THESIS

NUCLEAR DETERRENT COOPERATION INVOLVING BRITAIN, FRANCE, AND GERMANY

by

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December 1998

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Nuclear Deterrent Cooperation Involving Britain, France, and Germany

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To construct a political union with an autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union (EU) must “sooner or later” address the integration of the British and French deterrents within a credible West European nuclear consultation arrangement. However, there exists little consensus among Britain, France, and Germany on the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), much less the “course and speed” of integration within the EU. Indeed, the “conflict and contrast” of national interests have been most conspicuous when discussions at the highest levels have turned towards creating a combined European nuclear posture through the coordination of the British and French nuclear forces. Without a “Eurodeterrent,” an autonomous CFSP for the EU would be impractical due to NATO Europe’s continued reliance on US nuclear guarantees. However, if an autonomous CFSP were realized, the EU’s combined nuclear posture would have significant implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Due to the complexity of the issues involved in the creation of a multinational European nuclear doctrine and deterrent, the creation of a “Eurodeterrent” should be considered the “anchorman” vice the “pacesetter” within the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
NUCLEAR DETERRENT COOPERATION
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ABSTRACT

To construct a political union with an autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the European Union (EU) must “sooner or later” address the integration of the British and French deterrents within a credible West European nuclear consultation arrangement. However, there exists little consensus among Britain, France, and Germany on the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI), much less the “course and speed” of integration within the EU. Indeed, the “conflict and contrast” of national interests have been most conspicuous when discussions at the highest levels have turned towards creating a combined European nuclear posture through the coordination of the British and French nuclear forces. Without a “Eurodeterrent,” an autonomous CFSP for the EU would be impractical due to NATO Europe’s continued reliance on US nuclear guarantees. However, if an autonomous CFSP were realized, the EU’s combined nuclear posture would have significant implications for the United States and the Atlantic Alliance. Due to the complexity of the issues involved in the creation of a multinational European nuclear doctrine and deterrent, the creation of a “Eurodeterrent” should be considered the “anchorman” vice the “pacesetter” within the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy.
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

If the ongoing process of creating a European Monetary Union succeeds, the next step for the European Union (EU) would be the creation of a political union. To realize a political union with a truly autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), the EU member states must “sooner or later” address the integration of British and French nuclear forces within a credible West European nuclear consultation arrangement. This line of reasoning formed the basis for President Mitterrand’s 1992 call for a single European nuclear doctrine followed later by France’s vague offers to devise a European dissuasion concertée involving the French deterrent in 1995.

As leading powers within the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Western European Union (WEU), Britain, France, and Germany constitute the main foundation stones upon which a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) must be assembled. The London-Paris-Bonn/Berlin strategic triangle will play a major role in determining the evolution of the WEU as a security and defense guarantor in Europe. However, casting Western Europe’s “Big Three” in the role of the standard bearer for the European integration movement has always been a monumental and elusive task.

To date, little consensus on the “course and speed” of integration efforts in European security and defense matters can be found among Europe’s “Big Three.” Since the 1991 Maastricht Treaty chartered the creation of a CFSP, the performances of the WEU on the international stage – such as minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf and embargo operations in the Adriatic Sea – have been of relatively limited scope. More
recently, policy paralysis vis-à-vis Bosnia, Albania, and Kosovo has exposed the difficulty of finding a coherent and cohesive position among the WEU nations. The "conflict and contrast" of competing national agendas have been most conspicuous when discussions at the highest levels have turned towards the challenges of creating a combined European nuclear posture through the coordination (or unification) of the British and French national nuclear forces in support of an autonomous European Pillar.

Although Britain and France have debated the issues at the highest political levels, no "common" nuclear doctrine has yet been adopted. Indeed, Britain and France have buttressed national sovereignty through "independent" deterrents that serve their respective national interests, while also upholding NATO's overall deterrence posture. Britain and France are not in a rush to give up their intrinsic rights of national sovereignty with respect to managing their national deterrents. Moreover, Germany is in no hurry to give up American nuclear guarantees for the unknown qualities of an Anglo-French nuclear umbrella.

Consequently, due to the complexity of the issues involved, the creation of a nuclear dimension in European construction should be considered the "anchorman" vice the "pacesetter" in the development of the EU's CFSP. Without the "Eurodeterrent," a fully autonomous CFSP for the EU would be impractical due to NATO Europe's continued reliance on US nuclear commitments. However, if a fully autonomous CFSP were ever realized, a truly united Europe – backed by the capabilities provided by nuclear weapons – would have significant implications for the United States and Atlantic Alliance in the twenty-first century.
I. INTRODUCTION

Why this sudden bewilderment? This confusion? Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly, everyone going home, lost in thought? Because night has fallen, and the Barbarians have not come! And some of our men, just in from the border, say there are no Barbarians any longer. Now what’s going to happen to us without the Barbarians? They were, those people, after all, a kind of solution.¹

Constantine Cavafy

Peace and stability in Europe no longer depend on being able to defend a carrier battle group from raids by Soviet Backfire bombers in the eastern Mediterranean or being ready to hold the Fulda Gap against the Red Army’s onrushing tanks. In the post-Cold War era, the NATO Allies have focused more on maintaining security in Europe by dealing with the Balkan crisis and the threat of a larger conflict than on the defense of NATO Europe against external coercion or aggression. For now, the caliber of peace in Europe can be measured more appropriately by the degree of political cohesion among the members of the European Union than by the number of carrier battle groups in the Mediterranean or the number of armored divisions stationed on the plains of Germany. Although paced by an erratic and unsure drummer, the march towards a wider and deeper Europe continues forward. Most of the EU countries plan to adopt a common currency in January 1999. US leaders must remain alert because the success of a European Monetary Union (EMU) might “change the political character of Europe in ways that may lead to conflicts in Europe and confrontations with the United States.”²


In Western European security affairs, the three most influential countries are Britain, France, and Germany. As leading powers within the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), and the Western European Union (WEU), Britain, France, and Germany constitute the main foundation stones upon which a European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) must be assembled. As Western Europe’s political-military center of gravity, the London-Paris-Bonn/Berlin strategic triangle will also play a major role in determining the evolution of the WEU as a security and defense guarantor in Europe and the future of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP). However, casting Western Europe’s “Big Three” in the role of the standard bearer for the European integration movement has always been a monumental and elusive task. As Peter Schmidt has noted, “[s]ince the failed attempt to establish a European Defense Community in the 1950s, Europeans have never been close to establishing the necessary consensus to change the basic security and defense structures in Europe.”

The rise of the WEU – as a European defense organization and champion for a greater European defense identity – was held in check from the very outset by the development and successes of NATO. In March 1948, the Brussels Treaty parties resolved to pursue “collaboration in economic, social, and cultural matters and for collective self-defense.” However, the practical implementation of the WEU’s

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collective defense responsibilities was transferred to NATO from the early beginnings of
the Atlantic Alliance, in 1951, and later reiterated in the modified Brussels Treaty in 1954
due to “the undesirability of duplicating the military staffs of NATO.”\(^5\) Hence, the WEU
remained non-operational as a military organization from 1954 to 1984; while NATO
went on to become one of the most successful defensive alliances in history. However,
the collapse of the Warsaw Treaty Organization in July 1991 and that of the Soviet Union
in December 1991 – historically the main external challenges for NATO – led Alliance
governments to question the single-minded focus on collective defense that made the
Atlantic Alliance so successful during the Cold War. Indeed, the new post-Cold war era
has necessitated a reevaluation of Alliance commitments and burden-sharing
responsibilities by governments on both sides of the Atlantic.

In December 1991, the WEU’s Maastricht Declaration established a renewed
emphasis on developing the role of the WEU as a means to strengthen the European Pillar
within the Atlantic Alliance. Two years later, in November 1993, the Treaty on European
Union entered into force and chartered the “implementation of a common foreign and
security policy, including the eventual framing of a common defense policy, which might
in time lead to a common defense.”\(^6\) In addition, the EU also envisioned the
implementation of its defense initiatives through the WEU. In response to the EU’s

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5 Treaty signed at Paris on 23 October 1954. WEU Secretariat General, “Treaty of Economic, social and
cultural collaboration, and collective self-defence at Brussels on 17 March 1948 as amended by the
‘Protocols modifying and completing the Brussels Treaty’ in Western European Union, Available [Online]:

6 Treaty signed at Maastricht on 7 February 1992. European Commission, “Title I, Article B of Treaty on
September 1998.
mandate for a more visible European role in the security of Europe, NATO leaders fully endorsed the emergence and development of the ESDI through a revitalized WEU working within NATO at the January 1994 Alliance summit. Although it has yet to enter into force (because it has still not been ratified by all members of the EU), the 1997 Amsterdam Treaty will take another step, although a very limited one, towards the development of a supranational CFSP among the European nations. As a result, the WEU would maintain a “curious” dual status serving on the one hand “as a means to strengthen the European Pillar of the Atlantic Alliance” while, on the other, concurrently authenticating the CFSP “as the defense arm of the European Union.”

Each of the three major Western European powers retains a historical national character, continuing aspirations for a place in Europe and the world, and a vision of the future security architecture of Europe, all of which could greatly influence the evolution of NATO’s European Pillar and the development of the ESDI within the WEU and the EU. Near-term success in establishing a coherent ESDI depends on the harmonization of separate national voices into one dominant European voice with respect to the handling of “humanitarian and rescue tasks; peacekeeping tasks;[and] tasks of combat forces in crisis management, including peacemaking.”

Yet, the long-term goal of shaping a fully comprehensive ESDI may still be beyond the grasp of leaders in London, Paris, and Bonn/Berlin because of their energetic

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protection of intrinsic powers associated with national sovereignty. Sir Michael Howard has stated that the sentiments of national self-consciousness in Britain, France, and Germany have been determined largely by "conflict and contrast with one another."

This pattern of "conflict and contrast" has been most conspicuous when discussions at the highest political levels have turned towards the challenges of creating a combined European nuclear posture through the coordination (or hypothetically unification) of the British and French national nuclear forces in support of an autonomous European Pillar.

This thesis examines the barriers that the major Western European powers must overcome to achieve success in the area of nuclear deterrent cooperation, an element that would be essential in a truly comprehensive ESDI. To satisfy this purpose, the policies of Britain, France and Germany are examined to highlight variances within each country's notion of the European project, the development of the ESDI within the WEU, and the eventual framing of a CFSP for the EU. Furthermore, each country's policies with respect to nuclear weapons, relations with the other two major Western European powers, and bilateral relations with the United States are also assessed.

In Chapter II, Britain's place in post-Cold War Europe is analyzed. Traditionally, Britain has been reluctant to accept its role in the European integration movement and has placed more political emphasis on maintaining its special relationship with the US than on the development of more intimate relations with Europe. The development of the British deterrent in the wake of the 1962 Skybolt affair was influenced by the special

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Anglo-American nuclear partnership that began during World War II. In fact, the British independent nuclear deterrent, with the "supreme national interests" caveat, has been dedicated to a deterrence role for NATO since 1962. Therefore, one must ask, how likely are the British to abandon their Atlanticist perspective and the special relationship with the US for the unknown qualities of a deeper relationship with fellow Europeans and nuclear assurances within the EU/WEU context?

In Chapter III, the role of France in the new Europe is assessed. How will France balance its Europeanist agenda against the Atlanticist tendencies of the other two principal Western European countries? What does this mean for the nuclear dimension of European construction? As a leader of the European integration movement and the chief advocate for a fully autonomous ESDI, France's ambition to lead Europe has called for a more European security structure in hopes of creating a true ESDI — implicitly, one devoid of American influence and led by the French. Under President Charles de Gaulle, the assertion of the French nuclear deterrent's operational independence was seen as a means to restore national pride, which was badly wounded by France's military failures in 1940. The withdrawal of French military forces from NATO's integrated military command structure in 1966 illustrated the contentious politics between France and the US regarding NATO issues during the 1960s. Within the last decade, French security policy, which preaches the independence of French military forces and strategy, has slowly given way to a more European approach as highlighted by President Mitterand's call for a single European nuclear doctrine in 1992 or the vague offers to devise a European dissuasion concertée involving the French deterrent in 1995.
Chapter IV examines the following questions vis-à-vis Germany. What is the role of a resurgent, unified Germany in the continuing evolutionary development of the WEU? Does Germany's reliance on US nuclear assurances impede efforts to pursue a nuclear dimension in European construction? Would a nuclear dimension in European construction necessarily mean a nuclear-armed Germany or just German participation in a European Nuclear Planning Group? Or would it mean that Germany would become an entity within a European Union that had become a single sovereign state? Germany, a non-nuclear weapons state by treaty and barred as a result of certain interpretations of its "Basic Law" of deploying military forces outside and beyond NATO's defensive missions and area of responsibility until 1994, has been playing the part of an inhibited European partner. The fear of a resurgent and nationalistic Germany dominating Europe has influenced domestic and foreign leaders to find ways to constrain - and in some areas to limit - Germany's power and influence on the continent. Long since comfortable playing the role as Europe's economic giant and political dwarf, Germany is beginning to exhibit signs of breaking through the political inhibitions and normalizing its foreign and security policies. Indeed, the substantial economic and political clout wielded by Germany within the European integration process may foreshadow the eventual return of the continental power.

