Joint Operations in Canada:
Necessary or Merely Fashionable?

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ABSTRACT


The end of the Cold War has resulted in a new strategic environment. While the threat to national survival has declined for NATO nations, the threats to international stability and prosperity from smaller conflicts have increased. At the same time governments have reduced the size of their armed forces in order to realize a peace dividend. In order to mitigate the reductions, armed forces have adopted the doctrine of joint operations.

This monograph examines whether joint operations between Canada’s Land Forces and Maritime Forces are necessary for the achievement of Canada’s defence objectives. It examines the Canada’s strategic context, its defence policy and its doctrine. The monograph also compares Canada’s approach to two close allies, Australia and the United Kingdom.

The monograph concludes the primary warfighting tasks assigned to the Canadian Forces can be achieved without joint land and maritime operations. There is room for such operations in domestic operations, in evacuation of non-combatants from strife torn areas of the world and in the delivery of international humanitarian and disaster relief. While no direct lessons can be drawn from the United Kingdom experience, a re-orientation of the defence of Canadian territory along the lines of the Australian approach, provides room for joint land and maritime operations.
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Introduction

"The Cold War is over."¹ This statement is obviously true to anyone who has lived through the last two decades. The fact that the statement is made in Canada’s Defence Policy White Paper demonstrates that, while stating obvious truth, it belies the complexity of the security environment in the post Cold War period. Since the end of the Cold War governments have re-examined their defence policies and reduced the size of their armed forces in order to distribute a “peace dividend” to their taxpayers.² The armed forces have been forced to find new ways of operating in order to safeguard their nations’ interests within the constraints of lower budgets.

Many armed forces developed doctrine for joint operations in order to find new efficiencies. By combining the effects of different services, they envisioned that the reduction in size and combat power of a single service would be mitigated. The Canadian Forces (CF) are now developing joint doctrine and procedures in order to benefit from the synergy joint forces are expected to achieve. The Canadian Forces elements forward deployed in Europe during the Cold War benefitted from the establishment of sound NATO procedures for the employment of air and land forces. The Canadian Maritime Forces was employed independently of the other two services throughout the Cold War and Canada cannot rely on NATO experience for joint operations doctrine for the employment of Land Forces and Maritime forces.

Is it necessary that the Canadian Land Forces and Maritime Forces work together in joint operations? This monograph answers this question.

As Canada is not unique in the necessity of adapting to the post Cold War security environment, this monograph will use the strategy, capability and doctrine of two close
allies in order to draw a comparison. Canada shares a great deal with the United Kingdom and Australia. Both Canada and Australia draw upon the British political and military traditions. All three also speak the same language, both literally and figuratively.

There are also great differences between the three. While the differences cannot be downplayed, they can be used to explain why some lessons may not be drawn from the experience and doctrine of our allies.

In chapter one, this monograph sets the strategic scene for the remainder of the analysis. Each of the three nations sets forth its Government's policy in the form of a White Paper. The current Canadian White Paper was published in 1994, the Australian government published a White Paper in 1997 and the United Kingdom published their most recent in 1998. Similarities and differences in the strategic context of each nation are examined so that the following discussion of capability and doctrine may be set in context.

Chapter two examines the Army and Navy Capability and doctrine of the United Kingdom. As the largest of the three nations, in population and economic power, the United Kingdom maintains the largest and most capable armed forces. As a nuclear power and a Permanent Member of the United Nations (UN) Security Council, it also bears responsibilities not shared by the other two.

In chapter three, Australia's Capability and doctrine are examined. Similar in size and economic weight to Canada, Australia is currently the major economic power in the Asia-Pacific region. Due to the rapid pace of economic growth in neighbouring countries, Australia expects to lose this status soon. These factors place Australia in a unique security environment.
Chapter four examines Canada’s capability and doctrine. Canada’s connection to the United Kingdom and Europe has shaped its Defence Policy for most of its history. While that connection is maintained through membership in NATO, the withdrawal of Canadian air and land forces from Germany has created new challenges and priorities for the employment of the Canadian forces. Canada shares the defence of its sovereign territory with the United States, the world’s most potent military power, a factor that differentiates it from any other nation.4

The lessons of this analysis are drawn in chapter five. The tasks that are currently incorporated into Canadian Joint, Naval and Land Forces Doctrine are first identified. Then tasks identified in the British and Australian Doctrine that are applicable and feasible within Canadian Capability, but are not currently contained within Canadian doctrine, are then identified. All tasks will be accepted if they allow for interoperability and if they permit complementary use of forces. They must allow for efficient cooperation of both Naval and Land Forces forces without duplicating efforts of one or the other. In the conclusion, the inclusion of those tasks that would contribute to effective joint operations in the Canadian Forces are recommended.

There are certain limitations that apply to the analysis in this monograph. The Canadian Forces are under severe financial constraints.5 Nothing is examined that will require spending not currently forecast in the capital equipment acquisition program. Secondly, this analysis has been conducted at the operational level. No changes to national strategy are proposed. The analysis has been conducted within the context of the 1994 Canadian Defence White Paper and the 1998 Defence Planning Guidance.
Chapter one – Strategic Environment

A nation’s strategic environment is a complex combination of factors, including its geography, population and economic power. These factors, along with each nation’s history and current relationships with its neighbours, help to form a nation’s strategic vision of its place in the world. This chapter reviews the geography, population and economy of the United Kingdom, Australia and Canada. For each nation, its strategic vision, as expressed in its most recent Defence White Paper, is then reviewed. This framework sets the strategic environment within which its armed forces are to be employed.

In Parliamentary systems based upon the British Model, the White Paper forms an important role as a policy instrument. It developed late in the 19th century, and has been used as a statement to parliament that outlines government policy. It has also been used in Canada in recent years as a means of stimulating debate in the policy formulation process. The three examples used here are examples of the former. The United Kingdom (UK) White Paper is the final product of a fundamental review national strategy conducted by the Labour Government soon after it took office.

United Kingdom’s Strategic Environment

The UK is a densely populated collection of islands between the North Sea and the North Atlantic Ocean. The English Channel separates it from the coast of Europe. Its landmass covers 242,900 square kilometres (93,783 square miles). The population in 1996 was 58,801,500, which results in a population density of 242.1 persons per square kilometre. In addition the United Kingdom retains sovereignty over some overseas
territories that were formerly colonies. The territories, such as the Falklands Islands and the British Virgin Islands are included in the British Strategic Defence responsibilities.

The 1996 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of the UK was US$1,159,250 million, of which US$478,219 million was Government spending. Defence spending was US$35,947 million, which represented 7.52% of total government spending and 3.10% of total GDP.

The UK plays a leading role in the world security environment that differs greatly from Canada and Australia. It position comes from its role as a permanent member of the UN Security Council and as one of the five nuclear powers recognized under the nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). In its 1998 White Paper, the Government of the UK sees itself as a “major European power and a leading member of the European Union”, with its economic and political future as part of Europe. This does not mean that they have confined themselves to a purely European focus. The foundation of the British economy is international trade and of all the major economies, the UK invests more of its income abroad.

Maintenance of trade is not the only reason the UK has for maintaining a world leadership role. Ten million British citizens reside abroad and the UK has sovereignty over 13 overseas territories. Notwithstanding these overseas interests, they do not “aspire to be a world policeman.”

Multilateralism is a key fundamental to the UK strategic environment. This is because many of their “important national interests and responsibilities are shared with others, particularly” with the European Union and NATO.
A strategic vision also takes into account potential threats a nation must face. The end of the Cold War has caused changes in the UK’s security environment, which means that the UK no longer faces a “threat to its national survival, represented by the Warsaw Pact.”\textsuperscript{16} This has resulted in the elimination of the need for large standing forces on the European continent or in the Atlantic.\textsuperscript{17}

The elimination of this most drastic threat has not resulted in a benign security environment. The UK currently has more commitments, and on a wider scale than previously. These commitments range from combating terrorism in Northern Ireland to peacekeeping in the Balkans. Although they “are individually on a smaller scale than the Cold War threat, they are operationally demanding, especially in aggregate.”\textsuperscript{18} At the beginning of 1998, the UK had over 25,000 personnel on operations in Northern Ireland and overseas.

The primary security priority established by the government of the UK is European security. “Membership in NATO will continue to provide the UK with its best insurance” against the risks identified in their analysis.\textsuperscript{19} Outside Europe the priority is given to the Gulf and the Mediterranean. Instability in this region has an indirect threat to Britain through the European Union (EU). The EU is dependent on Gulf Oil supplies and interruption due to conflict in the Gulf will affect the UK economically.

