NATO'S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE CONCEPT--
Viable Tiger or Paper Dragon

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

NATO’S COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE CONCEPT – A VIABLE TIGER OR A PAPER DRAGON? by MAJ Peter L. Jones, USA, 73 pages.

Today, a new strategic environment confronts the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and its member nations. In order to address the challenges posed by this new environment, NATO developed a new strategy emphasizing political and military means to achieve Alliance objectives. While Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty remains the cornerstone of the Alliance, a new emphasis was placed on maintaining stability throughout Europe and, if necessary, conducting “out-of-area” operations aimed at enhancing European security. In order to accomplish this broad goal of European security, NATO developed several new external and internal programs. One of these new concepts is the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

Proposed in October 1994, the CJTF concept was viewed as a means of establishing NATO contingency capability while also providing a genuine European military capability that was “separable, but not separate” from NATO’s existing military structure. In theory, this hybrid would combine the best of both coalition and alliance forces into a trained multinational force capable of rapid flexible crisis response. This monograph assesses whether the “theoretical” CJTF matches reality and can serve as a viable operational command and control (C2) structure for the achievement of NATO’s political and operational goals. In order to address this question, the monograph first considers the evolving strategic and operational environment in which NATO now finds itself. This analysis highlights the change in the strategic environment that has forced NATO to focus on “out-of-area” operations and the need for the capabilities embodied within the CJTF. Subsequently, an analysis of the CJTF concept, along with U.S. joint doctrine as it pertains to combined operations, provides evaluation criteria necessary for examining the viability of the CJTF concept at the strategic and operational levels. NATO’s involvement in the Balkans, particularly Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE), the only existing example of an operational NATO CJTF, serves as a case study and provides data for analysis in assessing the CJTF’s potential. The subsequent analysis highlights the viability of the CJTF concept as a C2 operational structure to meet NATO’s emerging contingency operation requirements.

The analysis outlines the difficulties of developing the C3I structures necessary for successful multinational operations and highlights some of the obstacles in the development of an effective NATO and Western European Union (WEU) CJTF command and control structure.
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I. Introduction

On 10 February 1999, two under secretaries from both the Departments of Defense and State appeared before the House International Affairs Committee to inform Congress of possible US and other NATO troop deployment to Kosovo in order to enforce a negotiated peace agreement. As the debate over the deployment of U.S. soldiers raged across the aisle, several issues emerged concerning not only the deployment but also the changing role of NATO – what is the proper role of U.S. and NATO in such “out-of-area” missions? What is the role of the Western European Union (WEU), the Organization for the Security and Cooperation of Europe (OSCE), and the purported emerging European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI)? Why isn’t a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) composed of European forces being activated to satisfy the requirements of both Kosovo and the Europeans’ desire for a separate defense identity?¹

As the NATO Alliance prepares to celebrate its 50th Anniversary, many members believe they are well on their way to answering these questions. However, NATO’s involvement in the Balkans, especially recent actions in Kosovo, has dampened the jubilation and raised serious questions concerning the future of the Alliance. Even before the end of the first week of NATO bombing against Serbian targets, many strategic analysts, decisionmakers and pundits lamented the failure of the Alliance’s action and its inability to achieve its stated objectives. Again, arguments concerning the deployment of ground troops under NATO, UN, or WEU auspices were raised. To many, the activation of a CJTF seems a viable solution to a potential quagmire in the Balkans.²

Throughout the Cold War, the United States and its North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO) partners successfully defended the West against Soviet aggression. Since it’s inception in 1949, NATO not only guaranteed the defense of Western Europe but also achieved a level of political and military cooperation and integration previously unachievable in peacetime. This cooperation, along with the development of a viable and capable unified command and control structure, coupled with sizable forces and supporting infrastructure, served not only as a deterrent against Warsaw Pact aggression but would have proved a formidable adversary if war had erupted in the central plains of Europe.

With the fall of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union, NATO and its members were confronted with a new strategic environment. For NATO, one large "monolithic" security problem was quickly replaced by many smaller security problems in and around Europe. This transformation left many wondering whether NATO was an archaic institution capable of addressing these new security concerns. Beginning in 1990, NATO evolved a new strategy emphasizing political and military means to achieve Alliance objectives.³ NATO’s principle role of defending the sovereignty of its members remained as espoused under Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty. However, a new emphasis was placed on maintaining stability throughout Europe and, if necessary, conducting “out-of-area” operations aimed at enhancing European security.

In order to accomplish this broad goal of European security, NATO developed several new external and internal programs. Externally, NATO established the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) and Partnership for Peace (PfP) program as vehicles for increasing dialogue and cooperation with non-NATO countries in Europe and the former Soviet Union. Internally, NATO revised and reduced its military structure while creating
the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) and supporting the establishment of several multinational land formations. Additionally, NATO developed a new concept for a Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF).

First proposed in October 1994, the CJTF concept was viewed as a means of establishing a genuine European military capability that was “separable, but not separate” from NATO’s existing military structure. In theory, this hybrid would combine the best of both coalition and alliance forces into a trained multinational force capable of rapid flexible crisis response. Over the last four years, the CJTF concept has been further refined in terms of the political objectives it was meant to satisfy and the military characteristics needed to ensure its success. The deployment of NATO forces in Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR, NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina in December 1995 to enforce the Dayton Accords, and the conduct of NATO exercises, specifically ALLIED EFFORT ’97 and STRONG RESOLVE ’98, have shed insights into the strengths and weaknesses of the CJTF concept. As NATO contemplates the measures necessary for fully implementing this concept during 1999, an assessment of its ability to satisfy both its political and military components is required.

This monograph assesses whether the “theoretical” CJTF matches reality and can serve as a viable operational C2 structure for the achievement of NATO’s political and operational goals in an ever-changing security environment. In order to address this question, the monograph first considers the evolving strategic and operational environment in which NATO now finds itself. This analysis highlights the change in the strategic environment that has forced NATO to focus on “out-of-area” operations and the need for the capabilities embodied within the CJTF. Subsequently, an analysis of the
CJTF concept, along with joint doctrine as it pertains to combined operations, provides evaluation criteria necessary for examining the viability of the CJTF concept in terms of both strategic and operational requirements. NATO's involvement in the Balkans, particularly Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE), the only existing example of an operational NATO CJTF, serves as a case study and provides data for analysis in assessing the CJTF's potential. The subsequent analysis highlights the viability of the CJTF concept as a C2 operational structure to meet NATO's emerging contingency operation requirements.
II. The Strategic Environment & The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept

From the fall of the Berlin Wall through the first use of NATO forces in combat in Bosnia in 1994, NATO has found itself in a race to keep up with these dramatic changes in the Trans-Atlantic security environment.5

Within seven months of celebrating its fortieth anniversary as an institution, NATO began to feel a titanic shift in the international security environment caused by major external and internal factors unleashed by the fall of the Berlin Wall. Externally, NATO and the rest of world began to feel the effects of three emerging and simultaneous revolutions concerning information, governmental relations and the geostrategic environment which continue to reshape the post Cold War world.6

During the last decade, the information revolution and its corresponding technology has transformed the richest nations of the world from industrial-based to information-based economies, and consequently changed the nature and integration of the global economic system. Increased economic interdependence among nations has not only changed the relationships between producer and consumer but has also brought an increase in cultural and political awareness among different societies. Today, CNN and other media report the actions and reactions of competing nations and societies throughout the globe almost instantaneously, exposing a world audience to a myriad of images both hopeful and horrifying. Information technology is also changing the face of war by increasing the precision, lethality and survivability of emerging combat systems and subsequently the way nations conduct warfare.7

In conjunction with the information revolution, a revolution in government is also occurring. After centuries of increasingly more centralized governments, the state’s
monopoly on power is being challenged and replaced by regional economic and political organizations, major international businesses, and well-organized interest, religious and ethnic groups. For example, in Europe the establishment of numerous organizations such as the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), European Union (EU), Western European Union (WEU), Partnership for Peace (PfP), Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council, along with NATO illustrate that nation-states entering the 21st century are no longer closed systems. In terms of developing a united Europe with its own distinctive European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), the Western European Union (WEU) plays a central role in the continued push for European military integration.

Concomitant with both governmental and information revolutions, a geostrategic transformation has occurred. Geostrategically, the bipolar superpower apparatus that existed during the Cold War has been replaced by an asymmetric multi-polar world with the U.S. as the sole remaining superpower. While both Russia and China cannot be ignored due to their position on the UN Security Council and their regional military and economic might, they do not have the capability to project sustained power (diplomatic, information, military, or economic) globally. As a result of this geostrategic revolution, today's world can be divided into three categories: (1) states that are successfully implementing market democracies; (2) states attempting to transition to market democracies but which may be thwarted due to politicized economies or authoritative political systems; and (3) troubled or failed states unable to produce a viable economy or government due to ethnic, religious or secessionist extremism.

Since 1989, the power of these revolutionary forces has drastically changed the
strategic security environment facing the members of NATO. The perceived omnipotent Soviet Union has vanished and in the process freed many of the countries of Eastern Europe to establish their own political identities and paths toward economic development. The Soviet Union itself has dissolved, leaving one major regional power, Russia, and numerous smaller states with some joining Russia in a weak confederation called the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS). The fragmentation of the Soviet Empire has made possible large-scale interactions on political, economic, and cultural levels between the formally divided East and West.\textsuperscript{12}

Militarily, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and withdrawal of Soviet/Russian troops dramatically reduced tensions on the continent of Europe. These troop movements, coupled with conventional forces and nuclear weapons agreements such as Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE), SALT II and SALT III, have drastically reduced military force structures and expenditures. In terms of conventional forces, the Alliance agreed in 1990 to force reductions under the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty, resulting in a forty-five percent decrease in peacetime strength in the central region alone by 1993.\textsuperscript{13} Additionally, many nations, especially those of the former Warsaw Pact, have not only reduced forces but are seeking to reorganize and reorient their military structures in order to participate in NATO sponsored Partnership for Peace (PfP) exercises and hopefully gain entrance into the Alliance.\textsuperscript{14}

As a result of this shift in the security environment, the allied leaders agreed that:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{15}
This view clearly necessitated a change in NATO’s long standing policy of “forward defense and flexible response” established in 1967. NATO’s new strategy as outlined in the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept and the Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation recognized that “…the risks to Allied security that remain are multi-faceted in nature and multi-directional, which makes them hard to predict and assess.” In surveying the emerging security environment, the members of the Alliance identified four major risks. First, Russia’s military power, both strategic and conventional, could not be discounted by either the members of the Alliance or many Central and Eastern European nations who still feel threatened by the possibility of a resurgent militaristic Russia. Second, the ever-present security risk posed by nuclear weapons was now coupled with an even greater possibility of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. Third, the integration of these new independent states into the concert of Europe and its supporting political, economic and military institutions threatens to create an atmosphere of “winners or losers” while potentially increasing Moscow’s sense of isolation. Finally, the nationalistic, ethnic, and religious tensions that had been suppressed under the weight of east-west tensions have violently resurfaced, especially among the nations of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (FRY).

