THE U.S. AND AUSTRALIAN RELATIONSHIP INTO THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY

A MONOGRAPH
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The US and Australian Relationship
Into the Twenty-First Century

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ABSTRACT


This monograph examines the US - Australian relationship as the world approaches the twenty-first century. Since the end of World War II Australia has maintained a close defense relationship with the US, which has been the guarantor of her independence. This relationship was formalized with the ANZUS treaty of 1951 and although global circumstances have changed the alliance remains the centerpiece of Australian defense strategy and US regional engagement within the Asian Pacific.

In 1972 President Nixon articulated the Guam doctrine, which required all US treaty partners to provide for their own defense. This doctrine forced Australia to review its defense strategy, and over the next 25 years, Australia developed a comprehensive strategic defense policy. These policies have been published in a series of government strategy papers, known as White Papers. These policy papers gradually shifted Australia’s strategy from forward defense as a member of a US led coalition to depth in defense and finally to self-reliance. As this metamorphosis occurred the US linkage remained strong. Whether fighting as part of a coalition led by the US, or relying on US logistical support Australia remains tied to the US in defense matters. In the 1980s there was a subtle shift towards a more independent regional engagement policy designed to demonstrate that Australia’s was regionally focused on the economies of the Asian Pacific.

However, as each of the Australian defense strategies evolved the ties with the US remained critical. This reliance on US support creates a dilemma for Australia. While it attempts to be seen as an Asian neighbor its close Western association has excluded it from key regional forums. To shed this and become integrated into Asia it must demonstrate a more independent stance and possibly a movement toward a nonaligned status.

This monograph concludes with the observation that Australia’s close relationship with the US is in its best interest. The logistic agreements, equipment and the technological advanced systems provide Australia with the necessary capabilities to provide for its own defense. The relationship in fact guarantees that the US will in times of crisis avail itself for Australia’s needs.
I. Introduction

"Without any inhibition of any kind, I make it quite clear that Australia looks to America, free of any pangs as to our traditional links or kinship with the United Kingdom."¹
Prime Minister John Curtin 27 Dec 1941

**Historical Perspective**

World War II changed previously established global alliances and forced the realignment of many traditional security relationships. When Prime Minister Curtin made his famous pronouncement in December 1941, he, in effect, cut the umbilical cord of Australia’s traditional allegiance to Great Britain. Australia had been a member of the British Empire ever since its establishment as a British Penal Colony in the 1800s. However, by late 1941 Australia faced its gravest crisis and the British could do nothing to stop what appeared to be an imminent Japanese invasion of Australia.

**Australia – Britain – US**

A review of the historical significance of the Australian and US alliance should begin by identifying the traditional and cultural ties of this western nation located in an Asian geography. Australia, discovered by Captain Cook in 1788, was colonized by Britain, and remained a part of the British Empire until 1900. In 1901 Australia established itself as a federal parliamentary state within the Commonwealth, but retained the Queen of England as the Head of State, with a governor-general serving as her representative.² Australia continues to maintain this relationship with the British monarchy, even to this day.

In 1940 the British realized the war in Europe prevented an early intervention by its fleet to (fortress) Singapore, which was considered the lynchpin in the defense of Australia and New Zealand. It became clear that the British interests in Asia and the Pacific would
have to rely on support from the US. Australia, along with New Zealand, had no alternative other than to take a new protector. With the Japanese opening of the Pacific and the capture of Singapore, both Australia and New Zealand realized how vulnerable they were.³ The American protection of Australia and use as a staging base by thousands of American soldiers and sailors during World War II changed Australia’s view of the relationship. The belief, held by many Australians to this day, is that the US halted an imminent invasion by the Japanese during the Second World War. In the Battle of the Coral Sea, the US repulsed a Japanese task force and ‘saved Australia’. This myth established the US as the protector, not only of Australia but the entire Pacific.⁴

Australia’s shift from a British protectorate into an American alliance supports the observation that Australia has always needed an alliance with a great and powerful friend, this has been a fundamental characteristic of Australian foreign and defense policy since its inception.⁵ At the end of WW II, and as the cold war dawned, the Australian and (at that time) New Zealand defense strategies became dependent on US military power. The British had maintained a presence in the region until the early 1960s, but when they withdrew their forces east of the Suez, only the US was left as guarantor in the region.⁶

As Cold-War bipolarity began to take hold and reach into the Pacific, new security concerns gripped Australia. Not only was there a fear of a resurgent Japan, but there was a growing concern about the spread of communism, and in particular the possible emergence of Communist China. Historically, Australia has always had a tendency to perceive threats as being Asian and coming from the north.⁷ The United States during the early post World War II period was clearly focused on Europe and did not at that time view the Pacific region as posing an immediate threat. The US policy in the Asia-Pacific region was
focused on designing a Pacific Pact, as a part of the Japanese Peace Treaty, that insured stability. The Australians felt isolated from this process, they were welcomed as an ally - but certainly not as an equal, regardless of what they viewed had been their significant contribution in the war against Japan. If it were not for the heroic efforts of Sir Percy Spender, Australia’s Minister for Trade and Foreign Affairs, the US, Australian, New Zealand Tripartite Pact (ANZUS Treaty) would probably not have been signed in Sept 1952.

**ANZUS and the Cold War Alignment**

In 1951 the United States, clearly the most dominant power after the war, had reluctantly entered into the ANZUS Pact with Australia and New Zealand. However, it was a unique alliance in that the US, was unwilling to include Britain in this alliance, one of its strongest NATO allies. Thus, the US reluctantly became involved in a security guarantee to Australia and New Zealand.

As the cold war continued Australia came to identify communism as the principle threat to the region and adopted a forward defense posture designed to contain Communism as far away from Australia as possible. This approach was the cornerstone of Australia’s strategic defense policy well into the 1970’s and a key factor in the decision to become involved in the Vietnam War. As the geopolitics of the cold war became more bipolar the US policy of containment gave Australia’s unique geographic position greater importance. The US use of Australian facilities strengthened Australia’s desire to have a closer linkage with the US defense strategy. These facilities presented a means for Australia to demonstrate unequivocal support for a “strong and powerful friend”. The Joint Defense facilities of Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station and Pine Gap
Satellite Communications Facility provided significant benefits during this stage of the cold war. The Joint Facility at Nurrungar in South Australia provided the US the ability to monitor arms control agreements and gather intelligence on the Soviet Union. Established in the 1960’s these facilities also provided early warning of ballistic missile launches. All three of these facilities demonstrated Australia’s commitment to the US and provided leverage during the cold war.¹¹

Australia maintains a unique geographical position in the world. An inescapable fact concerning Australia’s strategic position is that her coastline is the longest in the world, and she possesses large quantities of natural resources. This, coupled with her extensive landmass (only slightly smaller than the continental US) and a relatively modest population (18.5 million people with a growth rate of 1.3 percent per year), places her in a unique classification. While this western society exists within an Asian environment it stands alone along with New Zealand with respect to being an industrialized and developed nation situated among third world countries whose political and economic institutions are frail and volatile.¹² Australia’s neighbors continued to be focused largely on internal security matters well into the late 1980’s and only recently appear to be focusing on external priorities.

The cornerstone of Australia’s defense strategy was the ANZUS Treaty; precisely what the treaty guaranteed was never clarified. Certainly there was a belief by the Australians that it guaranteed the US would provide combat forces in the event of a threat to their national interests, however broadly this might be defined. The participation by both Australia and New Zealand in the Korean and Vietnam Wars became the mechanism to
demonstrate a commitment to a close relationship with the US. The critical article in the ANZUS Treaty stipulates that:

**Article IV**

"Each Party recognizes that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall be immediately reported to the Security Council of the United Nations. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security."\(^{13}\)

It does not specify that all signatories are required to provide combat forces in the defense of the others. Australia and New Zealand interpreted this Article as the guarantee of US combat forces; in the event their vital national interests were threatened.

