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NATO/RUSSIAN COOPERATION: ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

BY

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PREFACE

This project was written before NATO launched airstrikes against Yugoslavia in response to the Kosovo crisis on 23 March 1999 and Russia halted its cooperation with NATO. The NATO-Russia relationship has deteriorated seriously and it is impossible to predict its development and consequences. At the same time there is no alternative to NATO-Russia cooperation on maintaining European security and there can be no security in Europe without a stable Russia. The reactions from both sides indicate that Russia and NATO understand that and would like to have an "exit strategy" from the current situation. The President of the United States stated in his address to the nation on NATO airstrikes on the 25 March 1999 that Russia "despite our disagreements, is a constructive partner in the work of building peace."¹ NATO Secretary General Dr. Javier Solana hopes that: "...if we disagree tactically in parts of the crisis in Kosovo...the aim of Russia and the NATO countries... has been the same. I do hope that that will not prevent us from continuing what we have invested already together in the NATO-Russia relationship. We have started an avenue of cooperation and I hope ...that that will continue."² Russia in its turn, while condemning NATO actions, did not announce that it would
interfere in the crisis militarily or lift the embargo imposed on Yugoslavia.

There is no doubt that it will take a long time to restore the relationship between Russia and NATO damaged by the different approaches to Kosovo crisis and this process will demand significant joint efforts from both sides.

This project is intended to help to understand the nature of NATO-Russia cooperation and the reasons for the current crisis in their relationship.
Today Russia and NATO no longer regard each other as adversaries. This has reduced the probability of a large-scale conflict in Europe. Moreover, a partnership in maintaining peace and security on the continent has begun to take shape in their relations. Russia and NATO have a mutual interest in open dialogue and the first steps have been taken on the way to an equal and fair partnership.

**THE FOUNDING ACT**

Russia-NATO cooperation was formalized with the signing, on 27 May 1997, of the Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between the Russian Federation and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. Igor Sergeyev, Marshal, Minister of Defense of the Russian Federation, stated that “the NATO-Russia Founding act provides extensive opportunities for creating an atmosphere of trust. This can facilitate settling existing differences in our relations as well as establishing efficient and productive machinery for cooperation between the military establishments of Russia and NATO members states”.

The Act is a political document but it also contains a large number of military-political obligations that can, to a considerable degree, strengthen stability and security in the European region. In pursuit of the purposes and activities provided for under the Founding Act, the sides set up the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) which started functioning
in 1997. The PJC can be described as the Founding Act’s working agency. The PJC sessions are highly appraised by both sides in terms of substance and transparency. The PJC can set up committees and working groups. Following up this development, the Permanent Joint Military Committee (PJMC) was established under PJC auspices at the level of chiefs of general staffs and permanent military representatives. PJC (PJMC) do not make concrete decisions but this does not diminish their role. These sessions provide a venue for sides to present and promote their views and postures on current problems and ways of addressing them. In pursuit of the provisions under the Founding Act, following a Russian government decision, Russia’s Permanent Mission to NATO was set up in Brussels. In order to coordinate interaction with NATO military structures, the Office of Russia’s Chief Military Representative to NATO was established as a part of the Mission. At present the task of establishing a NATO presence in Moscow is under review.

Through the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, political consultation between the Alliance and Russia has been institutionalized. The PJC thus closes a gap in the European security architecture. Even if consultations in the PJC will not always lead to common positions, they serve to minimize misunderstandings or conflicting signals in a crisis. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) may provide the favorable
means for extending cooperation and arriving at mutually acceptable solutions to existing problems between Russia and NATO. At the Meeting of the PJC on 10 December 1998 Minister of Foreign Affairs Ivanov said Russia and NATO had “come a long way from mistrust to understanding” in the 18 months since they signed the Founding Act setting up the Joint Council.4

PARTNERSHIP FOR PEACE

The Russia Federation acceded to NATO’s Partnership for Peace Program in June 1994. From the Russian point of view the idea was that through its participation in the program, Russia would be able to follow its foreign policy line, establish and promote military cooperation with various countries, and influence the process of NATO enlargement. Furthermore, in choosing lines of cooperation, Russia also sought to derive an effective benefit for its Armed Forces through participation in the PfP.

