Multinational Maritime Operations (MMOPS) for Naval Doctrine Command

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Since May 1994, a research study team at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has been providing the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) with analysis on Multinational Maritime Operations (MMOPS) and Operations Other Than War (OOTW). One of the several MMOPS efforts, conducted from February to June 1995, analytically supported an NDC effort designed to provide documents for eventual release universally to maritime forces of any nation that can be expected to work with the U.S. Navy in the future. This briefing is divided into two sections. The first covers NDC's publication development program. It provides background for the second section on CNA's analytical support.
Since May 1994, a research study team at the Center for Naval Analyses (CNA) has been providing the U.S. Naval Doctrine Command (NDC) with analysis on multinational maritime operations (MMOPS) and operations other than war (OOTW). This team is headed by CAPT Peter Swartz, USN(Ret) and includes Dr. Lester Gibson, Dr. Michael Johnson, Mr. Richard Kohout, LCDR Kevin Lynch, USN, and LCDR Paul Dunne, USN. Dr. Gibson headed the OOTW half of the project and Dr. Johnson headed the MMOPS half. Both efforts built on previous studies conducted by CNA.

One of the several MMOPS efforts, conducted from February to June 1995, analytically supported an NDC effort designed to provide documents for eventual release universally to maritime forces of any nation that can be expected to work with the U.S. Navy in the future. This NDC effort, originally tasked by the Chief of Naval Operations, is assigned to a six-nation team of action officers at the command: CDR Christian Canova, FN; LCDR Fernando Cerutti, ITN; CDR Tim Concannon, USN; CDR John Dewar, RCN; CDR Peter Leschen, RAN; and CDR Gary Spalton, RN.
This briefing is divided into two sections. The first covers NDC’s publication development program. It provides background for the second section, on CNA’s analytical support.
The Chief of Naval Operations’ instructions in establishing NDC includes the charge “... to develop common doctrine to support multinational maritime operations (MMOPS) with non-NATO countries.” NDC is responding to this task by working with NATO in preparing doctrinal and experimental tactics that were originally written for NATO and are now being prepared for general release.
NDC’s intended application for MMOPS publications

- Formal alliances
- Regional security arrangements
- Ad hoc crisis response
- Coordinated operations
- Coordinated training

NDC expects that these MMOPS publications will be used by formal alliances that otherwise have not produced their own publications, for regional security arrangements, by ad hoc coalitions that form in response to crises, for coordinated operations not involving higher political organizations, and for coordinated training. The goal is to allow potential partners to better understand how each intends to operate prior to, or early in, an operational or training evolution.
NDC started with requirements that emerged from the 1993 International Seapower Symposium. These requirements include safe, and efficient operations at the tactical level and the wider cooperation issues at the operational level.
Tactical publications

"non-NATO" EXTACs

- NATO initiative
- Support cooperation partners
- Unclassified documents
- Ongoing development program

NATO has taken the lead in satisfying these requirements at the tactical level by producing a series of releasable and unclassified experimental tactics (EXTAC) publications. This effort is currently underway, with NDC the designated U.S. national contributor.
Tactical publications

Now in production

- Maneuvering/tactical procedures
- Exercises
- Replenishment at sea
- Helicopter operations
- Voice procedures

Publications on the following topics are now in production:
- Maneuvering and tactical procedures
- Exercises
- Replenishment at sea
- Helicopter operations
- Voice procedures
Tactical publications

Under development

- Structured messages
- Mine warfare
- Submarine escape
- Diving safety
- Non-combatant evacuation operations
- Maritime interception operations
- Humanitarian operations

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Above the tactical level, NDC is developing a proposed draft for a single capstone publication for the EXTAC series. This publication, at the operational level, is sponsored and funded by the USN, but is intended for agreement and use by all the world’s navies. Like the EXTACs, this publication is to support cooperation partners and be a universally released, unclassified document. It provides operational doctrine in support of tactical publications. While their staffs and subordinate commanders are reading the appropriate tactical series publications for the operation, it is anticipated that national component and combined task force commanders will be reading this operational publication. CNA has provided an analytical framework for the document.
Background on CNA's support

Part of long-term CNA support for NDC on Multinational Maritime Operations

This task to provide analysis for MMOPS

- Operational-art-level, doctrine-like publication releasable to all potential foreign maritime partners
- Capstone publication for a series of EXTACs

