Evaluation Report

OFFICE OF THE INSPECTOR GENERAL

EVALUATION REPORT ON
THE JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER

Report No. 97-193

July 18, 1997

DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

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Acronyms

ACOM  Atlantic Command
CINC  Commander in Chief
CJCS  Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
GAO  Government Accounting Office
J-7  Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability
JTF  Joint Task Force
JULLS  Joint Universal Lessons Learned System
JWFC  Joint Warfighting Center
MOU  Memorandum of Understanding
MEMORANDUM FOR COMMANDER, JOINT WARFIGHTING CENTER


We are providing this report for the Joint Warfighting Center’s information and use.

We appreciate the courtesies extended to the evaluation staff. Questions on the evaluation should be directed to Lieutenant Colonel Gary Williams, U.S. Army, Evaluation Project Manager, (703) 604-9566, (DSN 664-9566), or Ms. Pamela Steele-Nelson, Evaluation Team Leader, at (703) 604-9558, (DSN 664-9558). See Appendix C for the report distribution. The evaluation team members are listed inside the back cover.

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Joint Warfighting Center

Executive Summary

Introduction. The Joint Warfighting Center is a separate operating agency of the Joint Staff established by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to serve as his support agent for the joint training system. The Joint Warfighting Center is intended to be a cost-effective, forward-thinking, combat multiplier for joint warfare. Joint warfare is defined as “the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces, including the national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under a unified command.” The Joint Warfighting Center is tasked to coordinate the development of joint doctrine and to assist all combatant commands in their joint training and exercise programs.

Evaluation Objective. The overall evaluation objective was to determine the effectiveness of the Joint Warfighting Center in coordinating the development of joint doctrine and in providing joint training support to the combatant commanders in chief. Specifically, the evaluation focused on assessing the Joint Warfighting Center's role in the coordination, development, and standardization of joint doctrine and in the coordination and execution of joint training and exercises in support of the combatant commanders' training programs. The evaluation also reviewed the management control program as it applied to the overall evaluation objective.

Evaluation Results. The Joint Warfighting Center is successfully facilitating the development of joint doctrine. The joint community is satisfied with the Joint Warfighting Center's management of doctrine development. Combatant commanders reported that the Joint Warfighting Center provides effective battlestaff training, assistance, and exercise support to their headquarters. However, the joint training support roles of the Joint Warfighting Center and the U.S. Atlantic Command's Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center are not clearly delineated in Joint Chiefs of Staff-level policy documents. The lack of clearly defined roles causes confusion among the combatant commands regarding the two centers' joint training responsibilities and the potential for uncoordinated joint training efforts. A required memorandum of understanding to delineate the training roles of the two centers has not been completed.

Management Comments. The draft report issued on May 30, 1997, did not contain recommendations and therefore, did not require written comments. Because this report contains no recommendations, written comments were not required; however, informal comments were received and considered in preparing the final report.
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Part I - Evaluation Results
Evaluation Results

Evaluation Background

Joint Warfighting Center Creation. The Joint Warfighting Center (JWFC) was created in 1993 through the merging of two organizations, the Joint Warfare Center at Hurlbert Field, Florida, and the Joint Doctrine Center in Norfolk, Virginia. The JWFC charter was based on Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), requirements to develop doctrine for the joint employment of the Armed Forces and to formulate policies for joint training. Those functions were originally stated in the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986. The JWFC became fully operational in 1994.

CJCS Instruction 3500.02A, "Joint Training Master Plan," December 8, 1995, designated the JWFC as the CJCS support agent for the joint training system. The Joint Staff envisioned that the JWFC would enhance the ability of the Chairman, the combatant commanders, and the Services* to prepare for joint and multinational operations across the full range of military operations.

The JWFC, located at Fort Monroe, Virginia, reports to the CJCS through the Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff. The JWFC budget (Operation and Maintenance) for FY 1997 is $52.3 million with 225 (51 military, 12 civilian, and 162 contractor) personnel assigned.

Purpose of the Joint Warfighting Center. The JWFC mission, as defined in CJCS Instruction 3500.02A is to assist the CJCS, the combatant commanders, and the Service chiefs in preparing for joint and multinational operations in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises. Instruction 3500.02A identifies the central concept in the organizational design and operation of JWFC as the link between joint doctrine and joint training. The JWFC is charged with providing assistance to the combatant commanders in planning, executing, and assessing joint training. Each of the Service's doctrine and training centers or commands coordinate with the JWFC on joint matters.

