THE TRAINING RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN THE ARMY NATIONAL GUARD BRIGADES AND THEIR ACTIVE ARMY RESIDENT TRAINING DETACHMENTS--IS THIS AN EFFECTIVE RELATIONSHIP?

A MONOGRAPH
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The relationship between the Active Component of the U.S. Army and the Army National Guard has been troubled and divisive. When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, he unwittingly touched off a significant dispute between the active Army and the Army National Guard. Three of the Army National Guard's combat brigades - designed to go to war with active Army combat divisions - were mobilized and trained, but never deployed to the Gulf War. In the aftermath of this public relations debacle, the Congress drafted legislation which mandated that the Army increase its support of the Reserve Components by assigning 5,000 active Army advisors to positions in direct support. In response, the Army created several training organizations, one of which was the Resident Training Detachment.

The purpose of this monograph is to explore the genesis, the mission and functions of the Resident Training Detachments and to compare those to the identified pre- and post-mobilization training deficiencies of the Gulf War Roundout Brigades. The research question asks whether the Resident Training Detachments contribute effectively toward solving the Gulf War training deficiencies. The author concludes that the relationship is an effective one.
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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TABLE OF CONTENTS</th>
<th>PAGE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. INTRODUCTION...</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 1:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>II. THE TRAINING</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DEFICIENCIES WHICH</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STARTED THE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROCESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>III. THE CONGRESS</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TAKES ACTION</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IV. THE BOLD</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SHIFT PROGRAM</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>V. THE ARMY</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESTABLISHES RESIDENT TRAINING DETACHMENTS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VI. PROBLEMS WITH</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BOLD SHIFT AND THE RTD MISSION...</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 2:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VII. CORRECTIVE</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACTION: THE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CREATION OF THE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GROUND FORCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>READINESS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENHANCEMENT</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PROGRAM AND THE</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENHANCED</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SEPARATE BRIGADES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND TRAINING</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRATEGY, AND</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FORMAL</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOCUMENTATION IN</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US ARMY FORCES</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>COMMAND/ARMY</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATIONAL GUARD</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>REGULATION 350-2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SECTION 3:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIII. ANALYSIS...</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IX. CONCLUSIONS</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AND RECOMMENDATIONS</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ENDNOTES</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
INTRODUCTION

The relationship between the Active Component of the U.S. Army and the Army National Guard has been troubled and divisive. The relationship, especially in the twentieth century, has been fraught with a lack of trust and characterized as an ‘us versus them’ mentality.\(^1\) The Department of the Army maintains a standing Army based on Title X, United States Code and congressionally-legislated personnel end strength. The Army National Guard, on the other hand, claims its legitimacy from the United States Constitution, which specifies that the Congress shall “provide for calling forth the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions.”\(^2\) The National Guard believes that, of all of its forces, its combat units - the infantry, armor and cavalry brigades and divisions - are the jewel in the crown. The National Guard views any attempts by the Active Component of the Army either to physically reduce or diminish the importance of these National Guard combat forces as yet another step in the never-ending war between the two components.

At the end of the Vietnam War, the U.S. Army reduced its size. General Creighton Abrams, then the Chief of Staff of the Army, was upset at the lack of political and national will manifested in fighting America’s most troubling war. The Johnson administration fought the war largely with active units and resisted mobilizing the Reserve Components because of the belief that the country wouldn’t support “widening” the war. General Abrams was determined to prevent this from happening in the future. “They’re [the political leadership of the country] not taking us to war again without calling up the reserves.”\(^3\) Complying with then-Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird’s
August 21st, 1970 directive to increase reliance on the use of Reserve Component* units, General Abrams developed the "Roundout" concept, in which one Army National Guard combat brigade would augment an Active Army combat division as its third (of three) combat brigades. This concept provided several things. First, it allowed the active Army to "expand" its force structure from 12 to 16 active divisions without increasing the active duty personnel end strength, presumably increasing the deterrence capability of the force. Second, and not unrelated, using Reserve Component elements had been proven to be a cost effective method of maintaining combat force structure (Army Reserve Component ground forces cost 67 to 80 percent less than similarly equipped active Army units).⁴ Third, the Army National Guard brigades involved "got a mission." The concept would help improve the readiness and visibility of these units. Finally, the concept had congressional support.⁵

From the early 70's, through the end of the 80's, the Army planned to use these National Guard brigades as part of a strategy based on the possibility of large-scale conflict in Europe. This strategy foresaw a rapid reaction, first by active Army forward-based units, followed by deployment and reinforcement of other active Army divisions stationed in the United States. Several of these U.S.-based divisions had one of Abrams' Roundout Brigades. The scenario envisioned that the forward-based active units would fight the initial battles as the Roundout Brigades activated and their divisions completed post-mobilization training to prepare them for war prior to deployment overseas.⁶ In 1990, however, the end of the Cold War with the Soviet Union altered fundamentally the

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* Reserve Components of the U.S. Army consist of both the Army National Guard and the U.S. Army Reserve. Throughout this monograph, use of the term 'Reserve Component' thereby includes the Army National Guard.
military strategy of the United States, from one of global war with the USSR, to one of
deployment of quick power projection forces to major regional conflicts around the
globe. This shift in military strategy had a significant impact on the National Guard
Roundout brigades, which required a specified amount of time after mobilization to
complete training before their deployment.

When Saddam Hussein invaded Kuwait in August of 1990, he unwittingly
touched off a significant dispute between the active Army and the Army National Guard.
Three U.S.-based active Army divisions alerted for use in Operation Desert Shield/Desert
Storm - the 1st Cavalry Division, the 1st Infantry Division (Mechanized) and the 24th
Infantry Division (Mechanized) - deployed without their Army National Guard Roundout
Brigade that General Abrams had created painstakingly 17 years earlier. Instead, the
Army deployed unassociated active Army combat brigades in their place. The
Department of Defense cited several reasons in not mobilizing the Roundout Brigades for
immediate deployment: first, the possibility of immediate combat upon arrival in Saudi
Arabia; second, because General Norman Schwarzkopf, the United States Central
Command commander, had requested two full strength heavy Army divisions to counter
the Iraqi forces at the Kuwait-Saudi Arabian border; and third, because there was concern
in the Army that because reserve mobilization was originally limited to 180 days, that to
mobilize the Roundout Brigades too early might mean they would be unavailable should
the conflict last too long. The active Army did mobilize significant Army National
Guard and Army Reserve forces for use in Operation Desert Storm: at one point, 25
percent of all Army personnel serving in Southwest Asia were from the Reserve
Component. 67 percent of the Army National Guard units that were alerted for
deployment did deploy within 45 days of notification, to include 11 brigade or group headquarters commanded by a colonel, two field artillery brigades and three combat engineer groups.\textsuperscript{10} But the Roundout Brigades were missing.