CNA's analytical support to NDC has been focused on the operational level capstone publication. We started this particular task in February 1995 and completed it in June. The task involved answering the questions:

- What should be in an operational-art-level, doctrine-like publication that is releasable to all potential foreign maritime partners?
- How should those issues be presented for optimal effect and ease of use?
CNA's objectives

✦ Help NDC produce MMOPS capstone pub
✦ Provide input on:
  – Tone
  – Content
  – Structure
✦ Completed on 28 June 1995

These questions were refined into three areas of input to NDC:

• Tone
• Content
• Structure.
The tone should be appropriate for all potential multinational maritime force commanders and for all potential national component commanders in such a force, as well as their senior staffs and subordinates. The issues must be relevant and must use appropriate language. CNA reviewed existing multinational agreements to find the appropriate tone.
For content, CNA used a large number of sources to determine what issues should be addressed in such a publication. These sources included:

- Earlier CNA analyses (both from this CNA team and from other CNA work)
- Reports of the last four International Seapower Symposia
- EXTAC topics (if they warrant a book at the tactical level, they warrant at least a paragraph at the operational level)
- Bilateral or multilateral agreements, including the NATO Concept of Maritime Operations Agreement (CONMAROPS) 93 and the Combined Exercise Agreement (COMBEXAG) Five in the Pacific
- Multinational exercise lessons learned, including BALTOPS 95
- U.S. and NATO multinational doctrine publications (in particular, the drafts of Joint Publication 3-16 and Allied Joint Publication 1)
- U.S. Coast Guard international relations publications.
Structure is the final component of the publication. CNA addressed the structure by asking a series of questions: What structure would best present the issues to commanders in a straightforward manner? What is the publication supposed to answer? How can the implications of multinationality be presented? Where does multinationality most affect operations? What is the logical flow?

After examining the structures of other publications and addressing the questions, CNA determined that a logical flow would introduce multinationality (why nations work together and how to overcome political, military, and cultural risks that multinationality imposes on a multinational force); explain issues involved in building a multinational force; and discuss the issues related to how to conduct, sustain, and conclude operations.
Logical flow

- Multinational maritime operations
- Organizing the force
- Connecting the force (interoperability)
- Conducting the operation
- Sustaining the operation
- Concluding the operation

Six distinct sections emerged as recommendations to NDC from this analysis:

- Multinational maritime operations
- Organizing the force
- Connecting the force
- Conducting the operation
- Sustaining the operation
- Concluding the operation.

In each of these six sections, tone, content, and structure can be further developed.
Multinational maritime operations

- What is the purpose of the pub?
- What does it mean to operate multinationally at sea?
  - Why do maritime nations cooperate?
  - How do maritime nations cooperate?
    - Different ultimate sources of authority
    - Different military forces
    - Different cultures

The generic discussion of multinational maritime operations should discuss the purpose of the publication and also discuss why and how nations work together. It should explain that nations work together for both political and military reasons. Military commanders must be prepared to work with national components whose primary reason for being in the force is political. The publication should also address the three major types of issues that commanders must address when working together as part of a multinational force: political risks, military risks, and cultural risks.

Political risks are great in multinational forces—each element ultimately answers to a different government, with different requirements, different approaches to problem solving, and different interests. These political risks often force commanders to accommodate force structure and force employment issues that otherwise would be repugnant to them. They are often addressed by assigning the force to clumsy international political structures. Commanders should understand why political risks are important and how they should work to reduce them.
Although not a maritime or even a multinational example, the battle of King's Mountain during the American War for Independence illustrates this point very well. Lord Cornwallis had taken Charleston, South Carolina, and began an advance north. His advance force consisted of about 1100 loyalist militia. Six North Carolina counties mobilized their own patriot militia forces to respond to the threatened advance. Six patriot militia colonels, each reporting to their respective county, formed a coalition force of about 1800 men that defeated the loyalist militia. The patriot militia force existed for only a few weeks and was drawn from almost identical military and cultural conditions. Military commanders had to respond to political conditions and make command arrangements that they otherwise would not have made. They formed a board composed of the six colonels which met each morning. They rotated command of the overall force on a daily basis. They requested that the State of North Carolina assume command of the force, and even nominated a North Carolina general for command. They had to deal with a recalcitrant colonel who refused to participate in the original plan of attack, requiring considerable negotiations just to produce an acceptable plan. Many of the difficulties that multinational forces experience occurred in this multi-county force.