Based on this analysis, members of the Alliance concluded that the “…new strategic environment does not change the purpose or the security functions of the Alliance.” On the other hand, this emerging security environment “…offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security.” In light of the previously outlined threats, “Arrangements exist within the Alliance for
consultation among the Allies under Article 4 of the Washington Treaty and, where appropriate, co-ordination of their efforts including their responses to such risks."^{20}

With the adoption of the *Alliance’s New Strategic Concept* and the *Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation*, NATO committed itself to "realize in full [a] broad approach to stability and security encompassing political, economic, social and environmental aspects," and along with other regional and international organizations (including an emerging ESDI) comprise a new "security architecture" for Europe, to "protect peace and to prevent war or any kind of coercion" throughout the Trans-Atlantic community.^{21} With these threats in mind and an increased emphasis on integrating all the elements of Alliance power (military, political, economic, and social), NATO would fulfill four core security functions for its members:

- Provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe.
- Serve as a transatlantic forum for consultations on any issue that affect the Allies vital interests.
- Deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.
- Preserve the strategic balance within Europe.^{22}

In developing the *Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*, several key changes occurred. First, there was a major shift in the tone and emphasis of the *Alliance’s New Strategic Concept* in terms of ends, ways and means. Previous strategies published by the NATO Military Committee (MC) had a decidedly military thrust while the *Alliance’s*
New Strategic Concept clearly places predominance on the political element of the strategy. Second, the open publication of this document was the first time the Alliance released an unclassified strategy, thereby allowing the world community to not only evaluate the goals of the Alliance but also the ways and means the Alliance proposed to use to fulfill its objectives. Additionally, France participated in the development and approval of the strategy despite its self-imposed exclusion from the Alliance’s integrated military structure. This opened a new dialogue with France and raised issues concerning NATO’s role in “a united Europe” and its relationship to the EU and WEU.  

The most significant change, however, is recognition by the Alliance that in protecting its interest it must be prepared for the first time to operate outside the traditional NATO Treaty area and commit its forces to a type of operation that had heretofore never been considered as an Alliance mission — peacekeeping. Such operations call for NATO involvement in crisis management, conflict prevention and the establishment of rapid reaction forces. A fundamental restructuring of NATO policies, programs, force structure and operations became necessary.

To fulfill the security objectives and goals outlined by the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, several interrelated political and military initiatives were undertaken. Politically, NATO increased its dialogue with Central and Eastern European states that belonged to the former Warsaw Pact through the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). Additionally, the OSCE was strengthened and tasked with several initiatives to improve trust, confidence, and stability in Europe, thereby reinforcing NATO’s objective of enhancing dialogue and cooperation throughout all European nations. NATO’s establishment of the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP),
under the authority of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and within the framework of the NACC, seeks to "...expand and intensify political and military cooperation within Europe, increase stability, diminish threats to peace, and build strengthened relationships..."28 The most significant aspect of the PfP invitation is NATO's desire to "...consult with any active participant in the Partnership if that Partner perceives a direct threat to its territorial integrity, political independence, or security..." thereby effectively extending the provisions of Article 4 of the Washington Treaty to non-members.29

These political initiatives were also shadowed by military initiatives aimed at fulfilling the military portion of the Alliance's New Strategic Concept. Within days of announcing the New Strategic Concept, the NATO Military Committee (MC) published Alliance Military Committee Decision 400 (MC 400), Military Guidance for the Implementation of the Alliance's Strategic Concept. MC 400 stipulated the requirement not only for highly mobile forces within the Alliance, but also timely and accurate intelligence, adequate transportation, logistics, and infrastructure. MC 400 also addressed mobilization, reconstitution, peacetime positioning, readiness and training requirements and responsibilities.30 Additionally, NATO forces were divided into three categories -- reaction forces, main defense forces and augmentation forces. Maintained at high levels of readiness, reaction forces would provide NATO with the capability to respond quickly and flexibly. These forces consist of immediate reaction forces (IRF) and rapid reaction forces (RRF). Immediate reaction forces include Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force (Land), ACE Mobile Force (Air), Standing Naval Forces Atlantic (STANAVFORLAND), Standing Naval Forces Minesweepers (STANAVFORMIN), and Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED). Additional air and sea
assets for the rapid reaction forces would be provided as required while land forces would initially come from the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps. In terms of organizing and providing effective command and control for the use of these forces out-of-area, a new structure was proposed to meet both the political and military requirements of these operations – the Combined Joint Task Force.
III. NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force in Theory

The CJTF concept is an integral and essential part of the Alliance’s adaptation to the challenges – and the opportunities – of the new security environment. It will allow NATO to conduct crisis management and peacekeeping operations and, perhaps in certain cases, collective defence, with greater flexibility and effectiveness.\(^{32}\)

At an informal meeting of Defense Ministers held at Travemunde, Germany in the autumn of 1993, the United States proposed the CJTF concept as a means for establishing a genuine military capability that was “separable but not separate” from NATO’s integrated military structure.\(^{33}\) The following January, at the NATO Summit in Brussels, NATO leaders approved the initiative and directed further analysis, study and ultimately adoption of the concept.\(^{34}\) Initially hampered for two years by political issues revolving around the role of Major NATO Commands (MNCs) in the planning and conduct of “non-Article 5” operations, a consensus was reached with the French government concerning its role in NATO’s military staffs and possible deployment of NATO CJTFs. In June 1996, the North Atlantic Council (NAC) approved the Military Committee’s (MC) CJTF implementation plan, which commenced in 1997.\(^{35}\)

Prior to 1994, the concept of joint and combined task forces had been embraced not only by the U.S. but also by many of its Allies. Even before the Goldwater-Nichols DoD Reorganization Act directed that greater emphasis be given to joint and combined operations, joint task forces (JTFs) and combined joint task forces (CJTFs) had been established.\(^{36}\) Additionally, other NATO allies had used JTFs in such places as Zaire (1991), the Persian Gulf (1991) and the Falklands (1982). While “combined joint task force” is not specifically defined in US doctrine (specifically Joint Publication 1-02), it
can be derived from related definitions to mean:

A subordinate command consisting of land, air, and/or sea forces from two or more allies. A CJTF can be established on a geographical or functional basis when the mission has a specific limited objective and duration.\textsuperscript{37}

Doctrinally, the commander of such a combined force would exercise operational control over assigned and attached forces. Additionally, he would be responsible not only for making recommendations on the proper employment of assigned forces for accomplishing assigned operational missions and their execution, but would also be responsible for the conduct of joint training of assigned forces. Theoretically, the commander would have a combined joint staff capable of assisting him in these missions and functions.\textsuperscript{38}

In terms of NATO, the uniqueness of the CJTF concept is that:

...it will permanently institutionalize the multinational task-force concept, which has always been a temporary command-and-control arrangement employed by ad hoc coalitions. In fact, deploying CJTFs will, for the first time, become the primary modus operandi of a standing alliance in peacetime.\textsuperscript{39}

Through the permanent establishment of deployable multinational joint task forces, NATO hopes to develop a unique hybrid capability within its force structure that combines the best characteristics of both Alliance and coalition forces – “rapid crisis response by highly trained multinational forces, backed by pre-established political terms of reference, standardized procedures, regular exercises and in-place infrastructure.”\textsuperscript{40}

In adopting the CJTF concept, NATO not only wanted to develop an effective crisis response capability but also wanted to accomplish three other objectives. First, the NATO leadership wanted to adapt NATO’s force structure for new missions, principally peace operations outside the NATO areas as defined by Article 6 of the North Atlantic
Treaty.\textsuperscript{41} Alliance Military Committee Decision 327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations, identifies six peace support operational missions for NATO forces -- conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, humanitarian aid, and peace enforcement.\textsuperscript{42} Likewise, the WEU, in the 1992 Petersberg Declaration, identified the possible use of European forces for humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping and peacemaking.\textsuperscript{43}

Possible allocation of a NATO CJTF for accomplishing these WEU operational missions satisfy NATO’s second objective of the CJTF concept -- support the development of a European Security Defense Identity (ESDI) by offering the WEU a ‘separable but not separate’ military capability with no cost duplication within the NATO force structure.\textsuperscript{44} Seen as a military extension of European integration envisioned in the Maastricht Declaration, ESDI encompasses not only the theory of a free standing security pillar outside NATO, but also the concrete development of a common foreign and security policy, a wider role for the WEU military planning inside NATO, armaments cooperation, development of multinational formations, and the conduct of military operations.\textsuperscript{45}

One of the major objectives of PfP concerned the:

...development of an effective multinational capability to bring force to bear, where necessary, in support of CSCE or UN missions throughout Eurasia
...cooperative relations with NATO planning, training and exercises in peacekeeping, search and rescue, humanitarian assistance and other operations;
and developing forces better able to operate in conjunction with those of NATO.\textsuperscript{46}

This objective is coupled with the final objective for the CJTF concept -- assist in establishing security and stability to the nations of Eastern Europe by giving partnering states, those nations involved in PfP, a means to join NATO in crisis response.\textsuperscript{47}
Consequently, the PfP program and the CJTF concept became inter-linked and took on an added dimension in fulfilling the *Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*. Not only does the PfP program develop political-military ties between Central and Eastern European nations and NATO, but also military cooperation developed through PfP could ultimately lead to participation in NATO CJTF missions.⁴⁸

In addition to these three objectives, NATO Ministers established several parameters on developing the CJTF concept: first, the concept must ensure that collective defense requirements take priority if they arise; second, the concept must preserve both the transatlantic nature of the Alliance and the single integrated military C2 structure; and finally, be accomplished with minimum additional cost to Alliance members. Consequently, these stipulations mandated that CJTFs not only be organized within NATO’s established military structure but must rely primarily on the resources of selected Major Subordinate Commands (MSCs) designated as CJTF nuclei.⁴⁹

Given these objectives and parameters, former Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (SACLANT) Adm. Paul David Miller characterized the development of the NATO CJTF concept as:

...both a process and a structure: as a process, it enables us to assemble and groom the forces and capabilities to operate together; as a structure, it provides the command and control architecture to direct and employ a coalition operation.⁵⁰

Consequently, military planners envisaged three possible CJTF employment scenarios – a NATO-only CJTF; a NATO-plus CJTF; and a WEU-led CJTF. A NATO-only CJTF may involve forces from up to 18 alliance members (Iceland has no military forces) who wish to contribute.⁵¹ Presently, once released these forces would fall under one of the three NATO headquarters which would serve as the nucleus of the CJTF -- Striking Fleet
Atlantic (STRKFLTLANT), Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and Allied Forces Southern Europe (AFSOUTH). These headquarters would designate a number of dual hatted CJTF nucleus staff components from within its own resources, and also receive additional “staff modules” from other headquarters in order to meet the CJTF contingency plan’s command and control requirement. In theory, the nucleus staff will have received extensive training and remain generally constant from one operation to the next. Ultimately, the mission, force composition and size will determine the makeup of the CJTF headquarters. In all three options, the CJTF would operate under standard NATO procedures (SOPs) and agreements (STANAGS). Once deployed, command and control of a CJTF under NATO (either NATO-led or NATO-plus configurations) would report either directly to the regional MNC (SACEUR or SACLANT) or through a Major Subordinate Command (MSC). As with its force structure and composition, the CJTF lines of command would be based on such factors as geography and mission profile.

