JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION 1999: WHERE TO NOW?

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

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Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
AD BELLUM PACE PARATI

1999

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Joint Professional Military Education 1999: Where To Now?

Lt Col Michael K. Carney

This research examined the evolution of joint education at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from the days before the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to today. Analysis led to recommendations to improve joint education at the intermediate Service school level throughout the Armed Forces.

Analysis indicated that the Command and General Staff College was meeting, and oftentimes, exceeding the minimum requirements for joint education as dictated by law and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy. The author proposes changes to the officer education architecture to increase the number of officers fully educated in joint matters and to improve the quality of joint education. Recommendations include: a unified intermediate Service school curriculum throughout all the Service colleges, an even mix of Service representation in both student staff groups and faculty at all schools, and the changing of the intermediate Service school focus from a Service-oriented education with some joint education to a joint education with some Service education.
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Director, Graduate Degree Programs
Philip J. Brookes, Ph.D.

The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This research examined the evolution of joint education at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, from the days before the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 to today (1999). Analysis led to recommendations to improve joint education at the intermediate Service school level throughout the Armed Forces.

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To my parents, John and Ann Carney, thank you for all your support in everything I do--I will “keep pluggin’!”

Renée, Sarah, Joseph, and David--thank you for patiently listening to me talk about joint education for the last two years! This thesis is dedicated to you.
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<tr>
<td>ACSC</td>
<td>Air Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>AFSC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Staff College</td>
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<td>AFSOC</td>
<td>Armed Forces Staff Officers Course</td>
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<td>AWC</td>
<td>Air War College</td>
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<td>CGSC</td>
<td>United States Army Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>CGSOS</td>
<td>US Army Command and General Staff Officers Course</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIA</td>
<td>Central Intelligence Agency</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CJCSI</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction</td>
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<td>DCSOPS</td>
<td>Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations</td>
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<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FBI</td>
<td>Federal Bureau of Investigation</td>
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<td>FY</td>
<td>Fiscal Year</td>
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<td>GPO</td>
<td>Government Printing Office</td>
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<td>ILC</td>
<td>Intermediate-Level College like the Army Command and General Staff College or Air Command and Staff College</td>
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<td>ISS</td>
<td>Intermediate Service School</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JDAL</td>
<td>Joint Duty Authorization List</td>
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<td>JFC</td>
<td>Joint Force Commander</td>
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<td>JOPES</td>
<td>Joint Operations Planning and Execution System</td>
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<td>JPME</td>
<td>Joint Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>JSO</td>
<td>Joint Specialty Officer</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>MECC</td>
<td>Military Education Coordination Conference</td>
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<td>MOOTW</td>
<td>Military Operations other than War</td>
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<td>MTW</td>
<td>Major Theater War</td>
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<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
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<td>National Command Authority</td>
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<td>National Defense University</td>
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<td>Naval Postgraduate School</td>
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<td>National Security Council</td>
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<td>Officers Professional Military Education Policy</td>
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<td>Process for Accreditation of Joint Education</td>
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<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
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<td>Publication</td>
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<td>SAE</td>
<td>Special Area of Emphasis</td>
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<td>School of Advanced Military Studies</td>
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<td>SSS</td>
<td>Senior Service School</td>
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<td>US</td>
<td>United States of America</td>
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<td>United States Army</td>
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<td>USACGSC</td>
<td>United States Army Command and General Staff College</td>
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CHAPTER ONE
INTRODUCTION

While a student at the Armed Forces Staff College Joint Staff Officers Course at Norfolk, Virginia, the author began to question whether joint education was really getting us there. Was all the effort, time, and money spent on joint curricula accomplishing the implied goal of making the United States Armed Forces more effective? Now, as an instructor at the US Army Command and General Staff College at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, the author is often frustrated by fellow faculty members', of all Services and backgrounds, lack of understanding of the capabilities and limitations of sister Services and of how the joint team is designed to fight and win together. The author chose to investigate how Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) developed and determine whether the United States has got it right, and if not, in what direction joint military education needs to move to get it right.

To better understand Joint Professional Military Education, consider the formative events that have brought joint education to what is known today:

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (from here on referred to as the Goldwater-Nichols Act) was perhaps the most significant piece of defense-related legislation in the later half of the Twentieth Century.¹ This law had dramatic implications across the entire Department of Defense, but the aspects that effected Joint Professional Military Education most dramatically were the creation of Joint Specialty Officers (JSOs) and the requirement to begin to develop joint doctrine.
The process of creating Joint Specialty Officers requires substantial investment by the Services in terms of money and time—time spent in formal education and time spent managing Joint Specialty Officer assignments. The Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, the second part of the two-part joint officer education program, graduates only about 884 officers each year. This flow, compared to the approximately 6,825 officers promoted to major/lieutenant commander each year gives a sense for how few officers at this level, less than 13 percent, are fully educated in joint matters. See figure 1.

Nearly all of these 884 officers who complete their joint education annually are destined to fill some of the 9,371 joint duty assignment billets or positions. These joint billets are primarily found in the staffs of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Staff, and the Unified CINC staffs. Only a handful are found at lower levels within each Service such as Army corps and divisions, Navy numbered fleets, Marine expeditionary forces, and numbered air forces. There is no formal requirement for an officer to have joint education in order to serve on these Service staffs. But these same Service staffs form the planning and execution nucleus of Joint Task Forces (JTFs). Joint Task Forces are ad hoc fighting organizations which are called to bring necessary capabilities of all the Services together under a single joint command. The organization is commanded by a Joint Task Force Commander who should understand joint matters fully. The commander’s staff is made up of officers from all the Services who must work well and efficiently together to assure success in action. These lower-echelon Service organizations (numbered air forces, numbered fleets, Marine expeditionary forces, and corps) are the Joint Task Forces’ land component commanders, air component
commanders, amphibious component commanders, and maritime component commanders and their staffs. Consider, too, that within the air component of a Joint Task Force, there may be aircraft and personnel from not only the Air Force, but the Navy, Marine Corps, and even the Army--how well can planners, who do not understand the capabilities and limitations of the other Services forces, hope to employ these forces
effectively? The entire Joint Task Force is designed to fight as a unit with a single vision and intent. How well can Service forces work together if they don’t understand each other’s strengths, weaknesses, and procedures? Surely these Service staffs would be more effective at bringing all the different Service’s capabilities together with their own if more officers were educated in joint matters.

Joint Professional Military Education is a key nutrient in growing joint officers; men and women who are able to meld their Service’s capabilities with those of the other Services in all of the types of missions the military is called upon to execute. It appears that the Congress, Services, Joint Staff, and civilian leadership are quite comfortable with Joint Professional Military Education as it exists today. Have they found the answer or have they simply stagnated? This nagging question leads to this thesis.

The US Army Command and General Staff College is the senior statesman of intermediate Service schools. As an institution, it has been in operation since 1881 when General William S. Sherman strove to “Qualify officers for any duty that they may be called upon to perform, or for any position however high in rank that they may aspire to in Service.”\(^6\) While the college has undergone numerous changes over the decades, it remains a recognized leader in officer education. Today, civilian accreditation and military curriculum evaluators give it high marks. This author chose to examine the state of Joint Professional Military Education in general by examining Joint Professional Military Education at Fort Leavenworth in particular. Lessons learned in this thesis may have applicability to other Service schools. This author is physically located at Command and General Staff College where he has ready access to curriculum
information, and more importantly, the men and women who execute Joint Professional Military Education today and helped shape it in the past.

Methodology

A dozen years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, is the United States Military on the right track with Joint Professional Military Education? To answer this question, this thesis will:

1. Examine the law. What did elected officials lay down as the requirements for joint education and why?

2. Examine the Policies. What policies and procedures, if any, were put in place by the Secretary of Defense, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and the Army Command and General Staff College to enact the Congress’ edicts?

3. Examine the mechanism of ensuring continued compliance. What policies and procedures were established to ensure compliance to the law and report back to Congress?

4. Discuss how these requirements have been translated into real-life education at the Army Command and General Staff College.

By applying subjective and sound judgment criteria to the evidence and comparing the information discussed above, this thesis will present conclusions as to how effective Joint Professional Military Education is, and what, if anything, needs to be changed to better meet the needs of the modern joint warfighter. Is the current system of joint education producing a sufficient quality and quantity of officers educated in joint matters?
Before this thesis can address the preceding question, the author will examine the available literature on the subject of Joint Professional Military Education. Next, an examination of the legislation and policies will provide a framework for looking at Joint Professional Military Education today. The examination of what joint education looked like before the changes stirred by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and what the state of Joint Professional Military Education is now will provide the basis for analysis. Finally, this thesis will propose where the US Military should go next with Joint Professional Military Education to give the United States a more effective military force and make recommendations for further research beyond the scope of this project.

Limitations and Delimitations

The thesis research scope is limited to examination of Joint Professional Military Education at the intermediate Service school level, using the Command and General Staff Officer's Course at the US Army Command and General Staff College as the basis of this research. While the actual intermediate Service school at the Command and General Staff College is the Command and General Staff Officers Course, it is more commonly referred to by the overarching school name, the Command and General Staff College. In examining the development of Joint Professional Military Education, this thesis will concentrate on what Joint Professional Military Education aspects were present before the Goldwater-Nichols Act and how it grew into what is known today.

While the thesis focus is on intermediate-level, in-residence Joint Professional Military Education at the US Army Command and General Staff College, many of the
lessons may well apply to other Service schools and Joint Professional Military Education in general.

\(^1\)Public Law 99-433 [H.R. 3622]; October 1, 1986, 100 STAT. 992.


\(^3\)FY 1998 promotion figures are from the individual Service personnel Internet websites:

- Navy: http://bupers.navy.mil
- Air Force: http://www.afpc.randolf.af.mil
- Marine Corps: http://tripoli.manpower.usmc.mil
- Army: http://www-perscom.army.mil

\(^4\)Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, Command and General Staff College, “CGSC Overview Briefing” (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff college, 1998, photocopied).
CHAPTER TWO

LITERATURE REVIEW

There has been much research, discussion, and writing on many aspects of the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act (Goldwater-Nichols Act) and subsequent legislation, panels, and policies, but relatively little on whether joint professional military education today is on track or what it needs to be in the future. The author presents this review in chronological order so any logical development over time is more evident.

"Joint Professional Military Education: Are We There Yet?"

Congressman Ike Skelton, the chairman of the House Armed Services Committee chartered Panel on Military Education, in his 1992 Military Review article, "Joint Professional Military Education: Are We There Yet?," stated his insistence that good joint officers are first and foremost Service experts.¹ He provides an excellent synopsis of the history of the legislation and the reasoning behind it. He encourages an examination of a joint School of Advanced Military Studies (SAMS) concept as well. The School of Advanced Military Studies, as it exists today, provides the armed forces (primarily the US Army) with officers armed with an advanced education in the art and science of military operations. The School of Advanced Military Studies builds upon the foundation of operational art laid during the Command and General Staff Officer Course. Officers go on to serve as planners in division-, corps-, and joint-level organizations. Both the Air Force and the Marine Corps have similar advanced schools--the Air Force
School of Advanced Airpower Studies (SAAS) at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, and the Marine Corps School of Advanced Warfighting (SAW) at Quantico, Virginia.

"Knowledge is the Key: Educating, Training, and Developing Operational Artists for the 21st Century"

In "Knowledge is the Key: Educating, Training, and Developing Operational Artists for the 21st Century," Major Vincent Brooks, US Army, proposes the creation of a new joint school to educate officers for joint, operational-level warfare. The 1992 monograph has a solid argument for the need to change the educational model, and provides some excellent background about the events leading up to the Professional Military Education of the day. His solution, however, is flawed in that it simply creates yet another school instead of proposing corrections for the general, flawed military education framework.

"Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here?"

Major General William M. Steele and Lieutenant Colonel (Retired) Robert B. Kupiszewski in their 1994 Joint Force Quarterly article, “Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here?” examined the state of Joint Professional Military Education seven years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act. They stressed that: “We should not be content with the status quo but instead should go beyond Goldwater-Nichols.” This is an excellent review of significant legislation, panels, and policy which paints a clear picture of how the changes in Joint Professional Military Education evolved. Several examples of the changes experienced at the Army Command and General Staff College are highlighted. Of particular note are the recommendations for a joint School of Advanced Military Studies as Congressman Skelton had recommended in “Joint Professional
Military Education: Are We There Yet?” and increased use of joint doctrine to educate officers in the operational art.