The largest military operation the UK foresees conducting “is a major regional conflict as part of NATO or a wider international coalition” such as the 1990-91 Gulf War.\textsuperscript{20} While this definition is necessary to set a framework upon which to base development of their armed forces, the UK ranks major regional conflict outside of
NATO as next to last in its defence priorities, followed by conventional and strategic attacks on NATO itself.\textsuperscript{21}

First on the list is peacetime security, including antiterrorism, non-combatant extraction operations (NEO), and support to civil authorities for such tasks as drug control. Next in priority is the security of overseas territories. The third is Defence diplomacy, a new task for the armed forces, which brings together outreach programs to other nations such as education and training assistance. Support to wider British interests and peace support and humanitarian operations round out the top of the list.\textsuperscript{22}

The SDR also noted a need for closer co-operation between the three armed services through the development of a joint operations capability. This is in part because “At sea the emphasis continuing to move away from large scale maritime warfare and open ocean operations in the North Atlantic. In future littoral operations and force projection, for which maritime forces are well suited, will be our primary focus.”\textsuperscript{23}

\textit{Australia's Strategic Environment}

Australia is a sparsely populated island continent located in the South Pacific. Its landmass covers 7,682,300 square kilometres (2,966,151 square miles). The 1996 population was 18,289,000, which results in a population density of 2.4 persons per square kilometre.\textsuperscript{24} This density figure is deceiving since the population is predominantly distributed along the littoral, with vast deserts in the interior. Sixty percent of the population resides in the metropolitan areas of the national capital, Canberra, and the five state capitals.\textsuperscript{25} Its territory also includes some overseas territories in the Indian Ocean.
The 1996 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Australia was US$380,532 million, of which US$99,197 million was Government spending. Defence spending was US$7,838 million, which represented 7.90% of total government spending and 2.06% of total GDP.

The end of the Cold War did not reduce the importance of the Australian Defence Forces (ADF). They are considered to be at the heart of Australia’s strategic policy. This is despite the Government’s confidence in the security of their nation and their confidence “that no country currently has the intention or motivation to attack Australia.”

Australia’s Defence White paper was based upon a previously published foreign policy White Paper entitled “In the National Interest”. The key judgements from that document formed the basis for the analysis in the Defence White Paper. The judgements were the centrality of the Asia-Pacific region to Australia’s security, the significance of economic growth in the region, the challenges of new power relations resulting from that growth, the special relationship between China, Japan and the US for the security of the whole region, the unique role of Indonesia in Australia’s security and the importance of maintaining defence Capability and regional involvement.

These judgements shifted the focus of Australia’s strategic policy to a regional one. “During the Cold War, and in the era of Imperial Defence which preceded it, Australia’s strategic interests were closely bound up with the global balance of power. This is no longer the case.” Despite recent setbacks, economic growth potential in the region means that “Australia’s relative economic standing in the region will decline.” Indonesia is expected to eclipse Australia in both GDP and defence spending within 20
years. This “will affect our strategic weight in the region, and ultimately our capacity to defend ourselves.”

“Australia’s most direct strategic interests continue to include the stability, safety and friendly disposition of the countries closest to us, the inner arc of islands from Indonesia in the West through to Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands and the Southwest Pacific.” Bilateralism is the means by which Australia intends to pursue its strategic security.

Its primary bilateral relationship is with the US. This alliance is fundamental to Australia’s security but the US role in the region in general also contributes to the stability that is key to Australia’s security. While nuclear attack on Australia is unlikely, they rely upon the US relationship as a deterrent.

The relationship with New Zealand is strong and close due to a strong convergence of interests. Citizens of both countries believe implicitly in the fact “that an attack on one would bring an automatic response from the other.”

Beyond the traditional alliances, Australia seeks to turn potential threats into allies by diplomatic effort. Indonesia’s geographic proximity, large population and economic potential have already been noted as causing them to hold a special place in Australia’s security environment. Since 1995 Australia’s security relationship with Indonesia has been governed by the Agreement on Maintaining Security (AMS).

Papua New Guinea and Australia have been key defence partners. Internal instability, particularly the secessionist movement on the island of Bougainville, has placed some strain on this relationship but Australia is committed to strengthening the bond.
The ADF has three principal tasks: defeating attacks on Australia, defending Australia’s regional interests and supporting global interests. Notwithstanding the reliance on bilateralism, Australia’s defence has had self-reliance as a central feature since 1976. The need for self-reliance comes from the knowledge that an over reliance on an alliance might leave the nation defenceless in a larger conflict where allies are engaged elsewhere.37 Defeating attacks on Australia will be achieved by defeating hostile forces in the maritime approaches. While this implies a reliance on maritime power, air and land forces are an integral part of the strategy. Air forces assist the navy within their range and land forces deal with incursions that succeed in penetrating the naval defence.38

Regional interests are served by peacetime engagement with neighbouring militaries through exchanges and combined exercises. Participation in international peacekeeping and humanitarian assistance, in UN forces and other coalitions, allows the military to contribute to Australia’s global interests.39

Canada’s Strategic Environment

Canada is a sparsely populated, Northern Hemisphere nation. Its territory forms the northern part of the North American continent, bounded by the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic Oceans in the West, North and East respectively and the United States (US) on the South. The US State of Alaska also borders on the northwest, between the Pacific and the Arctic Oceans. Its territory covers 9,203,210 square kilometres (3,844,928 square miles), seven per cent of the world’s landmass. The three oceans yield over 240,000 kilometres of coastline.
Its 1996 population was 28,846,761, which resulted in a population density of 3.0 persons per square kilometre. This figure is as deceptive for Canada, as it is for Australia. Eight per cent of Canada’s landmass is covered by inland water and the northern territories are mostly infertile tundra. Canada’s population is primarily distributed along the border with the US. Fifty percent of the population lives in Canada’s ten largest cities, all but one of which is located within 200 miles of the US border.

The 1996 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of Canada was US$563,682 million, of which US$130,329 million was Government spending. Defence spending was US$7,677 million, which represented 5.89% of total government spending and 1.36% of total GDP.

Canada’s last defence review took place in early 1994 after a Joint Committee of the Senate and House of Commons held hearings on defence policy and reported to the government. While the recommendations of the committee were well received by the government, “the committee’s recommendation concerning the size of the Regular Forces was judged to be inconsistent with the financial parameters within which the Department of National Defence must operate.” Thus one of the key features of the Canadian view of its strategic environment is financial restraint.

The end of the Cold War resulted in “an unpredictable and fragmented world, one in which conflict, repression and upheaval exist alongside peace, democracy and relative prosperity.” This upheaval is of great concern because “Canada’s economic future depends on its ability to trade freely with other nations.” Canada’s military forces contribute to enhancing world stability according to three defence priorities: the
protection of Canada, co-operation with the US on the defence of the North American continent and contribution to International Security.\textsuperscript{46}

Canada's geostrategic position on the northern border of the most powerful nation on Earth has given it some advantages. The fact that this border has been secure and undefended for most of the last century means that Canada does not have to defend itself from a direct land threat. Defence of Canada is achieved through the performance of six subordinate tasks.\textsuperscript{47} Firstly, the CF must maintain the capability to monitor and control activity within Canada's territory, airspace, and maritime areas of jurisdiction. They must also be able to assist other government departments in achieving various other national goals in such areas as fisheries protection, drug interdiction, and environmental protection. They must be able to contribute to the national welfare by to contributing to humanitarian assistance and disaster relief domestically and by maintaining a national search and rescue capability. The CF must assist in mounting an immediate and effective response to terrorist incidents and finally they must respond to requests for Aid of the Civil Power.\textsuperscript{48}

The defence of Canada is inexorably linked to Canada-US co-operation on the defence of North America. Since the Ogdensburg Agreement of 1940, the defence of North America has been a joint effort between Canada and the US.\textsuperscript{49} Aerospace defence, formerly air defence, has been co-ordinated through the North American Aerospace Defence agreement (NORAD). Through NORAD, Canada has been contained under the US nuclear umbrella as well. These five decades of experience has led the government to conclude that co-operation with the US has served its interests well. As such it seeks to maintain the ability of the Canadian Forces to work with the US military.\textsuperscript{50}
Canada’s contribution to international security comes in the form of its contribution to multilateral efforts. As a member of NATO and a regular contributor of forces to UN missions, Canada’s commitment to the principal of multilateralism is expressed. While the 1994 White Paper removed Canada’s forward deployed forces from Germany and a contingency mission to Norway, the commitment to the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force (Land) (AMF(L)) was reinforced.51

The Strategic Setting

There are three common features to the strategic outlooks of Australia, Canada and the United Kingdom. They are the defence of sovereign territory, contribution to regional security and contribution to world stability. Australia and Canada have established these three features as the prime tasks for their military forces. The UK has subdivided these three and has ranked their military tasks in the order of most likely occurrence.