**The Guam Doctrine and Implications**

The expectation that the US would send combat forces to Australia's defense stood until 1969 when President Richard Nixon articulated the Guam Doctrine. The resultant confusion over what he had meant drove Australia, in particular, to review her strategic defense. Certainly Sir Percy Spender, one of the primary architects of the ANZUS agreement, believed that this document guaranteed Australia's security.\(^{14}\)

The circumstances surrounding the Guam Doctrine deserve some critical review; it is from this point forward that Australia began to retool its national defense strategy. In July 1969, at the Naval Officers Club on Guam, President Nixon, during a private meeting with Prime Minister Groton of Australia was told that some Asian leaders were concerned as to whether the US, in light of Vietnam, intended to play a vital role in Asia, or like the British, French and Dutch before them intended to withdraw from the Pacific, or play a minor role. Nixon responded that afternoon that he believed the greatest threat to world
peace existed in the Pacific and the US would "continue to play a significant role," but he went further and qualified his statement with the following:

"As far as the problem of internal security (issues) are concerned, as far as problems of military defense, except for the threat of a major power involving nuclear weapons... the US is going to encourage and has the right to expect, that type of problem will be increasingly handled by, and the responsibility for it taken, by the Asian nations themselves."\textsuperscript{15}

Although this created tremendous internal debate within the Australian defense community, Australian foreign policy and defense strategy continued until 1972 to rest on a concept of defense on the cheap through unreserved reliance on great and powerful friends.\textsuperscript{16}

The Vietnam War placed stress not only on the internal political institutions within Australia but also on the Australian – American relationship. It was the Australian recognition in 1972 that:

"A sovereign country pursuing independent foreign policies is best served ... by not being influenced in policy decisions ... by fear of their inability by military means to deter interference."\textsuperscript{17}

The Australian Prime Minister at the time, McMahon, went on to further explain that greater self-reliance is needed and would better equip Australia to play a more prominent role in the region. In articulating this shift in defense strategy Australia understood that:

"It would not be prudent to rest its security directly or as heavily, as in previous peacetime history, on the military power of a Western ally (implying clearly the US) in Asia."\textsuperscript{18}

In 1972 the Australian elections resulted in a change of government, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was elected with a majority and almost immediately US and Australian tensions began. These were in part the result of the Vietnam War but also there was a
belief that the US was acting in a bullying manner in regards to its Asian policies. Although diplomatic relations remained strained, it was not until the December 1972 US bombing of Hanoi, and the subsequent vociferous response from Australia’s new government, that the US openly questioned the strength of Australian and US friendship. Nixon, in light of Australian government’s comments, made it clear that the Australian Prime Ministers comments about the Christmas bombing were neither informed nor appreciated.19

In May 1973, President Nixon in a Letter of Transmittal to Congress stated, “that in reordering our relationships with Asia (he believed) the US role has been too dominant, and the US should henceforth adjust the manner of support.”20 He went on to clarify that:

"The US would never repudiate its pledged word nor betray an ally...(but) shall look to the nation directly threatened to assume the primary responsibility for providing the manpower for its own defense."21

Although this seems an obvious expectation on the part of the US, this statement accelerated Australia to embark on an in-depth review of their national defense strategy and military capabilities. The Australian – US relationship remained somewhat strained until the 1975 Australian elections brought the Liberal/National Country Party Coalition into power.

The Australian defense strategy began its fundamental shift in 1976 with the publication of Australian Defense: this was the first attempt by the Australian government to set out a comprehensive national defense strategy that did not rely solely on the US alliance. The Guam Doctrine had initiated a fundamental shift in Australia’s defense strategy.
Defining the Asia Pacific Region

The Asia Pacific region shall be defined as including the Great Powers of China, Japan, Russia, India and the US. The Middle Powers are considered to be North and South Korea, Australia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, Philippines, Indonesia, and Pakistan. The Small Powers are made up of New Zealand, Brunei, Myanmar, Cambodia, Laos, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea and the South Pacific Islands. This constitutes a broad Asia-Pacific region but does not imply a unifying security area.22

Australia occupies a larger status on the world stage than its 18.5 million population would warrant. It does this based on the strength of its economy, vast natural resources and diplomatic initiatives. In embarking in 1976 toward a more self-reliant strategic posture Australia believed that given:

"Its special character as a numerically small, territorially large, Western derived, affluent society on the edge of the Asia-Pacific region, (it) had to be sensitive to the widely defined strategic environment of Asia Pacific and demonstrate an ability to act separately from the US alliance." 23

Australia has developed a bond with the US that transcends just the ANZUS alliance. The two nations have become economically and politically intermeshed. However, it is the military aspect of national power that is most affected by a shift toward self-reliance. If Australia wants to achieve self reliance but maintain the significant advantages gained from the alliance with the US, Australia will need to achieve a greater military self-sufficiency.

The historical appreciation for Australia’s links to powerful western allies is at the core of her national defense debate. An analysis of Australia’s strategic and military objectives
as published by each government is critical to understanding the change that has occurred since the end of World War II. A thorough examination of Australia’s White Papers, since the end of the Vietnam War, will be undertaken to trace the shift in Australia’s strategic policy.

2 JICPAC/OSI on the Internet<smiller@JIC-MAIL.PACOM.IC.GOV>. statistical information provided by PACOM staff.


5 Ibid. p 3.

6 Theis, Wallace and Harris, James *An Alliance Unravels: The United States and ANZUS*, Naval War College Review, 1990. p.102. Addresses the issue of British withdrawal from India and east of the Suez Canal.


12 Albinski p. 2, provided the preponderance of information but the statistics concerning landmass and population size were pulled from JICPAC/OSI on the Internet <smiller@JIC-MAIL.PACOM.IC.GOV>.


15 St. J. Barclay. p 171.Much of the discussion was paraphrased however St J. Barclay used quotations, his sources were identified as 'Informal Remarks of President Nixon with Newsmen at Guam' 25 July 1969 as reported by Richard Stibbins and Elaine Adams.

16 St. J. Barclay. p. 181.
17 St. J. Barclay. p. 181.
19 St. J. Barclay. p. 187
20 St. J. Barclay. p. 187
21 St. J. Barclay. p. 187


II. Australia’s Shift Towards ‘Self-Reliance’

“All of our defense relationships, formal and informal impose responsibilities on Australia. Our self-reliant defense posture encompasses the capability to meet these responsibilities for regional security.”

The Defense of Australia 1987

Throughout the Cold War Australia’s relationship with the US was the central theme of her national defense strategy. Although the revelation of the Guam Doctrine changed strategic defense thinking, Australian security has remained fundamentally reliant on US military power. An assumption of security is that it requires more than the prevention of an invasion, occupation or destruction of a country. It must also include the ability of that nation to prevent others from influencing the independent institutions and actions of that nation. It should mean unhampered independence and a freedom of choice as regards external relationships.

Australia Defines a New Defense Strategy

To begin the analysis of Australia’s reliance on US military capabilities and identify the shift in Australia’s defense strategy, defense strategy and military strategy should be defined. The Glossary of Terms, published by the Australian Joint Services Staff College, defines defense strategy as:

“Those aspects of a national strategy/strategies which relate to the promotion of a nation’s defense interests. A military strategy will form part of the defense strategy, along with political, diplomatic, psychological, economic and social considerations.”

The definition of military strategy is defined in the Australian and US publications (JCS Pub 1) as:
"The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force, or the threat of force."

The components of strategy consist of ends, the desired objective(s) to be attained; ways the manner in which the end state is to be achieved, (the purpose or objective(s); and means the instruments used to achieve the desired end state or objective(s). Military capabilities provide a nation with the leverage to achieve a desired end state. Samuel Huntington described military power as having four primary dimensions. First, there is a quantitative capability, which includes numbers of service personnel, equipment and resources available to the forces. Secondly, the technological capabilities of the force in terms of their sophistication and effectiveness of both weapon systems and equipment. Thirdly, organizational coherence, discipline, level of training, and morale of the force, which includes effectiveness of command and control relationships. Lastly, he believed there are societal aspects of power, these include the ability and willingness of the society to apply military force effectively.