When President Bush decided to deploy additional combat forces in November of 1990 to provide General Schwarzkopf the ability to conduct an \textit{offensive} campaign to eject Iraqi forces from Kuwait, the Army did mobilize three of the Army National Guard Roundout Brigades: the 48th Infantry Brigade from Georgia, the 155th Armor Brigade from Mississippi, and the 256th Infantry Brigade from Louisiana. Upon mobilization, however, the Army conducted an extensive post-mobilization training program for each of the three in the United States, while General Schwarzkopf assembled his coalition forces in Saudi Arabia to fight and defeat Iraq. The three Roundout Brigades did not complete their post-mobilization training in time to deploy and fight as part of this Desert Storm coalition. This prompted yet another round of ‘us versus them’ sniping with the Army National Guard contending that their three Roundout Brigades had not been incapable of deploying and had met the deployment criteria, but that, at mobilization, the Army had increased the post-mobilization training and readiness requirements significantly beyond those which had been published previously.\textsuperscript{11}

With citizen soldiers resident and voting in every state, and with a hundred year history of fulfilling both Constitutionally-mandated State and statutory Federal missions, the Army National Guard enjoys a high degree of domestic and congressional support.\textsuperscript{12} After the National Guard raised its concerns to members of Congress, the Congress in turn directed the General Accounting Office to investigate the Guard’s allegations concerning misuse of its Roundout Brigades. The General Accounting Office conducted
its investigations and concluded that the Army had not properly prepared its National Guard brigades to be fully ready for war and rapid deployment.\textsuperscript{13} It also concluded that the Army's post-mobilization training plans had been based on unreliable readiness reporting standards. The report cited one of the three Roundout Brigades rated as able to deploy in 14-28 days, while the other two reported being able to deploy in 29-42 days, all well short of the 90-plus days that were actually required to prepare the Roundout Brigades for combat.\textsuperscript{14} The Army and Department of Defense countered these conclusions, stating that Roundout Brigades had never been intended to deploy on short notice to a contingency mission, but rather plans had envisioned a post-mobilization training period of 30-90 days prior to onward deployment.\textsuperscript{15} The Army National Guard responded by claiming that the active Army had taken over and driven post-mobilization training requirements without consideration for the needs of each of the Roundout Brigades and their commanding officers.\textsuperscript{16} Even General Schwarzkopf (who several years earlier as an Army division commander had asserted that his Roundout Brigade could go to war with him) testified to Congress, with Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney and Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell, that Army National Guard combat units would require several months of training before being sent into combat.\textsuperscript{17}

The Congress then took matters into its own hands. It created two pieces of legislation that sought to remedy the readiness problems of the Reserve Component of the U.S. Army. This legislation mandated that 5,000 active duty Army officers and noncommissioned officers would work directly with the Reserve Component on a full-time basis. Although active duty personnel had worked with the reserves previously, the
scope of responsibility had never been so vast. As part of this legislation, the Army created new organizations, called Resident Training Detachments (RTD). The Army assigned active duty personnel to the RTDs and stationed them at the Roundout Brigade locations throughout the country, in order to work directly with the Roundout Brigade personnel on a full-time basis.

The purpose of this monograph is to explore the genesis, the mission and the functions of these Resident Training Detachments, and to compare those to the identified pre-and post-mobilization training deficiencies of the Gulf War Roundout Brigades. The research question asks whether the Resident Training Detachments assigned directly to support the Army National Guard Roundout Brigades (and subsequently, the enhanced Separate Brigades) contribute effectively toward solving the pre- and post-mobilization training deficiencies documented during the Gulf War. The monograph will answer this question by examining the Army’s initial attempts at establishing the RTDs as well as the training strategy to remedy the Roundout Brigade training problems, entitled “Bold Shift.” The monograph will then document the early “growing pains” of the Bold Shift program and describe the measures that the Army took to fix those problems: the Ground Force Readiness Enhancement Program (GFRE) and the transition of Roundout Brigades into “enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB)”.

The monograph will conclude with analysis of the RTD mission and functions and the corresponding enhanced Separate Brigade pre- and post-mobilization training.

† Enhanced Separate Brigades have undergone several name changes since their creation in 1994. Also known as “Enhanced Readiness Brigades” or “Enhanced Brigades,” I have chosen their most recent title for use in this monograph. For consistency throughout, I will use “enhanced Separate Brigade (eSB).” A similar problem exists in the use of the title Resident Training Detachment (RTD). Effective the 1st of
deficiencies (in conjunction with the Army’s attempts to remedy problem areas early on) to determine whether the Army assigned the RTDs a mission which contributes effectively toward solving those training deficiencies. There is evidence that suggests that the Army did not consider a “linkage” between what the RTDs were supposed to do, and the stated pre- and post-mobilization training problems of the National Guard Brigades.\textsuperscript{18} The monograph will consider whether the Army “rushed” to fulfill congressional legislation and assigned personnel to RTDs without adequate mission definition, or whether the Army made a best attempt quickly, realized its errors after a trial period, and applied effective changes to better the relationship. Finally, the monograph will recommend modification to the existing RTD - eSB training relationship to further improve it.

An effective RTD - eSB training relationship is important to assure the National Guard that some of their combat units are vital to the United States Army and will therefore be kept ready for call-up. What is more important, however, is an overall improvement in active Army/Army National Guard public relations, which an effective RTD - eSB training relationship could promote.

**THE TRAINING DEFICIENCIES WHICH STARTED THE PROCESS**

Throughout America’s history, and especially in the twentieth century, preparing Reserve Component units for war following their activation has been problematic. Army National Guard combat units mobilized for use in World War II, in Korea, in reaction to

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October, 1997, RTDs changed to Training Support Battalions (TSTn). For consistency throughout, I will
the Berlin Crisis in 1961 and in Vietnam. All faced tremendous difficulties due to individual soldiers’ lack of military training and education, overall manpower shortages and equipment shortfalls.¹⁹

Training, however, poses a significant challenge to Reserve Component units. For the past few years, reserve units have been limited to 39 days a year in which they can train (compared to active Army units, which can devote up to 250 days per year in training). Of these 39 days, 25 constitute the one weekend per month that reserve units use to conduct Inactive Duty Training (IDT) periods. The remaining 14 days are devoted to the annual, two week summer Active Training (AT) period. Trying to attain and sustain combat readiness in 39 days of training each year is a tremendous challenge, if indeed it is feasible at all. Reserve Component units must contend with other training challenges, such as a lack of training facilities and the extended distances over which subordinate units must travel to conduct larger unit training.

Nowhere is this training challenge more evident than in the Army National Guard infantry and armor brigade combat units. Following one of its post-Operation Desert Storm training investigations of the Army National Guard, the General Accounting Office declared that “Mechanized infantry and armor brigades face some of the most complex training tasks in the Army.”²⁰ In another report, the General Accounting Office felt that the brigade and battalion staffs of these combat units faced “the most difficult doctrinal and leadership tasks[s] in the Army.”²¹

It was found that the Army’s peacetime training of National Guard Roundout Brigades did not properly prepare those brigades for several reasons. Training tended to

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²¹
be unrealistic. The training lacked challenging missions, including the use of dedicated opposing forces, attempts to attack in limited visibility conditions (to include night attacks and operations using smoke to obscure the battlefield) and the inevitability of the loss of key unit leadership. 22 Other training problems identified involved a lack of proficiency in individual soldier skills, leaders who had not attended the proper schools, problems in small unit (squads, Platoons and Companies) maneuver training, crew gunnery proficiency, poor brigade and battalion staff training, and collective unit proficiency as well as use of poor training techniques in general. Improperly trained and educated officers compounded these training problems. 23 The result of all of these pre-mobilization training deficiencies was that the Roundout Brigades had to use precious post-mobilization training time to readdress training weaknesses that should have been remedied in pre-mobilization. That, in turn, increased the overall post-mobilization training requirement. 24

The active Army had acknowledged tactical and technical training weaknesses in the Roundout Brigades, and prepared an extensive post-mobilization training program designed to prepare the three Roundout Brigades for combat. This training program focused on special schools designed to improve unit officers and noncommissioned officers in leadership and tactical skills; extensive individual training for soldier skills such as weapons marksmanship, grenade throwing and first aid; M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew gunnery skills; battalion and brigade battlestaff training; training in vehicle and equipment maintenance and extensive collective unit maneuver training at all echelons, to include the brigade level. This remedial training was
conducted at both the mobilization stations for the Brigades, as well as at the National Training Center (NTC) at Fort Irwin, California.\textsuperscript{25}