Russia’s individual partnership program for 1998 envisioned participation in more than 70 events and activities and 17 spheres of cooperation. Under this program, Russia planned to take part in 10 joint military exercises. Sixteen of the Alliance’s structural subdivisions were to cooperate with Russia. Unfortunately, limited funding did not allow Russia to make the fullest possible use of the program for these purposes. In order to carry out Russia’s individual partnership program
for 1998, appropriations of 6.7 million rubles and $222,000 were required. However these funds were not provided.\textsuperscript{5}

The PfP cooperation had already played a significant role in setting up the joint operation in Bosnia and providing assistance for states neighboring Kosovo. It will also facilitate the creation of future military coalitions. NATO thus “has created a security framework which bridges different memberships, fosters common approaches in crisis management and regional cooperation...”. \textsuperscript{6}

Cooperation in peacekeeping and peace enforcement occupies an important place in the Russia-NATO relationship. There are 1,400 Russian troops stationed in Bosnia cooperating with the NATO-led Stabilization Force. In December 1998 President Boris Yeltsin signed a decree extending the deployment of Russian troops in Bosnia until 31 July 1999.\textsuperscript{7} During the course of the peacekeeping mission as a part of a multinational force in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Russian military contingent acquired a broad and, to an extent, unique experience in establishing and promoting military cooperation between Russia and NATO.

Russia views cooperation in the Bosnian operation in terms of the prospects for a long-term partnership with the leading powers.

At the same time policy differences between Russia and alliance members have emerged over Bosnia. The Russian
representatives complain about lack of consultation concerning western enforcement action against the Serbs. Russia is concerned that "the emphasis of the West on NATO as the main instrument in crisis management is being interpreted in Russia as a shift towards unilateralism, which might revive the past East-West confrontation. Disagreements over Bosnia have negatively affected Russian views of NATO's other policies."

There is a whole range of short and long-term goals that Russia is pursuing by cooperating with NATO. This cooperation is based on economic, political and military considerations. Partnership between Russia and NATO is increasingly emerging from a theoretical postulate into practical lines of action, taking on an increasingly tangible, substantive form.

In formulating its position toward NATO, Russia proceeded from present-day realities, requiring concerted action by Russia and NATO in addressing international, above all European, problems. Cooperation with NATO, in conjunction with activity in other international organizations, will enable Russia to take an active part in building a new European security system, raising its international authority and producing a certain measure of influence on NATO activity, which could otherwise threaten, among others, the security of Russia. Here lies the significance and necessity of building an open, transparent relationship with NATO."
Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov said: "This allows us to expand our relations with European countries. It allows us to further develop our cooperation with the European Union."\(^{10}\)

Recently there have been many debates over such a notion as "Russia-NATO cooperation." Thus far public opinion is at a crossroads. It is rather difficult for contemporary Russian society to reach a consensus on this issue. Given the present-day situation, perhaps it is more important not to engage in polemics, but to act in accordance with the already approved Defense Ministry concepts that are conductive to strengthening national security.\(^{11}\)

CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES

The Alliance's Summit meeting in Washington in April 1999, which will mark the 50\(^{th}\) anniversary of the North Atlantic Treaty, will provide an opportunity to define the Alliance's role for the future, including ever closer relations with Partner countries. The Summit will bring Partner countries closer to the Alliance. Partnership for Peace will improve Partner countries' ability to work with NATO in responding to crisis, including Bosnia. At the Summit NATO will present a framework that will allow its Partners to become even more involved in defining the program. NATO will extend Partner involvement in political consultations, decision-making, command
arrangements and planning for NATO-led crisis response and peace support operations.

The Washington summit will highlight the importance of the NATO-Russia relationship. Dr. Javier Solana, NATO Secretary General stated that "...there can be no security in Europe without a stable Russia. ...if we want to manage the challenges of the 21st century, we need to have Russia on board. ...Russia can make a major contribution to European security. The NATO-Russia Founding Act and Permanent Joint Council provide opportunities to achieve such a relationship."¹²

NATO’s goal of working together with Russia is to achieve a strong, stable and enduring partnership, on the basis of the principles of common interests, reciprocity and transparency, as called for in the NATO-Russia Founding act. The updated and substantial Individual Partnership Program (IPP) will include a wide range of practical defense-related and military-to-military cooperative activities.