Chapter V analyzes the interrelationships of the three major Western European powers, specifically focusing on their policies and bilateral relationships with respect to the creation of a multilateral European nuclear deterrent. The creation of such a deterrent would create new challenges for European strategic planning and provide a degree of
great power status for the supranational leadership within the European Union and the Western European Union. However, how likely is the creation of a multilateral European nuclear deterrent given the concerns in some circles with respect to the legitimacy of nuclear weapons, the role of European national nuclear forces, and the role of the United States in providing nuclear deterrence for its allies in Europe? The evolution of the Atlantic Alliance and the character of the transatlantic relationship seem dependent on the level of development and integration of the WEU within or outside of NATO. Therefore, what would be the implications of a structurally and operationally mature WEU – one with a fully developed command and control structure backed by the authority of combined arrangements for European nuclear weapons – for the United States, NATO, and the transatlantic relationship?

Since the Maastricht Treaty chartered the creation of a CFSP, the performances of the WEU on the international stage – such as minesweeping operations in the Persian Gulf and embargo operations in the Adriatic Sea – have been of relatively limited scope. More recently, policy paralysis vis-à-vis Kosovo has again exposed the difficulty of finding the lowest common denominator among WEU nations in terms of a coherent and cohesive European position. Similarly, the crisis in Albania again highlighted the challenges in achieving a consensus among the Europeans and resulted only in a “purely ad hoc coalition of the able and the willing, without any institutional role being played politically or militarily by the WEU.”

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These same difficulties and inhibitions may hinder the governments of Britain, France, and Germany in pursuing the necessary qualities of an ESDI within NATO via the WEU and the eventual framing of a CFSP for the European Union. This lack of political and military cohesion may impede any progress towards nuclear deterrent cooperation among the major Western European powers under the auspices of the WEU. Furthermore, the lack of a European nuclear dimension may render a fully autonomous CFSP for the EU impractical due to NATO Europe’s continued reliance on US nuclear commitments. However, if a fully autonomous European CFSP were ever realized, a truly united Europe – backed by the capabilities provided by nuclear weapons – would have significant implications for the US, the transatlantic relationship, and the future role of the Atlantic Alliance in the security of the new Europe in the twenty-first century.
II. BRITAIN: THE RELUCTANT PARTNER

For four hundred years, the foreign policy of England has been to oppose the strongest, most aggressive, most dominating power on the continent, and particularly to prevent the Low Countries falling into the hands of such a Power...Here is the wonderful unconscious tradition of British foreign policy.11

Winston S. Churchill

A. INTRODUCTION

As was evident in Britain’s response to the hegemonic aspirations of Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon Bonaparte, Kaiser Wilhelm II, and Adolf Hitler, British leaders have demonstrated an inclination towards balance of power diplomacy to maintain the political status quo in continental Europe. Historically, British leaders have felt compelled to counter attempts by major European powers seeking to achieve “an overlordship of Europe”12 by maintaining the balance of power equilibrium. In fact, “Imperial Britain’s strategy was to capitalize on its great advantage of insularity — to stay aloof from the quarrels of Europe, if possible, and to intervene against the hegemonist of the day when necessary.”13

During the Cold War, German political disabilities, the French preoccupation with autonomy, and the special relationship with the United States helped maintain the political status quo in Europe while propping up Britain’s great power status. However, in the post-Cold War era, the implosion of the Soviet Union and attempts to build up a

12 Ibid, 208.
supranational EU/WEU governing body based in Brussels have forced Britain to reconsider its station within Europe. Although the British have become “reconciled to the United Kingdom’s inability to maintain the status of a major world power,” David Greenwood also noted that the security and stature provided by an “independent” deterrent still remains a high value card held closely within the political hand of British leaders because Britain still “aspires to cut a certain kind of figure in international affairs — that of a leading regional power with a global vision.”

B. BRITAIN’S PLACE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN IDEA

Britain remains reluctant to accept at face value the appropriateness of deeper integration in political, economic and military affairs within the European Union. Indeed, some changes in the European security order would not serve British interests; they would undermine Britain’s privileged standing by further weakening its position. As the EU countries continue gradually along the road towards building a comprehensive supranational entity, “the characteristic British response to grand visions of a European future is to worry about the details … and to insist that the participants address the

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practical issues before signing up to more ambitious schemes.”¹⁶ In regards to the British vision of the European movement, Michael Clarke has noted that British leaders often avoid answering questions and that policy in this area remains solely a tactful critique of the process because “policy is in essence critiquing the process.”¹⁷

Currently, the dilemma that confronts British policymakers is how to integrate alternative security European institutions within the NATO framework that, as noted within the 1998 Strategic Defence Review, “has been a uniquely effective political and military security alliance for half a century.”¹⁸ In fact, the British remain “loath to entertain any architectural design that appears to diminish the primacy of NATO or threatens to attenuate the connection between the United States and European security.”¹⁹ In spite of their penchant for wrangling over the details of European integration, British leaders maintain an acute awareness of what must by preserved in any future security architecture for a new Europe. From London’s perspective, the indispensable elements of any discussion on Western European security affairs remain the continued involvement of the US and NATO in European security matters; the preservation of the so-called “special” relationship between Britain and the US; and the protection of the intrinsic rights of national sovereignty.²⁰


¹⁷ Ibid., 7.


¹⁹ Sperling and Kirchner, 239.

²⁰ Clarke, 9-11.
During the 1996 Labour party convention, Tony Blair emphasized his belief in the revolutionary impact that the new Labour party could play within Europe: “[l]ead[ing] Britain into an age of achievement means Britain leading Europe... [therefore] we will build a new relationship with Europe.”²¹ After the Labour Party’s successful ascent to the majority as a result of the 1997 elections, Prime Minister Blair vowed to maneuver Britain towards smoother and more productive relationships with France and Germany. Blair’s emphasis was on recasting Britain as an equal partner. In his vision, Britain would strengthen a strategic triangle made up of Europe’s “Big Three.” In fact, the British tour of duty in the Presidency of the EU in 1998 was seen as an opportunity for Britain to demonstrate strong leadership in order to show Europeans (mainly the French and the Germans) that the British were no longer “reluctant” members of Europe.

However, the “October 1997 flip flops on British EMU policy”²² have not made it any easier to erase London’s historical reluctance towards deeper integration within the EU and WEU from the memories of leaders in both Paris and Bonn/Berlin. At the time, the decision to opt out of the monetary union – the EU’s most ambitious project to date – saddled Britain with a lack of credibility and effectively denied it any political leverage to affect internal debates on the “course and speed” of integration. In May 1998, the “last-minute quarrel between Germany, France, and the Netherlands over the choice of a president for the new European Central Bank” served to highlight “Britain’s general awkwardness in Europe ...[because] Britain was called upon to settle a fight that was not


of its own making, over the management of a currency that Britain itself has for now
decided not to join.” 23 According to Dominique Moïsi, since “it will take years for
London to behave in a truly European manner...a club of three is not about to replace a
club of two” as the political motor of European integration. 24 At the conclusion of his
six-month term, Prime Minister Blair openly recognized that his vision of making Britain
a more influential player within the European Union “could take 10 years.” 25 Hence,
Britain – even under Blair’s leadership – is still not perceived by leaders in France and
Germany as a fully engaged European partner.

C. POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

The British support for the creation of ESDI as a means to strengthen the
European pillar within NATO is driven by two narrow objectives: to prevent the US from
withdrawing from Europe over “corrosive burden-sharing debates...[and] to extend
British influence over the security policies of its major European allies.” 26 In 1990,
Philip A. G. Sabin noted that the British position within the political debates over
European integration has historically tended “to support only minor amendments to the


25 Robert Posten, “Blair order review of the UK role in Europe, PM’s ambition of powerful presence in EU
‘could take 10 years’,” The Financial Times (London), 1 July 1998, 1.

26 Sperling and Kirchner, 238.
status quo and to resist suggestions from other allies for more radical changes.”

Eight years later, British planners (and for that matter other Europeans) still advance differing attitudes concerning the future direction and magnitude of greater European integration. However, the British perspective on where the primary political-military decision-making within European security affairs should reside has remained consistent. Britain maintains that NATO has always been the foundation of effective allied military cooperation in Europe and still remains “highly relevant to the specific circumstances of Europe today.”

Although the WEU plays “an important role in fostering defense co-operation amongst its members in conflict prevention and particularly peacekeeping,” the evolution of the WEU seems to represent in British eyes a potential challenge to the unity of the Atlantic Alliance. Expressing similar sentiments, Sir Michael Howard noted that the contribution of the WEU towards the development of NATO’s European Pillar “seems to [them] at best redundant, at worst a deliberate challenge to the United States to leave the Europeans to fend for themselves.”

British officials point to the logical consequences of the current attempts at a common monetary policy as the eventual framing of a CFSP that in turn may lead to a common defense policy for all of the European Union. The British position that a CFSP

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29 Ibid.

should not necessarily produce or lead to a common defense policy reflects a preference that the WEU retain its intergovernmental character, remain independent of the EU, and remain subordinated to NATO. 31 Indeed, the inherent responsibilities associated with national defense evoke symbols and rights of national sovereignty that push the British to ask, Which European countries are prepared to give up national control over defense and foreign policy? As Michael Clarke has noted, for France and Germany to give up intrinsic rights of sovereignty in national defense remains “inconceivable to officialdom in London” and in any case “[t]he British themselves have no expectation of doing so in the foreseeable future.” 32

D. THE BRITISH “INDEPENDENT” DETERRENT

In view of Britain’s political and military rank in international politics after World War II, the British government took it virtually for granted that Britain acted in accordance with its rights and responsibilities in acquiring nuclear weapons. In fact, nuclear historians have stated that the British drive to develop nuclear weapons was a product of several factors: (1) Nuclear weapons were needed to safeguard Britain’s “vital interests” by countering the threat of the Soviet nuclear arsenal; (2) Nuclear weapons offered a means for a “second-tier” state to achieve (or maintain, in the case of Britain) great power status; and (3) The Atomic Energy Act (McMahon Act) of 1946 restricted access to US atomic information, placing into question British reliance on the American

31 Sperling and Kirchner, 240.

32 Clarke, 9-11.
nuclear program. Regardless of why the British sought nuclear weapons, the fact is that the British nuclear weapons program led by William Penney designed and successfully developed a nuclear weapon. The concepts which would lead to the eventual development of an "independent" British deterrent were validated as a result of the Hurricane atomic weapons testing conducted at the Monte Bello islands in October 1952. Thus, Britain became the third state – after the United States and the USSR – to achieve membership within the nuclear "club."

Since the 1954 amendments to the McMahon Act allowed only very limited exchanges of atomic information with the United States, Britain might have considered a joint venture alongside France in the development of their separate nuclear weapons programs. However, a strategic partnership with the more developed US atomic weapons program afforded Britain more benefits than a relationship with the French atomic program, then still in the first stages of development, would have provided at the time. In any case, the nuclear aspects of Britain’s "special" relationship with the US started to gain political momentum towards greater cooperation in the aftermath of the 1956 Suez Crisis. By October 1957, when the Soviets launched Sputnik, nuclear cooperation between the US and Britain was well underway.

In 1957, three separate meetings laid the foundation for increased collaboration between the American and British nuclear weapons programs. The first meeting, in


34 Ibid., 24.
January/February 1957, was between US Secretary of Defense Charles Wilson and British Secretary of State for Defence Duncan Sandys. Set in Washington, the discussions centered on the adaptation of British bombers to carry US nuclear weapons, storage of US nuclear bombs on British territory, and the coordination of targets between the US Strategic Air Command and the British Bomber Command. The second meeting, held on Bermuda in March 1957, was between President Eisenhower and Prime Minister Macmillan. This meeting resulted in the publicly announced decision to deploy US Thor missiles to Britain, as well as a secret annex covering prior consultation on testing initiatives. A common policy toward French nuclear ambitions was also part of the Bermuda agenda.\textsuperscript{35} The third meeting, held in Washington during October 1957, resulted in Eisenhower and Macmillan agreeing to a "Declaration of Common Purpose" which marked commitments to greater nuclear cooperation between the US and Britain.

As a consequence of the meetings in 1957, amendments to the McMahon Act were passed by the US Congress, paving the way for the 1958 Agreement for Cooperation on the Uses of Atomic Energy for Mutual Defense Purposes. Entering into force in August 1958, the agreement allowed: cooperation on design, testing, and fabrication of nuclear weapons; the development of defense plans; training of personnel in employment of, and defense against, atomic weapons; the evaluation of potential enemies; and the research, development and design of military reactors.\textsuperscript{36}

\textsuperscript{35} Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 43.

\textsuperscript{36} Ibid., 46.
In May 1959, the 1958 Agreement was further amended to allow the transfer of nuclear weapons equipment and materials along with US atomic information. In April 1960, the British government announced the cancellation of the Blue Streak ballistic missile project, as well as the intention to purchase the US Skybolt air-launched ballistic missile. The abrupt cancellation of the Skybolt program without prior consultation with the British again placed Anglo-American relations on precarious footing. However, the meetings in December 1962 between President Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan at Nassau in the Bahamas helped to quell the antagonism and led to the subsequent transfer of Polaris submarine-launched ballistic missiles.