In spite of the Army’s efforts, a Congressional Research Service investigation noted that individual officers and soldiers were incapable of performing their jobs, and in some cases were not even aware of tasks that \textit{had} to be performed.\textsuperscript{26} General Accounting Office investigations also noted that in two of the mobilized Roundout Brigades - the 48th Infantry Brigade and the 155th Armor Brigade - 19 percent and 15 percent of the soldiers, respectively, had not attended the Army’s Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) schooling which was necessary to train the soldier how to perform his specific mission.\textsuperscript{27}

Key leader training fared little better. Although in active Army units checked, the percentage of captains who had attended the Officer Advance Course (a course designed to prepare officers with 4-5 years experience for their next 5-8 years in the Army) was greater than 90 percent, the corresponding percentage in two of the Roundout Brigades was barely 50 percent. Similarly, active Army junior noncommissioned officers (sergeants) who had attended the Primary Leadership Development Course (PLDC) (a course designed to prepare young soldiers with 3-5 years experience for their next 2-4 years) was also greater than 90 percent, while the same group in two of the Roundout Brigades checked was 28 percent and 51 percent, respectively.\textsuperscript{28} Equally unsettling was the fact that the National Guard, unlike the active Army, did not require successful completion of PLDC prior to attaining the rank of sergeant.\textsuperscript{29} The result was that many Roundout Brigade sergeants were insufficiently trained as leaders. Finally, many key
leaders were found to be physically unfit for the demands that full-time soldiering imposed.\textsuperscript{30}

Crew gunnery proficiency posed significant training challenges for the Roundout Brigades as well. Although it normally took an active Army unit a week to conduct tank crew qualification gunnery, it took two armor battalions of the 155th Armor Brigade 17 and 24 days, respectively, to achieve the same qualification. According to an investigation conducted by the Department of the Army Inspector General (DAIG), many of the tank crews required as many as eight qualification runs to successfully complete the qualification course. (In the active Army, most crews (ideally 90 percent or better) complete qualification on their first run; crews who must negotiate their qualification run a second time suffer from peer pressure and embarrassment.) Several units allowed only the “Mastergunners” - noncommissioned officers who had successfully completed a rigorous Army school designed to create M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle gunnery experts - to boresight all tank and Bradley gun systems, a key task that each crew must do for itself, especially if that crew is to survive in battle. Several Roundout Brigade units did not even have enough school-trained tank and Bradley Mastergunners to perform the intended requisite tasks associated with those positions.\textsuperscript{31}

Equipment maintenance also plagued Roundout Brigade units as they conducted post-mobilization training at the National Training Center (NTC) in Fort Irwin, California. A lack of crew maintenance training and diligence conducting individual vehicle preventive maintenance checks and services (PMCS), combined with poor individual maintenance training of unit organizational and direct support level mechanics, resulted in the 48th Infantry Brigade and the 155th Armor Brigade showing 50 percent
operational readiness rates by the second half of their NTC collective training period. This means that fully one half of the combat vehicles of the Brigades were unavailable for missions; by comparison, the active Army strives for an 85 to 90 percent rate. Contributing to this lack of individual maintenance training was the fact that in a peacetime environment (due to the restriction of 39 active duty training days a year for Reserve Component forces), Roundout Brigade soldiers had limited contact with their combat vehicles. Full time civilian maintenance technicians perform the routine and scheduled maintenance checks required.32

A summary of the Roundout Brigade training deficiencies that eventually would require active Army attention were as follows:‡

a. Individual soldier skills and training. These included MOS schooling, MOS training task proficiency, common skills task (skills which all soldiers, regardless of MOS, must have) proficiency, individual weapons proficiency and key leader task proficiency. Leader tasks are those skills required to successfully conduct collective unit and battlestaff training.

b. Individual and collective unit (squad and platoon level) training in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) tasks.

c. Crew, organizational and direct support level maintenance training.

d. Crew level M1 Abrams tank and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle gunnery.

‡ The author does not intend to disparage Army National Guard units (nor, indirectly, U.S. Army Reserve units) in listing these training deficiencies and comparing them to active Army units. The comparison is merely an attempt to show the relativity of training deficiencies among like-active Army and Army National Guard combat units, as well as point out the significant challenge of preparing Reserve Component combat units in peacetime for rapid mobilization and deployment to a combat theater.
e. Collective unit proficiency in tactical gunnery tasks (platoon and company level) as well as in maneuver tasks (platoon, company, battalion and brigade level).

f. Battalion and brigade battlestaff proficiency.

On the 12th of March, 1992 (almost a year after the end of Operation Desert Storm and the post-mobilization training of the three Roundout Brigades), then Chief of Staff of the Army, General Gordon Sullivan, announced that the Army believed that it would take 90 days for a Roundout Brigade to conduct post-mobilization training.\textsuperscript{33} Based on the results of an internal Department of the Army Inspector General report, the Army also began developing a new program which would institute a more integrated approach to pre- and post-mobilization training, seeking to reduce the number of post-mobilization training days by “training smarter” in pre-mobilization. The Army called the program “Bold Shift.”\textsuperscript{34} Concurrently, the Congress began debating legislation which would force the Army to devote more active duty soldiers to training the Reserve Components.

THE CONGRESS TAKES ACTION

In two separate pieces of legislation, Congress stipulated that the active Army focus its attention more toward Reserve Component training. In 1991, the first piece of legislation, Title VII of the Fiscal Year 1992 Defense Authorization Act, mandated that 2,000 active Army officers be assigned to positions which worked directly with the Reserve Component units. The provision of Title VII, admittedly, was a “pilot program,”
which would provide “active component advisors to [Reserve Component] combat units.” (Italics are mine.) The objectives of the Title VII program were to improve the readiness of units in the Reserve Components of the Army, to increase substantially the number of Active Component personnel directly advising Reserve Component personnel, and to provide a basis for determining the most effective mix of Reserve Component and active duty personnel in organizing, instructing and training Reserve Component units.\textsuperscript{35}

Congress produced the second piece of legislation the following year, as Title XI of the Fiscal Year 1993 Defense Authorization Act. Title XI expanded upon Title VII by increasing the number of active advisors by 3,000 (for a total of 5,000 advisors). Title XI also moved to structure and focus Army National Guard combat unit pre-mobilization training by stipulating that it emphasize individual soldier qualification training, collective training at crew and squad levels, annual crew gunnery qualification, maneuver training at platoon level, and that battalion and brigade staff training occur once annually.\textsuperscript{36} Of the 5,000 total active Army advisors sent to Reserve Component units as a result of Title VII and Title XI, eventually almost 700 would be assigned to RTDs supporting the Roundout Brigades or their successors, the enhanced Separate Brigades.

Two issues arose quickly that would hamper active Army advisors. First, legislation did not specify what exactly the active Army advisors would \textit{do}. In fact, in subsequent legislative hearings to check on the progress of Army implementation of Title XI (conducted six months after Title XI went into effect), congressional members asked about details of the program such as, for whom the active Army advisors would work, and the specific personnel qualifications of the advisors that would be required prior to assignment to a Title XI assignment. Congress did not ask about what the advisors
specifically were to do. Rather, Congress left the actual details of advisor duty up to the Army. A second, and perhaps more serious issue, was the fact that the active Army advisors were to have no authority over the Reserve Component units that they advised. The units with whom they worked were free to accept or decline the advice of the active Army advisors.

As Congress debated and passed Title VII and XI legislation, the Army worked to develop an initial training strategy to help remedy the National Guard pre- and post-mobilization training deficiencies.

THE BOLD SHIFT PROGRAM

The Army’s Bold Shift program was an effort to improve the readiness of selected high-priority Reserve Component units for the quick deployments envisioned in the post-Cold War era, to enhance the Army’s ability to meet the nation’s changing military requirements and to improve the relationship between the Active and the Reserve Components of the Army. The Bold Shift program attempted to better integrate all of the pre- and post-mobilization training tasks required to deploy a Reserve Component combat unit, thereby minimizing the amount of post-mobilization training time required.

