THESIS

PROPOSAL FOR A STANDING MEDITERRANEAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

by

Aaron D. Weiss

December 1998

Thesis Advisor: Richard J. Hoffman
Associate Advisor: Brad R. Naegle

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited
**Proposal for a Standing Mediterranean Amphibious Force for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization**

**Weiss, Aaron D.**

**Naval Postgraduate School**
Monterey, CA 93943-5000

The views expressed in this thesis are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the Department of Defense or the U.S. Government.

Approved for public release; distribution is unlimited

This thesis examines the need for a Standing Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean (STAPHIBFORMED) and proposes a distinct European maritime force, under NATO auspices, to compliment US presence in the Mediterranean and, when necessary, to act as a substitute. The United States looks to simultaneously share some of the European regional security responsibility with its Allies while still maintaining its influence with security matters. Concurrently, European nations have reduced their defense budgets and, in the spirit of Maastricht, look to rely on multinational defense organizations for both economic and political reasons.

The STAPHIBFORMED concept is a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operations that facilitates resource-sharing and permits Europeans to undertake some missions without direct US involvement. Such a force promotes a distinct European Security and Defense Identity, reflects the new NATO Strategic Concept, and helps to satisfy the American desire to share more of the European regional security burden with Europe.
PROPOSAL FOR A STANDING MEDITERRANEAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE FOR THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

Aaron D. Weiss
Captain, United States Marine Corps
B.A., Northwestern University, 1992

Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

MASTER OF SCIENCE IN MANAGEMENT

from the

NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
December 1998
ABSTRACT

This thesis examines the need for a Standing Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean (STAPHIBFORMED) and proposes a combined European maritime force, under NATO auspices, to compliment US presence in the Mediterranean and, when necessary, to act as a substitute. The United States looks to simultaneously share some of the European regional security responsibility with its Allies while still maintaining its influence with European security matters. Concurrently, European nations have reduced their defense budgets and, in the spirit of Maastricht, look to rely on multinational defense organizations for both economic and political reasons.

The STAPHIBFORMED concept is a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operations that facilitates resource-sharing and permits Europeans to undertake some missions without direct US involvement. Such a force promotes a distinct European Security and Defense Identity, reflects the NATO Strategic Concept, and helps to satisfy the American desire to share more of the European regional security burden with Europe.
# TABLE OF CONTENTS

## I. INTRODUCTION ................................................................. 1

A. BACKGROUND .................................................................. 2  
B. OBJECTIVES .................................................................. 4  
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS .................................. 6  
D. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS ............................... 7  
E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY ............................................. 8  

## II. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN ............. 13

A. ANCIENT AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY .................................... 13  
   1. Greece at Troy ....................................................... 13  
   2. Persia at Marathon ................................................. 14  
B. EARLY 20TH CENTURY AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY .................. 15  
   1. Gallipoli ............................................................... 16  
   2. Corfu ................................................................. 17  
C. MODERN AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY .................................... 17  
   1. Suez Crisis ........................................................... 18  
   2. Operation BLUEBAT—Lebanon 1958 ......................... 20  
   3. Cyprus ............................................................... 21  
   4. Libya ................................................................. 22  
   6. Somalia ............................................................... 24  
   7. Liberia ............................................................... 26  
   8. Albania .............................................................. 26  
   9. Sierra Leone ......................................................... 28  
D. AMPHIBIOUS CONCLUSIONS .......................................... 29  

## III. ANALYSIS .................................................................. 35

A. GLOBAL THREATS ......................................................... 35  
B. MEDITERRANEAN THREATS .......................................... 39  
C. UNITED STATES ........................................................ 44  
D. EUROPE ................................................................. 48  
E. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION .................... 55  
   1. NATO's Legal and Moral Authority ......................... 57  
   2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue .......................... 61  
   3. Reaction Forces ................................................... 63  
   4. Combined Joint Task Force .................................. 65  
F. ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS ............................................. 67  

## IV. MEETING AMPHIBIOUS REQUIREMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN .... 69

A. UNITED STATES ........................................................... 70  
B. ITALY ................................................................. 71  
C. FRANCE ............................................................... 73  
D. UNITED KINGDOM .................................................. 75  
E. NETHERLANDS ....................................................... 77  
F. SPAIN ................................................................. 78  
G. TURKEY .............................................................. 80  
H. GREECE ............................................................. 81  
I. PORTUGAL ........................................................... 83  
J. PPP NATIONS .......................................................... 83  

vii
LIST OF FIGURES

Figure 3-1. NATO Reaction Forces........................................ 64
Figure 5-1. STAPHIBFORMED Force Structure..................... 106
Figure 5-2. STAPHIBFORMED Command Structure................... 106
Figure 5-3. STAPHIBFORMED Operational Control................. 107

LIST OF TABLES

Table 5-1. STAPHIBFORMED Responsibilities.......................... 102
### TABLE OF ABBREVIATIONS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AAV</td>
<td>Amphibious Assault Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACE</td>
<td>Allied Command Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AF SOUTH</td>
<td>Allied Forces Southern Europe (now RCSOUTH)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AMF</td>
<td>ACE Mobile Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARRC</td>
<td>ACE Rapid Reaction Corps</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ARG</td>
<td>Amphibious Ready Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAFMED</td>
<td>Combined Amphibious Forces Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C²</td>
<td>Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C⁴T</td>
<td>Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CATF</td>
<td>Commander Amphibious Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCATF</td>
<td>Commander Combined Amphibious Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CC</td>
<td>Component Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCNAV</td>
<td>Component Command Naval Forces Southern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CFSP</td>
<td>Common Foreign and Security Policy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Combined Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CCLF</td>
<td>Commander Combined Landing Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CLF</td>
<td>Commander Landing Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CSCE</td>
<td>Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (renamed OSCE as of Jan 1995)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DSACEUR</td>
<td>Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ESDI</td>
<td>European Security and Defense Identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EU</td>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>EUROMARFOR</td>
<td>European Maritime Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAWEU</td>
<td>Forces Answerable to the Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>IRF</td>
<td>Intermediate Reaction Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JSRC</td>
<td>Joint Sub-Regional Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LAV</td>
<td>Light Armored Vehicle</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>LCAC</td>
<td>Landing Craft Air Cushioned</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MBT</td>
<td>Main Battle Tank</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MC</td>
<td>Military Committee</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MEU (SOC)</td>
<td>Marine Expeditionary Unit (Special Operations Capable)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NAC</td>
<td>North Atlantic Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NATO</td>
<td>North Atlantic Treaty Organization</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEO</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation Operation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NSS</td>
<td>National Security Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NMS</td>
<td>National Military Strategy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSCE</td>
<td>Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PfP</td>
<td>Partnership for Peace</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Full Form</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>--------------</td>
<td>-----------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RC</td>
<td>Regional Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RCSOUTH</td>
<td>Regional Command South</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>RRF</td>
<td>Rapid Reaction Forces</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SACEUR</td>
<td>Supreme Allied Commander Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SIAF</td>
<td>Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STAPHIBFORMED</td>
<td>Standing Amphibious Forces Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAVFORCHAN</td>
<td>Standing Naval Forces Channel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAVFORLANT</td>
<td>Standing Naval Forces Atlantic</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAVFORMED</td>
<td>Standing Naval Forces Mediterranean</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAVFORMIN</td>
<td>Standing Naval Forces Minesweeping</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STANAVMCMFOR</td>
<td>Standing Naval Mine Counter-Measures Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STRIKFORSOUTH</td>
<td>Naval Striking and Support Forces Southern Europe</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>STUFT</td>
<td>Ships Taken Up From Trade</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UKNLPHIBGRU</td>
<td>United Kingdom/Netherlands Amphibious Group</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UN</td>
<td>United Nations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WEU</td>
<td>Western European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>WMD</td>
<td>Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
I. INTRODUCTION

In February 1998, the 24th Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) departed the Mediterranean Sea for duty in the Persian Gulf. During the two months the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) was engaged, the Mediterranean basin was left without an amphibious force capability. When regional instability requires a US response elsewhere, it may be necessary for the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), specifically the European pillar, to fill the lacuna left by the United States.

This thesis examines the need for an amphibious capability in the Mediterranean region, analyzes the European Forces available to provide that capability, and proposes a NATO Standing Mediterranean Amphibious Force capable of operating with or without the United States. The Standing Force ties to the long, rich, amphibious tradition of the Mediterranean, but also is a response to the region's history of instability. The proposal responds to the current military and political climate in Europe by enhancing the development of a European Security and Defense Identity and multinational defense structures. The proposal also enables the United States to encourage the Europeans to take a larger role with regional security
issues, while maintaining the American leadership role in NATO. Ultimately, Europe and the United States should work as equal partners to ensure peace, stability, and security to the entire region.

A. BACKGROUND

With the mid-20th century replacement of traditional Mediterranean naval powers—such as the UK, France, and Italy—with NATO, the United States has become the primary guarantor of political and military stability in Europe and the Mediterranean. In the decade following the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the US has continued to provide the military potency that has promoted peace, economic growth, and stability in NATO states of the Mediterranean. With fixed defense budgets projected into the next century and a rising demand for US forces in regions such as the Persian Gulf and Asia, the US looks to mitigate growing demands for air and sea capability needed to defuse future Mediterranean crises before they endanger Western interests.

As Europe moves towards the Maastricht goals of closer economic and political unity, it aspires for, but still struggles to achieve, a distinct European Security and
Defense Identity (ESDI). European nations face flat or decreasing defense budgets and look toward multilateral military structures as a method to enhance cooperation and minimize their individual deficiencies. Nevertheless, Europe recognizes "that security in Europe is closely linked with security and stability in the Mediterranean."¹ Those threats include religious fanaticism in the Maghreb, unrest in the Middle East, and economic disparity between northern Mediterranean nations and the remainder. The problems of the region can be attributed to the difficulty in reconciling the development of religious, cultural, and economic pluralism with the demands that this poses in terms of civil rights, accountability, and political succession. Consequently, for the majority of nations in the Mediterranean, security is more a question of internal stability than an external military matter. The European Union (EU) attempts to provide stability via dialogue with non-EU Mediterranean countries through the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership.

NATO also gives attention to a Mediterranean Dialogue as part of their overall cooperative approach to security.

¹ NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (98)59, Ministerial meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 28 May 1998
A November 1997 RAND study of Mediterranean security revealed that the region "has acquired increasing strategic importance in recent years, and in the context of growing instability in the southern and eastern Mediterranean, NATO's vital security interests may be affected." Not coincidentally, NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept calls for a framework that will enable the Alliance to respond effectively to the changing security environment by providing the forces and capabilities needed to deal with a wide spectrum of risks and contingencies. A NATO-led European expeditionary force may best reflect the Mediterranean security requirements of Europe, NATO, and the United States alike.

B. OBJECTIVES

This thesis will examine the necessity for and feasibility of a Standing Mediterranean Amphibious Force (STAPHIBFORMED) within NATO. Critical attention will be directed at the historical precedents and current trends of the region, determining amphibious capability in the region and the role a European Expeditionary Force could play in the 21st century. Creation of any ESDI within NATO "aims to

---

reconcile greater European autonomy in security and defence matters with the maintenance of the transatlantic link.\textsuperscript{3} The formula gives the Europeans more of a voice in Alliance decision-making and provides the military arm of the European Union (EU), the Western European Union (WEU), the tools needed to carry out its own missions. Since the US refuses to commit forces unless they are part of an operation using the NATO integrated command structure or as part of a Combined Joint Task Force, Europeans must consider operating without access to American capabilities, such as strategic logistics and airlift that are essential to success in force projection missions. Therefore, the Europeans will need to develop independently or have access to NATO (and US) resources and infrastructure through cooperation under ESDI. Lastly, an examination of STAPHIBFORMED's autonomy will be made with respect to American foreign policy to determine whether such an assemblage should assume a complimentary, secondary, or independent role to American expeditionary forces.

\textsuperscript{3} Luis Maria de Puig, "The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO." NATO Review, Summer 1998: 6
C. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS

Any organizational proposal presupposes that the political, economic, and military status quo of Europe and the United States will be maintained and that resources, leadership, and political structures will remain intact. Any number of unforeseen events could upset the European "apple cart," such as nuclear terrorism, alliance enlargement difficulties, or the removal of a democratic government. European states are engaged in a process that is slowly moving towards an ever-tighter federation, both politically and economically. This paper assumes that European cooperation and integration, both domestic and military, will continue and the European Monetary Unit will be introduced as scheduled.

Limitations of the thesis are the relative inexperience of the author in the field of European relations and the workings of NATO. Other than duty with a Marine Expeditionary Unit attached to the 6th Fleet, the author has never served in a NATO command. Planned release of a new Strategic Concept at the April 1999 Washington Conference,⁴ as well as NATO's rapidly changing political

⁴ Jan Petersen, "NATO's Next Strategic Concept," NATO Review, Summer 1998: 18
and military climate, could antiquate the basis of this thesis.

D. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS

Although official definitions note subtle differences, the terms Expeditionary, Amphibious, and Maritime are used interchangeably throughout this document. Each definition, according to Joint Pub 1-02 DoD Dictionary, is listed.

AMPHIBIOUS FORCE is defined by both NATO and DoD as:

A naval force and landing force, together with supporting forces that are trained, organized, and equipped for amphibious operations.

EXPEDITIONARY FORCE is defined by DoD as:

An armed force organized to accomplish a specific objective in a foreign country.

MARITIME FORCE is defined by both NATO and DoD as:

Power projection in and from the maritime environment, including a broad spectrum of offensive military operations to destroy enemy forces or logistic support or to prevent enemy forces from approaching within enemy weapons' range of friendly forces. Maritime force may be accomplished by amphibious assault operations, attack of targets ashore, or support of sea control operations.

Amphibious ship descriptions are broken into two broad categories: "big deck" and "small deck." Big deck
amphibious ships refer to helicopter assault ships (LHA, LHD, and LPH-class) that have enough deck and hanger space to embark a reinforced helicopter squadron and can conduct waterborne assaults using assault craft from the well deck. Big deck can also refer to CV or CVN class aircraft carriers, though these ships have no organic waterborne assault capability. Small deck ships refer to LPD, LSD, LKT, LST, and LSL-class ships that have only a nominal heliborne capability (usually one or two helicopters) and can conduct amphibious operations via waterborne assault from the well deck. An outline of amphibious ships is listed in the Appendix.

E. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY

Chapter II will examine the history of the Mediterranean's distinct amphibious nature of naval warfare. Dating back to Agamemnon's naval expeditionary force, amphibious operations have played an important and unique role in Mediterranean history. Since the assault on Troy, battles such as Hannibal's defeat by Scipio, Tripoli, Gallipoli, and Anzio have demonstrated the amphibious character of Mediterranean naval conflict. A short history of twentieth century warfare in the Mediterranean will
demonstrate the applicability of an amphibious capability, especially when faced with economic, religious, and ethnic instability following the Cold War.

Chapter III is an analysis of external factors unique to the Mediterranean that warrant consideration of the requirement for a Standing Amphibious Force. Discussion will start with a global abstract, and be followed by respective security and political concerns of the United States, Europe, and NATO in the Mediterranean. Within the global context of international crime, terrorism, biological warfare, rogue nuclear threats, and economic concern in Asia, European security affairs occupy only a portion of the American foreign policy effort. The President's National Security Strategy argues the need to provide global leadership through its economic strength and military superiority, but that has become increasingly difficult as force structure and budgets decrease while operations have increased.

European security remains unique to each region and nation despite efforts to unify and integrate. Northern nations have concerns with central Europe and the Baltic, while southern states argue that instability in the Mediterranean poses the greatest threat. However, the
European Union agrees that ethnic and religious unrest, political/economic instability, and potential for mass refugees and migration are considerable issues that a united Europe must address.