A fundamental underpinning of the benefits Australia receives from the Australian – US alliance can be tied to Huntington’s definition and summed up as privileged access to US intelligence sources. The access to purchase state of the art US military technology and equipment, regular opportunities to train with US forces and benefit from operational doctrine and tactics. Cooperation on defense science matters, an active personnel exchange program, and participation in a variety of military conferences and forums. These benefits provide Australia with the capability to provide for itself a greater degree of self-reliance.
The US in return receives access to facilities in Australia that provide valuable intelligence information. There are three major joint facilities, which were established during the cold war. They consist of the Joint Defense Space Research Facility established by a 1966 accord, at Pine Gap, which is located in the Northern Territory. It provides communications with satellites and assists in the development of strategic space technology, this facility was. The second facility is the Joint Defense Space Communications Station, established by a 1969 treaty, located at Nurrungar in South Australia. This is a fixed ground station used for US military satellite communications in the southern hemisphere. The facility at Harold E. Holt Naval Communications Station located at Northwest Cape in Western Australia provides secure communications for US ships at sea, the site was established in 1963. All of these facilities played important roles during the cold war and continue to provide critical intelligence today.

**Changing Australian Defense Strategies**

Two significant actions forced Australia to reevaluate its military strategy. First, the British decision to withdraw its forces east of the Suez Canal. This left the Australians with no real alternatives, since only the US maintained a significant presence in the region. To demonstrate their commitment to the alliance Australia committed ground troops to the US war in Vietnam. This war had a significant impact on domestic politics as well as creating a problem in Australian – US relations. The Vietnam War was the first time Australia had gone to war without the British who had decided to maintain a diplomatic focus and not become militarily engaged. Secondly, in 1969, after President Nixon articulated his Guam Doctrine, Australia as well as other nations of the Asian Pacific region began a re-examination of their ability to provide for their own defense. The US
had made it clear that it expected the nations of the region to provide for their own
defense\textsuperscript{11}. This was the impetus for Australia to begin a fundamental re-examination of
her military dependence on US military power.

\textbf{1976 White Paper}

The first formal shift in Australian defense policy was set down in the 1976 White
Paper, \textit{Australian Defense}. In the opening chapter of this White Paper the Australian
government announces that as a result of a strategic defense review:

\begin{quote}
A primary requirement emerging … is for increased self-reliance. In our contemporary circumstances we no longer base our policy on the expectation that Australia…will send its forces overseas to fight as part of some other nation’s force.”\textsuperscript{12}
\end{quote}

This 1976 White Paper did continue to identify the Australian – American relationship
as very important to Australia’s defense strategy. It stated that:

\begin{quote}
Many important practical advantages flow to Australia from its defense relationship with the United States. These include assistance to Australia, unique in comprehensiveness and quality, intelligence, defense science and technology, military staff contacts regarding tactical doctrine and operational procedures and military exercises with forces using high technology (weapons,) which is not otherwise available.”\textsuperscript{13}
\end{quote}

The specific advantages to Australia’s defense capabilities, as a result of the alliance
with the US, can be viewed using Huntington’s quantitative definition. The 1976
government publication recognized that this close relationship also provided benefits to US
strategic interests. The Joint communications and intelligence facilities are highlighted as
one of Australia’s significant contributions to this relationship. The White Paper goes on
to acknowledge that despite the disparate strength and resources of the two countries,
Australia has value to the US.\textsuperscript{14}
The 1976 White Paper took a bold step in identifying that first, Australia no longer intended to fight overseas as part of another nation’s forces. Australia’s defense strategy until this time was a forward-deployed defensive concept and was left over from its long allegiance to the British Empire. The 1976 policy paper openly identified that the primary purpose of the Australian Defense Forces (ADF) was the defense of Australia; that the Asian Pacific region is Australia’s area of influence and therefore it needs Australia’s emphasis and focus. The US relationship although still considered very important began slipping in priority.\textsuperscript{15}

In 1976 the uncertainty presented by a strategy of self-reliance required Australia to identify capabilities and roles for the ADF. This policy paper first addressed the question of what capabilities Australia must possess in order to be self-reliant. The guidance presented in the White Paper identified the primary considerations for change in how Australia viewed its strategic circumstances as well as geographic considerations. In the 1976 White Paper force capability requirements were summarized as needing to possess:

- Force-in-being capable of performing current and foreseeable tasks dealing with selected short term contingencies
- Sea control in areas of Australia’s maritime jurisdiction
- Quick detection and response
- Aid to civil powers
- Maritime surveillance and display in areas of Australian interest
- Support for UN operations.
- Force should be of such size and versatility… to expand against a range of contingencies…
- Force in being … should have a substantial capability for independent operations…
- Force should demonstrate Australia’s serious attitude towards defense matters…
- Capacity to absorb and operate high technology equipment…
- Capacity to operate effectively with the US
- Strategic strike capability.\textsuperscript{16}
The 1976 White Paper was Australia’s first published attempt at identifying the military roles and capabilities necessary to attain self-reliance given the current strategic circumstances of the time. However, it also maintained the importance of the Australian–US relationship.

**1987 White Paper**

Prior to the publication of the government's 1987 White Paper, Defense of Australia, a review of Australia’s defense capabilities was conducted. In a Report to the Minister of Defense, Paul Dibb, a noted Australian defense strategist conducted a detailed review of Australia’s strategic circumstances. He reviewed the previous theme of forward defense and the more recent defense self-reliance. Dibb recognized that defending Australia would be a daunting task. Given the size and geography of the country, he identified two key considerations. First, that the ADF must be able to defend the sovereignty and national interests of Australia; and, secondly in order to do that Australia must focus on assessing future threats (heavy reliance on intelligence). This led Dibb to postulate a defensive strategy of layered defense with a heavy reliance on intelligence as the centerpiece. He believed Australia’s focus must be to the north in the sea-air gap.\(^7\)

Dibb recognized that Australia needed to enhance its intelligence gathering capability within the Asia-Pacific region, its strategic area of interest. If the requirement was to stop an aggressor in the sea-air gap then early warning was essential and only by obtaining reliable and timely intelligence could this happen. Dibb further identified that self-reliance did not mean self-sufficiency, which for Australia was unrealistic.\(^8\) The strategic circumstances for Australia had changed by 1987 and the defense strategy began a further
shift away from dependence on the US alliance. The focus was clearly on the development of the capabilities required of the ADF to defend Australia and remain a regional power.

Prior to the publication of the 1987 White Paper the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was elected to government. This new government placed even greater emphasis on self-reliance as the cornerstone of Australia’s defense policy and wanted a greater involvement in regional forums. The Defense of Australia 1987 still identified that:

“This Government’s policy of defense self-reliance gives priority to the ability to defend ourselves with our own resources. The policy of defense self-reliance is pursued within a framework of alliances and agreements…most significant of these are with the United States.”19

When the 1987 Government White Paper was published the term self-reliance was more fully developed. The cold war had entered a new stage and Australia’s priority was not only to self defense but had taken on a broader requirement of regional engagement. However, the Australian – US alliance remained important:

“Australia is part of the Western community of nations. Australia therefore supports the ability of the United States to retain an effective strategic balance with the Soviet Union. This Government considers that basic self-reliance is the minimum that any self-respecting country should contribute to an alliance.”20

The 1987 White Paper was more comprehensive in defining Australia’s defense strategy, force requirements and capabilities. The strategy was based on a concept of:
- Defense in depth...in order to meet credible levels of threat in Australia’s area of direct military interest
- Priority was to the ability of the ADF to mount operations capable of defeating enemy forces in our area of direct military interest.
- Forces (must be) capable of tracking and targeting the adversary,
- Capable of mounting maritime and air operations in the sea air gap to our north.
- Have a capability of offensive strike and interdiction missions
- Comprehensive range of defensive capabilities – including air defense, mine countermeasures, and protection of coastal trade
- Mobile land forces able to defeat hostile incursions at remote locations.  