Some commentators worry that the PJC will give Russia a veto over NATO decisionmaking. The real danger, however, is the opposite: that the two sides will fail to exploit its potential.¹³ The Founding Act obliges NATO "to consult and strive to cooperate to the broadest possible degree" with Russia in the PJC on all issues of common interest. In theory Russia cannot exercise a veto over NATO decisions, but in political practice
Russia is bound to wield considerable influence over the new, enlarged alliance when NATO is obliged to discuss any controversial decision with Russia, on site, at NATO headquarters. Henry Kissinger argues that at a minimum, Russia will have succeeded in injecting itself into NATO deliberations in a way bound to complicate purposeful Alliance action. The legitimization of deep Russian penetration into the heart of NATO affairs may jeopardize effective NATO decisionmaking. Russia, half in and half out, may have the opportunities to disrupt NATO decisionmaking and exert influence over East European States excluded from NATO membership. NATO cannot acquiesce in proposals that would enable Russia to block alliance decisions, such as the suggestion that OSCE coordinate the security operations of all European organizations, including not only NATO but the European Union, the WEU and CIS.

These objections are serious. But the veto is only an informal diplomatic privilege and not a right in NATO. The North Atlantic Council has the flexibility under the North Atlantic Treaty to make decisions by whatever procedure it sees fit. Individual members have no legal right of veto on ordinary NATO decisions, nor on the use of common NATO resources; they have a right of veto only over treaty amendments and over the use of their national forces and territory, that is, on the matters which belong to their national sovereignty. Any time it wants,
the North Atlantic Council has the authority to begin operating without vetoes. This would not be such a great revolution in practice, since probably most decisions would continue to be made by consensus; but in reserve, in place of threat of national vetoes, NATO might develop a new mechanism of voting, probably with a 2/3 weighted majority needed to carry decisions. Member countries would retain the right to decide whether and when their national military forces would participate in implementing the decision. This would give real meaning to the CJTF concept. NATO would have finally achieved a large degree of flexibility. And it would finally be able to accept Russia as an equal member, without fear of being destroyed by a daily Russian veto.14

After nearly 50 years of confrontation between Russia and NATO, it is obviously too early to talk about close cooperation: the aftermath of the Cold War has not as yet been fully overcome and there are still barriers of mutual distrust. One should keep in mind that, besides political and military considerations, NATO needs time to change its image in the eyes of Russian public opinion. Russia needs to change its image as well.

The main success story in these interrelations is the establishment and successful operation of the mechanism of consultations on an extremely broad range of problems that are of common interest. At this stage of cooperation it is essential
for Russia to present and talk over its positions exhaustively, learning openness and transparency, and finding points of convergence.15

However there are fears that these arrangements may not be implemented in full. These fears would prove to be justified if Russia’s role in the PJC was arbitrarily restricted.

From the Russian point of view, there are definite shortfalls in NATO-Russia relations. The expectations from the Founding Act have not been realized in full. The breakthrough in the relationship and the promotion of the new system of a European security did not take place. SFOR in Bosnia and occasional military maneuvers are in fact the only areas of cooperation. Chief of the Russian General Staff General Kvashnin said: "the PJC activities should not be limited only to exchanges of opinions and sharing of information. There should be a shift towards joint and mutually acceptable decisions."

Russia made a mistake when Russian Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeev refused to participate in the discussions on the development of a new NATO strategic concept for the 21st Century. In fact Russia does not participate in the NATO policy formulating process.

Some of the reasons for that are:

- Economic crisis in Russia has affected and paralyzed Russian foreign policy
• The Founding Act was a compromise that allowed both sides to save face, without changing their views of each other.

• The partnership between NATO and Russia takes place at the level of high-ranking officials and presents only common statements that do not produce new ideas and programs.