NATO is still defining itself after the demise of the Soviet bloc—debates over an organization dedicated to collective security or collective defense continue. The new Strategic Concept to be announced at the fiftieth anniversary of NATO in 1999 will most likely address out-of-area operations and set a new course for the Alliance. NATO also must deal with Mediterranean threats within a larger framework of enlargement, Partnership for Peace ( PfP ), and Russia. With respect to a European expeditionary capability, the Combined Joint Task Force ( CJTF ) concept will be discussed as the basis for separable but not separate forces\(^5\) in support of an ESDI anchored securely in NATO.

The fourth chapter presents a detailed examination of European navies, NATO and PfP, that can contribute to a European amphibious force. The American ARG template is dissected and compared against capabilities of European

\(^5\) NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(96)63, Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council, 3 June 1996
navies for consideration in STAPHIBFORMED. First, individual nations are reviewed, followed by bilateral structures such as UKNLPHIBGRU and SIAF, and concluding with an inspection of existing multilateral organizations such as EUROMARFOR and CAFMED.

In response to existing proposals for an On-Call European expeditionary capabilities such as EUROMARFOR of the WEU and the CAFMED concept developed by AFSSOUTH, Chapter V examines STAPHIBFORMED as a permanent, standing, force. The US Navy's Amphibious Ready Group will be discussed as the template the force will be modeled after, along with the roles, missions, and requirements that are expected. Discussion will focus on whether a multinational establishment can perform its threefold mission of capability, interoperability, and reliability. Most importantly, command and control issues are considered, such as where STAPHIBFORMED is located in the NATO military framework and its use by the WEU, the OSCE, and the UN.

Lastly, conclusions are drawn regarding a requirement for STAPHIBFORMED exists, European nations’ capability, and the feasibility of this concept. Recommendations for the future of STAPHIBFORMED will be presented based on these conclusions.
II. AMPHIBIOUS OPERATIONS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

A. ANCIENT AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY

Amphibious operations have defined naval warfare in the Mediterranean Sea since recorded time. Expeditionary forces have taken to the sea to wage war since the ancient world of the western Mediterranean—the geography of the southern Europe, southwest Asia, and north Africa made a large land army obsolete.

1. Greece at Troy

The Greek army at Troy was a joint expeditionary force operating against a fixed target. In the Illiad, Homer details how Agamemnon, the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF), and his Commander Landing Forces (CLF), Achilles, conduct a high-intensity conflict against Troy. Achilles explains that this is the final piece of their Thrace campaign, taking twelve cities by waterborne assault and eleven overland.

The Greek Expeditionary Force arrived at Troy with overwhelming numerical superiority, and with all the logistical worries of an amphibious assault. Achilles authorized raiding and pillaging to sustain his army, only to find out that Agamemnon had not kept up his side of the
plan. He neglected to impose a tight blockade around Troy, while Achilles worked feverishly to meet the Greeks' logistical requirements. The *Iliad* established an ancient precedent of maritime "forcible entry" operations.

2. **Persia at Marathon**

   By 490 BC, the Greeks were pitted against Darius, the King of Persia and ruler most of the civilized world. Darius selected Datis as both CATF and the CLF of the joint task force to lead 600 galleys and 85,000 combat troops into battle against the growing strength of Athens on the Greek peninsula.

   Darius' plan was the reduction and seizure of Athens, followed by reduction of Sparta. Datis selected Marathon for the main effort and landed unopposed, but took his time reorganizing and making no effort to seize the mountain pass leading to Athens. Miltiades, the Greek Defense Force commander, established a perimeter in the natural mountains on the three sides of the plains of Marathon. Seeing his cavalry would be useless, Datis re-embarked the majority of his troops to sail to Athens and destroy the paltry home guard.

   The Greeks watched Task Force Athens sail away and attacked, catching the remaining 20,000 Persians by
surprise. The Persians counter-attacked in the center, while Greek forces were slowly withdrawing. When the Persian forces were extended, Miltiades closed the vise and the heavy forces in the wings destroyed the remaining forces. Miltiades detailed a small force to guard the dead and the spoil, and led the rest of his force back over the mountains to Athens, arriving before the Persian Task Force landed. Datis, realizing that it was too late to attack Athens, called off the operation and return to Persia.

B. **EARLY 20TH CENTURY AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY**

Expeditionary operations continued to take place in the Mediterranean after Marathon, despite the defeat of the Persian’s amphibious task force. Alfred Thayer Mahan, establishing the importance of sea power, recognized the amphibious aspect of the Mediterranean and used examples from Publius Cornelius Scipio’s victory over Hannibal due to the Roman supremacy of the Tyrrhenian Sea to the British destruction of the French fleet in the Battle of the Nile. Other operations such as Presley O’Bannon’s raid of pirate ships in Tripoli and the British victory in the Crimean War

---

during the 19th century kept the Mediterranean’s maritime history alive.

1. Gallipoli

The Gallipoli campaign was to be a naval expedition to force the Narrows of the Dardanelles, enter the Sea of Marmara, and bombard Constantinople. General Sir Ian Hamilton, the Mediterranean Field Force commander, landed troops after a month-long delay allowed the Turks to ready their defenses. Although the Allied forces initially had some success, the landings were contained by Turkish forces. Later in the campaign two more successful amphibious landings were conducted, though they were both contained by Turkish reinforcements and unable to maneuver ashore and significantly expand their beachheads. For eight and one-half months the struggle was contained essentially in the beachhead areas where both sides were stalemated by trench warfare tactics. After employing almost 500,000 men, the Allies completed a withdrawal in January 1916 with only one casualty. Tactically, the battle was a draw. Casualties were estimated to be 250,000 for both sides. Strategically, the battle was a resounding victory for Turkey and the Central Powers.
2. Corfu

On 27 August 1923, General Tellini, the Italian President of the Commissions of Delineation who was appointed to mark out the frontiers of Albania, was ambushed and murdered. Since this was Greek territory, the Italian government decided that Greece was morally responsible and should be required to make reparations. The Greek government failed to meet the required demands, and four days later, the Italian Navy landed in Greece and occupied the island of Corfu.

The occupation was maintained until 27 September, by which date the Greek government had complied with every one of the original Italian demands.7 Italy's expeditionary force had achieved its well-defined objective, and in a manner no other expedient could have.

C. MODERN AMPHIBIOUS HISTORY

Most Mediterranean operations during World War II were dominated by amphibious operations. Operation TORCH in north Africa, Operation HUSKY in Sicily, and the invasion of Italy at Salerno were combined joint task forces,

---

consisting of sea, air, and land components of the Allied nations. Even the land campaigns in Sicily and Italy were enabled by amphibious "end-runs." After the war, though, amphibious operations in the Mediterranean region were relatively non-existent until 1956.

1. Suez Crisis

In July 1956, Colonel Gamal Abdal Nasser announced that Egypt was nationalizing the Suez Canal, which had been controlled until then by a mostly British- and French-owned canal company. Prior to this, Israel’s hope for peace at the 1948 armistice borders was shattered by the announcement in 1955 that the Soviet Union, via Czechoslovakia, would be providing Egypt with arms of a quantity and quality capable of pushing the military balance in its favor. The essence of war for Israel was no more complex than those described by Thucydides as underlying the Peloponnesian War: "What made war inevitable was the growth of Athenian power and the fear this caused in Sparta."⁸

After Egypt’s nationalization of the Suez, the British, French, and Israelis quietly resolved to fight the

---

Egyptians. On October 29, the Israelis attacked, smashing Nasser's ill-trained forces in the Sinai, and began driving toward the canal. Two days later the British and French began bombing Egyptian military installations and landed paratroops with the objective of re-taking the canal. By 2 November, the UN General Assembly (France and the UK had blocked Security Council action with their vetoes) called for an immediate cease-fire, withdrawal to 1949 armistice lines, and reopening of the canal. The resolution passed overwhelmingly, with the United States and the Soviet Union standing together against Britain, France, and Israel.

The flashpoint included threats of involvement by both the Soviet Union and the United States. This was averted when the combatants agreed to a cease-fire and ultimately withdrew. Israel demonstrated its military viability, while both Britain and France lost their standing in the Middle East, having been isolated and forced to withdraw from a traditional area of influence. The Suez Crisis illustrated an early example of a multinational expeditionary operation but also the decline of the

---

9 It must be noted that though this operation is an excellent example of combined expeditionary warfare, no amphibious forces were involved.
traditional naval powers in the Mediterranean and the ascendency of the United States.

2. Operation BLUEBAT–Lebanon 1958

When religious conflict in Lebanon threatened to erupt in a civil war in the spring of 1958, Task Force 62 (2\textsuperscript{nd} Provisional Marine Force) was alerted and began the planning of Operation BLUEBAT, an intervention designed to end factional fighting. When President Chamoun of Lebanon asked for intervention by the United States within 24 hours, TF 62 promptly responded with the landing of Marines within six hours of his request.\textsuperscript{10}

By the end of the month, 10,000 soldiers held a 20-mile perimeter around Beirut. On 8 August, the force reached its peak of 15,000, including a regiment of tanks; one Marine battalion was re-embarked as a floating reserve. Having achieved its mission objectives, withdrawal began on 14 September and was completed by 25 October.\textsuperscript{11} BLUEBAT was the largest overseas deployment of U.S. forces between the Korean and Vietnam wars and only an embarked expeditionary force could have met President Chamoun’s deadline:

\textsuperscript{10} Cable, 57

\textsuperscript{11} Cable, 58
It was five days after the landing, in full force of seaborne Marines from 18-knot transports, before the first lightly armed airborne troops reached Lebanon and that only happened after delicate and uncertain negotiations, in a tug-of-war for overflight permissions from each country in the paths of the transport planes.\textsuperscript{12}

Fortunately for all concerned, fighting proved unnecessary, since Lebanon had faced no real threat. In his eagerness to display the resolve of the United States, President Eisenhower resorted to the use of an expeditionary force as crisis manager.\textsuperscript{13}

3. Cyprus

As a result a Greek-sponsored coup and the subsequent Turkish intervention on Cyprus in 1974, a contingent of U.S. Marine forces attached to the 34\textsuperscript{th} Marine Amphibious Unit (MAU) was dispatched to the waters surrounding the embattled island of Cyprus. The Marine force evacuated 752 persons representing 22 nations.\textsuperscript{14} Pre-deployment planning for the possibility of the evacuation had been so complete

\textsuperscript{12} Cable, 58

\textsuperscript{13} James T. Patterson, \textit{Grand Expectations} (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) 423

\textsuperscript{14} Maj W. Hays Parks USMC, "Foreign Policy and the Marine Corps." U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1976: 20
that the embarked stores were able to supply diapers for
the infant children of the evacuees.

4. Libya

Although the United States did not land troops, they
conducted a series of maritime actions against Libya in the
1980s. The first occurred in August 1981 when Muammar
Qaddafi declared the 32nd parallel a "Line of Death" and all
water south to be sovereign Libyan waters. The United
States, determined to sail in international waters,
conducted OPEN OCEAN MISSILE EXERCISE within the Gulf of
Sidra. On August 19, a Libyan aircraft section fired a
missile at two American F-14s, and the resulting response
was the downing of both Libyan Su-22 aircraft. Before the
exercise ended, Qaddafi's air force challenged the American
battle group forty-five times,15 but conducted only one
hostile act.

When American warplanes attacked Libya in 1986, it was
borne out of retribution for the bombing of a West Berlin
nightclub that killed two American servicemen. Air Force
F-111s from England and carrier-based aircraft from the 6th
Fleet bombed military and political targets in Tripoli and

15 Gregory L. Vistica, Fall From Glory (New York, Simon and Schuster, 1995) 121
Benghazi, the nation's second largest city. The attacks targeted terrorist facilities and aimed to prevent the training of future terrorists.


The Peacekeeping Task Force used in Lebanon in 1983 is one of the most vivid examples of an expeditionary capability. A force consisting of 1200 Marines was deployed at the Beirut airport to provide a buffer between the withdrawing Syrian and Israeli armies until the Lebanese armed forces could provide their own internal security.

Supporting the force would be the 16-inch guns of the USS New Jersey offshore. The American task force fired into the Lebanese hills in support of the Marines ashore. To the fighting sects, it appeared that the United States was no longer a peacekeeping force, but one that had sided with the Christian government. The response of the Islamic Jihad was a truck bomb on October 23rd that killed 241 Marines in their barracks at the airport. By February 1984, the decision was made to pull the Marines out of Lebanon, their mission, undetermined and vague, a failure.
6. Somalia

The American 6th Fleet's area of responsibility is vast, encompassing not only the Mediterranean, but also the West Coast of Africa. Although eastern Africa is the 5th Fleet's and CENTCOM's responsibility, the expeditionary force that came ashore in Somalia in 1992 is relevant due to the security impact on the 6th Fleet and the Mediterranean in general.

In November 1992, UN Secretary Boutros Boutros-Gali reported that traditional peacekeeping in the form of the 500-man force already in Somalia was not working and looked to peace enforcement as a possible solution. The United States led a UN authorized United Task Force (UNITAF) in an operation known as RESTORE HOPE. The mission of UNITAF: restore peace, stability, law and order; re-establish the Somali police force; provide security and assistance in the repatriation of refugees and resettlement of displaced persons; monitor the arms embargo and to facilitate disarmament; and assist in the provision of relief and the

---

economic rehabilitation of Somalia. In effect, they were to reconstruct the Somali state.\textsuperscript{17}

Approximately 30,000 troops from 22 countries participated in the peacekeeping effort. By late January 1993, the stabilization process was well enough along to re-embark the Marines of the Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) to remain off the coast to remind the Somali warlords that "a posse," in the words of Joint Chiefs Chairman Colin Powell "is still on duty."\textsuperscript{18}

Following the replacement of UNITAF with UN Operation in Somalia II (UNOSOM II) in May 1993, the peace enforcement mission turned violent, graphically illustrated by the death of eighteen US Army Rangers in October. The consent of the factions depended on impartiality and overwhelming US force. When the UN decided to pursue the warlord Aideed, the presumption of impartiality dissipated. Peace enforcement operations by nature threaten the presumption of impartiality as it presumes an adversary and action against one side or sides in a conflict, thus requiring the retention of forces fully capable of conducting an offensive mission.

\textsuperscript{17} Carr and Ifantis, 117

7. Liberia

On 20 April 1996, a reinforced rifle company from the 22nd MEU(SOC) was airlifted into the U.S. embassy compound in Monrovia, Liberia in order to provide security and assist the embassy and its small Marine detachment in evacuation of American and designated foreign citizens due to continuing unrest and increased lawlessness in the capital. Called ASSURED RESPONSE, the U.S. European Command designated the MEU’s CO as Joint Task Force (JTF) commander. The 22nd MEU assisted the evacuation of 2100 people\(^{19}\) from Liberia during the most recent involvement of the U.S. Marine Corps to war-torn Liberia. This was not the first time US Marines had been to Liberia. From May 1990 to January 1991, the 22nd and 26th MEU(SOC)s assisted in the evacuation of more than 2400 people, including 226 Americans, in the midst of an insurgency during Operation SHARP EDGE.\(^{20}\)

8. Albania

On 12 March 1997 JTF SILVER WAKE was activated to plan for a noncombatant evacuation (NEO) operation of Americans

---

\(^{19}\) "Operation ASSURED RESPONSE: Liberia." Marine Corps Gazette." June 1996: 5

\(^{20}\) "Operation SHARP EDGE." Marine Corps Gazette, November 1991: 76
from the embassy in Tirana, Albania. The 26th MEU(SOC) began the evacuation within 30 minutes of receiving the order and extracted nearly 400 Americans and over 500 foreign nationals from more than 30 countries.\textsuperscript{21}

In six days, 10,619 Albanians\textsuperscript{22} crossed the Adriatic to land in Italy. Concerned these migrants were coming for economic reasons, the Italian Navy began aggressive patrolling and "convincing" refugees to return to home. The Italians determined that intervention in Albania was necessary to restore order, ensure humanitarian aid, and stem the tide of refugees. When the WEU proved too paralyzed to act, Italy prevailed on the United Nations for a mandate to lead an international force of 6,000 soldiers.\textsuperscript{23} The United Nations endorsed a three-month intervention for humanitarian reasons to be called Operation ALBA. The Italian leadership of the a UN "military-humanitarian mission"\textsuperscript{24} represented a break from precedent, as the United States had led all previous


\textsuperscript{23} Perlmutter, 203

\textsuperscript{24} Office of Naval Intelligence, Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997) 4
missions. Italy was the natural leader of the military mission—it had the strongest motive to act. Joining Italy's 2500 soldiers were 1000 French, 700 Turks, 680 Greeks, 450 Spaniards, 400 Romanians, 120 Austrians, and 60 Danes. ALBA's Multinational Protection Force provides some evidence of European states' ability to deal collectively with a Mediterranean security problem.