Australia went on to highlight the benefits to both nations. These included the US providing Australia preferred status in military equipment purchases, access to US training and doctrine, privileged access to the highest levels of US defense technology, and to extensive US intelligence gathering activities. For its participation, the US continued to operate the Joint Facilities of Pine Gap, Harold Holt Communications Center and Nurrungar, all providing important links in the US intelligence information and communications collection apparatus. However, the 1987 policy paper unequivocally stated:

“"The defense relationship with the United States gives confidence that in the event of a fundamental threat to Australia’s security US military support would be forthcoming.""  

The 1987 White paper provided the Australian defense establishment with direction in the purchase of military weapon systems and the development of force structures, command and control relationships and alignment of headquarters in order to meet the defense strategy laid down in the 1987 publication.
1994 White Paper

In early 1990, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Australian government initiated another strategic review intended to identify the strategic direction Australia needed to take over the course of the next twenty to twenty-five years. The publication Strategic Review 1993 provided interim guidance while the government continued to study and analyze prior to the completion of the broader based 1994 White Paper. The geostrategic situation in which Australia found herself had been transformed, the Soviet threat was gone and the US appeared to be pulling out of the Asia Pacific region. The departure of US Naval forces from the Philippines was viewed as a US intention to limit its military role in the Asia-Pacific region. This, coupled with the publicized draw down of US force structure, gave the appearance that the US was limiting its involvement in the region.

In publishing Defending Australia: Defense White Paper 1994, the Australian government set down broad guidance for designing ADF capabilities in light of the changed strategic circumstances. It built upon the earlier 1976 and 1987 White Paper’s but further defined the direction of Australia’s defense strategy. The 1994 White Paper continued the theme of self-reliance and demonstrated its commitment to the linkage between strategy and capability requirements. In each previous White Paper the Australian – US alliance was addressed as a result of its singular importance, by 1994 the Australian – US alliance is referred to as secondary to self-reliance:

“Australia’s self-reliant defense policy requires that our defense capabilities enable us to defend Australia without depending on combat help from other countries. It follows that we do not rely for our defense on combat assistance from the United States.”

20
This shift in Australia’s strategic defense policy, although subtle over twenty five years, has not resulted in a shift away from reliance on US military power. The achievement of Australia’s published goals, objectives and national interests in defense, as stated in the 1994 White Paper, continue to emphasize:

“Australia’s security is not vital to other nations that we can assume others would commit substantial forces to our defense. This will become increasingly so as our environment becomes more complex. Our alliance with the United States does not mean we can expect it to provide for our defense.”24

This statement is a clear deviation from the earlier 1987 White Paper, which identified that the US would be expected to come to Australia’s aid. Although the 1994 White Paper does address the importance of the alliance, for the first time it is qualified, and viewed in a short-term approach. Specifically it states:

“Australia’s defense alliance with the United States continues to be a key element of our defense policy, and will remain so over the period covered by this White paper.”25

The 1994 policy paper goes on to reiterate that Australia’s self-reliance is the cornerstone of her defense strategy. The 1994 government White Paper explains that the US alliance provides the foundation requirements to achieve self-reliance. These are:
➢ Intelligence cooperation (with the United States) is fundamental to our national effort.
➢ Access to high technology (from the United States) continues to be important in sustaining the leading edge capabilities.
➢ As a close and long-standing ally and as a major buyer of US defense equipment.
➢ Defense science links with the US ... which the Defense Science and Technology Organization has with the US will also help Australia to maintain an indigenous capability for modifying and maintaining US sourced equipment.
➢ The maintenance of the Australian defense Force's professional military skills benefits from the breadth and depth of the military relationship with the United States.
➢ Combined exercises and exchanges of military personnel...cement the interoperability that is fundamental to combined operations²⁶.

The White Paper clearly defines the reasons that the US and Australian relationship remains so close. The regional engagement focus of Australia during this period did nothing to diminish the close alliance it maintained with the US during this same period.

There is a linkage between the identified strategic requirement to provide for the defense of Australia and defend Australian interests in the region. They demonstrate that the Australian strategic policy is relying on the US to provide the means to achieve the identified capabilities. In order to achieve the strategic imperatives set out in the 1997 Strategic Policy paper, the government identified capabilities required to achieve the objectives. In order to accomplish those key strategic imperatives Australia must have defense capabilities that have:

➢ A robust command, control and communications capability
➢ An intelligence collection and evaluation capability
➢ Surveillance of the maritime areas of Northern Australia
➢ The ability to conduct maritime operations
➤ An air defense system in maritime areas in northern Australia
➤ A competent mobile and versatile land force
➤ A capability of supporting the force
➤ A strategic strike capability.27

The Australian defense strategy is based primarily on a defensive approach only strategic strike can be assessed as an offensive capability. To secure and maintain the capabilities that have been developed in the White Papers will require a close relationship with the US.

1997 Australia’s Strategic Policy

In 1997 the Australian government underwent a change, the Australian Labor Party (ALP) was voted out of office and the National Liberal Party, under Prime Minister John Howard was elected to govern. Although a new White Paper has not been published the most recent government publication addressing defense matters, Australia’s Strategic Policy was released in December 1997. This policy paper addresses the broad issues of defense and sets forth the current governments views on defense matters. There are two major factors that the current government believes influence the direction of Australian defense strategy and shape Australia’s strategic environment into the next century. The first is the economic growth in East Asia and the implications this will have on defense spending and regional arms modernization. Secondly the government identified the changing strategic relativities between the regions major powers.28 This was reflective of the belief that the US presence was shrinking while Japanese and Chinese presence was increasing.

The 1997 Policy Paper identified the tasks that the ADF must be able to perform as:
Defeat attacks on Australia
Defend our regional interests
Support a global security environment, which discourages interstate aggression\textsuperscript{29}

These tasks have been translated into capability requirements and identified as:

- Maintaining the knowledge edge by the effective exploitation of information technologies. These will enable Australia’s small force maximum effectiveness.
- Develop military capabilities to defeat any future threats in our maritime and air approaches.
- Maintain an effective ADF strike capability, which can act proactively and finally to develop capabilities to defeat threats on Australian territory.\textsuperscript{30}

In summarizing the development of the Australian defense strategy over the last twenty-five years it is important to acknowledge the changes that have taken place in the alliance relationship. The critical issue of whether Australia can maintain a self-reliant strategy given the degree of dependence on US intelligence, high technology weapon systems, and logistical support requirements remains unanswered. In the following chapters the assessment of whether Australia is developing these capabilities or relying on the US to provide them will be analyzed.


3 Definition is from the Glossary of Terminology of Strategy. Joint Services Staff College, Canberra Australia, 1995.


5 Lykke, Arthur. Toward an Understanding of Military Strategy. Published at Army War College, date unknown, p. 3.


8 Ibid. p. 25-26


10 Ibid. p. 402.


13 Ibid. p. 11.


15 Ibid p. 47.


18 Ibid p. 66.

20 Ibid p. 3.
21 Ibid p. 31.
22 Ibid p. 4.
25 Ibid p. 95. Author added italics for emphasis and to highlight the time period.
26 Ibid p. 97.
29 Ibid p. 2.
III. Australia's Dilemma: Regional and Economic Realities of the 1990’s

"Australia’s future security – like our economic prosperity – is linked inextricably to the security and prosperity of Asia and the Pacific".¹

Regional Realities of the Asian-Pacific

The end of the cold war brought about a rapid economic expansion in the Asia-Pacific region. The nations of the region, those that make up the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum, accounted for 10 per cent of the global GNP in the 1960’s. By the early 1990’s this had risen to 25 per cent and is projected to reach 33 per cent by 2010.² Although this economic growth was anticipated to bring stability and security, along with prosperity, it has not. The nations of the Asia-Pacific have shifted from concentrating on internal conflicts to democratization and economic growth. In the 1980s Australia found herself committed to engagement in the region but struggling to be more involved and accepted in the economic growth of the region. As the economic boom of the early 1990s began, Australia, a Western nation in a predominately Asian culture was working toward broader inclusion in regional forums. Government policy papers stressed engagement within the Asian Pacific, to be in Australia’s best interests.³ This was further developed in the 1994 Defending Australia White Paper, which identifies Australia’s close association with the prosperity and security of the region as paramount to its overall defense strategy.