As it has since its operational beginnings, the “British government continues to present the UK deterrent as primarily a contribution to the NATO Alliance.”37 Britain’s nuclear strategy is based on a readiness to use nuclear weapons to defend British “vital interests” in the event of a nuclear attack or an overwhelming conventional weapons attack against NATO Europe. Another rationale that was articulated to support the necessity for a British deterrent was that of a second center of nuclear decision-making, which provided an element of nuclear weapons autonomy to hedge against US isolationism or indecisiveness with respect to American nuclear commitments.38 Taken together, both rationales provided a justification for an “independent” nuclear deterrent

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while also characterizing Britain's role as a nuclear weapons state in broader and more palatable terms for British citizens than narrow national self-interest.

Despite US nuclear commitments, there was always a risk that the Soviet Union might be tempted into aggression in Europe by the calculation that the US would choose to withhold its strategic deterrent capabilities rather than face nuclear retaliation from the Soviets on the North American continent. This theory does not offer to any evidence of US unreliability; however, as Nicholas K. J. Witney noted, "it was enough to establish that there was a gamble that the Soviets might conceivably be tempted to take."39 The theory of a second center of decision-making attributes to Britain the ability to influence scenarios in such a manner that Kremlin strategists have to take notice of the leadership in London. Consequently, the Soviet Union would "feel less sanguine about discounting the possibility of nuclear retaliation from a European power, arguably more threatened by, and certainly geographically much closer to invasion across Europe's central front."40 Therefore, the existence of the independent British nuclear deterrent was justified as a means to cover up a potential "chink in the Alliance's armor" which the Soviets might otherwise have been tempted to try to exploit. However, with the demise of the Soviet Union, Witney also noted that "the specific second centre justification is becoming increasingly hard to make with real conviction...[because] the palpable threat to Western Europe has all but disappeared."41


40 Ibid., 9.

41 Witney, "British Nuclear Policy After the Cold War," 104.
For Britain, operational independence (the ability of the Prime Minister to independently control the British nuclear deterrent) rather than full independence in areas such as research, development, and procurement matters has always been sufficient. Provided that this minimum operational independence remains secure, Britain appears content to cooperate with the US in vital areas related to the construction and maintenance of its nuclear deterrent. Cooperation between the US and Britain regarding development, testing, and production of nuclear materials is at such high levels that the withdrawal of US support (piecemeal or whole) would have placed the sustainability of the British deterrent in a perilous position. Indeed, even the potential withdrawal of US nuclear support would place heavy strains on the British treasury, especially "with the huge costs of ensuring against it by doing everything 'in-house'". This scenario remains far from reality because, according to a 1985 US State Department report, "The US talks more often, more candidly, and on more subjects with the UK than with any other country. The complexity of Anglo-American ties is so immense as to defy easy characterization. Cooperation in strategic systems is so close, in fact, that the British have found it virtually impossible to work in this field with the French despite their periodic desire to do so."

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The British Trident program provides an excellent example of the close nuclear cooperation between Britain and the United States. The United Kingdom has relied centrally on the SLBMs – Polaris followed by Trident – procured from the United States. Not long after the July 1980 announcement by the British government of its intention to purchase the Trident I (C4) SLBM, the US decided to upgrade to the Trident II (D5) SLBM. Consequently, the British government (which had decided to follow suit in November 1981) announced the decision in March 1982. The government's stated reason for choosing to upgrade to the Trident II (D5) SLBM was to maintain commonality with US equipment over the lifetime of the system rather than to acquire a more powerful system with options for more warheads and greater accuracy. With the withdrawal from operational service of the WE-177 free-fall nuclear bomb in April 1998, Britain will rely solely on the deterrent capabilities provided by a planned force of four.

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45 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 115.

46 Ibid., 117.
Trident strategic missile nuclear submarines (See Table 1) with approximately 160 nuclear warheads in stockpile.\textsuperscript{47}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME</th>
<th>LAUNCHED</th>
<th>COMMISSIONED</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>VANGUARD (S28)</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>VICTORIOUS (S29)</td>
<td>September 1993</td>
<td>January 1995</td>
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<td>VIGILANT (S30)</td>
<td>October 1995</td>
<td>November 1996</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VENGEANCE (S31)</td>
<td>August 1998</td>
<td>July 1999</td>
</tr>
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\textit{Source: Jane's Fighting Ships 1998-1999}

With the launching of HMS VENGEANCE, the last of the Vanguard Class Trident SSBNs, in prospect, British Secretary of State for Defence George Robertson commented that “Trident should meet our needs well into the next century, [therefore] there is no work under way to develop a new generation of nuclear weapons.”\textsuperscript{48}

The British Trident D5 SLBMs are identical to those used by the US strategic submarine force. The British-designed and British-produced warhead is very similar to the US W76 warhead designed for the Trident I (C4) SLBM. In fact, there are no specific American or British missiles because all the missiles are part of a pool held at the US Naval Submarine Base at King's Bay, Georgia. The British will have the title to a certain number of the missiles; but, they do not actually own any specific missiles. A missile that is deployed on a US SSBN may at some later time serve on a British SSBN and vice


\textsuperscript{48} United Kingdom, House of Commons, written answers for 28 July 1998.
versa. The 1982 decision by the British Ministry of Defence to refurbish the Trident missiles at King’s Bay vice the Royal Naval Armament Depot at Coulport was to avoid the expense of duplicate nuclear weapons storage, handling and maintenance infrastructures.49

Following the abandonment of the “sub-strategic” roles by the Royal Navy and the British Army in 1992-1993 and the Royal Air Force in 1998, the British planned to fill the void by deploying some of their Trident II SLBMs in a “sub-strategic” role.50 The intention not to use the full capacity of the Trident system due to the present calmer international strategic environment has allowed the development of a number of sub-strategic options.51 Concerning this “flexibility in the choice of yield for the warheads in the Trident missile,”52 George Robertson commented:

The credibility of our minimum nuclear deterrent requires that we have the option, in extreme self-defence, of deterring further aggression through a nuclear (“sub-strategic”) strike which is limited in scale and nature of target so that it could not be expected automatically to lead to a full scale nuclear exchange.53

According to a Defence Select Committee report, “[t]here is no technical reason why Trident missiles should not carry out the ‘sub-strategic’ role, by firing a single missile carrying one warhead, whose target could be communicated to a submarine at sea …The

49 Norris, Burrows, and Fieldhouse, 117.

50 Ibid., 113.


52 United Kingdom, House of Commons, written answers, 19 March 1998.

53 United Kingdom, House of Commons, written answers, 24 July 1998.
major constraint arises from the need to decide on a particular weapon outload when the submarine is in port.”54

UK governments have taken the political stance that force levels for the British deterrent were set at the minimum needed for their politico-strategic purposes. Therefore, the level was not a function of the levels of other countries’ offensive forces and there was no logical case for any particular numerical relationship.55 Moreover, UK nuclear weapons systems were never included in SALT or START negotiations. The 1998 Strategic Defense Review conducted “a rigorous re-examination of [British] deterrence requirements” and concluded that deterrence “does not depend on the size of other nation’s arsenals, but on the minimum necessary to deter any threat to our [British] vital interests.”56

E. ANGLO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

The British ability “to punch above their weight” is largely derived from the British military’s ability to project power in a global sense while leaning on its privileged position within NATO. In the Atlantic Alliance, the US remains a key factor in meeting the political-military challenges of building “a new world order to allow the advanced economies of the world to function without constant interruption and threat from the third

54 Ibid., 132.


world."\textsuperscript{57} London continues to believe that the capitals of Western Europe need Washington to remain critically engaged within European security affairs, and the British always seem to do their best to keep the Americans in and to dissuade them from going away. Peregrine Worsthorne has noted that "[i]n the foreseeable future there will be only one superpower capable of rising to this challenge – the United States – and only one European power able to give instant support — Britain....A United Europe would be quite useless in this new world order where a speedy willingness to use force is of the essence."\textsuperscript{58} Although no longer in office, former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher’s words retain their usefulness in describing the "special" relationship:

Such are the realities of population, resources, technology, and capital that if America remains the dominant power in a united West and militarily engaged in Europe, then the West can continue to be the dominant power in the world as a whole. Understanding and accepting this will always be easier for us in Britain than for our European neighbors. The Anglo-American relationship is not some outdated romantic notion. It reflects shared history, language, values, and ideals — the very things that generate the willingness for sacrifice on which the outcome of every military venture ultimately depends.\textsuperscript{59}

Britain clearly wants to maintain the "special" relationship it currently enjoys with the United States in naval, nuclear, and intelligence matters. Since the end of World War II, Britain has tried to have the best of both worlds by maintaining this privileged bilateral security relationship, while at the same time becoming part of the integration process of

\textsuperscript{57} Peregrine Worsthorne, "What kind of People?" \textit{The National Interest}, no. 22 (Winter 1990/91): 99.

\textsuperscript{58} Ibid., 99.

Europe. However, as Lawrence Freedman has noted, “the uncoupling of the US nuclear arsenal from European security is now a much more serious prospect than it has ever been, but precisely for that reason the British government does not want to start talking of American disengagement as a foregone conclusion.”\textsuperscript{60} Therefore, British leaders have approached the issue of a cooperative European nuclear policy “not as an alternative to the nuclear defense umbrella provided by the US and NATO but only as a supplementary contribution to the strengthening of cohesiveness throughout the Western European security landscape.”\textsuperscript{61}

The overall importance of the British role as the transatlantic link between Europe and America – like the once vast and formidable British Empire – has been in a steady continuing decline. The Clinton administration has urged Prime Minister Blair and the Labour majority to pursue a larger leadership role within Europe as well as a more active presence with regard to European integration. During his visit to Washington in February 1998, Prime Minister Blair steadfastly expressed that Britain remains the “bridge between the US and Europe.” British leaders desire to reinforce the belief among their European counterparts that Britain has a special place as the intermediary or bridge to the United States, and this approach “confers greater status on Britain vis-à-vis France and Germany than London has within the EU, where it is a late-coming and frequently reluctant


partner."62 Blair also resisted notions that the British “special” relationship with America and the perception of bias toward Atlanticism would jeopardize the British rapprochement with Europe.63 Still, acting in the role as America’s interlocutor with Europe, Blair has occasionally issued “Thatcher-like warnings against American ‘wobbliness’ in world and European affairs.”64

F. FINAL REMARKS

Given British strategic culture and the manner in which the British nuclear deterrent forces were developed, the British are not likely in the near future to forsake their Atlanticist viewpoints and the “special” relationship with the US for the unknown qualities of a deeper European relationship. As Lawrence Freedman has noted, “[British] nuclear weapons remain little more that a hedge against an uncertain future. The inclination is to keep them well clear of any conflict in which it is likely to be involved where the future of western Europe is not directly at stake.”65 In any case, British nuclear forces will continue their traditional role as an “independent” deterrent serving within the integrated NATO nuclear force structure.66


66 Johnson, British Perspectives on the Future of Nuclear Weapons, 27.

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Ultimately, lingering doubts concerning French and German motives within the European integration effort and issues of national sovereignty regarding the relinquishing of control over national nuclear forces to a supranational EU/WEU governing authority will certainly ensure that the British reluctance to greater integration will continue. However, the fundamental British dilemma vis-à-vis the creation of a more substantial British presence within the European Union still draws its foremost reasoning from what Luigi Barzini has noted:

[W]hen one asks a Briton, any Briton, pointblank, ‘Are you European?’ the answer is always, ‘European? Did you say European? Er, er’ – a long thoughtful pause in which all other continents are mentally evoked and regretfully discarded – ‘Yes, of course, I’m European.’ This admission is pronounced without pride and with resignation.67

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III. FRANCE: THE AMBITIOUS PARTNER

There is no France of worth, notably in the eyes of Frenchmen, without worldwide responsibility. That is why she does not approve of NATO, which does not allow France her proper role in decisions and which is limited to Europe. That is also why she is going to provide herself with an atomic armament. By that means, our defense and foreign policy will be able to be independent, on which we insist above all.68

Charles de Gaulle

A. INTRODUCTION

The French desire to maintain the nation’s rank among the “great powers” of the world is an intrinsic element of France’s strategic culture. The decision to create an “independent” nuclear weapons program, the status provided by a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council, and territorial possessions that span across the entire globe all serve as expressions of “grandeur” for France. In the words of General Charles de Gaulle, “France cannot be France without grandeur.”69

The notion of France as a nuclear weapons state has been at the heart of the national self-definition since President Charles de Gaulle celebrated the detonation of France’s first atomic bomb at Reganne (Algeria) on 13 February 1960, exclaiming “Hurrah for France! Since this morning, she is stronger and prouder.”70 Indeed, the

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distinctive elements of French national security remain “the absolute need for independence in decision making, a refusal to accept subordination to the United States, the search for grandeur and rang, the primacy of the nation-state, and the importance of national defense.”71

However, France is a “great” nation, which peers back into its military history and notices a large share of defeats and disasters. The French place the blame for these military failures squarely on “being let down by others” and this perception has assumed the standing of ingrained national mythology in France. As a kind of remedy, Michael Quinlan has noted that nuclear weapons were essential because they are seen as the “grand equaliser” with which to deter stronger enemies and a guarantee that “France cannot be humiliated again.”72

B. FRANCE’S PLACE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN IDEA

At times, France’s aspiration to achieve grandeur on its own terms seems an odd fit when paired alongside its vision for “wider and deeper” integration within Europe. In Michael Howard’s words, “France was in fact the first Great Nation – militarily, economically, and culturally – and has never forgotten it ... even today it is difficult to visit Paris without experiencing a sense of cultural inferiority ... and the French themselves have no doubt that it is the greatest city in the centre of the most civilized


country in the world.”\textsuperscript{73} Within France, the “European” idea – from the confederal model envisioned by de Gaulle to the federal model preferred by Mitterrand – is seen as a means to “pursue France’s past glory and power by multiplying its influence.”\textsuperscript{74} Illustrating the existence of the “complementarity” between the competing visions of “grandeur” and “integration” within French diplomacy, Jolyon Howorth cites President de Gaulle’s words in 1962:

Owing to the fact that, for the first time in history, there are no longer any quarrels among European neighbours, France must help to build western Europe into an organised union of states so that, little by little, we can see the establishment, on either side of the Rhine, the Alps and perhaps the Channel, of an entity which, in political, economic, cultural and military terms will be the most powerful, prosperous and influential the world has ever seem.\textsuperscript{75}

In the near term, France’s motivation to pursue an organized union of European states rests on maintaining (in the case of Germany) or deepening (in the case of Britain) close relations with the other members of Europe’s “Big Three.” “France likes to see itself as the connecting rod between two sets of bilateral relations [with Britain and Germany], to which [President] Chirac would eventually, he implies, like to give equal weight.”\textsuperscript{76} However, when viewed from a longer perspective, France’s view of the future


\textsuperscript{74} Dominique Moisi, “The Trouble with France,” in Foreign Affairs 77, no. 3 (May/June 1998): 100.


