Exercise Rainbow Serpent
After Action Report

A. Martin Lidy, Project Leader
Samuel H. Packer

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PREFACE

This report was produced by the Institute for Defense Analyses (IDA) in partial fulfillment of the task "U.S. Military Involvement in Multiple Smaller-Scale Contingency Operations," sponsored by the Director, Program Analysis and Evaluation, Office of the Secretary of Defense.

By special arrangement with the Washington Primary Standardization Office of American, British, Canadian, and Australian (ABCA) Armies, and at the suggestion of the sponsor for the task, permission was kindly provided for two IDA personnel to attend Exercise Rainbow Serpent 98 as observers and informal evaluators. The purpose for observing the exercise was to gain further insight into combined smaller-scale contingency operations and to share with the participants the task framework and responsibilities already developed by IDA for conducting these types of operations.

The document was reviewed by the IDA personnel who observed the exercise, and by the Operational Evaluation Division Director, Mr. Thomas P. Christie.
EXERCISE RAINBOW SERPENT
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EXERCISE RAINBOW SERPENT
AFTER ACTION REPORT

A. INTRODUCTION

This document provides a summary of observations collected during an Australian-led multinational exercise focused on peace support operations. The Institute for Defense Analyses has been tasked by the sponsor to respond to the following questions:

- **Question 1:** What are the strengths, weaknesses, and unique capabilities of the U.S. military that affect U.S. involvement in SSC operations, particularly those in which non-DoD organizations may be involved?

- **Question 2:** What types of non-DoD organizations is the U.S. military likely to be collaborating with in the range of potential future SSC operations, and what is the typical nature of the involvement?

- **Question 3:** What changes to the current force structure and/or doctrine would better enable U.S. military forces to contribute to SSC operations, and collaborate more effectively with non-DoD organizations?

- **Question 4:** What factors affect backfilling a U.S. military withdrawal from a posture of engagement in SSCs, and what resources and capabilities could be shifted to non-DoD organizations?

- **Question 5:** How much and what type of residual military support would the U.S. likely need to provide to remaining organizations following a U.S. withdrawal?

This document is the second in a series\(^1\) that will assist the sponsor in gaining a more comprehensive understanding of the employment of U.S. military resources in smaller-scale contingency operations. The observations provide important insights to the first three questions above.

\(^1\) IDA Document D-2166, "The United States' Military Role in Smaller Scale Contingencies," August 1998.
B. BACKGROUND

The America, Britain, Canada, and Australia (ABCA) Armies Standardization Program was initiated in 1947 when General Eisenhower and Field Marshal Montgomery agreed that the levels of cooperation and standardization achieved among allied forces during World War II should be maintained and extended. America, Britain, and Canada were the original members; they were joined by Australia in 1963. New Zealand became an associate member through Australia in 1965. The ABCA organization has developed quadripartite agreements and publications that have facilitated cooperation and effective operations among the Armies of America, Britain, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand during the conflict and peace support operations they have undertaken since World War II.

The ABCA conducts exercises biennially, with each Army in turn hosting an exercise. The primary purpose of these exercises is to validate existing ABCA quadripartite standardization agreements (QSTAGs), to identify areas for future standardization efforts, and to facilitate information exchange through the exposure of personnel to coalition activities. The scope and nature of each exercise is proposed by the host Army, and agreed by TEAL (the acronym for Tripartite Equipment and Logistics – a reflection of the origins of the program), the senior organization within ABCA formed by the Army Vice Chiefs of Staff. In 1996, the ABCA exercise Cascade Peak hosted by the U.S. Army was conducted at Fort Lewis, Washington and was a command post exercise with a tactical combat scenario. In the year 2000, the ABCA Armies exercise will be hosted by the British. That exercise is scheduled to be a seminar entitled Focus 2000 using a British-led peace support operation scenario in a fictitious Western African nation, but with joint and interagency participation.

C. EXERCISE OBJECTIVES AND SCENARIO

Exercise Rainbow Serpent 1998 (RS98) was an Australian-hosted ABCA exercise conducted at Gallipoli Barracks, Enoggera, Brisbane, Queensland, Australia during the period 29 October to 13 November 1998. It was a Command Post Exercise (CPX) managed by Australian Land Headquarters (LHQ), involving the Deployable Joint Force Headquarters, four ABCA Army brigade headquarters, a combined logistics support command, and associated control and evaluation personnel in a peace support operation scenario. The Land Commander Australia was designated as the Officer Scheduling the Exercise (OSE), and the Colonel Training Land Headquarters was designated as the Officer Conducting the Exercise (OCE). There were approximately 500 participants,
including 250 players, 200 controllers, and 50 evaluators and observers. On Day Four of the CPX, a group of about 15 distinguished visitors from the participating nations observed the exercise.

