PEACEKEEPING ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IN THE EVENT OF AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE ACCORD

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Peacekeeping on the Golan Heights in the Event of an Israeli-Syrian Peace Accord

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In 1996 Syria and Israel came close to ratifying a peace accord. Currently, however, negotiations are stalled, but a change of government in Israel could provide the impetus for them to recommence. A peacekeeping force is most likely to be deployed as part of the security arrangements of a peace accord. The objective of this study is to determine what type of peacekeeping force would be applicable for deployment on the Golan Heights. Two ongoing Middle East peacekeeping missions, the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) are evaluated to determine their suitability as models upon which to structure a peacekeeping force for deployment on the Golan Heights.

The purpose of this thesis is to detail the perspectives of the Israelis and the Syrians in formulating a peace accord and rationalize those perspectives to determine the mission and structure of the peacekeeping force. The study concludes that a hybrid of the MFO and UNDOF models should be utilized to structure a Golan Heights peacekeeping force with a monitoring mission. The political organization of the MFO should be adopted and the military force would be a unique structure using the better aspects of both the MFO and UNDOF.
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

PEACEKEEPING ON THE GOLAN HEIGHTS IN THE EVENT OF AN ISRAELI-SYRIAN PEACE ACCORD by MAJ Gregory Charles Bilton, Australia, 89 pages.

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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

Israeli-Syrian peace is the key to a comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace... The peace will appreciably enhance regional stability and, as a result, dramatically change the economic outlook of the entire region.¹

Jacques Neriah

The conclusion of a peace agreement between Syria and Israel will have far-reaching implications for the Middle East. The likely result is a resolution of the problems in Southern Lebanon culminating in peace between Israel and all its immediate Arab neighbors. From this regional peace will stem stability and economic prosperity, unprecedented in the region. But, once formulated, this peace agreement will require the deployment of peacekeeping forces on the Golan Heights to ensure its integrity.

This thesis will consider what type of peacekeeping force will be required on the Golan when a peace accord between Israel and Syria is ratified. The option to utilize a peace enforcement force on the Golan Heights has been discounted for reasons that will be discussed later in this chapter. Chapters two and three will consider the Israeli and Syrian perspectives with a review of each nation's principle concerns in regard to the Golan Heights. The Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) and the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) are two successful Middle East peacekeeping missions that will be evaluated to determine their applicability as models from which a Golan Heights peacekeeping force could be structured. The most suitable peacekeeping force to deploy on the Golan Heights to meet the mission requirements of a peace accord between Israel and Syria is a hybrid of both the MFO and UNDOF peacekeeping models. This hybrid organization would reflect the political structure of the MFO, however the
peacekeeping force itself would incorporate aspects of both UNDOF and the MFO, but would remain uniquely structured to meet the particular mission requirements.

Two assumptions are made in conducting this study. Firstly, it is assumed the peace settlement will involve a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights and the territory will be returned to Syria. Secondly, the conflict in Lebanon is inextricably linked to the Syrian-Israeli peace process. Both countries have indicated that resolving the conflict in Lebanon may be a prerequisite to a peace agreement. This may be the case, however, Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights remains quintessential to any agreement, and the deployment of peacekeeping forces to either the Golan or Lebanon will remain separate as the missions they undertake will be fundamentally different. The issue of the Golan Heights has relevance to a settlement of the conflict in Lebanon, especially since Syria and Israel are active participants in the Lebanese conflict. This thesis will refer to circumstances in Lebanon where relevant, but will not assess the situation in Lebanon in detail.

Significance of the Golan Heights

Israel and Syria consider the Golan Heights strategically significant for both geographical and historical reasons (See map of the Golan Heights at appendix A). These reasons have been formulated through the events of 50 years of tumultuous history. Israel believes occupation of the Golan Heights affords it a strategic buffer that strengthens its security. Alternately, the Golan Heights are Syrian sovereign territory and regaining them is a matter of Syrian national pride. Geographically, the region is significant because it encompasses an area of rugged terrain and high ground that provides excellent command of the surrounding territory of northern Israel and southwestern Syria that can be readily
defended. It also provides an excellent point from which to launch an offensive into either Israel or Syria. The region also includes the water sources of the Jordan River.

The Golan Heights is a mountainous plateau rising steeply from the Jordan River valley along Israel’s northeast border with Syria. The Golan is 40 miles long and varies in width from 7 to 16 miles. It covers an area of approximately 780 square miles. The average altitude of the region is approximately 3,200 feet with Mount Hermon in the north rising to an elevation of 7,296 feet. Mt Hermon dominates the surrounding landscape providing commanding views overlooking Southern Lebanon, the Golan Plateau, much of Southern Syria and Northern Israel. To the west the Golan overlooks Israeli metropolitan areas. At present the Israeli Army is stationed 35 kilometers from Damascus and the Syrian Army is stationed 250 kilometers from Tel Aviv.

The Golan is also important for its regional water sources. This is particularly true of the Mt Hermon area from where the headwaters of the Jordan River emanate. The Baniyas Spring, a major Jordan River source, is located on the lower slopes of the Golan. To the south, the Sea of Galilee and the Yarmouk River constitute two more important regional water sources. Since Israeli occupation the Golan Heights have grown in economic importance for Israel. The area is farmed extensively, has a wine growing industry and is the home of Israel’s only ski resort on Mount Hermon. The geographical significance of the region is a principle reason why Israel and Syria have gone to war twice.

Historical Background

The Arab–Israeli conflict has been the dominant political issue in the Middle East since the establishment of Israel as a nation state in 1948. The past 50 years of warfare
have created an Israeli and Syrian mindset that plays a critical role in the negotiations of a peace accord. An understanding of the events since 1948 will help to explain the mutual mistrust and deep suspicion the Israelis and Syrians harbor for each other. It also explains some of the perceptions held by each nation that may not necessarily apply today. Breaking through this mindset is one of the difficult tasks of the peace negotiations.

1949 Agreement

Between 1948 and 1967, Arabs and Israelis have been in constant military and diplomatic confrontation. The 1948 Palestine war ended with a truce along demarcation lines that extended over 400 miles between Israel and neighboring Arab states: Syria, Egypt, Lebanon and Jordan. Israel and Syria signed a truce on the 20 July 1949 on the Island of Rhodes. Article seven of the agreement entrusted the supervision of the execution of the provisions of the agreement to a Mixed Armistice Commission that was chaired by the Chief of Staff of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) and included two representatives from both Syria and Israel. UNTSO was empowered to utilize observers and have freedom of movement and access to areas covered by the armistice agreements.

The armistice agreement resulted in the establishment of a demilitarized zone (DMZ) formed in areas Syria occupied on the Palestine side of the 1948 international border. This DMZ incorporated three sectors stretching from north of Lake Huleh to south of the Sea of Galilee (see map at appendix A) and encompassed an area of less than 100 square miles. Two small sectors of Palestine occupied by the Israelis also became DMZs. Israel’s creeping annexation of the DMZ and Syria’s determination to check Israeli advances dominated much of the history of the 1949–1967 period. The armistice
arrangements were conducive to military clashes which occurred between Syrian and Israeli forces on a frequent basis.

At issue was the control of the Jordan River and the Sea of Galilee. Control of the Jordan River would allow Israel to complete the National Water Carrier, a project to divert water from the Jordan to the northern part of the Negev Desert. Article five of the agreement stipulated that the DMZ was neither under Syrian or Israeli sovereignty. Regardless of the provision of this article Israel actively sought to gain control of the DMZ. The Israelis utilized military pressure, through progressive extension of cultivation that included the demolition of Arab villages and the removal of the inhabitants, the erection of fortifications, the planting of minefields and restriction on the movement of UNTSO observers in a systematic annexation of the DMZ. By 1964 Israel had succeeded in annexing the DMZ and achieving its objectives. The series of clashes over the DMZ culminated in the 1967 war.²

1967 Six Day War

The enduring Arab-Israeli confrontation increased tension during the early part of 1967 and set the stage for the 1967 Arab-Israeli War. The crisis intensified with the false reports that Israel was massing troops on its northern border with Syria. In May 1967 the Egyptian government inexplicably requested that all UN forces be withdrawn from the Sinai and Gaza. The UN local commander initially declined this request; nevertheless by 18 May 1967 the Secretary-General ordered the withdrawal of the UN troops. With the UN troops removed, Israel became concerned about its security and the way was now left open for military operations to be undertaken.
Other major causes of the war include a disagreement over the Israeli rights of passage through the Tiran Straits. President Nasser of Egypt declared on 25 May 1967 that the Tiran Straits were Egyptian territorial waters and that Egypt would exercise sovereign rights over these straits. As a result, Egypt denied Israel the right of passage, thereby creating economic problems in Israel. Simultaneously, Arab nations began to concentrate military forces on their borders; Israel considered this concentration of forces a major threat. "A threat to Israel’s shipping and access to the east was one thing: the direct and deadly threat of an Arab build-up along her borders was another."

Israel believed that the Arab nations were threatening its very existence and consequently decided to take preemptive action. The Israelis estimated that Egypt posed the greatest threat to Israeli security. Egypt had the majority of its armed forces stationed in the Sinai. Meanwhile, Syria occupied the Golan Heights area with nine brigades: five infantry, two armored and two mechanized. "The Israeli plan was to maintain a defensive posture on the Syrian and Jordan fronts, thus enabling the greater part of Israel’s army to be free for the battle royal in the Sinai Arena."

Israel began the war on 5 June 1967 with an attack on Egypt. The attack began with devastating airstrikes followed by a major ground offensive. On 9 June 1967, Israel attacked the Golan Heights based on the justification that Syria had bombarded Israeli settlements without provocation from positions on the Golan Heights. In reality the attack on the Golan Heights was an extension of the ongoing dispute over the DMZ. The attack was consistent with Israeli strategic objectives of seizing the Golan Heights to establish a security buffer against the Syrians and to gain control of water sources.
The 1967 War was a major victory for Israel. At the end of the six days of hostilities, Israel was in possession of the following large areas of enemy territory: the Sinai Peninsula, the West Bank, the Gaza strip, the city of Jerusalem and the Golan Heights. Moreover, Israel was in a position to occupy Amman and Damascus but chose not to continue hostilities. As a small country with vulnerable borders, these new territories provided Israel with a buffer zone to strengthen its security. Israel was in a very advantageous position as the Arab nations now scrambled to replace their losses and reestablish their military credibility within the Middle East.

Between the 1967 and 1973 wars, the situation remained tense. Arab nations were rebuilding their armed forces; they took particular care to buy better air defense assets. For the Egyptian and Syrian leaders, internal political pressures created the need to salvage their national honor by regaining the territories lost in the 1967 war. Israel, as a result of its overwhelming victory, had become complacent.

1973 War

Still bitter after the 1967 defeat, Arab Forces attacked Israel on 6 October 1973. This time, the Arab Forces achieved surprise. Israel had minimal manning on fortifications on both fronts and had only recently placed the regular forces on the highest state of alert and initiated the mobilization of the reserves due to Yom Kippur. Egypt attacked with two armies; one north of Great Bitter Lake and one south of it. Syria attacked with three mechanized divisions followed by two armored divisions, two tank brigades and one mechanized brigade. At first these large-scale offensives were successful. Israeli pilots did not initially have the success they had achieved during the 1967 war because of improved Arab air defenses and poor targeting priorities. The Israeli
Air Force, through interdiction, delayed Arab forces as the Israeli army mobilized reserves and moved into position.

Israel had lost some of the territory it was relying on as a buffer zone. The Egyptians had crossed the Suez Canal and the Syrians had penetrated up to ten kilometers in the southern Golan Heights. Simply to stop the Arab Offensive and prevent further loss of terrain was unacceptable to the Israelis: “Acceptance of any form of the status quo was never considered by the Israeli command. Israel might be able to tolerate the Egyptian presence on the edge of the Sinai, but the Syrians had to be dislodged from the strategic Golan Heights.”

Israeli forces stopped the enemy advance and by the end of 10 October had pushed the Syrians off the Golan Heights. Then the Israeli attack into Syria east of the Purple Line was successful and within days the Israelis reached within 20 kilometers of Damascus. In the Sinai, Israel counterattacked across the Suez Canal on 15 October and cut off the Egyptian Third Army. At the end of the 1973 war, Israel had regained the Golan Heights, seized a salient of Syrian territory extending from the Golan Heights towards Damascus and gained territory on the west bank of the Suez Canal.

Hostilities ended on the Golan Heights with a fragile cease-fire signed on 24 October 1973. Between this date and the signing of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces in Geneva on 31 May 1974 several small scale military actions took place. The United Nations passed Resolution 242 in 1967 (attached as appendix B) and Resolution 338 in 1973 (attached as appendix C) essentially called upon the belligerents to find a peaceful resolution to the fighting in the Middle East and the withdrawal of Israeli Forces from occupied territory. The disengagement agreement
included provision for the deployment of the United Nations Disengagement Observer
Force (UNDOF) to supervise the implementation of the agreement. On 6 June 1974
UNDOF commenced its mission on the Golan Heights and since the signing of the
agreement there has been no further outbreak of hostilities between Israel and Syria over
the Golan Heights.