\textsuperscript{76} “France and Britain: Amour propre?,” The Economist, 18 May 1996, 52.
of European integration and its political stance regarding security and defense affairs within the new Europe places the EU/WEU nexus at the center of the European security order. Indeed, a mature WEU is seen as a means to forge “the primary connection between the western, central and eastern Europeans; to form the basis of a European defense identity that can strengthen the European pillar of the Atlantic Alliance; and to provide a basis for expanding NATO membership eastwards without transforming it into a military alliance aimed explicitly at the Russian Federation.”

Despite a preference for autonomy in security and defense affairs, the French may be led to make compromises regarding their national sovereignty in an effort to ensure national security, avoid international isolation, and escape confinement to a clearly secondary rank in international politics. According to David S. Yost, “[m]any of the French are more prepared to accept integration in a West European defense framework in which they might have a pre-eminent role than integration in a NATO framework in which, many Frenchmen fear, France would be subordinated to the United States.”

C. POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

Since the end of the Cold War, Paris has increasingly resented American attempts to preserve or even increase US influence in European security matters. In response to this resentment, the creation of a European Security and Defense Identity was viewed by

77 James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and Economic Cooperation (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 249.

78 Yost, “France,” 272.
the French as a means to challenge the dominance of the United States within NATO Europe. The security architecture preferred by France for a new Europe anticipates the development of an ESDI within the European Union. The WEU, to some degree, would be subordinated to, or (France’s preference), be absorbed within, the European Union. Paris’ blueprint for building an ESDI relies on the strength of the Franco-German couple to provide it political clout, as well as more extensive Anglo-French collaborative efforts in the field of nuclear deterrence cooperation. The French hope that both sets of bilateral relations will eventually provide “a basis for the creation of a European nuclear deterrent, without which European autonomy in the defense field is impossible.”

Early on, French policies regarding the development of an ESDI were motivated by two factors: the collapse of the Soviet threat and the belief that the disengagement of US military forces from Europe was inevitable. Certainly, the collapse of communism in Eastern Europe, as well as within the former Soviet Union has provided a “low-risk” window of opportunity to “transform the European common market into a political union with responsibility for defense and security policy.” Despite US assurances to the contrary, President Mitterrand expressed concern about the possibility of America’s eventual return to traditional isolationist tendencies: “We don’t want to see American troops leave, but who knows what decisions will be made because of the economic

79 Sperling and Kirchner, 246-247.

80 Scott A. Harris and James B. Steinberg, European Defense and the Future of Transatlantic Cooperation (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 1993), 45.
difficulties facing the American leadership?" Due to the increased likelihood of a
return by the Americans to some form of isolationism, Europeans (mainly in France) felt
it essential on political and military grounds to develop European military capabilities
that could fill any void left by the United States.

However, the French approach to ESDI has evolved since the initial pressures of
domestic political and international events leading to the debates at Maastricht in 1991.
Indeed, France’s new interest in developing ESDI within NATO received its motivation
from several factors: the unification of Germany, the realization of the real value of the
Atlantic Alliance as demonstrated during the Gulf War and the Bosnia conflict; and the
political reality that attempting to develop ESDI outside of NATO was garnering little
support in the rest of Europe.82

D. THE FRENCH NUCLEAR DETERRENT FORCE

By the end of the 1950s, a decade marked by unsuccessful military actions in
colonial wars and the loss of political face in the 1956 Suez crisis, the French government
resolved to diminish its political-military dependence on the United States by developing
an “independent” nuclear deterrent. By developing and harnessing the power and status
provided by nuclear weapons, France expected to gain the ability to

81 “France, Germany Unveil Corps as Step Toward European Defense,” The Washington Post, 23 May


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deter aggression against the hexagon. The existence of the *force de frappe* – marked by the first operational nuclear Mirage IV bomber squadron in 1964 – was justified in the following terms: great power status, influence, independence, and national security. Moreover, nuclear weapons were considered symbols of technological and military prowess in the modern era and it was inconceivable to leaders in Paris that France not possess them.83 By earning France the respect of its allies and giving France a say in when to start or how to fight a nuclear war, the *force de frappe* allowed France to play the sort of leading role in the Atlantic Alliance that it felt it deserved.84

At the height of the East-West nuclear standoff, France’s leaders believed that neither the Americans nor the Soviets would be willing to run the risk of total destruction as a result of a global nuclear weapons exchange and that they would attempt to limit any war to the European continent. In the words of General de Gaulle, “[a] great state which does not possess [nuclear weapons] does not command its own destiny.”85 Consequently, “[t]he only way to prevent this...was for Europeans themselves (and this meant France) to possess atomic capabilities.”86 Indeed, the very essence of French strategy has been to shun any thought of linking the use of nuclear weapons to actual military operations, except in the most extreme circumstances of an East-West war or


84 Ibid., 141.

85 Charles de Gaulle, speech at Strasbourg on 23 November 1961 quoted in Ibid., 142.

86 Ibid., 141-142.
another contingency in which France’s independence or existence might be at stake. Instead, the French sought to deter an adversary from attacking French “vital interests” through what David Haglund calls “nuclear existentialism” — the mere existence of their nuclear arsenal. “In the case of France, the doctrine had a name that paid tribute to its adherence to nuclear existentialism, la dissuasion du faible au fort (the deterrence of the strong by the weak).”

The French model for nuclear independence differs from the British model. The French nuclear program was a reflection of Gaullism by demonstrating France’s strategic and technological independence from the United States. From initial weapons research to testing and production, France set out to construct an independent national nuclear weapons program. Notwithstanding the formidable technical challenges, the nuclear infrastructure requirements were enormous. According to Michael Quinlan, France “probably spent more than Britain by a factor of at least three or four, with heavy opportunity costs elsewhere.” Indeed, the “price of independence” for a nuclear arsenal represented between 0.4 and 1.2 percent of the gross domestic product and took up 30 percent of the defense budget annually for 30 years (1963-1992).

The result was a success in which France could take great pride, although the absolute purity of the French nuclear program from US technical assistance is a myth.

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According to a French commentator, Camille Grand, only "limited forms of cooperation" as a result of the 1961 US-France mutual defense agreement ever took place and "negative guidance" during the Nixon administration "remained on the whole very limited due to some American reluctance to cooperate extensively."\(^{90}\) However, "[a]ccording to former President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing, technical exchanges with the United States have helped France with miniaturization, multiple warheads, and hardening against electromagnetic effects; but the independence of France's strategic conduct and decision making has never been placed into question by this cooperation."\(^{91}\)

In any case, acknowledging the existence of a US-France nuclear connection may make it possible for analysts in Paris and London to look deeper into questions concerning what type of nuclear force a "second-tier" nation should maintain and how much nuclear collaboration between the two is enough to support an autonomous European defense policy. Another by-product of acknowledging the American-French nuclear connection would be to facilitate efforts towards collaboration and coordination in nuclear matters between France and Britain — an element of a fully autonomous common foreign security policy for the European Union.

Although the French triad (consisting of ballistic missile submarines, bombers and land-based missiles) has been cut back to a dyad consisting of only submarines and bombers, the nuclear deterrent force remains the centerpiece of France's military posture. The new Le Triomphant class ballistic missile submarine force will serve as the backbone


\(^{91}\) Giscard d'Estaing quoted in Yost, "France," 245.
of France’s strategic forces (See Table 2). However, due to the shrinking French military budget since the end of the Cold War, only four of the new generation SSBNs will be procured, instead of the six that had been envisioned originally.

**Table 2. Current and Planned French Ballistic Missile Submarine Force**

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<th>NAME</th>
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<tr>
<td>L’INFLEXIBLE M4 CLASS</td>
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<td>L’INDOMPTABLE</td>
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<td>September 1977</td>
<td>May 1980</td>
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<td>L’INFLEXIBLE</td>
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<td>April 1985</td>
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<tr>
<td>LE TRIOMPHANT CLASS</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>LE TÉMÉRAIRE (S617)</td>
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</tr>
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<td>LE VIGILANT (S618)</td>
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</tr>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------- (S619)</td>
<td>November 2005</td>
<td>July 2007</td>
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</table>

*Source: Jane’s Fighting Ships 1998-1999*

The French SSBN force will consist of only 4 active submarines. This entails decommissioning the older *L’Inflexible* class ballistic missile submarines one by one as the newer *Le Triomphant* class ballistic missile submarines enter active service. In June 1992, the Mitterrand government announced a significant shift in its nuclear operational doctrine. Instead of maintaining three SSBNs at sea at all times (as was French policy since January 1983), only two SSBNs will be required to be kept at sea in a “ready to fire” status.

President Mitterrand’s June 1992 announcement also lowered the alert levels for the second “leg” of the French deterrent which consists of dual capable aircraft of the
French Air Force and Navy. Since the retirement of the Mirage IVP strategic bomber in 1996, France’s nuclear air arm has consisted of the Air Force’s Mirage 2000N bomber and the Navy’s Super Étendard carrier-based fighter-bomber, both aircraft equipped with the Air-Sol Moyenne Portée (ASMP) supersonic air-to-surface missile.

In the wake of German unification and the political situation in Eastern Europe, ground-based short-range nuclear systems have become politically difficult to sustain in France. The French Army’s Pluton missiles were all withdrawn in 1992. The Hadès missiles, originally planned as successors for the aging Plutons were never placed in active service; in February 1996 President Chirac announced that the 30 Hadès missiles that had been produced and immediately placed in storage would all be dismantled. In September 1996, 18 silo-based S-3D IRBM on the Plateau d’Albion were deactivated at a cost of $77.5 million.

French politicians and analysts have argued that it remains important to preclude any situation that would leave Germany preoccupied with an apparent lack of nuclear protection or vulnerable to Russian nuclear coercion. In order to avert a gap between nuclear and non-nuclear EU members and to promote greater consensus with respect to nuclear deterrence, it has been suggested that France (along with Britain) must

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92 Yost, “France,” 262-263.