* The Services include the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps.
The JWFC also serves as the implementing agent for the management of concept development, assessment, and integration of Joint Vision 2010, the Chairman’s vision for future warfighting concepts. Joint Vision 2010 will provide the Military Departments the CJCS strategy for integrating future technologies into warfighting into the next century.

The Joint Universal Lessons Learned System (JULLS) is a database used and maintained by the Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7), Joint Staff, and the JWFC. The JULLS is used to collect task proficiency observations and to improve accessibility and better integrate lessons learned into the joint training and analysis process. Responsibilities for the JULLS were divided between the J-7 and the JWFC. The JWFC was tasked to develop a Joint Center for Lessons Learned to improve the current JULLS. The JWFC was also tasked to develop a Joint Exercise Management Program, a software package, that will eventually include the JULLS. These additional functions were transferred to the JWFC without any transfer of resources. The JWFC, therefore, is developing the systems using its personnel who were originally assigned to the JWFC operational functions.

Evaluation Objective

The objective of the evaluation was to determine the effectiveness of the JWFC in coordinating the development of joint doctrine and in providing joint training support to the combatant commanders in chief (CINC). Specifically, we examined JWFC roles in the coordination, development, and standardization of joint doctrine. We also examined the JWFC role in the coordination and execution of joint training and exercises in support of the combatant commanders’ joint training programs. Appendix A describes the evaluation process, and Appendix B summarizes other coverage related to the evaluation objective.
Joint Doctrine

The JWFC is successfully facilitating the development of joint doctrine. The JWFC solicits active participation by the Joint Staff, the CINCs, and the Services to develop joint doctrine and provides a center for integration of joint doctrine projects and issues. Representatives of the CINCs and the Services responded that they are satisfied with the JWFC services and assistance related to the development of joint doctrine. Those customers support efforts by the JWFC to facilitate doctrine development, coordination, and standardization.

Successful Facilitation of Joint Doctrine. The joint doctrine development community, in coordination with the CJCS, agreed that 104 joint publications were required for joint doctrine. As of March 1997, 66 joint publications have been approved, 33 are under development, and 5 need to be developed.

Joint Doctrine Development Community. The joint doctrine development community consists of the CJCS, the Services, the combatant commands, the Joint Staff directorates, the doctrine development agencies of the Services and other joint customers. Representatives from those organizations comprise the joint doctrine working parties and joint doctrine working groups.

Joint Doctrine Working Parties. Joint doctrine working parties, hosted by the JWFC, meet at least semiannually to address and vote on publication project proposals, to discuss key joint doctrinal and operational issues and contentious issues on joint publications, and to keep participants informed on the status of the joint doctrine development program and evolving publications. Joint publication project proposals and recommendations, based on JWFC analyses, are provided to participants for review prior to the meetings. The meetings are led by the J-7 and are held at the JWFC. The Services, the combatant commanders, and the J-7 are the voting members of the joint doctrine working parties. Other permanent (nonvoting) members of the joint doctrine working parties are the JWFC, all other Joint Staff directorates, the Services, multi-Service and combatant command doctrine organizations, and the National Defense University.

Joint Doctrine Working Groups. Joint doctrine working groups, made up of subject matter experts from the joint doctrine development community, meet periodically to address specific issues and concerns related to joint doctrine. As an example, a joint doctrine working group met February 19 and 20, 1997, to address two issues presented previously.
by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman challenged the attendees to develop ways of improving joint doctrine and to consider a reorganization of the hierarchy of joint publications. The effective coordination of both issues resulted in a majority recommendation to keep the present system for the joint publication hierarchy. Working group participants also proposed 39 suggestions to improve the Joint Doctrine Development Program.


Joint Publication 1-01 sets forth the procedures and policy for initiating, validating, developing, coordinating, evaluating, approving, and maintaining joint publications. It provides an overview of the joint doctrine system, defines the roles and responsibilities of the members of the joint doctrine development community, describes the procedures for developing joint doctrine, and explains the joint publication organization framework. Joint Publication 1-01 is being revised to better respond to the needs of the Armed Forces through the inclusion of information that defines the way they are trained to fight or operate and to ensure the consistency of joint doctrine development throughout the joint doctrine development community. Improvements made to the Joint Doctrine Development Program are discussed in the revised publication.