“Joint Officer Management”

Major Stephen McHugh, United States Army, in his 1995 thesis “Joint Officer Management,” focused on the ability of the Army to meet the joint promotion objectives of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. It includes some interesting background and history on events leading to the Goldwater-Nichols Act and the Joint Specialty Officer concept. McHugh’s work does not discuss Joint Professional Military Education beyond its role as part of the Joint Specialty Officer-making process. His conclusions focus, logically, on two sets of recommendations, one for the Secretary of Defense and one for the Army, to alter the management process for Joint Specialty Officers. The recommendations for the Secretary of Defense center on the designation and career management of Joint Specialty Officers (Joint Specialty Officers are discussed fully in chapter three of this thesis). He suggests a structure and mechanism in the Department of Defense to select, grow, and monitor Joint Specialty Officers and Joint Specialty Officer billets. The discussion is somewhat superficial and his cause and effect arguments are arguable. His recommendations to the Army center around the Army’s difficulty in managing Joint Specialty Officers in its own Service personnel system. He includes creation of a special assignment branch for Joint Specialty Officers and a system of incentives to attract the best to this career track.
"Joint Education for the 21st Century"

Robert B. Kupiszewski, in his 1995 Joint Force Quarterly article, "Joint Education for the 21st Century," asserts that a new joint command should have responsibility for integrating doctrine and educating officers. This visionary treatise lays out a logical argument for a complete overhaul of how the United States educates officers for the joint fight. His arguments are compelling. He sees a natural extension of the first steps from the Goldwater-Nichols Act to be the creation of a centralized, joint education command that would, "integrate doctrine as well as education." In his recommendation, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff would continue to oversee joint education as he does now. A four-star flag officer or general, a duty rotating between the Services every few years, would lead the new command. The universities would operate at each level of professional officer education--entry, intermediate, and senior level. At each university, each Service would make up a college. This plan would certainly bring some consistency and economy to the education process in the long run, but the short-term implementation costs could be difficult to manage.

"A Strategic Vision for the Professional Military Education of Officers in the Twenty-First Century"

In 1995, the Panel on Joint Professional Military Education of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff published their report, "A Strategic Vision for the Professional Military Education of Officers in the Twenty-First Century." This report emphasizes the need for strengthening an already strong, in their view, education system. The panel recommends extending education in joint matters earlier in an officer's career--all the way into precommissioning courseware. It recommends increased emphasis on jointness
in Service-run intermediate Service schools while not giving up the necessary education
and training in Service-specific competencies. This change would allow officers to
graduate from intermediate Service school ready to move on to most joint assignments.
The mission of Armed Forces Staff College in Norfolk, Virginia, would change to
provide some job-specific education and training as determined by combatant
commanders and the joint interaction that officers completing intermediate Service
school by means other than in-residence miss. It is interesting to note that while this
exposure to an even mix of officers is praised as essential at Armed Forces Staff
College—even to the point that officers who do not complete intermediate Service school
in-residence would go to Armed Forces Staff College for that exposure—the same mix is
not considered vital at Service intermediate Service school institutions. “Current mixes
in Service school seminar groups are considered sufficient.”

“Emergence of the Joint Officer”

Howard D. Graves and Don M. Snider, in their 1996 article, “Emergence of the
Joint Officer,” follow the changes in Joint Professional Military Education through the
Goldwater-Nichols Act and lay out some challenges for change to how the United States
will train and educate officers in the future. The authors effectively discuss how the
Goldwater-Nichols Act set the two cornerstones of the changes to Joint Professional
Military Education: the Joint Specialty Officer and Joint Doctrine. The creation of Joint
Specialty Officers, and the accompanying requirements for competitively selecting,
educating, and promoting them, led to the creation of the two-phase intermediate military
education system and the Chairman’s Professional Joint Education objectives which help
guide joint education. Joint doctrine revolutionized joint education and employment
since it gave officers an agreed-upon point of departure in discussing how Service forces come together to fight and win.

Graves and Snider go on to illustrate how the law forced changes in long-standing Service culture—especially in regards to the desirability and usefulness of joint duty. Whereas it used to be the kiss-of-death, joint duty is now perceived as desirable for the development of an officer—indeed, it is a requirement (although some exceptions are allowed) for an officer to have joint experience before being promoted to general or flag rank.

The authors then delve into the cost to the Services in terms of an intellectual drain of the most talented officers from Service headquarters to joint duty assignments. All this during a time of reduced numbers of officers and an ever-increasing number of joint billet requirements. A discussion about what the emphasis of education should be—Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) or conventional military operations—leads to no answers, it just describes the challenge of having to educate officers in both mission categories.

As to challenges to the future, Graves and Snyder lose focus. They discuss the need for a strong moral-ethical focus on the development of officers for the future—this researcher does not disagree, but the authors fail to explain what is different today that requires a change. Are officers currently not being educated to be moral and ethical, or is it a matter of ethics education quality? They further state that Professional Military Education is “already overflowing with good joint subject matter.”10 This is a true statement, but what about the context of this good subject matter and is it presented
effectively? The reader is left wondering if joint education could be done better. The authors appear content that the status quo is adequate and acceptable.

"Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress"

"Professional Military Education: An Asset for Peace and Progress," a 1997 report of the Center for Strategic and International Studies study group on professional military education chaired by Dick Cheney, the former Secretary of Defense, looks at the entire professional military education system from precommissioning through senior-level education.\textsuperscript{11} The report explains why Professional Military Education is needed—that education of this type is a force multiplier and especially critical during interwar years where there is less opportunity to learn through direct operational experience, especially experience in war. Two sections of this report are of particular interest to this research project: the chapters on intermediate-level Professional Military Education and Joint Professional Military Education. The panel echoes the Chairman’s Panel on Joint Professional Military Education view that students graduating from intermediate Service school need to be sufficiently educated in joint matters to work at "most joint assignments."\textsuperscript{12} Changes will need to be made in Service-run intermediate Service school programs to increase time and emphasis on joint matters to make this goal a reality. The panel also recommended that completion of intermediate Service school or senior Service school be a prerequisite to promotion to the general or flag ranks. A remarkable finding since it seems to imply that \textit{either} intermediate Service school or senior Service school can sufficiently prepare an officer for flag or general officer duties and responsibilities in the joint world. This report addresses issues throughout all levels of professional military education, but fails to make recommendations in several areas it
brings out as important. While an even student and faculty mix (one third Army, one third Air Force, one third sea Service) is described as a major benefit to understanding of joint matters at Armed Forces Staff College, no recommendation is made to change the student and faculty mix at Service-run schools.

“Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior”

In January of 1998, the Naval Postgraduate School and Office of Naval Research hosted a conference titled “Military Education for the 21st Century Warrior,” billed as an opportunity to “present lectures and participate in panel discussions to formulate and discuss the issues which will shape the education of the Nation’s officer corps in the next century.” Of the transcripts this researcher reviewed, three included information pertaining to the Joint Professional Military Education issue:

Vice Admiral Dennis C. Blair, US Navy, is the former Director, Joint Staff. He described his role on the Joint Chiefs of Staff as the officer who must take the visions and make them into programs. He asks, “what changes in officer education will strengthen the planning and execution of joint operations . . . how should education anticipate and adapt to make our joint officers even more effective in the future?” His conclusions are:

1. Direct education to build a sense of joint teamwork by intensifying their personal interaction within our schools. Explicitly teach the essence of each Service to the officers of the other Services.

2. Link the military educational institutions electronically so participants can draw on the resources of all. A major benefit is to teach officers how to make information technology work for them.
3. Focus more on the military's role in military operations other than war—the complicated tasks which are still considered nontraditional.

4. Educate more officers in the role of information technology in the future battlespace.

The first conclusion bears directly on the effort of this research and gets right to the heart of what joint education should strive to do. Vice Admiral Blair explains the importance of breaking down barriers of understanding between officers of all the Services. “In my experience, the proclivity of officers to look down their noses at other Services is pretty much in direct proportion to their ignorance of what drives the other Services.” This major design to accomplish this barrier-busting is increased personal contact of officers from different Services by raising the proportion of non-host Service faculty and students at each Service-run school.

Vice Admiral Blair further states that a key educational goal of Joint Professional Military Education should be discussing and learning the “unique essence of each Service.” This would be done through thorough analysis and discussion of what each Service is tasked to do and research specific aspects of a Service's basic experience. Officers would come away with an understanding of how other Services think, what their strengths and weaknesses are, and ideas of how they can build synergy of their forces with the other Services in the joint fight.

The second recommendation is really a call to make use of the information revolution in our educational institutions—an effort that is well underway.

The struggle on emphasis between military operations other than war and conventional, combined arms warfare is certainly evident at the US Army Command and General Staff College today. While history seems to prove that the majority of our time
and effort is spent on these nontraditional military operations like peacekeeping and humanitarian missions, the less frequent, large-scale wars most directly threaten the existence, liberty, and continuation of the United States. Vice Admiral Blair calls for more emphasis on the complicated nontraditional military missions.

Finally, as a nod to the emergence of information operations as a potential dominant effort in future conflict, Vice Admiral Blair calls for more curriculum emphasis on information technology and how to best apply these technologies to our military operations today and in the future.

Vice Admiral Blair is a visionary and his recommendations hold some real value in how the United States should shape Joint Professional Military Education for the future.

Retired Vice Admiral Jerry O. Tuttle expounded on the information revolution and its affect on everything from the US economy to how decision cycles will be shrunk in combat.\textsuperscript{16} A most insightful comment, made almost in passing, was, "During this period of diminishing defense dollars, we should be investing more, not less in the intellectual capital of our military personnel."\textsuperscript{17} This researcher agrees with Vice Admiral Tuttle's assertion completely.

Retired General John J. Sheehan, formerly the commander of US Atlantic Command, the unified command responsible for providing most of the military forces for the US combatant commanders around the world, noted that the Goldwater-Nichols Act was a good law, but the Services have continuously circumvented its intent by "cooperating and graduating."\textsuperscript{18} By working together to protect each Service's parochial
interests the United States has a system that thrives on mediocrity and protecting the
status quo.

**Joint Professional Military Education 2010 Study**

The conference discussed in the previous paragraphs helped spur Vice Admiral
Blair to commission a study to determine requirements for Joint Professional Military
Education in the future. Through questionnaires and senior officer interviews, the
Requirements Team determined the requirements needed by today’s officer. Data were
compiled into an index reflecting the relevance and importance for each requirement.
Trends were identified and Service intermediate and senior schools were polled to
determine which topics were addressed in the school’s curriculum.

Of interest to this research, nearly all of the topics listed under General
Requirements are in each of the Service’s intermediate school curriculum and Armed
Forces Staff Officers Course to some degree or another today. What needs to be
examined further is how well these topics are presented. The team found no trends to
indicate that any major changes to the current Phase I or Phase II Joint Professional
Military Education system were warranted.

The team further concluded that the three-month Phase II Armed Forces Staff
College course is disruptive to the attending officers and the Services’ one-year-based
assignment cycle at large. While some senior leaders saw significant value in the
education at Armed Forces Staff College, others saw the disruptive effect of losing an
officer for three months during their three-year joint tour as a significant problem.
Finally, the panel found a need to “develop more efficient, effective, and flexible
education and training programs.”^20
Considering the comments of Vice Admiral Blair from the Naval Postgraduate School, it is surprising that the Requirements Team did not go further into how the requirements should be met. This may be a result of the very short time allowed for the team to execute its mandate. Instead of stirring the Services to critically examine the way they are conducting joint education, this panel serves to bolster the Services’ contention that they are complying in good-faith with the intent of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has commissioned a second phase to determine courses of action--this activity is now underway. This team is chartered to “develop a continuum of Joint Professional Military Education that takes advantage of Service and joint schools, is flexible in its timing and methods of delivery, provides all officers with a knowledge of joint operations commensurate with rank and responsibilities, and will provide officers destined for joint positions with the knowledge to carry out their duties in planning, executing and supporting joint operations.”21 It will be interesting to see the result of this team under this substantial mandate.

Throughout the literature reviewed, this researcher sees pieces of the puzzle emerge, but is left wondering, “and so what?” Many of the conclusions are not really conclusions at all, but deductions short of any real statement of reality. The way the US forces fight has undergone incredible changes over the past forty years through a growing understanding of jointness, it is logical that how the United States educates the leaders of these forces will also need to evolve and change. Before this thesis can answer the question “Where to Now?,” the next chapters will examine the policies and legislation coming out of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the state of Joint Professional Military Education at the US Army Command and General Staff College before the Act,
and what Joint Professional Military Education looks like at the Army Command and General Staff College today.


2Vincent K. Brooks, “Knowledge is the Key: Educating, Training, and Developing Operational Artists for the 21st Century” (Monograph, School of Advanced Military Studies, United States Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, 1992), i.


4Ibid.


7Ibid., 72.


10Ibid., 57.


12Ibid., 40.


14Ibid.

15Ibid.


17Ibid.


