two nations theory" and principle of separate elections acquired a particularly great importance as a means of splitting the unified nationalist Bengali movement. Making use of this means, the upper bourgeoisie and landlords of Punjab attempted to hammer a wedge between the Hindus and Moslems in East Pakistan, weaken their common struggle and, in the final analysis, maintain that subordinate status possessed by East Bengal. This is why the representatives of all social groups and religious communities of the Bengal nation came out against separate elections. And this was in spite of the fact that for the religious minorities of East Pakistan, comprising 10 million persons, unified elections were not advantageous from the viewpoint of the government and legislative organs. It has been proven in practice that with unified elections they receive less deputy mandates than with curial mandates with reserved seats for communities.

If the religious minorities of Bengal nevertheless proceed with this, one can obviously say that they are sacrificing certain community advantages in the interests of the entire nation, that the cleavage between Hindus and Moslems of East Bengal is smaller than that between the Bengali and ruling clique of West Pakistan, that the interests of the nation are stronger than religious differences. When in the Western part of the country, in view of the introduction of joint elections, a hue and cry arose on the "Hindu danger," it is clear that this did not mean danger against the state by the Hindus, but a threat against the dominant position of the landlord and other bourgeoisie of West Pakistan. The national movements in East Bengal and in the former provinces of West Pakistan were directed against the anti-democratic great power policies of the landlord-bourgeoisie clique of Punjab. As a counterweight to the "two nations theory" and the consequent principle of sep-
arate elections, the nationalist parties made use of the one nation concept and the slogan of unified elections as an ideological weapon. In this case the national symbol is only citizenship and residence.52 Reclaiming the principle of one nation, its supporters at the same time recognized the differences between the various regions of the country in a linguistic, cultural and geographic respect, while some of them championed more consistently the free development of national characteristics (the National People's Party),53 others — less consistently (People's League).54 The National People's Party came out definitely against the formation of a single province in West Pakistan and demanded the formation in this part of the country of provinces based on linguistic, cultural and geographical affinity and the granting of regional autonomy to both parts of Pakistan. The problem of election form was deep in contest. The heated discussion which resolved around it was a reflection of the struggle carried on by the nationalities of Pakistan against the Punjabi group which was running the country. This is why all those persons who came out against granting autonomy to the various nationalities of Pakistan supported separate elections. On the other hand, the members of the nationalist movements were supporters of unified elections.

One should keep in mind that the parties heading the nationalist movements expressed primarily the interests of the bourgeoisie and part of the landowners of various nationalities in Pakistan. But since these parties advanced general democratic demands and, in particular, attempted to end national discrimination against various nationalities in Pakistan, an unhindered development of language and culture of all the nationalities in the country, they found support in the masses. Cleverly maneuvering, bourgeois—landlord parties made use of the violent struggle within the country on the question of election forms for increasing their influence. Demands for separate elections were not only the basic principle of the Moslem League policy and that of its allies, but the main slogan under which these parties attempted to consolidate their positions; organizing extensive campaigns in support of the election system which was advantageous to them, appealing to the religious feelings of the backward strata of the Moslem population. On the other hand, the People's League presented itself as the champion of the national union of Pakistan and opponent of religious differences. Operating primarily in Bengal, it attempted to win popularity among the Hindus who comprise here a considerable percentage of the population. With this aim the party, as early as 1955,
eliminated the second word from its old title "People's Moslem League" and opened the doors wide for non-Moslems to join their ranks. Unified elections, besides everything else, would allow the People's League to gather a large number of votes due to Hindus, who in actuality were deprived of the opportunity to vote for this party under the curial election system. Unscrupulousness in the election form question was manifested by the Republican party. It made use of the fighting on this question as a means of political maneuvering with the aim of seizing power and consolidating the positions of certain groups of landlords and wealthy merchant-industrial bourgeoisie of West Pakistan.

Some leaders of the Republican Party, including its founder, the deposed Khan Sahib, championed unified elections in the past, before the party was formed. But when the legislative assembly of West Pakistan began in the beginning of August 1956 to discuss the election system, the Republicans, who had not joined the People's League up to that time, and who feared to be isolated, came out in favor of separate elections. In discussing this question in the national assembly of Pakistan in October 1956, the Republicans supported the proposal by the People's League -- their ally in the government coalition -- to pass a compromise resolution: separate elections in West Pakistan and unified ones in East Pakistan. When in April 1957 Suhrawardi made a proposal in parliament to extend the principle of unified elections throughout the country, the Republican Party, which needed the support of the People's League very much at that time, voted for it.

While this question was being discussed, the Moslem League conducted an ardent campaign for "defense of Islam." Crowds of fanatics with black flags demonstrated on the streets of Karachi. The National Assembly Building looked like a besieged fortress. But this had no effect on the voting. On 24 April the Resolution was passed to conduct future elections in the country on the basis of common elector lists, thanks to the votes of the People's League, the Republicans, the minority parties of East Pakistan and the West Pakistan opposition parties. By fall 1957 the cleavage between the Republicans and the People's League had increased, which was reflected by the different goals and interests of the landlord and bourgeoisie groups represented by these parties. In October 1957 the Republican Party refused to support the People's League and entered a union with the Moslem League, accepting some of its conditions. The Chundrigar government formed by these parties placed the principle of separate elections as the
basic plank in its platform. The government intended to conduct elections on different lists for Moslems, Hindus, Christians and Untouchables. Small groups of non-Moslems (Parsees and Buddhists) were to be grouped together. However, Chundrigar was not successful in carrying out his plans. The endeavor to introduce separate elections caused widespread dissatisfaction in both provinces. Meetings and protest demonstrations took place throughout the country. Representatives of the People's League were victorious in two Moslem districts during elections of three deputies of the provincial assembly in East Pakistan at the end of November 1957, and a member of the national congress was victorious in a Hindu district. The results of these by-elections were interpreted by the public as a new manifestation of the will of the people of East Pakistan to support unified elections.

In the Republican Party itself the movement for joint elections gained ground. Their supporters asserted that separate elections would run counter to the party manifesto. Under such circumstances, under conditions of an aggravating political crisis, the leaders of the Republican Party, feeling that remaining any further in a bloc with the Moslem League and its allies ("Nizam-i-Islam", "Krishak shramik" party", etc.) and insisting on the principle of separate elections was fraught with unpleasant consequences, once again came forth for joint elections in the middle of December. This meant a break in the coalition and a fall of the Chundrigar government. The opposition parties expressed support for the Republican Party and on 16 December the leader of the Republican Party, Nunn, formed a new government, which promised to conduct general elections on the basis of single elector lists no later than November 1958. The Republican government of Nunn was supported by the People's League, the Untouchables Federation, the National People's Party, the Hamid-ul-Hak Choudhuri group, and the United Progressive Party, in other words the supporters of unified elections. The opposition was formed by the Moslem League, "Krishak shramik parti", "Nizam-i-Islam," the Choudhuri Mohammed Ali group and several independent parties, that is, all the bitter opponents of joint elections. By the end of the first decade of the independent existence of Pakistan the question of the form of elections became a serious problem for the country's political life. As a result of the bitter struggle which took place due to this problem, coalitions were formed and broken, 61 governments came and went. However, one must keep in mind that during the course of this struggle the largest bour-
geois-landlord parties, pursuing their own interests, endeavored to maintain and further strengthen the economic and political role of the bourgeoisie and landlords.