The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) and the
Multinational Force and Observers are regarded as two successful Middle East
peacekeeping missions that warrant assessment of their applicability to the circumstances
on the Golan Heights in the event of a Syrian and Israeli peace agreement. The United
Nations has sponsored the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)
operations on the Golan Heights since 1974. UNDOF was created to monitor the
disengagement agreement signed between Israel and Syria at the end of the 1973 Arab-
Israeli war. The MFO is a non-UN force that was created under the auspices of the
United States in response to the Camp David Agreements signed by Israel and Egypt in
1979.

United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

UNDOF was established after the 1973 War as a result of the continual conflict
and the lack of a peace treaty between Israel and Syria. Its mission is to monitor the
disengagement agreement signed by Syria and Israel on the 31 May 1974. One of the key
aspects of the disengagement agreement is the buffer zone that is in place today between
Israeli and Syrian forces. It is .5 to 8 kilometers wide and has three limitation zones of 10,
20 and 25 kilometers. In the 10-kilometer zone, each country is limited to two brigades of
no more than 6,000 men, 75 tanks and 36 pieces of short-range artillery. In the 20-
kilometer zone each country can maintain 162 artillery pieces, not exceeding 20
kilometers in range, and 450 tanks. No surfaces to air missiles are allowed within 25
kilometers of the buffer zone.\textsuperscript{6}

UNDOF was issued both long-term and short-term tasks. The short term tasks
included: establishing a forward headquarters in the area of separation; inspecting the
redeployment of Israeli and Syrian forces in accordance with the agreed timetable;
denying access to military forces endeavoring to reenter the area of separation and
completing inspections of the areas of limitation. The long-term tasks included: observing
the area of separation; establishing a ready reaction force and maintaining
communications between both parties. In order to accomplish the assigned tasks,
UNDOF consists of two infantry battalions, a logistic battalion and observers attached
from UNTSO. The Infantry Battalions conduct patrols of the area of separation to
confirm the absence of all military forces and maintain a quick reaction force to activate
if military forces are discovered in this area. The observers maintain various static
observation posts throughout the Golan and conduct inspections of the areas of limitation
to ensure both nations are abiding by the terms of the agreement.

Even though UNDOF has been a success to date, it has experienced difficulties in
carrying out its mission. Contrary to the terms of the disengagement agreement, UNDOF
has experienced a lack of freedom of maneuver. The UN has reported that both Syria and
Israel have at times denied full freedom of movement for UN forces carrying out their
duties. This lack of freedom prevents UNDOF from verifying that military forces and
equipment have not been introduced into the areas of limitation. Inspections of Israeli and
Syrian positions are only conducted by appointment on a fortnightly basis every Tuesday
and Wednesday respectively. With advance knowledge of inspections and the lack of a 24-hour surveillance capability within UNDOF, both nations could feasibly shift equipment and units in and out of the areas of limitation with breeches of the agreement going unnoticed. The credibility of UNDOF is brought into question.

This credibility problem is further amplified by the ineffectiveness of the static observation posts, which are located to observe the areas of limitation and complement the efforts of the observers that inspect the areas of limitation. These static observation posts are equipped only with large binoculars and there is no radar or night vision equipment. As a result, good visibility is required to carry out observation and 24-hr surveillance is not possible. This situation has arisen because at the time UNDOF deployed in 1974 this technology was not available. Today Israelis and Syrians possess technologically advanced surveillance equipment that enables them to monitor each other more effectively than UNDOF can monitor both nations. UNDOF elected not to equip itself with new technology due to the costs involved and the requirement for advanced training. This situation undermines the credibility of UNDOF because UNDOF cannot monitor the areas of limitation on a 24-hour basis and both Israel and Syria are aware of this deficiency. The deficiency is reduced marginally by the use of foot patrols but these only occur in the zone of separation.

UNDOF’s infantry battalions actively patrol the area of separation. Due to the small size of this area, breeches are identified readily. The most common problem the infantry battalions deal with when patrolling the area of separation is shepherds who lead flocks across the boundaries to take advantage of greener pastures. It should be noted that the quick reaction forces provided by the battalions lack real military deterrent capability.
because they consist of light infantry that are not equipped to deal with a significant threat that could be posed by the Syrian or Israeli forces. However, the political circumstances dictate that a deliberate incursion into the area of separation by either side is unlikely. The infantry battalions have proven to be suitable to meet mission requirements for the duration of the mission to date. Both nations have consented to the deployment of peacekeeping forces, therefore, the need to utilize force to carry out the mandate diminishes.

The problems highlighted in the way UNDOF undertakes its mission must be taken into account when considering UNDOF as a model from which to structure a Golan Heights peacekeeping force that would be deployed in the event of Israel and Syria ratifying a peace accord. The new circumstances created on the Golan Heights by a peace agreement will place greater emphasis on security, which the deployed peacekeeping force will only be able to reinforce by utilizing an excellent surveillance and reporting capability. Although UNDOF experiences some difficulties in conducting its mission, it is the propitious political circumstances between Israel and Syria in regard to the Golan Heights that ensures the Heights remain relatively tranquil. This is also true of the situation in which the MFO operates in the Sinai.

**Multinational Force and Observers**

On 26 March 1979, following years of violent confrontation, Israel and Egypt ratified a peace treaty. The parties agreed to terminate the existing state of war, including the withdrawal of all Israeli forces from the Sinai, to establish normal and friendly relations and to demarcate the Sinai into military limited zones. "While Annex I, article VI of the treaty specifically proposes that UN forces supervise these security
arrangements, the United States committed, during the Camp David Accords, to ensure
the establishment of an acceptable alternative multinational force if the UN process
failed."

On 18 May 1981, the United Nations Security Council indicated it was unable to
reach the necessary agreement on the proposal to establish a UN Force and Observers.
The Soviets had opposed the deployment of a UN peacekeeping force because the peace
agreement impinged upon their influence in the Middle East. They had been able to
utilize the Arab-Israeli conflict to maintain an influence in the region that countered
American influence. Consequently on the 3 August 1981 the governments of Egypt and
Israel establishing the MFO signed a protocol to the treaty. The protocol serves as the
mandate and charter of the MFO.

"The United States, though not a party to either the treaty or the protocol, agreed
during follow-on negotiations with Israel and Egypt to provide the following: MFO
military forces and civilian observers; contribute 60% of the start up costs of the MFO in
1981 through 1982; and pay a third of annual operating costs thereafter." Separate from
this agreement, but intrinsically related, Israel and Egypt also receive significant annual
aid packages from the US of $1.8 and $1.2 billion respectively. Israel receives a further
$1.2 billion in economic aid that is tied to this agreement. In effect the US pays a "peace
dividend" that encouraged both parties firstly to sign an agreement and then maintain a
peaceful existence.

The United States provided the impetus to ensure this agreement was signed.
When the United Nations was unable to provide the necessary peacekeeping force to
monitor the agreement, the United States, in cooperation with Egypt and Israel, created
the framework for the establishment of the MFO outside of United Nations auspices. The peace agreement mediated by the United States defined the composition and charter of the MFO. The peace agreement between Israel and Egypt brought an end to the war that had existed between the two nations since 1948, formalized the relationship between the two nations, and set out the terms for the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai.

Many aspects of the design of the MFO were drawn from UNDOF. The MFO model consists of a military force administered by a civilian authority with the mission of monitoring the compliance with protocols of a peace accord signed by Israel and Egypt. By definition, it constitutes a classic peacekeeping operation, high consent and low force. The structure of the MFO incorporating a civilian headquarters in Rome with a military force stationed in the Sinai is very similar to a United Nations mission. The key difference is that the two former belligerents and the United States fund the MFO. The MFO was designed specifically to undertake the mission in the Sinai. Each of the participating nations was selected by the US and the former belligerents to bring a particular capability to the Force. United States participation is a crucial element of the force design. The MFO model fulfils a peacekeeping role with a monitoring mission.

The Sinai Peninsula in Egypt is divided into zones A, B and C. Zone D incorporates a narrow slice of Israel along the current Israeli and Egyptian border. Zones C and D are adjacent to the international border (see map of the Sinai indicating the zones at appendix D). The peace accord dictated specific limitations on the level of military personnel and equipment allowed in each zone. The mission of the peacekeeping force is to observe and verify compliance with, and report violations of, the stipulated limitations and ensure freedom of navigation through the straits of Tiran. A force consisting of three
light infantry battalions, a civilian observer organization and several supporting elements, including an aviation unit, from 11 different countries commenced operations on 25 April 1982.

The MFO is also considered a successful Middle East peacekeeping mission. The favorable political circumstances under which it operates contributes most to its success. Like UNDOF, the static observation posts occupied by the MFO are not furnished with modern surveillance equipment, preventing 24-hour surveillance. The inspections conducted by the civil liaison unit, however, are conducted randomly and involve both aerial and ground reconnaissance. The force structure of MFO provides little military deterrence. The similarities and key difference of the UNDOF and the MFO will be discussed in chapter four.

**Peace Operations**

There are two types of peace operations: peace keeping and peace enforcement. The United Nations has the ability to implement either type of mission. Proposals to undertake missions are presented to the UN Security Council by one of the sitting members. The proposal is discussed considering all relevant information and a decision is made through a UN resolution. The UN Security Council will also call on UN member states to provide the forces deemed necessary to undertake the mission. The impartial nature of the force is imperative. A terms of reference is drafted by which a force will operate. The Security Council can opt to establish the force under chapter VI for a peacekeeping mission or chapter VII for a peace enforcement mission. A UN mission will be controlled and administered by a civil authority.
Many pundits have advocated the need for substantial peace operations forces to be deployed on the Golan Heights in the event of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria that incorporates an Israeli withdrawal. Suggestions have ranged from deploying mechanized or armored forces of a brigade up to two divisions to complete tasks ranging from deterrence to peace enforcement. These requirements have been stipulated by Israelis or Americans who believe that the return of the Golan Heights to Syria will jeopardize Israeli security to such an extent that the only means to compensate is to deploy large standing international forces. Generally, peace enforcement operations are required where consent of both nations to the deployment of international forces is low and the need to use force to implement the terms of an agreement increases and as a result impartiality decreases. Such a situation is not consistent with the circumstances under which Syria and Israel would ratify a peace agreement as will be discussed later.

Once the two nations ratify a peace accord, they are not likely to readily discard that agreement. Some Israelis call for peace enforcement forces on the Golan Heights, but this is not based on a realistic assessment of the circumstances in place. They perceive that a Syrian surprise attack as being highly likely. This defies the fact that both nations have complied with the terms and conditions of a disengagement agreement for the past 25 years. Also, this view does not consider Israel’s clear military superiority. Any Syrian attack would be futile and severely punished. These pundits fail to appreciate that any force deployed to the Golan Heights on peace operations must be impartial and therefore they do not understand that a force will not be deployed to guarantee the security of Israel. This is the responsibility of the Israeli Defense Force. For these reasons the
The deployment of peacekeeping forces to the Golan Heights will be undertaken only in the event that a peace accord is ratified and with the consent of both nations. In accordance with Field Manual 100-23, *Peace Operations*, "peacekeeping operations are designed to monitor and facilitate implementation of an existing truce agreement and support diplomatic efforts to reach a long term political settlement." Peacekeeping operations are only effective where the former belligerents' consent to the deployment of a peacekeeping force is high, where the requirement for force to implement the agreement is low, and where the peacekeeping forces deployed are impartial. The mission of a peacekeeping force is likely to incorporate the tasks of reporting and monitoring, supervision of the implementation of an agreement, investigation of complaints and violations, liaison and negotiation and mediation. Breeches would be reported to the authority presiding over the operation and the two nations concerned. The monitoring mission may also include the provision of early warning sourced from impartial assets and disseminated to both nations. These tasks are consistent with the operations currently conducted by both UNDOF, on the Golan Heights, and the MFO, in the Sinai.

A monitoring mission fits neatly into the FM100-23 definition, however, the mission for peacekeeping forces based on the Golan Heights may also need to incorporate an element of deterrence or defense appropriate to the circumstances. Force may be used in peacekeeping operations in self-defense or defense with a mandate. This may be required where dissident groups unhappy with the peace accord may attack elements or individual members of the force. Potentially these groups may emanate from
the communities of either nation and this factor must be considered in planning the
structure, operations and force protection measures to be employed by the force.

Peacekeeping forces provide little military deterrence; however, they may provide
political deterrence." In essence, if either nation contravened the terms of the peace
accord, it would be viewed dimly by the governments of the participating nations or the
United Nations. Both Syria and Israel have been influenced in the past by international
opinion, particularly that of the United States. The level of political deterrence may vary
depending on the nationality of the forces that make up the peacekeeping force. In the
case of a peacekeeping force incorporating US forces deployed on the Golan Heights, US
participation will lend that force greater political clout and therefore provide greater
political deterrence. This is particularly the case if the peacekeeping force was modeled
on the MFO.