Desmond Ball, a noted Australian Historian and Political Scientist, has identified that:

"...economic and political factors are undoubtedly playing a larger role in shaping the structure of the emerging security architecture of the Asia/Pacific region and determining important aspects of regional behavior with respect to security matters."⁴
She went on, however, to comment that there is:

"... a general feeling of uncertainty throughout the region, which feeds upon the complexity of security and it is this uncertainty that is compounded geostrategically by the absence of super power bipolarity."

The end of the cold war has left a void that regional powers have attempted to fill. The nations of the region have formed a number of organizations and established forums to address grievances and establish protocols for yet unforeseen problems. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) was established to address differences among the five original members. It has contained contentious issues, not necessarily solving them but by preventing open conflicts from erupting. This organization has excluded other nations of the region including Australia, from ASEAN.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN Established 1967 Members</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei (1984)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vietnam (1995)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The recent economic growth has also created challenges for the Asia Pacific region; most notable is the subtle movement towards an arms race. The emergence of China and Japan as more dominant actors in both economic and defense areas has hastened the arms acquisition race. Although the US remains the only global superpower within the Asia Pacific region, US influence has diminished since the end of the cold war; if not in fact, certainly in perception. The US withdrawal from the Philippines and the much
publicized draw-down of US force structure sent a message that the US intends to limit its involvement in Asia Pacific region. Australia’s acceptance of this changing environment and concern at US withdrawal has shaped the defense strategy and placed greater importance on self-reliance.

APEC was established as an informal consultative arrangement for addressing trade issues. It has evolved into a major economic forum committed to free trade by 2010 for industrial nations and 2020 for developing economies.⁸

These forums play an important role in the overall security strategy of Australia’s regional engagement policy. ARF is the only security-oriented organization in the region; however, conspicuous by their absence are Taiwan, North Korea, Burma India, Pakistan, and the South Pacific Islands.⁹

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) Established 1989</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chile</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) is an embryonic venture in multilateralism within a region that exists more as a category of convenience than a coherent framework for inter-governmental cooperation.¹⁰
The ARF is made up of eighteen countries.\textsuperscript{11}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM (ARF)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brunei</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canada</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>China</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European Union</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Korea</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This association first met in 1994 and has been cast as a confidence building exchange. The nations of the region have been careful not to cast the ARF in any security role but rather use it to create a sense of stability and regional cooperation. In the Asian Pacific environment cooperation rather than coordination has been the most frequently used form of multilateral interaction. Most of the nations have an aversion to organizational structure and bureaucracy that is common in Western organizations such as NATO.\textsuperscript{12}

The only defense activity in the Southeast Asia region that Australia is formally involved in is the Five Powers Defense Arrangement group (FPDA). This alliance of Britain, New Zealand, Malaysia and Singapore is a loosely designed security arrangement which primarily conducts joint training and information exchanges. This arrangement was initiated when the US began its pullout of Southeast Asia at the end of the Vietnam War. It has provided a forum for combined training and exchanges.\textsuperscript{13}

The Royal Australian Navy (RAN) exercises with every ASEAN nation in the region and conducts joint patrols with Indonesia in the Timor Gap Cooperation Zone lying between the two nation’s Economic Exclusion Zones (EEZs), Australia’s sea-air gap in the north.\textsuperscript{14} Australia
wants to be included in ASEAN but has not been able to convince its Asian neighbors that it merits inclusion. Australia’s approach has been to apply steady pressure without appearing to be forceful.

**The Military Dimension of Regional Engagement**

Along with the economic prosperity that has come to the Asia Pacific region, an increase in wealth has brought an increase in the purchase of high tech weapon systems. There are roughly three sets of reasons for the weapons proliferation in the region. First, economic growth has provided governments with the ability to modernize their military forces.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Defense Expenditures</th>
<th>ASEAN 1985-1991&lt;sup&gt;15&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indonesia</td>
<td>+19.35%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>+23.36%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Philippines</td>
<td>+42.86%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>+30.95%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thailand</td>
<td>+12.05%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Without the need to focus on internal issues, many of the nations of the region are enhancing and modernizing their military. A second reason for the modernization is a perception that the major powers in the region, China and Japan, have become more aggressive. Finally, prestige plays a significant role in the acquisition of high technology weapon systems. Other regional factors involving security issues have also heightened concerns about security. The regional nations are concerned that a shrinking US presence in the Asian Pacific will leave a vacuum and create instability. The rapid proliferation and availability of modern weapon systems has compounded the problem. Between 1983 and 1990, sixty to sixty-five percent of all international weapons transfers
were from industrial states to developing states in the region. The US is one of the world's primary weapons exporters.

The types of weapon systems purchased have shown a trend towards high technology and stand off systems. The nations of the region seem consistent in their types of purchases and have focused on the capabilities provided by:

- missile systems;
- maritime capabilities, including modern surface combatants (destroyers, frigates, ocean patrol vessels), submarines, and maritime surveillance aircraft;
- electronic warfare (EW) systems and modern national command control, communications and intelligence (C3I) systems;
- multi-role fighter aircraft with maritime attack capabilities as well as air superiority capabilities;
- rapid deployment forces, with light armor, artillery, and supporting vehicles.

These regional military capabilities mirror quite closely those priorities that Australia has identified as critical requirements for self-reliance. To achieve its weapons and technological edge Australia has relied on the US for purchases of high technology weapons systems. As R&D, as well as production costs, soar smaller nations are finding it difficult to afford these expensive technologies. Australia receives great benefits from the Australian-US alliance.

In Sept of 1997 the Minister for Defense, Ian McLachlan stated that Australia:

"As a small high-technology force, the ADF must be at the forefront of development in technology and doctrine ... one area likely to grow will be cooperation with US military forces."
Trade and Regional Engagement

The organizations that have formed in the Asia Pacific have a shared common goal of economic growth and therefore they try to mitigate problems regarding trade. One of the most important functions of APEC is in dealing with trade problems and disputes. Australia has undergone a shift in trade, currently about 60% of Australia’s trade is with Asia and only about 11% with North and South America. Concurrently, South Korea is poised to overtake the US as Australia’s major exporter.19

Australia and the US have had a number of significant disagreements on trade issues and increasingly there has been a call in Australia for linkage between trade and security issues. As the dynamics of the region have changed the importance of economic issues, primarily derived from trade, have become paramount. To Australia this problem is vitally important but in the US it receives little or no public attention.

The primary focus of the trade rivalry is on US subsidized sales of agricultural products in Asia and on restricted access to US markets. Australia believes subsidies undercut the fair market value of their agricultural products. The US export enhancement policies were aimed at the European Community subsidies but they clearly undermine Australian farmers.20 With a population of 18 million and agriculture as a primary export of the nation, US farm subsidies have become a political issue. A political party whose power base rests with farmers (National Party) maintains visibility in the Australian media. As recently as 1993 Senator Cook the Australian Minister for Trade stated that,

“US agricultural export subsidies could start to undermine Australia’s capacity to support US leadership on key international issue.”21
Australia provides the US with a large and consistent trade surplus, the per capita trade deficit with the US surpasses that of the US–Japan deficit and even with this the Australians are faced with quotas. These restrictive policies have become significant issues in Australia and have grown to effect other areas of the Australian-US alliance. In 1993, previous Prime Minister Malcolm Fraser stated, "we must be prepared to tell the US to take their bases home". As pressure on Australian politicians increases on trade issues these confrontations result in unnecessary pressure on the fabric of the relationship. Australia does not feel it is gets a fair go, an Australian euphemism for being treated with respect and equal opportunity by the US. The reality of the alliance is that from a trading standpoint, Australia perceives the US as a bully; it has observed the vitriolic attacks by US politicians on Japanese trade practices, and has sided with Japan on a number of trade issues. Australia sees Asia as a friend and trading ally. At the same time Australia has watched as its technological edge in military capability has eroded within its region of interest.