• Parallel structures exist at the organizational level. Two structures exist within NATO: one is for NATO everyday activities and another one is for representation and demonstration of NATO-Russian cooperation (NATO Council and PJ C; NATO Military Committee and parallel Military Committee for cooperation with Russia).

• Contradictions in intentions for mutual transparency and suspicions that still exist.

Neither skeptical nor optimistic assumptions regarding NATO-Russian cooperation were correct and supported by the realities. That means that NATO-Russian relations can develop in both ways. The development of their relations will depend both on NATO behavior and Russian policy.

From the Russian point of view, future development of the Russia-NATO relationship will depend on the settlement of three problems:

• The model of European security

• The second wave of NATO enlargement
• The new NATO Strategic Concept for the 21st Century

Russia and NATO have different approaches to European Security. In Russia’s view, NATO must be transformed into a political organization, which would comprise only one of the components of the European security in the 21st century. The security architecture should be based on the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), the only international organization on the continent that fully reflects the interests of all participating states in its activities and ensures that all have equal rights, irrespective of their membership of various unions and alliances.17 Russia claims that the OSCE should be a foundation, while the West (and the U.S.) considers NATO as the basis for the new model. Russian envisions a withering away of the collective defense mission and a new military organization for collective security and stability—something like a military adjunct to the OSCE, where their voice will be stronger and their veto effective.18 Russia considers that it is unacceptable for NATO to appropriate the right to address European security problems within the framework of a military union.

On the other hand, having declared missions in support of peace and peacekeeping operations as a priority for the Allied Armed Forces, NATO has staked out its position in ensuring security in the Euro-Atlantic area. NATO’s international
prestige in the Euro-Atlantic area is high. The majority of European countries consider their membership in the alliance or their close cooperation with it as a necessary precondition for their own security and prosperity.\textsuperscript{19}

**NATO STRATEGIC CONCEPT**

Russia is very concerned about the Alliance’s planned new Strategic Concept. The Russian leadership believes that the U.S.’ intention to widen the alliance’s role and area of operations and enable it to take military action if necessary without a United Nations Security Council mandate would undermine the whole system of international relations based on international law.\textsuperscript{20}

The sides disagree on the choice of means and mechanisms of using them in dealing with crisis situations. There will be a number of disputes between NATO and Russia regarding NATO’s policy on peacekeeping operations. One is where to act. The operation in Bosnia showed that NATO is ready to send forces outside the treaty area. A second issue is whether the decision to act will be made by NATO alone or debated in other forums. NATO will always have the right to reject or amend proposals originated elsewhere. Then there is a question of how the decision will be reached: by consensus or by letting those willing to act decide what to do. Finally, there remains the decision concerning who will carry out the proposed operation:
NATO itself, the WEU using NATO assets, the OSCE or the UN, with the participation of elements from the PfP.

The disagreements stem from divergent national interests, conflicting assessments of the situation and varying views of the role that NATO should play.

From the Russian Ministry of Defense’s point of view there is no alternative to partner-like relationship between the sides. The situation requires a pooling of efforts by Russia and NATO for a joint and effective response to the challenges and threats to European security. Both sides stated in December 1998 that “world order should be based on the prevalence of international law. The main organization for decision-making on the use of force should be the United Nations.”

1998 also demonstrated the fragility of NATO-Russian beneficial cooperation. Russia twice threatened to reconsider the agreement with NATO: in January 1998— in connection with signing of the Baltic Charter between the Baltic States and the U.S.; and in February— in attempting to prevent bombing of Iraq. These threats prove that the NATO-Russian relationship is not just about Russian European policy. The security concerns in such areas as the Baltic and the South/Middle East are interconnected in Russian mentality and strategic thinking.

Immediately after the US and British air and missile strikes on Iraq, the Russian leadership threatened to suspend all
military cooperation with NATO. A senior Russian Defense Ministry official General Leonid Ivashov said “We can not pretend that relations are good after what has happened.”