As Israel negotiates peace sequentially with each of her other Arab neighbors' 
expectation builds for a resolution of the conflict between Syria and Israel. The United
States has actively supported the Arab-Israeli peace negotiations. Israel and the
Palestinians signed the Oslo accords in 1993, and Israel and Jordan signed a peace treaty
in 1994 as a direct result of the rigorous involvement of the United States as a mediator.
The United States is exerting its influence on both Syria and Israel to come to a peace
agreement. President Clinton has indicated that U.S. peacekeeping forces may be offered
to encourage the signing of an agreement.

The return of the Golan Heights is pivotal to a peace agreement between Israel
and Syria. Israel and Syria have been engaged in ongoing peace negotiations since 1991;
however, they have been suspended since the ascension of the Netanyahu Government in
1996. “The formula of ‘full withdrawal for full peace’ remains at the heart of the present impasse in the Israeli-Syrian negotiations.” Although considerable progress was made in negotiations between Syria and Israel, the Netanyahu Government refuses to recommence negotiations where they left off with a verbal agreement from then Prime Minister Peres of “full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights for full peace.” The Netanyahu Government will not honor that agreement and contends that negotiations should recommence without preconditions and should be based on a tenant of “peace for peace” as opposed to “land for peace.”

The Netanyahu Government believes that a peace agreement can be achieved with Syria without necessarily relinquishing the Golan Heights. It has offered to exert influence on the United States to have Syria removed from the list of nations supporting terrorism in return for normalized relations. This is one of a sequence of steps that would be undertaken towards a peace agreement. These options are unacceptable to Syria, although Netanyahu believes that the successor to Assad may be weaker and therefore more inclined to compromise. For Syria the return of the Golan Heights is not negotiable. Whilst the present impasse does not appear resolvable within the near future, the negotiations up until 1996 made considerable progress towards a peace accord. Key issues requiring further negotiation include the schedule and duration of the withdrawal, normalization of relations between the two nations, and security arrangements. Both nations have acknowledged that any final agreement would require the deployment of an international force to ensure compliance.

Contingency plans for the deployment of a peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights should be developed now. The mission can be determined by assessing the needs
and expectations and perceptions of Syria and Israel. Once the mission is specified, a suitable force can be structured to complete the mission. The United Nations and the MFO offer two models that can be assessed to define the applicability of each model to the circumstances on the Golan Heights and the political and diplomatic situation between Israel and Syria. UNDOF is a United Nations (UN) sponsored force undertaking a monitoring mission on the Golan Heights and the MFO is a non-UN sponsored force undertaking a monitoring mission in the Sinai.


4. Ibid., 63


9. Gold Dore intimates that significant forces would be required on the Golan Heights to meet the security needs of Israel. Whilst he dismisses the use of American forces on the Golan Heights his memorandum presents an unbalanced perspective of the Syrian and Israeli military balance of power and he overstates the strategic value of the Golan Heights. See Dore Gold, US Forces on the Golan Heights and Israeli-Syrian Security Arrangements (Televiv University, Memorandum no. 44, Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies, August 1994). Thomas Moore the Deputy Director of Foreign Policy and Defense Studies at the Heritage Foundation also advocates the need for at least an


CHAPTER 2

THE ISRAELI PERSPECTIVE

In considering the Golan from the Israeli perspective, one can identify three Israeli views: those adopting an ambivalent position with respect to the extent of potential withdrawal from the area; those stressing the need to retain the Golan and those advocating total Israeli withdrawal in return for full peace.  

Muhammad Muslih

Israel has a number of key issues to consider before signing a peace agreement with Syria that relinquishes the Golan Heights. Principally Israel has concerns about security. The Golan Heights provides a buffer that consists of defendable terrain that provides the time necessary to mobilize reserves in response to an attack. Also a significant proportion of the Israeli water supply emanates from the Golan Heights region. In addition, Jewish settlers have occupied the Golan Heights since 1973, establishing farms and businesses from which they would have to be resettled. Israel also harbors concerns about the future political stability of Syria and the Syrian government’s connections to terrorist organizations in Southern Lebanon. However, Israel appreciates that if it can make peace with all its Arab neighbors its economy will prosper. Each of these points will be addressed in evaluating the Israeli perspective.

Security

If the Golan Heights is returned to Syria, Israel will require a phased withdrawal to satisfactorily resolve the security, water, and settlement concerns. It is the duration of this phased withdrawal that is creating one of the stumbling blocks in peace negotiations. “The Rabin and Peres Labor Governments verbally accepted the principle of withdrawal from the Golan in the context of a peace settlement, however, the depth of withdrawal, the schedule and duration of withdrawal, the establishment of normal relations and an
agreement on security arrangements are still to be determined.\textsuperscript{2} In contrast, the Likud Government under Netanyahu has clearly indicated that full withdrawal from the Golan in exchange for peace promised by former Prime Ministers will not be honored. Prime Minister Netanyahu has said, "such a move would compromise Israel’s security."\textsuperscript{3} Consequently peace negotiations have been stalled since early February 1996. Netanyahu has indicated that he will only resume peace negotiations without preconditions. He offers a “peace for peace” solution as opposed to a “land for peace” solution, which he knows the Syrians will not entertain. Netanyahu believes he can negotiate a peace agreement with Syria over time without having to relinquish the Golan Heights.

Security Buffer

The foremost Israeli concern is security. “The Golan Heights has provided a buffer that the Israelis feel is necessary to prevent Syria from attacking Israel. The 1973 Yom Kippur War proved that having the Golan as a buffer zone gave the Israelis both the time they needed to mobilize forces and the strategic advantage that permitted them to stop the advancing Syrian Army.”\textsuperscript{4} The Israelis are concerned that Syria may mount another surprise attack against northern Israel through the Golan. “This area offers an indispensable buffer zone, a favorable line of defense, and an advantageous position for launching an offensive against Syria.”\textsuperscript{5} As a consequence the Israelis maintain an armored division and numerous intelligence facilities on the heights.

Intelligence Gathering

Israel’s principal intelligence asset is a large and sophisticated site on the northern slopes of Mt Hermon with a commanding view of southern Syria and Damascus. “From here the Israelis gather extensive visual and electronic intelligence on Syria which
provides them detailed tactical and strategic intelligence as well as early warning." 

Whilst the loss of this asset would be an inconvenience, Israel has sufficient intelligence assets to offset the loss of its intelligence facilities on the Golan Heights and would suffer no major loss in warning capabilities by withdrawing from the Golan. Israel has sufficient ground and airborne intelligence assets available to replace critical data originally collected from the Mount Hermon site.

These assets include Israel's newly developed Phalcon Airborne Early Warning aircraft. Phalcon employs a phased array radar with moving target indicator mode capabilities which will enable it to track 100 ground or air targets to a range of 250 miles, well beyond what is provided by surveillance from the Golan. Israel also has the moving target indicator mode capability mounted on its reconnaissance fighter aircraft that can provide early warning out to 50 miles. "In conjunction with these systems Israel also has a variety of airborne mounted, long range, electro-optical, electronic intelligence, signals intelligence, thermal signature, forward looking infrared, remotely piloted vehicle, and balloon aerostat intelligence systems. In addition, Israel has its indigenous developmental satellite program, the Ofeq-3, reportedly with sufficient clarity to provide military significant intelligence." 

Taskable satellite imagery capability with one-meter resolution is now available through commercial sources and could further offset the loss of the Golan intelligence facilities. Under normalization with Syria, Israel would most likely have liaison officers working with Syrian officers on the Golan and with friendly military attaches in Syria who could provide early warning information. By withdrawing from the Golan Israel may lose a measure of convenience that its facilities provide, but it will not lose the critical early warning information required.
Comparison of Military Forces

The Israeli concern for a major Syrian ground attack has some legitimacy considering the previous three wars and fifty years of suspicion and mistrust. Syria’s demonstrated capabilities, however, render this concern somewhat implausible. "President Hafez Assad has long accepted Israeli Military superiority."

Assad has tried to offset this acknowledged military superiority by engaging Iran. This relationship with Iran has also been driven by Assad’s concerns about being isolated in the peace process and Israel’s military relationship with Turkey. He was bitterly disappointed that the Palestinians and Jordanians negotiated bilateral peace agreements with Israel instead of joining Syria and negotiating collectively. Assad believes the relationship with Iran will help offset the widening gap between Israeli and Syrian military capabilities. Syria’s own military capability is in decline. The demise of the former Soviet Union has left Syria without a major military benefactor and has forced President Assad to accept that Syria can not achieve military parity with Israel. "The flow of modern military equipment from the Soviet Union at bargain prices ceased in the late 1980s." The Russians now demand cash on delivery, funds Syria does not have. Syria’s economy cannot sustain a military build up to achieve parity with Israel. "A comparison of military expenditures each country allocates clearly indicates Israel’s military expenditure has been consistently higher than Syria’s."

Over the last decade Israel has spent close to $8 billion a year on defense. The Syrians have averaged about $3.5 billion per year over the decade up to 1998. Two distinct increases above $4 billion occurred in the years immediately following the Gulf War resulting from funds received for participating in the conflict. It is important to
recognize that it is difficult for both nations to sustain this level of expenditure on
defense. These amounts represent up to 24 percent of Syria’s GDP and 9 percent of
Israel’s GDP. By virtue of this expenditure and Israel’s access to US military aid and
weapons Israel maintains a technologically advanced and better-trained defense force.

Israel has 134,000 regular troops, which is significantly less than Syria’s regular
army of 306,000 troops. Syria also maintains 100,000 reserves. Mobilizing the 365,000
Israeli reserves takes up to 48 hours. However, once fully mobilized the Israeli Army is
larger than the Syrian Army. The Israeli Army can mobilize its reserves much faster than
Syria. In the unlikely event of a Syrian attack on Northern Israel, the Golan Heights
forms a buffer that would enable the Israelis to delay the Syrian offensive thereby
providing adequate time to mobilize the reserves. The argument that the very existence of
Israel is threatened by Syrian forces occupying the Golan Heights when the Israelis
withdraw is compelling. However, if the Golan Heights are declared a demilitarized zone
and credible measures of verification are implemented under the terms of a peace
agreement, then Israel’s fear of a Syrian offensive, mounted from the region is
satisfactorily addressed.

Technology, Military Training and Equipment

A review of the military balance between the two countries reveals that a Syrian
attack on Israel is even less likely. Simple quantities of equipment don’t reveal the
technological advantage held by the Israelis. “Syria maintains 18 percent more tanks and
46 percent more artillery pieces than Israel. However, 31 percent of the Syrian tanks are
T-72s whilst the remainder are near obsolescent T-54/55s. Israel possesses 38 percent
more armored personnel carriers. Some 84 percent of the Syrian artillery pieces are older,
less capable towed systems while most of Israel’s artillery pieces are self-propelled systems.”  

A comparison of long range targeting systems and fire control systems would further demonstrate Israel’s superiority. Syria’s disadvantage is amplified through a lack of maintenance and the subsequent deterioration of equipment. Although Syria’s 12 divisions simply do not equate to a creditable offensive force. Israel also maintains a much larger and far more capable air force than Syria. “Israel’s air force commands unquestioned numerical, technological and capabilities advantages over Syria.”

Israel maintains a much more potent force than the Arab states. “Israel maintains superiority in the quality and technology of its weapons, as well as the quality of leadership, personnel, intelligence, training, doctrine, battlefield automation, battlefield management, research and development, logistics infrastructure, morale and alliances.”

An extensive defense industry building high technology equipment and enhancing equipment purchased from overseas further augments Israeli superiority. These attributes combined create a strong advantage for the Israeli military over those of the Arab states. Israel has demonstrated this potency in 1967, 1973, and during its occupation of Southern Lebanon from 1982. Syria recognizes this superiority further deterring an attack on Israel.

The regional proliferation of surface to surface missles complicates Israel’s mobilization strategy. “Syria possesses sufficient SSMs with the necessary range and accuracy to disrupt Israel’s mobilization by attacking bases, assembling points, airfields and transportation and logistics bases.” However, Syria does not possess sufficient or capable ground forces to synchronize with a missile attack in an offensive against Israel. Realistically the Syrian missiles would only be used in defensive operations. To counter the missile threat, Israel is developing an antimissile defense system under the “Arrow
Program.” Israel also maintains an arsenal of missiles; which may include as many as two hundred nuclear weapons. This is an obvious deterrent against attacking Israel.

Syria is unlikely to launch a ground attack on Israel whilst the IDF occupies the Golan Heights. “By occupying the Golan, Israel has achieved deterrence against such an attack by virtue of the threat posed to the Damascus area.”\(^{15}\) “Notably the threat of IDF ground action fulfills two basic conditions of conventional deterrence: denial and punishment.”\(^{16}\) It is unlikely that Israel would launch an attack on Syria; however, Israel believes the IDF forces on the Golan provide another deterrent. Therefore, the planning of security arrangements as a substitute for control of the Golan Heights must address Israeli security concerns. This will most likely be articulated in the peace accord by making provision for a demilitarized zone and a series of limited forces zones on either side of the border, such as those monitored by the MFO in the Sinai.

