FOURTEEN POINTS: A FRAMEWORK FOR
THE ANALYSIS OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

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FOREWORD

This study was prepared by Douglas S. Blaufarb and Dr. George K. Tanham. Since it covers a wide range of countries over about four decades of time, the authors believe they owe the reader some indication of the scope of the research involved in its preparation. This research was of two types. First - and perhaps in this case "research" is not the accurate word - both authors have had considerable personal experience in several of the countries and counterinsurgency efforts covered. One or both of us spent many years in or involved operationally with Vietnam, Thailand, Singapore, Malaya, Burma and Laos, all of which have been confronted with insurgencies during our years of involvement. Unfortunately, this experience did not extend to any part of Latin America but in those countries where we served the work we did and the experiences we lived through provided insights which, we believe, were very helpful in coming to grips with the problems posed by this study. They supplied background which was considerably more vivid and meaningful than that provided by research in written materials.

The second type of research undertaken has been in secondary sources - books, articles, studies, unclassified government reports and the like. In most cases we found the available secondary materials to be adequate to our purposes. The exceptions were in Colombia, Guatemala and, to a lesser extent, Venezuela. When it came to describing and analyzing the insurgencies and the counterinsurgency efforts undertaken in those three countries, we found gaps we were not able to fill and have so stated in our reports on them. Undoubtedly, if we had access to contemporary newspapers, periodicals and government reports we could have filled the gaps. The time available for this study, however, as well as the wide scope of the material to be covered would not have permitted that depth of primary research in any case.

The interested reader will find in the endnotes and the bibliography a list of the sources we did consult. In some cases, especially in the
bibliographies attached to each Appendix, we have indicated the sources that we found to be the most useful.

Douglas Blaufarb

George K. Tanham
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

The purpose of this study is to provide a framework of analysis to help the analyst determine whether or not a government threatened by insurgency can prevail and, if that is in some doubt, what foreign assistance is required to make success more likely.

Insurgency is defined as an organized attempt to overthrow a government by armed attack continuing over an extended period of time. Insurgencies have been launched by many groups for many purposes, but the study is concerned only with left-wing insurgencies with some communist involvement. Of the various strategies that have been followed by left-wing groups to seize power, two are pertinent to the purposes of the study. These are politically organized insurgency (also called "people's war" by Mao Tse-tung) and foco insurgency as codified by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara. The first type is characterized by top-to-bottom political control, focus on developing and organizing popular support, usually in the remote countryside, reliance on guerilla tactics, a phased strategy and the notion of a protracted conflict which may last for many years.

Both types have been tried with some successes and numerous failures.

Effective counterinsurgency against either of these two strategies calls for government actions, behaviors, and programs which are identified and described in the study and number 14 in all. Virtually all of them have an impact on popular acquiescence or support for the government's cause. A system of classifying counterinsurgency is proposed based on this fact and on the additional fact that Popular support is defined as ranging from withholding cooperation from the
insurgents to willingness to sacrifice one's life on behalf of the government. It is the principal criterion of the proposed classification system because neither side can succeed without it. The guerillas depend on it for the intelligence which permits them to operate in secrecy and exploit the factor of surprise and for other vital matters, such as recruits, finance and supply. The government must gain popular acquiescence/support to deprive the guerillas of these critical elements and also to gain the intelligence essential to its operations.

The classification system proceeds by grading the two fundamental aspects of counterinsurgency, coercion and persuasion, in terms of their effects on popular acquiescence/support.

The coercive effort is graded into four different categories: harsh, precise, inconsistent or weak. Of these, the category of precise effort is the most effective in terms of gaining popular support. A precise coercive effort will employ unconventional tactics and take precautions to ensure that uninvolved bystanders will not be harmed by military or police actions aimed at the insurgents. A harsh coercive effort will rely on violence and brutality and will negatively impact on the people and on their attitudes toward the government's cause. An inconsistent coercive effort will combine conventional tactics which impact heavily on uninvolved bystanders with other actions aimed at sparing or helping them. The net effect, as in the US effort in Vietnam, will still be negative in terms of popular support. A deliberately weak coercive effort is a rarity but is theoretically possible. It will spare the people but not impress them.

The second axis of the proposed classification system relates to the persuasion effort. Even the most harshly coercive government will strive to put a good face on its activities and to counter the propaganda of the insurgents. The attempts of such governments usually fall into the category of low persuasion efforts. The highest category on this axis is an intense persuasion effort involving effective psychological and information
activities and programs to help the rural population improve their lives. An intermediate position also appears on this axis, namely a moderate persuasion effort. Applying this classification system to the cases covered in the study, it is found that... It is recognized that the proposed classification system is rough and approximate, but it is offered as a quick method of assessing a government's program and of helping the analyst by identifying his priorities at an early stage.

To make a complete evaluation, the analyst will be required to research and study all of the government's major activities against the insurgents. In the military field, there are seven activities to be considered. At the top of the list is leadership at all levels of the armed forces. The quality of the leadership is defined as an aspect of military professionalism; to the extent that those forces are characterized by professionalism, the leadership is likely to be good. The opposite of professionalism is politicization, i.e., an armed force which is involved in the politics of a regime and in which promotions and assignments are determined by political loyalty to the ruling group without regard to professional competence or honesty, dedication, etc. In addition, such a system is very difficult to reform since the removal of top officers threatens to de-stabilize the regime and so such efforts are stubbornly resisted.

In tactics and strategy, the emphasis should be on unconventional, small-unit tactics and on the careful and restrained use of firepower to spare the lives and property of uninvolved bystanders. The opposite of this standard is conventional tactics aimed at concentrating the maximum force and firepower against the enemy's armed units, an approach which will often impact heavily on innocent civilians and inevitably affect negatively their attitudes toward the government's cause. Many armies, including the American, are unable to fight in the appropriate mode without serious
strains since all their indoctrination and professional formation favor the conventional method of fighting.

Competent military intelligence collection and exploitation are indispensable for an army fighting insurgents. Difficult as it may be, the analyst must make an effort to determine the government's capabilities. How does it interrogate captured insurgents? Does it make rapid and effective use of the reports of its patrols, of captured documents and of aerial reconnaissance results? Most importantly, how does it collect information from the people, by brutal or by civil methods? The use of torture to force information out of captives or suspects may be effective in the short run, but it often produces bad information and always discourages wavering guerrillas from surrendering.

The factors of troop behavior, discipline and civic action are also important ingredients since they have a direct impact on the population. Among the negative influences on troop behavior in addition to poor leadership are faulty pay and supply systems, a brutal political regime and mistreatment of soldiers by their officers. A well-executed program of military civic action, on the other hand, can have a favorable effect on the army's relations with the surrounding population.

Air operations can play an important supporting role in counter-insurgency by providing careful and controlled fire support and also in reconnaissance, supply, transport and medical evacuation. Navies have usually played a minor role, but their fire-support and patrol capabilities can be useful if the insurgents are operating along the coasts or on navigable rivers. In both activities, the analyst should look carefully for rules of engagement restraining the uninhibited use of firepower and attempt to determine how well such rules are enforced.

The character of civil-military relations are also a key factor for they will often determine the extent to which the military command can be effectively restrained from indiscriminate use of its firepower.
some successful counterinsurgency efforts, e.g., Malaya under the British, civilians were involved in military decisions down to the level of district. US doctrine, however, frowns upon such interference in purely military matters except at the level of Secretary of Defense or the Oval Office.

Another military element in successful counterinsurgency is the creation of a popular militia to supplement the army. The latter is usually thinly stretched and required to scatter manpower about on static guard duties. The role of the militia is to relieve the regular forces of this duty and also to provide security once an area has been cleared of guerrillas. It may take various forms, volunteer or drafted, paid or unpaid, full-time or part-time, but its members must be trained and regularly inspected by the army and must have good communications in order to be able to call for reinforcements when needed. The analyst, therefore, will find it important to ascertain the training, equipment and leadership of the militia and its relationship to the army.

The seven remaining major counterinsurgency activities are non-military although three of them relate directly to security. The first is police operations which, according to British counterinsurgency theories, can be of greater importance than military operations. The police are, or should be, better qualified than the army to track down subversives, to maintain law and order and, by virtue of their superior closeness to the people, to carry out population control measures and to cut off insurgent supply systems. In fact, however, rural police services in less developed countries are often inadequate, being subject, by virtue of poor pay and neglect, to corruption and inefficiency. As a result, they are mistrusted by the population. It is also likely that in regimes run by military juntas the police service will be involved in politics which, just as is the case with the military service, will tend to undermine their professionalism. Such problems can and have, in some cases (Venezuela, the Philippines), been resolved by reform-minded leadership but in others have proved impervious to reform efforts.
The police should also play a major role in the intelligence effort. It is important, however, that intelligence collection by all services be tightly coordinated. This means that police and military intelligence units and any civilian intelligence entity work together in a cooperative spirit which overrides the normal institutional rivalries. The best means of accomplishing this is to establish joint intelligence centers at national, regional and local levels where information is pooled and filed for immediate reference as required. Again, we find that in less developed countries where power tends to change hands by coup d'etat, intelligence services usually give highest priority to detecting coup plots rather than to amassing the urgently required detailed information on the insurgency. The use of torture to extract intelligence from captives and even simple villagers is also sometimes common. Such practices detract from the effort rather than enhance it. Although torture is sometimes effective, it has many disadvantages as noted earlier. It also interferes with government/people relations to the detriment of the good rapport that should be a prime objective of all counterinsurgency activity.

Another major intelligence goal is effective counterintelligence to protect the secrecy of the government's operations, the identity of its agents and preserve the possibility of surprise. The intelligence service must collaborate in collecting the necessary data and the government must take action on the basis of that data to remove insurgent agents or sympathizers from the scene, if necessary without trial as was done with measured firmness in Malaya, Greece and elsewhere.

Well-conducted and based on fact, can be of considerable utility. However, they must be closely related to the other parts of the government's activities and not carried out in isolation.

The first target is reached by all the means of publicity and public information available to modern governments. In fact, however, many threatened regimes, especially if headed by military juntas, are ineffective in the use of such techniques because they are unaccustomed to
open political competition and so are unskilled in the arts of public persuasion. Thus, although American aid enabled to the government of South Vietnam to develop sizeable information and propaganda services, they had few positive results. The heads of the government were unskilled in the use of such facilities and their output was filled with exaggeration, vain boasting and outright untruth.

Psychological warfare against the enemy can also be very useful if well done. In both Malaya and the Philippines, effective use was made of leaflets, loud-hailer broadcasts from aircraft and radio broadcasts to induce surrenders and build up pressures within guerrilla groups which forced them to restrict severely the activities of their members. This in turn increased disaffection and reduced morale.

The unified management of counterinsurgency activity is a matter that grows in importance as and if the insurgency increases in size and seriousness. If the government is required to develop a number of different kinds of civilian and military activities, some of which may be new and unfamiliar, it becomes essential that . The custom in the US bureaucracy is to establish a committee to coordinate the various agencies involved, negotiating compromises on disputed issues. This proved inadequate in Vietnam, where, after years of delay, a new field agency was established (it was called CORDS) with command authority over the programs of the participating agencies. It required a presidential order to accomplish this. CORDS was placed within the military command and succeeded in time in energizing the program and also in persuading the Vietnamese government to give pacification a priority it had previously lacked.

The British in Malaya used a different approach to achieve the same goal, relying on coordinating committees at the various levels of government but giving them command authority over the assets of the participating agencies. This system worked impressively as have other types of unified management tried elsewhere. There is no single pattern a government is
obliged to follow but the principle of unified management, whatever form it may take, is of major importance once the program has developed beyond simple suppressive operations.

Inevitably, counterinsurgency acquires major political implications and the political framework on which the government bases its appeals and its claims to legitimacy becomes exceedingly important. If the government is democratic it will point to the fact that it came to power as a result of a free election to justify its claims. This will be challenged by the insurgents who will charge the regime with electoral fraud. If this is popularly accepted, as it was in the Philippines in regard to the presidential election of 1949, the government is in difficulty. The problem was solved in the Philippines when exceptional measures were taken by Magsaysay to guarantee the honesty of the congressional elections of 1951. In the midst of the Malayan insurgency, the British presided over the transition of Malaya from a colony to an independent, constitutional monarchy. In Oman, on the other hand, no change was considered necessary in the absolute monarchy of Sultan Qaboos. All three counterinsurgency efforts were successful. In short, for an insurgency situation. Much depends on the historical background, the political culture of the country and the skills of the leadership.

Since modern insurgencies tend to center their efforts in the countryside, the government's approach to the needs and aspirations of the population there assumes great importance. The improvement of rural administration and environment will usually be called for. Land reform can be important. Other programs may include improvements in education and public health services, dams, roads, wells and agricultural development. In many cases, e.g., Vietnam, Thailand
and Malaya, such programs have depended on foreign aid, but if the will exists much can be done without outside help.

Finally, on this list of factors of major importance in counter-insurgency is the matter of the legal framework of the government's suppression program. In Malaya, this was avoided by the great precision and attention to detail in drafting the 169 pages of Emergency Regulations and also by meticulous attention to their fair implementation. In addition, they were lifted, region by region, as soon as the area was pacified. In Vietnam, on the other hand, the regulations were abused by a corrupt police and made a mockery of by the communists who were usually able to gain their release by offering a bribe. The result of such practices is contempt for the law and for the authorities, with negative impact on the government's efforts to build popular support.

In addition to developing a clear and detailed picture of the government's capabilities, performance and problems in the 14 activities just described, the analyst must inform himself thoroughly on several other aspects of the matter. First of these is the qualities and capabilities of the insurgent side of the equation. These include insurgent organization, its skills in guerrilla tactics, its understanding of popular psychology, the quality of its leadership, its strategy, its foreign models and patrons and its ability to generate sympathy in other countries, particularly in the west. Communist movements vary very greatly in the ability of their leaders and in all the other qualities necessary for success. The analyst must therefore develop a clear picture of all important aspects of the insurgent side to enable him to measure the threat to the government and the level of effort required to master it.

An additional matter to be addressed is the government's need for foreign aid. This requires the analyst to arrive at a clear identification
of the gaps and deficiencies in the government's effort.

Such policies as professionalization of the military and the police, land reform, strengthening the government's legitimacy by holding genuine free elections, to list some of the more likely, cannot easily be forced upon a threatened regime by a foreign power. Its ultimate sanction, a threat to withdraw its aid, is a two-edged sword of doubtful efficacy. Conversely, if the need is for assistance of a type the aiding government is not willing or able to give, then the threatened government may be well-advised to rely on its own devices. Specifically, the need to develop skills in unconventional tactics may not be understood by the military institutions of the aiding government, as was the case in the US involvement in Vietnam. Foreign military aid of the wrong kind will be of little use, yet there is a distinct risk that such aid may be all that is available.

A final matter to be considered is the relative priority among the 14 factors that are the basis of successful counterinsurgency.

There are three fundamental factors involved in making an area and its population secure: good military leadership deriving from a competent professional service, appropriate (i.e., unconventional) tactics and effective intelligence collection based on full coordination among the intelligence services. Together, these three capabilities will make it possible to bring improved security to the affected areas.

A second order of priority comes into play if the insurgency develops in depth and extent beyond the point where a military response will suffice. It must also take
steps to ensure that its police force is large enough and professional enough to enforce emergency regulations or measures of population control and supply interdiction. The goal.

Finally, if the insurgent movement has taken hold in sizeable areas and has growing influence within some major sector of the population (students, intellectuals, tenant farmers, etc.), then the remaining factors should also come into play, bringing about a full-fledged program. This order of priority is not proposed as fixed and rigid except for the importance of establishing security. For the rest, a good deal will depend on the particular circumstances and the capabilities of the threatened government.

To put together a predictive assessment based on the approach explained in the study, the analyst is advised to follow these steps:

1. **Step One:** Assess the qualities and capabilities of the insurgency and its leadership.
2. **Step Two:** Apply the proposed scheme for classifying the insurgency, the purpose being to make a quick and rough cut at the totality of the effort to define its characteristics and establish the scope of the analyst's task.
3. **Step Three:** Pursue research in all 14 courses of action and lines of approach until the analyst is satisfied that he has a clear and detailed picture of the government's effort, especially of its gaps and deficiencies.
4. **Step Four:** Address the question of foreign aid by determining which of the deficiencies relate to resource constraints, lack of technically qualified people or experience and which to sensitive internal matters such as distribution of power, status or wealth in the society. The latter problems will not be easily susceptible to solution by foreign aid.

Having completed these steps, the analyst is finally in a position to make a valid prediction of the likely outcome of the counterinsurgency.
effort he has been studying, conditioned on its ability--or the ability of
the government's foreign friends--to fill the gaps and remedy the deficien-
cies that the process has identified.
INTRODUCTION
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM AND DESCRIPTION
OF THE APPROACH

This study is an effort to develop a framework of analysis that can be applied to the situation of a government threatened with insurgency to yield a valid prediction of its ability to master the threat with, or alternatively, without external aid.

It should also be noted that the paper deals exclusively with left-wing insurgencies, controlled or strongly influenced by Communist movements of some variety. There are, of course, other types of insurgency which have been or are today in evidence such as ethnic separatist movements or those that are anti-communist and conservative or traditionalist in motivation. (Afghanistan, Nicaragua, etc.) These are not dealt with here since it is the left-wing insurgencies that are of greatest concern to the US and present the most difficult problems for analysts. Since the study is intended for the use of US government analysts, it has been deliberately focused on that portion of the broad field of insurgency that is of greatest importance to them.

A. THE APPROACH FOLLOWED IN THIS STUDY

The foundation upon which our analytical framework is based is a list and a description of the principal courses of action and lines of approach - 14 in all - which a government may be required to implement for success in counterinsurgency. The list is derived from study of the cases covered in the 11 Appendices and others not so covered such as the French in Algeria and Vietnam, the Chinese Communist insurgency and the insurgencies in Laos and Cambodia. The authors have some familiarity with these cases also, but for various reasons, they have not been described in detail in this study.
The 14 counterinsurgency activities we have determined to be important are as follows:

(1) **Military leadership** - both at the higher and company grade levels. As explained in detail in Chapter II, we consider good leadership to be the product of a professionalized military service and we use the terms "leadership" and "professionalism" to denote the same quality;

(2) **Unconventional tactics and strategy** - a term we use to denote tactics that de-emphasize concentration of forces and firepower and emphasize constant patrolling by many small, lightly armed units supported by larger back-up forces;

(3) **Competent military intelligence** - focused not so much on enemy order of battle and armament as on guerilla personnel, *modus operandi* and locations;

(4) **Discipline, behavior and military civic action** - all of which relate directly to the impact of the military presence on the surrounding population and are therefore treated together;

(5) **Air and naval operations** - in support of counterinsurgency;

(6) **Civil - military relations** - which in this system denotes the ability -- or the lack of it -- of civilian authorities to influence military operations to include proper consideration for political objectives;

(7) **Establishment of a popular militia** - to assist the regular military forces in maintaining security;

(8) **Police operations** - to maintain law and order and implement population and resource control as well as any emergency regulations in support of the counterinsurgency effort;

(9) **Intelligence operations** - above and beyond the intelligence effort of the military, especially the intelligence collection activity of the police and other civilian services. The term includes the effective coordination of such collection at all relevant levels;

(10) **Psychological operations** - including psychological warfare, information and media activities by the government and its ability to project its cause, domestically and overseas;

(11) **Unified management of counterinsurgency activity** - which involves the government's method, if any exists, of unifying the many strands of counterinsurgency operations into a coherent whole;
(12) The Political framework - which refers to the overall political form and appeal of the government on which it bases its claim to being the legitimate expression of the people's aspirations and of the country's traditions and ethos;

(13) Programs to improve rural conditions and administration - in order to gain popular acquiescence in and support for the government's efforts and to counter the appeals of the insurgents;

(4) The legal framework - which refers to the special laws and regulations promulgated to counter and suppress the insurgency.

These 14 factors, comprising the principal actions, programs and behaviors which experience has shown to be essential to counterinsurgency, will be discussed fully. The difficulties they pose will be analyzed along with the various solutions attempted, with illustrations drawn from some 13 episodes in 12 countries. Each such discussion is followed by a section called "What the Analyst Should Look For" providing guidance for the researcher who is attempting to come to grips with an unfolding situation.

B. STUDYING THE INSURGENCY

Although this paper is focused on counterinsurgency, the analyst cannot fully discharge his task without also making an effort to learn the strengths, weaknesses and capabilities of the organization (or organizations) that have created the problem. The study cannot cover this extensive subject in any detail but an effort is made in Chapter IV to outline the main points of interest. Fortunately, many studies are available on the subject and the researcher need not feel that he will be left without useful guidance.

C. PRIORITIES AND WEIGHTS

The analysis will address the question of priorities among the various courses of action from the point of view of time—i.e., which actions should be undertaken first—and from the point of view of substantive importance. Where appropriate and feasible, relative weights will be
assigned, although it is impractical to think in terms of a precise weighting of all factors, leaving the analyst with merely the task of adding up a few numbers to arrive at a finding. We are dealing with too many complex variables to permit that type of mechanistic approach. We attack the problem by establishing three orders of priority which depend in turn on the seriousness of the threat. (See Chapter IV.) As for priorities in terms of time, our method is to relate these to the seriousness of the threat while insisting on the overriding importance of establishing population security before any of the other activities can have their full intended effect.

D. FOREIGN ASSISTANCE

If the analyst determines to his satisfaction that a threatened regime is unable to meet critical elements of the criteria for success because of gaps or deficiencies in its effort, he should anticipate being asked whether foreign aid can provide the missing ingredients. Many different factors come into play here and although the study attempts to suggest answers, the question cannot always be answered definitively, depending, as it does, on the abilities and the generosity of the country providing the assistance. Nevertheless we believe the analyst will find helpful guidance (see Chapter IV) on the types of problems that can be helped by foreign aid and the types that probably cannot.

E. THE CASE STUDIES

The experiences of nine countries faced with rural insurgencies in various Communist patterns are described and analyzed in ten Appendices to this study. Three other episodes are briefly described in the Introduction to the Appendices. The cases were selected to provide a geographical
spread with an emphasis on Latin America and to contrast successful and unsuccessful counterinsurgency efforts. The successful cases are:

1. Colombia,
2. Greece,
3. Guatemala,
4. Malaya,
5. Oman,
6. Peru,
7. Philippines,
8. Thailand,
9. Venezuela,

The unsuccessful counterinsurgencies are:

10. Cuba,
11. Nicaragua,
12. Vietnam,

Of these twelve countries three (Cuba, Nicaragua, Peru) are dealt with summarily in the Introduction to the Appendices because they offer very little to the analyst that is instructive or useful. In Cuba and Nicaragua, the government relied entirely on brute force in an attempt to overwhelm its enemies and ultimately failed. This simply teaches that brute force is not enough, something all analysts of the subject are well aware of. In the case of Peru, the government acted quickly with well-trained forces and eliminated the small focos before they established themselves. (The foco principle is defined in the first chapter.) This experience is equally barren of lessons except in underlining the importance of prompt, effective military or police action, something that hardly needs re-emphasis.

The case histories include nine other countries treated in 10 studies of which two are devoted to Vietnam. They follow a similar structure. First, the reader will find a summary and conclusions section followed by a brief background section which sets forth geographic and demographic facts. Next is a narrative of the events of the insurgency. The study then offers an analysis of the counterinsurgency programs considering in turn each of
the fourteen courses of action and lines of approach that have formed the basis for effective counterinsurgency. Each case study also includes a chronology, a map and a bibliography.

In selecting the cases to be studied in this manner, we have avoided colonial counterinsurgency efforts such as the French in Indochina and Algeria because colonial situations lack current relevance. We have, however, included the British efforts in Malaya and Oman. In justification, we note that in Malaya the country ceased to be a colony before the effort was concluded. With respect to Oman, which was a British protectorate at the time (early 1970's), we decided that the case offered too many useful lessons to be ignored.

F. PUTTING IT TOGETHER

The final section of the report is a step-by-step discussion of how, in the view of the authors, the predictive assessment should be put together, drawing on the study's discussions of the various aspects that must be included. Since all situations are different, we anticipate that the analyst will find it convenient to alter and adapt this guidance to his specific needs in each case but it should give him what we believe will be a useful starting point.
A. TYPES OF INSURGENCY

Counterinsurgency is the effort of a threatened government to eliminate an insurgency and its characteristics are in part determined by the nature of the insurgency. Before discussing types of counterinsurgency, however, a brief definition and discussion of insurgency and the types addressed in this report is in order.

Insurgency is an organized attempt to overthrow an existing regime by armed attack persisting over an extended period. Many different kinds of groups, ethnic and religious, as well as right and left-wing political groups, can and do, conduct insurgencies against governments. Insurgency as referred to in this paper, has three main characteristics.

(1) Organization, which means it is not merely spontaneous but evidences planning, distribution of functions and a hierarchy of command;

(2) Armed attack is the primary activity, although it is accompanied by propaganda, attempts to organize support among the population, strikes and demonstrations, political maneuvers, etc.;

(3) Persistence over a period of time (more than a few months) distinguishes insurgency from other types of armed attack such as coups d'etat or insurrections which are inherently short-lived.

This study focuses primarily on left-wing insurgencies influenced or controlled by communist parties or movements. Communist insurgencies are of fairly recent vintage, and with one important exception, have occurred entirely since World War II. Prior to that war, the standard communist technique for seizing power was insurrection in major urban centers of power. It is still a common method. The pattern resembles a coup d'etat in that it is inherently short-lived. The communist seizure of power in Petrograd in 1917 serves as a model for this type of take-over. If the
rebels fail to take power quickly as they did in several European countries before World War II, the attempt for all practical purposes is over since the strength of the insurrectionists is located in the power centers, exposed and vulnerable to concentrated government suppression. After World War II, quick communist seizures of power took place in Vietnam in 1945, in Czechoslovakia in 1948, in Aden in 1967, and in Ethiopia and Afghanistan in 1978. A similar attempt was made in Indonesia in 1965 but failed.

We should also note here that Communist insurrections in the Russian pattern are governed in part by rules laid down by Lenin in such works as The State and Revolution and Left-Wing Communism: An Infantile Disorder. Most important are Lenin's precepts relating to the nature of a revolutionary situation and the necessity of awaiting such a situation before attempting to overthrow a given regime. In brief, a revolutionary situation is one where the "ruling class" and the government it controls are beset by economic and political crises, are bitterly divided as to the best policies to follow and have begun to lose their grip on the so-called institutions of repression: the police and army. Until recently, all Communist parties accepted these precepts and were prepared to await, while also attempting to hasten, the inevitable crises which would open the way for their seizure of power.

An entirely different pattern for seizing political power emerged in China in the 1930's in the struggle of Mao Tse-Tung and the Chinese Communist Party against both the Chinese Nationalist government and the Japanese. This type of revolution against a ruling government has been frequently analyzed and discussed. For our purposes it is sufficient to note briefly its defining characteristics:

(1) Political control by the revolutionary organization which assures priority of political considerations;
(2) Reliance upon organized popular support to provide recruits, funds, supplies and intelligence;
(3) Primary areas of activity, especially in early phases, in the remote countryside where the population can be organized and base
areas established with relatively little interference from the authorities;

(4) Reliance upon the techniques of guerilla warfare to carry on the military attack. These focus on the avoidance of battle except at times and places of the insurgents' choosing, the employment of stealth and secrecy, ambush and surprise to overcome the initial imbalance of strength;

(5) A phased strategy consisting first of a primarily organizational phase in which the population is prepared for its vital role, a second phase when "armed struggle" is launched and the guerilla force gradually builds up in size and strength, and a third phase of mobile, more conventional warfare when concealment and stealth are abandoned. In Mao's concept; this phase is accompanied by a popular uprising which helps to overwhelm the regime;

(6) The concept of "protracted" war, by which Mao meant that the contest would be a long one and that once started, would be persisted in through many peaks and valleys until the insurgents took power. In effect, the concept was of a lengthy process rather than of so simple a matter as a war.

This classic pattern, called "people's war" by the Chinese, was emulated in many places in the Far East and elsewhere. Vietnam provided a good example in which Ho Chi Minh made some modifications but largely followed Mao's prescriptions first against the French and then against the South Vietnamese and Americans. Similar but less successful attempts were made in the Philippines, Malaya, Thailand, Laos and Burma. Other attempts, some successful and some not, were made in Africa. An interesting variation was the Algerian War for independence from France, which followed the Maoist pattern but was not under the direction of the Communist Party. The Algerian insurgency, although supported by the Communists, was directed by a nationalist movement espousing socialism, and was fervently Moslem. In the years following the Sino-Soviet split, however, Mao Tse-tung and his then heir-apparent Lin Piao abandoned the Leninist precept of the importance of awaiting the ripening of a revolutionary situation before
launching armed revolutionary activity. In their view, the long-awaited worldwide "crisis of imperialism" was at hand and all "third world" countries were ripe for revolution.

The next major form of left-wing insurgency was developed in Cuba by Fidel Castro and Che Guevara; it has been called *foco* insurgency from the Spanish word meaning "focus" or "focal point." In this variation, the insurgent leadership dispenses with the first phase, organization among the peasantry in a remote rural area. They arrive unheralded, but armed and ready to fight and in theory, the peasants rise up in their support. It now seems clear that Castro had no strategy in mind when he launched his attack on the Batista regime, but developed one after his success. Its distinguishing characteristics are:

1. Deliberate avoidance of preparatory organizational work. The rationale is based on the belief that Latin American peasantry is too cowed by the authorities and will betray any group that cannot defend itself.
2. The development of rural support by demonstrating the ability of the *foco* to strike against the authorities and survive.
3. The unification of political and military leadership in the persons of the guerrilla leaders who also dominate the revolutionary organization in the cities.
4. The absence of any emphasis on the protracted nature of the conflict or of a formal concept of phases.

Following the victory in Cuba, Castro and Guevara pushed for the emulation of their insurgency concepts throughout Latin America for they too abandoned Lenin's precepts relating to a revolutionary situation. Over a 20-year span a great many attempts were made, from the Caribbean and Central America to Argentina and Uruguay, but without success until the Sandinistas' victory in Nicaragua in 1979. This was promptly followed by the continuing attempt in El Salvador.

During the decades of *foco* failure in Latin America many revolutionary groups turned away from rural insurgency and tried terrorism in the cities, often called "urban guerrilla warfare". It was a phenomenon not limited to
Latin America, but with covert support from the Soviet Union, its European satellites, and the PLO and Libya, it spread through parts of Europe and the Middle East. Although in no country did it achieve its goal of seizing power, the technique proved sufficiently disturbing to stimulate a strong reaction from the military leadership in Argentina and Uruguay. Military coups brought the generals to power in both countries, the urban guerillas were crushed, and the generals stayed on to rule by martial law and so-called "death squads". The 1984 elections in Argentina, however, threw out the generals and brought in a civilian regime in that country.

Thus, two forms of left-wing insurgency are of importance to analysts of counterinsurgency: The Maoist scheme of "protracted war," which has also been called "politically organized insurgency," and foco insurgency. The other two forms of seizing power that we have noted, namely urban insurrection and urban terrorism are not germane to this study for several reasons. Combating urban terrorism, which is a single threat approach to revolution unlike multi-faceted insurgency, calls mostly for effective police action. In some cases the police may have to be supplemented by the army, but it will be operating as a police force. In other words, this limited threat does not demand a complex array of security and socio-economic measures to defeat it.

Urban insurrection is a more serious matter. It differs from urban terrorism in that the revolutionary side has far greater resources. In particular, it disposes of some armed forces acquired through mutiny or defection of unit commanders. It also is likely to have labor and student support and thus the ability to call strikes, to launch demonstrations and to foment riots at critical moments. The result can be a formidable threat to an incumbent regime, but it is over with quickly. In the case of the Bolshevik revolution, the initial insurrection lasted about ten days (the famous "ten days that shook the world"), after which Lenin and his associates were in control of the Russian state apparatus. Other attempts have been similarly brief. Since the purpose of this study is to analyze the chances of a threatened regime to surmount an insurgency, the rapidity with which an urban insurrection climaxes rules it out of consideration.
We will not discuss further either "urban guerilla warfare" or urban insurrection except for two countries, Venezuela and Guatemala, where the urban terrorists were linked to groups attempting to launch Cuban-style foco insurgency in the countryside.

B. TYPES OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

Since the purpose of this study is to assist the analyst to arrive at a valid finding on a threatened government's chances of success in counterinsurgency, the question of whether there are distinctly different types of counterinsurgency and, if so, what they are, is of more than theoretical importance. We approach the matter with the intention of providing the analyst with a rapid, rule-of-thumb method of arriving at a tentative finding at an early stage of analysis. It is not intended to be a substitute for a painstaking point-by-point application of the criteria set forth in Chapters II and III with respect to the main counterinsurgency activities of the threatened government. It will, however, provide the means to take a quick cut at the subject and help the analyst identify the areas on which he should focus priority attention.

Very little analytical work of which the authors are aware has been done to distinguish between different types of counterinsurgency efforts. The studies and works consulted for this report focus almost entirely on what their authors consider to be the correct way of defeating insurgency. They devote almost no space to discussing other ways in which the problem has been or might be attacked.

In fact, virtually all counterinsurgency programs are a mix of similar elements which vary (often widely) in respect to the overall emphasis of the effort and the proportions of that effort devoted to the various means and actions available to a threatened government. This study is constructed on a foundation consisting of a total of 14 principal activities (called courses of action and lines of approach) which form the bulk of any given counterinsurgency effort. These activities, comprising action, behaviors and programs, divide readily into security operations.
which cover military, police and intelligence activities, and activities which have other objectives. The problem then is to establish one or more criteria by which all these activities can be categorized in the hope that regularities and similarities will emerge to make possible a simple way of classifying a given counterinsurgency.

There are several possible criteria around which such a system might be organized such as government inputs, harshness or mildness, conventionality or unconventionality. The authors' chosen criteria are based on the perception that nearly all the counterinsurgency courses of action discussed in this study, ranging from military leadership and tactics through police and intelligence operations to the legal and political frameworks of the government's efforts and its attempt to improve conditions of life in the affected areas - all of these activities have in common the matter of their impact on the population of those areas and therefore on the attitudes of that population toward the government. This factor thus seems to offer a reasonable key to the problem of separating out different types or categories of counterinsurgency and to promise some aid to the analyst in orienting his approach.

From the fact of this shared characteristic, we proceed to the proposition that counterinsurgency will succeed in proportion to the favorable impact it has on the affected people and their acquiescence in or support for the government's cause. Correspondingly, the effort will fail in proportion to the extent that the government's actions tend to lessen that support. This statement must not be taken to mean that all governments will conduct counterinsurgency as though they perceived this truth. The opposite has sometimes been the case. Moreover, governments that have ignored the population's reaction have nevertheless succeeded in suppressing insurgencies, at least for a time, as for example in Guatemala (see Appendix C), and in the case of France in Algeria. Still, the fact remains that the most efficient counterinsurgencies (i.e., producing the most result for the least investment of assets) and those with the most permanent effects have generally kept clearly in mind as a controlling criterion the need for a favorable impact of all counterinsurgency actions
on the population. (See Appendix D on Malaya, Appendix E on Oman and Appendix F on the Philippines).

Before taking the argument further, let us note some of the comments on the importance of popular support by a few of the best-qualified students of the subject. Sir Robert Thompson, an architect of the British victory in Malaya and advisor to both the South Vietnamese and US governments in Vietnam, states: "An insurgent movement is a war for the people. It stands to reason that government measures must be directed toward restoring government authority and law and order throughout the country, so that control over the population can be regained and its support won."

Roger Hilsman, a designer of the Kennedy administration's counterinsurgency programs, put it in these terms: "I hope...my awareness (is clear) of how important it is to have popular support in conducting an internal war." Here is a similar comment by Col. John J. McCuen, who pioneered the development of counterinsurgency doctrine in the US Army: "...for the governing authorities to win, they must not only defeat the revolutionary attempts to mobilize the people, but mobilize the people themselves. To limit themselves to any effort less than their adversaries will be to invite failure." Citations could be multiplied but the point should be clear: this is a common principle of almost all counterinsurgency doctrine.

The reasons for the importance of popular support for the government's cause are basically two. Most important is the point touched on in the quotation from McCuen cited above. Some degree of popular support is essential for the insurgent adversaries of the government, especially at the early stages of their effort. It is their main source of recruits, funds, supply and of vital intelligence which permits them to evade the superior forces of the government. If the government can take actions to deprive the insurgency of this absolutely critical asset, then it has taken the first essential step toward defeating it. Secondly, and on the opposite side of the same coin, if the government does not enjoy sufficient support among a significant portion of the population in areas where the
insurgency is active, it will then be blind vis-a-vis the guerrillas, its forces constantly subject to ambush and surprise attack. This condition, in turn, further increases the gulf between the population and the government until, if the process goes on, the gulf becomes unbridgeable. On the other hand, if the government does enjoy a modicum of such support, it can at least begin to collect the necessary intelligence and take some of the other measures which will deprive the enemy of recruits, supplies and similar essentials. If, as time goes on, it is able to increase its popular support, it can then move progressively to increase the pressure until it has the insurgents at its mercy.

1. The Meaning of Popular Support

As the term is used in this paper, "popular support" covers a range of attitudes from simple acquiescence to deep commitment, including willingness to sacrifice the individual's life, if necessary. All attitudes covered by the term are beneficial to the government although some are obviously more so than others. To make the point clear we will modify the terminology and speak of "popular acquiescence/support."

There are two ways of gaining popular acquiescence/support: by coercion or persuasion. In fact, all counterinsurgency programs contain elements of both. Even the most mildly benevolent government must use coercion when faced with armed and violent men determined to overthrow it. On the opposite side of the coin, even the most authoritarian and arbitrary government, in addition to employing harsh coercive measures, must also attempt to put a good face on matters and so will talk in its public statements of patriotism and of its good will toward the people and will denounce the insurgents as criminals or as unpatriotic tools for Moscow or both.

This phenomenon makes it possible to rate a government's counterinsurgency program along the two axes of coercion and persuasion in relation to its overall goal of getting the population's acquiescence and/or support. Our proposed method of characterizing counterinsurgency focuses, therefore, on those two factors. There are still, critics may note, some courses of action and lines of approach in our list of 14 which
do not relate directly to the factor of popular attitudes, e.g., unified management of counterinsurgency activity and coordination of intelligence operations. These courses of action promote efficiency and can be said to have an indirect impact on popular attitudes but by and large such actions are not covered in our proposed system. To incorporate them would have complicated it to the point of reduced usefulness by introducing a third axis, namely efficiency. We preferred to keep the system simple in the hope of increasing its usefulness as a first rough cut.

2. Grading the Coercion Effort

We distinguish four different categories of the coercive effort which relate either to its harshness (or mildness) or to the degree of dissemination in its application. A mild coercive effort is one of our four categories. It is theoretically possible but rarely encountered. The Venezuelan suppression program vis-a-vis the rural guerillas in 1962 comes closest. (See Appendix H.) At that time, the Bentancourt government, before moving vigorously against the guerillas, was concerned to establish a mutually supportive relationship between the army and the affected population. It attempted no serious ground operations but concentrated on civic action, good troop behavior and propaganda while occasionally sending a few aircraft to drop bombs in the vicinity of the guerilla hideouts. Even so, the entire Venezuelan coercive effort cannot be described as "mild." Its efforts against the urban terrorists and its later efforts against the rural guerillas were firmly coercive.

As for the category that stands in contrast to "mild," we use the term indiscriminate which involves harshness not limited by any legal or moral restraints and also indiscriminateness in that its victims are not necessarily either insurgents or even sympathizers or supporters--at least no effort is made to establish their guilt before action is taken against them; mere suspicion or an unconfirmed rumor is enough. An indiscriminate coercive effort can, at the extreme, victimize children, distant relatives or friends of insurgents or uninvolved bystanders who merely happen to be in the way. The purpose of such activities, if they have a considered purpose, is to terrorize into submission all within reach of the
government's coercive instruments. Illustrative cases include Cuba, Nicaragua (see the Introduction to the Appendices), and Guatemala (Appendix C). In all three, the government acknowledged no limits to its coercive activities either against its armed enemies or the population.

There are two other categories of coercion which are somewhat more complex. As we have said, all governments involved in counter-insurgency must to some degree employ coercion, but there are major differences in the way it is applied. We approach these distinctions, again, keeping in mind that we are grading the impact of the government's activities on popular attitudes in the affected areas. If coercion is used, therefore, it must be applied as much as possible to those who already support the enemy or the enemy himself. The criterion here is precision, that is discrimination in the application of coercive force. The question this category responds to is whether the coercive effort can be described as precise and discriminate in its impact, avoiding damage to uninvolved bystanders.

Several measurements can be used to establish whether or not the coercive effort is precise and discriminate. An important one is whether or not the military tactics employed are conventional or unconventional. By the term conventional tactics, we refer to the normal tendency of modern military commanders to concentrate their forces and firepower with the purpose of delivering a devastating blow to the enemy. This military style features the maximum employment of airpower and artillery bombardment to prepare the battlefield and to avoid casualties. It also calls for the deployment of armor along with infantry, often on wheels, to "find, fix, fight and finish" the enemy by "getting there firstest with the mostest." In brief, it is concerned with purely military goals.

Unconventional tactics, on the other hand, involve the dispersal of infantry units into many small patrols operating both day and night to gather intelligence, set ambushes and counterambushes and the like. It eschews the use of heavy firepower except against carefully confirmed targets and avoids the use of armor or other vehicles in combat. Its concern
To illustrate the bearing of an unconventional combat style on the precision of coercive activities, let us cite an imaginary example of a combat commander faced with the necessity to silence two snipers holed up in a village and emerging occasionally to shoot at his men. If he is trained and expected by his superiors to operate conventionally he will, in all likelihood, call in aircraft to bomb the village. This bombardment may or may not kill the snipers although it will probably force them to stop sniping for the time being. It will likely injure or kill some of the villagers and destroy their property. This fact, in turn, will negatively affect the attitudes of the entire village toward the government's cause.

If, on the other hand, the commander employs unconventional tactics and applies his power with precision, he is likely, for example, to send out a few patrols to approach the village from different directions and attempt to draw the snipers' fire so as to expose them to the fire of friendly forces. These will then close in and apprehend the snipers or otherwise put them out of action. Whether or not this tactic succeeds, the commander has avoided the guerrillas' deliberate trap which was to provoke him to let loose an indiscriminate rain of fire on a village filled with uninvolved bystanders. If, in addition, the commander is able to obtain prior intelligence pin-pointing the location of the snipers, the likelihood is that even more precise tactics could be used and the chances of success greatly multiplied. Moreover, his chances of obtaining such intelligence are enhanced if the people of the village understand that he intends, should they be willing to help, to avoid unnecessary harm to all except the snipers and their friends.

The practice of precise and discriminate coercion involves many other qualities in addition to unconventional tactics. It calls for the careful review of all targets for air or artillery bombardment by non-military authorities who are familiar with the target areas; it requires the dominance of professionalism in the military sphere as against political involvement with political preference of army officers, for
professionalism is the best assurance of good leadership, good discipline, and, most important, good behavior by the troops vis-a-vis the population. (See Chapter II for a full discussion of these matters.)

Precision in the use of coercive means also requires that high priority be given to collecting and exploiting detailed intelligence on enemy personnel, locations, and modus operandi. In turn, this priority obliges the government to discourage the torture of prisoners and suspects to extract intelligence (torture produces unreliable intelligence and discourages others from turning themselves in) and to coordinate effectively all of its intelligence collection on the enemy. It also requires strict discipline and good behavior of the troops so as not to antagonize the people. In addition, at least at a high level and preferably down to the local level as well, there should be effective subordination of the military to civilian authority. The purpose of such subordination is to assure that purely military considerations do not override the objective of influencing popular attitudes. Unfortunately, tactics devised to achieve military goals are not necessarily sensitive to undesirable and important side effects. It is the task of the civilian authority to make certain that such side effects are not forgotten or ignored and, insofar as they relate to the effect on popular attitudes, are given their due weight.

It should also be understood that the characterization "precise coercive effort" is not limited to military operations. It includes all types of security operations as well. Then we might note population control measures, including forcible transfer and resettlement, search and seizure without warrants, detention for indefinite periods without trial and the like. Such methods are characterized as precise rather than harsh if they are discriminate, limited in degree to what is necessary to accomplish their purposes, are used only as long as the insurgency poses a serious threat, and are carried out in a fair as well as firm manner. If most or all of these qualities characterize the coercive effort then it is appropriately labeled "precise."

A final type of coercive effort is one which is not internally consistent but rather alternates between or attempts to combine precision
and inefficient for precision and coercive mildness. Inconsistent coercive effort is exemplified by the US in Vietnam where it followed mutually contradictory tracks with respect to the impact of its activities on the population. Its military approach to combat with the enemy was conventional and therefore involved immense firepower which impacted on the affected areas, many of them heavily populated, causing many thousands of civilian casualties and large property losses. On the other hand, in its pacification programs, which were managed with the goal of influencing popular attitudes favorably, it attempted to and succeeded in carrying out a counterinsurgency program that, on the axis of coercion, fits the criteria of a "precise coercive effort." (See Appendices I and J.) Similarly in Thailand, the government's avowed policy was based on the British example in Malaya and thereby would seem to have earned the characterization "precise." In fact, however, Thai military commanders have been essentially uncontrolled in their strategies and tactics and have often ignored avowed policy. On occasion they have bombed villages and engaged in large-scale sweeps which accomplished little. Moreover, for long periods the Thai army has simply ignored the guerillas and focused its attention on the Cambodian and Lao borders. Both the American (and South Vietnamese) programs in Vietnam and the Thai program in Thailand are best characterized as "inconsistent coercive efforts."

Inconsistent coercive effort can also emerge from a contradiction between the coercive and persuasive axes. If a government, employing conventional tactics, levels a village by aerial bombardment and then moves in to pay damages for property losses and to conduct civic action, its coercion effort is inconsistent with its persuasion effort and, in the proposed system, will be placed in the inconsistent category.

3. Grading the Persuasive Effort

To repeat what has already been said, all counterinsurgencies conduct some kind of persuasive effort directed at the involved population. In some cases it has been no more than a token attempt to put a good face on matters by publicly denouncing the insurgents while extolling the government's virtues. The efforts of Cuba, Nicaragua and Guatemala fall
into this category and can be characterized as "low persuasive efforts." At the other extreme, we find the US in Vietnam subsidizing and advising large Vietnamese information and propaganda programs and massive rural aid programs, including--after many years of steady pressure on the South Vietnamese government--a sweeping land reform. Although not so lavish of funds, the counterinsurgency program of the British in Malaya also involved an intense persuasive effort focusing particularly on propaganda and good troop and police behavior. In the Philippines, the government also put heavy emphasis on propaganda, good troop behavior and, in addition, on rather large-scale civic action which included the construction by the army of thousands of village schools and the resettlement of some 5,200 surrendered or captured guerrillas. (See Appendix F.) The persuasive efforts in all these cases can therefore be described as "intense."

In examining other counterinsurgencies there is also to be found an intermediate position which will be called "moderate." In this category fall the counterinsurgencies of Thailand, Colombia, Venezuela and Oman.

4. Applying the Categories

We are now ready to apply the system we have developed to classify counterinsurgencies against the twelve cases discussed in the Appendices. We will do so by setting up a table which shows the individual country in the left-hand column, followed by a second column showing the category of its coercion effort, a third categorizing its persuasion effort and a fourth giving the outcome in each case (i.e., success or failure).

Here then is the table setting forth the twelve cases discussed in the Appendices:

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Some comment is called for in the asterisked cases. In both Colombia and Guatemala, while the insurgency was defeated in both countries, it revives later. In neither country, after more than twenty years of intermittent effort, has the government succeeded in eliminating it entirely.

The case of Vietnam II is more complex still. Some obvious successes were achieved by the US/Vietnamese pacification effort (1966-1971). Reasonable security was established in 33 out of 44 provinces. Prosperity in the Mekong Delta reached levels that had never existed there before; the acquiescence of much of the rural population was accorded to the government cause. But there were also serious flaws in the picture. Popular attitudes seldom went beyond acquiescence to evidence willing support, and the enemy's organizational infrastructure remained in being throughout South Vietnam, albeit at a much reduced size and level of activity. Although space does not permit the full development of this conclusion, it is the opinion of the authors that the mixed nature of the result was largely due to the inconsistent and therefore imprecise character of the coercive effort.

In regard to Greece, no attempt is made to apply the criteria since the Greek case is anomalous. The insurgents deliberately chose to fight in a conventional mode, making it unnecessary for the government to adapt its activities to the special requirements of effective counterinsurgency.

Turning to the Thai success, this is due far more to the failures and inadequacies of the insurgency than to the counterinsurgency measures of the Thai government. It is also due to the fact that Thailand was simply not ripe for revolution. The insurgency was launched in Thailand on the urging of the Chinese Communists operating on the Maoist assumption that, in this age of the crisis of "imperialism," all less developed countries are in a revolutionary situation. It turned out not to be true in Thailand.

Setting aside these atypical cases, we then find that the most common quality of the successful counterinsurgencies is precision in the
use of coercion followed by intense or moderate application of persuasive measures. The common quality of the failed efforts is indiscriminateness in the application of coercion and a low level of persuasive efforts. These results should be of practical use to analysts faced with the need to come to grips with insurgency and counterinsurgency in some country whose situation has not yet been subjected to detailed analysis. It is intended to help them establish the scope of the problem and sort out their priorities at an early stage of the analytic process by means of a first, if rough, cut at the entire government effort.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I


3. Among the works reviewed for their contribution on this subject are the following:


   Valeriano and Bohannon, *op. cit.*
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER I (CONTINUED)

4. In Algeria, of course, the French government eventually made the wrenching decision to terminate its effort, not because it had failed but because its success had merely led to a political dead end and left no reason to hope that France would ever be able to govern Algeria with less than 200,000 French troops in occupation.

5. Thompson, op. cit., p. 51.


7. McCuen, op. cit., p. 56.

A. PREFATORY COMMENT ON THE PHASES OF INSURGENCY AND THEIR EFFECT ON COUNTERINSURGENCY

As stated in the Introduction, we start in this chapter to build the framework of analysis for assessing counterinsurgency.

We have already drawn attention to the phasing pattern in insurgencies of the Maoist type. According to the schema adopted by western analysts, Phase I is the initial, organizational phase; Phase II begins with the first episodes of armed struggle such as attacks against police posts and military units and can continue for a long period of gradually escalating violence until the insurgents, assuming that their cause prospers, are able to make the big transition to conventionalized warfare. This is Phase III and is supposed to be accompanied at some climactic point by a nationwide uprising.

Counterinsurgency will to some extent reflect this breakdown of the phases. For the most part, however, counterinsurgency operations will be concentrated in Phase II. The reasons are readily apparent. In Phase I, the opposition is not active militarily but is preparing the ground in various ways. If its activities are reported in detail and continue for some time, it should begin to be apparent to the authorities that something serious is underway. The proper response at this point is a combination of effective police work together with political and economic measures to deprive the movement of broad popular support.

Full-scale counterinsurgency involving the military deployed in the manner appropriate to counterguerrilla operations (see below under Section C, Tactics and Strategy) will in all likelihood not take place until Phase II is well underway. The reasons are first, that most governments will hesitate to resort to military measures against their own populations until it appears absolutely necessary, second that it will take some time to become certain of that necessity, and third that governments usually start their counterinsurgency programs in a conventional mode. In other
words, they tend to begin by doing all the wrong things and only gradually by trial and error, do they make the adaptations which are necessary for their programs to become effective. As for Phase III, if the insurgency reaches that ominous stage, it signifies that counterinsurgency has failed and full-scale conventional war is the only response remaining to the government.

In other words, the description and analysis of courses of action and lines of approach that follow apply, for the most part, to counterinsurgency in Phase II of the Maoist schema. At the same time, the discussion of police and intelligence operations and other non-military activity can apply equally well to Phase I. It will depend on the particulars of the situation and the government's capabilities and grasp of the problem. The analyst should be able, if he is familiar with the cases discussed in the appendices and the theories of insurgency, to identify the types of activity required by the situation, whether in Phase I or Phase II, and move on to estimating the government's capabilities, using the indicators suggested under each course of action.

As for the problems posed by the foco-type of insurgency, as we have pointed out in Chapter I, the guerillas following this pattern leap immediately into armed struggle, skipping the preparation of the ground and the organizational phase. Similarly, the government's response will be required to follow suit and the full range of counterinsurgency actions will be appropriate, varying in scope in accordance with the threat.

To sum up then, what follows assumes that the insurgency has reached at least the early stage of Phase II. If it has not, the analyst can easily make adjustments, focusing on those courses of action which are clearly appropriate to the actual situation.

B. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

We begin the discussion of military operations in counterinsurgency with the matter of leadership because that factor is the
foundation of military effectiveness. Without it, no army—no matter how well-equipped—will succeed against a determined enemy. Leadership in counterinsurgency operations does not differ from military leadership in any other type of warfare. It means that in combat situations the officers and non-commissioned officers display the well-known martial qualities of courage and composure under fire, competent judgement in stressful circumstances, consideration for and rapport with their men and the like. These are the qualities in which prospective officers are indoctrinated at their military schools and academies, and which tend to be taken for granted in analyses of military capability but which are ignored at the peril of failing to pin down the actual capabilities of a given military force as distinct from its nominal capabilities.

The matter of leadership is of particular importance in analyzing counterinsurgency capabilities because in less developed countries the military forces very often become entangled in the political arena to the great detriment of their professionalism in what is supposed to be their primary task. A process of political favoritism sets in which starts at the top and permeates the entire system. Senior officers are chosen for their loyalty to the ruling group, which is often itself composed of military men. In return for their loyalty they are assured of security in their jobs and no pressure is put on them to meet a professional standard of performance. In many cases it is also understood that discreet corruption is permissible within certain understood bounds. Practices of this type can very quickly affect military performance if the officers enrich themselves by such means as faking the lists of soldiers in their units to pocket the pay of "ghost" troops or appropriate part of the troop allowances for subsistence—both of which occurred frequently in Vietnam, for example.

When an army is led at the top by officers who are chosen for political reasons and are under no pressure to maintain professional standards, they in their turn also select their principal officers by the criterion of personal loyalty whether based on membership in the same class at the military academy or regional, family or ethnic ties and thus the
system is perpetuated down through the ranks to the company or platoon level. The effect on the performance levels of the army so led is highly destructive, particularly in combat leadership. The implicit bargain by which an officer obtains his job does not require that he exhibit the martial qualities essential for combat leadership but merely that he show loyalty to his patron. Unit performance usually reflects that fact.

Among the cases discussed in the appendices, we find no dearth of material illustrating the nature of the problem. In Vietnam, for example, one student of the war says, "The appointment and promotion of the top-ranking officers...always remained closely linked to President Thieu's endeavor to protect the base of his political support within the officer corps; most of his general officers, therefore, owed their position more to their political dependability than to battlefield performance."1 As far as concerns the effects of this system, here is a comment from the most experienced American observer of the Vietnamese military, John Paul Vann: "Coupled with the corruption that exists in the form of padded payrolls, the hiring out of troop labor, the theft and/or sale of material resources, the selling of jobs and promotions, the rental of military vehicles to smugglers and worse, the illegal taxation of farmers and travelers, it is surprising that the GVN's armed forces perform as well as they do."2

Another case illustrating the point is Cuba, where the performance of Batista's army in combat against Fidel Castro's tiny guerilla group was so poor as to be derisory. The Sierra Maestra mountains where the Castro band operated, were far from Havana, and they were rugged and covered with forest. Batista's troops, used to a soft barracks life and untrained for extensive field operations, quickly became exhausted in the chase and their officers simply gave up the fight. It was an army which formed a major element in the political base of the regime and was run by a clique of corrupt officers for their personal benefit. Discussing the failure of Batista's climactic offensive in August 1958, two historians of Castro's victory say: "The offensive failed not only because the troops had generally refused to engage in earnest fighting, but because of the lack of professionalism of most regular army officers...Confronted by

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irregular guerilla warfare, Cuban officers demonstrated their lack of technical preparation...It was the first time the Cuban military had been really challenged by an armed, well-organized group of young men, and the challenge was too much for the political generals of dictator Batista.\(^3\)

Of the other cases treated in the appendices, similar though not as extreme effects of political involvement can be seen in Thailand, Greece, and the Philippines. In Nicaragua, on the other hand, the National Guard; although certainly an important political base of the Somoza regime, did fight effectively with its back to the wall. This would appear to be a result of the devices deliberately used by the Somozas to build service pride among guardistas and to insulate them from the rest of Nicaragua (see Introduction to Appendices). National Guard training was fairly rigorous and it remained a volunteer service throughout its history.

Other armies elsewhere have been deeply involved in politics and have nevertheless remained professional in their attitude toward their duties and responsibilities. Two contemporary examples we can cite are Korea and Pakistan. The reasons are not entirely clear to the authors but we note that both countries have a proud martial tradition which, in the case of Pakistan, dates to the days of the British Raj and the fighting along the Northwest Frontier, and in Korea, dates from the Korean war. Pride in service and in a martial tradition thus seem to be two factors that can counteract the effects of military immersion in politics.

a. Can Political Armies be Reformed?

Citing the two cases of Greece and the Philippines we can answer the question affirmatively. Given the right circumstances, political armies can be reformed but it requires a willingness to take political risks. The dangers are aggravated when the army is embattled in a conflict with a stubborn and well-conceived insurgency for then it seems to the heads of government that demands for reform are an invitation to political suicide. Such changes inevitably disturb the balance of forces within the ruling group which is often quite fragile and they are therefore rejected.

The problems were solved in both the Philippines and Greece thanks to several special factors. In both cases, reform was carried out
by charismatic leaders who were not themselves the beneficiaries of the system they were reforming. In Greece, Field Marshall Alexander Papagos, who had led the Greek Army in its totally unexpected victory over the Italians in 1940, was brought out of retirement to become Commander-in-Chief in 1949, something he agreed to do only after he demanded and was given a free hand to reorganize the Army with full control of assignments and promotions. Also we note that in Greece, the Army did not form the political base of the government; it was rather a play-thing of the civilian politicians, who pushed the careers of their favorite officers regardless of competence in order to buttress their standing with important patrons or members of their parties. On the Greek political scene, Papagos was above party and ruthlessly weeded out the incompetents. In a matter of a few months the problem was solved.

Similarly, in the Philippines in 1950, Magsaysay was offered the post of Secretary of National defense (he had been Chairman of the House Committee on National Defense) only after the military situation began to appear desperate. He was in a strong bargaining position vis-a-vis President Quirino and was able to demand and receive unprecedented powers to approve promotions and assignments. After receiving those powers, he rejected an entire promotion list because none of the officers on it had had combat experience.

Magsaysay also was a charismatic figure who had the knack of suddenly appearing on the spot when anything of interest transpired to congratulate officers or reprimand them, promote or cashier, interrogate prisoners or succor wounded. In addition, as in Greece, the Philippine government was not controlled by the military; the latter had merely become another part of the spoils system under which the government functioned at that time. Within months the Secretary of Defense had been able to change and reform the Army and put it on the road to success.

In contrast to these two successful cases of reform in the midst of crisis, the combination of circumstances that existed in Vietnam seemed impervious to attempts at reform despite considerable efforts by the Americans to persuade first Diem and then Thieu to make changes. In the
case of Diem, he persisted in manipulating assignments and promotions because he was fearful of military combinations to overthrow him—and rightly so, as matters turned out. Later, President Thieu similarly resisted American urgings that he reform the military. The political system in Vietnam under Thieu did not resemble the arrangements noted above in the Philippines and Greece. In Vietnam, the armed forces constituted the principal political base of the regime. Behind the scenes, an extra-constitutional Armed Forces Council comprising all the general officers formed Thieu's base constituency. Demands for reform were in effect demands that he jettison this base and replace it with some form of civilian political movement. In fact, at least twice President Thieu did seriously contemplate such drastic reforms in response to American pressure but in each case he finally drew back and declined to take the risk.

The Americans also brought pressure in individual cases to remove particularly incompetent or dishonest officers, although not often with success. This type of approach came up against the hard fact that the problem was systemic, it permeated the military and stemmed from the nature of the political system by virtue of which the government survived and the officers running it prospered. Individual changes might improve matters in the unit concerned but an officer with political preference would simply be transferred to another job where he would continue the practices that had caused him to be transferred.