Keeping pace with then-developing congressional legislation, the Bold Shift program also stipulated that pre-mobilization training would focus at platoon level and below, whereas post-mobilization training would focus on full scale company, battalion and brigade level training. This concept offered a more viable training approach, given
the limited active duty training time for a Reserve Component unit. It was conceivable that post-mobilization training time could be shortened if units focused on *more achievable* pre-mobilization tasks, rather than having to devote post-mobilization training time in readdressing those tasks. It certainly was a radical departure from previous Reserve Component combat unit pre-mobilization training models that specified that units would train to all tasks at all echelons, an objective that Operation Desert Storm clearly showed to be impossible.41

General Sullivan approved the Bold Shift initiatives in the fall of 1991. The Army selected all seven of the Army National Guard Roundout units (all of which would eventually become enhanced Separate Brigades) as benefactors of the program.42 In addition to the training concepts described in the previous paragraphs, Bold Shift initiatives also addressed several different program areas, such as providing new opportunities for key leadership and battlestaff training courses, as well as improving individual soldier attendance at MOS training schools.43 Significantly, the Bold Shift Program called for development of the Reserve Training Concept, whereby active Army advisors would establish collective unit maneuver training “lanes”: a “turn-key” operation to facilitate Reserve Component unit training, complete with preparatory leader training, opposing forces, and observer-controllers to conduct the training and after-action reviews. The Reserve Training Concept was an effort to make Reserve Component unit field training more efficient by allowing the reserve units to focus on the training proper, while using active duty advisors to set up and facilitate the training.44

Initial indications during the first year of its existence showed that Bold Shift was a good program. A RAND Corporation survey of selected Reserve Component units
undergoing Bold Shift training found overwhelming support by both the Reserve Component leaders as well as their active Army advisors. 75 percent of the Reserve Component leadership thought that Annual Training with the Reserve Training Concept was better than previous years’ efforts. 94 percent of the same leadership recommended continuation of the Bold Shift program in their units for the succeeding year. RAND concluded that training under the Bold Shift program provided more attainable pre-mobilization goals as well as fostering closer ties between the active Army and the Reserve Component.

**THE ARMY ESTABLISHES RESIDENT TRAINING DETACHMENTS**

While Congress debated legislation for active Army support to the Reserve Components and the Army developed the Bold Shift strategy, the idea for a dedicated group of active Army advisors who would work *directly alongside* selected high-priority Reserve Component units began to emerge. Seen as a way to help improve the relationship between the Active and Reserve Components of the Army, the concept had roots in the post-mobilization training period of the three Roundout Brigades during Operation Desert Storm. National Guard brigade and battalion commanders had praised highly the active Army assistance rendered during that time period.

Simply put, a Resident Training Detachment, or RTD, was a group of active Army officers and noncommissioned officers who would live and work with a high-priority Reserve Component unit. The seven former Roundout Brigades were examples of high-priority units which received the initial RTDs. Eventually, RTDs would support other
high-priority type units. United States Forces Command, the Atlanta-based headquarters responsible for all Active and Reserve Component training in the continental United States, initially envisioned that the RTD for each Roundout Brigade would consist of 70 officers and noncommissioned officers, with 20 of the noncommissioned officers serving in positions at the company level. \textsuperscript{49} General Edwin Burba (the Commander of Forces Command) decided at a later date to maintain the RTD manning level at 45, negating the possibility of significant numbers of noncommissioned officers to serve at the company level. \textsuperscript{50} (Eventually, RTD manning levels would stabilize at 49 for mechanized infantry and armor brigades, and 42 for light infantry brigades.) \textsuperscript{51}

Active Army personnel selected for RTDs required appropriate experience levels in order to best assist the Reserve Component units with whom they would work. Lieutenant colonels, with experience in battalion and brigade field grade officer positions, led each RTD. Generally, each RTD had the lieutenant colonel, two majors and a sergeant major assigned to the reserve brigade headquarters, and a major, one or two captains, a maintenance warrant officer and a noncommissioned officer, assigned to each of the subordinate battalions. Captains assigned to RTDs normally had served as company commanders (which qualified them in their basic branch of service), and noncommissioned officers normally had served at least two years as platoon sergeants and graduated from the Advanced Noncommissioned Officers Course. Forces Command set the tour length for officers at two years, and for noncommissioned officers at three. \textsuperscript{53} The experience requirements for RTD personnel would facilitate their ability to instruct the Reserve Component units as staff trainers, platoon and company lane trainers, and gunnery trainers.
Forces Command placed RTD personnel with five of the Roundout Brigades in 1992. These five brigades were the 116th Cavalry Brigade (Idaho), the 218th Infantry Brigade (South Carolina), the 155th Armor Brigade (Mississippi), the 48th Infantry Brigade (Georgia) and the 256th Infantry Brigade (Louisiana). Further, while the RTDs would work with each of these five brigades, they would report directly to the active Army division headquarters responsible for the training oversight of the respective National Guard brigade. The active Army division would prepare and complete officer and noncommissioned officer efficiency reports on RTD personnel, not the Roundout Brigade to whom the RTDs were assigned.54

In approving the concept for active Army support to the Reserve Components, General Sullivan approved the mission of the RTD to be to “Advise and assist the RC commander to implement battle focused training programs that maximize the use of limited time available to enhance pre-mobilization training readiness and assist with post-mobilization training.”55 General Sullivan expanded that RTD mission with the following functions: first, to assist the RC commander to develop and conduct individual, leader and staff training; second, to teach RC leaders how to use simulation and simulators in training; third, to assist the RC commander in the preparation and execution of collective training with emphasis on crew and platoon levels; and fourth, to assist the RC commander in the evaluation of individual and collective training. Finally, General Sullivan agreed that RTD officers should focus on planning, organizing, training and evaluating unit staffs and leaders, while noncommissioned officers should focus on individual, crew and squad training, MOS specific skills, and small unit leader development.56
Forces Command developed an RTD implementation document the following month. It echoed the Army Chief of Staff’s decisions as well as provided other key insights. The memorandum specified that “Active Component soldiers [RTD personnel] are intended to be *doers.*”\(^{57}\) (Italics are mine.) The memorandum further stated that RTD soldiers would “be directly involved in assisting with implementing the BOLD SHIFT initiatives...through objective *evaluation* of units...[RTDs] are to enhance and extend the capabilities of RC leadership to train their units, *not replace it.*”\(^{58}\) (Italics are mine.)

The future focus (or confusion?) of what each RTD would do, began to develop as a result of the Army Chief of Staff briefing and the subsequent Forces Command implementation memorandum. The key action verbs in the Army Chief of Staff briefings were to “advise” and “assist.” Although “evaluate” appears once, the subsequent Forces Command implementation memorandum changed that to “provide feedback.” Yet the Forces Command memorandum explicitly stated that AC soldiers would conduct objective evaluation of units.

The American Heritage Dictionary defines “advise” as offering advice to, informing, recommending or suggesting. The Dictionary defines “assist” as giving aid or support. On the other hand, the Dictionary defines “evaluate” as examining or judging, appraising or estimating. Although both the Army Chief of Staff briefing and Forces Command implementation memorandum clearly used the terms “advise and assist” more than “evaluate,” the inclusion of the latter term lent just enough confusion to the fundamental duties of RTD personnel to cause difficulties later on.

