NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND NATO-RUSSIA RELATIONS

by

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ABSTRACT

Despite the development of positive institutional arrangements such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, the strategic culture of Russia has not changed in any fundamental sense. Russian strategic culture has not evolved in ways that would make Russian policies fully compatible with those of NATO countries in the necessary economic, social, technological, and military spheres. On the domestic side, Russia has yet to establish a stable democracy and the necessary legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions for a free-market economy. Russia evidently lacks the necessary cultural traditions, including concepts of accountability and transparency, to make these adaptations in the near-term. Owing in part to its institutional shortcomings, severe socioeconomic setbacks have afflicted Russia. Russian conventional military strength has been weakened, and a concomitant reliance by the Russians on nuclear weapons as their ultimate line of defense has increased. The breakdown in the infrastructure that supports Russian early warning and surveillance systems and nuclear weapons stewardship has exacerbated Russian anxiety and distrust toward NATO. Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with a tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Despite dramatic changes in the international environment and the Russian domestic scene since 1991, Russian strategic culture has not changed in its essence. The Russian worldview and long-standing patterns of behavior persist. Therefore, despite positive developments such as Russian participation in the NATO-led peacekeeping force in Bosnia and the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, many Russians are likely to continue to see NATO as a threat rather than as a partner in international security.

Institutional arrangements set up to promote effective interactions with Russian elites and to facilitate their cooperation with Western institutions, such as the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council and the Partnership for Peace, have had only a limited impact. Russia’s strategic culture has not changed in such a way as to make Russian policies fully compatible with those of NATO countries in the economic, social, technological, and military spheres. Russian compatibility with the West depends upon creating, on the domestic scene, democracy and governmental and socioeconomic institutions conducive to free-market economics. Russia has not yet succeeded in making these adaptations, however. These circumstances have led to socioeconomic setbacks, questions about the quality of Russia’s nuclear weapons stewardship, and continued attitudes of suspicion and distrust toward NATO in the Russian geopolitical worldview.

Russian leaders have been unable to set up the mechanisms necessary to accomplish the transition from the USSR’s state-centered command economy to a market-centered free-enterprise economy. They have not established the necessary legal,
judicial, and regulatory institutions. The present Russian constitution lacks popular legitimacy, and the system of government remains one of presidential primacy. Despite this, entrenched regionalization of power and an ineffective federal bureaucracy have resulted in an overall weakening of the federal system, a situation that may continue for decades.

Accountability and transparency are fundamental Western concepts which are alien to Russian culture. The lack of accountable and transparent legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions has adversely affected respect for property rights and contractual obligations in Russia. This situation has in turn affected both foreign and domestic investment, and has resulted in grave socioeconomic setbacks.

The lack of accountability and transparency has also adversely affected Russia’s ability to create a functioning and effective democracy. The Russians are accustomed to having an authoritarian government, a notable feature of which is the lack of accountability and transparency. Their disappointing experiment with pseudo-democracy as well as their unfortunate experience with pseudo-capitalism have meant disillusionment, cynicism, disappointment, and possible future political volatility. It has also resulted in the Russian adoption of psychological defense mechanisms—for instance, finding fault with Western culture, and emphasizing Russia’s supposed moral and cultural superiority.

The Russian geopolitical stance and worldview have not been significantly modified since 1991. Russian elites remain suspicious of Western intentions. Because of the economic and social chaos and a concomitant breakdown of the transportation and communications infrastructure, the quality of Russian nuclear weapons stewardship is
being increasingly questioned. Russian conventional force strength has been dramatically weakened. The deterioration in the reliability of Russian early warning and surveillance systems, as well as the breakdown of basic supportive infrastructures such as personnel, supplies, and maintenance of nuclear weapons sites, have greatly exacerbated Russian anxiety and suspiciousness; and this situation could, in combination with other factors, lead to misinterpretations of events. Russia’s reliance on nuclear weapons as the ultimate line of defense, coupled with its tendency toward suspicion and distrust toward NATO, could lead to dangerous strategic miscalculation and nuclear catastrophe.
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Last but not least, I dedicate this thesis to my yet unborn children. On the edge of the 3rd millenium — may they live in a safer world — where verifiable storage, and the safety and handling procedures of nuclear weapons arsenals can be assured!
I. INTRODUCTION

A. GENERAL

The purpose of this thesis is to advance understanding of the prospects for improved NATO-Russia relations, despite the complex concerns on both sides regarding nuclear weapons in Europe and the continuing process of NATO enlargement. The ultimate question, the thesis suggests, is whether Russia’s strategic culture can change — that is, whether the Russians can learn to see NATO as a partner in international security rather than a threat.\(^1\) According to Ken Booth,

The concept of strategic culture refers to a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behavior, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the use of force. A strategic culture is persistent over time, but neither particular elements nor a particular culture as a whole are immutable. Nevertheless, those elements together or in part deserving to be called “cultural” do tend to outlast all but major changes in military technology, domestic arrangements or the international environment. The strategic culture of a nation derives from its history, geography and political culture, and it represents the aggregation of the attitudes and patterns of behaviour of the most influential voices; these may be, depending on the nation, the political elite, the military establishment and/or public opinion. The strategic culture defines a set of patterns of and for a nation’s behaviour on war and peace issues. It helps shape but does not determine how a nation interacts with others in the security field... Strategic culture helps shape behaviour on such issues as the use of force in international politics, sensitivity to external dangers, civil-military relations and strategic doctrine. As a result of continuities in these matters, it is legitimate to talk about a particular national “style” in the theory and practice of strategy.\(^2\)

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\(^1\) The views expressed in this thesis are that of the author’s alone. It does not express the views of the Naval Postgraduate School, the U.S. Department of the Navy, or any other U.S. government agency.

Russia’s “domestic arrangements” are clearly in flux, and this thesis takes that factor into account. The focus is, however, on examining whether the change in the “international environment” — to use Booth’s phrase — has as yet been significant enough to bring about modifications in Russia’s worldview and patterns of behavior.

NATO is in the process of creating structures and arrangements that will ultimately affect the emerging security environment in the Euro-Atlantic region. Integrating Russia into this security environment remains a crucial priority. This thesis attempts to assess the factors that might indicate the direction in which Russia is headed. For the next twenty years, Russia will probably concentrate on internal development and its traditional empire-building impulses will be in temporary abeyance.3 During this period, the Russian people will probably have an “opportunity for reflection and debate about their national purpose” as well as for “the creation of new Russian political structures.”4 NATO enlargement nevertheless remains a deeply troubling development in the eyes of Russian elite groups. Although the general Russian population is concerned with the challenges of daily life, the elite groups “have been and remain generally opposed to NATO expansion.”5

The NATO Allies would prefer that Russia become an important partner of NATO, and that NATO and Russia progress to a new level of strategic cooperation,

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4 Ibid.
including participation in the surveillance and monitoring of proliferation risks and other potential challenges to international peace and security.

The potential contributions of the Russians are based on Russian strengths, such as decades of experience with the details of setting up and maintaining a reliable nuclear weapons monitoring and security system. At least until recently, Russia maintained a large scientific establishment. In addition, some Russians recognize that NATO is more than a coordinating body directing a common defense policy for the Allies in Western Europe and North America. NATO already has the basic structures set up for consultation and cooperation with Russia — above all, the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC). Moreover, Russia is a member of the Partnership for Peace ( PfP) and has concluded an Individual Partnership Program ( IPP) with NATO.

Questions remain concerning the direction in which Russian policies may evolve over time. Getting the Russians to accept NATO as a constructive partner means getting rid of the old mindset in the Russian security establishment, and this could require a generational change. The old xenophobic ways of thinking that emphasize spheres of influence and fears of encirclement slow down the process of psychological accommodation to the new realities and opportunities. Russia is not far from the end of Boris Yeltsin’s presidency and Western hopes for an early change of thinking by the Russian government have apparently been set back by the appointment, on 11 September
1998, of Yevgeny Primakov as Prime Minister. As the former intelligence chief of the foreign service branch of the KGB (now called the foreign intelligence service, or SVR), Primakov is widely reported to maintain his longstanding connections with the security apparatus and to fervently support efforts to thwart U.S. and NATO interests.

The currently ambiguous NATO-Russia relationship may improve if Russian elites become more pragmatic, technocratic, and confident about the advantages of cooperating with the Alliance. The Russians recognize a zone of nuclear risk to the south and the east. Indeed, according to Sumner Benson, the Russians "have already agreed in principle to cooperate with the United States and Europe in developing a global missile defense system."

At the present time, three nuclear issues appear most significant: (a) Russian anxieties regarding NATO enlargement and hypothetical NATO deployments of nuclear weapons on the territory of new allies; (b) NATO's concerns about Russia's non-strategic

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6 According to one author, "Primakov has had a close relationship with the KGB all of his adult life. He was an influential pragmatist on behalf of Middle Eastern terrorist groups and reportedly a bag man for KGB money to Palestinian terrorists in the 1960's. He became a major figure in crafting the Brezhnev regime's expanded support for terrorist regimes to act as surrogates to attack the United States and its allies. He authored the Communist Party's ideological justification for the 1979 Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, and was found to have been the principal guiding figure behind the 1989 crackdown on democratic, pro-independence activists in Azerbaijan in which 130 [people] were killed and more than 700 wounded. Up through the present, he has been the most prominent source of diplomatic support for the Qaddafi and Saddam regimes to escape international sanctions respectively for sheltering the suspects behind the 1988 bombing of an American jumbo jet over Lockerbie, Scotland, and for continuing clandestine weapons of mass destruction programs. He has never recanted." *Russia Reform Monitor*, no. 514, 14 September 1998. Available at [http://www.afpc.org]; accessed 16 September 1998.


8 Sumner Benson, "Will NATO Deploy European Missile Defenses?" *Comparative Strategy*, vol. 16, 1.
nuclear weapons; and (e) NATO's interest in gaining Russian cooperation to deal with NBC proliferation. There are obviously other nuclear issues of importance — for instance, the future of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) agreements and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). These are, however, either U.S.-Russian matters (as with START) or global issues (as with the CTBT), rather than being NATO-Russian questions.

This thesis critically evaluates the factors that support the likelihood of Russia becoming a true partner of NATO, as well as the factors that may promote the opposite outcome. In order to attain a careful evaluation of the possibility and likelihood of Russian-NATO cooperation, particularly regarding the nuclear issues listed above, this thesis attempts to accomplish three tasks.

The first task is to examine the current status and principal characteristics of Russia's political culture. What institutions are the Russians building that may facilitate their successful cooperation with Western democracies? What are the schools of thought in Russian elite circles about the relations with the West? This part of the thesis draws on the Russian press, public opinion polls, and scholarly studies as gauges of the direction of Russian political culture.

The second task is to analyze the current status of NATO's institutional arrangements set up to include the Russians as partners with NATO and to promote effective interactions with Russian elites. These institutional arrangements include the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council (PJC) and the Partnership for Peace (PfP). With respect to these institutional arrangements, the features examined include their
inclusiveness, effectiveness, and seriousness of purpose (that is, actual implementation of formal commitments), plus the relationships among the organizations. Additionally, this thesis assesses the other facilitating organizational arrangements, such as the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

The third task is to investigate the current status of NATO and Russian deployment of non-strategic nuclear weapons, the Alliance policy of the “Four No’s,” and the status of the integration of new members into the current NATO organization. According to the Founding Act,

The member States of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapon storage sites on the territory of those members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities. Nuclear storage sites are understood to be facilities specifically designed for the stationing of nuclear weapons, and include all types of hardened above or below ground facilities (storage bunkers or vaults) designed for storing weapons.⁹

B. OVERVIEW OF THE THESIS

This thesis is organized as follows: Chapter II offers background on the NATO enlargement debate, including the nature of the discussion in the United States concerning the wisdom and extent of NATO expansion. Particular emphasis is given to the fear of alienating Russia by expanding NATO into Central Europe, and thereby

undermining prospects for obtaining Russia’s cooperation in nuclear matters, as against
the dangers posed by leaving a power vacuum in Central Europe as a result of not
expanding NATO.

Chapter III examines the current status and principal characteristics of Russian
political culture with regard to foreign relations, particularly the resistance of the Russian
elites to NATO enlargement. Furthermore, this chapter also examines the potential
impact of NATO enlargement on Russia’s foreign policy and strategic posture.

Chapter IV offers an examination of Russia’s military doctrine, nuclear
capabilities and strategic posture. It examines the Russian decision, in view of its
conventional force weakness, to abandon the 1982 Soviet “no first use” pledge. Finally,
this chapter discusses the threat posed by what may be unsatisfactory Russian
stewardship of non-strategic nuclear weapons, in the context of the disastrous breakdown
of social and economic structures in Russia.

Chapter V examines efforts by the NATO Allies to create reassuring and inclusive
institutions to aid in the effort to integrate Russia into the evolving security architecture
of the Euro-Atlantic region. It further examines the reasons for Russian reluctance to
participate wholeheartedly in this effort. These reasons include distrust of Allied motives
and strategies, especially with respect to the hypothetical abandonment of the “Four
No’s” policy of non-deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the three new
members of NATO.

Chapter VI outlines conclusions concerning Russian strategic culture, particularly
as to whether the Russians are likely, in the present domestic turmoil, to become true
partners of NATO. In the context of the present disastrous social and economic circumstances, including an impoverished military and potentially unsatisfactory nuclear weapons stewardship, the prospects for a favorable outcome seem bleak. The concluding chapter includes an examination of Russia's inability to date to create economic and governmental institutions that could facilitate Russia's integration into the Western community of democratic states. The analysis concludes with an evaluation of the possibility that the Russians may not only fail to become true partners of NATO, but instead may actually prepare for a renewed Cold War.
II. OVERVIEW OF NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS IN THE CONTEXT OF THE ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

A. INTRODUCTION

1. Decisions

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was originally created in 1949-50 to resist an expansive Soviet Union. During the Cold War, NATO acquired additional functions and purposes, such as providing a framework for the establishment of West German armed forces.\textsuperscript{10} When Soviet Communism broke apart and the Red Army’s brutal forty-five year occupation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) ended abruptly, the world security environment made a historic transformation. The global ideological thrust of Leninist foreign policy collapsed in a heap. However, since the end of the Cold War the world has not become a safer place. In fact, in many ways, it has become much more dangerous. A new phase in the security arrangements and defense organizations of Europe began when the Cold War ended, precipitating a debate about the nature and extent of the adjustments demanded by the changed conditions.

The debate has focused on enlargement of the existing security and defense arrangements, the most important of which is NATO. However, at the same time, there has been an increasing web of cross membership and interrelationships among many of the security institutions related to Europe.\textsuperscript{11} Additionally, an extensive collection of

\textsuperscript{10} West Germany was eventually admitted into NATO in 1955.

alternative security arrangements has been considered, with recommendations made for promoting an extensive array of European-related security organizations including: (1) the OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), (2) the NACC (North Atlantic Cooperation Council), (3) the PfP (Partnership for Peace), (4) the EU (European Union) and (5) the WEU (Western European Union). The NACC was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in May 1997.

2. Possible Alternative Security Configurations

A dizzying array of several possible alternative security configurations was proposed in the early 1990s by various groups. Among the significant suggestions offered about how the security alignments might change were the following basic configurations.\textsuperscript{12}

\textit{a. If NATO Expands}

- NATO could expand to include only states from Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), or
- NATO could expand to include some CEE plus some Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, or
- NATO could extend membership to all Partnership for Peace (PfP) partners.

\textit{b. If NATO Does NOT Expand}

- NATO’s size could stay the same, at sixteen members, and NATO could simply continue cooperation with Eastern European countries under EAPC and PfP, or
- the principal security umbrella for European security could be changed to the OSCE, with NATO and the CIS as the supporting pillars of the umbrella, or

\textsuperscript{12} Ibid., 117-118.
• the EU and the WEU could become the chief elements of the European security umbrella, expanding to include most of the CEE states, and NATO would remain static at sixteen members.

