OPERATIONAL ART AND THE 1813 CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY

A MONOGRAPH
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ABSTRACT

OPERATIONAL ART AND THE 1813 CAMPAIGN IN GERMANY by CDR John Trost Kuehn, USN, 48 pages.

The purpose of this monograph is to search for, identify, and discuss the emergence of elements of operational art during the Napoleonic wars. James Schneider has tied the emergence of operational art to the technological advances of the industrial revolution; specifically the rifled musket, steam locomotive, and instantaneous communications theoretically possible with telegraph. Schneider lists eight "key attributes" that are used in this monograph as elements of operational art. These elements are: a distributed operation, distributed campaign, continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational vision, a distributed enemy, and distributed deployment. Others argue that technology was important, but not the only factor in the development of operational art. This monograph uses Schneider's elements as the criteria to establish the presence or absence of operational art in the 1813 campaign in Germany.

The 1813 German campaign is examined from the viewpoint of Napoleon's adversaries; principally the Prussians, Russians, and Austrians. This campaign was used because it represents Napoleonic warfare at a very high level of sophistication by both the Allies and their French opponents. Both sides were now organized along the French model with field armies, corps, and divisions as standard organizations. The armies that faced each other, while composed of some veteran troops, were mostly the result of massive conscription across all classes of society. All of the protagonists were essentially nations in arms. The complexity of this campaign, there were approximately seven field armies in Germany by the fall of 1813, lends itself well to a search for Schneider's elements. The course of this campaign followed a pattern of attrition and exhaustion which, too, favors an operational analysis vice analysis along the lines of classical strategy.

Finally, an operational examination of this campaign is important because so many of its characteristics resemble American military thought and practice. The Napoleonic period represents a veritable laboratory of coalition warfare and provides a means of applying the lessons of a historic period to understanding the dynamics of coalitions. Additionally, the primacy of politics, maneuver, and early forms of deep operations emphasize areas of similar importance in current U.S. Army doctrine. This period also coincided with perhaps the last truly profound Revolution in Military Affairs and as such its relevance to our current debates and doctrinal developments remains appropriate despite the vast technological changes we have seen. Although the Allied solutions and reactions to their problems cannot be applied to today's challenges, the process of operational art, and the dynamics of human behavior on the grand scale of history, can be understood so as to better understand modern challenges and a process which could lead to their resolution.
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I. INTRODUCTION

The purpose of this monograph is to search for, identify, and discuss the emergence of elements of operational art during the Napoleonic Wars. U.S. Army doctrine defines operational art as follows:

The employment of military forces to attain strategic goals through the design, organization, integration, and execution of battles and engagements into campaigns and major operations. In war, operational art determines when, where, and for what purpose major forces will fight over time.¹

James Schneider has made the assertion that it was during the American Civil War that “a new style of warfare emerged” which he characterizes as operational art. Schneider’s thesis presents eight “key attributes” which allow the “fullest expression” of operational art. He identifies these attributes as: a distributed operation, distributed campaign, continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational vision, a distributed enemy, and distributed deployment.²

Schneider further lists “seven necessary and sufficient contextual conditions” which “must first exist” in order for this “fullest expression” of operational art to “flourish and sustain itself creatively....” These conditions tie the emergence of operational art during the Civil War to the technology of the industrial revolution and the exponentially increased lethality of the battlefield due to mass use of rifled weaponry. They closely match, and in some cases are identical to, those operational attributes discussed in the previous paragraph. They are: weapon lethality beyond the technology of the smoothbore musket, telegraph, logistics supported by railroads, operationally durable formations, command structures with operational vision, , an operationally minded enemy, and a distributed capability to wage war as an industrial nation.³ Four of these conditions are directly tied to technology.

Others, most significantly Robert M. Epstein, argue that operational art developed along more evolutionary lines and that technology was “important, but it is not the full story. Other factors play a role in the evolution of warfare... .”⁴ Epstein defines “modern war” as having “the following characteristics: a strategic war plan that effectively integrates the various theaters of operations; the fullest mobilization of the resources of the state, which includes the raising of conscript armies; the use of operational campaigns by opposing sides to achieve strategic objectives in the various theaters of operations.(emphasis mine)”⁵

Epstein identifies the campaign of 1809 as the seminal year for the emergence of modern war. The 1809 campaign saw the leveling of the Napoleonic playing field as two nineteenth century armies
came into conflict with each other. Both the French and Hapsburg military establishments were now utilizing the revolutionary new methods of organization, tactics, and mobilization that this extraordinary period produced. Admittedly, the levels of sophistication were different, but the fundamental asymmetry between Napoleon and his opponents had been eliminated by evolution within the military of dynastic Austria. Epstein’s argument is the more modest of the two since it places the genesis of operational art within the confines of an evolutionary process solidly linked to societal changes that were also occurring.

The argument is then simply one of degree—both have utility and merit because they lead to a fuller understanding of what is undeniably a new level of warfare, the operational level, and its cognitive intellectual process known as operational art. Operational art is the creative process that encompasses the design and execution of campaign level operations and links them coherently to the levels of war above and below—tactics and strategy. Accordingly, we should be able to find elements of operational art, admittedly in immature form, in Napoleonic campaigns after 1809.