The political situation in Pakistan which jelled toward the end of the period under study was distinguished by extreme tension. The anti-nationalist policy of the Pakistan ruling circles, and increasing dependence on American "aid" and participation in aggressive military blocs, SEATO, and the Baghdad Pact, brought the country into an economic and political dead-end. "This policy," the Indian weekly New Age wrote, "led to political instability, endless changes in government, a weakening of democratic institutions . . . and the disenchantment of the masses." The calculations of the ruling circles in Pakistan that the ratification of a constitution would lead to a stabilization of the country's life and make it possible for them to pursue their policies, covering everything with a smoke screen of bourgeois parliamentarian democracy, proved false. Therefore, as early as the spring of 1957, plans for setting up an open dictatorship in the country began to mature among certain circles of Pakistan landlords and the upper bourgeoisie, officers and government functionaries. Prominent political and governmental figures, including the president of the republic, Iskander Mirza, criticized in their public statements the existing parliamentary structure and the multi-party system, trying to prove their unsuitability for Pakistan and appealing to establish a "controlled democracy" in Pakistan, "presidential government of the American type," etc. The leader of the Republican Party, Khan Sahib, proposed that all power be concentrated in the hands of a "revolutionary council" consisting of ten of the "nation's best sons." Here and there voices were heard in favor of . . . a monarchy. Democratic public opinion in Pakistan, experiencing great uneasiness due to the situation in the country, insistently demanded immediate general elections and the formation of a truly representative legislative government organ. For "a strengthening of democracy," the newspaper Imroz wrote in December 1957, "it is essential to hold general elections as soon as possible." However, the government, ignoring the will of the masses, continued to pursue the policy of delaying elections, a fact which made the situation worse, increased political instability and aided those persons who were endeavoring to set up a dictatorship. The domestic situation grew much worse toward the autumn of 1958. The economic situation became aggravated and the political situation grew tense. Under conditions of general dissatisfaction with
the domestic and foreign policies of the government, the
government, fearing the outcome of the election,65 again
put them off until February 1959, although all prepar-
atations for the elections had actually been completed. In
October 1958 extremely important events took place for
Pakistan's political situation. After the regular gov-
ernment crisis which broke out on 7 October, a military
junta, headed by President Mirza and Commander and Chief
of the Armed Forces Ayub-Khan carried out a coup d'etat:
the 1956 constitution was abolished, legislative organs
and the government were dissolved; political parties were
forbidden. In a few weeks, under pressure by high officers
in the army, Mirza resigned and the post of president was
occupied by general Ayub-Khan, concentrating in his hands
all state power. "Military coups in Pakistan and Thailand,"
Khrushchev stressed at the 21st Party Congress, "showed
that the attack on democratic gains by peoples who have
achieved national independence is being stepped up."66
Under conditions of military dictatorship and liquidation
of parliamentary institutions the problem of general
elections acquired a new aspect, and as the weekly New Age
noted, remained as formerly the basic demand of the Pak-
istan people.67
FOOTNOTES

First Article: Population Breakdown

1 Here is a characteristic example. According to 1891 figures, there were 1,229,227 persons in Northern India who spoke Dohri. In 1921 there were 418,673, or almost 800,000 less. Why the difference? The persons who drew up the 1921 official report included in the Punjabi language Kanhra (a dialect of the Dohri language), which, according to the 1891 report, was spoken by 636,500 persons (Linguistic Survey of India, Calcutta, 1927, Vol I, page 405). In 1951, during the Pakistan census, Dohri was included in Punjabi.

2 Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol I. table 7, pages 7-3, 7-4.

3 Census of Pakistan, ibid., page 7-4; Vol IV.

4 M. C. Aslanov, "Afghantsy" (The Afghans), in the book Narodnye Narodnosty Azii (The Peoples of Inner Asia), Moscow, 1932, page 96.


7 J. Biddulph, Tribes of the Hindoo Koosh, Calcutta, 1880, pages 12-17.


9 Khel -- Afghan family, tribal subdivision, sometimes tribe.

10 In 1951 69,790 Afghan-Powinds lived in Pakistan, including: in the NW Frontier Province -- 34,560; in Baluchistan -- 19,215; in Punjab -- 13,083 (Census of Pak., op. cit., Vol. I, table 10-A); also ibid., Census Bulletin, No 2, table 10, page 27; Dawn, 1956, 5 November.

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13. For the development of capitalism in the regions of the NW Frontier Province and the tribal belt in 1901-1947, see: L. R. Gordon, op. cit., pages 146-155.

14 Between 1930 and 1947 alone the number of factory and railroad workers in the NW Frontier Province almost doubled. The number of Push tonsi among the population of the province increased, urban-wise. Seasonal migration increased both to the cities of this province and to the industrial centers of Punjab and other areas of India. Migration continued after the formation of Pakistan. In 1951-1957 alone the number of Push tonsi in Karachi increased by 150,000 (*The Pakistan Times*, 1957, 10 October).

15 Possibly this was furthered by the Moslem League Government to consider the nationalist demands of the Push tonsi and to recognize the independence of Push tonsi after the end of the war in Kashmir (See Rahman Rashwak, *Pakhtunistan*, pages 111-121).

16 *People's Age*, 6 July 1948. The complete text of the proclamation of the foundation of the "People's Party", signed by Abdul Haffar-khan, Abdussamad-khan Achakzay and other Push tonsi leaders (see *The Hindustan Times*, 14 March 1948).

17 *People's Age*, 2 May 1948; 30 May; 27 June.

18 According to data in the magazine *Pakhtunistan*, in 1949-1950 more than 12,000 Push tonsi were imprisoned ( *Pakhtunistan*, Delhi, September 1950).

19 *The Pakistan Times*, 22 March 1954.

20 ibid., 4 July 1956; 19 October; 26 October.

21 ibid., 9 February 1956; 23 February.
22 ibid., 1 March 1956.


24 *The Pakistan Times*, 10 July 1956.

25 ibid., 9 July 1956.


27 *Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol I, table 8, pages 8-6, 9-7; Vol IV, table 7, F. R. 7-1.


29 *The Pakistan Times*, 21 April 1957.


33 Ibbetson, op. cit., page 45.

34 ibid., op. cit., pages 3-4.


36 ibid. According to the *Pakistan Times*, there were 45,000 Baluchi nomads in the Dera-Gazi-khan region in 1947 (*The Pakistan Times*, 21 April 1957).


38 In 10 years (1941-1951) the number of Baluchi in Sind increased from 235 to 442 thousand, or by 88% (*Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol VI, pages 107-108). One must assume, however, that some of the Baluchi living in Sind were nomads from the districts of Sarawan and Jalawan of the Kalat principality, the migration of whom is of a seasonal nature (*Census of Pakistan*, 1951, Vol II, pages 30-31).

39 *The Pakistan Times*, 21 April 1957.
40 *Dawn*, 3 January 1957.


43 The majority of persons literate in Baluchi lived outside of Baluchistan, mainly in Karachi (ibid., Vol I, table 8, page 73; Vol II, page 53).

44 *Civil and Military Gazette*, 21 January 1957.


49 *The Pakistan Times*, 22 December 1953.


51 *The Pakistan Times*, 9 February 1956; 23 February; 25 July. In November 1956 "Ostoman holli", together with other national-democratic parties of West Pakistan, formed the National Party, which in the summer of 1957 joined with the left wing of the "Awami League", headed by Bhasani, to form a united National People's Party.

52 *The Pakistan Times*, 9 July 1956.