3. Early Debate and History of the Decision to Enlarge

When the Cold War with the Soviet Union ended, followed by the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact in 1991, a power "vacuum,"¹³ or large neutral area, appeared in Central and Eastern Europe. In response to this development, "many public officials and private citizens in Central and Eastern Europe began expressing the desire for their countries to join NATO."¹⁴ By the same token, many countries in the area also applied for membership in the European Union (EU).¹⁵ "Instability and uncertainty in Russia, Ukraine, and elsewhere in the CIS [Commonwealth of Independent States] and possible Russian imperialistic and expansionistic tendencies, are viewed in Central and Eastern European states as the greatest threats to their national security. Individual states see themselves as incapable of coping alone with the magnitude of these challenges. They see NATO as the most capable security institution to help protect them against these threats, particularly because of U.S. involvement."¹⁶

In 1991, NATO created the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which, as noted above, was replaced by the Euro-Atlantic Cooperation Council (EAPC) in May 1997. In addition to this, in January 1994 NATO created the Partnership for Peace (PfP), an initiative with various purposes, including to aid in the process of getting prospective

¹³ Kissinger, cited in ibid., 30.
¹⁴ Ibid., 21.
¹⁵ Ibid., vi.
¹⁶ Ibid., 31.
members ready to become full members. The overall aim of the PfP is to aid in the creation of a common approach to security arrangements in the Euro-Atlantic region. Specifically “the PfP became an instrument for building closer relationships with our new Partners to the East. Through PfP the East and the West seek to build the habits of consultation, trust and cooperation. Much of its cooperation is in the military sphere. At the same time PfP-countries build common ideas and approaches to peacekeeping and humanitarian support operations. We also aim to introduce a planning system that has played a major part in enhancing Alliance solidarity and underpinning the integrated military structure.” Moreover, in January 1994, regarding the PfP, the NATO heads of state and government declared:

The Partnership for Peace, which will operate under the authority of the North Atlantic Council, will forge new security relationships between the North Atlantic Alliance and its Partners for Peace.... [W]e will work in concrete ways towards transparency in defense budgeting, promoting democratic control of defense ministries, joint planning, joint military exercises, and creating an ability to operate with NATO forces in such fields as peacekeeping, search and rescue and humanitarian operations, and others as may be needed.

Russian responses at that time were mixed. In 1993, Russian President Boris Yeltsin wrote to Western leaders expressing concern that NATO expansion would tend to isolate Russia and asked that membership be open-ended and not exclude Russia itself.

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17 Ibid., vi.
Moderating his terms by characterizing NATO membership for Russia as "purely theoretical," Yeltsin further suggested that a NATO-Russian relationship should be "several degrees warmer than the relations between the alliance and Eastern Europe."\textsuperscript{20}

The NATO Foreign Ministers met in Brussels on 1 December 1994 with the assignment to "begin an examination inside the Alliance to 'determine how NATO will enlarge, the principles to guide this process and the implications for membership.'"\textsuperscript{21} Expansion to include the first wave of new members began in Madrid in July 1997, when Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic, were invited to begin talks concerning adherence to the North Atlantic Treaty.

4. **Open-Endedness**

At the present time, in addition to the three countries listed above, nine other countries have applied for membership: Albania, Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia. Some observers judge that the most probable and most qualified candidate countries for a "second tranche of NATO enlargement" are Slovenia, Romania, the three Baltic States, and perhaps Austria.\textsuperscript{22} Future membership in NATO depends in part on candidates meeting specific criteria, including (a) having their military forces under democratic and civilian control, (b) resolving border and minority disagreements with their neighboring countries, and (c) making effective efforts to create stable free-market democracies.

\textsuperscript{20} Yeltsin, quoted in Morrison, 1995, 23.
\textsuperscript{21} Ibid., 24.
\textsuperscript{22} However, Vienna has not yet initiated a dialogue with NATO about possible admission.
Debate and pressure for NATO enlargement have been especially strong in Germany. Among the key issues under consideration by well-informed observers in the various NATO member countries are: (a) the potential effects of enlargement on “alliance cohesion,” (b) the implications for unsuccessful first-wave applicants or “also-rans,” (c) “the risk of unnecessary confrontation with Russia,” and (d) reservations over “the gravity of accepting new collective defense obligations.” Open-endedness implies an “inclusive” process of indefinite scope and duration. That is, it implies that the applicant countries should not give up hope. This “open-ended process is seen as the necessary complement to taking in only a few new allies.” This is necessary “in order to avoid implying there is a ‘permanent exclusion’ of some countries,” an implication that might have destabilizing effects.

B. NATO RELATIONS WITH RUSSIA

1. NATO-Russia Founding Act

It has been clear to Western leaders that open-endedness in the NATO enlargement process is not adequate to the task of dealing with Russia. The challenge of developing constructive relations with Russia is a unique one, and recommendations were accordingly made for developing a unique forum for cooperation and dialogue between NATO and Russia. Hence, the NATO-Russia Founding Act, seen as the solution to the

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24 Ibid., 119.
25 Ibid.
26 Ibid.
27 Morrison, 1995, 129.
special challenge of Russia, was signed in Paris on 27 May 1997. The NATO-Russia Founding Act called for the establishment of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, a vehicle providing a forum for consultations, cooperation, and coordination with Russia. In support of this historic achievement, prominent NATO officials have asserted that because the new European security environment has changed so fundamentally, “it is only natural that a new Russia and a new NATO have become partners.”

2. NATO’s “Four No’s” Policy and How it Emerged

To the Russians, the most troubling aspect of NATO enlargement has been the potential deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new members. The NATO-Russia Founding Act of 27 May 1997 clearly states a policy of non-deployment in the foreseeable future:

The member states of NATO reiterate that they have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy — and do not foresee any future need to do so. This subsumes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of those new members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities.

The NATO-Russia Founding Act with its stated policy of the “Four No’s” was developed to assuage Russian concerns and to respond to the widespread conviction in Russia that Russia has been betrayed by the NATO powers. The betrayal that the Russians claim to have suffered resides in what they feel is a violation of implicit

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29 NATO-Russia Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 7-8.
understandings and promises made by U.S. President George Bush to Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev in Malta in 1989 that, if the Russians would permit Germany to reunify, the “quid pro quo” would be that NATO would not expand. Though apparently all that President Bush offered was a vague verbal assurance that the West would “not seek to profit” from Moscow’s weakness, it is nevertheless an instance of what the Russians consider a breach of faith. This interpretation of events contributes to the tendency of Russians to see themselves as victims of machinations and treachery by the Western powers and to distrust the statement of the “Four No’s.” Furthermore, it affects Russian strategic thinking and reinforces the tendency to cling to the old Cold War views of NATO as the enemy.

3. Further NATO Enlargement Questions

Other questions related to NATO enlargement that had to be answered included: (a) the criteria for membership, (b) whether to offer full or partial membership, (c) which countries should be invited, (d) the timing and sequencing of enlargement, (e) the problem of tension between states asked to join and those “waitlisted,” (f) the role of public opinion in the countries involved, and (g) the impact of proposed enlargement on NATO’s effectiveness.

The debate in 1993-95 examined how NATO enlargement would improve security and stability in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), thereby avoiding a security

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vacuum, nationalization of defenses, and an East-West clash. By providing greater security to the Central and Eastern European states, NATO would be increasing the likelihood that those countries would become stable democracies.\textsuperscript{32} Thus, the argument was that enlargement should begin at a time when any threat from the Russians was minimal.\textsuperscript{33}

Those who argued against NATO enlargement countered that expansion was not necessary, since, with the demise of the Soviet Union, no threat existed.\textsuperscript{34} Other arguments claimed that expansion would actually deepen divisions in Europe, since there would be a demarcation between those who had been invited to join NATO and those who had not, and that this would in fact result in new bloc formations, tensions, and confrontations. The exact nature of the security commitments involved was also a concern. The NATO decision-making processes, already cumbersome, might become more so.\textsuperscript{35}

The debate about long-term strategy suggested that before enlargement could take place, other questions would first need to be addressed, and that more time and study were needed to answer them. These issues included defining the nature of NATO transatlantic relationships, working out the details of the NATO-Russia relationship, and

\textsuperscript{32} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{33} Ibid., vii.
\textsuperscript{34} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{35} Ibid.
conducting a more extensive public debate. Some argued that invitations to join NATO could be deferred until such time as an actual threat from Russia became evident.\textsuperscript{36}

C. U.S. DEBATE ABOUT NATO ENLARGEMENT

In the final analysis, the decisions made in the United States will be the deciding factor concerning the shape of NATO enlargement. In 1994, President Clinton stated that NATO expansion was "no longer a question of whether, but when and how."\textsuperscript{37}

The long-term strategic relationship between the United States and its European allies depends on the American role as security guarantor and pacifier.\textsuperscript{38} This umbrella role is crucial to its present NATO leadership. America is the "key agent in the construction of an interstate order in Western Europe that muted, if not removed, ancient conflicts and shaped conditions for cooperation."\textsuperscript{39} The most important aspect of this leadership role is the "essentially unilateral American security guarantee."\textsuperscript{40} That role continues to this day, and extends to the countries in the first tranche of NATO enlargement. This is the basis of the long-term strategic alliance between Canada, the United States, and several European nations.

Although U.S. leadership is the crucial factor, U.S. leadership regarding enlargement has not always been as forthcoming as it is at the present time. For example, during the early phase of President Clinton's first administration, the U.S. did not

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., viii.
\textsuperscript{37} President Clinton, cited in ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{38} Josef Joffe, "Europe’s American Pacifier," \textit{Foreign Policy}, Spring 1984, 67-68.
\textsuperscript{39} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{40} Ibid.
vigorously support NATO enlargement as an urgent priority. Secretary of State Warren Christopher and Secretary of Defense William Perry discussed the merits of expansion for years, owing to a judgment that more examination, debate, and time were needed to deal with the vexing questions. Christopher and Perry together wrote against enlargement in February 1995, saying, "If we arbitrarily lock in advantages now for some countries, we risk discouraging reformers in countries not named and fostering complacency in countries that are."  

1. Early Debate in the U.S.

Such well-qualified observers as Henry Kissinger, who served as Secretary of State in the Nixon and Ford administrations, and Ronald Asmus of the RAND Corporation, suggested NATO enlargement as early as 1991-92. However, earnest discussion about the topic was not undertaken until 1993, prior to the NATO summit in Brussels in January 1994. Clearly, there were uncertain and distressing questions from the beginning. The questions included "how far it should go, who should be invited to join (and at what point), who will pay for it, what its real purposes are," and "how to console those left out of the first round of enlargement." These issues "have emerged as the most obvious signs of how difficult NATO is finding the challenge of building a new

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41 Morrison, 1995, 42.
42 Ibid.
44 Ibid., 100.
security order to prevent and contain conflict in the Euro-Atlantic region." Moreover, these questions are still being debated in earnest at the present time.

2. **For Enlargement**

Proponents of NATO enlargement in the United States have included: (a) Senator Richard Lugar, (b) former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, (c) former U.S. Presidential National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski, (d) former National Security Council official Peter Rodman, and (e) *New York Times* columnist William Safire. In addition, leading political analysts at the Rand Corporation, such as Ronald Asmus, Richard Kugler, and Stephen Larrabee, have also been strong supporters of expansion, writing that the inclusion of the Visegrad states (Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Slovakia) "would strengthen the Atlanticist orientation of the alliance and provide greater internal support for U.S. views on key security issues."47

a. **Stability in Europe as a Vital American Interest**

Senator Richard Lugar wrote in 1993 that "defining the current problems in terms of the future of Europe as a whole helps clarify the issue of vital American national interests. The United States cannot afford to allow Europe to unravel for the third time this century. Projection of stability to the East is a prudent investment to secure the peace in Europe."48 Furthermore, Senator Lugar wrote that "membership in

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45 Ibid.
46 Ibid.
48 Lugar, cited in ibid., 30.
NATO is a way to strengthen domestic forces committed to democracy and market economies. Western policy-makers and analysts tend to overlook the link between democracy and security.\textsuperscript{49}

\textit{b. The Security Vacuum}

Henry Kissinger, also an early advocate of expansion, wrote that “the expansion issue arose because Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary — all victims of Soviet occupation — sought NATO membership.”\textsuperscript{50} Kissinger further warned not to allow a “vacuum between Germany and Russia that tempted so many previous conflicts.”\textsuperscript{51} In 1994 he wrote, “if this request [the Visegrad states’ requests to join NATO] is rejected and the states bordering Germany are refused protection, Germany will sooner or later seek to achieve its security by national efforts, encountering on the way, a Russia pursuing the same policy from its side.”\textsuperscript{52}

\textit{c. Keeping NATO Vital}

In 1994, Zbigniew Brzezinski argued that in order to keep NATO a vital and energized organization, it was necessary to provide “a long-range design for Europe,” and that “hesitation, inconsistency and weakness will not only discredit American leadership but probably doom NATO altogether.”\textsuperscript{53}

\textsuperscript{49} Ibid., 33.
\textsuperscript{50} Ibid., 29.
\textsuperscript{51} Ibid., 30.
\textsuperscript{52} Ibid.
d. Avoiding Ambiguity and Uncertainty

Peter Rodman, a former National Security Council official, wrote that, “if the history of this century proves anything, it is that ambiguity about the status of these small Central European states is exceedingly risky for peace. It would only invite future revisionist temptations. In the interest of European stability, the uncertainty should be foreclosed by their admission to the alliance.”

3. Against Enlargement

When NATO was first formed in 1949, there was opposition from a political triangle of (1) isolationists, (2) defense hawks, and (3) liberal internationalists. According to Jeremy Rosner, a well-qualified and informed observer of NATO enlargement, the same three groups are again forming the principal opposition.

Isolationists, such as Patrick Buchanan, a former official in the Reagan administration, have worried about the Article 5 defense commitments that enlargement might entail. For example, Buchanan wrote in late 1993, “the United States cannot, and must not, give Poland and other East European countries the guarantee that it would go to war because of their eastern borders, as would follow from their admission into NATO.”

Others who are not isolationists doubt whether NATO is the most appropriate vehicle for achieving stability in Central Europe. For example, former Senator Sam

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56 Ibid.
57 Buchanan, cited in Morrison, 1995, 40
Nunn of Georgia, a longtime defense expert, is said to prefer using membership in the European Union (EU) rather than NATO as the main vehicle for stabilizing Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The “father of containment,” George F. Kennan, is also genuinely concerned that U.S. interests would not be served by any NATO enlargements at present.58

4. **General Implications**

   a. **Open-Endedness and NATO-Russia Relations**

   Jonathan Dean of the Union of Concerned Scientists argued against enlarging NATO on the grounds that it is going to be much more costly than the $30 billion estimated by the State Department source. Dean stated at the Senate Foreign Relations Committee hearings that enlarging NATO “will be costly, risky, and above all, unnecessary.”59 The open-endedness issue is, in Dean’s view, the most distressing aspect, and is likely, in a runaway enlargement process, to result in an eventual cost to the United States of “$90 to $150 billion.”60 Furthermore, Dean stated, “If the Baltic states do become members of NATO, then the costs to present NATO members of making a realistic effort to defend the countries, which border Russia at the Eastern end of the Baltic Sea, will include very large increases in NATO’s force projection capabilities, including naval forces and combat aircraft, and, quite probably, explicit reliance on

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58 Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Senator Wellstone, testifying concerning Senator Sam Nunn, and George F. Kennan, *The Debate on NATO Enlargement, Hearing before the Committee on Foreign Relations, 105th Cong., 1st sess*, 63.
60 Ibid., 68.
nuclear weapons, matching a parallel and ominous development in Russian nuclear weapons policy.\textsuperscript{61}

Moreover, according to Dean, NATO’s enlargement is risky if open-ended, because it would “dangerously expand the scope of current United States security commitments.”\textsuperscript{62} In addition, Dean expressed apprehension and fear that Russia would feel encircled by open-ended in enlargement, and that it would be dangerous to antagonize a country with Russia’s supply of nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{63} Further, Dean stated that “what [the] Eastern European countries most want and most need is a form of membership in the Western community that provides support for their growing economic, and social and political structures.”\textsuperscript{64} Finally, Dean stated the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an adequate alternative to NATO expansion.\textsuperscript{65}

b. \textit{Concerns about Russia}

In the United States, other foreign affairs specialists who feel that American interests are best served by maintaining good relations with Russia include Fred C. Iklé, former Under Secretary of Defense for Policy; Charles Kupchan, a former member of the U.S. National Security Council Staff; and Michael Brown of Harvard University.\textsuperscript{66}

\textsuperscript{61} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{62} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{63} Ibid., 68-69.
\textsuperscript{64} Ibid., 69
\textsuperscript{65} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{66} Morrison, 1995, 35.
Fred C. Iklé feels that American interests are best served by soothing and coaxing the former Soviet superpower into helping solve the world’s current problems, rather than creating a Russia that would be irritated by giving NATO membership to Central and Eastern European neighbors. Furthermore, America’s best interests, Iklé argues, are to look upon Russia as a potential partner in dealing with a dangerous and uncertain world ahead. Russian nuclear threats in the context of NATO expansion are also a concern, and Iklé feels that American interests are better served by making sure America and Russia cooperate, especially in the area of preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.\footnote{Fred C. Iklé, cited in Timothy R. Trampenau, “NATO Expansion and the Baltic States,” (Master’s Thesis, The Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, December 1996), 56.}

Other well-qualified observers who oppose NATO expansion feel that it would exclude Russia, and hence might cause Russia to be “resentful, less cooperative, and perhaps adversarial.”\footnote{Morrison, 1995, 36.} Included in this group of scholars is Charles Kupchan, formerly of the National Security Council, who has argued that America’s interests are best served by not missing an opportunity to build greater security. Fundamentally, Kupchan is concerned about building a cooperative relationship with Russia, rather than creating new lines of division in Europe. Furthermore, he stated that “pushing NATO’s boundaries eastward promises to resurrect Europe’s dividing lines, not erase them. The chance to build a European security community that included Russia will be lost. The
West might be larger and stronger, but Europe would again be divided into hostile
halves.\textsuperscript{69}

c. \textit{Spheres of Influence}

Michael Brown of Harvard University has argued that admission of the
four Visegrad states would be counterproductive because, "in all probability, Russian
leaders would interpret NATO expansion as a delineation of spheres of influence in
Central Europe and they would move to establish greater control over non-NATO areas.
Russian aggression would be encouraged, not discouraged, by NATO expansion."\textsuperscript{70}

d. \textit{Weakening Democratic Forces in Russia}

Other well-qualified observers who support closer ties with Russia feel
this would be in America’s long range interests for three reasons.