Recognizing the impracticality of insisting on unanimous participation in out-of-area missions, the NATO Ministers at Brussels could seek “coalitions of the willing,” including those “nations outside the Alliance” to participate in non-Article 5 missions. NATO-plus CJTFs would consist of not only contributing Alliance forces but also PfP partner states under a NATO nucleus staff. Non-NATO contributing forces would augment the CJTF nucleus staff with essential liaisons and specialty staff sections if required. These non-NATO forces would agree to operate under established NATO procedures and agreements and bolster the importance of PfP exercises in educating and practicing these procedures.

The WEU-led CJTF option sees either a NATO or national nucleus headquarters
controlling the operation. In both cases, however, NATO military command structures or forces would assume a supporting role in terms of preparing forces to operate under a national headquarters of a WEU member state or serving as the CJTF headquarters for the operation under the control of the WEU. Both configurations would assume command and control of forces coming from WEU members, associates, observers, associate partner nations and other contributing nations seeking to participate in the endeavor. 55 

To this end, nations participating in the WEU have delineated Forces Answerable to the WEU (FAWEU) which could be drawn upon to form a WEU-led CJTF. These forces include the European Corps (EUROCORPS), the Multinational Airborne Division (Central), the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Force, European Rapid Operational Force (EUROFOR), and possibly the 1st German/Netherlands Army Corps. 56 Many of these units are also dual-hatted to NATO.

Under all three options, the functional requirements of the CJTF headquarters would include: assimilation and dissemination of intelligence; planning, receiving and committing forces; maintaining communications among subordinate, higher and ‘lateral’ elements, which include local authorities, non-government agencies, and private volunteer organizations (PVOs). The CJTF headquarters must also be capable of controlling airspace and air operations. While logistics in NATO is a national responsibility, due to the nature of possible non-Article 5 contingencies the CJTF must be designed to manage and sustain itself logistically in both permissive and non-permissive environments. In out-of-area missions, NATO’s present luxury of interior lines, fixed bases, established infrastructure and host nation support will be potentially replaced by long lines of communications, dilapidated infrastructure, and meager host nation support,
especially in areas hit by humanitarian disaster. Consequently, depending on the operational environment and the composition of the task force, the CJTF may be presented with unique transportation and distribution requirements which necessitates either an integral logistics staff or an independent combined-joint logistics command.\textsuperscript{57}

Since the CJTF concept was devised to answer both political and military concerns facing the Alliance, questions concerning the concept’s viability must also be examined along political and military lines. In analyzing NATO’s actions in Operation Joint Endeavor, the viability of the CJTF concept can be evaluated against the following strategic and operational requirements:

- **Political-Military Strategic Criteria:**
  
  - Does the CJTF concept give NATO’s command structure sufficient flexibility to respond effectively to new non-Article 5 missions beyond the borders of the Alliance? Are there sufficient organizational structures to provide effective political oversight and political-military strategic planning for NATO-led CJTF operations?

  - Does the CJTF provide an effective means for incorporating non-NATO partners in operations, exercises and training, as envisioned in the PfP? Are their sufficient organizational structures to provide effective political oversight and integration of non-NATO political-military coordination and guidance for NATO-plus CJTF operations?

  - Does the CJTF concept facilitate the dual use of NATO forces and command structures for Western European Union operations in the context of an emerging European Security and Defense Identity without the support of US assets? Does the WEU possess sufficient political and military institutions to provide the requisite oversight and planning for WEU-led CJTF operations?

- **Operational Criteria (NATO or WEU led CJTF configurations):**

  - Does the CJTF provide a viable command, control, communications and intelligence (C3I) infrastructure, in terms of automation, manning, communication and intelligence assets, to meet the operational challenges
of both peace and contingency operations both in and out-of-area?

- Can the CJTF, as currently structured, effectively conduct contingency planning?

- Is the CJTF’s C3I architecture fully mobile and able to deploy where required without incapacitating the mounting headquarters?

- Once deployed does the CJTF have the capability to manage the resources required for sustained operations?

Even before these criteria could be evaluated against a well planned and executed CJTF experimentation and implementation plan, the Alliance, “...which for years had enjoyed the luxury of long range detailed planning for potential allied military operations [has been] reduced to ‘making it up as it [goes] along’ on the road to the first actual use of force in Alliance history.”58 As various committees wavered over the specifics of the CJTF concept, its founding principles and NATO would undergo “the test from hell” in the former Yugoslavia.59
IV. NATO’s Bosnia Experience – Reality Driving Theory

The Bosnian experience also shows the importance of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) initiative undertaken at the January 1994 Summit... In many ways, the CJTF concept is having a trial run in Bosnia, driven partly by the requirements of assembling the IFOR from Alliance and non-Alliance troop and asset contributions. 60

Even before NATO committed ground forces to Bosnia in order to enforce the provisions of the Dayton Accords (officially known as the General Framework for Peace – GFAP), NATO conducted several operations in support of UN mandates and initiatives aimed at stopping the conflagration in the Former Republics of Yugoslavia (FRY). From 1992 to 1995, CINCSOUTH, under the direction of SACEUR, coordinated three non-Article 5 operations in support of UN resolutions: Operation SHARP GUARD, a maritime embargo in the Adriatic; Operation DENY FLIGHT, multi-mission air operations over Bosnia; and Operation DELIBERATE FORCE, close air support missions in support of UN ground forces in Bosnia. 61 Although these NATO operations were conducted piecemeal, with largely independent air and maritime assets under the aegis of CINCSOUTH, in total, they formed an unofficial and loosely interpreted Combined Joint Task Force. 62 The conduct of these operations and the C2 structure built to support the multinational forces assembled influenced the establishment of IFOR and provided lessons concerning the CJTF concept. 63

U.S. – NATO Operations prior to Dayton – Piecemealing a CJTF Structure

In 1992, NATO (Operation MARITIME GUARD) and WEU (Operation SHARP FENCE) ships began enforcement operations in support of UN authorized arms embargo of the FRY. In June 1993, the WEU and NATO combined their efforts under Operation
SHARP GUARD. This union provided a "...unity of military command maintained through the NATO chain but responding to joint political decisions of the NATO and WEU councils..." Operational control of this NATO/WEU Task Force, designated Combined Task Force 440 (CTF 440), was delegated through SACEUR to the Commander, Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe (COMNAVSOUTH), responsible to CINCSOUTH. While both the commander and deputy commander of CTF 440 were Italian, the NAVSOUTH staff was augmented by a WEU staff element. During a two-year period, Operation SHARP GUARD on average had 17 ships deployed and five maritime patrol aircraft aloft. They challenged over 31,400 ships, boarded 2,575 and diverted another 643. Following the 14 December 1995 signing of the Dayton Peace Accords in Paris, naval forces involved in Operation SHARP GUARD stopped enforcing the economic sanctions imposed by the UN mandate, and with the subsequent lifting of the arms embargo, the operation was terminated on the 18th of June 1996.65

Initially designed as a monitoring mission in support of the UN established no-fly zone, Operation DENY FLIGHT began operations in October 1992 with NATO AWACS aircraft. With the passage of United Nation Security Council Resolution (UNSCR) 816 and subsequent NAC approval, Allied Forces Southern Command (AFSOUTH) began enforcement of the no-fly zone on 12 April 1993. In June 1993 the NAC approved another request from the UN Security Council to provide Close Air Support (CAS) for the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in Bosnia.66 Subsequently, DENY FLIGHT missions included:

- Conducting aerial monitoring and enforcement of the "No-Fly Zone" over Bosnia-Herzegovina.
• Providing close air support for UN ground troops at the request of, and controlled by, UN forces.

• Conducting, after request by and in coordination with UN, air strikes against designated targets threatening the security of the UN declared “safe areas.”

As a result of the political environment that surrounded the use of NATO forces in support of UN mandates and ground troops, each of these tasks required a separate and sometimes convoluted set of agreements with the UN. In terms of air strikes and CAS, CINCSOUTH, UN commanders and the Secretary-General established a “dual key” arrangement which hampered the quick and efficient use of NATO air power. During the 33 months of the operation’s duration, almost 80,000 sorties were flown (30 percent combat air patrols, 28 percent strike, 25 percent reconnaissance, 17 percent “other”). Of these sorties, 47 percent were flown by the U.S. (30 percent by the USAF alone).

Command and control of air operations in support of not only Operation DENY FLIGHT but also SHARP GUARD, DELIBERATE FORCE and PROVIDE PROMISE were provided by the Fifth Allied Tactical Air Force (5 ATAF) Combined Air Operations Center (CAOC) under Commander, Air Forces Southern Europe (COMAIRSOUTH) located in Vicenza, Italy. Initially established around a core of 78 U.S. Air Force headquarters personnel, by December 1995 it had become a permanent facility with more than 400 personnel assigned.

On 30 August 1995, in response to a Bosnian Serb mortar attack on Sarajevo, NATO began a series of air attacks on Bosnian Serb military targets. During Operation DELIBERATE FORCE NATO flew 3,515 sorties with the U.S. responsible for two-
thirds of the missions flown. As with the other air operations, the 5 ATAF CAOC controlled strikes originating from both Italian air bases and carriers in the Adriatic.

In addition to NATO operations in support of UN operations on the ground in Bosnia, CINCOUTH, in his capacity as CINCUSNAVEUR, oversaw all U.S. activities supporting UN missions in the FRY. These humanitarian efforts encompassed not only the establishment of a U.S. medical treatment facility in Zagreb, Croatia, but also the management of the longest lasting multinational airlift in history. From February 1993 to January 1996, Operation PROVIDE PROMISE delivered over 176,000 STONS of food, medicine, and supplies into Sarajevo. U.S., German, French, Canadian, Italian and British aircraft flew 14,660 equivalent C-130 lifts, approximately 13.8 equivalent C-130 sorties per day. In addition to flying approximately forty-five percent of these missions, the U.S. Air Force also conducted emergency airdrops of approximately 19,800 STONS of food and medicine to regions isolated by Bosnian Serbs. C2 for JTF PROVIDE PROMISE came out of AFSOUTH Headquarters in Naples, Italy, with forward elements in Zagreb and liaison elements at EUCOM Headquarters at Kelly Barracks, Germany and UNPROFOR Headquarters, Kiseljak, Bosnia. Air operations were controlled and coordinated through the 5th ATAF CAOC, which ensured they were integrated into the overall air effort.