20 Ibid., 8.

CHAPTER THREE

LEGISLATION AND POLICY

The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 (Goldwater-Nichols Act) and subsequent legislation and review panels have changed the shape of Joint Professional Military Education dramatically over the last thirteen years. The Goldwater-Nichols Act was passed to reorganize the Department of Defense and to make it more effective and better able to fulfil its mission of protecting the interests of the United States. Among other events, the reforms of the Goldwater-Nichols Act were fueled by the failed Iranian Hostage Rescue in 1980 and OPERATION URGENT FURY (the Grenada invasion) in 1985, where significant and dangerous deficiencies were noted when the different Service forces worked and fought together. Instead of achieving synergy when fighting together, considerable friction, inefficiency, wasted effort—even loss of American lives—resulted. Services working and fighting side by side—achieving synergy—is what joint is all about; where the whole exceeds the sum of the individual parts. The Goldwater-Nichols Act directed changes to the Department of Defense to help foster more effective military operations.

Congress discovered that the real holders of power in the Pentagon and combatant commands were the military Services; the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. Combatant commands, such as US Pacific Command and US Central Command, are unified military forces commands where forces from all Services are organized under one joint commander. While these organizations appeared joint on the
organizational diagrams, it actually was business as usual with the Services pulling in, often-times, different directions.

The Goldwater-Nichols Act

While conducting operations jointly was not a new idea, the Goldwater-Nichols Act made jointness a legal requirement—the legislators forced the Department of Defense to make serious and significant changes in the way it trained, equipped, organized, commanded, and fought.

Among other reforms, the Goldwater-Nichols Act had a tremendous impact on how military officers of all Services were to be educated. Of the seven factors cited by Howard Graves and Don Snider in their 1996 Joint Force Quarterly Article, “Emergence of the Joint Officer” discussed in chapter two, most have a direct and important impact on Joint Professional Military Education at the intermediate Service school level—the level of schooling of interest to this research.

*The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff was designated as the principal advisor to the President and Secretary of Defense on all military issues, including PME.* Before the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Chairman would bring the advice and counsel of the entire Joint Chiefs of Staff which is made up of the military heads of the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps. If members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff did not agree on what advice to give, the Chairman would be obligated to present all the opinions to the civilian leadership. Now the Chairman is free to speak as the head of the staff and communicate his own opinion formulated using the counsel and advice of all the members of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Instead of being merely a mediator or messenger,
trying to bring four Services to consensus, the Chairman became the ranking military leader of the Armed Forces able to speak for the US Military.

*The term joint matters was clearly defined.* While a term with previously many different meanings to different audiences—and often used solely in discussions of military force *planning*—Congress stated that it related to the integrated *employment* of land, sea, and air forces in the areas of national military strategy, strategic and contingency planning, and command and control of combat operations under unified command.

*It created the Joint Specialty Officer*—an officer specifically educated in joint matters to serve in Joint Critical Positions that have been specifically identified as requiring such a specially qualified officer. Congress also mandated promotion opportunities for Joint Specialty Officers. This career track specified selection criteria to ensure the best and brightest chose to enter this arena. Perhaps most importantly, the promotion rate for Joint Specialty Officers was to be equal to or greater than the rate of promotion for the officers in the Service’s headquarters staff. Officers who chose to go forth and think and function beyond Service parochialism could not be punished or discriminated against through the Service-controlled promotion systems. Joint Specialty Officers or Joint Specialists were to be competitively selected, trained, and educated to better understand how the United States Armed Forces fight as a joint team.

*Congress mandated the creation of rigorous standards for all Joint Professional Military Education.* While there has always been some joint education going on, it was not mandated, monitored, or consistent. This provision led to the chartering of Congressman Skelton’s Panel on Military Education and the subsequent legislation which defined educational requirements discussed in chapter four.
The Vice Director, Operational Plans and Interoperability (Joint Staff J-7) was also designated the Deputy Director, Joint Staff, for Military Education, responsible for the new military education division under the J-7. The Joint Staff, specifically the J-7 branch, was now responsible for the direction of joint education. They were to organize education objectives for, and later evaluate compliance by, the Service education institutions.

While the Goldwater-Nichols Act called upon the Secretary of Defense to “establish policies, procedures, and practices for the effective management of officers of the military Services who are particularly educated, trained in, and oriented toward joint matters—the integrated employment of land, sea, and air forces” the Goldwater-Nichols Act did not specify how the education would be accomplished.

The Skelton Panel

To translate the broad concepts of the Goldwater-Nichols Act into specific guidance for the Department of Defense, the House Armed Services Committee chartered Representative Ike Skelton’s Panel on Military Education to review the Services’ command and general staff colleges. The work of Congressman Skelton and his panel laid the groundwork for how these Joint Specialty Officers would be identified and educated. Department of Defense Authorization Acts, such as the 1990/1991 Department of Defense Authorization Act, codified into law important aspects of the Panel’s work. This particular bill specifies the course length of Armed Forces Staff College at Norfolk, Virginia, allows nonresident (correspondence and seminar) Phase II course credit, and lays down a process for hiring civilian instructors for better continuity in organizations where military faculty members are reassigned every two or three years.
Other authorization bills, have clarified other requirements reflected in the Chairman’s policy discussed later in this chapter.

Before further examining the panel’s findings, a clear understanding of several terms is necessary:

**Professional Military Education**

Professional Military Education (PME) entails the systematic instruction of professionals in subjects enhancing their knowledge of the science and art of war. The PME system is a progressive, cumulative process preparing officers for duty at each successive level of responsibility within the levels of war.⁹

Professional Military Education is a broad term which encompasses the entire formal education program for military officers from precommissioning (Reserve Officer Training Corps, military academies, Officer Training School, etc.) through junior officer programs, intermediate level colleges, and senior level colleges. Knowledge developed at each progressive school builds skills that the officer needs to function effectively at their level of responsibility.

**Joint Professional Military Education**

Joint Professional Military Education (JPME) is that portion of Professional Military Education concentrating on the instruction of joint matters...¹⁰

This area of education broadens the officer’s knowledge to include aspects of operations beyond their own Service environment. At each level of Professional Military Education the curriculum addresses issues appropriate for officers of that level. Joint Professional Military Education builds upon the foundation of Service Professional Military Education to show how Service forces come together and achieve effectiveness...
with other government agencies and even nongovernmental activities and
nongovernmental organizations like Doctors Without Borders or the Red Crescent.

Process for Accreditation of Joint Education

The Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) is the
Chairman's of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy to evaluate the effectiveness
of joint education at the Service colleges and the National Defense
University.\footnote{11}

The Process for Accreditation of Joint Education is discussed in chapter three.

Program for Joint Education

The Program for Joint Education (PJE) is that portion of Joint
Professional Military Education that qualifies officers for Joint Specialty
Officer nomination. Frequently shared Program for Joint Education
curricula areas include warfighting and national and international
(regional) considerations as they affect the formulation of national
security policy, the roles of the Department of Defense and the Services,
military history, military strategy, leadership skills, and analytical
techniques.\footnote{12}

The current structure of Joint Professional Military Education in two phases has
evolved to provide the educational foundation for Joint Specialty Officers. The panel
established the Program for Joint Education, a framework for the two-phase education
process for Joint Specialty Officers.\footnote{13}

In Phase I, officers complete a Service intermediate staff college--the Air Force
Air Command and General Staff College (ACSC) at Maxwell AFB, Alabama; the Army
Command and General Staff Officers Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas;
the Navy College of Naval Command and Staff (CNCS) at Newport, Rhode Island; the
Marine Corps Command and Staff College (MCCSC) at Quantico, Virginia; the Naval
Postgraduate School (NPGS) in Monterey, California, or the Naval Postgraduate School
(NPS) Joint Education Electives Program (JEEP)\footnote{14}--by attending either the resident
program, completing the requirements at off-campus seminar locations, or completing individually by correspondence. These Service-run schools teach Service competencies with a joint flavor. Their primary emphasis is Service-specific military education.

Congressman Skelton emphasized the need for joint officers to be experts, first and foremost, in their own Service's capabilities, limitations, and doctrine. The Service schools emphasize their own Service perspectives, but include required curriculum on joint matters and provide a set student and faculty Service mix. Joint Specialty Officers are expected to bring their Service competencies to the joint table—they must understand the capabilities and limitations of their and other Services and how all the Service's forces are best orchestrated and brought to synergy. Service competency—knowing how your own Service fights—is essential.

The second piece of the Joint Specialist's education is Phase II Joint Professional Military Education. Currently, the only institution certified for Phase II at the intermediate level is the Armed Forces Staff College's Joint Staff Officers' Course at Norfolk, Virginia. This course emphasizes joint planning in an environment that helps to foster a joint perspective. Student and Service faculty ratios are balanced—one third Air Force, one third Army, one third sea Service (Navy and Marine Corps together) with a few officers from foreign countries (international officers). This ratio reflects the overall officer mix throughout the US Armed Forces.

The capstone of a Joint Specialty Officer's education is performance in a joint duty assignment. Officers must complete a tour of duty in an designated joint billet—a job that requires the integrated employment or support of at least two of the military departments; Navy, Air Force, and Army. Tours of duty are normally three years and
expose the officer to real-world issues and joint matters. Officers work daily with members of other Services. It is in this duty that the officers should grow to appreciate joint matters.

Finally, each Service examines officers who have completed all three requirements and select the best for designation as Joint Specialty Officers. Officers are drawn from this pool of Joint Specialty Officers to fill positions that have been designated Joint Critical. These are jobs that require officers with the complete and unique education and experience described above.

While Congress researched, drafted, and implemented all these actions, the Department of Defense actively pursued options. Numerous studies, reports, and panels have been commissioned from 1986 to the present day. These studies examined issues covering the entire spectrum of military education. The most significant study, up to the current Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff study on Joint Professional Military Education 2010, was the Dougherty Board.

The Dougherty Board

The Dougherty Board, officially, the Senior Military Review Board on Recommendations to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Regarding Professional Military Education in Joint Matters, began in October of 1986 to examine the state of military education in joint matters and the preparation of officers for service in joint assignments. The board members also examined the academic rigor of each school.

Rigor is a subjective analysis of the level of challenge students face. Some indications of rigor are individual examinations, research papers, class rankings, and performance awards.
The board issued its report in May of 1987, strongly supporting the primarily Service focus of all the Service schools. "It is vital that the intermediate and senior Service schools of the Services maintain their identities and continue to teach the roles and capabilities of the individual Services."\textsuperscript{15} The panel also recommended that all Service Professional Military Education schools be accredited as joint, the creation of an education directorate in the Joint Staff J-7 staff, and the maintenance of an appropriate student and faculty Service mix at each school. This mix was not clearly defined, "... the Board supports the establishment of an agreed upon proportion of Service representation ..."\textsuperscript{16} But later stipulates that the student mix should be no less than one non-host Service officer per staff group and no less than 5 percent non-host Service representation on the faculty. Using the Army Command and General Staff College seventeen-member staff group as an example, that would include one Air Force and one sea Service officer with the fifteen Army officers. The board went on to recommend that joint matters would comprise a minimum of 25 percent of the total curriculum hours.

It is important to note that this was only a study. The panel had no authority to mandate any changes; it made recommendations only.

The OPMEP

The Goldwater-Nichols Act identified the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as responsible for joint education. The Chairman designated the Joint Staff J-7 directorate as the office responsible for directing Joint Professional Military Education. This direction is codified in the current CJCSI 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP). This policy directs aspects of officer education from precommissioning to the general and flag officer levels including joint education.
The OPMEP spells out the current Joint Professional Military Education paradigm: “In conjunction with Service-unique education, Service schools provide joint education primarily from a Service perspective in accordance with joint learning areas and objectives.” and “Joint schools provide joint education from a joint perspective.”\textsuperscript{17} (italics are the author’s emphasis provided.) This concept of perspective is important. The Army Command and General Staff College is directed to provide a joint education from an Army perspective within its curriculum which is mainly focused on preparing Army officers for duty on Army staffs and in Army units, while Armed Forces Staff College, a joint school, is to use a solely joint curriculum taught from a joint perspective. How are these perspectives different? Is one more narrowly focused than the other? Is one more complete than the other? This distinction and paradigm is at the heart of the thesis conclusion in chapter six.

Joint Professional Military Education is further defined as:

\ldots that portion of Professional Military Education concentrating on the instruction of joint matters to:

- Provide officers a broad base of joint professional knowledge
- Develop officers whose expertise and education improve the strategic and operational capabilities of joint forces across the range of military operations
- Instill knowledge of the broad joint warfare concepts embodied in Joint Pub 1, “Joint Warfare of the Armed Forces of the United States” and the specific concepts throughout the range of military operations and codified in other joint doctrine
- Develop officers skilled in attaining unity of effort across Service, interagency, nongovernmental, and multinational lines.\textsuperscript{18}

This is a good explanation of what education in joint matters means in concrete and practical terms. It goes on to further explain the focus and joint emphasis at the intermediate Service school, Phase I level:
Service ILCs teach subordinate joint operations from the standpoint of Service forces in a joint force supported by Service component commands. Joint curricula at their level include:

- National military capabilities and command structure
- Joint Doctrine
- Joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war
- Joint planning and execution processes
- Systems integration at the operational level of war\(^\text{19}\)

It further lays out the Phase II (Armed Forces Staff College) emphasis as:

"examining joint operations from the standpoint of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, a Unified Commander, and a Joint Task Force Commander. It also develops joint attitudes and perspectives, exposes officers to, and increases their understanding of, Service cultures while concentrating on joint staff operations. Its curriculum is specifically joint and accomplishes the following:

- Increases and applies knowledge gained in a Phase I program
- Addresses joint staff operations in detail.\(^\text{20}\)

Note the differences between the mandates to Phase I and Phase II Joint Professional Military Education--this is where the balance of what Service versus joint perspectives is addressed. Joint education with a Service perspective means educating officers to how a particular Service contributes to and operates in a joint operation, while joint education with a joint perspective defines how joint operations are planned and executed in general. The further focus on Service culture and capabilities in Phase II is vitally important. It begins to build trust and understanding between members of the different Services who will be working together side by side in future operations.