Reform of a military-based regime in a situation of crisis is therefore an exceedingly problematic matter which is difficult to arrange and uncertain of outcome.

b. What Should the Analyst Look For?

At the opposite pole from a politicized army that fails in combat leadership and the other qualities essential for success, is a professionalized army focused on professional standards and goals. The first requirement of the analyst attempting to put his finger on the potential for government success in a given insurgency situation is to inform himself on the political role of the military leadership. Does it form the political base of the regime? If so, does it constitute a major part of
that base, as in Vietnam, or is its role a lesser one, constituting part of the spoils system as in the Philippines and Greece? How are promotions and assignments determined? Is corruption prevalent and endemic or merely the practice of particular individuals.

Other clues should be looked for in the standard criteria applied by foreign advisers and military attaches in assessing the military competence of the services to which they are accredited. How rigorous is the training? Are extended field exercises conducted periodically? Professional qualities will show up in such details as the condition of equipment, the conduct of troops while off-duty, the appearance of bases and other facilities. Such matters do not give a direct reading of the quality of combat leadership but are an indicator of professionalism, which is at the base of good leadership.

To help the analyst judge the factors of professionalism and its probable impact on leadership, he should examine carefully the military traditions of the services he is studying. Do they have a proud history of valor in combat which is kept alive by ceremonies and symbols daily recalling the past to the serving officers and soldiers. In Pakistan the regimental traditions handed down from the days of the Indian Army under British rule are kept alive in the officers' messes of today. This is not an insignificant factor in governing present military behavior. Many former colonies, on the other hand, have almost no military tradition and have very little to pass on to officers to help set a standard of valor that can be incorporated into the concept of professionalism governing soldiers' behavior. In addition to martial traditions, pride in service is also generated by the status of soldiers in the society at large. If the military calling is a respected one, this too, will have an effect on military proficiency.

In a country like Vietnam, there was very little either in tradition or in status to make a soldier proud to serve. The Vietnamese army had existed for only a few decades and had not had time or opportunity to establish martial traditions. The values of society at large were Confucian which accorded to the soldier a rather low status in terms of
respect for his calling. Taken together, these factors meant that military pride hardly existed in the armed services of Vietnam. Without pride, professionalism has difficulty competing with the factors that tend to undermine it such as political interference, cliqueism or the urgings of family and associates to exploit the officer's position for their benefit. Without professional standards, military leadership especially in combat, falls off in quality and in some cases evaporates.

2. Tactics and Strategy

The first principle of successful counterguerrilla tactics is to take the guerrilla as the model and fight him in his own style. "The jungle, nighttime and surprise attack are the guerrilla's weapons. The solution is to adopt the same weapons to fight him." This principle means the broad deployment of forces in small units relying largely on weapons they can carry. It means, in fact, the abandonment of much of a modern army's equipment and combat style and reversion to a more "primitive" kind of combat although it is a rather sophisticated form of "primitivism," with helicopter support, up-to-date radio communications and powerful light weaponry. The duties of these combat units are to patrol energetically, especially at night, to lay ambushes and counterambushes and conduct deep penetration patrols and raids. Essential for success in such operations is a flow of precise current intelligence to help in locating valid targets for the patrols and ambushes.

In addition to small patrols (platoon and squad-size), the counterguerrilla force is required to maintain reaction forces of up to battalion size which can be deployed rapidly to the scene in the event that a patrol encounters a large enemy force or such a force attempts a surprise attack on a fixed base. The capability to deliver such reaction units by helicopter is of great importance and is one of the prime uses of air power in warfare of this type.

Occasionally, it may be important to concentrate larger than usual forces in an attempt to clear out an area as part of counterinsurgency operations. When this is planned, the government forces should not simply move in, clear the area and then move out. If that is the
pattern, they will soon find that the guerrillas have merely hidden themselves until the coast is clear, when they will re-emerge. Plans must be made in advance to maintain security even after the large regular force has moved on. Means of accomplishing this are discussed at a later point.

Another way of describing this style of combat is that it "makes the people the target," rather than the enemy's forces. As one analyst has put it: "The native population must be taken into account in all counter-insurgency warfare planning, regardless of the level of operations. Any objective and any method of achieving the objective which will alienate the population should be avoided if at all possible. The people must be convinced that they have a common cause with the incumbent government...If this cooperation does not develop, the counterinsurgency campaign is doomed to eventual failure. This is fundamental."6

With this as a major objective, the nature of the forces deployed must reflect the alteration of purpose and target from destroying the enemy's forces to influencing and, in fact as we shall see, protecting and thus gaining the support of the population. Heavy weaponry and equipment are positively harmful to the effort because they are indiscriminate, and are likely to cause harm to the people among whom the fighting takes place. This means the rejection or at most the highly selective use of tanks, artillery, armored personnel carriers, bombers and air bombardment, high performance jet fighters and attack planes in combat.

There are other reasons for the government to deny itself the use of such heavy weaponry. It constricts the movement of government forces, obliges them to stay on the roads and thus seriously reduces their mobility. Long convoys of vehicles and tanks make a fat target for ambush. The use of such weapons--especially to "prepare the battlefield" as taught in US Army schools and manuals--alerts the enemy beforehand to an impending attack which in turn permits him to slip away unscathed. It means that in the end the attack so thoroughly prepared will achieve nothing. Finally, the use of heavy weapons distracts the command from its essential task of maneuvering many small units while, at the same time, it tempts the troops
themselves to fight in an "easier" style, riding to and from combat and relying on armor instead of stealth and concealment to protect them.

A criticism of the conventional school of tactics against this style of combat is that in aiming at protecting the population rather than destroying the enemy, it is essentially a defensive strategy. However, since support of the population is essential to the insurgents, this criticism is merely a misreading of the reality. By depriving the insurgents of the ability to exploit the people for their basic needs, the government forces are striking at their vitals. It is also essential that counter-insurgency forces, once they have made contact or located an enemy camp or unit maintain the pressure and do not permit the enemy to escape to a location where he can rest and refurbish his forces.

The combination of tactics that are most effective therefore emerges clearly. Many small lightly armed units maintaining constant patrols by night and by day to locate the enemy, doggedly pursuing him once contact has been made, and having the means to call in help from larger forces should the need arise;these form the core of the counterinsurgency force. Larger units on occasion are useful to commence clearing operations and as back-up for small patrols. Helicopters and good communications are also important as is good current intelligence. If, in addition, the government can command an air capability to bomb with precision identified enemy units or bases, that will be useful but only if it is truly precise and if care has been taken in advance to assure that civilians will not be killed or injured by the attack. A further refinement is the use of long-range patrols which can operate away from their bases for as much as a week (or longer with aerial resupply) to harass the insurgents in their base areas, to capture prisoners or gather information by observation. Such units can be very useful but are not essential.

Tactics similar to this pattern were followed in most of the successful examples described in the case studies, notably in the Philippines, Malaya, Oman, and Colombia. In Greece, where the government was successful, but did not follow the recommended tactics, the reason lies in the deliberate decision of the insurgents to abandon guerilla style
operations prematurely and to conventionalize their forces, hold territory permanently and meet the Greek Army on its own terms.

In Cuba, too, at a climactic moment of the battle Castro make a similar mistake and attempted to hold on to his base against the government's superior firepower. If the Cuban army had persisted in its offensive for a short while longer, it could very well have eliminated Castro's main forces and delivered a punishing setback if not a finishing blow. By that time, however, Batista's commanders were deeply discouraged over their losses and, in fact, panicked at the dangers and difficulties of the task and pulled back.

The need to develop a different set of tactics for counter-guerilla warfare and to put the needs of the population ahead of military objectives is often resisted and resented by the conventional-minded military commands in most armies. The required tactics violate most of the principles that professional officers have learned and based their careers on; the result is a powerful bureaucratic resistance to innovation which persists in error in spite of all evidence to the contrary. Counter-guerilla operations represent, in President Kennedy's words, "a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training." In spite of these words, however, the US military command made only very limited changes in its tactics in Vietnam. Commanders were urged to use their immense firepower discriminatingly, "and yet," one student of the matter points out, "these sensible ideas ran head on against the mind-set of the conventionally trained officer, who, seeing the war in the perspective of his own expertise, concentrated on 'zapping the Cong' with the weapons he had been trained to use." The result was often failure to strike the enemy effectively while wreaking heavy damage on the surrounding population. Lewy quotes from a US Army field report of 1962:

"It is possible that an analysis of past performance might show that air strikes have rarely been justified in terms of enemy casualties. It might well show that more noncombatants than fighters have been killed and that other noncombatants were driven into insurgency through resentment. Indiscriminate killing gives the VC a propaganda and recruiting tool, loses support
for the GVN, and dries up sources of intelligence at the 'rice root' level."8

Another consequence of this tactical pattern was that the South Vietnamese army followed closely the American example, "using air strikes in particular as a substitute for rather than in support of infantry forces, and must of the time they seemed quite oblivious of the destruction and suffering these weapons inflicted upon the civilian population."9

The war in Vietnam was a most complex conflict and regular forces using conventional tactics were no doubt required at appropriate times and places. The problem came from the lack of flexibility of the US military command and its failure to adjust tactics to suit varying requirements. The need to maintain a dual capability for conventional and unconventional combat will probably be found in other countries, particularly those that feel threatened by the conventional forces of their neighbors. This poses a difficult problem which is best met by designating certain forces for counterinsurgency combat while others continue to be tasked with conventional responsibilities.

Tactics, of course, must also be fitted into a suitable strategy, if the gains made by good tactics are not to be frittered away. The strategy of counterinsurgency actually must transcend the military aspect and incorporate the entire range of measures and policies called for. On the purely military plane the strategy will first of all be based on an overall plan that in its turn rests upon a through appreciation of the situation. The plan will establish area priorities which, according to several experienced analysts of the matter, should proceed from the more secure to the less secure sections of the country.10 It will also encompass whatever measures have been decided upon as feasible and appropriate to control the population, to separate it from the insurgents, to protect it, and to encourage it to give the government its support. Such measures will often be the task of government services other than the military and the proper unification of all these activities will require a suitably unified command. All these matters will be discussed in greater detail below.
What the Analyst Should Look For

The tactics followed by an army in combat are not difficult to ascertain if the government is friendly or at least not unfriendly to the US. The task is best accomplished by professional military men acting as advisers or by military attaches. Through them, the analyst should be able to learn readily enough what tactics and strategy are being followed. If American military observers are not welcome, the task becomes more difficult but other sources may be available such as military observers from friendly foreign governments. In any case, the questions to be asked of sources are obvious from the earlier discussion of appropriate tactics. Are the counterinsurgency forces operating conventionally or unconventionally? Are they relying on heavy firepower and concentration of force or are they patrolling in small groups? Do they strive to maintain pressure on the enemy once contact is made? Do reaction forces respond when called upon, even at night? Is concern for the population uppermost in the minds of commanders?

If the responses to such questions indicate that conventional tactics are being followed, the analyst would be well-advised to pursue the matter and attempt to find out why. Is the pattern the result of a conscious decision and in any case, what are the chances of its changing? Is there a school of thought in the military that advocates unconventional tactics? Is there a possibility that such a school might prevail at a later date?

The answers obtained to such questions are rather fundamental to any determination by the analyst of the government's chances of success since conventional tactics will not succeed against a skillful and determined insurgency.

3. Military Intelligence

Good intelligence is another indispensable ingredient for successful counterinsurgency. Everything about the insurgency and its adherents is of intelligence interest, not merely order of battle information. Military intelligence is only one of the elements that should be operating on the government side. The police in particular have a major
role to play as will be discussed in Chapter III. But the military, being in direct contact with the enemy, has access to information not available to other services. The following sources are the most profitable for military intelligence:

(1) Interrogation of captured or surrendered enemy personnel. This should be a major source but its usefulness depends on the competence with which the prisoners are handled. Torture of prisoners is unfortunately all too common; besides being inhumane, it is ineffective in obtaining reliable information. Its use also discourages other guerrillas from surrendering. Patient detailed interrogation combined, if necessary, with skillful use of psychological pressures, are the recommended techniques but adjustments should be made for different approaches in different cultures. In Oman, for example, it was discovered that direct, business-like interrogation worked poorly, whereas treating a surrendered insurgent as a guest in traditional Arab fashion, produced excellent results. This took time, since it was important that certain amenities be observed, but the time was well-spent.

(2) Reports of patrols. The purpose of constant patrolling is to gain information and even negative information to the effect that no enemy was encountered, can be useful. In the Philippines, army patrols were given a standard form to fill out after each mission to make certain that all the information obtained was reported immediately.

(3) Captured documents. These can be important depending on how formally the insurgents are organized and thus how much they put down on paper. Prisoners and surrendered personnel and the bodies of enemy dead must be searched for documents but the richest source will be enemy bases and encampments if they are taken by surprise. In Vietnam, the Viet Cong, being in one aspect a highly sophisticated bureaucracy, proliferated paper. Vast amounts were captured and exploited at a central Document
Exploitation Center in Saigon. Every effort was made to deliver tactically useful information as rapidly as possible to the units concerned. In any event, troops involved in combat should be briefed on the importance of seizing and protecting enemy documents and delivering them rapidly to intelligence personnel.

(4) Aerial and naval reconnaissance. These can be particularly valuable if small spotter planes are used and are flown regularly by the same pilots over the same areas. The pilots then become familiar with the terrain and highly skilled in noting any changes that may take place from day-to-day.

(5) Informants and agents. Intelligence units will normally attempt to identify and exploit paid informants in their areas of operation and also to recruit agents with the purpose of planting them within the enemy organization. Such operations call for well-trained personnel and are always difficult. One shortcut that has been used successfully is to turn surrendered or captured personnel around quickly and send them back to their units as agents. Alternately, if—as is likely—the prospective agent is reluctant to take the obvious risks, he can be asked to lead a patrol back to the camp he has just left. This technique proved highly productive in Malaya, where surrendered personnel often harbored bitter resentments against their former comrades and were glad to cooperate with their captors by acting as guides.

(6) Other, more sensitive sources of a technical nature may be available but require a degree of technical proficiency which is likely to be scarce.

In order to exploit sources of this varied nature, intelligence units must be set up and be well-supplied with trained personnel and funds at every level from company on up to the high command. Officers must be intelligence-oriented, aware of the special intelligence needs of counter-insurgency for information on enemy modus operandi, and must treat the end-product, namely the raw reports and the processed, collated summaries not only with proper attention to their contents but also with dispatch.
Combat intelligence is perishable and must move promptly through the system to the unit which can make best use of it.

The intelligence units must also be indoctrinated on the importance of cooperation with other intelligence services, especially the police. The best way of assuring such cooperation is to establish combined intelligence centers at the lower as well as higher geographical subdivisions, e.g., districts, provinces and regions. Here, the military, the police and other intelligence services can work together, combine their information to give the command of each level the full intelligence picture and do it in a timely fashion. Precisely this pattern was followed in several of the successful cases discussed in the appendices, notably Maylaya, Oman and also, it would appear from rather sketchy information, in Colombia. In Thailand an attempt was made patterned on Malaya. Joint Intelligence Centers were set up but they languished for lack of command interest. In Vietnam, the Phoenix program was designed to accomplish the same purpose but did not succeed for a number of reasons (see Appendix J). The device can be a useful one but it requires interest and attention from the commands to reach a level of usefulness that repays the effort.

In some less developed countries where power tends to change hands by coup d'etat there will be a tendency for military intelligence units to focus on coup plotting among military officers as their main target. No more certain way exists of gaining the attention and the thanks of the ruling group than uncovering a coup plot against it. In this type of environment there is little hope of preventing such a diversion of resources. It is to be hoped that, at the same time, the military intelligence corps will not forget that they also have another important target, namely the insurgency.

What the Analyst Should Look For
It is usually difficult for outsiders to get the full picture of what is going on inside the intelligence services of a foreign government. In some cases, of course, the US is providing support and advice and the advisers themselves should be able to develop a useful sense of the capabilities and practices of the service they are assisting. Absent this
source of information, the analyst can fall back on indirect cues and physical evidence. The existence of intelligence centers should become apparent in time as should the general effectiveness of the system. If the government’s forces are continually being taken by surprise and are not surprising the enemy, that is prima facie evidence that the intelligence system is not working well. The routine use of torture to produce information generally comes to light in the press or through such institutions as Amnesty International. From US or friendly military attaches additional information can be acquired on military attitudes toward intelligence, whether it has command attention and whether the product is treated with respect. In general this is a field in which the analyst may find it necessary to look for indirect evidence wherever he can find it.

4. Troop Behavior and Discipline; Civic-Action

The factors of troop behavior and discipline and of civic action are grouped together because of their connection to the same phenomenon, namely the impact of the military forces on the surrounding population. Good troop behavior is a product of good discipline, among other things, and so the two can be considered different sides of the same coin.

Both behavior and discipline also reflect the quality of leadership at the level of company and platoon. Similarly, they reflect the state of unit and general army morale.

The specific behavior we are considering here is how the troops interact with the population, whether they are abusive to women, steal chickens and other property without compensation, extract bribes, invade homes without permission, offend local customs, etc.

If they do behave in this manner and do so routinely, any of the following causes or a combination of several can be at the root of the behavior:

(1) Their commanders are indifferent to such behavior and take no action to punish it or discourage it or to encourage good behavior.

(2) The supply and pay system are faulty and the troops do not receive their pay on time, or some of it is appropriated before
it gets to them. If the troops are supposed to supply themselves with food, their supplementary pay is similarly delayed or stolen.

(3) The commanders look down on the local population as ignorant peasants who are of no consequence, cannot harm them and can be mistreated with impunity. In some cases this is because the peasants belong to a disadvantaged minority group such as the Indians in Guatemala or the Montagnards in Vietnam whom the majority despises.

(4) The local population is assumed to be sympathetic to the insurgents and therefore the military unit feels free to take revenge for losses it may have suffered from ambush or other attacks.

(5) The regime is routinely brutal to the population at large and deliberately behaves abusively in order to keep people awed. This seems to have been the case in both Cuba and Nicaragua and in the end, in both countries, the population took its revenge.

(6) The troops are routinely mistreated by their officers and the military system and take out their feelings of bitterness on the nearest helpless target, the population. This behavior pattern existed in Vietnam where private soldiers were drafted for no fixed term, were given no regular leave and were sometimes mistreated by their officers.

Nothing is as harmful to the success of counterinsurgency as bad troop behavior or as reliable an indicator that the government side is in trouble. Effective counterinsurgency programs place emphasis on good behavior, on courtesy and consideration toward the population and on rapidly redressing the effects of bad behavior by punishing violators and paying compensation for damages to the population or its property. The British in both Malaya and Oman were able to assure good behavior by indoctrinating the troops in its importance and making certain that officers enforced the rules by punishing malefactors. As an example, in Malaya, when British soldiers moved into a village of Chinese squatters to enforce a resettlement order, they did so considerately, helping the
children and old people into the trucks and assisting the men to load their families personal possessions. According to one observer, "This astonished the Chinese, and many have since placed on record that it was one of the biggest factors in winning their eventual support." In contrast, when the US and the GVN decided to resettle a cluster of villages in South Vietnam in 1962 preparatory to cleaning out the area, the villagers were treated with minimum consideration, their old homes were burned and the provisions for them in their new homes were meager. The move was dubbed "Operation Sunrise." The press was invited to view it and it left a highly negative impression which affected the views of the reporters for the duration of the strategic hamlet program. The villagers who were moved in "Operation Sunrise" were Viet Cong sympathizers and the manner of the move did nothing to change their opinions. The area remained secure only as long as regular forces were stationed nearby.

Another approach aimed at building favorable army/population relations is to involve the military in civic action for the benefit of villagers living in the area of operations. Civic action comprises all activity by the military whose purpose is to benefit the population; it can range from giving free haircuts to building dams and canals. It can also include public works such as access roads and bridges which serve a military purpose but are also of use to the population.

Civic action has an important place in the counterinsurgency doctrine of the US military and has been prominent in countries where US influence is strong. In Vietnam, for example, every US unit had some sort of civic action program which usually included a large component of medical help for the local population (see Appendix J). Medical Civic Action Programs (MEDCAP) personnel gave inoculations, conducted clinics, etc. and the Medical Provincial Health Assistance Program (MILPHAP) provided teams of medical personnel to assist provincial hospitals. This represents only a small fraction of US military civic action but despite its size, it failed to overcome the effects of the American style of war which emphasized firepower and impacted with great destructive force on the same population whose wounds were being bound up by the MEDCAP and MILPHAP teams. We have
already noted earlier (see Chapter I) that American counterinsurgency practice followed contradictory approaches as between the military style of war, which was conventional, and an active civic action program, which emphasized persuasion.

In some other countries, the American influence on the military was more positive. Thus in Colombia both the style of war and the emphasis on civic action showed American influence but the two aspects were consistent with one another. Plan Lazo, as the Colombian counterinsurgency program of 1962-1964 was called, placed emphasis on small, highly trained lancero (Ranger) units to carry the attack to the remote Andean valleys where the insurgency flourished. Often these units were obliged to build roads merely to obtain access to the zone of combat. Once there, they immediately organized civic action of two types, one the standard military effort and the second called "military-civil action" which mobilized the professional classes of the area to provide free services to the population, services ranging from haircuts to surgery.

In Venezuela the counterinsurgency effort against scattered bands in Falcon province and the El Charral mountains consisted in its early stages almost entirely of civic action and propaganda aimed at the population. The Venezuelan command was aware that in those particular areas, which had a history of dissidence, the arrival of the army reawakened memories of great suffering and caused panic among the population. During the first campaign season the military command made little effort to carry the war to the insurgents but concentrated on improving its relations with the population, with emphasis on civic action. Keeping in mind that in time the army would have to leave and take its civic action with it, the command organized a unique consortium of government and private agencies, state, federal, church and military to keep the programs going. (See Appendix H.) In both Colombia and Venezuela, American advice played some role in forming local doctrines and it is not unlikely that the emphasis on civic action in both countries reflects that fact.

Another such example is Thailand, where military civic action took form even before the outbreak of the armed struggle phase. (See
Appendix G.) Beginning as early as 1961 when vague reports began to reach Bangkok suggesting preinsurgency organizing activity, the government launched a military civic action program built around teams called Military Development Units, which stayed and conducted a variety of civic action in a cluster of villages for as long as a year. This program continues in existence today, 23 years later.

Even in Cuba, one example can be cited of fairly successful civic action in the course of the generally futile and misguided counter-insurgency effort of the Batista regime against Castro's guerilla force. Briefly, the government forces in the Sierra Maestra area were commanded by an officer who appreciated the critical importance to the guerillas of the local squatter population who lived a marginal existence in the area and provided invaluable intelligence to Castro and company. He commenced a program that provided medical services, a soup kitchen, schools and some housing. It lasted only a few months, after which the commanding officer was replaced by a more typical "Batistiano" who resumed the standard policy of harsh reprisals and hostility vis-a-vis the population. Briefly, however, according to the officer who launched the civic action program, the local population had begun to cooperate with the army.

In areas influenced by British doctrine, such as Oman and Malaya, less emphasis has been placed on civic action although in both countries there was a limited effort. The British place great importance on good troop behavior, however, and have an impressive record in this regard.

Civic action has sometimes been viewed as a universal panacea for dealing with insurgency. It is hardly that but it has usefulness in helping to establish good relations between the military forces and the population. Such relations can only be established and maintained if the entire posture of the military vis-a-vis the population is consistent including troop behavior and, most important, tactics carefully calculated to avoid impacting destructively on civilian non-combatants. By itself, civic action cannot undo the harm caused by bad behavior or poor tactics.
What the Analyst Should Look For

Civic action has a political and propaganda purpose which is only realized if publicity is given to it. The problem of the analyst is not to learn whether it exists but how well-conceived and seriously-intended it is. The study of military manuals and training programs, of military budgets and of the assignment of extra medical and engineering personnel to the combat units will provide some useful information. For the rest, it would appear to be a matter of following up the military's claims with information, however obtained, on what was actually done in a given area as compared to the official claims which may be made.

As for troop behavior, only reliable eye-witness evidence can be trusted. The subject is a delicate one and rarely will a government discuss such matters freely. (An exception was Venezuela, where the government prosecuted police charged with brutality and made no effort to cover up these cases.) The extent to which troops are indoctrinated in proper behavior is probably ascertainable without difficulty but the actuality in the combat zone may be quite different. When soldiers are being ambushed and suffering losses which they attribute to the hostility of the population they may quickly forget what they were taught in training classes. The occasional lapses of the British troops in Northern Ireland illustrate the point.

5. Air and Naval Operations

Air power in counterinsurgency operations is a weapon of considerable usefulness—it is even vital in some situations—but must be used with great discrimination. The nonlethal uses of air power for reconnaissance, transport and the movement of personnel are not at issue; such uses are of great importance and cause few problems. Helicopter gun-ships and low and slow aircraft equipped with rapid-firing gatling guns are also relatively non-controversial if it can be assumed that their targets are confirmed and they avoid situations where non-combatants can be caught in the crossfire. Most controversy attaches to the use of bombers and attack aircraft and especially modern, high-performance jet planes in situations...
where they are unable to be as precise as desirable because of their speed and the height at which they operate.

In any case, the lethal use of air-power should be subject to stringent rules of engagement to make as certain as possible that innocent by-standers are not injured or their property destroyed. This is usually accomplished by imposing a clearance process on target approval, one which is likely to work best if civilian governmental authorities, independent of the military, are required to approve a proposed strike. Such a system is not fool-proof, however, as illustrated by the case of Vietnam, where air attacks were supposed, in most circumstances, to receive prior approval from the Vietnamese who gave it routinely without seriously reviewing the risks. In Malaya, on the other hand, the British approval system was strict and mistakes were few.

Similar caveats should apply to naval gunfire against shore targets. Other uses of naval power are less controversial and can be important, depending on the terrain. Small vessels are most useful in riverine operations or for blockade of coasts being used by insurgents to bring in supplies.

What the Analyst Should Look For

Assuming that they exist, rules of engagement are not difficult to learn in most situations. The difficulty will come in learning how conscientiously they are applied. This is a problem similar to gaining reliable information on troop behavior. The government concerned may not be anxious to advertise its errors or its callousness to noncombatant suffering. Eye-witness reports with due attention to the quality and reliability of sources are the best check against government claims and may be the most difficult kind of information to obtain.

6. Civil-Military Relations

Modern, left-wing insurgencies give first priority to politics in all their activities and operations. They do this because they are dependent on the support of a sizeable part of the population to provide them with the essentials for maintaining and broadening their struggle: food, money, recruits and intelligence. In many cases, in order to assure
that politics maintains its priority ahead of merely military concerns they
have inserted a party element at each military echelon with authority to
countermand orders of the military command.

The more or less standard response on the government's side, as
far as doctrine is concerned, is to insist upon civilian control of the
military at least at the echelon of chief of government but in some cases
such as in the British campaign in Malaya, it has been pushed much lower.
There a system of committees was established at district, state and
national levels where military, police and civil officials met daily to
make operational decisions controlling all aspects of the war. Such a sys-
tem guaranteed adequate civilian control and the primacy of the political
dimension. In Oman, on the other hand, the military enjoyed a general
dominance over all counterinsurgency operations due to the lack of Omani
administrative capabilities. Even there, however, the civilian governors
of the Dhofar province participated in operational decisions. Moreover,
the British officers who ran the war through their positions at the criti-
cal commands in the Sultan's Armed Forces, were indoctrinated in the
British approach and modelled their policies on the Malayan example.

The American view, on the other hand, resists civilian "meddling"
in military decisionmaking except at the level of the Secretary of Defense
and the President who, of course, is also commander-in-chief. Even there,
at those heights, civilian involvement is usually limited to the broadest
kinds of policy decisions and to selection of top commanders. Briefly,
President Kennedy tried to impose on a reluctant military hierarchy the
concept that the challenge of insurgency demanded a "whole new kind of
strategy, a wholly different kind of force." He did not enjoy much
success, partly because he did not appear to appreciate the dilemma this
view posed to the command: which thereby became responsible for fighting two
entirely different kinds of war, with quite different tactics and strategy.

American management policies for its overseas agencies assign to
the Ambassador, as the President's representative, primacy over all US
personnel and offices in a foreign country including the military, except
when the military is engaged in combat. At that point the senior military
officer on the scene comes under the authority of the military hierarchy and the Ambassador may attempt to influence military decisions but cannot expect to direct them. Indeed the entire American ethos vis-à-vis armed combat is to resist the notion that political factors should be weighed on the same scale as the lives of our soldiers. Hence the resistance to introducing civilian control into combat decisions.

The effect of such doctrine on counterinsurgency decisionmaking is to give the military leaders a free hand to conduct the war as they see fit. This in turn means that in any situation where political goals come into conflict with military goals, the latter will take priority. The result in Vietnam, as we have seen, was to relegate the goal of influencing the population to a secondary position.

"Ever since the huge losses of life caused by the human wave assaults of World War I," writes Guenter Lewy, "the military had embraced the motto Expend Shells Not Men." Hence, when American troops encountered a VC company dug into a Vietnamese hamlet, or in the fighting in Saigon and Hue during the Tet offensive of 1968, the tempting thing to do was to employ all of the powerful military instruments developed by the leading industrial, technology-conscious nation of the world—artillery, tactical air-power, naval gunfire, aerial rocket artillery, helicopter gunships."12 It was not possible for any civilian figure, not even the President, to intervene in this process to say, "expend lives, not shells." Yet, in the longer run, a war of this type may well be shortened and lives preserved by restraining the natural predeliction of the military leadership to set aside political constraints and let fly with all the immense firepower it commands.

In other cases in which American doctrine had some influence, for example in Colombia, Venezuela, and on occasion in Guatemala, these effects were not noticeable. Among the reasons must be included the fact that immense firepower was not available to those governments and also that the responsible military and civilian authorities saw the unwisdom of employing such heavy firepower as they possessed in a conflict of this kind. In the Philippines, civilian authority was paramount throughout the conflict
and political considerations had complete priority. To follow such policies, the Philippine military often ignored the advice of the US Military Aid and Advisory group (MAAG) and in fact "Filipino officers considered...MAAG views so inappropriate and unacceptable many of them refused to associate with their MAAG counterparts..."

The matter of civil-military relations becomes somewhat complicated when the government defending against an insurgency is itself dominated by a military junta. This, of course was the case in Cuba and also in Nicaragua where Anastasco Somoza had commanded the National Guard and remained close to it after he nominally yielded command. It is the case today in Guatemala. In both those cases the military operated in conventional fashion and the approach vis-a-vis the population was coercive. Political considerations played no role in determining counterinsurgency tactics or strategy.

For Thailand, where one military junta or another has dominated the political scene for most of the time since the insurgency was launched, the nominal policies have been enlightened enough but the practice has left much to be desired. The elements advocating precedence for political considerations (some of them in the military) had some influence but when a direct conflict occurred between military and political goals under the decentralized Thai system the local commander had the final say and his decision was usually the conventional military response. (See Appendix G.) Although the insurgency in Thailand has recently declined in strength to the level of a minor nuisance, it is questionable how much credit Thai government policies can take for that result. Much of it stems from the internal and external problems of the insurgents themselves and the strength and resiliency of Thai society.

To sum up then, the challenges posed by modern left-wing insurgency will require that political consideration take precedence over purely military ones and the best means of assuring that precedence is to insert civilian authority at the appropriate decisionmaking level. Where that may be will vary depending on circumstances but when, and if, the fighting becomes intense in or near populated areas, the military will have
to be denied complete freedom to "do its thing." The best means of accomplishing that goal will also vary but in the extreme case it can actually mean that civilian authorities are involved in day-to-day tactical decisions.

What the Analyst Should Look For

The crux of the matter is at what level are the civilian authorities involved in military decisions. This will not normally be difficult to determine if the country is one where Americans are welcome or at least not considered unfriendly. For some societies however, the internal workings of the political system and its relations with the military are closely guarded secrets especially from Americans. For simple situations which have not yet become critical, it may suffice to refer to the constitution and other overt governmental arrangements. Where the conflict has become intense, however, the critical points to examine are the regional and local command centers. Do provisions exist there for civilian inputs to daily decisionmaking? Regardless of what the constitution may say about civilian domination at the top of the government, the heart of the matter lies in military activity in the rural localities and whether the effects of combat on the population are being properly considered there.

7. Popular Militia

A paramilitary militia of some sort has played a key role in most successful counterinsurgency campaigns. A key to insurgency strategy is to spread the government's forces as thinly and widely as possible and pin them down in static guard duties, which prevents them from concentrating for offensive operations. The sound response to such a strategy is to augment the regular military (or in some cases the police) with various kinds of paramilitary auxiliaries drawn from the affected populations and usually assigned to remain in their own areas to provide continuing security for the population.

Such a militia can take various forms, depending on what use is to be made of it. It can be full-time and paid a regular wage; it can be part-time with little or no pay. It can be led by regular officers or non-commissioned officers or by privates; it can be armed with the latest model
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weapons or with old cast-offs. Whatever form it takes, however, certain policies are essential. Responsibility for training, equipping and managing the militia should be a priority duty of the regular forces. They must not merely be put out to guard some remote place and forgotten. They must be inspected and drilled regularly; where they perform well, this should be recognized; their wounded should be cared for at the same level as the regulars, and death-benefits, if such a commitment exists, should be paid promptly to dependants.

A critical factor is the existence of communications with a designated regular force which will come to the militia's aid if it is attacked by a superior enemy. Without provision for such a reaction force, the militia units will not be motivated very strongly to resist when attacked. They will truly be "sitting ducks," to be wiped out whenever the enemy sees fit.

When the regular forces are assigned to an area to clean out the insurgents in the type of operation called "clear and hold" by the Americans, the cleansing effect will be only temporary if the regular forces merely move on to another area after they have completed the clearing phase. The responsibility for maintaining the newly-achieved security must be turned over to some security force which will normally be the militia. At this point, it must be made clear to all concerned under whose authority they will operate and what unit will be designated to come to their assistance if they are attacked. Whether or not the clearing stage of "clear and hold" will have been in vain, with the insurgents returning as soon as the regular forces have left, will depend on the existence of a militia, on its quality and on the continuing review and inspection of the militia by the regular personnel who have been given this responsibility.

An excellent example of effective militia operations is to be found in the Greek civil war, where the government formed the National Guard Defense Battalions known by the Greek initials T.E.A. Organized on a territorial basis, the TEA battalions were commanded by regular officers at battalion level and higher headquarters and by reserve officers at lower levels. They were made up of soldiers who had completed their military
service. The men served on a part-time basis without pay. They received regular refresher training and weapons instruction and each unit was tied in to a nearby regular headquarters. According to students of the Greek civil war the T.E.A. battalions performed invaluable local security service throughout the areas where the guerillas were attempting to operate.

In the Philippines a somewhat different situation existed in 1950, when Ramon Magsaysay became Secretary of National Defense and proceeded to reform and rejuvenate every aspect of the counterinsurgency effort. Local security was often in the hands of an improvised militia called the civil guard, some of whom were paid out of the pockets of wealthy landowners to provide security on their estates while others were formed by provincial governors. In other words, there was no national militia program. Magsaysay's policy was to assign responsibility for security in a given area to one of the battalion combat teams (BCTs) into which the regular army was being organized. Control of all security forces in the area was given to the BCT commander, who then took over the existing civil guard units and deployed them to meet the requirements of the security situation. Thus controlled and supported they performed usefully, relieving the military of static guard duties.

The examples could be multiplied. For instance very important service was performed in Vietnam after 1967, when the Rural and Provincial militia forces were finally accorded the priority they deserved and had been completely re-trained and re-equipped. In Malaya, the police Special Constables, despite some early difficulties, were similarly of great value in providing local security. In addition, the British formed several other police auxiliaries including a Home Guard to provide security in the "New Villages." All were valuable and it seems unlikely that the small British military force assigned to Malaya could have dealt with the insurgency without the assistance of the various police militias they organized there.

What the Analyst Should Look For

The existence of a militia as part of a given counterinsurgency program is of course, easy enough to determine. More difficult to ascertain is the quality of training, equipment and morale. The analyst should
endeavor to learn about the relationship between the regular army and the militia, what priority the military leadership gives to its auxiliary forces. Are they well-armed and drilled and regularly inspected? Eye-witness reporting will be most useful in answering these questions.

The seven areas of military activity described and illustrated in this chapter comprise the main elements of the military side of counter-insurgency. They provide a checklist for the analyst and a guide for his researches into the critical military factor. Not all are of equal importance, but none are unimportant. If pressed the writers would rank-order them as they appear above, with leadership heading the list. The priority to be assigned to the various courses of action will be discussed further in Chapter IV.

We turn now to the nonmilitary aspects of counterinsurgency.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER II


2. Quoted in Ibid., p. 171.


8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., p. 97.

10 See, for example, Sir Robert Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, NY, Frederick A. Praeger, 1966, pp. 57-58.


12 Guenter Lewy, op. cit., p. 96.

A. POLICE OPERATIONS

The role of the police in counterinsurgency operations is always important and can be vital. One determining factor is the state of the police system at the outbreak of hostilities, particularly in the rural area, which will normally be the focus of the trouble. If the country under attack has a rural police force in which the government has confidence, a normal initial reaction would be for it to turn to that force rather than the army. The use of the latter would amount to a confession that the situation had gone beyond the point of containment short of exceptional measures.

The British school of counterinsurgency doctrine prefers, where possible, that the effort be treated as mainly a police problem. Its proponents point out that building up a large army will have a disturbing effect on the whole society.1 The police are far closer than the army to the people, are familiar to them as well as used to dealing with them and are usually better informed on subversive organizations and activities. They do not have heavy weapons and are used to operating discreetly against pinpointed targets; both are factors which reduce the incidental damage to the innocent.

These considerations led the British to assign a major role to the police in Malaya where, by the time the insurgency came under control, they far outnumbered the military. Still, in other areas, the British found such an approach to be impractical. Thus in Oman, the police force was so undeveloped as to be unable to assume the kind of responsibilities that British doctrine called for.

In most less developed countries, the police have limited capabilities and a poor public image. Recruitment standards are not high, pay is low and morale is poor. Usually, the police are concentrated in the cities and rather thinly scattered throughout the countryside. Because of low pay and

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general indifference of the government, the police often supplement their income by exacting payments for all the minor services they perform. In Nicaragua, this pattern was systematized by the Somoza regime to increase the income of members of the National Guard at no cost to the government. Numerous administrative responsibilities were added to the Guard's duties to increase the opportunities for corruption; among them were traffic control and vehicle registration, health and sanitation inspection, postal service, tax collection, customs and immigration. The pattern of corruption was similar though not as extreme in Thailand, Venezuela, Vietnam, Cuba and the Philippines. In some of these countries the police engaged in petty racketeering, exacting regular payments from businesses in exchange of "protection." In the Philippines, however, Ramon Magsaysay eventually managed to reform the police, as did Betancourt in Venezuela.

Another factor sometimes affecting police efficiency is the same tendency we noted earlier in discussing military effectiveness in less developed countries: the involvement of the police in the political arrangements of the regime. This was particularly noticeable during certain periods in both South Vietnam and Thailand. In the latter country, during the mid-1950's Prime Minister Pote Sarasin maintained himself in power by balancing the police and army against each other, building up police strength and armament in order to do so. The army finally succeeded in ousting Sarasin in a coup d'etat. They proceeded to reduce the police's excess strength and maintain careful control of it by placing military officers in charge of the service. One result of this experience, however, was a permanent unwillingness of the succeeding military regimes to build up the police to the level necessary to cope effectively with the Thai insurgency. Similarly, in Vietnam during the regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, the President manipulated the police as a counterbalance to the army with results, after Diem was overthrown in a military coup d'etat, very like those in Thailand.

When the police form part of the political base of a regime the effects on police professionalism are the same as those discussed earlier with respect to the military. Police work can be arduous and sometimes
dangerous, especially in an insurgency situation. When the leadership of the service receive their appointments as a reward for political loyalty, few demands are made on them respecting quality of performance. It is understood that they will enrich themselves more or less discreetly and other ranks of the police services will also.

In a serious insurgency situation, a poorly-motivated, poorly-led, corrupt police force is a considerable disadvantage to the incumbent government. In addition to their vital intelligence role (discussed later) the police have critical functions to perform, particularly in establishing and maintaining population control measures such as an ID card system, as well as food and commodity controls. If the police have low standards and are given to exacting bribes, then these programs will be ineffective, as they were in large part in South Vietnam. If the police are corrupt their standing in society will be low and the public will distrust them. They will then have great difficulty in gathering reliable information by voluntary action of the public, a source which is potentially of great value.

In Venezuela in the years 1960-1963, the focus of the insurgency was the capital, Caracas, and the principal target was the municipal police. (See Appendix H.) The insurgents announced that their goal was "to kill a cop a day," and although they did not reach it, they did take a heavy toll. At the beginning the police were unpopular, especially in the "ranchos" or slum areas on the outskirts of the city, where they had a reputation for corruption and brutality. As the insurgent campaign proceeded, however, law and order broke down almost entirely in the ranchos and as a result, public attitude toward the police began to change for the better: they began to be seen as an essential safeguard against anarchy. At the same time, the Betancourt administration made serious efforts to reform the police, publicly prosecuting some cases of brutality and corruption. In part, the government's motive was to gain support in the Venezuelan Congress for additional police appropriations to remedy some of the weaknesses of the service. Additional funds were approved and help also came from US and Chilean police aid programs. In time, the quality of police performance in Caracas and in other cities improved significantly.
the help of the army acting in a police role and the rural gendarmerie
temporarily reinforcing the municipal police, the insurgents were turned
back in the cities and the insurgency then changed the focus of its efforts
to rural guerilla warfare. The case demonstrates that a poorly functioning
police force is a considerable vulnerability to a regime threatened by
insurgency but that reform can transform it into a strength. This is more
likely if the police do not form part of the regime's political base. If
they do, the possibility of reform becomes more difficult for reasons
discussed in the previous chapter.

What the Analyst Should Look For

It is important for the analyst to obtain a detailed picture of
police organization and capabilities, especially in the countryside. Some
questions he needs to have answered are: what are the public's attitudes
toward the various police services? Do they have a reputation for bru-
tality and corruption? Do public attitudes distinguish between the various
police components, i.e., the rural police, the metropolitian police, the
traffic police, etc.? Is the public likely to cooperate willingly with the
police and to volunteer information?

Another group of questions relates to the professional qualities
of the police. What are the standards of recruitment and training? Is
there a police academy and if so, what is its quality? Most important, is
the police leadership involved in politics? Does it form part of the
political base of the regime? Are the leaders chosen from police ranks or
are they brought in from the military? What is the state of relations
between the police and the military? Do the two services cooperate readily
at the working levels or is there rivalry and hostility between them?

If some or all of the police services are corrupt and/or inef-
fective, what are the possibilities of reform? This will depend, in the
first place, on the existence of a will to reform at the higher levels of
the government as existed, for example, in the Philippines and Venezuela.
Whether reform can be systematically carried out will also depend on the
extent to which the police form part of the regime's political base. If it
does, the possibility of thorough reform is likely to be remote.
B. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Students of counterinsurgency are virtually unanimous in asserting the critical importance of effective intelligence operations. The insurgency relies on secrecy, surprise, and its ability to conceal itself to counterbalance the incumbent regime's overwhelming superiority in weapons and other resources. Effective intelligence operations will penetrate that screen of secrecy and permit the government side to take advantage of its superiority.

Good counterinsurgency intelligence derives from two key factors. The first of these is good organization which can only exist if there is close cooperation between the various intelligence services, namely the police, the military and the civilian. There are various ways of bringing about such cooperation. In the Philippines, it was done merely by informally designating the Military Intelligence Service (MIS) as the senior branch and assuring that all relevant information on the insurgency was disseminated to it. In Malaya, on the other hand, the police were given the primary role. The solution was to establish district and state and national intelligence centers which the police ran but where the different services were represented and all the relevant information was stored in readily retrievable form. The case for giving the police the primary role was put by Sir Robert Thompson as follows: "The police force is a static organization reaching out into every corner of the country and will have had long experience of close contact with the population. If it can possibly be avoided, the army should not be responsible for internal security intelligence. The army will have had little concern with subversion before the open insurgency breaks out; it will have had limited experience of contacting the people, particularly rural communities, which are inherently suspicious of troops; and its units are always liable to be redeployed throughout the country in accordance with the situation."³

In time, the district intelligence centers in Malaya had built up their files to the point where they had dossiers and usually photographs of each member of the insurgency. When a Communist insurgent was killed, the
body was brought to the center for identification and his picture taken from the hook on which it hung and dropped into the "dead-box." The exchange between military and police intelligence was full and prompt with no information held back.

That situation is not easily arrived at or duplicated elsewhere. Intelligence services do not readily cooperate with each other; their normal attitude is one of mutual rivalry and suspicion. In both Thailand and Vietnam considerable efforts were made to follow the Malayan model. In Thailand, Joint Intelligence Centers were established in the various effected regions while in Vietnam, the Phoenix program was created with its intelligence centers established in every district and province in the country. In neither case, however, was the cooperation complete, largely due to the mutual suspicion existing between the police and the military. On the other hand, excellent cooperation existed between police and military intelligence services in Colombia, to the considerable benefit of the counterinsurgency effort. This seems to have been due to the fact that in that country, the police services (with the exception of a civilian countersubversive service active mostly in the cities) were under the Minister of War, by custom an army general, and were therefore obliged to cooperate.

The second of the two main factors underlying effective counterinsurgency intelligence is the very broad but fundamental question of relations between the population, especially in the rural areas, and the government. If the village population supports the government, it will willingly pass on information about the insurgents. If its attitude is hostile or neutral, it will take the path of discretion and remain silent. Intimidation by the insurgents of course, also plays a role in this matter, but if the will to cooperate exists and the government can protect the identity of its informants, it should be able to collect enough information to improve the effectiveness of its operations. This, in turn, will reduce the grip of the insurgents' intimidation tactics and even more information will be provided. This was the sequence in such successful counterinsurgencies as Malaya, the Philippines and Oman.
Relations between population and government constitute a matter that goes far beyond the ability of the intelligence services to manage themselves, although their attitude and actions vis-a-vis the population play a part in forming the climate of opinion in the affected areas. The parent police and military services, as we have already noted, are more able to influence popular attitudes. The matter of relations with the population also connects with such questions as the legal framework of the government's approach, the deliberate efforts of the police and army to improve such relations by carrying out civic action programs and the government's cognate efforts to improve the rural environment and local administration. All of these matters have either been dealt with in Chapter I or will be discussed later in this chapter.

Another matter related to both intelligence and to the posture of the intelligence services vis-a-vis the population is the use of torture to obtain information from prisoners. The subject is a difficult one for the analyst whose purpose, of course, is not to pass moral judgment but to weigh the government's chances of success. Very little comparative analysis exists on the efficacy of torture in insurgency situations. We merely note that it has been used successfully, for example by the French in Algeria (although its use was not without domestic political cost in France) and by the Guatemalan government in the 1960's, and unsuccessfully by, among others, the Batista regime and by the South Vietnamese police and army. It goes without saying, however, that its use is frowned on by US government. Indeed, if the situation being analyzed is one in which US assistance is involved, the use of torture by the incumbent regime is certain to plunge the whole matter into domestic political controversy and reduce the likelihood of continuing US aid.

Nevertheless, the analyst must include this factor in his considerations. He will have to do so without the help of comparative studies reviewing the practice and its effectiveness. We will only venture this comment. It would seem that if torture is used to extract information from prisoners, its effectiveness will depend upon the precision and relative rarity of its use. If the government merely practises brutal mayhem upon
all who come within its grasp, as did the Bastista and Somoza regimes; the tactic eventually becomes self-defeating. It discourages guerrillas from turning themselves in and it builds a general climate of anti-government hatred that eventually can become overwhelming.

A problem which reduces the effectiveness of the intelligence services in military dictatorships where power is likely to change hands by coup d'etat is that the priority target of the intelligence services is likely to be coup plotting by the military and others with political ambitions. An intelligence officer is more likely to obtain career rewards by uncovering a plot against the regime than by collecting details on insurgent group. Unless the problem can be corrected, and priorities redirected, the entire counterinsurgency effort will suffer.

One additional factor is that of effective counterintelligence, without which most of the government's security program will fail. To view the problem in some of its complexity, we must first note the obvious fact that insurgency is also civil war. The combatants are of the same nationality and cannot easily be distinguished from each other. This is true even when an ethnic minority is involved since some of the minority may be with the government and some opposed, as was the case with the Chinese in Malaya. The insurgents will clearly have relatives and other connections throughout the society upon whom they can build an espionage network. In Vietnam, one CIA study, leaked to the press in 1970, estimated the total number of Communist penetration agents throughout South Vietnamese society and government at 30,000. It was believed (and this was later confirmed by Hanoi) that the Communist networks reached into the highest levels of the government and into its most sensitive organs. If we accept this as accurate then there was probably no solution to the problem; any effort to deal with it would probably have been penetrated from conception and therefore neutralized.

A less severe but still serious problem existed in Greece in the early months of the civil war. It was particularly aggravated in the army where, as the various age groups were called up by the military draft, no provision existed at first for combing out the Communist Party members or

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sympathizers. The presence of Communists in the army—while it was engaged in combat with other Communists—led to serious security leaks and had a distinctly negative effect on the morale of combat units. (See Appendix B.) The matter was finally handled by the passage of laws permitting detention of known Communists without trial. The intelligence services developed lists of suspects from their sources and many thousands were taken out of the armed forces. They were sent to the island of Makronisos for re-education and eventually a number of combat units were formed of "graduates" of the re-education process. International left-wing propaganda targeted on the Makronisos camp as an example of the horrors committed by Greek "monarcho-fascism" but later review indicated that the camps genuinely focused on re-education except in the cases of a limited number of recalcitrants. These later were treated harshly.

The conclusion to be drawn from such experiences is that the intelligence services must provide the raw information on which effective counterintelligence is based and the government must take appropriate measures to act on that information. The matter of what measures are likely to be effective and the problems they raise are discussed below in the section entitled "Legal Framework."

What the Analyst Should Look For

The analyst of counterinsurgency needs to have at his disposal as full a picture as possible of the government's intelligence structure, its component parts and their interrelationship. He should learn everything he can about their method and their degree of professionalism. Some of the questions he should seek to answer are whether there are intelligence centers in the operational areas; the collection priorities of the various services; the degree of cooperation between military, police and civilian services; the emphasis accorded to counterintelligence. There will often be difficulty in acquiring such information and the analyst may never be satisfied that he has the full picture but in time he should be able to put together an outline that answers his principal needs.
C. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological operations and the various information activities conducted by a threatened government can be of very great utility to its counterinsurgency effort. However, they cannot be effective in isolation or in opposition to well-known facts. They must be closely related to the totality of the government's program, have some basis in fact and be generally truthful.

There are usually three distinct targets the government must keep in mind: the population and in fact, the world at large, its own combat forces, and the enemy. The first of these will normally be dealt with by conventional means employing the devices governments everywhere have developed for getting their point of view before the public: communiques, official statements, speeches of government leaders, interviews and press conferences, etc. The governments which function most effectively in this phase of psychological operations are the more open and democratically-oriented ones, since their leaders have had the experience necessary to use public forums and the clash of political groups to their advantage. An outstanding example is Venezuela, where the skills of President Betancourt as a spokesman for his cause had a great deal to do with rallying the Venezuelan public to the government's side during the insurgency.

In contrast, the various military juntas attacked by left-wing insurgency have usually lacked the skills or the interest to exploit public forums and the various media to their advantage. A particularly vivid example is South Vietnam which was generously aided by the US in developing its own information agency and press service and in building and operating radio and television services. It was widely covered by the world and American press throughout the war years but, in spite of the many opportunities so offered, the GVN was unable to project itself favorably. No doubt there were many reasons for this but one that stands out is the lack of experience or skill on the part of the leadership in the arts of public communication or an understanding of its importance.
One particular appeal a threatened government is required to make is to the population directly involved in the areas of insurgent activity—usually in the remote countryside. Again, turning to Venezuela, we note the great care taken by the army in its initial campaign in Falcon province, using leaflets, loud speakers and broadcasts, to make clear to the local population that its purposes were friendly. Similar approaches were followed in Colombia and for the same reasons. In both countries, the army was moving into areas where earlier governments had turned loose their forces to operate with great brutality upon the population and they wished to make clear that the current operations were quite different. The results in both cases were favorable to the government's cause.

In contrast, again we can cite the case of Vietnam where a large apparatus came into being to generate support for the government in the villages and hamlets but without significant effect. The failure, in addition to the leadership's weakness in communication, was due to the contrast, obvious to every villager, between the government's deeds and its words. We quote a comment from an observer on the information booths built in each hamlet in Quang Nam province in the 1960s.

"[They] were often poorly located in the hamlet and the posted materials were rarely up-to-date. The condition of the structures suggested to this observer that they were rarely used and little appreciated by the hamlet people. They were empty symbols of community deference to external authority."5

As for the second target of psychological operations, the government's own forces—modern armies will usually have some form of troop indoctrination and information program. In many cases of course, the armies committed to counterinsurgency are not particularly modern and lack a troop indoctrination program. Nevertheless, professionally prepared combat leaders have a responsibility to assure that their troops are adequately informed and motivated.

It is the third target (the enemy) that calls for those aspects of psychological operations specific to counterinsurgency emerge most clearly.
If the government is organized effectively to take advantage of opportunities and to invent strategies to exploit enemy weaknesses and if it has detailed information on the insurgents, it can be highly effective in psychological warfare. In Malaya, the government's propaganda effort was organized and headed for a time by an accomplished professional, Hugh Carlton Green, who later became Director of the British Broadcasting Corporation. An equally accomplished assistant was C. C. Too, who had an intimate understanding of Chinese psychology and great ingenuity. The system they implemented depended heavily on good current intelligence on the situation within the enemy camp. Using leaflets, radio and aircraft equipped with loud-hailers, they appealed directly by name to individuals in specific units, revealing rivalries and betrayals and thereby increasing the psychological tensions within those units. They also dropped leaflets with pictures of surrendered or captured insurgents showing them at the time of capture, hungry and dressed in rags, and then, after a few weeks in government hands when their physical appearance had improved greatly. This approach went hand-in-hand with a reward system which offered large sums of money—graduated in accordance with the rank of the insurgents—for information leading to the capture or killing of members of the insurgency. These techniques proved exceedingly effective as time wore on and more and more detailed intelligence became available to the government side.

Similar approaches were followed in the Philippines where the beleaguered insurgent units found it necessary to punish severely any members found with government leaflets in their possession. According to Valeriano and Bohannon:

"Leaflets of both "canned" and "spot" varieties were extensively airdropped and hand-delivered. Themes ranged from appeals from mother or wife, through safe-conduct passes, to warning or threatening messages. Portable reproducing equipment in the field enabled battalion commanders to have spot leaflets prepared for immediate distribution. Loud-speakers -- hand-carried, jeep-mounted, and airborne -- were used to advantage. Always, success in these...operations, depended on the accuracy of the information on which the operation was based, the intelligence with which it was prepared, and the effectiveness of its delivery."
None of these operations would have been possible in Malaya or the Philippines without an organizational back-up with sufficient personnel, material and funds. In the Philippines, indeed, a unique organization was devised by Magsaysay called the Civil Affairs Office (CAO) which echeloned down from the Office of the Secretary of National Defense to the battalion level and had responsibility, among other things, for psychological operations directed at both enemy and friendly targets. But, as we have seen in the case of Vietnam, organization and resources are not themselves sufficient to produce effective psychological operations. There must also be available sufficient intelligence and a good government posture which lends credibility to the claims of its information and propaganda organs.

What the Analyst Should Look For

Propaganda is meant for public consumption and the analyst should have no difficulty in gaining access to it. (We except "black" propaganda which is always surrounded in secrecy.) He must analyze this output carefully, identifying the themes and assessing their effectiveness as well as the quality of the presentation. He should particularly look for whether the propaganda organs are merely going through routine motions or whether they are able to project conviction and persuasiveness. These qualities, in turn, will depend on the overall policies of the regime and the extent to which psychological materials are embedded in a matrix of fact and respond to generally known realities.

The organizational back-up for psychological operations is also important. Does an organization exist and if so, how extensive? Are there separate military and civilian organizations? What is the quality of the personnel and their selection and training? Do psychological operations have high-level attention? Are the target audiences responding to these operations?

To sum up, much can be learned about the skill and sophistication of the government side and about the seriousness and depth of its approach by studying its psychological operations.
D. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

The question of unified management of counterinsurgency emerges once a counterinsurgency effort has gone beyond military or police counteraction to a broader response involving many other activities. The component parts of the program are the responsibility of different government agencies each of which has its own bureaucratic agenda and conventional repertoire. These often will be in conflict with the overall purposes of the counterinsurgency effort. Unless firm, centralized management is established, the result will be gaps, overlapping areas and separate elements which operate at cross-purposes -- an effort that is less than the sum of its parts. The extreme example of this phenomenon was the American experience in Vietnam. In that conflict, the military was called upon to fight with a "new kind of strategy" which made rather different demands than those it was prepared for; the international aid agency found itself involved deeply in small-scale rural activities rather than large-scale economic modernization programs - not to mention responsibilities for refugees, for police activities, for defector inducement and the like. The CIA was committed to very sizeable paramilitary and cadre programs whose purpose were socio-economic as well as security-oriented. USIA became responsible for creating and advising an entire indigenous apparatus for psychological operations.

In all of these activities, there was an underlying tendency for each agency to pull away from the unfamiliar toward the familiar aspects of the work before it. This was particularly evident in the case of the military which with some limited exceptions, never effectively made the shift to a "new kind of strategy." As one observer put it, the military establishment "knew how to utilize resources, provide logistic support, deploy assets, manage large efforts. So they employed all these skills to develop irresistible momentum toward fighting their kind of war."7

The evolution of unified management of the American and Vietnamese pacification program was a long and painful process culminating in 1967, some six years after the program began, in the formation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) Directorate of the
military command. A presidential fiat placed the various component parts of the program (with the exception of information and propaganda) into a separate unified organization. The decision was resisted by the parent agencies which, while retaining legal responsibility for their activities in Vietnam, stood to lose control over many of them. It was also resisted by the Embassy which, until the formation of CORDS, had management responsibility for the civilian aspects of the program. It discharged these by the traditional methods of interagency coordination which involved negotiating points of disagreement until all parties were satisfied. This traditional system also involved very little central monitoring or evaluation of performance and results. No staff existed to perform such functions.

CORDS succeeded in putting certain military activities such as the military advisory system at province and district levels and support of the militia (Regional and Popular Forces) and many civilian functions of pacification under a unified management structure with command rather than coordinating authority. A sizeable staff was created to set goals, monitor and evaluate performance. In time it had a significant impact. (See Appendix J.) Nevertheless, this reorganization still did not achieve the ultimate in unification in that regular military activities remained untouched by the unified pacification structure and responsible only to the military command.

The failure to combine all US counterinsurgency activities in Vietnam under civilian authority stemmed from the traditional American concept that, in time of war, military activities in the field should not be interfered with by civilians and especially not by the injection of political considerations into purely military matters. It also stemmed from a reluctance to put the military in charge of everything. The Ambassador and his civilian aids were free to attempt to influence the military command but they could not direct it to act. The function of CORDS was, in fact, a partial dilution of that traditional freedom of the military. It was loyally taken under COMUSMACV's wing and supported. But that was as far as the military command would go in adjusting to the special needs of the "new kind of strategy" that it was supposed to be implementing.
An entirely different pattern emerged in Malaya - one with more general application than the CORDS formula because of its simplicity and economy. After an initial period of groping and confusion, the British government established as part of the Briggs Plan, a unified command structure for all aspects of counterinsurgency which finally put the effort on a sound organizational basis and helped assure ultimate victory. (See Appendix D.)

The unification was accomplished by establishing a hierarchy of war executive committees, as they were called, extending from district level through the various states to the national level in the capital of Kuala Lumpur. Represented on these committees were the military, the police, the civilian government. A representative of the Police Special Branch also attended along with other officials as required. The committees met daily and made operational decisions. Independent operations by the military, for example, were not permitted except in rare cases. From the military point of view, the sacrifice of independence of action was virtually total and called for an unusual degree of willingness to submerge institutional prerogatives in a common approach. This was not done without some grumbling but on the whole the military response was loyal and cooperative.