56 ibid., Vol I, table 7, page 71.
After the partition of 1947 550,000 refugees from India resettled in Sind (ibid., Vol I, page 31). Considerable emigration to Sind was due not only to the partition; it is also the result of the rapid economic development of this province during the past decade (chiefly the development of irrigation and cotton), thanks to which by 1941 8% of the population was immigrant, and the population density increased between 1921 and 1931 by 19% and from 1931 to 1941 by 17%, for the Bombay presidency -- 16 and 13% (see Kingsley Davis, The Population of India and Pakistan, Princeton, 1951, pages 120-121).

E. TrumpD. Sindhi literature, the Divan of Abd-ul-Latif, Known by the Name of Shahajo Risalö, Leipzig, 1886. The songs of Abdul Latif are still extremely popular in Sind (see Maneck B. Pithavalla, An Introduction to Sind: its Wealth and Welfare, Karachi, 1951, page 116).


According to 1951 census data, the number of persons normally speaking Sindhi was 280,000 greater than those for whom the language was native (ibid., Vol VI, page 105).

According to the newspaper Imroz, 2 million peasants in Sind do not own land; at the same time 7,000 large-scale landowners own 95% of all arable land (Imroz, 7 August 1953). 90% of the land in Sind is farmed by renter-metayers (Economy of Pakistan, K, 1950, pages 38-46; The Pakistan Times, 1950, 14 August).

The movement to preserve the Sindhi language and to recognize it as an official language is also active in India. At the 1956 conference of Asiatic writers in Delhi in December, a delegation of Sindhi
writers of India insisted on the necessity of recognizing Sindhi as one of the official languages of India. In 1956 the "Sindhi boli sabha" evoked the same demand in Bombay (see M. U. Malkoni, "Sindhi Literature", Indian Literature, Sahitya Akademi, Vol I, 1957, No 1, page 123). At the end of 1957 the first All-Indian conference of Sindhi speakers took place in Delhi, which demanded the inclusion of Sindhi among the "basic Indian languages", mentioned in the Indian constitution (Indian PEN, Bombay, Vol 24, 1958, No 1, pages 15-16).


70 The Pakistan Times, 1 March 1956.

71 ibid., 23 April, 29 October 1956.

72 M. K. Kudryavtsev, "Osnovnyye etnicheskiye gruppy Zapanadnego Pakistan" (Basic Ethnic Groups of West Pakistan), Sovetskaya Etnografiya, (Soviet Ethnography), 1952, No 2, page 108.

73 Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol V, table 1.

74 ibid., Vol V, table 6.


76 Linguistic Survey of India, C (Calcutta), 1927, Vol I, part 1, page 137.


78 Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol I, page 31; Vol V, table 519-A.


80 ibid., table 7-A, pages 71, 75.

81 ibid., page 71.


83 Mohan Singh, An Introduction to Panjabi Literature,
Amritsar, 1951, pages 150-151.

84 Census of Pakistan, 1951, Vol. I, page 73; Vol V, Table 8-A.

85 Ibid., Vol IV, page 62.

86 Pakistan Press Yearbook, 1956, pages 123, 133, 136-144.

87 In West Punjab more than 20% of the land under cultivation belongs to 0.5% of landowners (from the speech of an official of the "National Party", Amir Husein Shah, in the Legislative Assembly of West Pakistan; The Pakistan Times, 16 March 1957.

88 Ibid., Vol IV, page 62.

89 In 1951 refugees comprised 69% of the inhabitants of the city of Lyallpur, 49% of Multan, 43% in Lahore, 40% in Bahawalpur, 37% in Rawalpindi and 32% in Sialkot; ibid., page 75, Table 2.

90 The Pakistan Times, 23 February, 14 March, 8 October 1956.

91 See Mohan Singh, op. cit., pages 194-195.

92 The Pakistan Times, 26 March 1957.

93 Ibid., 18 March 1957.

94 See the speeches of leaders of the nationalist movements in West Pakistan, demanding the pursuit of an independent peaceful foreign policy by Pakistan, withdrawal from military blocs and the British Commonwealth, etc. (Imroz, 27 February 1957; The Pakistan Times, 13 November 1956, 10 April 1957; 2 April 1958.

Second Article: Status of the Working Class


2 Ibid.; also The Pakistan Times, 7 May 1957.


6 Economy of Pakistan, op. cit., page 120.

7 Pakistan Trade, K, 1956, November, pages 12-14.

8 The First Five ..., op. cit., Vol II, page 464.


10 ibid., page 307.


12 Calculated on the basis of data from the 1953 industrial census (Pakistan Stat..., 1955, pages 28-31.

13 ibid.


16 Data from Pakistan statist..., 1955, pages 183-185.

17 Economy of Pakistan (1950), page 126.

18 The First Five ..., op. cit., Vol II, page 463.

19 Economy of ..., op. cit., page 132.

20 Pakistan Statist..., op. cit., page 24.

21 Data from Pakistan Labour..., page 4.


23 Pakistan Stat..., op. cit., page 190. Data from 1953 census.

24 Royal Commission on Labour in India, Vol I, part 1, pages 228, 234, 249.
In this article problems of land ownership and use in Pakistan are touched upon only to the degree as is necessary to explain the influence of the expropriation of the direct producers and village unemployment on the status of the working class. More detail can be found in the author's article in the collection: Agrarnyye otnosheniya v stranyakh Vostaka (Agrarian Relations in the Countries of the East), M, 1958.


Economy of Pakistan (1950), page 131.

These figures, taken from the press in various districts of Bengal and Punjab, are naturally far from accurate, but nevertheless reflect to a certain degree the relative and absolute impoverishment of the Pakistani peasantry (The Pakistan Times, 1, 7, 22 July 1953; Cross Roads, 16 June 1953).

Naya Hindustan, 3 July 1953.

Calculated on the basis of figures in S. M. Akhtar, Ekonomika Pakistanata (Economy of Pakistan), M, 1957, pages 31-32.

Pakistan Lab..., op. cit., page 9.

The Pakistan Times, 9 July 1957.

Naya Hindustan, 5 July 1953.

S. Patel, Agricultural Labourers in Modern India and Pakistan, B (Bombay), 1952, page 134.

ibid.

ibid., pages 135-137.

ibid., page 135; Report on an Enquiry..., op. cit., page 27.

Report..., ibid.

ibid., page 26.

ibid., pages 26-28.
42 The First..., op. cit., Vol II, page 471.

43 Plantation Labour in Assam Valley, D (Delhi), 1951, pages 24-25.


46 ibid., pages 64, 93-94.


48 The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1950.

49 ibid.

50 ibid.

51 Pakistan Labour Yearbook, op. cit., pages 52-53.


54 The Pakistan Times, 10 July 1956.

55 ibid., 7 May 1957.

56 ibid., 14 August 1950.

57 ibid.

58 ibid.

59 Data from The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1950.


61 The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1950; Karachi Commerce, 6 May 1954.

Third Article: Agriculture


2 Economy of Pakistan (1950), K (S.a.), pages 58, 65.


4 Report to the President of the Board of Trade by the UK Industrial Mission to Pakistan 1950, L, 1950, page 30; see also D. K. Bishop, The Consumption of Agricultural Products in Pakistan, W (Washington), 1954, pages 4, 12.

5 Royal Commission on Agriculture in India, Vol VIII, Evidence taken in the Punjab, L, 1927, page 191. An exception is made by the sugar-cane presses, the incorporation in agriculture of which began in the 80s of the last century. These presses were produced then at the iron works in Batal (Gurdaspur District).