The Program for Joint Education is fleshed out from Representative Skelton’s two-phase education process to a series of "objectives, policies, procedures, and
standards fulfilling educational requirements for JSO qualification” required by law.\textsuperscript{21}

The Program for Joint Education is to:

- Ensure that Service college and NDU (National Defense University—home of the Armed Forces Staff College and other joint colleges) graduates are knowledgeable in joint matters.
- Prepare students for joint duty assignments.\textsuperscript{22}

This is what joint education is all about today—education in joint matters and preparation for future joint assignments.

The OPMEP’s discussion of student and faculty mix is revealing. While all senior level colleges, except the National Defense University’s National War College, are required by the 1996 Defense Appropriations Act, Section 8084 to have a minimum of 20 percent sister-Service representation, intermediate-level schools are only required to have “at least one officer from each of the two non-host Military Departments.”\textsuperscript{23}

Legislators felt it was important to have a greater sister-Service representation in senior Service school seminars (given a seventeen-member staff group at the Army War College, that would be two Air Force officers and two sea Service officers with the thirteen Army officers) it did not make the same recommendation for intermediate-level schools. Congress also fell short of mandating a proportional mix for all intermediate Service schools that it mandated for Armed Forces Staff College. A proportional mix being representative of the mix of Service officer billets on the Joint Duty Authorization List—it works out to approximately one Air Force to one Army to one Sea Service—Sea Service can be represented by a Marine Corps, Naval, or Coast Guard officer.

The Service-run intermediate colleges must have a four to one ratio of students to faculty and a minimum of 5 percent of the military faculty must be non-host Service
officers. Again, Armed Forces Staff College is mandated to have a roughly equal mix of the three military departments.  

The OPMEP lists specific mission Learning Areas and applicable Joint Learning Objectives for all levels of officer education. For the intermediate Service school level:

**MISSION:** The joint mission of the Service ILCs is to expand student understanding, from a Service component perspective, of joint force employment at the operational and tactical level of war.

**Learning Area 1. National Military Capabilities and Command Structure.** Students will learn the capabilities and limitations of US military forces across the range of military operations. Command relationships, force development and organization, and the concepts of deployment, employment, sustainment, and redeployment are examined. The following learning objectives further define JPME efforts in this area.

a. Comprehend the capabilities and limitations of US military forces.

b. Explain the organizational framework within which joint forces are employed.

c. Explain the purpose, roles, functions, and relationships of the National Command Authorities (NCA), National Security Council (NSC), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, combatant commanders, Service Chiefs, and Joint Force Commanders (JFCs).

d. Summarize how joint force command relationships and directive authority for logistics support joint warfighting capabilities.

e. Comprehend how the US military is organized to plan, execute, sustain, and train for joint and multinational operations.

**Learning Area 2. Joint Doctrine.** Students review appropriate current Service and joint doctrine and examine factors influencing the development of joint doctrine. Students formulate solutions to operational problems with particular attention to issues where doctrines differ. The following learning objectives further define JPME efforts in this area.

a. Comprehend current joint doctrine.

b. Give examples of the factors influencing joint doctrine.

c. Formulate and defend solutions to operational problems using current joint doctrine.

d. Summarize the relationship between Service doctrine and joint doctrine.
Learning Area 3. Joint and Multinational Forces at the Operational Level of War. Students will gain a basic knowledge of joint and multinational force employment at the operational level of war. This area introduces campaign planning and the linkage of campaign plans to attainment of national objectives. The following learning objectives further define JPME efforts in this area.

a. Summarize the considerations of employing joint and multinational forces at the operational level of war.

b. Explain how theory and principles of war apply at the operational level of war.

c. Develop an ability to plan for employment of joint forces at the operational level of war.

d. Review wars, campaigns, and operations and explain the link between national objectives to supporting military objectives, and the importance of defined conflict termination.

e. Summarize the relationship between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels of war.

Learning Area 4. Joint Planning and Execution Processes. Students will understand how the various components of the joint planning and execution processes support force functioning at the operational level of war. The following learning objectives further define JPME efforts in this area.

a. Through the framework provided by joint planning processes, explain the relationship between national objectives and means availability.

b. Comprehend the effect of time, coordination, policy changes, and political development on the planning process.

c. Explain how the defense planning systems affect joint operational planning.

d. Explain how national intelligence organizations support Joint Force Commanders.

e. Comprehend the fundamentals of campaign planning.

Learning Area 5. Systems Integration At The Operational Level Of War. Students will know of the systems and understand the processes supporting 21st century battlespace and how they are integrated to achieve operational-level joint force missions.

a. Comprehend the relationship between the concepts of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) and the Military Technological Revolution (MTR).
b. Understand how command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) systems apply at all levels of war.

c. Comprehend how joint and Service systems are integrated at the operational level of war.

d. Understand that opportunities and vulnerabilities are created by increased reliance on technology throughout the range of military operations.\(^{25}\)

**Review Process**

As part of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent legislation, the Department of Defense is required to report on its progress in executing the requirements of the law. The OPMEP establishes mechanisms for feedback, updates, and evaluation.

Each school reviews its own curriculum and participates in Joint Professional Military Education conferences where the effectiveness and execution of joint education is discussed. The Military Education Coordination Conference (MECC) is held semiannually where senior-level representatives of all the Professional Military Education institutions, Services, Joint Staff, Commanders-in-Chief, and Office of the Secretary of Defense come together to discuss Professional Military Education issues. Supporting the Military Education Coordination Conference is a working group of officers from the staffs of the Military Education Coordination Conference membership. They research and coordinate agenda items and issues raised before the Military Education Coordination Conference. Joint Educational Conferences are held frequently to address specific items of interest to the joint education community.

At least every three years, Joint Professional Military Education is updated--this process is underway at the time of this writing in the form of the ongoing Joint Professional Military Education 2010 study. General Joint Professional Military
Education policy is reviewed, discussed, and changed as necessary. Special Areas of Emphasis (SAEs) are identified for emphasis in Joint Professional Military Education curriculum. Often Special Areas of Emphasis are issues not fully developed with solid doctrine and experience, but are important for officer education none the less. Special Areas of Emphasis are discussed at the Military Education Coordination Conference and considered for inclusion into Joint Learning Objectives. The Military Education Coordination Conference also scrutinizes the Armed Forces Staff College curriculum. As the only full-service, totally joint curriculum, Armed Forces Staff College serves as an useful benchmark for joint education across the board.

The Process for Accreditation of Joint Education (PAJE) evaluates the schools’ compliance to directed joint education policies. It serves as the Chairman’s oversight of the program executed by Service schools and Armed Forces Staff College as well as a tool for providing helpful feedback to the operating institutions. Institutions have their Joint Professional Military Education Accreditation reaffirmed every five years. Evaluations use a peer-review process. Team members are individuals experienced in Joint Professional Military Education and are drawn from the Services, Joint Staff, and National Defense University. The Military Education Division (J-7) of the Joint Staff builds the teams to conduct the evaluations. The team is chaired by the Director, Joint Staff. The Deputy Director, Joint Staff, for Military Education and a respected Department of Defense civilian educator with a doctoral degree serve as the executive committee. The working group is comprised of a chief (colonel or Navy captain from the Military Education Division), a colonel or Navy captain from each of the Services and National Defense University (though not from the institution being evaluated), a
senior civilian from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, and other supporting staff such as Joint Doctrine Advisor, Executive assistants, and advisory support as deemed necessary. After the review, the team makes a recommendation to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for reaffirmation of Program for Joint Education accreditation. The report, once approved by the Chairman, is forwarded to the appropriate Service Chief or President of National Defense University for action.

The accreditation teams look for compliance to six standards:

1. Develop joint awareness, perspective, and attitudes [by educating officers in the learning areas and objectives of Joint Professional Military Education].

2. Employ predominately active and highly effective instructional methods for the subject matter and desired level of learning.

3. Assess student achievement [through measurable objectives and evaluation tools].

4. Support the needs of the joint community. [primarily through surveys to graduates and their supervisors to gauge the effectiveness of school curriculum.]

5. Conduct a quality faculty recruitment, selection, assignment, and performance assessment program.

6. Conduct faculty development programs for improving instructional skills and increasing subject matter mastery.

Other Policy

Below the Joint Chiefs of Staff level, there are no Army or subordinate command written policies. The Army Command and General Staff College has Bulletin #32, “CGSC Program for Joint Education (PJE),” that simply echoes the most pertinent metrics from the OPMEP and adds some internal college responsibilities for monitoring, developing curriculum, and producing materials for the Program for Accreditation of Joint Education.
The Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Dougherty Board, The Skelton Panel on Military Education and subsequent portions of Defense Authorization Acts, and resulting Chairman's policy in the OPMEP represents a logical flow of events which has transformed Joint Professional Military Education at the intermediate Service schools throughout the US Military. A systematic program exists for identifying talented officers, educating them, and monitoring their effective utilization in the joint world. With this background, this thesis will examine the US Army Command and General Staff College before the reforms discussed in this chapter and the college as it exists today after the reforms have been fully implemented.

1Public law 99-433 [H.R. 3622]; October 1, 1986, 100 STAT. 992.
4Ibid.
5Ibid.
6Ibid.
7Ibid.
9Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CJCSI 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy" (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 March 1996), A-B-1.
10Ibid., A-B-3.
11Ibid.
12Ibid., A-B-3.
13Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, "CJCSI 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy 1st Coordinating Draft" (Washington, D.C.: Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 February 1998), A-A-2.
14Ibid., 2.

16Ibid., 16.
17Ibid., 1.
18Ibid., 2.
19Ibid., 3.
20Ibid., 3.
21CJCSI 1800.01, B-1.
22Ibid.
23Ibid., B-2.
25Ibid., C-B-1 – C-B-3.
26Ibid., D-A-1.
27Ibid., D-B-2.
CHAPTER FOUR

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AT
THE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE
BEFORE THE GOLDWATER-NICHOLS
ACT REFORMS

Joint warfighting was not invented in 1986 with the passing of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act. The United States had been employing military forces in a cooperative and often synergistic way since before World War II, but there was no formal process for training and developing joint warfighting expertise. Each Service went about it their own way, set their own standards and trained and educated primarily from within. In examining joint education before 1986, this thesis will focus on three areas: class participant Service mix, faculty Service mix, and curriculum before the changes discussed in chapter three came into effect. This thesis will focus on the 1987-1988 academic year as representative of the state of the art before the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent legislation had an effect on college curriculum and architecture. While this 1987-1988 academic year is chronologically after the passage of the Goldwater-Nichols Act, no significant Goldwater-Nichols Act-driven changes are reflected in the college curriculum until the following years.

Class Participant Service Mix

In the case of the US Army Command and General Staff College, the US Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were represented in the class in varying numbers, but not to the extent that every staff group had one officer from each Service represented. The Army Command and General Staff College actively sought to increase sister-Service
representation in the staff groups to provide their Army officers a broader joint experience, but the other Services resisted. In examining correspondence between the senior leaders of the Service colleges, the resistance resulted from the following:

Sending more Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps officers to the Army’s staff college meant fewer Air Force officers attending the Air Force College, fewer Navy officers attending the Navy college, and fewer Marines attending the Marine college. Services viewed greater participation in other Service colleges as having a diluting effect on their Service education of future Service leadership. While Services could increase the total number of officers selected to attend Service colleges in-residence to make up for this, the Services also resisted that because of the difficult personnel issues involved with officer training and education for career progression. Put simply, each Service had a reason for sending the set number of officers to college each year and did not wish to increase it to make Army staff college staff groups more joint.

There was a difference in how many officers each Service sent to school each year. The differences were based upon Service culture and how it regarded the importance of professional education, the needs of the officer personnel system, and career training issues. These differences will be discussed more in the final chapter. The Service mix in the student body is depicted in figure 2.