94 Yost, “France”, 262-263.

95 Arkin, Norris, and Handler, 42.
demonstrate a preparedness to make the necessary concessions for a credible West European nuclear consultation arrangement. This line of reasoning may have formed the basis for President Mitterrand’s 1992 call for a single European nuclear doctrine followed later in 1995 by the vague offers to devise a European dissuasion concertée involving the French deterrent. However, both attempts seem to have been made without prior consultations with Bonn or London.96

E. FRANCO-AMERICAN RELATIONS

Historically, the French have been seen by some Americans as difficult allies because of their insistence on maintaining their rank as, in the words of Jean-Pierre Chevènement, “indisputably, the world’s third military power.”97 “Although the French would clearly prefer to pursue military cooperation in a West European framework, disappointments in this domain – a lack of partners and resources commensurate with French ambitions and assessments of security requirements – may lead them to give more attention to partnership with the United States.”98 However, as Dominique Moïsi noted, “Paris and Washington are at once allies and competitors.” 99


98 Yost, “France,” 272.

Indeed, the collapse of the Berlin Wall precipitated a reawakening of French interest in “the idea of a Europe Européenne”\textsuperscript{100} — a notion first propounded by de Gaulle which implied Europe’s ability to play an autonomous role in international politics. At the end of the Cold War, France found itself in competition with the United States for a position of leadership in the new Europe. France’s desire for the EU to create a Common Foreign and Security Policy “although formally welcomed by Washington, clashes with the United States’ inclination to take the lead.”\textsuperscript{101} In Henry Kissinger’s words,

The adjustment of the internal relationships within the North Atlantic Alliance has been dominated by the perennial tug-of-war between the American and French views of Atlantic relationships. America has dominated NATO under the banner of integration. France, extolling European independence, has shaped the European Union. The result of their disagreement is that America’s role is too dominant in the military field to promote a European political identity, while France’s role is too insistent on European political autonomy to promote cohesion of NATO.\textsuperscript{102}

“One of the greatest disappointments for proponents of an ESDI within NATO,” according to Philip Gordon, “was the collapse of a French-American rapprochement that began in the early 1990s.”\textsuperscript{103} Because of the AFSOUTH debate and the American refusal to back the accession of Romania and Slovenia in the first round of NATO


\textsuperscript{101} Moïsi, “The Trouble with France,” 98.


enlargement, France felt unable to continue forward on the path to closer ties with NATO and the United States. Further complicating the construction of an ESDI within NATO, France announced in June 1997 that it would not go further in re-joining NATO’s integrated military structure in the foreseeable future due in part to the continuing AFSOUTH debate.104

The French rapprochement with NATO was genuine and promising because “the agreement between these two long-time antagonists within NATO for a time seemed likely, after more that thirty years of debate, to permit the creation of an ESDI within NATO that would have satisfied both countries.”105 Philip Gordon suggests that the “AFSOUTH dispute demonstrated the gap in thinking about ESDI that exists between France and the United States … [and] demonstrated the lack of trust that prevails between Washington and Paris even after the period of rapprochement of the mid-1990s.” 106 The failure to reach an acceptable accord to resolve the AFSOUTH dispute along with French resentment of American unilateralism means that for now France’s new relationship with NATO will remain incomplete.107

The task facing the United States is to maximize French involvement in an effort to ensure consent for the formation of transatlantic “coalitions of the willing” in the event


106 Ibid.

of serious threats to international peace and security. Formal military integration of French forces within NATO must matter less; actual contributions and mutually preferred outcomes must carry more emphasis.\textsuperscript{108} The US must do so without simultaneously sacrificing or downgrading crucial benefits to be gained from the formal integrated alliance structure. In any case, the rate of change in French diffidence will almost certainly continue to be slow and deliberate.

F. \textbf{FINAL REMARKS}

France’s declining defense budget, the move towards professional armed forces, the scrapping of previously sacred joint projects with the Germans, and a rapprochement with NATO does not signal any abatement of France’s traditional ambitions or “a return to status quo ante 1966.”\textsuperscript{109} While France is drawing closer to NATO, Alliance members should not be surprised to see France continue its policy of “NATO à la carte.”\textsuperscript{110} Nonetheless, it remains clear that French policies towards the US and NATO have changed. It is the depth of the changes that remains to be seen.

In the post-Cold War era, do the reasons that led France to develop an “independent” nuclear arsenal still apply? As Philip Gordon notes, “the relevance of the

\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{110} Ibid.
\end{itemize}
French nuclear force should be assessed in terms of the context in which it was built.”

The French deterrent, designed as a source of national pride and unity in a country that badly needed both, contributed to “winning” the Cold War as one more element of uncertainty for Kremlin strategists. Nuclear weapons have provided French leaders added strength with which to stake their claims to “great power” status and confidence in their ambitions to play an active role in the world. Recognizing the vital role nuclear weapons play as a symbol of French independence and national sovereignty, would France allow its “great power” status to be transferred to a supranational government based in Brussels? How does France maintain its status as an “independent” great power, while leading the march towards a common European defense within the European Union? As Luigi Barzini has noted:

The strain is sometimes evident. The insistent crowing...the demand that France be treated always as the foremost nation after the two superpowers, surely the first in Europe, the sometimes incoherent and contradictory foreign policy, complicate any relations with it as never before. Relations with it are further embroiled by the fact that it is admittedly true that it is still, in many ways, Numero Uno in continental Europe, whatever that may mean, and that Europe would be inconceivable without it.


112 Johnsen and Young, 86.

IV. GERMANY: THE INHIBITED PARTNER

The present-day world situation is such that one can only serve the interests of one's country by acting in concert with other countries....a new age is dawning in which men will look beyond the borders of their own country and work in fraternal co-operation with other nations for the true aims of humanity....This very task and the construction of a Europe dedicated to this goal afford a great mission for German youth.114

Konrad Adenauer

A. INTRODUCTION

Germany is well on its way to fashioning itself as a viable “partner in leadership” for the United States. Despite the fears in some quarters of a new German hegemony, the unification of Germany promoted, rather than hindered, efforts towards greater European integration and community-building within the Euro-Atlantic security area. “By forging close links with France, as well as, other European countries, Germany was able to aid the process of Atlantic consensus building.”115 The Federal Republic is leading the way towards a “wider and deeper” Europe partly because German leaders are finally adapting Germany’s economic weight into political presence.

At the end of World War II, the Germans were forced to surrender their national sovereignty and endure occupation by the four most powerful victorious states. As a result, Germany has already made the conceptual leap towards a strategic culture that would accept a loss of some measure of sovereignty to a supranational political entity to


gain a post-national European identity. Germans have evolved beyond the perils associated with national chauvinism out of necessity and have sought “safety in numbers” by incorporating themselves within organizations in the name of rebuilding German society and pursuing economic prosperity within Western institutions. In fact, the German Basic Law provides a constitutional mechanism for legally giving up powers associated with national sovereignty. As stated in Article 24 of the German constitution:

(1) The Federation may, by legislation, transfer sovereign powers to international institutions.

(2) For the maintenance of peace, the Federation may join a system of mutual collective security; in doing so it will consent to such limitations upon its sovereign powers as will bring about and secure a peaceful and lasting order in Europe and among the nations of the world.

(3) For the settlement of disputes between nations, the Federation will accede to agreements concerning a general, comprehensive and obligatory system of international arbitration.116

Today’s policymakers in Bonn/Berlin were inoculated (unlike their British and French colleagues) against national hubris as a result of having to bear the heavy burden of (and moral as well as political responsibility for) responsibilities for the atrocities committed by Adolf Hitler and the Nazis during World War II. As Elizabeth Pond has noted, “[t]he much more nationalistic French and English, having been spared such shame, still face the painful loss of narrow patriotism as the European Community (EC) assumes more authority.”117


Germany's attitude towards West European security and defense affairs has evolved over the years since unification. For example, in 1990, when the Persian Gulf war broke out, Germany was still marked by its Cold War reticence. Hesitant about the use of German military force abroad, Germany's leaders failed to demonstrate any interest in adopting a more prominent role in international security. However, since the Gulf War, the emphasis of Germany's external security policies has gradually shifted towards action as illustrated by the new willingness of German political leaders to adopt additional responsibilities more commensurate with the nation's "weight class."

B. GERMANY'S PLACE WITHIN THE EUROPEAN IDEA

After World War II, the West Germans were not allowed to establish armed forces until the Federal Republic of Germany had been admitted to the Brussels Treaty and NATO. Furthermore, these events were preceded by the Federal Republic's renunciation of options to build nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons in 1954. Thus far, the Federal Republic has shown no interest in a national nuclear deterrent and the 1954 commitments have been supplemented by those in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty and the "Two-plus-Four" Treaty on German unification. As a result of these commitments and other constraints, Germany has not conducted an energetic foreign policy proportionate to its economic might and at times has suffered the political consequences for this inability. This is why the country has been known for years as "an economic giant but a political dwarf."\(^{118}\)

In order to maintain the current European peace and bolster Europe's place in world affairs, it remains a German belief that the European nations should act as one as soon as possible. Collectively, Europe must patiently weave a net of counterbalancing ententes to preserve the balance of power. It is in this manner, Germans believe, that Europe would be most likely to speak with a collective voice in a strong and authoritative enough manner to make Washington listen carefully to the European point of view.

However, care should be taken not to exaggerate the extent to which Germany has changed since the end of the Cold War. Significant constraints on the role Germany plays on the international scene still exist. First, the memory of World War II has not disappeared — within Germany or its neighbors. Second, despite being buoyed by legitimacy as a result of the July 1994 rulings by the Federal Constitutional Court for the most recent troop deployments abroad, legal restrictions remain on the use of German military forces. For example, the Bundestag abroad must approve the use of German military forces before actual deployment abroad. Third, public opinion within Germany, which is still in the midst of East-West consolidation, is showing little change towards German participation in military operations beyond the Alliance area.\(^{119}\)

On the whole, Germans remain reticent about undertaking military operations abroad. Although a majority of Germans support the principle of military intervention under UN auspices, only 32 percent of those polled supported Bundeswehr participation

in NATO operations outside Germany. Moreover, only 20 percent supported German
military participation in UN-sponsored operations such as Desert Storm.\textsuperscript{120}

From the German perspective, a new Europe must be assembled with three
primary elements in mind. First, the self-containment of German military power remains
paramount in order that Germany may use its economic power to influence its European
neighbors in pursuit of German policy objectives. The second element is the creation of
an independent Europe capable of negotiating on an equal basis with the United States at
least on economic issues. Finally, the third element is the continued "demilitarization" of
Europe, which depends upon the sustained growth of democracy and free markets in the
former states of the Warsaw Pact.\textsuperscript{121} However, for the European project to truly succeed,
Germany must make a full recovery from its self-perpetuating fears of nationalism and
embrace a level of responsibility in European security and defense affairs more
commensurate with its standing in Europe.

C. POLICIES TOWARDS DEVELOPMENT OF THE EUROPEAN
SECURITY AND DEFENSE IDENTITY

German leaders face a dilemma within the implementation of their security
policies. On the one hand, Germany seeks to retain the American extended deterrent,
while on the other, it hopes to build a prosperous, politically stable and "independent"
Europe within an inclusive pan-European security system. How will Germany manage its

\textsuperscript{120} Philip H. Gordon, \textit{France, Germany and the Western Alliance} (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995),
91-92.

\textsuperscript{121} James Sperling and Emil Kirchner, \textit{Recasting the European Order: Security Architectures and
relations within and outside of Europe given that its national agenda contains aims that may not be simultaneously achievable? There is no "quick and painless" solution to this German security dilemma. The problem is too complex to be solved by simply choosing among the myriad of organizations available in Europe: NATO, the OSCE, the EU, and the WEU. In fact, German leaders often reject any notion that a choice must actually be made.122

Germany's continuous political balancing act is an effort to maintain the political equilibrium between Germany's relationship with NATO and its desire to pursue closer integration in security and defense matters with France. Each time Germany has supported NATO's agenda (for instance, integration into the Rapid Reaction Corps or co-sponsoring the North Atlantic Cooperation Council), Germany has also taken the necessary commensurate steps in the other direction in an effort to satisfy France (for instance, supporting the creation of the EUROCORPS and French proposals for ESDI). Thus far, the German strategic balancing act between the French and American positions has proven highly successful. Undoubtedly, German governments will seek to continue the balancing act between the American and French points of view for as long as possible. According to the former Foreign Minister Klaus Kinkel, "We cannot accept an 'either-or' situation."123 Consequently, the evolution of the WEU and the creation of the ESDI will most likely be pursued within the following constraints: Germany's

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122 Sperling and Kirchner, 256.

transatlantic relationship with the US must remain intact; and the expansion of the EU and the WEU will lead to incongruent memberships.\textsuperscript{124}

As Holger Mey has noted, "Germany will always have certain reservations with regard to the creation of a ‘purely’ European defense"\textsuperscript{125} because it is hard to imagine a European non-Article 5 contingency in which the United States has nothing at stake. Furthermore, Mey states, "Even if there are some scenarios in which Europeans would want to and could, go it alone, there are many scenarios in which at least the Germans would want the United States to be involved from the beginning. After all, what has begun as a non-Article 5 contingency may quickly and easily become Article 5 contingency."\textsuperscript{126}

Since the full development of the EU to become a supranational political union will probably not occur anytime in the foreseeable future, Germany must continue to play an active national role in security and defense matters, while the integration process continues. In the long run, many Germans view the WEU as the structural basis for a future ESDI. However, the WEU remains unable to support the types of military operations (including power projection) that NATO is still able to provide. Therefore, the priorities of Germany’s leaders remain in favor of a "long-term Europeanisation


\textsuperscript{125} Ibid.

\textsuperscript{126} Ibid., 315-316.
while keeping operational structures of transatlantic cooperation for the foreseeable future.” 127

D. GERMANY’S NUCLEAR POLICIES

From the very beginnings of the Cold War, the Federal Republic of Germany was strategically exposed. As the most important state on the front lines, West Germany was the most dependent on external protection and relied heavily on US nuclear guarantees of extended deterrence to counter the conventional and nuclear threats posed by the Warsaw Pact nations. However, the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, and German reunification have not altered Germany’s reliance on the nuclear qualities of the transatlantic relationship.

There are significant differences in approach and emphasis between Britain and France, the nuclear weapons states of Europe, and Germany, a non-nuclear weapons state but a burgeoning economic powerhouse. As nuclear weapons states, Britain and France each rely on their “independent” deterrents not only as an expression of national sovereignty but also to confer a degree of immunity on their national territories. Conversely, Germany has relied on others – namely the United States – for extended deterrence because Germany was the country most likely to suffer nuclear destruction if deterrence failed during the Cold War. “Committed to a non-nuclear status, Germans feel more comfortable with an American nuclear guarantee and are still not ready to accept

127 Gutjahr, 639.
such a guarantee from France — which is not being offered anyway.”

Consequently, the core of Germany’s foreign and security policy is the maintenance of close relationships with its neighbors within European security structures.