The campaign by the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in 1813 in Germany offers a particularly lucrative case study for this examination by virtue of its sheer scope of operations. The Sixth Coalition’s operations in Germany were only one of many theaters with a strategic bearing on the situation; but the liberation of Germany was by far the most important strategic goal when compared to the liberation of Spain (essentially completed by midyear after Vitoria) and Italy (still not completely “liberated” at the time of Napoleon’s abdication in 1814). It was in Germany in 1813 that we see the employment of the combined conscript armies of the Allies—armies composed of Prussian, Austrian, and even Russian militia (Landwehr and apolchenie) combined with reserve and line units.

After 1805, Napoleonic campaigns had essentially pitted individual nations, such as Austria or Russia, versus Napoleon’s empire. The Sixth Coalition finally linked a true grand coalition not matched since the War of Spanish Succession and is a forerunner of allied coalitions in our own century. These armies were also employing new types of command organizations, among them the Prussian General Staff system. They were also following the script, in the fall of 1813, of perhaps history’s first ever coalition operations order—the Trachenberg Convention.
The methodology for this monograph will analyze the 1813 campaign in Germany using the eight "key attributes" as defined by Schneider. For the purposes of this monograph these attributes will equate to operational elements and serve as criteria against which to examine the history. Before a discussion of the course of this campaign we must present the definitions of Schneider's eight "attributes" of operational art: a distributed operation, distributed campaign, continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational vision, a distributed enemy, and distributed deployment. This will allow the reader to identify the appearance of any or part of these elements as we review the history.

Schneider's first element is the distributed operation. "Operational art is characterized first by the distributed operation: an ensemble of deep maneuvers and distributed battles extended in space and time but unified by a common aim." This definition includes the existence of "temporal and spatial distribution..." in the conduct of an operational campaign. According to Schneider, the relationship between this "characteristic" and what U.S. Army labels "deep operations" is in fact the fundamental discriminator between operational art and classical strategy. Modern U.S. Army doctrine defines deep operations as those which "engage enemy forces throughout the depth of the battle area and achieve decisive results rapidly." Therefore, the existence of "deep operations" will be a key indicator that an operation is distributed.

Distributed campaign. Schneider does not give a precise definition for this element; rather he says its the "final structure," the product so to speak, of the operational artist's vision. He then gives several characteristics of distributed campaigns which we can use as criteria in judging the 1813 campaigns in question, these are: "battle itself becomes subordinated to maneuver" and, two, "Because modern warfare emphasizes battles and maneuver, distributed campaigns are inherently exhaustive." Continuous logistics. "In order for a modern industrial army in a theater of operations to maintain a militarily effective presence, its logistics system must be continuous." Schneider makes the analogy between the laws of physics and the laws of warfare. The laws of classical strategy are now replaced by the more fluid laws governing distributed operations and modern industrial warfare just as Newton and classical physics (mass, accelerations, force) were superseded by the laws of fluid dynamics.
Instantaneous command and control. Distributed operations generate more information, therefore command and control must be instantaneous, specifically, the telegraph, in order for operational art to be in its most mature form. In this discussion Schneider uses the battles of Waterloo and Jena/Auerstadt as examples to prove his point. Schneider hypothesizes that had Napoleon had telegraph at either of these two engagements the results may have been very different. In fact, a very good argument can be made on both counts that telegraphic communication would not have affected the outcome of either battle. Grouchy was still too far away with Theilemann in between and Napoleon and Davout still destroyed the morale of the Prussian Army.17

A better measure might be the effectiveness of the information transfer vice its speed of transmission. Schneider’s own example of the battle of Chancellorsville supports this proposition. Even with telegraph, the command and control climate and its effectiveness not the speed of information transfer helped make the difference at Chancellorsville. Hooker was unable to synchronize with Sedgewick while his opponent, Lee, was essentially of “one mind” with his subordinates. It is not the speed with which a commander communicates, but the understanding of his intent by his subordinates and ability to execute that intent in the presence of an enemy.

Operationally durable formations. These are “...formations capable of conducting indefinitely a succession of distributed operations.”18 According to Schneider these formations were first seen during the Civil War as field armies. Russell Weigley, on the other hand, hints that this type of force, one that relied on attrition and exhaustion, had already been developing for some time. The Russians may have had operationally durable formations as early as the Seven Years War, as the battle of Zorndorf may prove--European armies were becoming difficult if not impossible to destroy in battle.19 Epstein explicitly supports this line of thought. Once the fundamental asymmetry of the Napoleonic wars was resolved in 1809 it was rare that a Napoleonic Field Army was destroyed in one day’s battle or even in one campaign.20 Oman’s monumental work on the Peninsula emphasizes Wellington’s astonishment regarding the durability of French armies, freely admitting that he never saw anything like the recovery of the French armies after their retreat from Portugal, after Salamanca, and Soult’s unexpected offensive after Vitoria in the Pyrenees.21
Another of Schneider's criteria for judging the maturity of the element of operationally durable formations is "...the emergence of the army group." He uses the example of the command and control of American Civil War armies, particularly later in the war. However, Schneider qualifies this development using the term "quasi army group" to refer to the best result of the organization efforts on both sides in response to the problem of the command and control of widely distributed field armies. If we use the Civil War as the standard of maturity, then we can extrapolate that a situation like Grant's, where he exercised field command of the Army of the Potomac (through Meade), "quasi army group" command of the eastern armies, and supreme command of all the Union's armies, might be mirrored in some respect in 1813.