There were sixty-four staff groups in this academic year. In the average sixteen-member staff group, there was approximately thirteen US Army officers, zero or one Air Force officers, zero or one sea Service officers, and two international officers. Put another way, of the sixty-four total staff groups, twenty-four did not have an Air Force officer and forty-three had no sea Service officer.
Faculty Service Mix

The faculty Service mix is even more striking. Of 288 faculty members, 255 were military (thirty-three civilian instructors). Only twelve officers of the 255 were from non-host Services, less than 5 percent of the total. The overall Service mix of the faculty is shown in figure 3.

While the classrooms and the faculty are far from what is now considered as joint, the jointness of the curriculum was another story completely.
Curriculum

The Army Command and General Staff College curriculum was broken into three terms. Term I ran from August to December and focused on a core curriculum. Term II and III ran for ten weeks each consecutively beginning in January and provided a mixture of core curriculum with a series of electives. While all officers participated in the core curriculum, students took elective classes based upon their military specialization and personal and professional interest. The core curriculum can be envisioned as building a foundation upon which electives could further expand.

Table 1 shows how the curriculum in the 1987-1988 college year was laid out.
Table 1. Army Command and General Staff College Curriculum Academic Year 1987-1988.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Core Curriculum</th>
<th>617 Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Joint and Combined Operational War Fighting</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Organization of US Armed Forces</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint and Combined Operations</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Central Command/European Command Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>US Army in Space</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurgency and Counterinsurgency</td>
<td>18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational War Fighting</td>
<td>70</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>188</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Management</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Computer Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Planning and Allocation</td>
<td>34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Training the Force</td>
<td>19</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>59</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Tactics</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Operations</td>
<td>172</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle East Exercise</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>196</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Combat Service Support</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combat Operations Sustainment</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations Sustainment</td>
<td>26</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean Staff Battle Exercise</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>73</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Military History</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>American Heritage: Constitutional Basis of US Army</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20(^{th}) Century War: The American Experience</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Battle Analysis</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>55</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Profession of Arms</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Communicative Skills</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff Dynamics</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Senior Level Leadership</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Law</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>46</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Figure 4 depicts the 1987-1988 curriculum in graphical terms.

Figure 4. Curriculum Break-Out and Service-Specific versus Joint Curriculum Academic Year 1987-1988


Of this core curriculum, this researcher recognized the 188 hours of the Joint and Combined core curriculum as being essentially joint. The curriculum content outlined in the college course catalog is similar in scope and point of view to what is taught today in joint classes. Joint curriculum accounted for nearly 30 percent of the total core curriculum. This proportion is especially noteworthy since this is the Army Command and General Staff College curriculum before the directed requirements grown out of Goldwater-Nichols Act, the Skelton Panel, the Dougherty Board, and the OPMEP!

In Terms II and III, officers would continue some core instruction and take seven elective courses. These elective courses were each thirty hours long. Depending upon
the background and career track of the individual officer, about four electives were mandatory, Service-specific education such as advanced tactics for a US Army artillery officer. The rest were free electives that each officer was allowed to select from the college offerings. Each college department proponent for the major core curriculum areas sponsored electives. Of the 120 electives offered in the 1987-1988 college catalog, twenty-nine, or 24 percent of all the electives offered, were offered by the Department of Joint and Combined Operations, and judging from the course descriptions, they all appear to address joint matters. If a student was to take three joint electives for a total of ninety additional hours of joint instruction, that would equal for the entire academic year 278 hours of joint instruction in the total 833 hours of college curriculum or 33 percent joint education. There were also other electives offered by other teaching departments that appeared to have some joint perspective.

This author was unable to make an objective, qualitative assessment of the joint education offered in this time period. However, from the course descriptions and the course syllabi, the overall joint curriculum appears to have been adequately joint by today's OPMEP standards. Further, the following year's 1988-1989 academic year curriculum, virtually the same curriculum as the year before, was certified by the Joint Staff as meeting the requirements of both Program for Joint Education phases--Phase I and Phase II.

The Army Command and General Staff College also offered Focused Programs where selected students could earn Army Skill Identifiers for completing a specific track of training. These identifiers were used by the Army personnel system to indicate that an officer had completed special training and education that might be valuable in certain
assignments. Both the Joint Planner and Strategist Focused Programs required a significant number of joint electives.

There are references in the course catalog to several exercises which relate to Service-specific education.4 Additionally, the elective "Joint Middle East Operations Planning and Execution" offered officers an opportunity to plan and execute a joint military operation in conjunction with the students attending the Air Command and Staff College, the Naval War College, and the Marine Corps Staff College.

In 1987, the Army Command and General Staff College had a significant joint curriculum. Thirty percent of the core curriculum was joint-focused and very similar to what is taught today in a broad sense. While the school curriculum shows significant joint education opportunity, the lack of non-Army Service representation in the staff groups and especially this lack in the faculty was a serious detriment to truly effective joint education. The Army did attempt to increase the non-Army Service representation in the staff groups through the years, but encountered significant resistance from the other Services.


2Ibid., 70.

3Ibid., 71.

4Ibid., 61, 91.
CHAPTER FIVE

JOINT PROFESSIONAL MILITARY EDUCATION AT THE ARMY COMMAND AND GENERAL STAFF COLLEGE TODAY

The Army Command and General Staff College has undergone many significant changes since the 1987 academic year. The thesis will examine the current state of joint education at the Army Command and General Staff College using the same three areas addressed in chapter four: class participant Service mix, faculty Service mix, and curriculum.

Class Participant Service Mix

The 1998-1999 Command and General Staff College class is made up of 1052 officers. The Service mix is shown in figure 5.

The class is divided into sixty-four staff groups of sixteen or seventeen officers. Every staff group has one Air Force officer and one sea Service (Navy or Marine Corps) officer, one or two international officers, and thirteen or fourteen Army officers. This is a significant improvement since 1988 when many staff groups lacked an Air Force or sea Service officer.

Faculty Service Mix

The number of non-host military faculty members has doubled since 1988 as shown in figure 6.
Figure 5. Service Representation in Army Command and General Staff College Student Body Academic Year 1998-1999

Source: Army Command and General Staff College Department of Student Affairs, Opening Day Briefing, (3 August 1998), [briefing on-line]; available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/dsa/GENERAL/Briefs/USSD/open9899/index.htm; Internet.

Figure 6. Service Faculty Representation at the Army Command and General Staff College Academic Year 1998-1999

Most of the non-Army faculty added since 1987-1988 have been assigned to work in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations (renamed from the Department of Joint and Combined Operations to reduce the confusion over the many meanings of the word combined in military circles). This teaching department writes and facilitates virtually all of the joint curriculum. The Department of Joint and Multinational Operations enjoys a mix of four Air Force, two Marine Corps, two Navy, two international officers, sixteen Army officers, and nine civilians. Additionally, all the officers in the department are required to have had significant joint experience. While still far from Service-balanced, their combined expertise contributes to a solid joint curriculum which is joint-focused and shows a marked improvement since 1987-1988 when this teaching department was all-Army. All non-host military faculty are included on the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL) as Joint Specialty Officer assignment billets.

Both in terms of Service mix in the classroom and in the faculty, the Army Command and General Staff college is complying with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff policy and the letter of the law.

Curriculum

In the years after the Goldwater-Nichols Act, the curriculum structure at the Command and General Staff College has evolved. For instance, in 1991 the Deputy Commandant of Command and General Staff College, Brigadier General John E. Miller, steered the college away from a central focus on the defense of Europe with its NATO versus Warsaw Pact scenario to a more future-looking scheme.¹ Based upon studies from within and outside the Army, he envisioned that future leaders needed to be educated in the values of the military profession and the Army’s expanding role in what
is now called stability and support operations or military operations other than war. An important part of this redesign was the increased role of joint education throughout the entire curriculum. Students were to learn about “how the US employs the armed forces as an element of national power and the nature of joint and combined operations.”

Brigadier General Miller directed the faculty to develop C320, a course which brought together the joint and multinational, at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The Department of Joint and Combined Operations tailored a curriculum which introduced students to concepts of strategic strategy formulation and national command and control. As students worked their way down through the operational level with the unified commands and the Joint Task Force, the Department of Joint and Combined Operations instructors began to hand off instruction to the Center for Army Tactics department who presented curriculum for the tactical employment of assigned Army forces in the course scenario as the Army Component of the Joint task Force. This concept was sound, but very difficult to coordinate between the departments. The two teaching departments were frequently at odds as to the emphasis of joint instruction and Service-specific tactics. Over the years after Brigadier General Miller left the college, the departments slowly pulled away from each other until the C320 course was purely an Army tactics course and the Department of Joint and Combined Operations was not involved in the course at all.

While joint matters are addressed in many parts of the curriculum and a full 30 percent of the core curriculum is joint, the primary focus of the Army Command and General Staff College curriculum remains that which supports the staff college as the Army senior tactical school. As a result, classroom time and emphasis on joint matters
tend to take a back seat to Army tactics. Student practical exercises within the tactical curriculum give a nod to the role of other Service’s forces in a campaign, but often the capabilities and limitations are inaccurately and unrealistically portrayed. These oversights are compounded when there is lack of significant non-Army Service representation in the classroom. While appearing joint, with the notional Army forces in a tactics scenario organized under a joint task force, the Army forces would often be portrayed as operating autonomously without any realistic direction from a joint task force commander orchestrating air, land, and sea forces in a synergistic, joint manner.

Beginning in 1997, the curriculum underwent another major shift. Brigadier General Joseph Inge approved teaching virtually all of the core classes between August and December, shifting and reducing core curriculum hours from Terms II and III so that class participants could take more Advanced Application Program courses (called “electives” back in 1987) from January through May. Only the history core curriculum continues through Terms II and III.

Between August and December, all students participate in the 449-hour core curriculum that is divided into the major curriculum areas shown in table 2.

Figure 7 illustrates the proportions of joint, Service-specific, and other curriculum.

53
Table 2. Army Command and General Staff College Curriculum Academic Year 1998-1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course Description</th>
<th>Credits</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>The History of Warfighting: Theory and Practice</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Leadership</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentals of Warfighting (Army Tactics)</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resource Planning and Force Management</td>
<td>38</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting (Joint)</td>
<td>128</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>449</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Figure 7. Curriculum Break-Out and Service-Specific versus Joint Curriculum Academic Year 1998-1999

Table 3 shows the core joint education instruction.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Course</th>
<th>Hours</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>National Strategic Concepts</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>International Security Environment and Range of Military Operations</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defense Planning Systems</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacetime Strategies</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Instrument of Power</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JC^4^I--NCA through the JTF</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Logistics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Estimate</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Operations Planning and Execution System (JOPES)</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Campaign Planning, Operational Art, and Synchronization</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strategic Estimate</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Intelligence and Theater Assessment</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Design/Geometry</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Maneuver</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Fires</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Protection</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Operational Logistics</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tasks to Subordinates/Synchronization II</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC's Campaign Concept Brief and AAR</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Multinational Operations</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Engagement Planning</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Military Support to Civil Authorities/Counterdrug</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Combating Terrorism and Force Protection</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping and Foreign Humanitarian Assistance Operations</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Hours</strong></td>
<td><strong>128</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**Source:** Department of Joint and Multinational Operations, Army Command and General Staff College, *C/M/S 500 Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting Course Syllabus*, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Army Command and General Staff College, 1998), 2.
The Center for Army Tactics core curriculum, "C300--Fundamentals of Warfighting," is a significant departure in how Army tactics is taught at the Command and General Staff College. The new course focuses on corps- and division-level operations at the operational and operational/tactical level whereas the course of recent years has spent considerable time on lower-level or brigade-level tactical employment. The syllabus, scenarios, and course materials make it appear that C300 presents Army tactics in a joint perspective, or how the Army would function in a Joint Task Force. However, in reality, the lack of a good Service mix in the classroom and the faculty causes skewed instruction and unrealistic and even incorrect portrayal of non-Army capabilities and limitations. For example, the course book includes detailed, robust force listings of US Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, and coalition air forces and a reasonably plausible command and control relationship of these forces in a Joint Task Force. However, in the classroom, the rolls of these non-Army forces are seldom, if ever, mentioned and if they are, it is usually because of a zealous Air Force, Navy, Marine Corps, or international officer student who puts in the considerable extra effort to show how these forces could produce results important to the Army commanders. Even with such effort by a student, these results of airpower, seapower, amphibious, and coalition operations are often discounted as insignificant.

Students report a significant difference between the scenarios of joint force employment in the tactics course and the employment portrayed in the joint courses. While there are certainly important learning objectives in the Army tactics course, they should not be made at the cost of inaccurate representation of the capabilities, limitations, or attitude of non-Army Services. In the last four years, many sister Service officers
have related to this author that tactics is the most difficult Command and General Staff College course of study, not because it is all unfamiliar material for them, but because of their inability to convince their fellow officers from the Army that their Service also plays an important role in Joint Task Force operations. The Army forces are portrayed as the central part of a Joint Task Force with all the other Services supporting them, instead of the Army being one of several Service and national components working together supporting the Joint Task Force Commander.