Additionally, when the US expanded its economic involvement into the booming economies of the Asian Pacific region many Australians viewed it as an encroachment into their traditional markets. The US traditionally competes with allies throughout the world, however, Australia because it has a small economic base has felt a greater impact in its markets. There is an expectation by Australians that they should be treated differently due to their special relationship with the US. Although the trade implications do not unsettle US policy makers, it creates significant concerns to the Australians over the degree of leverage the US has in regards to trade. From a US perspective it has little alternative but to pursue an aggressive share of the Asian Pacific markets. Regulations and trade restrictions designed to level the playing field with Japan and Europe have had an adverse affect on Australia. The Australian defense
infrastructure is dependent on US logistical and technological support for maintaining its military capability. Australia cannot easily extract herself from the US umbrella nor would she want to relinquish this insurance policy without accepting significant risk.

In summary, the regional realities of the Asian Pacific are that the booming economic growth that has characterized the 1980's and 1990's has provided the nations of the region with the ability to modernize their military capabilities. The military growth of the region has diminished Australia's military edge. The US provides stability in the region, but concerns about Chinese and Japanese military capabilities and intentions have created uncertainties. Although there is not a NATO type security arrangement in the region, the embryonic ARF has assisted in forming some loosely structured security arrangements. The trade tensions between Australia and the US has done nothing to enhance the security relationship between the two nations. The perception that the US bullies others on trading issues has had a negative impact on public opinion, which will have ramifications on the Australian - US alliance in the future.

The environment of the Asia-Pacific provides Australia with a unique set of strategic challenges. To understand how these impact on military preparedness and capabilities a review of the implications and importance of US military support will be undertaken, the military reliance of Australia upon the US is important to their fulfilling strategic objectives.


3 1987 White Paper CH One discusses the importance of engagement within the region and Australia's capacity to influence her neighbors.


5 Ibid. p 4.


11 Ibid. p. 204.


13 Ibid p.27.


16 Ibid. p 161

17 Ibid. p. 161. This article was written in conjunction with Panitan Watanayagorn, the article was entitled A Regional Arms Race?


20 Ibid. p. 33.

21 Ibid. p. 33.

22 Ibid. p. 34.

23 Ibid. p. 32.

24 Ibid. p. 36.

25 Ibid. p. 36-37.
IV. Australian and US Military Linkages

“Close defense relations with the US remain central to our policy of defense self-reliance. They also reinforce Australia’s standing in the region and provide us with security against nuclear intimidation.”

Australia’s Strategic Planning in the 1990’s

The US and Australian defense ties, which had their birth in World War II, matured into an effective alliance (ANZUS) during the Cold War, and continued to grow since the collapse of the Soviet Union. This alliance has become one of the most effective relationships in which the US is involved. During the 1990s the US has, from a global perspective, relied more on regional allies and less on presence and has been forced to de-emphasize the use of military force as a means to effect change. Engagement has come in the form of economic packages and trade. This has at times clashed with Australian regional interests. Australia for its part has shifted from a defense policy of total reliance on US military support to a position of self-reliance within an alliance framework.

The Australian Defense Force, however, is still reliant on US technological and logistical support to achieve its strategic policy objectives with regard to security. The report Australia Strategic Policy, (1997) stated that:

“Strategic policy covers those elements of the Government’s overall security policy which relate to the role of the armed force in international affairs. Strategic policy therefore serves a fundamental aim of wider security policy, which is to prevent or defeat the use of force against Australia and its interests.”

Australia places great emphasis on both the cultivation of bilateral relations with the US and its engagement policy with regional Asian Pacific nations. It does this in order to promote stability and discourage the use of force, as well as to participate as a good
international neighbor. The means by which Australia strives to accomplish its identified strategic objectives is directly anchored to US support.

The 1997 Australian strategic policy paper stated that its military forces, the ADF, are the forces that insure Australia is capable of defending herself and her territories. Security is derived from a strong effective military force and is also intended to assist in shaping the Asian Pacific region. This will enhance Australia’s sense of security and US objectives in the region as well. In a broad sense the ADF contributes to a national sense of self-esteem and standing on the world stage. The paper goes on to state that the ADF is a reflection of how Australia sees itself, as well as being reflective of how the world views Australia.

The Australian Defense Forces is not large by regional or world standards, recent strengths:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ADF and Civilian Force</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>★ Active Military</td>
<td>56,605</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Army</td>
<td>25,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Navy</td>
<td>14,331</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Air Force</td>
<td>16,705</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>★ Reserves</td>
<td>29,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>★ Civilians</td>
<td>19,300</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Australia and the US are signatories to a number of current agreements that binds and continues to strengthen the relationship. These agreements, cooperative programs, standardization programs and personnel exchanges greatly enhance the unity of the Australian – US alliance and directly affect Australia’s ability to achieve its stated objectives. There is a linkage directly back to Australia’s core tasks. Restated in the most recent government publication, Australia’s Strategic Policy, and discussed earlier in Chapter II, Australia has designed its (ADF) force structure to accomplish three specific tasks:
Defeat attacks on Australia
Defend regional interest
Support global interests

The US is relied upon to provide key resources which assist in the accomplishment of these tasks. The defense of Australia is directly tied to the US alliance through a multitude of interwoven support agreements.

**US and Australian Cooperation**

The close relationship between Australian military forces and US forces is fostered at the highest levels and enhanced through a series of high level forums. These take shape as ministerial talks, Pacific Area Senior Officer Logistics Seminars, Cooperation in Defense Logistics Support Agreement Review Talks, Cooperation in Radar Activities MOA Steering Group and Senior National Naval Representative Talks (SNNR).  

The 1994 Deutch-Ayers Agreement in particular is a recent endeavor of cooperative and collaborative research, development, and engineering. This agreement focuses on specific sciences which will enhance Australia’s strategic defense policy.

| 1994 Deutch-Ayers Agreement  
+ Low Observable Technology  
+ BMDO Scientific Data Fusion  
+ Automated Radar Management for Over-the-Horizon Radar  
+ Coordinate Registration in Over-the-Horizon Radar  
+ Systems Operations for Over-the-Horizon Radar  
+ Advanced methodologies for ECM simulation  
+ Collins Class Acoustic measurements  
+ Adaptive flexible structures for the Air Vehicle applications  
+ Advanced integrated aircraft survivability technology  
+ Aging aircraft life prediction/extension |

These project agreements provide Australia a clear technological advantage within the Asian-Pacific region, in addition to providing a cost effective means to share in the
conduct of expensive research. The focus of the Deutch-Ayers agreement also directly facilitates two of Australia’s most critical operational tasks: The need to have the capability to observe the sea-air gap to the north and the requirement to possess a robust intelligence gathering capability.