RTDs would eventually suffer from other problems as well. The RTDs would not have any authority over the Reserve Component units with which they worked. The
Reserve Component units could accept or decline RTD advice.\textsuperscript{59} Even more important, the manner in which newly-assigned RTDs received their mission and functions left considerable room for misinterpretation. Rather than document RTD missions and functions formally in well-established Forces Command publications (which Forces Command would eventually do in its Regulation 350-2 in 1995-1996), the Command relied upon a series of RTD training sessions during which the newly-assigned RTD personnel, headed for their RTD assignment, would gather and receive briefings on what their duties were to be.\textsuperscript{60}

Over the next two years (1993 and 1994), RTD personnel in their initial assignments would face a degree of difficulty over their confusing mission and functions. In this same period, other problems with the Bold Shift strategy began to surface as well. Although the Bold Shift strategy received high marks initially, when looked at close-up, problems began to emerge.
PROBLEMS WITH BOLD SHIFT AND THE RTD MISSION

In 1994, the General Accounting Office began an investigation at the request of Congress to determine how well the initial Army attempts to implement Title VII and Title XI legislation were proceeding. The GAO checked the seven Roundout Brigades, reasoning that of all Reserve Component units, these Roundout Brigades (based on their high-priority) should have been the most successful in achieving Bold Shift training objectives. Of the seven Bold Shift training initiatives, the GAO checked five (four of which were related to training): whether platoons were achieving 100 percent pre-mobilization training task completion, the success rate of M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew gunnery, whether at least 85 percent of individual soldiers had completed MOS training, and whether the National Guard brigade leaders were conducting training in command, control and coordination (staff training).61

The GAO’s final report to Congress contained some disheartening results. Many of the training problems that the GAO found during its investigation were problems that it had identified earlier in Operation Desert Storm mobilization training period of the three mobilized Roundout Brigades. The GAO felt that the solutions to these problems were likely to be difficult and require a long time to solve.62 Although it checked during 1994, the GAO used training data from each of the Roundout Brigades for 1992 and 1993 as well, concluding that none of the seven Brigades came close to achieving the Bold Shift strategy goals during the first three years of the program. The GAO found insufficient individual and leader training conducted, that platoons had achieved success in attaining only 14 percent of their pre-mobilization training tasks (the Bold Shift goal was 100
percent), and that only 33 percent of the battalions had successfully achieved their
gunnery goals (again, the goal was 100 percent).63

One of the reasons that the Bold Shift strategy was not working properly was a bit
embarrassing. Poor communications served as a major impediment to the effectiveness
of the program. Officials in four of the seven Roundout Brigades, as well as one-half of
their RTD personnel, said that they either did not know about Bold Shift’s peacetime
training goals or were uncertain about them. The Roundout Brigade officials stated that
they had learned about Bold Shift goals only in broad, general terms through a series of
briefings from the Army to the National Guard Bureau and the brigades, as opposed to
finding detailed documentation. In fact, the GAO identified the specific Bold Shift goals
only after interviewing the Forces Command Bold Shift Director and his staff in person.64
A not-so-surprising similarity would eventually surface with respect to RTD personnel
and the understanding of their duties as well.

Once Roundout Brigade and RTD personnel fully understood the Bold Shift
strategy goals, most of them felt that the goals were unrealistically high and could not be
achieved. For example, the goal of each infantry and armor platoon attaining and
sustaining a fully-trained status in each one of its Mission Essential tasks was a higher
standard than even active Army platoons were expected to achieve.65

The Roundout Brigade leaders felt that insufficient Mission Essential Task
achievement by platoons (as well as companies, battalions and the brigades themselves)
was due in part to the confusion over which of the hundreds of Mission Essential Tasks
and Subtasks soldiers could train for.66 U.S. Army Field Manuals 25-100 and 25-101
delineate the Army’s training doctrine. In those manuals, the Army admits that there is
not enough training time to train everyone in every task. Instead, each unit is supposed to select those tasks that are most essential to success in combat and focus on those. In retrospect, what the Roundout Brigade leadership was revealing was that the Bold Shift strategy diverged from Army training doctrine by expecting an unrealistic degree of success in too many training tasks. The Brigade leadership also felt that platoon level Mission Essential Task proficiency suffered due to competing demands on time such as administrative tasks, crew gunnery qualification, New Equipment Training and shortages of suitable local training areas. Finally, although Brigade leaders stated that leader training and individual soldier training rated as the major problems preventing overall training proficiency, the amount of active duty training time that was required to send leaders and individual soldiers to the proper schools competed directly with the Mission Essential Task training that had to take place to achieve success.  

The GAO investigation did not focus solely on Bold Shift problems. Although Roundout Brigade officials felt that the RTD personnel were highly valuable in their up-to-date technical expertise and hands-on support, in its conclusion the GAO found that the active Army personnel assigned to help the Roundout Brigades were inadequately managed, with spotty results. The GAO reported that the RTD personnel duties were ambiguous regarding whether the advisors should identify and resolve training problems, or only assist with training. Poor communications between the active Army RTD advisors, the Roundout Brigade leadership and other National Guard officials, also caused disagreement over Bold Shift training goals, as well as difficult working relationships between the RTD advisors and their Roundout Brigade leadership. In a subsequent Army War College monograph, which discussed the problems and challenges resident in
National Guard combat brigades, then-Lieutenant Colonel Thomas Gross stated explicitly that "...there was considerable confusion on the role of RTDs...legislation establishing the program [called for] 'advisers' and the 1992 Army Memorandum of Instruction on the program stated that the RTD staff would focus on assessing training."70 (Italics are mine.) Gross’ comments should not be taken lightly, for he spoke with authority. He had been one of the early RTD chiefs, serving with the 256th Infantry Brigade in Louisiana following completion of a mechanized infantry battalion command assignment at Fort Hood, Texas.

The Department of Defense, in responding to the GAO’s allegation of poor RTD mission definition, stated that “Though admittedly inadequate, the Army did conduct some schooling before the RTD members went to their posts...Because the Army accelerated initiation of the RTD program, start up problems are understandable.”71 The interpretation of RTD mission and duties was even more problematic, however, for two additional reasons. First, Forces Command did not formally standardize RTD missions and functions in a regulatory document such as Forces Command Regulation 350-2; and second, because each of the RTDs reported directly to a different active Army Division Commander, who, in the absence of formal regulatory definition of RTD duties and functions, was left to interpret for himself what he wanted his RTD to do to help the associated Roundout Brigade.

This problem of RTD mission and functions definition revealed itself during an early 1996 Forces Command workshop. Designed to discuss current RTD issues, information, guidance and regulations with not only then-currently existing RTDs, but also new RTD organization personnel headed for assignments with emerging enhanced
Separate Brigades, four of the RTD chiefs (whose RTD organizations by then had existed over three and a half years) briefed their missions and functions to the group at large. Although all four contained a significant amount of detail surrounding "advise" and "assist" functions, the four RTDs' mission statements and functions listings were significantly different in appearance - evidence of non-standardization of missions and functions of RTDs from the overall Army standpoint.  

The most significant problem with the RTD mission and functions, however, seemed to stem from whether RTD personnel were indeed only to "advise" or "assist" as opposed to "evaluate." Some of the RTD personnel told GAO investigators that the active Army Division leadership, for whom the RTDs worked, had told them not to become involved in assessing or evaluating training readiness. As a result, those RTD personnel focused instead on training processes, such as training meetings, etc. By prohibiting these RTDs from assessing training, the active Army Division leadership in effect de-linked the RTDs from Bold Shift strategy training goals. The RTDs could not be instrumental in ensuring that the associated Roundout Brigade attained those Bold Shift goals. 