In the other major core curriculum areas—history, resource management, and even leadership—there are some joint issues addressed. However, the vast majority of the joint education is in the Fundamentals of Operational Warfighting part of the curriculum.

A major shortfall in the overall core curriculum, the portion of the curriculum that all students participate in, is the lack of sufficient, accurate Joint Task Force education. There is insufficient depth in the Department of Joint and Multinational Operations core curriculum, and the subject is poorly addressed in the Center for Army Tactics curriculum. More time needs to be allotted to this subject so students will be prepared to step out of the college and walk into a Joint Task Force ready to work effectively.

Individual Service capabilities and limitations, other than the Army’s, are also insufficiently addressed. The lack of sufficient non-host faculty and students is partially to blame for this shortfall. Inaccurate portrayal of non-Army Service capabilities and limitations in the tactics curriculum is particularly harmful.

The Advanced Application Programs system has expanded significantly since 1987-1988’s elective program. Officers now participate in twelve twenty-seven-hour Advanced Application Program courses during Terms II and III. The college now offers
163 Advanced Application Program courses of which thirty-nine, or 24 percent, are joint. As the number of Advanced Application Courses has increased over the years from 120 to the current 163, the ratio of joint to Service-specific Advanced Application Program courses has not changed significantly.

The Strategist and Joint Planner Focused Programs, both of which are joint focused programs, continue to be offered. Space Operations was added in 1992 as a new Focused Program and is also very joint in its perspective.

A very important development over the years is the creation of a large-scale capstone exercise at the end of the academic year. The PRAIRIE WARRIOR exercise allows students to simulate a military campaign at the tactical and operational level of war within a framework that provides some theater strategic and strategic structure. The exercise incorporates many joint, multinational, and interagency aspects through some sister-Service participation and employment of current Service and joint doctrine. Students, working in selected Advanced Application Program courses, design the warfighting concept for the complex scenario and write orders for the support and execution of notional military forces. Some of the computer modeling is very sophisticated allowing students in exercise leadership roles to react and change plans in a real-time environment.

This capstone exercise concept is an excellent idea in theory. It should allow the students to draw upon the knowledge gained through college education and apply it in a complex and realistic scenario. Unfortunately, in practice, the exercise requires extensive support both in terms of money and personnel. Setting up the computer hardware, simulation software and contractor support costs millions of dollars. A large
segment of the student population was used to run the modeling—typing in commands and relaying results. These students did not learn a great deal from the exercise except how to run the computer modeling program. These student operators were also the officers who were not taking the PRAIRIE WARRIOR Advanced Application Program courses, so they did not gain the experience in studying the scenario problems and developing the concept of operations. Most students were trained on the exercise scenario and their duties the week before the exercise simulation actually began.

Students chosen to serve as decision-makers or to participate on planning staffs gained tremendous experience. The combination of the inputs of computer simulation and the human instructors served as a decision-generator mechanism. The real-time action-reaction of the simulation program created situations for the students to deal with. The difficulty was that only a small proportion of the students actually experienced the learning the exercise afforded. It was not cost effective.

The size of the exercise has grown and shrunk over the years. This year, academic year 1998-1999, only a portion of the student body will be participating in the exercise. Since not all students are participating in the exercise, PRAIRIE WARRIOR can not be considered contributing to the overall Program for Joint Education Phase I joint education. This focuses the resources on a smaller and more manageable group of officers, most of whom have been involved in the planning of the operation through Advanced Application Program courses. Fewer officers will be simulation operators—a greater proportion will be commanders and important staff members than in years past. While resources may be applied more effectively in this mode of exercise, most Command and General Staff College officers will not have any opportunity to participate
in this education opportunity at all. Officers who will not participate in the exercise will take an additional Advanced Application Program course instead—most of these offered Advanced Application Program courses are joint-focused.

While the exercise has many joint aspects, it falls short in many important ways. Without sufficient sister-Service representation in the class and faculty, it is difficult to model the operations of the other Services in the Joint Task Force accurately. The Navy and Marine Corps are especially poorly modeled in the simulation due to the lack of Naval and Marine human expertise in planning and execution and limitations inherent in the computer simulation models. Even though the Air Force participates in the exercise extensively with a robust computer modeling system and every Air Force student in the college actively involved, conflicts in learning objectives can produce some faulty learning on the part of the students. For example, the scenario might lend itself to an effective use of airpower at the opening days of the conflict to degrade and destroy a portion of the adversary military forces. But if the students planning and running the airpower portion of the campaign do their job well, the officers planning and running the ground portion of the exercise will not be challenged by a strong adversary. Referees, made up of college instructors and leadership, monitor the simulation and if the student learning will be adversely affected, they will modify the results of exercise operations, resurrect destroyed forces, or change the modeling to cause student inputs to have varying levels of success. The danger of this tampering is that students working in their command centers do not know why the adversary forces are as strong as they are—they will often conclude that the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were ineffective in doing their job. This is a serious problem for joint education.
While the previous discussions may have applicability to other Service-run colleges, the Army Command and General Staff College faces a particular challenge. The mission of the intermediate Service school program at Fort Leavenworth clearly defines the focus of the college. Table 4 shows the evolution of the school mission and objectives from 1988 to today. Throughout the modern history of the Command and General Staff College, the essential mission was to educate officers to be proficient division- and corps-level Army tacticians. That basic need continues to this day. This focus complies completely with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Congress’ direction up to this point, but competes and conflicts in terms of time and resources with the needs of joint education in general.

The mission of the school has expanded to address topics more specifically, including joint matters as mandated by policy and law changes since the Goldwater-Nichols Act. These developments have caused significant friction between the proponents of joint education and the proponents of corps and division tactics. There exists a constant struggle between the teaching departments of the Command and General Staff College over hours devoted to each department’s curriculum. It is, unfortunately, a zero-sum game—a gain in hours devoted to one part of the curriculum means a loss somewhere else. Students attend the college for only ten months and there is a limited number of hours available for classroom instruction. Of interest is the fact that between 1987 and 1998, despite the friction of competing curriculum objectives, time spent on joint curriculum has held essentially steady at about 30 percent of the core curriculum. The ebb and flow of hours between tactics and joint instruction is in terms of one or two percentage points over the years.
Table 4. Comparison of Mission Statements for the Army Command and General Staff College 1988 and 1999.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>1988</th>
<th>1999</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>&quot;Prepare officers for duty as field grade commanders and principal</td>
<td>&quot;Educate officers in the values and attitudes of the profession of</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>staff officers at division and higher echelons&quot;³</td>
<td>arms and in the conduct of military operations during peace,</td>
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<td></td>
<td>instability, and war with emphasis at division and corps levels.&quot;⁴</td>
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Graduates will be able to:

- Command battalions, brigades, and equivalent-sized units in peace and war
- Train these units to accomplish their assigned missions
- Employ and sustain weapon and equipment systems in combined arms operations
- Serve as principal staff officers from division through corps, including support commands, and as staff officers of major Army, joint, unified, or combined headquarters
- Efficiently manage manpower, equipment, money, and time

- Regional and global military operations.
- Preparing for war, mobilization, strategic deployment, contingency planning, and force tailoring.
- Joint and Multinational operations, forward deployed forces, and low-intensity conflict.
- Diverse brigade level applications.

Source: CGSC Circular 351-1, United States Army Command and General Staff College Catalog Academic Year 1987-1988 and CGSC Circular 351-1, United States Army Command and General Staff College Catalog Academic Year 1998-1999.
The numbers of hours devoted to joint education and the names of courses are only part of the whole joint education picture. Is there a marked difference in the quality of joint education at the Army Command and General Staff College since 1986? Absolutely.

Joint doctrine has provided curriculum writers and instructors with authoritative roadmaps that did not exist in 1987. Creation of joint doctrine was mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Doctrine is a template describing how something is done. In the case of joint doctrine, it describes how US Military forces operate together. The doctrine has been written and coordinated with the participation and input of all the military Services and takes precedence over any Service-specific doctrine. Joint doctrine provides the basic rules of how Service forces will work together. All joint doctrine provides the Joint Force Commander the authority to modify procedures from basic doctrine to fit the given situation. Now, when an instructor discusses a topic, he can draw on the agreed-upon doctrine to help guide student learning.

The Chairman’s Officer Professional Military Education Policy, which grew out of the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent legislation, includes the Joint Learning Areas and Objectives outlined in chapter three. These criteria provide a systematic focus for joint education at the college. As curriculum is reviewed, it is compared to the required learning areas to ensure that the essential aspects of joint matters are being addressed.

The college offers officers the opportunity to earn a Master of Military Art and Science degree while attending the in-residence school. The core curriculum and Advanced Application Program courses make up most of the classroom requirements.
An additional three Advanced Application Program courses address research methods and completion of a thesis. The program is accredited by the North Central Association of Colleges and Schools.\textsuperscript{5}

Assessments, inspections, and accreditations all indicate that the US Army Command and General Staff College is meeting, and often exceeding, the requirements set forth for joint education by the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent legislation and policy. The assessments and inspections are good measures as far as compliance with the OPMEP is concerned, but the OPMEP does not go far enough to ensure sufficient joint education for the modern-day officer. There are problems in current joint education at the Army Command and General Staff College because of the student and faculty Service mix, inaccuracies in the tactics curriculum, and insufficient Joint Task Force focus throughout the curriculum.

\textsuperscript{2}Ibid., 15.
\textsuperscript{3}CGSC Circular 351-1, 47.
\textsuperscript{4}CGSC Circular 351-1, United States Army Command and General Staff College Catalog Academic Year 1998-1999, [catalog on-line]; available from http://www-cgsc.army.mil/dsa/Pubs/CIR351-1/chapter3.htm; Internet.
\textsuperscript{5}Army Command and General Staff College, Student Text 20-10, Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Research and Thesis, (Fort Leavenworth, KS: July 1998), 1.
CHAPTER SIX
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

While joint education at the Command and General Staff College has not been stagnant over the years since the Goldwater-Nichols Act, it has not evolved sufficiently to keep pace with the evolving needs of the warfighter. Hundreds of joint operations have taken place since 1986 including ELDORADO CANYON--the 1986 raids on Libya to deter her support of international terrorism, DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM--the 1990-1991 defense of Saudi Arabia and liberation of Kuwait, PROVIDE COMFORT--1991 humanitarian relief operation for the Kurdish peoples in Northern Iraq, and the current operations in Yugoslavia and Southwest Asia. The United States now has immeasurably more experience in operating jointly--experience made possible by the visionaries who wrote, legislated, and enforced the Goldwater-Nichols Act and subsequent legislation. But the United States Military has reached a level of comfort in joint education at the intermediate Service school level. Each year, curriculum is modified, updated, and improved incrementally from the year before. Courses are added, dropped, repackaged, renamed, but overall the quality and quantity of the education is basically the same. What is needed is a sweeping change in the fundamental approach to education at this level--and probably all levels. This author asserts that, beginning at the intermediate level, Professional Military Education should equal Joint Professional Military Education.

In the introduction, this thesis showed the growing need for officers educated in joint matters and the small rate of production through the entire joint education system--
less than 13 percent of the officers selected for promotion to major or lieutenant commander will complete both Phase I and Phase II of the current joint education system. While this production rate may be sufficient to fill the current joint billets, it is insufficient to spread expertise in joint matters throughout the organizations which form Joint Task Forces. Chapter three shows the evolution of the mandates of the civilian leadership and the military’s execution of these directives. Chapters four and five outlined the evolution of joint education at the Army Command and General Staff College and identified some particular strengths and weaknesses in terms of curriculum, faculty, and student body makeup.

While the current system meets the letter of the law, it is not up to the task of meeting the growing need for officers conversant in joint matters to serve on Joint Task Force staffs. The development of these chapters shows some particularly significant gaps in how joint education has been structured and conducted in the years since 1987 to the present day. Fundamental changes are necessary to meet our current needs and continue to develop the vision of jointness in the spirit of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The following recommendations address the two major areas that need attention—quantity and quality. The United States needs more officers with the joint education necessary to understand how to plan and function in a Joint Task Force. These officers also need a better joint education than is available now.

A Broader Definition of Joint

The definition of jointness needs to expand to include multinational operations, interagency (interagency refers to the interaction of different parts of the US Federal Government like the CIA and FBI) and nongovernmental organization interaction. There
is no need for new terms to describe these operations since just as all US Military
operations are now joint, they are also almost always multinational, interagency, and
complex. Warfighters need to understand how to work with other agencies and other
countries as well as nongovernmental agencies, such as the Red Cross and World Food.

The Changes

This author categorizes his discussion of changes for intermediate Service school
into six major categories: (1) Joint Education with a Service Flavor (2) Joint Faculty
(3) Joint Curriculum (4) Joint Classroom (5) Service Challenges, and
(6) Infrastructure.