- First, they want to assist Russia "in its progress towards democracy, to
  continue with arms control negotiations, and to secure assistance in
  responding to international crises."\textsuperscript{71} Michael Mandelbaum, Professor and
  Director of Foreign Policy at the Nitze School of Johns Hopkins University,
  for example, reportedly argues that a "‘neo-containment’ policy of NATO
  enlargement would run the risk of weakening democratic forces in Russia, and
  if imposed, would be seen as illegitimate by the Russians. This illegitimacy
  would give a revisionist Russia reason to try to undermine the fragile
  European order."\textsuperscript{72}

- Second, those who emphasize that good U.S.-Russian relations are important
to the overall security of the United States claim that Russia’s cooperation is
needed to counter the threats that are likely to emerge in the future: more
specifically, the dangers posed by rogue states’ possession of weapons of mass
destruction (WMD) and the risks in further WMD proliferation.

\textsuperscript{69} Charles Kupchan, cited in ibid., 37.
\textsuperscript{70} Michael Brown, cited in ibid., 39.
\textsuperscript{71} Trampanau, 1996, 54.
\textsuperscript{72} Michael Mandelbaum, cited in ibid.
• Third, a strategic alliance with Russia in the future may be imperiled by actions today. Hence, there is concern that Russian help may be needed to contain a robust giant looming on the horizon — that is, China. According to Stephan Sestanovich, "A Russia oriented to the West would be needed to build an effective coalition against an aggressive China. In fact, it is possible that good relations between Russia and the West could deter China from taking risks that might make a coalition necessary." 

D. THE OUTCOME OF THE NATO ENLARGEMENT DEBATE

At Stanford University in May 1997, James E. Goodby predicted that the most likely outcome of the debate to enlarge NATO will be to "enlarge and then have a lengthy pause for a period of consolidation." With the invitations to Poland, Hungary, and the Czech Republic in the summer of 1997, Goodby's prediction has so far proven correct. Furthermore, the first tranche of post-Cold War NATO enlargement is now nearly accomplished. On 30 April 1998, the United States Senate approved a resolution of ratification to add the three new members to NATO, thus bringing their membership one step closer to reality. Accession will take place only after all sixteen current allies ratify the protocols of accession, as anticipated. However, NATO enlargement remains controversial and the debates continue, especially in Russia. Moreover, open-endedness in the membership process may be put on hold, primarily because "given Russian opposition to accession to NATO of any newly independent state that emerged from the

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73 China sees itself as the "Middle Kingdom" (the center of the Universe) and is long-lived strategically in terms of future Milleniums.
75 James E. Goodby, "NATO Enlargement and an Undivided Europe," Payne Lecture at Stanford University, 8 May 1997, 3.
collapse of the Soviet Union, there will be considerable hesitation, at least in Western Europe, about a second round of expansion.\textsuperscript{76}

According to Zbigniew Brzezinski, "the real nature of the debate is about the long-term historic and strategic relationship between America and Europe."\textsuperscript{77} Brzezinski states categorically that "NATO's enlargement is not principally about the Russian threat, for currently it does not exist, though one cannot exclude its reappearance and hence some insurance against it is desirable."\textsuperscript{78} He further states that neither is NATO expansion "primarily a moral crusade, meant to undo the injustice the Central European people suffered during the half-century long of Soviet oppression."\textsuperscript{79} According to Brzezinski, NATO enlargement is about nothing short of "America's role in Europe, whether America will remain a European power and whether a larger, democratic Europe will remain organically linked to America."\textsuperscript{80} Brzezinski's interpretation of the Russia question is that "NATO and the European Union have creatively resolved the old question of disproportionate German power in Europe. The progressive expansion of NATO can similarly resolve the question of disproportionate Russian power in Europe."\textsuperscript{81} Furthermore, Brzezinski stated that maintaining the American military presence in Europe is "central to nothing less than global stability... Europe is the place in which some of the worst human suffering and some of the worst tragedies of this century were

\textsuperscript{76} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{77} Zbigniew Brzezinski, cited in The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 46.
\textsuperscript{78} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{79} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{80} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{81} Ibid.
precipitated. We were dragged into two world wars by the dynamics of European politics."³²

Henry Kissinger when called to testify before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, strongly urged the Senate to ratify NATO expansion. In a prepared statement, he said that the stakes in NATO enlargement are “large, for the nations of the Atlantic area need each other, and NATO is the fundamental link between the two.”³³ Kissinger further stated that “a major American role in Europe is a prerequisite for European coherence. Without it, the European Union would founder on the fear of German domination; France would see reinsurance in a Russian option.”³⁴ He further stated that “an American presence in Europe provides a measure of equilibrium.”³⁵

1. Continuing Concerns About Russia

With respect to the problem of Russian sensitivities, Kissinger stated that “critics of NATO enlargement argue that the admission of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary threatens prospects for the democratic evolution of Russia and therefore magnifies perils rather than allays them. I hold the opposite view.”³⁶ Kissinger went on to say that “failure to enlarge NATO thus would risk either collision or collusion between Germany and Russia. Either way, American abdication would produce a political earthquake threatening vital American interests.”³⁷ According to Kissinger, “NATO

³² Ibid.
³³ Kissinger, cited in ibid., 186.
³⁴ Ibid.
³⁵ Ibid.
³⁶ Ibid., 184.
³⁷ Ibid., 187.
expansion therefore represents a balancing of two conflicting considerations: the fear of
alienating Russia, against the danger of creating a vacuum in Central Europe between
Germany and Russia. Failure to expand NATO is likely to prove irrevocable.  

On the other hand, the Russians, who claim to want to be included in a Western
security arrangement, continue to behave in an inconsistent and contradictory fashion.
In the present turmoil, the problem for both NATO and Russia remains whether Russian
domestic circumstances will develop in such a way as to lead Russia on a logical and
practical path to a genuine security partnership with NATO. It is entirely possible that
some Russians are planning for a future without NATO partnership.

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Ibid.

III. RUSSIAN POLITICAL REACTIONS TO NATO ENLARGEMENT, NOTABLY WITH RESPECT TO NUCLEAR WEAPONS ISSUES

A. FOREWORD

Although the domestic scene in Russia has altered dramatically from what it was in 1991, the necessary governmental and socioeconomic adaptations to integrate Russia into Western economic and monetary institutions have failed to develop. The reasons for this failure have not been hostility to the expansion of NATO, but the incapacity of the leadership to set up transitional mechanisms through which the Russian government could accomplish the transition from a state-centered command economy to a private-enterprise economy. The resulting chaos has provided an opportunity for some individuals to take advantage of the situation to transfer Russian wealth and governmental administrative capacity to themselves.

Owing in part to their disappointing experiment with pseudo-democracy and their unfortunate experience with a grossly distorted form of capitalism, the Russians are now in a condition of economic collapse and social catastrophe, with the great majority of the

90 Below are listed some of the possible economic and governmental institutions that would be necessary to build an economy that would (1) attract foreign investment, (2) help pave the way for the transition from a command (communist) economy to a free market (capitalist) economy, and (3) help build the infrastructure needed in order to establish stronger ties to the Western economic institutions. The list would include a body of commercial law that clearly defines contracts, including the obligations and rights (including property rights) associated with contracts; standard Western accounting methods and procedures; an uncorrupt state licensing body; a judicial system capable of settling contractual disputes fairly; a system of taxation which is clearly defined and capable of actually accomplishing tax collection; and a fair and uncorrupt system of law enforcement.
Russian people deprived of an adequate standard of living. Although politically they have more freedom, the majority of the Russian people may be worse off materially than they were under communism. The benefits of the economic changes that have taken place during the last seven years appear to have gone to a small group of people who have plundered the wealth of the Russian state by taking ownership of former state property for grossly distorted low prices, and who have subsequently sent profits gained thereby outside the country to foreign banks. This evident lack of confidence in the future economic development of their own country, and the obvious lack of commitment to building Russia's economic future contributed to the general cynicism not only of Russia's citizens, but also of foreign investors. In addition, it is likely that some Russians feel an emotional and irrational need to blame someone for their current plight — e.g., the American and other Western economic advisers of Yeltsin's government. Some Russians clearly suspect that the real motivation behind American encouragement of Russian "democracy" was to rob Russia of its empire, as well as to take away the military and strategic strength of the Russian superpower.

Because crop failures and low food stores have led to the likelihood of food shortages during the coming winter, the Russian government has found it necessary to play the role of a petitioner seeking emergency deliveries of food from the West. Because of their need for help, and because of the generosity of Western countries, the Russians will probably show a cooperative attitude of outward compliance with

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91 For the ordinary Russian citizens, there is an unprecedented level of freedom of speech, freedom of political affiliation, and freedom of assembly.
international norms and treaties in matters such as terrorism and expansionism. Furthermore, the Russians may display an apparent attitude of peacefulness and cooperation with the NATO alliance countries, including the United States. Similarly, Russian dependence on the international community will probably continue for the next several years, because of the country’s economic prostration. The organization of food-producing capacity will take some time to accomplish; however, this will be not only because of the difficulties of economic and social reconstruction, but also because of the diversion of funds to military use. With the overwhelming loss of geopolitical status and fears of encirclement, as well as the hostility of Russian elites to the expansion of NATO, some Russian leaders may yearn for an eventual return to Russia’s former power. The outwardly compliant and restrained Russia may mask persistent efforts to recover Russian strength, military capability, and strategic power. One of the instruments of Russian power will in all likelihood be nuclear weapons.

B. RUSSIAN POLITICAL REACTIONS TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

At the present time, “the Russian elites have been and remain generally opposed to NATO expansion.”92 The current view from Russia is that “the prospect of NATO enlargement to Central and Eastern Europe has become the most important and potentially explosive issue of Russia’s foreign policy. It should also be regarded as the ultimate test of Russia’s relationship with the West... No other issue can harm this relationship to the extent that NATO enlargement would. From Moscow’s perspective,

92 Angelakis, 1997, 1.
NATO’s decision over whether or not to enlarge to the east will shape the relationship between Russia and the West for the next period of world history.93

Russian attitudes to NATO have varied over time from hostility to indifference.94 During the last few years of the Soviet Union, after Mikhail Gorbachev came to power in 1985, “NATO did not become a matter of high political or strategic concern for Soviet leaders and public opinion. Mikhail Gorbachev’s concept of a common European house was for many Russians a welcome change from the Cold War division of Europe.95 “After the failure of the August 1991 coup, those who adhered to the old concept of NATO as Russia’s enemy (e.g. orthodox communists, KGB officers, part of the members of the military, government officials, and military-industrial complex) became disoriented and weakened by the Soviet Union’s dissolution, and neutralized temporarily as a political force.”96

After the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, in the early part of Russian President Boris “Yeltsin’s rule, the liberal political establishment in Russia did not consider NATO to be a serious problem.”97 The emphasis at that time was on “integration into international economic and financial institutions (e.g., the IMF, the World Bank, and GATT). Russia largely thought that NATO would change by itself.”98

94 Ibid., 124-125.
95 Ibid.
96 Ibid.
97 Ibid.
98 Ibid., 126.
"Russia’s geopolitical interests were virtually absent from Yeltsin’s early foreign policy doctrine; the Alliance was not seen as a potential threat."\(^9^9\)

By 1993, for various reasons, the “political honeymoon with Russia was ending, [and] the debates in the United States and other Alliance member-states began to focus on NATO’s future.”\(^10^0\) In August 1993, Yeltsin stated “in Warsaw that Eastern European countries were free to join any alliance they deemed necessary.”\(^10^1\) However, he immediately reversed his position on NATO enlargement and began “trying desperately to prevent enlargement.”\(^10^2\) Yeltsin wrote letters to the leaders of NATO countries that reflected the growing fear among Russia’s political class that enlarging NATO to Central and Eastern Europe would lead to Russian isolation.

1. **The Resistance of the Russian Elites To NATO Enlargement**

By late 1993, three principal groups among the political and military establishments and the bureaucracy, in Russia were deeply suspicious of NATO enlargement; (a) the traditionalists, (b) the radical pro-Western democrats, and (c) the statist democrats.

   a. **The Traditionalists**

The traditionalists — including top government officials, key military figures, influential members of the Yeltsin administration and of the Security Council — perceived the future enlargement as a political move against Russia. They thought it would subvert Russia’s security, isolate it in Europe and result in the West taking over its former sphere of influence.

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\(^9^9\) Ibid., 125.
\(^10^0\) Ibid., 126.
\(^10^1\) Ibid., 127.
\(^10^2\) Ibid.
in Central and Eastern Europe, creating additional grounds for the American dominance in the post-Cold War world.\footnote{Ibid., 128.}

\textbf{b. The Radical Pro-Western Democrats}

The… radical pro-Western democrats viewed NATO enlargement not in terms of a new danger for Russia, but as a way to eliminate it from the "civilized world." They were hurt by the fact that Russia had moved decisively towards the West, but in return, the West decided not to embrace Russia, but to strengthen NATO. Some, like Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, felt personally endangered, for they were accused by the conservatives of playing into the West's hands.\footnote{Ibid.}

\textbf{c. The Statist Democrats}

Finally, statist democrats (e.g., those who stand for political democracy and a strong Russian state capable of defending its national interests) both within and without the administration, stressed that NATO’s enlargement, while not representing a direct danger for Russia, created conditions for its isolation and changed the geopolitical configuration of Europe in an unfavorable way to Russia. They thought that enlargement would have negative domestic repercussions, contribute to the strengthening of the communists and ultra-nationalists, help the rise of anti-Western feeling, and offer new arguments to the communist-nationalist opposition against any sort of partnership with the West.\footnote{Ibid.}

\section{The Military, Foreign Ministry and the Duma}

At the present time, the Russian military is concerned mainly about whether "NATO expansion will upset the balance of conventional forces between NATO and Russia well beyond"\footnote{Ibid., 1997, 2.} the imbalance that became obvious when the Warsaw Pact was dissolved in 1991. In 1995, the view of the Russian General Staff was "that NATO..."
expansion would threaten the Conventional [Armed] Forces in Europe (CFE) treaty.”

Specific concerns of the Russian General Staff were that NATO tactical aircraft would be able to strike deep into Russian territory and that the Russian Baltic fleet would be threatened by NATO air power moving to the shores of the Baltic Sea.” The Russian General Staff argued that the aircraft would therefore become strategic rather than tactical assets, thus violating the spirit of the CFE treaty. The Russian General Staff is not expecting any attack from NATO at the present time, but stresses that its planning must be based on being able to react to a potentially hostile NATO acting in as yet unforeseen circumstances. As a compensatory move, the Russians have abandoned the 1982 Soviet “no first use” pledge of nuclear weapons. These concerns have also slowed down the process of ratification of the second strategic arms reduction treaty, START II. START II was signed in January 1993, but has not yet been ratified by Russia.

Russian policy has as its overall long-term goal preventing “NATO’s military infrastructure from moving closer to Russia’s borders.” NATO thus needs to take into account the objections of the Russian military; otherwise, Russian military officers have argued, “NATO expansion may not improve European security.”

In the Russian Foreign Ministry, from 1990 to 1996 NATO expansion was not viewed as a military threat, although it was felt to be a catalyst for negative domestic

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107 Ibid.
109 Ibid., 4.
110 Ibid., 5.
111 Ibid.
political reaction. Andrei Kozyrev, Foreign Minister during most of that period, concentrated on "making Russia a part of the 'system of Western states,'"\textsuperscript{112} a system of pluralistic democracies with their governments reined in by legal institutions, effectively removing the problem of military aggressiveness. He failed to convince other Russian leaders of the validity of his policy, and he lost his job to Yevgeny Primakov. Primakov, whose distrust of NATO enlargement was based on the Alliance's military potential, changed the focus in the Foreign Ministry from domestic reforms to military issues, and set up closer "cooperation and coordination between the Foreign and Defense ministries."\textsuperscript{113} As early as 1995, however, the Russian Foreign Ministry had begun to seek a compromise solution in the form of a "formal permanent consultation mechanism."\textsuperscript{114} In Paris, on 27 May 1997, the NATO Allies and Russia signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act.