Canada shares the UK’s perspective that their sovereign territory is fairly secure. Any external threat will be addressed within the context of an alliance, NATO in the case of the UK and the Canada-US Co-operation agreement and NORAD in Canada’s case. While the UK specifies a domestic role for the military in counter-terrorist and counter drug operations, Canada’s military bear a much greater responsibility for domestic support tasks.

Australia’s focus is on the defence of their territory. While they are currently secure, the potential exists for serious threats to develop very close to Australia’s shores. While the US also plays a role in the defence of Australia, self-reliance is a cornerstone
of Australian defence policy. The ability to counter, without assistance, any attempt to
attack is the key feature of Australian defence policy.

Regional security in the UK and Canada is linked to multinational efforts, as was
stated before. If instability elsewhere results in an economic threat to Europe, the UK is
also prepared to act outside the Europe, in the Gulf or the Mediterranean particularly, in
order to preserve regional stability. Australia’s emphasis in maintaining regional stability
is primarily diplomatic. The military participates through defence diplomacy, to borrow
the British term.

Efforts to preserve international stability are common amongst the three.
Multilateral operations, particularly through the UN, are the means by which all three
contribute military forces to the maintenance of world stability.

Chapter two – United Kingdom Military Capability and Doctrine

The Armed Forces of the United Kingdom are in the midst of a reorganization
resulting from the SDR. The reorganization affects both the Army and Navy and
rationalizes the organization of the forces with the tasks discussed above.

Capability

The British Army\textsuperscript{52} will consist of forty infantry battalions, six armoured
regiments and fifteen artillery regiments.\textsuperscript{53} These units will support two deployable
divisions, one armoured and one mechanized, supported by Corps troops.\textsuperscript{54} Each division
will consist of three brigades, instead of the two brigades the mechanized division
formerly had. This change will be achieved by eliminating the current airborne brigade
and absorbing the parachute infantry capability into the airmobile brigade.\textsuperscript{55}
The Navy’s structure will be adjusted to support a new focus on force projection. The range of capability will be retained, with a reduced emphasis on anti-submarine warfare and a higher emphasis on littoral operations. The fleet will consist of thirty-two frigates, ten nuclear-powered attack submarines and three ballistic missile submarines. The navy’s three Invincible class aircraft carriers will be retained until 2012, when they will be replaced by two larger carriers. The new vessels will be capable of carrying fifty aircraft each, including helicopters, as opposed to the Invincible’s twenty-three. Within the navy, the Royal Marine Commando brigade will also be retained. Acquisition of two additional landing ships will augment the amphibious capability. This will give the UK the ability to conduct amphibious operations of two-brigade strength, including the Commando brigade.

The capabilities will be brought together in Joint Rapid Reaction Forces (JRRF). These are brigade-sized, rapidly deployable forces. The concept has its root in the Joint Rapid Deployment Force (JRDF), which was a single brigade designed to respond to contingencies in which NATO was not involved. The JRDF was not a structure that could respond to the current demands of force projection. It was a single, light brigade with a specially tailored logistic system. While the primary focus was the defence of NATO against the Warsaw Pact, this force allowed the UK to respond to its out of area responsibilities without drawing troops from the main effort. With the new focus on force projection, the need for a more flexible structure was determined.

Scale of commitment

In the SDR the British government made a commitment that it would maintain the capability to do one of two missions. It would “respond to a major international crisis
which might require a military effort and combat operations of a similar scale and
duration to the Gulf War when we deployed an armoured division, 26 major warships and
over 80 combat aircraft.” 58 Alternatively it would “undertake a more extended overseas
deployment on a lesser scale (as over the last few years in Bosnia) while retaining the
ability to mount a second substantial deployment - which might involve a combat brigade
and appropriate naval and air forces - if this were made necessary by a second crisis. We
would not, however, expect both deployments to involve warfighting or to maintain them
simultaneously for longer than six months.” 59

A commitment of forces to one of these missions is in addition to their
commitment in Northern Ireland and “the ability, at much longer notice, to rebuild a
bigger force as part of NATO's collective defence should a major threat re-emerge in
Europe.” 60

**Doctrine**

The fundamental doctrinal reference for the UK Defence Forces is *Joint Warfare
Publication (JWP) 0-01 British Defence Doctrine*. This document “sets out to outline a
doctrine that describes the British approach to defence.” 61 In it the types of operations
performed by British military forces are defined. These are combat, deterrence, support
to diplomacy, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, military home defence, military aid to
the civil authorities, non-combatant extraction operations, humanitarian aid, monitoring
compliance with arms control treaties and public and ceremonial duties. Combat is
further defined as high intensity, armed intervention, counter insurgency and counter
terrorist. Military aid to the civil authorities is further defined as military aid to civil
community (assistance in case of natural disasters etc), military aid to civil ministries
(military performing non-military government work) and military aid to civil power (restoration of law and order).\textsuperscript{62}

In order to perform these tasks, British forces are categorized as permanently committed forces, national contingency forces or forces for general war. "Permanently committed forces are dedicated on a day-to-day basis to the protection and security of the United Kingdom and Dependent Territories."\textsuperscript{63} National contingency forces form the basis of the national response to threats to national interests or to international peace and security.\textsuperscript{64} These forces correspond to the two deployable divisions, the airborne brigade and the Corps troops. While the JRRF is a concept that has been developed since the publication of JWP 0-01, it would form a key element of national contingency forces. It replaces the JRDF, which is noted as a particular category of these forces.\textsuperscript{65} Forces for general war constitute the national capability to regenerate and mobilize to contend with larger threats to national sovereignty or an ally.\textsuperscript{66}

The employment of the JRRF is well described in Supporting Essay Eight in the SDR. The JRRF would deploy in two echelons. The first echelon would consist of a high readiness "Spearhead" followed by a lead battlegroup. Spearhead forces are based upon a pool consisting of Special Forces, an attack submarine, surface warships and a support ship, and a battlegroup based upon a light infantry battalion or a commando group, from 3 Commando Brigade, 24 Airmobile Brigade or the division ready brigade of 3 (UK) Mechanized Division.

The remainder of the first echelon would contain "additional Special Forces; shipping to generate a maritime task group centred on an aircraft carrier or helicopter assault ship, and including amphibious shipping if necessary to support the lead
Commando battlegroup”. Land forces would be based upon a lead battlegroup, selected from amongst a menu of options to provide a broad choice of capabilities, including: a lead Commando battlegroup equipped with Lynx anti-tank helicopters (Longbow Apache when in service), support helicopters and all-terrain vehicles; a lead parachute battlegroup, based on a parachute battalion; a lead aviation/armoured reconnaissance battlegroup, with Lynx anti-tank helicopters (Longbow Apache when in service), armoured reconnaissance and infantry sub-units; a lead armoured battlegroup with Challenger tanks and Warrior armoured infantry vehicles; and combat support and logistic support groups with artillery, air defence, engineer and other assets.” The RAF contingent would a range of high capability air assets, including additional offensive and defensive combat aircraft, helicopters and support aircraft. 67

Second echelon forces would consist of additional maritime forces to form a second or larger, more capable maritime task group, including an amphibious capability if necessary to support 3 Commando Brigade. Land forces would be selected from a choice of ground force brigades drawn from: 3 Commando Brigade (including specialist capabilities for amphibious, mountain and cold weather operations); a mechanised 'ready brigade' from 3 (UK) Mechanised Division; an armoured 'ready brigade' from 1 (UK) Armoured Division; and 24 Airmobile Brigade (providing an aviation, parachuting or tactical air-landed capability). The RAF would provide substantial additional air assets to enable operations across the full spectrum of airpower roles to provide a robust air contribution to the Joint Task Force. 68
Another development in doctrine to emerge from the SDR is the development of a Joint Helicopter Command. This organization will be “responsible for training, standards, doctrinal development and support for operations.”