The utility of a European Amphibious Force was never more apparent when a civil war erupted in Zaire during the Albanian crisis and prompted Navy and Marine Corps commanders to begin emergency planning for Operation GUARDIAN RETRIEVAL, a Noncombatant Evacuation, before SILVER WAKE was even complete. While the big-deck LHA, containing most of the MEU's firepower, logistics, and troops, steamed for the West coast of Africa, the Nashville (LPD) and Pensacola (LSD) remained in the Adriatic to assist the continuing efforts in Albania.

9. Sierra Leone

After Zaire stabilized somewhat, fighting and looting spread to Freetown, Sierra Leone when the democratically

---

25 Perlmuter, 206

elected President Ahmed Kabbah was ousted and sent into exile. The Navy steamed to Freetown to begin the first of three evacuation operations, supported by over 200 Marines on the ground, fast attack vehicles, AH-1 Cobra helicopters, and AV-8B Harriers. Despite coup leaders’ warnings that they had closed the borders and banned all foreign aircraft, over 900 evacuees, of whom 336 were American, were evacuated.\(^{27}\)

Marines returned on 1 June with six Light Armored Vehicles (LAV) and a 300-man force to escort civilians who had taken up refuge in a hotel in the middle of the city. By the end of the day, 247 additional people had been evacuated. A third operation of NOBLE OBLISK evacuated nearly 1250 individuals two days later—for a total of 2500 people, to include 451 Americans.\(^{28}\)

**D. AMPHIBIOUS CONCLUSIONS**

With all of the Mediterranean and most African nations accessible by water, Europe’s southern security must include a distinct amphibious dimension in order to have a viable crisis response instrument. The history of the 20\(^{th}\)

---

\(^{27}\) "22\(^{nd}\) MEU Remains Busy." *Marine Corps Gazette*, July 1997: 6

\(^{28}\) Scott C. Turner, 90
century outlined above illustrates that a capable, well-trained expeditionary force can have an immediate impact in regions of national interest. Vice Admiral Steve Abbot (USN), emphasized the importance of that impact, "the key to these operations are ready forces, properly positioned." 29 VADM Abbot confirmed what Alfred Thayer Mahan concluded a century earlier, "that sea campaigns lead logically to amphibious assault." 30

However, errant use of expeditionary power, due to the lack of preparedness and complexity of an amphibious campaign, can lead to crushing defeat (e.g., Persians at Marathon). Inductively, amphibious operations in the Mediterranean reveal these conclusions: Amphibious operations must have clearly delineated political goals; must be self-sufficient or a have protected lines of communication; have objectives attainable by the forces at hand; and most importantly, have unity of command. Failure to adhere to basic principles of war can deny an expeditionary force the opportunity to shape foreign policy through decisive, capable action.

29 VADM Steve Abbot USN, U.S. Navy Commander Sixth Fleet, before the Senate Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee concerning operational readiness, Washington DC, 25 February 1998

Being sea-based, expeditionary forces remain a conspicuous and mobile example of national or international resolve, providing, in the words of former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, "the visible capability that serves to deter many acts of aggression." \(^{31}\) Experience has shown that attempts to deploy forces by air are fraught with difficulty in seeking landing, staging, and overfly rights, and are inadequate from a logistics standpoint. General Carl Mundy, the 21\(^{st}\) Commandant of the Marine Corps, stated that "forward presence, war avoidance, crisis management, and a host of humanitarian operations are all best accomplished by naval forces that feature amphibious forces as their centerpiece." \(^{32}\)

While at sea, an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is self-sufficient and politically benign, requiring no right of passage to operate in international waters. It sends a political signal by demonstrating capability and resolve. Naval presence—historically known as "showing the flag"—is defined as "the use of naval forces, short of war, to

\(^{31}\) Parks, 21

achieve political objectives." The value of naval presence lies in its potential rather than kinetic energy. It is a tactic of conflict avoidance executed through preventive deployments. Furthermore, the force can remain poised over the horizon for a prolonged period in times of tension. The characteristics of flexibility, mobility, and presence allow policy makers a credible military option to any contingency. As Cdre Paul Stone, former British commodore of Amphibious Warfare stated:

Politicians can use this flexible instrument to achieve a delicate balance between deterrence and provocation—either by exerting pressure without violating the territory or airspace of the opponent, or by withdrawing without conceding ground or losing diplomatic face

Thus, the missions of naval presence and projection of power ashore are inseparable. While neither humanitarian missions nor evacuations meet the technical definitions of projection of power ashore, the appearance of an on-site, task organized expeditionary force can provide a policy response to a variety of mission requirements, however unusual, including forcible entry. To be effective in

33 VADM Stansfield Turner USN. "Missions of the U.S. Navy." Naval War College Review, March-April 1974: 2-17


32
these operations, amphibious forces must be ready and close at hand to have an immediate impact.

Politically, deployment of Army forces has historically been perceived as a commitment to a sustained land campaign, both signaling and requiring the long-term effort of the United States. As former US Army Chief of Staff, General Frederick C. Weyand stated, "...in greater degree perhaps than the other services, if and when the Army is committed, the United States is committed." An expeditionary force can land on sovereign soil and, whether in a humanitarian mission or in response to hostile actions, suggest the limited nature of the mission while serving as a continuum of the naval presence mission.

---

35 Gen Weyand's statement was made to the Senate Armed Services Committee, 2 February 1976
III. ANALYSIS

Security in the Mediterranean is embedded in the interaction of localizing and globalizing forces, meaning regional threats will have to be dealt with by regional powers supported by an international consensus. An ideal vehicle to meet that order is a combined amphibious force in the Mediterranean under the direction of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. As President Clinton said at the 1996 Berlin Summit:

Yesterday’s NATO guarded our borders against direct military invasion. Tomorrow’s NATO must continue to defend enlarged borders and defend against threats to our security from beyond them—the spread of weapons of mass destruction, ethnic violence and regional conflict."^{36}. 

NATO must do this in part because non-Article V threats can become Article V threats if they are not addressed early.

A. GLOBAL THREATS

The threat of terrorism is a constant and long-term threat to established democracies throughout the world. As the August 1998 bombings of United States’ embassies in Tanzania and Kenya show, terrorism is global and the fear
it causes is universal. The rise in terrorism comes, in part, from the breakdown of central authority and domination of the former USSR. Despite optimism at the conclusion of the Cold War, ancient loyalties have not withered in the face of technology, democracy, and introduction of free market economies. This has led to a growing assertion of both sub-national and transnational calls for "self determination." These groups deny the legitimacy of what they perceive to be a discredited international order. Indeed, "many groups and movements have fed upon a reaction that is sometimes viewed as the secular immorality of the west." 37

Traditional motivations for terrorism include ethnic, tribal, and religious animosities. Perhaps more ominous is the growing significance of apolitical groups which resort to terrorism in pursuit of a personal or religious agenda. These groups, including narco-terrorists, are particularly difficult to contain and predict given their vast resources from illicit trade, and because of their ability to influence and control governments where they operate.


37 Prof Frank Teti, Naval Postgraduate School Lecture, Monterey, CA, 12 December 1997
Additionally, sea-borne violence had increased, constituting more than mere piracy, as more and more militant groups seek to further their political aims offshore.\(^{38}\)

A growing concern exists that terrorists will engage in acts of mass or "super terrorism" by using nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons. The crumbling of the Soviet Union could result in illicit trade in weapon grade plutonium and commensurate technology. Cities may be held hostage by threats to poison the water supply or to disseminate any number of dangerous chemicals or biological agents.

These Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) threats can come from either sovereign states or rogue actors that have developed or purchased this capability. The UN Security Council on 31 January 1992 affirmed that proliferation of WMD constituted a threat to international peace and security.\(^{39}\) The potential for proliferation is increased by the availability of nuclear technology, a trend likely to

---

\(^{38}\) Anthony Forster, "An Emerging Threat Takes Shape as Terrorists Take to the High Seas," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 Jul 98: 23. Maritime Terrorism includes the hijacking of ships, reflagging them, and selling their contents. Also, organizations will hold a crew and ship for ransom until the shipping company pays

\(^{39}\) NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995) 84
be accelerated by the break-up and privatization of the Soviet military-industrial complex.

Terrorism is unpredictable and almost impossible to prevent. Though none of the numerous Alliance port facilities, air bases, or military installations have been seriously attacked, a coordinated terrorist assault could have a devastating effect on the response capability of NATO. That it is difficult to point to an example of an amphibious force that did combat terrorism or how terrorists were deterred is more a statement on luck than preparedness.\textsuperscript{40} It is vital that the Atlantic Alliance has redundant deterrence and retaliatory capabilities from land, sea, and air. A standing amphibious force floats generally safe from terrorist action, an untouchable entity that provides deterrence by nature of its mobility and its threat of potential retaliation.

Threats of terrorism, ethnic and tribal warfare, WMD, and political instability exist for Europe and the Mediterranean. The international response to the contradictory world of “integration and fragmentation”\textsuperscript{41} is

\textsuperscript{40} An example of a maritime force deterring terrorism is difficult to provide, though a good illustration of retaliation to terrorism is Israel’s OPERATION JONATHAN in Entebbe, Uganda in 1976, and the US Navy to Libya in 1986

\textsuperscript{41} Dr. Javier Solana, “Preparing NATO for the 21st Century.” Secretary General’s Keynote Address at the Maritime Symposium, Lisbon, Portugal, 4 September 98
a multi-faceted approach that focuses on prevention through diplomatic means—like the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty—backed by a credible threat of force. The establishment of a standing multinational force precludes international assent and physically manifests its resolve. A capable, well-trained, readily available force is needed to act as a deterrent, and a potent response in cases where the defensive posture of the Alliance is threatened.

B. MEDITERRANEAN THREATS

The Mediterranean region has come to be symbolized by Samuel Huntington as a North/South clash of civilizations. Divided by religious, economic, and political differences, The RAND Corporation describes the Mediterranean as an "arc of crisis." Divisions between the "haves" and "have-nots" pose the largest threat, however, not as differences themselves, but in the instability they cause. With respect to Arab-Israeli tensions, main threats to security in the region are internal and have their roots in economic disparities.

---


The Mediterranean can be seen economically, "as the place where the Persian Gulf begins." For the United States and developed European nations, many common strategic interests are at stake along NATO's southern flank. The Mediterranean supports the world's busiest shipping lanes—65% of Europe's oil and natural gas imports pass through on 3,000 ships daily. In the Gulf War, 90% of war materiel that went to the Gulf went through the Mediterranean. Maintaining the lines of communication and access to markets is essential for economic and political security in the region.

Immediate threats to regional security are social and economic, though a long-term military threat can emerge. For southern Mediterranean countries, the growing North-South economic gap is bound to fuel domestic instability and radicalization of politics along religious lines. The by-product of economic marginalization will be Islamic fundamentalism with strong anti-western attitudes. The presence of one or more regimes hostile to European

44 Larrabee and Thorson, 10
45 de Santis, 34
46 Larrabee and Thorson, 10
hegemony and American imperialism will directly influence the security of Europe and American interests.

Combined with economic imbalances, population growth and migration present another cause for concern. The North African population is expected to grow from about 63 million today to 142 million by 2025. In the same period, the population of the southern European members of NATO is expected to grow by only 5 million.\textsuperscript{47} The resulting demographic imbalance may result in massive migration pressures from Africa to southern Europe, which will find it increasingly difficult to absorb large amounts of immigrants. Efforts to restrict immigration may provoke a hostile response from regimes in North Africa.

Another, more sinister, by-product of economic incongruity is the proliferation and acquisition of inexpensive, accurate, high-tech weapons, such as ballistic missiles and WMD, by states or organizations not friendly to the West. Libya and Algeria are poised as potential chemical weapon states, and the mere fact of possession has implications for regional relations. Rooted in socio-economic inequality, the subsequent fundamentalist regime, spawned by instability and tension, will pose serious

\textsuperscript{47} de Santis, 34
security problems and alter the strategic situation of the entire Mediterranean littoral.

The fundamentalism and violence of Algeria—the death toll in a bitter civil war has reached 30,000—demonstrates both the inability of Europe to make an influence in the former colonies, and of tragic levels of death and destruction. The EU and NATO cannot afford to turn their backs on Algeria. The development of a fundamentalist government in Algeria could have repercussions throughout Arabic-speaking North Africa. Said NATO Secretary General Javier Solana, "Look at the disparity in incomes between north and south, combine that with population growth and you have the ingredients for the conflict between Islam and Europe that has made up so much of the unhappy history of the Mediterranean." 48

The force shaping political evolution in the Maghreb 49 is fundamentalism: either ethnic or religious. Extremism succeeds and creates instability wherever under-development, obsolescence, and unemployment occur—whether

---

48 Michael Sheridan, “Europe Must Look South, Not East.” The Independent (London), 8 February 1995: 17. Dr. Solana made these remarks while acting as the Spanish Foreign Minister.

49 The Maghreb, or "land on which the sun sets" consists of the Moslem nations of northern Africa. It is "West," distinct from other nations of the Middle East, the Mashreq, or "East"
it is in Marseilles or Algiers. The upsurge of religious zeal comes as the poor and disenfranchised seek a new way of life to replace the dogmas of state socialism and Arab nationalism. The National Front’s victory in southern France in 1997 emerged from the same problems of strife in Algeria, and also featured some of the same people, refuting any theory that the Mediterranean is a frontier against instability. In sum, the next confrontation could grow out of any number of explosive factors—economic difficulties, water shortages, religious fanaticism, immigration, of which are prevalent in the southern region.50

The emerging challenges require a concerted approach of the two main initiatives, those of the EU and NATO. Though they seek different goals, the EU’s Euro-Mediterranean Partnership and NATO’s Mediterranean Dialogue are complementary since they address different aspects of the same issues. Unless European nations engage North Africa, else the commercial success and material wealth created without respect to the “have-nots” will create the instability that threatens peace and sustained economic

---

growth. On the other hand, the WMD proliferation issue raises the importance of a flexible, credible force not only as a deterrent, but also as a retaliatory capability.