The overall aim of the exercise was to evaluate the ability of ABCA Armies to operate together within the context of a United Nations sanctioned military operation other than war (MOOTW). Specifically, this exercise provided the opportunity to evaluate the command and control interfaces between an Australian Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ) at the division echelon while serving as a lead nation headquarters and other ABCA formation headquarters at the brigade echelon.

The approved objectives for the exercise were as follows:

- To evaluate the level of command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) standardization among the ABCA Armies
- To refine the Lead Nation concept, developing it as necessary for a joint environment
- To assess ABCA logistic procedures in a single Service and joint environment
- To evaluate the ability of the ABCA Armies to operate together in a joint environment.

The evaluation team further refined these objectives to include the following:

- To assess the effectiveness of the ABCA force in MOOTW/Peace Support Operations
- To evaluate levels of standardization achieved/required in command and control (C2), intelligence, electronic warfare and signals intelligence, and logistic procedures within a division-level ABCA force
- To identify further developments required in the Lead Nation concept within a joint environment
- To identify areas requiring new or revised standardization agreements
- To examine the concepts and emerging doctrine for Information Operations
- To evaluate the draft Coalition Operations Handbook (COH) and other Program documents (the draft Coalition Logistics Planning Guide (CLPG), Medical Interoperability Handbook (MIH), etc.).

By special arrangement with the Washington Primary Standardization Office of ABCA, and at the suggestion of the Office of the Secretary of Defense sponsor for the IDA task supporting analysis of smaller-scale contingency (SSC) operations, permission was kindly provided for two IDA personnel to attend RS98 as observers and informal
evaluators. The purpose for observing the exercise was to gain further insight into combined SSC operations and to share information already developed by IDA for the SSC task with the assembled participants.

The scenario portrayed a situation in a fictitious Southwest Pacific island nation called Capricornia that required Australia to lead an ABCA combined and potentially joint military force – Capricornia Force (CAPFOR). Intervention by the multinational force was authorized by the United Nations and the mandate for the peace support operation was to ensure compliance with the provisions of the UN-brokered agreement and to restore normal governmental and associated processes. The scenario for the CPX began with forces assumed to have been in Capricornia for a period of about one month. The CPX was played in real time over 5 days (Friday 6 November through Tuesday 10 November 1998) and involved 10 hours of play per day. The CPX was preceded by a 2-day seminar addressing recent Australian experiences in military operations other than war (MOOTW) and key issues resulting from these operations. The seminar was followed by a 2-day test CPX to ensure the players, controllers, and evaluators were familiar with the procedures to be used during the exercise, and that the local area networks (LANs) and other communications means were operational. The commanders, controllers, and evaluators conducted a half-day review of the exercise on 12 November, and the ABCA Washington Standardization Office will produce a formal evaluation report. This report is an informal review intended to complement the ABCA report.

D. SELECTED HIGHLIGHTS OF THE EXERCISE

This was the first ABCA exercise that employed forces in a peace support scenario. Because the exercise was unique, a number of interesting highlights are summarized below.

1. Capricornian Council

A council was formed by the ambassadors of the troop-contributing nations and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSRG) to provide the commander of the multinational force with essential political guidance for the operation. The council was chaired by the Australian ambassador and met daily with the force commander; once a week the host nation government representatives were invited to the meeting. The key individuals who played the council were experienced in political-military operations. For example, the SRSRG was played by a retired Australian ambassador with experience in UN operations through service in the former Yugoslavia.
and Cambodia. The Australian ambassador was played by a retired member of the national foreign service. The United Kingdom ambassador was played by the former political advisor to the British-led multinational division in Bosnia.

The council was a very realistic element injected into the exercise. It provided a mechanism through which the military force commander and the civilian authorities responsible for overseeing the use of military forces could discuss their concerns and work out coordinated actions on political-military issues such as rules of engagement for the force, handling the internally displaced persons, and dealing with the host nation authorities and other factions. Although the military forces established Civil Military Operations Centers (CMOCs) at force, brigade, and even battalion echelons, the council also provided the forum through which the Capricornian government could work with the UN and troop-contributing nations on policy issues to achieve unity of purpose.

The use of a council with carefully selected experienced civilians provided the commander and his staff with very realistic training for peace support operations. The same arrangements should be incorporated into the concept for similar exercises.

2. Political Advisors

The military forces were employed in peace support operations and were required to interface not only with other allied military formations, but also with the council, host nation civil authorities at force and brigade echelons, the former warring factions, and a number of civilian humanitarian relief organizations. Other than the Australian ambassador, who was also a member of the council, the force commander had no additional political advisors to help him deal with the full range of political, diplomatic, humanitarian, economic, human rights, and law and order issues at the national level. As the exercise developed, he appointed his deputy commander to serve as his representative to the host nation and other factions, and requested and received six additional political advisors (simulated) from the UN to assist with these tasks.

