THE ROLE OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS
IN STABILITY OPERATIONS IN CHILE

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General Studies

by

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THE ROLE OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS IN CHILE

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This study investigates the role of civil military relations in stability operations in Latin America, using Chile as a case study. This study analyzes the pattern of civil military relations that exists in Chile according to a model constructed on Huntington’s theory of civil military relations.

Objective control of the military by the legitimate government, as opposed to varying forms of subjective control, is the most effective pattern of civil military relations in modern society. This study examines the factors necessary to achieve objective control, beginning with the establishment of a professional, nonpolitically involved military. The resulting analysis provides a basis for determining what measures may be taken by Chile to achieve an objective pattern of civil military relations that supports regional stability.

The model used in this study, based on Huntington’s theory of civil military relations, analyzes three primary factors to determine the pattern of civil military relations. The factors used are the relative power that the military has in relationship to other institutions or groups within the government, the level of professionalism within the military, and the political ideology that exists within the nation in terms of supporting the military.
Master of Military Art and Science

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT

THE ROLE OF CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS IN STABILITY OPERATIONS IN CHILE by MAJ Francisco R. Betancourt, USA, 70 pages.

This study investigates the role of civil military relations in stability operations in Latin America, using Chile as a case study. This study analyzes the pattern of civil military relations that exists in Chile according to a model constructed on Huntington's theory of civil military relations.

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CHAPTER ONE

INTRODUCTION

The United States executes numerous operations around the world designed to
enhance the stability of a particular region. Stability operations may take the form of
direct, significant U.S. involvement, such as the Bosnia peacekeeping mission, or it may
take the form of limited training or materiel aid, as is the case with Sub-Saharan Africa.

A common aspect of almost all stability operations conducted by the United
States, whether under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), the North Atlantic Treaty
Organization (NATO), or on its own, is to attempt to reduce the involvement of the host
nation’s military in internal affairs. Military involvement in internal affairs seems to be a
common state of affairs in many of the countries in which the United States conducts
stability operations. The interest the United States has in reducing the foreign military’s
involvement in internal police actions and affairs of state brings it into the realm of civil
military relations. Civil military relations refer to the relationship of the military with its
own government, not with the relationship of the United States military with foreign
governments. One of the issues that will be discussed in this research is determining the
role of civil military relations within stability operations or determining if civil military
relations have any role at all.

Stability operations, by definition, are conducted with the intent of “creating and
sustaining security operations globally, and in key regions that allow the peaceful pursuit
of our interests and the just resolution of international problems through political means”
(Shalikashvili 1997, 11). Stability operations are conducted to ensure that “no critical
region is dominated by a power hostile to the United States and that regions of greatest importance to the U.S. are stable and at peace” (Shalikashvili 1997, 11). Latin America presents a dilemma for U.S. policy makers in developing an effective policy of ensuring stability in the region through stability operations, particularly in the area of civil military relations.

Latin America is going through a tremendous transitional period in consolidating the gains in democratic rule with the end of the cold war. The bipolar world of the cold war, where Latin America was a contested region in the war between East and West, is gone. Latin America, with the exception of Cuba, is not “dominated by a power hostile to the United States,” nor is it in any immediate danger from leftist insurgents as it was during the cold war. The principal security concerns for Latin America today, as stated in the National Security Strategy published by the White House, are transnational in nature. They include but are not limited to drug trafficking, organized crime, money laundering, illegal immigration, and terrorism. Corruption and rule of law concerns are also mentioned as security concerns (Clinton 1998, 7). The Americas no longer pose the threat to American national security that they once did during the cold war. With the threat of communism sweeping up through the Americas virtually nonexistent, the U.S. is able to change the focus of the national security strategy with regard to the Americas. It is changing from one of defeating communism to one of supporting and helping consolidate the nascent democracies in the region and of supporting evolving national and global interests in the region.
National interests in the region are expanding. The *National Security Strategy* states that "economic growth and integration in the Americas will profoundly affect the prosperity of the United States in the 21st century. Latin America has become the fastest growing economic region in the world and our fastest growing export market. In 1998, our exports to Latin America and the Caribbean are expected to exceed those to the EU" (Clinton 1998, 7).

Latin America has numerous emerging democracies and with the exception of Cuba, can be said to be wholly democratic. The U.S. has a sincere interest in sustaining and promoting democracies in the region. The belief is democratic neighbors will be less apt to be hostile than nondemocratic neighbors will and they will be more stable both politically and economically.

Stability is a key issue in supporting the burgeoning economic ties and the democratic process in Latin America. With no significant military threat from outside the Americas to threaten the progress being made, the most immediate threat comes from within. The Americas have a long history of military regimes, coups, and political upheaval. Much of the turmoil experienced in the Americas in the past half century can be traced to influences of the cold war, as differing ideologies drove the military, political groups, and other factions to attempt to assume power and further their own causes. Ironically, the U.S. sees the region’s own militaries as one of the principal threats to regional stability—militaries that were once instrumental in winning the cold war. The concern that the military is a potential threat to democracy in the region leads to
significant U.S. interest in civil military relations as a part of U.S. stability operations in Latin America.

The U.S. is confounded by several factors in its efforts to develop an effective strategy for dealing with Latin America. Lingering distrust of U.S. motives by nation states used as pawns during the cold war as well as significant cultural and political differences between Latin America and the U.S., make it difficult for the U.S. to come to terms with its hemispheric neighbors.

The Department of Defense translates the National Security Strategy published by the President and his national security advisors into viable programs to achieve the security goals set forth in the National Military Strategy. Oftentimes, the security goals fall into the broad category of stability operations. The success of stability operations is determined by many factors, to include the role that the military plays in these operations, the extent of military involvement, and the degree of military interaction with civilian authorities. In determining how the U.S. military translates the national security strategy into objectives, the Army must examine these factors before determining the nature of its involvement in stability operations and examine the nature of civil military relations in the region in question.

Regional stability is critical in advancing many of the interests the U.S. has in Latin America; in fact, the national security strategy of the United States of America emphasizes regional stability as the cornerstone to enhancing security in Latin America and throughout the world. The process for developing programs to enhance regional stability begins with the national security strategy. It establishes the desired endstate, in
terms of purpose, interests, and objectives. The Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, together
with the Joint Chiefs, has the responsibility of translating the desired endstate of the
National Security Strategy into the ways and means of the National Military Strategy for
the Department of Defense. The National Military Strategy consists of policies,
commitments, and programs with objectives that support the objectives of the National
Security Strategy.

The U.S. has specific economic interests in the region, as illustrated by U.S.
involvedment in the 1994 Summit of the Americas and support for the Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA). The U.S. Caribbean Basin Initiative program, designed to
stimulate the economy of nations in the region, helped pave the way for eventual
admission to the FTAA for countries in the region.

The U.S. clearly has national interests in Latin America, as identified above. The
problem then becomes one of translating the national security strategy into a national
military strategy. The problem that the military faces in translating the national security
strategy into the national military strategy in terms of regional stability in Latin America
is what actions/programs are acceptable in the region, considering the history of military
based regimes in the region. The military must be aware of the civil military relations in
the region based on its history, current political climate, and the civilian populations’
perception of the military’s role in the society in question.

The U.S. National Security Strategy is based on the principle of engagement and
has three core objectives:
1. Enhancing its security with effective diplomacy and with military forces that are ready to fight and win.

2. Bolstering America's economic prosperity.

3. Promoting democracy abroad.

The Secretary of Defense has established several security objectives for Latin America based on these core objectives. The security objectives for the region are:

Support the commitment to democratic norms in the region, including civilian control in defense matters, constructive civil military relations, and respect for human rights.

1. Foster the peaceful resolution of disputes, transparency of military arms and expenditures, and development of confidence and security building measures appropriate to the region.

2. Carry out responsibilities under the Panama Canal Treaty and cooperate with the government of Panama in addressing issues linked to the companion Neutrality Treaty.

3. Work with our friends in the region to confront drug trafficking, combat terrorism, and support sustainable development.

4. Expand and deepen defense cooperation with other countries of the region in support of common objectives, encouraging them to improve capabilities for joint actions, including international peacekeeping.

5. Prevent humanitarian crisis from reaching catastrophic proportions.
6. Encourage efforts to prevent the proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and associated delivery systems, as well as other arms control initiatives of common benefit.

It is hoped that achieving these objectives will ensure the growth of democracy, peace, and prosperity in the region. The United States is committed to using all the political, economic, and military assets at its disposal to help realize these (Perry 1997, 4).

United States Southern Command (SOUTHCOM) is the military agency responsible for carrying out initiatives and programs in support of the national security strategy and national military strategy in Latin America. The SOUTHCOM has established the following goals in support of the goals established for the region by the Secretary of Defense:

1. A stable, prosperous, democratic region cooperating to achieve mutual interests

2. An effective capability and will to respond to theater challenges and support counterdrug operations

3. Postured to capitalize on future opportunities

The thesis objective is to examine the role of civil military relations in stability operations in Latin America using Chile, as a nascent democracy in the region, as a case study. The research will focus on Chile as a microcosm of the Americas because of its history of military dictatorship in this century and how its recent history of military rule impacts on current civil military relations. The first task in determining the role of civil
military relations in stability operations is to develop a model by which to examine civil
civil military relations and determine if the pattern that develops is one that supports stability.

The research also seeks to examine the perception of the military role in society in Latin America, the constitutional rights and obligations of the military, and how they interrelate. The research will analyze the role the military plays in sustaining democracy, taking into consideration the role it plays in society. Finally, it will examine the role of the military and the growing trend towards democracy not only in Chile as a microcosm, but in Latin America in general. In doing so, the research will examine the National Security Strategy, National Military Strategy, and SOUTHCOM strategies from the context of Latin American culture, history, and political climate to determine how feasible U.S. goals and the methods of achieving them are in the region.