C. UNITED STATES

The United States’ 1998 National Security Strategy (NSS), titled *A National Security Strategy for a New Century*, identifies major threats to American security and establishes three principle security objectives: Enhancing security with existing forces; bolstering American economic interests, and promoting democracy. The American strategy for achieving these mutually supporting objectives is through global leadership and shared collective security responsibilities. The North Atlantic Alliance is the principal security institution through which to shape the European and Mediterranean environment in ways favorable to the US and Allied interests. US management of the post-Cold War peace is guided by the conviction that America’s prosperity depends upon the preservation of an interdependent international economy. The condition for economic interdependence, achieved through engagement of American Allies, is geopolitical stability.
To attain the three objectives of the NSS, the US has to maintain a strong influence in Europe, with mutually supporting economic and security strategies. The United States is, and will remain, a European power, because its self-interest lies in not departing Europe, just as it was decided in the late 1940s not to repeat the mistake of 1919. Thus, American insistence on maintaining its interest in NATO as the central focus of European defense was to maintain its own influence as a central participant in the European security debate.

The NSS recognizes that the nation cannot, as Henry Kissinger states, "remedy every wrong and stabilize every dislocation," but it can achieve burden sharing and prevent re-emergence of a destructive set of regional powers through multilateralism and cooperation. The Atlantic Alliance has proven to work best when the United States is prepared to engage and when it is prepared to lead. The US aims to reconcile the ambition of greater European autonomy while maintaining the trans-Atlantic link by providing support for the development of ESDI within NATO and making assets available for WEU operations. The US has no interest in contributing assets, or becoming a

51 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994) 805
“lending library”\textsuperscript{52} to anything other than an organization authorized by the North Atlantic Council (NAC).

*Shape, Respond, Prepare Now*, the 1997 National Military Strategy, identifies the military’s role in shaping the international environment in order to promote peace and stability. The United State’s Armed Forces are engaged in the Mediterranean and throughout the world, shaping an unpredictable international environment through their use of civil-military relations, deterrence, and threat of overwhelming force. Maintaining this strategy is difficult given the widespread budget and force reductions. Total active duty forces have been reduced from 2.2 million personnel in 1990 to 1.45 million in 1998.\textsuperscript{53} During that same period, however, operation tempo has risen, as the US engaged in several operations other than war, notably Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Iraq, and North Korea. This paradox of force reduction and operation tempo was identified by former Commandant of the Marine Corps Carl Mundy, “While the Marine Corps has been drawn down to a strength of 174,000 from a Gulf War high of 196,000, the

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
\item \textsuperscript{52} Mathias Jopp, Adelphi Paper 290, *Strategic Implications of European Integration* (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1994) 38
\item \textsuperscript{53} Frederick F. Y. Pang, Assistant Secretary of defense for force management policy, before the Personnel Subcommittee, Senate Armed Services Committee, Washington, DC, 16 March 1996
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
percentage of forward-operating Marines has actually increased."

The US Sixth Fleet, operating in the Mediterranean, has been called upon to respond to crises, on average, every four months since 1991.54 During the Jan/Feb and October 1998 crises in Iraq, 10,000 sailor and Marines that normally constitute the bulk of the maritime power projection forces in the Mediterranean were absent. When a big deck amphibious ship is sent to equatorial Africa or CVN Task Force is deployed to the Persian Gulf, those assets are not readily available to respond to a "911" call in the Mediterranean or Europe. Despite a "strategic reserve" of 84,000 troops in Germany55 and with respect to the US Air Force in Europe, United States impact in the Mediterranean is primarily through maritime power.

A combined, permanent amphibious force in the Mediterranean is an excellent example of the ESDI agreement and reflects the United States' eagerness to share the burdens of global leadership without compromising its position as the world's lone superpower. NATO's assumption of responsibility for security and stability in Central,

54 VADM Abbot's address
55 Drozdiak, A2
Eastern, and Southern Europe after the Cold War reflects this new relationship. Europeans will have an organization with which to more effectively impact regional disputes, with the support and assets of the United States. Genuine concern exist that American responsibilities in the Persian Gulf and equatorial Africa will result in an absence of representation in the Mediterranean. A combined European amphibious force is one vehicle by which American interests could be represented via the North Atlantic Council and Europe’s interests represented via ESDI.

D. EUROPE

With the conclusion of the Cold War, it would seem natural for the US Navy’s 6th Fleet, no longer tasked to “blunt and turn back any Soviet naval thrust westward,” to disengage somewhat for a “Eurofleet” to emerge. Member states of the Europe Union, like the United States, have experienced declining defense budgets since the end of the

---

56 Concern comes from both the North Atlantic Council [NATO Communiqué M-NAC-1 (98) 59] and the United States. In a 1997 public statement from the former CINCUSACOM and SACLANT Commander, USMC Gen John Sheehan raises the issue of scaling back US forward deployments in duration and frequency


48
Cold War. This has resulted in a new military focus, balancing budgetary needs with smaller, more utilitarian forces. Rather than encourage the reduction of the American hegemony in European security, Europe wants to ensure the US’s continued support and multinational leadership to amend their security deficiencies. At the same time, Europe wants to preserve and enhance its collective defense capability.

As Europe moves towards Maastricht goals of closer economic and political unity, it aspires for a distinct ESDI. European nations have been looking towards multilateral military structures in order to minimize their own deficiencies. Europe’s goal is to secure collective defense and contribute to collective security without further encouraging re-nationalization. Multinationality promotes cohesion, reinforces the transatlantic link, and demonstrates Alliance solidarity and commitment to collective defense. Moreover, multinational formations may impede “force structure free fall” as nations seek to maximize the peace dividend.  

59 Jopp, 37

60 William T. Johnsen, NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind? (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995) 22
Historically, international alliances have been formed to meet perceived security threats; they are not forged to achieve a political federation. The Maastricht treaty aims to repudiate this logic by creating an inter-governmental defense as an implied condition to political union. The traditional division in Europe between politics and military has been altered, and the EU and NATO have become partners in ensuring security. Following Maastricht, the EU consists of three pillars: first is the existing EC, the second calls for a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and the third allows for inter-government cooperation.\textsuperscript{61} Additionally, the EU will "request the Western European Union, which is an integral part of the development of the European Union, to elaborate and implement discussions and actions of the Union which have defense implications."\textsuperscript{62}

The EU's CFSP contribution to European and international security will be more diplomatic, political, and economic than military. Those contributions, however, are insufficient once a conflict is escalated militarily. Consensus-building, force planning, and combined training

\textsuperscript{61} Carr & Ifantis, 16

\textsuperscript{62} Maastricht Treaty of the European Union, Article J.4.2, 1991
prior to an emergency are the best ways to ensure a rapid, unified, and capable response in the event that diplomatic negotiations unravel. To execute the CFSP, members must be proactive rather than reactive to play a supranational counterweight to national interests. A multinational force staged in the proximity of trouble acts as both a deterrent and a show of solidarity to the aggressors.

The long-standing debate over the proper role of ESDI reached a final verdict at the January 1994 NATO Summit in Brussels. Although the US saw the development of ESDI as assuming a more equitable share of the European security burden, it recognized that the benefits would be lost if competition for scarce resources developed. ESDI would henceforth be shaped within the Alliance—the alternative to an autonomous role—and the Alliance would adapt "political and military structures to reflect the full spectrum of its roles and the development of the emerging European Security and Defense Identity, and endorse the concept of Combined Joint Task Forces."\(^\text{63}\) Thus, NATO supports the development of ESDI within NATO by making available assets and capabilities for WEU operations and providing support for the WEU-led operation as an element of a CJTF.

\(^{63}\) NATO Handbook, Appendix XII, 269
Although the WEU has made progress with the strengthening of a Planning Cell, it is still far from being able to manage large-scale operations, particularly due to Europe's lack of strategic transport, C^4I, logistics, precision-guided munitions, and satellite capabilities. In principle, WEU units will be multinational, drawing on a dual-hatting formula by using national forces and NATO assets such as headquarters, C^4I, and logistics of nations which are NATO-assigned or FAWEU.

However, traditional suspicion and political posturing of European nations make credible multinational forces suspect if left to European nations alone. The United States is in the unique position of being the only nation that the other members of the Alliance trust. As impressive as the institutional developments of the WEU may be, its policies and operations are in contrast. The lack of a coherent EU policy during the early years of the Yugoslav crisis and the virtual absence of Europe during the Gulf War revealed the practical problems.

The Balkans crisis was the first test of Europe's CFSP and ability to deal with a regional problem. Europe's response was a failure, as it wasn't until the United States acted, through force and command structures of NATO,
that a credible response was made to end the fighting in Bosnia-Herzegovina. To be fair, "Europe" as a political entity, was in an embryonic stage when hostilities broke out, but throughout the crisis, the Twelve were unable or unwilling to establish effective solutions to fighting. The policy was inconsistent and inadequate. The WEU and NATO played their respective roles in enforcing or supporting UN Resolutions, but the European initiative failed to prevent an escalation of conflict or to end it. The evident lack of willingness to play an active role in the sub-region undermined their credibility.

Yugoslavia exposed the flaws behind the desire for European unity. The weakness of Europe's CFSP cannot be totally held responsible for the Balkans, as all of the organizations were supposed to form the basis for "a new European security architecture in which NATO, the OSCE, the EU, the WEU and the Council of Europe complement each other." Unfortunately in 1998, a similar scenario appeared in Kosovo, when Slobodan Milosevic tightened the clamps on the ethnically Albanian province of Yugoslavia. Europe, lacking the political will to intervene militarily,

---

dithered for most of the spring and summer of 1998 while hundreds of Kosovars were killed and the refugee crisis grew to unmanageable proportions.65

Current European security is a function of consensus building and "coalitions of the willing." Unlike alliances, which have an enduring element, Europeans have relied on ad hoc, short-term, unpredictable coalitions of principal nations in a feeble attempt to carry out European foreign policy.66 Moving toward a permanent force structure would establish a strong role in cementing an ESDI capable of responding to a variety of security challenges. In this respect, a standing force capable of action following a political decision would best serve Europe. Existing NATO political and military structures provide the best vehicle for a well-informed decision without rancor and an efficient execution.

A standing multinational amphibious force could minimize the difficulties of coalition warfare and enhance

65 In October 1998, the NAC, itself divided and receiving no clear mandate from the UN Security Council or from the OSCE, authorized air strikes on Yugoslav forces and positions in Kosovo. Military action was averted when Slobodan Milosevic then agreed to voluntarily withdraw his forces.

66 Joint Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington, DC: Joint Staff, February 1995) VI-1. a. Alliance: a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives. b. Coalition: an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
the strengths of the Atlantic Alliance. It provides a key element in a coherent crisis management strategy that could make assessment of the possible military options complementary to diplomatic efforts. In the past, military options have been presented as alternatives, rather than complements to diplomatic initiatives. A credible threat of force will be required to negotiate a settlement to a crisis as well as enforcement of its terms.

E. NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY ORGANIZATION

As Lord Ismay, first Secretary General of NATO is credited with saying the aim of the Atlantic Alliance "was to keep the Soviets out, the Germans down, and the Americans in." Following the Cold War, the Alliance has reoriented its policies from ensuring the collective defense of its members to enhancing their collective security. Accordingly, the Alliance maintains four fundamental principles:

- The Alliance is purely defensive in purpose
- Security is indivisible. An attack on one member is considered an attack upon all
- NATO's security policy is based on collective defense, including an integrated military structure
• The maintenance of an appropriate mix of nuclear and conventional forces is required\textsuperscript{67}

NATO’s Strategic Concept, released in November 1991, reflected the maintenance of the core guarantees along with acknowledgment of changes in European security in a post-Cold War era. The Strategic Concept addresses the fact that the Alliance no longer confronts a massive, specific foe and extends security beyond traditional borders to unspecified risks. "Alliance security interests can be affected by other risks of a wider nature, . . . proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage."\textsuperscript{68} Furthermore, the Concept recognizes that security is based on political, economic, social, and environmental considerations as well as defense. Thus, the Concept seeks to achieve the Alliance’s long standing objectives by political means, in keeping with the undertakings made in Articles II and IV of the North Atlantic Treaty.\textsuperscript{69}

\textsuperscript{67} NATO Handbook, 41

\textsuperscript{68} NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, "The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept," 7 November 1991, paragraph 13

\textsuperscript{69} NATO Handbook, 41
The cornerstone of effective security relationships is the fair and equitable sharing of mutual responsibilities and proper balance of costs and benefits. The European Allies contribute significantly militarily, politically, and economically. NATO's common funded budgets have long "been unique instruments for achieving defense objectives while reducing each country's costs through economies of scale and development of joint projects."\textsuperscript{70} The common-funded budgets are a dramatic example of the multiplier effect provided by NATO membership, which allows cost saving, coordinated actions by the 16 member states.

1. **NATO's Legal and Moral Authority**

The United Nations Charter does not define peacekeeping, but Chapter VI provides for pacific settlement of disputes. The Security Council is empowered to call on parties to settle disputes and further empowered by Article 34 to investigate any dispute and make recommendations to the parties for dispute resolution. The Security Council is forbidden to intervene in matters that are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of a

sovereign state. In other words, moral pressure is brought to bear, but not enforcement.

The Security Council was given in Article 42, however, the use of armed forces "to maintain or restore international peace and security." The intention was an enforcement system determined by a unanimous Security Council, which was short-circuited by the divisions of the Cold War. Since the end of the Cold War, the veto power of the Permanent Members of the Security Council has not been used, resulting in resolutions condemning aggression (Iraq), providing for humanitarian relief (Somalia), and peacekeeping (Bosnia-Herzegovina).

Authorized in Chapter VIII of the UN Charter is the right for regional security institutions to exist, forming the bedrock of legitimacy for the existence of NATO. Providing collective defense in the face of a specific foe did not require Security Council approval, but to carry out the "out of area" and "non-Article V"\textsuperscript{71} operations, the

\textsuperscript{71} Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty states: The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defence recognised by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Non-article V operations refer to actions
Alliance needs to look to international institutions such as "the UN Security Council and the OSCE—which have a special role to play in providing legitimacy for collective military actions."\textsuperscript{72}

Thus, legal framework exists to allow for NATO to expand its mission from collective defense to collective security—casting its gaze to security of the entire region, rather than its members. The issue of when and how non-article V missions, such as peacekeeping, would be employed was decided at the 1994 Brussels Summit. General principles were adopted that dictated peacekeeping can only be carried out under the authority of the UN or the OSCE, with exceptions based on Article VII\textsuperscript{73} of the Charter by the UN Security Council.\textsuperscript{74}

An example of this exception occurred with Kosovo in October 1998. UN Security Council resolutions 1069 and

\begin{flushleft}
taken not in self-defense, but of offensive maneuvers outside traditional Alliance borders
\end{flushleft}


\textsuperscript{73} Chapter VII permits regional security organizations to respond with force to "threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression"

\textsuperscript{74} General Principles on Peacekeeping were developed by the North Atlantic Cooperation Council's Ad Hoc Group on Peacekeeping which met in Athens, 11 June 1993 [Communiqué M-NACC-1(93)40]. "Peacekeeping can be carried out only under the authority of the UN Security Council, or of the CSCE [OSCE] in accordance with the CSCE Document agreed in Helsinki in July 1992"
1199, vague denouncements calling for the end of fighting in that region, were used as moral justification for the NAC's authorization of NATO air strikes to remove Yugoslav forces from their siege of Kosovo. The UN Security Council, under threat of veto from Russia, was unable to pass a resolution ordering Milosevic out of Kosovo. Though NATO did not receive moral authority from the UN to act, the NAC possessed legal authority for out-of-area air strikes defined as *peace-enforcement*. The problem accompanying the lack of international consensus is inherent in NATO delays and divisiveness over this issue.