6 Agricultural Statistics of the Punjab (Pakistan) 1901/02 to 1946/47, Lahore, 1950, page 101. Here and later, unless stipulated, data on improved tools refers to the regions of Punjab, forming part of Pakistan.


8 Ibid. It is interesting to note the following reason for
the distribution of chaff-cutters among peasant farms. As a result of the plowing up of former commons, there was a rapid decrease of village pastures, which caused the peasants to resort to wheat straw more and more often for stock feed. This greatly increased the demand for chaff-cutters. (See H. K. Trevaskis, The Punjab of Today, Vol I, Lahore, 1931, page 322). In the 20s of this century the Royal Commission on Agriculture in India found that "there is now a great demand for chaff-cutters" (Royal..., op. cit., Vol VIII, page 194).

9 Almost all these tools are powered by domestic animals. Only 111 presses in 1945 were mechanically operated (See Agricultural Stat..., Punjab, op. cit., page 101).


12 According to agricultural equipment censuses, in 1935 there were 1500 irrigation pumps in Punjab with kerosene motors and 135 pumps with electric motors (deep wells). In 1945 there were 451 of the former and 822 of the latter (Agri..., St..., Punjab..., op. cit., page 101).

11 Ibid.

13 By the middle of 1956 there were more than 1,500 deep wells with electric motors in the virgin land areas of Rasul (The First..., op. cit., page 133).


15 Ibid.; The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 8 August 1957.

16 Report..., Pak..., Agr..., Ind., op. cit., page 21.


19 Only in East Pakistan

20 Report..., Pak..., op. cit., page 10; Enterprise, 23 March
page 29. We note that light wheel tractors are used usually in agriculture (in 1954 351 of 2523 machines were caterpillar tread and 2172 -- wheeled). Official statistics give no data on their horsepower.

21 The Pakistan Times, 8 June 1957.


23 Pakistan's small-scale iron industry suffers constantly from lack of raw materials. As a result of a critical fiscal situation, the government in recent years has sharply curtailed the import of metal for this industry. For example, in 1957 the majority of Lyallpur enterprises were either shut down or had drastically cut back production (See The Pakistan Times, 8 June 1957).


25 According to a collection for the 1934/35 agricultural year, one of the farmers in the Jelum district, cultivating 38.6 acres of land (10.1 of his own and 28.5 leased acres), had three light iron plows. A large-scale landowner peasant in Lyallpur, cultivating 34.1 acres, used an iron harrow, seeder, plus a chaff-cutter bought in partnership with another farmer. A wealthy peasant in Sargodha, cultivating 60.5 acres, owned several improved plows and a chaff-cutter, bought in shares with neighbors (See Labh Singh and Ajaib Singh, Farm Accounts in the Punjab, 1934-1935, Lahore, 1937, pages 194, 200, 230, 234, 263, 272).

26 M. Darling, Rusticus Loquitur or the Old Light and the New in the Punjab Village, L, 1936, pages 204-205.

27 Even such common equipment as chaff-cutters, the best of which cost 30 rupees in the 30s, were owned on shares with neighbors by wealthy Punjab peasants.

28 Report of the Economic..., op. cit., page 67. In another source referring to this period, it is noted that "more and more Zamindars are buying tractors" (Agriculture in Asia and the Far East, FAO, Rome, 1953, page 74).

29 Enterprise, 4 May 1957, page 8.

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30 Report by the United Kingdom Industr..., op. cit., page 34; The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 40.

31 Ibid (Report), pages 32, 34.

32 The constant complaints by the representatives of official agricultural organizations of the state and private owners due to the lack of technical personnel in the country are well-known, as well as lack of service points, as a result of which the majority of tractors break down and cannot be used regularly in production. Some landowners consider it normal to have three tractors, only one of which is constantly in use, one under repairs, and the other "for emergencies", in case the first breaks down. In 1950 there were about 1000 tractors in Pakistan, apparently; the British mission, drawing up its report in the same year, noted that "although higher estimates are quoted, in actuality 200 or 300 tractors were being used regularly in Pakistan agriculture..." (Ibid., page 36).


35 Ibid., pages 56, 222, 246, 256.


37 "A large quantity of fertilizer never reaches the fields. Most of it is used for fuel and some is wasted. But even the remainder which is preserved for the fields is not kept properly. As a result the useful fertilizing properties either are subject to leaching or acidation. (The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 34.)

38 Yearbook of Food Agricultural Statistics 1955, Vol IX, Part I, page 212. The majority of the cultivated lands in Pakistan suffer primarily from a great lack of nitrous compounds.


The Pakistan Agricultural Inquiry Committee notes that in spite of the policy of giving landowners subsidies for purchase of fertilizer, "the farmer's low buying power", alongside the "high cost of fertilizer", hinders any significant distribution of the latter. As a result of the excessive prices, purchases of fertilizer do not pay for ordinary crops — wheat, rice, cotton, that is, those crops which are basic in Pakistan (See Report of the..., pages 28, 29).

The Pakistan government intends to conduct a general agricultural census, including equipment listing, no sooner than 1960.

Report of the Econom..., op. cit., page 64.

The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 41.

The material basis for production on this farm consisted of the following elements. The cultivated land comprised 100 irrigated acres, livestock included 10 strong oxen worth 120 rupees apiece (total value of livestock — 3212 rupees); there were 14 units of improved agricultural equipment: three heavy "Raja" iron plows, two mattock frames for working the soil after deep plowing, three seed drills, an iron harrow, feed cutter, two sugar presses, two carts (total value of improved equipment — 1314.5 rupees). In addition the farm had 86 units of minor equipment, produced by village artisans, including three wooden harrows, six ordinary and three special collars, six shovels, four buckets, eight scythes, four feed-cutting knives, two axes, etc. The total value of these tools, judging from the numerous descriptions of similar types of equipment, was evidently no more than 200-300 rupees, and annual depreciation — 50-75. The farm hired each year eight farm hands for the year, and during harvest hired supplementary day laborers, the labor of whom amounted to 334 man-days.

"...Capital... was at first indifferent to the technical nature of the labor process which it ruled. It takes it basically as it finds it" (Marx, op. cit. Das Kapital, page 253). "Capital subordinates labor to itself at first under those conditions at which it finds it historically. Consequently, it does not immediately change the method of production" (Marx, ibid., page 315).
The process of the growth of the relative overpopulation in India and Pakistan is studied in great detail in the monograph by S. Dzh. Patel, *Sele'skokozyaystvennye rabochie v Indii i Pakistanе* (Agricultural Workers in India and Pakistan), M., 1955.

For the rural entrepreneur, as for any capitalist, "the use of machinery is expedient only within the limits of the difference between the cost of machinery and that of the labor replaced" (Marks, op. cit., Vol I, page 398). The extremely low cost of labor in India and Pakistan reduces to a minimum the formation of this difference.

In Soviet Indology the question of the stages of capitalist development of agriculture in colonial India was studied in greatest detail by M. A. Maksimov (See "Formation and Conditions of Exploitation of the Indian Agricultural Proletariat (1914-1947)", candidate dissertation, M., 1955, chapter 2); M. A. Maksimov and V. G. Rastyanikov, "Features of the Formation and Exploitation of the Agricultural Proletariat in Colonial India", *Sovetskoye vostokovedenie* (Soviet Oriental Studies), 1956, No 6, pages 42-55.