The commanders of subordinate brigades had similar issues at the province level, but they were not provided political advisors, other than their "ambassadors" located in the capital of Capricornia. During the exercise, the brigade commanders met with the local provincial officials played by military controller personnel to discuss regional political and military issues. After the exercise, the commanders indicated that they could have used civilian political advisors to help guide their actions when dealing with the local civil authorities. Moreover, if carefully selected experienced civilian personnel
were used as provincial authorities (controllers), the brigade commanders would have received more realistic training in MOOTW.

The headquarters staffing for future exercises of this type should include political advisors at force and brigade echelons.

3. Changes in Operational Control

During the exercise, the scenario events list was modified to require a U.S. battalion task force to be deployed to the UK brigade sector. This event provided the commanders and staffs of the battalion and gaining brigade an excellent opportunity to plan and coordinate a complex activity during the exercise. The transfer placed the U.S. battalion under the tactical control (TACon) of the gaining brigade, and was carried out in a very comprehensive, timely, and professional manner. Similar events should be incorporated into future exercises.

4. Weather

During the play of the exercise, the island nation of Capricornia was threatened with a tropical cyclone, which is similar to a hurricane. This event caused the commanders to take necessary force protection actions, and to assess the impact of the impending storm on their ongoing operations. Although the personnel of the Canadian brigade were very familiar with the effects of snow and ice storms, they had no personal experience or background in the effects of a storm of this type and had to conduct more research than the other forces to determine the potential consequences. While these weather related events might be viewed as distractions by the player staffs, they do provide valuable training.

5. External Threat

Although the warring factions in the host nation had agreed to the UN-brokered peace agreement and the intervention of the multinational force, an external threat was initiated by the island nation of Kamera, which supported a major opposing faction. Although early in the exercise this threat appeared to be dismissed as potentially inconsequential, in later play it was determined to be significant, requiring joint air and maritime forces to respond. These capabilities were not available in the Army-only CAPFOR. The planning required for this threat again highlighted the limitations in joint staffing of the DJFHQ.
6. Handling of Internally Displaced Persons

The scenario included almost spontaneous and uncontrollable movement of large groups of internally displaced persons (IDPs) within Capricornia. These simulated activities complicated the planned operations of CAPFOR and created a political-military situation that was brought before the council. It caused the commanders and their staffs at all echelons to focus on identifying different populations, determining why they were moving, and taking actions that would encourage them to return to their homes. This activity demonstrated to the players, more than any other situation in the exercise, that they were conducting an operation that required a unique application of their capabilities.

7. The Media

The media was introduced as an integral part of the exercise. The local university provided media players to augment the military media staff players. They conducted realistic interviews of commanders and key staff members and participated in press conferences held by the commands. These events were recorded on video, and the media players also published a daily newspaper for the exercise. Both the daily video and newspaper were prepared to contain incidents from the Master Events List (MEL) that required identification and action by the players. This training was very realistic and was extremely well done. The commanders and staffs learned very quickly the importance of understanding the media and working with them to facilitate unity of purpose. This concept should be incorporated into future joint and combined peace support exercises conducted by ABCA nations.

8. The United Nations, and Other International and Non-Governmental Organizations

The exercise control group included a cell to represent various humanitarian and development organizations. The cell was headed by a representative of CARE Australia and staffed by a number of military personnel who had field experience working with these organizations. This was another bit of realism inserted into the exercise to ensure the military forces were exposed to the civilian organizations and their capabilities. The single civilian staff member, however, was overworked and should have been provided with additional civilians from either governmental or non-governmental organizations with experience in not only humanitarian issues, but also those of economic development, scheduling elections, and rebuilding civil law and order. Such an arrangement would enable both the military and civilian players to become familiar with each other and to
achieve better understanding of how they can work together in this type of an environment.

E. PRINCIPAL OBSERVATIONS AND COMMENTS

Our primary interest in observing this exercise was to learn how the DJFHQ was organized and how it exercised control over allied Army and joint forces during a peace support operation. We also were interested in which tasks the multinational command performed, how the mission and tasks affected the force structure, how the combined logistics support command was organized and performed its functions, and how the forces coordinated and collaborated with civilian organizations through the interagency process during these operations. In addition, we were interested in obtaining the views of senior participants and other allied personnel regarding the use of military forces in peace support operations. The exercise provided an excellent opportunity to gain these insights. The discussion that follows addresses these interests, which are focused on areas somewhat different than those of the ABCA evaluators.

This was an exercise designed to address many of the issues experienced by military forces during recent Smaller Scale Contingency (SSC) operations. It was well planned, fulfilled its aim, and met most of the stated exercise objectives. While many of the issues were injected to cause desired command or staff responses, other activities – particularly the extent of political-military dialogue experienced by the force commander during the council meetings – were unanticipated and resulted in a significant and positive training outcome. The results of this exercise and the valuable lessons identified from it should be widely disseminated not only in the ABCA national Army channels, but also within the respective joint and interagency organizations to reinforce the need for closer cooperation within the broader community during such operations.