Nevertheless, NATO has political, legal, and military authority for conduct of non-Article V missions. Defined by MC 327 as "Peace Support Operations," the document lists six missions:

- Conflict Prevention
- Peacemaking
- Peacekeeping
- Humanitarian Aid
- Peace Enforcement

---

75 NATO Communiqué M-NACC-1(93)40: 2. *Peace enforcement*: action under Chapter VII of the UN Charter using military means to restore peace in an area of conflict. This can include dealing with an inter-State conflict or with internal conflict to meet a humanitarian need or where state institutions have largely collapsed.
• Peacebuilding\textsuperscript{76}

2. NATO's Mediterranean Dialogue

NATO has been forced to change its approach to the Mediterranean due to the end of the Cold War. The Alliance responded with a Mediterranean initiative\textsuperscript{77} that has three major objectives:

• to contribute to security and stability in the Mediterranean

• to promote mutual understanding among NATO and the countries of the Mediterranean

• to counteract misperceptions of the Alliance\textsuperscript{78}

Since the main problems of the region are economic, social, and political, it seems odd that a military organization could affect much. Though the EU may play the primary role in the region, NATO cannot ignore the Mediterranean and must accompany the outreach to the East with an outreach to the South. NATO is viewed with

\textsuperscript{76} MC 327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations.

\textsuperscript{77} First mentioned in NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1(93)38 in June 1993, the Mediterranean Dialogue stated the their readiness to establish contacts on a case-by-case basis, between the Alliance and Mediterranean non-member countries, with a view to contributing to the strengthening of regional stability. On 8 February 1995, the NAC, in Permanent Session, decided to initiate a direct dialogue with Mediterranean non-member countries

\textsuperscript{78} Larrabee and Thorson, 25
mistrust in the countries of the Maghreb and should initiate any outreach as exploratory. Some outreach measures include: public information, civil emergency planning, crisis management, and peace support operations. Simultaneously, the region is a source of instability and unpredictability. Any foray into Mediterranean security must be accompanied with a fear that engagement of one of the Mediterranean Dialogue partners—Egypt, Israel, Mauritania, Morocco, Jordan, and Tunisia—may also result in conflict with one of the regimes hostile to the West.

NATO has adopted a broad approach to security, defining it more comprehensively than as a response to military risks. Issues such as proliferation of WMD, chemical and biological weapons, and medium range missiles all have direct implications on European security. It is NATO's strategy to improve cooperation with its Dialogue Partners in a preventive discourse, while maintaining the military strength to affect the nations if diplomatic means fail. The 1998 Luxembourg Summit reiterated the Alliance's belief "that security in Europe is closely linked with

---

79 de Santis, 35

80 This discourse is in the form of dialogue. NATO's 16 have one unified position with which discussions are centered. There is no "conference style" negotiations with many differing opinions

62
security and stability in the Mediterranean, which is part of the Alliance’s overall cooperative approach to security and reinforces and complements other international efforts.  

3. Reaction Forces

Protecting European security interests implies that the Alliance must be prepared to operate outside the traditional NATO Treaty area, such as the Mediterranean as a whole. However, the core guarantees reiterated in the Strategic Concept necessitate a military capability sufficient to prevent war, provide for effective defense, and manage crises affecting security of its members. Alliance forces have been divided into reaction forces, main defense forces, and augmentation forces. Reaction forces (Figure 3-1) consist of Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). IRF forces can be deployed in three to seven days and include the ACE (Allied Command Europe) Mobile Force (AMF)—Land and Air and

---

81 NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (98)59, 6

82 The Mediterranean, bordered by five member states, has always been included in NATO’s treaty area. In fact, VADM Forrest Sherman called it in 1947 the “decisive theater of war.” Operating outside the treaty area refers to nations on the other side of the Sea, such as the Maghreb, former Warsaw Pact countries, and the Middle East
Standing Allied Naval Forces: STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED.

Rapid Reaction Forces are deployable in seven to fifteen days and contain air, sea, and land elements. Air and maritime elements beyond those available will be provided by nations on an as-required basis. Land forces will come from the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The Commander ARRC can draw from a pool of national units from up to ten divisions whose composition will be depend on the missions, terrain, and forces available.

ACE Reaction Forces are a visible demonstration of NATO’s cohesion and can facilitate the timely build-up of forces in a crisis area. They may be employed either
alone, as part of "joint operations" (with one or more other components i.e. Maritime, Land or Air forces), in "combined operations" (in conjunction with other national, NATO or international forces in the theatre of operations), or with a mixture of both in "combined joint operations."  

4. Combined Joint Task Force

The 1996 Berlin Summit ratified two measures needed to make the Alliance more effective and flexible. First, it was agreed that developing ESDI within NATO would strengthen the European pillar of the Alliance. Secondly, the Summit endorsed the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept as a means of facilitating the use of NATO capabilities for European/WEU operations. Introduced as an idea following the success of the United States in the Gulf War, the CJTF initiative re-vamps NATO's military in order to keep it relevant in an era where crisis response is in greater demand than territorial defense. "The CJTF concept will be the keystone . . . and be the unifying concept for enabling the Alliance to respond and organize for both collective defense and 'new' mission requirements."  

83 NATO Handbook, 161

What is unique about NATO’s CJTF concept is that it will permanently institutionalize the multinational task force concept, which has always been a temporary command and control arrangement employed for crisis response by alliances or ad hoc coalitions. The concept is a hybrid capability that combines the best attributes of both coalition and alliance forces, i.e. rapid crisis response by highly ready multinational forces, backed by pre-established political terms of reference, standardized procedures, regular exercises, and in-place infrastructure. The stated aims of the CJTF concept are: to adapt NATO’s force structure for new missions; to project security and stability towards the East by offering partner states a way to join NATO crisis response; and to support ESDI for offering the WEU a "separable but not separate" military capability. In sum, CJTF can draw from NATO’s military structure as well as from PfP partner countries to make it "possible for headquarters and other assets of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization to be transferred, under very special circumstances, for the use of the Western European Union, without American engagement

85 Charles L. Barry, "The NATO CJTF Command and Control Concept," Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997) 30
directly through NATO, but under Western European Union command. The CJTF concept would provide an always-ready capability for peacekeeping, peace enforcement, humanitarian relief, and other operations called for under the Strategic Concept.

F. ANALYSIS CONCLUSIONS

Without the US, NATO’s maritime dimension in the Mediterranean is structurally undeveloped and politically disordered. Without the unifying presence of the US Navy, NATO would not have an effectual amphibious dimension in the Mediterranean. Only the US can cut through the political Gordian knot of European military planning, and that leadership comes through the North Atlantic Alliance. It is clear that only NATO, through the United States’ leadership, can unite the maritime powers of the Alliance and establish an effective chain of command and military structure.

Changes initiated by the Alliance during the past decade reflect the new paradigm that “the political role of


the Alliance has to some extent taken precedence over the military role. American influence in Europe reflects the reality of unparalleled means for satellite and remote observation, intelligence gathering, communications, transport, logistics, nuclear deterrence, and effective air-land action. Europe will not be able to achieve military parity with the US without substantial effort and cost, and will have to balance the transatlantic Alliance with multinational military formations and political-economic leadership by the EU.

The development of combined, standing amphibious concept under NATO is a desire to share the European security burden in times when a European-led force would be the most appropriate. Regional security, however, should not be tied to one organizational response, and the prevailing post-Maastricht attitude concurs with a multi-dimensional response entity from a variety of institutions working with the North American partners to respond to an unpredictable environment.

---

88 de Puig, 7
IV. MEETING AMPHIBIOUS REQUIREMENTS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN

With the exception of the US Navy, Western naval force cannot operate across the full range of military missions, e.g. amphibious warfare, mine countermeasures, and air operations. A single European navy cannot afford to cope with a crisis on its own—broader political and military leverage is needed. Thus, the United States Navy and Marine Corps Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) is the operational template from which a standing amphibious force in Europe should be compared against.

This chapter will compare the amphibious capabilities of NATO, WEU, and PfP nations that possess amphibious capabilities against the amphibious capability of the United States Navy and Marine Corps. American supremacy in amphibious doctrine, practices, and equipment make the Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) a natural model by which to measure the capabilities of a potential European amphibious force. After a brief description of the ARG, individual countries will be examined, followed by bilateral and multilateral amphibious initiatives.
A. UNITED STATES

Highlighting American force projection in the Mediterranean is the Amphibious Readiness Group (ARG). At this time, only the US Navy and the US Marine Corps can boast the full spectrum of amphibious assets from which to launch a Marine Expeditionary Force against an opposed shoreline. The ARG is built around one "big deck" amphibious assault ship. Commissioned between 1976 and 1980, five Tarawa-class (LHA) assault ships offer an over-the-horizon capability via heliborne insertion, aquatic entry with Amphibious Assault Vehicles, or both. Six Wasp-class (LHD) ships have been commissioned since 1989. The LHD is capable of transporting 2100 troops and their equipment, with vehicle storage for five M1 tanks, 25 LAVs, eight M198 guns, 68 trucks, and a number of service vehicles. The ship's dock can accommodate up to three Landing Crafts Air Cushioned (LCACs) while the flight deck can carry twelve CH-46 helicopters, four CH-53Es, and six AV-8B Harrier attack aircraft.\(^9\)

Each forward-deployed ARG—with an embarked force of just over 3,000 Marines—will eventually be comprised of

three ships; an LHA/LHD assault ship; an LSD 41/49 dock landing ship, and an LPD 17 amphibious transport dock (being procured in 2002).  Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers will be deployed with the ARG, enhancing air defense and self-sufficiency. The Marine ARG responds to the perils that threaten not only American lives and interests, but also those of our European Allies.

B. ITALY

La Marina Militare Italiana (MMI) recognizes a wide strategic interest to sail beyond the boundaries of the Mare Nostrum. Low-intensity tasks have come to characterize the MMI’s operations in recent years. With the political situation in Albania deteriorating in spring 1997, Italy led a coalition protection mission, Operation ALBA, which the MMI provided transport and escort assets.

The San Marco Amphibious Battalion has evolved from a reinforced company to a landing battalion now 900 marines strong. When combined with the Army’s Amphibious Assault Regiment (a Joint Amphibious Brigade) overall strength

---

90 Grimes, et al., 24

91 ALBA was not the first deployment of Italian troops to Albania. Operation PELICAN deployed 6000 soldiers in a humanitarian assistance mission from September 1991 to December 1993 following the collapse of the communist regime.
increases to 2,000 men.\textsuperscript{92} Considerable money has been allocated to amphibious operations and the procurement of US AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, armored vehicles, and RIB raider boats will provide a significant increase in forcible entry capability.

Amphibious shipping consists of the three San Marco-class LPDs, each capable of carrying 400 combat-loaded Marines plus 30 APCs or 30 medium tanks. However, one of the shortcomings of this design is "the reduced helicopter component, which is too small to properly cover both vertical lift assault and fire support roles."\textsuperscript{93} The MMI would be forced to risk its sole carrier relatively close to shore, in order to provide aviation assets. The carrier Giuseppe Garibaldi can provide C\textsuperscript{2} functions and both rotary and fixed-wing aviation assets, but would have little room for additional troops.

To meet this shortfall as well as alliance commitments and national missions, a new "big deck" amphibious ship was needed. This carrier, named the Luigi Einaudi,\textsuperscript{94} is

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{itemize}
  \item \textsuperscript{92} Grimes et al., 30
  \item \textsuperscript{93} Paolo Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership for NATO Amphibious Forces." \textit{International Defense Review}, 1 July 1998: 43
  \item \textsuperscript{94} Luigi Einaudi was Italy's first president after World War II
\end{itemize}
\end{footnotesize}
"strongly reminiscent of a scaled-down Wasp-class LHD."\textsuperscript{95} Luigi Einaudi can accommodate various aircraft/vehicle mixes to include up to 8 helicopters, 80 vehicles, and 6 AV-8Bs. The ship will be capable of carrying 625 combat equipped Marines and will enter service around 2005.\textsuperscript{96}

C. FRANCE

The French Army is undergoing a significant reorganization which will comprise of 15 brigades\textsuperscript{97} organized around five task force headquarters tailored for crisis response. The Army's 9\textsuperscript{th} Division d'Infanterie Marine and 6\textsuperscript{th} Light Armored Division are allocated to amphibious operations.\textsuperscript{98} 9\textsuperscript{th} Division has been deployed overseas on a regular basis, including Somalia, Cambodia, Bosnia, and Rwanda. It will currently responsible for maintaining amphibious skills, but upon reorganization, all units will conduct amphibious training. The French Ambassador to the United States, Francois Bujon de

\textsuperscript{95} Alcibiades Thalassocrates, "Luigi Einaudi: A New Carrier Concept for the Italian Navy." Military Technology, March 1988: 81

\textsuperscript{96} Thalassocrates, 81

\textsuperscript{97} Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 44. The reorganization will consist of 8 maneuver brigades and 7 combat support and combat service support brigades

\textsuperscript{98} Grimes et al., 28
l'Estang, stated in April 1998 that, "the overhaul of French armed forces will enable them to project more than 50,000 troops in a major engagement and 100 combat aircraft as well as an aircraft carrier task force." 99

The core amphibious shipping force currently consists of three Transport de Chalands de Debarquement (TCD) vessels (equivalent to an LSD). A new TCD, the Siroco, entered service in 1998 and is the second in the Foudre-class (commissioned in 1990). The Foudre has been designed to transport, land, and support a mechanized armored regiment. It can embark 467 combat-loaded troops, accommodate ten LCUs in its well deck, and four helicopters on the flight deck. 100

Smaller vessels include two Ouragan-class LSDs, capable of transporting 343 combat troops and four Super Puma helicopters. The Ouragan-class, commissioned in the late 1960s, is due to be replaced shortly after 2002. One Bougainville-class LPD can carry 500 troops for eight days, and performs in the amphibious role with two LCUs and two helicopter spots. Five Batral-type LSTs were commissioned from 1974 to 1987. Each is capable of transporting 138

troops but unable to perform strict amphibious operations due to a limited flight deck and absence of a well deck.\textsuperscript{101}

The 9\textsuperscript{th} Division has deployed on French aircraft carriers, to support amphibious assault or other "From the Sea" operations.\textsuperscript{102} Even without deploying an aircraft carrier, the French capability to carry out heliborne assault or NEOs from the sea will be considerably increased through the deployment of the Tiger helicopter and the advantages of the Foudre and Siroco landing ships.

D. UNITED KINGDOM

The UK's amphibious forces have survived the downsizing suffered by much of the world's conventional forces due to a transition to an expeditionary doctrine with joint and combined operations at its core.\textsuperscript{103} Rejuvenation of UK's amphibious shipping centers on acquisition of a "big deck" helicopter assault carrier (LPH) and two new LPD ships. The LPH Ocean is due to

\textsuperscript{100} Grimes et al., 28

\textsuperscript{101} Jane's Fighting Ships 1997-98, Amphibious Forces supplement, 25

\textsuperscript{102} "French Carrier for Crisis Force." Jane's Defence Weekly, 6 October 1996: 5. The Clemenceau here was assigned as to EUROMARFOR as a dedicated amphibious assault platform for six months. A different carrier will be designated FAWEU and assigned to EUROMARFOR on a rotational basis

\textsuperscript{103} Grimes et al., 27
become operational in early 1999, while the new LPDs, *Albion* and *Bulwark*, are due in 2002 and 2003 respectively.\(^{104}\) *Ocean* will be capable of transporting a full Commando battalion (500 landing troops), plus overload for a further 303 and will provide the Royal Navy with a dedicated aviation platform from which to embark and support 12 medium-lift helicopters. It will also be able capable of transporting all vehicles, equipment and stores for the commando unit via hovercraft or LCVP. Until *Ocean* comes on line, one of the three *Invincible*-class carriers (CV) has been periodically tasked as an LPH during exercises. *Invincible* and *Illustrious*\(^{105}\) are currently operational, while *Ark Royal* is laid up in refit.