**Program Improvements.** The JWFC has enhanced the Joint Doctrine Development Program through various improvements. Those improvements, also discussed in the revised publication, include:

- hosted working groups to resolve contentious publication issues;
- hosted and facilitated 6 major writing working groups on various publications;
- assessed 19 joint publications;
- streamlined the process for developing publications, resulting in a reduced publication cycle time from 32 through 46 months to 19 through 21 months;
- eliminated test (draft) publications that undergo formal testing before final approval;
- developed and managed a new joint doctrine distribution system;
- developed the Windows-based Joint Electronic Library and improved it by incorporating the World Wide Web;
- produced 59 tailored CD-ROMs for exercises and operations;
- developed the Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations; and
Joint Doctrine

- developed a semiannual newsletter to provide the status of joint publications, changes to the Joint Doctrine Development Program, and other important issues related to joint doctrine.

**Participation in Joint Training and Exercises.** The Doctrine Division, JWFC, is also a player in joint training and exercises. The Doctrine Division participates as planners during joint training and exercise concept development conferences and facilitates the incorporation of joint publications that need assessment. Doctrine Division personnel also serve as trainer-observers during joint training and exercise events to directly evaluate the usefulness of existing joint doctrine. Their involvement provides for an effective method to assess joint doctrine and adds credibility to recommendations related to joint doctrinal issues.

**Customer Responses.** The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, is satisfied with the progress to date and impressed with the quality of the joint doctrine that the JWFC has produced. Input from combatant commanders and the Service doctrine centers and commands showed that overall, the JWFC customers are satisfied with the services and assistance they have received related to joint doctrine. The customers believe that the JWFC has done a good job bringing the joint community together to discuss and develop joint doctrine and that the JWFC has been helpful in getting joint doctrine to the joint community.

**Conclusion.** The JWFC has established itself as the single organization responsible for the coordination and integration of joint doctrine projects and issues. The JWFC has developed an effective program, with continual improvements, that is praised by its customers, the joint community.
Joint Training and Exercise Support

The JWFC provides tailored battlestaff training, assistance, and exercise support to the combatant commands. The JWFC offers a wide range of joint training and exercise assistance to the combatant commands and is actively involved in the design, planning, execution, and after-action review process for joint exercises. As a result of those efforts, the JWFC has enhanced the training of combatant commands' battlestaffs and their preparation for joint and multinational operations.

Joint Training System. The objective of the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff's training program and the joint training system is to develop a joint training and exercise program focused on warfighting and training the way the military intends to fight. The primary purpose of joint training is to prepare U.S. forces to conduct joint and multinational operations. One of the methods, a joint exercise, is used to test the validity of joint doctrine and to provide joint forces training.

The joint training system is the formalized approach, to include the development of requirements, planning, execution, and assessments of the joint training process, found in CJCS Manual 3500.03, "Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States," June 1, 1996. The manual provides a basic methodology for linking training programs with assigned missions.

The Universal Joint Task List, a structured group of tasks that describes functional capabilities that may be required to execute assigned missions, is used by the combatant commands. Each combatant command uses the task list to develop its Joint Mission Essential Task List, which identifies those tasks that the combatant commander determines essential to accomplishing his mission.

Role of the JWFC. The role of the JWFC in providing training is defined in two documents, CJCS Instruction 3500.01, "Joint Training Policy," November 21, 1994, which established the Chairman's policy for planning and conducting joint and multinational training, and CJCS Instruction 3500.02A, "Joint Training Master Plan," December 8, 1995, which provides guidance to the combatant commands and supporting Services.
Joint Training and Exercise Support

The purpose of designating the JWFC as support agent in the Joint Training Master Plan was to focus joint resources on more efficient and effective joint training. The concept was to ensure the linkage of joint doctrine and joint training. The combatant commands indicated that the JWFC has played an important part in assisting them with the development of their joint training plans and Joint Mission Essential Task Lists.