Even if the RTD personnel were charged with assessing training, the lack of formal authority over their associated Roundout Brigade hindered success. The Roundout Brigade leadership had no responsibility to abide by RTD recommendations. As a result, RTD effectiveness resulted primarily in the quality of the interpersonal relationships established with each Roundout Brigade set of leaders. Due to the ambiguous Army guidance on RTD roles, many advisors aggressively identified training problems and sought corrective action on their own, relying on the power of personality.
to help the Roundout Brigades correct their problems.\textsuperscript{75} This dilemma was not lost on RTD personnel. At the 1996 Forces Command Workshop, one of the four RTD briefers briefed that Title XI legislation would only improve the situation to the extent that responsibility [for training achievement] could be affixed.\textsuperscript{76}

It its report to Congress, the GAO stated that the National Guard and the Army required a smoother relationship to include a mutually-acceptable role for the RTD advisors, which balanced National Guard command prerogatives with the need to identify and correct training problems.\textsuperscript{77} The Department of Defense, responding to the GAO report for the Army, did not agree that the RTDs should be given more authority over the National Guard. DOD felt that increased authority would subvert the National Guard chain of command and put the RTD personnel in an untenable position.\textsuperscript{78} Some active Army officials believed that the RTD could not be effective without formally assessing National Guard training or possessing a clear line of authority. Other Army officials believed that the RTD/National Guard relationship was not strong enough to allow RTD personnel to live with their associated Roundout Brigade and assess the training at the same time. Instead, they believed the RTDs should only conduct training support functions (advise and assist) while other active Army organizations conducted the formal assessment.\textsuperscript{79} Indeed, during the difficult Operation Desert Storm post-mobilization training of the three activated Roundout Brigades (a similar situation in that numerous active Army advisors worked directly with the Roundout Brigades, in some instances wielding enormous authority over what the Brigades did), the National Guard Bureau declared that the overwhelming and well-intentioned support provided by the active Army advisors had a counter-productive effect on Roundout Brigade training. The active
Army advisors tended to take over the leadership of the brigades and short-circuit the brigades’ chain of command. Clearly, as the Army refined the mission and functions of the RTD, it had to account delicately for the incursion of active Army advisor influence into the Roundout Brigade leadership’s command prerogatives and responsibilities.

Given these emerging problems in both the RTD program and the Bold Shift training strategy, the Army agreed to reassess the role of the RTD advisors and clearly stipulate whether the advisors were to identify and resolve training deficiencies or only to assist with training. The Army also agreed to prepare detailed guidance to end the confusion over RTD roles. Further, the Army agreed to reassess the Bold Shift pre-mobilization training strategy goals to ensure that the goals were feasible and that the goals stressed a balance of maneuver, gunnery and staff training. Finally, the Army agreed that formal documentation of Bold Shift strategy training goals was necessary.
CORRECTIVE ACTION: THE CREATION OF THE GROUND FORCES
READINESS ENHANCEMENT PROGRAM AND THE ENHANCED SEPARATE
BRIGADES AND TRAINING STRATEGY, AND FORMAL DOCUMENTATION
IN U.S. ARMY FORCES COMMAND/ARMY NATIONAL GUARD
REGULATION 350-2

In addressing the challenge of RTD mission and functions - whether RTD personnel were best suited to advising and assisting rather than evaluating training - the Army developed a unique solution. It created new organizations that would supplement the existing RTD organizations in the field. Entitled the Ground Force Readiness Enhancement (GFRE, or “Jeffrey” in the vernacular), this new organizational program recognized that, with the downsizing of active Army units taking place, reliance upon the active Army divisions to provide Reserve Component training assistance would eventually become problematic (too many reserve units needing help from too few active Army divisions). Prior to the GFRE program, the original RTDs and their parent active Army divisions, assisted by Readiness Group personnel at large, were responsible for conduct of the annual training of the Roundout Brigades. The GFRE program took measures to slowly wean the Roundout Brigades from the active Army divisions, while at the same time providing new, tailored Reserve Component training organizations, manned by Title VII and Title XI personnel.

Established in 1995, these new GFRE organizations were located around the continental United States to facilitate collective training evaluation and would assume ever-increasing roles in the annual training of the Roundout Brigades.\textsuperscript{82} The
"uniqueness" of the solution stemmed from the evaluation responsibility given to the new GFRE organizations, thus leaving the RTDs with the responsibilities of advice and assistance, alone. The GFRE organizations would also assist with more Reserve Component units than just the high-priority Roundout Brigades (and their successors, the enhanced Separate Brigades). Support would extend to both Army National Guard and U.S. Army Reserve combat support and combat service support units as well.

The new GFRE organizations consisted of the following:

a. Regional Training Brigades. These brigades were to provide active Army training facilitators and evaluators at Roundout Brigade annual training, to include execution of the Reserve Training Concept, evaluating Roundout Brigade crew gunnery qualification and providing formal input to the annual Training Assessment Model (the active Army evaluation format for Reserve Component annual training);

b. Division (Exercise) and Field Exercise Brigades. They would facilitate Roundout Brigade and subordinate battalion staff training and evaluation; and
c. Team C of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). Team C would facilitate brigade and battalion staff training and evaluation in conjunction with the Battle Command and Battle Staff Training Program at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The GFRE program also established eight new RTDs to work with National Guard brigades recently designated as enhanced Separate Brigades.

At about the same time, the Army took actions to create the enhanced Separate Brigades (eSB) while creating simultaneously a training strategy for them that remedied the Bold Shift strategy problems surfaced by the GAO. ESBs were a product of the 1993 Department of Defense Bottom-Up Review (BUR). The BUR postulated that the eSBs
provided a strategic hedge against the possibility of having to fight and win in one of the two nearly simultaneous regional conflicts that DOD officials then felt necessary to guard against. According the Bottom Up Review, eSBs were to be “organized and resourced so that they [could] be mobilized, trained and deployed more quickly to the fast-evolving regional conflicts...in the future.” 85 “Deployed more quickly” equated to being ready not later than 90 days after mobilization.

The Army went to some length to insure the political viability for elevating the eSBs in readiness priority over the larger Army National Guard Divisions. Although the Bottom Up Review recommended maintaining eight Army National Guard combat divisions, the division commanders complained about the relative reduction in their readiness in deference to the 15 eSBs. 86 General Colin Powell, then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, declared that focusing on the brigades made more sense, in light of the fact that there would be minimal time to conduct post-mobilization training, and that division-size units would be much more difficult to prepare for combat in the same amount of time. 87

The Army also designed an eSB training strategy that sought to correct the Bold Shift strategy problems, as well as ensure that eSBs would in fact be able to mobilize and deploy to a regional contingency within 90 days and at the highest Army level of readiness. Specifically, the new eSB training strategy focused each of the Brigades’ pre-mobilization training on only three Mission Essential Tasks: Attack, Defend and Movement to Contact. (Previously, the Roundout Brigades had focused on between six and nineteen Mission Essential Tasks, which proved to be too many to handle.) The new strategy refined platoon pre-mobilization training goals downward, from 100 percent fully
trained, to 70 percent partially or fully trained. The strategy also mandated a more balanced, annual approach at gunnery and maneuver tasks, rather than an annual focus on one at the expense of the other. Finally, the strategy called for increased battalion and brigade staff simulation training on an annual basis.

In addition to creating the GFRE organizations and eSBs, as well as refining the eSB training strategy, the Army formally documented the eSB training strategy and RTD roles within a new version of U.S. Forces Command Regulation 350-2, Reserve Component Training in America’s Army. 350-2 reiterated the eSB training strategy pre-mobilization goals of platoon level maneuver proficiency in 70 percent of tasks focused on attack, defense and movement to contact, in addition to annual crew gunnery qualification and annual staff training at both battalion and brigade level. The objective of pre-mobilization training was to produce a unit as proficient as possible, thereby reducing the post-mobilization training time. Post-mobilization training would focus on collective training at the company, battalion and brigade level, as well as platoon level gunnery qualification. 350-2 also provided additional focus for training in Nuclear, Biological and Chemical-related tasks, as well as maintenance training at operator/crew, organizational and direct support levels, all problematic areas in the past. Finally, 350-2 addressed in detail the annual battalion and brigade staff training required, as well as the GFRE organizations and locations to support that training.