Radhakamal Mukerjee, *Land Problems of India*, L, 1933, page 60. Analogous explanations of the reasons for the technical stagnation of agriculture in colonial India can be found in various sources. Chowdhri Muktah Singh, member of the Indian Central Bank Commission in the past, wrote: "...the idea of introducing tools and saving labor cannot receive broad dissemination... In a country where farmers are unemployed more than 6 months of the year, in other words, where 50% of the village is unemployed, an attempt to introduce machinery is useless and a waste of time, money and energy" (Chowdhri Muktah Singh, *Rural India*, Allahabad, S. A., page 172). Mentioning the few landlord-entrepreneurs in Punjab at the end of the 30s and beginning of the 40s, the colonial authorities in the province, in the memorandum presented to the commission for studying the reasons for famine (1945), noted: "Landlords have not yet organized farming with machinery and still count on the initiative of the government. Their net income from leasing land is comparatively high, and therefore they are inclined to be satisfied and show insufficient interest in expanding farming, renovating cultivating methods and methods of economy" (The Famine Inquiry Commission, Final Report), Madras, 1945, page 266.


55 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 249.

56 Report..., by the UK Industr..., op. cit., page 31.


60 Liu Shao-chi, "Report at the Second Session of the VIIIth All-China Party Congress (Pravda, 29 May 1953).

61 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, pages 39, 40.

62 ibid., page 40; Enterprise, 4 May 1957, page 8; The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1957.

63 ibid.


66 The First Five..., Vol II, page 40.


68 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, pages 92, 39.

69 ibid., page 33.


71 Report of the Econ..., page 63; Pakistan 1955-1956, page 150; Pakistan Trade, March 1958, page 25;

72 Report of the Econom..., page 64.

73 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 33.

74 The Weekly Bulletin, 7 March 1957, page 17; Ten Years...
op. cit., page 341; The Pakistan Times, 8 August 1957.

75 Ten Years..., ibid., page 97.

76 Pakistan 1955-1956, page 147; The Pakistan Times, 6 August 1957.

77 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 33.

78 ibid., page 32; Pakistan 1955-1956, page 151.

79 ibid., page 151; Ten Years of P..., op. cit., page 341.

80 Statistical Digest of Pakistan, 1950, K, S.a., pages 26-27. This does not include data on Baluchistan and small principalities the cultivated land of which comprises an insignificant percentage of the total for West Pakistan.

81 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 178. If one considers that 10% of land farmed produces two crops per year (comprised 24.75 million acres in 1955), the percentage of irrigated land in the total reaches 34.8%.

82 We cannot treat the question of the nature of irrigation in Pakistan during the colonial period and the goals pursued by British imperialism. See S. A. Kuz'min, "Agrarian Relations in Sind in the Second Half of the 19th Century" (candidate's dissertation), M, 1958, ch III.

83 The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 188. These improvements consist chiefly in the fact that some of the canals which furnish water now only during high water (spring), as a result of construction of new dams and reservoirs will have water the year round.


85 Certain facts on this subject were given in the work: V. G. Rastyanikov and S. A. Kuz'min, Problemy ekonomiki Pakistan (Problems of Pakistan's Economy), M, 1958, pages 50-52.


87 Pakistan 1955-1956, page 146; The First Five..., op. cit., Vol II, page 173; This includes dry valley cultivated land, tremendous expanses of waste land, fallow and other

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unfarmed land. These lands are subjected to wind erosion. Sands which come to the surface as a result of the destruction of the thin surface cover often are blown to neighboring farmlands. For example, in Punjab 2.8 million acres of irrigated farmland were completely or partially covered with sands. (The First Five... op. cit., page 173.) The scourge of agriculture, occurring chiefly along rivers and main irrigation canals, is periodic flooding, which washes away the fertile topsoil.

88 Building during past decades a broad system of irrigation facilities, British finance capital, endeavoring to receive the maximum profit from capital investments, usually did not bother to build water runoff facilities. Lengthy use of irrigation inevitably brought about an increase of the sub-surface water level; the water came into direct contact with the soil strata and brought massive salt deposits to the surface. For example, in 25 years (1927-1952) in Punjab alone irrigated farmland where sub-surface water was 3 m or less from the surface doubled.

89 According to the Pakistan Planning Committee, in Punjab alone, as a result of wind and water erosion 1.6 million acres suffered badly; more than 6 million acres of irrigated land (of 14 million) were subjected to excessive salinization. One of the latest official handbooks states that "practically all land under cultivation in West Pakistan contains a significant amount of salt" (The First Five..., op. cit., page 173; Pakistan 1955-1956, page 149).

90 ibid., page 174; Morning News, 13 February 1957.

91 The First..., ibid., pages 144, 174, 182.

92 Pakistan 1955-1956, page 149.


94 ibid., (budget)(1958), K, 1957, page 12. For example, the American International Cooperation Administration stated in: "Punjab productivity decreased 50-60% on 1.7 million acres subjected to strong salinization, 20% -- 5 million acres (Morning News, 13 February 1957).

95 Some data based on the processing of Pakistan statistics.
were used in the book: V. G. Rastyannikov and S. A. Kuz'min, op. cit., pages 47-49.

Fourth Article: People's League Party

1 The Pakistan Times, Lahore, 21 July 1953.


3 ibid.

4 According to an official announcement by the leaders of the Moslem League, in 1953 the number of illiterates comprised 90% of all its members in Karachi -- the largest city and capital of Pakistan (The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1953).


6 For example, see the statement by the General Secretary of the East Pakistan People's League, Sheikh Mujib-ur-Rahmana (The Pakistan Times, 24 July 1953).

7 ibid., 22 July.

8 The events in 1953-54 in East Pakistan, connected with the formation of the United Front, and the role of the People's League in these events require careful study. Certain facts indicate that the People's League was the organizer of the United Front and that its leaders drew up the famous "21 points" of the Front's platform. At any rate, the idea of forming a United Front of Bengal nationalist parties to oppose the government of the Moslem League was first voiced by the leaders of the People's League. Important also is the fact that all the basic principles of the platform of the United Front were formulated by the leaders of the East Pakistan People's League as early as the summer of 1953 (ibid., 24 July).

9 The text of the platform appears in the newspapers Dawn, K, 4 April 1954; The Pakistan Times, 6 April 1954.

10 The system of court orders by which the property of peasants who have failed to pay up their rent is sold at auction.

11 L. R. Gordon in his article "Status of the Peasants in
East Pakistan notes that after the formation of Pakistan many landowners began to buy up large quantities of jute from the peasants (see Uchenye zapiski Instituta Vostokovedeniya /Learned Notes of the Institute for Oriental Studies/, Vol XII, M, 1955, page 236).

12 "Has" — landowner's personal use land.


14 The "Hari Committee" of Sind is the organization leading the fight of the Sindhi tenant farmers -- hari -- against the large landowners.

15 The Pakistan Times, 18 November 1954.


18 Civil and Military Gazette, Lahore, 26 April 1957.

19 The People's League faction in the second constituent assembly consisted of 13 deputies and was third in membership after the Moslem League (25) and United Front (16). In the Legislative Assembly of East Pakistan in February 1955 the People's League had 95 mandates of 310 (The Pakistan Standard, 24 June 1955; Pacific Affairs (Richmond), 1950, Vol XXIX, No 1, page 191). In both assemblies the leaders of the parliamentary factions of the People's League—Suhrawardi and Ataur Rahman Khan—were officially considered to be leaders of the opposition.