Operational vision. Schneider associates operational vision "...with mental agility, the ability to react to incoming information faster than it arrives." However, Schneider does not provide an explicit definition; instead he gives us an example of someone who had operational vision--U.S. Grant. He adds that a staff plays a "crucial role...in sustaining that vision." Therefore, I will use the following definition for operational vision: seeing beyond to an endstate that accomplishes strategic goals. I will only add that this vision must be exercised in a distributed environment similar to that described by Schneider in order for it to be operational.

Distributed enemy. As discussed earlier under instantaneous command and control, Schneider indirectly gives Napoleon credit for a being a distributed enemy by using two of his campaigns as examples relevant to a discussion on instantaneous command and control. My goal then for this analysis will be first to see if the Sixth Coalition fights operationally distributed and look at Napoleon's response...did he fight distributed in reaction or of his own accord, if at all?

Distributed deployment. Again, Schneider does not provide a precise definition, but he ties this element to the industrial revolution and nations' capacity to wage war. Nations must "defend--and seize--the resource and production base." This element would seem to be a given if the operation is distributed and countries have undergone the kind of total mobilization we see occurring in the latter half of the Napoleonic Wars. But its earliest expression may have been the announcement of the levee en mass and
Carnot's efforts in 1793-4. At any rate we will define distributed deployment as deployment in breadth and depth, both military and economic, in support of operations of war.

The campaign in 1813 is easily divisible into two phases: a spring phase that led up to an armistice, and the armistice and subsequent fall phase when hostilities resumed. The armistice and fall campaign are grouped together because the planning for the campaign occurred during the armistice. These two phases, then, will be the historic landscape that we will search for operational elements.

A given in this monograph will be that Schneider’s “necessary” contextual conditions are not present in the mature form required for the “fullest expression” of operational art. Thus we recognize that any attributes of operational art that are identified in this analysis are, as stated previously, immature. However, a discussion of these conditions at this time will facilitate a better understanding of just what level of maturity for operational art was possible in 1813.

The first of these conditions is that “weapon lethality must be advanced beyond the technology of the smooth bore musket.” The weapons of 1813 were overwhelmingly smoothbore muskets. Some Jaeger (lit. hunter—the German designation for skirmish capable light infantry) and light units were equipped with rifles, but the vast majority of the light troops carried muskets. The technology existed but was in its infancy and not available en masse for the good reason of the low rate of fire of the existing weapons. The real source of lethality on the Napoleonic battlefield, as Baron Mueffling and British casualties at Waterloo attest, was artillery. Massed mobile artillery contributed to an already existing trend (first seen in the American and French revolutions) toward a more dispersed battlefield. In conclusion, lethality existed, albeit not of the technological type specified by Schneider.

A second condition is that sustainment must be successive and continuous. Britain’s shipping and sea control met the requirement for continuity, linking the budding Industrial Revolution in Great Britain to Germany via the sea. Wellington proved during the Peninsular campaign that this condition was actually attainable as long as sea lines of communication and the bases or campaigns they supported were within easy reach and facilitated by littoral geography. Great Britain’s control of the sea also enabled this level of sustainment in the German theater in 1813. The successive condition was met partially by an operation that was supported westward by the numerous ports of the southern Baltic Sea in Allied hands. The river
line of the Oder also partially supported this condition. The Prussian Army was almost wholly clothed, fed, and armed in this manner.

The importance of this sustainment flow is highlighted by the fact that two high-ranking British envoys were sent to Europe in 1813 precisely to ensure that the great resources flowing continuously into Europe were being effectively utilized.28 Napoleon intuitively understood the importance of controlling what he could of this cornucopia of supplies, limiting its legal flow to the Baltic by assigning one of his best Marshals, Davout, the job of holding Hamburg and the lower Elbe. In the south the lack of a littoral flank for logistics support would be a considerable operational constraint.