The Technical Cooperation Program is designed as a memorandum of agreement (MOU) that includes Australia as well as Canada, Britain and New Zealand; it is designed to enhance technological cooperation in defense matters. The participants meet yearly and share research into ten sub groups which focus on:

| I.       | Chemical defense          |
| II.      | Undersea warfare         |
| III.     | Aeronautics technology   |
| IV.      | Infrared/Electro-optic technology |
| V.       | Radar technology         |
| VI.      | Materials technology     |
| VII.     | Electronic warfare       |
| VIII.    | Communications, command and control |
| IX.      | Human resources and performance |
| X.       | Conventional weapons technology |

These areas are reflective of current military realities and are the primary focus for Australia in terms of the requirements it believes it needs to maintain a technological edge in its region while maintaining a cost-sharing approach. There are a number of standardization and coordination programs that enhance capabilities and provide Australia with valuable technologies, as well as ensuring their ability to be integrated into US command and control arrangements. Some of these forums are bilateral while others include key US allies.
They are normally aligned by services; the currently established programs are:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>ABCA Armies Standardization Program&lt;sup&gt;10&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Army Quadripartite Working groups</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Air Defense Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Army Operational Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Armor</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Aviation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Combat Developments</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Comms/Info Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Command and Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Engineering</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Material Acquisition</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Health Services Support</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Infantry</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Logistics</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ NBCD</td>
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<tr>
<td>+ Surface-to-Surface Artillery</td>
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<tr>
<th>ASCC Air Standardization Co-ordination Committee&lt;sup&gt;11&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AS/US/UK/CAN/NZ Working Parties</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Aviation Fuels, Lubricants, Gases and Products</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Air Armament</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Aircraft Cross Servicing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Aircraft Eng Support/Info</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Air Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Air Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Core Avionics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Aerospace, Medical and Life Support Systems</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Airfields and Airfield Facs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Mission Avionics</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Imagery Intelligence</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ NBC Defensive Measures</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Air Space Management</td>
</tr>
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<thead>
<tr>
<th>Naval Quadripartite Standardization Program&lt;sup&gt;12&lt;/sup&gt;</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Information Exchange Projects</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Fuels and Lubricants</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Electronic Warfare</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Explosive Ordnance Disp.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Ship Survivability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Materials Technology</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Machinery Control</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Diving and Savage</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ ASW R&amp;D</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ MK 46 Torpedo</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Communications</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Operations Research</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>+ Command and Control</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Each of the standardization programs provides a forum not only for the exchange of technological information but also opportunities to develop greater operational understanding. This does not go unnoticed in the Asia-Pacific region. Australia’s technological edge is the result of its close association with the US as the only remaining superpower. These programs and committees share the costs of research in areas that would otherwise be prohibitive for a country that maintains a modest defense budget.
In addition to providing Australia with state of the art technology and equipment, the US has Memorandums of Understanding (MOU’s) that ensure US logistical support is available to Australia in times of crisis. These logistics cooperation agreements are reciprocal treaty status agreements and have been designed with a very broad scope. Additionally, there are acquisition and cross-servicing agreements that provide support during military operations. These international logistics cooperation agreements provide:¹³

| + Furnishing supplies and services to USN and RAN ships |
| + Technical property agreements |
| + US government blanket waiver of royalty charges |
| + Cooperative Military Airlift arrangement between USAF and RAAF |
| + Defense communications services agreement |
| + Control of Strategic Technologies Agreement (classified) |
| + Qualification of products of Non-resident manufacturers |

The importance of these logistics agreements cannot be overstated, since they provide a crucial pillar in the overall Australian defense structure. The US logistics agreements provide Australia with the ability to purchase weapons platforms, intelligence gathering technology and resupply of high technology munitions. These are procured from US sources on short notice and would be vital in times of crisis. This releases Australia from much of the burden of research and development as well as the requirement to maintain large quantities on hand.

At the operational and tactical level, the large number of information exchange agreements provide Australia with access to state of the art systems as well as insights into US operational techniques. These insights provide the ADF with enhanced interoperability in operating with US forces.
All US service components participate in:

**US Navy Data Exchange Agreements**

- Mine hunting and Mine sweeping
- ASW Operational Analysis
- Surface-to-surface and surface-to-air missiles
- Underwater range technology
- Shipboard guns, gunfire control systems and ammunition
- Undersea surveillance systems
- Underwater Physiology
- Real time shipboard combat data and C3 systems
- Mine technology, mine laying and minefield planning

**USAF Data Exchange Agreements**

- Safety and suitability for service for non-nuclear munitions
- Low cost guidance and control technology for missile systems
- Communications for command and control
- Conventional air launched munitions
- Wind tunnel and test techniques
- Aerodynamics of aircraft and missiles
- Ramjet propulsion technology
- Software engineering for embedded computer systems
- Air to air refueling
- Aircraft and stores compatibility testing
- Air breathing propulsion technology

**US Army Data Exchange Agreements**

- Field HF and VHF communications
- Proving ground techniques
- Safety and suitability of Non-Nuclear munitions
- Penetrators and light armor
- Parachutes and air delivery systems
- Small caliber weapons systems
- EW vulnerability assessment

These agreements focus on those areas that specifically address Australia’s ability to achieve its stated strategic objectives. The value to Australia’s capability to gather intelligence, conduct surveillance of the sea-air gap to the north and ensure state of the art
command, control and communications dominance within the region, is of tremendous value.

**US and Australian Combined Training Exercises**

ADF and US forces train on a regular basis and the operational benefits that the ADF derives from combined operations with US forces strengthens its capability. The Royal Australian Navy routinely takes part in operations with US Carrier Battle Groups, USAF and Royal Australian Air Force participate in joint and combined training flights and US Army and USMC units routinely train in the Australian outback.

CINCPAC has developed a series of combined and joint exercises with the ADF. The ANZUS planning manual provides guidance on how often and at what level these exercises are to take place. The ADF and US forces have transitioned to an exercise schedule based on a four-year cycle. The primary training focus for the ADF is the defense of Australia. The secondary focus is defense and protection of Australian interests outside of its contiguous land border.\(^{17}\) This would include Australia’s Territories of Cocos Islands (also known as Keeling Is.), Christmas Island, Heard and McDonald Islands and territory Australia has claimed in Antarctica.

The US goals of security cooperation, protection of critical lines of communications (LOCs) and enhanced joint and combined interoperability are achieved through these exercises. The primary focus of the programs is at the strategic and operational levels. There has been a distinct shift from earlier exercise programs; the current concept is for the US and Australia to alternate between US-led and Australian-supported, to Australian-led and US-supported training.\(^{18}\) This is a distinct change in training methodology.
Recent US-led, Australian-supported Exercises:

- Simulation Military Exercise (SIMEX) - a seminar wargame with a broad exercise objective to examine ANZUS strategic interoperability issues. Lead country rotates.
- TEMPEST EXPRESS - academic and computer assisted CPX.
- TEMPO BRAVE - computer assisted JTF-focused CPX to train CINCPAC and JTF staffs in interactive crisis action planning.
- TANDEM THRUST - major combined field training exercise, in 1997 included 22,500 US and 5,700 AS personnel.
- RIMPAC 98 - biennial multi-lateral naval exercise.

Recent Australian-led, US supported Exercises

- Simulated Military Exercise (SIMEX) - same as above.
- KINGFISHER - Operational level CPX exercising high level joint/combined planning procedures
- CROCODILE - Joint/combined CPX/FTX with maritime/land defense focus.

These recent exercises greatly enhance the interoperability of Australian and US forces, the level to which both countries participate is indicative of the close relationship. These exercises are designed to ensure a cross-fertilization of doctrine, tactics, techniques and procedures that are required to conduct operations effectively.

The possession of sophisticated and technologically advanced weapons platforms and sensors does not create combat effectiveness by itself. The Australian relationship with the US provides them the access to purchase the most capable weapon systems and the training required to effectively employ these capabilities. The ability to develop competency by exercising with the most sophisticated military establishment in the world has had and will continue to have singular value to Australia.\(^{19}\)
Australia has however in the 1990s involved itself in training more with regional nations. Involvement in combined exercises with ASEAN forces has increased between 1992 – 1995.²⁰

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What this demonstrates is that Australia has taken a keen interest in interoperability with regional nations. However, it does not address the level of the exercises or the training objectives both significant factors in assessing the value of the combined exercises. What is known is that the level of exercises with US forces is at the upper end of the scale in terms of sophistication and complexity of missions.