Military risks are the second type of risk that must be addressed by commanders. These risks occur because forces have different ways of operating, different rules of engagement, and different equipment. Synchronizing the force militarily is the major requirement of commanders, and most of the publication should address these issues. Military risks may often be overcome by peacetime preparation. CNA documented a number of types of activities that nations do in peacetime to build interoperability and confidence among themselves.

Cultural risks are the third type of risk that must be addressed. Different nations have different cultures. Each national force will have its own opinion of the relative worth of each other's culture. That cannot be prevented, but allowing cultural differences to divide the force can and must be prevented. The commanders and national components must demonstrate respect for their partners. Each must also be open with regard to cultural limitations (which days they can work or fight, which supply items they can use or provide, etc.) The goal is to work on the areas of common interest that brought the force together and prevent divisions from occurring along lines of disagreement.
Organizing the force

How are multinational maritime forces organized?
- Command relationships
- Command structures
- Factors to consider when determining the command structure

Organizing the force is the second major section that should be addressed. This section should deal primarily with command structures, how multinational command structures differ from national ones, what command structure options are available, and what factors should be considered when establishing the command structure. Particularly important is that the traditional concept of command and control should be expanded to include cooperation and coordination. Just as command embodies the direction, control, and sustainment of a force, cooperation embodies the consultation, coordination, and mutual support among national components of a multinational force.
Connecting the force involves the ability for information to flow into, inside, and out of the force. Information includes intelligence, situational awareness data, METOC data, communications, and public information. All of these factors are affected by having elements from different nations in the force. Procedures that both control and allow the flow of information need to be addressed. Of particular importance, the force must determine early-on its intelligence needs, in terms of both what is needed and where, and efforts must be made to establish adequate releasibility across national lines to support the force while not jeopardizing national collection efforts.
A discussion on conducting the operation should include how to plan operations, how to increase the level of operability of the force (harmonizing ROE, operating procedures, and mission analyses, to the extent possible), how to analyze the mission (both for warfare and for non-war missions), and how to task organize the force. This section's primary purpose is to provide a common point of reference for elements of a multinational maritime force that otherwise would not have such a common reference for conducting operations.
Sustaining the operation should be the responsibility of the entire force—both warriors and support elements. What are the major factors that commanders need to account for when they conduct multinational maritime operations to preserve the force’s ability to keep going? Obviously logistics is a major element. But how should logistics be organized? Should every nation provide for its own or should individual nations request assistance from other partners, or should the logistics be centralized? Should certain aspects of logistics be centralized and others be left up to national control? Why? The other part of sustaining the operation concerns measures to ensure the preservation of the force’s capabilities. These include ship, aircraft, and weapons safety procedures; search and rescue planning; damage control planning; personnel safety; medical response; and related measures. Although the CNA team considers force preservation measures to be part of sustaining the force, we understand that these issues may be combined with “connecting the force” issues under the heading of interoperability.
Concluding the operation

- How does the multinational maritime force complete its mission? How should nations terminate their participation? What happens next?
  - Successful multinational conclusion
  - Terminating national participation
  - Maintaining relationships

Concluding the operation is often not addressed in doctrinal publications. It is particularly important for multinational operations where nations may “come and go.” Some nations may prefer to go in early and then leave when the operation becomes more routine. Other nations may desire to wait and join the operation in progress. How should individual nations terminate their participation in a force? How should they turn over to follow-on nations? What should they do when they leave? Other issues relate to how the force itself terminates the operation successfully, and how to incorporate lessons learned by elements in the force to further peacetime preparations for the next conflict.
After discussing both NDC’s planned documents and CNA’s support to NDC, it is appropriate to conclude with NDC’s schedule for development of the publication. NDC will use the CNA analytical framework, as one of their source documents, to produce a first-cut “strawman” publication to be fed to a working group of officers from several U.S. commands to meet in September 1995. Assuming agreement on the part of the Navy Staff and pertinent Navy Commands, the plan is to recommend that the Chief of Naval Operations present the draft publication to his international counterparts at the International Seapower Symposium in November with solicitation of comments to be returned by February 1996. A multinational working group from all interested nations is to convene in May 1996, and NDC expects final publication by the end of that year.