1. Deployable Joint Force Headquarters (DJFHQ)

   a. Observation

   This was the first ABCA combined force exercise\(^2\) conducted by the DJFHQ and its two key supporting units, the 1\(^{st}\) Joint Support Unit (JSU) and the 1\(^{st}\) Topographical Survey Squadron (TSS). The exercise demonstrated the capabilities of these

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\(^{2}\) The DJFHQ has participated in multinational combined exercises with U.S. naval and marine elements during the Gold Eagle exercise series, and with other allied forces in the region.
organizations, but identified shortfalls in headquarters staffing for the type of operation conducted in the exercise.

b. Discussion

The exercise was conducted at the home station of the DJFHQ and its two key support units. Prior to its new mission, the headquarters was configured as an Army division headquarters to exercise command and control of subordinate units administratively in peacetime, and to conduct combat operations with assigned forces to defend Australia in wartime. It retains the same peacetime mission, but now provides a deployable operational level headquarters to command and control joint and combined forces deployed for the defense of Australia or for contingency missions other than the defense of Australia, such as peace support operations. The headquarters also has responsibility for constructive engagement with the military forces on Papua New Guinea and throughout the Southwest Pacific area.

The headquarters has a traditional joint staff configuration with 91 active personnel and 56 reservists. While most of these positions are filled by Army personnel, there are two officers from other Services – one naval officer and one air force officer – on the staff to provide it with joint focus and capabilities. During the exercise, which was conducted from 0800 to 1800 hours daily, the headquarters operated from its peacetime offices and received modest augmentation in many staff cells from participating nations. The civil affairs and engineer staff augmentation sent by the U.S. and UK, respectively, provided the headquarters with its Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC) capability. The U.S. also provided a navy and a marine officer to augment the other joint members of the staff.

Although augmented, many staff cells were not robust enough to provide 24-hour operation or to handle the workloads caused by peace support operations. In addition, there were other important functions that were not manned but should have been provided for the exercise. Listed below are examples where additional personnel augmentation may be warranted for future exercises of this type; in some cases, they may need to be incorporated as full-time staff positions.

- A senior civilian political advisor to assist the commander and staff with the wide range of political-military problems that were addressed within the council (and that arise while conducting constructive engagement)
- Additional political advisors for the Deputy Commander, who was designated as the military contact with the host nation and warring factions
A more robust joint force planning/operations cell capable of planning tactical air and maritime force operations and coordinating their execution

- A psychological operations staff cell
- A civil affairs staff section and a more robust civil affairs or CIMIC cell
- A more robust provost marshal cell to address not only the military police support to the military forces, but also military support to the civil law and order sector during the contingency
- A more robust media cell to handle the large number of public information and public affairs issues and media activities that occur in these operations
- A more robust intelligence cell to provide political, human rights, and criminal intelligence, not merely force targeting intelligence
- An airspace management cell to coordinate with the host nation civil aviation authorities
- A search and rescue cell.

The 1st JSU supports the DJFHQ with communications, information systems, electronic warfare, local defense, and administrative capabilities. The unit serves as mounting headquarters for the deployable force, and forms the nucleus of the lead element (advanced party) of the headquarters during a deployment with its organic communications equipment, similar to the deployable joint task force augmentation cell (DJTFAC) provided by U.S. combatant commands for their joint task forces. The unit provides logistical support to the headquarters, including transport, and its military police troop secures the headquarters. During the exercise, the JSU furnished the local area network supporting the players, controllers, and evaluators. They also fought a very realistic battle with a number of viruses that fortunately were not fatal to the operation. The 1st TSS provided excellent geodetic information support to the players and the controllers. The capabilities of both units appeared to be well established and to meet the requirements of the combined force.

c. Comment

The DJFHQ should evaluate the existing organization and personnel manning, and determine from this and other exercise experiences which staff sections require further augmentation, or that might need to be established to enable the headquarters to perform its peacetime and contingency missions more effectively. The DJFHQ should also conduct exercises that require it to deploy from its headquarters and conduct 24-hour operations in an SSC scenario.
2. Early and Continuous Involvement of Non-Military Interagency Players

a. Observation

The exercise planners attempted to represent as accurately as possible the roles, responsibilities, and capabilities of interagency civilian organizations included as part of the exercise. It would have been more effective to invite those organizations to participate in the design of the exercise and to take a more active role in the play and control of the exercise when possible.

b. Discussion

The exercise reinforced the value of establishing sectors, tasks, and assignment of responsibilities for complex contingencies as promulgated in U.S. Presidential Decision Directive 56 (PDD-56) and as discussed in the IDA presentation given at the seminar. The SSC task lists provides a useful checklist for identifying which actions the mandate requires and which agencies have lead responsibility within the U.S. government and the United Nations, and provides a useful starting point for planners.