Summary

Current and emerging UK doctrine provides for the capability of deploying a brigade sized ground force, supported by air and naval assets to move, support and sustain the force for an extended period of time.

Chapter three – Australian Military Capability and Doctrine

Capability

The Australian Army consists of deployable joint force headquarters, two brigades and a task force. The 1st Brigade has an armoured regiment equipped with Leopard I tanks, one squadron of which is active, a cavalry regiment, one mechanized infantry battalion equipped with M113 armoured personnel carriers and a medium artillery regiment (155mm towed). The 3rd Brigade is formed of two infantry battalions, a cavalry squadron and a field artillery regiment (105mm towed). The task force is based upon an infantry battalion and a field artillery regiment. It is augmented by infantry from the reserves. Engineers, signals and service support units complete each of these brigades. In addition, Australia maintains Special Forces of approximately brigade strength, formed of a Special Air Service Regiment and two commando battalions.

Australia’s Navy consists of three submarines, three destroyers and eight frigates. It’s amphibious fleet consists of 5 Landing Craft Heavy, each capable of carrying 3 tanks,
and one Landing Ship Tank (LST). The LST is a roll on-roll off ship capable of carrying eighteen Leopard tanks. Two Landing Platform Amphibious (LPA) ships have been acquired from the US, and are undergoing conversion. These latter ships will also be capable of carrying three helicopters each. This gives the Australian Defence Forces the capacity to conduct amphibious operations of approximately brigade strength.

**Doctrine**

*Australian Defence Forces Publication (ADFP) 001 Doctrine* is the fundamental doctrine publication of the Australian military. It recognizes the necessity for joint operations that arises from Australia’s strategic environment.

The Australian Defence Forces (ADF) are primarily concerned with the defence of Australia. The defence of Australia is conducted in depth primarily through the control of the maritime approaches, with greatest emphasis on the channels through the islands to the north and northwest. Routine patrols and surveillance constitute Precautionary Operations designed to detect a threat. Once a threat of invasion is detected, operations for the defence consist of protection of sea lines of communication, air defence operations, offensive operations, lodgment prevention, counter-lodgment, and support operations.

Australian joint doctrine recognizes six types of amphibious operations. Amphibious assault is the insertion of a landing force from ships, craft or by helicopter against a hostile opponent. This differs from an Amphibious Tactical Lodgment, which is an insertion that is unopposed. An amphibious raid is an insertion of a temporary nature, followed by a withdrawal. The fourth type of amphibious operations is the insertion of Special Forces. The final two are demonstrations and withdrawal.


_AFDP 11 Offensive Support_ describes another aspect of joint operations.

Offensive support in land operations is "the offensive measures taken to support a commander in pursuing his tactical aim. Offensive support may be organic to the Service of the supported unit or be provided by another Service...". This definition includes naval gunfire, fire from ground based systems other than small arms and air support.

A third type of joint operation included in Australian doctrine is the evacuation operation. Called non-combatant extraction operations (NEO) in other countries, Australia defines two types of evacuations: Service Assisted Evacuations (SAE) and Service Protected Evacuations (SPE). The SAE is conducted in a benign environment where the host country is capable of providing the security. The Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade usually plans this type of operation. The military provides administrative or logistics support, including command and control, communications or transport. The SPE is executed where the host country is unwilling or unable to provide security for the evacuation.

Summary

Australian doctrine recognizes that the defence of Australia is by necessity a joint operation. The defence is conducted in depth initially by the Navy in controlling the maritime approaches. If necessary the Army contributes by preventing or countering enemy lodgments on Australian territory. Amphibious capability exists in order to preempt hostile forces from gaining a lodgment on nearby islands.
Chapter four – Canadian Military Capability and Doctrine

Capability

Canada has a unified structure for its defence forces. Traditional service roles are performed by environmental commands. Land Forces Command (LFC) controls the ground forces and Maritime Command (MARCOM) controls naval forces. Air Command (AIRCOM) controls fighter, transport and search and rescue aircraft. AIRCOM also provides helicopters to the land forces and helicopters and patrol aircraft to MARCOM under operational control.78

The land forces are composed of a Task Force headquarters and three mechanized brigade groups. Each brigade group has an armoured regiment (with one squadron of Leopard I tanks and two squadrons of Cougar wheeled fire support vehicles), three infantry battalions (two mechanized and one light), an artillery regiment (155mm self-propelled), an engineer regiment, air defence battery and a signal squadron. In addition the land forces possess a divisional air defence regiment and an engineer support regiment. A helicopter squadron from the AIRCOM Tactical Air Group supports each brigade group.79

MARCOM consists of three Oberon class submarines (to be replaced by four Upholder class), four destroyers, sixteen frigates and three replenishment ships. The fleet is divided into Atlantic and Pacific fleets. The Pacific fleet, known as MARPAC, is assigned two destroyers, six frigates, two replenishment ships and two submarines. The remainder are in the Atlantic fleet, known as MARLANT. Maritime Air Group contributes 21 CP-140 Aurora (P-3 Orion) aircraft in three squadrons and 30 Sea King
helicopters in two squadrons configured for anti submarine warfare. Canada lacks any specialised amphibious warfare shipping.

Scale of Commitment

The support provided by the Canadian Forces to international operations is governed by the White Paper. In 1994 the government made a commitment to three defence missions: to defend of Canadian sovereignty, to co-operate with the United States for the defence of North America and to contribute to international security.

In fulfilment of this third task the government has committed Canada to deploy naval forces consisting of “a naval task group, comprised of up to four combatants (destroyers, frigates or submarines) and a support ship, with appropriate maritime air support.” Ground forces deployment would be up to “three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support).” Air forces committed would be “a wing of fighter aircraft, with appropriate support, and, one squadron of tactical transport aircraft.” These forces are available on ninety days notice to NATO or the UN.

The Canadian government has also promised that it would “provide, within three weeks, single elements or the vanguard components of this force and be able to sustain them indefinitely in a low-threat environment. An infantry battalion group has also been earmarked “as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with NATO's Immediate Reaction Force.”

Peacetime commitments to NATO consist of “one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, one ship to serve, on an occasional basis, with the Standing Naval
Force Mediterranean, aircrews and other personnel to serve in the NATO Airborne Early Warning system, approximately 200 personnel to serve in various NATO headquarters.”

Doctrine

The keystone joint doctrine publication for the Canadian Forces is Canadian Forces Publication 005 Volume 4 Joint Doctrine for Canadian Forces- Joint and Combined Operations (CFP(J)5(4)). This doctrine supersedes any doctrine published by the Environmental commands. This

CFP(J)5(4) establishes the principles and definitions that form the foundation of Canadian military doctrine. The principles of war, principles of command and the role of the commander are defined. Joint Forces are also defined and the structure and roles of Canadian joint forces are established. Some of the issues covered that relate to land and naval force interaction are command and control, movement, military engineering support, domestic operations, NATO operations and evacuation operations.

Command and Control

A Joint Force (JF) is established whenever forces from two or more of the environmental commands are brought together in a single force. A separate chain of command is then established in which the Joint Force Commander (JFC) responds to the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) and the environmental commands become supporting commands to the JF. For domestic operations the JF Headquarters (JFHQ) could be based upon one of the four Land Force Area HQs, one of the two MARCOM coastal HQs, the HQ of the Canadian Forces Northern Area or an AIRCOM formation HQ.
None of these is a deployable organization. For simple international operations, e.g. humanitarian assistance to a natural disaster or a major oil spill in international waters, an AIRCOM formation HQ or a MARCOM coastal HQ could form the HQ. In complex international operations, the HQ of 1 Canadian Division serves as a deployable Task Force HQ.⁸⁶

Command and control of Canadian Forces employed in international operations normally follows one of two forms. If the operation is an independent Canadian operation or if the JFC is in the chain of command of a coalition force, the JFC retains full command over all Canadian Forces involved in the operation. The JFC could transfer operational control of all or some of the JF to a Coalition Force Commander (CFC). In this case, the Canadian JFC retains national command responsibilities for the JF.

Movement

International operations imply a requirement to move to an area of operations across an ocean, due to Canada’s geographic position. While airlift is fast, it is also scarce and expensive. The more economical method is by sea. Canada does not maintain sealift within MARCOM. Instead commercial transportation is used or US sealift is provided either under mutual agreement or under NATO’s Integrated Lines of Communication concept.⁸⁷

Military Engineering

While military engineering is unified within the Canadian Forces, combat engineers are found solely in the Land Forces. Planning and control of engineering is
centrally co-ordinated at National Defence Headquarters (NDHQ) by the J3 Engineers.