Russia hopes the American and British bombing of Iraq was not a precursor of a new, global NATO ready to take unilateral military action wherever it pleased. “We understand NATO is not involved (in strikes on Iraq) but two of its members are and Russia cannot remain indifferent,” said Ambassador Kislyak, Russia’s permanent envoy to NATO at the meeting with NATO defense ministers in Brussels. “It is very important for Russia to see how NATO’s new strategic concept develops and whether this action represents a precedent.”

KOSOVO

NATO and Russia came close to a crisis in October 1998 when the Alliance approved an order to use force if necessary against Yugoslavia over Kosovo. Russia is increasingly concerned over potential NATO military strikes against Serbian targets. Russian politicians and analysts see them as reflecting NATO’s contempt for the United Nations and the international community. The danger of a military approach, Russian officials and analysts say, is the precedent it sets for future conflict-resolution in Europe. Russia objects to the violent methods Milosevich has used to crack down on separatist Kosovo, but says the conflict should be settled through talks. Carried out with or without a
United Nations mandate, proposed NATO air strikes against Serbia would inevitably create a controversial precedent for the post-Cold War world, because unlike the 1994 NATO bombardment of Bosnian Serb positions, strikes against Serbia would constitute a declaration of war against a sovereign state. They would also establish a potential precedent against Russia. Russia considers Kosovo as an internal conflict and has several potential flash points itself (Chechnia, Dagestan, Tatarstan). Russian leadership is concerned that NATO’s new strategic concept can be applied to Russia in case of clashes at these points. Vladimir Lukin, head of the Foreign Relations Committee in the lower house of parliament, the State Duma, said, “If a regional organization like NATO... without a decision by the UN...decides to launch a military strike against a country that is solving its ethnic problems in a way we don’t like...that means for Russia that next time, the same thing can happen when someone does not like the way we are conducting affairs.”

Russia is doing everything in its power to prevent these strikes. A consensus is forming among Moscow’s usually scattered political forces that the NATO attacks, if they take place, will cause a backlash against the West. This could further set back relations that are already chilled after Russia’s financial system collapsed in August. Russian leaders have threatened to sever ties with NATO, send peacekeeping troops to the Yugoslav
Federation, and unilaterally end an arms embargo against the Yugoslav Federation. The State Duma, the lower house of the parliament, also has threatened to break off ties with NATO and has suspended consideration of START-II.

At the same time the Kosovo crisis has shown the benefits of NATO-Russia consultation within the PJC, even if they have not always agreed.

Russian Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov stated on 23 December 1998 that “A return to the Cold War in its classic form is not possible.” Primakov said that Russia would continue its cooperation with NATO.

**NATO ENLARGEMENT**

The consultation mechanism has not as yet directly affected one of the most intractable problems—NATO expansion.

NATO enlargement could once more bring NATO face-to-face with Russia, and it could strengthen the political elements opposing cooperation with the West.

Russia cannot remain passive in response to NATO’s eastward expansion. The implementation of these plans could be a destabilizing factor in contemporary international relations. NATO expansion could have a serious impact in four inter-related areas: psychologically, on Russia’s self-image and its consequent view of the West; domestically, in terms of a nationalist resurgence; militarily by provoking a strategic
realignments; and diplomatically, where continued Russian cooperation with the West in international relations may be jeopardized.\textsuperscript{26}

Russia does not possess the means to block NATO enlargement or to oppose it effectively. However, the potential for enlargement will reinforce a sense of isolation and encourage a strategic perspective dominated by revisionism, the "risk of creating a consensus within Russia that only this particular measure, but also the entire post-Cold War settlement is arbitrary, unfair, and anti-Russian."\textsuperscript{27}

NATO enlargement will be viewed negatively and understood as "an attempt to push Russia out of Europe, to deprive Moscow of its legal right to participate in the formulation and realization of the all-European process."\textsuperscript{28}

NATO expansion may "also undermine Russia's incentive to cooperate in international regimes and forums. The East-West collaboration on security issues, those gains that have been made will be preserved only if Moscow can be persuaded it is not threatened in Europe. Given the possible impact of the expansion on Russian nationalism and the sense of the mistrust amongst the military elite, continued Russian cooperation in international peacekeeping and preventive diplomacy will not be a certainty. NATO enlargement to the Baltic states is a primary source of potential tensions between NATO and Russia. Both Russian and
NATO (American) policy has created a situation where it is difficult for either to step back. Russia has very limited options. All its attempts to convince the West to forego the first wave of NATO enlargement failed. Russia should discuss this problem at the PJC with the possible participation of Baltic states and try to find a mutually acceptable solution.