Unlike major theater wars (MTW), where the hierarchical structure of the military forces is well known and the degree of control is clearly articulated, the coordination and collaboration architecture (C2A) for SSC operations is less clear, but it must be established as early as possible, preferably prior to intervention. Early and continuous joint and combined needs assessment (or mission analysis), done in collaboration with the civilian interagency participants, is an important and integral part of any SSC operation. The military force and civilian agency roles must be defined and their tasks supported by adequate and timely resources to ensure unity of effort (or unity of purpose as a minimum).

c. Comment

These factors require the early and continuous involvement of non-military interagency participants in the planning and execution during actual contingency operations. Similar early and continuous interagency involvement should be encouraged by the ABCA members during future exercises that employ SSC scenarios so that military and civilian organizations can gain a better understanding of the capabilities each provides and to learn how to coordinate and collaborate to achieve unity of purpose.
3. Use of Military Constabulary Force in Peace Operations

a. Observation

The potential role of military police to conduct constabulary operations in support of the operational mandate is not receiving appropriate attention in ABCA doctrine or other forums.

b. Discussion

One of the major considerations for using military forces in peace support operations is that security is lacking in the joint operational area. Lethal military force is usually deployed to reestablish overall security, but the military police forces are typically planned to provide support to the military forces assigned peace operations missions, not to carry out tasks to support the mandate prompting the intervention.

The military police forces, however, are trained to conduct law and order operations employing the full spectrum of capabilities from non-lethal through lethal means. They also conduct police intelligence, internment, and resettlement operations. In these capacities, military police can be employed during the early phases of an operation to support the portion of the mandate of the civil authorities by either mentoring local police while improving civil law and order and public security for the population, or by replacing corrupt local police. In either case, the military police should be used in this capacity until the responsible civilian authorities can provide the resources needed to establish viable civil law and order and public security institutions within the nation. In many situations, the military police forces can provide an economy of force role that would permit earlier redeployment of the lethal elements of the military force.

c. Comment

National doctrine for employing these military forces in a constabulary role has not been fully developed by ABCA member nations. Based on this exercise experience as well as national experience gained in a number of contingencies, the ABCA Armies might consider developing multinational doctrine to fill this void.

4. Size and Composition of Headquarters

a. Observation

The size and composition of the military force headquarters at all echelons will increase substantially when they are assigned to peace operations.
b. Discussion

The normal military headquarters configuration is optimized to work effectively and efficiently within a large hierarchical structure of military units. Forces assigned to peace support operations, however, are required to plan and manage many of the functions done by other military organizations, but at lower echelons because the large hierarchical formation is not deployed. For example, a typical infantry brigade may require augmentation for intelligence capabilities normally found at division, corps, or even theater echelons in order to accomplish its mission. Other information capabilities, such as public affairs and public information, civil affairs, and psychological operations, as well as military police and logistics assets normally controlled at higher echelons, will be integrated into the headquarters of elements assigned to peace operations.

In addition, there is an extensive requirement for liaison, not only with other military elements, but also with a wide range of civilian organizations. Moreover, in many situations, the commanders at lower echelons will require timely and responsive civilian political advice to handle local situations and to coordinate military assistance with civil law and order, humanitarian, human rights, and other activities. The structure and composition of these headquarters must be carefully planned for each contingency, tailored to the mandate, and staffed with competent and well trained personnel, not merely those that happen to be available.

c. Comment

Currently, there is no published guidance available to military planners for how the military headquarters should be configured for peace support operations. Based on this exercise experience as well as national experience gained in a number of contingencies, the ABCA Armies should consider adding such guidance to the draft Coalition Operations Handbook.

5. Military Liaison Capabilities

a. Observation

During SSC operations, the role of military liaison officers is critical to the success of the operation.
b. Discussion

It is unlikely that significant communications and computer systems interoperability will be achieved among the disparate military and civilian elements that participate in these operations. Consequently, commanders will need to rely on liaison personnel to serve as the glue that holds an ad hoc coalition together to achieve its purpose. Liaison personnel are not merely information conduits between military organizations as in traditional MTW operations, but also serve as “ambassadors” of the providing commander to the head of the receiving organization.

The liaison officers must be cognizant of all military capabilities available to the parent command and their limitations, and understand the commander’s mission and intent. They also require thorough understanding of the mandate of the military and civilian participants, and appreciate the capabilities and limitations of the other interagency participants. It is critical that these liaison personnel be provided adequate training and the resources (communications, computers, and transportation) to accomplish their task.

c. Comment

The ABCA Coalition Operations Handbook should contain guidance for commanders on the type of training and the resources that liaison officers require, specific guidelines on the experience levels and grades of the liaison officers, and a checklist of typical organizations, especially civilian organizations, where commanders should consider employing liaison officers in SSC operations.