In summary the Australian – US defense alliance is a multifaceted relationship in which both parties receive benefits by virtue of this enhanced alliance. The technological and weapons transfers make Australia a power within her region. This coupled with the significant benefits of joint/combined training exercises and interoperability with US forces combine to serve Australia’s national interests. In each of the core strategic objectives Australia has defined for the ADF, defeat attacks against Australia, defend regional interests, and support global security, the relationship with the US is imperative to the accomplishment of this end. Australia has identified that it will achieve these objectives by maintaining a technological edge within the region, by developing capabilities to defeat future threats in its maritime and air approaches, and by maintaining a
strike capability which will provide options in times of crisis. In each of these US support is essential to the accomplishment of these objectives. The technological edge is maintained through purchases of US equipment and shared technology either outright, or gained as a result of the programs and agreements the two countries are a party too. The strike capability identified in Strategic Policy, 1997 is gained as the result of purchasing the US-built F-111 fighter-bomber. Additionally, the logistics support agreements allows Australia significant cost savings both in production and storage of parts and equipment. Australian self-reliance is intertwined with US support. The options faced by Australia are implicit in their direction, maintain the close alliance with the US and with it the baggage of the perception that Australia is really an Anglo nation within an Asian geography. Or rely on a nonaligned status and enter into a closer relationship with regional powers in the hopes that diplomacy will provide adequate resources if a crisis evolves.


3 Ibid p. 3.

4 Ibid p. 3.

5 Beaubien, LCDR Roger, Statistics taken from a briefing packet provided by: Office of Defense Cooperation Australia, USN, 9 Dec 1997, p. 3.


8 Ibid p. 11.


11 Ibid p. 15.

12 Ibid p. 16.

13 Ibid p. 22.


15 Ibid p. 27.

16 Ibid p. 28.


V. Conclusion

“Our alliance with the United States is by any measure our most important strategic relationship. It is a major strategic asset and its preservation and development is among our highest strategic priorities.”

Australia’s Strategic Policy, December 1997

In conclusion, the relationship that began in 1941 as a result of the Japanese threat to Australia and formalized during the Cold War, in the form of the ANZUS Alliance, has provided Australia with a security guarantee for the past 57 years. The Guam doctrine pushed Australia on a course to establish its own strategic security policy suited to its geographic situation and political circumstances. As Australia’s defense strategy has evolved since the publication of Australian Defense 1976 white paper, the Asian Pacific region has also undergone a significant transformation. No longer are internal security issues restraining the growth of these nations. The 1998 economic crash suffered by the tiger economies of Asia has stifled, but not ended, the potential for dramatic economic growth throughout the region. With this economic growth comes the potential for an enhanced military expansion and modernization.

The Asian Pacific forums in the form of ASEAN, APEC, and ARF have transformed the traditional relationships within the region, with cooperation and economic expansion now being paramount. Security arrangements are not the priority; economic growth is the focus of these organizations. The military build-up prior to the economic collapse of 1998 has required the Australian defense establishment to reassess its strategic defense policy. The technological edge that Australia has always maintained in the region has gradually slipped away.
What Australia intended with the publication of the 1976 white paper was to recognize the requirement to have the capabilities to provide for its own defense, regardless of its alliances. The metamorphosis from forward defense to depth in defense to self-reliance and now self-reliance within an alliance framework has changed Australia’s defense strategy to a capabilities based defense focused on the defense of Australia. This has required tasks to be associated with national objectives and linked to ADF capabilities. These required capabilities drive force structure and defense procurement. This has led the ADF to develop or purchase systems that provide these capabilities and the formal Australian – US relationship has been crucial to this end.

Australia as a formal ally of the US, which is an important distinction, allows access to state of the art systems. This unique status is fundamentally significant to Australia’s methodology for the development of its capability-based defense. Its ability to participate in defense activities with the US as identified by US legislation (e.g., the Foreign Assistance Act and the Arms Export Control Act) significantly enhances its stature in the region. Australia’s eligibility for cooperation in logistics, intelligence sales of front line platforms and sensors, and their priority in receiving these resources is an essential component of its defense strategy.²

Given Australia’s ambiguous threat environment, sophisticated intelligence gathering and assessment capabilities are crucial to providing sufficient warning time for Australia to take an appropriate action. In order to defeat an attack on Australia, defend regional interests, or support global security Australia must inhibit incursions and monitor its sovereign territory. The areas require sophisticated air, maritime, and ground surveillance and reconnaissance capabilities suitable for peacetime and wartime employment. This
requirement has been a priority since the publication of the 1987 white paper. The US provides this capability and has through technology transfers ensured that Australia’s capability goes unchallenged in the region.³

The US competes economically throughout the world with many traditional allies. However, when in direct competition with Australia, with its relatively small economic base, Australians feel a much greater impact and this impacts on internal political considerations. In many respects the disagreements that surface from time to time concerning trade imbalances have value in demonstrating Australia’s independence. As a result of the close traditional, cultural and political ties the US and Australia see, in most situations, the same solutions to common problems. This can be at times interpreted as Australian subservience to US policy objectives and has been a factor in their exclusion form certain regional forums.

The Minister for Defense stated in his Australia’s Strategic Policy that the US – Australian relationship is:

“… presently sound, we need to be active in managing the alliance and careful to avoid drift and complacency. The challenges in alliance management over the next few years will include sustaining our military capacity to operate with the United States by … collaborative development of new systems and platforms.”⁴

The Australian-US cooperation in standardization programs across all service components, and the sharing of new technologies, systems and weapons platforms has great benefit to Australia. The 1994 Deutch-Ayers agreement provides access to the technology needed by Australia to achieve and retain predominance in high technology weapons and intelligence collection systems. The military to military exchanges enhance
interoperability, cross fertilization of doctrine and understanding of command relationships which are critical when conducting both joint and combined training. The recent shift to sharing the lead and supporting roles during combined exercises has provided Australia a more high profile role in the relationship. The logistic agreements between Australia and the US are crucial to Australia’s sustainability in almost any military scenario. The US is scheduled to provide resupply and airlift capabilities, which are essential to all Australian contingencies.

The emergence of Japan as a regional military power has not gone unnoticed by Australia. The perceived withdrawal of US forces from the Asian Pacific region and the requirement for Japan to assume a greater burden for military expenditure has expanded her role in the region. This coming out of Japan, given Australia’s historic fears, could force Australia into an even closer alignment with US strategic policy.

Australia’s options are limited, either continue the status quo and remain closely aligned with the US and dependent on US technology and logistics, or pursue a course of non-alignment and further develop a self-reliant defense strategy. Non-alignment will create challenges for Australia with the Asian nations of the region. Australia stands as a traditional Western democracy in an Asian environment; this, coupled with its heritage and language, cannot easily be transformed.

Thomas Durell-Young pointed out in his 1993 paper addressing the post Cold War period that:

"The most obvious reason for Canberra (Australia) to continue peacetime security ties with the United States, which one would suppose both the government and the opposition (Party) would agree to, is that of maintaining a treaty relationship which, in extremis, is the guarantor of Australia’s national security."
In summary, the Australian Defense Force (ADF) gains significant advantages as a result of the formal alliance with the US. These have been identified in detail in the previous chapters. Australia’s geographic as well as geostrategic environment provides the United States with a valued ally. The net assessment of the value Australia provides to the US was clearly demonstrated during the Jan - Feb 1998 Iraq standoff, when they were quick to support US policy. The current relationship is both intimate and solid with both nations receiving significant benefits and it is in both their best interests to continue the status quo.

The issue for the future, Is what does Australia give up in return for this valued relationship? That is at the core of the dilemma facing Australia into the new millenium.
1 Australia’s Strategic Policy. Commonwealth of Australia 1997, Australian Government Publishing, Canberra pg. 18. This publication constitutes the key policy document from the Howard Government in order to ensure Australia has a modern, relevant military able to undertake … the range of challenging tasks required of it in the coming years. Minister for Defense Ian McLachlan Dec 1997 p. iv.


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