Joint Education with a Service Flavor

Today, intermediate Service school can be described as Service education with a
joint flavor. This builds upon the axiom that effective joint officers must be experts in
their own Services first and foremost; that the most vital ingredient they bring to the joint
arena is their experience and knowledge of how their Service organizes, moves, and
fights. This author does not dispute this, but it is arguable that an officer has sufficient
Service expertise after accumulating thirteen years or more of on-the-job experience.

Intermediate Service school should be a program of primarily joint education
with some necessary specialized Service education which builds upon the thirteen or
more years of on-the-job experience. It would be akin to an undergraduate college
student who majors in joint studies and minors in Service. At the US Army Command
and General Staff College this would require a substantial change in the curriculum
layout.
All Service-run intermediate Service schools are owned and operated by the individual Services. They must meet the minimum requirements for joint education as laid out in the Officer Professional Military Education Policy (OPMEP)--and based upon periodic inspections they do meet these learning objectives and often exceed them. To support the fundamental shift in focus at this level of education, responsibility for the schools and their curriculum must shift from the individual Services to the Joint Staff. The Chairman would assign oversight of the entire school system to a Joint Staff organization and the Services would be tasked to provide faculty, infrastructure, and curriculum expertise. Overall ownership of this entire level of education, not just the joint education piece, would shift from the Services to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Services, as evident from the incremental changes to the Army Command and General Staff College over the last twelve years, appear unable or unwilling to take joint education beyond where it stands today.

Joint Faculty

Faculty, the teachers, facilitators, course and curriculum authors, is a key ingredient in the success of an educational institution. Following the Armed Forces Staff College model, the faculty at all intermediate Service schools should reflect the Service mix in the joint operational world--roughly one third Air Force, one third Army, and one third sea Service (Navy and Marine Corps combined). In addition to these US Military faculty members, a rich infusion of expertise from international militaries (again, all services) and the interagency realm is essential. Civilian instructors would continue to be an important part of the faculty as they provide vital continuity and experience.
Combined with the rotating active duty military, the whole faculty can be a very effective team.

Recruiting quality faculty members is essential. While it may be unreasonable to expect the Services to provide their absolute best and brightest to serve as faculty, Service officers should perceive instructor duty as desirable. Officers who are intelligent and experienced should not be faced with the choice of going to the Pentagon and advancing their career or going to Fort Leavenworth as an instructor in a what is perceived as a neutral at best career move in the Army. Other Services may differ on this perception somewhat, but teaching should be a career enhancing choice across all the Services.

**Joint Curriculum**

The entire curriculum should be designed to produce officers ready to serve on Joint Task Forces as commanders, planners, and other staff officers. It is the officers at the rank of major, lieutenant commander, lieutenant colonel and commander who plan and direct execution of virtually all Joint Task Force operations. To this end, the intermediate Service school should provide a curriculum that educates officers in what they need to know to work well in *the joint fight* and round-out their Service education as well.

The OPMEP learning objectives do not fully support this vital need. The OPMEP describes the need for intermediate Service schools to “teach subordinate joint operations from the standpoint of Service forces in a joint force supported by Service
component commands. It goes on to list curricula emphasis areas of:

- National Military capabilities and command structure
- Joint doctrine
- Joint and Multinational forces at the operational level of war
- Joint planning and execution processes
- Systems integration at the operational level of war

These curricula emphasis areas stress Joint Task Force operations, but the OPMEP Learning Areas discussed in chapter three do not specify specific tasks to support this education. The Army Command and General Staff College looks to the Learning Areas to assess their compliance to the Chairman’s of the Joint Chiefs of Staff intent for joint education. Further, inspections for joint accreditation by the Joint Staff limit their scope of inspection to compliance to the Learning Areas alone. While the Army Command and General Staff College meets the Learning Areas guidance, it falls far short of sufficiently preparing officers for duty in a Joint Task Force. Armed Forces Staff College is tasked by the OPMEP to “address joint staff operations in detail” yet many officers who need this knowledge do not attend because they are not slated to fill a joint billet. Expanding the joint education in the proposed core curriculum to include discussions and exercises of joint staff operations such as joint operations planning and execution would go a long way to providing officers with a solid understanding of joint matters.

**Joint Curriculum--Re-Bluing**

While most officers will have had better than thirteen years of experience as Army, Navy, Marine Corps, or Air Force officers, they may well have been very channelized--focused narrowly in one specific function of their Service. A good starting
point for this level of education is bringing officers together, grouped by Service, to provide some education in what their Service does as a whole. The Air Force calls this process re-bluing—a reference to the color of Air Force uniforms. Currently during three weeks of the summer before the formal Command and General Staff College course begins, all the Air Force officers who will be attending the college are brought together and are briefed and participate in discussions about how the Air Force is organized and how it fights as part of a Joint Task Force. This education helps to broaden the officers’ understanding to the span and breadth of Service capabilities and limitations sufficiently that they can go into their individual staff groups and speak intelligently as the sole Air Force representative. This education would also be valuable in the more balanced Service mix this thesis proposes later.

In this joint curriculum, this concept would be extended across all the Services’ representation to educate their officers in how their particular Service operates and is organized. For example: All Service basic courses would include such things as their particular Service roles and organization. Then each Service course could focus on their particular functions and how they accomplish them. Discussions about core doctrine and how the Service views warfare in general would round-out this education.

With all the Service officers grounded in the basics of their Service and well-versed in their particular area of expertise from more than thirteen years of experience, officers are ready for the broader joint education to begin.
Joint Curriculum--The Core Curriculum

The current joint curriculum in the core course at Command and General Staff College described in chapter five and as mandated in the OPMEP Program for Joint Education are good models to begin with. Instead of 128 hours in thirty days for the core joint education as it exists today, however, the curriculum would be built-upon and expanded to run throughout the entire academic year. The additional time would allow more discussion of joint matters, analysis of case studies, more depth in the how of Joint Task Force operations, logistics, and planning, and joint exercises which would serve as a decision-generators for the officers who plan and lead the Joint Task Force notional operations. A sixth Learning Area, Joint Task Force Planning and Operations, should be added to the OPMEP, specifying particular learning objectives addressing such topics as interagency and non-governmental agency interaction, headquarters organization, multinational force integration, and force reception.

It is vital that this joint education be in the core curriculum. Core curriculum is for all students, no exceptions. All officers in the class need to understand Joint Task Forces and joint operations regardless of their background or projected next assignment. This thesis proposes that the general layout of this core curriculum span the entire spectrum of Joint Task Force operations.

Begin from the beginning--the strategic level aspects of policy formation and execution. The military is a tool of the American people and their government just as diplomacy, information, and economics are. The military is used to ultimately accomplish political goals and as such, officers must understand how these political decisions are made and who is involved. This portion would continue to include
discussions of how the US Military forces are organized both along Service lines, but
also by the joint Unified Commands. This portion would also develop more thoroughly
what a joint staff does and how it is organized.

Next a solid grounding in all Service and agency capabilities and limitations is
vital. Each Service would be scrutinized in detail with facilitation led by the Service
representatives in the class and assisted by members of the joint faculty. Examining all
the functions of each Service would provide each officer an excellent grounding in joint
matters--learning how is each Service is organized, how it approaches warfighting, and
about some important Service doctrine. In addition, the classes would explore US
Federal agencies which have a significant impact on the missions the Military is called to
execute such as the intelligence community, Department of Justice, the State
Department, and the Agency for International Development.

Then three major Joint Task Force lesson areas, each culminating with an
exercise, build on the foundation knowledge gained in the previous weeks. One
operation which replicates a humanitarian Military Operations Other Than War
(MOOTW) scenario, a peacekeeping MOOTW scenario akin to Bosnia today, and finally
a major force operation like Korea or Southwest Asia to replicate the major military
force operation of a Major Theater War (MTW). The capstone exercises would be of a
much smaller scale than the current Command and General Staff College PRAIRIE
WARRIOR exercise. By using small computer-based simulation software, students can
build a campaign concept, develop the deployment schedule, and wargame or play the
conflict through to experience some fog and friction of war. The computer-based
program would not be an precise simulation, per se, but a means of bringing some of the
pieces together in a rational, reasonable manner to force students to make decisions as their plans unfurl in near real time. The simulation could be similar to those used at the Armed Forces Staff College today.

In addition to the three major areas described above, other joint operation areas such as Military support to civil authorities like the military role in quelling the Los Angeles riots after the Rodney King verdict and the Hurricane Andrew relief operations in Florida would be addressed and discussed.

By the end of this joint curriculum, all the officers in the class will have had much more opportunity to debate, research, discuss, analyze, and try-out the doctrine and understand the joint matters considered so vital in Joint Task Force operations.

Table 5 shows the proposed core curriculum. The core curriculum is completely joint focused; building officers who will have some experience in how Joint Task Forces operate. This curriculum actually brings the current Service-run intermediate Service school joint curriculum (Program for Joint Education Phase I) together with the National Defense University Armed Forces Staff College (Program for Joint Education Phase II) and makes it flow logically. This would eliminate the need for the separate three-month Joint Staff Officers Course at the Armed Forces Staff College.

Part of the core curriculum, also taught to the joint staff groups discussed later, would include history and leadership using case studies of actual operations. Ideally, these topics could be built into the rest of the joint curriculum described above. Both topics are critical to officer professional development.

A robust guest speaker program would not only bring in subject matter experts to brief the class en masse, but would also bring experts into the staff groups throughout the
academic year to engage the officers in a small group seminar format. This is done in the
current joint curriculum where representatives from various non-governmental agencies
work in the staff groups to provide some real-world insight into how they operate around
the world. Guest speakers may focus on supporting the joint learning objectives or may
focus on a more narrow Service-specific issue--the audiences can be tailored to the
speaker. Guest speakers should bring not only generally accepted points of view, but
also challenge the students and faculty with unpopular and forward-thinking ideas.

Table 5. Proposed Joint Core Curriculum.

- Service Orientation (Students separated by Service)

  Rest of Core Curriculum uses the joint class mix

- Strategic Level Concepts

- Service/Agency Capabilities and Limitations

- Unified Command Organization and Responsibilities

- Operational Level Concepts and Operations

  - Joint Task Force Operations in General

  - Joint Task Force MOOTW (Humanitarian) - Exercise

  - Joint Task Force MOOTW (Peacekeeping) - Exercise

  - Joint Task Force Major Theater War - Exercise

  - Other Joint Task Force Operations
Throughout the year, officers would also take courses that continue their Service education. These courses would break out officers by Service and build specific Service-related skills the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Services, and CINCs believe are essential to their functions and missions. Examples might be air operations planning for Air Force officers, sea denial operations for Naval officers, amphibious operations for Marines, and division operations for the Army officers. The number, length, and actual subjects covered would have to be explored further and is beyond the scope of this research.

Finally, there could be Service and joint electives which officers could choose to take which could develop specific topics more fully such as Information Operations, corps logistics, or Space Operations.

The new core curriculum would continue throughout the academic year—perhaps the first three hours of each class day. The second three hours of the day could be utilized for these electives, history, and guest speakers. By holding classes Monday, Tuesday, Thursday, and Friday, the students would have evenings, Wednesdays, and weekends to do individual preparation, study, and research.

As Representative Skelton asserts, rigor is essential to any fine educational institution. Throughout the course, officers would be required to read books from a provided professional reading list and write critical analysis papers on them. Throughout the course, officers would produce thoughtful point papers using formats common to staff officers in the military instead of the lengthy essay styles currently in use at the college. Officers would be drawn on to lead facilitation throughout the year—building lesson plans and sharing their knowledge with their classmates. Throughout the
education process, the papers, presentations, briefings, and research should encourage in-depth analysis and critical thinking, using similar written and briefing tools employed by officers in the field.

The current Master of Military Art and Science program should be expanded. Instead of being an option, as it is now, all students should be enrolled in the program. Instead of a large thesis, two smaller monograph research projects could be integrated into the curriculum as it is currently in the School of Advanced Military Studies. Some of the other Service colleges are already doing, or considering, this course of action. Linking the college curriculum to an accredited university degree program would go a long way toward ensuring this level of education is rigorous and challenging.

This section provides a thumbnail sketch of how the intermediate Service school curriculum should be laid out. It provides a much more robust joint-matters-focused effort, but allows time for Service-essential education. It also provides for all the minimum required educational points mandated in the law and the OPMEP and expands the curriculum into more detail concerning Joint Task Force operations and Service capabilities and limitations.