One of the assumptions used in the research is that the military in Latin America, Chile specifically, is not viewed in a positive light by society in the region. This assumption is based on the role the military sometimes played as an instrument of power of the local regimes throughout history and most recently, during the cold war. This is an important assumption to test, because it is important to determine what role the military should play and how successful it would be in stability operations or in furthering the democratization process. It is also important to note that although the United States is concerned with civil military relations and currently seeks to assist other nations with developing an effective pattern of civil military relations, this was not always the case. The United States was involved in undermining the democratically elected government under Salvador Allende Gossens regime in Chile from the time Allende came to power.
until the military coup in 1973, and in doing so contributed to General Augusto
Pinochet’s rise to power and the subsequent destruction of effective civil military
relations. The United States’ role in undermining Allende’s government and in other
issues during the cold war contributes to mistrust of U.S. motives in Latin America.

Another assumption is that the military in Latin America is under civilian control
and serving the will of the people. This assumption is fundamental to the question of the
society’s perception of the military and of the military’s role in society.

It is important to define civil military relations in the context of this paper. The
term civil military relations does not simply refer to the relationship between the state, as
represented by the civilian government and the national military. The term civil military
relations, as used in this paper and in the research material, refers to a condition of
assumed subordination on the part of the military to the state government and to the
degree of subordination. The relationship and condition of subordination draws on
Samuel Huntington’s theories of achieving civilian control over the military. The two
major strategies used in analyzing civilian–military relations in Latin America and the
U.S. initiatives in that area are the strategies of “subjective” and “objective” control. The
strategies differ in terms of achieving control of the military through convergence of the
military and civilians, or through differentiating the armed forces from the civilians.

In exercising subjective control, civilian groups attempt to achieve control over
the military by having the military identify with their goals or ideologies. If the military
and the civilian leadership are working to achieve common goals then the military would
not have reason to rebel and work towards a separate agenda. This theory works well if
the military and civilian leadership do in fact share common goals, and have a common perspective on how best to achieve them. In many instances in Latin America, however, working towards a common goal of furthering democratization and enhancing stability is often done at the expense of the military’s power base and their influence on affairs of state, whether direct or indirect. Alfred Stepan writes “if the military has a working definition of democracy . . . that is different from the working definition held by democratically elected officials ‘in charge of the state,’ then civil military conflict may ensue” (Norden 1998, 143).

Objective control over the military is more appropriate for modern militaries, according to Huntington. Modern militaries evolve their own society and institutional concerns based on training, organization, and equipment. The civilian government maintains control over the military by making it professional, with its own professional agenda, and out of politics. Huntington describes this process as “militarizing the military, making them tools of the state” (Norden 1991, 152).

To further define civil military relations in Latin America, one must ask, If the military is subordinate to civilian authority in Latin America, is civilian authority subordinate to military rule, or are they on equal footing in governing the country? The term also refers to the role the military plays in government as an instrument of national defense, protector of the constitution, or other role(s) it might play.

Regional perception of U.S. involvement in internal Latin American issues has a tremendous impact on the degree of skepticism with which the U.S. aims are viewed. The typical Latin American opinion is that the U.S. views civil military relations as a
euphemism for nothing more than subordinating the military to civilian control. This opinion is essentially true and creates conflict in some Latin American countries where the militaries feel that historically, legally, and by right of the constitution, they have a larger role in actually governing the country.
CHAPTER TWO

REVIEW OF LITERATURE

There is a great deal of published work on civil military affairs. The issue of civil military relations and the dynamics involved in the balance of power and influence between the government of a people and the military that serves them is as relevant today as it was when Huntington published his theory of civil military relations in 1959. Much of the work is current, as Latin America and Eastern Europe continue to rumble with the aftermath of the end of the cold war. The cold war was partially responsible for the creation of large standing militaries that are no longer needed. The armies that today seem anachronistic in light of the demise of the Soviet Union and the “New World Order” played a central part in winning the cold war. The armies exerted their influence directly, as was the case in counter--insurgent operations in much of Latin America, or indirectly, as U.S. military power led to a state of détente with the Soviets and eventually, to Soviet collapse.

Having won the cold war, the governments of the Western Hemisphere seek to win the peace by consolidating democracy and conducting stability operations to help foster an environment conducive to greater democratic reforms. A central part of this endeavor is to reduce the size of the militaries and to extricate the military from internal politics and government.

In the U.S., the end of the cold war, in an environment of a long--standing democratic government that generally has a dislike of large standing armies, led to an orderly reduction in the size of the military and the amount of resources dedicated to
supporting it. Although there was the usual discussion that always follows the end of a conflict about the need for a standing military and a reexamination of the military's mission, the role of the military and its place in society remain unchanged. This was not the case for the militaries of other countries that played a part in the cold war. Chapter four of this research discusses the role the military plays in Latin America and the various models that depict its relationship with its society and within its culture.

Much of the literature available today is current because it deals with issues that remain unresolved in many countries in both hemispheres. Many of the militaries of these countries find their existence seriously challenged, and their role in society and in matters of state a topic of considerable discussion. The amount of current literature available is a testament to the tremendous impact that resolving these issues has on the U.S. and the world in general.

The cornerstone work on civil military affairs is arguably Huntington's *The Soldier and the State*. Written in 1956 (it was published in 1959), the theories and models it established are still referred to as gospel by modern researchers. The focus of Huntington’s research and theories was the United States Army, and his research was largely historic in nature, showing the development of current models of civil military relationships based on historical data. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, among other noted scholars, aided him in his research. The models Huntington created based on the U.S. Army established paradigms applicable to all militaries. The problem modern—day analysts have with Huntington’s theories is viewing them as prescriptive instead of descriptive.
The vast majority of the current literature is written from a perspective that the militaries need to be subordinated to civilian control following a North American model of civil military relations. Otherwise, the authors feel, they would pose a threat to the legitimate, elected democratic government, and in turn a threat to the newfound stability. With very few exceptions, however, the literature does not take into consideration the considerable sociological and historical impacts of this subordination process.

One of the books that reflects this unfortunate tunnel vision is the *Conference Report. The Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas: Civil Military Relations for the 21st Century*. This lack of vision is an unfortunate flaw in an otherwise invaluable source of information. The *Conference Report* is a collection of papers and speeches presented at a conference of the same title held 3–6 November 1997. The United States War College, Southern Command, Inter-American Defense Board, National Guard Bureau, and the Latin American Consortium of the University of New Mexico and the New Mexico State University attended. Over 150 prominent political and military leaders and scholars were present. The *Conference Report* begins with a series of recommendations, broken into categories for Latin American policy makers, U.S. and Latin American policy makers, U.S. policy makers, and the U.S. military. This hyper-segregated list of recommendations is compiled from recommendations made by the various speakers. The recommendations have a central theme: removing the military from internal civic functions such as domestic law enforcement, and removing the military from the political spectrum as much as possible. Another theme of the recommendations is establishing
and strengthening bilateral ties amongst hemispheric players to be able to reduce the need for national security and consequently, the need for sizeable militaries.

Most of the papers and speeches presented stuck to a common theme with regard to civil military relations with one notable exception. Professor Luis Bitencourt Emilio, a professor with the Catholic University of Brasilia, questioned the advisability of many of the reforms, suggesting that perhaps it was too much, too soon. He concluded, despite his reservations, that it was essential that Latin America participate in the process, no matter if premature, because, “this is a U.S. initiative, and the U.S. is a friend of Latin America. . . whether we like it or not” (Schulz 1998, 100). This tongue in cheek comment reflects a common cynicism found in Latin America with regard to U.S. motives in the region. The comment reflects Bitencourt’s reservations on following the U.S. lead in adopting a North American model of civil military relations, but also grudging acceptance of U.S. dominance in hemispheric

One article that does take more than just the threat of the military and civil military relations into account with regard to stability operations is an article titled “Consolidating Democracy in the Americas” (Larry Diamond 1998, 53).

The author examines ten different challenges he feels the Americas face in consolidating their newfound democracy. The challenges the author addresses are mainly in the political, judicial, and economic systems. The article is useful in putting the research question of the role civil military relations plays in stability operations in perspective. Although the author’s examination of different factors that impact on stability in the Americas help put the role of civil military relations in perspective, it lacks
one key element. That element is the role of society and culture on the stability of
democracy in the Americas, whether related to the military in civil military relations or
directly to democracy as a form of government that meets the will and needs of the
people.

An article that takes a broader view encompassing the social, cultural, and
historical impacts on democratic stability, as well as the impact of civil military relations,
is “Democracy and Military Control in Venezuela: From Subordination to Insurrection”
(Deborah L. Norden 1998, 23). The author examines Venezuelan politics and its history
of coups and political instability primarily from a Huntington view of civil military
relations, but she also takes into account and examines how other factors came into play
and will continue to affect Venezuela in the future. Norden analyses the status of civil
military relations in Venezuela using Huntington’s definitions of objective and subjective
control of the military and discusses the dangers of using models of civil military
relations inappropriate to the culture, or political and economic environment. Norden’s
work was particularly relevant to the research as it discussed various models of civil
military relations in a Venezuelan context.

Paul W. Zagorski takes a similar look at civil military relations and the problems
Relations in Latin America.” Zagorski examines five Latin American countries—Chile,
Argentina, Peru, Brazil, and Uruguay—which have had similar experience transitioning
from military rule to civilian rule and the problems they have had. As the title indicates,
Zagorski discusses the problems of trying to reduce the power, influence, and role of the
military within internal politics without jeopardizing national security. Zagorski
discusses the experiences of each country in turn and the various factors that influence
each country's particular situation. Zagorski also includes separate chapters for each of
five different "flashpoints" common to the countries he studied. The flashpoints are areas
that are potential areas of conflict that threaten civil-military relations between the
military and the government in each of the countries. The flashpoints Zagorski discusses
are human rights, internal security, military reform, and reform of the state.