While not officially involved in ground operations in the FRY, NATO nations provided most of the 38,000 troops assigned to the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR). From the very beginning, UNPROFOR played an emerging role. During the initial stages of the conflict, between April 1992 to June 1993, UNPROFOR’s role consisted primarily of providing humanitarian relief, operating the Sarajevo airport, protecting
ground convoys, and monitoring the no-fly zone from the ground. Between June 1993 and February 1994, the conflict expanded as Bosnian Croat forces launched attacks against Bosnian Muslims, and Bosnian Serbs intensified the stranglehold on Muslim enclaves. Correspondingly, UNPROFOR’s missions expanded to include providing humanitarian relief for roughly 2.7 million people and extending protection to the six designated safe areas. During this time period, UNPROFOR worked out procedures for the use of NATO air power in support of ground operations – Operation DENY FLIGHT.

Between February and October 1994, the Bosnian Muslims slowly began to turn the tide of war in their favor. With the emergence of a U.S. brokered Bosnian Muslim-Croat federation in March 1995, the military situation reached a relative balance and the level of violence began to recede. UNPROFOR expanded its missions to include the monitoring of locally negotiated cease-fires (especially between Bosnian Muslim and Bosnian Croat forces), heavy weapons inspection, anti-sniping enforcement, and protection of civilian movement. These missions continued during the spring of 1995 as Bosnian Croat and Muslim forces went on the offensive against Bosnian Serb held areas. While UNPROFOR’s performance has received mixed reviews, it effectively facilitated humanitarian assistance but was unable to provide adequate security to the designated safe areas. This task proved untenable due to the lack of resources.

The summer of 1995 saw renewed fighting between the factions. Croatian forces sought to gain control of the Krajina region. In conjunction with this offensive, Bosniac forces attempted to push their way into the Bihac Pocket and thus evict Bosnian Serbs forces from western Bosnia. Bosnian Serb forces, in the mean time, renewed their mortar attacks against Sarajevo and began to intensify their stranglehold on three isolated
Muslim enclaves—Srebrenica, Zepa, and Gorazde. These events coupled with the increased use of NATO air power against Bosnian Serb forces set the conditions for a U.S. led diplomatic effort during the summer of 1995.74 

As U.S. diplomatic efforts pushed the leaders of the warring factions to Dayton, Ohio, the negotiators faced three leaders who sought diverging objectives.75 The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP) which emerged from the 20 days of negotiating in Dayton, while general in some areas, satisfied many of these competing goals and laid down specifics in eleven areas. The GFAP solidified the 5 October cease-fire into a viable peace between Bosnia-Herzegovina and its neighbors. The agreement, signed by Milosevic, Tudjman, and Izetbegovic, contained eleven articles and annexes. These annexes contained the specifics of the accord’s implementation and covered areas ranging from regional stability to the conduct of elections, as well as the governing framework of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina.76 Of particular importance was Annex 1A—Agreement on the Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement—which laid the framework for a multinational Implementation Force (IFOR), and outlined its authority and military tasks. The commitment of this force was termed—Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR.

**Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR – Prototyping the CJTF**

The concept for a NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) predated the actual negotiations at Dayton. On the same day that the cease-fire was announced, 5 October 1995, the NATO Defense Ministers were meeting in Williamsburg, VA. With surprising little difficulty, the ministers approved the concept for the first peacekeeping force in NATO history. On 1 December 1995, the NAC authorized SACEUR to commence Operation JOINT ENDEAVOR (OJE) in support of the Dayton Peace Accords. As
NATO's first non-Article 5 ground operation, IFOR is "...tangible proof that, in addition to carrying out the core functions of defense of the Alliance, its military forces have the flexibility to be used outside the NATO area." 77

A truly joint and multinational force, with coordinated air, ground, and maritime components, IFOR superseded the previous NATO, WEU and UN forces conducting operations in and around Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unlike the separate naval and air component activities controlled by AFSOUTH, IFOR as a multinational, multiple service force under a single unified command within NATO's integrated command structure meets the technical definition of a CJTF. Annex 1A of the GFAP served as the force's mandate and gave IFOR responsibility for the following military tasks:

- Ensuring continued compliance with the cease-fire;
- Ensuring the withdrawal of forces from the agreed cease-fire zone of separation back to their respective territories, and ensuring the separation of forces;
- Ensuring the collection of heavy weapons into cantonment sites and barracks and the demobilization of remaining forces;
- Creating conditions for the safe, orderly and speedy withdrawal of UN forces that have not been transferred to the NATO-led IFOR;
- Controlling the airspace over Bosnia-Herzegovina. 78

While the UN Security Council authorized NATO to assume responsibility for the military provisions of the treaty, IFOR would receive its political guidance not from the UN Security Council but from the NAC. As the regional Major NATO Command (MNC) responsible for the operation and principle force provider, SACEUR delegated command of IFOR and dual-hatted CINCSOUTH as COMIFOR. AFSOUTH was designated the operational level headquarters as a result of its regional focus and previous success in managing Operations SHARP GUARD, DENY FLIGHT and PROVIDE.
PROMISE. In terms of other key positions, the duties of Deputy COMIFOR were delegated not to DCINCSOUTH but to France in recognition of the size of their force contribution.

Additionally, COMIFOR’s service components did not fall within the existing AFSOUTH structures. Ground component command fell to Commander, ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (COMARRC), a British general. Activated in 1992, the ARRC is the foundation of the Alliance’s rapid reaction forces designed to demonstrate Alliance resolve, reinforce main defense forces; conduct sustained combat as a multinational force; and conduct peace operations. As the IFOR’s ground component, the ARRC consisted of approximately 60,000 soldiers from contributing nations grouped into three multinational divisions:

- Multinational Division (Southwest), commanded by a British general officer and composed of British, Canadian, Dutch and Czech forces.
- Multinational Division (Southeast), commanded by a French general officer and composed of French, Spanish, Italian, Portuguese, Ukrainian and Egyptian troops.
- Multinational Division (North), commanded by an American general officer and composed of U.S., Turkish, and Russian troops, plus a multinational Nordic Brigade composed of Norwegians, Danes, Swedes, Finns, and Poles. 79

In terms of air and naval elements, component command was established along both traditional and ad hoc lines. COMAIRSOUTH, who previously controlled Operations DENY FLIGHT and DELIBERATE FORCE, assumed command of the IFOR air component. As the CJFACC, COMAIRSOUTH drew up the Air Tasking Message and exercised C2 and coordination authority for not only the airspace and air operations but also all air forces operating throughout the Air Tactical Area of Operations. Naval operations were split between two commands. COMNAVSOUTH, an Italian Admiral,
maintained control over Operation SHARP GUARD but did not assume responsibility for IFOR maritime support. Commander, Striking Forces Southern Europe (COMSTRIKEFORSOUTH), the commander of the U.S. Sixth Fleet, assumed responsibility of all IFOR carrier battle and amphibious ready group support. Additionally, while AFSOUTH furnished the bulk of the lower level IFOR HQ staff positions, officers from other Alliance headquarters filled many of the remaining flag and general officer billets in COMIFOR HQ.  

In addition to air, ground, and sea component commanders, an IFOR Commander for Support (C-SPT) was established in Zagreb, Croatia. While all troop-contributing nations used national logistics to support themselves in Bosnia, C-SPT coordinated the sustainment, movement, medical, engineering, and contracting operations of the national logistics elements located in Kaposvar, Hungary (U.S.); Split, Croatia (British); and Ploce, Croatia (French). In order to manage and coordinate this expansive system, C-SPT established an Engineer Coordination Center, Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC), Medical Coordination Center (MEDCC), and a Theater Contracting Coordination Center (KCCC).  

On 2 December 1995, this headquarters structure oversaw the deployment of an advance enabling force of 2,600 troops to Bosnia and Croatia. The mission of this advance force was the establishment of C2 and logistics nodes needed to support the deployment of 60,000 IFOR troops into the area. IFOR commenced deployment on 16 December after the passage of UNSCR 1031 and formal NAC approval. Transfer of authority (TOA) between UNPROFOR and IFOR occurred 96 hours later. By D+90, 19 March 1996, IFOR had overseen the withdrawal of all Bosnian Muslim, Bosnian Croat
and Bosnian Serb forces; the transfer of territory between Bosnian entities; and, the
establishment of a zone of separation and inter-entity boundary line. By D+180, 27 June,
all heavy weapons and forces were in cantonment areas or demobilized. This action was
the last major milestone in the military annex of the GFAP.  

In addition to accomplishing all the specified tasks in Annex 1A, IFOR conducted
other operations to assist in the rebuilding of Bosnia and the establishment of a safe and
secure environment. First, IFOR provided emergency humanitarian assistance to local
communities, including hospital reconstruction, delivery of food and water, emergency
medical and transportation support, and mine awareness training in over 200 schools and
community groups. Some 7,000 IFOR engineers repaired and maintained over 2,500
kilometers of roads, 60 bridges, and assisted in repairing water supply systems.
Additionally, IFOR, through the establishment of a 350 man Civil-Military team,
provided technical advice concerning legal, transportation, agriculture, public health and
other civil affairs issues to various commissions, non-governmental organizations
(NGOs), PVOs, local and national authorities.
V. Evaluating NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force

Since the CJTF concept was born out of both political and military necessity in order to meet the requirements of Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, all three proposed CJTF configurations (NATO-led; NATO-plus; and, WEU-led) need to be judged by both strategic political requirements as well as military operational viability. While the CJTF concept theoretically provides the capability for NATO to operate out-of-area in three different configurations, at issue is whether NATO and the WEU have established the necessary mechanisms to provide for not only political-military oversight of these operations in terms of guidance, planning and control but also C3I structures necessary for operational success.

The C3I viability of NATO-led and NATO-plus CJTFs

Following the 1994 Summit, SHAPE realized that it had to establish the mechanisms to “..quickly translate political and military instructions from NATO headquarters (Military Committee and North Atlantic Council) into guidance and operational plans for its subordinate commanders to execute.” Several innovations were put in place to not only support the CJTF concept but also IFOR operations. First, a revitalized and bureaucratically strengthened ACE Reaction Force Planning Staff (ARFPS) directly responsible to the Deputy SACEUR was charged with strategic planning. Second, a Crisis Management Organization (CMO), with cells from SHAPE operations, intelligence, logistics, mobility, public information, and communications peacetime headquarters sections, coordinated IFOR efforts and kept the SACEUR, MC and NAC informed of any changes in the situation. Additionally, SHAPE established the
ACE Mobility Coordination Center (AMCC) in December 1995. The AMCC worked with all participating nations to ensure that all deployment plans and force movements matched priorities set by COMIFOR. The AMCC coordinated movement issues between force contributing nations, host nation facilities, and the Joint Movement Control Center in theater. While these mechanisms greatly enhanced SHAPE's ability to guide and control IFOR military operations, the lack of a political organization with which the NAC could coordinate with the European Union (EU) High Representative for Bosnia responsible for civil tasks exacerbated synchronization of civil/military implementation at the strategic level. Consequently, while NATO forces completed the majority of Annex 1A tasks within the first 180 days, the EU High Representative, Carl Bildt, was only beginning to mobilize resources he needed to complete the remaining provisions of the GFAP. While NATO had developed the means to guide NATO forces in out-of-area non-Article 5 missions, it still has not developed the mechanisms necessary to coordinate military operations with political and civil organizations at the strategic level.