The Joint Classroom

The third major piece of this education puzzle, linking with curriculum and faculty, is the makeup of the student body and the staff groups. Again, Armed Forces Staff College has it right--the colleges need a joint mix in the staff groups (seminars as they are called in Armed Forces Staff College) of roughly one third Air Force, one third sea Service, and one third Army (one international officer and an interagency representative should also be added to the mix). It has been the author’s experience,
having attended both Command and General Staff College with its mix of one Sea
Service and one Air Force officer with fifteen Army officers and the Armed Forces Staff
College with the balanced Service mix described, that the discussions of joint matters in
each situation had a distinctly different result. While examining the difficult issues,
problems that the Services quarrel over such as control of airpower in the deep fight,
close air support, and control of Naval aviation, it is often fifteen against one--little real
intellectual debate on contentious interservice issues happens at the Command and
General Staff College. However, at Armed Forces Staff College with its balanced
Service representation, the issues are debated and argued in a broader and more balanced
fashion.

Balanced Service representation also has the advantage of having a broader
experience base in the joint classroom. With four Air Force officers in a staff group you
could represent experience from fighter operations, airlift, logistics, and space all in the
same staff group. Similar breadth of experience can be represented among the staff
group students from the other Services. When it comes to developing plans and
executing operations, the real flavor of Joint Task Force functions can come through--the
synergy of many Service capabilities and limitations toward a common goal.

Currently, one officer in the staff group is an Army National Guard or Reserve
officer. Most times, this officer attends only the first five months of the course. Today,
the Reserve and National Guard represent nearly half of the US Military's total strength.4
One officer from the National Guard and one officer from the Reserve should be part of
every staff group's Service makeup for the entire academic year. These officers should
be drawn from all the Services' non-active duty components.
As the military continues to recognize the need to work with interagency and non-governmental organizations in the conflicts they are called upon to serve, these organizations must be represented in the classrooms. One interagency or non-governmental organization representative should be in each staff group. The military should consider scholarships to organizations as an incentive to encourage their participation.

The colleges must continue to include the officers from nations around the world in the staff groups. These officers bring a wealth of experience and a thoroughly different world-view to the classroom. One officer from a foreign country should be in each staff group.

Students should be competitively selected for attendance. Only officers who have demonstrated the ability to perform at the graduate school level should be considered. Officers should be required to apply to attend the college and complete a screening examination to test their ability to handle the reading load and the writing requirements.

Should an officer prove unable, or unwilling to satisfactorily accomplish the work assigned at these colleges, the officer should be disenrolled. At the Army Command and General Staff College today, it is virtually impossible to flunk out of the program solely due to poor grades—a poor precedent.
Service Challenges

This author sees many serious issues that will challenge some deep-rooted mindsets within each Service's officer development and personnel systems. This thesis will address some of the more significant issues as recommendations for further research.

The Services take a widely varying stand on who they send to in-residence schools and how many officers they wish to send. The Air Force and the Marine Corps competitively select about the top 20-30 percent of their majors to attend the in-residence programs—essentially limiting the complete in-residence education experience to what they believe will be the pool from which they will draw their future senior leadership. The Army sends the top 40-50 percent of its majors to intermediate Service school in residence and is working toward increasing that percentage to 60 percent and eventually 100 percent. While this includes their future service leadership, it includes many who will not even progress past the rank of major or lieutenant colonel. The Navy, due to some cultural and operational peculiarities, do not select officers for in-residence schooling based on merit—it is more an issue of availability—though there are signs that this seems to be slowly changing and the Navy will more closely match the policies of the Air Force and Marine Corps.5

All these systems have some solid reasoning behind them. The Navy has significant timing challenges in officer career development. Officers in many specialties such as surface and submarine warfare must complete tours of duty in several different specialties in order to have the broad experience the Navy deems necessary to command vessels. The timeline is very tight, especially since the draw-down has resulted in many fewer vessels on which to gain this experience. Often times, taking a year out for
education is considered a distracter—and in fact, education has not been a significant discriminator for promotion in the Navy as it is in the other Services. There are signs of this paradigm changing to be more along the views on education shared by the Marine Corps and the Air Force both in terms of officer selection for school and the numbers of officers attending school.

The Air Force and Marine Corps choose to invest the large amount of time and money in the officers that have shown the greatest potential and best performance over the first thirteen years or so of their careers. It is logical that this group of select officers is the pool from which their future senior leaders will come. An interesting result of sending a relatively small number of officers to intermediate Service school in residence is that many of the majors who do not go to in-residence intermediate Service school will still compete well and be promoted to lieutenant colonel. Officers selected to attend in-residence intermediate Service school are virtually assured of promotion to the next grade since they were in the top 20 percent of their year group and the promotion rate to lieutenant colonel is around 65 percent. Officers not selected for in-residence intermediate Service school still have a solid chance for promotion—about 56 percent (using the representative promotion rates above) will be selected for promotion. Those officers not selected for in-residence school are more likely to be motivated, in the author’s experience, to work harder to ensure they are promoted. This author uses the analogy that Air Force and Marine Corps majors are told by the fact they were not selected for in-residence school to peddle faster if they wish to be promoted further.

The Army has been trying to find a way to send all of its new majors to in-residence Command and General Staff College. Educating all of a Service’s officers to
this level, spending the tremendous amount of money and resources on each and every officer is a worthy ideal, but impractical. The Army has continued to state that 100 percent is a goal, but they will push up from 40 or 50 percent to 60 percent for now. A perception, backed by simple mathematics, exists that not being selected for in-residence intermediate Service school means you have only about a one in ten chance for promotion. Non-selection for intermediate Service school will be equivalent to an early notification to 40 percent of the new majors of the Army each year of a virtually-assured future pass-over for promotion for lieutenant colonel. The potentially serious demotivating result of this scheme has not been satisfactorily addressed by the Army.

Another reason for the high number of Army officers attending intermediate Service school in residence is the branch-qualifying officer development process. Similar to the Navy, it is felt that officers need to have certain assignment experiences in order to be competent for selection for command. Much of the material taught at the Army Command and General Staff College is training and education designed to ready officers for these assignments and is considered an essential prerequisite for serving in these assignments. The Army’s new Officer Personnel Management System XXI may change, but not eliminate this training and education challenge.

These different Service views for who and how many officers should attend intermediate Service school impacts the Joint Professional Military Education plan since it influences the officer Service ratios in the classes. Ideally, each Service will select sufficient officers for schooling to build the balanced Service officer representation discussed. Either the Navy, Marine Corps, and Air Force will need to send more officers to in-residence intermediate Service school, the Army will have to send fewer, or a
combination of both. Considering the added expense and the negative impact of non-selection for intermediate Service school in the Army, this author recommends the Army pull back their selection rate and the other Services push up their rates to balance the numbers. If the Army, Navy, Air Force, and Marine Corps selected about 22 to 27 percent of their newly promoted majors and lieutenant commanders to attend the new in-residence intermediate-level college, balanced classrooms could be realized and a total of over 2,200 officers would be fully educated in joint matters each year.

Another challenge is in the impact of this scheme on Service education. All Services look at intermediate Service school as a critical and necessary opportunity to train and educate their future Service leaders in Service doctrine and operations. For the Army Command and General Staff College, this means training Army officers to serve on corps and division staffs—to be fluent in tactics, leadership, and logistics. Reorienting intermediate Service school at the Command and General Staff College, as perhaps with all the Service schools, would require a significant change in how the Services educate their officers in Service doctrine and operations. This author contends that most this education could and should be happening on the job and in schools other than intermediate Service school. To teach tactics alone as it is done at Command and General Staff College would require a four to six week, intensive course—something that should be workable in an officer’s career development in one, or many, smaller courses, perhaps some employing distance learning methods. The Command and General Staff College would then be free to focus on the operational and strategic levels of conflict—the subject matter that benefits most from the face-to-face seminar in-residence format.
This author would be remiss if he did not address infrastructure and resource issues inherent to his proposed Joint Professional Military Education scheme. While the discussion is very broad and superficial, he hopes to lay some groundwork for further research by others.

While a single, massive campus for Joint Professional Military Education would have many interesting advantages such as the ease in coordination on curriculum, the opportunity to easily share expertise between the intermediate Service school and senior Service school faculty and class members, and reduced long-term operating costs, it is probably unreasonable from the standpoint of start-up costs. Finding a location and building sufficient infrastructure could be a daunting expense. Closing several Service school campuses could seriously hurt local communities. The author proposes something more manageable—a common vision and centralized control / decentralized execution at the existing Service school campuses.

A Common Vision

A common vision means all the existing Service school campuses will adopt the same faculty organization, Service mix in the classroom and faculty, curriculum, schedule, etc.. Each Service will be tasked by the Joint Staff to provide support to all the campuses in terms of personnel and operations funding. Funding allocations can be worked out at the Joint Staff level to ensure a equitable distribution of cost burden to each Service. When completed, it will matter very little whether an officer attends Fort Leavenworth, Maxwell Air Force Base, Quantico, or Newport since the faculty, curriculum, and class are equivalent. Some things like the quality of quarters, research
facilities, classroom and office spaces may vary, but these aspects are secondary to the education process and could be addressed and improved over time.

Centralized control means the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in his role as the Goldwater-Nichols Act-identified leader of joint education, directs how officer education will be conducted throughout the military. He and his staff, in coordination with the Services, will build a broad central curriculum plan with associated numbers of contact hours from the OPMEP requirements with added emphasis on Joint Task Force, multinational and interagency operations. Service education requirements will also be determined and worked into the central curriculum plan. From there, in the spirit of decentralized execution, each school faculty will have the opportunity to build their courses meeting the course objectives laid out in the Chairman’s guidance. This will provide faculty curriculum authors at each campus the opportunity to improve the program and have a sense of ownership. Schools will enjoy a healthy spirit of competition to continually look for new ideas and better courseware. Schools can benchmark each other--sharing good ideas and what doesn’t work. The centralized curriculum ensures an equivalent, quality education experience producing joint officers regardless of what campus they attend and decentralized execution gives local faculty the opportunity to own their courses.

Schools will have the flexibility to try new organizational models for the faculty and class members, develop new courses, and try new ideas--all shared with the other campuses. Good ideas can be expanded to all campuses.

The current Process for Accreditation of Joint Education can easily be adapted to ensure the equivalency of all the campuses and collect the benchmarks to share with the
other campuses. They could also serve as the judges to determine if a new organizational concept or curriculum design should be applied across the campuses or a return to the previous method is warranted.

**Recommendation for Further Research**

These ideas open a wealth of issues worthy of further research and analysis:

How do Service promotion, assignment selection systems and professional development tracks hinder the development of officers ready to take on the challenges of making Joint Task Forces more effective? Are there processes left over from the Cold War or earlier, which do not make sense today or will not make sense tomorrow? This thesis contends there is a strong argument for a redesign of the Army’s overall concept of Branch Qualification, the Air Force’s scheme for the development of leaders, and the Navy’s track for developing competent skippers.

How does this discussion about officer education and development relate to noncommissioned officer, warrant officer, and junior enlisted rank’s training and education? It is certainly arguable that jointness throughout all levels of the military’s leadership is essential.

What role should nonresidence Professional Military Education serve? Can a nonresident program achieve any significant level of education in joint matters when it lacks the face-to-face interaction of officers from different Services?

How much Service education can be effectively accomplished by distance learning means? What learning requires the seminar interaction? Do officers have time to spend on this education requirement when they are serving in a regular military duty
position or do they need to have an in-residence school assignment where their only duty is learning? The impact on in-residence education could be significant.

Further research may show that this overhaul is certainly pertinent to senior service school-level professional military education and may also give insight in how to begin joint education from pre-commissioning onward.

The Army Command and General Staff College is currently meeting all the Joint Professional Military Education OPMEP joint learning areas and objectives in the first term. Is it wise to shorten the current ten-month in-residence college to allow more officers to attend each year? Can officers learn and internalize sufficient education and interpersonal experience in a shortened course?

**Conclusion**

Joint education with a Service flavor, joint faculty, joint curriculum, joint classroom, Service challenges, infrastructure--these aspects address the major points of a scheme which answers the thesis question: Joint Professional Military Education 1999, Where to Now? While the author has not answered every conceivable question here, he has laid out a concept which would educate over 2,200 joint-matter-educated officers each and every year compared to the current 884 a year completing the current Phase II Joint Professional Military Education at Armed Forces Staff College. The author further asserts that the scheme described will be qualitatively better than the current Service education plus Armed Forces Staff College program.

This proposal eliminates the need for a separate, follow-on course at the Armed Forces Staff College to complete the joint education alleviating the difficult assignment turbulence this three-month course causes. The Services gain the advantage that their
officers would receive the same Service-specific education no matter which campus they attend. The number of officers who will be fully educated in joint matters each year would more than double which will further inculcate the understanding of joint warfare throughout the US Armed Forces. *Quantity* and *quality* would be significantly improved.

It is well past time for change. The educational institutions of the entire US Military must change to keep pace with the demand for joint, multinational, and interagency savvy officers.

1. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *CJCSI 1800.01, Officer Professional Military Education Policy* (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1 March 1996), A-B-5
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3. Ibid.
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Kupiszewski, Robert B. “Joint Education: Where Do We Go From Here?” *Joint Force Quarterly* 3 (winter 1993-94): 63-70.


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