Edmund C. Mercado has a more narrow focus in his thesis, "Military
Institutionalism and Liberal Constitutionalism in Chile." Mercado focuses on civil
military relations in Chile. Submitted as a master's thesis, Mercado argues that
professionalizing the Chilean Army, thereby institutionalizing it, has threatened
Constitutionalism in Chile. The premise that the military as a professional institution is a
threat to Liberal Constitutionalism is ironic given the fact that one of Huntington's
theories of establishing civil-military relations involves subordinating the military by
doing just that--professionalizing it, and making it politically neutral.

Mercado's focus is primarily the Pinochet regime and the historical event leading
to the institutionalization of the military in contrast with earlier governments and less
institutionalized militaries. The thesis is a bit one-sided with a definite anti--Pinochet
slant, but is interesting to examine from the perspective of the various models and
combinations of factors of populace, military, and government proposed by Huntington.
CHAPTER THREE

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

This chapter addresses research methodology in two main components: a
discussion of the primary and subordinate questions in greater depth than in the
introduction, and a discussion of how to answer the questions, or methodology.

The primary question of this research is the role of civil military relations stability
operations in Chile (as a case study for Latin America). Stability operations is a term
often used to describe U.S. efforts to maintain the status quo, and therefore peace and
stability in regions where the U.S. may or may not have specific national interests.
Maintaining the peace and stability in those regions where the U.S. does not have specific
national interests allows the U.S. to focus its attention on those regions where it does.
This is often the case with areas such as Sub-Saharan Africa where the U.S. does not
have vital national interests and is not willing or able to extend itself militarily or
economically to providing support to maintaining the peace.

Latin America falls into a special category because of its current state of
transition. Latin America, to include Chile, is not used to civil military relations
according to a North American model, where the military is automatically assumed
subordinate to civilian control and has no involvement in politics, government or internal
law enforcement. In North America, the concept of civil military relations assumes that
the military is politically sterile as an element of their professionalism— the military is
focused on fighting the nation’s wars and defending the constitution, not affairs of state.
Conversely, Latin America, Chile in particular, has a long tradition of military rule. One
of the assumptions that the U.S. seems to use in formulating foreign policy is that the
North American model of democracy is exportable to all regions of the world and can
easily be assimilated by other cultures. This may not be true, and it becomes necessary to
determine if the American model of civil military relations is suitable for Chile and Latin
America, and if not, what model of civil military relations would be more suitable to
Chile and other Latin American states and still accomplish the task of supporting stability
operations. The key elements necessary in determining the role of civil military relations
in Latin America in stability operations, therefore, are to determine the following:

1. Are the societies in question willing to have the military, that in many cases
   they view as the embodiment of their nationality, subordinated to the political party that
   happens to be in power at the time?

2. Are the legitimate political leaders willing (and capable) to take the lead in
   formulating defense strategy and policy, something that was traditionally left to the
   military?

3. Are the society, political system and military ready and able to adapt to the
   myriad changes required to extract the military from the daily internal political, economic
   and peace enforcement (police activity) activities?

In order to answer these questions, one must examine Chile from a historical
perspective, with particular emphasis on the nature of civil military relations in Chile’s
history. It is also necessary to examine the culture and society of Chile itself in order to
determine if the model of civil military relations the U.S. is attempting to export is
suitable for the people it is supposed to serve. An examination of the Chilean political
structure is also necessary, as it will be required to adapt and change to the demands placed on it by the responsibility of governing the military. Within the examination of the political structure, it is necessary to examine the Chilean Constitution in order to determine what rights and responsibilities are given to the military with regard to its involvement in politics and state security.

The Combined Arms Research Library (CARL) was the primary source for the research conducted in this study. (CARL has a predominantly military related collection of over 1.5 million books and more than 227,000 periodicals.) CARL also has access to the Library inter--loan system and is able to get most titles within a week of requesting them. Additionally, CARL has access to Internet material and searches along with CD--ROM and various other multimedia resources.

The research began with a search for relevant topics using the ProQuest Direct, WinSPIRS, and PAIS at CARL. The initial keywords used in the search were Latin America, civil military relations, stability operations, and Chile. The search produced several hundred sources. Most of the sources were in book form, while some were from periodicals. Several websites were also found that dealt directly with civil military relations in Latin America and with political topics in Latin America in general. Examining the abstracts to determine the actual relevance of the sources to the research then refined the list of sources. The majority of the sources discussed civil military relations in a general sense, defined predominantly as a “status report” on the status of civil military relations in Chile and Latin America without any serious discussion of the
underlying causes or roots to the problem of Latin America assimilating a North American model of subordinating the military to civilian rule.

Once the initial sources were identified, it became necessary to conduct a second, more detailed search in order to research more specific questions with regard to the implementation of various models of civil military relations. The second search concentrated on researching the secondary and tertiary questions with regard to Chilean culture, society, history, and political structure. The keywords used in the search were culture, society, history, and government. These keywords were used in conjunction with both Chile and Latin America in separate searches. These searches produced close to a thousand sources, making it necessary to review only those with obvious relevance based on the abstracts.

The sources produced by the second search provided a means to examine those aspects of Chile and Latin America that would impact on Latin America in general, and Chile specifically, to adopt a particular model of civil military relations. The examination of different models of civil military relations made it necessary to review an initial delimitation with regard to a discussion of the theories of civil military relations proposed by Huntington. It became necessary to examine the models and theories of civilian control of the military set forth in his book, *The Soldier and the State*. These models, discussed in chapter four, are examined based on the template of Chile and Latin America's culture, society, history, politics, and other factors as discussed above.
CHAPTER FOUR

ANALYSIS

A Civil Military Relations Model

An in-depth analysis of the civil military relations of a country requires a model or template from which to operate. The model used in this research is based on theories proposed by Huntington in his book, The Soldier and the State. Huntington’s theories and models for civil military relations proposed in 1959 have influenced students of political science since their introduction. Much of the study and research conducted since then are based at least in part on his work, although some modern-day researchers do not stay strictly within the bounds of the models of civil military relations as Huntington described them. The model, based on Huntington’s theories used in this research, is as follows:

Huntington’s model proposed that civil military relations are based on one of two basic methods of controlling or subordinating the military to civilian rule. One method is termed subjective control and is defined as “civilianizing the military” (Huntington 1959, 83). Subjective control of the military attempts to empower civilian groups in relationship to the military, by getting the military to identify themselves with the values and character of the state. In essence, subjective control attempts to make the military “mirrors of the state” (Huntington 1959, 83).

The problem with subjective control is that it is difficult to empower any one civilian group in relation to the military without coming into conflict with other civilian groups. In any nation’s political sphere, there are generally have many civilian groups
competing for power and influence, versus only one military community. In some cases, the nation may be so vast as to actually have several military institutions, such as different regional army groups or military components—the air force or naval forces. These forces may compete internally within the military community, but overall, they represent the military as an institution within the political sphere. So, while one can talk about the military in a homogenous sense, one cannot talk about the civilian community in the same way. The struggle for power in this type of subjective control results in civilian groups vying for power amongst one another as opposed to the civilian community as a whole vying for power with the military community. Methods of attempting to achieve subjective control in the past have included civilian control by governmental institutions, control by social class, and control by constitutional form.

Control by governmental institution was attempted in both England and America in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and although not attempted in Latin America, the experience still serves as a universal example (Huntington 1957, 81). The real power struggle in those instances was between the parliament and the crown, as military forces were generally under the control of the crown. The power between the crown and parliament illustrates the fundamental flaw with subjective control in that it places civilian groups in conflict with one another vis-à-vis the military. Huntington also makes note of the fact that there is a comparable struggle in current U.S. Government between Congress and the president over the control of the military (as illustrated by the debate over the president’s authority to commit forces without a congressional declaration of war). Huntington hastens to add that the struggle for power between the executive and
legislative branches is more concerned with the distribution of power between the two branches of government as opposed to a struggle for power between the military and civilian groups.

Control by social class was seen in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in Europe as the aristocracy and bourgeoisie struggled for control of the military. Each of the social classes attempted to identify civilian control of the military with its own interests (Huntington 1957, 82).

The result was again an ensuing conflict between the social classes with the military as the battleground instead of the social classes as a civilian group achieving any type of real control over the military.

Control by constitutional form, as is found in democratic governments, can be undermined by a lack of professionalism in the armed forces. The military may achieve political influence outside its professional scope through legitimate and constitutional means and thereby undermine the legitimate government. Huntington uses MacArthur and the United States circa World War II and the Korean War to illustrate this situation, because of MacArthur’s open disagreement with the political agenda. Other more modern examples include military coups where the military has usurped the legitimate democratic government because of differing ideologies, the military’s lack of professionalism.

Another danger in attempting control by constitutional form is in the military that believes that its role as protector of the constitution gives it the responsibility and authority to usurp the legitimate government if they feel it is acting contrary to the
constitution or the country’s best interests. Pinochet cited his responsibility to protect the
country from the ills of the leftist Allende regime when he executed the coup that placed
him in power. Therefore, civilian control by constitutional form without the necessary
separation from politics afforded by professionalism may leave a military with vigilante
leanings when it comes to determining the direction the nation takes.

Given the problems with subjective control, the alternative method of achieving
civilian control over the military according to Huntington’s model is objective control.
Objective civilian control achieves its goal by doing just the opposite of subjective
control—instead of attempting to civilianize the military by making it the mirror of the
state, it militarizes the military and makes it politically sterile by making it professional.
Huntington argues that in any modern state, subjective control is obsolete. He states:
“Subjective civilian control is fundamentally out of place in any society in which the
division of labor has been carried to the point where there emerges a distinct class of
specialists in the management of violence” (Huntington 1957, 83).