In the Duma (the lower house of the Russian parliament), the response to NATO expansion has ranged across the political spectrum. With respect to three principal groups in the Duma, namely (1) the International Affairs Committee, (2) the Defense Committee, and (3) a recently formed group called the Anti-NATO Group, the responses range from the non-confrontational to threats of START II non-ratification. Suggestions from the International Affairs Committee have included creating alternatives to NATO expansion such as WEU expansion, the OSCE being given expanded authority, and

\textsuperscript{112} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{113} Ibid., 6.
\textsuperscript{114} Ibid., 7.
assigning the Council of Europe responsibilities to deal with internal security matters such as terrorism, organized crime, and drug trafficking.\textsuperscript{115}

The Defense Committee of the Duma pressed President Yeltsin to ask President Clinton at the Helsinki Summit in March 1997 to accept the following five suggestions:\textsuperscript{116} 1) expansion should occur slowly and with promises not to station troops and nuclear weapons on the new members’ territory; 2) expansion should be parallel to enhancing relations between NATO and Russia in order to prevent a Russian sense of isolation; 3) expansion should occur at the same time as NATO is transformed from a collective defense pact to a peacekeeping organization; 4) NATO must cooperate more fully with the OSCE and the UN; and 5) the CFE treaty must be revised to reduce NATO superiority. Suggestions three and four were emphasized by the Russians.

The third group in the Duma, the Anti-NATO Group formed in January 1997, has focused on “reviewing agreements on conventional and tactical nuclear weapons, restoring medium range missiles, and promoting closer ties with India, China and others.”\textsuperscript{117} However, the Anti-NATO group is considered more a lobby or public relations mechanism than a potent force in policy recommendations.\textsuperscript{118}

Meanwhile, in the West debate has raged for some time about the possible effect NATO enlargement might have on Russia, and about how the United States and NATO ought to respond to the challenge of dealing effectively with this new situation. It has

\textsuperscript{115} Ibid., 8.
\textsuperscript{116} Ibid., 9.
\textsuperscript{117} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{118} Ibid., 10.
been clear to Western leaders that the principle of open-endedness in NATO membership is not adequate to the task of dealing with Russia. Indeed, as David Yost points out,

From a European perspective, it would have been wiser not to have brought up the issue at all — to have avoided raising long-term hypothetical options or posing unanswerable questions. Some Western experts in Russian affairs have suggested that at least some prominent Russians regard U.S. statements about eventual Russian membership in NATO as patronizing and disingenuous. It is inconceivable to these Russians that the Western nations would agree either to defend Russia against China (or other powers) or to turn a functioning Alliance, a mainstay of the U.S. and Western global power position, into a vacuous collective security institution. In this Russian view, U.S. talk of future NATO membership for Russia is analogous to President Reagan’s promise to share the Strategic Defense Initiative (‘Star Wars’) technology with the Soviet Union — a promise that probably was never taken seriously by the Soviets.\footnote{Yost, 1998, 150.}

The problem of Russia is a unique one and recommendations were accordingly made for addressing the unique relationship between NATO and Russia.\footnote{Morrison, 1995, 129.} As a way of dealing with Russian sensitivities, a special consultative body was created, called the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council, on the basis of the NATO-Russian Founding Act, signed in Paris on 27 May 1997.

3. Russian Concerns about NATO Nuclear Weapons

New tensions may arise between Russia and NATO regarding nuclear weapons. The new Russian Prime Minister, Evgeny Primakov, who is reportedly pragmatic enough to bring some interim stability to the Russian domestic situation, is also viewed as markedly hostile to NATO expansion and to United States interests around the globe.\footnote{Jeff Jacoby, “With Primakov, It’s Back to the Cold War,” Boston Globe, 17 September 1998, 23.}
Primakov has been characterized by some observers as a positive and pragmatic individual, but conversely as a supporter of terrorist activities who is likely to expend great amounts of energy in plotting to subvert American interests around the globe. His long-term association with the KGB has provided him the skills required of a leader who must behave in a fairly conventional way as the representative of his country, which has ties with the global economic and diplomatic institutions. Any efforts by Primakov to pursue covert subversion of NATO and of the American strategic posture generally will probably be detected by the surveillance of the NATO allies. The implications for the strategic situation in the world include the prospect of new tensions, with a danger of the resumption of the nuclear arms race.

C. SUGGESTED ALTERNATIVES TO NATO EXPANSION

Suggestions for alternative security arrangements have included the Russian suggestion “to put more stress on the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe [OSCE].” The OSCE was promoted and praised throughout Russia and much of Europe in the early 1990s as an instrument of crisis prevention. “Most Russian elites support establishing an OSCE Security Council and expanding the role of the OSCE as the basis for a new pan-European security system, including Canada and the U.S.” In addition, they support the transformation of NATO “from a military alliance

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125 Angelakis, 1997, 2.
into a peacekeeping/making organization.” However, the OSCE failed to meet the test of crisis prevention in Yugoslavia. “Because the OSCE is ‘a fairly toothless organization’ and depends on a consensus of 53 countries, those who have supported a central role for it have also called for the establishment of an OSCE Security Council, similar to that of the UN. Furthermore, NATO would become just one tool at the disposal of the OSCE, and would need to be fundamentally transformed from a military alliance into a peacekeeping/making organization operating ‘under the mandate of the UN Security Council and the OSCE.’”

NATO offered the Partnership for Peace (PfP) as an alternative to immediate NATO enlargement, and for other purposes, in 1994. However, opposition groups in Moscow saw the PfP as a “hoax and smoke-screen for NATO’s preparations for enlargement at Russia’s expense.” Some cooperation with Russia in PfP has been undertaken, principally for civil emergency activities.

European Union (EU) membership extended to Central and Eastern European countries (CEE) has been suggested as an alternative method for achieving European security through the subtle means of “providing support for their growing economic, social and political structures.” Well-qualified American observers and scholars such as Zbigniew Brzezinski doubt whether this would be an effective solution, pointing out

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130 Pushkov, 1997, 139.
132 Dean, cited in, The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 68.
that while no doubt admission in the European Union (EU) for countries of Central and Eastern Europe is a good idea and should be pursued, it will be a time-consuming and cumbersome process. In any case, the United States is not a member of the EU, and cannot effectively direct a successful "fast-track" membership drive for these countries.\textsuperscript{133} Similarly, it was hoped at one time that the WEU would be used as an effective mechanism. However, it failed to deal decisively with the breakup of Yugoslavia, principally because of disagreements between Germany and France about a coordinated policy.\textsuperscript{134}

D. CONCERNS OVER CHANGES IN THE NATO MISSION & SOLIDARITY

Other European affairs experts have raised the issue of how Russian membership might change the character of NATO.\textsuperscript{135} More specifically, would NATO be changed from a collective defense organization to a collective security organization? "The officially expressed rationales for the NATO enlargement process in the Alliance study — general aims such as promoting stabilization and democratization — offer no grounds for excluding Russia. Extending NATO membership to Russia, however, would mean emptying the Alliance of its collective defense substance."\textsuperscript{136} As Henry Kissinger has incisively stated, "the proposition that NATO enlargement might eventually include Russia confuses all parties. For Russia is in, but not of, Europe; it borders Asia, Central

\textsuperscript{133} Zbigniew Brzezinski, cited in ibid.
\textsuperscript{134} Koslowski, 1996, 361.
\textsuperscript{135} Yost, 1998, 149.
\textsuperscript{136} Ibid. 150-151.
Asia, and the Middle East, and it pursues policies along these borders that are difficult to reconcile with NATO objectives. Russian membership would dilute the Alliance to the point of irrelevance.”

The European Allies generally consider U.S. rhetoric that envisages eventual Russian membership in NATO unwise. From their perspective, three arguments against Russian membership stand out: First, Russian membership could mean abandoning NATO's role as an instrument of collective defense and turning the Alliance into an ineffective Kantian or Wilsonian collective security regime for the Euro-Atlantic region... Second, Russian membership in NATO would upset existing patterns of influence in the Alliance, and might subordinate the Europeans to a U.S.- Russian dyad of power... Third, if NATO retained its role as an instrument of collective defense, Russian membership would make the Alliance responsible for protecting Russia against China and other powers.

1. The Impact of Russian Membership on NATO Solidarity

Not all of America’s European Allies consider openness toward eventual Russian membership in NATO as wise or prudent. In fact this has been a source of division in the Alliance. In 1994 the German Defense Minister, Volker Rühe, declared that “if Russia were to become a member of NATO it would blow NATO apart. It would be like the United Nations of Europe — it wouldn’t work.” William Perry, then U.S. Secretary of Defense, took a different view and stated that Russian inclusion was not ruled out. President Clinton said in March 1997 that his vision of the future included a special

137 Kissinger, cited in ibid.
138 Ibid., 149.
139 Ibid., 149-150.
140 Ibid., 146.
141 Volker Rühe, cited in ibid., 147.
142 Perry, cited in ibid.
relationship with Russia, and did not rule out even Russian membership in a common
security alliance.\textsuperscript{143}

2. The NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council

Owing in part to its wish to make NATO enlargement more palatable to the
Russians, NATO has created a consultative mechanism which — some observers argue
— may create serious problems. Henry Kissinger raised this disturbing possibility in
October 1997. During the Senate hearings on ratification of NATO enlargement,
Kissinger called attention to a proximity or "back-door" pressure problem that could
amount to a de facto veto. He referred to the fact that NATO officials and representatives
to the Alliance from Central European countries and Russia are housed in the same
complex of buildings in Brussels. Thus, the danger is that informal pressures might be
brought to bear on the staff of new NATO members, who might be working on problems
being discussed in a more formal setting, thus giving Russia a de facto veto. In this
context, Kissinger criticized the consultative machinery and philosophical ambiguities of
the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Kissinger said that he is deeply concerned
about the Founding Act that seeks to reconcile Russia to NATO expansion by offering
Russia a role in NATO councils. The most troublesome aspect of the Founding Act is the
consultative machinery which it provides. The Act calls into being, side-by-side with
existing NATO institutions, a new Permanent Joint Council (PJC) composed of the same
ambassadors who form the existing NATO Council, plus a Russian representative. The
Permanent Joint Council will meet at least once a month. Twice a year, the Council is to

\textsuperscript{143} Clinton, cited in ibid.
meet at the foreign ministers level. The first such ministerial meeting was held at the United Nations in September 1997. Regular meetings of the defense ministers are also envisaged, as well as summits.

It has been argued that if the Permanent Council deadlocks, the regular NATO Council remains free to perform its historic functions. That is true in theory. However, critics such as Kissinger have argued that it will not work in practice in all but the most extreme cases. Since, except for the Russian representatives, the membership is identical; each country will assess the grave of step of meeting without a Russian presence in terms of its overall relationship with Moscow. Thus, in practice, NATO Council sessions and Permanent Council sessions will tend to merge.144 Kissinger further explained in testimony before the Senate Committee that the Russian ambassador is located inside the building where the other council members are, and so are their military representatives.145

Further, an ironic outcome of the executive signature process is that the NATO-Russia Founding Act is already in effect. In contrast, the full process of NATO integration by the three new European members of NATO is much more time-consuming. As an executive agreement, the NATO-Russia Founding Act does not have to be ratified by the U.S. Senate, while NATO enlargement, involving a treaty, does. Thus, if the admission of new members is not ratified, Kissinger argued, the Alliance will have inherited the worst

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144 Kissinger, cited in The Debate on NATO Enlargement, 87.
145 Ibid.
possible outcome: the demoralization of Central Europe and a NATO rendered dysfunctional by the Founding Act.\textsuperscript{146} However, according to David Yost,

Kissinger’s anxieties about the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council appear to have been disproportionate so far. The Council has convened for the meetings envisaged in the Founding Act, but little has been accomplished — partly because its procedures are quite bureaucratic, but mainly because the Russians have not been willing to exchange much information or engage in genuine dialogue, relying instead on predictable prepared positions. Thus the Russians have not been able to use the Council to influence significantly, much less interfere with, the North Atlantic Council’s proceedings so far.\textsuperscript{147}

Moreover, according to NATO participants “in May 1998 it was reported that the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council had made little headway because of procedural confusion and Moscow’s persistent distrust of an organization that it long considered its enemy... [Furthermore] at a recent meeting to exchange information on tactical nuclear weapons, the Russian delegation’s presentation was ‘extremely fuzzy’ and failed to provide any illumination on the fate of some 10,000 to 12,000 of its tactical nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{148}

3. **Domestic Impact on Russia of NATO Enlargement**

According to the Russian commentator Alexander Pushkov, “NATO enlargement risks poisoning the relationship between Russia and the West for a long time.”\textsuperscript{149} Furthermore, he wrote, the impact on Russian civilization should not be underestimated. In Pushkov’s view, there will be seven undesirable consequences for Russia’s national

\textsuperscript{146} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{147} Yost, 1998, 145.
mentality, foreign policy and strategic posture. These seven undesirable consequences he listed are as follows.150

- Deepening of the gap between Russian civilization and the West. Enlarging NATO would undermine Russia’s feeling of uniqueness and prompt it to assertiveness to demonstrate its uniqueness.

- The “loose cannon effect.” Russia will become more inward-looking and unpredictable.

- Russia will reassert its historic sphere of influence.

- Ukraine and the Baltic republics are especially sensitive trigger points to Russian sensitivities, and inclusion of these states in NATO would result in a major crisis between Russia and the West.

- NATO Enlargement will reduce Russian cooperation on treaties such as START II as well as the control of chemical weapons.

- NATO enlargement will strengthen anti-Western circles in Russia.

- NATO enlargement will strengthen those who favor a strong military posture in Russia. Strong feelings of distrust towards NATO’s Eastern Border will emerge.

.a. The Russian Identity Crisis and Patriotic Consensus

Some European experts have warned that Russia is experiencing a cultural identity crisis, because “today’s Russian Federation is a state without a concept of its statehood.”151 Gerhard Simon notes that “the formation of an empire extending beyond the Great Russian ethnus and its areas of population, held together by the Tsarist dynasty and the Russian mission civilisatrice — that was the idea of [the] state of the Russian Federation before 1917. The Bolsheviks opted for more far-reaching goals: the order

150 Pushkov, 1997, 139.
151 Ibid., 136-138.
inside the USSR was to become the model for the one world, the socialist world, of the future.”

The identity crisis seems to result from confusion between Russian ideas of what constitutes statehood and their ethnic sense. Furthermore, this identity crisis has implications for the Russian people vis-à-vis the other ethnic groups that make up the Russian Federation. The absence of civil war, despite the existence of severe domestic turmoil in Russia, apparently rests on “patriotic consensus” — that is, on a sense of Russian grandeur.

b. Geopolitics and Grandeur

Even though the Soviet Union has disintegrated, the Russians have not abandoned their ideas of grandeur. Many Russians hold that the loss of Russian status as a superpower is unnatural and temporary. The Russians are in a state of shock and denial about their loss of superpower status. A fallback emotional prop is their longstanding collective consciousness regarding their vast land and the concept of “geopolitics.” Because Russia is a huge land-mass with vast natural resources, Russians still have one source of confidence. In the Russian language, the term geopolitics means that geographical determinants are not subject to historical change and that a country’s location and size guarantee its significance and influence. Therefore, Russia’s claim to a role as a world power is viewed as guaranteed, irrespective of its internal state

151 Ibid.
152 Ibid.
153 Ibid., 248.
154 Ibid., 247.
of affairs or economic and military performance. For example, Russian politicians such as Gennady Zyuganov have stated “that the goal of Russian policy should be the restoration of a single state on an essential new and entirely voluntary basis, whose frontiers should not substantially differ from those of the Soviet Union.”

**c. Russian Exceptionalism**

Secondly, another underlying Russian cultural premise is that Russian civilization is not a European civilization, but a special and unique Russian civilization. This Russian civilization has a civilizing mission in the world, it is argued, and the rest of the world will benefit from the effects of the civilizing mission. This idea was clearly articulated by Sergei Baburin, a leading officer of Russian parliament, in 1995 when he said that “the special Russian civilization’ was pervaded with the awareness of the community of ideas, of social-psychological, economic, political-legal unity of all the various strata of Russian society.” Nevertheless, this uniquely Russian civilization is considered to be international, at least in its intellectual form. It is a magnet, as well as an example to other nations. It is a special “superethnos” into which other ethnic groups can be drawn, with the potential for thus creating a “new historic community of mankind.”