Additionally, in order to accommodate PfP and non-PfP nations into both operational and strategic planning, several mechanisms in addition to AFPS, CMO and AMCC were established. Both PfP and non-PfP contributing nations, except Russia, provided liaison officers to the Partnership Coordination Cell and IFOR Coordination Center (ICC). The ICC was the key link in arranging initial contact, coordinating plans and resolving national issues between the contributing nations and SHAPE. Due to the political sensitivity and desirability of deploying Russian forces as part of IFOR, a special arrangement was established between U.S. Secretary of Defense, William Perry, and the Russian Minister of Defense, Pavel Grachev. Under this agreement, control of the
Russian Brigade ran from the SACEUR through the Deputy Commander for Russian forces at SHAPE. Tactically, the COMARRC exercised TACON of the brigade through Commander, MND (N), the commander for the overall sector in which the Russians operated. While this arrangement proved problematic, especially under stress, it did initiate military cooperation between Russian and NATO forces in actual operations and further demonstrated the Alliance’s willingness to establish special arrangements to ensure political strategic objectives are met.

Even with the above mentioned NATO/SHAPE organizational structures and use of established operations plans, NATO lacked an institutionalized strategic planning process, both deliberate and crisis action, for out-of-area missions. NATO planning procedures are a holdover from the Cold War which prohibits the MC from conducting contingency planning till authorized by the NAC. With no agreed to political end-state, the NAC could not provide the MC guidance till after the signing of the GFAP. As a result of the compressed time schedule, no strategic plan beyond implementing the provisions of the agreement was developed. AFSOUTH, as the mounting IFOR headquarters, received limited operationally planning guidance from either the NAC or SHAPE. Additionally, AFSOUTH did not have all the planning expertise needed to produce a fully integrated campaign plan. AFSOUTH “…was neither staffed nor equipped to lead a land force in combat. Had IFOR encountered more combat in this operation, the headquarters structure probably would have failed without additional U.S./NATO staff support and equipment.” Due to the lack of expertise concerning the use of ground forces, most of the ground planning was executed not by the operational headquarters but by the ARRC and multinational division commanders responsible for
their respective sectors. While detailed conceptual planning for potential operations within the Former Republic of Yugoslavia had begun by NATO forces, particularly the ARRC, in September 1991, a key component in the planning process had been missing — namely the political end state. As a result, the normal staff planning relationship throughout all the headquarters, both Corps and divisions, had become distorted and resulted in isolated and disjointed planning processes, bottom-up planning, unilateral planning and continuous “what if drills.” The signing of the GFAP provided NATO planners at all levels with the desired political end-state for the operation. Consequently, absent guidance from the MC or AFSOUTH, COMARRC and the multinational division commanders saw the implementation of the requirements of the GFAP, specifically those in Annex 1A, as constituting the desired military end-state. As its tactical objectives, ground operations centered on verification of faction compliance with the GFAP and its established timeline. As a result of this planning focus, the lack of an overall integrated campaign plan did not significantly hamper the execution of the military provisions of the GFAP. However, this focus on the military objectives of the GFAP and fear of “mission creep” caused friction between IFOR and the numerous civilian agencies responsible for the other provisions of the agreement, particularly policing functions, detaining of suspected war criminals, refugee return and voting assistance. Ultimately, IFOR would have to take the lead or provide significant support in the accomplishment of many of the remaining tasks outlined in the GFAP.

Along with issues concerning planning responsibilities, there were issues concerning command authority. In line with stated NATO practice, COMIFOR and COMARRC had been given NATO OPCON over their forces. NATO OPCON,
however, does not permit (1) assignment of separate employment to force components; (2) allow the redress of imbalances and possible shortfalls within the task force through the shifting of resources; and (3) does not allow the reassignment of forces to correspond with possible changes in the situation.97 These deficiencies surrounding proposed command relationships had surfaced prior to IFOR’s deployment. In previous NATO training exercises both the Commander, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (COMLANDCENT), and COMARRC had directed a subordinate force to reallocate forces to another national force to react to situations on the battlefield. Due to the time required for the subordinate commander to gain approval from his national authorities, both commanders nearly lost control over the battle.98 Under this command relationship, if a more dynamic and hostile environment had arisen during IFOR’s peace enforcement mission, COMIFOR and COMARRC would have been hampered in their ability to shift assets among the three multinational divisions. Additionally, the command arrangements surrounding the employment of the Russian brigade were unique among the forces deployed and posed challenges at both the operational and tactical level. Because COMARRC only exercised TACON of the Russian brigade through the MND (N) American commander, the U.S. and Russian forces had to go through a time consuming interpretive process in order to relay orders to back and forth between MND (N) and the Russian brigade.99 This fluid command environment was further aggravated by the presence of approximately 10,000 other forces in theater, both sea and land, operating under national C2.100 COMIFOR had no control over these forces and subsequently could not coordinate their activities. While the theater of operations proved permissive, any operational emergency could have created serious problems in terms of rules of
engagement (ROE), force protection, and enforcement of the GFAP.\textsuperscript{101} Establishing a viable communications and information system (CIS) between the various forces and responsive to the demands of OJE proved a challenge and accentuated disparities between allied capabilities.\textsuperscript{102} Throughout the operation, there were separately managed NATO and national voice, message, data, and VTC networks.\textsuperscript{103} In order to provide some commonality and connectivity, AFSOUTH, which had no mobile HQs capability, and the U.S. pushed integration of the various NATO and national systems through the establishment of a Combined Joint Communication Control Center (CJCC) to manage the IFOR CIS network.\textsuperscript{104} To provide CIS conductivity, the U.S. Tri-Service Tactical Communications system formed the backbone of IFOR’s strategic and theater-level network. In order to support this configuration, the U.S. provided 59 percent of the military communicators and 76 percent of the SHF SATCOMs needed. British tactical systems also played a major role in supporting IFOR operations. U.K. CIS systems supporting the ARRC were compatible with the U.S. dominated CIS backbone. However, the French tactical SHF terminals only supported national connectivity needs and therefore had to be augmented.\textsuperscript{105} Despite standardization agreements, this disparity between C2 systems among alliance members will continue as each member continues to rely on systems with which they are most comfortable. This lack of CIS connectivity and the lack of mobile land C2 assets within NATO at the operational level of command could seriously hamper NATO efforts to mount CJTF operations expeditiously in out-of-area missions.

Along with the lack of clear strategic and operational planning, the lack of guidance concerning intelligence reporting procedures, information sharing techniques
and national intelligence responsibilities further disjointed COMIFOR’s attempt to exercise some basic principles of multinational intelligence operations.\textsuperscript{106} As a result, COMINFOR was unable to maximize assets and synchronize intelligence collection and dissemination by all the players in this multinational operation. Because national intelligence support plans were closely held, COMIFOR and his staff were unclear on what nations would bring what capabilities, what were their strengths and weaknesses, and what intelligence doctrine and disclosure rules would be followed.\textsuperscript{107} Even with the deployment of nearly 60,000 potential intelligence collectors and a wide array of intelligence assets, HQ IFOR received limited releasable intelligence information. This redundancy and lack of synchronized intelligence collection was even present at the tactical level with all three multinational divisions possessing their own stovepiped intelligence assets. These intelligence relationships were a result of various national agendas that required a significant portion of the intelligence collection be siphoned off to national commands or national intelligence agencies rather than being forwarded to the ARRC and HQ IFOR.\textsuperscript{108} This desire for information to support not only IFOR operations but also national policy agendas produced “mini-intelligence fiefdoms” in the HQs. At HQ AFSOUTH, no less than six separate intelligence entities existed in addition to the AFSOUTH Intelligence Directorate. In theater, there were at least ten national intelligence centers dedicated to providing intelligence solely for their national forces.\textsuperscript{109} This absence of unity of effort in the intelligence realm, coupled with intelligence disclosure issues, meant that each MND, and even members of HQ IFOR, operated on varying levels of situational awareness.\textsuperscript{110} While the tactical situation proved less lethal due to general compliance of the majority of the former warring factions, a more willful
opponent could have exploited the lack of intelligence sharing and confusion within IFOR to his benefit. While the U.S. attempted to alleviate this confusion and increase the common situational awareness throughout the command by deploying joint defense intelligence support systems to COMIFOR, COMARCC, and Commander, TF EAGLE (COMEAGLE), seamless intelligence sharing among contributing national forces was still lacking.\textsuperscript{111} Besides the flow of intelligence, several Alliance members felt that U.S. dominance with respect to satellite imagery, intelligence electronic warfare and rapid processing capabilities would overshadow their own contributions and were hesitant to provide support to U.S. intelligence efforts.\textsuperscript{112} This led to conflict over asset support, asset tasking authority, and a bifurcation of not only technical assets but also human intelligence and counterintelligence support.\textsuperscript{113}

In terms of sustainment, the original IFOR concept for support called for a strong logistical backbone based on the principles outlined in Alliance Military Committee Decision 319 (MC 319).\textsuperscript{114} In theory, the C-SPT would provide an organization able to span the divergent national logistic doctrines and effectively integrate logistical support to IFOR from planning to execution.\textsuperscript{115} C-SPT efforts, however, were hampered as a result of limited and inexperience staffing, resources and national desires to maintain their own logistical infrastructure. Consequently, the role of C-SPT became diffused by the command’s inability to cover the logistics functions with the area of responsibility and the development of multiple mini “ad hoc” staffs operating in individual stovepipe modes.\textsuperscript{116} Additionally, logistical planning and efforts were further frustrated by unrealistic expectation on the part of the U.S. that other coalition forces would be able to project and sustain themselves.\textsuperscript{117} Subsequently, it fell on the shoulders of the U.S., UK
and France to fill the void in expeditionary logistics capability.\textsuperscript{118}

While IFOR demonstrates that NATO can successfully mount a NATO-led, specifically a NATO-plus CJTF, in a complex peace enforcement operation, several shortcomings were apparent. NATO's mechanisms for providing strategic direction, developing contingency plans, deploying C3I infrastructure, and sustaining a multinational force out-of-area were overcome along ad hoc lines, and through the expenditure of major Alliance resources, particularly U.S. assets. Additionally, four years of prolonged operations in the FRY AOR had taken its toll on the AFSOUTH staff that was split between Naples and Sarajevo. While AFSOUTH performed commendably throughout the crisis in the Bosnia, its regular functions of planning and exercising for other regional contingencies and general war had atrophied. While not deployed as long, the ARRC staff had suffered similar degradation.\textsuperscript{119} Consequently, the NAC announced in September 1996 that it agreed to a new command relationship for the Stabilization Force (SFOR) scheduled to relieve AFSOUTH and COMARRC of their IFOR duties in November 1996.\textsuperscript{120}

\textit{The C3I viability of WEU-led CJTFs}

The success of such WEU operations as Operation SHARP GUARD demonstrate that the WEU can mount and control combined forces in the conduct of certain stability and support operations, such as maritime patrolling. Additionally, the composition of UNPROFOR demonstrates that WEU nations can take the lead in conducting peace operations under a UN mandate with a certain level of success. However, the current structure of the WEU brings into question its ability to effectively interface with NATO assets and conduct complex combined and joint peace operations requiring a mature C3I
structure.