The committees had a war-room and a few full-time personnel to maintain records, agendas and the like but on the whole the system functioned without a large bureaucratic apparatus to keep it going. This was in distinct contrast to CORDS which was forced to build a large staff to manage a large budget and many very sizeable programs. Although the problem in Malaya was much smaller, it is still a tribute to the British management style that the committee system established in Malaya was set up and operated with the expenditure of so few resources in overhead activities.

These two examples do not by any means exhaust the organizational possibilities. Each country faced with an insurgency will have to work out a different solution to the problem of unified management. In the Philippines, unification was not the result of organizational arrangements but stemmed from the fact that virtually the entire program was conducted out of the Department of National Defense headed by the energetic and
dedicated Ramon Magsaysay. Benefiting from the fact that the insurgency was limited in size and the Philippine government was also relatively small and compact, Magsaysay was able to keep all the threads in his own hands without becoming an obstruction to the smooth functioning of the counter-insurgency apparatus. He thus provided unified management at the national level in his own person. At the local level, the military commander was in charge.

In Thailand, on the other hand, a conscious effort was made to emulate the British pattern in Malaya with regional Civil-Police-Military (CPM) centers and national management undertaken by the Communist Suppression Operations Center (CSOC). After one operational season, however, this system was effectively abandoned because it removed troops from military control and thus appeared to threaten the careful balance of forces on which the military junta at the top of the government relied for stability. CSOC lost its command functions and was relegated to the role of a planning staff. Control of counterinsurgency operations reverted to the regional military commanders who were free to operate more or less as they pleased. Most of them ignored the CPM centers which they also commanded and relied on their own staffs and on such intelligence as the military was able to collect on the enemy.

What the Analyst Should Look For

The existence of a system of unified management is readily enough determined, there normally being no reason for keeping it a secret. The analyst will be interested in establishing how comprehensive it is, whether or not it is merely a system for "coordinating" various agency activities by negotiation and agreement or whether it has been given genuine powers to command. If so, has it also been granted a staff to provide continuity and follow-up? If unified management does not exist, what are the prospects for establishing it?

If a complete system of unified management appears to exist, it is still necessary to probe into its workings to make certain that the appearance corresponds to reality and it is not merely a facade with each agency still pursuing its own goals. It is also possible to be deceived by
the absence of any formal apparatus of management. As we have seen, given
the right leadership and concepts, unified management is possible without a
formal organizational structure.

E. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

By the term political framework we mean the political system for which
the government speaks, on which it bases its appeal for public support and
its claim to legitimacy as the vehicle for the expression of national
aspirations and ethos.

All governments make such claims and all insurgencies challenge those
claims, advancing themselves as the legitimate alternative to the regime
which they maintain is illegitimate. In countries with a democratic
system, the government's most effective answer to such a challenge is to
point to the fact that it achieved power by the choice of the majority of
the population. The usual response of the insurgency is that the election
was not an honest reflection of the people's will and that it was rigged to
favor the powers that control the government. Some left-wing insurgencies,
in fact, will go so far as to explicitly reject democratic practices and
principles as a sham and a fraud. This is the actual communist position on
that subject although parties out of power usually avoid espousing it
openly.

In countries with democratic systems which have been challenged in
these terms the effective response is to make sure that the system is
working properly. A good example is the Philippines where the charge was
not only made but also believed by much of the public that the national
elections of 1949 had been fraudulent and that the government of President
Quirino was illegitimate. For the mid-term elections in 1951, Ramon
Magsaysay, then Secretary of Defense, devised a scheme by which the
military, assisted by ROTC students, would supervise the polls, guard the
ballot boxes and make certain in various ways that the count was honest.
This was done and the public accepted the results as a true reflection of
public opinion, a view supported by the fact that the opposition party won
most of the contests. Many observers look on the 1951 election as the turning point of the insurgency. (See Appendix F.) It undermined one of the most effective of the insurgents' appeals and firmly established the government's legitimacy in the public mind.

The legitimacy of the government's power was also a major theme of the Venezuelan counterinsurgency in the early 1960's. As the first democratically elected President in many decades, President Romulo Betancourt hammered away in his speeches on the fact that he had a legitimate claim to speak for the people and at the importance of firmly establishing democratic continuity in Venezuela and assuring a democratic succession when his term was ended. The insurgents played into his hands by attempting to prevent the voting from taking place. They appeared not to appreciate the appeal of democratic practice to a population tired of government by coup d'etat and enjoying the long-delayed benefits of political competition channeled into peaceful and orderly processes.

An interesting and successful political transition took place in Malaya which was a British colony when the insurgency began and an independent constitutional monarchy when it ended. In order to reach this goal while at the same time effectively combatting the insurgency, the British negotiated some exceedingly difficult political terrain but were aided by the emergence of able native political leaders, both Chinese and Malay. What took great skill was the timing of the various steps involved, not pushing too fast or too slow for the emerging native leadership. The contrast between the delicacy and skill of this operation and the abject abandonment to the Communists of Aden and South Yemen by another British government a few years later (1967) is striking.

It was the fall of South Yemen to the Communists that prepared the way for the left-wing insurgency in neighboring Oman. Here, the British did not flinch from firmly resisting the insurgency nor did they perceive any need to launch a democratic experiment in the unlikely terrain of Western Arabia. The Sultanate of Muscat and Oman was a traditional absolute monarchy to which the population was accustomed. It was accepted as entirely legitimate, although the Dhofari, who lived in the affected
province and are ethnically distinct from other Omani, did oppose central authority and aspire to autonomy. Qaboos made no political concessions and his British advisers saw no need for any. But he emphasized his commitment to Islam, an effective issue in view of the insurgents' opposition to religion, and stressed his concern for the welfare of his people. He started programs to build mosques and schools, dig wells and build roads in the Dhofar, where his predecessors had undertaken little development. This very simple political framework was well-suited to the situation in Oman as demonstrated by the favorable outcome.

The point that clearly emerges is that no single formula suffices in determining the efficacy of a given political framework in an insurgency situation. Much depends on the historical background, the political culture of the concerned population and the political skills of the leadership. Americans are prejudiced in favor of a democratic framework but in some situations it is difficult if not impossible for democracy to flourish. This appears to have been the case in South Vietnam, where our government made strenuous efforts to launch a democratic system but ultimately failed. The reasons are complex but two stand out: the absence of political leadership with the requisite skills and the lack of experience or education in democratic practice and principles on the part of the vast majority of the population - the peasants. The notion of the secret ballot as a key to political power was not self-evident to the peasant and had little persuasive power. Far more important in securing his support would have been a political system which made an effort to treat him respectfully, to meet his fundamental needs and to deal effectively with his local security problem. A government with such qualities, even lacking democratic credentials, would have had more success in Vietnam in persuading the population that it had "the mandate of heaven" and was deserving of support than the existing one or the democratic ones the Americans proposed. The Saigon regime had a democratic facade behind which lay arbitrary rule by men who appeared to be complete outsiders and whose approach to the peasant society was frequently abusive and exploitive.
The Thai example offers an interesting contrast. Although no more democratic than the military rulers of Vietnam, the military rulers of Thailand benefited from a traditional political framework which still maintained a strong hold over popular loyalties both in the countryside and in the cities. This was a combination of the hereditary monarchy, Buddhism and a clear image in most people's minds of a "Thai way of life" built around these institutions. At various times the government has experimented with democracy but has yet to work out a formula which satisfies Thai peculiarities and this effort so far has had only superficial and partially successful results. In spite of this, however, the traditional political framework has sufficed for nearly 20 years to thwart the Thai Communist Party's attempt to gain support for an entirely different political approach.

What the Analyst Should Look For

Establishing the outlines of the political framework on which a government bases its appeals and its claim to legitimacy is sometimes straightforward and simple, and sometimes not. If the government is a functioning democracy, the matter tends to be fairly simple for much of political life takes place in full public view. In the more likely case, democratic processes are partial or non-existent and the analyst must fall back on other kinds of evidence. In this effort, he is going to have to familiarize himself with the traditional political culture of the country, not only in the cities but in the countryside as well. If he can travel to such areas, he should; in any case, he needs to develop sources who have studied such matters and have well-grounded views. More important is to establish whether familiar and long-lasting patterns in the countryside are changing and if so, in what way.

The political framework will not be adequately covered, or, in fact, covered at all, in normal intelligence reporting. It calls for the analyst to develop his own expertise based on reading, interviews and immersion in the mores and culture of the society he is studying.
F. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND ENVIRONMENT

Often in less-developed areas the remote rural regions are virtually ignored by the government. Few services are provided by the government and little is asked of the peasantry. If insurgency is launched in such areas, the government is not in a good position to respond effectively until it takes some action to provide more responsive administration and help to the people.

Thailand has been one of the insurgency-threatened countries to take serious and effective action to improve its rural administration, often with US aid. An Accelerated Rural Development Program financed by the US began in 1964 to provide equipment and build new staff capabilities in the offices of provinced governors who, until then, had had virtually no staffs or resources of their own. This enabled the provinces to build roads and other public works and later to improve health services, provide water and much more. Meantime, on their own initiative, the Thai established a new academy for the training of district chiefs and later of assistant district chiefs, created a Community Development Department and other agencies to help the peasants.

In South Vietnam, one of the most productive aspects of the post-Tet 1968 expansion of pacification was the build-up of local governments' capability. This began with the decision to grant villages the right to elect their own governing councils which, in turn, elected a village chief. Control of local defense forces was vested in the village chief, the position of deputy chief for security was created as well as deputy chief for administration and a secretariat assisting village officials to handle their paperwork. The same decrees allotted each village one million piastres annually for development projects and established a training school for village officials through which no fewer than 17,000 passed in 1969 alone. Although it is difficult to trace any direct link between such activity and success in counterinsurgency, there is no doubt that such programs, together with the energetic land reform undertaken by President
Thieu, played a role in the considerable improvement in the pacification picture recorded between 1968 and 1971.

In Colombia, on the other hand, there are some indications in the rather thin material available to us that serious flaws in local government arrangements may be one of the reasons for the persistence over decades of low-level left-wing insurgency in that country. Colombian local government is often dominated by cliques comparable to the "courthouse gangs" familiar in the US. These cliques divert resources granted by the national government for community development to their own private purposes, depriving most of the population of the benefits intended to improve local conditions. 9

Closely allied to improvement in administration are programs to improve the rural environment. The effort in Vietnam was particularly extensive, involving large expenditures for schools, public health programs and agricultural development. The latter virtually transformed the countryside and greatly improved the farmer's return from his land. Throughout the South Vietnamese countryside, yields improved from the introduction of new strains of so-called "miracle rice," and of large amounts of fertilizer and pesticides. Motors for pumps increased the availability of water, fish-ponds were dug and stocked in every backyard, new markets were built in the towns and new roads made them more accessible.

Similar improvements became apparent in Thailand although the programs were not as massive and were spread out over a longer time. In Malaya, the British approach to counterinsurgency put somewhat less emphasis on material improvements in the environment, although efforts were made. Indeed, the entire "New Village" program amounted to a substantial improvement in the lives of the Chinese squatters who were forcibly removed to new homes behind barbed wire, although such was not the main purpose of the British in forcing their removal. That purpose was to separate them from the insurgency and cut off the latter's sources of information, food and other supply. (See Appendix D.) Nevertheless, the standard of living of the squatters was considerably improved by the move. They now lived in
communities with electricity and water, with schools and health and police services, all of which were unknown to them before.

When this became apparent, the rural Malay population began to complain of neglect in spite of their loyalty to the government. In response the government formed a Rural Industrial Development Authority to carry out a small-scale development in the countryside. Similar efforts on a smaller scale were made in Oman by the Dhofar Development Department.

In contrast, we find little of that type of activity in countries without major foreign assistance programs. Many of the counterinsurgencies in our list of cases, especially in Latin America, were, in fact, rather short-lived, leaving little time or opportunity for serious efforts to improve the environment. Moreover, some were conducted by governments which had no interest in such programs, their approach being largely coercive. In Venezuela, however, the Betancourt administration came to power with a commitment to land reform and to other measures to improve the economic status of the peasantry, such as easy credit, technical assistance and the like. Such activity bound a large majority of the peasantry to the Accion Democratica administration and was of great importance in preventing the insurgency from gaining widespread rural support. Similarly, in the Philippines, under the very broad civic action concepts of Magsaysay, lawyers from the Adjutant-General's office of the Army were assigned to defend peasant suits in the land courts. Then, after Magsaysay became President in 1953, he proceeded with several important national measures to improve conditions of land tenure and provide other forms of assistance to the peasants. These programs came into force after the back of the insurgency had been broken but no doubt they helped in the lengthy mopping-up process.

What the Analyst Should Look For

Government programs to improve local administration and economic conditions are never kept secret. The difficulty may come in ascertaining how well they are being executed and what their true impact may be. To ascertain such effects is the task of the political and economic section of the Embassy and their reporting will be an important source for the
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analyst. If possible, he should also travel to the affected areas to see for himself what conditions are and the nature of the problems the government may be trying to deal with. Open sources in the form of press reports and academic studies both of local and foreign origin will also be useful. The key task will always be to determine the reality of rural conditions as against the picture the government may be trying to project.

G. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

All regimes that attempt to govern by the rule of law are faced with a dilemma when confronted with a serious insurgency. Most modern legal systems provide safeguards for those accused of crimes—summed up in the concepts of habeas corpus and due process—which are exploited by the insurgents to delay or prevent legal action against them. In most such cases, after a period during which it becomes clear that standard legal safeguards are being exploited by men determined to overthrow the entire system, exceptional measures are taken, setting aside the safeguards on the grounds that the survival of the entire system is at stake. Martial law may be declared which has the effect of shunting all security cases into the military justice system and suspending some or all constitutional guarantees of freedom of expression, assembly and some types of political activity.

The British school of counterinsurgency lays considerable stress first on the need for emergency legal measures and second on the equally important need that these measures be limited, carefully applied and only as extensive as necessary. It is also essential, in this view, that these exceptional measures be applied fairly and justly to all elements of society and that no exceptions be made for individuals of influence or particular ethnic or religious groups. The legal framework of the British counterinsurgency in Malaya exemplified these qualities in an impressive fashion. In 1948 (with substantial amendments and extensions in 1949 and 1953) Emergency Regulations were promulgated setting aside under precisely stated conditions, the rights of habeas corpus and due process and limiting
in many other ways the rights and freedoms of citizens if they were sus-
pected of supporting or lending aid to the Communist guerillas. These
regulations eventually totalled 169 pages of detailed instructions to the
authorities letting them know exactly how far they could go and what pro-
ceedures were to be followed in place of pre-existing processes.

The rationale behind this approach is explained by Sir Robert Thompson
in these words:

"There is nothing to prevent a government enacting very
tough laws to cope with the situation, but the golden rule should
be that each new law must be effective and must be fairly
applied...Some very tough laws were enacted in Malaya...laws
imposing strict curfews, a mandatory death penalty for carrying
arms, life imprisonment for providing supplies or other support
for terrorists, restricted residence or detention for suspected
terrorist supporters...The main point about them is that they
were seen by the population to be effective and were applied
equally to all. The population knew what the law was, and
because the government itself functioned in accordance with law
and could be held responsible in the courts for its actions, the
population could be required to fulfill its own obligation to
obey the laws."10

Moreover, the Emergency Regulations in Malaya also included safeguards
against abuse, such as a periodic review of all detention orders by an
independent commission. Their effort was limited to specific "black" areas
and when a "black" area was determined to be secure, it was declared
"white," which meant that the Emergency Regulations were no longer in
force. The British were determined to avoid giving the public the
impression that the regime they were living under was, in fact, lawless, a
"government of men, not laws." To have such an impression created blurs
the distinction between the insurgents and the threatened regime, causes a
feeling of helplessness among ordinary citizens and makes the insurgency,
with its promises of "liberation" and "freedom," more attractive than it
would otherwise be.

Similar principles were attempted in South Vietnam but failed because
of poor implementation. Suspected violators of security laws were tried by
military tribunals or were subject to detention by administrative order
under a system known as an "anti." The suspect's file was submitted to a commission which sentenced him or freed him after reviewing the facts in the file with no open trial required. The purpose was to avoid the necessity of producing witnesses, usually secret intelligence agents, in open court. Like many other well-intentioned policies in Vietnam, it was seriously abused in practice. Torture was used to obtain confessions, huge backlogs of cases built up and were relieved by simply turning prisoners loose in order to make room for new ones. Moreover, while innocent persons languished in detention awaiting disposition of their cases, dangerous numbers of the VC infrastructure obtained release by simply slipping a payoff to a policeman.

Another problem in Vietnam was the fact that the legal system was a hasty patchwork of laws left over from the French together with decrees and other changes by successive regimes either superceding or amending the French laws. The totality was never codified into a single coherent system and in many cases the officials whose duty it was to enforce the laws did not even possess copies of them. Out of this chaos it was impossible to produce a "government of laws" and such a government did not exist in Vietnam, with the foreseeable consequence in terms of the citizens' respect for the law and for the government. (See Appendix J.)

In Venezuela, the Betancourt administration bent over backwards to prevent any suggestion of illegality and sacrificed valid counterinsurgency objectives to avoid weakening the government coalition or offending against an unwritten custom that granted unusual freedom to the opposition to oppose, even by illegal means. Later, Betancourt took advantage of the public outcry at some particularly atrocious acts of terrorism to suspend constitutional guarantees. He arrested and detained most of the leadership of the insurgency, including members of Congress who had exploited congressional immunity to act as couriers between Cuba and Venezuela. In all, various constitutional guarantees, including the inviolability of the mails, freedom of the press, freedom of movement and assembly and the right to public trial, were in suspension during 42 percent of Betancourt's term of office. Later, under President Leoni, they were restored and the
Communist Party itself was legalized after it pledged to abandon armed rebellion.

The remainder of our cases divide into examples of careful legal safeguards surrounding emergency procedures as in the cases of the Philippines and Colombia or lawlessness leading to failure, as in Cuba and Nicaragua. The exception is Guatemala (see Appendix C) where the government acted with little legal restraint but nevertheless prevailed, at least for the time being.

What the Analyst Should Look For

The matter of determining the legal framework of a counter-insurgency is reasonably straightforward if the government is attempting to observe the laws itself. In such cases, the questions involved are discussed and debated openly and the facts are generally known. Still, the analyst will want to know if the security and legal arms of the government are actually carrying out its avowed policies. This is a more difficult matter to ascertain but should be accessible from political and intelligence reporting.

In the situation where the government itself behaves in a lawless manner, the facts may be more difficult to establish and intelligence reports as well as accounts in the US and foreign press, proceedings before international forums (UN, OAS, etc.) may be of value. Interviews with returned travelers or refugees may also provide useful material.

* * * * *

We have now completed our presentation and discussion of the most important courses of action and lines of approach -14 in all - which comprise the principal elements of most counterinsurgency programs. Our goal of providing a framework for analysts which they can use to produce a valid prediction of success or failure, however, has not yet been reached. There remain additional factors such as foreign aid, which must be taken into account and further aspects of methodology which must be described and discussed. They will be addressed in the fourth and final chapter of this study.
FOOTNOTES FOR CHAPTER III


In this final chapter we will discuss several remaining factors which, in addition to the 14 courses of action and lines of approach described in Chapters II and III, will have to be taken into consideration by the analyst in preparing his predictive assessment. These comprise two factors exogenous to but nevertheless important for the government's counter-insurgency activity, namely the character and effectiveness of the insurgent side and the matter of foreign aid. Also included is one endogenous factor, namely the relative weights to be assigned to the different courses of action. Finally, we will suggest a way of putting together the methodology to produce a usable product in the form of a valid assessment of the probable outcome.

A. THE INSURGENT SIDE

Up to this point virtually our entire emphasis has been on the government's activities and capabilities. But an assessment attempting to predict outcomes must, quite obviously, also take into account the general character and especially the strengths and weaknesses of the insurgent side. Although this rather large subject was not part of the brief for this study and it will not be possible to discuss it in detail, we will outline what appear to us to be the main points the analyst will have to inform himself on. In passing we note that there is a sizeable literature on Communist insurgencies, including several studies by Farid Abolfathi especially prepared to assist analysts of the subject.¹

The first point to note is that insurgencies vary very greatly in competence. To cite a few extreme examples, the authors place the Vietnamese Communist organization at the very top of the list while the Che Guevara effort in Bolivia certainly ranks among the most incompetent ever attempted. The Lao Dong Party of Ho Chi Minh developed into an extremely supple, tough but flexible instrument which was able to survive and emerge
victorious after 30 years of war and political conflict against very much more powerful enemies. Its military arm acquired a mastery of the tactics of guerilla warfare and devised many new methods and techniques of that style of fighting. It was a thoroughly sophisticated bureaucracy, among its other qualities, and it had a superb understanding of the mentality and culture of the Vietnamese peasant. It also had a good grasp of the domestic political realities of its two western enemies, France and the United States. These qualities would appear to owe a good deal to Ho Chi Minh himself.

On the other hand, the fiasco of Che Guevara's abortive attempt to duplicate in Bolivia the Castro/Guevara success in Cuba (1967) was lacking in all these important qualities and several more. Guevara knew little about Bolivia, not recognizing at all that that country had already had a successful revolution in the 1950's led by Paz Estenssoro. He apparently did not understand that the Bolivian government was not a mere cabal of military thugs, as Batista's regime had been in Cuba, or that the Indian peasants of the operating area he selected were deeply suspicious of all Spanish-speaking outsiders. He had little support structure in the country and only the minimum of contact with the Bolivian Communist Party, whose opinions he did not seek.²

In between these two extremes, there are many gradations. The Chinese Communist Party was clearly a superior organization whereas the Yemeni who sponsored the revolt in Oman had so limited an understanding of the culture of the people among whom they worked that they propagandized against Islam and attempted by force to make their recruits renounce Allah. We also have to credit the Sandinistas, the Malay Communist Party of Chin Peng and the Philippine Communists with considerable competence and understanding of their people whereas the Communist Parties of Thailand, of Venezuela and Colombia had a limited grasp of the popular psychology and little tactical or organizational competence.

In spite of Communist theories to the contrary, the records of these parties illustrate the importance of personal qualities in the leadership of social and political movements. It is impossible to understand the
success of the Chinese, Vietnamese and Cuba Communists without reference to the leadership of Mao Tse-Tung, Ho Chi Minh and Fidel Castro or the inadequacies of their opponents: Chiang Kai-Shek, Ngo Dinh Diem, Nguyen Van Thieu and Fulgencio Batista. It is therefore of considerable importance for the analyst to acquire some understanding of the qualities of leadership of the insurgency he is studying as well as its organizational competence and its understanding of the psychology of the population among whom it is attempting to work.

It goes almost without saying that the analyst must also have a clear understanding of the type of insurgency he is dealing with, whether politically organized in the pattern established by the Chinese and Vietnamese Communists, or of the foco type as in Cuba and so many other countries of Latin-America in the 1960's and 1970's. In some cases he will find that the insurgency is a hybrid as in Venezuela, where the Communists and their allies divided their efforts between urban terrorism and rural guerrilla activity. It is also possible for an insurgent organization to evolve from one type to another as seems to have happened in Nicaragua where the Sandinistas moved in some rural areas from foco style to an approach based on preparatory organization. A related question is the identity of foreign patrons and models, since their identity will also be reflected in the strategy the insurgency follows. This leads to the matter of foreign aid, both material and in political and propaganda support. The latter, of course, is an intelligence requirement that is always important to have answered.

As mentioned earlier, the leaders of some Communists insurgencies have demonstrated a marked talent for generating external political support, not only among fraternal Communist Parties and governments but also in the political arenas of the free world where they have easy access to the media and where organizations exist that are happy to adopt their cause. The political turmoil within the US over the Vietnam War was played on brilliantly by the Vietnamese Communists with a powerful eventual impact on the outcome of the war. Similarly, Fidel Castro, by the simple tactic of inviting the famous New York Times correspondent Herbert Matthews to his
hideout in the Sierra Maestra mountains and persuading him that his guerilla movement was far larger and more important than it actually was, pulled off a political and propaganda master-stroke. Until that point, Batista had persuaded most of the world that Castro was dead, his group annihilated and that, in any case it had been entirely insignificant. These efforts have not been limited to the US. Political activity in Western Europe, particularly among the large Socialist Parties there, was important to the cause of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua; de Gaulle ultimately decided to pull out of Algeria partly in response to internal opposition in France played on by the Algerian independence movement and Britain's abandonment of Aden in 1967 was partly the result of domestic political pressures exploited by the Aden and South Yemen Communists. When insurgent leaders have the requisite skills and understanding of how the western media function, they have a powerful tool to advance their cause at home by manipulating opinion overseas.

Another question for the analyst to answer is whether insurgent activity demonstrates a competent grasp of guerilla tactics or whether, for example, the insurgents are occasionally trapped into attempting to defend base areas against superior forces. This latter is always a temptation, one to which Castro succumbed at one point, almost suffering a serious defeat as a result. The temptation lies in the fact that often a developed base area with workshops, hospitals, supply dumps and rest and recreation and training facilities, is the product of years of painful effort which the insurgents cannot duplicate quickly and hate to lose. The insurgent model here is Mao Tse-Tung's decision to abandon his large base area in Kiangsi in South Central China in 1934. There the Communists had established a "Soviet" with its own government and army. Under attack from several sides by superior government forces, Mao abandoned the Kiangsi base and led his army and party cohorts on the "Long March" to Shensi province in the Northwest. Although accomplished at great cost, it turned out to be a tactical master-stroke for Mao's cause and a model of good guerilla tactics and strategy.
What are the appeals of the insurgency and do they demonstrate a good understanding of popular grievances and aspirations? Probably the most effective of all propaganda themes for an insurgency is nationalism, for which it is possible sometimes to substitute ethnic or regional aspirations. Nationalism proved immensely powerful in China against the Japanese and in Vietnam against the French and the Americans. Anti-American propaganda by the Philippine insurgents, on the other hand, had little impact, the average Filipino having considerable respect and even affection for the Americans. Other important themes are land reform to satisfy "land hunger" and other basic anti-government appeals if the government is considered corrupt and exploitive by sectors of the population. All of these can be handled well or poorly, depending on the insurgent leadership's sensitivity to popular attitudes. An example of poor handling was in evidence in Venezuela where Cuban support for the Communists and the latter's praises of Cuba created a vulnerability instead of a strength. The government was quick to exploit Venezuelan national pride against the insurgency and its dependence on Cuba.

The matter of exploiting grievances to build popular support for an insurgency is complicated by the Communists' virtual abandonment in recent decades of the Leninist principle which counsels the need to await the development of a "revolutionary situation" (see Chapter I; Section A) before launching revolutionary activity. In the present state of Communist thinking on these matters, it seems that insurgents are not required to await the correct combination of events to give them their opening and so, in some cases, grievances have to be manufactured to supply a justification for armed violence. Something like this has been the case in Thailand, the Philippines, Bolivia and elsewhere.

A final point to note is the quality of the insurgent organization. Is it well coordinated and disciplined and does it motivate and inspire its recruits to ignore the odds, willingly sacrifice themselves to the cause and, if so, is it able to continue to do so even after many setbacks? In this regard it would be difficult to match the achievement of the party of
Ho Chi Minh which can serve as a model and a basis of comparison for the analyst.

If the analyst is able to answer most of these questions, he is well on his way to developing a sound understanding of the quality of the insurgency and the seriousness of the threat it poses to the government. How he might fit this into his assessment of the government's chances of success will be discussed at a later point.

B. THE MATTER OF FOREIGN AID

In many insurgencies both the government and its opponents have had the benefit of some foreign assistance. For the analyst of counter-insurgencies, the question poses itself in this form: are there deficiencies on the government side which are susceptible to redress by the insertion of foreign resources? The answer depends on the deficiencies, for some can be cured by foreign aid and some cannot be. In general, these weaknesses which stem from inexperience, lack of funds or properly qualified personnel are susceptible of redress by external aid from countries with the necessary funds, technical expertise and equipment. Aid of this kind can help with very simple problems, for example, the supply of combat radios and training of technicians to operate and repair them, or more complex ones up to and including institution-building. An example of the latter would be the building or rebuilding of an entire police force, providing manuals of standard operating procedure, training in implementing the manuals, complete police communications networks, filing and modern retrieval systems, vehicles and vehicle maintenance, recruitment, training and career development for police constables and officers and so forth. The US, France, Great Britain and other European countries, especially when they had foreign colonies, have carried out such institution-building on a large-scale and over long periods of time.

Doing the same in a critical insurgency situation is more difficult but given adequate resources and the willingness to expend them it is usually possible to provide the aid and assure that it is properly used.
Successful examples include the US and Chilean police programs in Venezuela and the US Special Forces program to assist the Colombian army to train Ranger units at the Colombian Escuela de Lanceros. In some situations, in addition to supply of equipment and training either in technical skills or more general training of the military in a new way of fighting, foreign countries have provided both combat and staff advice, stationing advisers with military units in active combat down to battalion level or below. The same sort of advice has been provided to police units and intelligence services and other institutions of a threatened government. This type of advisory program was conducted by the US on a massive scale in Vietnam and also in Laos, Thailand and Cambodia. It is again being tried in El Salvador, although on a more modest scale than in Southeast Asia in the 1960's and 1970's.

In other words a foreign aid program for counterinsurgencies is certainly possible and has been carried out with success in many insurgency-threatened countries. There are definite limits, however, to what foreign aid can accomplish. Experience shows that these limits emerge very quickly when the insertion of foreign aid-cum-advice involves the more intimate aspects of the internal affairs of another country, most particularly matters that concern the distribution of power, wealth and status within the society being aided. The relationship of patron and client by no means gives the government providing the aid the ability to force changes that the client government perceives as threatening to its hold on power. In these matters the aiding government can argue, try to persuade and even threaten to withhold its aid unless its wishes are met, but it cannot force change. If at the same time, the client-government is also in an insurgency-generated crisis to which it might succumb, the aiding government faces a serious dilemma which, at least when the US was involved, was solved by giving way on the matters at issue.

What are the changes that are likely to be perceived by the threatened government as undermining its hold on power? If it is a government dominated by a military clique that governs by buying off the in-group of
military commanders with choice assignments without regard to their competence or even their honesty, then it will resist the essential reforms that are necessary before any amount of external aid can turn its army into a professional and effective counterinsurgency force. In this context "professional" is the opposite of "politicized." Professionalism of the military is the absolute sine qua non if the army is to perform up to the necessary standards. At the same time, professionalization, which means assigning and promoting officers on the basis of merit in the performance of their military duties, threatens to undermine the political base of the regime, leaving it without the support of the senior officers who keep it in power. The changes in the direction of professionalization will therefore be resisted with a desperation born of fear. In this event, the aiding government is likely to find that it can do little to change the situation using only the normal diplomatic tools of persuasion. If this combination of circumstances exists, and it is not uncommon, the analyst will be well-advised to give it serious attention.

The most obvious example of the problem here outlined is Vietnam and the long, costly and fruitless effort of the US to convert the RVNAF into a simulacrum of the US armed forces -- professional, technically skilled, well-trained and well-led. In spite of persistent efforts by advisers at all levels of the system and massive training programs both in Vietnam and the US, not to mention unstinting material aid, the United States, which provided the Vietnamese armed forces every shoe and shoelace it required, every bullet and brass button, every weapon up to and including jet aircraft, failed entirely to convert it into a professional armed force. With certain honorable exceptions, it remained poorly-led, riddled with corruption and committed first and foremost to the power and prosperity of its favored officers. Very similar experiences were undergone in Cambodia, with tragic results. In Thailand where, due to the weakness of the insurgency, survival fortunately did not depend on the armed forces, the US, despite years of trying and hundreds of millions in military aid, never succeeded in persuading the Royal Thai Army to establish a central training facility, to rotate officers regularly to and from the combat areas,
to establish a uniform career system immune from politics, or to centralize the counterinsurgency command. All of these reforms were inconvenient, interfered with the untroubled enjoyment of their status by the senior officers or risked destabilizing the careful balance which kept the ruling group in power and so were successfully resisted.

The limits of intervention do not apply only to the armed forces. If the aiding government perceives the need for reforms which are redistributive of wealth or power in the client economy or political system then it must be prepared for desperate resistance and probable failure. Taxation of the wealthy, serious land reform, democratic political processes, these are some of the more common issues in which the aiding government is likely to see the need of liberalizing change in order to undercut the appeals of a left-wing insurgency and build the government's popular support. In some cases, the patron will find its pressures answered with token compliance, particularly in respect to political reform, elections and the like. A military junta with full control of the government's legal and political processes as well as the important public media, has many devices it can use to rig an apparently free election. Similarly with land reform, which is a complex matter placing heavy demands on the bureaucracy for persistent and skilled implementation of the intricacies of the reform legislation. There are many opportunities available to the client government to appear to bend while actually yielding very little in substance.

An analogous but rather different problem arises in situations where what is called for is an innovative approach tailored to the special requirements of counterinsurgency combat. In such situations, the question the analyst must ask is whether the government providing the aid is capable of giving the appropriate kind of advice and assistance. In this regard we have in mind unconventional military tactics focused on population security and control verses conventional tactics aimed at overwhelming the enemy armed force with superior firepower. As discussed in Chapter II with special attention to the example of the US in Vietnam, the latter approach is unavailing against a skilled insurgency practised in the tactics of guerilla warfare. Aiding countries will vary in the degree to which their
own armed forces are capable of making the adjustment. It is a difficult one, demanding the abandonment of many of the elementary principles drilled into students at military schools and reinforced throughout a conventional officer's career. Some types of specialized units will be better able to make the adjustment than the regular infantry. Thus, in the case of the US, the Special Forces are better qualified to advise foreign armies on counterguerrilla tactics and have been used in that way with some success. When large American forces are committed, as in Vietnam, the Special Forces tend, however, to be shunted aside to lesser tasks while the regular military hierarchy assumes control, not always with reassuring results.

What it comes down to is that, in certain circumstances, the aiding government may not be capable of providing the correct kind of advice and may only accomplish, at considerable expense, a muddying of the situation. The effect may summed up by referring to the classification system outlined in Chapter I namely, "an inconsistent coercive effort," leading to failure.

These then are the main areas in which distinct limits emerge to constrain the ability of a patron government to bring about significant change or reform in the internal arrangements of a client regime. The limits relate to the internal power arrangements of the regime being aided or to the constraints imposed by bureaucratic inertia within the services of the aiding government. Under modern patterns of relations between states—specifically the end of the age of colonialism and the rise of the age of the United Nations—the aiding nation is severely constrained by international convention from directly inserting its power into those internal arrangements which bear most heavily on the ability of a threatened regime to contain and defeat a left-wing insurgency. These complex problems must be kept in the forefront of the analyst's awareness in assessing the possibility that foreign aid will serve as a deus ex machina riding to the rescue of a threatened regime.
C. RELATIVE WEIGHTS

The foundation of our proposed analytical framework consists of 14 different courses of action and lines of approach, 7 of which relate to military activities and 7 to non-military. Clearly they cannot all be equally important and we owe the analysts some guidance on the relative weight to be attached to each. Equally clearly their relative importance cannot be dealt with mechanically, simply by assigning a number signifying the weight of each factor. The first consideration to be nailed down by the analyst relates to the seriousness of the threat, its depth and extensiveness throughout society. Is it comparable, for example to the menace of the tough, pervasive, well-led Vietnamese Lao Dong Party or even to the Greek Communist Party at the start of the Civil War there? Or - at the other end of the scale - does it resemble the Thai Communist Party or the Omani DIF with a limited hold on peripheral minority groups removed from the mainstream of society and with untested, inexperienced leadership?

If the threat is limited in extensiveness throughout the society and in depth within important political groups, then clearly the government will not be obliged to develop a fully-fledged counterinsurgency program encompassing all 14 of the actions, behaviors and programs discussed in Chapters II and III. Conversely, a serious, pervasive threat will obviously demand a more elaborate response.

A left-wing insurgency will nevertheless require at a minimum an effective military or police response or, to use the terminology explained in Chapter I, "a precise coercive effort." In numerous examples, notably against an outbreak in the foco pattern, nothing more has been required. We discuss one such example, the case of Peru, in the introduction to the Appendices. Many others could have been selected for discussion. They occurred throughout Latin America from Panama to Bolivia, Argentina and Uruguay. All illustrate the same point: prompt, energetic and reasonably professional military or police operations will suffice if the insurgency is of the foco type, is caught at the embryonic stage and then pursued without relaxation until it is wrapped up.
More serious problems will have to be confronted, however, if political organization has preceded the outbreak of active insurgency. If such is the case, the government side will have to consider other actions above and beyond a coercive response consisting merely of small-scale military or police operations. At this point, additional factors in our list of 14 assume growing importance; on the military side, the government must begin to look to such matters as troop behavior, civic action and the organization of a militia; on the non-military side to a coordinated intelligence system, a political framework with convincing legitimacy in the minds of the population and so on. If the insurgency has been able to ramify its activities throughout the society and to achieve a hold in some depth among major groups (peasants, students, intellectuals, etc.), then action will be required on the entire list of major factors.

A further consideration relates to the general priority which must be given to the establishment of security in the affected areas. Without an adequately secure environment nothing else the government attempts in the way of civic action, land reform or other rural improvements, or, for example, actions to strengthen its legitimacy through elections, will succeed. It is both notorious and true that left-wing insurgents will not spare activities of the government aimed at improving conditions, even such apparently innocent and constructive facilities as schools and dispensaries or election booths. By definition, anything the government is involved in is subject to destructive attack. The calculation of the insurgents in cases of apparently constructive government activities targeted for attack, is that whatever popularity may be lost by blowing up a school is balanced off by the demonstrative effect of this action in terms of insurgent power and ruthlessness and in highlighting the government's inability to protect the people.

These activities on our list that are indispensable for the establishment of security therefore have an absolute priority over the others. No matter how minimal the threat, the government's forces must be well-led, professional in their methods and able to deploy unconventionally. The object lesson is the abject failure of Batista's 40,000 man army against
about 300 competent, well-led guerrillas. We therefore give priority to the first two factors on our list of government counterinsurgency activities, namely leadership which in effect means professionalism (versus its opposite, politicization) and unconventional tactics (versus their opposite, conventional tactics emphasizing concentration of forces and firepower against the enemy armed forces). A third factor is competent, coordinated military and police intelligence to guide the government units to their targets.

Turning to the next stage of difficulty, as soon as a politically organized insurgency reveals that it has achieved a hold on some significant element of the population, especially if it is located in the countryside where the government is very likely seen as a remote and hostile eminence and where the military confronts many difficulties, then other factors, both military and non-military, come into play. Let us take as an example a hypothetical case in which the insurgents have begun Phase II operations and have demonstrated a hold on some rural areas where minorities or isolated groups have grievances against the government. The insurgents seem to be expanding their popular base and increasing the size and armament of their fighting units. Thailand, Oman and Colombia at the start of the counterinsurgency effort all fit that pattern. At this point, the government would be well-advised, in addition to the three activities already cited, to look to its political framework, i.e., its popular standing in terms of legitimacy, the capability of its police forces to maintain law and order, its ability to control the military and to assure itself that political factors will receive their due weight in military operations. It also should begin civic action and rural improvement programs in the affected areas. These activities constitute the minimum required for effective counterinsurgency in the circumstances described. They are only a minimum, however. Other courses of action may also be advisable - psychological operations, for example, or carefully targeted air operations - depending on the situation and the government's capabilities.
Finally, we come to the case in which the insurgency has influence or control in more sizeable areas, a foothold in several important social or economic groups and is able to deploy company-sized units. At that point the entire range of 14 activities must be addressed with urgency. They have been selected and discussed because they are all important, at least at the stage described.

We have thus outlined three orders of relative importance or priority. They are:

(1) **Priority I**

(a) Professionalized and therefore competent military forces with good leadership.

(b) Unconventional military tactics.

(c) Competent, coordinated military, police and other intelligence operations. (Combines two courses of action treated separately in Chapters II and III.)

(2) **Priority II**

(a) Sound political framework with convincing claims to legitimacy.

(b) Police forces capable of maintaining law and order and enforcing emergency regulations.

(c) Political-military relations assigning unchallenged authority to the political leadership to control military operations.

(d) Correct military behavior toward the population combined with civic action and the development of government programs to improve rural conditions. (Combines two courses of action treated separately in Chapter II and III.)

(3) The remaining five activities on our list: air and naval operations, development of a popular militia, development of unified management for counterinsurgency, an appropriate legal framework whose implementation is perceived as fair.

This assignment of priorities is intended to be suggestive rather than rigid and non-adjustable. Much will depend on the details of the situation.
in the country, and its government's status and capabilities. If the regime has been notoriously brutal and is considered illegitimate by the population, then its reform assumes importance equal to the three military factors assigned to Priority I, especially if the insurgency has managed to gain a popular foothold. If the police are competent while the military is not, then police operations may well be moved up in priority. The analyst must use his own judgement, therefore, in assigning relative weights among the 14 courses of action and lines of approach, keeping in mind the fundamental importance of population security and the strength and pervasiveness of the insurgency.

D. PUTTING IT ALL TOGETHER

We have now completed our discussion of all the major factors which must be researched, analyzed and considered in order to make a predictive assessment of the likely outcome of a particular counterinsurgency effort. It remains at this point to suggest a method of putting all of these many factors together into the coherent and complete picture necessary if such a prediction is to be made with confidence.

1. Step One

The first step of the process is the fundamental matter of assessing the capabilities of the insurgency. The factors to be considered are those described in the first section of this chapter: the nature, size and strategy of the insurgent movement, the quality of its leadership, its appeals and the skill with which they are projected both at home and overseas, the quality of its organization and the competence of its military leadership in guerilla tactics. The answers to these questions will establish the dimension of the threat and thus the requirements confronting the government in its effort to master it.

2. Step Two

The second step we suggest is to take a quick reading of the totality of the government's program, applying the scheme for classifying counterinsurgency described in Chapter I. The purpose is to define the...
main characteristics and thrust of the government's effort and the scope of the analyst's task. The importance of this step will vary with the seriousness of the threat and the complexity of its effort to counter it. In the case of a simple and limited threat, it may not be necessary to go through this step at all.

3. **Step Three**

The main burden of the work involved in applying the system will come in the third step which is to pursue research on all 14 courses of action and lines of approach until the analyst is satisfied that he has a clear and detailed picture of the government's entire effort and posture. No doubt, in some cases, he will find that not all of the 14 factors are relevant to the situation. Again, we repeat that the format we propose is not intended to be used rigidly without regard to the specific context. The analyst is expected to apply his own judgment to the utilization of the analytical framework and to modify it when the situation appears to call for modification. The important point to keep in mind is the goal of this step which is to acquire a complete picture in depth of all important aspects of the effort.

4. **Step Four**

At the point where he has completed step three to his own satisfaction, the analyst should have a good grasp of the major gaps and deficiencies in the program and posture of the government. Then, applying the scheme of priorities among government courses of action and the criteria for judging the capabilities of the insurgency, both discussed earlier in this chapter, he is in a position to determine the importance of the gaps and deficiencies. If they appear unimportant when measured against these other factors then he is in a position, without the need for further analysis, to predict success. If in the more likely event that he has identified serious gaps and deficiencies, then the prediction will have to be conditional, i.e., defeat for the government appears probable unless adequate steps are taken to fill the gaps and remedy the deficiencies.

In discussing remedies, the deficiencies should be divided into two types. The first category includes those that are merely due to lack
of material resources, of technically qualified personnel or of experience in operating or managing complex enterprises and institutions. These can probably be remedied, given sufficient time and resources, by a suitably generous foreign patron. In this case, a conditional prediction of success may be ventured, assuming the availability of such aid and its effective administration. The second category of deficiency comprises those that relate to intimate internal problems of the kind already described, i.e., bearing on the distribution of power, wealth or status within the society under attack. In such a case, the prediction will point to probable failure unless the regime or other forces within the society can manage to bring about the wrenching changes required. Examples might include replacement of a regime's narrow political base with a broadened and more democratic system or redistribution of land ownership from monopolization by a few families to wide peasant ownership. Failing the changes required, the foreseeable outcome for the regime will be defeat or at best, as in Guatemala, an interminable series of insurgencies of increasing sophistication with a long-term prognosis which, taking the similar case of Nicaragua as an illustration, can only be gloomy.

Step four may result in a predictive assessment considerably hedged with conditions. And yet, there is still one more to be added to complete this step. In the event that foreign aid is determined to be necessary and that aid relates to advice, guidance and material assistance in military tactics, success is conditioned on the provision of the right kind of advice and assistance, that is in unconventional methods aimed at population security rather than in the conventional methods required for victory in a mechanized battle on the North European Plain.

5. Conclusion

Very possibly, the final result of the process we have described may appear cautious. This, however, is the result of the complexities of the problem and the difficulty of identifying unmistakable regularities in the limited number of relevant cases—in a word, of the stubborn resistance of human affairs to the equally stubborn desire of all of us for
predictability and certainty in those affairs. Nevertheless, conscien-
tiously pursued, the framework we have offered should provide a basis for a
reasonably confident prognosis both for the purpose of analysis and beyond
that, if such be the use to which the system is put, for educated and
disabused policy choices.
FOOTNOTES TO CHAPTER IV

1. These are:


APPENDICES
INTRODUCTION

Peru, Cuba, Nicaragua

The appendices which follow represent case studies of nine countries that have been subjected to rural insurgencies in one of the Communist patterns and in most cases under Communist control. Several other countries not dealt with in the appendices, especially in the western hemisphere, have had such experiences and, in fact, two of them, Cuba and Nicaragua, have succumbed and are now under Communist government. Other countries where attempts were made--largely in the Cuban pattern--include Panama, Argentina, Bolivia, and Peru. In neither the successful nor the unsuccessful attempts in these countries, however, did the counter-insurgency effort illustrate lessons or rules that have any instructive value for analysts except such very obvious ones as the importance of reacting quickly and pursuing energetically with available force when a rural insurgency gets under way. Therefore, it would seem to serve little purpose to attempt a detailed analysis of policies and programs in either the successful or unsuccessful cases noted above. Instead, we will deal with three of them somewhat summarily in this introduction. The three we have chosen for this type of treatment are Peru, which illustrates a fairly typical case of rapid pursuit and success, and the two unsuccessful cases of Cuba and Nicaragua.

Peru, 1962 - 1965

In the small Andean valley of la Convencion, near the city of Cuzco, a young agronomist named Hugo Blanco, of that city, settled in 1958 and began organizing the Indian tenant farmers who lived an exceedingly meager existence under the near-feudal system of land ownership. He experienced some success in organizing the Indians whom he led in land-seizures, some of which the government recognized. Blanco, however, made a serious strategic
error in 1962, when he led some of his followers in several attacks on police stations. At that point, the government sent in its best infantry and engineers to pursue Blanco and his group. Within six months he was in jail and the insurgency was terminated.

The land-seizures of la Convencion were not typical insurgency attempts of the foco or Guevara/Castro type. Blanco denied that he was influenced by the Cuban experience or that he was attempting to seize power.

"Blanco's armed peasant militias, which seized lands they felt should be theirs, were not guerillas. Guerillas are mobile units of men that have no ties to the land. Blanco did not believe that such men could win peasant support..."1

In addition, Blanco was a Trotskyist and received no support from the Peruvian Communist party or similar groups. Immediately after his defeat, however, a more typical foco-type effort was launched by several Communist-allied leaders who consciously attempted to duplicate Castro's model in the high Andes.

The restlessness among the Indians stimulated by Blanco was exploited by a leader named Gonzalo de la Puente Uceda and several others who launched focos and managed to survive against a thinly scattered local police force for two years, 1963-1965. They consciously modeled themselves on Castro and Guevara. The democratically-elected government of President Belaunde then called on the Army which dispatched highly-trained Ranger units (allegedly trained by the US) and within a few months de la Puente and his associates were dead and their attempt was entirely suppressed.

It should be noted that not only was there a democratic government in office but it was already implementing a partial land reform. Also of interest is the fact that the army's exposure to the poverty and exploitation of the Indian population in the Andes during this episode was the genesis of the left-wing officer's revolt that overthrew Belaunde in 1968. But purely in terms of counterinsurgency theory and practice, the Peruvian episodes of the early 1960's simply underline the importance of moving with
dispatch to deploy appropriate force against armed rebellion - a lesson of no particular novelty. This is especially true of foco-type situations for in such cases there has, as a matter of principle, been no preparatory organizing work carried out among the peasant population of the area and the foco itself is highly vulnerable to a vigorous suppression effort.

Cuba, 1956 - 1959

The Cuban insurgency of 1956-1958 led by Fidel Castro was a major event with worldwide repercussions but from the point of view of the analyst of counterinsurgency it simply underlines an old adage of all competitive activity: "You cannot beat something with nothing." The ex-Sergeant Fulgencio Batista, the caudillo who ruled Cuba in 1956, was a man of limited education but considerable shrewdness who gained power twice, the second time in 1952 as the result of a coup d'etat. This time around he seemed motivated largely by greed and he proceeded to arrange affairs so as to enrich himself and to buy the loyalties of his principle associates.

The army was the mainstay of the regime, numbering about 40,000 men. It was quite adequately armed and equipped, and included tanks among other modern weapons in its arsenal. The air force had some 65 aircraft.

The police were organized in paramilitary style into seven divisions and collaborated closely with the army. Investigative police units existed in the form of the Secret Police (Department of Interior) and the Judicial Police (Department of Justice).

All sources are unanimous in pointing out that these forces, formidable in outward appearance, were in fact thoroughly corrupt, poorly trained and internally divided into rival cliques. In a fashion typical of a regime whose political base is entirely or partly formed by the military command, Batista's army made few demands on its officers for professional accomplishment.

Like most Latin American regular armies, the Cuban military was not accustomed to real war. The bitter encounter with reality, with death, the long marches through jungles and mountains, the
surprise ambushes, were all quite removed from the quiet, comfortable life in the city barracks. It was the first time the Cuban military had been really challenged...and the challenge was too much for the political generals of dictator Batista.2

Laziness was another characteristic of Batista and his henchmen. He preferred playing canasta and watching horror films to working at his desk or making decisions. There seems no other explanation for his failure to react quickly to the landing of Castro's rag-tag force on the coast of Oriente province on December 2, 1958. Although the military forces immediately at hand acted quickly enough, they nevertheless allowed a remnant including Fidel and Raúl Castro and Che Guevara, to escape along with 17 others from the original group of 82. They struggled slowly toward the Sierra Maestra mountains. Batista announced that they were dead and made no exceptional efforts to assure himself of that fact, leaving the matter to the local forces to deal with.

As time passed, Batista made mistake after mistake in his entirely fruitless efforts to eliminate the tiny band of guerillas. Possibly the worst error was the persistent antagonizing by the army and the Rural Guard of the peasant population of the region, mostly squatters living a marginal existence and out of necessity seeking to placate the nearest armed group—in this case the guerillas. The peasants proved invaluable to Castro, providing priceless information as well as supplies and some recruits.

Only one of Batista's officers, a Colonel Barrera, perceived the importance of winning over the local population. Briefly in charge of the front in the Sierra Maestra, he launched a civic action program, including a free kitchen, medical services, construction of houses and schools. He also attempted to impose a blockade, closing off all movement into or out of Castro's mountain lair. After a few months Barrera declared victory and returned to Havana to receive congratulations. His replacement promptly undid whatever good he had accomplished by resuming the army's harsh treatment of the local population.
The Batista police forces were no more competent or intelligent in the use of force than the army. Their normal reaction to dissidence was terror. One observer summed it up in these words:

Armed forces and police answered opposition terrorism with a vengeful wave of reprisals that turned some of Batista's strongest supporters against him. Cuban youths merely suspected of terrorism were arrested, killed, and left in the streets as a warning to others... Although both sides used terrorism as a technique, Batista's side suffered more from the negative aspects...4

After a naval mutiny at the Cienfuegos base in September, 1957, 30 rebels surrendered to the police and were all shot without trial; other captives were tortured for months. Out of about 400 who participated, 300 were killed - most after surrendering and most without trials. There was thus no attempt to establish a legal framework for counterinsurgency. Legality was what the army and police said it was at any particular time.

In similar fashion, the political framework of Batista's appeal was ostensibly the scheduled holding of elections in 1958, after which Cuba was to be governed under its existing free constitution which he had "temporarily" suspended. The problem with this appeal was that the date for the elections had been put off several times and in the end few Cubans believed they would be either free or honest. When the elections were held just before Batista's collapse, they were boycotted by many and so obviously rigged as to be ignored.

This lack of credibility together with the obvious incompetence of the military and the universal hatred generated by the brutality of Batista's attempts at suppression were more responsible for his downfall than the existence of a few hundred guerillas at the far eastern end of the island. Another important factor was the vacillating policy of the US which, although it took several different and even contradictory tacks, finally, by cutting off the supply of weapons to Batista, seemed to indicate that it no longer supported him. In the end, Batista's regime collapsed from the accumulated weight of these factors, leaving Castro in the best position to
pick up the pieces. In every aspect its fumbling efforts at dealing with the insurgents were a failure and frequently served to hasten its demise.

Nicaragua, 1977 - 1979

The story of the failed counterinsurgency in Nicaragua is somewhat different in detail but resembles that of Cuba in one basic respect: its entire thrust was centered on the goal of suppression by violent means. In terms of the categories of counterinsurgency policies discussed earlier, it lay entirely on one side - that of mobilizing and exercising the regime's coercive strength without regard to any of the other factors.

The Somoza regime overthrown by the Sandinista Front for National Liberation (FSLN) and its allies in 1979 had been in power under three successive heads since shortly after the departure of the United States Marines from Nicaragua in 1933. The founders of the dynasty, Anastasio Somoza Garcia and his eldest son, Luis Somoza Debayle, and especially the latter who had been educated in the US, with a degree from Louisiana State University, were far more supple and politically adept leaders than was the last Somoza, Anastasio Somoza Debayle, who held power from the death of his brother in 1967. From the very beginning of the Sandinista movement, Anastasio Somoza Debayle attempted to confront it with an iron refusal to compromise and with the utmost violence. He continued this policy with minor exceptions until he was defeated in pitched battle, with his foreign allies gone and even his ammunition running low. In the process, by his adamant refusal to make any change in the system or to maneuver among the highly varied elements that made up the opposition front, he succeeded in unifying against him and his rule all classes and communities of Nicaragua, save his immediate family, the National Guard and a few clients who had nowhere else to turn.

The battle caused unparalleled destruction to most of the cities of Nicaragua, especially to Managua, which had been punished almost daily by air raids. It is estimated that 50,000 people died either directly or indirectly as a result of the fighting between 1977 and July 1979. Several
hundred thousand were made homeless, food stocks had disappeared, epidemics raged and the economy had come to a complete standstill. This, of course, could no longer be described as "counterinsurgency". It was all-out war against virtually the entire population of the country.

The National Guard and its air arm, the National Air Force (FAN), were, in the final years, the only important institutions that Somoza was able to rely on and which he expended with a gambler’s disregard of consequences. Earlier his father and brother had taken pains to dress their power in constitutional forms, to court and build relations with certain political groups, with trade unions, chambers of commerce and the like. Luis Somoza yielded the Presidency at one point in order to mollify the political opposition. Anastasio Somoza, however, coming back to the Presidency in 1972 after a brief interlude when he was forced out (without, however, yielding power), attempted to fasten an iron hold on it through the National Guard while at the same time he greedily exploited the flood of international aid that poured into Managua to help repair the ravages of the earthquake of that year. That process was the immediate background to the emergence of the FSLN as a national movement and the beginning of the last phase of the insurgency. This phase was characterized by the throwing aside by all sectors of the community, including the business classes and many of the old landholding families, of their hesitations about joining an avowedly revolutionary movement led by disciples of Fidel Castro. Their resentment was fueled by the greed with which Somoza built his business empire, using strong-arm tactics and government sanctions to expand into industry and banking on a large scale.

The relationship between Somoza and the National Guard was an intimate and complex one. At the time of the withdrawal of the Marines, Somoza Garcia was in command of the Guard but faced many rival officers who resented his power. He maneuvered carefully to get rid of or co-opt his rivals while at the same time gradually gaining the upper hand politically, emerging as President in 1936.
With power securely in his hands, Somoza was free to develop the Guard as a completely loyal tool. He used several techniques to this end:

(1) He "countenanced widespread corruption to help buy Guard loyalty."\(^5\) This included the operation of illegal gambling and prostitution rackets by the Guard.

(2) He added numerous administrative responsibilities to the Guard's duties to increase the opportunities for corruption. These included routine police duties, traffic control and vehicle registration, health and sanitation inspection, postal service, tax collection, customs and immigration. For each of the essential services so provided, the ordinary Nicaraguan had to pay a bribe.

(3) He worked to alienate the Guard from the population at large. "Troops and their families were encouraged to live on base and to socialize among themselves in order to promote internal unity while reducing scruples about repressing civilians. Throughout the Guard's history it became more and more isolated from the populace..."\(^6\)

(4) He spied on the internal workings of the Guard and manipulated assignments, retirements and expulsions to achieve complete loyalty to himself.

(5) He appointed close members of his family to the top positions in the Guard. These included his younger son, Anastasio Somoza Debayle (a graduate of West Point) as commander. When the latter became President in his turn, he appointed his son as commander of the Basic Infantry Training School and his illegitimate half-brother as commander of the elite Third Battalion.

(6) The Guard was well-paid and well-looked after in terms of quarters and perquisites such as commissaries, paid vacations and the like. It drew on volunteers from the poorer classes for its ordinary ranks and to them the life of a Guardista offered many comforts and securities which were highly valued.
(7) At a later stage, Somoza Debayle introduced the policy of retiring large numbers of officers who then drew full salary. This was still less than they were accustomed to "earn" and so Somoza arranged new jobs for them, either in the government or in business. (At this point, the Somozas controlled the largest commercial and industrial empire in the country.) The policy was intended to confirm the loyalty of active officers by holding out the expectation of a permanent sinecure if they behaved loyally.

Despite the corruption and nepotism that permeated the Guard it was not incapable and in this respect it did not resemble Batista's army in Cuba. It went about its tasks with a certain basic efficiency and, at the climax of the insurgency, during the pitched battles of the first part of 1979, it fought with a courage apparently born of desperation. Even at that climactic moment, however, there were many desertions. The Guard as a whole was not a formidable, highly motivated fighting force although it had some high quality, elite units with effective leadership. If one is permitted to speculate on this point, it is possible that the alienation from the population cultivated by Somoza also brought about the kind of pride in the service which is important for combat morale.

The Somoza National Guard thus, had significant weaknesses. The most important of these derived from its character as a gendarmerie - a rural paramilitary type of force - rather than an army. According to one observer:

"The Guardia was essentially a gendarmerie resident in the localities in which it was stationed. Indeed, its character as a provincial police force, deeply entrenched in the local networks of corruption...was to be the Achilles heel of the regime. So long as there was no major national insurgency against the Somozas, it remained an efficient instrument of intelligence, competent at continual, low intensity intimidation and repression...Guardia officers knew everything...in their areas of operation. But once civil war broke out, the force was to prove incapable of action as a national army lacking...training, mobility and armor."
press censorship imposed... The strikes and student movement were brutally suppressed. And an annihilation campaign... was launched against the FSLN. According to Weber, the FSLN was severely reduced by this campaign and at its end numbered only a few dozen militants.

Nevertheless, within a matter of months, it returned to the offensive, concentrating on urban violence. The repression escalated and so did the insurgency, stimulated first by the widely-abhorred murder of the independent newspaper editor Pedro Joaquin Chamorro in 1978 and then by the seizure of the National Palace by a group led by the Sandinista Eden Pastora later in that year. From that point the movement snowballed, increasing in a matter of a few months from a total of perhaps 500 to many thousands, creating precisely the type of nationwide movement with which the National Guard was least able to cope. Although Somoza called up all his reserves, desertions suddenly increased and he was not able to increase the total numbers of his forces above approximately 10,000. Indeed, at this point, an attempted anti-Somoza coup began to take shape within the guard itself, presumably motivated by the belief that order could be restored and the regime and National Guard preserved intact once the Somozas had been thrown overboard. The plot was detected, 85 Guardistas were arrested and the battle to preserve "Somocism" continued.