**d. Changing Values**

A third concept that entails a basic change is the attitude toward the role of the individual in society. According to Gerhard Simon, Russian culture has been

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155 Ibid., 248.
156 Ibid.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid., 251.
antipathetic to the individualistic, liberal and rationalistic culture of the West. Collectivism, striving for justice and equality, patience and a willingness to endure suffering, and the priority of intellectual needs over material needs are described as national traits of the Russians. At the same time, according to Simon, concomitant with the disintegration of the Soviet Union (and indeed one of the reasons for it) has been the growing social pressure for universal human rights, the right to free development of the individual’s personality, and, above all, the striving for individual prosperity and a comfortable standard of living.\(^{159}\)

\[ d. \quad \text{Mixed Economy} \]

A fourth feature is the co-existence of private enterprise and government intervention in the economy. Despite disillusionment with capitalism, specifically the disastrous “Mafia capitalism” rampant in the country, the Russians seem to be steering toward a mixed economy.\(^{160}\) At the present time, the Russians do not want a return to communism with a command economy or the restoration of Leninism.\(^{161}\) Nevertheless, there are persistent calls for more government intervention and planning in the economy combined with the existence of partial privatization; these factors seem to point in the future to what is usually referred to as a mixed economy.\(^{162}\)

\[^{159}\text{Ibid., 252.}\]
\[^{160}\text{Ibid., 250.}\]
\[^{161}\text{Ibid., 252.}\]
\[^{162}\text{Ibid.}\]
IV. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR CAPABILITIES, DECLARATORY POLICY, AND STRATEGY

A. INTRODUCTION

At the beginning of the breakup of the Soviet Union in 1991, then Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev optimistically called for "new political thinking."\(^{163}\) This was based on his vision of a Russia integrated into a "new world order,"\(^{164}\) and accordingly set on a path to improved socioeconomic and political conditions similar to those existing in the West. Russian President Boris Yeltsin has held essentially the same goals for Russia — that is — "to democratize her society; to implement reforms and achieve an integration of our economy into the international market economy."\(^{165}\) Unfortunately, instead of a new Russian democracy, the result has been criminalization of the economy, the "collapse of discipline"\(^{166}\) in the economy and in nuclear weapons control, as well as the concomitant development of a privatized, oligarchical, quasi-state governing system which rules in the areas of media, finance, and marketing. Law enforcement in Russia is marred by corruption and mafia-type violence, with many of the


\(^{164}\) Ibid.


functions of the police taken over by private armies, privately owned security forces, and paramilitary groups.\(^{167}\)

In November 1993, Russian military doctrine abandoned the Soviet-era pledge of the no-first-use of nuclear weapons, a shift in position based not on strength but on weakness, especially of the Russian conventional forces. Military reform decrees have been made but actual reform has eluded the reformers.\(^{168}\) Mismanagement has evidently occurred in the areas of strategic and non-strategic arms control as well as in nuclear weapons stewardship.\(^{169}\) These failures have been in the larger context of the Russian failure to build “a coherent and effective decision-making process.”\(^{170}\) The essential infrastructure of state-building and strategic planning has been “marked by improvisation and ad hoc” responses.\(^{171}\)

B. CONVENTIONAL FORCE WEAKNESS AND THE STRATEGY OF INCREASED RELIANCE ON NUCLEAR FORCES

The breakup of the Soviet Union coupled with severe economic chaos and mismanagement has resulted in a great weakening of the Russian military’s conventional force strength. Russian military power has become a function of the social, economic and political chaos in the country. Rapid change, economic problems, socioeconomic


\(^{168}\) Stephen J. Blank, “Russia’s Armed Forces on the Brink of Reform,” *Strategic Studies Institute Monograph*, 16 March 1998, 1.

\(^{169}\) Congress, Senate, Committee on Strategic Forces Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee on Nuclear Policy, Bruce Blair, Testimony during hearings 31 March 1998, Unpaged, Nexis, Online.


\(^{171}\) Ibid.

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pressures, obsolescence, the breakup of the Soviet Union, and various treaties have also combined to reduce the size of the Russian strategic nuclear capabilities.

Because of conventional force weakness, the Russians in November 1993 abandoned the 1982 Soviet pledge of "no first use," and at the present time Russian dependence on nuclear deterrence is their stated first line of defense, even in the case of a conventional attack. 172 In 1996, the war in Chechnya ended in a Russian defeat. This demonstrated the weakness of the Russian conventional military for the entire world to see, with the psychological effect of increasing even further Russian emotional dependence on their nuclear defense. 173

The Russian Security Council in repudiating "no-first-use" revived the concept of "limited nuclear war." It also approved a new military doctrine that has been described as "more destabilizing — and more dangerous — than Soviet Cold War military doctrine." 174

The development of this policy came about when the military supported President Yeltsin in resisting the October 1993 coup attempt. This resulted in his being forced to yield to military demands for a tougher stance against the West. The Russian military

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174 Ibid., 171.
adopted the new policy as a way of making up for the lack of conventional forces through greater reliance on nuclear weapons.  

The policy document approved in November 1993 is entitled Basic Provisions of the Military Doctrine of the Russian Federation. This policy has been described as dangerous, not only because the new doctrine allows Russia to undertake a preemptive nuclear attack if Russia suffers conventional attacks, but also because the list of what the Russians would consider provocation has been lengthened. Therefore, according to General Makhrmut Gareyev, Russia may launch a nuclear first strike to "preempt enemy preparations for such an attack," and further, "might start a nuclear war based on vague strategic warning or 'totally unproved aggressive intentions' attributed by Russia to another state." Consequently, some analysts have suggested, Russia may resort to preemptive nuclear attack based on vague, unverified information, a circumstance which considerably lowers the nuclear threshold. The Russians have stipulated that any use on their part of nuclear weapons would be defensive:

The Russian Federation: will not employ its nuclear weapons against any state party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, dated 1 July 1968, which does not possess nuclear weapons except in the cases of: (a) an armed attack against the Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies by any state which is connected by an alliance agreement with a state that does possess nuclear weapons; (b) joint actions by such a state with a state possessing nuclear weapons in the carrying out or in support of any invasion or armed attack upon the

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176 Pry, 1997, 171.
177 Ibid.
178 Gareyev, quoted in ibid., 172.
179 Ibid.
Russian Federation, its territory, Armed Forces, other troops, or its allies.\textsuperscript{180}

The diplomatic wording of the Basic Provisions states: “The aim of the Russian Federation’s policy in the sphere of nuclear weapons is to eliminate the danger of nuclear war by deterring the launching of aggression against the Russian Federation and its allies.” According to some Russian observers, the document shows “a readiness to lower the nuclear threshold to the maximum extent.”\textsuperscript{181} In the words of Pavel Grachev, in a statement published in 1993, when he was Minister of Defense: “If an adversary has launched an aggression, we have the right to choose and employ those types, forms and ways of military actions that are most effective in a given situation. These may be both offensive and defensive in nature.”\textsuperscript{182}

Subsequently, in 1997 the head of the Russian Security Council, Ivan Rybkin, emphasized to the Russian press that Russia has the right to first use of nuclear weapons if Russia is attacked by conventional weapons, or to “discourage military adventurers bent on exploiting Russia’s difficulties.” Moreover, Rybkin was unequivocal in declaring that Russia would respond with nuclear weapons, if necessary, to “a direct military challenge.”\textsuperscript{183}

\textsuperscript{180} Ibid., 170-171.  
\textsuperscript{181} Sergey Rogov, cited in ibid., 172.  
Criticisms of the Russian first use doctrine include the argument that this policy is transparently a case of posturing, i.e., "a political message to the West, lacking any material substance or logical framework."\(^{184}\) Confusion in the strategic thinking behind these changes stems from not only the "nature of the deterrent relationship between East and West,"\(^{185}\) but also from the entire rationale behind the doctrine. It has been claimed that President Yeltsin acceded to the military doctrine in 1993 as a tradeoff in exchange for Defense Ministry support in his struggles with the Russian parliament, and that the military doctrine does not represent a plan devised by the Russian Security Council.\(^{186}\)

The validity of the doctrine as well as its practical value has been called into question.\(^{187}\) Alexei Arbatov has argued that the first use of nuclear weapons would be nonsensical and in fact suicidal for Russia, because Russia "would not be able to achieve any military advantage by initiating nuclear warfare, either to dominate in escalation or inflict larger damage than incurred by itself. Moreover, in a crisis situation, Russia's first use posture might provoke a preemptive strike by NATO, which would be quite effective due to its conventional, tactical and strategic nuclear counterforce superiority.

\(^{184}\) Ibid.
\(^{185}\) Roy Allison, 1997, 183
\(^{186}\) Ibid., 179.
\(^{187}\) In Alexei Arbatov's view, the doctrine of relying on nuclear weapons to compensate for conventional force weakness makes no sense in Russia's situation, because Russia is unlikely to encounter an enemy that meets the criteria of the two basic assumptions underlying the usefulness of the doctrine. These two assumptions are (1) "an opponent or opponents superior in conventional capabilities and capable of threatening one's own interests by implementing successful conventional offensive operations," and (2) "nuclear force employment should be credible as a threat — that is, the subject's interests must be really vital to justify nuclear warfare, and this act should not be purely suicidal for the initiating party. Hence, the initiator should possess clear advantages in nuclear capabilities in order to achieve military objectives, dominate escalation and prevent the opponent's nuclear counteractions, which may deny these gains or inflict overwhelming damage on one's own state." Arbatov, 1997, 3-7.
Contemplating this possibility, Russia might decide to launch its weapons first, with catastrophic consequences for itself as well as for others."¹⁸⁸ The lack of a rational plan for tactical nuclear weapons management and use is a serious aspect of the chaotic Russian military situation. However, this is apparently one of the longstanding "peculiarities of Soviet/Russian strategic nuclear thinking."¹⁸⁹ For example, "declaratory doctrine lives quite independently from practical strategy and forces. And as before, several principal strike plans are operational without much attention to their validity at the level of 'grand strategy' or national survival."¹⁹⁰ Alexei Arbatov has pointed out other features of Russian strategic thinking regarding nuclear weapons:

In particular, nuclear weapons employment strategy (i.e., first/second strike counterforce/countervalue targeting, retaliation/damage limitation missions etc.) is not seen as closely related to force levels, structure, posture and systems characteristics. Force employment plans are not perceived as affecting the probability of war, encouraging or provoking first nuclear strike/use from one or the other opponent. Any declaration on the need to compensate Russian conventional weakness with nuclear strength is predominantly a general political argument, not a reflection of a consistent strategic analysis, assessment of contingencies or planning of defense policy options.¹⁹¹

According to Arbatov, the ongoing processes in Russian strategic posture are affected by "(1) the disintegration of the Soviet Union and its nuclear arms development/production complex; (2) the deep economic and financial crisis in Russia, as a result of the failed 'reforms' of 1992-1996; and (3) disarray in Moscow’s decision-

¹⁸⁸ Ibid., 4-5.
¹⁸⁹ Ibid., 7.
¹⁹⁰ Ibid.
¹⁹¹ Ibid.
making system on strategic programs and arms control talks, which has led to confused priorities in defense policy and a wide divergence between force planning, budgeting and arms control agreements. 

In early August 1998, the Russians issued “The Foundations (Concept) of the State Policy on Military Development for the Period Until 2005,” a document which is said to be a precursor to an updated version of “The Military Doctrine of Russia.” This updated version has not yet appeared, but is reportedly due some time in the autumn of 1998, and will replace the November 1993 military doctrine. Reports from Andrei Kokoshin, then Secretary of the Security Council, announced that the first two features of the “Foundations” are that it holds that “Russia’s nuclear capabilities reduce the risk of general war, and [it] identifies local wars as the most immediate threat to Russian security.” In other words, “the main dangers to Russia’s security [are] identified by the document as small-scale conflicts along the country’s perimeter.” The new defense concept contains the two previous basic assumptions: namely, that local wars could escalate into global ones, and that Russia may have to use nuclear weapons first in its defense, assumptions which do not represent any basic departure from the premise of the November 1993 doctrine.

192 Ibid., 8.
194 Ibid.
Reports of incidents of Russia's "overdeveloped threat sensitivity" include those arising from domestic turbulence that could easily disturb equilibrium in Russia's military stance. According to Peter Pry, "The desperation and paranoia of the Russian General Staff will only deepen as Russia continues to weaken militarily and internally, perhaps crumbling toward anarchy and civil war. The tempo of crisis in Russia and the former Soviet Union — and the threat to global security — seem to be increasing, as reflected by the occurrence in the 1990s of nuclear 'close calls.'" The threat of a nuclear war scare arising out of domestic turmoil in a battle for succession to President Yeltsin has been moderated with the rise of Yevgeny Primakov to the position of prime minister; thus he is the most likely successor to President Yeltsin. However, a war scare might arise out of a coup attempt. In the case of the Norwegian rocket launched on 25 January 1995, it was apparently a failure of the communications within the Russian bureaucracy that resulted in a dangerous misperception of nuclear attack. In other words, normally Norway would inform the Russian government of any planned rocket tests by

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197 Dr. Peter Vincent Pry is a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and currently serves as a Professional Staff Member to the National Security Committee of the U.S. House of Representatives. The portions of his 1997 manuscript entitled "War Scare" used in this thesis are cited with his permission. His book is not yet available for general purchase. It was originally contracted for publishing by Turner Books, which in 1997 had distributed a few hundred galley copies for reviewing purposes. However, Turner Books went out of business after the Turner/Time Warner merger, and unfortunately, dropped its entire pending book publication list. Peter Pry's manuscript "War Scare" (cited in this thesis) is soon to be published by Praeger, part of the Greenwood Publishing Group, and will be available for general purchase in the fall of 1999.

way of an official letter sent by mail. However, this time the letter got lost in the Russian bureaucracy.\textsuperscript{199}

Russia’s “overdeveloped threat sensitivity”\textsuperscript{200} has led some observers to point out that the United States and NATO should be more aware of the fact that Western “security policies, military operations and exercises” tend to unsettle the Russian military with possibly dangerous consequences.\textsuperscript{201} As Bruce Blair has observed, the Russian defense establishment is “more suspicious of the West than most observers imagine.”\textsuperscript{202} According to Blair, the Russian military has a susceptibility to “fear and panic”\textsuperscript{203} which could affect its judgment in the decision-making process. This circumstance has implications for an accidental or mistaken launch of nuclear weapons.

There are reports that the Russians are still very sensitive to NATO military exercises, including those such as the 1983 NATO theater nuclear exercise ABLE ARCHER-83 that resulted in a Russian nuclear alert. Another war scare occurred in early 1996 when NATO exercises in Norway, called BATTLE GRIFFIN-96, led to Russian uneasiness and to Russia’s military forces being put on alert.\textsuperscript{204} Russian nuclear alerts are increasing in frequency, with “war scares” occurring since 1991 approximately every eighteen months to two years.\textsuperscript{205} Most recently Russia has threatened to stop cooperating

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\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{200} Pry, 1997, 169.
\item \textsuperscript{202} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{203} Ibid.
\item \textsuperscript{204} Pry, 1997, 238.
\item \textsuperscript{205} Ibid., 233.
\end{itemize}
with NATO. In October 1998, Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov told Russia’s Federation Council that he had told the Western Allies that, in the event of NATO air strikes against Serbia, he would “sharply change our attitude to NATO and reconsider our orientation.” Primakov sees the Balkans as a Russian area of influence, and in order to keep Belgrade from being bombed by NATO, he has threatened to end cooperation with NATO.207

C. RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL STANCE AND NUCLEAR WEAPONS

The Russian elites continue to suspect that the West has motives focusing on Russia’s encirclement, and that the West would like to take advantage of the country’s current weakness. For example, some Russians fear that NATO peacekeeping efforts in Bosnia are actually part of a hidden agenda to “permanently introduce a large Western military presence that could use the region as a staging base to threaten Russia.” Similarly, in February 1991, during the Gulf War, the Russians “assumed the United States was on the verge of launching a nuclear first strike on Iraq.”209 Significantly, “Russian press reports speculated that the impending U.S. strike against Iraq was part of a master plan to subvert Russian interests and dominate the world.”210 These responses reflect the longstanding Russian tendency to see the country as surrounded, and to believe

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208 Pry, 1997, 177.
209 Ibid., 243.
210 Ibid.
that the West wishes to “invade, surround, or encourage the breakup of Russia.”211 It is a feature of Russian military thinking that local wars on Russia’s borders could escalate into global nuclear war. “The mechanism, as implied in Russian writings, that escalates a local conflict into a nuclear war appears to be intervention of the United States or of U.S. allies into conflicts on Russia’s periphery. From such a vantage point, the West could then invade, surround, or encourage the breakup of Russia. Because of the superiority of Western conventional forces and resources, Russian military efforts to prevent these developments would mean recourse to nuclear weapons.”212

With the ascendancy of Yevgeny Primakov to the position of prime minister in September 1998, it is likely that the attitude of the Russian government toward NATO and the United States will become both overtly and covertly more difficult, with a “bitter revival of anti-American hostility.”213 Primakov is a leader whose “aim in life is to contain and thus defeat American leadership.”214 Primakov has repeatedly taken the position that Russia is a “wounded great power in an open-ended struggle with the West.”215 Primakov’s background is with the international section of the former KGB, an organization now called the Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR). Primakov served as Russia’s foreign minister from January 1996 through August 1998. Primakov as foreign minister was able to work together with NATO to formulate the NATO-Russia Founding

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211 Ibid., 177.
212 Ibid.
Act, and he was the principal Russian official with whom NATO dealt in setting up NATO-Russia cooperation with IFOR and SFOR in Yugoslavia. He is proficient in Arabic and has provided diplomatic support for rogue state regimes in the Middle East and North Africa.\textsuperscript{216} As Russian foreign minister Primakov was a strong supporter of Russia’s geopolitical interests. During Primakov’s time as Russian foreign minister, one goal of the Yeltsin government was stated to be “satisfying a significant part of the population who believe Moscow must resume its duties as a global superpower, at least in the military sense, even if this means going against what is preferred by the West.”\textsuperscript{217} Furthermore, “Signals related to Moscow’s ties with states of the [former] Soviet empire and the eastward expansion of NATO are inter-linked. The ultimate goal is to prevent a NATO presence on the physical boundaries of Russia. As such, the emphasis is to stop the expansion of NATO or to slow it down considerably. In the worst scenario, Moscow would seek a ‘weak expansion,’ not involving military or strategic arrangements between former Soviet bloc states and NATO. To accomplish its objectives, Moscow would resort to threats if necessary.”\textsuperscript{218}


\textsuperscript{216} Michael J. Waller, “Career KGB man becomes Russian Premier; Primakov was architect of Soviet support support for terrorism,” \textit{Russian Reform Monitor}, 14 September 1998, 1.
\textsuperscript{218} Ibid.
Countering the Main External Threats to Russian Federation National Security.  