6. Lead Nation Responsibilities and Other Terminology

a. Observation

An objective of the evaluation team was to refine the term “Lead Nation” within a joint environment. This term and many others that are used in smaller scale contingencies require further clarification, and when clarified, should be incorporated into national joint and combined doctrine.

b. Discussion

During SSC operations, it is likely that one of the military force participants will be designated as “Lead Nation,” as occurred in this exercise. Other arrangements in SSC operations include “framework nations” and “role specialists nations,” but these terms are
not defined and their implications on operations, force structure, and logistical capabilities are little understood. These terms need further definition and field experimentation to determine appropriate metrics and planning factors to use when developing forces structures for contingency responses and to anticipate what can be expected from such combined forces in these operations.

A number of other terms used in smaller scale contingencies have not been defined, or have been defined from a military perspective and may not be understood by the civilian organizations involved in the operation. For example, the terms “demilitarization” and “demobilization” as applied to former warring factions or corrupt police forces have not been defined in the military lexicon, but are missions the forces may have to carry out. The terms “refugee,” “displaced person,” and “internally displaced person” have specific meanings in the international community and carry with them legal implications, but they are often misused by the military without understanding of the possible consequences. Additional terms such as “clear” (as in “clear an area”) and “cut” (as in transfer authority over a force) were used, but without common understanding.

c. Comment

The ABCA Armies provide an excellent forum with recent exercise experience with employing the Lead Nation concept. They should couple this experience with that gained by national forces during other recent contingencies, and take the lead to develop a clear set of terminology that describes the Lead Nation concept. They should also clarify other terms used in smaller scale contingencies so that the member nations can achieve a common understanding. This terminology should then be incorporated into national doctrine for multinational force operations, and made available for ad hoc coalitions that may be formed in the future.

7. Multinational Logistics

a. Observation

Although a Combined Logistics Support Command (CLSC) was established as a brigade echelon organization in the exercise, the robust logistical force provided by nations did not permit the full range of multinational logistics issues that would normally occur in a resource-constrained environment to be addressed in the exercise.
b. Discussion

For the exercise, certain logistics functions were provided by the Lead Nation for the entire force. For example, acquisition and distribution of fuel and rations were the responsibility of the Lead Nation, Australia. Some other services, such as seaport and aerial port operations, were provided by elements from one nation for the entire force. Military police, movement control, transportation, engineering and medical support were also furnished by the CLSC for the entire force, employing national units under the OPCON of the command. The logistics capabilities for the national forces, however, were planned by each nation for success and without resource constraints because the units were not actually deployed for the exercise. The substantial national support available in most service areas meant that the CLSC resources received little tasking, and that the command did not have to prioritize resource allocations. Because the logistics resources available were so robust, the combined logistics play during the exercise was one area that provided little evaluation opportunity.

Some of the assets that would normally be employed in these operations are usually provided by other Services. For example, the tactical airlift control, aerial port support, aeromedical evacuation, theater airlift, and air base defense units are typically provided by Air Forces. Afloat hospitals, husbarding services in coordination with the host nation, control of shipping, and port and harbor defense are typically provided by the Navy or Coast Guard. In addition, naval forces may establish advanced logistics support sites at existing aerial ports and seaports within the joint operational area and share real estate with Army and Air Forces at these locations. Real estate management issues for Army forces were not played in this exercise, but these issues should be injected from a joint perspective into future exercises.

c. Comment

Planning for future exercises should take into account the logistics issues — both Army and joint issues — that are to be evaluated, and then ensure the available troop list will produce the desired outcome to cause the commanders and staff to resolve the issue. The Coalition Logistics Planning Guide is a useful document that should be reviewed at the joint level within each member nation to incorporate the logistics requirements and capabilities of the other Services, and then adapted by the joint doctrine of the member nations.
8. Information Warfare

   a. Observation

   The emerging concepts and doctrine for information warfare (IO) were items evaluated during the exercise. Each nation employed different concepts, and the most developed national doctrine for IO is still in draft.

   b. Discussion

   The ABCA Armies should be commended for recognizing the importance of IO and using this exercise to evaluate different national concepts and emerging national doctrine. This is another topic, however, that should be addressed from a joint and combined perspective because many of the IO assets available to military forces are provided by other Services. Moreover, the IO activities must be coordinated closely with the “public diplomacy” activities of the civilian interagency participants in smaller scale contingencies.

   c. Comment

   The ABCA members should ensure that the evolving national IO concepts and doctrine are coordinated with appropriate joint military and civilian interagency organizations. The ABCA Armies may wish to adapt these national concepts into multinational doctrine after they been tested and published.