The class of specialist Huntington refers to, as the key to objective civilian control
of the military, is the military professional, and specifically, the professional officer.
Professionalism and the professional officer corps are central to Huntington’s theory of
objective civilian control of the military, so it is necessary to understand how he defines
them.

Huntington uses three characteristics to define the professional military officer:
expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Expertise is the specialized knowledge
necessary to accomplish the required tasks of the profession. The defining characteristic

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of military professionals is their expertise or central skill—the management of violence (Huntington 1957, 11). The duties assigned to the military professional in the management of violence require a degree of expertise that helps define him as professional. Those tasks are the organization, equipping and training of the force, the planning of its activities, and the direction of its operations in and out of combat (Huntington 1957, 11). Responsibility is the requirement to use that knowledge in a way that is beneficial to society. Corporateness is the degree to which members of the class of specialists, through execution of their profession, form a distinct identifiable group within society. The critical element of the professional officer corps is that the level of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness leads to a professional military ethic that by its nature renders the officer corps politically sterile. The political sterility is what helps prevent the military’s corporateness from contributing to an environment that could lead to a coup. The professional military ethic requires single-mindedness in order to concentrate on mastering the skills required to achieve the level of expertise necessary to execute the duties of the job. The trade-off, for the officer corps or a member of the officer corps to become involved in politics or affairs of state, is to surrender his or her professionalism.

The professional military ethic, then, becomes the critical component to Huntington’s model of objective civilian control of the military. There are two other critical components to Huntington’s model (see figure 1). The two other elements are the power level (i.e., the amount of power that the military has in society), and the ideological
level (i.e., the prevailing ideology within the society with regard to favorable or unfavorable military sentiment).

The power level refers to the amount of political power that the military possesses (if and how the military wields this power is a function of its professionalism). The degree of political power is a function of the amount of power the military has based on its formal authority, and the informal influence it has based on the scope, or locus of its influence.

The formal authority of the military can be analyzed using three criteria. They are the relative unity, the relative level of authority, and the relative scope of the authority. The relative unity refers to the level of cohesion within the military, and the resulting focus on the objectives it sets for itself and the focus of the energies it expends towards achieving those goals. The level of unity is relative to the level of unity within the other organizations in the political arena, and impacts on the ability of the other groups to divide the military in its focus opinion. The Goldwater–Nichols Act did much to increase the unity of the U.S. military by increasing the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS). There is a potential for disunity within the military with the different services (Air Force, Navy, Army, and Marine Corps) vying for funding and attention. The CJCS gives the military one voice, and helps ensure unity within the military.

The relative level of authority in Huntington’s model refers to the degree of power that the military possesses relative to other organizations within the political arena. The relative level of authority is measured by the degree of subordination within the
governmental hierarchy. The further up within the hierarchy, the greater the level of authority relative to other organizations within the government. Conversely, the further down in the hierarchy based on the levels of subordination, the lower the degree of relative power. The relative level of the military within the government becomes a means of vertical civilian control over the military when one looks at the hierarchy of the government as a vertical structure (see figure 2).

The relative scope of authority that the military possesses is based on the scope of authority that the military is allowed to have relative to other civilian agencies. In the United States, the scope of authority is normally limited strictly to military matters, but that is not always the case in other countries, as will be seen in examining the military’s role in Chile and other Latin American countries. If the military is allowed to possess a scope of authority outside of the scope necessary to execute its military functions, then the military may develop a greater relative scope of authority vis-à-vis the other groups within the government. Controlling the relative scope of authority is a means of establishing horizontal civilian control over the military when you look at the scope of authority within each successive level of authority in the governmental hierarchy (see figure 2).

Informal influence is the other half of the political power equation with regard to the military. Informal influence refers to the power the military has at its disposal as a result of its group affiliations, economic and human resources, hierarchical interpretation of the officer corps, and the prestige and popularity the officer corps enjoys in its particular environment.
Group affiliations refer to the group affiliations of the military’s officers and leaders. Huntington breaks these affiliations into three categories: preservice affiliations, inservice affiliations, and postservice affiliations. Preservice affiliations are those affiliations the officers had before they joined the military. The may be based on the geographic region or social class the officers came from before they joined the military, and they are carried into the service with the officer.

Preservice affiliations allow the officer corps to extend its influence into those areas the officer was affiliated with before he joined the service.

Inservice affiliations are those affiliations the officer develops while in the military. They may take the form of relationships with other governmental groups or commercial organizations the officer deals with in the execution of his duties. The officer corps is then able to extend its influence to those groups and potentially receive support from them, thus extending their informal influence.

Postservice affiliations are those affiliations the officer corps establishes upon leaving the service that may still impact on the service. A good example of this is officers that leave the service to pursue civilian careers with commercial organizations that they established inservice affiliations with. These officers are now in the position to influence the commercial organization from within and indirectly increase the informal influence of the military.
CIVIL MILITARY RELATIONS

OBJECTIVE CONTROL

Professional Military Ethic

Ideological Level
- Liberalism
- Fascism
- Marxism
- Conservatism

Power Level

Degree of Scope of Power

Political Power

Formal Authority
- Relative Level
- Relative Unity
- Relative Scope

Informal Influence
- Group Affiliations
- Economic and Human Resources
- Hierarchical Impenetrability of the Officer Corps
- Prestige and Popularity of

The key factor in Objective Control is the professionalism of the military.

Figure 1
The next major factors in informal influence are the economic and human resources the military has at its disposal. The economic and human resources refer not only to the personnel and budgetary allowances allowed the military by the government, but also to other resources available to the military that help increase its informal influence. A good example of this, that will be discussed in greater detail later in this thesis, is the Chilean army’s constitutional right to 10 percent of the profits from all national copper sales. The right to the profits from the copper sales give it monetary resources independent of congressional funding, and spreads its influence into the economic and labor sectors of the government.

Hierarchical interpenetration of the officer corps refers to the level in which the officer corps has penetrated the hierarchy of the government in the nonmilitary power structure (see figure 2). As officers assume nonmilitary positions within the governmental structure, the military’s influence is spread. An example of this is when Colin Powell served as the National Security Advisor in the Bush administration. His serving in the capacity of National Security Advisor, a position that by definition is not a military position, allowed him the opportunity to spread the military’s influence within the government. The greater the interpenetration of officers into the nonmilitary power structure, the greater the military’s influence.

The converse side of this equation occurs when civilians interpenetrate the officer corps. The influence of the officer corps is then weakened. In the North American military structure, civilians normally don’t occupy enough positions within the vertical
hierarchy to have a significant impact on the vertical hierarchy, but there still remains a degree of civilian representation. In many of the militaries in Central and South America, however, there are often no civilians in the military structure below the civilian head of state, if the head of state is a civilian at all. So while the influence of the U.S. military is mitigated somewhat by the civilian secretary at the top of its hierarchical structure, many Latin American militaries are not, as we will see as we examine the military in Chile.

The final factor in determining the extent of the informal influence of the military is the degree of prestige and popularity enjoyed by the military in its nation. A more prestigious military will enjoy greater popular support, and policy makers may be scrutinized by the populace on how well they treat the military with regards to decisions affecting the welfare of the military.

The third component of Huntington’s model is ideology. Ideology refers to the overarching political climate within the nation in question. It is not limited just to the political party in power, but refers in more general terms to the national climate with regard to the military. Huntington proposes four basic ideologies, and characterizes them as being either promilitary or antimilitary. Those ideologies are Liberalism, Marxism, Fascism, and Conservatism. He compares and contrasts these political ideologies with what he calls the military ethic.

The military ethic is based on what Huntington describes as the universal military mind. He proposes that the military mind-set is universal and shares a common military ethic regardless of cultural or national differences. The military ethic is formulated on the belief that man is “evil, weak, and irrational and that he must be subordinated to the
group” (Huntington 1957, 90). The military ethic believes that the natural state of man is conflict, and sees conflict as an unavoidable eventuality to be dealt with as efficiently as possible. Under these circumstances, the military ethic views power as a means to achieving the goal of protecting national security in an uncertain and unpredictable world, but not necessarily as an end unto itself.

The first political ideology that Huntington describes in contrast with the professional military ethic is Liberalism. Huntington describes Liberalism as the antithesis of the military ideology, and as such, as antimilitary. While the military mind believes that the natural state of man is conflict, the Liberal believes it is peace. The individual is paramount to the Liberal, while the group is the locus of the military’s power and authority. The Liberal goes so far as to dismiss the role power plays in human relations, preferring to focus on the individual. The importance of the individual is seen in the Liberal opinion that national defense is a responsibility to be shared by all individuals, not just one group. Liberals tend to view the military as “backward, incompetent, and neglectful of the importance of economics, morale, and ideology” (Huntington 1957, 91). Liberalism also takes national security for granted, relying on the belief that the natural state of man is peace. The Liberal tends to believe that the military itself is the cause of conflict, and rarely supports standing armies. This ideology was typical of the United States after the Revolutionary War. The military has tremendous difficulty getting support for national security defense measures in this environment.

Marxism is similar to Liberalism in the sense that both ideologies believe in the overall goodness of man. Marxism believes, like Liberalism, that man’s natural state is
peace. Marxism believes that man is corrupted by evil institutions, specifically those institutions devoted to capitalism. Marxism focuses on the empowerment of the proletariat, and in light of these beliefs, Marxism is willing to support war and the military institution only as instruments of class war and social revolution. Marxism is also in conflict with military ideology in supporting national defense and with the protection of the state. Marxism denies the existence of the state, again giving supremacy to the individual, and claims that the state is but an instrument of class warfare.