According to the author of the INOBIS report, Anton Surikov:

Finally, in case of a total break in relations with the United States, Russia has such convincing arguments for it as the nuclear-missile potential and the threat of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction around the world, which with skillful tactics can play the role of a kind of trading card. And in case Russia is persistently driven into a corner, then it will be possible to undertake to sell military nuclear and missile technologies to such countries as Iran and Iraq, and to Algeria after Islamic forces arrive in power there. Moreover, Russia’s direct military alliance with some of the countries mentioned also should not be excluded, above all with Iran, within the framework of which a Russian troop contingent and tactical nuclear weapons could be stationed on the shores of the Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz.

According to Peter Pry, “Russian press reports claim the INOBIS plan was tentively approved by the Defense Ministry. INOBIS analyst Anton Surikov, in an April 1997 article, claims the expansion of NATO to the Baltic States would constitute a provocation as dangerous as the 1962 Cuban missile confrontation.”

In 1997 and again in 1998, Pry met with “a high-ranking Russian official.” According to Pry, this official “warned me that NATO enlargement could trigger a nuclear war. The Russian official claimed knowledge of military contingency plans to deal with certain scenarios of NATO expansion.” Significantly, the high-ranking Russian official told Pry that

NATO enlargement to include Poland, the Czech Republic, Hungary, Romania, Slovenia, and Slovakia would be reluctantly accepted by Russia,

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220 Ibid.
221 Pry, 1997, 246
222 Ibid., 247.
and not trigger a military response, providing tactical nuclear weapons or advanced conventional weapons and strike platforms are not forward deployed to these states. If NATO moves tactical nuclear weapons or advanced conventional into these states, according to the Russian official, Russia would respond militarily to these countermeasures — deploying Russian tactical nuclear weapons, returning Russian missile submarines to Cuba, moving Russian nuclear weapons into North Korea to threaten U.S. troops and allies, or basing Russian nuclear weapons in Iran to threaten the Strait of Hormuz and the global oil supply, for example. Or, the official said, Russia might ‘initiate a preventive nuclear war.’

Ominously for NATO, Russian defense officials announced in Moscow in early October 1998 that “Russia is prepared to sell several up-to-date air-defense systems, including the SAM-300 (SA-10 ‘Grumble’) system to Belgrade.” Russian Defense Minister Igor Sergeyev was in Belgrade during the first week of October 1998 to provide support and advice to the Serbian military. Of great concern is the possible sale to Serbia of the S-300 PMU2 missile which contains an advanced design called a “transverse guidance engine, which reduces the chances of missing the target when the missile begins to home in.” Such support for the Serbs is likely to have a deleterious effect on continued NATO-Russia cooperation in the former Yugoslavia.

D. RUSSIAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS PRODUCTION AND MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT

According to French sources, the Russian military currently has a stockpile of between 10,000 and 30,000 tactical nuclear weapons. On 6 October 1998, Yuri

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223 Ibid., 248.
225 Ibid.
Maslyukov, the Deputy Prime Minister, stated that the nuclear weapons stockpile has become obsolete, and he urged parliamentary support for President Boris Yeltsin’s recommendation for building the new Topol missiles.\textsuperscript{227} The decision after a July 1998 military review was that Russia’s land-based missile force can afford only one new type of missile, the Topol (SS-27). However, the missiles are unlikely to be deployed this year because testing led to an explosion on the launch pad on 23 October 1998.\textsuperscript{228} President Yeltsin has called for several new Yuri Dolgoruky nuclear submarines to be equipped with nuclear missiles; however, the failure of the missiles to perform properly during testing has led to a shut down of their construction.\textsuperscript{229} Even in the area of design in nuclear weapons, there has been a breakdown in the system, including the elite Arzamas-16 (Sarov) laboratory.\textsuperscript{230}

Nevertheless, there is evidence that Russia continues to spend money designing, manufacturing and marketing weapons, in particular the “latest versions of surface-to-air missiles designed for use with its S-300PMU Favorit air defense system.”\textsuperscript{231} Two new missile systems, the S-300PMU-2 and S-300PMU-3, were displayed at a weapons show in Greece in October 1998.\textsuperscript{232} Russia is surprisingly strong in revolutionary new technologies and “maintains islands of excellence. Deep-diving submarines like the


\textsuperscript{230} Ibid.

modified alpha class, beam weapons, and extremely high and fast-flying aircraft” are areas of Russian strength. In the nuclear area, Russia has helped Iran to build a nuclear power plant at Bushehr, located approximately 470 miles south of Tehran.

In addition, work at the huge underground bunker at Yamentau Mountain in the Beloretsk area of the Southern Urals continues. See map of the Russian Federation in the Appendix. This mega-project began in the 1970s when President Leonid Brezhnev was heading the USSR. The giant endeavor is reportedly an underground shelter for Russia’s government in the event of a nuclear attack. It has also been described “as a mine, an underground food warehouse, an ore-processing complex and a nuclear waste dump.” Furthermore, it has also been suspected to be the site of the so-called “Dead Hand” — that is, an “automatic system for delivering a retaliatory strike when the top political leadership and the General Staff are already destroyed or deprived of communications equipment as a result of an enemy attack.”

Other deep underground bunkers are being built as well, to enable Russian leaders to flee from Moscow and, more generally, to escape from nuclear attacks. Extensive tunnels are said to be under construction, as well as a secret underground railway line. There is a bunker nearly complete forty-six miles south of Moscow at Voronovo, and

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232 Ibid.
233 Phil Reeves, and Christopher Bellamy, “Nuclear Secrets Top of Wests Snooping List; Russia Spy Row,” Independent, 8 May 1996, 10.
235 Ibid.
another at Sharapovo, thirty-four miles away from Moscow. Furthermore, four additional complexes of bunkers are built inside the city of Moscow.\textsuperscript{237}

E. STEWARDSHIP OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS

Conventional force weakness and reliance on nuclear weapons are likely to continue. Russia cannot hope to address its conventional force shortcomings adequately at any time in the near future because of severe economic constraints.\textsuperscript{238} Despite pronouncements by Russian military planners, Russia’s readiness and military professional standards have continued to deteriorate from that of a first rate power to a third, fourth or fifth rate power.\textsuperscript{239} Worse still, they could become “a major threat to Russia’s own internal security and stability.”\textsuperscript{240} There are reports that the “chains of command are broken and split into rival factions. There is no rule of law, [no] systematic or regularized procedure for making and implementing policy decisions, nor any accountability to the Duma or the Judiciary.”\textsuperscript{241}

The Russian military is angry and tensions are at a high level. On 14 September 1998, retired General Alexander Lebed, now the governor of Krasnoyarsk, warned that the situation in Russia’s military is so serious that he fears there could be a military coup;

\textsuperscript{239} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{240} Ibid., 11.
in his view, the armed forces are at a "breaking point."\textsuperscript{242} Reportedly some units are facing the prospect of only two meals a day; and others have no access to food for the coming winter, having already eaten eighty percent of the food kept on hand for war supplies. Some military units have been advised to fish, hunt and gather wild foods in order to survive.\textsuperscript{243}

Furthermore, the Russian army is reportedly desperate for conscript personnel. According to Defense Ministry officials, draft dodging is at the rate of about 30,000 men per year. This is so serious a problem that drastic measures have included resorting to military press-ganging in order to get the recruits.\textsuperscript{244} Military service in Russia is a humiliating, degrading and dangerous experience, with serious morale deterioration and high rates of suicide and murder among recruits.

Incidents of violence and killing among Russian soldiers guarding sensitive nuclear facilities are on the rise.\textsuperscript{245} In fact, there have been so many incidents that President Boris Yeltsin on 21 October 1998, ordered an inspection of security procedures. Specifically, one incident was a shooting spree by an army sergeant at Mayak, part of the Beliabinsk nuclear complex, on 20 September 1998. Another incident occurred on 5 September 1998, with hostage-taking, shooting, and a hijacking attempt at Novaya Zemlya, Russia's leading nuclear testing facility. A third incident happened on 11


\textsuperscript{243} Ibid.


September 1998, when a sailor went berserk aboard an Akula-class nuclear-attack submarine.\textsuperscript{246}

There are conflicting reports about the safety of Russian stewardship of nuclear weapons. Officially, the government declares that security is good.\textsuperscript{247} In Russia, both military and civilian units participate in the handling of nuclear weapons. In the Russian military, it is the Twelfth Main Directorate, a highly professional branch of the Defense Ministry, which is charged with the control and safe handling of nuclear weapons. There has been some consolidation, coordination, and streamlining of the command structure associated with security of nuclear weapons. On 1 April 1998, General Valynkin, commander of the Twelfth Main Directorate on the general staff, also took over responsibility for all Russian naval nuclear operations. On 1 May 1998, he took over responsibility for all Russian air force nuclear weapons. It is projected that before the end of 1998, General Valynkin will also take control of all the Strategic Rocket Force nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{248}

Despite these efforts at the practical operational level, Russian hypersensitivity and breakdowns in the Russian infrastructure have meant some close brushes with nuclear catastrophe. For example, the Black Brant II incident in Norway in January 1995 resulted in a “near miss” nuclear launch by the Russians. The Russian Navy had for several months prior to the launching of the Norwegian missile perceived an increased

\textsuperscript{248} Ibid.
threat from "allegedly increased U.S. submarine patrols in the Norwegian and Barents seas, even penetrating Russian territorial waters." This was the very area from which the Russian General Staff believed any possible U.S. nuclear surprise attack would probably come from. Through a series of errors, including poor communications within the Russian bureaucracy, the Russians who needed to be informed did not get the letter the Norwegians sent them concerning the launch. The launch was detected by Russian radar staff and interpreted as a genuine nuclear threat. The Russian high command was notified that a nuclear attack was in progress. Although the case was eventually resolved, it has been described as an extremely dangerous incident, possibly the most dangerous incident of the atomic age.

Over the past six years, with poor funding and chaotic management, supervision of the control and management of Russia’s nuclear weapons has been seen by the United States as a serious security problem. American concerns over proliferation and risk of theft or misuse of nuclear weapons in Russia and other former Soviet republics led to the creation of the American Department of Defense Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) program. The CTR program, also known as the “Nunn-Lugar” program, began in 1992 and provides funds to assist the Russians and others with compliance with the START I treaty commitments. The program has focused on the safe dismantling and removal of nuclear weapons in efforts to reduce the threat of diversion or theft, and it has been

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249 Pry, 1997, 189.
250 Ibid.
251 Ibid., 197.
252 Ibid.
successful. The U.S. House of Representatives on 24 September 1998 approved a sharp increase in funding for this program in fiscal year 1999, including the destruction of intercontinental missiles, nuclear submarines and long-range bombers, as well as secure storage of radioactive materials.\(^{253}\)

Despite the successes of the Cooperative Threat Reduction program, some reports indicate that a "progressive deterioration of Russian early warning and control represents a more serious threat than either of our governments is willing to acknowledge."\(^{254}\) This deterioration includes bomb-design laboratories, missile silos, submarines, and early-warning systems that are affected by the economic situation.

The situation of "disorder and despair among the guardians of its nuclear forces"\(^{255}\) has meant that basic day-to-day supplies are lacking for highly trained workers, and that their families are without basic necessities such as food or money for school supplies.\(^{256}\) The security of Russian nuclear facilities of all sorts is gravely impaired.\(^{257}\) Russia's early-warning system is increasingly ineffective because many of the Soviet-era radar and satellite tracking sites are either in countries on Russia's periphery or are in very remote areas of Russia where poorly-paid officers and other personnel lack basic


\(^{256}\) Ibid.

necessities. Without adequate funding, Russian surveillance and early warning sites are developing capability deficits which will increase Russian feelings of insecurity.\footnote{David Hoffman, "Shattered Shield: Doctrine of Nuclear Forces. Doctrines of the Cold War Refuse to Die," \textit{Washington Post}, 15 March 1998.} \footnote{Ibid.}
V. RUSSIA AND NATO – RUSSIAN COOPERATION

The Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation was signed on 27 May 1997, an arrangement aimed at providing Russia with firm security guarantees. Specifically, the Founding Act was created as a consequence of the need to address the distrust and sense of betrayal felt by Russia toward NATO and NATO expansion.\textsuperscript{260}

Ever since NATO began considering expansion, the Russians have opposed it. In December 1994 President Yeltsin delivered a “Cold Peace” speech at the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) summit which expressed Russian fears about a changed balance of power. The Yeltsin government claimed that “NATO was designed for the military and political containment of the USSR, and therefore expanding an unreconstructed Alliance must be aimed at weakening Moscow and giving the former a large measure of control over Russia’s foreign and defense policy.”\textsuperscript{261} The Russians suggested instead that “NATO should transform itself into a crisis management and peacekeeping organization with a mandate from the UN Security Council and the OSCE.”\textsuperscript{262}

\textsuperscript{262} Ibid.
The sense that they have been the victims of treachery and bad faith has developed as a result of what the Russians feel has been an abrogation of the terms of a gentlemen's agreement between the Russians and the West that NATO would not expand. Although not actually written down in a formal agreement, a number of Russians contend that an understanding had been arrived at between Russia and the West that if the Russians agreed to the reunification of Germany, NATO would not expand to the east.

Some authors assert that such an assurance was actually given, while others have offered grounds to question this view. According to Stanley Kober, discussions in 1990 and 1991 may well have ended in promises that were "well-meant and well-intentioned" by the Bush administration.²⁶³ In David Yost's account of these events, "In September 1993, Russian president Boris Yeltsin noted that the September 1990 treaty on German reunification includes 'stipulations banning the deployment of foreign troops in the eastern federal Länder of the Federal Republic of Germany,' and argued that 'The spirit of these stipulations rules out any possibility of a NATO expansion eastwards.' Russians usually cite Mikhail Gorbachev as their authority in claiming that Moscow made an unwritten 'gentlemen’s agreement' with the United States in February 1990 that NATO would not enlarge beyond the admission of the territory of the former East Germany into the united Germany."²⁶⁴ Although many Russians feel betrayed, the fact is that the Americans and their NATO allies did not in 1990-91 have any intention of expanding the

²⁶⁴ Yost, 1998, 133-134.
Alliance. The Clinton administration, which came into office in January 1993, did not at first plan to expand NATO.

Some scholars see parallels between the betrayal Russia feels in the 1990s and the betrayal Russia felt in World War I in a comparable Balkan context. Observers have extrapolated from this sense of betrayal the prediction that in the current setting, Russia will again bide its time as it did after World War I, and at some time in the future express its bitterness and anger when it regains its strength. The parallel is not exact, with one difference being that this time the Russians have been offered participation in the NATO-centered European security architecture as well as continuing participation in comprehensive institutions such as the United Nations and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe. Another difference is that Russia is now economically and socially prostrate in ways it was not after World War I. Nevertheless, at some point in the future, the Russian situation could become unmanageable and NATO is wise to maintain its collective defense posture while pursuing opportunities for cooperation and dialogue with Russia.