9. National Similarities and Differences

   a. Observation

   Even though the ABCA Armies participating in this exercise have a long history of close cooperation, mutual understanding, and common areas of national interest, there are still differences, often based on national policies.

   b. Discussion

   During the exercise, several issues caused by differences in national policies arose that required special attention. One issue concerned the development of rules of engagement for the exercise force. Another concerned the use of land mines. The national contingents also used different NCE arrangements to exercise command and control over the national forces. While these issues were resolved during the course of the exercise, it is important to identify them early in the planning for an exercise or a
contingency operation so they can be resolved before deployment so that the national differences do not have an adverse impact on the operation.

c. Comment

Differences in national policies can adversely impact multinational exercises and contingency operations. They should be identified and resolved during the planning phases to minimize their impact on the force employment.

10. U.S. Command and Control Arrangements for Peacekeeping Operations

a. Observation

When the mission of the forces changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement, the U.S. force was required by existing law to realign its national command arrangements.

b. Discussion

Under provisions of Title 10 U.S. Code, Section 162, all military forces are assigned to a combatant commander except those retained by the Secretaries of the military departments (1) to perform functions assigned to them by law, or (2) to participate in multinational peacekeeping operations. Because this exercise was initially planned as a peacekeeping operation, the command and control arrangement was established in accordance with the law, and extended from the Secretary of the Army, through U.S. Army Pacific (a major command of the Army and a component command of the U.S. Pacific Command), to the U.S. Army brigade commander. The brigade commander was designated the National Command Element (NCE), and commanded the U.S. troops in the brigade placed under the operational control of COMCAPFOR, the logistical elements placed under the (OPCON) of the Combined Logistics Support Command, and the personnel retained under the National Support Element (NSE).

When the mission of the multinational force in the exercise shifted to a peace enforcement mission, the U.S. chain of command had to be realigned because, in accordance with Title 10, the forces must be assigned under the combatant command (COCOM) authority of the geographic combatant commander – the Commander-in-Chief U.S. Pacific Command – in whose area of responsibility the force was operating. The peacekeeping command relationship mandated by U.S. Code in effect establishes two separate chains of command within a theater of operation and creates a situation where
the Secretary of the military department, not the combatant commander, commands the force and has force protection responsibility.

c. Comment

This issue should be reviewed by the U.S. Army, the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of Defense to determine whether the current arrangements should be modified. If warranted, recommendations should be proposed to the Boren-Rudman Commission which has been created to address these issues.

11. Training for Participation in Smaller Scale Contingency Operations

a. Observation

Smaller scale contingency operations (and exercises) have many unique requirements that need to be understood by the participating forces at all echelons and levels of seniority. The need for such specialized training is recognized by some, but not all, of the ABCA member nations.

b. Discussion

Commanders, staffs, and units are expected to focus primarily on maintaining their skills and readiness to perform combat operations in a major theater war. This training is considered by many to satisfy any requirements that the force might encounter in smaller scale contingency operations. During this exercise, there was a significant difference in performance between units that either had previous experience during contingency operations or some training focused on smaller scale contingencies, and those units that focused principally on warfighting.

When a combat formation has been earmarked for a small scale contingency operation or exercise, it should be provided specialized training to prepare it for the mission. The training required is not only tactical and technical training, but also a reorientation of attitude (e.g., non-lethal as well as lethal solutions to problems, high visibility rather than low profile, etc.), and increased understanding of the complex situation (the large number of civilian organizations with whom they must coordinate and collaborate). While combat forces must deploy to a small scale contingency prepared for combat, they must also be prepared for non-lethal actions. As cited in earlier observations, the headquarters of the force will likely expand, and well-trained and capable liaison officers will need to augment the force. The commanders and staff must
learn how to employ the individual skills of the augmenting personnel and the resources they provide to accomplish the new mission.

c. Comment

The ABCA should consider developing a handbook focused on peace support operations that describes the type of training and reorientation that will be necessary to prepare traditional combat forces for these type of contingencies. Such a handbook would provide a common basis for training ABCA members and could be used by the United Nations as a guide for others non-ABCA nations involved in these operations.

12. Starting the Exercise at D+30

a. Observation

The exercise started with the forces assumed to be in place for 30 days. This caused some confusion for the players because many of the early issues injected into the exercise were for activities that would have already occurred shortly after the force arrived. Additionally, the same assumption eliminated a number of critical force deployment issues.

b. Discussion

Because the exercise started with the forces assumed to be in country for 30 days, many of the initial activities of the commanders and staffs of the force were to “catch up” on actions that already would have been taken. For example, the force and brigade commanders’ meetings with the host nation and province officials would have been done early in the 30-day window. The initial press conferences would also have been completed. The staff would have been more familiar with the terrain and the local situations in their respective areas of responsibility. The test CPX could have provided the commanders and staff with an opportunity to accomplish some of these early actions prior to the start of the CPX and permitted a better transition into the post-30 day period of activities. There also was some confusion as to why the mission of the force changed from peacekeeping to peace enforcement. The test CPX could have provided in accelerated form the context for the mission change and the message exchange that such an event would cause.