The next ideology discussed by Huntington is Fascism. Fascism is described as promilitary, but with some marked differences from the military ideology. The military ideology views conflict as a necessary evil, while Fascism revels in the conflict, and sees it as an end unto itself. The same dichotomy exists between the Fascist and military view of power. The military mind views power as a means to achieve its goal of national security, while the Fascist views power, again, as an end unto itself. Fascism is willing to support the military as long as the military supports the proper ideology, and does not itself become a threat to the power of the state. Like Liberalism, Fascism believes that every individual should also be a soldier—not because Fascism believes in the supremacy of the individual, but just the opposite. The Fascist believes that every individual should serve the state because the state is supreme.

The political ideology most similar to the military ideology is Conservatism. Conservatism is similar to military ideology in that both want to maintain the status quo, and neither proposes grand schemes or sweeping changes in order to achieve their goals. Conservatism is also more compatible with the military ethic than other political
ideologies because of its lack of an agenda of change. It can be more tolerant of other
values and ideas, as long as the respect for established institutions is maintained.
Conservatism is defined as promilitary because of the role the military plays in protecting
the status quo, and the similarity between the two ideologies as being almost politically
sterile in not having specific goals and agendas to pursue.

The final part of Huntington’s model of civil military relations is the development
of possible permutations based on the elements of power, professionalism, and ideology.
Huntington explains that there are eight possible combinations, but of those, three are
either impossible or improbable. The remaining five combinations reflect varying levels
of professionalism, political power, and promilitary or antimilitary ideology in
combination with one another to create a specific civil military relations environment.

The possible permutations proposed by Huntington are: (1) antimilitary ideology,
high military political power, and low military professionalism; (2) antimilitary ideology,
low military political power, and low military professionalism; (3) antimilitary ideology,
low military political power, and high military professionalism; (4) promilitary ideology,
high military political power, and high military professionalism; and 5) promilitary
ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism.

The first pattern of civil military relations; antimilitary ideology, high military
power, and low military professionalism, is typical of Latin America. This combination
is a result, in part, of factors at work during the cold war. The need to deal with
insurgents and interstate disputes because of competing ideologies led to the military
playing a larger role in politics and the internal administration of the country. By
definition, the military had to either already have a low level of professionalism in order to delve into politics and other essentially nonmilitary matters, or it had to surrender its professionalism in order to do so. Huntington states that this pattern of civil military relations was also typical of Germany during World War I and the United States during World War II (Huntington 1957, 96). The comment regarding the U.S. during World War II is aimed at MacArthur, who achieved a degree of notoriety during the Korean War due to his open conflicts with the administration, but rose to prominence earlier in World War II. Huntington groups MacArthur with De Gaulle and Ludendorff as “deviant, nonmilitary military men” (Huntington 1957, 96). Huntington’s view is apparently that MacArthur sacrificed his military professionalism when he became involved in politics and open public dispute with the civilian leadership of the country while fighting in Korea.

Germany in World War II is presented as an example of the second possible pattern of civil military relations; antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and low military professionalism. Huntington states that this pattern of civil military relations is only realized when the political ideology is so intensely pursued that the military cannot escape it, no matter how far they reduce their political power (Huntington 1957, 96). In other words, the military in Germany in World War II did not have to sacrifice its professionalism in order to achieve political power, as was the case with the military in Latin America during the cold war. The military was thrust into the political arena through the sheer pervasiveness of the political ideology, and lost its professionalism as a result.
The third pattern of civil military relations uses the United States in the post Civil War period as an example. This pattern of antimilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism, is typical, according to Huntington, of nations with few national threats. The military is able to maintain its professional separation from politics and tolerate having low relative military political power because of the absence of any significant threats. Huntington claims this pattern was typical of the United States up until the beginning of World War II, since MacArthur achieved prominence during World War II and ultimately sacrificed his professionalism in Korea when he became embroiled in an open dispute with the government leadership.

The fourth pattern of civil military relations proposed by Huntington is one of promilitary ideology, high military political power, and high military professionalism. Huntington uses Prussia and Germany during the Bismarckian-Moltkean epoch as an example of this pattern (Huntington 1957, 97). This pattern may emerge, as it did in Europe, in a situation where there are continuing security threats, and an ideology sympathetic to military values. It is possible to permit a high degree of military political power and still maintain a high degree of military professionalism and objective control of the military under these circumstances (Huntington 1957, 97).

The last of the possible patterns of civil military relations uses Great Britain as an example. The pattern is composed of a promilitary ideology, low military political power, and high military professionalism. This pattern, like the one Huntington claims was predominant in the U.S. up until WW II requires an absence of any significant threat,
and has high military professionalism. The difference is that this pattern has a
conservative political ideology, such as conservatism.

The Chilean Military

Having constructed a model from which to analyze the civil military relations of
Chile, the first step is to examine the level of military political power enjoyed by the
military in Chile. The military in Chile enjoys a greater degree of power in the political
life of their nation than does its North American counterpart, although the role it plays is
not uncommon in Latin America. One cannot study modern Chile without discussing
General Augusto Pinochet. The role the military plays in Chile, and the current pattern of
civil military relations is due in large part to the role played by Pinochet in recent history.
Opinion regarding Pinochet is still divided in Chile today, with a virtual polarization of
opinion. There is a group of Chileans who remain loyal to Pinochet (known as
Pinochistas) because they feel he saved the country from anarchy and collapse under the
Allende government. They argue that Pinochet’s draconian measures were necessary to
save the country. Those that oppose Pinochet are quick to point out that the coup led by
Pinochet ended over thirty years of democratic rule. They are; however, quick to forget
the history of instability and coups in Chile’s recent history. The Pinochistas are equally
quick to point out that Pinochet saved the country from communism and financial ruin
and are just as quick to gloss over the human rights violations suffered under his regime.
Chile has had a long history of Communist and Socialist influence, as well as a history of
political unrest and coups. This tumultuous history has a direct impact not only on the
position of the military within the government and the amount of formal power and
informal influence it has, but also on the ideology of the country. It is impossible to discuss Pinochet, his role in creating modern--day Chile, and the current state of civil military relations without discussing some of the key historical events leading up to Pinochet's taking power in Chile. The latter half of the twentieth century provides ample examples of the turmoil and varying political ideologies that contribute to modern day Chile.

**Chilean Political History**

After World War I, great strife developed in the country between liberal and conservative elements. The Liberals gained power in 1920 with the election of Arturo Alessandri Palma, but he was unable to make the reforms he wanted due to resistance from the existing conservative political structure. In 1924, the military conducted a coup, and established a military dictatorship. Alessandri was removed from office, but was restored to power in 1925, after another military coup took place. A military officer, Carlos Ibáñez del Campo, actually ran the country under the next president Emiliano Figueroa. Alessandri was elected president again in 1932, but only after several other coups and more turmoil in the government.

Political turmoil continued to plague the Chilean government through the years leading up to World War II, where opposing camps of pro--Axis and pro--Allied sentiment contributed to the political tension. Immediately after the war, the first significant leftist movements came into the political spotlight with the election of Gabriel González Videla, who was elected largely based on the support of Communist elements within the country. González Videla appointed several communists to his cabinet,
sparking a series of events that eventually led to their ousting, and the subsequent severing of relations with the Soviet Union. The anti-communist sentiment was so great during this period that laws were passed making the Communist Party illegal, with the primary law being the Law for the Defense of Democracy. This law resulted in the imprisonment of hundreds of Chilean citizens, and was a root cause of severe labor and social unrest that had a negative impact on the economy.

There was a resurgence of communist influence in the subsequent decade, with the Communist Party being legalized again in 1958. Diplomatic ties were reestablished with the Soviets during this period of Communist resurgence. The communist/anti-communist ideological battle waged back and forth for a number of years, but it was not until 1970 that the crisis came to a head and catapulted Chile into the series of events that led to the military coup led by Pinochet.

In 1970, Salvador Allende Gossens became the first president of a noncommunist country to be elected on a communist platform. Allende promised full social reform, to include nationalization of the country’s industry and basic infrastructure, and he immediately set out to fulfill his campaign promises once he was elected. His reforms included government redistribution of income, and complete governmental control of the economy. Allende’s socialist experiment suffered the same fate as other socialist experiments—it ended in failure. Chile was driven to the point of almost complete anarchy by the economic chaos that resulted from Allende’s reforms. This situation was exacerbated by the covert operation conducted by the U.S. to undermine the Allende government—a prime example of U.S. involvement in Latin America during the cold war.
The upper class of Chilean society urged the military to conduct a coup and end the Marxist experiment. The Army’s Commander in Chief General Carlos Prats refused to surrender his professionalism for political gain and continued to support the constitution. There was a failed coup attempt in early 1973, which probably would have succeeded had it not been for Prats’ loyalty.

Allende appointed Pinochet as Prats’ successor when Prats resigned following the failed coup attempt. Allende’s belief that Pinochet was as professional as Prats and that he would continue to defend the constitution and support civilian rule was quickly disproved. On 11 September 1973, less than a month after his appointment as Commander in Chief of the Army, Pinochet led a coup that ousted Allende, who committed suicide in his office during the coup. There were allegations that Allende’s suicide may not have been voluntary or that he was murdered outright. The allegations were never pursued to any effect. General Prats was assassinated while in exile in Argentina; another human rights violation and atrocity attributed to the Pinochet regime.

Pinochet quickly reversed many of the economic and social changes that Allende had implemented. He established a free-market economy that produced an economic boom between 1977 and 1981. The Chilean people seemed more than happy to exchange democracy for economic and political stability. In 1980, Chileans ratified a constitution of Pinochet’s design by an overwhelming 70 percent. This was a result, in part, of the economic, social, and political stability that Pinochet had achieved. The constitution legalized the regime until 1989, and Pinochet began another eight-year
term as president in March 1981. The dividends of Pinochet’s regime were not enduring, however.