Engineer support to a JFC is provided in the form of Mobility, Counter Mobility,
Survivability and General Engineering support. 88

Domestic Operations

Domestic operations by the Canadian Forces in Canada are governed by the
Emergencies Act. A National Emergency is an urgent and critical situation of a
temporary nature that seriously endangers the lives, health or safety of Canadians. It is of
such proportions or nature as to exceed the capacity or authority of a province to deal
with it or seriously threatens the ability of the Government of Canada to preserve the
sovereignty, security and territorial integrity of Canada.

They are categorized as a public welfare emergency, a public order emergency, an
international emergency or a war emergency. A public welfare emergency is one in
which the cause of the emergency is fire, flood, drought, storm, earthquake or other
natural phenomenon, disease in human beings, animals or plants; or accidents or
pollution. A public order emergency is one in which there is a threat to the security of
Canada and that threat is so serious as to be a national emergency.

Threats to the security of Canada means espionage or sabotage that is against
Canada or is detrimental to the interests of Canada or activities directed toward or in
support of such espionage or sabotage; foreign influenced activities within or relating to
Canada that are detrimental to the interests of Canada and are clandestine or deceptive or
involve a threat to any person; activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or
in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for
the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state; and
activities directed toward undermining by covert unlawful acts, or directed toward or intended ultimately to lead to the destruction or overthrow by violence of the constitutionally established system of the Government in Canada.

Evacuation operations

Canada uses the same terminology as Australia to define operations aimed at the evacuation of non-combatants from strife-torn areas. While these operations are primarily a concern for the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT), the mission could be assigned to DND. This would be more likely in the case of the Service Protected Evacuation (SPE). In either case, if DND assets are employed the CDS would appoint a JFC and allocate the resources necessary for the operation. The options for transportation of the evacuees are either air or sea but the role for land forces is in the protection of evacuee assembly areas.\(^\text{89}\)

Land Forces Doctrine

Land Forces keystone doctrine publications are in the CFP 300 series. Only two refer to operating with naval forces. CFP 300 Canada’s Army is a broad concept manual that describes the role of the land forces in Canadian society and outlines the theoretical and doctrinal basis for land forces operations. In this manual, it is expected that operations domestically will be joint while operations abroad will be combined (i.e. multilateral or multinational).\(^\text{90}\) In the land forces’ keystone tactical manual, CFP 300(2), amphibious operations are defined. There are four types: Assault, Raid, Withdrawal and Demonstration. In addition to the definition, the planning sequence is explained.\(^\text{91}\) Beyond this there is no doctrine referring to the co-operation with naval forces.
Missions, Objectives and Expectations

Canadian Defence Planning Guidance establishes Defence Missions and Objectives and assigns Expectations to the Environmental Commands for the fulfilment of those missions. Annex B provides a list of the current objectives and a comparison of the LFC and MARCOM expectations.

In only four of the twelve Defence objectives do LFC and MARCOM expectations allow for joint operations between the two commands. These are Provide Aid to the Civil Power, Protect and Evacuate Canadians Abroad, Participate in Multilateral Operations and Enhance International Peace and Stability through Bilateral and Multilateral Contacts. This last objective is one of peacetime engagement and is not central to the planning of operations.

Within the Multilateral Operations objective, opportunities for co-operation can be further refined. Most of the Defence Expectations related to this objective retain the service specific tradition of the Cold War period. LFC is committed to providing a brigade group to NATO or the UN and a battalion group to the NATO Immediate Reaction Force (Land) (IRF(L)) while MARCOM participates in the Standing Naval Forces in the Atlantic and the Mediterranean (STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED). Only with respect to International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief and Peace Support Operations under Chapter VII of the UN Charter are the possibilities for joint operations foreseen.

Minor Amphibious Operations Study

In 1996 MARLANT initiated a Minor Amphibious Operations Study (MAOS) as a result of having been warned or having executed “operations which required joint sea-
land-air forces at the lowest tactical levels, and which involved a sealift of ground combat element and/or the crossing of a water gap in order to deliver such forces ashore. These operations included two contingency operations plans for evacuation of Canadians from Haiti (COP MATADOR IN 1988 and COP DIALOGUE in 1993-94). While these were never executed, ground forces were put ashore in Somalia in 1993 due to the unavailability of port suitable facilities. Finally the HMCS Preserver carried and supported combat engineers and medical personnel involved in the relief effort in Florida in the wake of Hurricane Andrew in 1992.

While these operations do not conform to the doctrinal definition of amphibious operations, they are cases in which Canadian maritime and land forces participated in joint operations. Furthermore they clearly fall into the three objectives where there is common ground already foreseen. The two COPs for Haiti evacuations were in order to Evacuate Canadians Abroad. The support to Hurricane Andrew falls within International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief.

The MAOS Work Up Papers suggest a role for an amphibious operation in Aid to the Civil Power. In December 1993, the Innu residents of Davis Inlet, Newfoundland dismissed the judge and refused to accept the authority of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This was a potential for military force to be used to restore public order. Fortunately the situation was restored by negotiation. The difficulty with using ground forces to restore public order in Davis Inlet is that it is inaccessible except by sea. Major Rob Bradford, author of the MAOS, suggests that a minor Amphibious Task Force of an infantry company embarked on a replenishment vessel and transported ashore by the ships integral Sea King helicopter could have been used if the need had arisen.
Summary

Canadian doctrine and defence planning is still based primarily on the same concepts that prevailed during the Cold War. Collective defence through NATO is a fundamental element of Canadian Defence policy and the tasks assigned to the commands are service related and along similar lines to the commitments that were made during the Cold War. There are opportunities for joint operations between land and maritime forces in domestic operations, humanitarian assistance and in the defence of Canadian territory.

Chapter five – Potential Canadian Joint Capability

The question posed in this monograph is “Is it necessary that the Canadian Land Forces and Maritime Forces work together in joint operations?” The simple answer is no. For the bulk of the missions assigned to the Canadian Forces, it is not necessary for the Land Forces and the Maritime Forces to participate in joint operations. The primary warfighting tasks of the Canadian Forces are still aligned on the Cold War model, although no longer focussed on the former Soviet Union as the enemy. Simple answers are not always the most useful ones, however.

As the UK approach shows, ordering defence missions according to their likelihood of occurrence rather than the scale of effort is a realistic approach to defence planning. If this approach is taken to Canadian Defence tasks, then there are openings for joint operations between the Maritime Forces and the Land Forces.
Canadian Doctrine and Defence Missions

As Annex C demonstrates, there are four objectives in which Land Forces-Maritime Forces joint operations. These are Provide Aid to the Civil Power, Protect and Evacuate Canadians Abroad, Participate in Multilateral Operations and Enhance International Peace and Stability through Bilateral and Multilateral Contacts. Since the activities involved in the last objective are trivial with respect to operational planning, they can be reduced to three.

CFP (J) 5(4) identifies command and control, movement, military engineering support, domestic operations, NATO operations and evacuation operations as areas in which commands can work together in joint operations. The table at annex C elaborates some examples of joint operations that could be conducted. The table cross-references the Defence Objectives with the doctrinal categories identified herein.

United Kingdom Lessons

The UK maintains high readiness forces with the shipping available to deploy up to two brigades in an amphibious role for a force projection operation. As such the JRRF concept is not readily adaptable to the Canadian context. Canadian Land Forces are maintained at much longer states of readiness, at three weeks for high readiness and three months for normal readiness, and they lack the amphibious shipping necessary to conduct such operations as the JRRF are equipped to conduct.

The primary lesson from the analysis of the UK approach is the ordering of Defence tasks by the likelihood of occurrence rather than the importance to National Sovereignty or the scale of effort that is required. By ordering Defence tasks in this
manner, UK Defence planners can maintain the perspective on the likely events while structuring their forces to be prepared for the major warfighting tasks.

*Australian Lessons*

The Australian Army is much smaller than the Canadian Land Forces, but they are much better integrated into a joint operations structure due to the insistence on being self reliant for the defence of Australian territory. As a result the transition from the defence of maritime approaches to the land defence of Australian territory is integrated into Australian Joint doctrine.