In order to make itself strategically viable, the WEU has developed a politico-military decision-making process similar to NATO. The WEU Permanent Council, the WEU’s political body, is supported by both a politico-military and military delegates group.\textsuperscript{121} The Permanent Chairman of the Military Delegates Committee (a 4-Star General/Flag Officer) also serves as the Director of the WEU Military Staff. In his role as Director, he is supported by the WEU Planning Cell and Situation Center. The four-year-old planning cell is the only military element of the WEU which operates under normal conditions. It has a combined joint staff of 55 members, of whom 40 are military officers operating within six functional sections corresponding to their NATO counterparts at SHAPE. The missions of the planning cell range from preparing plans for the employment of forces answerable to the WEU and coordinating exercises in peacetime to monitoring the situation and preparing relevant contingency plans when directed by the WEU Permanent Council during emerging crises.\textsuperscript{122} The WEU satellite center at Torrejon, Spain supports the planning cell and WEU Permanent Council with intelligence products derived mainly through France’s civil SPOT system.

While this small organization cannot match the planning capabilities of SHAPE’s 950 man organization, NATO has taken measures to be able to assist the WEU in meeting the Petersberg Agreement and Article 5 of the Brussels Treaty. European officers have been placed in key leadership billets to include chief of staff of the ARFPS, the Combined Joint Planning Staff and the PfP Coordination Cell. Moreover, the Deputy SACEUR serves as the official contact between SHAPE and the WEU. The Deputy SACEUR, upon approval by the NAC and WEU, could assume command of WEU-led
CJTF operations. In order to assist in the transfer of information, more robust terms of references are being drafted between the two organizations in order to support the development of ESDI while preserving resources and the principle of unity of command for NATO and the WEU.

Even with this assistance, however, the ability of the WEU to manage any major CJTF deployment over division size is questionable. Of the forty military personnel assigned to the WEU planning cell, only twenty personnel are actually involved in planning. This small group is also expected to maintain detailed forces lists, develop force packages, serve as the council’s source of military expertise, and prepare the draft directive for the WEU CJTF commander. Consequently, without a major shift of NATO planners to WEU and a restructuring of the politico-military infrastructure, the WEU assembly realizes that the “CJTF will make little sense for [the] WEU…” A scarcity of WEU strategic resources also exists in terms of communications and intelligence.

The WEU communication (WEUCOM) system between its Secretary General in Brussels and national capitals is considered too slow and of limited secure capability. Incompatibility also exists between WEUCOM and NATO’s Initial Voice Switch Network and Telegraphic Relay Equipment. While NATO – WEU have developed planning agreements, there is no intelligence agreement which allows the WEU planning cell access to NATO and national intelligence products. While the situation center provides some support, it lacks systems suited to military purposes. Of the forty-eight satellites used by IFOR and SFOR for C4I functions, forty-six belonged to the United States. While the upgrading of these strategic C3I systems have been continually discussed between the members of the WEU, major disagreements between the member
nations have precluded any consolidated effort to resource and fix the deficiencies.130 This shortcoming would seriously hamper any WEU-led CJTF called upon to conduct a peace enforcement or large scale peacekeeping mission and questions the viability of a WEU-led CJTF for anything other than small scale traditional peace keeping operations.

Operationally, the WEU does not possess an integrated military structure nor does it have any permanently assigned forces readily available to form the framework for a WEU-led CJTF. While nations have provided a list of Forces Answerable to WEU for planning and possible deployment, many of these forces are already earmarked to NATO. Consequently, conflicts between the units’ NATO and WEU mission profile and training requirements have yet to be addressed.131 Additionally, most of these FAWEU forces consist of multinational formations that have characteristics non-conducive for CJTF deployment. For example, the European Corps (EUROCORPS) is strategically immobile and consists predominately of French and German divisions composed of undeployable conscripts. Additionally, EUROCORPS suffers from both logistical and communication information system incompatibility.132 Due to the very nature and level of integration within these multinational land formations, political unanimity among the force’s contributing nations is essential. While many see the proliferation of multinational formations as beneficial to European solidarity and interoperability, they pose a potential problem for the CJTF concept. Nations choosing not to participate in a “coalition of the willing” may inadvertently (or intentionally) gut multinational forces and staffs available to a CJTF by withdrawing critical units or capabilities.133 The resultant level of “ad-hockery” which could result from throwing incompatible forces together seriously jeopardizes the WEU’s ability to effectively field a WEU-led CJTF.
While there is little doubt that WEU nations could muster the necessary number of ground forces for a post-SFOR peacekeeping mission, the ability to provide the necessary C3I and sustainment structure is questionable. Consequently, the WEU would have to fall back on NATO capabilities, specifically those provided by the U.S. For such a European-led peacekeeping force (EFOR) to succeed, the U.S. would have to augment EFOR with C4I, strategic logistics, intelligence, lift, as well as be prepared to provide an over-the-horizon rapid reaction force.\textsuperscript{134} The growing disparity in terms of European and U.S. military capabilities is a result of fiscal restraints placed on European defense spending pursuant to European Union monetary integration guidelines. Consequently, defense expenditures in Europe have been cut by an average of thirty-five percent. European research and development accounts are half that of the U.S., and procurement funds are scarce. Most of these cuts have occurred in such critical areas as mobile C2, strategic lift and sustainment.\textsuperscript{135} As a result, few concrete measures have gone into developing the WEU as a security mechanism for Europe. As one WEU official admitted, "...money is so tight that one even has to fight for paper clips."\textsuperscript{136} Consequently, little has been done to prepare the WEU for its place in the spotlight as the European Union's security arm.
VI. Conclusion

As the evolution of the CJTF concept attests, Clausewitz’s often quoted dictum that “…war is nothing but the continuation of policy with other means” applies not only to the aims of war itself but also how nations and alliance’s conduct war.\textsuperscript{137} NATO’s CJTF concept fits a long-standing pattern in which political imperatives and goals often are incompatible with military concerns and capabilities. Consequently, the viability of the CJTF concept is stretched between meeting the demands of the changing strategic and security environment, shifting political goals of Alliance members, and the military’s desire for an integrated and viable command and control structure. These competing demands hamper the CJTF concept’s viability in terms of NATO-led and NATO-plus operations, and make it almost impossible in term of WEU-led operations.

In relation to NATO-led and NATO-plus CJTF operations, the Alliance is wrestling with many of the issues which the U.S. faced in codifying when, where, and how to conduct joint operations under an established JTF HQ. NATO has been marginally successful in addressing many of the strategic and operational C3I issues necessary for NATO CJTFs to be viable. However, the political nature of the Alliance places unanimity of action and individual member considerations ahead of effectively integrating the military aspects of the concept. Consequently, numerous disconnects appeared in terms of planning, command, control, communication, intelligence and sustainment operations during OJE. While NATO has acknowledged these failings during OJE, many of the issues reappeared during CJTF trial exercises ALLIED EFFORT 97 and STRONG RESOLVE 98.\textsuperscript{138} As a result, NATO is still in a slow process
of transforming the CJTF concept from a “paper dragon” into a viable means of achieving the Alliance’s objectives.

WEU-led CJTF operations are even more questionable. No land exercises above division strength have ever been conducted to test the concept. “Ad hoctery” is a stated course of action and is viable if the mission demands limited resources and occurs in a truly permissive environment, such as traditional peacekeeping operations. European leaders readily admit that they will require NATO capabilities, specifically those possessed by the U.S., in order for them to execute a WEU-led CJTF operation. While some Alliance members have argued for a prearranged turnover of NATO assets to the WEU for European CJTF operations, the U.S. Government has made it clear that it will retain some form of oversight over deployed U.S. assets. While many European nations readily admit their dependence on U.S. capabilities, only the U.K. has taken substantive measures to increase its power projection capability and acquire C3I and sustainment structures necessary for out-of-area operations. Until other European nations make the same commitment of resources, the CJTF concept as it relates to the WEU will remain a “paper dragon.”
Endnotes

1 Hearing Proceedings, Committee on International Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, *U.S. Involvement in Kosovo*, Washington, D.C., 10 February 1999. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, Honorable Walter B. Slocombe, and the Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs, Honorable Thomas Pickering, represented the Departments of Defense and State before the House Committee. According to Mr. Slocombe, potential U.S. involvement in Kosovo is clearly in the U.S. national interest as it pertains to “…peace and stability in southern Europe, and in seeing that NATO, the instrument which is key to keeping the peace across that continent, stays strong.” Representative Richard Burr (R-NC) questioned this assessment and asked why the WEU was not asking NATO for a European led CJTF, which was formulated for such contingencies, to respond to this crisis which is clearly in Europe’s interest to resolve. Both under secretaries declined to comment on the viability of deploying a WEU-led CJTF. They viewed U.S. involvement in any NATO deployment as inseparable.

2 The discussion of deploying NATO ground troops into Kosovo was raised even before the first bombs fell on Belgrade, and as the air war continues so does the debate over the commitment of NATO (and subsequently U.S. ground forces). In the eyes of many analysts, there is a distinct reluctance by the U.S. to deploy ground troops into anything but a permissive environment. While this may not be possible in this case, Mike O’Hanlon, military and strategic analyst at the Brookings Institution, has suggested that a combined joint task force be formed from willing nations, not necessarily the U.S., and that it be deployed under NATO control. See Federal News Service Transcript, “The Kosovo Crisis: NATO Strikes Serbia,” Brookings Press Briefing, 29 March 1999, p. 21.

3 Today, as a result of changes in the Alliance and NATO’s role in the Balkans, most policymakers still view NATO as a viable and integral instrument for promoting security in Europe. After the demise of the Soviet Union, however, many questioned whether NATO was in fact hampering rather than achieving its members’ security interest. For a discussion of the eventual dissolution of NATO see Hugh De Santis, “The Graying of NATO,” in *U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era*, Brad Roberts, ed., Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993, pp. 113-127. Today, a debate still wages over how far NATO should move from its original purpose of collective defense as embodied in Article 5 of the Washington Treaty to collective security and promotion of peace and stability out of NATO’s traditional areas. This debate concerning NATO’s possible future mission and roles continues to effect NATO-Russian relations, NATO expansion, NATO force structure and organization. See Stanley R. Sloan, *NATO’s Future: Beyond Collective Defense* (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1995).