The economy suffered a downturn in 1982 because of the global recession, and in 1984, Pinochet declared a state of emergency following a series of bombings and popular unrest. The leftist influence that manifested itself so often throughout Chilean history had been placated by the economic good times, but regained new vigor through the disharmony created by the downturn of the economy. The situation worsened with increased repressive measures following an attempt on Pinochet’s life in 1986.

In 1988, in accordance with his own constitution, Pinochet conducted a plebiscite to determine if the Chilean people would support his continued rule of Chile until 1997. Despite strong-arm tactics and repressive measures with regard to the opposition during the voting, Chileans still voted 54 percent to 43 percent against extending Pinochet’s rule (with 3 percent undecided). Pinchistas like to point out the close margin of the vote to illustrate just how close the Chilean people were to voting to leave Pinochet in power. People opposed to Pinochet, however, claim that he went to great lengths to influence the outcome of the plebiscite through intimidation and other underhanded tactics. The significance of the closeness in the vote is mitigated by these claims.

In 1989, Chile held open elections as a result of the plebiscite, and Patricio Aylwin was elected to office. Pinochet’s influence and role in governing the country was not completely eliminated by his removal from office. The constitution established
during his tenure as president allowed him to remain in charge of the armed forces until 1997, and allowed him to become a senator for life upon retirement.

The Chilean Army has a relatively high degree of formal authority as a result, in part, of the Constitution ratified during Pinochet's regime. The relative level is high with regard to other governmental institutions because of the safeguards Pinochet built into the constitution to protect himself and the interests of the army.

Pinochet built safeguards into the constitution to provide for the safety of the military. The political right was reinforced with provisions for designated senators and a binomial electoral system, but the most significant measure in establishing a high relative level of formal authority within the government came from reserving seats in the Senate for nonelected officials selected by the outgoing military regime. The result of these measures meant that over one-third of the Senate would be comprised of rightists sympathetic to the armed forces. This weighting of the Senate is also significant in terms of informal influence, as it provides for a great deal of hierarchical impenetration and influence from group affiliations. The senators, while not Army officers, represent their interests in the government.

The National Security Council (NSC) established by Pinochet in the constitution is composed of military officers, and provides for an extraordinary level of formal authority in terms of its scope by giving it veto power over a wide range of policies. Pinochet ensured his own position as commander of the army by constitutionally limiting the president's ability to dismiss the chiefs of the army, navy, air force, and Carabineros (the militarized police). Pinochet further strengthened the military's (and his own)
position by building provisions against amendments to the constitution. These provisions virtually ensured that the political right supporting the military would not have their power base removed.

Contemporary Chilean Politics

The Chilean government has managed to make decisions strongly opposed by the military in recent years despite the legal obstacles left by Pinochet and has managed to make some headway in terms of removing some of the military’s legislative support and influence. These changes came only after a great deal of struggle within the political arena, and consist primarily in changes to the balance of power in the senate. This does not change the fact, however, that the military in Chile still enjoys tremendous political power throughout the three subsets of Huntington’s model with regard to the relative unity, level of authority, and scope of their power.

The Chilean military also enjoys a relatively high level of informal influence. The primary source of the military’s informal influence comes from the subset of economic and human resources. A percentage of the military’s income is independent of legislation and budgetary decisions because it comes directly from the mining corporation Codelco; one of the country’s state-owned industries. Ten percent of the revenue from Codelco goes to the military. The fact that such an important state-owned industry provided a percentage of its profits directly to the military further expands the military’s informal influence. Group affiliations are enhanced by the military’s connection with the copper mining industry. The military has a vested interest in the copper industry, and has strong ties with that community. The military becomes a
powerful supporter because of its ties to the copper industry, and is able to use its high level of formal authority and scope within the government to look out for the welfare of the copper industry. The copper industry and its members, on the other hand, become supporters of the military, and the military’s position is strengthened further.

The military’s informal influence is further strengthened by the lack of civilian hierarchical impenetration of the officer corps. The Chilean defense structure does not have a position similar to the U.S. Secretary of Defense or Secretary of the Army held by civilians, so the military structure enjoys a high amount of relative unity in addition to an extremely low level of hierarchical impenetration.

The final element of the power level left to examine is the prestige and popularity of the officer corps. The Chilean people do not all feel the same way towards the military. The political right views the military as the institution that saved the country from ruin during Allende’s presidency, while the leftist see it as the agency responsible for severe civil rights violations and outright criminal activity in some of its actions. While both are somewhat correct, an effective barometer of public opinion is to measure the success of subsequent regimes to effect changes in the country against the formidable constitutional safeguards and political structure left by Pinochet.

Patricio Aylwin, Pinochet’s immediate successor, was able to reinforce the power of the president vis-à-vis the military, but he had limited success breaking through many of the important constraints left by Pinochet. His limited success was due in part to the fact that he was a consensus candidate without strong political backing from any of the political sectors. Aylwin’s limited legislative success makes it difficult to use as a gauge
of the popularity of the military in terms of public reaction--there simply were not enough changes against which to gauge reaction.

Eduardo Frei Ruiz-Tagle, Aylwin's successor, has been more successful in strengthening the government in relation to the military, and has gained widespread popular support in the process. The degree of support he has received indicates that the degree of informal influence coming from the prestige and popularity of the military is not that great. Frei won the election by an impressive margin -- 58 percent of the vote -- on a platform of reducing military power and increasing civilian authority. A year and a half after taking office, he submitted a series of sweeping changes to the constitution that would greatly reduce the effects of Pinochet's safeguards. Among the changes are the elimination of the right-wing designated senators and a restructuring of the national Security Council that would greatly increase civilian participation. The inclusion of civilians in the Security Council decreases the military's formal authority by reducing its relative level of authority within the government, and decreases its relative unity. The important thing to note in these changes, however, is that 60 percent of the population favors these changes, as shown in public opinion polls. The large percentage of the population favoring the reduction of the military's influence indicates, like the large part of the electorate that voted for Frei, that the Chilean people want to reduce the power and influence of the military, or as a minimum, are ambivalent enough to allow the reduction in power.

The political ideology of the Chilean people is inextricably linked to the military's prestige and popularity. Although the country has the normal diversity among social and
economic classes, it is notable that the population is very homogenous with regard to ethnicity. Mestizos, descendents of Spanish conquistadors and Native Americans, constitute more than ninety two percent of the current population. Two percent of the population are Europeans that have not intermarried, and six percent are Native Americans that have remained unmixed. With such a homogenous population, the political ideology is then split along economic and social lines, as opposed to ethnic lines.

Although the current administration can best be described as Liberal, there remains a strong Marxist influence in the country, as seen in the organization of the political parties in the country. Chile has several political parties despite having such a homogenous population, with two major groups—the Coalition of Parties for Democracy (CPD) and the Union for the progress of Chile (UPP). The CPD consists of the Christian Democratic Party (PDC), the Socialist Party (PS), the Party for Democracy (PPD), and the Radical Social Democratic Party (PRSD). The UPP consists of just two groups; the National Renewal party (RN), and the Independent Democratic Union party (UDI). There are also political pressure groups with Marxist leanings in the student federations at all major universities. Labor Unions also play a part in political pressure with the United Labor Central (CUT). CUT includes trade unionists from the country's five largest labor confederations, which together form a formidable influence on social and political issues.

Analysis

The pattern of civil military relations that emerges from this analysis based on Huntington's theory is typical of Latin America. Chile has an antimilitary ideology, with a Libertarian government in place, and strong Marxist influence through political pressure
groups. It is interesting to note that at one time, the Chilean people identified much
closer with the military, as the French did after the French Revolution. The frequent
changes in government and general political instability during the sixties and seventies in
Chile left the people without a strong sense of commitment to their government as the
embodiment of the nation. In both cases, the military filled the void. For the French, the
military was the nation, and it was the same for the Chilean people in the period
immediately after the coup that put Pinochet in power. The downturn of the economy and
the extensive civil rights violations during the military regime helped distance the people
from the military, and contributed to the resurgence of a desire for civilian rule.

Despite the return of civilian rule and a demonstrated willingness by the people to
reduce the power of the military, the Chilean military still wields a tremendous amount of
influence throughout the spectrum of formal authority and informal influence. The high
degree of relative power that the military possesses is obviously part of Pinochet’s
enduring legacy. Aylwin began the process of reestablishing the authority of the
president over the military, and Frei has taken even greater steps towards establishing a
more stable pattern of civil military relations. The other major contributing factor to the
Chilean military’s high level of relative power was the perceived need to have a strong
military to counter insurgents and transnational threats during the cold war. Chile is not
alone in this problem, as most of the Latin American countries are now struggling to
reestablish positive, stable civil military relations and increase professionalism within
their militaries.
The Chilean military, by definition, is unprofessional. The military under Pinochet violated the constitution and the sanctity of civilian rule to pursue political ends. One may argue, as the military has, that the coup was a result of their patriotism. Love of country forced the military to take matters into their own hands and shoulder the responsibility of leading the country through a time of crisis, or so they will have you believe. *Chile: Los Militares y la Politica* by Colonel Carlos Molina Johnson of the Chilean army provides an excellent example of this belief. The book was published under Pinochet’s direction for dissemination within the military. The book is designed to educate the military on its role in public life in Chile, and to explain the “heroic and patriotic gesture” made by the military under Pinochet in order to save the country (Johnson 1991, 56). The fact remains, however, no matter how genuine the military’s belief in its cause or noble its purpose, that when the military abandons its political objectivity and operates outside of its professional constraints, then it has surrendered its professionalism. The Chilean military has done much to reestablish its professionalism. Pinochet himself showed remarkable restraint when officers loyal to him were convicted of war crimes after Pinochet was removed from the presidency. There was a general fear that Pinochet would once again use the military to impose his will on the government, but he ultimately allowed his former cohorts to go to prison.