In terms of refining the RTD roles, however, 350-2 did little to improve the ambiguity noticed by the GAO during its investigation other than to establish clearly that RTDs were an advisory and assistance element, with no responsibility for evaluation of their associated eSBs. Unlike the original Army Chief of Staff and Forces Command
declaration of RTD mission and functions, cited earlier in this monograph, the new version of 350-2 did not restate these elements. Rather, the regulation charged the RTDs to assist the Reserve Component chain of command to prepare both pre- and post-mobilization training plans as well as the Reserve Component’s Mission Essential Task List.\textsuperscript{95} The regulation also stipulated that RTD members must assist in the conduct of “lane” training, as well as train key Reserve Component leaders and assist in the planning and execution of unit training.\textsuperscript{96} The RTD’s principle role was to “train the Army National Guard trainer.”\textsuperscript{97} Finally, 350-2 cautioned RTDs not to “...perform [Reserve Component] unit administrative or other duties which may circumvent the responsibilities [of the eSB chain of command] to be prepared for deployment.”\textsuperscript{98}

This completes the description of RTD missions and functions that evolved (at that time) over a period of approximately six years. What follows next is an analysis of those RTD missions and functions compared to the training problems which plagued the Roundout Brigades during Operation Desert Storm, to determine whether the RTDs were an effective partner to the Roundout/eSBs.
ANALYSIS

The purpose of this monograph was to explore the genesis, the mission and the duties of the RTDs, and to compare those with the identified pre- and post-mobilization training deficiencies of the Roundout Brigades. The research question asked whether the RTDs assigned directly to support the Roundout Brigades contributed effectively toward solving the training deficiencies documented during the Gulf War. “Effective” merely means that the two are complementary, and not mutually exclusive. What will follow are the initial mission and functions of the RTDs, followed by an update of the Forces Command 350-2 RTD function areas. The initial training deficiencies and the impact of Bold Shift and the enhanced Separate Brigade training strategy actions to address those training deficiencies will then be laid down and compared to provide a basis for analysis of the relationship’s effectiveness.

RTD Mission and Functions. Initial RTD mission and functions from the Army Chief of Staff’s briefing were as follows:

a. Mission. Advise and assist the Reserve Component commander to implement battle focused training programs that maximize the limited time available to enhance pre-mobilization training readiness and assist with post-mobilization training.

b. Functions.

(1) Assist the Reserve Component commander to develop and conduct individual, leader and staff training.

(2) Teach Reserve Component leaders how to use simulations and simulators in training.
(3) Assist the Reserve Component commander in the preparation and execution of collective training with emphasis on crew and platoon levels.

(4) Assist the Reserve Component commander in the evaluation of individual and collective training.

(5) Officers should focus on planning, organizing, training and evaluating unit staffs and leaders.

(6) Noncommissioned officers should focus on individual, crew and squad training, MOS specific skills and small unit leader development.

Forces Command updated this initial set of RTD mission and functions in its Change #1 to Regulation 350-2 in 1996, adding comments to the effect that RTDs would:

(7) assist the Reserve Component chain of command in developing pre- and post-mobilization training task lists and plans.

(8) assist in the conduct of “lane” training, as well as assist in setting up lane and battlestaff training, etc.

(9) assist in instructor preparation - train the trainer.

None of these subsequent 350-2 additions changed substantially the nature of the initial RTD mission and functions. They merely added emphasis to those items.

Training Deficiencies. The three Roundout Brigades which conducted post-mobilization training during Operation Desert Storm demonstrated initial training deficiencies in the following areas:

a. Individual Soldier Skills: Proper MOS schooling, MOS skills task knowledge, Common Skills task proficiency, individual weapons proficiency and key leader task knowledge (key leader tasks are closely related to proficiency in collective unit maneuver...
and gunnery proficiency, as well as brigade and battalion battlestaff training, all listed separately).

b. Nuclear, Biological and Chemical task knowledge at individual, squad and platoon level.

c. Equipment maintenance training at the crew, organizational and direct support level.

d. M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew gunnery.

e. Collective unit training in gunnery skills (for platoons and companies) and maneuver skills (for platoons, companies, battalions and brigades).

f. Battalion and brigade battlestaff proficiency.

The subsequent Bold Shift strategy did not change any of these training deficiency categorical areas; the strategy instead focused the Roundout Brigades on selected portions of the deficiency areas for training during pre-mobilization. Bold Shift stipulated that pre-mobilization training would focus at platoon level and below. It also provided new opportunities for individual soldier MOS schooling, as well as providing Army school opportunities for key leaders. The Bold Shift focus on the above-listed training deficiencies, therefore, was to emphasize the first four areas, as well as collective unit training at the platoon level only.

The eSB training strategy, developed following the GAO investigation of the Army’s Bold Shift initiatives, further refined this pre-mobilization focus by mandating an annual balance between crew gunnery and platoon level maneuver tasks, reducing the number of Mission Essential Tasks to Attack, Defend and Movement to Contact, reducing the level of platoon Mission Essential Task accomplishment from 100 percent
(fully trained) to 70 percent (fully or partially trained) and mandating annual battalion and
brigade battlestaff training. RTD mission and functions will be compared against this set
of focused training deficiencies.

Comparison,

*Individual Soldier Skills.* RTD functions of assisting the Reserve Component
commander to develop and conduct individual and leader training clearly satisfy an
effective relationship in this deficiency category. RTD noncommissioned officers were
ideally suited to the challenges of providing remedies in MOS specific skills, Common
Task proficiency and individual weapons proficiency. The RTD function of assisting the
Reserve Component commander in preparation and evaluation of individual training also
facilitated this relationship. RTD officers focused on evaluating unit staffs and leaders.
This aligns properly with correcting the individual deficiency of key leader training.
Therefore, in the category of Individual Soldier Skills training deficiencies, RTDs could
facilitate fixing all subelements with the exception of proper MOS schooling, an Army
institutional training responsibility clearly outside of the bounds of an RTD. Bold Shift
and subsequent enhancements took measures to address this particular problem.

*Nuclear, Biological and Chemical task knowledge at individual, squad and
platoon level.* RTD noncommissioned officers, given the function of assisting the
Reserve Component commander to develop and conduct individual training, were ideally
suited for this task.

*Equipment maintenance training at the crew, organizational and direct support
level.* Again, RTD noncommissioned officers were ideally suited to assist the soldiers in
units who were assigned as crew members of vehicles requiring maintenance. For
organizational and direct support level, the RTD warrant officers assigned to most of the subordinate battalions in each Roundout Brigade/eSB were specifically trained in maintenance issues at these two levels, and as such, could facilitate assisting the Reserve Component commander in fixing those deficiencies.

*M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle Crew Gunnery.* RTD noncommissioned officers were ideally suited to meet this challenge. Assisting the Reserve Component commander to develop and conduct individual training, as well as teaching Reserve Component leaders how to use simulators, was a perfect solution for this training deficiency. M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle gunnery rely not only on live ammunition training, but also on key preparatory *simulator* training in the Conduct of Fire Trainer (COFT), which puts vehicle crews through their paces prior to, and in conjunction with, live ammunition training.

*Collective Training.* Bold Shift focused the pre-mobilization training of Roundout Brigades on platoon level training only. RTD function areas such as assisting the Reserve Component commander in preparation and execution of collective training *with emphasis on crew and platoon levels*, clearly facilitated an effective Active-Reserve Component relationship in this category. The refinements to the Bold Shift strategy after the GAO’s 1995 investigation, which focused platoon collective training on only three Mission Essential Tasks, provided further strengthening of that relationship. The other categories of collective training, however -- platoon and company gunnery qualification, plus company, battalion and brigade maneuver -- were areas left to post-mobilization training. While RTD officers and noncommissioned officers would have a role in assisting with this training, the GFRE organizations and Combat Training Centers
(such as the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California) were given a significant role as well. With that in mind, one can conclude that RTD missions and functions support an effective training relationship with the Roundout Brigades/eSBs.