Two additional conditions can be tied to this logistics/sustainment piece: continuous mobilization and nations' capacity to wage distributed war. The first is easily disposed of. The French literally invented the modern concept of continuous mobilization. Both Chandler and Bowden make it clear that Napoleon was a complete master of mobilization, culminating in his near miraculous creation of an entirely new Grande Armee in 1813 using his existing system of conscription by year group or "classes."29 The Prussians, under the leadership of Scharnhorst, took the French model and adapted and improved it...s they had to given their limited means. This system produced a three tier system of regular, reserve, and militia units that is still the cornerstone of mobilization today.30 The second condition is more difficult given, again, the technology of the era--horses, foot, and, most significantly, ships. Suffice it to say that when we combine Great Britain's industrial potential and control of the sea with the manpower of the continental opponents of Napoleon, we get a rudimentary coalition (vice national) capability to wage distributed war as defined by Schneider.31

Another of Schneider's conditions is that signals technology allow for instantaneous command and control--telegraph. The Napoleonic battlefield certainly did not meet this technological requirement, however the problems posed in controlling the huge armies (over one million combatants in Germany alone) were not left unattended. Strategically Napoleon was already using a primitive type of telegraph that was essentially an optically enhanced manual semaphore system (a form of which is still in use in the United States Navy today). However the most effective solution had existed for years--an operational general staff. As Epstein discusses, the French staff as led by Marshal Berthier was able to execute
complex operations instructions emanating from the computer-like brain of Napoleon that moved corps with time lags that compare favorably to those of DESERT STORM. As we shall see the Prussians took the staff to a higher level that further mitigated the constraints of this condition. Admittedly the geographic scope was much reduced, but this would come with technology. In any case, a means for instantaneous communication on a broad scale existed via another mechanism...published long term orders and decentralized command and control. This in fact was among the benefits conferred by the Trachenberg Convention to the Sixth Coalition and will be examined in more detail in chapter three.

Schneider's next two conditions go hand in hand—the requirement for an operationally durable formation and a command structure possessing operational vision. Schneider defines an operationally durable formation as one that “...must be able to conduct a succession of battles and deep maneuvers indefinitely.” Epstein and others make it clear that the birth of the operationally durable formation was undoubtedly during the late Eighteenth century with the French development of the combined arms division. Epstein sees the development of the Napoleonic Corps d'Arme as another step in the evolutionary development of the operationally durable formation. As for vision, if we interpret that it means seeing beyond to an endstate that accomplishes strategic goals, then the Allies possessed a modicum of it because they did in fact achieve their goal of the liberation of Germany upon the completion of the execution of their plan.

For Schneider, the enemy, too, must be operationally minded. On the surface, and given Schneider's discussion of "the dead hand of Napoleon," this may seem to be the one condition that cannot be met even in immature form in 1813. However, without going too far off track, an argument can be made that Napoleon was always operationally minded. His total unity of command within his own person actually hindered his development in learning, or even needing, to distribute ultimate command authority more broadly. The fact that he was often well-served by his much maligned subordinates on other fronts also hindered his development of more organizational vice personality dependent means to command operationally.

To sum up, this monograph will specifically search for, identify, and discuss operational elements that may have existed in the 1813 campaign conducted by the Sixth Coalition. As discussed above, this
campaign provides sophisticated evidence of a new type of warfare and practice of war--operations orders and general staffs. The size, scope, and means of these vast operations resulted, to use Schneider’s words, in a “crisis in control” that dictated a new level of competence in the conduct of operations. How was this new competence manifested as operational art?°\[37\]

Finally, where is the relevance to modern developments and doctrine? In today’s environment of coalition warfare the lessons of operational art residing within one of history’s greatest coalition contests seem worthy of examination and reappraisal. Does operational art perhaps lend itself particularly well to coalition warfare, especially when facing monolithic threats such as Napoleon? Are the two inextricably linked? Complete answers to these questions go beyond the scope of this monograph, but hopefully this monograph will provide some food for thought in addressing these questions with respect to their relevance to the modern joint, coalition environment facing today’s U.S. military.
II. SPRING 1813 OPERATIONS

On new year's day 1813 General Hans David Yorck, after extensive negotiations with a Prussian in Russian service named Clausewitz, agreed to neutralize the 17,000 men under his command. With this agreement, signed at Taurrogen in East Prussia, Clausewitz effectively negotiated the end of one coalition and the beginning of another.38

The outgrowth of this event was the rebellion of Prussia against Napoleon. For the first time since 1807, two major continental powers, Prussia and Russia, were united in arms against Napoleon’s Empire. However, in the spring operations that followed, Napoleon emerged tactically victorious despite: the military improvements of his opponents, the weaknesses of the new Grande Armee, the wavering of Napoleon’s allies in the Confederation of the Rhine, and the unexpected (to Napoleon) neutrality of Austria.39

Nevertheless, the Sixth Coalition outperformed the previous five coalitions. A common goal, the liberation of Germany, inspired a new found unity of effort that formed the solid foundation of this new coalition.40 It fought Napoleon and the French to a standstill forcing them to accept an armistice instead of a dictated or favorable negotiated peace—a very un-Napoleonic end to a campaign. Indeed, the armistice was not the end of the campaign—it was an operational pause between two phases. The purpose of this chapter is to examine the spring phase of the 1813 campaign for evidence of operational art in use by the Sixth Coalition.

Because this monograph is attempting to identify evidence of operational art, in whatever forms of maturity, the discussion of the military history will focus on the operational level. Strategy and tactics will be discussed only with regard to how they influenced the operational course of the campaign. With this context clearly identified let's proceed to review the history of the spring campaign.