In 1979, security arrangements were designed for the Sinai Peninsula that dealt with the same problem in the context of the Egyptian-Israeli force balance. There, however, the topography simplified the work of military planners. “The bulk of the Egyptian armored forces were relegated to the western shore of the Suez Canal, more than 220 kilometers from the Israeli border: in the desert buffer that was created, three limited forces zones were defined.”\(^{17}\) In contrast with the Sinai, the width of the Golan Heights is at most 27 kilometers. The demilitarization of such a narrow area is practically worthless in the context of modern mechanized warfare and missile technology without adjoining limited forces zones. Due to the proximity of Damascus and the geography of northern Israel the implementation of limited forces zones is difficult. They cannot be as extensive as those in place in the Sinai. However, adequate security arrangements,
acceptable to both nations, can be achieved by demilitarizing the Golan Heights and thoroughly monitoring the limited forces zones. The defensive value of the Golan does not emanate from its width but rather from its topographical features. If the military forces of both nations can not occupy the Golan Heights or do not have sufficient forces in proximity to quickly occupy the territory then no side gains the topographical advantage. Former IDF personnel have suggested possible structures for a demilitarized zone and adjoining zones of limitation.

Retired Major General Abraham Tamir, the architect of the security arrangements in the Sinai, in the framework of the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, raised the idea of demilitarization into the depth of South Syria. “In the Syrian context, Tamir insisted that all the area beyond the Golan Heights east to Jebel Druze (The Horan) be a limited forces zone: Between Israel and the offensive components of the Syrian Army will be a buffer consisting of a demilitarized Golan, a Horan in which there will be not more than one mechanized division; and south Syria, the Golan, and the Horan will be demilitarized from military aircraft and missiles.”

Brigadier General (Reserve) Aryeh Shalev and Ze’ev Schiff have published books that also expound views on Golan Heights security arrangements in the event of an Israeli withdrawal. Shalev has proposed a far more detailed peace arrangement, “in which Syria redistributes its forces along its other borders, so that in the area around Damascus no forces will be situated that they can pose a threat of attack to Israel.” This area would be considered a limited forces zone containing no more than two divisions. Between Damascus and the Golan Heights Shalev has proposed demilitarization. Schiff has similar proposals except he has taken into account Syrian requirements to defend Damascus from attack.
The Israelis have genuine security concerns that must be addressed in a peace agreement with Syria if the Golan is to be returned to Syrian sovereignty. These concerns of a Syrian surprise attack are rooted in the last 50 years of history; however, they are offset by several factors. But Israel maintains a superior military force in terms of, technology, modern equipment and highly trained manpower. Syria’s military is less capable and unable to launch effective offensive operations against Israel. The Syrians recognize that Israel maintains a significant military advantage and know that an attack on Israel would be futile. In the event that the Golan Heights is returned to Syria and a Syrian attack was launched from the region, Israelis believe that it would be much more difficult to defeat the Syrians. In these circumstances the Israelis would also have to dislodge the Syrians from the defensive terrain of the Golan Heights. The best way to address the Israeli security concerns is to declare the Golan Heights a demilitarized zone and establish a series of adjoining limited forces zones. The requirements and parameters of these zones would need to be negotiated as part of the peace agreement.

Water

Arguably water is second only to security in importance to Israel. The Israelis continue to research other potential water sources, including desalination, in an attempt to alleviate dependence on a few sources. However, approximately 30 percent of Israel’s water supply comes from the Golan. Two of the three springs that supply the Jordan River emanate from the Golan. “The Israelis attempted to divert the Jordan from Syrian use in the demilitarized zone established by the 1949 armistice agreements and prior to the 1967 war the Syrians attempted to divert the flow of these sources to deny Israel water.” The exclusive control of the Sea of Galilee (Lake Tiberias) is also an important
factor for Israel in determining the final withdrawal lines. Water is thus of strategic importance for Israel. A consistent supply of water from the Jordan River is crucial to Israel. A peacekeeping force stationed on the Golan must be responsible to ensure the continued supply of water. The United Nations Disengagement Observer Force currently monitors water distribution from the Jordan and its sources. The system it utilizes is effective and could be easily undertaken by the peacekeeping force.

Settlements

Approximately 15,000 Israelis have settled in 26 separate settlements across the Golan. These Israeli settlements are also a factor in the Golan’s importance to Israel and constitute a significant political problem. In any agreement with Syria, these settlers will most likely be required to move. The Golan has undergone significant economic development since 1967. This development, including industrial plants, a ski industry, a mineral water industry and wineries make significant contributions to the Israeli economy. The removal of the settlers and the industries will require significant compensation from the Israeli Government placing a burden on an already strained economy. Not only will the Israeli economy lose revenue, but it will also have to pay for the relocation of settlers. It is quite possible that the United States will ultimately pay this compensation as part of its contribution to the peace process.

The settlers are politically active and have gained significant support for their plight to remain on the Golan. "A forcible removal of settlers will raise the spectre of the Yamit for the Israeli Government." Removing settlers from the Yamit in the Sinai after the peace agreement with Egypt created great upheaval and anguish in Israel. Forcible removal of settlers is a humanitarian problem, and the Israeli Government will need to
plan carefully the implementation of resettlement to avert violent resistance. The Israelis will require time to conduct such a withdrawal, claiming they require a four to five year phased withdrawal. Rabin did offer in negotiations to complete the withdrawal in as little as three years. The Netanyahu Government continues to encourage further settlement on the Golan Heights, indicating it has no intention of offering a withdrawal to the Syrians in exchange for peace.

**Syrian Political Stability**

Israelis have two other legitimate concerns about formulating a peace accord with Syria. They are uncertain of Syria’s political stability, particularly under the regime that succeeds Assad. Also Assad’s willingness to cooperate with terrorists could potentially undermine the peace accord. Syria’s association with Iran and support for the Hizbollah raises Israeli concerns for security and deters peace negotiations. Until recently “Iranian policy still brooked no notion of a comprehensive peace with Israel and continued to emphasize its political and ideological opposition to the Jewish State.” Recently under the leadership of Khatami, Iran has adopted a more moderate line towards Israel which may manifest into an acceptance of Israel.

The political stability of Syria is of grave concern to Israel. If Israel brokers a peace agreement with Assad, will that be honored by the succeeding regime? Assad maintains a dictatorial position as President and is renowned for micro-managing government decisions. He is the center of political power in Syria. As a member of the Alawi sect he carefully vets all senior appointments which are held by Alawis assisting his ability to maintain control. The Alawis are a minority group, making up 11 percent of the population that was installed into power by the French. “Syria has the unenviable
distinction of having probably the most corrupt government in the Middle East, as judged by Middle Easterners.” This corruption has manifested in Lebanon where Syrians are trafficking drugs. The drugs are grown, processed and shipped under Syrian military protection. Whilst Assad is not directly linked to these activities, they raise questions for Israelis about the stability of the regime. Assad has maintained the most stable regime in Syria since 1948, but Israelis are concerned at the type of regime that will succeed his.

After the death of his first son Basil, who Assad put forward as his successor, Assad has been grooming his second son Bashir to assume the Presidency. It is uncertain as to whether the Syrian people will accept this arrangement. Whilst the succession is a concern and bolsters the argument for Israel not to support an agreement with Syria, Assad does not need to be concerned about any organized opposition. He crushed the Sunni Brotherhood, in 1982. Since so much in Syrian politics depends on Assad, concerns over Syrian stability are justified to an extent; however, they are not compelling enough to holt the peace process. In relative terms the Assad regime has been stable. Assad assumed power in 1970 and has governed the nation since. He is one of the longest serving Arab leaders. He has eliminated any viable opposition and embarked upon a reform program to improve Syrian infrastructure and liberalize the economy. Assad’s regime has clearly demonstrated its stability and Israel can comfortably negotiate a peace agreement knowing Syria will uphold it.

The Economy

Israel is by no means a wealthy nation. It has an industrialized economy with little natural resources and suffers from the perennial problem of balance of payments deficits. As a consequence its foreign debt levels are high and Israel relies on the US to provide
loans to prop up the economy. Half of Israel’s national debt is owed to the US. Israel recognizes how important peace is to creating a stable region in which it can prosper. This was apparent at the convening of the Casablanca Conference (a multilateral meeting of Middle Eastern States) in Morocco in November 1994. The Israeli delegation lobbied hard for the establishment of a regional bank. This bank, the money for which would be subscribed by the Gulf States, would fund projects to the whole Middle East region, Israel included. The US supported Israel’s stance on the creation of the Bank but the plan floundered on the reluctance of the Gulf States to commit the funds. The Gulf Monarchs intimated that the time was not appropriate due to the continuing Arab-Israeli conflict. The development of a regional bank is another motivating factor for Israel to formulate a peace agreement with Syria, which will contribute to resolution of the conflict in the region. The US supports the establishment of a regional bank because it alleviates Israeli reliance on US loans.

Peacekeeping Force on the Golan Heights

Israel would prefer that a peacekeeping force on the Golan not be under the auspices of the UN. “Israel views the UN as indecisive, inefficient and potentially unfriendly to Israel.”24 Israel’s reluctance to trust a United Nations force dates back to the sudden evacuation of the first United Nations Emergency Force from the Sinai prior to the Six Day War in 1967, which was prompted by the unilateral demands of Egypt’s President Nasser. Moreover “Israel also has a history of disputes with both UNTSO and the UN interim force in Lebanon.”25 UNTSO provides the observer group to UNDOF.

For Israel the critical element of an MFO style monitoring is US participation. The MFO protocols specify that mission termination requires unanimous agreement to do
so. "Both the United States and Egypt have indicated interest in concluding the mission, however, Israel, emphasizing the symbolic support the MFO provides the peace process, wants the MFO to continue to serve." Egypt's concerns relate to the costs and the issue of sovereignty. The MFOs military forces are stationed and operate only on Egyptian soil. US concerns over the MFO have to do with the extended commitment of US soldiers. Israel welcomes American involvement in the MFO.

This translates to an Israeli preference for US forces on the Golan Heights either as part of a multinational force or unilaterally. Many Israelis believe the current role of UNDOF or the MFO as monitoring forces is an inadequate role for a peacekeeping force deployed on the Golan Heights after Israeli withdrawal. Dore Gold of the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies in Israel contends that forces of up to armored division size would be required to replace Israeli security measures on the plateau and would have a mission more akin to peace enforcement than peacekeeping. He ignores the fact that a force deployed to the Golan Heights is required to be impartial and cannot necessarily act in the interests of Israel alone. Also he fails to explain how such a force would deploy and posture on the Golan Heights to complete its mission. The difficulty that the US would have sustaining a deployment of division size is acknowledged. Dore Gold's suggestions are untenable and are not based on a balanced perspective of the situation. The Americans have offered to deploy forces but only in accordance with Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD 25).

The US has actively participated as a mediator in attempting to broker a peace agreement between Syria and Israel. Mr. Bacon, Assistant to the Secretary of Defense, stated: "if there is a peace agreement between Syria and Israel, and if the two parties
request that we send troops to monitor the Golan Heights, then after consultation with congress we would be willing to consider doing it.  

Israel is expected to insist that early warning and implicitly, deterrence be added as required missions for a new peacekeeping force. Israel's emphasis on the deployment of US combat units is probably derived from three factors: its concern for the possibility of a major Syrian surprise attack, the expectation that US troops will man Israeli early warning sites that Israel will be required to vacate, and the symbolic requirement to appease the concerns of its citizens concerning peace with Syria.

To the extent that Israel obtains its basic requirements regarding limited forces zones eastwards of the Golan, then a monitoring force involving Americans could serve as an efficient instrument for increasing the confidence of the parties that the security arrangements are being carefully maintained. A MFO style force can serve as a limited deterrent factor, especially due to the existence of an American component. "The American presence in the Sinai is designed to guarantee the political intervention of the United States in the event that one of the former belligerents violates the security arrangements." Even without the involvement of US soldiers, America is likely to respond vigorously to any threat to Israel.