**JWFC Training Process.** The JWFC has a structured process for supporting the Chairman’s program for training and exercises. The purpose of designating the JWFC as support agent in the Joint Training Master Plan was to focus joint resources on more efficient and effective joint training. The concept was to ensure the linkage of joint doctrine and joint training. The combatant commands indicated that the program to provide training and exercise support to the combatant commands involves a full range of services, including scheduling and resource review, assisting in the development of exercise scenarios, designing requirements tailored to combatant commands needs, and assisting with analysis and review of operations and contingency plans and with the design of the exercises. Since it was established, the JWFC has been a force in the process of exercise and training support. Some of the training and exercise support services the JWFC provides to its customers are discussed below.

**Concept Development.** For major exercises, the JWFC may provide its facilities as well as military and contract personnel during a 3- to 4-day concept development conference. The purpose of the conference is to assist in planning and preparing for the exercise and in focusing and structuring the exercise to meet the combatant commander’s training needs and objectives. The JWFC provides joint event teams, consisting of JWFC staff members from all functional areas, to assist the exercise staffs of the combatant commands in the design, planning, execution, and evaluation of training events.

**Joint Training System Support Teams.** JWFC Joint Training System support teams provide facilitated training assistance to combatant commands to help prepare their individual joint training plans and to assist the combatant commands in developing their Joint Mission Essential Task Lists.

**Mobile Training Teams.** Mobile training teams provide academic instruction, which include JWFC-developed programs of instruction, seminars, workshops, and practical exercises. During this training, JWFC personnel provide tailored instruction, across various functional specialties to groups, such as command battlestaffs or crisis action teams. The mobile
training teams may also participate in joint exercises. For example, the JWFC provided a five-member Mobile Training Team Academic seminar in January 1997 for the exercise Blue Advance 97 at the U.S. Southern Command to instruct on crisis action team procedures.

**Joint Courseware.** The JWFC is the facilitator for the joint training course development process. As the facilitator, the JWFC has three roles:
- produce a Joint Course Catalog,
- develop courseware, and
- coordinate all joint courseware for any other commands involved in the process.

Courses are stand-alone products and can be taught by outside instructors. For example, the JWFC was tasked by the Joint Staff to prepare a program for the Joint Forces Air Component Commander. The JWFC developed the course with two parts: the Joint Air Operations Center course, and the Joint Forces Air Component, General Information course. In addition to its role in developing that course, the JWFC hosted the inaugural Joint Training Curriculum Working Group in 1996 and established a joint course development process. The Joint Training Curriculum Working Group determines the lead agent for joint courses and acts as a review and coordinating body. The preparation of the course, the development of the Joint Training Curriculum Working Group, and the establishment of the course development process are forward steps in controlling the joint training course development process.

**Joint Training and Exercise Support.** The JWFC has assigned an action officer to work directly with each combatant command in the set up, design, and preparation for exercises. The JWFC is funded to provide two support training packages to every combatant command each year. The JWFC provides resources for the combatant commands that do not have to be taken out of the commands’ own staff resources. The JWFC assists combatant commanders’ staffs throughout the exercise and has a structured process in place for after-action reviews. Further, the JWFC provides analysis throughout the training and has been commended by the combatant commands for its assistance in this area.

**Conclusion.** Since it was established, the JWFC has provided a tailored training and exercise support program for the combatant commands. Combatant commands reported that the JWFC provides effective training and exercise support and that even more support from JWFC would be helpful. Overall, the customers most affected reported that as a result of the efforts of the JWFC, their training and exercise programs have been enhanced.
Joint Training Roles

The joint training roles of the JWFC and the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) are not clearly delineated. Joint Chiefs of Staff policy documents do not sufficiently define the JWFC and ACOM responsibilities in joint training. This is evidenced by a Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, requirement for a memorandum of understanding (MOU) between ACOM and JWFC. As of July 1997, that MOU has not been completed. As a result of a lack of clear policy guidance or a formal MOU, the CINCs’ staffs are confused about ACOM and JWFC joint training responsibilities. As a consequence, coordinated joint training support to the combatant CINCs may not be achieved.

Training Roles. The JWFC is chartered to support the combatant CINCs’ joint exercise programs. JWFC joint training support typically involves tailored training for the CINCs’ battlestaff and the CINCs’ Service component headquarters. Beyond being responsible for joint training of its assigned forces, ACOM is chartered to conduct standardized training for a potential joint task force headquarters. The figure below shows the U.S. Central Command and its subordinate staffs as an example of the level of joint training provided by the JWFC and ACOM.
A JWFC joint training package typically involves tailored training for the CINCs' battlestaffs and the CINCs' Service component headquarters.