At the same time, the Guard, heavily engaged as a result of simultaneous attacks in six cities, where its posts were overrun, engaged in a paroxysm of miscellaneous terrorism. During this period, says Booth, "atrocities by National Guard troops... reached epidemic proportions. No type of person or institution escaped... it searched and vandalized schools, hospitals, health centers and churches; it attacked people of all ages and both sexes. The Guard executed many scores of preteenagers and repeatedly attacked Red Cross ambulances and their crews."

This type of behavior had the opposite effect of that intended. It merely served to increase the numbers of the regime's opponents and the risks they were willing to take. In the final weeks of "Somocism," the Guard and the regime were simply overwhelmed by the popular reaction...
against the methods of suppression they had attempted to follow. Unlimited violence had proved incapable of subduing the storm it had created.

Among the consequences of the kind of counterinsurgency Somoza attempted was virtual assurance that Nicaragua would be ruled by a Castroite type of regime after his expulsion. With the defeat of the National Guard, the FSLN had a monopoly of military and police force. Although the new regime had the facade of an all-party coalition, ultimate power remained in the hands of the Sandinista party, as it does today.
NOTES TO INTRODUCTION TO APPENDICES


6. Ibid., p. 57.


8. Ibid., p. 40.

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR INTRODUCTION TO APPENDICES

Peru


Cuba


Nicaragua


A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Unlike the case in most other Latin American countries, Colombia's armed forces have remained relatively free of politics and concentrated on developing their professional capabilities. When leftist revolutionaries became active in the Colombia countryside in the late 1950's and early 1960's the military command, partly influenced by American advisers, developed a relatively sophisticated approach to counterinsurgency. Called Plan Lazo, it focused on training special units in ranger tactics and also emphasized intelligence operations, civic action and psychological operations. In the years 1962-1964, Plan Lazo succeeded in eliminating most of the many guerilla groups active in the isolated areas of Colombia where at one time no fewer than nine so-called independent republics had flourished.

Guerilla activity in Colombia is favored, however, by several factors which have made it difficult to eliminate entirely. Firstly, many areas of the countryside are almost entirely isolated from the outside world by virtue of the ruggedness of the terrain. Secondly, the traditional system of local government is characterized by a form of local "Bossism" in which a small clique controls government resources for the benefit of its own supporters, leaving most of the rural population out of its arrangements. As a result of such factors, guerilla activity is endemic in some areas. On the other hand, the isolation of the rural guerilla also works against the spread of guerilla activity to other parts of the country. In addition, Colombia has become highly urbanized in the post-war years which decreases the likelihood that the guerillas will ever be able to pose a threat to future governments more serious than those they have posed in the past. In recent years the militant leftists have concentrated their activity in the cities where they have had some limited success in staging spectacular kidnappings and hostage-takings. These operations have generated much income for the terrorists and gained local publicity for their
movements but have not seriously threatened the stability of the political system, nor seem likely to do so in the future.

B. BACKGROUND

Colombia occupies the northwest corner of South America bordering on both the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans. In size it is the fifth largest country in Latin America. In 1976 the population reached about 25 million. It has a wide variety of geographic regions, highly contrasting in terrain and resources. These range from the coastal lowlands to the high Andes, which are interspersed with populated plateaus and valleys. On the eastern side of its mountains, we find wide, relatively undeveloped plains. Communications through and within the rugged mountains are poor with the result that many populated areas are isolated from the rest of the country.

Traditionally, agriculture provided the Colombian economic base but recent decades have seen a heavy migration to the cities of which there are ten with populations exceeding 200,000. This movement was accompanied by industrial development, although it has not kept pace with the growth of the cities, resulting, as elsewhere in Latin America, in the growth of slums and urban poverty. In the 1970s, industry surpassed agriculture as a contributor to national income. Unlike other less developed countries, Colombia is not dominated by a single urban complex. While Bogota is the largest city, it shares importance with Baranquilla, Cali and others.

Throughout its history, Colombia has been dominated by an upper class which is largely white and Spanish in origin and its culture and society remain more Spanish than those of its neighbors. About 20 percent of the population, dominant in most fields, is white while most of the remainder is mestizo (white/Indian) or mulatto (white/black). Only small minorities are pure Indian or pure Negro. Despite many decades of land reform programs, large estates formed by tenants predominate in agriculture, coffee being the principal export crop. Natural resources are fairly abundant and include some oil, considerable coal and other minerals.
Unlike its neighbors, Colombia has not experienced many periods of military dictatorship and caudillismo has been the exception rather than the rule. Its political life, however, has frequently been marred by violence of a particularly virulent character. From 1946 until 1958 there occurred a long-lasting period of rural blood-letting which acquired the name of la violencia. It stemmed from persistent local feuds between the two main political parties, Liberals and Conservatives. La violencia took an estimated 200,000 lives and only ended after 1958 when the two political parties joined together in a pact under which they alternated in the presidency and divided up the lower-level political jobs between them. This National Front arrangement, as it was called, succeeded for a time in putting an end to the worst of the political violence although by no means all of it. The National Front system was finally ended in 1978 when Colombia reverted to a normal constitutional regime.

C. EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Guerilla warfare with the political purpose of overthrowing the existing regime and replacing it with some form of Marxist dictatorship was an outgrowth of la violencia, in that many of the same bands and individual fighters were involved in many of the same areas. The apparent stimulus for this trend was the impact of Fidel Castro's victory in Cuba which led to the formation in 1963 of the Army of National Liberation (ELN) in Colombia with ties to Cuba. This group was not controlled by the Colombian Communist Party and the latter hastened to develop its own guerilla wing, apparently to avoid being outflanked on the left. Its guerilla force was called the Colombia Armed Forces of Revolution (FARC). A third leftist guerilla force of a Maoist complexion and with some ties to China made an appearance about 1967. It was called the Army of Popular Liberation (ELP) and was the smallest of the three forces. Each of these groups was dominant among the guerillas in different areas. Although occasional attempts were made to unify them, these never succeeded; they remained separate and competitive with each other.
One peculiar feature of guerilla warfare in Colombia was the emergence of so-called "independent republics," small, isolated enclaves where the central government had no presence and the guerillas were in fact the only governing authority. There were some nine of them at various times beginning during la violencia and persisting in some cases well into the subsequent period, during which they came under Communist control. They were a result of the absence of communications in some of the mountain areas and their existence was an isolated phenomenon without serious consequences in the rest of the country. In other words, the guerillas were not able to build their movement outward from these enclaves and for the same reason that permitted them to spring up in the first place, namely geographic isolation.

The FARC was the largest of the guerilla groups, and at its peak was estimated to control 500 guerillas. The main FARC centers were in the southern and central highlands where they controlled several "independent republics" named for the regions in which they were located, e.g., Marquetalia, El Pato, Guayabero, Rio Chiquito, Sumapaz.

The ELP, although smaller than FARC, was more active and flamboyant. It attracted large numbers of students and engaged in urban terrorism as well as guerilla warfare. Its guerilla effectives were estimated at several hundred in the mid-1960s. The ELN remained the smallest of the guerilla groups and the one about which the least is known. To give some idea of the scope of these movements, the number of deaths attributed to guerilla action in 1962 was 2,500.1

The Emergence of Plan Lazo. When, in the early 1960s, it became apparent that the National Front government had not succeeded in eliminating rural guerilla movements and that they had increased in activity, after a brief period, and had changed in character from adjuncts of the two traditional political parties to arms of militant left-wing groups, the Colombian army became seriously concerned and developed a conscious, well-articulated new approach to counterinsurgency operations which it put into effect beginning in 1962. The new approach came to be called Plan Lazo. It stemmed from the army's involvement in various rural socio-economic
programs in the 1950s and its participation in a National Commission estab-
lished to inquire into the causes of rural violence. As a result of such ex-
perience, the army command began to publish views which took the position
that "in the exercise of its main peacetime functions of eliminating
guerillas and preparing against external threats, the military would con-
tribute to civilian efforts to promote industrialization and modern
agriculture, and to repair social institutions damaged in the long period
of political violence."2

One officer in particular, General Alberto Ruiz Novoa, who was
appointed Minister of War in 1962, became identified with these views in
the public mind and began to develop operational plans which included a
large component of military civic action and psychological warfare. This
trend developed several years before the Communists moved into the guer-
rilla scene in a comprehensive way, but even at that time, Communist influ-
ence among some of the guerilla groups was quite apparent and growing.

The Plan Lazo strategy embodied four main principles:

(1) Unity of command of all security forces under the regular
military;

(2) The development of more versatile and more highly skilled tacti-
cal units for unconventional warfare;

(3) Enlargement and intensification of military public relations and
psychological warfare; and

(4) Commitment of the armed forces to economic development and social
improvements especially among the population affected by guerilla
activity.3

The first step in carrying out Plan Lazo was to train specialized com-
bat units at the Colombian Ranger School (Escuela de Lanceros). The Colom-
bian Army staff also conducted research in an attempt to determine the
motivations of the guerilla bands and then proceeded to include the results
of their research in the curriculum at the Ranger School. An attempt was
also made to set up a systematic assessment procedure whereby the success
or failure of the new technique would be continually monitored and reported
back to the command. All in all, Plan Lazo and the thinking behind it gave

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signs of knowledge of modern management techniques not dissimilar from those being developed in Vietnam at the same time by the US Army. (In passing, we note that the Colombians encountered the same difficulties as the Americans in identifying indicators and measurements that accurately reflected progress. They too, in the end, had recourse to such unsatisfactory indices as body counts and inputs, e.g., number of wells dug or men employed.)

With these preparations completed, the Colombian Army began the deployment of its forces in the guerilla areas. Patrol bases and military posts were established in the operational zones and within a year there were 154 of the former and 196 of the latter. The military command announced that 70 percent of all military forces were committed to public security missions.

In the implementation of Plan Lazo, the Colombian military gave high priority to intelligence operations, taking over management of civilian police in the process. This was not done without resistance, although the military eventually prevailed. Among the techniques developed were deep-penetration patrols which operated clandestinely and Mobile Intelligence Groups integrated with police and investigative service units in a Brigade Intelligence Net, of which several were created.

Military psychological warfare and public relations units were also deployed, integrating their activities with civic action units of two types. First was civic action proper which included much construction activity (roads, bridges, infirmaries, schools, and the like). In addition we find something called military-civil action under which the military mobilized the professional classes of a region to perform volunteer work such as filling teeth, giving inoculations and so on.

Plan Lazo concentrated first on some of the more accessible regions and then moved against the so-called "independent republics." In its original form it continued only until 1966 when the President who had encouraged the new ideas, Guillermo Leon Valencia, completed his term. With his removal from the scene and the earlier replacement of General Ruiz as Minister of War (1965), counterguerrilla operations evolved toward a
greater emphasis on military operations without, at the same time, abandoning the concern of Plan Lazo for civic action and psychological operations. The change amounted to a shift of priorities and the abandonment of some of the more ambitious goals of General Ruiz, who had conceived of his new ideas as a means by which the military could move the whole country in the direction of modernization and industrialization.

Focusing on the more modest goals of eliminating guerrillas, the military persisted in its campaign. By the late 1960s, guerrilla activity had fallen off markedly but it had not been eliminated entirely. In fact, what amounted to a new front had been opened in 1967 with the appearance of urban terrorist activity signaled by the explosion of several bombs in Bogota and elsewhere. From that date down to the present urban terrorism has been a recurrent feature of city life in Colombia involving many spectacular incidents of kidnapping for ransom, assassinations of prominent figures, the taking of hostages and the like. As recently as 1980, a group calling itself M-19 seized the Dominican Embassy during its national day reception and held the Ambassadors of 20 countries hostage for 60 days, among them Diego Asencio, the Ambassador of the US. This type of activity had some impact on the rural guerrillas in that large amounts of money came into the hands of the terrorists, some of which found its way to the guerrilla groups.

In the early 1970s an increase was noted in rural guerrilla activity and the military command launched another all-out campaign similar in character to its effort in the 1960s. By early 1975 the threat had once again been reduced to the level of a nuisance but, as before, it had not been eliminated. At present, small Communist-oriented guerrilla groups maintain a precarious existence in Colombia, isolated from the rest of the country, with little political importance but with access to funds not only from the urban movements but also from involvement in the highly lucrative drug traffic. It is apparent that an attempt to eliminate them entirely would require a substantial investment to increase the armed forces and that the people and government are not prepared to make such an investment to deal with what amounts to a peripheral nuisance. It is also apparent
that the Colombian armed forces have developed successful techniques to deal with rural guerillas which they can put into effect in the event that the threat once again becomes serious.

We turn now to a closer examination of the counterinsurgency program of the Colombian military following the analytical scheme described in the first section of this paper.

D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

Throughout its history, the Colombian armed forces have remained remarkably free of involvement in politics. They have focused their energies on the development of professionalism within the officer class with the result that combat leadership appears - judging from the absence of evidence of the contrary - to have been at least adequate or better. There is, in fact, no information on this subject available to the authors but this can be interpreted as favorable to the Colombian military's leadership quality. We, at least, so interpret it.

2. Tactics and Strategy

Plan Lazo, described earlier, has with some modifications in emphasis, remained the basis of the Colombian army's strategy for dealing with guerilla insurgency. As we have seen, it was an approach that emphasized appeals to the civilian population by means of psychological and information programs and by civic action with the purpose of persuading the population to support the government and abandon the guerillas. This strategy also brought all of the government's security forces under a unified command and emphasized rigorous training in ranger tactics for the bulk of the infantry.

The tactics which were followed in actual combat called first for orderly and carefully organized deployments into the target zones structured around newly established military posts and patrol bases. Often roads and trails into the hostile areas had to be built to permit the deployments. From that point on, the tactics relied heavily on patrols,
some of which were of the long-range deep penetration type. When contact was made with guerilla units, the patrols attempted by whatever means they had at their disposal, including helicopter support, to maintain contact and to pursue until they had cornered their quarry. At that point, in keeping with the approach of attempting to appeal to the guerillas and their supporters rather than suppress them violently, they endeavored to capture and disarm them. The patrols relied heavily on intelligence collected both by the army and the police to target their activity. They were often so far from their bases that they had to be supplied by air, and they could also be reinforced by the same means. It is apparent that these lightly armed units depended on weapons the men could carry and had little recourse to artillery or other heavy armament.

An exception to the more or less non-violent approach described above was the development of long-range penetration units called commando localizador. These were patrols of the "hunter-killer" type whose mission was to penetrate hostile areas clandestinely and kill or capture guerillas and their leaders.

These tactics represent a classic example of the counterinsurgency methodology favored by the US Army Special Forces, among others, and apparently were adopted by the Colombian military in part as a result of exposure to US doctrine and training. For example, it is known that US trainers had considerable input into the Escuela de Lanceros. To the credit of the Colombians, however, is the fact that they deliberately avoided the use of heavy firepower that would impact on the civilian population. It is to be doubted that such self-denial was advocated by US trainers and it may, in part, have been due to the difficulty of the terrain. In any event it was entirely consistent with an approach focusing on influencing popular attitudes.

3. Intelligence

The type of military tactics employed in counterinsurgency in Colombia puts a premium on accurate and timely intelligence for exploitation by the military patrols. Unfortunately, little detailed information
is available on this important aspect of the effort. We know of the formation of long-range penetration patrols which had intelligence collection as one mission. In addition, we know that Mobile Intelligence Groups were attached to all major operating units. These were later combined with police and investigative service teams in a Brigade Intelligence Net which employed informants and used cash rewards to generate intelligence. They also appear to have produced analyses of the raw intelligence thus collected. Beyond this sketchy outline, little further information is available. It is apparent even from this very general data, however, that the Colombian military placed considerable emphasis on intelligence and also that it relied heavily on the police which was under military command throughout the country. Indeed, another source states that the army was heavily dependent during its counterinsurgency campaigns on village police reporting which became immediately available to military posts and commanders.

Both the police and the military in Colombia have been charged with using torture in the interrogation of captives. No further information is available specifying whether this was done routinely and regularly or whether it was exceptional.

4. Discipline, Behavior-Civic Action

Consistent with the principles of Plan Lazo, Colombian troops were presumably indoctrinated in the importance of correct behavior in dealing with the population in operational areas. The information available to the authors makes no mention of military misbehavior as a problem in Colombian counterinsurgency which is negative evidence, of course, but is probably meaningful.

The related matter of civic action was, as we noted earlier, a major element of Plan Lazo and subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns. It took two forms, straightforward military construction of civilian facilities, some of which (e.g., penetration roads) had a military purpose as well; and a program called military-civil action which called on civilian professionals or service providers to donate their skills to people in the area involved. In the early 1970s the military expanded this
concept in the form of Plan Andes in which young people from high schools and universities were formed into a youth corps to work in guerilla-troubled areas.

Much effort and resources were expended in all these programs and no doubt they had some effect. It is not possible, however, to measure it in any satisfactory way except to note that the counterinsurgency campaigns as a whole did apparently succeed in changing public attitudes for the better in the operational areas and did eventually succeed in severely reducing the guerilla threat.

5. Air Operations

As early as the late 1950s, the Colombian military began to use helicopters to support military units operating in remote areas. Later, the US Military Aid Program invested heavily in helicopters in support of counterinsurgency. They were used to good effect, along with fixed wing aircraft, for moving troops, resupply into remote areas and reconnaissance. In 1967 the Colombian military, anxious to increase its helicopter capability beyond the level the US would support, ordered and paid for an additional 12 of these aircraft out of its own funds.

Some Colombian aircraft were also suitable for use in close support of ground forces but whether or not they were so used is not clear from available sources. Since none of the sources takes note of close air support in combat it is probable that it was of little importance in counterinsurgency.

The Colombian Air Force also employed fixed wing transports for the movement of personnel and supply in the remote areas where the counter-guerilla operations were centered.

6. Civil-Military Relations

Throughout the history of Colombia since independence, the military has been thoroughly subordinate to the civilian government and has very seldom challenged this status. The constitution of the country designates the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces. The Minister of National Defense, by custom the senior army officer, is a member of the President's cabinet and is thus subject to removal by the

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President. The Minister of National Defense is advised by a statutory body called the Superior Council of National Defense composed of other department heads (foreign affairs, government, finance, etc.) which permits regular coordination of security matters affecting more than one department.

The military in Colombia also has control of the National Police which is a civilian force directly under the Minister of National Defense. As a result of the violence which has characterized politics in Colombia since the end of the World War II, the military has been called on to provide services normally not considered military responsibilities. During most of the last 30 years the country has been intermittently under a "state-of-siege" which requires, among other things, that crimes against the security of the state be tried in military courts. As an outgrowth of the theories of General Ruiz Novoa the armed forces in the early 1960s moved into various developmental economic and service activities which it continued even after the policy was abandoned. Thus, it flies regularly scheduled air routes into remote areas, runs a hospital in Bogota open to civilians, operates an aeronautical industry and a sizeable Bogota hotel. Nevertheless, none of these activities has tempted the officers of the armed forces to become more deeply involved in political affairs. Most of its energies remain focused on professional matters to the general benefit of its performance as the government's main reliance for the maintenance of internal security.

7. Popular Militia

Here again we are faced with a paucity of information relating to the existence of a militia of any type. It is clear, however, from scattered references that in the counterinsurgency operations conducted during the 1960s and 70s, the army did rely upon an improvised militia in areas which had been initially cleared of guerrillas, which is the standard means of maintaining security in a counterinsurgency situation after the regular forces have completed their task and moved on. These units were called "self-defense" forces and they were assigned to relieve the army of some patrolling and static guard duty.
In 1965 the government established a nationwide Civil Defense organization to assist the authorities in maintaining security against the spreading incidence of urban terrorism. It linked together in a single organization various citizens' volunteer groups to assist the authorities in the suppression of riots and similar threats. The Civil Defense organization was not managed by the military, but many individual officers were involved in it.

E. POLICE OPERATIONS

The Colombian National Police unifies all police forces in the country in a single organization under the Minister of National Defense. The single exception is the investigative and intelligence service called the Administrative Department of Security (DAS) which reports directly to the President.

Like the military forces, the National Police has remained aloof from politics and centered its energies on its professional responsibilities. It is a volunteer service with relatively high standards of recruitment and several schools for training agents (as constables are called), non-commisioned and commissioned officers. It provides generous perquisites and pensions and the general quality of personnel is good.

The emphasis of the military on civic action for counterinsurgency purposes has also permeated the police services. Police posts in rural areas engage in a variety of activities designed to provide services to the villagers among whom they live while those in remote areas are served by a special unit of the police called the carabineros. These latter receive special training and are qualified to give advice on crops, care for sick animals, repair farm equipment and the like. The police also have a public relations department which carries on such varied activities as operating orphanages, vocational schools and literacy programs.

This curious mix of responsibilities has not prevented the police from performing critical services in counterinsurgency, where several sources state that its intelligence contribution has been vital.
F. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

The available information on intelligence operations is extremely general and limited. We have already noted the formation within Plan Lazo of combined police and military intelligence units at brigade level called "Brigade Intelligence Nets" but how they operated is not known in the detail that would be desirable.

At a somewhat higher level, a separate service, the Administrative Department of Security (DAS), was created in 1953 to investigate crimes related to state security and to provide related services. Among them is intelligence collection, analysis and evaluation.

Although these few sentences sum up our knowledge of Colombian intelligence activities in support of counterinsurgency, it is clear even from this rudimentary data that the government is quite aware of the importance of intelligence and has taken the requisite organizational steps to answer its needs. Beyond this, we are not able to go.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

As we noted earlier in the discussion of Plan Lazo, psychological warfare was one of the principal emphases of Colombia's counterinsurgency program. The rationale behind this priority was the fundamental strategy of seeking to gain the support of the rural population in the affected areas, thus depriving the guerillas of a vital source of information, recruits and material help. Psychological warfare together with civic action were the twin activities designed to achieve this goal. In an account of the army's campaign against the "independent republic of Marquetalia," one of our sources provides some detail.

"When the government forces entered Marquetalia they found extensive Communist propaganda. In little houses, almost at the end of the world, they found Communist literature and copies of books by Marx and Lenin. The military launched a campaign to counter this propaganda. They attempted to convince
these peasants that the bandits and Communists were not their true and lasting friends. The Army was there to stay and the Army would protect them. Military successes were given wide coverage in press and radio, while guerilla and bandit attacks were broadly advertised. Posters appeared asking for the return to a peaceful life. Rewards were offered for information leading to the capture of guerilla leaders. 10

According to the limited information available, appeals such as these enjoyed some success, although, in time, the guerillas once again became a threat in some of the same areas. The causes of violence and anti-government feeling in Colombia were deeply embedded in the Colombian ethos, at least of certain classes and in certain regions. Psychological warfare campaigns combined with other appropriate programs could give useful support to counterinsurgency but could not, apparently, produce permanent change for the better.

H. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

Since the army controlled all security activity under Plan Lazo and its successors, unified management was an internal matter within the military structure. Such indications as we have suggest that management in the field - e.g., air support for ground patrols and police participation in the intelligence process - was effective. At a somewhat higher level, an existing government structure provided a ready-made management mechanism for the cabinet ministers involved. This was the Superior Council of National Defense whose permanent members, besides the Minister of National Defense, included the Ministers of Foreign Affairs, Finance and so on. In a matter such as the purchase of 12 additional helicopters using scarce foreign exchange, such a mechanism would provide a convenient forum to obtain the necessary approvals. In short, unified management does not appear to have encountered difficulties in the counterinsurgency effort, largely, we may speculate, because all of the security agencies involved were under a single minister.
I. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The political framework for counterinsurgency in Colombia was democratic constitutionalism in a relatively free society but actual power has always remained in the hands of a small elite of wealthy upper-class whites. In effect, the guerillas, by their actions and in their propaganda, were saying that democratic constitutionalism was a sham and that much of the population was excluded from a voice in the system for reasons of poverty and exploitation. The emphasis of the government in its counterinsurgency approach was to attempt by concrete action to demonstrate its concern for those parts of the population which appeared to have been left out of the system.

This appears to have worked effectively enough but only temporarily. After having been brought under control for a while, guerilla activity began again in some of the same areas and continues in evidence today. What seems to have been lacking was any mechanism to bring the dissident populations permanently into the political process in a way which would assure them of some influence on matters that affected them. In some countries, such functions are performed by political parties, by legislative or local government representatives and the like. Because of the isolation of the remote areas where insurgency flourished and particularly because of the weakness of local government where the old system of political patronage controlled by local bosses persisted, it would seem that political linkages involving the remote populations in decision making on matters of concern to them did not exist. This may have been the reason for the persistence of insurgency in some of these same areas.

J. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND ENVIRONMENT

Improvement of the rural environment was precisely the purpose of the army's civic action emphasis. It brought definite improvement in the areas affected, some of which were permanent. The list of the army's civic action accomplishments is long and impressive: it built schools, conducted
literacy classes, built roads and power plants, strung powerlines, set up dispensaries. However, the problem with civic action as a form of development is that the army must move on and the programs move with it.

In Colombia, as we noted above, local government has been weak and dominated by "bossism," a form of client-patron relationship which excludes large elements of the population from participation in the system. Local government reform has not been seriously attempted although a major effort has been made in recent years to supplement local government efforts by community action programs organizing the community to draw up development plans and then to press both the local and national governments to carry them out. The community action programs were supported by US AID and had some impact but often local political bosses succeeded in taking them over and diverting the funds involved to their purposes. Until the problems of local government are solved in Colombia, it seems unlikely that a permanent solution will be found for local armed dissidence.

K. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

For most of the last 30 years, the Colombian government has relied on the device of declaring a state-of-siege in order to strengthen its hand against armed dissidence. This device permits the President to suspend specific provisions of the law and turns specified types of crimes over to the military justice system for trial and disposition. At various times the President has used these powers to suspend habeas corpus, ban strikes and public assembly, declare curfews, prohibit the sale of alcohol and to conduct searches and seizures without a warrant. Much of the counter-insurgency program was carried out during periods when a state-of-siege was in effect. Accusations of brutality have often been made against the authorities during such periods, accusations which are believed by the public.

Although legality is an important value to many Colombians and the laws, in the Spanish tradition, are exceedingly precise and detailed, there
is also a tradition in the hinterlands, at least, of frontier-style lawlessness and of various groups, for reasons they consider good and sufficient, taking the law into their own hands. For a country with such traditions it would be surprising if the authorities behaved with perfect legality when faced with violent opposition. However, accusations of unlawful conduct have not, in the sources available to the authors, been brought against the military in the course of counterinsurgency operations in the countryside.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX A

1. Raymond Estep, GUERRILLA WARFARE IN LATIN AMERICA, Directorate of Documentary Research, Air University Institute for Professional Development, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, 1975., p. 34.


3. Ibid, p. 73.

4. Ibid., Footnote 60, p. 143.


7. Maullin, op. cit., p. 75.

8. Blount, op. cit., p. 43.


BIBLIOGRAPHY TO APPENDIX A

Sources available to the authors on insurgency and counter-insurgency in Columbia have been highly general and lacking in detail. An exception is Richard L. Maullin's SOLDIERS, GUERILLAS AND POLITICS IN COLUMBIA which goes into some detail on the origins of PLAN LAZO but, like the others, is regretably short on detail in describing the actual operation.

The following books and studies were relied on for this paper:


## Chronology to Appendix A

### Colombia - 1948-1975

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1948</td>
<td>Assassination of charismatic Liberal leader Jorge Gaitan leads directly to outbreak of violence in Bogota in which 2,000 died and city center destroyed. This event known as the <em>Bogotazo</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1948-1958</td>
<td><em>Bogotazo</em> leads to decade of rural violence between adherents of Liberal and Conservative parties. Known as <em>la violencia</em>, period is featured by rural banditry and guerilla violence. Estimated toll of <em>la violencia</em> is 200,000 lives.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953-1957</td>
<td>General Rojas Pinilla seizes power with civilian backing and becomes President. This represents the only occasion in 20th Century that military seized power in Colombia.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Riots and strikes lead to resignation of Rojas. Leaders of Liberal and Conservative parties sign agreements to end <em>la violencia</em>.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1958-1962</td>
<td>Violence declines in rural areas but does not disappear. Communist Party of Colombia forges links with remaining guerilla groups, forming Colombian Armed Forces of Revolution (FARC), Castroite (ELN) and Maoist (ELP) form separate guerilla groups.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>------------</td>
<td>---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962-1965</td>
<td>Army develops Plan Lazo relying heavily on civic action, psychological and intelligence programs to eliminate leftist guerillas. Plan Lazo succeeds in reducing guerilla threat but does not eliminate it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1974-1975</td>
<td>Army action contains another outbreak of guerrilla violence. Lower-level guerrilla activity continues but Castroite and similar groups shift to urban violence as main front. This situation continues until present.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Greek civil war which unfolded in the years 1946-1949 started as a rural guerilla insurgency but by 1948 had evolved into a conventional combat between regular forces. This change took place by decision of the leadership of the Greek Communist Party for political reasons and virtually guaranteed the defeat of the insurgent movement. The reason for the certainty of that defeat was the simultaneous re-birth of the regular Greek Army after its defeat and disbandment during the war. Although that army was seriously weakened by virtue of political manipulations and by Communist penetration, it was finally able, with American help, to overcome its weaknesses and conduct a highly effective series of campaigns in 1949 which brought about the complete defeat of the insurgency. An important factor in the improvement of military leadership was the appointment of the wartime hero, Field Marshall Alexander Papagos as commander-in-chief. But the most critical factor leading to victory was political disarray in the Communist camp brought on by the split between Joseph Stalin and Marshal Tito, of Yugoslavia. When the Greek Communists sided with Stalin, Tito retaliated by closing the border between Yugoslavia and Greece, thereby cutting off the guerillas from their rear areas and their main source of supply.

This event together with the decision of the insurgents to fight conventionally made it possible to end the episode cleanly. The Greek civil war did not drag on for decades as has happened elsewhere. For this, the Greeks have their enemies to thank.

B. BACKGROUND

Greece, a small though historic country with a population of about 8 million in 1946, projects into the Mediterranean Sea at the Southern end of the Balkan peninsula. Besides the mountainous mainland areas, it also
comprises some 1,400 islands scattered through the Aegean and Ionian Seas, of which only 166 are inhabited. The country, whose territory is the size of Alabama, has always been extremely poor and economically backward, relying heavily for income on a merchant marine that is one of the largest in the world and on remittances from emigrants living in the US and western Europe. Nevertheless throughout its history, from the date of its independence from Turkey in 1832 until recently, it remained dependent on foreign subsidies to stay solvent.

As a result of several major population exchanges with Turkey and Bulgaria, Greece today has only small and unimportant ethnic minorities. The religion is overwhelmingly Greek Orthodox. Greece's relations with all its Northern and Eastern neighbors have always been poor. Since World War II the national rivalries between the Greeks of the mainland and the Albanian and Slavic peoples to the north have been aggravated by the take-over of the latter by Communist governments. Relations with Turkey have been primarily hostile, stemming from the continued control of Greek-speaking populations by the Turks right down to the present on the island of Cyprus.

C. EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

From 1946 until the end of 1949 the Greek Communist Party (KKE) mounted a rural insurgency against a war-weakenned Greek government which at times threatened to overwhelm that deeply troubled regime and absorb Greece into the Eastern European Communist bloc.

As in numerous other cases (e.g., Malaya, the Philippines, Vietnam), the insurgency had its origins in the Communist-organized resistance against the wartime occupying power. For about two months, from December 1944 until February 1945, the Communist-controlled underground army (ELAS-National People's Liberation Army) fought to prevent the Greek government-in-exile from returning to power. When, after much bloodshed and several unprovoked atrocities against civilians, the attempt was clearly failing, an agreement brought a temporary halt to hostilities. The
Communists agreed to surrender their arms and to seek power legally. In the event, however, they turned in only defective and obsolete weapons and maintained intact their military and underground organizations, ready to fight another day.

The newly reorganized Greek government then assumed the herculean task of restoring order, repairing with British assistance the battered economic base of the country and rebuilding the shattered morale of the people. The Communists, similarly, sought to reorganize and refurbish their political and military organizations, seeking to be ready to make a bid for power either by political or military means.

Although the government's course was anything but easy, it gradually pulled itself together, aided by the settlement of at least one key problem, that of preserving the monarchy. The Communists, meanwhile, seeing the gradual fading of their hopes of coming into power by legal means, looked to the newly-established Balkan Communist governments on the Northern borders of Greece for assurance that a bid for power by military means would have the required external support.

The available evidence, however, does not demonstrate that the resumption of armed struggle by the KKE in 1946 was the result of a specific decision either by Joseph Stalin, or by Marshall Tito of Yugoslavia or even by the KKE itself. Stalin seemed to be quite indifferent to Greek affairs; Tito offered advice and some support for various groups but no encouragement for a national uprising; in the meantime the KKE formally decided to prepare for armed struggle in case the policy of legality failed. What seemed to precipitate events was the accelerating rhythm of private reprisals and counter-reprisals stemming in part from the Communists' execution of a large number of hostages in late 1944 and in addition from the release of many prisoners, both left and right, who began to take vengeance for wartime brutalities. The government proved entirely unable to impose the rule of law while the formal KKE leadership, mostly urban and Athens-centered, proved equally incapable of imposing discipline on the war-tested veterans of the ELAS who still had their arms and many of their
old fighting units intact. In fact, during the entire period preceding full hostilities, the government's writ did not run in the rugged mountains of the North.

In May of 1946, the Greek National Army was formally reconstituted, took over from the paramilitary National Guard the responsibility of imposing order and began limited clearing operations. From this point the battle escalated until by the end of 1946 the Communists had at least 8,000 armed men deployed with an additional 12,000 in camps outside Greece, notably in Yugoslavia. They also had begun to activate a clandestine support structure, the so-called "self-defense" organization (the *afioamyna*) which penetrated deeply into the security organs of the state.

The scale of combat continued to expand with no end in sight as 1946 passed into 1947. It was then that the British government was forced to confront the reality that it could no longer bear the burden of assisting the Greek government either militarily or economically. It turned to the United States which responded in March 1947 with the Truman Doctrine and a program of aid to Greece and Turkey. Congress approved the program in May and in a matter of months the aid began flowing.

Also in 1947, an important change began to take place in the strategy and organization of the Communist forces. Until this change, they had functioned in classic guerilla style, operating in small groups targeted against local paramilitary and police forces and local populations. They ambushed and raided and sabotaged communications and utilities. They recruited, sometimes by force, but whenever the Greek Army concentrated against them, they avoided confrontation and melted away in traditional guerilla style. The conventionally trained and equipped army proved entirely incompetent in its attempts to deal with these tactics. For political reasons, however, the Communists came to believe that they must fully control some substantial area within Greece where they could establish the "Provisional Democratic Government" which they had publicly declared in December 1947. The area they chose was the Grammos Mountains near the frontier with both Albania and Yugoslavia. From this decision, which was related to the need for increased and increasingly open support
from the neighboring Communist governments, there apparently followed, in the view of the dominant Communist leaders (although not the military commander Markos Vafiades), the need to convert the Communist Army into a conventional force. Gradually then, throughout 1948, the Communists began to attempt to hold territory against the Greek army's superior fire power and to convert its units into conventional battalions, brigades and divisions complete with staffs, service and supporting units and relatively heavy weapons (mortars and light field and mountain artillery and light anti-aircraft and anti-tank guns). This was a fatal decision which was the single most important reason for their ultimate defeat.

In the meantime, the Greek armed forces moved rapidly with American aid to build up their numbers, their training and their equipment until they were able to field a force of eight divisions and seven independent brigades. The Royal Hellenic Air Force and Navy were also refurbished and expanded and contributed significantly to the ultimate victory.

By 1947, the Greek military recognized that counterguerilla operations in the mountainous terrain where most of the war was fought required some adjustment from conventional organization and tactics and a few changes were made, but they were not far-reaching.

In each successive campaign season from 1947 through 1949, the National Army performance improved. While 1947 saw a series of defeats (though costly to the enemy), 1948 was a year of mixed failure and success and 1949 saw the final victory with the permanent conquest of the Communist "state of Grammos" and the expulsion of the surviving guerilla forces to Albania and Bulgaria. Of major importance in this victory was the decision of Marshall Tito to terminate his support for the KKE and close the frontier of Yugoslavia to passage by the guerillas. This decision resulted from the final split between Communist Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union. In the aftermath of that major development, the KKE sided with Stalin, thereby sealing its fate.

Also of major importance in tilting the balance was the emergence from retirement of Field Marshall Alexander Papagos, the hero of Greece's successful defense of its homeland against Italy in 1940. Papagos became
Commander-in-Chief in January 1949 and proceeded to inject new vigor and decisiveness into the Greek command. Of the various improvements he instituted probably the most important was to exclude political considerations from military appointments and decision making. Many officers in the Greek Army had secured appointment or promotion by virtue of political influence and, equally damaging, many military deployments were made in response to the demands of politicians for defense of their home areas. Papagos had the authority and seniority to end such interference. His appointment resulted in important command changes and brought a profound lift of morale both in the military ranks and among the civilian population.

Such changes together with the steady improvement of weapons and supply resulting from American aid brought the long-delayed victory in August 1949. Of all the factors involved, however, none was more important than the Communist decision to hold on to specific areas and to conventionalize its forces in the process. By so doing, the KKE condemned its fighters to a hopeless battle against greatly superior forces, foregoing all the advantages that guerillas have in combat with regulars. Even if all the other negative factors had not come into play, this decision alone would have cost them the victory.

D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

Until the last year of the Civil War, the Greek Army had serious problems of leadership due in part to the fact that it had been virtually disbanded for four years but largely stemming from political interference with appointments and promotions. As the kaleidoscope of Athenian politics shifted and Prime Ministers succeeded one another, each new government put its favorite officers into senior positions and each of these brought with him an entourage of like-minded subordinates. This disease ate away at the discipline and efficiency of the forces and was cured only when Papagos became Commander-in-Chief. One of the conditions he insisted upon before
accepting the appointment was complete control of promotions and assignment and he quickly weeded out the incompetents to the great benefit of performance standards.

Lower-level leadership also suffered in the early years for similar reasons and also because of the low morale that permeated the National Army until corrective action was taken. These matters are discussed in more detail below.

2. Tactics and Strategy

As for combat tactics, the Greek Armed Forces, with limited exceptions, fought and were only capable of fighting in conventional style. Their campaigns involved concentration of fire-power, large-scale sweeps through enemy-controlled areas and set-piece battles with artillery and aerial preparation. They were nevertheless able to prevail against a large guerrilla force because their enemy played into their hands. In certain respects, however, they did make adjustments required by the special nature of counterguerrilla warfare.

Of these, the most important was the organization of commando units for raiding, harassment and deep penetration of enemy territory. A total of 20 companies of this type were organized. The commandos were highly successful in their operations and gave a considerable boost to military and civilian morale but they also brought with them the usual problems associated with elite, specialized units. Before the end of the war, they were de-emphasized and restricted to very specific and limited missions.

3. Popular Militia

Another major adjustment made by the Greek Armed Forces was the organization of a large popular militia to relieve the regular forces of the duty of static defense. This function went through various organizational changes until the formation in late 1947 of a National Defense Corps (TEA) under military control. Eventually numbering 50,000, organized into 97 battalions, the TEA was composed of civilians trained, armed and controlled by the National Army. Their creation succeeded in its purpose of relieving the regular forces of the need to stand guard over villages,
bridges, roads and government centers and permitted the National Army to dedicate the bulk of its forces to offensive operations.\textsuperscript{5}

4. Intelligence

As regards improved military intelligence, there is little information provided by available sources. Lagoudakis makes clear that early failures were in part due to poor military intelligence. He also states, however, that as general performance standards improved throughout the armed forces, the collection of information on the enemy's dispositions and capabilities also improved and assisted materially in the final victory. Clearly, the Communist decision to hold ground and to conventionalize their forces helped the National Army's intelligence units in their task by reducing the range and mobility of their target.

The allied matter of counterintelligence was a more difficult problem. The Greek civil war was more than a mere conspiracy of a few thousand Communist cadres. It was a genuine civil war in that it permeated the whole country and (unlike Communist prescriptions) divided all classes. The Army was no exception. In the early years, it incorporated, through the call-up of all in the affected age groups, many sympathizers with the Communist cause, some of whom belonged to the organized Communist underground, the so-called "self-defense" organization (aftoamyna). On more than one occasion the enemy was able to anticipate and prepare for National Army offensive operations and cause them to fail by reason of detailed intelligence on government plans. In addition, of course, disloyal soldiers in the ranks did not make for good morale or operational efficiency. The problem was dealt with by stages, the most important of which was the establishment of re-education camps on the islands of Makronisos and Leros to which many thousands of soldiers and civilians were sent. Although they were made notorious by Communist propaganda as resembling Nazi concentration camps, they actually succeeded in changing the minds and attitudes of some 70 percent of those who passed through. Three battalions of reliable troops were recruited from among former inmates. Such methods eventually solved most of the problem of insecurity in and enemy penetration of the armed forces.
5. Discipline, Behavior and Civic Action

As noted above, in the matter of discipline and behavior, the early years of the Greek civil war were a period of low morale for the Greek Army. Some indication of the reasons was given by the army's most effective field commander, General Tsakalotos, who said in 1948, "there must be more financial help for officers' families; more decorations for bravery; more privileges for the infantry; more liberal promotion. Evasion of military service must be suppressed; incompetent officers must be removed..." and so on. In effect, the Greek soldier was poorly paid and often poorly fed, felt discriminated against (many had fought in the war against Italy in 1940 while younger men were still not called up) and uncertain of the loyalty of his comrades. The result was poor discipline as well as low morale - all leading to harmful behavior vis-a-vis the population in areas taken from the enemy. Looting, brutality, abuse of women - all were in evidence until, as time wore on, the National Army with the help of the Americans, gradually overcame its most pressing problems. In this regard, the boost to morale resulting from Papagos' appointment was the final positive element which helped overcome the "afflictions of the spirit" which characterized the National Army during the first years of the war. When morale and discipline improved, behavior followed and the problem largely disappeared.

As far as concerns military civic action, which in later years became the American military's preferred way of dealing with the political dimension of counterinsurgency, available sources make no reference at all to such a program either as an American recommendation or a Greek prescription. In all probability if recommended, it would have been rejected by soldiers of both nationalities. Those directing the counterinsurgency as well as those advising them saw their cause as close to defeat, their forces unable to muster the minimum resources necessary to prevail and entirely unable to spare the men or materiel required for effective civic action.
6. Air Operations

With respect to air operations, the final stages of the war saw the Royal Hellenic Air Force (RHAF) finally begin to make a significant contribution to the government's cause at the battlefront. Until the summer of 1949, the military command had tended to neglect the need for air support for ground combat units, apparently for reasons of haste (such, at least, is the view of Colonel Murray) or perhaps lack of appreciation of its usefulness as "aerial artillery" in mountainous terrain. In any event, the RHAF performed usefully but conventionally and in a rather limited fashion until the climactic battles of Vitsi and Grammos in August 1949 when it delivered a sizable tonnage of bombs in preparation of the battlefield, to all accounts with considerable effect. Of course, helicopters and other specialized aircraft of most usefulness for counterinsurgency were not available at the time, which meant that few opportunities existed to deploy air power unconventionally.

7. Civil-Military Relations

On the matter of military subordination to civilian control and loyal participation with other areas of the government in the common effort, the situation in Greece was one in which civilian politicians interfered gratuitously and harmfully in military affairs, rather than the opposite. In combat areas, on the other hand, field commanders tended to assume complete control over all aspects of security, including the rural gendarmerie, and were occasionally criticized for brutality and illegal usurpation of the functions of the police and the courts. As discussed earlier, the pervasiveness of the Communist movement and the effectiveness of its underground posed serious problems for the government. The military's tendency in operational areas to impose a very rough sort of justice undoubtedly alienated some of the population. As the war went on, however, the bitterness of feeling mounted on both sides and the tendency of both camps to behave with summary brutality increased, although it is clear that the KKE initiated this style of behavior. On the whole, the Greek military was under adequate civilian control in most significant respects. Surprisingly, in view of the pre-war experience with the
army-supported Metaxas dictatorship and the later experience of the rule of
the "Greek Colonels," no serious military conspiracy developed to overthrow
the quarrelsome and unstable parliamentary governments. This was possibly
due to the Army's dependence on foreigners, namely the Americans and
British, who would have frowned on such a conspiracy as well as on the
influence of the King and Queen who at that time commanded the loyalty of
most military officers.

E. POLICE OPERATIONS

The Greek National Police constituted the type of law and order force-
typical of governments on the continent of Europe. Controlled by the
Minister of Interior, it focused on the cities and left the large and iso-
lated hinterlands to the paramilitary gendarmerie. It included an intel-
ligence arm which will be discussed below. The performance and activities
of this police force in relation to subversion reflected the policies of
the government in power and of the Minister of Interior. At various times,
it energetically pursued and arrested KKE activists; at other times, it was
less vigorous. However, after the confusion of its early years, the
National Police performed as called upon, steadily enforcing increasingly
severe laws against subversive activity. A particular target was the
underground "self-defense" organization, which was eventually thoroughly
decimated.

As noted, the rural gendarmerie, initially under the Ministry of the
Interior but later transferred to military control, had responsibility for
policing the countryside. It was a paramilitary force which because of
endemic banditry in the remote and rugged mountains of rural Greece, had
always maintained a capability to operate in mobile platoon and company-
sized units. As the insurgency developed, it proved entirely inadequate to
the task and, as early as 1946, the responsibility for restoring law and
order in the countryside was assigned to the army. The gendarmerie con-
tinued to function, of course, under military control and was occasionally
thrown into the breach when the army found itself spread too thin. Thus,
in 1947, it was committed to clearing the insurgents out of the Peloponnesos, the mountainous southern peninsula, which although far from the main front was nevertheless thoroughly infested. It succeeded only temporarily in this task for the area was large and the gendarmerie too few in number. In general, however, it performed satisfactorily in the more suitable task of taking over security responsibility for an area after the regular forces had cleared it, an assignment it often shared with the TEA.

F. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Very little is available in open sources concerning overall intelligence activity. We can be certain, however, that intelligence operations and collection against KKE targets as well as counterintelligence attempting to neutralize foreign Communist intelligence activity was intense. The Greek police had a pre-war history of success in anti-KKE operations, particularly during the Metaxas dictatorship (1936-1940). In those years, the Minister of the Interior, Maniadakis, conducted ingenious and successful efforts to neutralize the KKE both by direct police action and by deception. Using thoroughly unscrupulous means, he succeeded in gaining secret control over a number of senior cadres whom he then manipulated like a puppeteer. At one time, there were three separate bodies claiming to be the genuine Central Committee of the Party, two of them controlled by the police. With this tradition behind it, we can be certain that the Greek Special Police was active and that the thousands of arrests which eventually neutralized the afteromyna owed a good deal to penetration by the intelligence organs. In addition, a new player began operating in the intelligence arena during the civil war. This was the newly-formed Central Intelligence Organization (KYP), a civilian bureau attempting to centralize national level intelligence activity. Judging by the nearly total neutralization of the KKE and its organs which prevailed by the end of the war, the KYP presided over a systematic and thorough clandestine
program to identify and keep track of all KKE members as well as the underground and the associated Communist-controlled groups in the trade union movement and various cultural and social front groups.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

Available sources have almost nothing to say in regard to formal psychological warfare conducted by either the Greek Armed Forces or other organs of the government. A brief reference by Murray states that one of the RHAF's missions was to drop leaflets in enemy-controlled areas. From this we may conclude that while there was some activity, it was limited. The likely reason is that amid the urgencies of rebuilding the army and other security organs, tasks which did not bear on this priority tended to be shunted aside.

On the other hand, much of the public activity of the government and of the Americans as well had a psychological purpose and dimension. American aid efforts were thoroughly publicized; the Sixth Fleet visited often and opened some of its ships to the public; the King and Queen worked intensely at the task of building the public image of the monarchy and using it to restore confidence in the regime's cause. Political parties all had their press organs and the Athenian press was a psychological battlefield of considerable importance to the course of the war. If activities of this sort had been formally organized, the effort might have been somewhat tidier but hardly more effective.

H. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

Theoretically military and non-military security activity were initially supposed to be coordinated through a Supreme Military Council, a rather unwieldy body which included the Prime Minister and some members of his cabinet. This body met rarely and only dealt with policy matters of the highest import. In addition, of course, under the cabinet system of government, coordination took place on a routine basis at regular cabinet meetings.
This type of management device, however, was not comparable to the approaches to unified management developed later in counterinsurgencies fought by the British and Americans in Malaya and Vietnam. On the other hand, the Greek civil war, by Communist decision, did not present the type of exceedingly difficult challenge posed by rural insurgencies patterned on Mao Tse-Tung's formula for "protracted war." The regular military bore the chief counterinsurgency responsibility, co-opted the other security organs where and when this appeared to be required and coordinated its activities through command channels in normal military fashion. Under the cabinet system, it responded to civilian direction from the Prime Minister and the Minister of War and if serious problems arose with other security organs, they could be resolved between these two figures and the Minister of Interior.

I. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The appeal to the population of the government side during the Greek Civil War was based on the themes of monarchy, religion, nationalism and democratic freedoms all of which together formed the political framework within which the government operated. These themes were contrasted to the principles of the KKE and to its practice, which was often brutal and dictatorial. The freedom of the press exemplified by the newspapers of Athens and the clash of political parties were certainly free enough to make the point with some vividness, although as time went on and the government stiffened the laws and its enforcement of them, its rule became more authoritarian.

One theme of the government's cause which became important in the later phases was Greek nationalism. The fact that the KKE had the support of neighboring Slavic countries was useful to the government for it aroused traditional fears that Greek lands and population would be sacrificed to the territorial ambitions of its neighbors. When ethnic Slavs representing
the Slavic-speaking minority of Greece (the so-called Macedonians) appeared among the figures in the Communist "Government," these fears were heightened.

Religion also had a powerful hold on Greek emotions for traditionally the Greek Orthodox Church had helped to keep Greek nationalism and ethnic feeling alive during the centuries of Turkish domination. The Communists strove to play down the atheism underlying Marxist-Leninist thought but their effort was undermined by their loyalty to the Soviet Union and the newer Communist states to the North.

The Government was thus able to rally the population to its support as a regime which defended traditional Greek values and, by virtue of its democratic structure, was able to assure a sympathetic relationship with the great democratic powers, especially the United States and Great Britain. The monarchy also played a role in this appeal although it was not as powerful a theme as the others, since many anti-Communist Greeks were also opposed to the monarchy and wished to replace it with a republic.

In practice, the Government encountered many problems in making its case, due to the fragmented nature of the political party system inherited from the past and the resulting instability of the governments that succeeded each other in Athens. There was also much corruption and a great deal of bitter feeling stemming from the years of German occupation and the behavior of some political leaders during that period. It was fortunate for the Government cause that the KKE made a number of serious political errors for otherwise a somewhat different outcome might have resulted.

J. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND RURAL ENVIRONMENT

In the typical underdeveloped country, the rural areas are lightly governed and receive few services from the central government. As a result, Communist organizers and recruiters are able to move in and out with relative ease. When the government finally does attempt to confront its problems, it usually finds it advisable to strengthen those areas of the administration which reach down into the village. It launches programs
in the fields of education, public health, agricultural development and public works to improve the village environment. It also strengthens rural administration with additional personnel and training. In Greece, however, the campaign against the insurgency was carried on almost entirely by the military and the security organs of the state and little was done until years later to improve the harsh conditions of rural life. No serious consequences resulted from this neglect for the same reason that has been mentioned frequently here, namely, that the KKE devoted its energies to conventionalizing its military forces. When these were defeated, as was inevitable, the threat was eliminated and there was no pressure on the government in Athens to make any serious changes in its governance of the countryside. In any case, the resources did not exist for such programs and would have had to come from the United States, which also did not perceive the need.

K. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In spite of the growing bitterness of the conflict, the Greek government was slow in developing new legal instruments to aid in the suppression of rebellion. In mid-1946, a new Security Law was passed by the National Assembly. Woodhouse's account summarizes its terms and effects: “It set up summary courts with powers to pass capital sentences for several new offenses...it gave the government powers to ban public meetings and strikes, and to the police powers of search without warrant and detention without trial. Most remarkable was the restraint with which the government used its powers. The new courts were initially set up only in Macedonia; the Communist press was not banned until October 1947, nor the KKE outlawed until the end of that year; the power to ban strikes was not used until December 1947; and martial law did not become general until late in 1948...”

The reason for this initial reluctance to use arbitrary powers which most democracies would consider a legitimate means of self-defense in civil war, is probably the fact that virtually all of the politicians in power
had suffered under the pre-war authoritarian regime of Metaxas or under the draconian rule of the Germans. They were also sensitive to the Communist charge of representing a regime that was descending into "monarchofascism." Moreover, international opinion, at least in the western democracies, watched events in Greece during those years with close attention and was quick to criticize tendencies toward arbitrary rule at a time when international support in the United Nations, the United States, and Great Britain was of critical importance to the Greek government. Its leaders apparently decided to step warily in the area where it could be accused of tending toward authoritarianism.

In the end, these qualms were set aside and the Security Law was carried out vigorously. There were thousands of executions and tens of thousands of exiles were sent to the islands. Known Communists were assigned to Gioura (for men) and Trikkeri (for women), while senior KKE personalities went to Ikaria. As for boys and young men who were sympathisers rather then members, it was for these groups that the reeducation camps on Makronisos and Leros were established. Although there were undoubtedly instances of brutal treatment for those who resisted re-education, the elimination of the Communist threat was achieved. This was not done, however, without considerable travail, including the final drastic step of imposing martial law throughout the country and a stepping-up of summary executions to a total, admitted by the government, of 1500 in a two-year period (1946-1948). It is difficult to see what else the government might have done to eliminate the very sizable threat posed by the KKE and its apparatus except to have been more restrained in the imposition of the death sentence. But the scope of the threat was such that maintenance of democratic rights and protection for the accused would have made the ultimate victory impossible.


3. Murray, *op. cit.*, pp. 85-86. According to Murray the formal T/O for a Communist brigade was 1500 men and about 5,000 men to a division. These complements were never filled and, in fact, although carrying a total of 8 divisions in their books, the Communist army at its maximum totalled 26,000.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tr>
<td>1936</td>
<td>Establishment of Metaxas dictatorship.</td>
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<td>1940</td>
<td>Italian invasion of Greece; Italians thrown back.</td>
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<td>1941</td>
<td>Death of Metaxas; Germans invade and occupy Greece.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1941-1944</td>
<td>German occupation. (Bulgarians and Italians also occupy certain areas).</td>
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<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Agreement between Communists and Royal Government in exile permits return of Royal Government to Athens supported by British troops. December. Shooting breaks out between ELAS and British. Brief civil war begins.</td>
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<td>1945</td>
<td>January. King George II appoints Archbishop Damaskinos as Regent.</td>
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<td>February. Varkiza agreement settles conflict between ELAS and Royal Government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1946</td>
<td>March. First post-war elections result in anti-communist majority.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>September. Plebiscite results in restoration of monarchy. Civil war beings. Greek Army reconstituted and begins counterguerrilla operations.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947</td>
<td>Great Britain no longer able to act as main external support for Greece. President Truman announces Truman doctrine and US program of aid to Greece and Turkey.</td>
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<td>Date</td>
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<tr>
<td>1947-1949</td>
<td>Greek army conducts three successive annual offensives against ELAS, each one more successful than the last.</td>
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<td></td>
<td>August. Final Greek army offensive destroys guerilla army and expels remnants.</td>
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A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Guatemalan rural insurgency started when a group of young and disaffected army officers involved in the unsuccessful November 15, 1960 coup attempt went into the countryside to organize guerrillas. The two main guerrilla groups formed at this time were known as MR-13 and the FAR. They were nearly destroyed by the government in 1961, but almost immediately they began to reorganize, especially after some of the leaders visited Cuba in September 1962. Guerrilla actions increased and in 1966 the government took strong measures and again wiped out most of the several hundred guerrillas; the remnants fled to the cities to carry on urban guerrilla warfare. By 1972 they were destroyed again. However, new groups began to form the same year and violence, terrorism, and guerrilla actions increased in the 70's. By 1982 the guerrillas has grown to several thousand and they dominated some areas of the country, but in mid-1984 the numbers were down as the government's more enlightened counterinsurgency effort took effect.

The insurgents have generally failed so far in Guatemala because they have not won the support of the people, including the Indians. They have offered no meaningful program or inspiring leadership, the latter being particularly important in Central America. Foco-style guerrilla warfare was a failure. Since the late 70's they have tried to win over the people, especially the Indians, prepare a stronger political base, organize guerrilla bands in remote areas, prepare for a protracted struggle, and appeal for support and aid in the international arena. This is a sounder approach for them, but it still may not succeed as the government has also improved its counterinsurgency effort.

Guatemala until recently has been a classic case of a harsh military response to insurgency. During most of the nearly 25 years of the insurgency, and especially in the mid-60's, the government used overwhelmingly superior ground forces to smash the guerrillas and their
peasant supporters who were easy targets in the villages. Since 1966 right-wing vigilante groups have assisted the army and police in their efforts against all opposition, communist or non-communist. Their means have been as harsh as the army's, perhaps even harsher, but they have contributed to the government campaign to keep the guerillas under control. There have been few attempts by the government to attack the basic socio-economic and political problems of the country. The army and police have not behaved well. The army has performed little civic action and carried out almost no psychological operations. The government has acted illegally, even by its own loose standards, and has admitted it at times. General Rios Montt, when he became President, initiated a more enlightened approach. This included better trained and behaved troops, sincere and serious efforts to aid the people and enlist their help in their own defense and some control of right-wing violence and of corruption. The current Mejia regime seems to be continuing these policies and techniques. As a result, the situation in mid-1984 seems better and possibly more permanently so.

B. BACKGROUND

Guatemala is the largest of the Central American nations with an area of 42,042 square miles, and has an estimated population of 7,700,000. Most of the population lives in the highlands of the southern part of the country. About 50 percent are Indians, the highest percentage of any Central American country. Most Indians are illiterate and also fatalistic about what happens to them in life. They have been ignored by the government and generally mistreated in the countryside and until very recently they have remained politically apathetic. The rest of the population, called Ladinos, are mostly mestizos along with a few assimilated Indians. The economy is primarily agricultural, coffee being the most important source of foreign exchange, but industrialization is making some progress. An Atlantic-Pacific highway and a parallel railroad run from coast-to-coast...
while the Pan American highway goes through the southern part of the country. The climate is hot in the low areas and in the north. It is pleasant in the highlands.

During most of its history Guatemala has been ruled by dictators. General Jorge Ubico ruled from 1931 to 1944 when he was overthrown by a liberal coalition of students, dissident military and others in what is usually referred to as the October Revolution. President Juan Jose Arevalo (1944-1951) and his successor, President Jacobo Arbenz Guzman (1951-1954), pursued more liberal policies which included the establishment of social security, a labor code and agricultural reforms. They expropriated some lands of the rich and of the American-owned United Fruit Company. This period is often called the Reform Decade. Communists infiltrated this liberal movement and made it unpopular with the Guatemalan elite and with the United States. In 1954 Colonel Carlos Armas, an exile living in Honduras, with United States aid and support, organized and led a military attack against the government and overthrew it. This coup ended the period of reform, tended even more to polarize Guatemalan politics between right and left, and led to an increasing resort to violence which still plagues the country. Castillo undid some, but not all, of the earlier reforms. He was assassinated in 1957.

After a tumultuous election in 1957, fraught with fraud and violence, a military junta took charge for a short period. General Miguel Ydigoras Fuertes was elected president in early 1958. He was overthrown in 1963 by General Enrique Peralta Azurdia who ruled by decree but drew up a new constitution which served as the basis for the 1966 elections. Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, a civilian and professor, was elected and served his full four years. He initiated a very brief period of liberalization but when the rebels refused his offer of amnesty he took severe measures against them. The army's harsh but successful counterinsurgency operations decimated the rural guerillas. These did not end violence as both right and left continued their attacks. In 1970 Colonel Arana, the commander of military counterinsurgency operations in Zacapa province in the northeast, was elected president on his promise to rid the country of all remaining
guerillas and urban terrorists. He did so by 1972. He also traveled about the country, talked to the people and tried to provide rural improvements, roads, schools, hospitals, etc., but did not actually accomplish much in the way of such improvements. However, the early 70's were good economic years for the country and the situation improved for many people although not for the very poor nor the Indians. The gap between the wealthy elite, including top military officers, and the poor remained great. The elections of 1974, 1978 and 1982 were all fraudulent and accompanied by violence. Both rural and urban guerillas revived and violence, both by the right and left, reached high levels during the 1970's. A few days after the March 1982 elections and the ensuing disputes over it, a group of young military officers seized power and Rios Montt, a religious cultist, emerged as the leader of a 3-man junta and instituted more enlightened counterinsurgency policies. A few months later he became president. He was overthrown in August 1983 by General Mejia Victores and at this time (1984) Guatemala continues on the same path.

C. EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

The November 13, 1960 attempted coup by young liberal and nationalistic army officers set in motion the insurgency which has plagued Guatemala for nearly 25 years. These officers, disturbed and embarrassed by the United States' training of Cubans in their country for the Bay of Pigs operation, wished to restore their country's dignity and "independence." They also hoped to wipe out corruption in the army and in the government and relieve some of the inequities in Guatemalan society. Their views at the time could be described as nationalist and socialist. They failed because they had no plan, were not well organized, and because the government, helped by the US, was too strong. This event marks a watershed, as some of the young officers took to the countryside to form guerilla bands, notably the Movimiento Guerrillero Alejandra de Leon 13 de Novembre (MR-13) and the Rebel Armed Forces or Fuerzas Armadas Rebeldes (FAR). They found that the Communist Party was most sympathetic to their cause, though most of its leaders favored peaceful means rather than
violence to take over the government. This began a somewhat uneasy and intermittent relationship between guerrillas and the Communist Party. Guerilla activities started in some of the northeast provinces in 1961. Perhaps, almost unconsciously, the young officers had adopted the foco theory and thought that the people would rally around them once they began operations against the government. In fact, the rural population, composed mostly of illiterate and apathetic Indians, did not. By the end of 1961 most of the guerrillas were wiped out. In September 1962 some of the leaders visited Cuba and on their return they intensified their efforts to rebuild their organization and their guerrilla bands and to prepare for a protracted conflict. In 1963 they concentrated on politicizing the peasants and building an infrastructure. By 1965 and 1966 guerrilla groups, a few hundred strong, were carrying out more and larger guerrilla raids as well as some spectacular kidnappings, including top Guatemalan officials and two US attaches. The Peralta government (1963-1966) dismissed them as bandits and took little action against them.

An election was scheduled for 1966 and the Guatemalan Workers Party, (PGT) (actually the Communist Party of Guatemala), and some of the guerrillas decided to support Mendez Montenegro for president. He won, and immediately proclaimed an amnesty for the rebels. They rejected his offer as it had too many strings and they feared there would soon be a coup against the new civilian president. Mendez also allowed greater freedom of political organization and discussion and seemed headed toward some socio-economic reforms. However, the rejection of his amnesty and continued guerrilla activity generated army pressure to take strong action against the guerrillas. He yielded to the pressure. Colonel Arana, who had been training his troops for counterinsurgency, was put in charge of the operations in Zacapa, a key province in the northeast. The United States provided aid and loaned some Special Forces to help with the training. The Special Forces seem to have helped train the army to fight well but were not able to inculcate the right ideas of troop behavior. By early 1967 military operations were well under way. The guerrillas proved to be no match for the army in combination with the organized but unofficial
right-wing groups which helped in the fighting and also with the collection of intelligence. By late 1967 the army and rightist groups had ruthlessly wiped out the rural guerillas. The remnants fled to the urban areas where they pursued urban guerilla warfare. The guerillas failed in the 1960's not only because of strong government pressure but also because they lacked domestic support, were poorly organized and based, did not have specific and agreed upon goals and strategy, and lacked cohesive, charismatic leadership.

In 1970 Colonel Arana was elected president and promised to eradicate the guerillas and terrorists, even if, as he said, he turned the country into a cemetery. By 1972 a largely American-trained and equipped police force combined with civilian vigilante groups to eliminate almost all of the urban terrorists. But even as the government was completing its liquidation of rural guerillas and urban terrorists, new rebel groups were developing. In 1972 the formation of the Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) and of the Revolutionary Organization of the People Under Arms (ORPA) took place, although the latter did not announce its existence until 1979. Insurgent activities in both rural and urban areas increased during the mid-70's as the guerillas profited from their earlier mistakes, concentrating on an effort to gain the support of the people. Since the mid-70's the guerillas have rejected the foco theory. They have been trying to establish guerilla bands in remote areas, to develop a sound political infrastructure, to involve the Indians in the struggle and to pursue "the second front," by which they mean attempting to gain international support and help. By 1979 guerilla activity and violence were fairly widespread. The guerillas controlled some areas in northern and western Guatemala and had partial control of others. In 1981 they briefly occupied Chichicastenango, a provincial capital. They had also grown to a strength of several thousand. Meantime, right-wing groups continued their almost indiscriminate killing of all opposition, communist or not. In early 1981, four rebel groups, ORPA, EGP, FAR, and the Leadership Nucleus of the Guatemalan Workers Party formed a guerilla alliance, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG). This was done at least partly to
obtain aid from Castro who had been urging a unified effort against the government. In fact, one of the continuing problems of the insurgency has been the fragmentation of the effort based on ideological differences, competing leaders, and different orientations toward outside communist countries. The UNRG may solve this problem, but it seems to be a "paper" organization at present.

In 1982, Rios Montt announced an enlightened counterinsurgency policy of tackling the serious socio-economic problems of the country and improving the training and behavior of the military forces. A vigorous effort was made to provide security by dispersing the troops throughout the affected areas and enlisting the support of the villagers who provided good intelligence and helped fight off the insurgents. These Self-Defense Forces, as they are usually referred to, have played a major role in slowing down and indeed in reversing the insurgency.

D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

During the nearly 25 years of counterinsurgency operations, no Guatemalan has emerged as a capable practitioner of counterinsurgency, with the possible exception of Colonel Arana and recently Rios Montt. Most of the top army leaders have been ruthless military men who, usually through brute force, have attempted to eliminate the guerillas, the terrorists and their supporters by killing them. By some accounts, Colonel Arana had some charismatic appeal and he certainly was successful in militarily wiping out the guerillas in Zacapa. After he became president in 1970, however, he continued his harsh anti-guerilla campaign in both rural and urban areas. He is reported in a 1970 interview to have said that civic action deserved 70 percent of the credit for his successful counterguerilla operations in 1966-1968. But despite this, he acted brutally, both as military commander and as president, to crush the guerillas. One writer believes that Arana's program of civic action amounted mostly to public relations.
Virtually all the top leadership appears to have been more interested in retaining political power and access to wealth than resolving the socio-economic problems of the country. Their military operations have reflected this lack of concern and a belief, shared by some civilians, that the only way to defeat the guerillas was through violent suppression. Some junior officers have been concerned about the lack of attention to the needs of the people and by their ill treatment, but until recently they have been unable to make any change in the system. However, Rios Montt succeeded in making the important changes described above including better leadership at all levels and a higher degree of professionalism among the officers. As an apparent result the insurgency seems to be declining in strength.

2. Tactics and Strategy

The pervasive military approach has been to kill guerillas and their supporters by means of conventional military operations, with the support of air power, and with assistance from right-wing vigilante groups. In 1966, there was a semblance of a strategy. It called for the army to eradicate the main force guerillas by the usual conventional military means, while the militia, composed of irregulars and right-wing vigilante groups, was to provide local security and to destroy the guerilla infrastructure. As the same time, the army was to pursue a vigorous civic action program. During this phase the army seems to have changed its approach significantly. One leftist account says the troops came to the villages, talked to the people and won them over. Peasants, who had been helping the guerillas, then changed sides, assisted the army and in Rio Hondo they even lynched some guerillas. They also provided much useful information. In 1966-1967 Colonel Arana ringed the guerilla forces with troops and systematically and relentlessly pursued and destroyed them. The irregular forces and the rightist political groups helped the army by killing hundreds of peasants and obtaining important intelligence by various means, including bribery and torture. The combination was too much for the insurgents.
Beginning in 1982, Rios Montt's new approach brought significant changes which have been continued by his successors. The strategy is, by improved behavior and some civic action, to gain the support of the villagers and enlist them in their own defense. Better led, trained and armed troops are dispersed by platoon and squad among the villages, where they recruit the people to help gather information and defend their own homes. While the villagers have been a little slow to respond, having been used to harsh treatment by the army, they eventually began to provide vital intelligence to the army and assist the soldiers in defending their home areas. The small army patrols have been vulnerable to large insurgents attacks, especially as army back-up forces have not been readily available, but improved intelligence provides warning and nearby villagers act as reinforcements.

During most of the insurgency the Guatemalan army has not attempted careful, surgical counterinsurgency operations but has concentrated, along with the rightist vigilante groups, on an approach which has demonstrated little or no regard for civilian life or property. Unrestrained violence has been the general principle for strategy and tactics. It worked for many years in a military sense but it did not solve the insurgency problem. Recent improved efforts promise better results.

3. Intelligence

Military intelligence until recently was almost invariably tied in with the activity of the rightist vigilante groups. In any case, very little is known about it. What little information is available on the subject will be discussed in the general intelligence section.

4. Discipline, Behavior and Civic Action

Most past military operations by the Guatemalan military have shown a lack of regard for the safety and welfare of the people; the behavior of the troops also has reflected this general attitude. Innumerable accounts tell of troops killing and torturing Indian peasants. Army "foraging" operations were a cover for many abuses alienating the local population. During the most of the insurgency there has been little attempt to improve the behavior of the troops. The Minister of Defense
briefly talked about it in 1961, but he was later exiled for being too involved in rightist terrorism!

In 1982 the chief of staff of the army issued counterinsurgency operational orders which are a model. He stated: "counter subversive operations are in support of the population, not against it." "Do not take even so much as a pin from the civilian population." "Protect, do not damage crops." "Pay a just price for what you buy." "Be courteous to all people." The troops were issued cards reminding them of these orders and behavior has reportedly improved greatly, although old bad habits cannot be overcome in a short time.

Civic action has not played a major role in counterinsurgency. For many years the army claimed it ran the only rural school system but, in actuality, it was small and primitive. During the 1966-1967 campaign some efforts were made at improvements in the northeast, much of it being underwritten by US military aid. Plan Piloto, under the direction of the minister of defense, was the best known effort. The plan was undertaken to improve the government's relations with the people and to bring about popular participation in local government through socio-economic projects — all of which would also have assisted the counterinsurgency effort. The Plan fizzled out for a variety of reasons and had little lasting impact. Currently there is a greater emphasis on civic action. The army has built model villages and is trying to improve villagers lives where they are stationed. Some resulting improvements in attitudes toward the government are reported.

5. Air and Naval Operations

The Air Force in Guatemala is very small, numbering a mere 8 to 10 combat aircraft. In 1966-1968 limited and not very effective air attacks were carried out. In one case, the air force hit the wrong mountain but the guerillas had been warned of an air attack anyway. In the late 1970's attacks by aircraft and helicopters were loosed indiscriminantly upon guerillas and peasants. Somewhat more care has been used in recent years along with the general effort to restrict the indiscriminate use of military force. The army air force has assisted in
psychological operations by dropping leaflets and in civic action by supplying transportation but in general, air power has not played a significant role in counterinsurgency in Guatemala.

There are no reports of naval operations having been employed in Guatemalan counterinsurgency.

6. Civil-Military Relations

With the exception of the civilian presidency of Mendez Montenegro, all the presidents of Guatemala since before World War II have been military. Even during Mendez's presidency, the military wielded enormous influence and held many of the top jobs in the government. The military hierarchy has been allied with the oligarchy of landed and business interests and other rightist elements to form the ruling elite. However, parties and factions within the elite have fought with each other for control of the government, although no serious opposition in favor of change has been permitted. The army, with some police help in the cities, has run the counterinsurgency effort. The military has also dominated the government and increasingly much of Guatemalan society and economy and has worked more or less in harmony with the civilian elite, having in common an outlook which rejects any significant social or economic change in the existing system. Civil-military relations have therefore not been a serious problem in counterinsurgency.

7. Popular Militia

The army and the police did not officially or formally organize popular self-defense forces, local militia, or police auxiliaries until the 1966 campaign when the army did organize the people into a militia for a limited time. The effort was resumed recently in the form of the Self-Defense Forces. Since 1966 private right-wing groups have been organized for political purposes and for the protection of the elites. They have also played a key role in fighting the guerillas, the terrorists, and indeed, all opposition. In 1966 the Mano Blanca (MANO) first appeared in Zacapa province and it, along with the Nueva Organizacion Anti-Communista (NOA), began to support the army in its activities against all opposition, particularly guerillas and urban terrorists. Another civilian
organization, the Consejo Anti-Communista de Guatemala (CADEG) was organized by rich landowners to "keep the peace" in the rural areas. These rightist groups helped army operations, attacked the opposition on their own and obtained useful intelligence from the peasants. By means of intimidation and violence against both rural and urban dwellers, they tried to prevent popular assistance to the guerillas. One writer described their activities in the mid-60's as follows: "remarkably successful in slowly eroding the guerillas peasant base." Most observers believe that the army has supported these groups and that many of the members are off-duty soldiers or former non-coms. The right-wing groups have persisted over time and have often gone out of control. Some army officers felt it necessary in 1970 to clamp down on right-wing groups but without success since they have continued to enjoy powerful political protection. The army has at times organized irregular forces of villagers who have assisted its operations. The most recent effort along these lines has been the Self-Defense Forces which by mid-1984 numbered 700,000. These are part-time, unpaid and mostly untrained villagers who provide intelligence and also defend their homes. Their increased numbers and activities suggest that to some extent the regime has begun to gain the support of the villagers in the affected areas.

E. POLICE OPERATIONS

The National Police in Guatemala is commanded by an army officer who is rotated frequently so that he cannot amass too much power. Other army officers hold key positions in the force. Until 1966 the police force was not much concerned with counterinsurgency. Its total strength was about 4,000, most of whom were in Guatemala City. In 1967, as the defeated rural guerillas began to organize in the cities, urban terrorist problems increased. In 1966 the United States began a concentrated effort to improve the police force and nearly half of AID's budget in Guatemala went
to the Public Safety Division for police assistance programs. By 1970 the police force had increased to 6,000 and was much improved, at least partly due to US training and equipment.

The National Police consists of regular police and several special units. The judiciales or judicial police are an elite force, deployed mostly in Guatemala City. They are directly responsible to the Director General of the Police. They make arrests without warrant, take almost any action against terrorists or political opposition, gather intelligence, and are feared and hated by most of the people. SWAT units or Peloton Modelo also operate in the cities to handle terrorists and demonstrators. The so-called Treasury Police are a border police, under the National Police, whose function is ostensibly to stop smuggling and illegal border crossings, but they are now, in fact, more concerned with control of the population and the gathering of intelligence in the rural areas.

In the countryside the Commissionados Militares are composed of civilians, often ex-military, and are responsible to the chief of Military Reserves. In theory they act as a police force. They have headquarters in each of the 22 provinces, are located in almost every town, and are usually Ladinos. While officially they are law-enforcement officers whose duty is to protect the population, they usually sell protection to the wealthy. They also have intelligence functions, especially reporting on subversion. They try to control the population's political activity using harsh methods which have suppressed most such activity and assisted in the defeat of the guerillas. In addition, there are the Policia Militar Ambulante (PMA), a mobile military police who operate in both urban and rural areas. They number over a thousand and are often hired by large plantation owners for protection. They seem to do little conventional police work.

The police have been particularly active in the urban areas, providing security at banks, embassies, government offices, overpasses and other important installations. They have conducted cordon-off operations as well as lightning search raids and have arrested people at will. These actions, along with the activities of the right-wing vigilante groups, have kept the urban terrorists at a lower level of activity than they might have
maintained otherwise. The police, like the army, have had little concern for the rights of the ordinary citizen and have acted in harsh, sometimes cruel, ways to enforce their control over the population and to obtain intelligence.

They have failed to control violence, and indeed, in some ways, seem to have contributed to it. The police have not been a bulwark of law and order in Guatemala, nor have they been very effective in their counter-insurgency role.

F. INTELLIGENCE

There is a paucity of detailed information about intelligence operations in Guatemala. The government has recognized its importance and both the army and police have made considerable efforts to acquire it. Most official intelligence activity is highly centralized and the D-2 Section of the General Staff in Guatemala City is the focal point. The government has used agents, informers, and collaborators and other conventional techniques. Cash rewards and bribery have helped gain additional information. US military aid has included money for developing an improved military intelligence system but little information is available on how it was used or what results were obtained.

During the controversial military operations of 1966-1967, the army seems to have had some success in obtaining information from cooperative peasants. The leftist source mentioned earlier suggests, almost with disbelief, that the people willingly gave information to the army on former guerilla associates. For example, one informer provided information on the complete FAR courier system.

The government also employed intelligence gathering techniques that are not generally effective in counterinsurgency. Many writers have noted the widespread use of intimidation, blackmail and torture to gain information. One, Robert Moss, has observed that the Guatemalans are geniuses at developing new forms of torture.5 Such brutal means usually receive the most publicity, which seems deserved in Guatemala's case but should not be
permitted to obscure the conventional efforts. No doubt routine, non-sensational methods were also used effectively.

As noted above, right-wing political groups have played a significant role in intelligence collection. Composed of small landowners, a few former guerillas, ex-military and some "average" people, they had the benefit of many contacts throughout society. They also employed harsh means to obtain information; some believe they have been even harsher than the military. In most accounts of the counterinsurgency, these groups are given considerable, although reluctant, credit for the success of their intelligence activities. Recently the Self-Defense Forces have become a primary source of intelligence for the army. They are peasant volunteers who do not use harsh methods to obtain it.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

Psychological warfare operations have received scant attention in the literature on Guatemalan counterinsurgency; this is probably because they were employed so little. Where they are mentioned, few details are provided. The government's policy has been a harsh one which left small place for efforts to weaken the guerillas with words or to persuade them to abandon their struggle and turn themselves in. Amnesties have been proclaimed by the government and advertised in all news media, but usually they have not lasted long and never have they been successful. Leaflets have at times been dropped by the Air Force but in general the military have not carried out vigorous psychological operations.

The government has pursued what it usually called public relations activities to buttress its policies and positions. During the 1966-1967 counterinsurgency campaign, public relations played such a major role that some observers concluded that civic action was no more than that. But other than controlled outpourings by the government media, continuing and serious psychological efforts have not been attempted.
H. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT

The military has managed the counterinsurgency effort with the army commanders, chiefs of state and Ministers of Defense being the dominant players. Since the effort has been almost exclusively coercive, there has not been much to manage other than repressive operations. The police have operated in the cities, but they are commanded by a military officer and are subservient to the army. The unofficial right-wing groups have some independence, especially in political matters, but are dependent on the army for arms and other support in their vigilante efforts.

I. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

The government has passed strict laws prohibiting the possession of arms and subversive literature, limiting political activity and making arrest easier. But the army, the police, and the unofficial right-wing groups have not been satisfied even with these strict measures and have taken the law into their own hands. They have intimidated, tortured, arrested, and killed people without any recourse to the law. The Secretary General of the National Liberation Movement (NLM), has argued "that the terrorism of the guerillas, which has resulted in the death of many of our people, has forced the government to adopt a plan of complete illegality, but this has brought results." This remark seems to reflect the continued thinking of most top officials and it also accounts for the loss of US aid in 1977. Indeed, it brought some success, but at a high price, with little progress toward solving the basic problems which permit the guerillas to survive and periodically to revive their efforts, usually with improved organization and grasp. Recently this picture changed considerably as Rios Montt attempted to stop some of the illegal but official practices which had characterized Guatemalan counterinsurgency. His successor maintained his policies and it is possible that the improvement in the legal framework will become permanent.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX C


7. See Ibid., p. 83.

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX C


Serreseres, Cesar D., and Einaudi, Luigi, US Military Aid and Guatemalan Politics, Los Angeles, California, Arms Control and Foreign Policy Seminar, Los Angeles, CA, 1974.


GUATEMALA

CHRONOLOGY TO APPENDIX C

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1944</td>
<td>Overthrow of Dictator Ubico and beginning of Decade Reform.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nov 13, 1960</td>
<td>Unsuccessful revolt by young army officers.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961-1962</td>
<td>Beginnings of rural insurgency. Movimiento Guerrilleros Alejandro de Leon 13 de Noviembre (MR-13) and Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) organized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966</td>
<td>A civilian, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro, elected president; offers amnesty to rebels but they refuse it.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1966-1967</td>
<td>Active government counterinsurgency and vigilante groups defeat rural insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970</td>
<td>Colonel Arana elected president; vows to wipe out insurgents and terrorists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1972</td>
<td>Urban terrorists defeated. Guerilla Army of the Poor (EGP) founded.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1975</td>
<td>EGP initiated guerrilla warfare in Quiche province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1979</td>
<td>Revolutionary Organization of the People under Arms (ORPA) announced its existence and began operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1980</td>
<td>Spanish Embassy occupied by protestors, attacked by police and burned.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>Guerilla activity continues; Chichicastenango occupied briefly.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Young officers stage coup and Rios Montt installed as leader of three-man junta; later becomes president.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1982</td>
<td>Rios Montt's more enlightened but still harsh counterinsurgency policy destroys many supporters of guerillas while gaining some popular support in the affected areas.</td>
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</table>
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The British, while somewhat slow to see the seriousness of the communist threat in 1948, immediately issued Emergency Regulations which restricted the actions, movements and freedoms of the people. In 1950, they developed the Briggs Plan which provided a strategy, plan and overall organization for the conduct of operations against the Communist Terrorists (CT). The plan called for military elimination of the Communist guerillas, resettlement of their Chinese supporters, police protection of the population, improved and coordinated intelligence, and a committee system to coordinate all emergency actions of the civil government, police and military. The British provided the leadership, both civil and military, and it was good. Their security forces, military and police, were well trained and disciplined for the difficult tasks of seeking out the guerillas and protecting the population.

The police played a key role as the civilian government declared a state of emergency, not martial law; they were keepers of law and order, providers of intelligence, and protectors of the people. They raised large numbers of constables and part-time police to help with their increased responsibilities. Intelligence, a key to success, was the responsibility of the Special Branch of the police and was emphasized and constantly improved. The military cooperated and contributed, but the counterinsurgency program was primarily a police responsibility. The military also had to obtain police approval for all air and artillery attacks.

Psychological operations were skillfully employed by the British, especially against the guerillas, whom they hoped to induce to surrender. These Surrendered Enemy Personnel were valuable for propaganda and intelligence purposes.
From the beginning, the British provided a political framework that functioned well and fairly. They also promised the Malays independence and prepared them for it during the Emergency. They held elections in 1955 and in 1957 independence was granted. The British, though the Emergency Regulations restricted people's freedom, governed in a legal fashion. Detainees under the Regulations could appeal to the courts, and every effort was made by all military and civilian officers to behave considerately toward the population legally. Rural improvements were made, especially for the resettled Chinese. In fact, the Malays complained that, though remaining loyal, they had not been given a fair share.

The British worked out a sound doctrine of counterinsurgency and executed it well. It provided the basis for their efforts later in Oman.

B. BACKGROUND

Malaya, now a part of the Federation of Malaysia, lies at the southern end of the long, narrow Malay peninsula in southeast Asia. It is 200 miles across at its widest point and 400 miles long from its border with Thailand in the north and the island of Singapore in the south. About three-quarters of its territory is jungle and down the center of the peninsula runs a spine of jungle-covered mountains. On the western side of these mountains lies most of the country's settled and cultivated areas: rubber plantations, tin mines and rice fields. East of the ridge line is heavy jungle with a few sparsely settled, virtually undeveloped areas. The climate is hot and humid with very heavy rainfall from two monsoon seasons. In 1948, there were few hard-top roads and these were often unmarked; the network of jungle paths and trails were even harder to follow. The two major railroads ran north-south. The ports of Penang, Malacca and Singapore were fairly well developed; and the capital city of Kuala Lumpur was an attractive colonial capital, but the hinterland was largely underdeveloped.

The population in 1948 was about six million, of whom about half were Malays, a brown race similar to Indonesians and speaking the same language.
Another third of the population was Chinese, largely from Southern China, who had been brought to the country to provide labor for the tin mines and rubber plantations. The remainder of the population were largely Indians and Pakistanis.

The Malays are Muslim and between them and the other communities there have often been serious tensions and sometimes rioting over the issues of status, religion and economic position. The Malays are especially sensitive to the superior economic position of the Chinese who tend to dominate the commercial life of the nation. The Chinese are also more prolific and the Malays fear that their country will, in effect, be taken away from them by a people they consider to be foreigners. They have demanded and received preference in the political sphere and in the civil service. The Chinese, on the other hand, thrive on commerce and resented their exclusion from the government. At the end of the war, Malaya was a loose federation of ten Malay Sultanates and three Straits Settlements (Penang, Malacca and Singapore), restive under the government of the British but divided on what should replace it. In addition to three communities already mentioned there was a small minority of a few hundred thousand primitive aborigines living in the mountains who had little involvement, either political or economic, with the settled lowland parts of the country.

C. THE EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

The Malayan Communist Party (CPM) was formed in the mid-twenties. From its inception, it has been almost entirely composed of Chinese and thoroughly under the domination of the Chinese Communist Party. The CPM concentrated its efforts on the labor movement before World War II and created considerable labor trouble just before its outbreak. When Hitler attacked the Russians, however, the communists offered to cooperate with the British. After the Japanese conquest of Malaya they formed guerilla bands called the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army, which offered very
modest opposition to the Japanese. They also continued communist propaganda, developed the party organization, and prepared an attempt to take over Malaya once the war was over.

During the war, the Japanese were not only anti-British, but also anti-Chinese, while cultivating the Malays; this increased the tension already existing between the two races. Japanese restrictive measures forced the Chinese to leave many mines and plantations and become poor agricultural squatters on the fringes of the jungle. Many volunteered to help the anti-Japanese guerrillas, while others were cajoled or forced, but almost all became enmeshed in the CPM apparatus.

The British returned in some strength after the war and foreclosed the possibility of the CPM establishing a communist regime in Malaya at that time. They tried to impose a more centralized government, the Union of Malaya, on what had been a federated group of Malay Sultanates. Under this arrangement, the British reduced the power of the Sultans while giving citizenship and other privileges to the Chinese. Already opposed by the fairly numerous Communist Chinese and their sympathizers, the British by this policy aroused the wrath of the Sultans and most of the Malays. In 1948, therefore, they returned to a federated government, somewhat mollifying the Malays, but displeasing many Chinese who thereby lost their citizenship and other privileges.

The CPM, legalized after the war, was organized along the usual lines. That part of it which waged the insurgency was divided into the Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA) (often called the Communist Terrorists or CT's) and the Minh Yuen (People's Movement), mostly Chinese squatters on the fringes of the jungle along with some plantation and mine workers. The MRLA fought while the Minh Yuen organization provided supplies, intelligence, recruits and general support. Both organizations remained primarily Chinese. Initially, there were "regiments" in the MRLA, but as the British increased their pressure, they in fact became Platoons, though still calling themselves regiments. Orders and policies came from the Central
Committee or Politbureau down to the state and district committees and to their military units. A secret political hierarchy paralleled the military.

Estimates of the MRLA strength put it at about 5,000 guerillas in 1948, some of whom had had experience fighting the Japanese in World War II. It reached a high of perhaps 10,000 in the early fifties. Figures for the Minh Yuen organization must out of necessity be approximate but most sources put their strength at about 30,000 - 50,000. Some have estimated the Chinese sympathizers at 500,000, but that is also a guess. It should be noted that a majority of the Chinese in Malaya were neutral. They remained on the fence waiting to see who won, attempting to offend neither side. Right after the war the CPM continued its overt and covert activities against the British administration. In 1947 labor strikes and intimidations on the plantations and in the mines increased. The CPM soon turned to more serious violence, including assassination of British civilians and attacks on the plantations, the mines and on the police. The number of incidents rose regularly each month in early 1948. In June, the CPM ordered mobilization of the guerillas and the revival of eight regiments of the Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Army. The murder of three English plantation managers in early June, 1948, led the government to declare a state of emergency which provided a legal basis for sweeping restrictions and controls over all the population. Both sides, in spite of their actions, in a sense were surprised and caught off balance. The British thought the police could easily handle the internal situation. They did not understand the scope and motivation of the organization behind these incidents, and they were in no way ready for the long ordeal facing them. While the communists had brought about this state of affairs by launching a series of incidents and calling the guerillas back to action, they were not prepared for guerilla warfare and the three phases of Maoist-style "protracted" war they seemed to believe in. They had maintained secret, well-provisioned camps on the fringes of and in the jungle itself, but their guerillas were not adequately trained, organized or led, and their communications were poor. In late 1948 and early 1949, their leader,
Chin Peng, regrouped the guerillas in the jungle and tried to whip them into better fighting units. This reduced the number of incidents, and to an extent, lulled the British into a false sense of security. However, the rate of incidents increased rapidly in late 1949 as Chin Peng sent his guerillas out of the jungle to launch sizeable attacks against the government. The suddenly increased rate of attacks alerted some of the top British leaders to the seriousness of the threat and the need for greater resources and better coordination measures.

D.  THE BRITISH RESPONSE

Nevertheless, for the first two years of the Emergency, the British reacted slowly. They took some defensive steps, such as increasing the size of the police force which had been assigned responsibility for dealing with the problem. They also requested army reinforcements but these were slow in arriving. They realized that the guerillas causing the disturbances were to a large extent supported by a population of several hundred thousand Chinese squatters and the Chinese workers on the estates and mines, but detailed intelligence was lacking. The army attempted to deal with the guerillas in conventional ways, by attacks and sweeps which inflicted few casualties, but did manage to keep them off balance and to some extent on the run. By 1950, most government leaders saw that a very serious threat was posed by the CPM, its guerilla army and its underground organization. Discussions in Malaya finally led to pressure on the government in London to appoint a senior and respected official to coordinate and improve the anti-terrorist activities of its Kuala Lumpur government.

In April, 1950, London appointed a retired Army General, Sir Harold Briggs, to the new position of Director of Operations, in effect a deputy for anti-terrorism to the British High Commissioner. After a quick survey and numerous discussions, Briggs pulled together a strategic plan, later called the Briggs Plan, which remained the basic British strategy throughout the war. Avoiding the temptation to operate everywhere at once, the Briggs Plan called for clearing out the guerillas in a steady progression.
from south to north. Most important was a sweeping decision to create a physical separation between the CTs and the population they depended upon for support, the squatters and the workers in the tin mines and rubber plantations, both often found close to the edges of the jungle. The plan called for the forcible resettlement of some 400,000 squatters in "New Villages," surrounded with wire and closely controlled by the police. At the same time, the new villages provided security and services to the former squatters which they had never enjoyed before—electricity, schools, health care and the like. This massive operation was carried out with great care and precision over a period of 18 months and entirely changed the complexion of the war. It was a major blow to the guerillas who, from then on, were sorely pressed.

General Briggs also reorganized the government's machinery to manage all phases of the complex program that he developed. His scheme was to establish War Executive Committees at which the three main branches of the government—the police, the military and the civil administration were represented by their chiefs and which met frequently, in some cases daily, to make on-the-spot decisions for prosecution of the war. Such committees existed at district, state and national level, uniting the three main elements in a single command structure. Each committee at each level had a war room and an operations center where all information relating to the conflict was displayed or stored for immediate reference.

The Briggs plan also provided for further enlargement of the police, which eventually grew to number 60,000, far outnumbering the army, and the recruitment of an auxiliary police force, a paramilitary police field force and a large Home Guard staffed with part-time volunteers who provided basic security in the New Villages as well as the old.

This comprehensive plan was closely followed with some modifications, for the ten-year period that eventually saw the successful conclusion of the Emergency. Unfortunately, it was not implemented as rapidly nor as forcefully as General Briggs wished owing to bureaucratic infighting, especially between the police and the army, and to continued dispersal of authority for anti-terrorist action. General Briggs left Malaya at the end
of 1951, a dejected and disappointed man. Just before he left, the war reached its lowest point for the British with the ambush and assassination of the High Commissioner, Sir Henry Gurney, on a public road he was traveling under heavy military escort.

Nevertheless, despite the gloom, it later became apparent that a turning point had been reached with the resettlement of the squatters and the other measures of the Briggs Plan. Chin Peng was forced to regroup his forces and break them down again into still smaller, platoon-sized units. He abandoned terrorism directed at the population at large for a strategy of selective terror, subversion and infiltration of the government. In fact, the CPM was now--and continued to be--basically on the defensive, while the British were finally prepared for a vigorous precisely targeted campaign.

E. TEMPLER AS PROCOUNSUL

In January 1952, Winston Churchill, then Prime Minister again, took the unusual step of appointing a single person, General Sir Harold Templer, to be both High Commissioner and Director of Operations, thus finally giving one man authority and responsibility for the entire anti-terrorist campaign. Templer was a dynamic and determined man who exercised his authority to the fullest. Inasmuch as the numbers of the police had tripled, the army had doubled from 10 to 20 battalions, and intelligence had improved, the government began to make steady progress against the CTs.

Templer stayed for two years of increasing success. The guerrillas found themselves on a declining curve as, with the completion of the resettlement of the squatters, their source of recruits, supplies and information began to dry up. Extremely strict food controls which limited the amount of food each family could hold at one time and was sometimes enforced by communal cooking of rice (for rice will not keep more than a day in a tropical climate once it has been cooked), sharply reduced the supply of food to the CT's. Other controls reduced the supplies of essentials such as medicines and ammunition.
As a consequence of such measures, the incident rate dropped off; and in 1953 the first "white" (cleared) areas were declared, permitting the relaxation of controls and the restoration of normal government processes. No white area ever reverted to black status: the cleaning out had been thorough. In June 1955, Chin Peng made indirect overtures for peace talks. In July, 1955, partial self-rule was granted and Tunku (Prince) Abdul Rahman became Prime Minister and Chairman of the National Executive Operations Committee. In December, the Tunku talked with Chin Peng but refused his condition for calling off the insurgency, namely that the CPM be permitted to operate as a legal political party. By this time, Chin Peng and his headquarters had already fled to the Thai border area where they could retreat safely into Thailand when pursued. In 1957 full independence or merdeka was declared and the Federation of Malaya took its place in the world as a free and independent country, governed by an elected legislature and a cabinet composed entirely of Malaysians. Many British officials remained but their status was that of individuals under contract to the Malayan government and gradually, as native replacements were trained, they withdrew. By 1958, the collapse of the insurgency was complete in all except a few hard core areas and in 1960 the official end of the Emergency was declared. It had been a long and extremely tough battle and we must now examine a little more carefully the ingredients of victory.

F. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

The essential military quality of leadership presented no particular problem in Malaya since the British forces (including several battalions of Gurkhas) assisted by Commonwealth units from Australia and New Zealand, had full control of the military aspects of the counterinsurgency effort. These forces were elite, volunteer units and represented a first-class albeit a small fighting force with combat leadership as good as any army in the world.
2. Tactics and Strategy

It was in the area of tactics and strategy that the British army in Malaya, after making the usual mistakes of professional soldiers in counterinsurgency combat, seeking to maintain large concentrations deployed in sweeping actions, adjusted impressively to the special requirements of the situation. They scattered their forces throughout the country but with heavier concentrations in certain areas scheduled for a full-scale clearing action, while in the other areas they maintained enough presence to keep the guerrillas on the defensive. These forces were not under the combat command of either the military headquarters or their division commanders. Their deployment and commitment to combat were controlled by the War Executive Committees at each level: district (battalion), state (brigade) and national (entire army). The military command had responsibility for such vital support functions as training, supply and replacements but not for combat. As one general in Malaya said at the time, "As far as I can see, the only thing a divisional commander has to do in this sort of a war is to go around seeing that the troops have got their beer!"

The troops so controlled pursued the CTs in the jungle by means of incessant patrols and ambushes. Other units were assigned to remain on alert to respond to calls for help from police or paramilitary units under attack. Special training in jungle warfare proved to be a vital ingredient in this form of warfare. All battalions going to Malaya sent an advance party to the jungle school at Kota Tinggi, and these cadres played an important role in the month-long training course their battalion received on arrival in the country. This training included: living in the jungle, patrolling, ambushing, immediate action drills against ambushes, chance engagements, surprise attack, and attacks against CT camps. Marksmanship was especially stressed; as there were only brief opportunities for shooting and they were not to be wasted. General Templer realized that an immense amount of knowledge of this kind of warfare was being accumulated, but not collected and maintained for the incoming troops. He ordered the preparation of The Conflict of Anti-Terrorist Operations in Malaya, an excellent manual for anti-guerilla jungle warfare which was updated
periodically after his departure and had the endorsement of all subsequent Directors of Operations. It provided information in great detail and instruction not only on tactics and operations, but also on the use of air power, relations with the police, and the role of the Emergency Regulations. It emphasized the need for careful, minute planning for all operations, attention to details, and the patience and discipline needed on patrols, in ambushes, and on other operations. It seldom mentioned large unit operations, sweeps, encirclements and search and destroy operations but emphasized the need for detailed intelligence on the enemy.

3. Intelligence

While the police were responsible for intelligence and counterintelligence, the army contributed by working closely with the police. It formed a Special Military Intelligence Staff (SMIS) whose officers worked in the joint operations rooms at the different levels. This staff, helped with general intelligence matters, provided the tactical intelligence that the army and RAF needed, and released some police for counterintelligence activities. The army combat units also had intelligence staffs which received information from a number of sources: its patrols, surrendered enemy personnel (SEP's) and captured enemy personnel (CEP's), captured documents, and from the bodies of the dead. While the army could collect much short-term intelligence from these sources, all of the information was quickly turned over to the police who controlled the combined intelligence effort.

SEP's and to an extent, CEP's became an increasingly useful source of information. The British did not at first understand why an SEP could be turned around in as little as a few hours, lead a government force to his former comrades and then proceed to lead the attack against them. It appeared, however, that by the time they surrendered, many were so bitter and disillusioned over their wasted time, the hardships they had suffered and over being on the losing side that they wished to lash back at the people who had brought all this on them. It was an emotional reaction and also a pragmatic one. They jumped on the government wagon to gain the rewards that came with it.
4. Behavior and Civic Action

The British maintained that good behavior by the troops toward the population was essential. One or two instances of bad behavior could undo months of good behavior. In the roundups of civilians that took place as part of the resettlement program, the British troops in most cases behaved with great sympathy and humanity and this made a strong impression on the squatters who were being forced to move their homes. "For the soldiers it was a hateful task," wrote one observer, "and there was nothing false about the compassion with which they helped these families gather up the chickens, carry the babies, and lift the old women into the trucks. This astonished the Chinese, and many have since placed on record that it was one of the biggest factors in winning their eventual support."

Just as important was the need to carry out security operations in a way that did not harm private property or hurt or kill innocent civilians. All military operations had to have prior police approval to minimize the damage. Artillery and air strikes were particularly carefully controlled. Throughout the military forces it was repeatedly explained and thoroughly understood that their purpose was to kill or capture the enemy, not to harm the people they were intended to protect.

While there was some civic action by security forces it was not particularly stressed. The civil government continued to function effectively throughout the country, providing normal government services. Nevertheless, in "black" areas, in the remote mountainous areas inhabited by the aborigines and along the Thai border, the military did provide some medical care and help with small public works. The RAF brought in needed provisions and medical supplies and helped to develop the aborigines' trade with the more populated and advanced areas of the country.

5. Air Operations

The RAF supported the army's efforts in five main areas: close support, including bombings, transport, reconnaissance and aerial photography, medical evacuation, and psychological operations. Due to the dense jungle, the small size of the guerilla groups, and their tactics, close support was not often called upon, though it was useful at times when the
The army could carefully identify the target and guide the aircraft to it. Bombings were called for when the exact location of a CT camp or food gardens were known. These were attacked with pinpoint tactics whenever possible, or area bombing when they were not so precisely located. The dense jungle, however, made location, identification, and attack of targets difficult, and so strike aircraft were not used as much as they might have been in other environments. Aerial photography was widely used, especially as the CT were forced deeper into the jungle. While the dense jungle and CT countermeasures limited its value in many instances, it nevertheless made an important contribution to the overall intelligence picture. Army pilots in small aircraft and with long experience in one particular area, also provided useful information on CT activities, movements, and installations. Small and large aircraft were used to ferry troops and supplies and to resupply jungle units by parachute drops which enabled troops and patrols to remain for long periods in the jungle. STOL aircraft and helicopters were useful for command purposes, medical evacuation, small resupplies, and insertion of very small patrols into the jungle. Helicopters were also used to spray the CT's jungle food gardens with chemicals. In the PW effort, aircraft were used extensively to drop leaflets and for broadcasting by loud-hailer. With the exception of emergency situations, air strikes had to be cleared by the police through all echelons up to Kuala Lumpur to try to assure that innocent civilians were not attacked.

G. POLICE OPERATIONS

The police force in Malaya was a Federal agency organized along State and district lines. It was composed almost completely of Malays with many British officers. It had responsibility for law and order, public peace, criminal investigation, and the protection of life and property. In 1948, there were less than 10,000 police, mostly in the cities and towns. One of the first acts of the government after the Emergency declaration was to increase the size of the police which reached about 60,000 in 1950. Small rural police posts were favorite targets of the CT, and they suffered
serious casualties until the police force and its auxiliaries were
increased and better trained for their new duties. The army in the very
early years assisted the police in their static posts but helped most
effectively by its actions to break the CT guerillas into smaller groups
and force them deeper into the jungle.

The police, again with army help, also carried out the measures
necessary for population and food control. All persons over 12 were
required to have an ID card at all times. Various restrictions were put on
the amount of food a person or family could have at one time. Procedures
for enforcing curfews, conducting searches, manning checkpoints, checking
ID’s and other control measures were strictly enforced. Great care was
taken to try to avoid alienating the people, although this was not always
possible. There were avenues of appeals and provisions for court actions
when people felt that they had been unjustly or unlawfully treated. The
regulations were legal and binding and applied to all equally. When "clear
and hold" operations were carried out by the army in a "black" area, these
restrictive measures were even more essential. The permanent elimination
of the CT infrastructure was mandatory, so that there would be no support
for the guerillas if they tried to return. But innocent people also lived
in these areas, and British policy decreed that their rights had to be
respected. The procedures seem to have been implemented fairly and justly,
and with few complaints considering how exhaustive they were.

One important responsibility of the police at all echelons was giving
"clearance" for security operations. The reason for this again was to
assure civilian control as well as the protection of property and lives of
innocent people. It was assumed that the local police knew better than
most where people lived and worked. Most operations were cleared ahead of
time during the daily meetings of the State (SWEC) and District War Execu-
tive Committees (DWECC). There were times when the military undertook
independent minor or reactive actions, but even in these cases, police
clearance was sought as quickly as possible. Requests for air and naval
support were all sent up through police channels to police headquarters in
Kuala Lumpur. These precautionary measures generally reduced to a minimum civil casualties and property damage, and helped to avoid alienation of the population.

H. INTELLIGENCE

The Special Branch of the police had responsibility for all intelligence concerning the insurgency. The army provided support in many ways, as we have seen, and was also a prime user of police intelligence. Originally, because of the preponderance of Malays in the force, the police had considerable difficulty acquiring intelligence from the Chinese on other Chinese. In 1952, more Chinese were added to the force rather rapidly and the flow of information promptly increased. It had become increasingly clear that Chinese agents and informers were essential to the police intelligence system. Special Branch went down to district level and sometimes down to village, which simplified the handling of local agents and made it easier for villagers to contribute information informally.

In this kind of insurgency situation, it was important to gather detailed information on all possible suspects. Personal files were maintained on all persons involved in any way with the CT's. By the end of the Emergency, the police knew almost all the guerillas by name and had a picture of each hanging on a hook in the district war room. The body of each guerilla killed was taken there for identification and his picture removed from the hook and thrown into the "dead" box. It required patience and painstaking collation of details to build up this quantity of quality intelligence but it was done and it paid off.

The police and their auxiliaries were also tasked to provide the local security of villages, of utility facilities, and of the regrouped workers in the mine areas and on the plantations. Though this was called static duty, most units used mobile defense tactics, patrols, random sentries, and surprise checks. Purely static defense forces appeared to be a "sitting duck" target. While small police posts could not often hold off the attacks of large guerilla bands of 100 or 200 men, they could fight against
smaller groups until reinforcements arrived. Usually reinforcements were available on call and went to the rescue, prepared to avoid ambushes en route. The army played a role in this process, as we have noted, often coming to the rescue of a beleaguered post.

I. PARAMILITARY FORCES AND MILITIA

The Police Field Force (PFF) was organized somewhat later in the counterinsurgency to operate in Platoons against the CT in the deep jungle and along the Thai border. It grew to a strength of 3,000 and became more important as the CT were forced deeper into the jungle. The PFF also built and defended the forts established in the jungle for the protection and support of the aborigines. By aggressive patrolling from these forts, the Field Forces tried to keep the guerillas away from their sources of supply and on the run.

During the Emergency, the police were given additional personnel to provide local security. All paramilitary forces were under the police rather than the army. Among these was a Special Constabulary Force which grew in a few years to a strength of 41,000. Its duties were to help protect the mines, plantations, and villages, including some of the "New Villages," to assist in enforcing food control, and to carry out limited, local patrolling against the CT. The special constables worked under the police but did not have all the powers of a regular policeman. A volunteer auxiliary force, which grew to the size of 100,000, also assisted the police in their various duties. A Home Guard, another special Emergency measure, was created to form a closer link between the government and the people, and to defend the homes and nearby areas of its members. The Home Guard also collected information on the CT's and sometimes aided in offensive operations of the police and army. Some units were eventually recruited in the "New Villages," where they replaced the police. This was an important sign of the government's growing trust of the Chinese, as well as a sign of the former squatters' willingness to defend themselves. There were also women volunteers who had various duties, including the searching
of females. Some SEP's joined special units to carry out operations against their former comrades. There were also other small units of the police too numerous to mention.

Problems were encountered because of the rapid expansion of the police force and its new and broader responsibilities. The transition, however, was greatly assisted by the transfer of British policemen who had served in a similar situation in Palestine. They were experienced in dealing with guerillas and insurgents, though in a quite different environment. But they also created problems, with some friction between the "new outsiders," and the "old timers." Nevertheless, in a couple of years an effective and greatly enlarged police force, complete with auxiliaries, was organized.

The role of the police in the Malayan Emergency was a vital one which can be summed up briefly. They were responsible for all intelligence, and in time the Special Branch developed into an excellent service. The police also had responsibility for giving "clearance" to all Security Force operations, thus assuring civil control, as well as showing real concern for the protection of innocent civilians. The police provided local security for the population, and they took on similar responsibilities for the aborigines in the deep jungle. They enforced the Emergency Regulations and implemented the food and population control programs.

J. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

At the Federal level, a Psychological Warfare Section in the Director of Operation's staff carried out all psychological warfare (PW) activities. This section coordinated PW with other operations, controlled all propaganda material directed against the CT, Federal or local, and undertook the necessary PW research. The head of PW advised the Director of Information Services (DIS) on the operational and PW aspects of all information efforts directed at the civil population. At the State level, PW was in the charge of the State Information Officer who was responsible to the SWEC; in some cases, the organization went down to substate or district. The British used the usual means of dissemination: leaflets, voice aircraft, public
address systems, and the normal press and radio service. SEP's were a lucrative source of information for PW. They sometimes went on lecture tours, helped prepare propaganda messages, and talked on loudspeakers to their former comrades in the jungle.

The major objectives of British PW were to undermine the morale and confidence of the CT's in their leaders and their cause, to create dissension and unrest in their ranks, and to persuade them of the hopelessness of their effort. The SEP's were useful in sowing dissension among their former comrades by talking publicly about plots and dissatisfaction in a band, or the alleged disloyalty of a certain member. This sort of talk had a very damaging effect, as all members of the CT band became suspicious of the others. Also, the British proved how well SEP's were treated by distributing leaflets with pictures of a SEP surrendering when he was starving, sick, dirty, and poorly dressed, and again after several weeks in custody, when he was healthy, well-dressed and well-fed. The effectiveness of British PW was attested by the CT's drastic punishments of members caught reading leaflets or listening to PW broadcasts.

Supplementing the effects of PW in inducing surrenders was an elaborate rewards program with graduated bonuses offered to persons who captured or contributed information leading to the capture or death of individual CT's. The rewards ranged from $875 for a common soldier or party member to $28,000 for the Chairman of the Central Committee. As the government gained the initiative and showed its ability to protect informers, disaffected CT's and helpers increasingly took advantage of the rewards program. Many a Chinese laborer was able to set himself up in business for life as a result of betraying his former comrades.

K. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY

The Briggs Plan had called for close cooperation and coordination of all government agencies involved in the anti-terrorist effort. General Briggs in 1950 formed a Federal committee called the War Council, which was composed of the military commanders of all three services, a senior civil
servant, the Commissioner of Police, and the Director of Operations, who himself was the chairman. The Director of Special Branch and the senior staff officer in defense also attended. This committee, after partial self-government in 1955, became a higher level and broader group called the Emergency Operations Council (EOC), chaired by the Malayan Prime Minister. It included many ministers and the senior officers of each service, as well as the Director of Operations. The Council was responsible for policy issues, the overall conduct of the anti-terrorist campaign, and the full integration of all government efforts. Briggs's earlier committee, in essence later became the Commander's Subcommittee, which was in charge of day-to-day security operations. As we noted earlier, there were similar committees at State and district levels, each chaired by a civilian, and each collectively responsible for the overall conduct of operations at its level. The Director of Operations was a key factor in this system, as he supervised the daily actions and operations of all aspects of the efforts. He spoke within limits for the High Commissioner, and later the Prime Minister. He had a small joint staff composed of military, police, and civil officers to assist him.

There were many advantages to this committee system. Each member contributed to the collective discussion, and knowing that it was collective, saw to it that it worked. He gave the appropriate orders to his service or department, and the normal channels of government carried them out. For example, no policeman gave orders to an army officer, but only to subordinate policemen. The collective knowledge and experience was useful to the whole committee and often to individual members. The District Officer often gave helpful hints on the jungle to a new army commander. The Security Forces (police, Home Guard, and army) all shared the same information, and the appropriate service was selected for a given operation. At a later stage community representatives also participated and gave helpful advice on how necessary but unpleasant actions could be imposed with the least public resentment. As we have seen, the military accepted this system with only occasional grumblings.
L. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

During World War II, the British had decided that Malaya should be independent. The ill-fated Malayan Union was intended to help centralize Malaya and weld it into a single nation. Opposition to the Union and the outbreak of the insurgency slowed progress towards independence in some ways because of the need to defeat the communists first. Progress was speeded up in other ways by arousing more Malayan nationalism and strengthening the demand for independence. The British responded by holding elections, granting partial self-government in 1955, and full independence in 1957. General Templer had arrived in 1952 with instructions to move ahead on self-government and independence. He made much about getting ready for independence and by driving the Emergency towards a successful conclusion he helped bring freedom. While heading towards that goal, the British brought more and more Malays into their government, and helped to prepare them for self-government by an example of efficient, honest administration. This firm commitment to independence frustrated the CT's attempt to downplay communism and to claim that it was they who were fighting for Malayan independence. While all did not function perfectly under the British, with bureaucratic struggles, some occasional incompetence and dragging of feet on independence, the British Colonial Office did run, after a slow start, an honest, efficient colonial government and an effective counterterrorist operation. Most impressive were the determination to proceed with independence for Malaya even while the Emergency was in full swing and the delicacy and skill with which this complex policy was carried out.

M. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND VILLAGE ENVIRONMENT

Before he completed his tour, General Templer established a Rural Industrial Development Authority to carry out small-scale development projects in the countryside, and this program gathered momentum after independence. The greatest government effort to create a better way of life
was the provision of good water, health facilities, schools, better housing, and other amenities and was directed primarily at the former squatters in the New Villages. These villages, even though many Chinese disliked them at first, and not all of them were perfect, were an enormous leap ahead for people who had lived poorly and with almost no modern conveniences. Given that the government also helped the Chinese get jobs, they were probably ahead of the Malays in some respects. This, actually, is born out by the fact that some Malays demanded for themselves the benefits that the Chinese had received—a situation somewhat like the case of the prodigal son. The Malays, most of them being loyal to the government, did not suffer as much under the emergency regulations and continued their peaceful way of life, with little economic help. The problem of equal economic aid for the Malays haunted the new government and to this day it is not completely resolved. Rural administration and village environment did improve somewhat during the emergency, though there were few new programs for the rural population. The Malayan insurgency was not due to great socioeconomic grievances and complaints of the people though there were, of course, some legitimate ones. It came about as a deliberate plot of the communists to overthrow the British regime and establish a communist one. The fact that the village and local police were put in place or strengthened at least provided for better law enforcement and protection of life and property, all of which often can be as important as material improvements.

N. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Mention has been made of the provision of a legal basis for the conduct of the Emergency and for the numerous restrictive measures that were taken to separate the guerillas from their supporters. The Emergency Regulations first became law in 1948 and were substantially amended and augmented in 1949 and 1953. They eventually comprised no fewer than 149 pages of extremely detailed instructions and procedures involving substantial restrictions on the freedom of the individual. The
comprehensive requirement of ID cards became a serious constraint on the Communist underground organizations. The regulations also set aside the rights of habeas corpus and public trial for those accused of subversive activities. Most of the CT's or their helpers apprehended during the Malayan insurgency were simply detained indefinitely by administrative action without trial.

The British recognized the possibility of abuse of these draconian measures. This was one reason for spelling them out in such detail. In addition, the Regulations established a Public Review Board of independent citizens who examined and re-examined each case at intervals and also heard appeals.

The view of the British in Malaya (and elsewhere in similar situations) was that the suspension of basic rights put a premium on the just execution of the emergency rules. They also viewed as urgent the termination of the Regulations at the earliest possible date. The significance of declaring an area to be "white" was that the Emergency was terminated in the area and so were the Regulations enforcing it. This commitment to legality and fairness was considered to be essential for public support in Malaya and also for the support of the British Parliament and public back in England for the prosecution of the war until it was won.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX D

1. He died a few months after his return to England.


3. The Conduct Of Anti-Terrorist Operations In Malaya was revised twice to include lessons learned. The third edition, 1958, is used extensively in this paper.


5. See Richard Miers, Shoot To Kill, pp. 61-62, 72 for an interesting account of how he wanted to use air, but "old timers" said it never did much. However, he persevered in one case. The RAF bombed, and after searching the area, 13 dead CT were discovered. He claimed it was the first successful aerial attack of the Emergency.

6. The police had circles, a level of organization between state and district. There were other differences, but not major ones.

7. For one soldier's negative view of the committees, see Miers, op. cit., pp. 39-42. There are few such critical observations, and it is not clear if other soldiers were just silent or Miers' is a minority view.
BIBLIOGRAPHY TO APPENDIX D


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>EVENT</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1920's</td>
<td>Communist Party of Malaya (CPM) established.</td>
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<tr>
<td>World War II</td>
<td>Malaya occupied by Japanese; communists formed Malayan Peoples Anti-Japanese Peoples Army, the basis for future anti-British guerillas.</td>
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<td>June 1948</td>
<td>MCP orders mobilization of its guerillas. Government declares a state of emergency.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1949</td>
<td>Communist popular uprising fails; guerillas go into jungle and are renamed Malayan Races Liberation Army (MRLA)</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1950</td>
<td>General Briggs appointed Director of Operations and develops &quot;The Briggs Plan,&quot; the basic document for the counterterrorist campaign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October 1951</td>
<td>British High Commissioner is assassinated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1951</td>
<td>Chinese &quot;squatter&quot; resettlement completed.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1952</td>
<td>General Templar appointed High Commissioner and Director of Operations, in charge of the entire counterinsurgency effort.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1953</td>
<td>Communist casualties peak and British declare first white area.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 1955</td>
<td>Tunku Abdul Rahman, the Malay Prime Minister, becomes Chairman of Emergency Operations Committee and takes over direction of the Emergency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956</td>
<td>Most of Eastern Malaya declared &quot;White Area.&quot;</td>
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<tr>
<td>1957</td>
<td>Malay becomes independent.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>End of Emergency.</td>
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APPENDIX E
OMAN 1962-1975

A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Oman had most of the necessary ingredients for a successful counter-insurgency effort. The Sultan, as absolute ruler and Commander-in-Chief of all the armed services, provided unity of purpose in government and in the military sphere. The primacy of civil goals and objectives were recognized by military officers involved at all command levels. Coordination in the field was assured by the Dhofar Development Committee and by the British Brigadier as commander of all Dhofari forces. The British provided honest and effective advisors and commanders for the military units.\(^1\) They worked out a strategy for the campaign and followed it. They assured good training for the troops and a concern for the political effects of their behavior. They organized and led the firgats, the irregular tribesmen who helped turn the war around. Counterguerrilla tactics were sound. The information services functioned well and were critical in inducing enemy personnel to surrender. Intelligence improved continuously and was essential for military success. The air force, navy, and later the gendarmerie played supporting roles; all in all, the military functioned in an almost ideal manner.

There was no democracy in Oman. The Sultan exercised absolute power, but he was aware of the needs and desires of his people. His aims of modernization and development were what they wanted most; democracy might come later. The Sultan was the legal head of government and ruled in a fashion suited to his people and to the times. His drive to defeat the insurgency was soundly based. The civic action and development programs in Dhofar supplemented the purely military aspects. Development, during and after the securing of territory, was a key factor for victory and for long-term progress and stability.
B. BACKGROUND

Oman is located in the southeastern corner of the Arabian peninsula. It borders on Saudi Arabia in the north and on the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen in the west; it reaches to the Straits of Hormuz on the northeast, and it has a long coast on the Indian Ocean in the south. Oman is separated into two distinct regions, north and south, by 400 miles of desert. The northern part is the most important as it contains the seat of government at Muscat, the financial center at Matrah, and is the home of 90 percent of the population. The southern portion, or Dhofar, however, was the principal area of the rebellion, though at least three attempts at insurrection were made in the north.

Dhofar is about the size of New Jersey, has only 30,000-50,000 people of different tribes, and is mostly a hot, rugged desert country. However, a monsoon during June-September brings about 30 inches of rain from the Indian Ocean. Salalah, the capital, is on the coast and in the center of a small but fertile coastal plain about 30-40 miles long and several miles deep which produces considerable food. Beyond the rich coastal plain rises the jebeli (mountainous area), the home of the rebellion. This is bisected by deep, rugged, usually north to south wadis (canyons or ravines), often as deep as 2,000-3,000 feet. Beyond this is a rugged plateau, strewn with large rocks and dotted by bush, which merges into the Empty Quarter (The Arabian Desert). The limestone geology of the area has created numerous caves which often hid rebels during the revolt, and aquifers (underground lakes) which held precious water and played a key role in counter-insurgency efforts. While the monsoon provides vital water, it also makes for very rough surf, especially during its season, and thus limits the use of the sea for transport. Thus air and the interior road from Salalah to Muscat were essential for Dhofar's year-round import needs.
C. EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

What started as a not unusual tribal revolt against the Sultan in 1962 gradually grew by 1965 into a wider rebellion led by the Dhofar Liberation Front (DLF) composed of the traditionalists who wanted some modernization and to have Dhofar governed by the Dhofaris. It later became dominated by the communists of an organization called the Peoples' Front for the Liberation of the Occupied Arabian Gulf (PFLOAG). The split between the early rebels and the communists, who had far-reaching political and socio-economic goals, existed for several years after the unification of the groups, and put severe stresses on the movement. The early rebels received some aid from neighboring Arab states, but significant outside interest and help began only after the British left Yemen in 1967 and the communist Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen was established on Oman’s border. By 1968 the communists had taken over the leadership of the rebellion by brutal means and were waging an ideological revolution against the Sultan. The Muslim tribesmen little understood the communist jargon and ideas and refused, even under torture, to renounce Allah.

By 1970, the aggressiveness of the rebels, backed by the strong support of their own people, some aid by certain communist nations, and the old Sultan's inaction had allowed them to control all of the jebel and most of Dhofar. Sultan Said, a conservative and parsimonious leader, would allow no modernization which he feared would unsettle the people. Even after oil was discovered in 1967, he did little for his people. He employed ineffective and half-hearted measures against the rebels, and by early 1970 it was clear that something would have to be done quickly or the rebels would soon have achieved their goals.