The spring operations themselves can also be divided into two distinct phases. The first phase began with Yorck’s defection at Taurrogen and ended approximately at the time that Napoleon rejoined his reconstituted Grande Armee on 25 April at Erfurt.41 The second phase essentially begins with Napoleon’s
active campaigning and encompasses the battles of Lutzen and Bautzen, terminating with the signing of a cease fire at Pleischwitz on 4 June, 1813. This cease fire was soon followed by a formal armistice.

Straddling these two phases are other military operations which had a bearing on the operational situation. The first of these encompassed the masking and sieges of the fortified cities (e.g. Danzig) that Napoleon left along the Allied lines of communication. Another ongoing effort consisted of Allied efforts against Napoleon’s lines of communications using partisans, friekorps, Cossacks, regular units, and the various combinations of all of these--what might today be termed “deep operations.” We recall that U.S. Army doctrine defines deep operations as those which “engage enemy forces throughout the depth of the battle area and achieve decisive results rapidly.” Because of the vast geographic extent of these “deep,” one might call them distributed, operations, their bearing on the upcoming campaign must also be examined.

Yorck’s defection at Taurrogen completely changed the strategic fabric of the Russia’s war against Napoleon. Until this point the war for the Russians was a defensive one. Its strategic aim was, in Clausewitzian terms, negative--expel the infidel invaders from the sacred soil of Holy Russia. This was where the campaign would have reasonably ended. Any offensive ideas the Russians may have had prior to Yorck’s defection were about the disposition of Poland vis-à-vis the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. Let us first examine the situation as it appeared immediately prior to Taurrogen and then after to gain the context of the strategic and operational decisions that followed.

For the Russians the year of 1812 had been more than just a French military catastrophe. One account estimates that the Russians had lost at least a quarter of a million soldiers killed alone. Because of these losses the Russians had just over 150,000 men left, including reserves and replacements, to carry the fight to the French. Additionally, Russia’s military commander Prince Kutusov, whose prestige was now immense, was adamantly opposed to a continuation of the pursuit of the French beyond Russia’s borders. Baron Mueffling, a contemporary Prussian observer, makes this point clear: “Kutosof (sic) considered the Russian war as ended; his desire was to keep the army within the limits of Poland, and to
incorporate the Grand Duchy of Warsaw with Russia, as an indemnification for the war, leaving the other European nations to free themselves from Napoleon as Russia had done."46

With only 150,000 men available for operations the Tsar took the precaution on December 12 of ordering another massive round of conscription. To understand this act we must look at the resources of the French. Alexander’s conscription was a precaution intended to provide additional resources to fight a defensive war. As Mueffling made clear above, a negotiated settlement was forecast...but what had Napoleon done? He had returned to France to raise another army. The Russians knew this and wanted to be able to negotiate from a position of strength if Napoleon was even willing to negotiate. Even Gneisenau freely admits in his account that the Russians were not physically capable of maintaining themselves beyond the line of the Vistula river.47 Napoleon had good reason to believe that the French would return to Poland instead of several hundred miles further west. Napoleon could theoretically field more troops than the Russians, some 190,000, many of them in good shape. Napoleon’s instructions to Murat, in command after the Emperor departed at Smorgoni, were to defend along the Nieman if possible.48 However, the balance of his best troops in this total were from the Prussian and Austrian contingents—Napoleon’s strength derived from the corps of two former enemies.

However, as Clausewitz makes clear in his history of the 1812 campaign, Yorck’s defection completely changed the strategic equation.49 The Austrians subtracted another 25,000 troops from Napoleon’s forces when they came to a secret agreement with the Russians to withdraw their corps unmolested into Bohemia.50 The Russians were confident that they would see these men again—as allies. Napoleon, enraged by the Prussians and knowingly or unknowingly blind to the duplicity of the Austrians further compounded his shortage of veteran manpower by directing Murat and his successor Eugene to leave major fortresses garrisoned as the French gave up ground in their retreat westward. Instead of gaining strength as they collapsed on their lines of communications the French seemed to lose strength.

To summarize, the defection of Yorck signaled a change in the character of the war from the strategic defensive to the strategic offensive. Yorck’s defection not only mathematically altered the equation but it acquired a momentum of its own as the eastern Prussian provinces rose up in revolt. In
mid-January Yorck openly declared for the Russians and placed his forces at their disposal. Six weeks later the Prussian King Frederick William III finally fled to Silesia and secretly signed a Treaty of Alliance with Russians at Kalisch. This treaty laid the cornerstone for the Sixth Coalition. Its goal was quite simply the liberation of Germany based on the territorial configuration of Prussia in 1806. Great Britain rapidly concluded separate agreements subsidizing the Prussians and Russians and attempted to bring forces from Sweden to Germany for use in a spring campaign. Austria remained neutral and began a massive mobilization, offering armed mediation to both sides.\textsuperscript{51}

At this point we must digress before proceeding to the final military moves that ended this first phase of the campaign. Prussia had lost heavily during the Russian campaign. When her 17,000 are added to the Russian total, we find that the Allied field force was ill-suited to the “liberation” of Poland, much less Germany. Napoleon knew this. He had deliberately limited the Prussian Army to some 42,000 troops, half of which remained after the 1812 campaign. Prussia, Napoleon thought, could not generate enough trained manpower to be decisive prior to Napoleon’s return to the field with his new army.