_Battalion and brigade battlestaff training._ This area comprises the most significant inadequacy in the RTD -- Roundout Brigade/eSB relationship, at least prior to the genesis of the GFRE organizations. Although battlestaff training was not a particular Bold Shift area of emphasis for pre-mobilization training, clearly it became one as a result of the 1995 GAO Bold Shift investigation. Initially, the Army Chief of Staff assigned RTD officers a function of assisting the Reserve Component commander to develop and conduct leader and staff training, as well as focusing on planning, organizing, training and evaluating unit staffs and leaders. Without Bold Shift designating battlestaff training as a pre-mobilization focus area, however, it would be unreasonable to expect that RTD officers would make much headway into this area. Following the 1995 GAO investigation, the eSB training strategy mandated annual battlestaff training while Forces Command created GFRE organizations designed specifically to facilitate both training and evaluation of eSB battlestaffs. Although the RTD - Roundout Brigade/eSB relationship was initially inadequate in this area, the Army's creation of a GFRE organization designed to specifically address the training weakness in effect relieved the RTD of sole responsibility for the problem.

The comparison of each of the Roundout Brigade training deficiencies with RTD mission and functions reveals a solid match of expectations with respect to particular training deficiencies. One particular area, however, deserves further comment. Although the RTD organizations appeared to have a sufficient composition of officer, warrant
officer and noncommissioned officer experience levels, relative to the task at hand, it is highly questionable whether the *relative numbers* of noncommissioned officers assigned to the RTD at large was sufficient. For an organization of 49 total active Army advisors, RTDs possessed 10-13 noncommissioned officers. The remainder were officers. Noncommissioned officers thus comprised 20-26 percent of the RTD organization. Roundout Brigades/eSBs, on the other hand, consist of 4,300 soldiers, of which more than 90 percent were enlisted and noncommissioned officers. The point here is that, in spite of a solid match in RTD mission and functions against Roundout Brigade training deficiencies, the RTDs’ organizational structure provided only an average of 23 percent of each Detachment to assist in fixing training deficiencies in an organization where over 90 percent of the soldiers (greater than 3,870 soldiers) were to be the recipients of that assistance. Clearly, the RTD organizational structure was officer-heavy relative to assigned noncommissioned officer personnel. General Burba’s early decision to revise the RTD size downward from 70 to 45 members significantly affected this point. 20 of the positions eliminated were noncommissioned officer positions that would have served in Roundout Brigade/eSB company level positions. Without these noncommissioned officers, the lowest level at which noncommissioned officers work is with the battalions subordinate to the brigades.

Perhaps there are good reasons for the odd noncommissioned officer structure of RTDs. Active Army noncommissioned officers are in serious demand throughout the Army. First, they man the noncommissioned officer spaces in each of the ten active Army Divisions. They also serve as instructors in the Army's institutional school base, as well as in Basic Training units. They provide key assistance to officers in other staff
positions like the Training and Doctrine Command, the Unified Commands, etc. Finally, solid active Army noncommissioned officers are vital in fulfilling Army Recruiting stations throughout the United States. General Burba’s decision may in fact have been made with these considerations in mind. Nevertheless, the lack of the additional noncommissioned officers in the RTD structure hampers significantly the ability of the RTD to address fully the training deficiencies for which the RTDs were created.

CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The Resident Training Detachments assigned directly to support the Roundout Brigades/eSB’s contribute effectively toward solving the training deficiencies documented during the Gulf War. Given the mission and functions to advise and assist the Roundout Brigade/eSB units to which they are directly assigned, the RTDs as currently organized contain sufficient manpower and knowledge base to effectively address the Gulf War training deficiencies of individual soldier skills, NBC skills, equipment maintenance, M1 Abrams and M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicle crew gunnery, and collective unit training at the platoon level, although an increase in noncommissioned officer structure would provide the RTD an enhanced capability. Although not structured to credibly assist in the category of battalion and brigade battlestaff training, the Army’s creation of GFRE organizations specifically addressed this shortcoming, in effect relieving the RTDs of the responsibility.

Two recommendations follow from the analysis. First, Forces Command should rewrite Regulation 350-2 to formally document the RTD mission and functions, unless
the RTD mission and functions have changed in the interim. (If indeed the RTD mission and functions have changed since their inception, there is no publicly-available, officially-documented record of that change - evidence of the need to do so.) Regulation 350-2 in its current version did little to improve the ambiguity noticed by the GAO during its 1995 investigation, other than to reiterate that the RTDs were an assistance and advisory element. Forces Command should specifically list the mission and functions of the RTD in Regulation 350-2 to end any confusion or ambiguity that may still exist.

Forces Command should also consider reexamining the feasibility of adding the additional 20 noncommissioned officers to each RTD. These noncommissioned officers would provide a significant increase to the benefit of the RTD as a whole by directly influencing training at the company level.

Although problems between the Active and the Reserve Component of the U.S. Army will probably continue in the future, the Army has made good progress toward fixing some of those problems in its approach toward addressing the Roundout Brigade training deficiencies documented during the Gulf War. While it is too early to know whether the RTD organizations will have a decisive impact upon the training readiness of each of their supported eSB’s, it does appear that, at the least, the Total Army has taken a significant step in the right direction.
ENDNOTES


2 U.S. Constitution, article 1, section 8.


7 NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 10.


11 Ibid, 7.


15 Reisweber, 19-20.

16 Army National Guard Bureau, 34.


18 This assertion comes from the observations of two key personnel who were present when RTD establishment occurred: first, Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Fred Stritzinger, a U.S. Forces Command staff officer who has been involved with reserve affairs since before Operation Desert Storm, and Colonel Robert Hart, currently working as a staff officer in the Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs, but who had been present in the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations of the Army Staff during the time period when the RTD concept was developed.


20 NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 6.


24 NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 11-12.


27 NSIAD, *Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades For Gulf War*, 12.

29 NSIAD, *Peacetime Training Did Not Adequately Prepare Combat Brigades For Gulf War*, 17.


33 Reisweber, 24.

34 Thomas F. Lippiatt et al., *Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1992), 10.


38 Ronald E. Sortor et al., *Training Readiness in the Army Reserve Components* (Santa Monica, California: RAND, 1994), xii-xiii, 1.


40 Reisweber, 22-23.


42 Ibid, 3.


44 Sortor et al., *Training Readiness in the Army Reserve Components*, 9.


Ibid, 79.


NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 31.

Based on December 3d, 1998 interview with Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Fred Stritzinger, interview by author.

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Lippiatt et al., *Post Mobilization Training of Army Reserve Component Combat Units*, 15.

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Ibid.

NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 5.

Stritzinger interview.

NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 13.

Ibid, 15.

Ibid, 3.

Ibid, 5, 33-34.
Ibid, 5, 30.

Ibid, 4.


NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 3, 5.


NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 32.

Ibid, 30.

Ibid, 5.

United States Army Forces Command Memorandum, AFOP-TR, Subject: Resident Training Detachment (RTD) Workshop and associated RTD briefing slides. In this instance, the 116th Cavalry Brigade RTD briefer made this assertion.

NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 37.

Ibid, 38.

Ibid, 33.

Army National Guard Bureau, 12.

NSIAD, *Combat Brigades' Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 6-7, 38.

U.S. Army Forces Command/Army National Guard Regulation 350-2, originally dated March 1st, 1995, and including Change Number 1, dated February 1st, 1996.


NSIAD, *Combat Brigades’ Ability to Be Ready for War in 90 Days is Uncertain*, 19-22.

United States Army Forces Command Briefing, undated (developed during 1995), Subject: Enhanced Brigades.

U.S. Army Forces Command/Army National Guard Regulation 350-2, 3.

Ibid, 17.


Ibid, 57-58.

Ibid, 11.

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Ibid, 18.

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