It is possible to apply the MFO model to a monitoring force in the Golan Heights. But there are still at least three aspects of the Golan Heights that must be accounted for, which are different from the Sinai. First, there is no significant Egyptian population in the Sinai, while in the Golan it is reasonable to assume that Syria will seek to return most of the citizens that fled in 1967. Taking into account the growth of that population, a Syrian Golan could eventually include a population of some 200,000 residents. Secondly, while
the MFO in the Sinai is stationed relatively far from the mass of the Egyptian and Israeli armies, it can be assumed that any future Golan-MFO would be situated within relative proximity to the Syrian and Israeli force concentrations. And third while the present Sinai MFO is located in an area that is peripheral to the Egyptian political center along the Nile Valley, any future MFO on the Golan Heights would be stationed in an area relatively close to Damascus, the Syrian political and population center.²⁹

US peacekeeping forces are obliged to maintain impartiality. “This aspect of American involvement may have a negative political, military, and psychological impact on US-Israeli relations.”³⁰ This would be particularly true if the US maintains strict neutrality with respect to Israel and Syria in the implementation of any agreement. At a minimum sharp differences of opinion are likely to arise concerning compliance issues and interpretations of Syrian activities along the border. Deeper strains in the bilateral relationship could occur if Israel concluded that the peacekeeping forces were turning a blind eye to Syrian violations of the peace treaty. “American participation in the 1982-1984 multinational peacekeeping force in Lebanon led to considerable friction with Israel.”³¹

The Israeli determination to keep the US military actively involved in Middle East affairs must be viewed in a political and economic context. The US Government provides Israel with $3 billion in aid on the premise of promoting peace. The $1.8 billion Foreign Military Financing grant component of this aid supports major weapons systems and allows Israel to engage in significant military research and development. “In addition the US has recently transferred F15 fighter aircraft, Apache and Blackhawk helicopters, F16 A/B aircraft, Harpoon sea-to-sea missiles amongst other capital equipments to Israel.”³²
The remaining $1.2 billion constitutes economic support funds. These funds assist in the payment of debt and encourage economic reform and sustained private sector growth. “The funds may also be used to import US goods and services or used to service Israel’s external debt owed to or guaranteed by the US Government.” This “peace dividend” resulted from the political machinations of the Cold War and the signing of a peace accord between Israel and Egypt. This precedent has been followed in the Wye River agreements between the PLO and Israel with indications that Israel will be looking to receiving $1.2 billion in compensation. It is probable that any agreement between Israel and Syria may involve the payment of a peace dividend by the US.

The likelihood of a unilateral US peacekeeping force being deployed on the Golan Heights is extremely low. Although Israel would strongly support a US force, such a deployment is not in American interests. In May 1994 President Clinton signed PDD25 which was the first comprehensive US policy on multilateral peacekeeping suited for the post Cold War era. The PDD embraced peacekeeping operations, specifically UN operations, as potentially important and useful tools in American foreign policy. The directive proposes that collective engagement is a practical strategy. “Collective engagement shares the cost burdens, shares commitment of resources, provides community legitimacy, and shares the blame if problems arise.” PDD-25 stipulates a series of factors that must be considered when contemplating participation in peace operations. The key issue is the preference for multilateral operations. In the case of the Golan Heights the deployment of a unilateral force is not consistent with the directive.

The critical issues for Israel in regard to relinquishing the Golan Heights are security, water supply, the relocation of settlers and the financial loss of businesses
operating in the region. These issues present a reasonably strong case for Israel to retain the Golan Heights. A genuine and lasting peace with Syria will compensate for these difficulties. A peacekeeping force on the Golan may also have to ensure a consistent water supply, effectively assist in the relocation of settlers and provide reassurance to Israel regarding security concerns.

The perceived security problems, which the current Netanyahu Government reiterates as its principal concern, are essentially unfounded. Syria is far weaker militarily than Israel is prepared to admit. The likelihood of an unprovoked Syrian attack on Israel is minute. The peace agreements brokered with Egypt, Jordan, and the Palestinians further weakens and isolates Syria from surrounding Arab states. These states will not jeopardize their peace agreements to assist Syria. The Golan is not an essential buffer in providing strategic depth to Israel’s security. Israel has legitimate concerns regarding the political stability of Syria. Under Assad’s rule Syria has remained stable. He has made the strategic choice to seek peace with Israel. If a peace accord is struck and the Golan Heights returned, successive Syrian governments will abide by a peace accord or risk losing the Golan Heights. In this sense the return of the Golan Heights provides a measure of guarantee. The issues of water supply and relocation of settlers are far more compelling concerns in contributing to the negotiations of an Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights.


5. Ibid.


25. Ibid., 48.


31. MacKinlay, 83.

32. US Department of State, 434.

33. Ibid., 433

CHAPTER 3

THE SYRIAN PERSPECTIVE

I cannot tell you what will happen if Israel misses this historic opportunity to make a real peace. How intense the violence will be, how many more innocent people on both sides will die, and what kind of peace Israel will be able to achieve with the Arab states? But one thing I know for sure: if it takes another 1000 years, we will recover our land. Time is with us. The sooner Israel recognizes this fact of life; the sooner we can fold our president’s formula- the peace of the brave – into a comprehensive peace agreement.¹

Muhammad Salman, Syrian Minister of Information.

Recovery of the Golan Heights is imperative for Syria. The only feasible method of reclaiming the region is to negotiate a peace settlement with Israel. After fifty years of war with Israel the Syrians acknowledge that the recovery of the Golan Heights by military means is not feasible. Recognition of this fact and prompting by the United States drew Syria to the negotiation table in 1991. Syria considers the recovery of the Golan Heights is necessary principally to restore national honor and to alleviate security concerns. Importantly, the peace agreement must not be perceived as being on Israeli terms and must be even handed from a Syrian perspective. The peace process is also being governed by the realisation that from peace stems stability and economic prosperity. Syria understands that a settlement with Israel will encompass these benefits plus engender a more robust relationship with the United States.

National Honor

In the simplest terms Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights is a matter of national pride for the Syrians. From a geo-strategic point of view, the Syrians consider the Golan a critical natural defense against Israel. Since the commencement of the Madrid Peace Conference in 1991 Syria has maintained the consistent line of land for
peace. The only acceptable outcome of a peace settlement for Syria is a full Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. Israeli occupation of Syrian sovereign territory is an embarrassment to Syria. This was manifested in Syria’s attempt to seize the Golan Heights during the 1973 war, which was a direct result of the humiliating loss of the territory in the 1967 war. Pan Arab unity and Syria’s perceived role as champion of Arab interests were important driving forces in Assad’s approach to the peace talks. He believed that the best peace deal for the Arabs could only be brokered with Israel if the Arab nations negotiated collectively. Assad was bitterly disappointed with Jordan and the Palestinians when they ratified peace accords with Israel bilaterally. He believed they had weakened his negotiation position and they had accepted less than favorable peace agreements from the Arab perspective. An example of how Assad’s negotiation position is weakened is Jordan’s leasing of sovereign territory back to Israel as part of their peace agreement. This sets a precedent the Syrians find unpalatable.

While Assad maintains autocratic rule the push for recovery of the Golan Heights is driven by a strong chord of Syrian nationalism. The blight of the 1967 war can only be rectified with the return of the Golan Heights. Contrary to popular belief in Israel, Assad doesn’t control national sentiment in relation to this issue. Across Syria the benefits of making peace with Israel is trumpeted from billboards and posters. Assad has slowly prepared the nation for peace. The Syrian Ambassador to the United States, Walid Al-Moualem, and Syria’s chief negotiator stated: “No Syrian government could relinquish a single inch of the Golan to Israel, because that would betray the trust of the people.”

This reiterates Assad’s comments he made to a visiting delegation of Golan residents on 7 September 1992. He stated that “Syria desired an honorable peace accepted by a
people, a peace that does not concede a grain of sand from the homeland nor any right
from the national rights nor the national dignity. . . . If others agree to this peace, then
peace can be achieved. But if there are gimmicks and ambushes, then nobody can change
Syria’s attitudes and national principles. Surrender is not in her vocabulary.”
This concept of national honor is linked closely to security concerns that arise from having
IDF units stationed on the Golan Heights only 40 kilometers from Damascus.

Security

Just as the Israelis are concerned about security and the necessity of the Golan
Heights to provide a security buffer so to are the Syrians concerned at having Israeli
troops stationed just 40 kilometers from Damascus. This concern is accentuated by the
acknowledgement that the Israeli military is superior. IDF units equipped with state of the
art weapon systems and stationed within one hour’s drive of the Syrian capital are of
grave concern to Syrians. The establishment and operation of a sophisticated electronic
and visual intelligence gathering installation on the slopes of Mount Hermon enhances
these fears. The likelihood of an Israeli attack launched from the Golan into Syria is
remote; however, it is a possible contingency for which Syria believes it must plan. The
Golan affords the last natural barrier before the flat plain that runs east to Damascus,
rendering Syria’s strategic situation tenuous at best. Syrian military planners believe that
if the Golan Heights are in Syrian hands, the territory provides a defensive depth that is
indispensable for the security of Syria, while a Golan controlled by Israel poses a lethal
threat to the Syrian heartland.

Israel has perpetuated the argument of the necessity of the Golan for national
security based on the premise of a surprise attack from Syria. It has been convenient to
paint the Syrians as the aggressors. “Israel’s creeping annexation of the demilitarized (DMZ) zones and Syria’s determination to check Israeli advances dominated much of the history of the 1949-1967 period.”

Israeli politicians and military leaders maintained that Syrian forces stationed on the Golan shelled Israeli villages without provocation. Syria insisted these attacks were only in retaliation for Israeli encroachments of the DMZs as agreed by the two nations in the general armistice signed on the Island of Rhodes on 20 July 1949. Israeli actions up to 1967 have perpetuated Syrian security concerns and contributed to creating a Syrian security mindset that exists today.

Israel used the Syrian shelling as justification for the invasion of the Golan in 1967. In May 1997 Rami Tal, a correspondent with the Yediyot Aharonot newspaper, published a private conversation he had with Moshe Dayan, the former Chief of the Israeli General Staff and Defense Minister, in 1976 which paints a contrary portrait of the situation on the Golan prior to 1967. Dayan’s account was astounding:

After all, I know exactly how at least 80 percent of the incidents began. We would send a tractor to do some ploughing work in some spot in the demilitarized zone where farming activities were out of the question, and we knew in advance that the Syrians would start shooting. If they held their fire, we would instruct the tractor driver to keep moving forward until the Syrians would lose there temper and start shooting. Then we would begin artillery shelling and at a later stage we would bring in the airforce. This is what I did, and what Laskov and Tchera also did, and what Yitzak Rabin did as well. We thought then, and we continued to do so for a considerable while, that we could alter the armistice lines through military operations that would be just short of actual war. In other words by seizing land and holding it until the enemy would despair and let us keep it.

These comments contradict the perception that the Syrians were the aggressors and brings into question the Israeli occupation of the Golan. The humiliation of losing the Golan in 1967 was the catalyst for the Syrian attack made in October 1973. Israel’s contribution to manufacturing the circumstances for war in 1967 gives Syrians cause to
be concerned about their security. Israel has clearly demonstrated both on the Golan Heights and in Southern Lebanon that it is willing to annex territory on the basis of expanding buffer zones to ensure national security.

Possession of the Golan Heights affords each nation an area of defendable terrain that accentuates their national security by providing a buffer against a ground attack. “Overarching this geographic dimension is the perspective of a two tiered Middle East, in which Israel has a nuclear arsenal of at least 200 weapons with sophisticated delivery systems, while Syria and other Arab states have none, is potentially catastrophic to Syria’s security.” In response Syria continues to develop a chemical weapons capability and maintains a ballistic weapons capability, although inferior to Israel’s. This adds a dimension to the strategic situation that lessens the relevance of the Golan Heights. Each nation is maintaining weapons of mass destruction as a deterrent against an attack. If these weapons were to be utilized the geographical importance of the Golan to conventional operations is rendered irrelevant. The monitoring of missile systems held by the Israelis and Syrians is beyond the capability of UNDOF.

The likelihood of an Israeli attack on Syria is remote. The Syrians appreciate that the IDF is a superior military force. It fields advanced technology weapons and is a better-trained military than the Syrian Armed Forces. This acknowledged superiority raises security concerns, which the Syrians believe they must address. If the security arrangements stipulated as part a peace agreement encompasses a demilitarized Golan Heights and adjoining limited forces zones on each side of the border Syrian Security concerns will be adequately addressed. Once these security concerns are alleviated and a
peace agreement is ratified the conditions are set, in conjunction with internal reforms, for the Syrian economy to prosper and grow in a stable environment.

Economics

Syria is not a wealthy country and its economic development is curtailed by the country’s economic system. “It is patterned after that of communist Eastern European governments, Syria’s system is among the most controlled in the Middle East, if not the world.” This state intervention is manifested in state regulation of prices, control of trade and strict foreign exchange controls, all of which hamper economic growth. Syria is also failing to service a large foreign debt, which has accumulated in part as a result of high defense expenditures.

Assad has embarked upon reforms to liberalize the economy. Measures include privatizing former nationalized enterprises, reducing state intervention and encouraging investment. These measures are only a small step towards comprehensive reform and represent preparations to take advantage of the economic growth that will come with peace and stability. In the period immediately after the Gulf War Syria reaped the rewards of foreign investment as a direct result of its participation in the coalition force. This influx of investment, plus the effects of legislating investment Law 10, enabled Syria to embark on projects to rehabilitate the country’s deteriorating infrastructure and public sector enterprises. Investment Law 10 permitted the retention of foreign exchange earned from exports in order to finance certain imports of raw materials. The Government still maintains its monopoly on imports such as wheat and flour. The institution of the law has been the catalyst for over 400 new companies being formed and approximately $1.8 billion in new investment. Syria experienced promising economic growth with the influx
of investment and the liberalization of the economy; however, this is merely the beginning of transforming a decrepit economy.