20 The Pakistan Times, 23 February 1956.

21 Ibid., 16 February. We should note that the demand to carry out agrarian reforms in the form in which they were formulated by the leaders of the People's League in the Constituent Assembly had differing significance for East and West Pakistan. In East Pakistan the incorporation of the program of the United Front would lead to transfer into the hands of the state and subsequent distribution among the peasants without compensation for the majority of the landlords' lands. But with the mechanical application of the second point in the United Front program—East Pakistan People's League to the conditions of West Pakistan (as the rightest party leaders did), due to the historical
peculiarities of the development of agrarian relations in this part of the country, we can speak only of the liquidation of the privileged landed castes, that is, a thin stratum of land magnates of Sind and part of Punjab; most of the landlords retained their land. Therefore, individual groups of landlords could support the agrarian program of the People's League in West Pakistan.

22 Insisting on agrarian reforms, one of the leaders, Abul Mansur Ahmad, appealed to the deputies of the Constituent Assembly "not to forget the lessons of history": "You must remember what happened with the feudal landowners in Russia and China" (The Pakistan Times, 16 February 1956).

23 This is backed by a comparison of the speeches of the People's League leaders containing resolutions for agrarian reforms to the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of Pakistan, as well as the chambers of commerce and industry in Multan and Lyallpur (See: Karachi Times, 1954, Vol VI, No 28, page 1; The Pakistan Times, 24 January 1957; 3 March).

24 The Pakistan Times, 16 February 1956; 1 March, 23 July.

25 ibid., 16 February, 1 March 1956.

26 ibid., 6 July, 22 August 1956.

27 ibid., 24 July 1953.

28 See the speech made in the West Pakistan Legislative Assembly by industrialist and prominent figure in the Muslim League, Majmuddin Walibhai (ibid., 20 September 1957).


30 See the resolution of the session of the East Pakistan People's League Council, 21-23 October 1955 in Dacca (The Pakistan Standard, 24 October 1955; The Pakistan Times, 24 October 1955).


32 The Pakistan Times, 5 February 1956.
34 See statements by Maulana Bhashani and Mian Iftiharuddin
and the resolution by the Karachi City People's League
Committee of 23 January 1956, etc. (Civil and Military
Gazette, 24 January 1955; The Pakistan Times, 1 March

35 The Pakistan Times, 29 August 1956; Dawn, 29 August 1956.

36 The Pakistan Times, 22 August, 4 September 1956.

37 Imroz, Lahore, 6 September 1956; Current Affairs, India,

38 The Pakistan Times, 16 February 1956. We mean the vote aga-
against the amendment to article 15 of the constitution
("Guarantee of property rights") proposed by People's
League representative Abdul Mansur Ahmad. The amendment
would stipulate in the text of the constitution that
no guarantees of property rights could be an obstacle to-
ward carrying out agrarian reforms.

39 Pacific Affairs, 1956, Vol XXIX, No 1, page 9; The Pakis-
tan Times, 2, 9 September 1956.

40 In March 1957 the rightist opposition in the East Pakis-
tan legislative assembly had 83 mandates (ibid., 18
March 1957.)

41 See A. I. D'yakov, "National Composition of the Population
of India", op. cit., page 293; G. Kotovsky, "The Agrar-
ian Program of the National Congress in 1885-1917",
Ocherki po novoy istorii stran Srednego Vostoka (Outlines
of Recent History of the Middle East), M, 1951; V. Ya.
Grashe (V. I. Pavlov), "Peculiar Features of the Format-
ion of some National Groups of the Indian Industrial
Bourgeoisie", Kratkije soobshcheniya Instituta vostokov-
edel'nyx (Brief Reports of the Institute of Oriental Stud-
ses), No 1, M, 1951; V. I. Pavlov, "Merchant and Usurer
Activities in Colonial India", Uchenyje zapiski In., Vos.,
op. cit., Vol XII; V. I. Pavlov, Formirovaniye indyaskov
burzhuazii, M, 1958, pages 265-279.

42 The constituent assembly was so called after the Pakistan
Constitution was passed.

43 The Pakistan Times, 11 September 1956.
44 *Imroz*, 30 September 1956.

45 ibid., 15 September 1956.

46 *Foreign Affairs Report, Delhi, 1956, No 12, page 134*.

47 *The Pakistan Times, 27 April, 25 May, 25 October 1957*.

48 ibid., 17 December 1956; 23 March 1957.

49 *Dawn, 28 January 1957*.

50 At one time the leaders of the People's League claimed that passage by the Constituent Assembly of Article 15 of the Constitution was advantageous only to landowners and demanded that it be amended (*The Pakistan Times, 15, 16 February 1956*).

51 ibid., 4 December 1957.

52 *Pakistan Observer, Dacca, 31 August, 1 September 1957; The Pakistan Times, 31 August 1957*.

53 ibid., 15 March 1957.

54 For more detail see Rastyannikov, Kuz'min, op. cit.

55 *The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1957*.

56 This campaign, organized by the ruling groups in Pakistan as an emergency measure, consisted chiefly in agitation for an increase in land under cultivation, an increase in food crop productivity and a search for supplementary sources of food.

57 For example, to members of the Farmers' Association in the region of Dacca (*Civil and Military Gazette, 25 April 1957*).

58 *The Pakistan Times, 13 May 1957*.


60 Ten Year... op. cit., pages 113-115. In 1956 Pakistan imported, according to official figures, 1.3 million tons of food, ibid., pages 113-115; *Economic Observer, K, 1957, Vol XI, No 9-10, page 4*. However, according to other estimates, which seem to us to be more well-founded, the amount of imported food in 1956 amounted to 1.5
61 Ten Years of... pages 115-116; Civil and Military Gazette, 2 February 1957; The Pakistan Times, 2 February 1957.

62 ibid., 22 April 1957.


64 The Pakistan Times, 16 March 1957.

65 ibid., 16 March, 11 and 21 May 1957.


67 In this respect the criticism of the domestic policy of the Suhrawardi government is characteristic, especially on the agrarian question, made by the chambers of commerce and industry of Multan and Lyallpur.

68 In 1956/57 Pakistan’s balance of payments deficit reached a record figure --- 266.6 million rupees, and gold and cash reserves decreased by 194.1 million rupees (See report of the manager of the Pakistan State Bank: The Financial Times, L, 10 September 1957.)

69 Dawn, 16 October 1956.


72 The Pakistan Times, 3 April 1957; 17 May, 11 September; Pakistan Observer, 24 August 1957.

73 The Pakistan Times, 4 October 1956, 18 December; Dawn, 18 December 1956.

74 ibid., 22 January 1957; The Pakistan Times, 30 June 1957.

75 Civil and Military Gazette, 10 April, 22 May 1957; National Herald, Lucknow, 11 April 1957.
76 See the speech by Ataur Rahman Khan at the 7th Annual Economic Conference in Dacca on 18 December 1956. (The Pakistan Times, 19 December 1956).

77 Civil and Military Gazette, 17 February 1957; The Pakistan Times, 26 April 1957; 18 February 1957.

78 ibid., 7 March.

79 Civil and Military Gazette, 14 February 1957; The Pakistan Times, 26 April 1957; 25 June.

80 ibid., 4 January; Civil and Military Gazette, 8 May 1957, Pakistan Observer, 18-20 August 1957.

81 The Pakistan Times, 27 June 1957.


83 The Pakistan Times, 10 June 1957.

84 ibid., 19 December 1956.