Russian has special concerns as well over Ukraine and Uzbekistan, who have been part of the "extended PfP program". In the Russian view, they have been trained to host NATO troops in case of emergencies.

Russia warned that NATO expansion beyond a "red line" into countries of the former Soviet Union would ruin chances for further Russian cooperation with the Atlantic military alliance. Russia sees the borders of the FSU as the limit beyond which NATO expansion would be viewed as a threat. The Russian Deputy Foreign minister in charge of European affairs Yevgeny Gusarov said that "Upon crossing that line, the possibility of NATO-Russian cooperation...would be practically nonexistent."

In order not to be strategically counterproductive, decisions on NATO enlargement, especially of the second and third waves, must take into account the effects they will have on Russia. NATO membership for the Baltic states and the countries hoping to belong to the southern NATO flank will become equally sensitive to Russian's security. Those applicants
from the South, who are adjacent to the members of the CIS, will become increasingly important for Russian economic survival.

It is rather difficult, if possible at all, for Russia to stop the NATO enlargement. Yet it is necessary to impact on it. The practice of international relations shows that the most effective influence is exerted through partnership relations.

Russia is "a preeminent actor determined to adopt a tough line in safeguarding its vital interests, even if such is likely to put implementation of a number of multilateral military treaties and the partnership with the United States in danger."\(^{30}\) NATO expansion may have damaging consequences for future Russian-Western relations.

**DOCTRINE**

At present both Russia and NATO are working on new doctrinal provisions. Without a mutual clarification of this issue, declarations to the effect that NATO does not regard Russia as an adversary will remain just that—declarations. In order to prevent a return to the situation of mutual distrust and confrontation, it is necessary to ensure the transparency of concepts and doctrines that are now under consideration. The fundamental agreement has been reached to open joint consultations and exchange of opinion on matters bearing on the elaboration of Russian and NATO military doctrines and strategic
conceptions as well as on the further reform of the armed forces.

In fact NATO is already engaged outside its area of responsibility in Bosnia and Russia participates in SFOR. The possibility of new NATO-lead peace operations is very high and Russia does not exclude its participation in these operations. NATO and Russia have different approaches to the legitimacy and use of force in potential peace operations: "everything unauthorized is prohibited" in Russia and "everything is authorized, that is not prohibited" in the West. The lack of Doctrine on peace operations at the international level is a point here.

Russia has four options:

- To restore the image of NATO as an enemy (it would help to shift the public concerns from internal to external problems)
- To do nothing (like in case of NATO enlargement)
- To create new alliances
- To intensify cooperation with NATO and to use Western experience and assistance.

Russia has used already without the success the first two options in the past. There is no doubt that Russia has the right and will continue its multidirectional policy of mutually beneficial cooperation with different countries (China, India, the U.S., EU etc.), formulated by Russian Prime minister Evgeni
Primakov in 1998. This policy presumes that returning to the path of confrontation between Russia and NATO is not in Russia’s national interests. Therefore, Russian cooperation with countries other than NATO-member states is not certainly anti-NATO (or anti-American) in the contemporary interdependent and interconnected world. Understanding this aspect is vital for future relations and will take NATO some time.