Western and Arab investors still require further reforms before committing funds. Assad has recognized that with peace will come prosperity. A stable Middle East and further economic reforms will attract greater investment to Syria. The improvements in the Syrian economy after the Gulf War are testament to what the Syria economy can achieve with substantial foreign investment. At a National US-Arab Chamber of Commerce conference, the US Ambassador to Syria, Ryan C. Crocker, delivered the keynote address. He stressed that “the private sector needs to have a larger role in the Syrian economy.”

The current attitude of the Syrian government appears to encourage investment and gradually open up the public sector. On the 19 February 1998 the Syrian Ministry of Industry invited private companies to invest in fertilizer projects and on the 16 May 1998 American franchising was introduced to Syria with the opening of a Kentucky Fried Chicken branch in Damascus. Mobil is currently considering investing in oil exploration in Syria. These investments are a just prelude to the possibilities open to Syria if it continues to reform its economy and establishes a peace with Israel. The return of the Golan Heights does not enhance the Syrian economic situation directly, but as an integral part of the peace process it contributes to the overall economic growth that will stem from peace and stability in the region.

Assad’s Diplomacy

Although the IDF is clearly superior to the Syrian Armed Forces, remarkably Syria has maintained a position of strength throughout negotiations. This situation can be accredited to the astute diplomacy of President Assad. The Syrians are aware that in the
wake of the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the aftermath of the Gulf wars, the geopolitical conditions in the Middle East have changed dramatically. This coupled with the peace settlements made by Egypt and Jordan and by the ongoing negotiations with the Palestinians isolates Syria. To compensate, Syria has established relations with Iran endeavoring to provide some parity in the light of Israeli military superiority. Whilst the Syrian regime is not as radical as that in Iran, the support of the Hizbollah in Southern Lebanon provides an important tool for Assad to manipulate relations with Israel.

Assad appreciates that the Israeli public, and consequently Israeli politicians, are both unwilling to accept casualties in Southern Lebanon.

The Israeli public reaction to the invasions of Lebanon conducted in 1982, 1993, and Peres’s air and artillery foray in 1996 support this observation. When the casualties began to mount, the public demanded a withdrawal. The IDF is more inclined to rely on its technological superiority and use standoff tactics to bombard the enemy with aircraft and artillery. “In contrast the Hizbollah willingly use suicidal tactics which confounds the Israelis.”

The Hizbollah has shifted emphasis from its past practice of worldwide terrorism to targeting the IDF and Southern Lebanese Army (SLA) in Southern Lebanon. They have made a concerted effort to avoid civilian casualties and provide the Shia population of Southern Lebanon with essential community services which are not provided by either the Lebanese or Israeli Governments. Israel would like to extract itself from southern Lebanon and a peace accord with Syria could be the catalyst to a solution in Southern Lebanon. Assad could use his influence to assist in the resolution of the problems in Southern Lebanon providing Syria achieves it objectives from a peace accord with Israel.
In recent times the Hizbollah has gained legitimacy in what is viewed by other nations as a struggle against the illegitimate Israel occupying forces. Although they continue to use suicide tactics, over time the Hizbollah has also became more proficient at small unit actions as illustrated by the ambush of a reconnaissance company of an elite Israeli paratroop brigade in late February 1999. “In this action three guerillas supported by mortars ambushed the company killing three men, including the commander, and injuring five others. The arrival of helicopters to remove casualties was hampered by mortar fire and assistance was not rendered to the beleaguered company for close to two hours. The three guerrillas escaped unharmed.”

Lebanon has been a bleeding sore for the Israelis since 1982 and Israel’s reason for occupation, the security of Northern Israel, is questionable. Syria has manipulated these circumstances as a bargaining tool in the peace process. If Assad gets a settlement on the Golan it seems certain Israel will get one in Lebanon, after which things will return to calm.

The Israelis have expressed concerns at the stability of the Assad regime and the stability of the succeeding regime. Assad can make the counter claim that the Israeli Government is inconsistent when a change of party may mean that agreements formulated by one Israeli Government are not honored by the next. This is the case with the verbal agreements reached by the Rabin and Peres Governments during the peace talks that the Netanyahu Government has refused to honor. These agreements were not signed documents so Netanyahu feels he is not obliged to abide by them. Assad’s concerns are more strongly illustrated in the Netanyahu Governments failure to comply with the terms of its agreement with the Palestinians. The US is withholding $1.2 billion in funds, due to be paid to Israel as a peace dividend, as a result. The refusal of the
Netanyahu Government to accept the verbal agreements of its predecessors has stalled the peace negotiations. Even US prompting of Israel to accept the land for peace arrangement has not helped reinitiate the talks. Assad waits in anticipation of the May 1999 Israeli election result hoping that a government comes to power in Israel that he can negotiate.

**Peacekeeping Force on the Golan Heights**

The impact of foreign troops operating on Syrian sovereign territory will be the greatest concern to Syria. Syria is more predisposed to a small UN sponsored force to conduct the peacekeeping operation on the Golan Heights in the advent of a Syrian-Israeli peace agreement. UNDOF is considered by the Syrians to represent an appropriate sized force undertaking a monitoring mission. The deployment of a non-UN force may be acceptable to Syria based on a scaled down version of the MFO. The unique position of the US as mediator of the peace negotiations between Syria and Israel may present the option of an MFO style peacekeeping force. Contrary to the Israelis, the Syrians would not support a unilateral US peacekeeping force. The US relationship with Israel precludes this option from a Syrian perspective. The Syrians may, however, be agreeable to US participation in an international force.

The Syrian approach to negotiations has in fact been predicated upon the requirement to deal with the US, which has used its influence to perpetuate the Middle East peace process. Syria is resigned to the fact it must deal with the US as the world's single super power. “One of Syria’s highest foreign policy goals is to improve relations with the west, particularly the United States. Foremost among these concerns is getting removed from Washington’s lists of states that support terrorism or fail to combat the drug trade thus ending its status as an international pariah.”

The US maintains a
reasonable understanding of Syria’s security concerns as well as Israel’s. Bearing this in mind the Syrians believe a US presence may actually curtail Israeli activities that test the parameters of an agreement and ensures Israel complies completely with the terms of an agreement. A US presence and involvement affords an element of political persuasion. This would most likely be provided by the peace dividend that would be paid by the US on the signing of a peace agreement. The precedent of paying peace dividends has been set with payments made to Israel and its neighbors each time an agreement is ratified. The US has used this economic leverage against Israel recently, because it has not complied with the conditions set in the agreement with the Palestinians. The same leverage could be used against Syria.

Assad has established one undeviating principle as Syria’s minimal national requirement: Israel’s recognition of Syrian sovereignty over the entire Golan and its eventual full evacuation by Israel. This is a matter of Syrian national honor. Other Syrian concerns in formulating a peace agreement relate to security. Syria understands that with peace will come stability and prosperity and Syria will be able to build upon its economic reforms which will encourage economic development. The investment funds for this economic development will come principally from the Gulf States and the US. However, the critical element for Syria to ratify a peace accord remains the return of the Golan Heights. The issue of national honor allows for nothing less than the return of the Golan Heights as the first and most important element of a peace agreement struck with Israel. The issue of security is second in importance to restoring national honor. Syria has indicated that an international force will be an integral part of the security arrangements on the Golan Heights when a peace agreement is ratified.
Syria will accept US participation in a peacekeeping force and would most likely accept either a UN or non-UN force to operate on the Golan Heights providing it is a relatively small force with a monitoring mission. US participation is politically expedient and affords Syria the opportunity to engage the US. The impact of a peacekeeping force on Syria sovereign territory is a sensitive issue and therefore the Syrians would like the peacekeeping presence to be as unobtrusive as possible. The issue of a peace dividend payment by the US has not been fully considered in relation to Syria ratifying a peace agreement. Israel will most likely have the expectation to receive a peace dividend as the precedent was set in the Egyptian and Israeli peace agreement and repeated again as part of the agreement between the PLO and Israel. The Israeli Government has not released an official figure, however, rumors indicate that Israel would expect a sum of $10 billion or more. Syria will obviously accept a peace dividend if monies are made available; however, no mention was made of any payments of aid to the two belligerents in negotiations.

**Conclusion**

Syria has made a strategic decision to pursue a peace settlement on the Golan with the stipulation that any agreement must include full withdrawal of the Israelis. The two nations came close to an agreement in 1996, and with a the possibility of a change of government in Israel in May 1999, negotiations may commence once again where they left off in March 1996. Syria has shown a willingness to consider Israeli concerns during the negotiations up to February 1996. This flexibility indicates that whilst the return of the Golan is unconditional, the shape and nature of security arrangements, the duration of
the Israeli withdrawal, the establishment of normalized relations, and the nature and
makeup of an international force to monitor the terms of the agreement are negotiable.

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CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

The peacekeeping force deployed on the Golan Heights in the event of a Syrian-Israeli peace accord must have a mission that addresses the concerns of both nations as detailed in chapters 2 and 3. These concerns are both real and perceived and each must be considered in the formulation of the peace accord and then translated clearly in a mandate by which the peacekeeping force can operate effectively. To achieve success, the peacekeeping force must operate with the consent of both nations. An indication of the likely agreements that will be stipulated in the peace accord can be garnered through an assessment of the details of the Syrian-Israeli negotiations up until they ceased on 4 March 1996. Through this analysis the likely mission and tasks of a peacekeeping force deployed on the Golan Heights can be extrapolated.

Great progress was achieved during the peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. Israel made a verbal commitment to withdraw from the Golan Heights in exchange for peace. The extent of the withdrawal was not stipulated although Syria has consistently argued that the pre-1967 boundary and not the 1948 international boundary should be endorsed as the new international boundary. A phased withdrawal by Israel would take place over a period of between one to three years. This issue requires further negotiation. During negotiations Israel offered to complete a withdrawal in three years, and Syria expected the withdrawal to be completed within one year. A system of zones incorporating limitations on the deployment of military equipment will be arranged asymmetrically in favor of Israel.
“Syria conceded that these areas of limitation should be arranged asymmetrically based on a 10:6 ratio. The Israelis insisted on a 9:1 ratio that directly correlates to the difference in the land area of Syria as opposed to Israel.” Further negotiation is required to determine the exact ratio; however, the fact Syria is willing to concede an asymmetrical arrangement is critical. It indicates that Syria accepts the geographical difficulties Israel would face if arrangements were to be symmetrical. The Golan Heights is likely to be declared a demilitarized zone with a waiver granted for the necessary number of Syrian police to conduct normal law and order requirements. Water supply to Israel must be assured with the signing of the accord. It is expected that Israel and Syria will commence normal political and diplomatic relations on the signing of the peace accord. Further negotiation is required, as Israel has attempted to tie a phased withdrawal to the incremental establishment of normal relations rather than a set time period. On the contrary, Syria has indicated that it is not willing to establish normal relations until Israel withdraws completely from the Golan Heights. Once the issue of normalized relations is resolved it is expected to provide the stimulus for economic growth. This did not occur between Egypt and Israel after the Camp David agreements because normalized relations did not involve economic interaction. The most difficult task for the Israelis will be the removal of settlers from the Golan Heights.

Peacekeeping Forces

The MFO and UNDOF are considered successful Middle East peacekeeping operations. The principle reason for this success has been the propitious political circumstances existing between the respective belligerents. This success is hinged upon the clear mandate given to both forces and the respective protocols they monitor.
Furthermore, the continued political stability of the nations involved also contributes to this success. Although operationally they are similar in design there are distinct differences between the peacekeeping forces and their modus operandi. These differences are most apparent at the political level. In deciding whether a United Nations or Non-UN force would be more applicable to deploy on the Golan Heights these differences must be evaluated.

The reason for the MFO's success is that it bolsters the mutually agreed upon security arrangements in the peace treaty, which both states view as compatible with their security needs. "Not the least of these favorable circumstances in which the MFO functions is that it is accepted neither as interposition force nor guarantor but, as one of the negotiators of the protocol observed, as an instrument to build confidence and help parties work out their problems." The MFO Director General drew liberally on the United Nation's peacekeeping experience and institutional memory in designing a new international institution. The MFO was the first multilateral peacekeeping organization operating outside of the United Nations. Certain advantages were derived in a reliance on the United States and the need to operate outside an established international framework. Advantage lay in a greater freedom from political constraints normally characteristic of Security Council decision making where extraneous concerns are often grafted into peacekeeping decisions and thus impair their efficiency.

The authority entrusted to the MFO Headquarters in Rome and the unique relationship among this Headquarters, Egypt, Israel, and the United States contrasts starkly with the long consultations required in the Security Council to gain consensus. Arab opposition, reinforced by the Soviets, is what prevented the Security Council from
authorizing a UN monitoring force in the Sinai after the signing of the Camp David agreements. Yet another advantage of the MFO is that its existence does not depend on the weakest link in the Security Council to assure its survival. Moreover should the initial political underpinnings of the enterprise, the authorization and renewal of a mandate in the case of the UN, be eroded, the US becomes the guarantor of last resort. An autonomous force is more responsive to changing needs.