The defence of Canadian territory is treated more as a multilateral operation within the context of the Canada-US Co-operation Agreement and the NORAD Agreement. Thus the CF are more focussed on service related compatibility with the US services than they are with joint compatibility within the CF.

The adoption of the Australian approach to territorial defence within the context of the Canada-US Co-operation Agreement would give MARCOM and LFC a greater opportunity to develop joint operations doctrine and procedures.

*Analysis*

The tasks that would permit Land Forces and Maritime Forces to conduct Joint Operations can be summarized as follows: Joint Defence of Canadian Territory, Aid to the Civil Power, Service Assisted and Service Protected Evacuation Operations, International Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations and Peace Support Operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter.
Joint Defence of Canadian Territory

Approaching the task in the same manner as the Australian Defence Forces have done, defence of Canadian territory as a joint operation is both complementary and interoperable. To recapitulate, the defence of Australia is conducted in depth, primarily through the control of the maritime approaches, with greatest emphasis on the channels through the islands to the north and northwest. Routine patrols and surveillance constitute Precautionary Operations designed to detect a threat. Once a threat of invasion is detected, operations for the defence consist of protection of sea lines of communication, air defence operations, offensive operations, lodgment prevention, counter-lodgment, and support operations.

Such an approach can be taken in Canada. Control of the Maritime approaches is currently a task of MARCOM on both coasts. The Land Forces task need only be adjusted to add lodgment prevention and counter-lodgment to the task of vital point protection currently included in the LFC Expectations.

Command and Control of such operations would likely be conducted through either MRLANT or MARPAC HQ since these HQs currently perform the Maritime control function. Deployment of a Land Forces HQ as a JFHQ would duplicate the effort and thus would reduce the complementary aspects of the operation.

At the tactical level, the movement of Land Forces would need some detailed analysis. In northern areas, on both coasts, difficult terrain and lack of roads inhibit ground movement. The use of sea transport to deploy land forces could be a solution to the problem, as was suggested would have been advantageous in the Davis Inlet case.
Aid to the Civil Power

As was suggested by Major Bradford, maritime forces could be used to deploy land forces to inaccessible coastal areas during Aid to the Civil Power operations. While his example of Davis Inlet would have been a public order emergency had forces been ordered in, the same concept could be used to insert medical or engineering personnel to assist in a public welfare emergency. Furthermore, combat arms personnel could also be inserted where labour is required to assist civil authorities in the restoration of public services.

While the main role of maritime forces in this context is to provide transportation for land forces, command and control of such an operation would still be retained by MARLANT or MARPAC HQ, or the HQ of Canadian Forces Northern Area. This is because these operations would take place within the coastal areas in their normal areas of operation.

Service Assisted and Service Protected Evacuation Operations

SAE/SPE operations are clearly recognized in both Canadian doctrine and in the Defence Planning Guidance as operations with a joint requirement. While Land Forces may be required for the security of evacuees, the evacuation must take place by air or sea. In case of evacuation by sea, land and maritime forces are required to work together.

International Humanitarian and Disaster Relief Operations

As was demonstrated in the case of the Hurricane Andrew relief effort, the replenishment vessels can serve as excellent platforms for the conduct of Humanitarian and Disaster Relief from the sea. The LFC currently maintains a Disaster Assistance
Response Team (DART), consisting of medical and engineering personnel. While the DART has only been employed once since its inception, and in that case deployment occurred by air, the employment of the DART by sea is easy to conceive.

Peace Support Operations under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter

Major warfighting operations are considered under the auspices of NATO or a UN sanctioned coalition force. Canadian commitments to NATO are established upon service lines and thus do not require the establishment of a JFHQ to control operations. In the case of an ad hoc coalition established under the UN auspices, the establishment of a JFHQ would be consistent with the command and control philosophy established in CFP(J) 5(4). The HQ of 1 Canadian Division is established to perform that particular function, either as a Canadian Joint Force or as the National HQ when the Canadian Forces contribution to the force falls under service lines.

Conclusion

Despite the acknowledged end of the Cold War, Canadian Defence commitments are still organized in accordance with the same concepts as were applicable during the Cold War. The Canadian contribution to international security, and its major warfighting and peacekeeping tasks, are still to be conducted within NATO or the UN. As a result, the major defence tasks are still performed upon service lines.

In the international arena, operations in International Humanitarian and Disaster Relief and some Peace Support Operations can lend themselves to joint operations between Land Forces and Maritime Forces. Evacuation operations, launched from the
sea and requiring the use of land forces to secure assembly areas, are by necessity joint
operations. Otherwise service specific lines will tend to be the norm.

In the domestic arena, Aid to the Civil Power operations conducted in
inaccessible coastal areas can benefit from the co-operative efforts of land and maritime
forces. The primary role for maritime forces is the deployment, sustainment and
withdrawal of the ground forces conducting the operation.

As a warfighting task, the defence of Canadian territory could become a joint
operation with the adoption of the Australian approach to territorial defence, within the
context of the Canada-US Co-operation Agreement. This would require a re-orientation
of the service specific perspective currently contained within Canadian defence planning.

Beyond these areas, Canadian defence policy and doctrine are founded upon
service specific co-operation with our allies to achieve collective defence. Both the land
forces and the maritime forces are equipped and trained to operate on service lines.
Without a major re-orientation in equipment and policy, this service-oriented approach to
operations will likely persist, despite the adoption of joint terminology and doctrine.
Endnotes


3 Australia’s Strategic Policy, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1997), p. 5

4 The 1994 White Paper on Defence Policy, Chap 1

5 Ibid.


7 Ibid., p.179

8 The Strategic Defence Review, Introduction


10 The Strategic Defence Review, Chapter 2, Paragraph 21

11 Ibid., Paragraph 18

12 Ibid., Paragraph 19

13 Ibid., Paragraph 20

14 Ibid., Paragraph 21

15 Ibid., Paragraph 21

16 Ibid., Paragraph 27

17 Ibid., Paragraph 25

18 Ibid., Paragraph 28

19 Ibid., Paragraphs 36 and 37

20 Ibid., Paragraph 45

21 Ibid., Chapter 3

22 Ibid.

23 Ibid., Chapter 5 Paragraph 85

25 Ibid.

26 *Australia's Strategic Policy*, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1997), p. 3

27 Ibid., p. 4

28 Ibid., p. 7

29 Ibid., p. 9

30 Ibid., p. 5

31 Ibid.

32 Ibid., p. 10

33 Ibid., p. 19

34 Ibid.

35 Ibid., p. 11

36 Ibid., p. 21

37 Ibid., p. 30

38 Ibid., pp. 43-44

39 Ibid., pp. 32-33


41 Ibid.

42 Ibid., p. 809


44 Ibid.

45 Ibid.

46 Ibid., Highlights

47 Ibid., Chapter 4

48 Ibid.,

49 Ibid.


51 Ibid., Chapter 6
52 This monograph examines only active duty forces.

53 In Australian, Canadian and UK force structure, armoured and artillery regiments are battalion sized units.

54 The Strategic Defence Review, Essay 6. Additional infantry battalions surplus to the deployable divisions perform a variety of tasks, such as garrison duties in Northern Ireland, The Falkland Islands and Cyprus as well as providing support to the infantry school and performing public duties such as the guard at Royal palaces.

55 The Strategic Defence Review, Chapter 5, Paragraph 112

56 Ibid., Chap 7, Paragraph 143

57 Ibid., Essay 8

58 Ibid., Chapter 5

59 Ibid.

60 Ibid.


62 Ibid., p 6-2 to 6-8

63 Ibid., p. 6-9

64 Ibid.

65 Ibid.

66 Ibid., p6-10

67 The Strategic Defence Review, Essay 8

68 Ibid.

69 Ibid.

70 Australian Army Organisation Available at http://www.army.gov.au/
Also The Military Balance 1997/98, p. 173

71 The Royal Australian Navy Homepage Ships, Available at http://www.navy.gov.au/1_fleet/ships.htm

Ibid., Chapter 3 Paragraph 3.34
Ibid., Chapter 3 Paragraph 3.48
Ibid., Chapter 12 Paragraph 12.4 to 12.11


The Military Balance 1997/98, p.47

Ibid.
Ibid.
The 1994 White Paper on Defence Policy: Highlights
Ibid.
Ibid.