4 Lt. General Mario da Silva, Chief of Staff of NATO’s Combined Joint Planning Staff outlined the implementation plan for the CJTF concept in his article, “Implementing the Combined Joint Task Force Concept,” *NATO Review*, Winter 1998, pp. 16-19. The implementation timeline for the CJTF concept consists of three phases. Phase I –
Establish Initial Capability runs from 1996 to March 1999. Phase II – Assessment runs from June 1998 to October 1999. Phase III – Full Implementation is scheduled to run from March 1999 to January 2000. While the first two trials of the concept have been productive initial steps, Lt. General da Silva believes “...that we need to expand the focus from the CJTF HQ itself to more detailed study of the other issues related to the CJTF concept, including HQ formation, training, deployment, employment and redeployment, The headquarters of the next level down the chain, CJTF component commands, as well as the necessary sustainment over extended periods, rotation of personnel, CIS and costs…”


7 Ibid., p. 2.


10 The WEU was established as a successor to the Brussels Treaty Organization established to monitor German rearmament. It is the only European institution whose members have pledged to defend each other. However, NATO preempted its security function after the Federal Republic of Germany entered the Alliance. It has often been viewed as the security analogue to the EC and OSCE in their respective economic domains, and contains 28 European nations (some nations maintain only associate, observer, or partnership status). See Graham Messervy-Whiting, “WEU – Operational Development,” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 97, pp. 70-79, and Hugh De Santis, “The Graying of NATO,” in *U.S. Security in an Uncertain Era*, Brad Roberts, ed. (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1993), pp. 113-127.

11 Binnenkijk, pp. 1-2.


14 Coffey, p. 22.


16 Nelson Drew, *Trans-Atlantic Security in Transition: The Evolution of NATO from Berlin to Bosnia*, McNair Paper No. 35 (Arlington, VA: National War College, 1995), pp. 4-5. These twin pillars of NATO security strategy were outlined in MC 14-3. It took seven years and the withdrawal of France from NATO's integrated military structure before this strategy was approved by the Alliance.

17 *The Alliance's Strategic Concept*, Paragraph 8.


20 Ibid., Paragraph 12. Article 4 to the Washington Treaty, 4 April 1949, states that “The Parties will consult together whenever, in the opinion of any of them, the territorial integrity, political independence or security of any of the Parties is threatened.”


25 Johnsen, p. 3. Several studies concerning restructuring of NATO forces were immediately started. Additionally, the provisions for establishing the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps had already begun.

26 In December 1991 the NACC convened for the first time. The NACC provides an essential interface and confidence building measure between NATO and its former adversaries, and serves as a forum in which members can raise and explore security issues of mutual interest and concern. The NACC issues and agendas cover a broad range of issues to policy and security, defense planning, defense conversion, economics, science and air space management and control. Besides serving as a forum concerning numerous defense issues, the NACC Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping has sought to harmonize peacekeeping doctrines, practices, and procedures. Johnsen, p. 13.

27 Established in Helsinki in 1975, Johnsen, p. 12.

28 “Partnership for Peace: An Invitation,” NATO Press Communiqué M-1(94)2, January 10, 1994, pp. 1-2. PfP activities cover a broad range of political and military activities between participating nations and NATO headquarters. Activities include not only peacekeeping exercises but also examination of defense budgets, democratic control of armed forces cooperative military relations and development of forces outside of NATO capable of operating with Alliance forces. William T. Johnsen and Thomas-Durell Young provide an initial assessment of PfP in “NATO Expansion and Partnership for Peace: Assessing the Facts,” The RUSI Journal, Vol. 139, No. 6, December 1994, pp. 47-53.


30 Johnsen, p. 17.

31 Ibid., pp. 17-19.


"Therefore, we direct the North Atlantic Council in Permanent Session, with the advice of the NATO Military Authorities, to examine how the Alliance's political and military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance's missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity. As part of this process, we endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces as a means to facilitate contingency operations, including operations with participating nations outside the Alliance."

The two and a half years of internal haggling centered around French and US disagreement over where the CJTF headquarters would be located, terms under which it would be created, and the role of NATO's Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) would have over the crisis response planning process. France perceives that the American SACEUR would have too much influence over the planning, deployment and oversight of CJTFs. The Berlin agreement compromises on these issues have allowed for the CJTF implementation plan to move forward. See International Institute for Strategic Studies, "NATO, CJTFs and IFOR," Strategic Comments, Vol. 2, No. 5, June 1996, pp. 1-2, and Charles L. Barry, "The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept," in Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National and Multinational Considerations, Thomas-Durell Young, ed. (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), p. 34-35.

Both the 1991 and 1997 versions of Joint Pub 1, Joint Warfare of the U.S. Armed Forces, (Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1991), pp. 41-61, use the Yorktown and Normandy Campaigns as examples of successful operations conducted by combined and joint forces.


JP 0-2, IV-10.


Ibid., p. 82.


43 "On Strengthening WEU’s Operational Role," Section II, Petersberg Declaration, Meeting of WEU Foreign and Defence Ministers, 19 June 1992. There is a key distinction between WEU and NATO concerning the term -- “peacemaking.” The WEU uses the term to mean peace enforcement in UN and NATO parlance. While “peacemaking” is defined by NATO and the U.S. as “The process of diplomacy, mediation, negotiation, or other forms of peaceful settlements that arranges an end to a dispute, and resolves issues that led to it” (JP 1-02). Designed to support implementation of the 1991 Maastricht Declaration, the Petersberg Declaration tasked the WEU to develop a defense identity for the European Union by creating a military planning staff and conducting contingency planning concerning the use of European forces to accomplish those previously stated missions.

44 Charles L. Barry, “NATO’s Combined Joint Task Forces in Theory and Practice,” *Survival*, Vol. 38, no. 1, Spring 1996, p. 83, and Anthony Cragg, NATO’s Assistant Secretary General for Defense Planning and Policy, “The Combined Joint Task Force Concept: A key component of the Alliance’s adaptation,” *NATO Review*, No. 4, July 1996, pp. 7-8. Specifically, the January 1994 NATO Summit Declaration tasks NATO “…to examine how the Alliance’s political military structures and procedures might be developed and adapted to conduct more efficiently and flexibly the Alliance’s missions, including peacekeeping, as well as to improve cooperation with the WEU and to reflect the emerging European Security and Defence Identity.”

45 Charles L. Barry, “Creating a European Security and Defense Identity.” *Joint Force Quarterly*, Spring 1997, pp. 62-69. While European signatories to the Maastricht Declaration have made major strides in all five areas, the development of an operational WEU and its relationship to NATO, the establishment of multinational military forces and the operational deployment of WEU forces has been lacking and has profound effects on the CJTF concept.


Lt. General Mario da Silva, p. 7.


Brussels Declaration, para. 7 and 9. While unanimous consent is still required for NATO to initiate or participate in such operations, participation in any such operations “...will remain subject to decisions of member states in accordance with national constitutions.”(para. 7).


Drew, p. 10.

Ibid., p. 7. It is profound that COL Drew would label NATO’s challenges in the Balkans as “the test from hell.” Unfortunately, he was one of NATO and America’s first
casualties in attempting to find a solution to the conflict in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Drew, along with Robert Frasure and Joseph Kruzel, were killed on the slopes of Mount Igman overlooking Sarajevo on the 19th of August, 1995 as they traveled as part of Ambassador Holbrooke’s negotiating team. See Richard Holbrooke, *To End a War*, (New York: Random House, 1998), pp. 3-18.


63 Barry, “NATO’s Bold New Concept…,” p. 54. Additionally, many of these missions and C2 structures were continued as IFOR was deployed.

64 Drew, pp. 13-14.

65 Larry Wentz, pp. 21-22.

66 Ibid., p. 22.


68 Ibid., p. 4 and Good, pp. 88-89.

69 Wentz, pp. 22-23.

70 Wentz, p. 23. Of the major contributors, the U.S. flew 2,318 sorties; United Kingdom, 326; France, 284; Netherlands, 198; and Spain, 121.

71 Wentz, p. 17. The U.S. portion of regular transit of supplies consisted of two C-130s operating from Falconara, Italy and an indeterminate number of C-141s from Rhein Main Air Base in Germany. Canada, France and the U.K. provided two C-130s each. Germany provided two C-160s. During the 19-month emergency airlift to the Bosnian Serbs, the U.S. provided the bulk of almost three C-130 sorties per day required.

72 UNPROFOR had been initially deployed to monitor the UN brokered cease-fire in January 1992 between Croatia and Serbia. The force of approximately 14,000 soldiers
was assigned the traditional peacekeeping role of monitoring this agreement within four sectors established within Croatia. Adolf Carlson, “No Balm in Gilead: The Employment of Military Force in the War in Former Yugoslavia and Prospects for a Lasting Peace,” in Yugoslavia’s Wars: The Problem From Hell, Stephen J. Blank, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995), p. 95.


74 Holbrooke, pp. 60-75, outlines the events leading up to his diplomatic mission. While five previous diplomatic efforts had failed, Holbrooke realized that “...the success of the Croatian (and later, in similar circumstances, the Bosnian-Croat Federation) offensive was a classic illustration of the fact that the shape of the diplomatic landscape will usually reflect the balance of forces on the ground. In concrete terms this meant that as diplomats we could not expect the Serbs to be conciliatory at the negotiating table as long as they had experienced nothing but success on the battlefield.” (73) This change in the balance of military power coupled with the use of air power to reinforce U.S. diplomatic initiatives gave Holbrooke an negotiating leverage with Milosevic that previously had not existed.

75 Holbrooke, p. 105, outlined the numerous goals of many of the players in the conflict. Milosevic acquired from the Bosnian Serbs the right to represent them at Dayton and throughout further negotiations. The “Patriarch Paper” signed by Karadzic, Mladic, Milosevic and other major Serb players created a joint Yugoslav-Repulika Srpska delegation with Milosevic as its representative (105). While the Bosnian Serbs sought to maintain their control over conquered areas, Milosevic’s greatest concern was the lifting of economic sanctions against his country. In terms of Bosnia, he sought a quick agreement, which would freeze the contending armies in place (thereby insuring a Serbian Republic in Bosnia), while leaving the political provisions ambiguous and thus limiting the power of any central government. Tudjman sought: first, to regain eastern Slavonia; second, to create an ethnically pure Croatia; and third, to maintain maximum control over the Croat portion of Bosnia. The objectives of Alij Izetbegovic, the Muslim President of Bosnia-Herzegovina, were and still are difficult to quantify. While re-establishment of a multi-ethnic nation with a strong central government seemed to be his primary focus, the establishment of a geographically viable nation was his major objective at Dayton.

76 The General Framework Agreement for Peace (GFAP), also know as the Dayton Accords, was signed on 21 November 1995 in Paris. The agreement contained the following numbered annexes which contained the specifics of the settlement and the negotiated agreements on: 1A – Military Aspects of the Peace Settlement; 1B – Regional
Stabilization; 2 – Inter-Entity Boundary and Related Issues; 3 – Elections; 4 – Constitution; 5 – Arbitration; 6 – Human Rights; 7 – Refugees and Displaced Persons; 8 – Commission to Preserve National Monuments; 9 – Bosnia and Herzegovina Public Corporations; 10 – Civilian Implementation; and, 11 – International Police Task Force. 