The MFO demonstrates that an autonomous non-UN force can be more selective and flexible in its recruiting effort because it is not required to observe the UN rule of equitable geographic distribution. UN peacekeeping forces are obliged to achieve a delicate balance between geography to satisfy political sensitivities and military competence to satisfy operational requirements. Although a narrow range of countries were willing or persuaded to serve with the MFO, it was free to concentrate on acquiring the battalions and specialized units to meet the operations needs. Structural impediments aside, the MFO benefited from its ability to create new institutional procedures free of the United Nations bureaucracy labyrinth with its cumbersome long established institutional procedures. Unlike UN operations, which are characterized by a sprawling variety of equipment and maintenance standards among various contingents, the MFO quickly established a unified transport, supply, and maintenance system. Standardization of equipment facilitated maintenance. A unified and cost effective logistical system was in place from the beginning. The MFO acts as a fully integrated force where no one national contingent could survive or operate on its own resources. Imposing degrees of uniformity on the conduct of the troops, their domestic arrangements, the transport fleet, and even appearance of the individuals reinforced this homogeneity.
The genuine international character of the MFO and its legitimacy as a force is undermined by the lack of a broad political base normally derived from a Security Council authorization. The United Nations attracts widespread political support for peacekeeping ventures partly because peacekeepers in disputes insulate the conflict from superpower involvement. Permanent members of the Security Council are not normally acceptable peacekeepers because they inevitably infect the peacekeeping venture with their ideological base. The UN Secretariat has more flexibility in seeking troop contributors; it also knows where to look. In effect, UN recruitment has been institutionalized. The UN can draw on existing peacekeeping operations to man the first phase of a new venture. A wider range of countries are available to the UN from which to choose. This choice is only limited to those nations acceptable to the parties involved. “The Scandinavian nations, the Dutch, Irish and Japanese are governed by constitutional or political constraints that limit them to serving with UN sponsored forces only.”

The prevailing political circumstances and the contribution of the US to the peace process place the US in a unique position. In a unipolar world the US wields considerable influence in the Middle East. Israel is more readily agreeable to the deployment of an international peacekeeping force that includes US servicemen than a UN force that does not. The prospect of a MFO style peacekeeping force being instituted on the Golan Heights under the leadership of the US is very attractive to Israel as it avoids the politics and bureaucracy of the United Nations. Syria may also accept such an arrangement based on its desire to engage the US and encourage investment. Distinct advantages will flow from a US instituted peacekeeping force as opposed to a UN force. Syria believes it has to deal with the US as the principal foreign influence in the region and therefore US
involvement in negotiations and in turn the peacekeeping force expands Syrian engagement of the US. When the negotiations recommence the concerns of both nations in formulating an agreement can be rationalized down to four items: security, water supply, Israeli settlements and the duration of a phased withdrawal.

**Security**

Henry Kissinger once observed “that attaining absolute security by one side will inescapably render its counterpart absolutely insecure, which is a recipe for instability.”

Security is Israel’s principle concern in relinquishing the Golan Heights and a major concern for the Syrians. Supervision of security arrangements stipulated in a peace agreement will be the principle task of the peacekeeping force. The security arrangements are likely to include a designated demilitarized area incorporating the Golan Heights and a series of areas of limitation established on an asymmetrical basis in favor of Israel. These measures were utilized in the disengagement agreement of 1974 and duplicated with modifications for the terrain and situation in the Sinai in the peace accord between Egypt and Israel. Although it is important to stipulate that in the case of the disengagement agreement monitored by UNDOF, the arrangement is symmetrical. The proximity of Damascus to the Golan Heights and the Syrian requirement to provide security to the capital entails a critical restriction on the extent to which areas of limitation can be applied on the Syrian side. However, the limitation on military forces in these areas is essential to addressing the security concerns of both nations.

The peacekeeping force will alleviate security concerns by maintaining a vigilant watch over the Golan Heights and the areas of limitation and reporting all breaches of the agreement to all parties. The deployment of the force is just the first step and it must have
a clear mandate and be fully equipped to effectively monitor the implementation of the peace accord. Most importantly, the force must enjoy freedom of movement throughout the demilitarized area and the areas of limitation. This freedom of movement must be complemented with a rotary wing capability offering high mobility. The experience of UNDOF and the MFO endorses this requirement. Israeli and Syrian sites are inspected by UNDOF observers on a fortnightly basis every second Tuesday and Wednesday respectively. Appointments to inspect the areas are made with the respective Liaison Officers in advance. The UNDOF observation posts scattered about the Golan Heights are static and do not possess a 24-hour surveillance capability. The combination of schedule inspection appointments and static observation posts results in breeches of the agreement by both nations going unreported. There have also been incidents where the liaison officers have denied the observers access to areas to presumably prevent them from witnessing breeches of the agreement.

The MFO utilizes a civilian observer unit transported in helicopters to inspect the zones of limitation established in the protocol. The size of the area to be inspected and the poor infrastructure of the Sinai necessitate the use of helicopters to complete the task. Liaison Officers from the respective nations travel with the observers when they conduct inspections of the zones within each nation. Inspection of a zone commences with a general aerial reconnaissance followed by a series of landings at military positions and installations to verify the nature of equipment and troops deployed. A report is compiled and sent to both nations. The wording of this report is imperative, and whilst it must reassure all concerned that the nation’s military deployments and installations are in accordance with the treaty, it should not reveal any intelligence about the forces.
inspected. The fact that both nations carry out comprehensive electronic surveillance of each other’s military assets by overt and clandestine means does not necessarily diminish the importance of the observer’s function. They provide a reliable pair of eyes that can look in bunkers and under camouflage nets and physically confirm what equipment is deployed. In contrast electromagnetic waves, thermal images, cameras and other types of technology will not provide an exact description of what equipment and troops are located in an area. Such equipment can be susceptible to deception if the information they provide is not verified. The distinct advantage of inspections enables the observers to report if the treaty is circumvented in a deceitful manner. Such a role for observers stationed with a peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights is critical to reassure both nations that their security concerns are addressed. The observers in a Golan Heights peacekeeping force must conduct regular and impromptu day and night inspections by air or land of the areas of limitation as defined in the peace agreement. Such rigorous inspection lends credibility to the peacekeeping force and maintains the integrity of the peace agreement.

Regardless of the extent of the areas of limitation they cannot account for the use of ballistic missile systems. It may be impossible to determine an agreement that prevents the use of such weapons. Both nations possess ballistic missiles and the Israelis maintain a technological edge and also have a nuclear capability. The use of these weapons will render any peace agreement invalid. Both nations maintain their arsenals as a deterrent to offensive action by their neighbors. Therefore, the likelihood of either nation using this capability against the other nation is miniscule. The proliferation of
these weapons systems and their impact on security issues in the Middle East requires further research.

**Water**

Israel relies heavily on the waters of the Jordan River that emanate from the Golan Heights. Certainty of the supply of water is an essential element of a peace agreement. The scarcity of water in the Middle East has led to elaborate arrangements by neighboring nations to ensure a consistent supply to meet their needs. Water is the geo-strategic natural resource of the Middle East. The peacekeeping force will most likely have a role in ensuring a consistent and equitable supply of water continues to Israel as well as Jordan and the West Bank. UNDOF currently monitors water distribution on the Golan Heights as part of its mission.

**Settlements**

The resettlement of Israeli settlers on the Golan Heights is clearly the responsibility of the Israeli Government. The deployed peacekeeping force must have nothing to do with the physical removal of the settlers. The force should monitor progress of resettlement to ensure it is in accordance with the agreed timetable. The Israeli Liaison Officers should be responsible to keep the force informed of progress. This will be a particularly volatile event which may result in animosity directed towards the peacekeeping force as those being removed from their homes may revert to irrational acts and strike out at any element that represents an authority responsible for their removal. The peacekeeping force must have no interaction with Israeli settlers being removed for this reason.
Force Capabilities

A peacekeeping force deployed to the Golan Heights will require particular capabilities to effectively complete its mission. Most importantly, the force must have a comparable 24-hour surveillance capability equal to that of Israel and Syria. Presently UNDOF and the MFO do not have an equivalent surveillance capability. In the case of the MFO this is offset to a degree by the operations of the civilian observer unit; however, the potential for breeches of the protocol or agreement to go unreported is high. Throughout Zone C the MFO infantry forces that man the observation posts are only equipped with binoculars and conduct some irregular patrols by foot and vehicle during the day. This practice would not be sufficient to reassure Israel and Syria in regards to their security concerns. Observers deployed on the Golan Heights must be equipped with modern and sophisticated surveillance equipment with the capability for sustained and continuous surveillance. This equipment, supplemented with observers conducting impromptu inspections by helicopter and by road, will guarantee breeches of the peace agreement are observed and reported inculcating Israeli and Syrian confidence in the peacekeeping force and the security measures in place.

Helicopters equipped with surveillance equipment, such as the OH58, will further strengthen the capabilities and credibility of the force. A troop of helicopters will be sufficient to complete the required tasks due to the size of the area of operations. This area will only incorporate the Golan Heights and the associated limitation of forces zones extending into northern Israel and southwestern Syria respectively. Access to satellite imagery will complement other surveillance resources and provide redundancy in systems that will further raise confidence in the operations of the peacekeeping force. In
conjunction, a reliable communications system is essential. A secure communications capability must be incorporated into this system to enable sensitive information to be transmitted and to prevent monitoring of the peacekeeping forces’ communications. If Israel chooses not to clear the minefields on the Golan Heights as an act of good faith, then engineer elements must be deployed as part of the peacekeeping force to clear mines to prevent civilian casualties when Syrian civilians are resettled. These confidence-building operations will also engender better relations between the peacekeeping force and Israel and Syria.

The most important aspect of the surveillance operations of the peacekeeping force is that they are conducted impartially. Each side must understand that they are being subjected to the same level and frequency of monitoring. The MFO and UNDOF have successfully maintained impartiality through the use of well-established and effective liaison systems. UNDOFs attached UNTSO observer groups that operate on the Golan Heights take on liaison as one of their principle roles. Liaison Officers from the respective nations accompany observers when they complete their inspections. The observer group at Tiberias operates with the Israeli Liaison Officers and the observer at Damascus operates with the Syrian Liaison Officers. Liaison Offices were established in both Damascus and Jerusalem to assist UNDOF operations. Unlike the MFO the liaison officers from Israel and Egypt do not interact.

A similar elaborate liaison system is employed by the MFO. It is structured to include offices in Tel Aviv and Cairo, and a multinational team of officers stationed with the force. The commanders of the respective nations’ liaison units meet regularly in conjunction with MFO representatives to discuss issues trilaterally. It is this trilateral
interaction that makes the MFO liaison system distinct from the UNDOF/UNTSO system. These meetings initially assisted to establish the authority of the Force and enabled concerns to be rectified readily. Importantly this liaison function did not facilitate discussion on issues at the national level, such as the alignment of the boundary at Taba, which fell outside the framework of the MFO, but dealt with the practical implementation of the conditions of the peace accord.

Liaison will be one of the principle tasks of a peacekeeping force deployed on the Golan Heights. The MFO and UNTSO/UNDOF present effective liaison systems that can be duplicated or enhanced and implemented by a peacekeeping force on the Golan. The nature of the 1974 disengagement agreement may have prevented the bilateral interaction between Syrian and Israeli Liaison Officers. However, the advent of a peace agreement may enable a system similar to the MFO to be adopted. This interaction will strengthen the authority of the peacekeeping force and establish methods for the quick resolution of disputes.

**Force Composition**

Political circumstances as well as military necessity will drive the composition of the peacekeeping force stationed on the Golan. The method of selecting nations to participant in both UNDOF and the MFO was outlined previously. The United Nations has the advantage of being able to select participants from a broader range of countries and has well-established procedures for making the selection. On the other hand, the MFO had a more restricted selection of nations but was able to tailor the force by selecting nations to provide particular capabilities. Ultimately, in both cases, Israel, Egypt and Syria must endorse those nations selected by the UN or MFO to participate. The
make up of both the MFO and UNDOF offer insight into which nations Israel and Syria are willing to accept as contributor nations to a peacekeeping force. The acceptance of American involvement in a Golan peacekeeping force is crucial. It is through United States initiative that the Middle East peace process has progressed. The United Nations has issued resolutions 242 and 338 demanding a peaceful resolution to the Arab-Israeli conflict and yet has done little to bring about a resolution. Successive US administrations have been the conduits for peace agreements between Israel, Egypt, the Palestinians, and Jordan. They have encouraged other Arab nations to recognize Israel and brought Syria and Israel to the negotiation table.