The difficulties associated with assimilating Russia as a true partner of NATO reside partly in the fact that NATO at the present time is a collective defense organization that is being employed on a selective basis to conduct operations in support of collective security. NATO was originally created as a collective defense organization against possible Soviet aggression. It has now become an organization that is evolving into a

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266 Ibid.
mechanism for conducting collective security operations that could include Russian participation, two potentially contradictory basic motivations that mean that NATO is now "actually a confusing hybrid that ignores the fundamental differences between a collective security organization and a traditional military alliance."  

According to Charles Barry, "At present, Russia verbally opposes enlargement in spite of its foregone outcome. Key factors in Russian external affairs are its intent to maintain as large a Great Power role as possible, and to extract from the west the maximum assistance in turning around Russia's internal crisis (although Russia wants aid on its own terms to the extent it can make such demands)."  

Russian bitterness and anger are no doubt going to continue, despite the fact that the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act may seem like a significant step in changing Russian attitudes toward NATO. However, it is possible that President Boris Yeltsin signed the NATO-Russia Founding Act because of an opinion that Russia for some time has been too weakened and powerless to do otherwise. Because of Russia's devastating loss of geopolitical status, Ted Carpenter has argued, agreeing to the document was simply a case of the Russians making the best of a difficult situation.  

Some observers argue that Russia is being left out of the decision-making process in NATO's highest circles, except for the interactions in the NATO-Russia Permanent  

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Joint Council and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council. Russia is aware of this, and wants to cooperate on the "operational-tactical and strategic levels of interaction."**270** Furthermore, the Russians complain that, while they are "ready to discuss with the United States serious aspects of our future strategic partnership,"**271** the Americans will not discuss these issues — a complaint that surprises the United States, which is cultivating dialogue and constructive cooperation with Russia.

To facilitate communication and consultation with Russia on matters relating to security, NATO and Russia created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. Specifically, the NATO-Russia Founding Act states with regard to the practical carrying out of the provisions:

NATO and Russia, in order to develop cooperation between their military establishments, will expand political-military consultations and cooperation through the Permanent Joint Council with an enhanced dialogue between the senior military authorities of NATO and its member States and of Russia. They will implement a program of significantly expanded military activities and practical cooperation between NATO and Russia at all levels. Consistent with the tenets of the Permanent Joint Council, this enhanced military-to-military dialogue will be built upon the principle that neither party views the other as a threat nor seeks to disadvantage the other's security. This enhanced military-to-military dialogue will include regularly scheduled reciprocal briefings on NATO and Russian military doctrine, strategy and resultant force posture and will include the broad possibilities for joint exercises and training.**272**

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**271** Ibid.

**272** Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 7.
However, actual participation has been limited because, while Russia has played a practical role in the peacekeeping efforts of IFOR and SFOR in Bosnia, it chafes at the fact that it has been left out of NATO’s top-level strategic decision-making process — the North Atlantic Council. Russian participation in the NATO-led collective security operation in the Balkans has to date been successful. Early reports about the efficacy of these arrangements showed, predictably, that progress had been patchy, at the beginning. With such a devastating change in its status, Russia’s progress on the road to cooperation has been predictably bumpy and confusion reigns. To cite an instance, as of late May 1998 the Russians had promised to make progress some time during 1998 in allowing NATO to set up a liaison office in the Defense Ministry in Moscow. However, no progress so far has been noted, although at “NATO military headquarters outside of Brussels, the Russian military recently set up a small Spartan office to help plan joint military exercises.” Additionally, Russia has not been “able to participate in the alliance’s programs for sharing military technology because Moscow has not yet concluded an agreement on how to handle sensitive NATO documents.”

The Russians reportedly do not always seem to know what to make of the new relationship with NATO, and have in some ways misused it by reverting to old Soviet-era behavior patterns. For example, “Russian diplomats have sought to use the new council to extract commitments they were unable to negotiate during the talks over the Founding

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274 Ibid.
Act. Russian diplomats have pressed for detailed information about the bases and storage sites NATO plans to use on the territory of its new members.²⁷⁵

In spite of the mistrust on both sides, efforts to cooperate continue and positive statements are issued from time to time. Almost exactly a year after the signing of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, a meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was held at the ministerial level in Luxembourg, on 28 May 1998, after which a statement was issued which emphasized that NATO and Russia will continue working together to contribute to common and comprehensive security in the Euro-Atlantic area based on allegiance to shared values, commitments and norms of behavior in the interests of all states. The statement "welcomed the establishment of Russia’s mission to NATO and the appointment of the Senior Russian Military Representative in its framework."²⁷⁶ Moreover, the Ministers stressed the need to move ahead with Russia’s Individual Partnership Program under Partnership for Peace, as agreed in the Permanent Joint Council Work Program for 1998.

Positive efforts notwithstanding, NATO’s cautious policy toward Russia is wise. For example, one of the most significant statements in the NATO-Russia Founding Act is that “NATO and Russia do not consider each other as adversaries."²⁷⁷ However, the soothing phrases in this document should not simply be taken at face value.

²⁷² Ibid.
²⁷⁷ Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 7.
During U.S. House of Representatives National Security Committee hearings held on 4 August 1998, the committee heard testimony from Colonel Stanislav Lunev, the highest-ranking GRU officer ever to defect to the West. "Since [his defection in] 1992 Lunev has served as a consultant on intelligence matters for the FBI and the CIA."278

According to Representative Curt Weldon, "The most significant part of Colonel Lunev's testimony, in my opinion, is his allegation that the Russian military and intelligence services still regard the United States as the enemy...[and assume] that ultimately the U.S. will be Russia's long-term enemy — [and that their leadership] considers a war with the U.S. as likely or even inevitable, and are actively planning for a third World War. According to Colonel Lunev, so seriously does the Russian military regard the possibility of war with the United States that nuclear suitcase bombs may already be pre-positioned somewhere in the vicinity of Washington or New York."279 Furthermore, as Weldon points out, "Colonel Lunev's description of the dire threat perceptions of the Russian military and the GRU contrast sharply with the [Clinton] administration's comforting assurances that the U.S. and Russia are now strategic partners and no longer regard each other as threats."280

279 Ibid.
280 Ibid.
A. NATO-RUSSIA COOPERATION IN PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS

On the more practical side, the hopes of NATO for future cooperation with Russia rest especially on the hope that generational change will mean changes of attitude conducive to the cooperation agenda. Furthermore, it is hoped that the "simple day-to-day experience of working together will help, too." The most notable example of NATO-Russia cooperation has been peacekeeping in Bosnia.

The principal venue for practical Russia-NATO cooperation on the day-to-day working level has been the Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the IFOR/SFOR peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia. In the spring of 1997, the enhanced Partnership for Peace (PfP) and the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) were set up as a venue to facilitate cooperation and to increase transparency.

Created originally in late January 1994 as an outreach program (or for some states, an alternative path to NATO) that could embed Russia in an "institutional web," the Partnership for Peace (PfP) was intended to serve as an institutional vehicle to produce stability by integrating Russia into cooperation with Western economic and security institutions.

Although the PfP was originally viewed with skepticism by critics who thought it was a "stalling tactic" to avoid offending countries refused first tranche admission to

NATO, PfP has in fact been reported to be very successful.\textsuperscript{285} However, because of its devastating loss of geopolitical status, integrating Russia into active participation has been a special problem, and Russia hesitated about signing up until 22 June 1994, when Russia did sign the Partnership Framework Document.\textsuperscript{286} In fact, even though Russia now has functioning military units in both Bosnia and Albania, “the post-Cold War degradation of Russia’s armed forces has also been detrimental to efforts to interact with the U.S. military establishment and to implement the Partnership for Peace program with NATO.”\textsuperscript{287}

In terms of “equipment and combat readiness,” the Russian military continues to deteriorate. The exception is the formation of 1,400 soldiers the Russians have deployed to Bosnia as peacekeepers — a unit for which NATO is paying most of the costs.\textsuperscript{288}

1. Practical Considerations

To have a practical facilitating arm for consultation and communication, an organizational structure had to be set up to coordinate the activities of the PfP. This structure is the Partnership Coordination Cell (PCC) established in June 1994. This was so successful that “in less than two years, the PCC has become the largest multinational military headquarters in NATO — bringing together 36 nationalities under one roof.”\textsuperscript{289}

\textsuperscript{285} Ibid., 2.
\textsuperscript{286} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{288} Harry Levins, “In Bosnia Anyhow, Russia’s Troops Are Impressive,” \textit{St. Louis Post-Dispatch}, 12 July 1998, B5.
\textsuperscript{289} Penner, 1996, 2.
At present, the PCC command group has a Danish general directing a permanent staff element of NATO officers, plus liaison officers from twenty-one partner states. The PCC improves consultation, communication, and coordination in the pursuit of common security objectives. Education, training and workshops for partners and members have been held since 1994. The “development of the PCC structure facilitated the coordination and participation of Partner contributions to NATO’s IFOR.”

B. IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR)

The crisis in the former Yugoslavia led NATO to assume peacekeeping responsibilities. With the United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) peacekeeping efforts foundering because of its failures in preventing “atrocities, stopping the fighting, and bringing about a settlement,” NATO decided to act to enforce the UN-mandated no-fly zone. On 28 February 1994, “NATO shot down four Bosnian Serb aircraft. This was significant in NATO’s history as the Alliance’s first use of deadly force.”

Eventually, this led to the opportunity for Russian participation in a NATO-led peacekeeping operation. The institutional framework was the Implementation Force (IFOR) for the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina (commonly called the Dayton Accords) established in late 1995, a NATO-led peacekeeping effort.

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290 Ibid., 3.
293 Ibid., 195.
Although Russia did not at first want its troops to be under NATO command, a compromise was worked out. The military control of a Russian brigade, from the 98th Guards Airborne Division, operating in an American division would be commanded by a Russian general who would “in turn report to U.S. General George Joulwan, NATO’s top commander.”

In July 1998, the reports of success were very favorable. The Russians have proven especially useful in helping NATO to deal with the Serbian parties to the conflict. Major Charles J. McLaughlin, U.S. Army, has praised the professionalism and success of the combined NATO-Russia efforts.

In order to monitor compliance with “the General Agreement for Peace in Bosnian and Herzegovina” (the Dayton Accords), Operation Joint Endeavor was set up by IFOR. The two main missions of Operation Joint Endeavor were to (1) maintain cessation of hostilities and to (2) prevent episodes of interference with the civilian populace. Both of these missions were successful, and were combined with infrastructure repairs and mineclearing. The efficient exchange of information was facilitated by the creation of parallel administrative units called Joint Military Commissions. About a year after the Implementation Force was operational, the implementation of at least some elements of

the Dayton Accords having been fairly effectively achieved, the point was reached for the creation of a stabilizing force.

C. STABILIZATION FORCE (SFOR)

The Stabilization Force, which followed the Implementation Force, was the NATO-created Operation Joint Guard, set up in December 1996. This force was smaller than IFOR, and its task was to prevent the resumption of hostilities, provide security in local elections, and to furnish aid in reconstruction efforts by the local authorities. The task of bringing indicted war criminals to prosecution was not emphasized for various reasons, including the need to maintain impartiality and to avoid Russian protests in favor of the Serbs.

D. PROSPECTS FOR NATO-RUSSIAN COOPERATION IN CONVENTIONAL OPERATIONS

Some excellent progress in NATO-Russia cooperation has been made. In September 1997, the first ministerial meeting of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council was held in New York. It was followed by agreement “on an extensive Work Program for 1998, covering a wide array of topics of consultation and cooperative activities, such as peacekeeping, defense conversion, defense-related environmental issues and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.” Moreover, the Russian

298 Ibid., 62.
Parliament and the Federation Council decided in July 1998 to maintain Russia’s 1,400 troops in Bosnia.\textsuperscript{301}

As the Russian Ministry of Defense has pointed out, “Russian representatives constantly interact with the American representatives, with representatives of European countries and in the course of these contacts present their views to each other.”\textsuperscript{302}

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense William J. Perry considers that the Russian and NATO cooperative efforts in Bosnia have to some extent successfully eased Russian fears of NATO.\textsuperscript{303} The Russians themselves have given positive reports of effective NATO-Russia cooperation.\textsuperscript{304}

On 19 June 1998, to mark the first anniversary of the NATO-Russia Founding Act, a workshop was held at the Institute of Scientific Information for Social Sciences (INION) in Moscow as “part of the 1998 Work Program of the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint Council. The workshop brought together for the first time civilian and military policy practitioners from NATO and Russia with a group of scholars from 14 NATO countries and from Moscow and regional Russian universities. Some 90 Workshop participants reviewed the achievements of the first year of NATO-Russia cooperation under the Founding Act, and furthermore discussed ideas for further cooperation in a

\textsuperscript{302} Press Conference, 10 July 1998.
\textsuperscript{304} \textit{Nezavisimaya Gazeta}, 30 December 1995, cited in Gavrilov, 57.
wide range of areas, including peacekeeping, science, civil emergency planning, armaments cooperation and retraining of retired servicemen.\textsuperscript{305}

The Russians report that they are “prepared to be cooperative with NATO in Kosovo and [are] contemplating joint exercises with NATO.\textsuperscript{306} Secondly, they acknowledge the praise offered by NATO of their peacekeeping units in Bosnia, and admit that they have responded to “the obligation to the European community and to NATO to make President Slobodan Milosevic more restrained, [and] to induce him to take a number of positive steps.”\textsuperscript{307}

E. NATO-RUSSIAN RELATIONS CONCERNING NUCLEAR ISSUES

Three nuclear issues appear most significant:

- Russian anxieties regarding NATO enlargement and hypothetical NATO deployments of nuclear weapons on the territory of new allies,
- NATO’s concerns about Russia’s non-strategic nuclear weapons; and
- NATO’s interest in gaining Russia’s cooperation to deal with NBC proliferation.

1. The Four No’s Policy

One of the most controversial points of the debate in Russia over NATO enlargement concerns the hypothetical deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of new members. The NATO Allies have clearly stated in the NATO-Russia Founding Act of May 1997 that they have “no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear

\textsuperscript{305} Klaiber, 1998, 19.
\textsuperscript{306} Press Conference, 10 July 1998.
\textsuperscript{307} General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashev, cited in ibid.
weapons on the territory of new members, nor any need to change any aspect of NATO’s nuclear posture or nuclear policy. Furthermore, they do not foresee any future need to do so. This includes the fact that NATO has decided that it has no intention, no plan, and no reason to establish nuclear weapons storage sites on the territory of those new members, whether through the construction of new nuclear storage facilities or the adaptation of old nuclear storage facilities.\textsuperscript{308}

The phrase “storage facilities,” it should be noted, refers to nuclear weapons storage sites, and not to “the creation of storage facilities in central Europe, in the event that a stationing of Western troops is required.”\textsuperscript{309} In other words, although the provisioning and training of troops are continuing, this does not include the deployment of nuclear weapons on the territory of the new allies (Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary).

This policy is subject to change, depending on the evolution of circumstances. It simply is not possible to state finally and categorically that “nuclear weapons will never be deployed under any circumstances on the territory of the new allies.”

According to a Russian commentator, commitments such as the statement in the NATO-Russia Founding Act overlook the fact “that a binding agreement between NATO and Russia would be relevant only in times of peace. If serious military tension were to

\textsuperscript{308} Founding Act on Mutual Relations, 1997, 7-8.
\textsuperscript{309} Eyal, 1997, 718.
develop between the two sides, which is highly unlikely, any standing agreement would become irrelevant.\textsuperscript{310}

Various circumstances might cause a change in this policy: for instance, a change in the government of Russia to policies of neo-imperialism and belligerence; a change in the political alignments of the countries of Europe, including Russia; or a renewed arms race in another part of the globe.

Russia claims to want to participate in Euro-Atlantic security arrangements with the West.\textsuperscript{311} However, some Russians have threatened to form other sorts of alliances that are not helpful to the West.\textsuperscript{312} Russia’s “policy is opportunistic, incoherent and based on fundamentally flawed instincts. But, it will remain Russia’s policy for years to come.”\textsuperscript{313} These instincts and attitudes include Russia’s tendency to see itself as a victim of historic injustices. Russia may be unable, because of the present turmoil in its society, to proceed on a logical and practical path to obtaining security.