However, Prussian reformers led by the chief of the Quartermaster General Staff Gerhard Scharnhorst, devised an ingenious workaround, the Krumpersystem, to compensate for the Napoleonic constraints.\textsuperscript{52} Every year prior to 1812 a portion of the conscripted Prussian army was released from active duty as krumper, or reserves, eligible for recall. Gneisenau estimated that some 150,000 trained men had been generated in this way by 1813. However, only some 16,000 were young enough to be recalled.\textsuperscript{53} The beauty of this system was that Prussia implemented a leverage en masse and many of these older trained men served anyway in the Landwehr (militia). All sections of society served in some manner: the lower classes providing conscripts for the line and Landwehr; the middle classes providing volunteer rifle units, some of the militia cavalry, and officers for the Landwehr; and the aristocracy served in their traditional role as line and staff officers.

Another aspect worth noting was the arming of these troops. Much has been made of the shortage of weapons and the Landwehr being armed with pikes. This is exaggeration. Gneisenau estimates that on their own the Prussians had already produced enough cannon to support 120,000 men.\textsuperscript{54} Both Austria and Great Britain immediately began to funnel weapons to the Prussian masses and the Russians provided
much captured equipment as well (remember the hundreds of cannon that Napoleon left behind in Russia).

Of the sources of armament, Great Britain by far proved the most significant and had the most influence (see Appendix I). As already mentioned, Sir Charles Stewart, the brother of Great Britain’s foreign minister Lord Castlereagh was sent as a liaison office to the armies of the Sixth Coalition forming in the north for the express purpose of ensuring the proper management and placement of His Majesty’s resources. Great Britain flexibly and rapidly shifted her focus to supporting the war in Germany. This support was not limited to arms, many of the reserves and Landwehr wore uniforms in the spring of 1813 originally destined for Portuguese, Spanish, and British soldiers.55

By these astonishing efforts, armaments and manpower mobilization, the Prussians with the considerable assistance of Great Britain, were able to field 110,000 men prior to Napoleon’s return. This result Napoleon could never have forecast. Of this total, some had to be told off to help the Russians cover the fortresses occupied by the French. However, the cream of this force, some 55,000 were available to oppose Napoleon and had indeed already started campaigning.56

The Russian campaign up to this point had been one of operational pursuit. The frozen rivers of Germany provided Napoleon’s step-son Eugene, now in command, no defensible barriers and he delayed and withdrew the best he could as Germany exploded into revolt around his tired and demoralized troops. However, he was helped in no small measure by Kutusov’s lack of commitment to a vigorous pursuit. The Allied forces essentially consisted of three field armies: one to the north under the Russian General Wittgenstein, one in Silesia under General Blucher, and the main Russian army under Kutusov still in Poland. Wittgenstein’s army included his own corps and Yorck’s Prussians—about 50,000 men. Blucher’s included a Russian corps under Winzingerode. Other corps under both Bulow and Kleist were forming but not yet ready for major operations.57

The operational plan was essentially to liberate as much of Germany as possible, which by April meant as far west as the Elbe River. Here Kutusov wanted to stop, but he died and the Tsar appointed Wittgenstein in his place. In the meantime Wittgenstein conducted a flank march along the Elbe to join Blucher who had captured Dresden. Eugene attacked Wittgenstein near Mockern, which threatened to
upset the Allied plans to concentrate. However, Eugene withdrew and informed Napoleon of his intention to abandon the upper Elbe and retreat as far as the more defensible Saale River.

Now the second phase of the campaign began. This phase might properly be titled the "battle phase," since it was characterized by two fierce but ultimately indecisive battles between the main armies of Napoleon and those of the Sixth Coalition. While Napoleon marshaled his forces at Erfurt for a resumption of the offensive and Eugene withdrew, the Allies were thrown into a command crisis over Kutusov’s imminent death. The Tsar appointed Wittgenstein as nominal commander-in-chief, but his authority only extended over his own corps and Winzingerode’s. The Prussians, in a move to solidify unity of effort, generously placed their forces under the command of Wittgenstein. Two other Russian corps, those of Miloradovitch and Tormassov, both senior to Wittgenstein, were under the personal command of the Tsar. This confusing command structure was exacerbated by an operational dispute between the Prussians, led by Scharnhorst who was the chief of the Prussian General Staff, and the Russian peace party led by Kutusov. The dispute centered on the wisdom of advancing beyond the Elbe. Scharnhorst wanted to maintain the initiative and advance beyond the Elbe and disperse the French between the defiles of the Thuringian mountains and the Saale before they gained strength.

There were political imperatives as well: Austria was in contact and wanted the coalition to operate contiguous to her borders so that when she joined she would not have Napoleon between her and the main Allied forces. Obviously the further west the Allies advanced the more time Austria would have to rearm and join them. Austria fully expected Napoleon to vigorously attack the Allies and wanted no part of any defeats until she was sufficiently rearmed. This Austrian imperative, as we shall see, was to wield exceptional influence over the remainder of the Allies’ campaign and can be considered the dominant factor in the decision by the leaders of the Sixth Coalition to keep the bulk of their field forces in the southern part of the theater, that is in southern Saxony and eventually Silesia.