National nuclear deterrent capabilities or a nuclear security arrangement are especially important to a non-nuclear country like Germany that will not “have sufficient political weight and influence in any alliance with nuclear partners.”

Would a perception of US disengagement from Europe push Germany into assuming a more visible role in European security through the acquisition of a German nuclear deterrent? Among Germans, the repudiation of a German nuclear weapons capability cannot be underestimated. In fact, German scholars in strategic studies hold that no group in the German political spectrum would suggest that Germany acquire nuclear weapons, which would be seen as a violation of constitutional positions and international treaties.

Karl-Heinz Kamp has noted that “in light of today’s anti-nuclear tendencies in Germany, combined with [a] cautious attitude to military power in general, the possibility of a majority of Germans striving for nuclear weapons comes close to nil.”

Future German security policy will probably continue to be shaped in part by nuclear weapons as an element of the international political-military environment.

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128 Gordon, France, Germany and the Western Alliance, 90.


130 Ibid., 138.

According to the 1994 German Defense White Paper:

The role and importance of NATO’s nuclear arsenal have changed...[however] the presence of North American troops in Europe and an appropriate combination of conventional and nuclear forces at a much reduced level remain essential cornerstones of a collective and integrated defence based increasingly on multinational force structures.\textsuperscript{132}

The preceding statement implies a modified role for US nuclear weapons. However, the 1994 German Defense White Paper fails to specify any design in European defense affairs for a nuclear dimension in European construction.

Shortly before joining the Clinton Administration, Walter Slocombe, now the Under Secretary of Defense for Policy, wrote:

\begin{quote}
A unified Germany would not readily rely indefinitely on a British or French deterrent. The practical issue, therefore, is whether there will be US nuclear weapons in Europe — or German ones. So long as there is a reluctance to see German nuclear weapons, there will be a strong case for an American nuclear guarantee made manifest by the presence of nuclear weapons nearby.\textsuperscript{133}
\end{quote}

Maintaining a continuing American military presence in Germany, with conventional and nuclear forces, for as long as the Germans desire, remains an extremely valuable expression of the US security commitment to allies in Europe. US Nuclear weapons should remain in Germany as long as they are wanted and needed, because they serve also as symbols of political reassurance. Catherine McArdle Kelleher has noted that


“American leadership with Germany in NATO on more equitable terms and in more cooperating or coordinating nodes will be essential.”\textsuperscript{134}

Germany’s overriding principle is not to hold up the already demanding European integration agenda with a subject that is too complex to be solved in a prompt manner.\textsuperscript{135} German leaders have demonstrated that they attach no urgency to efforts to resolve critical issues with respect to the creation of a nuclear dimension of European construction. This low profile approach by the German government to the issue of a European nuclear deterrent may be explained to some degree by the magnitude of the economic and social problems related to German unification that remain more central preoccupations for German leaders. In any case, the extension of protection via the British and French national deterrents and the creation of a unified “sanctuary” that encompassed all the EU members would require deep and comprehensive integration and strategic planning, while also overcoming the present concepts of the nation-state.

E. GERMAN-AMERICAN RELATIONS

While serving as Defense Minister, Volker Rühe stated the following aims for the April 1999 NATO Summit as part of NATO’s new strategic consensus: balancing between preservation and innovation of the new NATO; ensuring the European and Atlantic dimensions of the Atlantic Alliance as a “partnership of equals;” and maintaining


\textsuperscript{135} Kamp, “Germany and the Future of Nuclear Weapons in Europe,” 287.
positive relations with Russia and Ukraine as NATO goes forward towards a new strategic consensus.\textsuperscript{136} Today, Germany needs NATO and the United States for many of the same reasons as during the Cold War, even though circumstances have changed in some fundamental ways. “German leaders are well aware that the presence of American troops in Germany not only serves to deter any aggression and prevent the ‘nationalization’ of European defense, but it also serves to reassure Germany’s neighbors, who would be uncomfortable without the Americans around.”\textsuperscript{137}

For the United States, one of the toughest adjustments during the post-Cold War era has been, and will continue to be, forming a new relationship with the Federal Republic of Germany — the key country in any future European enterprises. The postwar German-American relationship has gone through several phases: Germany as pupil; Germany as key NATO ally; and Germany as America’s strategic partner at the end of the Cold War. However, unification signalled the end of the informal, as well as formal political constraints and an ultimate reduction of security dependencies, leaving

\textsuperscript{136} Volker Rühe, “Europe’s Security in the Next Millenium,” speech given at Stanford University on 21 May 1998.

\textsuperscript{137} Philip H. Gordon, \textit{France, Germany and the Western Alliance} (San Francisco: Westview Press, 1995), 90.
Germany less affected in the long run by American choices and preferences.\textsuperscript{138} In the words of the former Minister of Defense Volker Rühe,

the history of the 20th century has taught us that the fates of Europe and America are intertwined. To each of us, events in Europe are just as important today as they were 10 or 20 years ago. Europe may no longer play the central role it used to in U.S. defense planning as an endangered continent, but it has become more important as an ally and a partner. I cannot think of a single major strategic issue where U.S. and European interests are opposed. And there is hardly a problem either of us faces that we would not be much better off facing together.\textsuperscript{139}

Germany remains a critical concern to many, in part because of its actual or potential predominance politically, economically, and militarily in Europe. The United States is still seen by many Europeans as the counterweight to a strong Germany and the guarantor of a continuing European balance.\textsuperscript{140} As the editor of \textit{Die Zeit} and a former director of the International Institute for Strategic Studies, Christoph Bertram has stated that "For Germany, the Alliance has had, and continues to have, a special function, namely that of making German power controllable and more acceptable to Allies and

\textsuperscript{138} Kelleher, \textit{The Future of European Security: An Interim Assessment}, 143.


political adversaries alike.”\textsuperscript{141} However, Europe’s delicate political balance is changing
and, as noted by Henry Kissinger,

\begin{quote}
In the years ahead, all the traditional Atlantic relationships will change. Europe will not feel the previous need for American protection and will pursue its economic self-interest much more aggressively; America will not be willing to sacrifice as much for European security and will be tempted by isolationism in various guises; in due course, Germany will insist on the political influence to which its military and economic power entitle it and will not be so emotionally dependent on American military and French political support.\textsuperscript{142}
\end{quote}

F. FINAL REMARKS

Within the new European community, the Germans are being forced by circumstance to abandon their dream of remaining an apolitical Switzerland writ large. Germany will increasingly be called upon to exercise leadership within NATO, the EU, the WEU, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Euro-Atlantic community. For Americans, recognizing the prospect of a “normalized” Germany playing a positive political role in European affairs is a step towards becoming true “partners in leadership.”\textsuperscript{143} However, for other Europeans, the rise of a unified Germany – revived and restored – is not always such a comforting sight.

Nevertheless, “[t]he more Germany’s partners accept Germany as a ‘normal state’ – with all due regard for its past and potential – and the more they [the other Europeans]

\textsuperscript{141} Yost, \textit{NATO Transformed}, 54.


\textsuperscript{143} Pond, “Germany in the New Europe,” 130.
join the Germans in their emphasis on multilateralism, the better the chances will be that Germany will stay on a steady course." 144 However, it remains a “tall order” to ask fellow Europeans to forget all that has transpired in the past, particularly Germany’s role in the tragic history of Europe in first half of this century. In spite of Germany’s efforts to assuage the fears of its neighbors in the European community, Europeans remain wary of a unified Germany. Coupled with the recent electoral loss of Helmut Kohl to Gerhard Schroeder on 27 September 1998, Europeans along with the rest of the international community will keep a watchful eye out for Germany’s political trajectory into the twenty-first century. As Luigi Barzini has noted:

> It is therefore once again essential for everybody, the French, the British, the Italians, the other Europeans, as well as the Americans and the Soviets, to keep an eye across the Rhine and the Alps and the Elbe in order to figure out, as our fathers, grandfathers, great-grandfathers, the ancient Romans, and remote ancestors had to do, who the Germans are, who they think they are, what are they doing, and where will they go next, wittingly or unwittingly. 145

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145 Barzini, 69.
V. PROSPECTS FOR NUCLEAR DETERRENT COOPERATION AMONG THE MAJOR WESTERN EUROPEAN POWERS

In the nuclear age, the ultimate guarantee of survival and independence is a credible deterrent. Western Europe could only dispense with the United States if it fielded a deterrent capability commensurate with the Soviet force reserved for Western Europe. Yet, how could Western Europe achieve this goal without true supranational integration?\textsuperscript{146}

Josef Joffe

A. BACKGROUND

In Western European security affairs, American nuclear commitments have been the supreme guarantor of security on the continent since 1949.\textsuperscript{147} In view of this nuclear legacy, American nuclear weapon systems and more importantly American nuclear commitments will continue to play a vital role within the evolving security architecture in Europe in the foreseeable future. Any lessening or withdrawal of US nuclear commitments would certainly have great ramifications for the present and future security landscape of Europe as well as the vitality of the transatlantic relationship. Indeed, the ongoing process towards the creation of an EU Common Foreign and Security Policy will sooner or later lead to questions of how to integrate British and French nuclear forces and how to make a non-nuclear Germany a partner within any future European security architecture.

In the period spanning the establishment of NATO to the demise of the Soviet Union, various attempts were made to establish alternate forms of nuclear trusteeship or

\textsuperscript{146} Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 54 (Spring 1984): 77.

cooperation by establishing greater West European defense cooperation. In 1957-1958, the French-Italian-German (FIG) negotiations, which included public agreements concerning conventional arms, were rumored to have broached a joint nuclear weapons production venture whereby French nuclear weapons programs would receive some financing from Italy and West Germany. By the time of General de Gaulle's election to the Presidency in 1958, the FIG negotiations had lost political momentum due to German reservations with respect to French intentions and the general uncertainty over the American position on the subject of sharing control over nuclear weapons. On the French side, de Gaulle immediately rejected West German collaboration in the French nuclear program on the grounds that development of the force de frappe should remain strictly a national endeavor. Nevertheless, as David Yost has noted, "even in the rather murky case of the French-Italian-German negotiations ... France's partners seem to have stressed that a stronger and more cohesive West European defense effort would still require alliance with the US."149

Despite the failure of the FIG negotiations, France and Germany remained involved in cooperative nuclear weapons planning because of their inherent responsibilities to provide some delivery means for US nuclear weapons based in West Germany. This cooperative arrangement existed until the French withdrew from NATO's integrated military structure effective on 1 July 1966. Although General de


149 Ibid., 35.
Gaulle envisaged a long-term role for the French strategic force at the European level, no concrete proposals were ever forwarded. In any case, de Gaulle’s next attempts to promote West European defense cooperation were the “failed” Fouchet Plan negotiations within the European Economic Community in 1960-1962 and the Franco-German (Elysée) Treaty of January 1963 with West Germany. The demise of the Fouchet Plan, a proposed West European political union with implied nuclear means, led to the successful efforts towards Franco-German rapprochement and the establishment of formal consultation mechanisms as a result of the Elysée Treaty.

In the early 1960s, the concept of a Multilateral Force (MLF) proposed by the Kennedy Administration broached the idea of bringing together an internationally manned fleet of nuclear-armed surface ships and submarines under the control of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (SACEUR). However, in 1965, the British unveiled the Atlantic Nuclear Force (ANF) as a counter to the MLF and proposed that internationally manned US and UK Polaris missile submarines operate within the NATO framework. The British proposal effectively denied any political momentum towards the MLF concept. Alastair Buchan, the MLF’s most ardent and effective critic, argued that control – not manning – should be the primary issue in forming nuclear deterrent policies and his detailed analysis published in 1964 exposed the frailty of the “nuclear-sharing” concept, which led to the MLF’s eventual demise. In place of the MLF and ANF, a

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consultation forum known as NATO's Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) was adopted with the goal of encouraging consultation on nuclear deterrent policies in the Alliance. The NPG still exists and remains effective today.