85 ibid., 8 March 1957.

86 Civil and Military Gazette, 5 April 1957; The Pakistan Times, 5 April 1957.

87 Dawn, 6 April 1957.

88 See the speech by Suhrawardi on 28 March 1957 at a meeting at Lahore University (The Pakistan Times, 2 April 1957).

89 ibid., 13 January.


91 The Pakistan Times, 22 May 1957.

92 See the resolution of the Working Committee of the People's League of Sind of 15 January 1957 (ibid., 16 January.)

93 See the printed speech by president of the "Sanatantri dal" Abdur Rab Seribat, Mahmud Ali and other leaders of this party (Dawn, 15 April 1957; The Pakistan Times, 15 April, 17 May 1957).

94 Particularly characteristic in this respect is the speech

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by Bhaskari at the peasant conference in Bogra on 19 May, Civil and Military Gazette, 21 May 1957.

95 The Pakistan Times, 25 October 1957.

96 ibid., 22 May. There were many hari-tenant farmers among the members of the Sind People's League, and Kazi Faiz Mohammed at one time headed the Sind "Hari Committee".

97 Civil and Military Gazette, 21 May, 1 June 1957; The Pakistan Times, 1 June 1957; National Herald, 22 May 1957; Hindustan Times, D, 24 May 1957.


99 Imroz, 17 February 1957; The Pakistan Times, 19, 23 February 1957.

100 ibid., 7-10 February; Civil and Military Gazette, 9 February 1957; Hindustan Times, 9 February 1957.

101 The Pakistan Times, 18 May 1957; Civil and Military Gazette, 19 May 1957.

102 Delhi Times, 10 August 1957.

103 The Pakistan Times, 21 June 1957. Figureheads, bribery of members of the Council for import licenses, violations of party democracy, etc., were discussed by the papers of the most varied political leanings, including the organ of the East Pakistan Moslem League, Azad, the paper of the "Krishnakot" party leader, Hamidul Hak Chaudhuri, Pakistan Observer, and other papers which cannot be suspected of sympathizing with the left wing of the People's League.

104 For the session of the East Pakistan People's League Council, see The Pakistan Times, 13-15, 17, 21 June 1957; Dawn, 13 June 1957; Civil and Military Gazette, 14, 15 June 1957.

105 The Pakistan Times, 18 June 1957.

106 ibid., 22, 25, 30 June; 1, 13, 18 July 1957.

108 quoted from The Pakistan Times, 27 September 1957.

109 See Pakistan Observer, 20 August 1957.

110 The paper Pakistan Times, close to the leaders of the National People's Party, wrote on 2 September 1957: "On 1 September Article 14 (Criminal Code -- author) came into force in Barisal, prohibiting the assembly of more than five persons. According to available information, this was done in order to break up the conference of the National People's Party in the district of Barisal".

111 Not without purpose did part of Pakistan's national bourgeoisie support the National People's Party, which sought democratic reforms more consistently than the People's League.

112 The Pakistan Times, 1 August, 15, 27 September 1957; National Herald, 5 November 1957.

113 See Pakistan Observer, 9-14 August 1957. Iskander Mirza was formally considered to be non-party, although he was one of the initiators of the formation of the Republican Party and participated in its most important decisions.

114 National Herald, 5 September 1957.

115 This proposal was first introduced by Iskander Mirza in his radio speech on 23 March 1957 (The Pakistan Times, 26, 27 March, 10 April 1957).

116 Ibid., 27 March.

117 Ibid., 10 April.

118 The Times, L, 13 August 1957; Blitz, 5 October 1957, p 1.

119 The Pakistan Times, 18 September 1957.

120 Ibid., 26 March; Pakistan Observer, 20-21 August 1957.

121 Governor of West Pakistan, M. A. Gurnan, was replaced against Suhrawardi's will; on the other hand, the republicans rejected all demands of the leaders of the People's League to remove Fazlul Hak from the post of governor of East Pakistan.

122 The Pakistan Times, 8 October 1957.
After the fall of the Suhrawardi government, the leaders of both parties postponed the resolution of the question of the formation of a federation of autonomous provinces in West Pakistan until general elections.

Times of Karachi, 10 October 1957.

Civil and Military Gazette, 5 October 1957.

See The Pakistan Times, 5 November 1957.

This is shown, for example, by the mass campaign organized by the People's League against attempts by the coalition government of Chundrigar, replacing the Suhrawardi cabinet, to restore the separate election system for religious-communal curias.

It is necessary to say at least a few words on the fate of certain members of the People's League after the establishment of a military dictatorship in Pakistan. In the proclamation by former president Iskander Mirza, the ban on all parties was motivated by the necessity to rejuvenate the country's internal political situation as well as by the fact that these parties and their leaders had discredited themselves by political intrigues and corruption. Many arrests were made for this. However, in spite of Mirza's proclamation, not only politicians involved in corruption and intrigues suffered, but even more were it those participants in the democratic movement and mainly leaders of the National People's Party. Many rank and file members of the People's League were also thrown in jail, either because they, different from Suhrawardi, demanded a change in Pakistan's foreign policy or because they sought more autonomy for East Bengal, or simply because they had actively defended democracy in Pakistan.

Fifth Article: General Elections

See The Pakistan Times, 1957, 14 August.

On the largest party in Pakistan -- the Republican -- the magazine The Round Table wrote: "Even the chameleon cannot change its color as easily and as often as the Republicans" (1957, December, No 189, page 77).

This name is explained by the fact that, together with legislation, this assembly had the aim of drawing up a constitution.
4 The Indian constituent assembly was elected in June 1946 by provincial legislative organs, one deputy per each million inhabitants (this ratio was maintained in the Pakistan Constituent Assembly). Indian provincial assemblies were elected at the end of 1945–beginning of 1946 on the basis of the 1935 constitution, limiting the number of electors, grouped in various religious-communal curias.

5 See Manifest of the Punjab Committee of the CP of Pakistan, Lahore, 1950, pages 13-14.


7 Provincial legislative assembly elections took place in Punjab in March 1951, in the NW Frontier Province in December 1951, in Sind — in May 1953 and in East Bengal — in March 1954.

8 The parties in opposition to the United Front won at the polls (N. Chakravarty, Blackout in East Pakistan, D, 1954, page 36.)

9 41,932,000 persons of the Pakistan total of 75,636,000 live in East Bengal (Figures for 1951, see Census of Pakistan, 1951: Population acc. to religion, Table 6, K, 1951, page 17).

10 This included a printed interview between a reporter from the paper and Fazlul Khak, Prime Minister of the new provincial government, supposedly wishing to form an "independent" East Bengal. Although this assertion was denied by Khak, the central authorities used it as a reason for throwing out the government of the United Front (Chakravarty, op. cit., page 48).

11 All authority went over to Major General Iskander Mirza, appointed governor of the province.


13 The Pakistan Times, 14 August, 21 October 1954.

14 East Pakistan had 44 representatives in the first Constituent assembly, Punjab — 22, the NW Frontier Province — 3, etc.

15 The legislative assembly of the new province was formed
of deputies of the former provincial assemblies and representatives of the principalities of West Pakistan.

16 On 7 January 1956 Prime Minister Choudhuri Mohammed Ali announced that "general elections will be held within one year after passage of the constitution (The Pakistan Times, 14 August 1957).

17 When he was Prime Minister, H. S. Suhrawardi stated that "political instability in the country will continue until general elections are held" (ibid., 8 April 1957).