The pattern of civil military relations that we are therefore presented with in Chile is one of antimilitary ideology, high military political power, and low military professionalism. The question becomes one of determining the most effective way to institute effective civilian control of the military and determine an ideal pattern of civil
military relations. Huntington states, as mentioned earlier, that subjective control is out of place in modern society, where the military is a distinct class of professional schooled in the management of violence. Objective control of the military requires a high degree of professionalism; something that is clearly lacking in the Chilean army. Huntington states that "the essence of objective civilian control is the recognition of autonomous military professionalism" (Huntington 1957, 83). The problem of instituting civilian control of the military in an environment that does not readily support objective control is not unique to Chile. Unfortunately, the pattern of relatively high military power and low professionalism exists throughout Latin America, regardless of the political ideologies.

Huntington makes subjective control of the military sound anachronistic in the modern era, yet there are theorists that propose using elements of subjective control with objective control in Latin America, where the critical element of professionalism is lacking. Deborah L. Norden comments that "it is feasible and probably even desirable to combine Huntington's subjective and objective control" in discussing the problem Venezuela has encountered in establishing effective civil military relations (Norden 1998, 15). Objective control is the ideal form of civil military relations. Where the existing pattern does not support objective control, the goal then is to have elements of subjective control make up for missing elements of objective control. In this instance, the missing element for successful objective control of the military is professionalism within the military.

Subjective control, by definition, is built on the requirement to have the military identify with the ideology of the state, so that both the state and the military are working
towards the same goals. In theory, there would be no reason for conflict in such a situation. Norden points out that: "Effective subjective control requires two conditions above all: ideological convergence between the civilians in power and the armed forces, and consistency of ideas and identifications within the military" (Norden 1998, 15). Unfortunately, Chile’s antimilitary Liberal political ideology and the military ideology do not mesh well. The problem of subjective control is not getting the military to identify with civilian groups; it is the danger inherent in the military adopting any one group’s agenda or political objectives. In 1973, the military identified too strongly with the right wing conservatives, with catastrophic results for Allende’s government. Ultimately, attempting to control the military by having them identify with a political ideology is too risky, given the vagaries of political trends, and the risk of a subversive civilian group, such as the conservatives in Chile, to influence the military to its own ends.

Norden’s second requirement, consistency of ideas and identifications within the military, is not difficult to achieve in Chile. The military in Chile is not far removed from Pinochet’s influence. There are generations of officers still in the military that came up through the ranks while Pinochet was in power, and were greatly influenced and homogenized in their ideology by having him as their commander.

With only half of the equation (by Norden’s definition) for successful subjective civilian control of the military met, it seems that the only subjective element available as a replacement for professionalism in the objective model is the consistency of ideas and identifications or homogeneity within the military. The homogeneity of the Chilean military actually, then, becomes the key to successful civilian rule of the military and
effective civil military relations. Homogeneity makes indoctrination of the military with a professional ideology, which divorces them from the political aspects of the government, more feasible. Although it would be possible to inculcate professional values in the Chilean military and ultimately allow a pattern of objective civil military relations without homogeneity, a consensus of thought allows greater leverage and makes the process remarkably easier.

Civil military relations play a vital and central role in stability operations in Latin America, and especially Chile. Chile’s long history of political unrest, although exacerbated by the cold war, preceded it and is still a danger to national stability after the end of it. A politically involved military is counter to stable civil military relations, and is a continuing threat to the stability of the country.

The process of subordinating the military to civilian rule begun by Aylwin and furthered by Frei is a continuing one, and one that is vital to the stability of Chile and Latin America. Latin America has too many influences and competing ideologies for the concept of true subjective civilian control of the military to work; the danger of military subjugation by an ideology counter to national stability is too great. The key to successful civil military relations comes full circle to professionalizing the military as the key to successful objective control. In this light, the long list of recommendations made by the attendees of the conference on the role of the Armed Forces in the Americas (see appendix) seem much less heavy handed than they would when seen objectively. Fulfillment of these recommendations is a necessary element to achieving effective civil military relations and stability in Chile and Latin America.
CHAPTER FIVE
CONCLUSION

Civil military relations play a key role in stability operations. The stability of any nation depends on many factors, but when the greatest threat to the legitimate government comes from the nation’s own military, the relationship between the government and the armed forces becomes paramount.

Chile, as a microcosm of Latin America, is not the only country presented with the problem of drawing down a Cold war era military and developing a national defense policy that reflects the postcold war security environment. Latin America, however, does not possess the U.S. advantage of having objective control of the military by virtue of its professional military. Latin America is confronted with the dual missions of establishing objective civilian control of the military, and also drawing the military down to a level that meets the national security needs as established by the civilian leadership. The danger lies in reducing the size and relative power of the military without first having established a pattern of civil military relations where the military is subordinate to the government by subjective control (co--opting their goals and ideology), or objective control (professionalizing the military and making them politically sterile). The civilian government must establish dominance over the military and bring it under civilian control before attempting to take any actions that the military might perceive as a threat to its existence. As long as the military has a separate ideology from that of the government and considers itself a political actor, there is a danger of backlash from attempting to reduce its relative power.
The list of recommendations in the annex from the *Conference Report on the Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas* seems very heavy-handed when viewed from outside the context of objective civil military relations. This apparent heavy-handedness is reminiscent of the American involvement in internal political affairs in Latin America from the first half of the twentieth century through the cold war, as discussed, that resulted in a general mistrust of American motives today. This distrust of American motives is probably what prompted Luis Bitencourt to make the comment that “the U.S. is a friend of Latin America, whether we like it or not” (Schulz 1998, 100) with regard to complying with the suggestions made at the conference.

The suggestions seem much less heavy-handed and directive in nature when viewed from within the perspective of attempting to make changes in the pattern of civil military relations in Latin America. The suggestions touch on both subjective and objective aspects of civil military relations, with an emphasis on the objective--attempting to professionalize the military.

The suggestions that came out of the conference also touch on an important aspect of relative power--the need for the government to step in and take control of areas where it seeks to reduce military involvement. The need for the government to step in and take charge means, in many cases, that politicians will have to become proficient in areas that historically have been left to the military. The politicians and legitimate government will have to take charge of policy decisions as they relate to the military, and become involved in national defense policy and security strategies to ensure that they meet the legitimate government’s objectives, and not just the military’s.
The government will also have to resist the temptation to use the military in roles that jeopardize the military's burgeoning professionalism. The temptation to use the military in civic action roles is great, especially in situations where assets are limited and the military is seemingly unemployed. Continuing to use the military in internal roles unrelated to national defense will only keep them involved in internal administrative areas better suited to civilian police or similar bodies.

Another tempting but potentially military damaging is peacekeeping operations. The military should be left to adapt to its newly defined role in external defense, and to making those changes necessary to help become more professional. Peacekeeping operations are risky enough with a professional force, but are too similar to the sort of internal police actions the militaries of Chile and Latin America undertook in the past. The military must divorce itself completely from the experience of becoming involved in internal police actions to help reduce the temptation for them to become involved in their own country. A mature, professional military such as the British or American militaries can become involved in peacekeeping operations and operations other than war without the temptation to take those same lessons and paradigms and apply them on home soil. Most of the militaries in Latin America have a history of internal involvement, and the risk of them taking home the lessons of using the military in civil defense or other internal roles is too great.

Both the governments and militaries in Chile and in Latin America need to have the opportunity and support to make the changes necessary without the distractions of peacekeeping operations and other operations other than war. They need to have the
opportunity to adjust to the global changes in the balance of power and to adjust their role in terms of economics and transnational threats, such as drugs and terrorism. They need the opportunity to restructure their internal structure such that the legitimate government is in a position to make defensive policy and is willing to do so. Lastly, they need to be allowed the opportunity to restructure their internal police force so that the military is not involved in internal security issues. Only when these steps are taken, and Chile and Latin America develop a pattern of objective civil military relations can stability in the region be assured.
APPENDIX

SSI RECOMMENDATIONS

The following list of recommendations is from the Strategic Studies Institute (SSI) recommendations to Latin America and U.S. leaders on civil military relations (Schulz 1998, vii). They are a compilation of recommendations made by the SSI following the Conference on the Role of the Armed Forces in the Americas.

For Latin American Policy Makers:

- Military institutions should consider unprecedented levels of civil military dialogue and regional cooperation.

- New arrangements for domestic and regional security cooperation should be informed by effective civilian control over the military and the adoption of a hemispheric approach as a supplement to nationalism.

- In general, democratically elected civilian leaders should move more aggressively to strengthen their control over the military.

- At the same time, those leaders must assume leadership in developing an effective defense policy. It is the responsibility of the civilians, rather than the military, to decide where and how armed force is used. The latter, however, should play an important advisory role. The relationship is best achieved through a frank and constructive dialogue that recognizes the political responsibilities of civilian officials and technical expertise of military professionals.

-- A fundamental intermediate step is a national commitment to train and educate civilian professionals in strategic affairs and the leadership and management of defense institutions. This requires the creation of think tanks, the financing of research projects and the organization of conferences and seminars that can bring together civilians, and military officers in shared educational experiences where they can interact and learn from each other.

-- The Latin American armed forces should open up their national defense and war colleges to senior governmental officials and other key political actors who would benefit from the educational programs offered at those institutions.

-- The Latin American militaries should establish liaison offices with Congress.