In the late 1960s, greater nuclear cooperation between Britain and France was considered, drawing its political impetus from the vague comments attributed to French President Georges Pompidou and Edward Heath, the British Conservative party leader. After Heath became Prime Minister in 1970, however, no further progress towards establishing deeper nuclear protocols between the two European nuclear powers is known to have taken place. As David Yost noted, "[i]f any negotiations on the possibility ever took place, they were probably frustrated by the clash between (a) the British principle of coordinating nuclear weapons planning with the US and NATO and (b) the French determination not to permit any such arrangements to interfere with France's complete liberty of decision regarding nuclear weapons employment."152

Throughout the 1970s and 1980s, there were several more attempts to gain some measure of cooperation in nuclear affairs among the West Europeans. In the early 1970s, the French sought closer nuclear ties with the British by offering to share development costs of the new French SLBM – MSBS M4 – portraying it as a European alternative to the US-built Poseidon SLBM.153 Instead, the British opted for their own indigenous payload package, the Chevaline, for their Polaris missiles, purchased from the United

152 Yost, Alternative Structures of European Security, 35.

States. In 1974 and 1975, the French plan to deploy Pluton missiles to West Germany met with failure because of the French objection to any type of German "double key" arrangement (veto power over the employment of the French nuclear forces).\textsuperscript{154} In October 1987, President Mitterrand reaffirmed France’s obligation to consult with Germany prior to the employment of French sub-strategic nuclear weapons on German soil.\textsuperscript{155} Furthermore, David Yost has noted that there have been various other ideas floated for a Western European nuclear planning group for consultations concerning the British and French deterrents that never reached the discussion table of governments.\textsuperscript{156}

Since the end of the Cold War, French officials have made two more proposals to consolidate British and French nuclear forces to form a nuclear dimension of European construction. In January 1992, President Mitterrand proposed studying a basis for a "European" nuclear doctrine through the following statement:

Only two of the twelve have an atomic force. For their national policy, they have a clear doctrine. Is it possible to conceive a European doctrine? This question will very rapidly become one of the major questions in the construction of a joint European defense.\textsuperscript{157}

Three years later, in January and February 1995, Alain Juppé (then Foreign Minister) first proposed the dissuasion concertée concept. In August/September 1995, French Prime


\textsuperscript{156} David S. Yost, \textit{Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons}, (Livermore, California: Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California, 1993).

\textsuperscript{157} François Mitterrand, speech given at the Palais des Congrès, Paris, 10 January 1992.
Minister Alain Juppé proposed the *dissuasion concertée* proposal in the midst of the diplomatic outcry attributed to President Chirac’s announcement that France would conduct a limited series of nuclear tests.

Both Mitterrand’s 1992 “Euro-doctrine” proposal and Juppé’s 1995 *dissuasion concertée* initiative suggested that France was disposed to seek a previously unthinkable degree of Franco-British nuclear cooperation by offering to “Europeanize” the French nuclear deterrent. While certainly not proposing “extended” deterrence, French officials believed that the *dissuasion concertée* initiative was not a suggestion for “shared” deterrence either. France has, since the very beginnings of its independent nuclear force, rejected any notion of “extended” deterrence. Likewise, “shared” deterrence is also not considered a viable option due to the lack of institutional control within an established supranational political union. When forced to interpret the meaning behind the *dissuasion concertée* initiative, Prime Minister Juppé preferred to emphasize a “relationship among equals” built upon the foundation laid earlier by the Franco-British Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine and also including Germany.158

Rather than the literal translation of ‘concerted deterrence’, David S. Yost suggests, an alternate translation of the French nuclear mindset concerning the *dissuasion concertée* initiative would be “deterrence supported by continuing consultation and substantive consensus.”159

158 Alain Juppé, speech given at the Institut des Hautes Études de Défense Nationale, 7 September 1995.

The rest of this chapter is devoted to analyzing the prospects for nuclear deterrent cooperation among Britain, France, and Germany. In May 1994, a WEU defense committee report titled “The Role and Future of Nuclear Weapons” stated:

...given the Maastricht Treaty’s declared intention of developing a common European foreign and security policy and European defence identity, the role of France’s and the United Kingdom’s nuclear weapons in this framework cannot be ignored. Sooner or later this issue will have to be considered.160

Despite the recent dialogue in nuclear matters among the major West European powers, there still exist substantial obstacles that must be overcome prior to achieving nuclear cooperation on a scale required to ensure a truly autonomous Europe. In terms of the WEU defense committee report, the “Eurodeterrent” question was deemed important because:

Europe must of necessity reach a decision in this matter. It would be unimaginable for the European Union to define a common foreign and security policy and at the same time for France and Britain to continue to insist on defining their vital interests as they perceive them, in isolation, protected by their strike forces...The debate on the European nuclear deterrent will be the moment of truth in the construction of a European political union.161

It is within this context that the Anglo-French relationship, the realities of the Franco-German couple, and the role of the Anglo-German partnership must be examined in an attempt to ascertain their effect on the creation of a nuclear dimension in European construction.


161 Ibid.
B. ANGLO-FRENCH COOPERATION

The response from London to the call from Paris for a single nuclear doctrine applied for a joint West European deterrent appeared skeptical to say the least. In response to Mitterrand's 1992 proposal, then British Secretary of State for Defence Minister Malcolm Rifkind responded:

For Europe and America to develop separate security strategies would be in the interests of neither continent... It is not in our interests to encourage any tendency towards thinking that there could be a major conflict in Europe in which the question of nuclear use arose which did not involve the vital interests of all allies including the United States.\(^{162}\)

Hence, Rifkind's statement is a clear endorsement of NATO nuclear strategy and also indicates that the role of the "independent" British deterrent remains as a second-center of decision making that complicates the decision matrix of any would-be aggressor. Although talks between London and Paris have explored the possibilities of a single European nuclear doctrine on a continual basis, they have failed to sustain any motive force beyond continued dialogue and cooperation on only the most basic and fundamental nuclear issues.\(^{163}\)

The forum for the continuing nuclear dialogue is the Anglo-French Joint Commission on Nuclear Policy and Doctrine, which was established in November 1992. The Anglo-French Joint Commission has facilitated increased dialogue and cooperation - however limited - in nuclear matters between Britain and France. The increased Anglo-


French nuclear cooperation seems to be based in part on the fact that as medium sized, or second-tier, nuclear powers, Britain and France are isolated in international arms control negotiations; both face pressures from non-nuclear weapon European states and US-Russian bilateral initiatives.\(^{164}\) Despite the lack of official documents and public statements from which to accurately measure the depth of the Franco-British nuclear relationship, both nations discovered that they possess more similar concerns vis-à-vis nuclear matters than was anticipated initially. In October 1995, Prime Minister Major and President Chirac issued a joint statement on nuclear cooperation declaring that aim of the Anglo-French dialogue in this area is “to mutually strengthen deterrence, while retaining the independence of our nuclear forces. The deepening of co-operation … will therefore strengthen the European contribution to overall deterrence.”\(^{165}\)

In December 1995, President Chirac again floated the “Eurodeterrent” trial balloon by repeating the offer to “Europeanize” the role of the French deterrent. However, the proposal suffered from poor timing and was perceived by the British and most other Europeans as a cynical attempt to wrap the French decision to resume nuclear testing in the protective garb of European unity.\(^{166}\) In spite of French overtures concerning the creation of a European nuclear dimension, British policy with regard to


the creation of a European nuclear dimension remains staunchly of the Atlanticist perspective.

London remains opposed to any form of nuclear deterrent cooperation that could separate the British deterrent from the structure of the Atlantic Alliance. Furthermore, British leaders remain quick to note that a “Eurodeterrent” is unnecessary based squarely on the fact that Britain’s nuclear deterrent, unlike France’s, has been committed since 1962 to a deterrence role for Britain’s non-nuclear European partners within the NATO nuclear consultations system. Britain’s NATO-centric attitude was evident in Rifkind’s 1992 Paris speech:

We are as committed as is France to the total operational independence of our deterrent...But we have regarded the commitment of forces as an important way of underlining the message that our deterrent is there for our non-nuclear Allies as well – that Britain would regard her own vital interest as at stake in any attack upon an Alliance member. The Alliance strategy provides for flexibility in the choice of response dependent on the circumstance.\(^{167}\)

Despite limited gains towards greater nuclear cooperation, Britain’s perspective remains that the Anglo-French Joint Commission plays only a minor political role and that future dialogue in this area should be confined to only the most basic bilateral consultations on nuclear policy. The foundation of the British attitude is the belief that NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group already provides a multilateral forum for consultation in nuclear deterrence matters involving Western Europe. Hence, if the French were truly serious about “Europeanizing” the role of the French deterrent, they should do so by upholding

the nuclear strategy of the Atlantic Alliance and becoming a member of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group.

On the other hand, leaders in Paris insist that French NPG membership would lead to an unacceptable level of subordination of French nuclear forces to the leaders in Washington. For France, non-participation in the NPG asserts French national sovereignty and reinforces a sense of autonomy in strategic planning. This approach plays to the French ideals of national independence and remains a major obstacle in nuclear cooperation because it restricts dialogue among the allies and hampers the development of a unified nuclear planning process. In fact, French participation in the NPG would not only strengthen the European pillar but also enhance the security of NATO Europe by making France’s nuclear commitment to collective defense less ambiguous. In fact, any flexibility demonstrated by France could lead to “previously unthinkable links to the NPG and perhaps other adjustments in France’s relationship with NATO.”  

However, a French reversal in the near term regarding active involvement in the NATO NPG remains unlikely. As Henry Kissinger has noted, “[t]he difference between the British and French attitudes towards their nuclear weapons was that Great Britain was prepared to sacrifice form to substance, whereas De Gaulle, in striving to reassert France’s identity, equated form with substance.”

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At the operational level, it has been suggested that Britain and France could achieve greater nuclear deterrent cooperation by coordinating nuclear missile submarine patrols and/or undertaking some form of joint targeting. However, the current nuclear doctrines of both countries demand that at least one submarine always remain deployed, so that a minimum national nuclear retaliatory capability is maintained. As long as there remains no room for maneuver within these areas, there is nothing including targeting, for a “European” version of NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (or an evolved and mature WEU for that matter) to coordinate. Only if each country agreed that its “vital interests” could be adequately guaranteed by the presence at sea of the other’s nuclear submarine force could the question of increased coordination become relevant. However, this would be a drastic departure from traditional strategic policy making in both countries. In fact, the cost savings would most likely be inconsequential when compared to the domestic political ramifications in London and Paris as a result of such a turn in nuclear security policy.

The recent attitudes towards cooperation in nuclear matters between London and Paris will remain pivotal in determining the future nuclear policies of both countries. However, the 1994 French Defense White Paper appeared to already acknowledge the

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172 Nicholas K. J. Witney, The British Nuclear Deterrent After the Cold War (Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation, 1995), 87.
obstacles impeding further progress towards greater West European nuclear cooperation, as well as the inevitable outcomes of the "Eurodeterrent" proposals:

The problem of a European nuclear doctrine is destined to become one of the major questions in building up a common European defence. The subject will become more acute with the European Union gradually realizing its political identity as well as its security and defence identity. This is as yet a remote prospect, but we should not lose sight of it. With nuclear potential, Europe's autonomy with regard to defence is possible. Without it, it is not...there will be no European nuclear doctrine, no European deterrence, until there are vital European interests, considered as such by the Europeans and understood as such by others.\textsuperscript{173}

Thus, from the French perspective, a European nuclear doctrine and deterrent remain an essential "final" ingredient for the development of an autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy for the EU. The planned downsizing of the British deterrent as stated in the 1998 Strategic Defense Review will provide France an almost 2 to 1 advantage in terms of nuclear warheads. If this numerical superiority led to French interests being accorded more political weight in the EU, and this in turn translated into French dominance in EU defense and political decision-making, the British would be hard pressed to continue their plans to go to a "minimal" deterrent and risk playing a subordinate role to France in the European security arena.\textsuperscript{174}


C. FRANCO-GERMAN COUPLE

The relationship between France and Germany has never been obvious and easily understood because diverging interests rather than a pursuit of a common point of view have defined the character of the Franco-German couple.\textsuperscript{175} As Peter Schmidt has noted, “France and Germany tend to agree much more on institution building than on hard-core policies.”\textsuperscript{176} Luigi Barzini accounted for the Paris-Bonn/Berlin axis in the following manner:

Three wars since 1870, all of them fought against Germany, cracked its comforting faith in its invincibility, and this is why France must now keep abreast of Germany, keep them under surveillance, maintain the most intimate relations with them, and hold them in an embrace as close as a stranglehold. If France cannot dominate Europe alone, it hopes that maybe two nations together might do so.\textsuperscript{177}

Furthermore, as Dominique Moïsi notes, the pairing of the Franco-German couple is inevitable mainly because both nations are “deeply aware that they must preserve it [the relationship], regardless of frustration, disillusion or even suspicion ...[because] no serious alternatives exist in Europe to their unique relationship.”\textsuperscript{178}

Since German unification, Presidents Mitterrand and Chirac have entertained the idea of establishing closer ties with Britain as a means to counter-balance the political and


\textsuperscript{177} Luigi Barzini, The Europeans (New York: Simon and Schuester, 1983), 154.

economic weight of Germany. Due to the reluctance of the British to embrace European integration wholeheartedly, the Franco-German couple has remained “the political motor of European integration.” However, the post-Cold War relationship between France and Germany has endured several periods of difficulties attributed to: Mitterrand’s initial coolness toward the prospect of a unified Germany in 1989-90; French annoyance over Germany’s early recognition of Slovenia and Croatia in 1991; and Germany’s displeasure when France, in 1995, resumed nuclear testing in the Pacific. Most recently, President Chirac’s announcement in February 1996 halting conscription within the French armed services, as well as, the intention to withdraw French troops stationed in Germany, once again threatened to place the Franco-German relationship in a precarious position.