On July 23, 1970, Sultan Said's only son, 30-year old Qaboos, who had been educated at Sandhurst and trained in the British Army, seized power for his father in a bloodless coup.

One of Qaboos's first acts was to ask for more British military officers; his father had had only a nominal number. London obliged with several hundred, including a squadron of the Special Air Services. Sultan
Qaboos also immediately issued an amnesty and announced plans for development in Oman, especially in Dhofar, where the insurgency was at a very critical point. This policy had some immediate and far-reaching effects. On September 12, 1970 a bitter fight took place among the rebels; many tribesmen saw no reason to fight any longer, since the new Sultan seemed to be ready to give them what they wanted, while the communist elements said the struggle for communism was only beginning. Twenty-four rebels surrendered to the government, partially as a result of the open fight, but also to see if the Sultan’s promises would be fulfilled. They seemed satisfied that they would be and so they became the first firqats, irregular forces, which not only acted as protective forces for their own people, but later engaged in offensive operations.

By 1972 Sultan’s Armed Forces (SAF) with firqat help, had reoccupied parts of the jebel. The firqats were also holding a few secured tribal areas and more rebels were surrendering. Alarmed by this, the communists decided that they must have a victory to keep their organization intact and to shatter the Sultan’s protective and progressive image. They chose to attack the town of Mirbat in July 1972 with over 200 men. It was a bitter and bloody affair, but the SAF and firqats held and repulsed the rebels, thanks to some monsoon-weather flying by air force pilots and the advance arrival of reinforcements in the form of the replacement British Army Training Team (BATT). The rebels lost nearly 100 men and retreated to the mountains. It was the turning point in the war; had the rebels won, the population would have been terrified and turned against the Sultan. It would have been impossible to get naib waTis (mayors) for such places as Mirbat, and the government presence would have disappeared. While it was not exactly smooth sailing after this bloody but decisive fight, the enemy never again was able to muster such a sizeable force. By the end of 1975 the rebels were pretty well defeated and driven back into the PDRY. The Sultan proclaimed victory in December.
D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

Sultan Qaboos, advised and aided by the British, supplied the leadership needed to prosecute the insurgency and initiate modernization. He put the British in charge of the counterinsurgency effort by appointing a British Army Major-General as Commander-in-Chief of the SAF with authority to do what was necessary. Other British officers commanded the air and naval forces. British officers were placed throughout the armed forces and commanded the combat units. Many of them had had counterinsurgency experience and were dedicated professional soldiers. The SAS provided a squadron to recruit, train and lead the militia, the firgats, who played an important role with the SAF in defeating the rebels. Other British served with the Dhofar Development Department and the Civic Action Teams. The Omanis were not at that time able to provide either the trained civilian or military personnel needed. However, the British also provided assistance to help the Omani develop their own officials and leaders, starting at the base level and moving up from there.

2. Tactics and Strategy

From the beginning the British developed a strategy for the Sultan which was never basically altered. It had three elements: cut off the enemy's supplies coming from Yemen; conduct small search and destroy operations to secure the province for the Sultan, while driving the enemy from east to west and out of the country; and work out a pacification plan and a longer term development program which would give the people what they wanted and hopefully gain their support.

The first of these elements took the form of a physical barrier to cut down, if not stop entirely, rebel supplies coming from Yemen. The Hornbeam Line, the first of several barriers, was composed of barbed wire fencing and mines, and was patrolled by troops placed at intervals along it. It achieved its purpose. Other parallel lines were built eastward as military progress was made and the enemy was eventually pushed out of Oman completely. These lines were built in intense heat over steep ravines and
peaks of bare rock. The 2,000 or so Iranian soldiers sent by the Shah of Iran to support the Sultan played an important role in securing and holding these lines. Then, once the SAF and the firqats were trained and equipped, the second element of the strategy was launched: offensive operations to clear the rebels out of the jebel. Small unit tactics were used as befitted a conflict of this type. The most important were patrols, small search and destroy operations, ambushes, and counterambushes. The SAS were experts in these tactics, and, with their training, the firqats became formidable fighters with the added advantage of their intimate knowledge of their own people and terrain. The Sultan's Army also improved. It was generally used to carry out larger operations, although usually no larger than battalion size. The campaign against the insurgents was a closely coordinated operation of carefully planned and circumspect military operations, followed immediately by civic action and, as soon as possible, by more permanent development projects.

3. Intelligence

The British put the highest priority on intelligence. The SAS, with its initial squadron, provided an intelligence cell to acquire its own intelligence and to help train the Omani. It used many devices to obtain information, including briefing the SAS medics to pick up information while chatting and listening on their daily calls on the sick. The Dhofar Brigade Headquarters had a small intelligence section, but it apparently relied heavily on the Omani Intelligence Service. The relationship of the SAS intelligence effort with that of this headquarters is not known, though the SAS was under the command of the Dhofar Brigadier. Surrendered Enemy Personnel (SEP) were very good sources of information as were some of the local leaders, the sheiks, etc. Military intelligence became highly productive as the end of the campaign approached: winning always helps.

4. Discipline, Behavior and Civic Action

The British realized that the behavior of the troops was also an important factor. Bad behavior obviously alienated the people. Even routine military actions such as clearing operations, by disturbing and inconveniencing the people, could also turn them against the government.
Operations were therefore planned so as to avoid this result. Searching people for arms and food had to be done meticulously and fairly so that no one went away upset. The use of air power was carefully controlled. Throughout the campaign, the predictable and hard-learned reactions of the people to all military actions played a dominant role in selecting and executing them.

The British also recognized the value of civic action. Civil Action Teams, closely following the troops, often brought food and blankets as well as medical help to the people of the jebel (jebeli). While these small measures were helpful, the jebeli, being hard-boiled realists, were not impressed until more permanent assistance was provided. This was done as soon as possible by the Dhofar Development Department and is discussed in Section 13.

5. Naval and Air Operations

The small navy prevented supplies from coming from Yemen by sea, thus making the land route even more critical to the enemy. The air force, under the command of the Army Brigadier in Dhofar, provided effective close support to the combat soldiers, ferried troops, evacuated the wounded, and transported much needed supplies. Air support for the ground forces was never more than 15 minutes away in this small theater of operations, and close air support played a critical role in a number of engagements such as Mirbat. The knowledge that it was available helped the morale of SAF and hurt that of the rebels. The helicopters, although few in number, were invaluable in rough and largely roadless Dhofar. The pilots carried heavy loads, flew in and out of treacherous places, and worked long hours and sometimes in extremely poor weather. This air mobility gave the SAF a great advantage over the rebels who had only their feet.

6. Civil Military Relations

The military ran the counterinsurgency program. Even in the civil departments, such as the Civil Aid Department and the Dhofar Development Department, retired or former British officers did most of the work. The military at first also ran intelligence and psychological operations, but gradually turned them over the the Omani. The governor of Dhofar, a
civilian, was the senior official in the province; however, the British Brigadier in fact was the dominant official. Civilians and the military got along very well.

7. Popular Militia

The first *jebeli* to accept the Sultan's amnesty in 1970 were formed into self-defense groups, normally stationed in their home territory. They moved easily and rapidly in their own area since they knew it well. As they became better organized, trained and trusted, they also served in areas outside their own territory. These *firqats* were organized, trained and led by BATTs (British Army Training Teams). At the very beginning, the British tried to overcome tribal feuds by putting men from different tribes into one *firqat*, but this did not work. Feuds and rivalries were too deep-seated and the *firqats* had to be organized primarily along tribal lines. Under SAS leadership, they defended their homes with tenacity and fought well alongside the SAF. They were natural fighters and their major shortcoming was what might be called temperamentality. Small episodes could lead them to withdraw and refuse to fight for days or weeks, but in general they were won over to the Sultan's cause and served him loyally.

8. Police Operations

The police did not play a significant role although the Dhofar gendarmerie did man the Hornbeam Line once the pressure was off. This service provided support and security in the few towns that had been secured. What role, if any, the gendarmerie played in intelligence and related fields is not discussed or mentioned in the available source materials.

9. Intelligence

The Omani Intelligence Service, its organization and operational procedures, are not described or discussed in the available source materials. The relationship of the SAS intelligence cell, the Dhofar Brigade Headquarters intelligence system and the Omani intelligence system is also not known. In 1974 General Akehurst stated that the Omani service was the primary source of intelligence for his headquarters.6 There were,
according to him, some problems of coordination and timeliness, but intel-
ligence improved as time went on.

10. Psychological Operations

The SAS started the psychological effort in the armed service and it was later turned over to the Department of Information. In 1970, Radio Dhofar had a small antiquated transmitter which was housed in a shack and was no match for the Communist Radio Aden in Yemen. By 1975 it had been replaced by a more powerful transmitter which could reach throughout the jebeli. As most radio receivers were in Salalah or the larger towns and almost none in the jebeli, it was decided to give the jebeli cheap Japanese radios to tune in the new government station. Curiously, the recipients did not much value these radios because they were given to them. Afterwards the government sold radios to the people who then highly prized them, listened to them, and protected them from the rebels who had easily appropriated the ones given to them.

The printed word was useful in the larger towns and Salalah, but the jebeli had no written language. In the towns it was found that bulletin boards located at points where people were stopped to be searched for arms and food were the most useful as people had time to read while they waited. Leaflets and tracts were also distributed in the towns and a newspaper was published in Salalah. However, word of mouth information was the most persuasive and pervasive, as it came from friends and therefore was considered more reliable.

The first aim of the psychological operation was to bring the truth to the jebeli because Radio Aden was full of lies and distortions. It was also decided for this reason that there would be no black or gray operations. The second aim was to encourage the troops and discourage the enemy by emphasizing government successes and downplaying defeats. There were thus three main targets: the people, friendly forces, and enemy forces. The enemy forces were divided into hardcore, the Peoples Liberation Army, and softcore, the militia. The leaflets and broadsides emphasized development and the progressive actions of the Sultan. However, it was necessary to have more than material arguments in the appeal to the
and the government could honestly espouse the cause of Islam. The communist cadres were atheists, trampled on Islam and tried to force the tribesmen to deny Allah, an approach which repelled the conservative jebeli tribesmen. Government propaganda supporting their religion was first directed to them and later to the hardcore. For the propaganda to be effective it had to be based on a thorough knowledge of Arab views. For example, if the palaces, cars, and riches of the Sultan were shown to Westerners they would be likely to identify precisely this flaunted affluence as the problem. But to the Arab, the Sultan was a great man and such riches were quite appropriate, even essential to his station in life. In the handling of the SEP they were never referred to as surrendered personnel, but were treated as prodigal sons returning home. They were never interrogated but were engaged in conversation over tea consisting of traditional greetings and exchanges and only a gradual turning of the conversation to more interesting subjects. The British encouraged people to surrender by offering amnesties and by good treatment. A defector counted twice - the enemy lost one fighter and, if he were treated properly, the government gained one, in addition to valuable information. Also, as one firgat leader said, when the rebels hear one of their own tell of good treatment and the progress being made, then you have the most effective information service. 8

II. Unified Management

The Dhofar Development Committee which operated under general guidance from Muscat, coordinated the counterinsurgency operations in the field. It met weekly on Sundays. "This committee...epitomized the essential ingredient of anti-terrorist operations - that the military is in support of the Civil Power, never the other way round, and that it is as important to win the support of the civil population as to defeat the terrorists." 9 The committee was chaired by the governor of Dhofar province, called the wali, and included the Brigadier, the head of the Dhofar Development Department (DDD), the town clerk, the heads of intelligence and the Civil Aid Department and the Chief Police Officer. All issues and actions were discussed freely and decisions on military and
civil matters were made on the spot and then promptly executed. Thus all parts of the government were informed of proposed actions and indeed had a say in them. This committee worked like the executive committees in Malaya and indeed the system was taken from that experience by the British. The able wali gave advice on proposed actions, indicated what the jebeli reactions would be, and put proposed actions into local perspective, a very useful contribution to this largely British group.

12. The Political Framework

The Sultanate of Oman was an absolute monarchy of a traditional form, accepted from time immemorial by the various peoples of Oman. The jebeli originally demanded autonomy but were not offended by absolutism and the Sultan made no apologies for it. His appeals were based on traditionalism, on Islam and on the improvements he was bringing.

After the ascension of Qaboos, the Omani had a leader they could look up to and respect and who tried to respond to their most pressing needs. It was generally recognized that there were not enough trained Omani to run either the Army or the government, and so it was accepted that the British would do the job with increasing help from the Omani. This political system seems to have been accepted by most of the people.

13. Improvement in Rural Administration and Environment

Partly because of the insurgency but also in an effort to modernize the country the Sultan undertook to improve rural administration and rural life. Once an area had been brought back under his control, the Dhofar Development Department moved in. It drilled wells, providing precious water for the jebeli's cattle, their only source of income. As much as anything done for them, this program won them over. The DDD also provided schools, small mosques and shops. Such physical structures and the clear commitment they provided of the Sultan's intention to improve the lot of his people were worth more to the jebeli than the ideological slogans and Mao badges which were all that was offered by the other side. The program thus brought over many fence sitters.

In addition to buildings, the DDD built roads so that the people of the jebel could more easily travel to Salalah, a principal trading
center on the coast, and also import the necessities of life. Some of the towns of the jebel were spruced up and also provided with police and additional administrative capabilities.

14. Legal Framework

As an absolute monarch, the Sultan of Oman can do as he wishes and what he wishes is law. When he gave the orders and instructions for counterinsurgency operations and programs, there was no question of their legality. The British with their high respect for law, tried to carry out his policies justly and fairly; in many cases they had suggested them to him. There seems to have been a minimum of complaint about the British administration and no question as to the legality of the counterinsurgency operations.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX E

1. In addition to British leadership, advice and aid, the Shah of Iran provided moral support for the young Sultan and sent 2,000 troops who, while not perfect, provided the manning and enormous firepower support for the various barrier lines. Jordan provided an engineer battalion and Special Forces; they were also a morale booster for the Omani. Saudi Arabia provided considerable monies for the counterrevolutionary effort, especially in the development field.

2. The name has changed several times and there also have been several groups involved, but for simplicity's sake, this name will be used when discussing the insurgents. See D. L. Price, OMAN: INSURGENCY AND DEVELOPMENT, Conflict Studies #53, January 1975 for a discussion of different rebel organizations.

3. See Jeapes, Colonel Tony, SAS OPERATION OMAN, pp. 143-158 for an excellent account of this battle.


6. Ibid., p. 44.

7. A little extra space has been given to psychological operations as the examples demonstrate how important knowledge of the local scene is in a counterinsurgency operation.


9. See Akehurst op. cit. pp. 53-57 for an agenda of the Dhofar Development Committee meeting and the military attitude toward civil control.
BIBLIOGRAPHY TO APPENDIX E


OMAN
CHRONOLOGY 1962-76

1961-63 Beginnings of rebellion.
June 9, 1965 "Official" beginning date of rebellion according to the Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman (PFLO).
Nov 1967 British withdraw from South Yemen which becomes the Peoples Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) and outside aid begins to flow to the rebels.
July 1970 Sultan Said overthrown by his son Qaboos.
Oct. 1971 "Operation Jaguar" launched by Sultan's Armed Forces; a major operation against the rebels.
April 1972 Simba outpost established at Sarfait near PDRY border.
July 1972 Battle of Mirbat - probable turning point of war.
Dec 1972 First Iranian troops arrive.
Nov 1973 The PDRY bomb Oman near Habarut; Iran guarantees Oman airspace.
Dec 1974 SAF began sweep of Western Dhofar.
Jan 1975 Iranians take Rakhyut, "capital of Free Dhofar".
Dec 1975 Sultan declares victory.
1976 Normalization of relations with the PDRY.
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The Hukbalahap insurgents commenced operations against the Philippine government in 1946 during the confusion attendant upon the beginning of the post-war period and the newly-granted independence of the Philippines. The government of President Roxas was ill-equipped to deal with the threat since the Army was in the process of being re-built after the war and the paramilitary Philippine Constabulary, although larger than the Army, was disorganized and suffering from poor morale. Without any considered counterinsurgency plan, President Roxas alternated between offers of amnesty and attempts at conciliation and uncontrolled violence in the villages along with large-scale sweeps that produced few results. After his death, the new President, former Vice President Quirino, continued the Roxas policies with similar lack of success. The elections of 1949, which re-elected the Quirino administration were widely believed to have been tainted by major voting frauds and the administration lost much of its popular support.

In some desperation Quirino called on the respected Congressman Ramon Magsaysay to become Secretary of National Defense with full powers to re-organize the Army and take whatever steps he thought necessary to restore law and order. Magsaysay developed a counterinsurgency plan which emphasized improved military leadership, small-scale persistent patrolling, intensified intelligence collection and psychological approaches and operations to increase popular support for government and army and undermine support for the insurgents. He used the Department of National Defense as a multi-purpose counterinsurgency organization which engaged in large-scale civic action and re-settlement programs. He also took responsibility for assuring the honesty of the Congressional elections in 1951. He succeeded in this effort by stationing military and ROTC units at the polling places and a variety of other means which reversed the government's loss of
credibility and authority. The elections are generally held to have been a turning point in the campaign against the Huks. They also secured Magsaysay's popularity and led in 1953 to his succeeding Quirino in the Presidency.

The improved tactics of the Army and the turnaround in popular attitudes toward the military and the government rapidly eroded insurgent strength in 1951 and 1952. By the time Magsaysay became President, the insurgent cause was in decline but he nevertheless pressed forward with a series of major economic reforms which further undermined the Huk's appeal to the population. By 1954, when the Huk military leader Luis Taruc surrendered, it was clear that the insurgency was doomed.

The turnaround came with startling speed, driven by the energetic Secretary of Defense who managed to combine political charisma with an experienced knowledge of the essentials of guerilla and counterguerrilla warfare and sensitivity to the needs and mentality of the Philippine peasantry. Although small in scale, the Philippine counterinsurgency program was a model of what such a campaign must be if it is to succeed.

B. BACKGROUND

The Philippines comprise a tropical archipelago of some 500 large islands and over 6,000 very small ones, stretching 1,150 miles from north to south and lying 500 miles off the Asian mainland. Their total area is 116,000 square miles, slightly larger than Arizona, and the population in 1946 was 18.5 million. Almost half that population lived on Luzon, the largest island of the group, which became the center of guerilla activity. Nearly 90 percent of the population are of Malayan/Indonesian stock. There were, in 1966, small minorities of Chinese and Caucasians (mostly Americans) and primitive aborigines in remote corners of the islands. Tagalog, the language of Luzon, was the official national language but few of the people spoke it. There were 70 other dialects used on the island and about 30 percent of the population spoke some English in 1946.
Over 80 percent of Filipinos lived on the land. Manila was and remains the largest city with half the total urban population. The land tenure system consisted almost entirely of large estates share-cropped by tenants, most of whom lived in poverty. Rice and such export crops as sugar and palm oil dominated agriculture. In Luzon particularly there was heavy population pressure on the land and a resulting land hunger which became a major political issue. Much of the land area of the Philippines is mountainous and not suitable for agriculture, although on the large southern island of Mindanao there was considerable undeveloped arable land.

The Philippines were a colony of the United States for nearly 50 years during which time the educational system and health services were improved and considerable development took place of roads, ports, and some small industry. The standard of living before World War II was relatively high by Asian criteria but, because of the system of land tenure, wealth was concentrated in the hands of a few and most of the rural population lived at a low standard.

C. THE EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

This potentially wealthy country was the scene of a rural-based Communist insurgency during the years 1946-1954. It was instigated and controlled by the Communist Party of the Philippines which mobilized guerilla forces originally formed during World War II to struggle against the Japanese. These were called Hukbong Bayan Laban Sa Hapon (People's Army Against Japan) abbreviated first to Hukbalahap and then to Huk. (Later the name was changed to People's Liberation Army (HMB), still abbreviated as Huk.) At its height the HMB numbered about 12,000 with a total supporting organization estimated at 100,000.1

Huk strength was concentrated in Central Luzon, a densely populated area where population pressure on the land was intense. The strongest appeal of the insurgents was to the land hunger of the people which they sloganized as "land for the landless," and, indeed, the party claimed to be nothing more than a band of militant "agrarian reformers." In this as well
as most other ways, the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP) consciously patterned itself on the Chinese Communist Party.

The Philippine government attained independence less than a year after the end of the war in the Pacific, a war which had cost the country a heavy price in death and destruction. It tried various counterinsurgency tactics and strategies against the Huks. In the earlier years (1946-1950) it alternated between negotiations and periods of truce on the one hand and, on the other, tactics which were harshly coercive (2). With few exceptions, these failed with the result that by mid-1950 a condition of crisis was clear to most observers and not least to the government. President Elpidio Quirino was persuaded that drastic action was necessary. He agreed to a thorough reorganization of the army and the police and appointed Congressman Ramon Magsaysay to be Secretary of National Defense with a mandate to take charge of the counterinsurgency effort.

The result was a remarkable reversal of trends in a brief period of time. Within a year, the government forces had assimilated a new approach and favorable results were becoming apparent. The turning point came in 1951 and by 1953, when Magsaysay himself became President, the outcome was clear to most. Then, in 1954, Luis Taruc, the sometime military chieftain of the insurgents, surrendered and all doubts disappeared.

In the course of those four years, Magsaysay, first as Secretary of Defense and then as President, initiated and managed a multi-faceted counterinsurgency program. We will describe it in relation to the courses of action discussed in the body of the analysis.

D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

Magsaysay confronted a military leadership notoriously incompetent and corrupt, dominated by cliques which gave a low priority to professionalism. Its counterinsurgency strategy relied heavily upon large-scale sweeps combined with static security by forces scattered widely throughout the affected areas. Troop behavior was extremely poor. Abusive
treatment of civilians, bribery and extortion were common as the soldiery swept through the countryside, chasing the elusive HuKS and venting their frustrations on the villagers. 3

Magsaysay went energetically about reforming this situation. One of his early priorities was precisely that of improving leadership, to which end he personally assumed authority over all officer promotions. 4 He performed surprise inspections of front-line units, and personally promoted or cashiered soldiers and officers whose performance pleased or displeased him. These and other measures rapidly improved the quality of leadership of the Philippine armed forces, especially the army and the Constabulary, both of which now came under the Secretary of Defense.

2. Tactics and Organization

Out of the reorganized leadership new tactics emerged emphasizing persistent patrolling and ambush, long-range patrols by newly-organized Scout Ranger teams, sustained pressure on the enemy, and improved intelligence collection. Strategy remained Magsaysay's prerogative. It came to combine the intensified military pressures resulting from the new tactics with political, social, and psychological measures directed toward undermining the support of the insurgents among the peasantry of the Huk-controlled areas.

At the beginning of the Huk emergency, the Philippine Army had just been re-born after its wartime destruction and the brunt of the counterinsurgency effort was assigned to the Constabulary, a paramilitary police force whose combat units outnumbered those of the army. Quirino and Magsaysay, however, preferred to assign the counterinsurgency responsibility to the army, which was entirely reorganized. Most of the Constabulary was therefore transferred into the army. The infantry was organized into Battalion Combat Teams (BCTs) miniature divisions numbering about 1,000 men, with artillery and service units attached.

This proved a highly successful formula. The war was essentially fought by individual battalion commanders who did not control a great deal of heavy firepower and were not tempted to concentrate it for large, set-piece operations. The battalion commanders also abandoned the earlier
emphasis on large-scale sweeps through wide areas. In most cases, they had a territorial responsibility which they met by gathering their regular units together and deploying them for offensive operations—mainly saturation patrolling. The troops' former responsibilities for static guard duty were taken over by civil guards. Some larger units were constantly available for rapid support of patrols or civil guards attacked by superior force.

As for air power, it was seldom employed directly against the Huks but performed valuable support services, including liaison, transport of supplies, observation, and intelligence. According to some commentators, the few helicopters that were available performed valuably in evacuating wounded.

3. Military Intelligence

A glaring weakness of the system before the Magsaysay reforms was the neglect of intelligence collection and dissemination by and within the military. The Secretary of Defense set about to remedy the deficiency by insisting that prisoners not be mistreated, but rather be carefully interrogated, by launching courses for intelligence training of officers, and by emphasizing the importance of prompt collation and dissemination of intelligence. One historian of the war against the Huks says: "Intelligence....from local people, informant nets, interrogations, and patrols was collected and collated on battalion level. Card index files showed order of battle strength, and intelligence situation maps indicated their locations." In other words, intelligence collection became systematized and routinized throughout the armed forces with results that quickly justified the effort.

4. Discipline, Troop Behavior, and Civic Action

A further initiative of Magsaysay was to reform completely the relations of the army with the rural population. During the first years of the insurgency, combat units frequently displayed hostility toward the barrio (village) populations during patrols and sweeps. Moreover, the military's support capability was poor. Soldiers were routinely required to forage for their supplies and not provided with funds to pay for what
they took. Troops were also instructed to enter population centers in a posture of combat readiness with weapons loaded and cocked.

The new Secretary of Defense, a wartime guerilla himself, was convinced that the government could not succeed in its counterinsurgency effort unless a complete change had been wrought in the relationship between the army and the rural population. Some of the remedies seem simplistic but they achieved their purpose. Units approaching villages were instructed to enter in a relaxed and friendly fashion. They were provided with supplies of candy and chewing gum to hand out to the village children and also with extra food rations and medical supplies which they dispensed to those in need.

A truly unusual expansion of military help to the rural poor was Magsaysay's assignment of lawyers from the Judge Advocate General's staff to argue the peasants' cases in special land courts and other tribunals. This use of government legal resources was intended to undercut the appeal of the Communists' demand for "equal justice," a theme which had considerable impact in the countryside. Magsaysay described these various approaches as the "attraction" program; all ranks were indoctrinated in the importance of developing good relations with the population.

Civic action by the military came to be a preeminent feature of this program. The larger and more costly civic action programs were conducted by the Army's regional headquarters. They involved building roads and repairing bridges, digging wells, rebuilding houses or whole villages destroyed by friendly or enemy action. One of the most elaborate of the Army's efforts involved the mass production of schools. Four thousand prefabricated school houses were manufactured, shipped to villages and put up. (The number reflects the need resulting from the wholesale destruction of schools by the Japanese during the war.) In many cases the army also provided school teachers.

5. The Economic Development Corps

But the most elaborate of all the civic action initiated by Magsaysay was a program that attracted widespread attention not only in the Philippines but also abroad. It was called EDCOR - Economic Development Corps.
Corps - and it offered to resettle on his own land any surrendered Huk who requested such resettlement. As in most of the other programs launched by Magsaysay, the Department of Defense and the Army administered the program. The surrendered Huks were transported to new communities on newly-cleared land in Mindanao. The Army Engineer Corps built roads and houses, dug wells, provided power and other infrastructure and the settler was granted an account on which he drew for food and seed and tools and which he began to repay after he had brought in his first crop. About 100 families, mostly former Huks with a nucleus of Philippine Army veterans, formed the first village in the program. In all, five settlements were created, three on Mindanao and two on Luzon, totaling 5,200 persons, most of them former Huks and their families.

The purpose of the program was to undercut the Huk demand of "land for the landless," which had had considerable impact in overcrowded central Luzon. The details of the program and the eligibility of surrendered Huk were broadcast by radio and leaflets and spread by word of mouth and reached the remote hiding places of the guerillas. One source estimates that 1500 of them surrendered because of EDCOR and further guesses that it would have taken 30,000 troops to eliminate that number of the enemy by military action. 

6. Popular Militia

A final significant aspect of military operations concerns the civil guard, a militia composed of local units, some even privately financed, which often behaved oppressively in the pre-Magsaysay years. Under the new dispensation, battalion combat teams were given territorial responsibility and in most cases assumed control of all security forces in the assigned area, including civil guard units. These were then taken over by the military. Soldiers were assigned to train and control them and they came to perform essential auxiliary duties, especially static security, a burdensome but essential counterinsurgency task.
E. THE ROLE OF THE POLICE

As noted earlier the Philippine Constabulary, a militarized police force under the Minister of the Interior, bore the brunt of the counter-insurgency in the period 1946-1950. The Philippine Army could field only two combat-ready battalions at the time and was in the process of being re-built. The Constabulary was actually organized on military lines and little difficulty was encountered in combining the two forces under the Secretary of Defense in 1950. At this time, the Army numbered 17,000 and the Constabulary 12,000. Much of the Constabulary was then transferred to the Army and the rest, reduced in number to 4,000, specialized in rural police work. There is little evidence to suggest that either this force or the regular municipal police played any other than a routine role during the ensuing four years when the back of the insurgency was broken. In effect, it seems to have been concluded that the approach which considered the insurgency to be simply a problem in law enforcement had been tried and had failed in the years 1946-1950. The responsibility was therefore transferred to the military under the civilian leadership of the Secretary of Defense. From then on, the police played a minor role.

F. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

We noted earlier the increased importance accorded under Magsaysay to military intelligence collection against the Huk. At the national level, in contrast to the indifference and laxity that existed in the Army, he found intense activity by more than a half-dozen groups, among them the Constabulary, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Military Intelligence Service, the Manila Police Department and others. There existed the expectable amount of jealousy, overlapping and duplication among these elements which Magsaysay resolved by assigning primacy to the MIS for collecting, processing and disseminating intelligence against the Communists and their military arm, the Hukbalahap.10
The MIS was reorganized for this increase in responsibility and considerably strengthened. Early in Magsaysay's term, it was able to exploit a stroke of good fortune, namely the identification of a Communist courier in Manila; and expand it into a massive intelligence coup resulting in the arrest of the entire Politburo of the party together with all its files and records, totaling several truckloads. With this achievement to its credit, the MIS established its credibility and was thus better able to discharge the primary intelligence role assigned to it. It did not, however, acquire direct authority over the other intelligence agencies. These continued to operate independently but under the new dispensation they made their product routinely available to the military, something they had not always done before. Magsaysay's reforms therefore assured the armed forces that their intelligence needs would have priority, which had not previously been the case.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE

Concerned to systematize his new psychological emphasis, the Secretary of Defense hit upon a device which was unique to the Philippines and has not been duplicated anywhere else. He called it the Civil Affairs Office (CAO). The CAO operated out of the office of the Secretary of Defense with units at each echelon down to battalion acting as advisers to commanders, particularly in matters relating to the program of attraction. At the same time, it was responsible for operations in the fields of troop information, psychological warfare, public information and civic action. CAO units, inter alia, published a newspaper for the troops, printed leaflets and surrender passes to be dropped in enemy areas, arranged for propaganda broadcasts directed at the enemy, produced films and traveling cabarets for the rural population in "Huklandia," as central Luzon came to be called. It also served as a kind of inspectorate, enforcing Magsaysay's policies on troop behavior. It collaborated closely with MIS on various deception schemes aimed at producing intelligence on the enemy. CAO also functioned as the Army's and the Defense Secretary's public relations adviser and
spokesman. If there were a common denominator to its various duties, it lay in the term "influence." Its purpose was to influence by means other than force the actions and attitudes of all those who played a role in the insurgency and in the effort to counter it.

H. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

The requirement that effective counterinsurgency be under unified management was met in the Philippines largely by the device of expanding the Department of National Defense to encompass new activities. The expedient was necessary in Magsaysay's view because with few exceptions other departments of the government felt no urgency to become involved. It had as a by-product the result that the Secretary of Defense had unchallenged control of the entire program, greatly simplifying coordination. Thus, in addition to complete control of the armed forces, Magsaysay controlled public information and intelligence, at least insofar as they bore on the insurgency, and a considerable share of public works, rural education and resettlement. He was obliged, of course, to secure the President's approval for major policy changes but had little difficulty with Quirino. After 1954, he became President himself, removing any residual constraints on his ability to coordinate and manage the program.

I. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

Permeating Magsaysay's approach was its explicit goal of persuading the ordinary voter and specifically the rural population that the government was legitimate and was also responsive to their needs within the framework of a functioning constitutional democracy. Much of the "program of attraction" had this purpose, as did such efforts as the building and staffing of schools, the use of military lawyers to assist peasants in the courts, and so on. Another device of similar purpose was Magsaysay's offer to any citizen to subsidize telegrams of complaint, which could be sent to the Secretary's office at a cost of five cents. An acknowledgement was
always sent immediately and action on the complaint, if justified, came as soon as possible. But most commentators agree that the successful policing of the congressional and gubernatorial elections of 1951 were critical to the success of Magsaysay's political approach. Because previous elections, especially those of 1949, had been flagrantly dishonest, the government's position and policy on all matters were generally suspect. In their propaganda the Communists exploited effectively this public distrust. Magsaysay guaranteed an honest election which in his view was essential to establish the government's legitimacy. He met his commitment by mobilizing the ROTC and the Army to attend each polling place and investigate complaints on the spot.

The public consensus following the elections accepted them as the most honest in Philippine history, a view supported by the fact that most victors at the polls were opponents of the Quirino administration. Commentators and analysts view the elections of 1951 as a critical turning point of the counterinsurgency campaign. On the one hand, it undermined a most effective propaganda line of the Communists and their supporters, while on the other, it restored public faith in the government as an honest agent of public views as expressed at the polls.

J. IMPROVEMENTS OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND VILLAGE ENVIRONMENT

Perhaps the most important improvements in rural administration resulted from the elections of 1951. Under the Philippine system, provincial governors are elected and those elected in 1951 in most cases had Magsaysay's support and were an improvement over the men they ousted. Few other details are available concerning rural administration.

As far as concerns improvement of the village environment, the army's civic action program had favorable effects. Beyond that, most of the national-level effort to deal with the social and economic roots of the insurgency nevertheless had to await Magsaysay's election as president. Once in the presidential office he vigorously pursued a series of programs directed at undercutting the Huk social and economic appeals. These
included land reform, road and bridge construction, rural education and the like. The laws on tenancy were more strictly enforced and resettlement was pushed ahead vigorously.

There is no information to assist in evaluating the effect of such policies on the insurgency which, in any event, was in sharp decline by the time Magsaysay became president. From the evidence of public support for his administration, however, there is not much doubt that the economic and social programs had their impact on public and particularly rural attitudes toward the administration and its rival, the Hukbalabap.

K. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

In 1946, the Philippines became an independent country with a constitution based on that of the US. In view of the background, it is not surprising that the government was reluctant to appear to be tampering with the freedoms enshrined in the new constitution. The official approach to the insurgency held it to be a problem in law enforcement not requiring exceptional measures. The press in particular stood vigilant guard over civil rights and particularly the writ of habeas corpus. As a result, most guerrillas taken prisoner were quickly freed either for lack of evidence to bring an indictment or, if one was brought, by making bail. At the same time, partly in frustration at this state of affairs, many illegal actions were carried out by the army and Constabulary, including torture and killings of prisoners and of suspect villagers.

Magsaysay was able to make the case for suspending the writ of habeas corpus to President Quirino who courageously enough assumed the political onus and made the required declaration. On the other hand, the Secretary of Defense insisted that the lawlessness that had characterized the behavior of some units of the Constabulary and the army be stamped out. The suspension of the writ of habeas corpus was not followed by a new stream of civil rights abuses as some opponents had feared. The legal framework as adapted and enforced by Magsaysay proved adequate to the task.
FOOTNOTES FOR APPENDIX F


9. Ibid., pp. 127-129.

10. Ibid., p. 175.


BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX F

The following were the most useful sources in the preparation of this study both for their authoritative review of the facts and for their analyses:


Additional facts were taken from the following studies produced by students at the Army War College, Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>DATE</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>April 1946</td>
<td>In first post-war election, Manuel Roxas is chosen to be President. Remnants of communist war-time guerilla forces, the Hukbalahap, clash with government forces attempting to disarm them.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1946</td>
<td>Huks go into armed dissidence, re-establishing their war-time General Headquarters under Luis Taruc.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 4, 1946</td>
<td>The Philippines become independent after 48 years as an American colony.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1946-1947</td>
<td>Fighting intensifies in Luzon. Government organizes large-scale sweeps and other military actions but fails to eliminate guerillas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>April 1948</td>
<td>President Roxas dies of natural causes. He is succeeded by Elpidio Quirino, who initially attempts a conciliatory approach to Huks. When this fails, he resumes Roxas' conventional tactics. Huk movement continues to spread.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1949</td>
<td>Quirino re-elected President in disputed election which featured major frauds and corruption. Government loses popular support because of corruption. Huk military action intensifies.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>Event</td>
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<td>----------------------</td>
<td>----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>September 1, 1950</td>
<td>Quirino appoints Congressman Ramon Magsaysay as Secretary of National Defense and charges him with the responsibility to restore law and order. Magsaysay immediately begins re-organization of armed forces, cleaning out military leadership of corrupt elements.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Late-1950</td>
<td>Government arrests entire Communist Party leadership and seizes truck loads of documents. Magsaysay persuades President to suspend writ of habeas corpus so that Communist prisoners can be held.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>December 1950</td>
<td>Magsaysay establishes Economic Development Corps to resettle captured insurgents in newly developed rural areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1951</td>
<td>New military tactics succeed in harassing Huk forces while new economic and social programs reduce their popular support and increase that of the government.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1951</td>
<td>Magsaysay supervises mid-term Congressional elections which result in government defeat at polls but increased prestige for Secretary of National Defense.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>January–March 1952</td>
<td>Four thousand Huk weapons are captured in three-month period. Huk weapons losses amount to 50 percent of original 1946 total. By April 1952, about 40 percent of original Huk force has been eliminated.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>February 1953</td>
<td>Magsaysay retires as Secretary of National Defense and announces intention to run for Presidency.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November 1953</td>
<td>Magsaysay elected President and pushes energetic program of reform and military action against insurgents.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DATE</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>-----------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May 1954</td>
<td>Luis Taruc, one-time supreme commander of Huks, surrenders. Insurgency is virtually ended except for minor mopping-up operations.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

Thai leaders have not considered the communist-led insurgency a major threat and consequently Thai counterinsurgency efforts have never received the priority attention needed to make them successful. However, over the 20 years since the beginning of the insurgency, the Thai have made efforts, security, and developmental, to eliminate it. As early as 1961 they established the National Security Council to coordinate the security effort and in 1962, the Community Development Department to improve the lot of the villagers. Efforts have been made to coordinate the counterinsurgency, most notably by CSOC, the Communist Suppression Operations Command, to establish village security force, and to develop the rural areas—all with very limited success. The Thai have had some excellent concepts and plans but their execution has been poor. This is partially due to lack of interest and partially to rivalry and competition among government agencies and officials. The insurgency today is at a low ebb; this is caused more by its own internal weaknesses and competing outside supporters than to the efforts of the government. Reports from the Fourth Thai Communist Party Congress in 1983 and the Fifth Congress held in the south in early 1984 suggest a shift to urban insurgency. The communists have not given up the struggle for Thailand and the Thai still must deal with a continuing insurgency in four regions of the country.

B. BACKGROUND

Thailand is located in mainland Southeast Asia and Bangkok is its capital. Cambodia lies to its east, Laos to its east and north, Burma to its north and west, and Malaysia to its south on the long, narrow Malay peninsula. It is about 200,000 square miles, slightly smaller than France, and nearly twice as large as Colorado. It stretches approximately
500 miles across at its widest point, and is nearly 1,000 miles long from its Malaysian border to its northern border with Burma. Thailand is comprised of six regions: the most important and richest is the central plain of the Chao Phya River; the northeast and southeast are largely flat with some rolling hills and border Cambodia and Laos; the mountainous north borders parts of Burma and Laos; the hilly west central is next to Burma; and the rolling jungle in the south reaches to Malaysia. The climate is tropical with monsoon rains beginning in late May and lasting to November. The temperature is generally in the 90s, except in the mountainous areas. The mountains, mainly in the north and along the western border, reach a height of 9,000 feet in places and are inhabited largely by hill tribes, not ethnic Thai. In the northeast, the people are akin to the Laotians, and, though separated by the Mekong River, the two communities have close social and economic relations. In the southern five provinces, the people are ethnic Malay and Muslim, referred to in Thailand as Thai-Muslims. They are separated from most Thai by race and religion, which have caused problems ever since 1911 when the present boundary was set by an agreement with the British. But most Thai citizens are ethnic Thai and are Buddhists, factors which contribute to the unity and cohesion of the nation.

Thailand has a centralized government with a constitutional monarch who plays an important role as a national symbol and is thus also a unifying element in the country. There is a constitution and a parliament, partially elected and partially appointed, and the government is headed by a prime minister, at this time (1984) General Prem Tinsulanon. While these constitutional underpinnings and some democratic political practices exist, there is no democratic tradition. The small but numerous political parties, the powerful bureaucracy and the predominance of the army make democratic parliamentary government difficult.

Thailand sided with Japan in World War II and was largely spared the oppressive occupation that most of Southeast Asia suffered. There was nevertheless a Free Thai resistance movement with some communists in it, although it was not communist-dominated. Also Thailand was never a colony
of any European power and through skill and good luck has maintained its independence. It thus differs from its neighbors in never having had an independence movement nor the struggle for independence after World War II that Indonesia and Indochina waged. The Thai are more or less self-sufficient, have no colonialist hangups, are ethnically a reasonably cohesive people. They are loyal to the royal family and generally display an easygoing view of life.

The Royal Thai Government (RTG) has not given counterinsurgency top priority attention. Although at times it has appeared to take the threat seriously, the effort never reached the levels that some Thai have wished or many Americans thought it should. In 1974 the new government did not even mention counterinsurgency in its list of top priorities. There are several reasons for this attitude. The mainstream Thai, especially in the great central plain of Thailand, have not participated much in the communist insurgency and have remained largely loyal to the RTG. Minorities have been the primary basis for insurgency, especially the Sino-Thai, but also the hill tribes in the north, Thai-Muslims in the south and the Thai-Lao in the northeast. Unrest among minorities on the borders has not been an uncommon state of affairs in Thai history and so is not seen as a major new threat. Activities in the Indo-China area have also distracted the RTG leadership's attention. Furthermore, to the Thai military and civilian elite politics and moneymaking in Bangkok are much more important, rewarding and comfortable than dealing with guerilla bands in outlying areas. While the Thai are pleased that the insurgency is now (mid-1984) at a low point, and they have indeed helped to bring this about, they cannot claim that this state of affairs is entirely a result of their own efforts. It is in considerable part due to disarray in the CPT and outside factors.

C. EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

Communist activities in Thailand, as in most other Southeast Asian countries, began in the 1920s. From the beginning they have been strongly influenced by the Chinese Communists and led by Sino-Thai. The original
nucleus first formed a Chinese Communist Party of Thailand, and then re-named it the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT). It made little progress either before World War II or during the war when the party failed to play a significant role against the Japanese. After the war, the CPT muddled along, trying to improve its organization but made little headway. In the late 1950s and early 1960s an internal struggle took place over how to proceed in the fight against the Royal Thai Government. In 1961 a decision was taken, probably under Chinese pressure, to follow Mao's path and wage protracted guerilla warfare against the RTG. Preparations were made and a few small operations were undertaken; then, in August 1965, the communists officially launched their armed insurgency effort. It started in the Phu Pan mountains in the northeast, an area which the Thai government had largely neglected, and where in the towns there were, and still are, substantial Vietnamese minorities which support Hanoi. The region had socio-economic grievances and some history of dissidence which the communists tried to exploit. Shortly afterwards the insurgency broke out in the north, where the communists manipulated the tribal people who lived in the mountains and who were neglected and rather coldly exploited by the local authorities. A small insurgency also broke out in the mid-south and there were remnants of the Malayan Communist Party (CPM) in the south on the border with Malaysia, a remote region also neglected by the RTG.

In this latter area, the situation was and has remained very complicated since 1951 members of the Communist Party of Malaysia have located on the Thai side of the border. They are organized into three very small regiments of guerillas, and have had some support from across the border in Malaysia. The goal of the Malaysian communists is to return home to take over the government there, but they also cause problems in Thailand. The Malaysian government has constantly urged the Thai to increase their efforts to wipe out the CPM remnant in Thailand, but the Thais have only limited interest in this problem. Some Thai-Malay combined police-military operations have been conducted but the guerillas remain in
being despite announcements of their demise. There are a few elements of the CPT in the area, though not many, as they have concentrated somewhat to the north in the area designated the "mid-south".

Separatist groups also exist in the south which are not communist but Islamic. They either wish to be independent as they once were, or to join Malaysia where they would feel more at home with fellow Malay Muslims. Lastly, there are bandits and pirates who disrupt life in their quest for booty. Unfortunately, the arrival of defenseless "boat people" from Vietnam, by providing more numerous prey, have led to even more piracy in recent years, making it a serious problem in the southern part of the Gulf of Thailand.

There are thus four regions of insurgency in Thailand: the northeast, the north, the mid-south and the south. While for years there has been but one official Communist Party of Thailand, a great degree of regional autonomy exists in the insurgency which poses four separate problems to the government, each one quite different. Furthermore, at the present moment, the CPT is divided into a Hanoi element, a Peking element and a Moscow element—practically three separate parties, a condition which weakens the insurgency. Reports from the Fourth and Fifth Communist Party Congresses held in 1983 and 1984 indicate that the communists may be planning to emphasize urban insurgency in the future; activities in the rural areas will continue, but may be of less importance. In addition to this fragmentation, the effort was further weakened by the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. The Chinese, who wished to help the Khmer Rouge insurgents and needed the Thai government's help to get supplies to them, reduced their support and supplies for the Thai communist insurgency.

While the various Thai insurgencies have never been a great threat to the RTG, they built up to approximately 10,000-12,000 guerillas in the late 1970s. These were spread out in four areas with little communication between them. They lacked leadership, training and supplies. They also failed to produce a national charismatic leader such as Ho Chi Minh, tended to be minorities within Thailand, and did not have the kinds of issues (independence, colonialism, etc.) that communists have exploited.
The BDM Corporation successfully in other countries. The best estimates today are that the guerillas now number less than 2,000. Many top leaders as well as rank and file have defected to the RTG, taking advantage of an amnesty program and repelled by the internal party difficulties which became acute after the 1979 invasion of Cambodia by Vietnam. Nevertheless, a dedicated cadre remains and the insurgency has not been wiped out.1

D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

No one military leader has been in charge of the military aspect of the counterinsurgency. Successive Commanders-in-Chief of the Army have seldom, if ever, devoted a significant part of their time and effort to it. Most of them have been more interested in the conventional aspects of the army, in internal Thai army politics and the larger political scene in Bangkok. The Commander of CSOC, usually the same man as the Commander-in-Chief, never played the role that was envisioned or needed. The Director of Operations for CSOC tried to develop concepts, strategy, and tactics, and attempted to coordinate all RTG efforts, but did not have the power nor influence to implement them successfully. The regional army commanders, the Second in the northeast, the Third in the north, the Fourth in the south, and the First in the central region, were key players in the counterinsurgency effort. They commanded troops which actually engaged in counterinsurgency. Each was more or less free to develop his own doctrine, strategy, and tactics as he saw fit, or even to ignore the guerillas, if he preferred. Furthermore, leadership in the Royal Thai Army (RTA) has been deeply affected by the involvement of the Army in politics. In effect, almost every government since the overthrow of the absolute monarchy in 1932, has depended on the RTA as its base of political support and most of them have been governments of generals.2 In order to assure stability, the military officers forming the government juntas have had to consider the political loyalties, not the professional competence, of senior commanders in making assignments and awarding promotions.
The effect of this involvement of the Thai military has been to downgrade the martial qualities, including combat leadership, in favor of political skills and influence. Although there have been and are today good officers in all ranks, there are many who are inferior. At the critical level of company and platoon, officers have tended to be older than would be the case in most armies. It is not unusual to find a 40 or 50-year-old commanding a company, which is far too old for that sort of responsibility. The over-age company commanders are those with the least political influence who for that reason have been unable to secure regular promotion. Another consequence of the same condition is the concentration of many of the best officers in the Bangkok area. Life in Bangkok is considered far preferable to life in the remote provinces, so officers with political influence do their best to avoid assignment away from the city.

2. Training

The ranks of the RTA are largely filled with conscripts who serve for two years, mainly in their own home areas. A great deal of the time of regular army non-coms and officers is taken up with the basic training of this regular influx of new recruits. Although there is some counter-insurgency training, not nearly enough attention is given to patrolling, night operations, ambushes and counterambushes and the various small-unit tactics so critical to successful counterinsurgency operations. The training program has not included the persistent and detailed planning and rehearsal of operations such as the British carried out meticulously in Malaya. These shortcomings have led to rather moderate military success against the insurgents.

3. Tactics and Strategy

Although the concepts under which the Thai Army is supposed to be operating emphasize the inadvisability of employing heavy firepower and large, concentrated forces in counterinsurgency combat, the RTA - not unlike the Americans in this regard - has tended to ignore this constraint and fall back on firepower at certain times, especially when the commanders have been surprised by insurgent attacks or frustrated by the enemy's elusiveness. Although a senior Thai general is on record as having once
said about large American operations in Vietnam. "We're not going to do that," they have nevertheless carried out large-scale sweeps and authorized unobserved artillery fire and air bombardment of villages. Usually this is done in areas where the population is largely composed of hill-tribes or other minorities, for Thai commanders are genuinely reluctant to shed the blood of fellow Thai.

The RTA has also shown a tendency to keep most of its troops in garrisons for long stretches of static guard duty. This is due to the desire of the higher command to be ready for conventional defense of the country, their reluctance to become bogged down in sustained counter-insurgency operations, often in remote areas, and lack of proper training of the troops for small-unit activity.

4. Military Intelligence

Military intelligence personnel are normally not trained or organized to gather the kind of information required in counterinsurgency operations. For example, the order of battle of the enemy, usually one of the main targets for conventional military intelligence, is not nearly as important in counterinsurgency where units vary greatly in size, training and leadership and regiments are sometimes the size of companies. Furthermore, if the enemy has his way, there will never be a pitched battle between large units. When confronted by a superior force, the guerilla will almost always fade away and live to fight another day. The kind of intelligence required on the personnel, leadership and logistic needs and methods of the guerillas and their local supporters is picked up best from villagers. For the most part the army is not trained to exploit this type of source. Defectors and captured personnel can also be useful, but they have been few in number. Another critical source is the police. For political reasons, however, the Thai Army's relationship with the police has not been good, and in many cases it has not been able to secure the necessary information from that source. Often the intelligence has been late and inaccurate and, in addition, the Army's security and counter-intelligence systems have not prevented operational plans from reaching the enemy. Too often surprise has been lost due not only to poor intelligence
but also to security leaks, with consequent negative results. Throughout
the years, more and better counterinsurgency intelligence has been needed
but has not been available.

5. Discipline, Behavior and Civic Action

While some of the Thai leaders have recognized the great
importance of strict discipline and good behavior of their troops, in too
many cases these qualities have not been achieved. Part of the problem
lies in the fact that the army, to some extent, lives off the countryside.
Adequate funds never reach the troops to pay for food taken from or pro-
vided by peasants. This shortage of per diem has been a serious problem and
has often caused feelings of ill-will toward the Army among the villagers
involved. Furthermore, the military leadership has not been as careful as
it should have been to avoid damage or injury to peasants or their
property. While the troops are not actively hostile toward the population,
they are sometimes careless, with negative consequences for counter-
insurgency.

The Thai military have undertaken some civic action. The Mobile
Development Units (MDU’s) of the National Security Council have for
20 years worked with villagers to help improve their lives through the con-
struction of small feeder roads, village wells, recreation halls and other
small construction projects. These units of a hundred or so men stay in one
area until they have completed their planned projects, then move on. While
they have not been in the mainstream of the counterinsurgency effort, they
have quietly done some good work. CSOC has sponsored civic action which
was included in their operational plan and army engineers have helped with
construction projects. As in most cases of Thai counterinsurgency, the
words are better than the actions, but some efforts have been made by the
military to help the people. It has not, however, been a major undertaking
and much more could have been done.

6. Naval and Air Operations

Naval operations have been very limited as the coastal areas have
not been important in the Thai insurgency. The Navy has patrolled the Gulf
of Thailand waters off the Thai-Cambodian borders and off the far south
coast. It also made experimental attempts to stop insurgent traffic and supplies coming across the Mekong River from Laos, but with no success.

Air power has not been extensively used in Thai counterinsurgency efforts. Some transports have been employed to supply isolated or beleaguered units, to move troops, and to carry out a few small airborne operations. Aerial photography has sometimes been employed as well as medical air evacuation. Air attacks have been carried out on suspected enemy locations with unknown results and occasionally villagers or innocent civilians have been hit. There has been no careful system of prior approval for air attacks, such as the procedure in Malaya where the police reviewed all proposed air targets to minimize civilian casualties. However, the use of air has been so limited that such casualties have not been a major factor in counterinsurgency operations. Some Thai army generals have been skeptical of the value of air attacks and concerned about the negative effects of indiscriminate air operations. This probably accounts for the restraint.

7. Civil-Military Relations

In Thailand the army is the most powerful and influential institution of government and is not subordinate to any civilian authority. While it cooperated with CSOC initially, it later withdrew direct support and CSOC was left with planning and psychological operations as its primary functions. Thereafter, all army orders went through army channels from headquarters in Bangkok, with or without coordination or approval from CSOC. In the northeast, the Second Army commander took his orders from Army headquarters in Bangkok and gave them directly to his subordinate units, with or without approval from the civilian-police-military (CPM) coordinating center in the region, even though he also commanded it. While occasionally coordination was effected with police, more often there has been none. The army and police were political rivals after World War II and the army has not been willing for the police to control large units or even to grow very much in total size. The army has also vacillated between wanting to participate in - indeed, to dominate - the counterinsurgency effort on the one hand, and to focus on the external conventional threat on
the other. Most Thai civilian officials are somewhat in awe and very deferential to army officers, leading to subservience rather than coordination. In spite of organizational attempts, such as CSOC, civil-military relations in the counterinsurgency effort have not been either good or close.

8. Militia

The army has had little to do with local militia or village defense. It views that as a police responsibility rather than a military one. Also, many army officers are opposed to giving arms to the villagers for fear that they might fall into the hands of the communists. In addition, the army has been somewhat reluctant to earmark relief forces for the police or local defense forces; it argues that this is not the real job of the army and that it diverts the troops from more important missions. Furthermore, the army has no direct communications with the small groups of village defenders, and poor communications with the police. It is also afraid of being ambushed en route to the beleaguered forces. Therefore, the army has played almost no role in local defense organization, though it has on occasion provided static defense forces for key installations and positions.

Some Thai over the years have recognized the need for village defense. A rather old and moribund organization, the Volunteer Defense Corps (VDC) has been resurrected at various times to perform village defense, and has served as a cadre for new efforts. The United States in the late 1960s pushed hard for a Village Security Force to do the job, but encountered the strong and continuing rivalry between the Department of Local Administration (DOLA) and the police over local security matters and ultimately failed. DOLA, after that fiasco, attempted to raise, train and deploy its own development and security teams. A training camp was established and teams were deployed to a few provinces, but the effort petered out. Numerous other attempts have been made, including the present political teams of Prime Minister Prem, which include security trainers, but none have succeeded, at least for very long. The Thai have talked interminably about village security but no high priority or continuous
effort has emerged from the talk. The reason may have been the fact that the most threatened communities have been minorities rather than ethnic Thai.

E. POLICE OPERATIONS

The Thai National Police Department (TNPD) is an agency of the national government, and comes under the Minister of Interior. Five elements of the police have played some role in the Thai counterinsurgency effort. These are: the Provincial Police, the Border Patrol Police (BPP), the Special Branch, the Air Division, and the Marine Division. The last two have played rather minor roles, though the Air Division with its helicopters and small aircraft provides some mobility, medical evacuation, and aerial command posts for the Provincial Police and Border Patrol Police.

The Provincial Police are stationed throughout the land in every province, and down to the level of tambon, which is defined as a "cluster of villages". They are responsible for normal peacetime police functions in the countryside. In addition, they assume some responsibility for village defense through their local stations at the tambon level, and sometimes at the village level. They have usually also participated in various village defense programs, such as the Village Protection Units, Village Defense Corps, and others. There have been very few attempts at weapons and resource control. Programs for ID systems have floundered. In most areas, the population is spread out and food is plentiful so that control in any case would have been difficult, even if the RTG had the will and the bureaucracy. However, there have never been enough police to perform normal duties satisfactorily, much less the additional security functions called for by the counterinsurgency effort. The police have had a spotty reputation and have been accused of corruption and inefficiency. In many cases, the people distrust and fear them, and do not look to them for security or help. Efforts have been made to improve the quality, training,
and behavior of the men, and some progress has been made. These problems of the police and their rivalry with the army have nevertheless reduced their effectiveness in the counterinsurgency effort.

The Border Police are responsible for surveillance of the Thai border, a surveillance which is limited because of the inadequate number of the BPP and the rugged, extensive nature of the border. The BPP has been unable to stop the flow of guerillas to and from neighboring countries, or prevent their supplies from coming in. It has made an effort to extend its capabilities by working with villagers, particularly the hill tribes, providing schools and some medical care, and organizing small groups of tribesmen to assist in border surveillance. However, the BPP are too few in numbers, they need better training and much more equipment, particularly radios. There is also little provision for the rescue of BPP units in cases of emergency, and so they patrol in isolation on remote borders with little or no help from the rest of the government apparatus. Given the length of those borders, any serious effort to control them effectively is beyond BPP's resources and capabilities.

The Special Branch of the police, which numbers in the hundreds, is too small for its responsibilities. It has nevertheless developed some intelligence nets, exploited defectors, and employed other means of intelligence-gathering with some success. The TNPD now is trying to get all divisions of the police to contribute intelligence data, but this is a slow process. Most police are untrained in the subject and not appreciative of the need. Cooperation with the army remains limited, and intelligence has not been pooled effectively.

Given the army's concern over the development of large police field units, not much has been done in this area. In the 1970s, the Provincial Police did form Special Action Teams (SAT's) of 50 men each which were capable of airborne and helicopter-borne operations. They were intended to come to the rescue of beleaguered police units and village defense forces. This effort had only limited success due to a lack of vehicles and equipment and to some misunderstanding of the teams' roles. The Provincial Police also tried to develop smaller reinforcement groups at all levels to
serve as relief forces. Given their limited personnel, these were not very robust. Relief of beleaguered police and village defense forces has remained a problem and the police have not developed significant paramilitary forces to solve it.

F. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

It has already been pointed out that the police and the army intelligence services have not worked together as well as required for an effective intelligence effort. Some attempts have been made to bridge this gap. In the 1970s, Joint Security Centers were established at the police region level (a police region usually includes six to ten provinces) manned by civilians, police and military. These were not primarily collection centers but were supposed to obtain information from the various collecting agencies and bring it together for counterinsurgency purposes. These centers have worked only moderately well. Security and counterintelligence have often been poor, leading to leaks which hampered security operations, spoiled surprise, and allowed CT's to escape traps. A unified and effective intelligence system is still much needed.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

The RTG has not concerned itself greatly with psychological operations. In the 1960s and 1970s, the United States Information Agency tried to help develop a psychological capability for CSOC by providing some equipment—jeeps, loud speakers, printing presses, and the like—with advisors. Mobile Information Teams (MIT's) were sent out to the villages, but they did not seem to be a success. People relied more on radios and the village headman for news. The government also set up radio stations, including station 909 for the hill tribes, which carried information and educational and motivational programs. These competed somewhat with the communist radios outside the country, but again they were not particularly successful. The present Thai government believes that the insurgency is
caused by a lack of democracy, and is therefore taking a much greater interest in psychological and informational programs. It has formed the National Defense Thai Volunteer Service (NDTV) which is composed of villagers and is intended to help educate the people about democracy, to develop a better relationship between villagers, their leaders, and government officials, to participate in local community development programs, and to train villagers for intelligence, village defense and community leadership. Those involved in defense are to be supplied with arms and radios. When the basic cadre has finished its job in one village, it will go to another to recruit another group. If the Prem government continues this policy psychological operations among the people should play a more important role than in the past.

H. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF THE COUNTERINSURGENCY PROGRAM

From the beginning, the Thai realized the need for unified management not only of all security efforts, but also of related civilian programs and activities. As noted earlier, the National Security Command was formed in 1961 in the Ministry of Defense to coordinate security operations. It began to try to do this, but was not completely successful and in 1965 the Communist Suppression Operations Command (CSOC) was formed. (In 1973 it became the Internal Security Operations Command, ISOC). CSOC was intended to coordinate all agencies of government, civilian, police and military (CPM) in a unified campaign against the CT's. The CPM concept was not only attempted at the central government level, but also at regional and provincial levels. CSOC-1 was formed in the northeast, and several of the provinces were provided with a CPM headquarters. In 1967 the army took over control of counterinsurgency operations, relegating CSOC to staff functions only. CSOC-1 was disbanded and Second Army Forward was created to discharge the same responsibilities.