Ibid., Chapter 1 to 4
Ibid, Chapter 3 Section 1
Ibid., Chapter 14
Ibid., Chapter 15
Ibid. Chapter 22

B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army: we Stand on Guard for Thee CFP 300, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998)

G-GL-300-002/FP-000 Land Force Tactical Doctrine, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1997) p. 7-9 to 7-12


95 *The Requirement for a Canadian Amphibious Capability*, p. 27-28
Annex A Comparison of Defence Related Statistics  
(1996 Data)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Australia</th>
<th>Canada</th>
<th>United Kingdom</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Area (km²)</strong></td>
<td>7,682,300</td>
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<td><strong>Area (mi²)</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Population</strong></td>
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<td><strong>Density (persons/km²)</strong></td>
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<td>Revenues</td>
<td>121,660</td>
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<td>145,453</td>
<td>106,676</td>
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<td>Total Expenditure</td>
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<td>177,703</td>
<td>130,329</td>
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<td>Defence Expenditure</td>
<td>10,011</td>
<td>7,838</td>
<td>10,468</td>
<td>7,677</td>
<td>23,018</td>
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<td>Gross Domestic Product (GDP)</td>
<td>486,054</td>
<td>380,532</td>
<td>768,580</td>
<td>563,682</td>
<td>742,300</td>
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<td>Defence as % of GDP</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>2.06%</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>1.36%</td>
<td>3.10%</td>
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<tr>
<td>Defence per capita</td>
<td>547</td>
<td>429</td>
<td>361</td>
<td>265</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>611</td>
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<td>Defence as % of total expenditure</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
<td>7.90%</td>
<td>5.89%</td>
<td>5.89%</td>
<td>7.52%</td>
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# Annex B Canadian Defence Missions, Objectives and Expectations

Note: Lightly shaded areas denote commonality between Land Forces and MARCOM Expectations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Key Results</th>
<th>Land Forces Expectations</th>
<th>MARCOM Expectations</th>
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<tr>
<td><strong>Defence Mission 1 – Defending Canada</strong></td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td>Protect Canadian Sovereignty</td>
<td>Effective monitoring of Canadian territory and responding effectively to incursions.</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability to conduct land based reconnaissance patrols, surveillance and vital point protection against violations of Canada's sovereignty in a low-threat environment, in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. An appropriate response by land forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 15 days and sustained for up to 60 days. The response is to be available across the Canadian land mass (including the Arctic) in all seasons. Stage 2 mobilisation may be required. When directed, the Army is to command assigned forces.</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability to respond to maritime based illegal activities and maritime resource challenges in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. An appropriate response by maritime forces and assigned air forces is to be available on each coast within 8 hours. When directed CMS is to command assigned forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assist Other Government Departments</td>
<td>Co-operative agreements are established where needed; agreed levels of support are provided; and OGDs are assisted when directed.</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability to meet co-operative agreements in support of OGDs, especially the Solicitor General/RCMP, in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. An appropriate response by land forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 7 days and sustained for up to 30 days. The response is to be available across the Canadian land mass in all seasons. When directed, the Army is to command assigned forces.</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability to meet cooperative agreements in support of OGDs, especially the Department of Fisheries and Oceans (DFO) and the Solicitor General/Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP), in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. An appropriate response by maritime forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 8 hours. When directed CMS is to command assigned forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Key Results</td>
<td>Land Forces Expectations</td>
<td>MARCOM Expectations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contribute to Emergency Preparedness, Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief</td>
<td>Humanitarian assistance and disaster relief requests are responded to in a manner that mitigates: the loss of life and minimizes suffering; property damage and environmental damage; also, foster and coordinate civil preparedness and response activities to ensure a national capability and uniform standard of emergency services.</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability to respond to natural and man-made disasters such as earthquakes, floods and fires, in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. This response is to include assisting civil authorities in providing relief of human suffering and re-establishing local infrastructure. An appropriate response by land forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 24 hours and sustained for 30 days. The response is to be available throughout Canadian urban and rural areas in all seasons. When directed the Army is to command assigned forces.</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability to respond to natural and man-made disasters, such as earthquakes, floods and fires, in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. This response is to include assisting civil authorities in providing relief of human suffering and re-establishing local infrastructure. An appropriate response by maritime forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 24 hours. When directed CMS is to command assigned forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Search and Rescue</td>
<td>Search and Rescue incidents are responded to in a manner that minimizes the loss of life and suffering</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability to respond to Search and Rescue incidents, such as an airline crash or lost person(s), in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF and civilian authorities. An appropriate response by land forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 12 hours and sustained for 7 days. The response is to be available throughout Canada’s land mass in all seasons. When directed the Army is to command assigned forces.</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability to respond to maritime and air Search and Rescue incidents, such as an airline crash or the sinking of a luxury liner/cargo ship, in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. This is to be accomplished through coordination with the Coast Guard and other civil authorities. An appropriate response by maritime and assigned air forces is to be available immediately. CMS is to continuously maintain the ability to coordinate and respond to incidents in the Halifax and Victoria SAR regions. When directed CMS is to command assigned forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Respond to Terrorist</td>
<td>Terrorist incidents are responded to in a manner that meets the requirements of the Solicitor</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability of supporting a response to terrorist incidents in concert with civil authorities, specialised counter-terrorist forces and</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability of supporting a response to terrorist incidents at sea (Canadian territorial seas and areas of maritime jurisdiction) in</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Key Results</td>
<td>Land Forces Expectations</td>
<td>MARCOM Expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Incidents</td>
<td>General and the Government of Canada</td>
<td>other operational elements of the CF. This support is to include forces, infrastructure, and a Command and Control capability. An appropriate response by land forces and assigned air forces is to be available immediately and sustained for 30 days in urban and rural areas of Canada.</td>
<td>conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. This support is to include forces, infrastructure and a Command and Control capability. An appropriate response by maritime forces and assigned air forces is to be available immediately.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Aid to the Civil Power</td>
<td>Effective aid is provided to civil authorities upon their request.</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability to assist civilian authorities in maintaining and restoring law and order as a result of a civil unrest, riot or illegal activities in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF. Land forces and assigned air forces are to be available within 12-48 hours. Deployed forces are to be self-contained and sustained for up to 30 days in urban and rural areas of Canada. This may require Stage 2 mobilization. When directed the Army is to command assigned forces.</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability to provide sea transport support to other CF operational forces. An appropriate response by maritime forces and assigned air forces is to be available within 8 hours.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provide Departmental Administration</td>
<td>Cost effective administrative support is provided to DND/CF.</td>
<td>This objective addresses activities relating to corporate administration and capture those activities and outputs which do not have a direct linkage to another objective or mission. The Army will provide appropriate administrative support activities in an efficient and effective manner.</td>
<td>All L1s will provide appropriate administrative support activities in an efficient and effective manner.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Provide</td>
<td>Contributing to the strengthening</td>
<td>The Army will provide information and advice to the</td>
<td>The provision of advice and information to</td>
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<td>Objectives</td>
<td>Key Results</td>
<td>Land Forces Expectations</td>
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<tr>
<td>Support</td>
<td>of a united, informed and well-managed country through support to government programs, policies, legislation and initiatives and that DND/CF personnel understand and act in an appropriate manner in exercising their authorities and responsibilities.</td>
<td>government, Parliament, other departments and Canadians, contributions to the joint development and implementation of government-wide initiatives; and compliance with government legislation, policies, programs and management practices. It includes activities to ensure that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces fulfil their roles as national institutions.</td>
<td>government, Parliament, other departments and Canadians; contributions to the joint development and implementation of government-wide initiatives; and compliance with government legislation, policies, programs and management practices. It includes activities to ensure that the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces fulfil their roles as national institutions. DPG 99 Chap 3 Annex C has a list of the Acts and the responsible Departmental Authorities.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Defence Mission 2 – Defending North America

| Interoperability with US Military Forces | Effective interoperability with US Forces. Treaty and other obligations are met so that threats to North America are detected and resolved. | The Army is to maintain the capability to detect, identify and intercept a military raid or a group of saboteurs penetrating a vital point(s) in conjunction with other operational elements of the CF and the military forces of the United States. This capability is part of the requirements for continental defence under the aegis of CANUS Basic Security Plan. Land forces and assigned air forces are to be available at 15 days notice and sustained for 60 days of combat operations (longer periods may be required). Stage 2 mobilization may be required. | CMS is to be capable of generating two naval Task Groups for the defence (in conjunction with US Forces) of the maritime approaches to North America, within the timeframe dictated by the strategic situation. |