The ACOM joint training package is a standardized training package used to train potential joint task force headquarters at the Corps, Numbered Air Force, and Marine Expeditionary Force level.

**JWFC and ACOM Training**

**JWFC Training.** The JWFC is a separate agency of the Joint Staff, whose mission is to facilitate joint doctrine development, provide joint exercise support, and expand joint exercise management services. The JWFC is designed to support the combatant CINCs' training and exercise programs. This support covers all aspects of the joint exercise cycle, from
pre-exercise training, design, planning, and preparation, through exercise execution and after-action review, analysis, and reporting. The support also provides opposing force “real-time” support data for the exercise.

**ACOM Training.** ACOM is responsible for training its assigned joint forces and, beyond its combatant command authority, also has a joint training support role like the JWFC. The Unified Command Plan tasks ACOM to conduct joint training of assigned forces and joint task force (JTF) staffs. ACOM is also responsible for maximizing U.S. military capability through joint training, force integration, and deployment of forces, and is tasked to provide standardized JTF headquarters training. Additionally, ACOM is chartered to collaborate with the U.S. Pacific Command to coordinate training of its assigned continental U.S.-based forces. The long-range goal of this effort is to ensure that continental U.S.-based forces of the future have a higher degree of joint capability than currently exists.

**Joint Chiefs of Staff Policy.** Guidance for training joint forces is found in the two instructions discussed in the previous section of this report: Instruction 3500.02A “Joint Training Master Plan,” December 8, 1995, and Instruction 3500.01 “Joint Training Policy,” November 21, 1994.

**Joint Training Master Plan.** Instruction 3500.02A provides guidance from the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the combatant commands and Services for planning and conducting joint training and exercises. The main objective of Instruction 3500.02A is for the Chairman to provide guidance to the combatant commands, Services, Joint Staff, and Defense agencies on ways to develop a joint training and exercise program that meets the needs of the combatant commanders. Instruction 3500.02A identifies ACOM as the executive agent and the JWFC as the support agent for joint training. The JWFC is assigned as the joint doctrine and support agent for joint exercises, and ACOM is tasked to focus on conducting high, value-added, joint training.

Both organizations are chartered to focus joint resources for more efficient and effective joint training. Instruction 3500.02A also requires the ACOM and JWFC to complete a memorandum of understanding by July 1996. That MOU was intended to provide a coordination of efforts to optimize support to the CINC’s. As of June 30, 1997, the MOU was not yet completed.

**Joint Training Policy.** Instruction 3500.01 is also designed to prescribe the training of joint forces. Instruction 3500.01 provides Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, policy for joint training as a means to enhance joint
Joint Training Roles

readiness and identifies the JWFC as responsible for assisting in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises. A draft version of Instruction 3500.01, dated May 1, 1997, goes further by specifying the needed relationship between the JWFC and ACOM. This draft version of Instruction 3500.01 identifies the JWFC as the CINCs’ first point of contact and source of joint training assistance.

ACOM, on the other hand, is responsible to ensure that the joint forces and JTF staffs are trained for augmentation into regional CINCs’ forces worldwide. The Joint Training Policy states that the JWFC retains the lead on training guidance, doctrine development, and deployable training resources for the geographic CINCs. The ACOM retains the lead on conducting training. The guidance in Instruction 3500.01 does not clearly identify how the JWFC and ACOM will work together in the joint training arena.

Both instructions (including the draft version of Instruction 3500.01), need refinement. As currently written, the instructions do not allow the roles of the organizations to be easily understood by their customers—the CINCs and the joint community. A statement in Instruction 3500.02A that ACOM should focus on “high-value added training” and statements in Instruction 3500.01, such as “JWFC retains the lead on training guidance, doctrine development, and deployable training resources for the geographic CINCs, USCOM retains the lead on conducting training,” are vague and confusing. Clearer guidance is needed if efficient, synergistic, joint training is to be provided to the CINCs by both organizations.

Memorandum of Understanding. In February 1997, the two organizations drafted an MOU as required by the Joint Training Master Plan. The 10-page document was coordinated by ACOM and the JWFC and describes in detail how both units would cover items, such as joint doctrine, joint training, and after-action-review support.