79 Holbrooke, Ibid., 203. **NATO’s Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia**, NATO Basic Fact Sheet #4, March 1997, [http://www.nato.int/docu/facts/bpfy.htm], Internet. The U.S. force commitment centered around the 1st Armored Division (IAD) providing the nucleus of Task Force Eagle (TFE), the Multinational Division – North. In this role, TFE was one of three multinational divisions in IFOR under the command and control of the NATO Allied Ready Reaction Corps (ARRC), operating out of Sarajevo. U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, **Operation Joint Endeavor: Task Force Eagle Initial Operations** (Fort Leavenworth, KS: May 1996), ix. The U.S. contribution to OJE augmentation of the ARRC headquarters, a National Support Element (NSE), consisted of elements from USAREUR and V Corps in Hungary and Croatia, and air and naval assets working throughout the AOR. TFE would eventually consist of over 23,000 soldiers in 14 brigades, 42 battalions from 11 nations. Stanley F. Cherrie, “Task Force Eagle,” **Military Review** (July-August 1997), p. 66.


81 Layton, pp. 50-51.

82 NATO Fact Sheet #4, **NATO’s Role in Bringing Peace to the Former Yugoslavia**, March 1997, pp. 9-10.


86 Wentz, pp. 37-38.

87 Holbrooke, p. 324. “This lag in implementation troubled us enormously, although we shared in the blame for it. While the military, sixty thousand strong, met every early deadline, the civilian side, functioning out of Carl Bildt’s cellular telephone, met almost none, and fell steadily behind schedule. For this Bildt was personally criticized, but the fault was more in the structures we had imposed on him, particularly the failure to give him sufficient funding or stronger backing from IFOR.”

88 Leighton W. Smith, Jr. “The Pillars of Peace in Bosnia,” *NATO Review*, No. 4, July 1996, p. 14. In ADM Smith’s eyes as COMIFOR, “Criticism that ‘the civilian organizations’ have been slow in standing up to their tasks is, in my judgement, unfair...I would, therefore, offer that the ‘criticism’ is not levied against [them]...but, rather, against the lack of a strategic or operational plan...”

89 Wentz, pp. 39-40.


92 U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned, *Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: December 1995), p. 8. NATO planning is initiated by a planning document approved by the NAC. It is a consensus document among the Alliance members which not only outlined what contingency is to be planned for but also what member nations accept responsibility for providing forces if the plan is executed. It has been suggested by some member nations that the NAC should delegate staffing authority to the MC. This would allow the MC and SHAPE to direct campaign planning for contingencies in peace operations, thereby easing the planning difficulties at lower levels and the disconnects which presently exist in the planning effort.

94 U.S. Army Combined Arms Command, Center for Army Lessons Learned. Bosnia Contingency Planning and Training, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: December 1995), pp. iii, 2-5.

95 Ibid.

96 Holbrooke, pp. 333-357. Holbrooke and other civilian decisionmakers were disturbed by IFOR’s reluctance to stop the burning of villages as Serbs departed, particularly suburbs of Sarajevo, and IFOR recalcitrance in arresting ‘war criminals’. According to Holbrooke, “Watching with growing anxiety from New York, I called Washington frequently, pleading for action, pointing out that Dayton’s “silver bullet” clause [Annex 1A, Article 51, para 3 & 4] gave IFOR full authority in such a situation. But Admiral Smith [COMIFOR] refused to act, repeating his mantra that IFOR was not a police force, that putting out the fires or arresting the arsonists would be mission creep. That IFOR’s passivity was endangering fundamental policy goals of the United States and NATO seemed unimportant to him.” (p. 337)

97 Layton, p.39. In NATO –agreed usage, there are four levels of command authority: (1) Operational Command (OPCOM); (2) Operational Control (OPCON); (3) Tactical Command (TACOM); and, (4) Tactical Control (TACON). OPCOM provides a commander the greatest degree of control and flexibility over his assigned forces while TACON provides the least. See Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, “Command Authorities and Multinationality in NATO: The Response of the Central Region’s Armies,” in Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations, Thomas-Durell Young, ed. (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996), pp. 53-78, for a comparison of all these levels of command authority and their relationship to multinational land formations.

98 Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, p. 54.

99 Layton, p. 43.

100 Ibid., p. 42, and Forsterl, p. 5. Of particular concern to U.S. forces was the fact that no U.S. Joint Force Commander (JFC) was designated for OJE, therefore, doctrinal command relationships were not established among U.S. forces. This caused several problems related to force protection, support and Title 10 responsibilities, and resulted in an inefficient “stovepipe” channel through USAREUR-Forward in Hungary. Consequently, two distinct chains of command developed for U.S. forces: one NATO operational chain and one service chain.
101 Layton, p. 42.

102 According to JP 6-0, Doctrine for Command, Control, Communications, and Computer (C4) Systems Support for Joint Operations, Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1995, pp. V-1, U.S. policy “…focuses on enhancing multinational combat capabilities of US military forces to communicate and share data and information. Areas of particular concern for compatibility and commonality include C4 and automated information systems, battlefield surveillance systems, target designation systems, target acquisition systems, and COMSEC hardware and software systems.” While the U.S. and other NATO countries comply with the standards of the NATO Air Command and Control System, many nations have yet to fully conform to the provisions of this agreement.

103 Wentz, p. 273.


105 Wentz, pp. 282-283.

106 According to JP 2-0, Joint Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Operations, Washington D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, May 1995, pp. VIII-1 to VIII-5, while there “…is no single intelligence doctrine for multinational operations. Each coalition or alliance must develop its own doctrine. There are, however, principles and concepts that provide an initial position for developing the objectives and nature of multinational doctrines.” (VIII-1). These intelligence principles include: (1) adjust national differences between nations; (2) establish unity of effort against a common threat; (3) determine and plan requirements for intelligence special arrangements; (4) coordinate intelligence sharing; provide for complementary intelligence operations; (5) operate combined intelligence centers; and, (6) conduct intelligence liaison exchange activities (VIII-3).

107 According to Larry K. Wentz, “Intelligence Operations,” in Larry Wentz, ed., Lessons From Bosnia: The IFOR Experience, (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University, 1997), p. 60-63, NATO intelligence states, “In peacetime, NATO commanders have to rely largely on member nations for intelligence they need. In wartime, the majority of NATO commanders’ intelligence may still come from the member nations; however, they will also acquire intelligence from many different sources and agencies such as assigned combat units, reconnaissance units, and aircraft.” The need and ability to synchronize intelligence operations as it pertains to CJTF peacekeeping or peace enforcement missions is not addressed in NATO doctrine.

Ibid.

Wentz, p.89. There was a disconnect between the members of the Alliance, particularly between the U.S., Britain, and France, on how to effectively share information with all contributing national forces. As a result of these divergent philosophies, the responsiveness of intelligence analysis and dissemination was lacking. For example, the ARRC G2, a UK Officer, released information strictly on a “need to know” basis. This conflicted with U.S. doctrine, which espouses shared situational awareness through broadcast intelligence. Consequently, the U.S. Commander of TF Eagle, MND(N), relied heavily on U.S. national and theater assets responsive to his needs and desire for greater detail.

Wentz, p. 84. These systems provided immediate theater and national level intelligence databases to all three commanders.

Wentz, pp. 102-104, and Collin A. Agee, “Joint STARS in Bosnia: Too Much Data – Too Little Intel?” *Military Intelligence Professional Bulletin*, October-December 1996, at http://huachuca-usaic.army.mil/contlearning/infrastructure/media/mipb/octdec96/agee.htm], Internet, pp. 1-9, outline the numerous obstacles and factors which effected Joint STARS and UAV operations. While the U.S. deployed Joint Surveillance and Target Attack Radar System (JSTARS) airframes and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in support of IFOR, the nature of the operation, terrain, composition of the FFW’s, shared intelligence restrictions, logistical requirements for ground station modules (GSM), and lack of support by allies hampered JSTARS operations and negated its effectiveness. While JSTARS did identify some FFW convoys, defensive positions and trench lines, it served mainly to cue other assets such as UAV, HUMINT, and ground reconnaissance to confirm possible violations of the GFAP. UAVs, however, proved invaluable due to their flexibility, accuracy, and availability. While Lofty View, a short range tactical asset, was deployed to support ARRC requirements, the Predator, as a theater platform controlled by the ARRC and flown by the CAOC, was the system of choice by the ARRC in monitoring FFW compliance with the GFAP.


MC 319 was approved in 1992 in an attempt to properly organize NATO’s logistics system to support the military initiatives outlined in the *Alliance’s New Strategic Concept*
and MC 400. The key points of MC 319 include the following changes to NATO’s logistic doctrine of national support: (1) NATO authorities must exercise collective responsibility for logistical support of NATO’s multinational operations; (2) NATO commanders at the appropriate level must be given sufficient authority over logistics resources to enable them to employ and sustain their forces in the most effective manner; and (3) NATO commanders must exercise increased authority and responsibility in the area of host nation support. Charles A. Seland, “The New NATO,” Army Logistician (May-June, 1996), available from http://www.almc.army.mil/orgnzatn/alog/mayjun/ms062.html, Internet.


117 Forsterl, p. 10.

118 Farman, p. 64.

119 Good, p. 107.

120 On 7 November, Headquarters, Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), assumed command of IFOR and on 20 November, LANDCENT relieved the ARRC as the IFOR Ground Component Commander and subsequently activated SFOR on the 20th of December 1996. IFOR Fact Sheet, No. 4, p. 4.


122 WEU Planning Cell, April 1999, available from [http://www.weu.int/planning/home.htm], Internet.


127 Foster, p. 28.

128 Foster, pp. 27-28.


130 Foster, pp. 27-28.

131 Thomas, Durell Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures (Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997), p. 12.

132 Ibid., pp. 35-36, and Foster, p. 31.

133 Good, p. 54.


135 Hillen, p. 77.


138 Thomas Cook in “NATO CJTF Doctrine: The Naked Emperor,” Parameters, Winter 1998, pp. 124-136, outlines many issues which plagued NATO during OJE and reappeared during Exercise ALLIED EFFORT. He attributes most of these problems to national agendas and NATO’s inability to provide the resources necessary for making AFCENT a viable C3I platform for out-of-area missions.

An unnamed U.S. NATO official stated that “...there is no way we are going to hand over assets lock, stock, and barrel to the WEU without some form of oversight.” Quoted by Good, p. 62.

Ibid. While both the United Kingdom and France signed a joint Declaration at St Malo in January 1999 in an attempt to revitalize measures necessary to make ESDI and European led CJTFs viable, only the United Kingdom instituted measures for transforming its armed forces to cope with the security problems of the 1990s and the 21st century. Some of these measures include: creation of Joint Rapid Reaction Forces with deployable command and control, strategic lift, medical and logistic support, and better arrangements for joint training; enhanced in-theatre command and control of operations by rapidly deployable joint force headquarters; and acquisition of four more roll-on roll-off (RORO) container ships (giving the United Kingdom a total of six) and four C17 large aircraft or their equivalent. See,
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