This sustained diplomatic effort and success on the part of the United States Government demonstrates the influence the United States wields in the region in contrast to the United Nations. This influence encompasses the four instruments of national power that the United States can bring to bear. The economic instrument of power is arguably the most important. Both Israel and Syria recognize that a peace agreement will bring stability and prosperity to the region. American and Gulf State investment will be fundamental to attaining that prosperity. The Syrians have encouraged American investment over the last few years and appreciate that with American support Syria can gain access to IMF and other development funds. The Israelis believe the United Nations is not necessarily an objective organization and have grave reservations about its function. On the contrary, the Syrians view the United Nations as a source of support, particularly with the support of the Arab block and non-aligned nations on the Security Council, such as Russia and China.
A continued American presence will encourage stability in the region. The deployment of American troops to participate in peacekeeping operations is a definitive representation of American presence in the region that bolsters stability. The deployment of a unilateral American force on the Golan Heights is unlikely. Firstly, it contravenes PDD25 issued by President Clinton, which stipulates the US preference for deploying forces on peacekeeping missions as part of a multilateral force to burden share and conserve resources. Secondly, a unilateral deployment would be inappropriate on the Golan Heights. Whilst the participation of US forces in a peacekeeping force is preferable and supported in principle by both Syria and Israel, a unilateral US force is not a creditable alternative. A unilateral deployment would impinge upon the special relationship established between Israel and the US because US forces are obliged to remain impartial. A US contribution to the peacekeeping force will furnish the force with strengthened political deterrence.

It is the framework under which this US contribution will operate that will result in disagreement between Israel and Syria. Syria will have a preference for the peacekeeping force to operate under the auspices of the UN whilst the Israelis will prefer a non-UN organization that is American led. A non-UN force more readily obtains Israel’s trust and cooperation, particularly if a US presence is its central feature. The US has proven its commitment to the Middle East peace process and set the conditions for the ratification of peace agreements between Israel and its neighbors.

The Syrians are thus likely to accept a US led non-UN force providing it has an acceptable multinational composition. The Syrians engagement of the US is designed to foster a more robust relationship and reap the economic benefits of a better relationship.
American leadership and participation in a non-UN peacekeeping force addresses Israeli security concerns. The establishment of MFO style peacekeeping force through American leadership has greater political application on the Golan Heights than a United Nations equivalent. The US impetus in the peace negotiations places it in a unique position to influence the outcome of a peace agreement as it did in the Camp David Accords. In the case of the Sinai, the initial preference was for a UN force to be deployed. The United Nations Security Council vetoed this option. The US overcame this impediment and created the MFO to meet the security concerns of Israel and Egypt.

The composition and size of the peacekeeping force will also be determined by the capabilities required by that force to conduct its mission effectively. Previously the need for particular capabilities was identified. A requirement exists for observers, signalers, personnel to man and operate surveillance equipment, engineers to clear mines and pilots and support staff to deploy and maintain a small helicopter unit. The force would be more technologically advanced than either the MFO or UNDOF and substantially smaller. Because the disengagement agreement has been in force since 1974 without major incident, the requirement for infantry units to operate on the Golan Heights to occupy an area of separation is tenuous.

It will be incumbent on the peacekeeping force to carefully manage the transition from the disengagement agreement to a peace agreement that involves Israeli withdrawal from the Golan Heights. The peacekeeping force may alter its structure in accordance with the phases of the Israeli withdrawal and the reoccupation of the Golan Heights by Syrian civilians. During the Israeli withdrawal the area of separation established under the disengagement agreement and monitored by UNDOF should remain in force. It is
during the withdrawal phase that disgruntled elements from either nation may engage in violent activity. This activity may also be directed at the peacekeeping force. An increased force presence during the withdrawal will provide a deterrent to such action and enhance the peacekeeping force's defensive capability.

The structures of the MFO and UNDOF are so similar at the operational level that they are difficult to distinguish with a few minor differences. The MFO was designed utilizing United Nations models, in particular UNDOF. However, at the political level they are considerably different and an MFO force deployed to the Golan Heights is more politically expedient than a UN force. The final step in the resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict will precipitate the dawn of a new era of prosperity and stability in the Middle East. The two nations recognize what is at stake and must harness the political will to ratify the peace agreement.

Cost

"The MFO initially was the most costly of any peacekeeping operation ever."5 Over the lifetime of the MFO operating costs have been reduced by half. In 1982 operation costs were $103 million compared with $54 million in 1997. The initial setup costs were $200 million. These costs incorporate the maintenance and operating of all equipment provided to the force by contingents which is not a cost normally borne by the UN. Contingents are reimbursed by the MFO for their contribution based on a separate agreement negotiated with each nation. The advantage for the contingents is not so much the scale of reimbursement but its certainty and promptness. In contrast the UN has experienced uncertainty and delay in payment of reimbursements. This resulted in nations
like Fiji threatening to leave UNFIL unless it was paid. The MFO system of prompt payment creates the perception of a well-managed and rigorously accountable operation.

Endstate

A peacekeeping force deployed to the Golan Heights will have a mission to monitor the implementation of a peace agreement between Israel and Syria. During 25 years of maintaining the disengagement agreement both parties have adhered to the conditions of the disengagement agreement with only minor violations. Whilst the presence of the force will provide some political deterrence, there will not be a requirement to deter any Israeli or Syrian military action. The US would be in a position to negotiate the disbandment of the MFO in the Sinai if it institutes a peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights. The Americans may stipulate that their involvement in the peacekeeping force would be contingent on the disbandment of the MFO in the Sinai. The signing of a treaty brings Israel peace with all its neighbors. As a consequence the utility of MFO in the Sinai is questionable. The US has the leverage, through the provision of military and economic aid, to insist that Israel agree to the disbandment of the Sinai MFO. Egypt and the US have already indicated that they wish to disband the force.

The peacekeeping force should remain in place for 10 years after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal. The force will only continue operations beyond this point with the consent of each of the signatories to the peace accord: Israel, Syria and the US. This will address one of the principle concerns expressed by the Israelis about the stability of the Syrian government. In that period, the two nations must maintain cordial normalized relations and no major breech of the agreement should have occurred. The challenge for
Assad and his successor is that Syrians must view life in Syria as distinctly better after the implementation of a peace agreement. There will be initial euphoria in Syria with the regaining of the Golan Heights, but this will be short lived unless the benefits of peace and stability are apparent soon after the agreement is implemented. This is where the IMF and wealthy nations can contribute to the economic growth of Syria.

A MFO force established and paid for by the Israelis, Syrians and the US affords the best solution for providing a peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights. The strongest argument for a UN force is to bolster UNDOF and maintain the corporate knowledge. Whilst this is true, the MFO can recruit nations that have participated in UNDOF to take advantage of that corporate knowledge, provided the nation is acceptable to both Syria and Israel. The MFO peacekeeping force would consist of nations selected by Israel and Syria. The United States would broker agreements with a number of nations to contribute. A force on the Golan will require particular skills and equipment. The MFO model will ensure the right forces with the appropriate capabilities that are politically acceptable to both Syria and Israel operate on the Golan. This spreads the burden and is consistent with PDD25.

A peacekeeping force stationed on the Golan Heights will require technologically advanced surveillance equipment to complete its mission. The force must have all weather day and night surveillance capability. The force will require rotary winged assets to rapidly move around the demilitarized and areas of limitation. This will facilitate surveillance and enable impromptu inspections of the zones. The MFO force should be no larger than UNDOF and considerably smaller than the MFO currently stationed on the Sinai. A force consisting of a headquarters, two infantry battalions, an aviation troop, an
engineer company, a logistics battalion, a signals company and the teams of observers would suffice to undertake the mission initially. This could then be downscaled by one infantry battalion, the engineer company and elements of the Logistics Company after the Israeli withdrawal is complete. The need for infantry battalions is creditable during the transition from the disengagement agreement to the peace agreement and during the Israeli withdrawal. Providing the force is adequately equipped with technologically advanced equipment and helicopters with their inherent mobility it will be able to successfully undertake its mission with the force structure described.


5. Pelcovits, 92.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS

Introduction

From the previous chapters speculate as to the broad outline of an Israeli-Syrian peace accord. The Syrians have consistently stipulated throughout negotiations that a complete withdrawal by Israel from the Golan Heights to the international border is a non-negotiable minimal condition. There will not be a peace agreement unless Israel agrees. Syria is principally concerned about regaining national honor with the return of the Golan Heights, Syrian sovereign territory, and national security. For the Israelis, full and normal relations between Israel and Syria are a non-negotiable condition. There will not be a peace agreement unless Syria agrees. In relinquishing the Golan Heights the Israelis are principally concerned about national security, a consistent water supply from the sources of the Jordan River and the removal of settlers. Until Israel and Syria accept without reservation the concept of “full peace for full withdrawal” there can be no peace between the two nations.

The Peacekeeping Force

If the Golan Heights is returned to Syria the terms of security arrangements under the peace agreement will include a demilitarized Golan Heights, a series of adjoining limitation of forces zones and the deployment of a peacekeeping force. These zones will be reciprocal, although they will be arranged asymmetrically in favor of Israel given the geographical constraints of northern Israel. The numbers of forces allowed in these zones on either side of the border are likely to be symmetrical. The Israeli withdrawal is likely to be phased over a period of somewhere between one and three years. Further
negotiation is required to determine the duration. An international peacekeeping force will be deployed to implement the terms and conditions of the treaty. The mission of this force will be to monitor compliance with the terms of the treaty. The United States will participate providing surveillance assets, such as satellite reconnaissance, thermal imagers and ground sensor radars, and possibly commit ground troops in the form of either observers or one of the units that make up the peacekeeping force.

The most appropriate peacekeeping force to undertake this mission would be a hybrid, combining aspects of the MFO and UNDOF models. This force would take on the political structure of the MFO. Due to the active promotion of the Middle East peace process by the United States it is best positioned to lead a multinational peacekeeping force. Politically the United States has credibility with both the Syrians and the Israelis. Although the United Nations have formulated Security Council Resolutions pertaining to the Arab-Israeli peace process, they have done little to force compliance and promote the peace process. The Israelis are particularly skeptical of the effectiveness of the United Nations. They are far more comfortable with a peacekeeping organization operating separately from the United Nations under the auspices of the United States.

The participation of the United States further bolsters the organization’s credibility in the view of Israel. Syria is also willing to accept American leadership and participation providing the force is multinational. These political circumstances render the MFO’s political structure as being most suitable for a deployment of a peacekeeping force on the Golan Heights. The structure of the military force stationed on the heights would adopt the best aspects of both UNDOF and the MFO. The operations of this force would only be successful if it is properly equipped with the most modern reconnaissance.
and surveillance equipment to complete its mission. The force must also enjoy freedom of movement anywhere within the Golan Heights and the adjoining limited forces zones. A thorough and competent execution of the mission will win the confidence of the Israelis and Syrians reassuring them that their national security concerns are being properly addressed. If the force has credibility then security concerns are alleviated and the Israelis and Syrians can concentrate their efforts on enhancing their relationship.

Lessons

The principle lesson that can be drawn from this study and applied when deploying peacekeeping forces is that the former belligerents must view a deployed force as credible. This credibility stems from the force being impartial, well trained and properly equipped and organized to undertake the mission. Although the MFO and UNDOF are considered successful peacekeeping missions, in both cases the forces are not properly equipped to effectively conduct their monitoring mission. This deficiency detracts from the credibility of both forces. It is crucial for a peacekeeping force deployed to the Golan Heights to be considered a credible entity by the Israelis and Syrians. This credibility will ultimately inculcate confidence in the force’s ability to effectively monitor the terms and conditions of the peace accord. This, in turn, means the security provisions of the agreement are being properly implemented. A peacekeeping force with a clear mandate and operating effectively will contribute to the successful transition from the implementation of a peace agreement to normalized relations between Syria and Israel.
APPENDIX A

MAP OF THE GOLAN HEIGHTS

Figure 1. Golan Heights
APPENDIX B

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 242

The Security Council,

Expressing its continued concern with the grave situation in the Middle East,

Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in security,

Emphasizing further that all member states in their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter.

1. Affirms that the fulfillment of Charter principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the Middle East which should include the following principles:

   (i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from the territories occupied in the recent conflict;

   (ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area and their right to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

2. Affirms further the necessity (a) for guaranteeing freedom of navigation through international waterways in the area; (b) for achieving a just settlement of the refugee problem; (c) for guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and political independence of every state in the area, through measures including the establishment of demilitarized zones;

3. Requests the Secretary General to designate a special representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and maintain contacts with the states concerned in order to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;

4. Requests the Secretary General to report to the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the special representatives as soon as possible
APPENDIX C

UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION 338

The Security Council

1. Calls upon all parties to the present fighting to cease all firing and terminate all military activity immediately, no later than 12 hours after the moment of the adoption of this decision in the positions they now occupy;

2. Calls upon the parties concerned to start immediately after the cease-fire the implementation of the Security Council resolution 242 in all its parts;

3. Decided that immediately and concurrently with the cease-fire, negotiations start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace in the Middle East.
APPENDIX D

MAP OF THE MFO ZONES ON THE SINAI PENINSULA

Figure 2. A Map of the Sinai Peninsula showing the MFO Zones
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