-- Since public opinion of the military’s role are of great importance to the development of functional inter-institutional relations, a civil military dialogue should be fostered to help build public confidence.
• There must be a decision at the national level on the division of responsibilities between the military, police, and other public safety institutions. Here national traditions, values, needs and capabilities should provide the guidelines. Again, civilian authorities must take the lead. One should expect considerable variation in policy from country to country.

-- The answer to extensive police corruption is police and judicial reform, rather than the militarization of law enforcement (which exposes the armed forces to corruption and diverts them from military training).

• There must be a singular decision at the national level with regard to the military’s use in national development/civic action programs. Again, such decisions must be made on a country--by country basis in accordance with the values, needs, and capabilities of each country.

• Once policy is established, civilian and military leaders should work closely together to prepare and defend before Congress a budget that realistically meets the armed forces’ needs. This would both help legitimize military spending and hold policy makers accountable.

• Since the reformulation of inter-institutional relations is at an early stage in much of the hemisphere, states looking for models to emulate should examine the processes in the most advanced countries, where the civil military dialogue had already led to extensive cooperation. Continued regional exchanges of personnel are highly recommended.

• With regard to peacekeeping Operations (PKOs), it is recommend that educational and training systems be created that would focus on military, governmental and nongovernmental activities involving PKOs. Such systems should include think tanks, like the Army’s Peacekeeping Institute, where key issues and strategies could be identified, and specialized training centers, like Uruguay’s Center for Instruction for Peacekeeping Operations. The funding of peacekeeping conferences and roundtables can also be a great help in determining whether the region’s armed forces have the capabilities to undertake specific operations.

• Along these same lines, it would be useful to have more general “cooperative education/training” programs and institutes involving military and civilian participants with regard to a whole range of national security issues.

• Laws inhibiting subregional cooperation -- for instance, those preventing the sharing of defense information -- need to be reviewed and revised when deemed desirable.
• Human rights education should be incorporated into the military’s training and instructional system at all levels.

For U.S. and Latin American Policymakers.

• There is a need for new multinational hemispheric security doctrine for security cooperation. This should complement, rather than displace, national objectives and establish agreement on the basic common denominators of hemispheric security cooperation.

-- This doctrine should be supplemented by greater levels of multilateral cooperation among police and judicial officials. This would occur through channels separate and distinct from those providing armed forces cooperation on security matters.

• The basic elements of this new hemispheric security might include commitments to:

-- improve cooperation with regard to information on the transit of vessels and aircraft to prevent the illegal use of national territory;

-- improve the exchange of climatological information from sources available to the military;

-- enhance information exchanges on insurgent groups operating near borders in order to prevent the establishment of sanctuaries;

-- exchange information on potential arms purchases to prevent misinterpretation of intentions;

-- debrief results of bilateral and multilateral military exercises so all countries in the region can benefit from investments in training;

-- define support functions that can be efficiently provided to those forces combating drug trafficking in the region; and

-- eventually reach an agreement on the specialization of functions by some armed forces, particularly those of smaller states. Here NATO can provide a model.

• For the new security model to work, a multilateral defense architecture must be developed that cannot be dominated by any single country. This would be constructed under the authority and through the cooperation of national defense ministers, thus assuring its consistency with the principle of civilian control. This architecture would include:
-- the establishment of a defense secretariat devoted to meetings of the ministers of
defense. This body would coordinate the meetings and provide periodic follow-up
on resolutions adopted at those sessions;

-- coordinate by that same secretariat of agendas for meetings of the Conference of
American Armies and chiefs of the regional air forces and navies to focus on
commitments arranged through the hemispheric security doctrine;

-- creation of electronic communications systems to better link defense establishments
for purposes of exchanging information related to the hemispheric security doctrine;
and

-- periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials below the rank of minister to
review the mechanisms of security cooperation implemented by defense institutions.

- There should be more communication and cooperation among the components of the
Inter-American Defense System, such as the Organization of American States
(especially its commission on Hemispheric Security) and the Inter-American Defense
Board, and the various conferences and ministerials.

- The Inter-American Defense Board (IADB) should take the lead in developing a
defense secretariat devoted to meetings of the ministers of defense, as proposed
above. The secretariat would coordinate those meetings, as well as those of the
Conferences of American Armies and regional air forces and navies.

- The IADB should also sponsor periodic meetings of senior defense ministry officials
below the rank of minister to review the mechanisms of security cooperation.

- The U.S. Department of Defense and the Inter-American Defense Board should
provide funding and other support to think tanks, such as the recently established
Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies in Washington, DC, devoted to the
development of civilian competence in defense and security matters. Such institutes
should not be limited to the United States, but should be established throughout Latin
America. Some could be affiliated with national defense war colleges, as is being
done in some countries; others could be associated with civilian universities; and still
others might be independent. They should share, however, a common purpose of
national security education, and should be strictly nonpartisan and nonpolitical in
nature.

- The U.S. Department of Defense, the Inter-American Defense Board and associated
institutions, such as SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College and other military
institutions, should increase their sponsorship of educational and training facilities
devoted to Peacekeeping Operations. The continued sponsorship of conferences and
roundtables on peacekeeping themes is also useful in identifying key issues and
strategies, and assessing regional capabilities for undertaking certain kinds of operations. Consideration might even be given to the creation of a regional Peacekeeping Institute, modeled perhaps on the U.S. Army's PKI. This institution would strictly be educational, rather than operational, in nature.

- The U.S. Department of Defense, the Inter-American Defense Board and associated institutions, such as SOUTHCOM, the U.S. Army War College and other military institutions, should continue to sponsor conferences, workshops, seminars and other meetings designed to facilitate civilian military interaction, both in the United States and the other countries in the hemisphere. This should be part of a broad program to educate both civilian and military cultures about each other, as well as about the challenges to national and international security in the 21st century.

- There should be increased educational efforts to better define and implement the goals of the Inter-American Defense System, including the defense of democracy and human rights, the maintenance of security, and the containment of criminality.

- A greater effort should be made to promote civilian participation in the Inter-American Defense System. The region's militaries have generally agreed to redefine their roles in decision making, but civilians are often poorly informed and uninterested. To assist them, the military should recognize them as the constituencies of the system, and help them become involved in all of its aspects.

- An effort should be made to develop a hemispheric counternarcotics policy. Among other things, the role of the Organization of American States should be strengthened by giving its Inter-American Commission Against Drug Abuse (CICAD) authority to evaluate the counternarcotics performance of OAS members.

- A more mature relationship between Latin America and the United States must be developed, abandoning the historic tendency of the latter to intervene in its neighbor's political affairs. There should be a reinforcement of contacts at the level of parliaments, political parties, and ministries of defense and foreign affairs in order to balance the influence of the U.S. Southern Command.

- There should be a substantial increase, monitored by the OAS, of cooperation among all areas of government at the national, subregional and hemispheric levels that have the responsibility for addressing new threats.

- There should be a strengthening of all political and diplomatic organizations, including Non-Governmental Organizations, that have a role in conflict resolution, using their experiences in past peacekeeping and mediation efforts to build a regional security structure that is not overly dependent on military instruments.
• There should be a resolution of the modernization versus arms race dilemma in order to permit all countries in reasonable proportion to their legitimate defense needs under the concept of cooperative equilibrium, to count on their armed forces when the duly elected civilian leadership determines it is necessary.

• Several recommendations were made with regard to Peacekeeping Operations:

  -- PKOs should be limited to countries outside the subregion concerned in order to alleviate fears and suspicions of intervention and partiality.

  -- Most of the funding should come from either the United Nations or other international and regional sources. Too much funding from a single country creates dependency, and can easily distort the purposes of the operation or result in a loss of political resolve.

  -- Authorization to use force must be clearly outlined. Force should be used only in extreme circumstances, including self-defense.

• More resources, including transfers from the wealthier countries to poorer countries, are needed to promote subregional cooperation, especially with regard to countering organized crime and narcotrafficking. As matters now stand, resource scarcity is a major obstacle to such cooperation. Effective information sharing and operational cooperation require compatible equipment, as well as transportation and personnel. There are also significant asymmetries between states in terms of the capacities of their security institutions, differences which need to be addressed for cooperation to be effective.

• Follow-up conferences to the Santa Fe meeting are recommended in order to further develop and flesh out courses of action for U.S. and Latin American policymakers, both military and civilian.

For U.S. Policymakers

• The United States should act as a catalyst for multilateral cooperation.

• Greatly expanded police and judicial training assistance should be provided to Latin American countries to strengthen civilian institutions so that Latin Americans do not become dependent on the use of the military for law enforcement.

• U.S. military support for nontraditional roles and missions (e.g., counternarcotics, law enforcement, economic development) of the Latin American armed forces should be given only at the request of the duly elected civilian authority.
-- Support for the Latin American militaries’ law enforcement missions should be given only under exceptional circumstances, when the rule of law has broken down and the police and other security institutions cannot cope with the threats posed by growing criminal activity. Such supports should be conceived as temporary in nature, lasting only as long as it takes to develop competent and honest civilian institutions.

- U.S. military sales to Latin America, especially those involving advanced weapons systems, should be made on a case-by-case basis, taking into account the legitimate security needs of the countries involved, and exercising care not to destabilize any regional or subregional balances of power. The initiation and authorization for such purchases must come from the democratically elected civilian authority, rather than the armed forces.

- The U.S. Department of Defense should increase resource transfers to Latin America to promote subregional cooperation. Compatible communications equipment, transportation, and training are especially needed.

For the U.S. Military

- The U.S. Southern Command should take the lead in creating electronic communications systems to improve the sharing of security information between the hemisphere’s defense establishments.

- The U.S. National Guard’s State to State Partnership Program should be expanded to develop partnerships with more Latin American militaries in response to requests from the duly constituted civilian authorities in those countries.

- Human rights training for the Latin American armed forces should be continued and expanded at all levels.
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