Another consideration that weighed heavily in the short term was the disposition of the Kingdom of Saxony, which had actually declared itself neutral, despite its King’s desire to throw in his lot with Napoleon. Kutusov’s death, Blücher’s capture of Dresden and passage of the Elbe, and Wittgenstein’s
successful flank march persuaded Scharnhorst and the Prussians that a continuation of the offensive to the Saale was the best course: “We...placed our confidence in acting vigorously on the offensive, before Napoleon could unite with the Viceroy of Italy and fully develop his strength.” With Kutusov dead and the more aggressive Wittgenstein, backed by the Tsar, at the helm the Russians concurred and the decision was made to advance.

The Battle of Lutzen resulted from this offensive movement. On the other side of the hill Napoleon’s plan was to incur a battle or cause the Allies to retreat across the Elbe, either of which he was convinced would give the initiative and momentum back to him. To do this he planned to turn the Allied position by making “...a movement exactly the opposite of the one I carried through during the Jena campaign...” by marching on Leipzig then down the Elbe behind the Allies to Dresden. The Allied advance surprised Ney’s corps south of Lutzen on 2 May. Ney’s men managed to hold on until Napoleon arrived with the bulk of his army, some 110,000 men versus the 73,000 of the Allies. The Allied assumption that their veterans would provide the edge over Napoleon’s conscripts proved incorrect and Napoleon forced the Allies to retreat. He was unable to fully capitalize on his tactical success due to his paucity of cavalry. As if to underscore the cavalry deficiency Blucher led a furious cavalry counterattack that stopped the French pursuit cold and served as a postscript to this bloody battle (a minimum of 20,000 French and 16,000 Allied casualties).

Nevertheless, Napoleon had regained the initiative and the Allies now retreated across the Elbe. Another significant result of this battle was the wounding of Scharnhorst, the intellectual...one might say operational...leader of the Prussians. He was replaced some months later, however, by the very capable Graf (Count) Neithardt von Gneisenau, who had been Blucher’s chief of staff. The Allied plan remained, in Gneisenau’s words, to “...dispute every inch...to convince the Austrians that they were resolutely determined not to spare their powers nor...leave the deliverance of Germany entirely at the discretion of Austria.” The line of operations remained along the Austrian frontier and a defensive position was chosen in the foothills of the Bohemian mountains adjacent to the town of Bautzen from which to impede Napoleon’s advance.
Napoleon employed his classic manœuvre sur les derrières against this position and another bloody battle ensued on 20-21 May. On the second day Napoleon nearly succeeded in cutting the Allied line of retreat and defeating their army in detail. But Ney, the commander of the approximately 80,000 man turning force (which might be properly termed a field army since it was a multi-corps unit) bungled the tactical execution and the Allies escaped. As the Allies retreated into Silesia they inflicted a series of sharp rebuffs to Napoleon’s cavalry-poor pursuit, particularly at Hainau on 26 May where one of Napoleon’s infantry divisions was ambushed and effectively wiped out.  

On the northern front Napoleon had peeled off another army under Marshal Oudinot to attempt to take Berlin, a prerequisite to advancing to the Oder and attempting to free the besieged French garrisons there. Oudinot’s opponent was the Prussian General Bulow who now had a sizable force, well armed with British equipment flowing through the Baltic and Hamburg (which had been captured in March—see below). Oudinot and Bulow fought each other to a stalemate in the plains and forests southeast of Berlin, their last engagement occurring at Luckau on 4 June.  

Thus at the end of May the Allies seemed to be in hopeless shape, their main forces had retreated into Silesia with Napoleon in pursuit and another force had narrowly averted the capture of Berlin. In the words of one observer the Allies were “...absolutely in a cul de sac.” Additionally, the Coalition seemed in danger of breaking up over the issue of the line of retreat.  

Nevertheless, on 4 June at Pleischwitz the representatives of Napoleon and the Allies signed a cease fire which resulted in an armistice that was to last most of the summer. Why had Napoleon, on the verge of trapping the Allied Armies in Silesia, settled for an operational pause that gave his opponents’ armies time to recover? Napoleon’s own explanation attributes his decision to “...lack of cavalry...and the hostile position of Austria... .” Additionally, Napoleon’s army was just as exhausted as the Allied. However, to fully understand Napoleon’s problems we must address the other aspects of this campaign that had contributed to Napoleon’s exhaustion.  

The first of these, the problem of the fortresses Napoleon left along the Allied lines of communication, is disposed of rather quickly, but its bearing on Napoleon’s problems is part of the entire
mosaic. Napoleon’s tasks for his fortresses were threefold: they were to tie down Allied forces, interrupt their lines of communication, and finally, because most of them were major road and bridge centers, facilitate his rapid own movement when he advanced victoriously eastward. As far as the first task the reverse situation was true, Stewart remarks that the French garrisons were “nearly double the blockading force.”