Under this new arrangement the regional army commanders - First Army in Central Thailand, Second Army in the Northeast, Third in the north and Fourth is the south and mid-south - became the key players in the
counterinsurgency effort. They commanded the troops actually engaged and each regional commander was free to develop his own doctrine, strategy and tactics as he saw fit. This inevitably led to a situation where one commander followed one concept while another pursued a different one. Moreover, in some cases the commander had other preoccupations and gave counterinsurgency little priority. In effect, although concepts of unified management were paid lip service, in practice there was none. Moreover, personality clashes in Bangkok, bureaucratic rivalries and lack of interest all detracted from the effort and reduced the likelihood of unified management.

Today, ISOC and NSC remain in existence but are powerless. In the meantime, the Prem government has formed a new centralized management group called the Committee of the Policy Struggle to Win Over Communism which is currently responsible for developing plans and programs for the new political campaign against the communists. It remains to be seen how well it will do.

I. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The RTG has based its claims to legitimacy and made its appeals to the people on the themes of loyalty to the nation, the king and Buddhism. The approach has been quite successful. Most Thai, in spite of inequities, corruption, inefficiency and the other shortcomings of the government have been unresponsive to communist appeals. The monarchy has provided the legal continuity and framework of legitimacy since 1932 when the absolute monarchy was overthrown and replaced by a military junta which nevertheless retained the monarch as a powerless facade to bestow legitimacy. Since that date and through many successive constitutions, the king has given every prime minister a cloak of legality.

The present monarch, Bhumiphol, is sincerely devoted to his task which, as he sees it, is to help his subjects and to provide continuity and stability to the system. Although since the end of absolutism power has normally changed hands by coup d'état a kind of stability has prevailed in
that power has been retained by the same groups although the specific incumbents have changed. Briefly during the 1970's the pattern seemed to change for the worse when several coups took place with considerable loss of life. In the late 1970's, however, stability was re-established under General Kriangsak who then peacefully resigned in 1980 when he lost favor among the elite groups who initially chose him.

Some progress toward democracy has taken place since 1969 when a new constitution was promulgated. Still, the RTG has not made a significant effort to build democratic processes at all levels or to correct the many inequities of Thai society. Behind the facade of a constitutional democracy the same elite composed of senior army officers, senior bureaucrats and a few civilian politicians runs the country. Among this group, the army usually has the final word. Some in the army are now espousing democracy for the people at all echelons by which they seem to mean that the government should function for the benefit of the people but not necessarily be run by them. The outcome of this line of thought is uncertain. At this writing the constitution of 1978 and the parliament it created are still in place. They have withstood attempts of some generals to change them and are available as a framework for a 'government of laws not men.'

J. IMPROVEMENTS IN RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND VILLAGE ENVIRONMENT

From the beginning, the RTG has taken an interest in this subject, not as substantial and intense as needed, but nevertheless a continuing one. The Community Development Department in the Ministry of Interior was created in 1962, partially in response to the communist threat, to help develop small village projects concerned with water, agriculture and recreation. It continues its efforts to this day. The MDU's of the NSC, as mentioned earlier, perform military civic action in the villages. They too are still functioning. The Accelerated Rural Development office was established in 1964 to give the provinces a public works construction capability of their own. The Public Welfare Department has worked with the hill tribes and others. There have been efforts by the Department of Local
Administration and the TNPD to improve the quality of rural officials, their job skills and their behavior. Much has been done; how much it has helped stem the communist insurgency is unknown, but over time it has had a noticeable impact on the quality of village life throughout Thailand. Inevitably such improvement must have had a political payoff although it is not measurable.

K. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Generally, the Thai government has formally observed the notion of legality in its counter-insurgency operations. Broad and strict anti-communist laws were promulgated in the 1950's which many critics have regarded as too all-inclusive and heavy-handed but the government's actions under them are based on law. In addition, martial law has been in effect for long periods during the years of insurgency which gave the successive military regimes the opportunity to deal summarily with their opposition. Nevertheless, violations of legality and many forms of corruption have marred the record at all echelons and under all governments. On the other hand, the Thai government has seldom resorted to brutality or torture, although there have been instances. In other words, the record of the RTG has been mixed one in respect to the legality of its approach to the Communist insurgency. The concept of legality exists as a desirable course for the government but has been violated when it proved inconvenient or the provocation was perceived as great.

Recently a broad amnesty resulted in the release of 90 percent of political prisoners. It was declared in an effort to reestablish a more relaxed political climate and so far it seems to have accomplished its purpose.
FOOTNOTES TO APPENDIX G


3. See Appendix D.


BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX G


CHRONOLOGY
THAILAND 1961-1984

1950's  Anti-communist legislation.
1961   Reports of impending insurgency.
1961   National Security Command created and its MDU's work in rural areas.
1962   Community Development Department organized.
1965   Communist announce official beginning of insurgency.
1965   Formation of Communist Suppression Operations Command 09/10 Plan developed as comprehensive effort to defeat insurgency in northeast.
1969   New Constitution
1972   Division level operation against communists in North failed badly
1973   Overthrow of Thanom-Prasach regime. Students begin to leave Bangkok and join guerrillas in rural areas.
1976   Return to military government.
1978   Amnesty for all who left Bangkok and joined CT's. Students start to return.
1980   Prime Minister Prem's new concept of the cause of communist insurgency and how to defeat it identifies democracy as cure-all.
1980   Communist insurgents becoming split in a number of ways; they are also hurt by reduced Chinese aid.
1983-84  CPT reported to have decided to emphasize urban insurgency.
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

During the years 1958-1964, the constitutional and democratic government of Venezuela confronted and mastered a violent Communist-organized insurgency which was centered in the capital city of Caracas but included some rural guerilla activity. The victory of the government was based on the ability of the President, Romulo Betancourt, and his successors to appeal for and effectively exploit public support for the newly-established democratic system, on the broad and effective pro-Government activities of Betancourt's party, Accion Democratica (AD) and several other parties of democratic principles, especially among the peasantry, on the mistakes of the leftist groups sponsoring the violence, on the decision of the military leadership to accept constitutionalism and renounce military rule and finally on the gradually improving performance of the police and the army in suppressing the violence. For several years, i.e., from 1961 through 1963, outbreaks of increasingly serious violence were a feature of daily life in Caracas until, on election day, December 1, 1963, the voters defied the insurgents' threats to go to the polls in overwhelming numbers. For the first time in Venezuelan history power passed peacefully from one democratically elected administration to another.

After that critical turning point, the insurgents shifted their emphasis to the remote rural areas of the Andes Mountains. With Cuban training and aid their numbers reached about 500 guerillas in 1965 but they lacked the critical element of broad peasant support. Without it, the effort gradually dwindled. The Government assisted the process by a series of well-timed amnesty offers and by legalizing the Communist Party after it had foresworn violence. Finally, in 1969 Castro also decided to abandon the guerilla remnant, putting an end to this violent chapter of Venezuelan history.
B. BACKGROUND

Venezuela is a country the size of Texas and Oklahoma together, lying on the north coast of South America and forming the southern boundary of the Caribbean basin. At the time of the events discussed here it had a population of about 7.5 million, largely of mixed-blood (Indian-Black-European) with small minorities of "pure" extraction. The coastal and western areas are the most heavily populated. Several ranges of the Andes mountains form the western frontier, and to the east and south of these mountains lie the plains of the Orinoco River. South of the Orinoco are very large, thinly populated jungle areas bordering on Colombia, Brazil, and Guyana. A wide low-land area between western mountain ranges around Lake Maracaibo is the location of the principal oil fields.

Until 1958, the history of Venezuela since its liberation from Spain had been the story of one traditional style military dictatorship after another, each succeeding the other by coup d'etat. Occasionally the story was punctuated by a failed attempt at constitutional government. These dictatorships, in the classic Latin American pattern, were authoritarian regimes dominated by the strong personality of the caudillo who rules, usually ruthlessly, for the benefit of himself, his family and his followers, extracting such wealth as the country offers for the coffers of his junta.

From the turn of the century until 1958, Venezuela was ruled in succession by several generals conforming to this pattern. From 1908 until 1935, the caudillo was Juan Vicente Gomez under whose rule oil was discovered (1913) and began in the 1920's to be produced in large quantities. In short order, Venezuela became the largest exporter of oil in the world. It was also endowed with rich iron ore deposits which began to be exploited in quantity at about the same time. Developments such as these could not proceed without having large effects on the economy and society at large. These began to evolve away from dependence on agriculture and the export of agricultural commodities produced on large estates by a peasantry verging on peonage. Rapid shifts of population towards the cities took place and
continued until Venezuela became 82 percent urban. A sizeable middle-class emerged, and the government grew larger and more complex. This modernization process had the effect of rendering the task of the caudillo, by now the widely hated Marcos Perez Jimenez, far more difficult, requiring a degree of political grasp and dedication to duty not normally found in the typical caudillo personality. Perez Jimenez was no exception, and he succumbed to a golpo d'estado in 1958. The events that followed represented a sharp break with the pattern described above, for they ended in replacing the traditional Venezuelan system of caudillismo by representative, democratic, constitutional government with power passing peacefully from one regime to the next. That system continues to exist today. It was a stunning change, particularly since it took place against the best efforts of several militant leftist parties, including the Communist, acting with Cuban support and aid, to prevent it.

1. The Events of the Insurgency

One of the aspects of modernization that occurred despite the best efforts of several dictators was the formation and development of modern political parties. Among them was the Communist Party of Venezuela (PCV) but the largest was Accion Democratica (AD), which started as a left-wing though non-Communist, Socialist Party and then gradually evolved toward social democracy and anti-Communism, occupying a position comparable to the British Labor Party. Accion Democratica actually had three years of power (1945-1948) and was able to keep its organization in being even though outlawed and with its leaders in exile under Perez Jimenez. It had an explicit ideology, a detailed program and a widespread membership organization especially strong among the peasants but also with considerable trade union and student support. The Communist Party also attempted to organize in its normal fashion as did a Christian Democratic group called COPEI, and a more centrist party called the Republican Democratic Union (URD). Some analysts attribute the surprising evolution of Venezuela toward a healthy, functioning democracy to the strength of these three parties committed to democratic norms.
With the overthrow of Perez Jimenez by a military junta committed to elections, the three democratic parties signed a power-sharing agreement. AD won the election in late 1958 and its leader, Romulo Betancourt, became President. He invited the other two parties into his government and although they did not stay for his full term of office, their presence was an important element of strength during the crises in law and order that followed in rapid succession after the new government took office (1959).

The immediate causes of the violence are less important than certain factors of the political environment in Venezuela and the Caribbean. Among these, the most important are:

1. The refusal of Betancourt to invite the Communists into his government;
2. The militancy of the younger generation of leaders, particularly in AD and URD, who had maintained the organization in Venezuela and battled the dictatorship while Betancourt and the other leaders of the older generation were in exile;
3. The importance of the university students and student politics in the capital area where the main university had its large campus and enjoyed the immunity from government interference and control traditional in most Latin American countries; and
4. Possibly of most importance was the victory of Fidel Castro in Cuba just at this time, blazing a revolutionary path which the Venezuelan left, and particularly the students, found tremendously exciting.

Rioting first broke out in Caracas in 1959, but the insurgency is usually dated from October 1960, some months after a formal split occurred in the AD party, with the militants declaring their opposition to Betancourt's, "conservatism," by which they meant his careful mending of his fences with the military, with the Catholic Church and the business community and his refusal to attempt immediate revolutionary economic measures. The dissidents proceeded to organize a "Fidelista" party which they called the Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR). It differed from the Communist Party in that, while Marxist in orientation, it was free of much of
the organizational and ideological baggage that official Communism Parties assume. Let us sum up these differences by calling MIR a Marxist Party of "free spirits," in the pattern its members thought to be exemplified by Fidel Castro.

Another factor that weakened the government at the time was the withdrawal of the URD party from the government coalition. The issue that brought about the withdrawal was the government's approval of international sanctions against Cuba.

Rioting started in Caracas in October 1960 and continued intermittently for months. The initial outbreak was a spontaneous response to the arrest of the editors of an MIR publication which had called for a mass uprising. The students burst out of the university to protest, hurling rocks, smashing windows and vehicles. After six days of this, criminal looting and sniping broke out in some working class districts. The government's reaction was hesitant at first but later firmed. National Guard and Army troops were called in and succeeded in restoring order. Betancourt then organized a mass rally attended by some 250,000 people mobilized by the peasant leagues and trade unions at which he pledged the government's commitment to social justice but also announced its firm intention to maintain order.

From late 1960 until the national elections of December 1963, the MIR, joined shortly by the PCV, mounted a series of violent campaigns in the cities and then in the countryside to unseat the increasingly beleaguered government of Betancourt and the AD party. When the latter survived the initial assaults, the militant opposition announced that its goal was to prevent the election from taking place. These elections then became the most important in Venezuelan history. If they were completed successfully, they would represent the first time that power had been passed constitutionally from one president to a freely chosen successor and they would also represent a severe defeat for both the left and the right.

The first plan developed by the MIR/PCV leadership had five stages and was supposed to bring rapid victory, climaxing in 1962. An important feature was the initiation of guerilla warfare in certain areas
of the countryside (Stage IV of the plan). Another important feature was to be the staging of mutinies within the military. It appears likely that the plan also had the approval of Fidel Castro and that considerable support was promised in the form of training, Cuban cadres, funds and weapons.²

Stages I, II and III of the campaign, which involved increasingly violent waves of urban terrorism, proceeded according to plan. The government counted a total of 113 "significant riots" in Caracas and elsewhere in 1961.³ The insurgents announced the goal of killing a policeman every day, a goal they did not meet but pursued doggedly. The toll of wounded and killed mounted steadily as the insurgents acquired more skill and better arms. In January 1962, they seized the radio station in the western city of San Cristobal and called for a people's insurrection. A spasm of rioting followed in Caracas and elsewhere on January 22-25 resulting in 19 dead and 110 injured. This was the climax of Stage III. A pause ensued while the attempt to develop guerilla warfare in the countryside was launched.

Some commentators believe that at this stage rural guerilla warfare was intended primarily as a diversionary tactic, that the insurgents' plan in fact did not allow enough time for guerilla activity to develop and mature. In any event, guerilla operations were launched in the early months of 1962 in eight separate mountain regions. Six of these eight nuclei were quickly wrapped up by the Army and National Guard with the help of local peasants loyal to the AD and its government. The guerilla groups proved to be largely made up of students from the University, only some of whom had had training provided in part by Cuban instructors. However, there remained two groups located in the rugged limestone mountains of Falcon province and the El Chareal region, whose leaders were of local origin and related to some of the large and important families of the area. These were pursued and reduced in number, but not eliminated.

Despite the survival of these remnants, the rural phase of the plan failed. It was accompanied however by ever more violent urban activity keyed by a nation-wide transport strike that brought trade and commerce to a virtual stand-still. This paroxysm passed, only to be succeeded by
two violent mutinies in naval installations, the first in Carupano, 250 miles from Caracas in May 1962 and the second in the navy's main base of Puerto Cabello early in June. Both were exceedingly bloody but were rapidly put down. Commentators point out that if these mutinies had occurred earlier, during the transportation strike and the opening of the rural front, the government might not have survived. As it was, however, the security forces were able to deal with these various outbreaks in succession and mastered them all.

Four stages of the revolutionary plan had thus been attempted with only mixed success. The insurgents paused for a few months to review their position. A debate seems to have taken place within their ranks between the advocates of a prolonged guerilla war and those favoring a renewed attempt to achieve a rapid victory with emphasis on urban tactics. The debate was resolved in favor of the latter and a cycle of violence began again in the cities.

The insurgents had available an urban combat organization estimated to number about 600 men and women. With this already tested organization and with the arms they expected from Cuba they seemed convinced that they could take over the government power in Caracas. The plan did call for the two remaining rural guerilla groups to resume activity. For purposes of propaganda and deception the leaders also devised a novel hybrid tactic using "weekend" guerillas, i.e., armed cadres from the cities who would go by car and truck to a rural location, stage a raid and then return to the city. In this way they hoped to create the impression of a widespread uprising to distract the authorities and divert government forces away from their principal targets.

In preparation for this climactic battle the insurgents reorganized and created a single armed force, the Forces of National Liberation (FALN) and a political grouping, the National Front for Liberation (FLN) which they hoped would induce additional political elements to join them. Through the FLN mechanism, the Communist Party became the dominant force in the insurgent movement. The combat forces were organized into five 100-man brigades, each with a support organization of 3-400 people. The brigades
were broken down into five or six-man platoons called Tactical Combat Units (UTC's).

The campaign was actually unleashed before the political framework was completed. Several months of violence took place in Caracas and other cities beginning in late September 1962. They included sniping at police, raids on residences of army and police officers to obtain arms, robbery of stores and small businesses, attacks on American-owned industrial and commercial installations and many other types of incidents. After a pause of a few months, a much larger outburst occurred in January and February 1963. After another semi-lull, the final paroxysm was launched in August and continued until December 1, when the elections took place.

Some of these episodes were conducted purely for propaganda's sake, including the seizure of paintings from a touring exhibition of French art, the hijacking of a domestic airliner which dropped leaflets over Caracas and of a Venezuelan freighter on the high seas. The FALN also kidnapped a famous Argentine soccer star and the senior officer of the US military mission, bombed the offices of the mission and set fire to the main Sears Roebuck warehouse, destroying nearly $5 million of goods. Many damaging attacks were made on oil installations, power stations and factories but there seemed to be no single focal point or specific purpose to this violence other than to create a climate of terror and demoralize the government and its forces. Many times bombs were set off on streets and in shops which killed or injured by-standers entirely unconnected with the government or with politics.

The climax of this wave of violence came in September 1963, with an attack on a crowded excursion train not far from Caracas. Five National Guards were singled out from among the holiday trippers and executed. This event struck the public as a totally uncalled for act of irrational violence and brought a sharp crack-down on known members of the FALN-PCV-MIR complex. The public reaction to the months of violence was, in fact, precisely the opposite of what the insurgents had intended. The arbitrary nature of their actions and the injuries inflicted on the public at large
aroused indignation and public hostility against them. Nationalistic feelings were also aroused by the discovery on November 1, 1963 of a large cache of weapons and supplies on an ocean beach. The charge was immediately made by the government that the arms had been sent to Venezuela by Cuba to supply the insurgents, a charge later proved to the satisfaction of the Organization of American States. It appears that the arms and ammunition had been intended for use during the final and most violent phase of the battle in Caracas.

The attack nevertheless proceeded with the weapons at hand but it began to flag during the final month before the elections. According to some accounts, the insurgents had begun to run short of ammunition. In addition, the security forces moved with increasing effectiveness to round up known or suspected terrorists. Neither the insurgents' call for a general strike nor their threat to shoot any one who ventured out into the streets on election day had any noticeable effect. On 1 December, 1963, over 91 percent of the electorate voted. The candidate of the AD party, Raul Leoni, was elected to succeed Romulo Betancourt with 33 percent of the vote and took office on March 11, 1964.

2. The Turn to "Protracted Guerilla War"

Although the election marked an important turning point for the government's cause, it did not put an end to the insurgency. The two militant left-wing parties split over the question but the majority was in favor of continuing the fight on a different basis. The strategy now shifted focus from urban action to rural guerilla warfare. The two remaining guerilla groups in Falcon province and the El Charral mountains, resumed activity in 1964. In addition, the Army learned of a guerilla training camp in the "El Bacheller" mountains and moved successfully against it. There were outbreaks of guerilla action in several other mountainous locations.

The rural insurgency reached its peak in 1965, no doubt because the militant parties had focused their resources into the rural arena. In early 1965 it is estimated that about 500 guerillas were operating throughout the country which meant, if the support apparatus is included, that
several thousand cadres were involved. This upsurge of activity was countered by the military and the police not only with arms but also with actions directed at peasant support.

These tactics proved effective enough to assure the failure of the effort. "By late 1965," says one account, "rural guerillas amounted to a handful of insurgents forced into living in uninhabited areas of the country." The underlying reason for the failure was undoubtedly the refusal of the peasantry to rally round the cause. The rural population in general had long since been thoroughly organized by the AD party and was satisfied by and large with that party's policy of land reform and other types of assistance for the countryside. On the other hand, the insurgency was an urban-based movement drawing heavily for its manpower on the student population, this latter a group with little knowledge of and few ties with the countryside. Cuba, during this phase, continued to help the effort, sending weapons and cadres and money and providing training in Cuba itself.

As the realities of the situation became apparent, the PCV gradually withdrew its support and took advantage of President Leoni's offer of legal status in return for renouncing the use of violence. A small hard-core resisted the trend and split off from the party under the leadership of Douglas Bravo, the chieftain of the guerillas in El Falcon province. Bravo retained the name FALN for his movement but merely succeeded in staying alive with a handful of followers and with Cuban support. He called for a boycott of the 1968 elections with no noticeable popular response. The new president, Rafael Caldera, announced a pacification program of which an amnesty offer formed an important part. Some of Bravo's adherents accepted it and then, in 1969, he suffered a further blow when Cuba cut off all support to the Venezuelan guerillas. By the mid-70's, diplomatic relations had been restored between Cuba and Venezuela and the guerillas comprised a tiny remnant of no political or military significance, which is the situation pertaining today.

We turn now to a more detailed analysis of the counterinsurgency based on the themes described earlier.
C. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

The history of the Venezuelan military during the 20th century up until 1958 was one of gradual substitution of non-political professionalism for the type of politicized military cronyism typical of rule by military caudillo. The overthrow of the last caudillo, Perez Jimenez, was largely engineered by younger officers who resented the favoritism shown to his personal followers within the military and the lack of preference for officers professionally more competent than Perez Jimenez's cronies. The succeeding regimes consciously adhered to a policy of encouraging military professionalism and of avoiding political considerations in such matters as promotion and assignment. At the same time, Betancourt and his successors deliberately sought to assure the military officer class of the government's sympathy and support for its profession by paying excellent salaries, improving facilities and perquisites and providing funds for modernization. Among the results has been an officer class with considerable pride and steadily improving standards of competence.

As far as concerns combat leadership, there is little specific information in available material nor is there any criticism. We can safely assume that, since the system is not involved in politics, professional standards prevail in combat leadership as well as elsewhere.

2. Tactics and Strategy

During the period when the insurgency posed a serious threat, the Venezuelan Army was small (16,000 in 1960) and had only a limited amount of heavy weaponry. The National Guard, an elite rural gendarmerie, had none. At the same time, the army was also called on to support the police in maintaining public order in the cities, a task for which heavy weapons were entirely inappropriate. For all these reasons, the Venezuelan armed forces did not tend to the error of relying on heavy fire power and concentrated forces to deal with the guerillas.

The use of military units to reinforce the police in Caracas and other cities during the height of the urban insurgency created novel
tactical problems for which the army was initially unprepared. After some experience was acquired, however, a noticeable improvement took place in army tactics. It began to follow a policy of dispersing small, highly mobile units throughout the city and had succeeded in instructing its men in such urban problems as riot control and street combat. The main brunt of the counterinsurgency effort in the cities was born by the police but the army made an important contribution, particularly after it had gained some experience and had made the necessary adjustments.

As far as concerns its performance in counterguerrilla operations in the countryside, the tactics and strategy of the Venezuelan Army (at least during the period 1962-1964 for which some detailed information exists) emphasized certain principles:

1. The army was committed to a precise and legal coercive approach opposite, for example, to the harsh tactics followed by the military regimes in Cuba and later in Nicaragua.

2. The military leadership was well aware of the serious deficiencies of its forces and went about dealing with the insurgents with deliberate caution.

3. The leadership was also aware that precisely in the areas of Falcon and El Charral where the principle guerilla units had holed up and developed their support network among the population, the history of past revolts and the brutality with which they had been suppressed had created great initial fear and hostility on the part of the population toward the military presence. The army deliberately set about to change public attitudes in a variety of ways. (Discussed below.)

According to the authors of the Georgetown Project, the military was initially accused, because of the deliberateness of its approach, of making the same mistakes that Batista had made in dealing with Castro, namely, of not pressing home the attack vigorously at the earliest possible date. In fact, however, it appears that the delays in the pursuit of Bravo and his associates was due to other factors. In 1962, during the first
outbreak of rural guerilla attacks, the army had information on the insurgents' plan, was aware that the rural front was intended as a diversion and that the main attack would come in the cities. It simply did not have enough disposable force at its command to deal with both fronts and so focused on the main one.

In the campaigns of 1963 and 1964 the approach remained deliberate, first because of the inexperience and low quality of the available forces. The army had been seriously neglected during the dictatorship of Perez Jimenez. Its conscripts were largely illiterate and, according to one source, in 1962 the army fired its artillery for the first time in five years. Training courses in counterguerilla warfare had been instituted in 1961 but it was too soon to expect significant results. A second reason for deliberateness was the low state of civilian/military relations in the affected areas. It would seem then that the counterguerilla campaign was governed by these factors. The army focused its efforts on easing the population's fears and gaining its cooperation. It limited combat operations to sealing off suspected guerilla areas and patrolling in large columns. It also called on the air force to bomb suspected guerilla areas. These tactics were adopted not because the leadership did not understand the value of aggressive patrolling by many small units but because it did not feel confident that its troops could carry out such tactics successfully. The campaign of 1963 ended with the withdrawal of a 3,000-man force sent to do battle after months spent without a single fire-fight of significance. Weapons were captured, guerilla camps taken and some guerillas surrendered but little else was accomplished except the gain in campaign experience and a notable improvement in civilian/military relations.

In the next similar effort, in 1964, the army cast aside its earlier inhibitions while still focusing considerable effort on civic action. It pursued the guerillas aggressively with many small patrols, it arrested suspected collaborators numbering in the hundreds, bombed areas after warning civilians present and moved peasant families from guerilla zones.
As reported earlier, these counterguerrilla operations and those that followed in successive years gradually had the desired effect. After reaching a peak in 1965, guerrilla activities declined over a period of years to virtually zero. This was accomplished with little combat, except for air bombardment and resulted from:

1. Effective civic action and improved civil-military relations;
2. The government's success in establishing a democratic and constitutional system with overwhelming popular support; and
3. The abandonment of "armed struggle" by the Communist Party and the eventual abandonment by Cuba of support for the Venezuelan guerrillas.

3. Intelligence

Very little detailed information is available on Venezuelan military intelligence during the attempted insurgency. We know that the military had a conventional intelligence organization reaching down through each of the services and that an Armed Forces Intelligence Service was superimposed over the individual services and was attached to the office of the Minister of Defense. No doubt much of its effort went into detecting coup plotting, given the history of the Venezuelan armed forces.

It is also apparent that useful combat intelligence was obtained by army units in the various counterguerrilla campaigns described earlier. This was one of the purposes of the army's attempt to build good civil-military relations and it seems clear that the results were as anticipated. Also relevant was the high standing of the AD party (and therefore the AD government) with large elements of the peasantry which therefore had a motive for cooperating with the army and providing information. It should be noted that the Betancourt government publicly and explicitly prohibited the use of torture on insurgent prisoners, insisting upon legal and humane procedures in dealing with the insurgents.

4. Discipline and Behavior: Civic Action

In keeping with its emphasis on good civil-military relations, troops on counterguerrilla operations were instructed to behave correctly toward the local population. On occasion loudspeaker trucks preceded...
military columns entering communities, advising the population not to be alarmed. Troops asked permission of family heads before searching their houses. In the first campaign in Falcon province the army also refrained from arresting and holding suspected guerilla supporters and from displacing families who lived near guerilla camps. In later campaigns some of these restrictions were eased.

As discussed earlier, a major concern of the army was civic action as a measure to establish better relations. Such operations began in Falcon within a few days of the army's arrival for the campaign of 1963. They were of three types:

(1) Literacy instruction by officers and men already trained for the task;
(2) Mobile medical/dental units which travelled from village to village; and
(3) Construction by military engineers of rural aqueducts, bridges and roads. The latter two also served a military purpose. One of the criticisms sometimes made of military civic action in an insurgency situation is that it is necessarily temporary; when the unit involved moves on as it must, the help provided stops. In Venezuela some thought was given to this problem. The army decided to continue its activity even though the troops had departed and searched for partners in the effort. Eventually, military civic action was broadened in Falcon into a continuing program to improve local conditions by a coalition including the army, the Falcon state government, the local diocese, the Ministries of Public Works, Education and Health and various other agencies and institutions. Although details are lacking, the major role assigned to civic action appears to have remained constant in in subsequent counterinsurgency campaigns.

5. Air Operations

The Venezuelan Air Force at the time of the events covered here was small and relatively new. It numbered a mere 2,500 officers and men and its aircraft were correspondingly few, although jet fighters and bombers, transports and helicopters were included. Accounts of the
campaigns in Falcon and El Charral make it clear that the air force was used routinely for bombing suspected guerilla encampments with fragmentation (i.e., anti-personnel) ordnance as well as conventional bombs. No information is available on the effectiveness of such attacks, which implies that they did not do much damage to their targets. The guerillas usually took cover in caves and steep clefts in the mountains and could not easily be struck directly from the air. On the other hand, indications are that attacks from the air did effect guerilla morale, especially among the student recruits who had little previous experience or training.

The helicopters and transports of the Venezuelan Air Force were also used routinely for the movement of personnel and supplies in the anti-guerilla campaigns.

6. Civil-Military Relations

At the policy-making level, the Venezuelan armed forces were committed by virtue of their support for the new constitutional regime to accept civilian supremacy. The constitution designated the President as commander-in-chief of the armed forces and Betancourt made it clear that he took this role literally and seriously. At the same time, as noted earlier, he cultivated the leadership of the armed forces by improving pay and perquisites.

Betancourt also took care to keep the armed forces fully advised on government counterinsurgency policies. Although insisting on legality throughout, he showed flexibility in changing his rather lenient approach after the intensity of the revolt increased. Thus, as the campaign to prevent the election of 1963 approached a climax in the cities, he resorted to more vigorous measures, including preventive arrest of known or suspected insurgents and the movement of a battalion of troops to the campus of Central University in Caracas. Such measures, among other purposes, assured that the military leadership's insistence on vigorous government action was satisfied, removing a motive for the officers to upset the constitutional regime.
The remarkable development of constitutionalism on the apparently stony soil of Venezuela is in one aspect the story of civil-military relations finally fixed in a pattern of civilian supremacy.

7. **Popular Militia**

The government fought and defeated the insurgency in Venezuela without having recourse to a popular militia in any of the various patterns used elsewhere. The reason would appear to be the urban battlefield where most of the fighting took place, a battlefield which requires a well-trained and well-led police force rather than a semi-skilled popular militia. As for the rural guerrilla front of the insurgency, it never developed to the point where existing military and paramilitary institutions required to be supplemented by an additional force of the militia type.

Venezuela does have a paramilitary force popularly called the National Guard whose formal name is the Armed Forces of Cooperation (FAC). It is a curious hybrid with numerous scattered functions but in most respects it operates as a police force and will be described later.

D. **POLICE OPERATIONS**

The various police forces of Venezuela, and there are many, bore the principal burden of combatting the insurgency. As is common in a federal system of government, the Venezuelan police are divided into numerous jurisdictions, each with a separate service. The total is usually given as 450. Most of these are under state and municipal control, vary greatly in competence and played little part in the counterinsurgency. There are also several national police services of the Federal Government which together with the police of Caracas and surrounding jurisdictions were the main combat element engaged with the insurgents. In the order of their importance these elements were:

1. **Direction General of Police (DIGEPOL)** - a national plain clothes police force of about 1100 under the Minister of Interior Affairs. It constituted in effect a political police, hastily organized to replace the widely-hated National Security police
(Seguridad National or SN) of Perez Jimenez which was dissolved in 1957. DIGEPOL recruited on a basis of political loyalty and its men were poorly trained with the result that it also rapidly acquired a reputation for being trigger-happy and somewhat brutal.

(2) Caracas Municipal Police - a uniformed law and order force for the city of Caracas. It was seriously hampered by the fact that the city had grown beyond the boundaries of the Federal District and its powers did not extend to the newer areas. Coordination between the various forces of the Caracas area was poor at first, but in 1962 the Federal Government formed a coordination commission to improve cooperation and also took measures to upgrade training and leadership. The formation of a Metropolitan Police Force, covering the entire area, did not take place until 1969.

(3) Armed Forces of Cooperation (FAC) - a paramilitary force under the Ministry of Defense. It was the most generally respected law and order service. It recruited with care, paid well and was a purely volunteer service. It demanded of its recruits that they be of good moral character and have at least six years of schooling while its officers were graduates of a four-year academy. The FAC numbered 8,000 men organized in 15 battalions but was normally deployed in much smaller units. Among its responsibilities was border patrol, guarding of such areas as oil fields and mines and static guard duty around prisons and public buildings. But much of its manpower was committed to providing a law and order capability in rural areas. It was in fact a rural gendarmerie. In addition, it was available to support other police forces in a crisis and this was its role in Caracas and other cities during the insurgency. It had the advantage in this duty of enjoying a good public reputation. Two additional national police services existed but played only a limited role in combatting the insurgency.
These varied services had many serious deficiencies which emerged during the insurgency:

1. Lack of coordination and outright competition prevented full exploitation of all police capabilities. This was tackled with some success by the coordination commission created in 1962;

2. Poor public image enjoyed by the police, particularly DIGEPOL. Accusations of brutality were brought against DIGEPOL and other police forces. The Betancourt administration strove to correct such abuses and made no effort to hide them. It conducted full public investigations and punished those found guilty;

3. Inadequate and outdated equipment plagued most arms of the police. All lacked radio patrol cars and a radio communications network, placing them at a serious disadvantage against terrorists using automobiles to make their attacks and escapes. By 1963 many of these deficiencies had been remedied;

4. Poor quality of personnel was an endemic problem in most of the police services except the FAC. This was tackled by making leadership changes and by training programs.

The Betancourt administration did not attempt to conceal its problems with the police but encouraged a full airing in the press and the legislature in order to generate public support for increased appropriations. It also conducted a public relations effort to help improve the police image. Among other things it encouraged a police civic action program in the poorer sections of Caracas, providing sanitary facilities and free police transportation to public health centers and hospitals to those in need.

Of the various police forces, the Caracas Municipal Police and its counterparts in neighboring jurisdictions were principal targets of the terrorist campaigns and suffered the heaviest casualties. The insurgents announced that it was their intention to "kill a cop a day" and, although they did not succeed in doing so, they nevertheless took a heavy toll. Since they were uniformed, the Caracas forces were the most visible targets of snipers and bombers. Their task was particularly difficult in the slum areas on the outskirts of the capital, the so-called "ranchos," where many
thousands lived in poverty and nursed their accumulated grievances against the authorities of whom the uniformed police were the most familiar symbol. The insurgents, by focusing on the police rather than the army, hoped to exploit those feelings to gain public support and cooperation and in the earlier phases of their campaign they succeeded, at least in the "ranchos." Later, however, a reaction set in and the tactics backfired as the residents of the ranchos themselves became victims of indiscriminate violence and of common criminals who exploited the near-anarchy in their sections of the city. At that point, support for the guerillas was replaced by hostility and the public began to cooperate more willingly with the police.9

It is also clear that when serious violence broke out in Caracas in 1960 and continued in intensifying waves, the police was poorly prepared to handle it. However, with greater experience and better training and leadership, the various services steadily improved their performance. At the climax of the urban violence, in 1963, the police in general were well prepared and moved with speed and efficiency to round up the insurgents and stifle the uprising. The police as a whole were never accused of serious corruption or of being dominated by politics and the final result of its efforts was a rather complete victory. An important factor in the improvement of police performance in this period that should be noted is the assistance in the form of training and material aid provided by the US and by a police advisory mission from Chile.

E. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

There is little detailed information available on intelligence operations by the various services involved in intelligence work during the insurgency. These services were attached to the separate security forces without any overall national intelligence structure or civilian equivalent. Police intelligence was the responsibility of DIGEPOL; each of the four services (including FAC) had an intelligence arm and, as noted earlier, there also existed an Armed Forces Intelligence Service (SIFA) under the Minister of Defense which coordinated the other military services.
No information on their operations is available in open sources but there is some evidence that they were not idle. In April 1962, the Minister of Defense testified before a Congressional Committee, laying out in detail the five-stage plan of the insurgents aimed at toppling the government by the end of the year. The government's possession of this plan enabled it to take some precautionary action and to avoid surprise as the various stages unfolded.

According to one analyst of the Venezuelan insurgency, the government was particularly handicapped in the urban areas in its effort to gain information. "The technique that finally produced the intelligence so sorely needed," he adds, "was that of massive arrests, combined with reorganization and rejuvenation of the civilian police forces and the development of a more effective adjudication and penal apparatus."  

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

No information is available on the existence of any formal organization for psychological warfare operations during the Venezuelan insurgency. The only information suggesting such organization is the mention in one account (The Georgetown Project) of the use of leaflets dropped from the air and aimed at some of the rural guerilla units.

On the other hand, it is clear that the Betancourt administration and President Betancourt himself were fully conscious of the importance of using all the modern techniques to present their cause effectively to the public and to create dissension in the ranks of the violent opposition—in other words to pursue an aggressive political attack which exploited information and argument for psychological purposes. With considerable effect Betancourt used the press, radio and television, rallied his supporters in the streets on numerous occasions and exploited the AD party, trade union and peasant organizations to maintain morale and attack his enemies.

Although Betancourt's political coalition fell apart in the course of his term, his propaganda succeeded in swaying the public and several sources note that general support for a vigorous attack on the insurgency
increased throughout the period. This resulted in part from revulsion against the excesses of the insurgents, particularly after the brutal attack on the excursion train in September 1963, but also reflected the effectiveness of the President's public presentation of his case.

G. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY OPERATIONS

Under the Presidential system existing in Venezuela, the chief executive has ultimate authority for security which he discharges through the various Ministries concerned. These are all his appointees and do not require Congressional approval. The cabinet meets as a body to advise the President and there also exists a National Council of Security and Defense which focuses on security matters. The Minister of Defense is an important member of that Council and himself acts as a coordinator of the four services. The President is also served by a Military Household (Casa Militar) which provides a direct link to the armed forces for the chief executive in his role as Commander-in-Chief.

In other words, a permanent mechanism exists for the unified management of security operations which was appropriately used by Betancourt and his successors to deal with the insurgency. One obvious point emerges which is that the insurgency, although a major threat to Venezuela, did not call for a complex response or place unprecedented demands on the government apparatus requiring exceptional measures and innovations. The existing mechanism, with certain adjustments, was adequate to meet the challenge.

H. POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The political framework of the Venezuelan government's approach to counterinsurgency was constitutional democracy and the contrast between the legitimacy conferred by that system and, on the other hand, Communism as exemplified by Cuba and the USSR and, on the other, classic Latin American caudillismo as exemplified by Perez Jimenez and General Trujillo's regime,
then in power in the Dominican Republic. Betancourt, in fact, took many risks in order to demonstrate his administration's commitment to the principles of constitutional democracy, particularly in his insistence on a thoroughly legal and even legalistic basis for all suppressive actions taken against his left-wing enemies. (see Legal Framework section, below).

According to Philip B. Taylor, "The real difficulty of the government's position was that Betancourt wished, by persistent effort, to de-personalize the images of the party i.e., the Accion Democratica, and government and so ultimately to facilitate the growth of constitutional consensus among the people. This precluded highly personal reactions by any of the officers of government. Ultimately, however, it created wide popular support for the democratic process and the government..."

Betancourt was not merely a theoretician of democracy but an experienced practitioner of the arts of the democratic politician. He understood that the public favored a democratic and constitutional approach as demonstrated by the enthusiastic turnout in 1958, when he was elected. Communist claims that the government had initiated the violence were unpersuasive in view of what all Venezuelans had witnessed in 1960 and 1961. The evidence made public of Cuban intervention aroused Venezuelan national feelings. Venezuelans were also proud of showing the way to their neighbors in putting into effect a more advanced and modern form of government.

Betancourt played on all these themes, took the risks necessary so that his party and administration could go before the electorate in 1963 as confirmed supporters of constitutional democracy. They emerged from the trial successfully when 91 percent of the electorate voted in defiance of communist threats, choosing the AD candidate, Raul Leoni, as Betancourt's successor.
I. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND ENVIRONMENT

A principal element of the AD's popular support from 1959 onwards lay with the peasantry and as soon as practical the AD government began to attempt to carry out its pledges of agrarian reform and agricultural improvement. In 1959, the government created the National Agrarian Institute and in 1960 passed a land reform law and began distribution of lands to the landless. The course of agrarian reform was not smooth and the results were something of a disappointment to the government and its critics for complicated reasons which we need not go into. The important fact is that the government that was confronted by insurgency beginning in 1961 already had a record of demonstrated concern for the well-being of the rural population. This served it in good stead in retaining the support of the population against the competing appeals of the Communists.

J. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

As we have already noted, the AD administration in its operations to suppress the insurgency followed a policy of relying exclusively on legally based action and avoiding any activity of dubious legality. In many respects, this policy reduced the effectiveness of its attempts to suppress the insurgency. It is apparent that Betancourt was motivated in part by the need to preserve the three-party coalition. Even after the URD party quit the government, he sought to avoid giving excuses to the opposition in Congress to obstruct the government's programs. According to Taylor, the administration was also constrained by "the Venezuelan political tradition which endows the opposition with a kind of 'divine right' to plot against the government of the day. Custom decreed that only the most outrageous resort to violence justified suppression of the insurgents' right to revolution."13

It is doubtful that President Betancourt himself accepted the principle of such a right but as a practical politician, he was constrained by his estimate of what the political community would accept in the way of
harsh suppressive measures. On the other hand, he had also to contend with the military and its demand for more freedom of action. He steered a careful course between these opposing forces. As the insurgency went from one outrage to another, his hand was strengthened and he moved more vigorously to close down the freedoms the insurgents enjoyed.

In the end, he suspended constitutional guarantees for a total of 42 percent of the time he served in office. These suspensions were selective and quite precise but they usually "affected the inviolability of the mails, limited free personal movement, severely restricted the right to hold meetings and publish 'news affecting public security,' and gave the government extensive powers of arrest and preventive detention." The recourse to suspension of guarantees became more frequent toward the end of Betancourt's term, at which time the public had clearly lost patience with the insurgents.

The greatest wave of public revulsion took place after the attack on the excursion train in September 1963. Immediately afterward, the police arrested and detained without trial 750 members of the FALN, PCV and MIR, including members of Congress, closed all public schools and brought into Caracas units of the Army and the National Guard to patrol the city. The result was that the insurgents became virtually leaderless and the violence steadily declined until December 1, election day, which was quite peaceful.

Nevertheless, throughout the entire period of the insurgency, no one was executed by the government, the death penalty having been outlawed. In a letter to President John F. Kennedy, written in May 1962, President Betancourt said, "We have laws, courts and legal procedures that work slowly and not always efficiently...The impatient ones would like us to go beyond the written law - and even beyond the unwritten but overriding law of respect for human dignity. I will not deviate from the course laid down for me by the fundamental law of Venezuela and by my own conscience." The contrast between the government's stance and that of the insurgents was striking and obvious and worked in the long run against the cause of the rebels.
BIBLIOGRAPHY TO APPENDIX H

Of the following works, by far the most useful is the Georgetown Research Project's *Castro-Communist Insurgency in Venezuela*, which is a detailed study of a depth all too scarce. It is based on a close scrutiny of the wide-open Venezuelan press during the insurgency and is therefore limited to what the government did not wish to restrict. It is lacking in detail on such matters as intelligence operations but is otherwise a uniquely full account combined with a useful analysis.


H-26
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>December 1958</td>
<td>Elections are held. Romulo Betancourt, head of Acción Democratica, is chosen to be President.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January 1954</td>
<td>Betancourt inaugurated and declares, &quot;The philosophy of Communism is not compatible with the development of Venezuela.&quot; He rejects Communist Party attempt to participate in government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April 1960</td>
<td>AD Party splits. Militants form Movement of Revolutionary Left (MIR) which looks to Cuba as model and is pledged to violent action against government.</td>
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<tr>
<td>October 1960</td>
<td>Violence erupts in Caracas and continues for eight days spearheaded by students.</td>
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<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>In course of year, 113 violent outbreaks and incidents are recorded. Cuban support for violence leads government to break relations with Cuba.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>In early months of year, eight separate rural guerilla groups begin operations. Six of them are rapidly eliminated by Army but two, in Falcon and El Charral Mountains survive.</td>
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<tr>
<td>May and June 1982</td>
<td>Successive leftist mutinies break out in naval bases of Carupano and Puerto Cabello. Both are put down with heavy loss of life. These revolts were supported by the Communist Party (PCV) as well as MIR. Government reacts by banning both parties. MIR and PCV form the National Liberation Front (FLN) and the</td>
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Armored Forces of National Liberation.
Campaign to block December 1963 elections is launched.

1963

With over 500 armed men and some 2,000 organized supporters FALN mounts wave after wave of terrorist violence centered in Caracas, but also carried out in other cities and in countryside.

November 1, 1963

Large cache of arms from Cuba discovered on beach. Arms were intended for final wave of violence preceding election. Violence abates as ammunition is exhausted and leadership placed under preventive arrest.

December 1, 1963

Presidential elections conducted in relative calm. Ninety-one percent of electorate goes to polls and chose Raul Leoni of AD as Betancourt's successor. For first time in Venezuelan history, power passes peacefully from one constitutionally chosen President to his successor.

1964

Revolutionary parties shift focus of efforts to countryside where two groups survive and remain active. With Cuban support these guerrilla units (in Falcon province and El Charral Mountains) succeed in increasing their size and activity.

1965

Guerilla operations peak with an estimated 500 armed men. Army mounts successful counterinsurgency and gradually reduces size and effectiveness of guerilla units.

1966-1967

PCV gradually disassociates itself from guerilla activity and is finally legalized again.

1969

Cuba cuts off support for guerilla remnants, virtually ending insurgent activity.
APPENDIX I.

VIETNAM 1961-1963

STRATEGIC HAMLETS

The counterinsurgency campaign undertaken by the American and South Vietnamese in South Vietnam lasted from the beginning of the phase of "armed struggle" by the Vietnamese Communists in 1960 until the signing of the Paris Peace Agreements in 1973. During this lengthy period, the American and Vietnamese approach went through two distinct phases characterized by different strategies and separated by an interregnum of some three years when political confusion reigned and counterinsurgency took second or even third place to other considerations. This appendix will treat the first of these periods. The second will be treated in Appendix J.

A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The strategic hamlet program carried out in South Vietnam in the years 1962-1963 was devised by the regime of President Ngo Dinh Diem to accomplish two purposes: defeat the Communist insurgency in the countryside and establish effective rule by the central government in all the many thousand villages of South Vietnam. The idea owed something to British experience in Malaya but essentially it reflected the thinking of President Diem's brother and political adviser, Ngo Dinh Nhu, who supplied the ideas, and the leadership and initiative behind it.

As originally conceived, it was a device to separate the rural population from the Communist guerillas and to prevent the latter from obtaining essential support from the people. This was to be done by creating a physical barrier in every hamlet in the country, a fortified fence to keep the guerillas out. Behind these defenses, the village population was to be organized to defend itself and to improve its standard of life with government assistance provided by specially trained cadres of so-called Republican Youth.
Although the original concept had many positive features, the implementation was woefully lacking. Under the driving leadership of the powerful Ngo Dinh Nhu, village defenses rapidly spring up everywhere without regard to any plan. In the haste to build them, other aspects of the plan were neglected, particularly the important step of cleansing the villages of Communist cadres so that, in many cases, the villages remained penetrated by the insurgents behind the barriers that were supposed to keep them out. The government's assistance and guidance were slow in getting to the villagers and sometimes did not arrive at all.

At the same time, very little effort was made to coordinate the building of defenses with the regular military and paramilitary forces so that the hamlets were not adequately protected against attack from larger guerrilla units. In general, the South Vietnamese Army, under American guidance, had a different concept of counterinsurgency and were not deeply involved with the strategic hamlet program. Moreover, relations between the military and President Diem's regime were poor. The President mistrusted his generals and attempted, by direct interference in military operations, to assure himself of control and neutralize military plotting against his regime.

Although observers noted some improvement in the situation in South Vietnam in the early months of the strategic hamlet program, by mid-1963 the picture had changed and signs began to be evident that it was failing to accomplish its goals. In the meantime, however, a political crisis burst on the regime in the form of a dissident movement organized by Buddhist monks. The President's effort to suppress this movement led by November 1963 to a successful military coup to overthrow the Diem regime. One of the first results of that coup was the dismantling of the strategic hamlet program.

In any event, even if Diem had parried the effort to overthrow his rule, the haphazard and hasty way in which the program had been carried out doomed it to failure. At best it was a complex and difficult program to implement and the regime would have been hard put to find the qualified personnel and lower-level leadership to make a success of it.
B. BACKGROUND

Vietnam as a whole is a long, narrow strip of land shaped roughly like the letter S strung along 1,100 miles of the coast of mainland Asia from Cambodia in the south to China in the north. At the northern and southern extremities it extends inland 100 to 250 miles and between is a long, narrow neck, 20 to 50 miles wide, which forms Central Vietnam, formerly called Annam. The northern section is called Tonkin and in addition to the Vietnamese, is inhabited by many tribal groups who have a distinct language and culture. The same is true in the south which was known under the French as Cochini-China. In general, throughout the country, the Vietnamese live in the lowlands where they are able to cultivate rice of the conventional type which grows under water during the flood season. The highlands of the rugged Annamite chain have been left to the tribal peoples.

In the north, the density of population is highest in the wide valley of the Red River. The North Vietnamese or Tonkinese are somewhat more numerous than the other groups and speak a northern dialect. The same is true of the southern and central groups although the three dialects are intelligible to all Vietnamese. As a result of the Geneva Accords of 1954, which ended the war of the Communist Viet Minh against the French, the country was divided roughly in half at the 17th parallel. The population of the north was just under 16 million in 1960. That of the south was 14.1 million in the same year.

In both sections, the economy was based overwhelmingly on rice cultivation, the main areas being the deltas of the two principal rivers—the Red in the north and the Mekong in the south. Some industry had been developed by the French in the north but very little existed in the south. The largest cities were Hanoi and Haiphong in the north and Saigon, Hue and Can Tho in the south. The majority religion of both areas was Mahayana Buddhism, loosely organized and tolerant of other beliefs. There was a Catholic minority of about 10 percent and many separate sects, some of which had been armed by the French to fight against the Viet Minh.
The North Vietnamese government of Ho Chi Minh reluctantly signed the Geneva Accords of 1954. They did so under pressure from their Soviet allies who had committed themselves to the French to help arrange a peace in return for France's agreement to veto the proposal for a European Defense Community.

From 1954, the date of the first Geneva Accords ending the war of the Vietnamese against the French in Indochina and dividing the country at the 17th parallel, until 1959 the Vietnamese Communists were in a holding pattern. They appear to have expected that the southern half of the country would drop into their hands of its own weight. In any event, they had a full agenda of domestic problems in the north and decided to await developments in the south before taking precipitate action. By 1959, it was clear that Ngo Dinh Diem had effectively established himself at the head of a republican regime and with American help was overcoming many of his problems in pulling South Vietnam together.

In the exchange of populations provided for under the Geneva Accords, close to a million northerners, mostly Catholics, had opted to go South to escape the Communists while between 80,000 and 100,000 Communist sympathizers had gone to the north, where many of them were organized, trained, armed, and equipped in case the situation called for them to be reinfilt rated to fight once again in their homeland. A few thousand armed cadres stayed behind in the south, to maintain a presence, to keep the skeleton of an organization intact and to keep up pressure on the southern regime, a tactic carried out in part by a program of assassination of local officials. An upturn of such activity was noted in 1959 but the Communists carefully avoided attacks against the regular military forces.

C. EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

It was in reaction to this low key terrorist activity that Diem launched a violent and somewhat indiscriminate anti-terrorist campaign in the countryside which caused serious damage to the Communist apparatus. This, in turn, led the Communist organization in the South to petition
Hanoi urgently for a change of policy which would unleash them in an all-out attack to topple the southern regime. In response to these pleas, the Central Committee of the Lao Dong (Workers' Party, i.e., the Communists) took a formal decision promulgated in May 1959, to form armed units and launch them in "armed struggle."1

The fruits of this policy did not become apparent until early 1960, when the first attack against a post of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) was carried out. Incidents of this sort followed each other throughout the year until the truth that the Communists had resumed active insurgency became apparent to all concerned. The point was underscored at the end of 1960 by the announcement in Hanoi of the formation of a National Liberation Front whose ostensible purpose was to lead the forces of "liberation." It was composed of a group of southern political figures, some of them Communist and some not.

Up until this threat became apparent, the United States military had focused its training and advisory efforts in Vietnam on the defense of the south against a conventional invasion across the 17th parallel. The Military Aid and Advisory Group in Saigon (MAAG) began to adjust its thinking and in 1961 proposed a Counterinsurgency Plan (CIP) which provided for increases in the Vietnamese armed forces, improvements in organization and in intelligence operations. It also prescribed a shift to widespread aggressive patrolling backed up by reserve battalions, ready to move rapidly in support of patrols of required. As we shall see, this plan was never actually implemented by the Vietnamese, although the US followed through on the increases.

Meantime, in Washington President Kennedy took office and immediately sounded the alarm regarding the threat posed by Communist "wars of national liberation." During 1961, he approved three separate increases in military aid to South Vietnam and continued to approve further increases. By the end of 1963, there were some 16,000 US advisors in the country, some of them pilots who flew aircraft on what were ostensibly training missions but were actually combat sorties. In 1962, about 150 helicopters were deployed and engaged in direct combat support of the ARVN.
While the MAAG focused on strengthening and improving the ARVN, other arms of the US government began developing programs which, it was hoped, would enable the Government of Vietnam (GVN) to preempt the appeals of the Communists by improving conditions in the countryside and by strengthening its capacity to govern. These included a police program, an information program which, among other things, helped to establish a Vietnamese Information Service, and a gradual movement of the Agency for International Development (AID) into the countryside to launch projects of immediate concern to the villagers such as small public works, schools, dispensaries and the like. AID also established a School of Public Administration to train an expanded civil service.

In the meantime, the MAAG's counterinsurgency plan received little more than lip-service from the ARVN. Although the US went ahead with its commitments to build up the armed forces (including a paramilitary militia) no command improvements were made by President Diem. Instead, he scattered his regular units around the countryside in static guard duties and attempted to defend every GVN outpost against attack. He made it clear to his commanders that he frowned on taking casualties, which further reinforced ARVN's lack of aggressiveness. And, in a precaution against a possible coup attempt by the military, he maintained a separate command line between himself and the province chiefs, keeping the regular army command out of this vital aspect of the war.

Instead of fighting the insurgency along the lines suggested by the MAAG, Diem and his influential brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu, launched an entirely novel and radical attempt to bring the entire countryside under government control. This was the strategic hamlet program which owed something to ideas suggested to Diem by the head of the small British Advisory Mission, R.K.G. (later Sir Robert) Thompson but was in fact largely a Vietnamese initiative. The concept as outlined by Thompson focused on the population of the villages and on methods of separating them from the insurgents while at the same time improving the conditions of their lives. Thompson called for some limited regrouping of villages but emphasized the importance of unifying the command of all security forces and especially of unifying all
intelligence efforts. He proposed putting all security operations under command of the militia (then called the Self Defense Corps) with the ARVN in support. He also prescribed a complete system of population control, with ID cards, curfews and check points. An important aspect of the Thompson plan was its emphasis on gradually and systematically building security by working outward from already secure areas. He said little about village defenses, but emphasized improved social services, particularly health and education.

Initially the reaction of the Americans in Saigon to these proposals was cool. In Washington, however, they were welcomed as offering for the first time a strategy appropriate to the special challenge of guerilla warfare and American support was soon forthcoming. At the same time, President Diem and especially his brother, Counselor Nhu, also welcomed them as providing a means not only of defeating the Communist challenge but also of accomplishing a goal that they had had from their advent to power. This was to establish full government control over the rural population, which traditionally in Vietnam had been only lightly controlled from the center.

Nhu was placed in charge of the program, beginning in early 1962. He began a furious public campaign whose goal was to incorporate almost all the hamlets in South Vietnam (some 11,000) into the program in the shortest possible time. The centerpiece of the Vietnamese approach was the construction of defenses around each hamlet and they sprang up everywhere. Some were merely a row of sharpened stakes and a ditch; others were more elaborate. As a means of energizing and monitoring the program the GVN relied on an organization called Republican Youth, actually simply some thousands of younger civil servants hastily trained and armed and pressed into service in the countryside. But in the meantime none of Thompson's prescriptions for unifying the security forces, improving intelligence or moving slowly and carefully from more secure to less secure areas was followed by Nhu. The program degenerated into a hasty rush to build hamlet defenses without any of the other, more important aspects receiving adequate attention.
The American contribution largely focused on providing the materials required both for defenses and for improvements in the hamlets and distributing them in the provinces. To start the pipeline flowing required time and in order to speed up the process, AID authorized $10 million for local procurement and agreed to a system permitting provincial officials and their American advisors to draw on this fund without further approvals.

Hamlet defenses continued to spring up everywhere. Official sources claimed over three thousand completed hamlets in late 1961, rising to 5,900 in April 1963 and to 7,200 in July 1963. Some of these performed as hoped, but many others were merely a facade. Behind the fortifications, the Communist organization remained intact and the hamlets quietly gave the guerillas whatever they asked for.

While this frantic campaign proceeded, the MAAG continued its efforts with the Vietnamese armed forces, and attempted to pursue the original Counterinsurgency Plan. Under the constraints imposed by President Diem and for other reasons which will be discussed in detail at a later point, the ARVN remained unaggressive and apparently uninterested in closing with the enemy. Its failures became notorious after the battle of Ap Bac in January 1963 when a strong ARVN force cornered a large number of guerillas and then allowed them to escape.

Briefly at the end of 1962, a spirit of optimism prevailed in Vietnam. The enemy seemed to be suffering heavily from such improvements as the deployment of helicopters in large numbers, the increase in ARVN effectives and even the strategic hamlet program. By mid-1963, however, this optimism began to fade. It became apparent to the American mission that much of the progress was illusory. In October, an American review committee examined the strategic hamlet program and concluded that it was time for a re-evaluation.

In the meantime, however, a succession of political problems had built up to a severe crisis for the Diem regime and it succumbed to an Army coup d'etat in November which saw the brutal execution of both Diem and Nhu. Immediately all programs associated with their regime became anathema, chief among them the strategic hamlet program. Despite lip service to its
goals, the successor regime in fact turned its back on the villages and
hamlets; most of the program disappeared from a combination of neglect and
enemy action. There followed a period when the Americans continued to
strive to build security in the countryside but priority attention shifted
to the matter of assuring some stability and effectiveness in the govern-
ment in Saigon and then to emergency measures to prevent a rapid Communist
victory. In pursuit of this last goal, the US began the bombing of North
Vietnam and then, in 1965, the introduction of American troops. The coun-
terinsurgency effort languished for lack of attention until mid-1966,
although verbal assurances of its importance by both the Americans and the
Vietnamese were frequent.

We turn now to a closer examination of the courses of action under-
taken by the Vietnamese government with American advice and support during
1961-63.

D. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

In most respects, the Vietnamese military failed to develop the
qualities and capabilities appropriate to counterinsurgency warfare. This
was partly a result of problems internal in origin and partly the product
of the training and advice of the MAAG. Leadership was a particularly weak
quality throughout the Vietnamese armed forces, a deficiency that persisted
for the duration of the war. Originally trained and selected by the
French, the officers of ARVN had served in an army whose role was largely
auxiliary to that of the French forces. This did little to build their
self-confidence after the French departed and left them with the entire
security responsibility. For several years after the settlement of 1954,
the army was seriously divided over political issues and only gradually
became united behind Ngo Dinh Diem. In his effort to maintain his pre-
carious hold on power, Diem interfered in matters of promotion and assign-
ment in favor of officers whom he deemed to be loyal. The result was to
permeate the military with political influence.
Qualities of leadership did not flourish under this regime. Unit commanders owed their positions to the loyalty they offered their superiors and were under little pressure to perform their duties to a high standard. Compounding the problem was the known disfavor in which the President held officers who incurred heavy casualties. His view seemed to be that battles should be won without serious bloodshed. Losses drew attention to the strength of the enemy while the official position was that the insurgency was not a serious threat and soon would be eliminated.