The JWFC commander signed the memorandum on February 6, 1997. ACOM, however, did not endorse it. The ACOM position is that the MOU was overcome by events based on the results of recent CINC-level conferences. Further, ACOM believes that requirements in the MOU breach Title 10, United States Code guidance that differentiates unit command responsibilities and relationships to the joint staff.

The Joint Training Master Plan dictated that the MOU be completed by July 1996, which has not been accomplished. This lack of agreement on training responsibilities between the two organizations is indicative of a
systemic issue, which could result in uncoordinated and duplicated training efforts for the combatant CINCs.

Conclusion. The current guidance causes confusion about joint training roles of the JWFC and ACOM. Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, policy instructions do not adequately define the differing joint training roles of the JWFC and ACOM. Both organizations are responsible to support joint training. Primarily, the JWFC trains CINCs' battlestaffs, while ACOM focuses on JTFs and conducts JTF headquarters' training. Efforts to complete an MOU to optimize combined support to geographic CINCs have not been successful. Without clear policy guidance or a clarifying MOU, there is a potential for uncoordinated joint training support and increased confusion among the CINCs regarding joint training.
Part II - Additional Information
Appendix A. Evaluation Process

Scope

The evaluation focused on the effectiveness of the JWFC in supporting the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the commanders in chief; and the chiefs of the Services in their preparation for joint warfare and multinational operations. The evaluation determined the effectiveness of the JWFC in coordinating the development of joint doctrine and in providing joint training support to the combatant commanders.

Methodology

In addition to obtaining information from the JWFC, the evaluation team received input and analyzed data from the Joint Staff (JWFC reports to the Chairman through the J-7); from the unified commands, since they are the primary JWFC customers; and from the Services because they are the contributors to the joint doctrine development process.

We reviewed information on joint doctrine and joint exercises; policy documents, dated from 1986 through 1996; and reports on related coverage. We also reviewed memorandums of understanding for various exercises between the JWFC and the supported combatant commands. We interviewed personnel at the Joint Staff and at the JWFC. We developed a formal questionnaire for and analyzed input from the regional CINCs. We conducted interviews with personnel from each of the unified commands, the Services' headquarters, and the Services' doctrine centers and commands. We reviewed reports on the results of Joint Doctrine Working Parties and attended a Joint Doctrine Working Group conference. In reviewing the doctrine development process and facilitation, we tracked the development of joint publications and analyzed JWFC documents to determine their accomplishments on joint publications since August 1993. We reviewed various reports on the results of JWFC-assisted CINC exercises and attended an exercise deconfliction meeting on JWFC exercise participation and scheduling. We visited the wargaming centers at the JWFC, the U.S. Pacific Command, and the Army-Air Force Warrior Preparation Center in Europe to observe their use of modeling and simulations in conducting joint exercises and training.

We analyzed data to determine whether the JWFC is accomplishing its mission effectively and whether the joint community effectively plans for
and uses the JWFC and to identify any major systemic issues associated with joint doctrine development or with joint training programs. Overall, we determined that the JWFC is meeting the training, exercise, and doctrinal needs of the warfighting CINC.

**Evaluation Period.** We conducted this evaluation from September 1996 through April 1997 in accordance with standards implemented by the Inspector General, DoD.

**Contacts During the Evaluation.** We visited or contacted individuals and organizations within the DoD. Further details are available upon request.

**Management Control Program**

DoD Directive 5010.38, "Management Control (MC) Program," August 26, 1996, requires DoD organizations to implement a comprehensive system for management controls that provides reasonable assurance that programs are operating as intended and to evaluate the adequacy of the controls.

**Scope of Review of the Management Control Program.** We reviewed the adequacy of JWFC management controls over the development of joint doctrine and joint exercise support to the combatant CINC. We did not assess the adequacy of management’s self evaluation of those controls.