The *Fearless* and *Intrepid* class LPDs have lift capability for 380 troops with overload of 1,000. These 1960s-era ships can accommodate 15 MBTs, 30 other vehicles, and four medium helicopters. Both LPDs are in reserve, though regularly maintained, and stand at 30-day readiness until the new LPDs are in service.\(^{106}\) The *Albion*-class LPD will have accommodations for an embarked force of 305

\(^{104}\) Grimes et al., 26

\(^{105}\) The 1998 Strategic Defence Review recommends the refit of existing carriers and purchase of two new carriers to increase UK’s power projection capability

\(^{106}\) Jane’s 1997-98, 34
marines, with capacity for 710 in an overload condition. The new LPDs will house up to 67 support vehicles, four LCU's, four LCVPs, and a platform for two heavy helicopters.\footnote{107} HMS Ocean and two LPDs will form the core of the Royal Navy's newly revived Amphibious Squadron.\footnote{108} The squadron will be further bolstered by the attachment of the Royal Netherlands Navy's new amphibious ship, HrMS Rotterdam, as part of the UK/Netherlands Amphibious Group (UKNLPHIBGRU). A United Kingdom amphibious group consists of a "big deck" like HMS Fearless and three LSLs. OCEAN WAVE '97 was deployed to the Asian Pacific to lay the groundwork for a UK amphibious ready group that "is very much seen as 'blazing the trail' for the [HMS] Ocean era."\footnote{109}

E. NETHERLANDS

Like Britain, the Netherlands Royal Marines are maintaining their force level, despite cutbacks for the Army, Navy, and Air Force. The Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) consists of four Marine battalions: one

\footnote{107} Jane's 1997-98, 34
\footnote{108} The UK's Amphibious Squadron was disbanded in 1966
\footnote{109} Grimes, et al, 29
attached to the UK/NL Amphibious Force; one earmarked for NATO's Allied Command Europe Mobile Land Force (AMF-Land); one in the Netherlands Antilles; and one (partly mobilized) held in reserve.\textsuperscript{110} To the UKNLPHIBGRU, the Dutch contribute the 1\textsuperscript{st} Battalion Royal Netherlands Marine Corps, a landing craft detachment, 7\textsuperscript{th} Netherlands Special Boat Squadron, and other task-organized combat and combat service support elements.\textsuperscript{111}

Until the introduction of HrMS Rotterdam in 1998, the RNLMC lacked dedicated organic amphibious lift and was forced to rely on UK ships or Ships Taken Up From Trade (STUFT) vessels. Rotterdam, similar to an LPD, has been built to embark an entire Marine battalion (611 troops), 30 Leopard 2 tanks or 90 armored fighting vehicles, four EH101s or Sea Kings, or six NH-90s or AH-64 Apaches. The well deck can accommodate four LCUs, six LCAs, or two LCACs (at the expense of vehicle space).

\textbf{F. SPAIN}

The Spanish Amphibious Force was restructured in February 1996 to streamline internal command and control

\textsuperscript{110} Grimes et al., 30

\textsuperscript{111} Steve Mitchell, "Gators on the Other Side of the Pond." \textit{U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings}, November 1997: 77
and improve bilateral cooperation with Italy in the formation of the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF). *Grupo Delta*, the marine amphibious component, consists of an all-volunteer amphibious brigade (BRIMAR) of over 3500 marines (4000 by 2004). With the acquisition of AAV7A1 and the formation of landing vehicle and rigid raider companies, BRIMAR will be capable of forcible entry operations. Of the 4000 marines in *Grupo Delta*, 3000 can directly support an amphibious landing.

The Spanish amphibious group is currently in the process of modernizing its amphibious shipping. In addition to the acquisition of two former US Navy Newport-class LSTs in 1994 and 1995, the new LPD, *Galicia*, has become the centerpiece of *Grupo Delta*. Commissioned in April 1998, *Galicia* is designed to transport over 600 combat loaded marines, 170 armored personnel carriers or 33 main battle tanks. Its well deck can accommodate up to six landing craft while the hanger and flight deck can accommodate up to six medium size helicopters. The *Príncipe de Asturias* aircraft carrier adds a further

---

112 Valpolini, *Mediterranean Partnership.* 41

113 Jane's 1997-98, 30

114 Grimes et al., 32

79
support dimension to amphibious operations with its AV-8B Harrier II, C-4I, and helicopter transport capability. A second LPD is planned to replace the aging attack transport (LPA) ships Castilla and Aragon, which remain in service since transfer from the US Navy in 1980. Each Paul Revere-class LPA is capable of transporting 1657 troops, but these can be put ashore only by using landing craft moored alongside the ship.

G. TURKEY

Though Turkey must split its assets among three areas of interest—the Aegean in the west, the Mediterranean to the south, and the Black Sea to the north, its amphibious priorities are also mostly local. The 1st Naval Infantry Brigade, the Amfibi Deniz Piyade, numbers 3100 men. The brigade consists of three amphibious battalions and a support battalion.

Turkish amphibious ships, all LST type, have an overall transport capability of 3300 troops, 50 MBTs, and other vehicles and heavy equipment. The fleet is completed by 60 landing craft of various dimensions

---


116 Valpolini, “Mediterranean Partnership.” 28
exceeding the strength of the amphibious force. The LST Osman Gazi was commissioned in 1994 and is capable of carrying 900 combat loaded troops, 15 tanks, 4 medium landing craft, and one large helicopter. Other Turkish amphibious ships consist of two US LSTs, two Sarucabey-class LSTs, and a number of heavy landing craft capable of carrying up to 100 troops and five tanks.117 The lack of C^3I assets, however, does not allow Turkey to assume the role of Combined Commander Amphibious Task Force (CCATF).

H. GREECE

Greece's amphibious priorities are to ensure the safety of its 3,000 islands. Greek amphibious force is comprised of navy assets for transport and army assets for the landing force. The Greek 32^nd Marine Brigade, composed of three maneuver battalions with combat support, is the result of a conscious attempt to create an organization with improved amphibious capabilities.118 The amphibious forces, also trained for NEOs and humanitarian assistance, have gained experience through the implementation of the multinational training.

117 Jane's 1997-98, 33

118 Blaveris Leonidas, "Greece - Forces Change Course as Old Rivalries Flare." Jane's Defence Weekly, 5 November 1997: 32
Five new Jason-class LSTs have been acquired to replace older vessels, six former US Navy LSTs built in the 1940s and 1950s. Three ships, Samos, Chios, and Ikara, are in service, with the remaining becoming operational by 2000. Each ship can host up to 300 soldiers, has a roll-on, roll-off configuration, and a hanger to enable use of medium size helicopters from the aft flight deck. Although the use of attack and transport helicopters during amphibious operations is part of Greek doctrine, the procedures for employing gunships are still being developed after the receipt of 12 AH-64 Apaches a few years ago.\textsuperscript{119}

The Greek Navy does not possess adequate causeways and cannot put MBTs and other heavy equipment ashore without a port facility. The navy will remedy this deficiency with an acquisition in 1999 of six air cushioned amphibious craft that will have a load capacity of 150 tons.\textsuperscript{120} Additionally, the navy does not possess a command ship and thus, is not capable of acting as CCATF.

\textsuperscript{119} Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 55

\textsuperscript{120} Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 55
I. PORTUGAL

The Portuguese Fuzileiros are acquiring a logistic transport ship with the capability to protect and sustain their forces ashore. Although significant organizational changes have streamlined their command and control, the Portuguese Navy consists of only three Bombarda-class LCT/LDGs. Contributions to a NATO amphibious force come in the form of manpower, conventional surface ships, and political support. Portugal is a member of EUROMARFOR and has designated a frigate to the WEU-led response corps.

In early 1998, the Portuguese government began a five-year plan to acquire helicopters, aircraft, improvement in command and control, and ships. The navy has plans to upgrade its amphibious fleet with the acquisition of a multi-purpose amphibious/logistics ship capable of combat flight operations.

J. PFP NATIONS

1. Romania

Poor relations with the Soviet Union during the Cold War led to erratic supplies of equipment and extreme

---

difficulty in maintaining the Romanian fleet. Additionally, readiness was sacrificed by Ceausescu's requirement that naval personnel participate in the dictator's projects ashore. When the economy failed, naval acquisition and refits halted until the early 1990s.

The Romanian Navy consists of one destroyer, six frigates, patrol vessels, a lone Kilo-class submarine, and a riverine force of 20 river monitors. Finding personnel to operate the ships is difficult, as nearly half the navy's strength of 17,500—over 50 per cent conscripted—is accounted by the naval infantry corps of 8,000.\textsuperscript{122} Unfortunately, there are no amphibious ships to transport the corps.

Although Romania can impressively deploy a few major combatants of limited capability at a distance—thus, the ability to take part in multinational exercises—it is a long way from deploying a NATO-style fleet. Romania needs dedication of resources and must achieve interoperability with western forces prior to serious consideration by NATO in a Mediterranean amphibious force.

\textsuperscript{122} Grove, "Rise and Fall." 38
2. Bulgaria

The Bulgarian Navy hopes to complete an ambitious restructuring by the year 2000. Although it calls for a reduction in ships, the plan sets an operational goal of one Romeo-class submarine, one Koni-class small frigate, 6 corvettes with ASW capabilities, and numerous patrol boats, torpedo boats, and riverine craft. Twenty mine-warfare vessels are planned along with twelve minelayers from converted amphibious ships. The planned naval aviation element will comprise of twelve land-based helicopters.\textsuperscript{123}

Bulgaria can offer nothing to a combined Mediterranean amphibious force. The fleet is generally a coastal patrol and defense force and possesses no capability for power projection. Although a nominal force of 2,000 naval infantry exists, they are tasked mainly with guard duties and seldom conduct training in amphibious operations. Only two Polnochny-class vessels are available for use as transports with no plans to build additional amphibious shipping at this time.

\textsuperscript{123} Grove, "Rise and Fall." 39
K. BI-LATERAL RESPONSES TO THE AMPHIBIOUS NEED

1. Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF)

Italy and Spain have amphibious forces of similar size and organizational structure, and both operate with their amphibious forces within NATO and the WEU. Based on these similarities, the Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF) was created in September 1996. With the SIAF, "Italy and Spain will provide, together with the US ARG and the UKNLPHIBGRU, a force of a clearly Mediterranean nature and with a higher capability than the force that would result if each country contributed with its forces separately."124 The use of similar operational procedures and the interoperability of assets enable a smooth integration of respective units. The complementary character of naval and landing units of both nations will result in a force greater than the sum of its parts and subsequently a more effective fighting unit.

The creation of SIAF does not imply any permanent stationing of forces other than their national bases. SIAF components will be Grupo Delta and Tercio de Armada (3rd Fleet) on the Spanish side; Terza Divisione Navale (3rd

124 "Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF).” XIV Spanish/USA Navy Staff Talks, date unknown, Topic 13
Naval Division) and Battaglione San Marco on the Italian side. The force will be activated on-call and act within a bilateral framework established in the Concept of Operations. Within multilateral operations, the force would be integrated in CAFMED or EUROMARFOR, which would provide the support means.

Exchanging commissioned and noncommissioned officers, permanently assigned to the host country, will integrate staffs. Command will change each year with one country providing both the CATF and the CLF. The CATF will be either the Italian 3rd Division rear admiral or the Spanish Grupo Delta commanding admiral, while the CLF will be the San Marco Battaglione CO or the Spanish 3rd Fleet’s executive officer.

2. United Kingdom-Netherlands Amphibious Task Group

Building on a relationship dating back to 1972, the attachment of the Royal Dutch Navy’s new amphibious transport ship completes the formation of the UK-Netherlands Amphibious Task Group (UKNLPHIBGRU). Originally created to operate in the mountain and cold weather conditions of NATO’s northern region in Norway, the Amphibious Group now primarily trains and operates in the Mediterranean and the Middle East.
The Task Group integrates one battalion of the Royal Netherlands Marine Corps (RNLMC) within Three Commando Brigade of the UK Royal Marines. The Landing Force is a brigade-size unit over 4500, consisting of a headquarters, three ground maneuver units, and supported by combat engineers and logistic units, mortars, antitank and air defense weapons, helicopter aviation, reconnaissance sub units, and artillery.\textsuperscript{125} The two Marine Corps have pioneered the multinational concept within NATO and are "interrelated and can work together, and have been doing so for 25 years."\textsuperscript{126}

The Dutch LPD Rotterdam fills a critical transportation and logistic shortfall in the bilateral force. The remaining vessels are provided by the United Kingdom and consist of the LHA Ocean, LPDs Fearless and Intrepid or LSLs, and support ships providing landing support logistics from the Royal Fleet Auxiliary. With the replacement of the LPDs in 2000 and 2002, the UKNLPHIBGRU will have a versatile and combat group capable of rapid

\textsuperscript{125} Mitchell, 75

reaction and force projection within the Atlantic and Mediterranean regions.

Under NATO command structure, Commander UKNLPHBGRU reports to SA ClausT as part of NATO’s Maritime Rapid Reaction Force. In 1993, the British and Dutch government formally designated the group FAWEU, as a multinational European Force capable of crisis response, peacekeeping, humanitarian missions, combat missions, and peacemaking operations.127

**L. EXISTING MULTINATIONAL PROPOSALS**

1. **History of European Naval Cooperation**

Over the years, NATO provided the means by which European navies established a set of cooperative operation and communication procedures. The Standing Naval Force Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT) was created in 1968, followed by the Naval On-Call Force Mediterranean in 1969 (re-designated STANAVFORMED in 1992), the Standing Naval Force Channel (STANAVFORCHAN) in 1973, and the Standing Naval Mine Counter Measure Force (STANAVMCMFOR) in 1994. These forces provided experience of truly combined operations and

---

127 These missions were designated by the WEU’s Petersberg Declaration of 19 June 1992. The WEU decided that certain missions of peacekeeping/conflict prevention in concert with the CSCE and UN would be a common military activity.
created a high level of interoperability among dissimilar vessels and operating procedures. France has taken part in NATO exercises and maintained standards of communication so that at the operational level the effects of its separation from the alliance were mitigated.\textsuperscript{128} These forces are "immediate reaction forces that will deploy to a crisis area in order to establish NATO presence, demonstrate solidarity, conduct surveillance, and contain crises."\textsuperscript{129}

In the Persian Gulf, a joint WEU operation named CLEAN SWEEP, was formed to clear the gulf of mines following the Iran-Iraq War. In DESERT SHIELD, the WEU contributed three groups of naval assets: a Spanish/Italian/French\textsuperscript{130} group in the Straits of Hormuz; a Belgian/French group around Bab-el-Mandeb; and a Belgian MCM group. The United Kingdom chose to operate with the American Navy in the north of the gulf, opposing an independent WEU command on the grounds that the organization lacked an appropriate politico-military structure.

Ships acting under the WEU accounted for about two-thirds of interceptions before the start of DESERT STORM,

\begin{footnotes}
\item[128] Grove, "A European Navy." 44
\item[130] The Italian Navy shifted to the US-led force just before DESERT STORM began
\end{footnotes}
and put naval activities at the forefront of the organization's operational capabilities. This new self-confidence led to the formation of SHARP FENCE, a maritime interdiction force to uphold the sanctions on warring parties in the Balkans. Civil war in former Yugoslavia also meant the involvement of NATO's naval reaction forces (e.g., STANAVFORMED) in the Adriatic in the first actual military operations performed since NATO's inception—named MARITIME GUARD. Eventually, the duality and inefficiency of two discrete commands led to a fully integrated task force, renamed SHARP GUARD. The joint NATO/WEU headquarters, basically NATO's COMNAVSOUTH with WEU officers, controlled Combined Task Force 440.

2. Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean

The concept for a Combined Amphibious Force Mediterranean (CAFMED) was developed in 1991 by the Amphibious Warfare Division at the Striking and Supporting Force Southern Europe (STRIKFORSOUTH) HQ in Naples, Italy. The CAFMED concept is the formation of a multinational NATO amphibious force in the Mediterranean in times of crises or for conflict prevention. CAFMED was

---

131 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 28
approved in 1995 by SACEAUR and is primarily made up of Greek, Italian, Turkish, Spanish, French, and American Navies. It could also include non-Mediterranean NATO nations such as the UK, the Netherlands, and Portugal.

CAFMED is not a standing force. It is a framework for amphibious forces to operate within and around NATO’s Southern Region in times of crisis. CAFMED “takes advantage of the ability of multinational-national amphibious forces, all of whom share a common operational mindset, to quickly mesh their planning and operations.” CAFMED offers NATO an additional deterrent or intervention capability and can deploy independently under a UN or OSCE mandate. CAFMED’s mission is “to deploy a brigade size landing force which must be self-sustaining for 15 days, and supported by adequate naval and naval-air assets.”

Its mission spectrum includes deployment as part of high intensity operations such as an amphibious assault, as well as execution of NEOs and humanitarian missions.

CAFMED’s organizational priorities concentrate on the integration of forces into an enhanced air-ground task force. The force can range from a light infantry unit to

---

132 Mundy, 62

133 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 28
a full brigade with up to five naval infantry battalions supported by armor, mortars, anti-tank weapons, and battalion level artillery. Particular emphasis is on the development of satellite based C4I and high data-rate communications for both amphibious shipping and land forces.

CAFMED is based on the Commander Combined Amphibious Task Force (CCATF)/Commander Combined Landing Force (CCLF) split of responsibilities. Both posts will be assigned to a single country, the respective staffs will be augmented by personnel from other participating countries.134 Despite the nationality of the CATF/CLF, English is used during operations and planning.

3. **European Maritime Force**

Following successes in the Persian Gulf, Somalia, and the Adriatic, ongoing reductions of naval forces are forcing a new approach for naval multinationality.135 A single navy can neither afford nor impact a crisis on its own. These initiatives represent a larger initiative in bringing European navies together to respond and proactively address distinct Eurocentric crises. However,

134 Valpolini, "Mediterranean Partnership." 28
the presence of US and NATO officers at these meetings and their "observer" role shows that any moves towards a "European" navy has been within a NATO context. French ideas that the WEU could act as a replacement for NATO foundered when faced with the realities of the Gulf and Bosnia. Now that France is moving back into the NATO fold, it is likely that consensus will be reached on the role of the WEU as a useful means of giving European countries the mechanisms for taking the lead in lower-level military tasks.\textsuperscript{136} Many of these are tasks for which maritime forces are highly suited.

The European Maritime Force (EUROMARFOR) was created in 1995 with the cooperation of France, Italy, and Spain. Portugal was added shortly thereafter. Headquartered in Spain, EUROMARFOR parallels the EUROFOR as a European formation established separate from NATO. It is to be activated under WEU's authority and tasked with a number of roles including peacekeeping, crisis management, and humanitarian assistance. It will stand up for training and exercises, and should a crisis arise, serve as a rapid reaction force. Currently commanded by an Italian vice

\textsuperscript{135} Cosentino, 66

\textsuperscript{136} Grove, "A European Navy." 50

94
EUROMARFOR consists of a 20-vessel fleet built around a French aircraft carrier and is trained for operations in the Mediterranean. Each nation designates ships and units as FAWEU, while still maintaining readiness under NATO direction (excepting France).

Despite the positive aspect of inviting Greece and Turkey to joint EUROMARFOR, the WEU is still bruised from its recent setback over Albania. In 1997 the Members were unable to agree on a joint military force to help maintain security and protect aid distribution after an insurrection against the government. In the end a "coalition of the willing" sent forces for three months. "Albania was the ideal operation for EUROMARFOR, not too far, not too complicated, not too dangerous."  

---


138 "Turkey and Greece Can Join Euro Forces in 1999," *Deutsche Presse-Agentur*, 20 June 1998: 5. The force will comprise 2,000 to 3,000 troops who will be based in their home countries. These forces will be available to take part in peacekeeping missions led by NATO or the WEU.

M. CONCLUSIONS

Although resting primarily with the United Kingdom, Spain, Italy, and France, sufficient amphibious capability exists among other European nations. Though that capability is not fully developed, there is a clear indication that the maritime nations of Europe regard amphibious operations seriously and have begun investing in these resources while reducing conventional ground combat forces and structures.

The more developed amphibious nations have developed a competent level of multinational action, such as the promising bilateral initiatives of UKNLPHIBGRU and SIAF. However, these initiatives along with the multilateral concepts of CAFMED and EUROMARFOR are ad hoc and cannot meet the need of a flexible, responsive force.

Expanding on the successful history European maritime cooperation (with both WEU and NATO) creates a precedent from which a combined force could be constructed. Based on evidence of sufficient European amphibious capabilities, successful multilateral development, and a defined need for a permanent amphibious capability, a NATO combined Standing Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean is feasible.
V. STAPHIBFORMED CONCEPT

The Standing Amphibious Force Mediterranean concept (STAPHIBFORMED) must achieve a four-fold purpose: flexibility, capability, interoperability, and reliability. Based on the Strategic Concept and CJTF, NATO will have a role in peace support operations. Force structures and decision-making mechanisms must provide suitably capable forces for deterrence, collective defense, and crisis management.

The Standing Force must be flexible enough to respond to contingencies promptly. Operations conducted at a distance will experience deficiencies in mobility, communications, and sustainment, which can become fatal impediments to mission success. Development of common doctrine, logistics, language, and communication skills are necessary for STAPHIBFORMED to achieve unity of purpose and efficient response to orders. The concept would create interoperable forces and qualified staff personnel that could be effectively used for peace support operations. The permanent structure would streamline the Amphibious Force and serve as a breeding ground for distinctly "European" military personnel.
A. FORCE COMPOSITION

In actuality, the only permanent component of the Standing Amphibious Force concept will be the headquarters. Though based on the American ARG, it is unlikely that European navies can equal the United States in maintenance, logistics, and sustainability. Therefore, forces assigned as STAPHIBFORMED will be assigned in four-month increments and rotated tri-annually. The following schedule is proposed for forces making up STAPHIBFORMED:

Jan - April     UK/NL Amphibious Group
May - Aug      Spanish Italian Amphibious Force
Sept - Dec   French deployment with secondary vessels assigned from Greece, Turkey or other 140

These organizations are not standing forces. STAPHIBFORMED offers a permanent structure and organization that will allow the already existing bilateral forces to plan and execute a necessary and needed NATO mission with the full support of the Alliance’s military. More importantly, the STAPHIBFORMED concept provides a unifying NATO framework for multilateral action already underway. In doing so, this will bring the full power of the Alliance

140 Forces capable of contributing to the STAPHIBFORMED concept are listed in the Appendix
(including US assets) to bear in support of the Force's credibility.

It is hoped that France, a key naval power in the Mediterranean, will soon rejoin the integrated military structure of NATO and take leadership of one-third of the Force. Without the aircraft carriers of France, the "big deck" capability would be lost, as well as the leadership and maritime experience of the French navy. Since it is unlikely that the remaining powers, Turkey and Greece, would subordinate themselves to each other, much less work together, French participation in NATO's military structure is imperative in fielding a full-time standing force in the Mediterranean.

B. STAPHIBFORMED MODELS

STAPHIBFORMED draws heavily from the already-established Standing Naval Force Mediterranean (STANAVFORMED) model. The concept permanently institutionalizes the multinational task force, similar to both STANAVFORLANT and STANAVFORMED. The Standing Naval force was activated on 30 April 1992 to provide a continuous maritime presence that is a constant and visible reminder of Alliance solidarity. STANAVFORMED, formerly an On-Call force, was initiated with the approval of the
Strategic Concept, which called for a greater role to be played by Allied multinational forces. Much of STAPHIBFORMED's development of common doctrine, procedures, and protocol can be acquired from the standing Mediterranean naval force.

STAPHIBFORMED mirrors the operational concept of the CJTF. It can be a NATO-led, NATO plus PfP, or WEU-led operation. Although under the NATO chain of command, some STAPHIBFORMED forces are FAWEU and could be released for assignment to the WEU pending a NAC decision. The permanent nature of this force makes its deployability immediate, possibly mating up with a CJTF headquarters in the theatre of operations. STAPHIBFORMED fits into the Strategic Concept, the CJTF concept, and the Ministerial Meeting of the NAC in May 1998. The NAC Summit urges:

The Alliance to maintain military effectiveness for the full range of its missions building on its essential collective defense capabilities and its ability to react to a wide range of contingencies, to preserve the transatlantic link, and to develop the European Security and Defense Identity with the Alliance.\footnote{NATO Press Communiqué M-NAC-1 (98)59, 3}

The permanence of STAPHIBFORMED allows the establishment of a Standing Headquarters within Regional
Command South (RCSOUTH) that will not take resident knowledge "home" when the ad hoc task force is discontinued. The accumulation of a ready reservoir of military personnel experienced in collective crisis response will be a significant by-product. The standing nature of the force and the permanence of the HQ will make the immediate execution of urgent missions, such as NEOs, initial disaster relief, and search and rescue possible. Political decisions will be facilitated by the existence of a standing force with established C² relationships, composition, and ROE.

The multinational template for executing this variety of missions is the CJTF, but the operational template is based on the United States Navy's ARG. The ARG mounts military operations from the sea on short notice—consisting of what the US Navy describes as "forward deployed, self-sustaining naval forces tailored to achieve a clearly stated objective."

Just as the American ARG demonstrates American "presence," the European STAPHIBFORMED would demonstrate Alliance resolve and unity under the NATO flag. Likewise, STAPHIBFORMED will retain the ARG's ability to quickly shift operational focus from combat missions to

142 Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare, 4
humanitarian assistance without need to reconfigure the force.

C. MISSIONS

STAPHIBFORMED would encompass the same peace operations (non-Article V operations) that are defined in NATO's MC 327 "NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations" and encompass conflict prevention, peacekeeping, humanitarian aid, and peace enforcement. WEU military missions, found in the 1992 Petersburg Declaration, are similar to NATO's MC 327 and include humanitarian and rescue operations, peacekeeping, and peace enforcement. The range of military options that STAPHIBFORMED is responsible for will run from peacetime engagements to deterrence and combat missions (Table 5-1).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PEACETIME ENGAGEMENT</th>
<th>DETERRENCE AND CONFLICT PREVENTION</th>
<th>COMBAT MISSIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Alliance to Partner Contacts</td>
<td>Crisis Response</td>
<td>Decisive Force</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assistance to Nations</td>
<td>Arms Control</td>
<td>Power Projection</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Peacekeeping</td>
<td>Confidence-building measures</td>
<td>Combined and Joint Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>Non-combatant Evacuation (NEO)</td>
<td>Counter Weapons of Mass Destruction</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Sanctions Enforcement</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 5-1. STAPHIBFORMED Responsibilities

102
A NATO Amphibious Squadron is a visible symbol of Alliance presence and, in effect, a NATO trip-wire. While under the NATO flag, an attack on Alliance ships would constitute nothing less serious than attack on 16—a breach of Article V of the Atlantic Charter. However, in international waters, STAPHIBFORMED is free of political encumbrances that inhibit and limit the scope of land-based operations.

D. PROBLEMS

While the United States steadfastly refuses to commit forces or assets unless they are part of an operation using NATO command structure, France has opposed using the NATO chain of command in the Mediterranean under an American Flag officer at RCSOUTH. France sees a European flag officer in NATO’s Southern Region as a prerequisite for its full return to the NATO integrated military structure. France argues that if ESDI is to be developed within NATO Europeans should have a larger share of top billets. France has also implied that any non-Article V military operation would require an “ad hoc” command arrangement totally dependent on the number of forces each nation
commits. This view contradicts the essence of the CJTF concept and would render inclusion of France in the STAPHIBFORMED proposal problematic, since both proposals argue for a dedicated and permanent command structure, rather than a provisional HQ.

The Allies have spurned France's call to turn Southern Command over to a European, which has now shelved its demand due to lack of support. Says one senior diplomat at NATO headquarters:

The prospective security threats along the southern flank make it all the more important to keep the Southern command in the hands of an American. Bosnia showed us the alliance only works when the United States takes the lead, and we need to keep the US engaged where the action is likely to be.  

Still, a strong Allied presence in the Mediterranean is impossible without the inclusion of France. An agreeable solution must be made to re-introduce France to the integrated military structure of NATO. As the largest regional influence in the Mediterranean, an effective Allied policy cannot be accomplished without complete

143 John Borawski, "NATO Restructuring and Enlargement: The Dual Challenge," Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Consideration, ed. Thomas-Durell Young (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1996) 206

144 Drozdiak, A4
French involvement: politically, economically, and militarily.

E. COMMAND AND CONTROL

Despite the demonstrated need of a NATO-led, European-staffed, standing amphibious force, American presence in the form of the 6th Fleet, is not likely to diminish in the Mediterranean. STAPHIBFORMED must have a complimentary role with the United States, rather than developing as a substitute for American maritime power. STAPHIBFORMED will act in cooperation with the United States as the "European response" to a crisis with NATO's approval (and America's implied consent). When world events require the 6th Fleet to respond to crises, their absence in the Mediterranean can be capably filled by STAPHIBFORMED in a supplementary role, fulfilling the missions of presence, engagement with Allies and Partners, and deterrence.

The Reaction Forces of Allied Command Europe (ACE) are divided into Immediate Reaction Forces (IRF) and Rapid Reaction Forces (RRF). Under IRF falls ACE Mobile Forces (AMF) Land and Air, and IRF Maritime Forces consisting of STANAVFORMED and STANAVFORMIN. This force structure arrangement falls under the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR), as shown in Figure 5-1, while administrative
Figure 5-1. STAPHIBFORMED Force Structure

Figure 5-2. STAPHIBFORMED Command Structure
control is delegated to the Component Commander Navy South (CCNAVSOUTH) under the Regional Commander South (RCSOUTH), as shown in Figure 5-2.

Once deployed, STAPHIBFORMED would report either directly to the Regional Commander (RC) or through CCNAV Component Command. In conjunction with the ESDI initiative, STAPHIBFORMED fits in this command structure, as the CCNAV billet will be filled by an Italian flag officer (Figure 5-3). When the North Atlantic Council

![STAPHIBFORMED Operational Control Diagram](image)

* Under WEU operations, CJTF Commander may report to DSACEUR or DSACEUR may assume CJTF command

Figure 5-3. STAPHIBFORMED Operational Control

approves a mission profile for STAPHIBFORMED, operational control would most likely be delegated to a CJTF commander under RCSOUTH. The CJTF commander could either be the
Commander of the standing CJTF HQ, CCNAV, or assigned to the force as circumstances dictate.145

It is critical that the STAPHIBFORMED chain of command lead clearly back to the Regional Command responsible for Article V defense in the region concerned. The sovereignty of the Alliance sails with the NATO flag and a non-Article V operation could quickly escalate into a defense of Alliance forces and material. For a WEU-led force, procedures to recall a force to NATO control must be developed and exercised, since territorial defense is considered, even by the WEU, to be executed under Article V of the Washington Treaty.146

The command relationship must continue to follow NATO's time-tested principle of unity of command. Coordination among European allies alone has rarely produced a viable and effective multinational structure. In a standing force rather than an ad hoc task force, day-

145 Command and control issues are a thorny problem of multinational land formations. Although multinational aviation and naval forces have worked well for years, ground forces are much more complex. Though the topic of multinational command and control is only briefly discussed, this thesis is sensitive to the inherent problems of national sovereignty, command authorities, exercise relationships, and "unity of command." For additional information on these problems, see Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young's essay "Command Authorities and Multinationality in NATO: The Response of the Central Region's Armies."