In an attempt to soothe strained feelings and clarify the Franco-German defense relationship, President Chirac and Chancellor Kohl signed the “Franco-German Common Concept for Security and Defense” in December 1996. However, the accord contained ambiguities and produced additional fodder for debate within both countries for Atlanticist and Europeanist political movements alike by raising more questions than it answered. Within the “nuclear paragraph,” the accords’ most significant clause, the nuclear status quo in Europe is upheld with the acknowledgment that the strategic defense of Europe will continue to be guaranteed by the “strategic forces of the Alliance, particularly those of the United States. ... [while] the independent nuclear forces of the Britain and France ... [will continue the] independent deterrent role of their own,

contribute to deterrence and to the overall security of the Allies."\textsuperscript{180} Within France, the pursuit of a role for the French deterrent within the NATO Alliance is seen as a clear departure from the Gaullist maxims that have dominated French "grand" strategy since 1958. On the other hand, the accord has also made Germans anxious because of Chancellor Kohl's agreement to "open a dialogue on the role of nuclear deterrence within the context of European defence policy"\textsuperscript{181} — a move that could be construed as a weakening of the primacy of NATO within German security policy.

Several factors highlight the complexities of the Franco-German relationship. One of the most notable factors that separate France and Germany has been their distinct approaches towards relations within the NATO Alliance. German leaders view NATO as a means of reassuring fellow Europeans by confining Germany within a system, led by the US, but inside which Germany and the Germans have felt at ease. According to Ronald Asmus' 1996 RAND survey, nine in ten members of the German elite still regard NATO as essential for German security.\textsuperscript{182} However, it remains clear, as became evident during the recent AFSOUTH debate, that the objectives for France's vision of "United Europe" as pursued by President Chirac are not in any way to enter NATO's existing military structure but rather to reform it radically. Concerning the recent French rapprochement with NATO, Chancellor Kohl stated in February 1998 that "in the long


\textsuperscript{181} \textit{The Economist}, "Otanising," 8 February 1997, 53.

term, for Europe to enjoy its full scope of action in the security and defence spheres, France will, of course, have to reintegrate into NATO's military structures.”

Differing national attitudes towards participation in the Alliance’s integrated military structure is another factor that separates the Franco-German couple, because of the French belief that this structure is dominated by the US. Since France’s withdrawal from NATO’s integrated military structure in 1966, Paris has been selective about participating in military command structures not of its design. This distaste for “subordinating” French forces to US-led defense efforts in Europe certainly differs from German security policies that dictate military integration to the maximum levels possible. Moreover, unlike France, Germany has not pursued a national nuclear option.

For French leaders in the habit of making nuclear decisions exclusively within a France-first mindset, any critique originating from Bonn/Berlin concerning France’s nuclear force posture and/or doctrine would certainly be received with a less than cordial demeanor. In fact, any perception that French leaders were receiving or taking policy direction regarding the French nuclear deterrent from Washington, London or Bonn/Berlin would surely produce problems domestically for the leadership in Paris. Indeed, President Chirac was criticized for his statement in February 1996 implying that one of his reasons for eliminating the Hadès missiles was to respond to concerns expressed by Chancellor Kohl.

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Finally, there is a growing concern in France and Germany that further discussions and/or implementation of the “Eurodeterrent” proposal might jeopardize support for nuclear deterrence in both countries.\textsuperscript{185} Even after the Cold War, German leaders still regard NATO’s nuclear posture, the extended deterrence protection provided by the US, and the regime of Alliance nuclear cooperation as crucial for European security. To a lesser extent the same seems to hold true in France. In fact, France’s attempts to bring about a rapprochement with NATO seemed to be a rather frank and grudgingly given admission that, in order for Europe to be more European tomorrow, France must accept NATO’s significant role in Europe today. Members of Germany’s political and academic elite have expressed similar judgements. In their view, that further discussions on the future of nuclear weapons would be detrimental to the already tenuous acceptance of nuclear deterrence in the new Europe.\textsuperscript{186} Thus, any new debate on such a disputed topic may lead to further erosion of the already fragile nuclear consensus in France and Germany.

\textsuperscript{185} Ibid.

D. ANGLO-GERMAN PARTNERSHIP

As NATO allies and European Union members, Britain and Germany are often said to enjoy “a silent alliance.”\(^{187}\) Since the 1960s, the “silent alliance” has worked closely together to develop a “common” European position (albeit minus France) on nuclear forces and arms control in NATO Europe. Consequently, a working relationship has developed between Britain and Germany that most of the time remained reserved, while at other times has suffered from being taken too much for granted.\(^{188}\)

In fact, “the presence of both countries in Europe’s two foremost political associations should make statements of shared commitments to democracy, the rule of law, peace, prosperity and free trade redundant; however, no concrete and exclusive arrangement defines their bilateral relationship.”\(^{189}\) As peer competitors seemingly headed in the opposite direction, Britain has had to deal with a unified Germany that has gradually taken over the role as America’s leading political and economic partner in Europe.\(^{190}\) In fact, the influence of Britain’s “special” relationship with the US has waned, and as illustrated by the American offers to Germany of the role as “partners in

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\(^{189}\) Foster and Schmidt, 1.

leadership” in new Europe. As the quest for a new European order continues to march forward to the drumbeat of the European Union, several reasons are presented to explain Germany’s indifference on the subject of a Franco-British nuclear umbrella in the European context.

First of all, Germany has indicated little interest in an independent West European nuclear deterrent, based on a strategic triangle of London-Paris-Bonn/Berlin. “For Germany, half-way measures — a loose association with British or French nuclear systems...would not do...because the British and French forces are small and designed for last-ditch retaliation.” Although Britain has “expressed no formal nuclear assurance to the Federal Republic of Germany...beyond that already implicit in the terms of the Brussels Treaty and the North Atlantic Treaty,” Michael Quinlan has noted, “full British commitment to NATO gave the [British nuclear] capability a particular Alliance dimension.” In any case, Germany cannot be expected to take kindly to any attempt by France and Britain to award themselves leadership roles within the EU solely on the strength of their nuclear capabilities.

Another reason for German apathy vis-à-vis a “Eurodeterrent” can be attributed to the overall confidence with which Germany holds the security guarantees provided by America’s nuclear deterrent compared to those which might be offered by the British


and/or the French. From the German point of view, US nuclear guarantees have always been regarded as the nuclear umbrella that protected NATO Europe from invasion by the USSR during the Cold War. Some Germans have declared that the US nuclear commitment constitutes a more effective deterrent than a collective and much less powerful European deterrent because "by definition, lesser powers cannot guarantee the security of a greater power." Beyond that, US nuclear guarantees are seen as the cornerstone of the US commitment to Europe, a key link with the only remaining superpower after the Cold War.

Edward Foster and Peter Schmidt have noted another factor that highlights the division between Britain and Germany — the national approaches to the further development of the EU/WEU and a Common Foreign and Security Policy. In this regard, Germany has supported a more "systematic" approach towards the development of EU/WEU policies by balancing the problems of creating a CFSP with the notion that the EU states have already agreed to build "an ever closer union." In fact, the Germans seem "to draw strength from the philosophical conviction that they are acting as serious and courageous builders" of a new European order. On the other hand, the British approach has been more "matter-of-fact" with each discussion concerning European integration riddled with inconvenient questions, which serve to illuminate the overall


195 David S. Yost, Western Europe and Nuclear Weapons (Livermore, California: Center for Security and Technology Studies, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, University of California, 1993), 18.

196 Foster and Schmidt, 17.
difficulty of creating a common European defense policy. Overall, Britain’s incessant attention to the EU’s lack of benefits and military capabilities invariably seems to point back towards Britain’s historically reluctant attitudes towards a permanent engagement on the European continent.

Finally, in light of the historical events in the first half of this century, the thought of a resurgent and unified Germany with strategic capabilities provided by nuclear weapons makes the British (as well as the French and other Europeans) very uneasy. The principal motive behind the 1995 dissuasion concertée initiative was to ensure that Europeans (led by France) maintained an alternate response in the event that the US should reduce its nuclear commitments to NATO Europe, while to some extent also denying nuclear capabilities to Germany.197

E. FINAL REMARKS

Ultimately, the ongoing process of creating an autonomous CFSP for the EU must answer the question of how to integrate British and French nuclear forces into a future European security architecture that includes thirteen or more non-nuclear weapons states. If such a nuclear arrangement were ever to exist, a supranational Brussels leadership backed by the London-Paris-Bonn/Berlin strategic triangle might be required to assume the full scope of Washington’s responsibility for nuclear deterrence in Europe. However, for the “Eurodeterrent” to become something other than a conceptual model adapted from

past attempts at cooperation and collaboration regarding the nuclear lever, several essential elements would be needed that currently still do not exist — including a truly common executive and a supranational political union.

Although Britain and France have debated the issues at the highest political levels, no “common” nuclear doctrine has been adopted. Instead these bilateral talks have apparently managed to brush only the surface of the problems associated with West European nuclear cooperation because of an inability to get beyond mere exchanges of national views and positions. Therefore, at least in the foreseeable future, it remains unlikely that concerns relating to national sovereignty will be successfully overcome to allow more effective nuclear deterrent cooperation among the major Western European powers. In Josef Joffe’s analysis, the development of a nuclear dimension of European construction is a problem that:

...cannot be solved by postulating that a dramatically increased demand for self-sufficiency in matters nuclear would finally push West Europeans toward political community. If anything, the opposite is true. Precisely because nuclear weapons have become the *ultima ratio*, they touch the very core of national sovereignty. When the existential crunch comes, no country is likely to risk its physical survival on behalf of another. Therefore no country, if given a choice, will entrust its physical survival to another, let alone to European Community-type bureaucracy.\(^{198}\)

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\(^{198}\) Joffe, 71.
VI. CONCLUSION

Western and Central Europe is a potentially awesome centre of power: a continental superstate would rival the United States in terms of wealth and population ... [the] EU state would possess all the economic, diplomatic, and military prerequisites for the creation of a political superpower.199

C. Dale Walton

Indeed, an independent European government backed by a fully autonomous Common Foreign and Security Policy would be free to pursue its own international agenda with greater latitude and less deference to the inclinations of the United States. Leaders in Washington would have less political weight or strategic leverage with which to negotiate with the leaders of a “true” European Union. However, the biggest hurdle that impedes the creation of a “United States of Europe” still remains: From what context do the European Union’s policies originate? How is EU policy made? Who makes policy for the EU? For now, political leaders in London, Paris, and Bonn/Berlin have more influence on the direction of the EU than any leader of a “supranational” EU organization such as the European Commission in Brussels.

In fact, the contrasts among Britain, France, and Germany in terms of identities, interests, and commitments are far from trivial enough to allow successful integration, for now, within a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union and the Western European Union. As Peregrine Worsthorne noted, “Nations, like individuals, are creatures of habit. ... They like to do what comes naturally; respond to ancestral

voices."\textsuperscript{200} Among Europe's "Big Three", little consensus to date can be found on the "course and speed" of integration efforts in European security and defense affairs. Western Europe still remains, in Stanley Hoffmann's words, "a collection of largely self-encased nation states...If the hostilities entailed by separate pasts appear to have evaporated, [Western Europe's] separate pasts have not."\textsuperscript{201} These "separate pasts" mean that the major states of Western Europe interpret events in the light of distinctly different lenses — contrasting definitions of interests and priorities.

Meanwhile, the European reliance on US conventional warfighting assets (including C4I and strategic lift) and, more importantly, the US nuclear umbrella, has fostered attitudes favorable to maintaining US engagement in Western European security affairs within the NATO context. Consequently, in the near term, ESDI will remain a means of strengthening the European Pillar within the Atlantic Alliance, not a program for dividing the European Allies from the Unites States. Similarly, the WEU allies, for now, will rely on NATO for collective defense and remain concerned with the "Petersberg tasks," while awaiting a potential political push towards a merger with the EU, as its defense arm.

In the final analysis, due to the complexity of the issues involved in creating a multinational European nuclear doctrine and deterrent, the issue of creating a nuclear dimension of European construction should be considered the "anchorman" vice the


\textsuperscript{201} Stanley Hoffman cited in Josef Joffe, "Europe's American Pacifier," \textit{Foreign Policy}, no. 54 (Spring 1984): 77.
“pacesetter” in the development of the EU’s Common Foreign and Security Policy. Indeed, Britain and France have buttressed national sovereignty by “independent” deterrents that serve their respective national interests, while also contributing to NATO Europe’s overall deterrence posture. Britain and France are in no rush to give up their intrinsic rights of national sovereignty with respect to managing their national deterrents. Similarly, Germany is in no hurry to give up its American nuclear guarantees for the unknown qualities of guarantees provided by a collaborative Anglo-French nuclear effort.

This seems just as well because the problem of “devising strategically credible and politically satisfactory multilateral nuclear control mechanisms among sovereign governments”202 with distinct national agendas also ensures that the probability of effective nuclear deterrent cooperation between Britain, France and Germany remains low in the foreseeable future. However, the main problem of establishing a nuclear dimension of European construction is not doctrinal or technical; the “Eurodeterrent” question remains one highlighted by a difference in strategic cultures among Europe’s “Big Three.” As Noel Malcolm has concluded:

The basic facts of linguistic, cultural, and geographic difference make it impossible to imagine federation-wide mass politics ever becoming the dominant form of political life in Europe. Instead, the pursuit of national interests by national politicians will continue at the highest “European” levels. ... The art of “European” politics, on the other hand, will be to do nothing more than dress up national interests as if they were Europe-wide ones.203

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