**Adequacy of Management Controls.** JWFC management controls were adequate in that we identified no material management control weaknesses.
Appendix B. Summary of Related Coverage

General Accounting Office

General Accounting Office/NSIAD-95-109, "Military Capabilities: Stronger Joint Staff Role Needed to Enhance Joint Military Training," July 6, 1995. The General Accounting Office (GAO) conducted this review to determine the scope of DoD joint training activities and the need for improvements in joint training. Two previous GAO audits, in 1979 and in 1985, determined that program effectiveness was impaired by inadequate Joint Staff oversight. The 1995 review determined that U.S. forces received little joint training as a result of inadequate oversight by the Joint Staff. However, GAO also determined that some improvements had been made in joint training, including the increased joint training responsibilities of the U.S. Atlantic Command (ACOM) and of the JWFC in providing technical assistance to the commanders in chief on their joint training programs. The GAO report also noted that two simulation centers were being developed at ACOM and at the JWFC in the same geographic area, despite questions about possible duplication. The GAO report states that there was still a need for improved oversight of joint training by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the report recommended that the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman seek a stronger consensus among the combatant commands regarding new joint training and force deployment strategies at the U.S. Atlantic Command. GAO concluded that the problems that hindered joint training in the past were likely to recur without increased program oversight by the Joint Staff.

GAO/NSIAD-93-122, "Simulation Training: Management Framework Improved, but Challenges Remain," May 10, 1993. In response to a congressional request, the GAO conducted a review of the DoD management of simulation technology. The newly created Defense Modeling and Simulation Office and the Joint Staff were the primary organizations involved in this review. The GAO stated that the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office had made progress in coordinating and providing guidance for simulation issues DoD-wide, but was hindered by the inability to obtain the personnel resources needed. The two Joint Staff directorates responsible for coordination of simulation support for the combatant commands had overlapping responsibilities, resulting in some duplication of effort. The GAO report provided recommendations.
regarding the problems of inadequate staffing for the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office and unclear delineation of duties for the two Joint Staff directorates. At the conclusion of the GAO review, the Joint Staff had begun a reassessment of its organization, which would provide an opportunity to eliminate unnecessary overlap.

Office of the Inspector General, DoD

Audit Report No. 97-138, “Requirements Planning and Impact on Readiness of Training Simulators and Devices,” April 30, 1997. This report discusses the acquisition process for training simulators, computer training simulations, training devices, and the effects of the training techniques on the operational readiness of the Services. Additionally, the report discusses the adequacy of the management control program. The report concluded that the Executive Council for Modeling and Simulation, the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, and the Modeling and Simulation Training Council have improved the development and management of simulations. The report also concluded that the Army and the Navy successfully cooperated in the development and acquisition of computer training simulations. There were three areas, however, in need of management action:

- adequate control and oversight by the DoD;
- an Overarching Integrated Product Team for the planned investment in redundant, joint computer simulation programs by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency and the Joint Staff; and
- development of policies and procedures for evaluating training effectiveness and cost-effectiveness of large-scale training simulations.

The Army, the Navy, and the Air Force have not shown that large-scale computer training simulations are effective. DoD is investing in large-scale computer training simulations that have not proved to enhance training and could instead adversely affect readiness.

The report recommended that for large-scale training systems, management establish acquisition oversight, clarify the scope of an automated information system and cognizant office, implement policy to ensure that oversight is exercised, establish an Overarching Integrated Product Team, and develop policies and procedures for evaluating training effectiveness and cost-effectiveness.
Appendix B. Summary of Related Coverage

Program Evaluation, "An Evaluation of Modeling and Simulation Support for Training in the Unified and Specified Commands," September 17, 1993. In response to a request from the Defense Modeling and Simulation Office, the evaluation was intended to assist with improving modeling and simulation activities throughout the DoD. The report discusses the management, acquisition, and use of models and simulations for joint training, the coordination and integrating of modeling needs, and funding options available. The evaluation determined that the unified commands were frustrated by the absence of a single knowledgeable source for modeling and simulation information, that there was a lack of long-term goals, and that policy needs to be updated. The report recommended that DoD publish its modeling and simulation goals and that the Executive Council for Modeling and Simulation tie DoD funding priorities more closely to the National Military Strategy.