18 In the summer of 1956 the C. M. Ali government promised to hold elections in March, and then -- in May 1957. The Suhrawardi government (September 1956-October 1957) planned elections for February 1958, delaying them to March and then to July of that year. The Republican government of M. F. H. Nun, coming into power in December 1957, stated that elections would take place no later than the end of November 1958.

19 The Pakistan Times, 12 May 1957.

20 ibid., 10 May 1957.


22 See the statement by the commission published on 4 August 1957 (The Pakistan Times, 4 August 1957). Prominent civic leader Mian Iftiharuddin, speaking before the National Assembly on 21 February 1957, stressed that the government had allocated barely ½ the amount necessary for holding elections (See Nasim Zekaria, Parliamentary Government in Pakistan, Lahore, 1958, pages 178-179).

23 For details see A. M. D'yakov, Natsional'nyy vopros i angliyskiy imperializm v Indii (The Nationalities Problem and British Imperialism in India), M, 1948.

24 ibid., page 221; The Problemsof Electorates (S.l.), S.a., page 11.

25 See note 23, page 221.

26 Five Years of Pakistan (August 1947-August 1952), K (S.a.), page 207.

28 It is interesting to note that in India separate elections were abolished as early as August 1947 (The Indian and Pakistan Yearbook and Who is Who, 1948, Vol XXXIV, page 12).


30 After the constitution was passed, the Constituent Assembly was called the National Assembly.

31 See the article by F. Mansur, "The CP of Pakistan rejects the Draft Constitution" (Naya Hindustan, 11 January 1953).


33 The Pakistan Times, 12 October 1956.

34 According to this "theory", Hindus and Moslems comprise two completely separate nations in India.

35 The Pakistan Times, 30 October 1956.

36 "Unified elections are a prelude to the elimination of Pakistan", stated Shah Azizur Rahman, Secretary General of the East Pakistan Moslem League (Dawn, 3 December 1957).

37 During the debates in the National Assembly in April 1957 on elections, prominent figure in the Moslem League F. Rahman stated: "The two nations theory is as effective today as at the time of the partition" (The Pakistan Times, 25 April 1957).

38 Ibid., 3 October, 1956.

39 Konstitutsiya Islamskoy..., op. cit., page 201, line 5.

40 As is known, "orthodox" Moslems refuse to recognize the members of certain sects (Primarily Ahmads) as Moslems and consider them to be religious minorities (For more details, see H. Feinman, A Constitution for Pakistan, pages 29-32, 37-47; Syed Abul Ala Maudoodi, The Qadiani Problem, K, 1953, page 3). It is clear that with the introduction of separate elections this problem could become the source of many difficulties and complications. One should note that the Ahmads were in favor of unified elections (The Pakistan Times, 27 April 1957).
41 See Konstitutsiya, op. cit., pages 178, 279. See also the statement by Jinnah on 23 March 1948 that "Pakistan is based on the solid foundation of social justice and Islam socialism, which stresses the equality and brotherhood of peoples", Electorates, Separate or Joint? (S.I., S.a.), page 14.

42 See Quaid-i-Azama and the Election Issue (S.I., S.a.).


45 Speaking over the radio on 22 November 1954, Prime Minister Mohammed Ali Bogra stated that the unification of West Pakistan would take place in accordance with Islam ideology, which rejects territorial boundaries. He appealed to the Bengali, Punjabi, Sindhi to cease to consider themselves as separate nationalities (Feldman, op. cit., pages 80-81; The Pakistan Times, 23 November 1954).

46 Ullah, op. cit.,

47 In 1957, that is, after the official recognition of Bengali as one of the official languages of Pakistan, there were more papers and periodicals in Urdu than Bengali; Zafar Mansoor, "Publishing Industry in Pakistan", Pakistan Quarterly, Vol VII, No 4, page 5.

48 Representatives of Bengal insisted repeatedly that with the aid of separate elections the ruling circles in West Pakistan were endeavoring to carry out the "divide and conquer" policy in respect to East Pakistan (Zakaria, op. cit., page 182).

49 In certain districts of East Pakistan unified elections for local administrative organs were held, and the results of these are very significant. In the district of Khulna 16 seats were usually reserved for Moslems in the local organ of self-government, for Hindus -- 14. With unified elections, 28 went to the Moslems and 2 to Hindus. Things were analogous in Faridpur, Dinajpur and other districts in East Bengal. For more detail, see the speech by Suhrawardi in parliament on 10 October 1956 (The Pakistan Times, 11 October 1956).
The religious minorities of West Pakistan, scattered throughout the territories of its former provinces and comprising an insignificant percentage of the population (less than 3%), generally opposed unified elections, insisting on their community interests, which is completely understandable and explainable if one considers the specific conditions of this artificially formed "unified province". Most active in the struggle for separate elections were the leaders of religious minorities who feared to lose their seats in parliament and the provincial assembly (under separate elections it was provided to reserve 10 seats for non-Muslims in the provincial assembly and 5 in the National Assembly). Christian leader S. Y. Gibbon (Deputy Speaker of the National Assembly) even submitted a petition to the West Pakistan Superior Court, arguing against the legality of the resolution of parliament of 24 April 1957 on unified elections. On 25 December 1957 Gibbon's petition was rejected (Pakistan Quarterly, Vol VII, 1957, No 3, page 65).

"If unified elections are disadvantageous to anyone, it is only the Hindus", stated Suhrawardi in parliament on 10 October 1956 (The Pakistan Times, 11 October 1956).

"Nation, state and country are synonyms," asserted Suhrawardi (ibid., 25 April 1957).

This party was formed in the summer of 1957 as a result of unifying several democratic and nationalist parties and groups in West and East Pakistan. In general it reflected the interests of the nationalist bourgeoisie in various sections of the country.

For more detail, see the article by S. Levin, to be found in the same collection.

The Republican Party-People's League coalition formed in September 1956.

Somewhat previously, the East Pakistan legislative assembly passed a recommendation to hold unified elections. A majority of 159 voted for the proposal, excluding all Hindu deputies.

We should note that at this time some local party organizations came out for joint elections (for example, Sialkot, Peshawar, etc.).

One should keep in mind that acceptance of the principle
of separate elections would cause a delay in general elections. This is one of the important reasons for the protest against government attempts to foist curial elections on the country.

59 "Republican Party Manifest", passed in the fall of 1956. It stated, in particular, that all persons in the country "belong to the indivisible Pakistani nation" (The Pakistan Times, 1 October 1956).

60 See, for example, the article "Breakup of Coalition (The Round Table, 1958, March, No 190, page 185).

61 The hassle as to the form of elections was one of the most important reasons for the fall in the beginning of 1956 of such a strong party coalition as the United Front.

62 New Age, 26 October 1958.

63 See, for example, The Eastern Economist, New Delhi, Vol XXVIII, 12 April 1957; New Commonwealth, September 1957, page 304; The Pakistan Times, 1 December 1957.

64 Pravda, 22 December 1957.

65 The author of the article "First Elections in Pakistan", J. Bagdade, wrote that "elections will make it possible for the strong left wing to appear on the scene for the first time". New Commonwealth, August 1958, page 80); the weekly New Age noted that as a result of elections "the parties and individuals in opposition to the government could obtain a number of seats in the legislative organs and the parliament" (New Age, 26 October 1956).

66 Pravda, 28 January 1959.

67 New Age, 19 October 1958