The exercise did not address the critical problems of (1) sequencing the arrival of a multinational force through constrained aerial port and seaport facilities (a time phased
force and deployment data and movement control issue), or (2) the joint and combined reception, staging, onward movement, and integration (RSOI) of national elements into the multinational force. These are activities that multinational forces must accomplish before they start to perform their assigned missions in the joint operational area, whether fighting a major theater war or conducting a smaller scale contingency. While member nations' forces have deployed and undergone joint and combined RSOI during recent contingency operations, national joint doctrine for some of these activities is still under development, and there is little guidance available for conducting multinational deployment operations.

c. Comment

The ABCA Armies should consider scheduling an exercise that focuses on and addresses the issues of multinational deployment and joint and combined RSOI. Future exercises that start at a point after the forces have arrived in the joint operational area should provide the players with appropriate context and actions that they would already have taken to reduce the potential for confusion and the need to "catch up" with the scenario.

13. Need for Joint Focus within the ABCA Forum

a. Observation

As this exercise demonstrates, military forces employed in SSC operations do so in a joint and combined environment. Combat operations in major theater wars will also be conducted in joint and combined environments. The combined Armies' doctrine and procedures must be evaluated in the anticipated environment, not one established by a single Service. The ABCA Armies should consider developing options for establishing a joint ABCA group to work towards joint interoperability and ensure coordination on joint issues and exercises among the Service and functionally oriented organizations already established by the member nations.

b. Discussion

During the exercise, the players were required to address issues that went into areas beyond purely single Service concern. Examples included: (1) the need to plan and possibly employ tactical air and maritime forces by the DJFHQ - a joint force headquarters; (2) employment of strategic intelligence assets; (3) coordination and collaboration with interagency participants including civilian governmental, United
Nations, host nation, and international, and non-government organizations; and (4) a number of command and control issues related to JTF operations and the national command responsibilities.

The ABCA member nations have already established a number of Service and functionally oriented groups such as the Naval Quadripartite Standardization Program, the Air Standardization Coordinating Committee, the Combined Communications Electronics Board, and the Technical Cooperation Program. However, there is no ABCA-sponsored joint program or committee to achieve interoperability among joint and combined forces of the member nations, or to ensure joint cooperation and participation in ABCA sponsored exercises. Exercises like Rainbow Serpent point out the need to have joint coordination and participation in exercise planning to ensure the roles and responsibilities of participants are consistent with national joint doctrine and not merely that of a single Service.

c. **Comment**

Based on the joint and combined issues highlighted during this exercise and resulting from other activities, the ABCA Armies National Standardization Offices and Primary Standardization Office should consider developing alternative organizational arrangements that would establish a joint ABCA organization that could be adapted by member nations to achieve interoperability at the joint and combined level.
APPENDIX A

ACRONYMS
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## ACRONYMS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ABCA</td>
<td>America, Britain, Canada, and Australia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CAPFOR</td>
<td>Capricornia Force</td>
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<tr>
<td>CIMIC</td>
<td>Civil-Military Cooperation</td>
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<tr>
<td>CLPG</td>
<td>Coalition Logistics Planning Guide</td>
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<td>C2</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
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<td>C2A</td>
<td>Coordination and Collaboration Architecture</td>
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<td>C3I</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, and Intelligence</td>
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<td>COH</td>
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<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>DJFHQ</td>
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<td>DJTFAC</td>
<td>Deployable Joint Task Force Augmentation Cell</td>
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<td>IDPs</td>
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<td>Military Operation Other Than War</td>
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<td>Major Theater Wars</td>
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<td>National Support Element</td>
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<td>OCE</td>
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<td>OPCON</td>
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<td>Officer Scheduling the Exercise</td>
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<td>Quadripartite Standardization Agreements</td>
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<td>RS98</td>
<td>Rainbow Serpent 1998</td>
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<td>Acronym</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<td>SRSG</td>
<td>Special Representative of the Secretary General</td>
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<td>Smaller-Scale Contingency</td>
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<td>Tactical Control</td>
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<td>TEAL</td>
<td>Tripartite Equipment and Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>TSS</td>
<td>Topographical Survey Squadron</td>
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Exercise Rainbow Serpent After Action Report

Mr. A. Martin Lidy; RADM Samuel H. Packer, USN (Ret.)

Institute for Defense Analyses
1801 N. Beauregard Street
Alexandria, VA 22311

Mr. Milton Tulkoff
Director, Regional Assessments and Modeling Division
Office of the Secretary of Defense (PA&E)
The Pentagon, Room 2C270
Washington, D.C. 20301


This document, the second in a series to be produced for the sponsor, provides an after action review of an Australian-led multinational command post exercise focused on peace support operations. It identifies highlights of the exercise and provides a number of observations that respond to specific questions raised by the sponsor regarding: strengths and weaknesses of U.S. forces engaged in smaller-scale contingency operations; the other organizations with which U.S. forces will need to coordinate their activities when engaged in these operations; and the doctrine and structure implications of such operations.


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