Joint Chiefs of Staff

Joint Chiefs of Staff, "Joint TRADOC Study: Quick Look," March 1996. The Joint Training and Doctrine Command study group conducted the study. The study group was formed in response to language associated with the FY 1996 Defense Authorization Act. The Act urged the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, to consider forming a Joint Exercise, Training, and Doctrine Command, concentrating on joint training and readiness. Language in the Act suggested that such a command could assist in improving preparedness and joint readiness and that it might optimize the efforts of the Joint Staff and U.S. Atlantic Command by resultant improved joint training and doctrine. According to the report, the JWFC could be the nucleus of such a command. The study was funded by the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence) to allow for analysis of processes and approaches that support joint training, doctrine, and education. The study group acknowledged Joint Staff improvements to the processes that provide joint doctrine, training, exercises, and education. The report concluded that improvements were needed in processing joint doctrine; that more Joint Staff influence was needed in planning exercises and training schedules; and that more Joint Staff involvement is needed in annual curriculum review by the professional military education and joint professional military education schools, with stronger linkage between joint
education and training. All three areas lacked performance measures to determine effectiveness. The study developed four organizational options: maintain the status quo, enhance the JWFC, eliminate the JWFC and transfer its functions to other agencies, and create a new joint organization. The report determined that a more comprehensive study may be needed to include the views of the commanders of the combatant commands, the Services, and Defense agencies.

Institute for Defense Analyses

Institute for Defense Analyses Paper P-3162, July 1996, “The Potential Cost Savings from Collocating the Joint Warfighting Center and the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center. The Institute for Defense Analyses was tasked to study the possible collocation of the JWFC and the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center and to determine whether the collocation can be cost-effective for the DoD. The study considered three possible sites: expansion of the current JWFC space at Fort Monroe, Virginia; expansion of the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center’s current facility at Suffolk, Virginia; and relocation to the National Test Facility at Boulder, Colorado (ruled out due to lack of available space.) The study determined that the overall cost savings would be less than $2 million dollars annually. The two commands did not fully agree with the finding. The study determined that the JWFC could be moved to the Suffolk facility with a small portion of the staff retained at Fort Monroe.

Relocation of the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center to Fort Monroe would require costly modification of buildings and construction of a new building. The study group also concluded that, although it had no data on the subject, synergy was a real possibility and that collocation could lead to reductions in costs and gains in performance. The report further states that such modest savings did not present a strong argument for collocation at that time. As a result, the study group did not recommend collocation of the JWFC and the Joint Training, Analysis, and Simulation Center.
Appendix C. Report Distribution

Office of the Secretary of Defense

Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology
  Office of the Director for Research and Engineering
  Director, Defense Modeling and Simulation Office
  Director, Defense Logistics Studies Information Exchange
Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
  Deputy Chief Financial Officer
  Deputy Comptroller (Program/Budget)
Under Secretary of Defense for Personnel and Readiness
  Office of the Deputy Under Secretary of Defense for Requirements and Resources
  Director for Requirements
Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs)

Joint Staff

Director, Joint Staff
  Deputy Inspector General
Director for Operational Plans and Interoperability (J-7)
  Commander, Joint Warfighting Center

Department of the Army

Chief, Training Operations Division, Office of the Training Directorate, Deputy Chief
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Auditor General, Department of the Army
Director, Joint Doctrine, Training and Doctrine Command

Department of the Navy

Commandant of the U.S. Marine Corps
  Strategy and Plans Division, Plans, Policy, and Operations Department
Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Chief, Policy and Joint Doctrine Branch, Strategy and Policy Division, Deputy Chief
  of Naval Operations (Plans, Policy, and Operations)
Department of the Navy, (cont’d)
Chief, Doctrine Development Division, Naval Doctrine Command
Auditor General, Department of the Navy
Chief, Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command

Department of the Air Force
Assistant Secretary of the Air Force (Financial Management and Comptroller)
Deputy Chief of Staff Plans and Operations
Directorate of Modeling and Simulation
Chief, Warfighting Support Division
Commander, U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center
Commander, U.S. Air Force Doctrine Center Detachment-1
Auditor General, Department of the Air Force
Director, Air Land Sea Application Center

Unified Commands
Commander in Chief, U.S. European Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Atlantic Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Central Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Space Command
Commander in Chief, U.S. Special Operations Command
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Technical Information Center, National Security and International Affairs Division,
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    Senate Subcommittee on Defense, Committee on Appropriations
    Senate Committee on Governmental Affairs
    House Committee on Appropriations
    House Subcommittee on National Security, Committee on Appropriations
    House Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
    House Subcommittee on Government Management, Information, and Technology,
        Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
    House Subcommittee on National Security, International Affairs, and Criminal
        Justice, Committee on Government Reform and Oversight
    House Committee on National Security
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