146 Barry, 40
to-day control will not be under national authorities, but under a NATO Strategic Commander. Therefore, within the STAPHIBFORMED concept, a single commander will be appointed and answer exclusively to the following:

a) In peacetime: RCSOUTH (through CCNAV)

b) In combat under NATO: Commander CJTF

c) In combat under WEU: Commander CJTF

The STAPHIBFORMED proposal fills a critical niche between the land forces of the Rapid Reaction Corps and CJTFs. Rapid Reaction Corps will respond to collective defense issues of the Alliance, while CJTF will draw on available forces to tailor the response to the collective security threat. STAPHIBFORMED will have a standing HQ and standing force, ready and available for assignment. STAPHIBFORMED may act alone, be the first to arrive in a larger CJTF, or act in concert with an ARRC deployment. It will be ready, capable, and flexible to meet any maritime contingency.
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

As this thesis has shown, the Mediterranean is a key security concern for the United States and Europe. Absent American leadership in NATO, little collective amphibious capability exists in the Mediterranean despite the reinvigoration of the WEU. Furthermore, global demands, Alliance burden sharing, and CFSP/ESDI require the multinational support of US forces in the region. The first among these is a requirement for a force capable of responding on short notice to the likely threat. The situation requires the presence of a ready, capable force to ensure stability. Thus, the proposal for a Standing Amphibious Force in the Mediterranean should be adopted by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

A. CONCLUSIONS

STAPHIBFORMED is a mechanism for crisis response and peacekeeping operation conducted beyond Allied borders. A European Amphibious Force is intended to facilitate better resource sharing between the US and Allies and permit the Europeans to undertake some missions without direct US involvement. Such arrangements will promote a distinct European Security and Defense Identity within the Alliance.
and help satisfy the American desire to share the global security burden with Europe.

STABILIFORMED is necessary. It is designed to respond to non-Article V operations, such as peacekeeping, humanitarian assistance, and peace enforcement, and deterrence of terrorism. As NATO casts its gaze outward, there is no shortage of conflict within or on the periphery of Europe. Ethnic, religious, and economic tensions create instability in many nations of the Maghreb as well as the more brutal examples in the Balkans. European prosperity, security, and peace depend on assisting these nations to become productive members of the international community or by being able to deal with unrest when engagement and diplomacy fail. Diplomatic resolutions, such as those in Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina, utilize the threat of force for two reasons: (1) to compel negotiations; (2) to enforce the terms. The attitude of the international community will be based on confidence that the military organization will be capable of delivering as expected. Thus, the greater need for collective security over collective defense is best illustrated by a force structure adaptable and flexible enough to deal with all ranges of crisis response.
NATO has undergone a period of transition and adaptation in order to focus on its new role in a post-Soviet Union world. The Strategic Concept has set the tone for the Alliance to welcome enlargement, approve new tasks, streamline its command structure, and develop new force structures capable of a flexible, rapid response. Politically, the Alliance has created a synergy with other regional organizations that present a European political, economic, and military demonstration of unity. STAPHIBFORMED seamlessly integrates these objectives as a result of its multilateral Alliance composition, display of naval “presence” during engagement, and robust and flexible capabilities required for crisis response.

STAPHIBFORMED is capable. Amphibious operations have defined naval warfare in the Mediterranean Sea since the days of Agamemnon. With all of the Mediterranean and most African nations accessible by water, Europe’s southern security must take on a distinct amphibious dimension. History has shown that a capable, well-trained expeditionary force can have an immediate impact in regions of national interest. Expeditionary forces, being sea-based, remain a conspicuous and mobile example of national or international resolve. While at sea, the Amphibious
Ready Group is self-sufficient and politically benign, requiring no right of passage while in international waters. The amphibious force can simultaneously provide naval presence to achieve political objectives and engage partners and allies. Thus, the on-site, task organized STAPHIBFORMED can perform the critical missions of power projection and presence while maintaining the capability to respond to a variety of mission requirements, however unusual, including forcible entry if necessary.

STAPHIBFORMED is feasible. Although the Europeans cannot put forward an integrated, self-sufficient, force with the durability of the United States, the four-month rotation cycle makes an annual Mediterranean deployment possible for nations involved. Europeans have much of the infrastructure of an amphibious force already in place, or are expected to field it within the next five years. Two-thirds of STAPHIBFORMED has already been chartered, with the UK/NL Amphibious Group drawing on 25 years of experience and SIAF operational for over two years. French participation, key to a year-round capability, is yet to be determined. Upon full re-integration into the military structure, France will be able to draw on its multilateral knowledge with EUROMARFOR and contribute experience,
leadership, and assets to Mediterranean security. Adds VADM Steve Abbot, Commander 6th Fleet and Commander Strike Forces South:

If the [European] nations have the desire and the political capabilities to stand up a permanent amphibious force, these capabilities exist.147

STAPHIBFORMED draws on three primary organizational models: the American Amphibious Ready Group; NATO’s Combined Joint Task Force; and the Standing Naval Force Mediterranean. Militarily, the ARG template is the foundation from which STAPHIBFORMED is built. The ultimate goal is a flexible crisis response capability similar to the United States Navy and Marine Corps. Politically, the CJTF concept provides a unique departure in Alliance thinking that embraces multilateralism while insisting on a clear chain of command. STAPHIBFORMED is above all things, combined and joint. Lastly, STAPHIBFORMED can utilize the lessons learned from establishing the first Standing naval force in the Mediterranean. The new force can draw on the experience of STANAVFOMED’s common doctrine, development of operating procedures, and solutions to command and control problems.

147 Paolo Valpolini, "DYNAMIC RESPONSE puts SFOR Reserve Forces to the Test," Jane's Navy International, 1 June 1998: 12

115
B. RECOMMENDATIONS

The Standing Amphibious Force is a necessary, capable, and feasible concept and should be held up to scrutiny and examination by national governments and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

First, the United States Department of State, on recommendation from the Defense Department, should study and endorse the STAPHIBFORMED proposal, concluding with a recommendation to the North Atlantic Council for adoption and action.

Secondly, the NAC should direct NATO Military Authorities to conduct a feasibility study of the STAPHIBFORMED concept for inclusion in the 1999 Washington Summit.

Lastly, upon successful completion of the feasibility study, the NAC should direct the establishment of STAPHIBFORMED within the integrated military structure of NATO.
# APPENDIX

## STAPHIBFORMED PROPOSED FORCE STRUCTURE

1. **UNITED STATES**

   | LSD  | Whidbey Island [12] | LPH     | Guam     |      |             |

2. **UNITED KINGDOM/NETHERLANDS AMPHIBIOUS TASK GROUP**

   | LPD (UK) | Albion (2002) | LPH (UK)  | Ocean    | LPD (NL) | Rotterdam |
   | LPD (UK) | Bulwark (2003) | CV        | Invincible | LSL (UK) | Sir Galahad |
   | LSL (UK) | Sir Beldivere | CV        | Illustrious | LSL (UK) | Sir Tristam |
   | LSL (UK) | Sir Geraint   | LPD (UK)  | Fearless  | LPD (UK) |              |
   |           |               | LPD (UK)  | Intrepid  |          |             |

3. **SPANISH-ITALIAN AMPHIBIOUS FORCE**

   | LPD (IT) | San Giorgio  | LHD (IT)  | Luigi Einaudi (2005) | LPD (IT) | San Marco |
   | LPD (IT) | San Giusto   | CV (IT)   | Giuseppe Garibaldi  | LPD (SP) | Galicia   |
   | LST (SP) | Hernán Cortés | CV (SP)   | Príncipe de Asturias | LST (SP) | Pizarro   |
   | LPA (SP) | Castilla     | CV        |                | LPA (SP) | Aragón    |

4. **FRENCH CONSORTIUM**

   | LSD (FR) | Ouragan | CV | Jeanne d’Arc         | LSD (FR) | Orage    |
   | LPD (FR) | Bougainville | CV | Clemenceau          | LST (FR) | Batral Class [5] |

   a. **Greece**

   | LST (GR) | Chios  | LST (GR) | Samos   |
   | LST (GR) | Lesbos | LST (GR) | Rodos   |
   | LST (GR) | Ikaria | LSD (GR) | Cabildo |
b. Turkey

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LST (TU)</th>
<th>LST (TU)</th>
<th>LST (TU)</th>
<th>LST (TU)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Osman Gazi</td>
<td>Serdar</td>
<td>Karamürselbey</td>
<td>Ertugrul</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Serdar</td>
<td></td>
<td>Sarucabey</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

118


BIBLIOGRAPHY

Books:


Sperling, James and Emil Kirchner, Recasting the European Order. Towbridge, UK: Redwood Books, 1997

Young, Thomas-Durrell, ed., *Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1997

**Pamphlets:**


*Jane's Fighting Ships 1997-98*, Amphibious Forces supplement

Johnsen, William T., *NATO Strategy in the 1990s: Reaping the Peace Dividend or the Whirlwind?* Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, 1995


Periodicals:

"22nd MEU Remains Busy," Marine Corps Gazette, July 1997


Deen, Thalif, "UN Approves Force to Protect Aid in Albania," Jane's Defence Weekly, 9 April 1997


de Lionis, Andres, "The Navies of Eastern Europe: Austere But Evolving," Jane's Intelligence Review, 1 April 1997

de Puig, Luis Maria, "The European Security and Defence Identity within NATO," NATO Review, Summer 1998


“A European Amphibious Dimension?” Jane’s Navy International, 1 September 1997


“French Carrier for Crisis Force,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, 16 October 1996

Forster, Anthony, “An Emerging Threat Takes Shape as Terrorists Take to the High Seas,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, 1 July 98

Franceschi, Bruno, “In NATO's Shadow, European Defence Group Looks For a Niche,” Agence France Presse, 13 May 1997


Gillum, Donald E., “Gallipoli, Its Influence on Amphibious Doctrine,” Marine Corps Gazette, date unknown


“Germans End Operation PELICAN in Albania,” Agence France Presse, 3 December 1993


122


Mason, Trevor, "Ministers Pressed to Think Again on TA Cuts," Press Association Newsfile, 19 October 1998


Miller, Charles, "New NATO 'Focus' for Marines," Press Association Limited, 26 September 1991


Murphy, John R., "Memories of Somalia," Marine Corps Gazette, April 1988


Petersen, Jan, "NATO's Next Strategic Concept," *NATO Review*, Summer 1998


Roos, John G., "It's All About Connections," *Armed Forces Journal International*, May 1998


Sheridan, Michael, "Europe Must Look South, Not East," *The Independent (London)*, 8 February 1995


Valpolini, Paolo, "DYNAMIC RESPONSE puts SFOR Reserve Forces to the Test," Jane's Navy International, 1 June 1998


Valpolini, Paolo, "Spanish-Italian Force to be Active Next Year," Jane's Defence Weekly, 8 October 1998


Public Documents:


The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 1-02, DoD Dictionary (Washington DC: April 1997)

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Pub 3-0, Doctrine for Joint Operations (Washington DC: 1 Feb 1995)


MC 327, NATO Military Planning for Peace Support Operations


Office of Naval Intelligence, Challenges to Naval Expeditionary Warfare (Washington DC: Government Printing Office, 1997)

**Briefings:**

"Spanish-Italian Amphibious Force (SIAF)," XIV Spanish/USA Navy Staff Talks, date unknown

"CJTF HQ Concept," NATO School (SHAPE) Brief, 17 March 1998

**Interview and Telephone Conversations:**

Dutel, LtCol Vic, Headquarters Marine Corps, PP&O

Gruber, CDR Dave, Chief of Naval Operations, NATO/Europe/Russia Branch (N524)

**Communiqués and Press Releases:**

AFSOUTH Fact Sheet, DETERMINED FALCON, 15 June 1998


ARRC Press Release, "EUROFOR Commander Introduced to Key NATO Corps HQ," 27 May 1998

126
NATO Ministerial Communiqué, "Future Tasks of the Alliance (Harmel Report)," 14 December 1967

NATO Press Briefing, "Statement by the NATO Spokesman on Kosovo," 16 October 1998

NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)85, "The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept," 7 Nov 1991

NATO Press Communiqué S-1(91)86, "Rome Declaration on Peace and Cooperation," 8 November 1991

NATO Press Communiqué M-NACC-1(93)40, "Final Communiqué," Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 11 June 1993

NATO Press Communiqué M-NACC-1(96)63, "Final Communiqué," Ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council, 3 June 1996


NATO Press Release (98)90, "Statement by NATO Secretary General, Dr. Javier Solana, on Exercise DETERMINED FALCON," 13 June 1998

**Speeches:**

Abbot, Vice Admiral Steve, USN, Commander US Navy Sixth Fleet, statement before the Senate Armed Services Committee Readiness Subcommittee, 25 February 1998

Albright, Madeleine K., statement to the North Atlantic Council, Luxembourg, 28 May 1998

127
Clinton, President William, address to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, Berlin, 6 Sep 1996


Hunter, Ambassador Robert E., Superintendent's Guest Lecture address to the Naval Postgraduate School, 5 August 1997

Joulwan, General George A., USA, Commander in Chief United States European Command, statement before the House National Security Committee, 2 March 1995

Pang, Frederick F. Y., statement before the Personnel Subcommittee of the Senate Armed Services Committee, 16 March 1996

Rühe, Volker, German Minister of Defense, "European Security and Stability—Europe Whole and Free," speech to the Aspen Institute and CSIS, Berlin, 14 March 1997

Solana, Dr. Javier, NATO Secretary General, "Collective Security and the Post-Cold War World," speech at the Conference on Crisis Management and NATO Reform in Rome, 15 June 1998

Solana, Dr. Javier, NATO Secretary General, "Confronting the Security Challenges of the New NATO," Keynote address at the XVth NATO workshop, Vienna, 22 June 1998

Solana, Dr. Javier, NATO Secretary General, "Preparing NATO for the 21st Century." Keynote address at the Maritime Symposium, Lisbon, 4 September 1998

Teti, Frank, Naval Postgraduate School Lecture, Monterey, CA, 12 December 1997

Web Address:

### INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No. of Copies</th>
<th>Name and Details</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Dudley Knox Library</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director, Training and Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2</td>
<td>Director, Marine Corps Research Center</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Director, Studies and Analysis Division</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marine Corps Representative</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Marine Corps Tactical Systems Support Activity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1</td>
<td>Professor Richard J. Hoffman</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
9. Mr. Kenneth Huffman
United States Mission to NATO
Defense Operations Division
APO AE 09724

10. LTC John Feeley
United States Mission to NATO
Defense Operations Division
APO AE 09724

11. LTC Brad Naegle
Code SM/Nb
Naval Postgraduate School
555 Dyer Rd, Rm. 206
Monterey, CA 93943-5103

12. Captain Aaron Weiss
655 Acker Pk NE
Washington, DC 20002

13. Chief of Naval Operations
NATO/Europe/Russia Branch (N524)
2000 Navy Pentagon, Rm. 4E583
Attn: CDR Jim Pelkofsky
Washington, DC 20350-2000

14. The Joint Staff
J-5/European Division
Pentagon, Rm 2D956
Washington, DC 20318-5114

15. Thomas-Durrell Young
US Army War College
Root Hall, Bldg 122
Carlisle, PA 17013-5050

16. Office of the Secretary of Defense
OASD/ISA (European Policy)
Pentagon, Rm 4D762
Washington, DC 20301

17. US Department of State
INR/EUC/ACE Rm 4742
Washington, DC 20520