Defence Mission 3 – Contributing to International Security
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Objectives</th>
<th>Key Results</th>
<th>Land Forces Expectations</th>
<th>MARCOM Expectations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protect and Evacuate Canadians Abroad</td>
<td>Key Results. Requests by DFAIT for the protection and evacuation of Canadian civilians are responded to in a manner commensurate with the particular situation, resulting in the safe recovery of affected Canadian citizens.</td>
<td>The Army is to maintain the capability to assist in an evacuation of Canadians from a foreign nation where the government is facing an insurrection. This assistance would be provided in conjunction with other elements of the CF and the military forces of other nations. The role of the land forces and assigned air forces is to provide the means to safeguard the evacuation of Canadians by providing a secure launching point, evacuation support, sustainment support, land evacuation and transportation. An appropriate response is to be available at 3 days notice and sustained for 30 days anywhere in the world.</td>
<td>CMS is to maintain the capability to assist in an evacuation of Canadians from a foreign nation where the government is facing an insurrection. This assistance would be provided in conjunction with other elements of the CF and the military forces of other nations. CMS's role is to provide the means to evacuate these Canadians by sea. An appropriate response by maritime forces and assigned air forces is to be available at 10 days notice.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Participate in Multilateral Operations</td>
<td>UN and international commitments and government direction to respond to international contingencies (humanitarian assistance and disaster relief; peacekeeping and peace enforcement) are met by an appropriate military response. A threat against NATO nations is deterred or successfully countered, because of NATO nations' (including Canada's) military posture and response. Canada's NATO commitments for military forces are met.</td>
<td>There are several Key Result Expectations for this objective. In part, they call for the contingent capability to provide land forces: up to three separate battle groups or a brigade group (comprised of three infantry battalions, an armoured regiment and an artillery regiment, with appropriate combat support and combat service support) and a joint task force headquarters. Single elements or the vanguard components of this force are to be available within 3 weeks and sustained indefinitely (in terms of rotations) in a low-threat environment. The remaining elements of the full contingency force are to be available within 3 months. The Main Contingency Force is to be sustainable for a 60-day period of combat operations based on planning guidance to be developed by the DCDS under the Joint Operational</td>
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<td>Planning Process. In addition an infantry battalion group is to be earmarked as either a stand-by force for the UN, or to serve with Nato's Immediate Reaction Force - Land. Advance elements of the joint task force headquarters are to be activated within 7 days.</td>
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<td><strong>NATO Collective Defence.</strong> The Army is to generate forces and a joint task force headquarters to conduct mid-level NATO joint and combined operations throughout the NATO area of interest. These land and assigned air forces are to be able to conduct land operations against modern enemy forces in order to restore and return control of the violated territory of a NATO member nation.</td>
<td><strong>NATO Collective Defence.</strong> CMS is to maintain the capability to conduct mid-level NATO joint and combined operations throughout the NATO area of interest. These maritime forces and assigned air forces are to be able to conduct maritime operations to satisfy several Expectations for NATO Collective Defence sub-objectives. In part they call for the contingent capability to provide naval forces, up to a naval Task Group. A single element of this task group is to be ready within 10 days and sustainable indefinitely in low-level operations. The remainder of the Task Group is to be available within 10-30 days and shall be sustainable in combat operations for a period of 60 days, or in low-level operations for 180 days. A second Task Group is to be available in 30-90 days. CMS will initiate in Fall 1999 the necessary action to more closely align (by 2001) our NATO commitments as currently expressed in the Defence Planning Questionnaire (DPQ) with the longer readiness levels set out in the DPQ.</td>
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<td><strong>Peacetime commitment to NATO.</strong> As part of the peacetime commitment to NATO, The Army is to provide the opportunity to Allied land forces to conduct training in Canada on a cost-recovery basis.</td>
<td><strong>Peacetime Commitments to NATO.</strong> As part of the peacetime commitment to NATO, CMS is to provide one ship to serve with the Standing Naval Force Atlantic (SNFL), and occasionally another ship to operate with the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean.</td>
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<td>(STANAVFORMED). The SNFL ship is to be maintained at the readiness state required by the Standing Naval Force Atlantic, sustained indefinitely and deployable throughout the NATO area of operations.</td>
<td>Support International Security. There are several Expectations for the Support International Security sub-objectives. In part they call for the contingent capability to provide naval forces, up to a naval Task Group. This Task Group is to be available within 90 days, with single element available within 21 days. The Task Group shall be sustainable in combat operations for a period of 60 days, or in low-level operations for 180 days.</td>
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<td>International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster relief. The Army is to generate forces and a joint task force headquarters able to operate as part of an international joint and combined force in providing humanitarian assistance in concert with NGOs. This assistance can include: delivery of food and emergency shelter; security/protection of supplies, people and equipment; security tasks; civilian engineer infrastructure damage assessment; and the provision of speciality advice. The land forces and assigned air forces are to provide assistance in a low threat environment anywhere in the world.</td>
<td>International Humanitarian Assistance and Disaster Relief. CMS is to maintain the capability to operate as part of an international joint and combined force in providing humanitarian assistance in concert with non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Maritime and assigned air forces are to provide assistance in a low threat environment anywhere in the world.</td>
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<tr>
<td>Enhance International Peace and Stability through Bilateral and Multi-lateral Contacts</td>
<td>Key Results. Cooperation with specific military forces and agencies results in increased confidence building levels as well as a better understanding and performance of the roles of military forces within a democracy and in peacekeeping.</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations (Chapter VI of the UN Charter). The Army is to generate forces (including land force observers) and a joint task force headquarters able to operate as part of a UN multi-national coalition force. These land forces and assigned air forces are to conduct peacekeeping operations in a low threat environment anywhere in the world. This may require Stage 2 mobilization.</td>
<td>Peace Support Operations (Chapter 6 of the UN Charter). CMS is to maintain the capability to operate as part of a multi-national coalition UN Peacekeeping Force in low-level naval embargo operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peace Support Operations (Chapter VII of the UN Charter). The Army is to generate forces and a joint task force headquarters able to operate as part of a UN multi-national coalition force in mid-level joint and combined operations. The Army is to provide land forces and assigned air forces able to conduct peace support operations against modern enemy forces anywhere in the world. This may require Stage 3 mobilization.</td>
<td></td>
<td>Peace Support Operations (Chapter 7 of the UN Charter). CMS is to maintain the capability to operate as part of a UN multi-national coalition force in mid-level joint and combined operations. CMS is to provide maritime and assigned air forces able to operate against modern enemy forces anywhere in the world.</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
### Annex C Examples of Potential Joint Operations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defence Objective</th>
<th>Provide Aid to the Civil Power Abroad</th>
<th>Protect and Evacuate Canadians Abroad</th>
<th>Participate in Multilateral Operations</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Command and Control</td>
<td>Land Forces OPCON to MARLANT or MARPAC for ops in coastal areas</td>
<td>Land Forces OPCON to MARCOM for SAE/SPE from the sea</td>
<td>National Command by: MARLANT or MARPAC for simple international operations 1 Cdn Div HQ for complex international operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Movement</td>
<td>Movement of Land Forces to inaccessible coastal communities for public welfare or public order emergencies</td>
<td>Movement of Land Forces to secure evacuee assembly areas for evacuation by air or sea in SPE operation</td>
<td>Movement of Land Forces or escort of civilian shipping for deployment of Land Forces in fulfilment of NATO or UN commitment</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Engineering Support</td>
<td>Use of combat engineers in public welfare emergencies OPCON to MARLANT or MARPAC</td>
<td>Use of combat engineers to assist port opening in SAE/SPE</td>
<td>Use of combat engineers OPCON to MARCOM in International disaster relief as in Hurricane Andrew.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic Operations</td>
<td>Use of naval vessels to insert land forces in inaccessible coastal communities for public welfare or public order emergencies</td>
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<tr>
<td>NATO Operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>National Command by 1 Cdn Div HQ for complex international operations Movement of Land Forces or escort of civilian shipping for deployment of Land Forces in fulfilment of NATO commitment</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Evacuation Operations

See above
Bibliography

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Government Publications


*Australia's Strategic Policy*, (Canberra: Department of Defence, 1997)


Doctrine Publications

Australian


Canadian


*B-GL-300-000/FP-000 Canada’s Army: we Stand on Guard for Thee CFP 300*, (Ottawa: Department of National Defence, 1998)


United Kingdom


Electronic resources


Articles