The fourth option presumes active Russian participation in NATO activities and allows Russia to influence NATO decisions. It depends on Russia’s ability to become an essential element in NATO structures, an element that not only receives, but contributes to the common work. (The Russian General Staff, for example, has provided NATO with reconnaissance imagery on Kosovar Albanians drug trafficking facilities, weapon communications from Albania and training basis of Kosovar separatists). NATO spokesman Jamie Shea stated it was “a good example of NATO-Russia cooperation and ...that cooperation has produced good results, no matter what disagreements (NATO and Russia) may have....”\textsuperscript{31}

This process should be mutual and NATO elements should be present in Russian military structures. That is why it would be more useful for Russia to have a guest or observer status at the NATO military committee, than to be a member of an artificial committee.
RECOMMENDATIONS

- Russian non-membership in NATO is a root cause of all the problems. The possibility of Russian membership, in principle, without specific dates or conditions, might have eased tensions and automatically solved many problems (second wave of NATO enlargement). The U.S., as a leading state in the Alliance might announce the possibility of an "open door" policy towards Russia. Russia in turn would have to confirm its readiness to join NATO. Such statements would close the gap between Russia, NATO and the potential candidates for a NATO-membership.

- Considering the contemporary threats and risks one can say that no one organization is able to deal with all of them and there should not be a hierarchy. Russia and NATO, EU, OSCE and PfP, all of them contribute to European security and occupy their niches. The task is to mark commitments, responsibilities and duties between existing organizations. Each of them will be a leading organization in its own way, contributing to the efforts of others.

- At this stage of cooperation it is essential for Russia to present and talk over its positions exhaustively, learn openness and transparency, and find points of convergence.
• NATO should understand that Russian cooperation with countries other than NATO-member states is certainly not anti-NATO (or anti-American) in the contemporary interdependent and interconnected world. Understanding of this aspect is vital for future relations and will take NATO a certain time.

• The Alliance is changing. It is becoming more European and cooperation with Russia is important for Europe. Russia should react to this process and promote its relations (including military) with the WEU.

• It is rather difficult, if possible at all, for Russia to stop NATO enlargement. Yet it is necessary to impact on it. The practice of international relations shows that the most effective influence is exerted through partnership relations.

• Cooperation with NATO, in conjunction with activity in other international organizations, will enable Russia to take an active part in building a new European security system, raising its international authority and producing a certain measure of influence on NATO activity. In the absence of cooperation with NATO, Russia may perceive NATO as constituting a threat to its security.

• Given the present-day situation, perhaps it is more important not to engage in polemics, but to act in accordance with the
already approved Defense Ministry concepts that are conductive to strengthening national security.

- it would be more useful for Russia to have a guest or observer status at the NATO military committee, than to be a member of an artificial committee.

- Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) has a large potential for the enlargement of the Russian presence in NATO structures. Participating in multinational forces Russia would maintain its security at less cost and would have the possibility to influence its partners.

- In multinational operations, trust binds the coalition together. "Patience, tolerance, frankness, absolute honesty in all dealings, particularly with all persons of the opposite nationality, and firmness are absolutely essential". But trust requires time and a measured appraisal of one another to emerge from personal relationships, particularly those that cross cultures.\textsuperscript{32}

- Personal aspects of Russia-NATO cooperation are of a great importance. The compatibility of leaders and staffs in a coalition is more important than compatibility in doctrine or materiel.\textsuperscript{33} It serves to remove mutual suspicions. The present situation is a result of cooperation solely at the high-ranking level and language barrier. Without appropriate
language skills it's impossible to establish relationships at the personal level and to promote national interests.

• In order to prevent a return to the situation of mutual distrust and confrontation, it is necessary to ensure the transparency of concepts and doctrines that are now under consideration.

• There is a need to develop a Doctrine on peace operations at the international level.

• The inclusion of Russian representatives in planning for peace operations and their absorption of NATO military culture through joint planning and exercises can bring benefits when these forces deploy in the field. Among the greatest benefits are the training and experience gained from working together.\textsuperscript{34}

• the PJC activities should not be limited only to exchanges of opinions and sharing of information. There should be a shift towards the developing joint and mutually acceptable decisions.

• Russia, facing defense budget problems, needs the West to finance its participation in peacekeeping and other PfP activities.
CONCLUSIONS

Russia-NATO interaction is less than two years old. During this time it has been difficult to achieve very much. The main thing is that NATO and Russia are on the right track. The process of the development of mutual relations has begun and is picking up pace. Its future will depend on many factors, the principal ones being the unity of purpose (a secure and stable Europe), openness and sincerity in achieving it, and mutual respect for each other's interests as well as the interests of all European states.35
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