This was a formula for failure and although the MAAG did its best to push against the grain in favor of aggressive and energetic leadership, there were few signs of success. ARVN avoided battle whenever it could. It broke off contact with the enemy at night even when it appeared to be winning. Weapons and supplies were sold on the black market or even directly to the enemy. In many areas, an informal truce prevailed, with immunity granted to the guerrillas on condition that they conducted their business quietly.

2. Tactics and Strategy

When it did fight, ARVN conducted operations in conventional style. This, of course, was an effect of its training, first by the French and then by the Americans. It prepared the battlefield with artillery and air bombardment, alerting the enemy to an attack. When involved in battle, its methods, which called for heavy expenditure of ammunition, assured damage to civilians caught in the cross-fire.

As for long-term strategic planning, this function was discharged by the MAAG rather than the neophyte ARVN staffs. The CIP was supplemented by the "Geographically Phased National Plan" which aimed at victory within three years. It was a thoroughly professional document, as one would expect, but unfortunately its assumptions of ARVN progress toward competence and of political non-interference in military affairs were out of touch with reality. It soon became a dead letter and was succeeded by various other plans, none of which had much success.
3. Intelligence

Military intelligence was a neglected phase of combat. Since patrolling was lax and unaggressive, a major source of current intelligence was lacking. Interrogation of prisoners relied heavily on torture and was neither systematic nor professional. The ARVN was often taken by surprise. Cooperation with other government intelligence arms was not characteristic. The neglect of intelligence collection was one of the deficiencies which all levels of the American community agreed needed reform as a matter of urgency yet no improvement followed. In part, this was because the senior levels of the GVN gave the highest intelligence priority to detecting coup plotting.

4. Discipline and Behavior

Discipline and behavior problems were endemic in the ARVN. Poor leadership was the cause in most cases. Desertion rates were high, fire discipline poor. The army sometimes behaved toward the population of the villages like an army of occupation, abusing women and stealing property. Villagers' complaints were not followed up and misbehavior by soldiers was seldom punished. Some civic action was undertaken on the urging of American advisors; there is little information as to its effectiveness but it would seem unlikely that its impact overcame the effects of the soldiers' misbehavior.

5. Air Operations

Air operations were a somewhat brighter aspect of the military picture but the extent to which they represented a Vietnamese contribution is doubtful. In 1962, helicopters flown by American pilots (with Vietnamese "student-pilots" participating) were introduced in large numbers and had, at first, a considerable impact on Communist morale. After the initial shock wore off, however, the guerrillas adjusted their tactics and were able to pursue their purposes without undue obstruction by this new device. Still, the helicopter force made their task more difficult and improved the reaction time and mobility of ARVN. To that extent it achieved its purpose. The Air Force of the Republic of Vietnam also had transports, reconnaissance aircraft and, after 1961, fighters and fighter-bombers. The
first two were useful but limited in capability. The last two came into play rather late in the period and had only slight impact. The RVNAF was very much a junior partner to ARVN and its activity was largely in support of the ground forces.

6. Civil-Military Relations

As to the relationship between the military and the civilian authorities, President Diem strove by every device he could imagine to dominate and control the armed forces, having survived several attempted coups which nearly brought him down. According to one observer, "...the President has elevated personal loyalty over military ability in the promotion and assignment of officers, has made use of informers within the military services, and has shifted officers who appeared to be too popular with their men or too close to the Americans. He interferes closely with combat planning; indeed, one correspondent has claimed that not even a battalion (can) move without first consulting the President."2

This was civilian direction with a vengeance. It was no doubt a function of the general disarray of Vietnamese society in which no dominant group had emerged to establish the legitimacy of its power and where Diem sought to impose himself and his family and their rather exotic concepts of civic virtue and national ethos in the teeth of indifference and hostility. The ultimate result was bitter resentment by the military leadership, culminating in the coup of November 1963 that brought down the regime.

7. Popular Militia

The establishment and strengthening of a popular militia, on the other hand, had general assent from the military, the President and the Americans. Unfortunately, this agreement came rather late in the period, partly due to internal disagreements in the American community as to the militia's character (whether civilian police, or paramilitary force under ARVN control). Finally, agreement was reached on the transfer of the Civil Guard to the military and a substantial aid and training program was begun. The Guard was organized in companies and placed under the province chiefs to provide defense against equivalent sized enemy forces. Eventually it numbered some 50,000 men. Unfortunately it was a step-child of the regular
army, which sent its least effective officers to manage it. "The organization," says Scigliano, "poorly trained, poorly led, and lacking needed armament, transport and communications, was faced with the increasingly difficult job of maintaining security in an increasingly insecure countryside." In addition, the Ministry of National Defense and the MAAG had responsibility for an even lowlier group, the part-time village defenders called the Self-Defense Corps, whom Scigliano describes as "ragamuffins." Considerably upgraded as a result of the MAAG program during this period, both corps were used largely for static defense and deployed in outposts throughout the countryside where they had little support and were easy victims whenever the enemy wished to pick them off. At first, in 1960, they were the main reliance of the regime against the guerillas. Later, of course, the ARVN became directly involved but nevertheless, due to the President's interference, it too was often deployed for static guard duties because of the inadequacy of the militia. In effect, although two militia forces existed, totaling some 90,000 men, they still did not succeed in their mission of relieving the regular army of the need to dissipate its forces in static duties.

In the final years of its existence, the Ngo family regime developed several new paramilitary forces specifically in support of the strategic hamlet program. These were the Republican Youth and an offshoot called the Combat Youth. They were intended to provide security for the defended hamlets and were called into being by Presidential Counsellor Nhu apparently because he had no control over the ARVN's resources and felt the need for a paramilitary force directly under his authority to man the new hamlet defenses. Hastily formed and poorly trained, they were not adequate to the task.

E. POLICE OPERATIONS

The building of an adequate police force for the new Republic of Vietnam was undertaken early in the Diem regime under the auspices of a group of contractors from Michigan State University. It found a situation in
which, up to Diem's arrival on the scene, the entire police force of Saigon had been legally and officially under the control of a mafia called the Binh Xuyen which taxed the commerce of the city and controlled the flourishing gambling casinos, opium dens, and houses of prostitution. A new police force had to be created and this was done but it was not employed in counterguerrilla activity. It was active in the cities, where it was relied on for protection against urban terrorism. The guerillas, however, only occasionally engaged in urban terrorism and concentrated their efforts in the countryside. They did, on the other hand, have an elaborate support apparatus in the principal cities for intelligence, collection of funds, purchase of supplies and the like. Against this apparatus, the regular police was largely ineffective. The task of targeting on the Communist underground was assigned to the Special Branch of the Police who are discussed immediately below. The regular police, burdened with routine assignments handling traffic, guarding buildings and important personalities and enforcing Diem's clean-up of Saigon and its Chinese sister-city of Cholon, were of little consequence in counterinsurgency. Their behavior tended to tarnish the government's public image since they often demanded bribes to perform their routine services and in this respect they were useful to the insurgents rather than to the government's cause.

F. INTELLIGENCE OPERATIONS

Secret operations of all kinds flourished in the atmosphere of intrigue fostered by the Ngo family and especially by Presidential Counselor Nhu. Each time Nhu created a new organization, such as the Can Lao, a semi-secret political party, or the National Revolutionary Movement, a mass party useful for large demonstrations or getting out the vote, he created a separate and secret intelligence apparatus to keep a check on it, to screen leadership candidates and the like. The most important of these organizations was called the Social and Political Research Service (SEPES). It worked out of the Presidential Palace and was Nhu's primary reliance not only for intelligence but for political action of all kinds. It also
served as a control mechanism for manipulation and management of the press, the cultural institutions, Nhu's own political organizations and much more. Although it attempted to conduct purely intelligence operations against the Communists, they suffered from lack of professionalism and from the fact that the Ngo family's most pressing concern was to hold on to power against its anti-communist rivals.

The most professional of the various intelligence groups was in the police, the so-called Surete, later renamed the Special Branch. It had a great deal of lost ground to make up, however, and by the end of this period, it had not yet been able to develop effective operations.

In addition to the police there existed a relatively powerful Military Intelligence Service (MIS) which also claimed a charter for covert intelligence operations. It too, however, invested much of its time and energy in monitoring the military for coup plotting and on occasion plotted on its own behalf and that of its commander.

None of these numerous competing intelligence agencies cooperated effectively with any of the others. Indeed, they were often bitter rivals. They attempted to keep their competitors in ignorance of their activities and stumbled over each other in the process. In effect, they failed rather thoroughly in what should have been their principal task of penetrating and neutralizing the Communist apparatus, which proved far more competent than its enemies at the task of covert operations.

G. PSYCHOLOGICAL WARFARE OPERATIONS

In the field of psychological warfare, there also was a rich growth of organizations stimulated originally by the French and then by the Americans. With help from the US Information Agency (USIA) a Vietnamese Information Service (VIS) came into existence and strove to match and counter the propaganda operations of the Communists in the countryside. Radio stations and newspapers were launched under government sponsorship and the government managed to establish virtually complete control of the press without having to resort to censorship. It did this by a variety of means,
including control of the distribution system, subsidy and, in the last resort, mob action. At the same time, the military developed a psychological warfare service which also broadcast by radio, distributed leaflets and news sheets and attempted, with little success, to reach the guerillas themselves. In the absence of effective military or security operations, however, little ascertainable impact resulted.

H. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

It should be clear by now that under the deliberately divided security system created by the Ngo family, direction and coordination could only come from the President who jealously kept all the threads in his own hands. But Ngo Dinh Diem, distracted by a myriad of details which he insisted on administering himself, was not able to give effective and coordinated direction to his scattered and competing security organs. Whereas Counsellor Nhu attempted to direct and manage the strategic hamlet program, his contribution was both competitive with the military and consisted largely of exhortation to hurry all phases of the activity to rapid completion. There was, in effect, no coordination of security operations deserving of the name. Each of the many services involved fought a separate war against the guerillas, a fact which would have doomed the program to failure even if the Ngo family had not been so suddenly removed from the scene in 1963.

I. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

The complex and diverse system of political mobilization and control spawned by the Ngo family was in many respects deliberately modeled on the communist pattern. It stemmed largely from the mind of Ngo Dinh Nhu, a self-proclaimed intellectual who seemed to see himself as a Catholic and Vietnamese version of some revolutionary leader of the past—perhaps resembling Leon Trotsky. Ngo Dinh Diem also felt a distinct personal rivalry with Ho Chi Minh whom he had known in bygone years. As one
observer put it, "... he thought of Ho Chi Minh and himself as rival patriots, struggling for domination over their people... primarily with ideological weapons..."4. Both brothers were unfortunately lacking Ho's brilliance as an organizer and his knowledge of and empathy with his own people, particularly the peasantry. The Ngo family ideology, which they called "Personalism," was a cloudy body of thought of no importance for this study. At any particular time it meant whatever Counsellor Nhu wished it to mean. It could not be simplified, however, so as to be meaningful to the average man and therefore was not able to compete with Communism in its appeals. A crazy-quilt of competing and overlapping political organizations was called into being by Nhu. Aside from a handful of true believers, however, the membership of these organizations was committed only to personal advancement. Even within the Ngo family there was division and competition provided by the youngest brother Ngo Dinh Can, who ruled independently of Nhu in Central Vietnam, where he coolly blocked Nhu's organizations from expanding.

Under this overlay of ideology and semi-official political organization, the official government apparatus was based on a constitution which provided for an elected National Assembly, but granted wide powers to the President to rule by decree. The legal framework thus provided is discussed below.

J. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND VILLAGE ENVIRONMENT

The Ngo family regime had long had as a goal the reform of rural government in a manner which would bring the rural population under full government control, something which was unprecedented in Vietnamese history until Ho Chi Minh achieved power in the north. Several unsuccessful attempts had already been made when the strategic hamlet program became the final, convulsive effort. Unhappily, the program's failures in execution meant that in most communities the new dispensation did not improve government or administration. In fact, the gradual replacement during Diem's time of civilian with military province and district chiefs virtually
guaranteed a decline of quality and of honesty in local administration. The officers had no experience and since the assignment was temporary, they looked upon it as an opportunity for personal enrichment.

Such opportunities increased greatly as the US aid program moved into high gear behind the strategic hamlet program. As noted above, $10 million was allotted for local procurement until the pipeline from the US could fill up. By early 1963, the flow of material to the countryside began in earnest along with civilian advisors to work with provincial officials in managing the programs. Despite mismanagement and outright embezzlement, there is no doubt that much good work was accomplished by these efforts, from building schools and dispensaries to improving strains of rice and stocking fish ponds with fingerlings. Unfortunately, however, the security situation in the countryside did not improve sufficiently during the period to permit this effort to achieve an impact on rural attitudes. It is a truism that if a government cannot provide security for a population it will be unable to gain that population's support. Another weakness of the program was the failure in many cases to consult painstakingly with representatives of the villages affected as to their needs and preferences. The strategic hamlet program failed for a number of reasons but first of all because it did not, despite its intentions, bring security to the people.

K. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

One of the glaring weaknesses of the Ngo family regime was its failure to establish a firm legal basis for the operation of its hastily assembled official and unofficial machinery. The President governed largely by decree; the laws of the land were often not available in written form to those charged with enforcing them and the semi-official political organizations sponsored by Counsellor Nhu often had no legal basis whatsoever and saw no need for one. The effects of this chaotic situation upon popular attitudes, especially in the countryside, were entirely negative. On the one hand, the peasant was confronted with the Communist organization which operated with precision and certainty and made clear its demands and
requirements. On the other was the government, claiming his loyalty but unable to make its demands and exactions either clear or reasonable because of its own confusion about the precise nature and bearing of the laws it was supposed to administer. To the peasant, the government seemed not only remote and unsympathetic, but often arbitrary, a situation stemming in part from the confused condition of the law. It was not a formula for success.
FOOTNOTES:


3. Ibid., p. 164.


5. Ibid., pp. 230-238.

BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX I

This account has relied on a few studies that pull together the facts in satisfactory detail and provide sound analyses. They are:

(2) Race, Jeffrey, War Comes to Long An, University of California Press, Berkely, CA, 1972.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Date</th>
<th>Event</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>July 7, 1954</td>
<td>Ngo Dinh Diem accepts invitation of Emperor Bao Dai to become Prime Minister of Vietnam.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July 21, 1954</td>
<td>A series of agreements concluded in Geneva ending the war between France and the Viet Minh, dividing Vietnam in half at the 17th parallel with Ho Chi Minh and the Communists ruling the northern half from Hanoi and Bao Dai's government ruling the south from Saigon.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1954-1955</td>
<td>Diem consolidates his power by eliminating the armies of religious sects, who were supported by Bao Dai. In same period, one million refugees (mostly Catholic) move to South from North.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>October, 1955</td>
<td>National referendum votes overwhelmingly to establish a republic and to terminate Bao Dai's reign.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>March, 1956</td>
<td>National Assembly elected and drafts constitution.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>July, 1956</td>
<td>Reunification elections suggested under Geneva accords do not take place.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1956-1959</td>
<td>Diem regime launches program of forceful suppression against secret Communist organization left behind in the South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1959</td>
<td>Lao Dong (Communist) Party in Hanoi takes secret decision to launch armed struggle against Diem regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1960</td>
<td>Lao Dong announces publicly its support for liberation of south. Formation of National Liberation Front is announced.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>First incidents take place of armed attacks on South Vietnamese forces.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Date</td>
<td>Event</td>
</tr>
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<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------------------------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1961</td>
<td>Kennedy administration takes first steps to support a broadened counterinsurgency campaign in South Vietnam. Number of authorized US military advisors increased to 2,000. Helicopters also authorized.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1962</td>
<td>Government of Vietnam launches &quot;strategic hamlet&quot; program to erect defenses and arm inhabitants of 11,000 out of 16,000 hamlets in South Vietnam. US decides to support program. Vietnamese army (ARVN) fails to eliminate large enemy force which it has trapped at village of Ap Bac. Public outcry ensues in US over failures and weaknesses of Diem regime.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1963</td>
<td>GVN continues to press forward with strategic hamlet program but authoritarian rule of Diem stimulates intensifying criticism of regime in US, particularly of President's brother, Ngo Dinh Nhu and sister-in-law, Madame Nhu.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>August, 1963</td>
<td>Ngo Dinh Nhu's special forces raid Buddhist pagodas and arrest 1,500 Buddhist activists.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>November, 1963</td>
<td>Military coup overthrows Ngo Dinh Diem with prior knowledge of US. Diem and Nhu murdered while in captivity. Strategic hamlet program dissolves and Communists launch offensive to bring regime down.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
A. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

The second phase of the combined US/South Vietnamese counterinsurgency effort in Vietnam, from 1966 to 1971, was a partial success, although the war—was ultimately lost after the withdrawal of American forces. That partial success came only after the enemy had been seriously weakened by his losses during the 1968 Tet offensive against the cities.

It resulted also from the Government of Vietnam's shift of priorities putting new urgency onto improving conditions in the countryside, mobilizing and arming the entire population and implementing energetically a thorough-going land reform. On the American side, the turn toward an improved result in counterinsurgency came only after the formation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support Directorate (CORDS) to unify the management of all phases of counterinsurgency and the placing of it within the staff of the Commander, US Military Aid Command, Vietnam (USMACV). From this decision, there emerged an increase in energy and focus and a more realistic ordering of priorities within both the American and the Vietnamese sides of the effort.

The success was nevertheless only partial. Among the reasons was the fact that the re-organization and re-ordering of priorities came too late. They had only begun to have their positive impact when domestic political pressures began to force the withdrawal of American forces. Secondly, the American effort in Vietnam was never fully unified in that the military and civilian sides remained under separate management. In addition, the bulk of American military force remained committed to conventional concepts of tactics and strategy, focusing on vain efforts to destroy the enemy's armed forces rather than on securing the rural population of Vietnam against the Communist guerillas. Another weakness was the lack of professionalism and commitment on the part of the Vietnamese command and officer class stemming from the fact that it formed the political base of the regime and was
therefore permeated by politics. Vietnamese officers also filled the positions of province and district chief throughout the country and played a key role in the government - and often the mis-government - of the countryside.

This last fact meant that the rural population never came to believe that its interests were represented and defended under the South Vietnamese political system. Due to the cultural cleavage between the often illiterate peasantry and the urbanized officers who ruled them, the peasants were left with the impression that those who governed them were remote, even foreign, cold and sometimes brutal. For this reason, in spite of considerable improvement in their standard of life and of control over their own affairs, the peasants, while in large part withdrawing their support from the Communists, remained neutral and failed to give the willing commitment to the government's cause that was the ultimate purpose of the counterinsurgency program.

B. THE EVENTS OF THE INSURGENCY

During the years between the fall of the Ngo family regime and the firm establishment of the government of Nguyen Cao Ky (Prime Minister) and Nguyen Van Thieu (President), that is from late 1963 until 1966, counterinsurgency in South Vietnam lagged behind other preoccupations of both the Americans and the Vietnamese. Instability in Saigon was the principal concern together with a flagging military effort that began to have ominous effects on the battlefield. While seeking to find a political combination which would stop the succession of listless, short-lived governments the US began to view the insertion of its own military strength as essential to prevent collapse and to restore morale and vigor to the political scene. The process began with the bombing of North Vietnam in 1964 followed by the arrival of the first US combat troops in 1965. A steady build-up of American and allied forces and construction of bases, headquarters and logistical facilities began which eventually peaked in 1968 when the totals reached 550,000 Americans and close to 50,000 allied forces.
In the meantime, Ky and Thieu had come to power by coup d'état and established themselves. Although they continued to be threatened occasionally by rival officers, they fended these off, surrounding themselves with supporters whose loyalty they rewarded with choice assignments. At first the more flamboyant Ky was the dominant figure, but in later years Thieu, the quieter personality, proved more skillful politically and relegated Ky to the background.

Ky and his group spoke publicly of the need for vigorous prosecution of the war and also of a vague "revolution" that they intended to preside over, without troubling to define what they meant. By 1966, with the military disintegration halted by American troops and stability restored to the political scene, American attention shifted back to the countryside and to the war for the support and control of the rural population which had never lost its official priority but had, in fact, been shunted aside by the political and military crises of 1964-65.

1. The Buildup in the Countryside

During this period of drift in the counterinsurgency (now beginning to be called pacification) effort, the momentum of the support program built up for the strategic hamlets had not been interrupted. American supplies, funds, and personnel not only flowed steadily into the countryside but volume increased. In virtually all of the 44 provinces of South Vietnam there were now military advisors at province and at district level as well as AID provincial advisory groups and CIA representatives. The US military also posted advisors with ARVN combat units down to battalion. It was an unprecedented deployment of Americans in a foreign country; nothing like it had been attempted before by the US to support an ally.

Despite this build-up, very little in actual fact was accomplished by way of restoring security to the countryside or improving the government's hold on the loyalties of the population. Firstly, this was and remained an advisory program. US representatives were not in charge of anything except their own personnel and the supplies they were charged to turn over to GVN representatives if they were satisfied that certain
conditions had been met. On the Vietnamese side, throughout 1964 and 1965, the political turmoil in Saigon had the inevitable effect of derailing the momentum behind the strategic hamlet program, which it replaced with a series of hastily thrown together expedients intended to satisfy the complaints of the Americans. These bore various names—New Life Hamlets, Chien Thang (Victory), Rural Construction—but were all equally characterized by lassitude and confusion. As governments changed in Saigon, province chiefs followed one another in the provincial capitals, sometimes three or even four in one year. Materials for reconstruction or development programs often sat in warehouses or simply disappeared.

2. The Emergence of Pacification

The Americans, nevertheless, persisted, both in Saigon and the provinces, in the attempt to accomplish the tasks assigned to them. Gradually a new series of programs began to emerge. Successful local experiments led to decisions to build on success and expand small initial efforts into larger and larger enterprises. A new pacification program began to take shape of which the main feature, initially at least, was the so-called Revolutionary Development (RD) Cadre program. This program will be discussed in some detail at a later point.

The RD cadre program was only one facet of the new pacification effort. AID found itself obliged to assume responsibility for an enormous number of refugees generated by the fighting. The totals fluctuated but at times they numbered upwards of a million.

Another major AID effort was the campaign to induce enemy defections. It was called Open Arms (Chieu Hoi in Vietnamese). Inducements were offered for defections, propaganda publicizing the campaign was widely distributed and re-education centers were established. The program began in 1963 and reached full development in 1967. AID also supported a wide-ranging effort to improve the quality of life in the countryside, especially in the fields of health, education, and agricultural development. These activities also intensified during the period of "interregnum." They will be described in greater detail later.
AID's police program similarly continued to grow although it did not hit its stride until 1967. At the same time the US mounted a police intelligence program which expanded greatly in the years we are considering. That effort concentrated on the Police Special Branch, subsidizing an expansion from the main population centers out into the provinces. A large-scale construction program brought into being a Provincial Interrogation Center (PIC) in each of 44 province capitals. The purpose was to enable the Special Branch to hold and interrogate prisoners in surroundings which permitted professional handling. Interrogation training was also part of the program.

Among its other efforts, the US sponsored a Central Intelligence Organization (CIO) in Saigon with the purpose of producing higher quality intelligence on the enemy. The CIO was a replacement for the confused secret apparatus spawned by Ngo Dinh Nhu and his brother, Ngo Dinh Can in the preceding regime. It was focused entirely on intelligence, however, avoiding the control activities of the Ngo family. In addition, toward the end of the period, the US set in motion an experiment which attempted to bring together all intelligence activity in local centers where it was made available for exploitation by district and provincial security forces. This was the genesis of the Phoenix program which later became the subject of much criticism. One of the arms of the local government with a capability to exploit intelligence was also sponsored by the US. It was called Provincial Reconnaissance Units (PRU) and consisted of small squads of highly motivated men with the mission of apprehending enemy cadres and bringing them back for interrogation and disposition through the judicial system.

Such, in brief, are the outlines of the pacification effort devised by the American agencies in Vietnam. As yet, however, they were far from constituting a firmly organized and administered pacification program. They lacked one essential ingredient: an adequately staffed management mechanism either on the American or the Vietnamese side.
3. The Formation of Cords

The initial steps in creation of such a mechanism were not taken until 1966. At a hastily organized conference of senior American and Vietnamese officials held in Honolulu in February of that year, President Johnson made clear his determination to accord high priority to a campaign to improve economic and social conditions throughout the country. The details of the decisions taken at Honolulu were soon superseded, but the priority assigned to pacification remained permanent. One result was a series of re-organizations of the US Mission in Vietnam culminating in May, 1967 in the creation of the Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) directorate of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV).

CORDS was an ad hoc organization created by Presidential fiat, placing under single management the entire range of American programs to secure the countryside, to improve the conditions of rural life and the government's control there. There was one exception, namely the regular military forces. They remained under the Commander, USMACV (COMUSMACV) and the new directorate was also under his command but with a difference. Heading up the CORDS directorate within MACV was a civilian with the rank of Deputy Ambassador. Under him was a hybrid staff of mixed civilians and military officers who managed programs with a budget of $500 million. These included the entire military advisory system of MACV, the rural activities of AID and CIA and a headquarters staff. In each province center, a single head was appointed for all pacification activities in the province. In each military region, the CORDS chief was designated deputy to the corps commander. In all, CORDS initially disposed of some 6500 civilian and military personnel, a figure which increased later.

Again, we must note that CORDS in its entirety was an advisory organization. Its mission was not to conduct pacification but to assist the Vietnamese with advice and material support. It took time but eventually the American example was followed. GVN pacification activity also became unified under a Central Pacification and Development Council whose head was President Thieu.
Among the early results of the creation of CORDS was a decision to assign it the responsibility for re-organizing and upgrading the rural militia, now called the Regional Forces (village defenders) and the Provincial Forces (companies controlled by province chiefs). ARVN was persuaded to upgrade its staff officer in charge from a Colonel to a Lieutenant General. Retraining was conducted by American Mobile Training Teams which eventually numbered 355. The RF/PF were also rearmed with modern weapons and given improved equipment.

The new CORDS structure gave priority to the Phoenix programs and the Open Arms campaign to induce defections, both of which had the purpose of weakening and eventually neutralizing the Communists' clandestine organization known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).

4. The Effects of the Tet Offensive

CORDS moved to strengthen pacification in many other ways but its first months were necessarily devoted to staffing and procedural matters. The situation in the countryside did not noticeably improve in 1967 and then, in late January, 1968, the enemy unleashed the daring gamble which has become known as the Tet offensive, a simultaneous attack on some 34 cities and towns throughout Vietnam.

In most places, the attack achieved surprise and important initial gains. The American Embassy in Saigon was besieged and Hue, the second city of South Vietnam, was taken by the enemy. Throughout the countryside, government troops were hastily pulled out to defend the towns and the rural security effort at first seemed entirely negated. With the passage of time, however, this initial perception proved incorrect. To mount the Tet offensive, the enemy had also pulled its forces from the countryside and many of them had been put out of action. The Communist death toll resulting from this offensive reached the extremely high estimated figure of 45,000, most of them belonging to the southern arm of the movement, which never again achieved its former strength. In several far-reaching ways, in fact, the Tet offensive changed the character of the war. From that point on, the brunt of fighting was borne by North Vietnamese regulars rather than southern guerillas. At the same time, the impact of the attack
on American public opinion, which viewed it as a major disaster, was such that the US was forced to abandon the goal of military victory in Vietnam and to seek lesser objectives.

Nevertheless, the war continued and it soon became apparent that the enormous Communist losses and the resulting blow to enemy morale had created new opportunities for pacification. The CORDS directorate launched a revised and streamlined effort called the Accelerated Pacification Program (APC). The RD teams were reduced in size and their role changed somewhat, the defense function being turned over to the local militia. The APC achieved unexpected gains and although originally planned to last only three months, it was renewed and extended several times, retaking all of the areas that had appeared to be lost at Tet and moving into new areas which previously had been under firm enemy control.

5. President Thieu's New Policies

At the same time, President Thieu himself finally appeared to realize, as he never had before, the critical importance of the battle for the countryside. He moved rapidly to strengthen the GVN's contribution to the effort, injecting new energy and priority into the program. Thus, in 1968, after years of hesitation, he pushed through a National Mobilization Law, drafting all able-bodied men age 18 to 38 into the armed forces and those 16 and 17 and 39 to 50 into the newly-formed People's Self-Defense Force (PSDF). Both in the cities and in the villages, all able-bodied men not in the armed forces were formed into part-time PSDF units to defend their local communities until help could come from larger forces. Some 400,000 weapons were distributed to these units.

Among other initiatives undertaken by the GVN in this post-Tet period, the most important were:

(1) Making universal the process of electing village councils, instituted in 1967. The councils, in turn, chose the village chiefs and other officials.

(2) By a decree of 1969, village governments were given control of local armed forces, e.g., RD teams, RF units, PSDF and police.
deputy chief for security and one for administration assisted the
chief in discharging his added responsibilities.

(3) The same decree allotted an annual fund of one million piastres
to the village government to be spent on local improvements.

(4) Village officials were incorporated in the training programs con-
ducted at the Vung Tau training center. Some 17,000 passed
through these courses in 1969 alone.

The crowning achievement of the GVN's new emphasis on pacification was
the passage in 1970 of a sweeping new land reform law which limited the
holdings of individual land owners to 15 hectares and distributed the
remainder to new owners with the government assuming the costs. Passed in
1970, the law was implemented with surprising vigor. In three years,
nearly one million hectares of farmland had been distributed.

President Thieu took a personal interest in all this activity. He
addressed the graduating classes at Vung Tau, visited numerous villages and
hamlets and regularly presided over the meetings of the Central Pacifica-
tion and Development Council. It had taken many years, but it seemed clear
that at last the GVN assigned very high priority to pacification.

These actions, together with the cumulative effects of CORDS
operations and the heavy losses sustained by the Communists in the Tet
attacks brought pacification to its highest levels of success achieved
during the war. Enemy guerilla operations in 1970 and 1971 were at a low
ebb, concentrated largely in some eleven provinces out of 44.1 A new
prosperity began to be apparent in the countryside while the total number
of refugees dropped sharply from a peak figure of 1 1/2 million in February
1969 to 217,000 in mid-1970. At the same time, however, the enemy
organization had not been destroyed but remained in being at a reduced size
and level of activity. It remains a matter of doubt whether the rural
population had effectively given its loyalty to the GVN, which had been the
underlying purpose of pacification. More likely, the peasants, though
withdrawing their support from the Communists had not fully committed
themselves to the government's cause and while enjoying the benefits poured into the countryside by American aid, nevertheless remained neutral for reasons which will be explored at a later point.

At any rate, the matter was never put to a final test. In 1972 and again in 1975, after the withdrawal of American forces, the Communists staged a full-scale invasion of South Vietnam, relying entirely on regular forces, including tanks. The first invasion failed, due to air and logistic support still provided by the Americans. With the Americans gone, the 1975 invasion succeeded and the war ended with the defeat and collapse of the GVN. In neither instance did the question of control of the rural population come very much into the picture except, we may conjecture, for its usefulness as a source of intelligence, of which the People's Army of Vietnam (PAVN) had no apparent lack.

We therefore conclude this summary narrative of the course of pacification in Vietnam, 1966-70 with no firm conclusion as to its success. We can only be certain that definite progress had been made, some of it quite impressive at the material level. As always in Vietnam, what went on "in the hearts and minds" of the people remained uncertain.

We turn now to examine in greater detail the courses of action undertaken by the government in pursuit of the goal of pacification, following the order discussed and explained in the body of this study.

C. MILITARY OPERATIONS

1. Leadership

With respect to leadership, all authorities agree that the ARVN and other arms of the Vietnamese military were seriously deficient in this crucial ingredient of military success. The Ngo regime was replaced by a series of military juntas, stabilizing at last with Air Vice Marshall Ky and General Thieu at the helm.

To preserve their power, Thieu and Ky became involved in a process of military politics in which promotions and choice assignments were the principal coin. Loyalty was often the product of personal and family
relationships, membership of the same class at the military academy, regional ties, and so on. These ties were then cemented by favoritism in assignment with little regard for competence or professional achievement. A choice assignment was one which offered opportunity for personal enrichment. As Lewy puts it:

"The appointment and promotion of top-ranking officers...always remained closely linked to President Thieu's endeavors to protect the base of his political support within the officer corps; most of his general officers, therefore, owed their position more to their political dependability than to battlefield performance."2

Leadership quality was also affected by the strict educational requirements for commissioned officers. Battlefield promotions were extremely rare. Officers were recruited from the middle and upper classes and had difficulty relating to their troops and little commitment to martial qualities or professionalism. Officers looked upon their assignments as opportunities for prestige and personal enrichment rather than as a chance to serve. Throughout its history, this aspect of ARVN assured that its performance in battle, with certain honorable but rare exceptions, would be poor. The Americans struggled against this handicap. CORDS, for example, kept careful record of the performance of province and district chiefs and brought successful pressure to have the worst performers removed. MACV, on the other hand, did not make a serious or consistent effort and failed to alleviate the problem.

2. Tactics and Strategy

With respect to military tactics and strategy the source of the difficulty was the American way of war which was imparted to and faithfully copied by the Vietnamese. When the American armed forces came to Vietnam, they came complete with all their high technology equipment - armor, artillery, jet aircraft, etc. - and proceeded to use it with only minor adjustments for the nature of the war the faced. This standard pattern called for heavy preparation of the battlefield with artillery and air bombardment which alerted the enemy to the likelihood of an attack (if they
were not already alerted by penetrations of the ARVN, and made it possible for them to avoid battle and thus control the level of their losses. It also meant that the fighting would impact heavily on the population in and around the battlefield, the same population whose loyalty and commitment to the government's cause was the agreed purpose of the war.

Aware to a degree of the contradictions involved, MACV decided on a division of labor between itself and the Vietnamese which was intended to minimize the problem. The Americans assumed the task of operating in less populated areas against enemy main forces, where they could freely use their immense superiority in fire power. About half of the US forces were dedicated to this duty along with some of the elite Vietnamese units. The strategic purpose of these operations was to cause unsustainable losses to the enemy and thus eventually force him to abandon his effort to take over South Vietnam.

The remainder of American forces and the bulk of the Vietnamese were assigned to "support pacification" in the more densely populated areas. They conducted "clear and hold" operations designed to comb out enemy agents and guerrillas in communities into which pacification teams were scheduled to move. In principle they designated units to be on call to support militia units or pacification teams attacked by superior forces.

In practice, the first, or "search and destroy" mission, failed for the reason suggested earlier: the communist forces were seldom caught unaware and so were able to maintain their losses at a sustainable rate. The second, or pacification support mission, suffered from equally serious deficiencies. In the first place, the American forces never reached the levels promised, i.e., half the US combat force. Secondly, both Americans and Vietnamese fought in conventional style, massing fire power, preparing the battlefield and thus causing heavy non-combatant losses of both life and property. Air bombardment and artillery were freely used, including unobserved harassment and interdiction fire. Thirdly, performance standards on the Vietnamese side were low and so troops failed to close
with the enemy, support for beleaguered pacification units was slow in coming, if it came at all, and troop behavior was poor toward the villagers among whom the troops were stationed.

After the Tet attacks and the resultant decision to start withdrawing American forces, the new commander of MACV attempted to adopt a strategy of "area security," breaking units down and patrolling more intensely, especially at night. The objective was no longer attrition but population security. "In order to provide security for the population," said the MACV Strategic Objectives Plan in 1964, "our operations must succeed in neutralizing the VCI and separating the enemy from the population." This strategy, which accompanied the program of rapid Vietnamization in preparation for the American withdrawal, failed because it was not seriously carried out by the field commanders to whom it seemed to violate basic principles and present unfamiliar challenges. For a variety of reasons, COMUSMACV, General Creighton Abrams was unable to secure effective compliance with the new approaches.

3. Intelligence

Turning to military intelligence, the efforts of MACV to collect information on the enemy were in some respects impressive and effective. This was especially true in the handling of captured documents, which became a flood after US combat units entered the conflict and began aggressive operations against enemy base areas. A Joint Translation Center was set up in Saigon, geared to exploit such documents rapidly. Prisoner interrogations and aerial reconnaissance also contributed heavily as well as more sensitive sources. The target was a tough one, however, and success was limited. This was even truer of tactical intelligence collected by combat units, especially on the Vietnamese side, where techniques were crude, and included torture more or less routinely. On the whole, military intelligence did not suffer from neglect but achieved only limited success against a highly skilled and disciplined enemy.

Counter-intelligence was an even less successful effort and here the problem lay largely with the Vietnamese. In the pattern that typifies all Communist governments, espionage and secret operations were accorded a
high priority by Hanoi and lacked nothing in the way of resources, personnel and command attention. Since, in one aspect at least, the conflict was a civil war, the enemy had a great advantage of intimate knowledge and a network of family and long-standing personal relationships it could exploit for the recruitment of penetration agents at every level of the GVN and its armed forces. A study by the CIA station in Saigon which was leaked to the New York Times in 1970, estimated the number of enemy spies throughout South-Vietnam at 30,000, many of them strategically placed in important government agencies or military commands. Very little of importance that ARVN or the government did or planned to do was not known well in advance by the enemy. Although the problem was well-recognized by the Americans, none of the efforts they made to deal with it succeeded in reducing much less in eliminating it.

4. Troop Behavior and Discipline

A recurring criticism in American reports and analysis of ARVN's performance beginning as early as 1961 dealt with the behavior of the troops toward the population. In 1961, a US Civil Affairs team reported, "The Army steals, rapes and generally treats the population in a very callous fashion." Ten years later in 1971, a special CORDS study concluded that such ARVN behavior as extracting bribes from highway drivers, taking goods and services without payment, armed robbery and assaults were "widespread and detrimental to the pacification program." This phenomenon was evidently systemic and lasted the entire history of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (RVNAF). In part, at least, it was a by-product of the low level of leadership and of morale in the Vietnamese military. As noted above, Vietnamese officers were drawn from the educated urban classes and had little rapport with their own troops, who came from the peasantry. Officers did not place much priority on the welfare of their men who, in effect, were drafted for life, unless they were killed or invalided out of the service. Until 1967, the cost of food was deducted from the soldiers' pay and regular leaves were not granted. Troop pay was low and no entertainment or "rest and rehabilitation" were provided. Under these circumstances, it is not surprising that behavior toward the population was poor and sometimes brutal.

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5. Civic Action

The US Army's doctrine of counterinsurgency warfare placed considerable emphasis on military civic action among the population. Every American unit had a Medical Civic Action program providing medical care to villages near unit headquarters and much construction was also completed and turned over to local authorities by military engineers. The troops also distributed food, clothing, building materials and fertilizers, gave haircuts and bathed babies. Undoubtedly, such actions helped compensate in some part for the disruptive presence of American troops in the communities. The difficulty with civic action, however, is that the military units move on and so does the civic action. In Vietnam, the Communist's underground organization did not move on but remained after the troops departed.

In other words, civic action was a superficial solution to a deep-seated problem and was not able to effect a permanent improvement in the situation.

There is little information available about civic action carried out by Vietnamese forces. If there was any such program, it did not compensate for the problems in relations between ARVN and the rural population already noted.

6. Air Operations

At the beginning of the insurgency, South Vietnam's Air Force consisted of a few transport and reconnaissance aircraft. Starting in 1961, a steady build-up was carried out until in 1972 the total number of aircraft reached 1,000 of which about 500 were helicopters. Numerous jet aircraft were included, mostly fighter-bombers and fighters equipped for close support of ground forces. (Later, in 1972, in preparation for the final withdrawal of American air power, the RVNAF fleet reached a total of 2,000 aircraft and was the fourth largest in the world).

This build-up was carried out under the guidance of the USAF which itself, at the same time, deployed in force into Southeast Asia. A primary target of the USAF and the aircraft of the Sixth Fleet, stationed in the Gulf of Tonkin, was North Vietnam, a phase of the war unrelated to
pacification. But both the RVNAF and the USAF were heavily deployed inside South Vietnam in support of both "search and destroy" missions and the various military activities associated with pacification. The aircraft provided facilities for commanders to survey the deployment and operations of troops in combat, for reconnaissance, swift movement of combat units into battle, close support of ground forces in combat, and air bombardment of enemy facilities and concentrations. In the latter category were included B-52 attacks which when properly targeted could achieve a devastating impact, churning up a square mile of terrain and leveling everything within it.

In the years 1966-68 the Americans and Vietnamese delivered 2,865,808 tons of air ordnance in Vietnam and Laos. That figure exceeded the total tonnage delivered by allied air power in World War II in both the Pacific and European theater. Regrettably, the impact of this enormous firepower on pacification was negative. The availability of bombs and aircraft meant that they would be used regardless of need or appropriateness. Any village from which sniper fire was detected would promptly be targeted for air attack, with heavy loss of property and life among a population who may or may not have been supporting the enemy. Indeed, the enemy was known to deliberately provoke this kind of retaliation in order to reinforce popular hostility to the Americans. Aerial bombardment was also used in so-called free fire zones, where any live target was assumed to be an enemy, but often was not. Jet aircraft were preferred over propellor-driven despite the fact that they flew too high and too fast to provide the kind of accuracy required for pacification operations. To sum up, the use of air power for the support of pacification in Vietnam was unsuccessful in advancing the cause of population security and, in fact, its net affect was to thwart the ostensible purposes of the American and Vietnamese pacification efforts.

7. **Civil-Military Relations**

On the US side, the military in Vietnam was in principle and in fact largely independent of civilian control. Although it could be influenced by the US Ambassador, the senior civilian official, it could not
be commanded by him. This was in keeping with traditional US doctrine, which exempts a military commander in a combat theater from the general rule that the Ambassador, as the President's representative, is in charge of all American activities in a given country. Civilian control is asserted over the military, in such cases, only at the level of the Secretary of Defense and the President. At the same time, the military field commander (in this case, COMUSMACV) is required to coordinate his plans and activities with the civilian agencies and can be persuaded, if not ordered, to change them. But again, American tradition frowns upon civilian interference with purely military affairs and, in Vietnam, the Ambassador usually honored this tradition in the interests of harmony with his military counterpart.

The result of this arrangement in Vietnam was not entirely happy, for the war was not merely a clash of regular military forces. It had political and psychological dimensions which outweighed the imperatives of combat as understood in the US military. The outstanding instance of this clash between political and military urgencies was the basic decision by the military command under General Westmoreland to concentrate on a strategy of attrition and reject the notion, sometimes urged on them by civilians and military alike, of giving priority to population security as a better means of achieving victory. Since neither the Secretary of Defense nor the President was willing to force a change of military strategy, the effort was not made.

The upshot of these decisions in Vietnam, therefore, was an independent US military command, free to fight the war according to its own cherished principles and precepts. These, unfortunately, did not adjust adequately to the demands of effective counterinsurgency in that strange and hostile environment.

On the Vietnamese side, meantime, no civilians spoke with authority within government councils. The government was in essence a military junta, even after regular elections took place in 1967, and civilians were invited into it merely as technicians with no policy role. Trained by
Americans and fully under the influence of the American military, the RVNAF leadership followed along with American strategy which they never seriously questioned.

8. **The Popular Militia**

The American and Vietnamese governments were slow to recognize the importance of a large, well-trained and equipped popular militia in effective counterinsurgency. The decision to upgrade the Regional and Popular Forces was not made and carried out until 1967, while the creation of a large part-time People's Self-Defense Force had to wait until the shock of the Tet attacks and the national mobilization which followed.

The strategy of insurgents who base themselves on the principles developed by Mao Tse-tung is to force the government's military to spread themselves thin in an attempt to protect every important location under government control. Much manpower is wasted in static guard duty while the insurgents, taking advantage of secrecy and mobility, are able to concentrate superior forces for a quick strike and then scatter and disappear once again. The solution to the dilemma is to recruit a local militia, full or part-time, paid or unpaid, to take over the static duties and also to assume the security role in an area after the regular military forces have swept through it and departed.

Thanks to the insistence of CORDS, the US military agreed to support a substantial build-up of the Regional and Popular Forces in 1967, with CORDS managing the effort. The RF/PF grew in size from 300,000 in 1967 to over a half million in 1971, at which time they comprised over half of the men under arms in South Vietnam. Arms and training were also upgraded at the same time. As a result, in 1971, in spite of their light armament and lack of air support, the RF/PF accounted for 40% of the enemy KIA. Much of the return of security to large areas of the South in the early seventies was accomplished by these forces.

Unfortunately, this improvement occurred late in the day, at a time when the character of the war had changed markedly to one of large regular forces on both sides. The militia was not able to confront PAVN divisions head-on and that ability was what was now called for.
Although not exactly a militia, the Revolutionary Development Cadre program should be noted here. This was the concept of recruiting a dedicated group of young men (and some women) and sending it to a village to organize the villagers for defense and help them improve their living standards with the goal of committing them firmly to the government. A team originally comprised 54 men, 34 of them armed and the rest trained as medics, teachers, farm specialists and the like. They were to take a census, try to identify Communists and their sympathizers in the village, train a self-defense force, organize literacy classes, set up dispensaries and much more. After 6 months, they were supposed to move on to another group of villages and begin over again.

To support the program a large Training Center was built at Vung Tau where recruits were given 13 weeks of training and indoctrination. Every five weeks, some five thousand were graduated in a solemn ceremony. RD cadres were granted exemption from the draft and eventually numbered some 50,000.

Although a great improvement over earlier programs of this type, the RD program had serious flaws. Many of the recruits came from the towns and had little rapport with the villagers. They joined to get a government job or to avoid the draft and their quality and dedication was uneven. Support from the regular military was often inadequate when a team came under attack and in general the program was too complicated to be implemented successfully on a mass scale. The concept was simplified under the Accelerated Pacification Program when the teams were reduced in size and placed under the village government. They then became a useful adjunct to the village chief's capabilities but were no longer the center piece of the pacification program.

D. POLICE OPERATIONS

Until as late as 1971, the National Police remained a stepchild of the GVN with extremely low pay and living conditions and a poor quality of personnel. The result, in spite of sizeable American efforts to improve the
professionalism and performance of the police, was to create another negative factor for pacification. Among the programs pushed by the Americans were a resources control system to block the enemy's nationwide supply arrangements, the distribution of tamper-proof ID cards to the entire population, full participation by the police in the district and provincial intelligence centers set up under the aegis of Phoenix, the creation of a paramilitary Police Field Force to defend local police stations. These efforts largely failed to accomplish their purposes because of the extremely low performance standards throughout the police services. Corruption was the most serious fault of the police. It permeated all of its activities and negated their ostensible purposes. There were many other faults as well all of which stemmed from the same root cause.

"If you talk about corruption, laziness, inefficiency, dishonesty, disinterest or any of the myriad faults that can be found with the Police ... you are talking basically of substandard working and living conditions."9

So wrote one American province senior advisor in 1972. Serious efforts to improve the National Police were undertaken in 1971 but not enough time remained for these reforms to have the hoped for impact. The police services remained ineffective and because of their habit of preying upon the population, a net loss for pacification.

E. INTELLIGENCE

The main burden of focusing the many intelligence agencies of the Vietnamese and Americans on their principal task, namely to uncover and identify the personnel of the secret Communist organization (called by the Americans the VCI), was assigned to the district and provincial intelligence centers created and supported by the Phoenix program. At these centers, personnel assigned from the various intelligence arms - police and military - were asked to collate all available information on the VCI, set
up dossiers and charts of the enemy organization which were then used to
target operations by the Provincial Reconnaissance Units, RF and PF or army
reconnaissance platoons. This, at least, was the theory of the program and
in order to bring pressure on the operators to press ahead, annual quotas
were assigned of VCI to be neutralized either by capture or by killing.

This proved to be a mistaken decision for it encouraged large-scale
fraud and abuse. A common practice was for local commanders to count the
enemy dead (or even non-combatant casualties) after a fire fight and credit
them to the Phoenix program as "VCI eliminated." Even worse was the
practice of arresting innocent persons in order to extract a bribe from
them. In other cases, personal or family vendettas were the motive for
arrests. Although the Phoenix program may have had a successful impact in
a few localities and caused some problems for the enemy, countrywide it was
a major disappointment to its advocates. Most of the captives brought in
by Phoenix operations were low-level and were soon released. The VCI did
not appear to suffer any serious losses as a result of Phoenix but it came
to be one of the major charges of opponents of the war against US opera-
tions in Vietnam. It was widely misrepresented as an "assassination
program" where in fact the worst change that could be brought against it
was ineffectiveness.

Earlier in this Appendix, we listed the other Vietnamese and American
intelligence programs which were mounted to develop the kind of
intelligence essential for effective military and police operations against
the enemy. These included the build-up and upgrading of the Special Branch
of the National Police, the construction of an interrogation center in each
principal capital, the creation of a Central Intelligence Organization to
collect and analyze national level intelligence. On the military side, a
Military Intelligence Service had existed since the beginnings of ARVN
under the French and it received appropriate support from MACV. The net of
these efforts did not at any time provide the necessary detailed target
information to permit more effective operations by the police or the
military. A large share of the resources assigned to the intelligence
services was diverted to defending the government against coup efforts
originating within its own ranks. At this work, the intelligence services were quite effective, for the Thieu régime was never seriously threatened with overthrow, although several attempts were made.

F. PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS

On both the American and Vietnamese sides, the pacification program was fully supported by psychological and informational activities covering most of the media. For instance, the government was subsidized by the US to permit the development of nationwide television and before the end of the war there was a television set in most villages and many hamlets as well. Radio and the press were also supported and developed and a Vietnamese Press Service distributed news to all these media. Within the military, a psychological warfare service developed material directed by radio and leaflet against the enemy and attempted to duplicate American military troop information services on a reduced scale.

It is a truism of psychological operations that their message must not be inconsistent with obvious facts known to everyone and it was in this regard that psychological operations in Vietnam failed to achieve their goals. They never succeeded in convincing the public of several basic themes such as the benevolence and firmness of the government, the growing weakness and ineffectiveness of the enemy and the imminence of victory. In fact, by its far more effective propaganda, the enemy was able to implant in virtually all Vietnamese an awe-inspired aspect for the Communists, a sense of the government's inferiority in moral and other non-material qualities and a virtual certainty that without the American presence the war was lost. These facts served to confirm the view that counter-insurgency wars are primarily political and psychological contests in which the military aspects must take second place. In the absence of an approach which placed appropriate emphasis on these non-military factors, the psychological efforts of the Vietnamese and the Americans flew in the face of reality and could only fail.
G. UNIFIED MANAGEMENT OF SECURITY AND OTHER COUNTERINSURGENCY OPERATIONS

We have already noted that complete unification of all aspects of the war effort among their own services was never attempted by the Americans. After the formation of CORDS and its insertion into the military apparatus, there remained a separation of military and non-military efforts as represented by the COMUSMACV on the one hand and the Ambassador and the remainder of the country team on the other. The consequence of this separation was the freedom of the military to pursue its own objectives with little more than lip service paid to what should have been the overriding political goals of the effort.

On the Vietnamese side, this division did not exist to the same extent since the military was also the dominant factor in the government as a whole. Nevertheless, coordination was seriously lacking in that the Vietnamese military system encouraged the existence of minor war lords who tended to run their own local wars with only occasional interference from the chain of command. This pattern appeared to be an aspect of the political process within the military described earlier. Commanders were chosen for political loyalty and were considered to be entitled to a certain freedom to enjoy the rewards of the system without being seriously bothered by pressures for conformity to directives, policies and programs originating in Saigon.

H. THE POLITICAL FRAMEWORK

Underlying the effort of the GVN against the Communists were several basic political propositions of which the most important was the legitimacy of its claim to sovereignty as representative and symbol of the aspirations of the South Vietnamese for independence and freedom. The concept of legitimacy in Vietnam is bound up with such qualities as effectiveness, justice and firmness. A government which evidences such qualities is
deemed to have "the mandate of heaven" and is supported by the population. In other words, the Vietnamese judge legitimacy by results rather than by the means by which power is acquired.10

At no time during the 21-year existence of the government of South Vietnam did the Saigon government clearly establish itself as fully legitimate in the eyes of most of the population. We can say this with some certainty because of the history of pacification which in one aspect at least was precisely an effort to persuade the rural population (80% of the whole) of the government's legitimacy. The actuality was often quite the opposite. Quite a large minority of the rural population (often estimated at 20%) gave its loyalty to the Communists and seemed willing to make endless sacrifices in that cause. Most of the rest were neutral, waiting to see who would win while trying to stay alive by avoiding offense to those who held power in the immediate vicinity.

In the American and the general Western view, on the other hand, legitimacy depends upon the means used to arrive in power and especially on a popular mandate expressed in the polling booth in a free atmosphere. The US struggled ceaselessly during those years to persuade each successive South Vietnamese regime to legitimize itself in the eyes of the world by adopting a free constitution and conducting honest elections to chose a government. No regime actually did so, although both Diem and later Thieu went through the motions. This factor was important to the US government both domestically and in terms of "world opinion" and every effort was made to persuade the public at home and abroad that the elections conducted at various times in South Vietnam were free and that therefore the regime had legitimized itself.

One is entitled to skepticism as to whether such elections, even if reasonably free, would have conferred legitimacy in the eyes of the rural Vietnamese population, absent the other qualities important in that culture. It was a population uneducated in democratic principles to whom the concept of a free and secret ballot was strange and unpersuasive. Far more significant to the villager was the degree to which the government permitted him to have some influence over the decisions that affected his
life. In this connection, such reforms as local elections to chose village
councils and land reform were an important step toward conferring
legitimacy. There remained, however, the unchanging fact that government
from district on up through province was in the hands of strangers who, to
the peasant, appeared remote, unsympathetic and often abusive. Of all the
factors affecting the legitimacy of the government in the rural areas, this
was the most important. It reflected the basic cleavage in Vietnamese
society between the educated urban classes and the mass of peasants whom
they governed and often misgoverned. This cleavage dominated the political
process and prevented the claims of the GVN to legitimacy from being
realized. It was the true underlying political framework of the war and
thwarted the substantial efforts made to gain the willing support of the
mass of the population.

I. IMPROVEMENT OF RURAL ADMINISTRATION AND RURAL ENVIRONMENT

Efforts to improve the rural environment and rural administration were
at the heart of the approach followed by the civilian side of the American
program in Vietnam and not only the civilian side, for the military made
its contribution, too. In this effort, the Vietnamese took little initiative but followed along the path laid out by the Americans without
enthusiasm until, in 1968-71, President Thieu suddenly became converted to
the cause and took the sweeping actions in building up village government
and land reform already described.

Most aspects of the programs to improve the village environment were
subsidized in whole or in part by the US aid program. They included road,
canal, and bridge-building, health and sanitation programs, digging of
wells, education, improvement of agricultural practices, construction of
markets, distribution of radio and television receivers and much more.
They reached into every corner of the country, including the tribal com-
munities of the mountain areas which had seldom if ever received help from
the government. There is little purpose in reviewing these programs in
detail, but to suggest the size and scope of the effort, we will focus on
health and note that over approximately twelve years "AID provided funds for the construction of 9 new hospitals, the major renovation of 11 others, the provision of 29 surgical suites and the construction of more than 170 district, 370 village and 400 hamlet maternity dispensaries." In addition, personnel were trained to operate the new rural facilities and dispense medication for simple medical problems.

Civic action by the military was also part of the approach but of more lasting importance was the effort to build new institutions or improve old ones, and even to make basic changes in economic relationships such as land reform. In both respects, the Americans and Vietnamese made earnest efforts not only by injecting American resources into the effort but by education and training both in Vietnam and the United States. The program became very large in scale and multi-faceted and was administered on the spot by American personnel assigned to province capitals.

Much improvement of the GVN's position in the countryside resulted. The improvement was certainly uneven and incomplete but more to the point, it was late. The Americans had lost patience and were preparing to leave, thus granting to the enemy the chance to achieve his goals by conventional military means. One result was to relegate the battle for control and support of the rural population to a secondary role. The main front of the war became the battle line between PAVN and ARVN and counterinsurgency ceased to have the importance it once had.

With the benefit of hindsight, therefore, we are able to say that improvement of rural government and the village environment, when finally undertaken with energy and a full Vietnamese commitment, demonstrated the possibilities of this approach but came too late to have the decisive effect hoped for.

J. LEGAL FRAMEWORK

Some theoreticians of insurgency and counterinsurgency maintain convincingly that without a suitable legal framework providing a consistent and fair basis for government actions affecting the individual's liberty
and his property, counterinsurgency cannot succeed. In Vietnam, this goal was not achieved, despite strenuous American efforts. The reason for the failure were to be found in the corruption and ineffectiveness of the police and the criminal justice system and also in the freedom of military officers in position of power in the countryside to ignore the law in their treatment of the population.

As in many civil war situations elsewhere, the government set aside normal legal guarantees and procedures in cases involving allegations of subversion. Emergency procedures, called an tri by the Vietnamese, were put into effect, under which an administrative committee could sentence the prisoner after a brief review of the police file. The weaknesses of the system reflected the deficiencies of the police, for in many cases innocent people were sentenced on trumped up charges while active VCI were able to bribe their way out of custody. Illegal means, namely torture, were also used by the police to obtain confessions.

Probably of more importance in its impact on village attitudes, was the inability of the simple peasant to prevent abuses by the military or the local government or obtain redress for such abuses. The rule of law did not obtain in the countryside, as we have made clear in earlier sections. Although the American command made serious and persistent efforts to regulate the behavior of American troops and to redress claims of individuals, this was never the case with the Vietnamese.
FOOTNOTES


3. Quoted in op. cit., p. 137.


8. Ibid, p. 182.


10. The best source for a larger treatment of these concepts is Paul Mus and John T. McAllister, The Vietnamese and Their Revolution, NY, Harper and Row, 1970.

11. Lewy, op. cit., p. 301.
BIBLIOGRAPHY FOR APPENDIX J

The main sources relied on in preparing this appendix were:


Both books, and especially Lewy's, are detailed compendia of American and Vietnamese military and civilian activities dealing with the Communist insurgency. It was therefore unnecessary to resort to original research in the primary source material which is both voluminous and scattered. To do so would have duplicated the work of these authors to little purpose and would not have been possible in any case within the time frame of this project.
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<td>1964</td>
<td>As situation on ground continues to deteriorate, US begins limited bombing operations against North Vietnam. NVN begins sending regular PAVN units South.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1965—</td>
<td>Bombing operations increase but the ground situation continues to worsen.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>June, 1965</td>
<td>Ky and Thieu take power in a coup in Saigon.</td>
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<tr>
<td>February, 1966</td>
<td>Honolulu Conference of senior US and GVN officials makes pacification a top priority of war effort.</td>
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<td>November, 1966</td>
<td>Pacification effort in Saigon is reorganized. First step of reorganization is placing of all civilian programs in the new Office of Civil Operations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>May, 1967</td>
<td>Second step of reorganization is taken with formation of CORDS, combining military and civilian pacification operation in a MACV directorate headed by a Deputy Ambassador. GVN organizes parallel Central Pacification Council.</td>
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<tr>
<td>January, 1968</td>
<td>Communists unleash Tet offensive in 37 cities and towns. Offensive is major psychological blow in US but results in heavy Communist losses in countryside.</td>
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<td>November, 1968</td>
<td>GVN and US move to exploit Communist setback in countryside with Accelerated Pacification Campaign. Thieu decrees national mobilization.</td>
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<td>GVN forms People's Self-Defense Force and begins distributing arms to villagers.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April, 1969</td>
<td>Village government reorganized and strengthened.</td>
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<tr>
<td>June, 1969</td>
<td>Nixon announces first withdrawal increment.</td>
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<tr>
<td>April, 1970</td>
<td>Joint US-Vietnamese incursion into Cambodia.</td>
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<td>May, 1970</td>
<td>Sweeping land reform enacted into law.</td>
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<tr>
<td>December, 1972</td>
<td>Christmas bombing of North Vietnam, heaviest of war.</td>
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<td>January, 1973</td>
<td>Cease fire agreement reached in Paris leading to termination of US participation in war.</td>
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