The Russians have their own reasons to distrust NATO’s Four No’s Policy. For example, as noted in Chapter II, some Russians claim that there was a more or less implicit guarantee by President George Bush to President Mikhail Gorbachev at Malta in 1989 that the West would “not seek to profit” from Moscow’s weaknesses.\textsuperscript{314} Subsequently came the so-called “promise-breaking” of German Chancellor Helmut Kohl

\textsuperscript{310} Pushkov, 1997, 60.
\textsuperscript{311} Ibid., 62.
\textsuperscript{312} Eyal, 718.
\textsuperscript{313} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{314} Ibid., 698.
(who emphatically denies he made such a promise), who (some Russians claim) stated that “NATO would never expand in central Europe if a united Germany were allowed to remain within the alliance.”\textsuperscript{315} Owing in part to their perceptions and convictions regarding these unwritten “understandings,” the Russians are clearly skeptical about NATO statements having to do with NATO enlargement.\textsuperscript{316} One manifestation of Russian distrust may be the fact that current Russian nuclear modernization plans call for the hardening of nuclear command and control sites, and the construction of new deep underground facilities designed to survive a nuclear war.\textsuperscript{317}

2. **NATO’s Concerns — Russia’s Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons**

The Russians continue to rely on tactical nuclear weapons as the principal defense in their nuclear arsenal. “In the event of a crisis or hostilities, tactical nuclear weapons are probably the least-controlled element of the Russian nuclear arsenal—and the ones most likely to be employed.”\textsuperscript{318}

Furthermore, “the security management of these weapons does not meet NATO standards.”\textsuperscript{319} A recent Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) report has concluded that Russian controls and management of tactical nuclear weapons are inadequate and that the

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\textsuperscript{315} Ibid., 699.
\textsuperscript{316} Kober, 1998, 130-131.
\textsuperscript{319} Ibid.
\end{flushleft}
risk of unauthorized use is high. Moreover, there are recent credible reports of eighty to one-hundred portable tactical nuclear weapons, the so-called “suitcase bombs,” which cannot be accounted for.

According to Colonel Stanislav Lunev, while the safety of the strategic nuclear arsenal is substantially assured because highly trained people under the Special Directorate handle it, the dangerous area is in tactical nuclear weapons. Lunev adds that Russia today is ruled by a mix of “industrial monsters, financial magnates, criminals, law enforcement agencies, leaders and high-level officials, all of them together plus former Communist party high-level bureaucrats,” with no clear demarcation between government and criminal infrastructure, between legitimate and illegitimate interests. According to Colonel Lunev, these entities are intermingled, and have “penetrated” each other, including law enforcement, which is taking money from the criminal infrastructure. As Representative Weldon points out, nine banking and financial families are “siphoning off the bulk of the money that the IMF” has provided. Colonel Lunev suggested the IMF loan money should not go to the central bank but rather to the regional banks, which are less corrupt than the central bank.

320 Ibid.
322 Ibid.
323 Lunev, cited in ibid.
324 Ibid.
325 Ibid.
326 Representative Weldon, quoted in ibid.
327 Ibid.
With respect to improved understanding of Russia’s stewardship of nuclear weapons, NATO has to date had little success. Efforts by NATO to set up a formal exchange of information between Russia and NATO on the disposition and stewardship of tactical nuclear weapons were not successful, and NATO personnel reported disappointing results. When pressed for details about safety procedures and the numbers of weapons in the stockpile, the Russians were evasive.\footnote{William Drozdiak, “The Next Step for NATO: Handling Russia. A peeved Moscow seems to be balking over the security issues,” \textit{Washington Post Weekly Edition}, 11 May 1998, 15.}

Regarding treaties governing nuclear weapons, the Russians answer yes to the question of whether Russia’s nonratification of START II is an obstacle to discussing “with the United States serious aspects of our future strategic partnership.”\footnote{Conference moderator, quoted in press conference, 10 July 1998.} Specifically, according to Chief Minister Colonel General Leonid Grigoryevich Ivashov, of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the failure to complete the START II ratification process has complicated “cooperation in such areas as anti-ballistic missiles defense, military-technical cooperation, and so on.”\footnote{Ibid.} Moreover, Russians assert that the Americans will not discuss these issues as well as “the process of further limitation and reduction of strategic nuclear forces.”\footnote{Ibid.} Furthermore, this stalemate has hampered progress on START III concerning sea-based cruise missiles, and consequently this has had a spillover effect on Russia-NATO relations.\footnote{Ibid.}
When asked whether the strategic nuclear forces are the “only remaining efficient” part of the Russian armed forces, Minister Ivanov downplayed the importance of strategic nuclear weapons, saying that the only aim of nuclear weapons is deterrence. Minister Ivanov said that the destruction of other nations is not the aim of the Russians and that consideration of their operational use is “madness.”\textsuperscript{333} Furthermore, “the stand of the Defense Ministry is that we should reduce this nuclear ceiling to reasonable levels. There is no need to spend money on ideas that have no future.” In his view, the threshold of “unacceptable damage has been brought down.”\textsuperscript{334} Unacceptable damage criteria can be satisfied to achieve nuclear deterrence, according to these Russians, with a strategic nuclear ceiling at 2,500 warheads.\textsuperscript{335} Similarly “the opponents of the ratification of START II argue that by complying with the treaty, the most effective part of [Russia’s] strategic triad – the heavy missiles [would be impacted].”\textsuperscript{336} In any case, the issue will be mooted by the five-year extension that was made by an agreement between President Yeltsin and President Clinton, because in five years, according to the Russians, “these missiles will become obsolete.”\textsuperscript{337}

\textsuperscript{333} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{334} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{335} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{336} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{337} Ibid.
3. NATO - Russian Cooperation in Efforts to Promote Nonproliferation of Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons (NBC)

The Russians have professed an interest in promoting nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons nonproliferation, and in working with NATO in this regard. Russian actions have, however, not always conformed to Russia’s declared intentions.

According to Lunev, in 1991 Soviet President Gorbachev cancelled the USSR’s research and development of chemical and biological weapons, but work on their development had resumed by “the end of 1991 or 1992.”\textsuperscript{338} Moreover, Russia’s chemical and biological weapons efforts continue under the cover of so-called “dual-use” pharmaceutical and chemical research and development.\textsuperscript{339}

In addition, there is evidence the Russians are training Iranians in nuclear technology in Russian universities. Furthermore, the Russians have transferred sensitive technology to Iran,\textsuperscript{340} including medium range missiles.\textsuperscript{341} The U.S. imposed sanctions against seven Russian economic enterprises that sold technologies to Iran that could be used to create delivery systems for nuclear weapons.\textsuperscript{342} The Russian motives include financial incentives as well as a desire to enlist Iranian aid in controlling Islamic fundamentalism.

\textsuperscript{338} Lunev, cited in Hearings, 4 August 1998.
\textsuperscript{339} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{341} Senate Hearings, 4 August 1998.
\textsuperscript{342} Igor Barsukov, “Russian-U.S. Summit to Focus on Cooperation in 21\textsuperscript{st} Century,” \textit{TASS}, 3 August 1998.
India has also received military-technical assistance from Russia. India is the largest purchaser of Russian weapons systems. "More than 60 percent of the Indian army’s hardware, 70 percent of the navy’s equipment, and 80 percent of the Indian Air Force’s equipment is of Russian origin. Indian defense contracts keep about 800 Russian defense plants in operation, according to some estimates."343 Russia also provides "valuable assistance to India’s space program and its nuclear power industry."344 India is said to share the Russian antipathy to a world order dominated by the United States. Furthermore, India is said to have been designated by the Russians as a so-called "strategic partner."345

343 Igor Khipunov, “From Russia, a Muted Reaction; Response to India’s Nuclear Testing” The Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, 17 July 1998, 66.
344 Ibid., 67.
345 Ibid., 66.
VI. CONCLUSION

A. THE FAILURE OF INSTITUTIONS

The domestic scene in Russia has altered dramatically from what it was in 1991, but the necessary governmental and socioeconomic adaptations to fully integrate Russia into Western economic, political, and security institutions have failed to develop. Russia is not likely to become a true partner of NATO because its strategic culture has not changed in ways that would make Russian policies and institutional frameworks compatible with those of NATO countries in the economic, social, technological, and military spheres. Russia will probably remain stalled and stalemated by its lack of efficient economic institutions, including reliable third-party enforcement of contracts, and hampered by its traditions and cultural prejudices.

This situation has not derived from Russia’s hostility to the expansion of NATO, but rather from the inability of the leadership to set up mechanisms that the Russian government could use to accomplish the transition from the state-centered command economy to a market-centered free-enterprise economy. At the present time the legal, judicial, and regulatory institutions that support commercial transations and private property rights are lacking. The government has failed to create effective and fair judicial, regulatory, taxation, and law enforcement systems. Russia’s current constitution is an ineffective document that lacks popular legitimacy partly because “its language
could not be used for defending most of the rights it gives, such as private property.\textsuperscript{346} Russia currently has a “pseudo-constitution” with a system of presidential primacy,\textsuperscript{347} in which the President may, if he wishes, rule by decree. Nevertheless, Russia suffers from a “weak state syndrome.”\textsuperscript{348} The federal government in Russia is weak in that the local and regional authorities may disregard its decrees as they see fit. The local authorities have developed systems of self-sufficiency (partly a carry-over from the Soviet system) of varying degrees of formality and legality, and various “groups within the society have the means to resist reform and state controls.”\textsuperscript{349} Russian society has developed sufficient strength to resist efforts at effective economic restructuring. According to William Odom, an American authority on Russian affairs, “A weak state syndrome can last for decades without resolving itself and without a total collapse.”\textsuperscript{350} To change a weak state syndrome, it is necessary to have an effective state bureaucracy. The Russian federal government lacks an effective bureaucracy, however.

The transition in the economy has been further stalemated by an inability to convert from the old Soviet command economy. Privatization would result in a workforce paid on a regular basis by private enterprise. Instead, at the present time, out of a workforce of sixty-seven million people, only twenty-seven million work in the private sector; the remaining forty million are in the state sector. Taxes collected from the

\textsuperscript{347} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{348} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{349} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{350} Ibid.
private sector pay the wages of the huge forty million strong state sector, a situation that is unsustainable and unmanageable.\textsuperscript{351}

Some Western analysts contend that the reason for the stalemate is ignorance. That is, the Russians have failed to create the right institutions to support transition because of their ignorance of management principles. According to this school of thought, Russian officials and entrepreneurs have a "huge knowledge gap"\textsuperscript{352} concerning modern business methods.

Another explanation for Russia’s inability to set up economic mechanisms to facilitate the pursuit of prosperity and full participation in Western economic institutions is the dominance of a culture in which accountability and transparency are foreign concepts. Without accountability, transparency, and guaranteed property rights, investor confidence has evaporated. Massive capital flight has followed. In fact, July 1998 data indicate that $99 billion of infusions of foreign capital have gone into Russia while about $103 billion have left Russia in capital flight.\textsuperscript{353} This evident lack of confidence in the future economic development of Russia and the obvious lack of commitment to building a prosperous future have contributed to the general cynicism of Russia’s citizens. This situation has further undermined foreign investor confidence.

\textsuperscript{351} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{352} Ariel Cohen, "How the West Lost the Battle for Russia's Future," Prepared Testimony before the House International Relations Committee, 17 September 1998, 4.
\textsuperscript{353} Odom, 16 July 1998, 10.
B. THE FAILURE OF DEMOCRACY

The Russian transition to democracy has failed because the people have “lost faith in the open election process” and because they lack confidence that the outcome is based on fair voting practices.\textsuperscript{354} As in economic affairs and government institution-building, the democratic process is affected by the fact that accountability and transparency are foreign concepts in the Russian political culture.

After Russia’s inevitably disappointing experiment with pseudo-democracy and unfortunate experience with a grossly distorted form of capitalism, the Russians are now in a condition of economic collapse and social catastrophe, with the great majority of the Russian people deprived of an adequate standard of living. Although politically they have more freedom, the majority of the Russian people may be worse off materially than they were under communism. Among the younger generation of Russians, there is a sense of disillusionment that hopes and desires for a prosperous and modern Russia have not materialized.\textsuperscript{355} Unemployment is on the rise, and the emergence of a dissatisfied and restless youthful segment of the population may become a volatile political factor.

After the disillusionment accompanying the apparent failure of the experiment with nominally democratic institutions, some Russians have turned to psychological defense mechanisms to help them deal with the feelings of disappointment and

inferiority. These mechanisms have included scapegoating.\textsuperscript{356} The Russians continue to be both envious and contemptuous of NATO countries, particularly the United States. However, the Russian elites have long had “an exceedingly complex and often contradictory” attitude toward the West.\textsuperscript{357} Public opinion studies confirm that the Russians think of themselves principally as a Western country; the Russians consider Asian cultures deeply alien.\textsuperscript{358} Nevertheless many Russians deem their culture morally superior to that of the West,\textsuperscript{359} while at the same time they are suffering from a national “inferiority complex,” particularly owing to their loss of superpower status.\textsuperscript{360}

Furthermore, some Russian elites have responded to their failures by denigrating American culture and values.\textsuperscript{361} This denigration stems in part from the moral indignation felt by the Russians, who “assumed that the entire world (especially prosperous countries) was morally obligated to help Russia build a new economy.”\textsuperscript{362} Recent opinion surveys conducted by Michigan State University indicate that persistent myths in Russia include the notion that the West is hostile to Russia, and that this is particularly true of Germany and the United States.\textsuperscript{363} Moreover, it is now considered “mainstream” in some Russian scholarly circles to be critical of Western ideas.\textsuperscript{364} Despite

\textsuperscript{356} Shlapentokh, 13.
\textsuperscript{357} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{358} Ibid., 1.
\textsuperscript{359} Ibid., 10.
\textsuperscript{360} Ibid., 16.
\textsuperscript{361} Ibid., 17.
\textsuperscript{362} Ibid., 13.
\textsuperscript{363} Ibid., 18.
\textsuperscript{364} Ibid.
viewing the West as hostile toward them, the Russians do not seriously fear the outbreak of war, although they would like to regain “military parity with the United States.”

C. RUSSIA’S GEOPOLITICAL STANCE

The new Russian Prime Minister, Yevgeny Primakov, believes that the West is not a friend, but a relentless rival. Nevertheless, he may bring stability by helping to shore up Russian pride, especially among nationalist and Communist parties. He may give the Russians some hope that Russia will be restored to the status of a superpower. Primakov is likely to do this by undermining American influence wherever he can, by refusing to support American decisions in the Balkans and the Middle East, and by limiting the latitude for maneuver of other countries as much as possible. On the other hand, Primakov was pragmatic enough to make the arrangements for Russia’s participation in the Bosnian peacekeeping mission, so that Russia can continue to play an important role in the politics of the region.

Crop failures and low food stores have led to the likelihood of food shortages during the coming winter. The Russian government has found it necessary to play the role of a petitioner requesting emergency deliveries of food from the international community. Due to Russia’s need for help and its reliance on generosity from Western countries, including help from international monetary institutions, as well as Russia’s continuing desire to be part of the “G8,” the Russians will probably maintain a somewhat cooperative attitude in their relations with the West. For the next decade or so, at least in

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365 Ibid., 22-23.
366 Ibid., 13.
the foreign policy arena, Russia will probably display an apparent attitude of peacefulness and prickly cooperation with NATO alliance countries, including the United States.\textsuperscript{367}

It is likely that Russia will continue to rely upon nuclear weapons as its ultimate defense, and it is possible that money from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) will be used to support the Russian military.\textsuperscript{368} The Russians have regularly received large IMF loans. However, some Russian think tanks, such as INOBIS, have accused the IMF and the World Bank of devising policies to destroy Russia’s manufacturing and technology infrastructure. Some Russians have argued that Western economic institutions wish to subject Russia to the colonial status of a raw materials provider in order to “keep it from turning into an economically, politically and militarily influential force.”\textsuperscript{369}

Primakov and other Russian leaders are likely to seek an eventual return to greatness for Russia, defined in terms of military power and imperial expansion. Efforts to recover Russian strength, military capability and strategic power are likely to persist. One of the elements of Russian power will remain the country’s nuclear weapons.

Dangerous new tensions may arise between Russia and NATO concerning nuclear weapons. The Russian military, demoralized and underpaid, with outdated or poorly-maintained equipment for monitoring and surveillance of international affairs, has become subject to anxiety and possible misinterpretation of events, a situation which

\textsuperscript{367} Ibid., 26.
\textsuperscript{368} Odom, 16 July 1998.
\textsuperscript{369} Surikov, 1995, 2.
could lead to strategic miscalculation. As Bruce Blair has observed, "the Russian defense establishment is more suspicious of the West than most observers imagine, the nuclear threshold is lower than commonly perceived, and the domestic and international context is a more pivotal factor in Russian threat assessment than is normally recognized. Worse, perhaps, the danger of Russian nuclear miscalculation is not as remote as many suppose, and the progressive deterioration of Russian early warning and control represents a more serious threat than either of our governments is willing to acknowledge."  

According to Peter Pry, "Russian and Western threat perceptions are likely to remain poles apart, if only because their internal realities are as different as night and day. The West takes peace and prosperity for granted, but Russia knows neither of these and is highly unstable." Yeltsin himself has acknowledged that another coup attempt could occur under some circumstances. However, Yeltsin added, "Danger rather lies elsewhere. There is still a visible trend toward the search for an enemy and an uncompromising all-out struggle in Russia.... [T]hese are the consequences of many years of life under the conditions of a totalitarian state. And they will not disappear overnight."

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370 Blair, Summer 1998, 88; emphasis in the original.
372 Yeltsin, quoted in ibid.
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