Not only did the Allies mask these fortresses with minimal forces, but the troops used were often the least trained. These fortresses interfered relatively little with the Allied lines of communications during the critical period when the French withdrew for the reason that most of the rivers were frozen rendering the bridges located at the fortresses irrelevant. By the time the rivers had thawed the front was far to the west and the Allies had opened up new lines of support for their armies. Additionally, Napoleon’s advance took him away from most of the fortresses anyway. The example of Thorn, which surrendered on 16 April, 1813 provides us with a glimpse of other serendipitous benefits: the captured artillery was immediately put to use in the Allied artillery park while the German partners of the French inside the fortress were paroled, many of them enlisting in the ranks of their former enemies.

The second set of operations involved the numerous Cossacks, partisans, and freikorps opportunely used by the Allies on Napoleon’s flank and rear. One eminent Napoleonic historian has credited these operations with shifting a balance of some 53,000 troops away from the French main forces for a cost of approximately 5,000 troops, mostly Cossacks. Another has called these Allied operations an “excellent demonstration of economy of force.” Their effect contributed greatly to Napoleon’s operational problems. The first phase of these operations was an outgrowth of the way in which the Russians had been employing their Cossack forces all along. Wittgenstein must get the credit for first initiating these operations, which were a response to a request by emissaries of the Hanse cities and Eugene’s withdrawal across the Elbe. It is important to remember that an earlier such “deep” operation by Wittgenstein’s Cossacks had set the conditions for Yorck’s defection at Taurogen.

The initial raid, by a mixed force of regular Russian cavalry, Cossacks and expatriate Germans succeeded beyond the Allies’ wildest dreams. Its commander, Colonel Tettenborn, managed, by a bold
advance into Mecklenberg, to secure the safety of Swedish Pomerania and gain the allegiance of the Duke of Mecklinberg-Schwerin to the Allied cause. However, the most stunning result was the withdrawal of the cowed French from Hamburg and the occupation of that strategic city by Tettenborn’s raiders on 18 March. Hamburg would later be recaptured at the end of May, but while it remained in Allied hands the British literally shipped tons of war material through it.\textsuperscript{73} These arms eventually ended up in the hands of numerous Hanoverian, Mecklinberger, and other levies that added substantial numbers to an Allied corps forming in this district under Graf Wallmoden (the de facto Hanoverian commander-in-chief).

The importance of the capture of Hamburg, the anchor of the French position on the lower Elbe can be judged by Napoleon’s response. First, he assigned the very capable Marshal Davout the job of recapturing Hamburg and securing the lower Elbe. Davout, whom Napoleon could ill afford to do without, would hold down this assignment for the remainder of the war. Secondly, Napoleon held back a large percentage of his scarce cavalry, desperately needed for his campaign, in Westphalia to protect that puppet kingdom from falling as well.\textsuperscript{74}

Following Wittgenstein’s example, General Bulow detached Cossack forces under his control to cooperate with partisans and friekorps beyond the Elbe. These forces, led by General Dornberg (another Hanoverian) and the Russian General Czernicheff, proceeded to Luneberg where they destroyed the French division of General J. Morand on 2-3 April. The Saxon troops of Morand’s division, after the action, deserted en masse to the Russo-German legion of Czernicheff.\textsuperscript{75} In April Wallmoden was appointed the commander of all these disparate forces.

One more example of the raiding operations should suffice to illustrate Napoleon’s problems as he attempted to crush the Allies in the “cul de sac” of Silesia. This was the capture of no less a strategic city than Leipzig three days after the signing of the Armistice of Pleischwitz. Czernicheff, who had just destroyed a Westphalian column at Halberstadt, learned from his Cossacks that Leipzig, garrisoned by 5,000 French cavalry (mostly) and infantry of Arrighi’s Corps, contained numerous magazines and wounded. Czernicheff contacted the Russian General Woronzov, who was observing Magdeberg, and proposed a raid.
Woronzov agreed to this plan and they were joined by the celebrated friekorps of Lutzow. In a brisk action on 7 June, the combined forces of Woronzov, Lutzow, and Czernicheff dispersed Arrighi’s cavalry outside Leipzig and proceeded to occupy the city...only to learn from Arrighi that an armistice had been concluded three days earlier! Woronzov’s raid reveals just how tenuous Napoleon’s lines of communication through Saxony were. If we wonder as to Napoleon’s weakness in cavalry, we learn from the above operations that a good portion of it was employed guarding the lower Elbe and his rear. Napoleon’s acceptance of the Armistice makes even more sense in the light of these “secondary” operations which have remained out of the limelight of history.

At first blush one sees in this campaign the standard Napoleonic format: a search for decisive battle along a single line of operations, in this case north of the Bohemian mountains. However, even a cursory examination, such as that just presented, reveals a more complicated operational picture. The operations of the Allied forces during this phase of the campaign were distributed, displaying a level of sophistication not previously seen in central Europe. However, we have not quite satisfied one of the criteria specified earlier—the subordination of battles to maneuver. The most compelling evidence of distribution were the raids, harrassment, and even the taking and holding of a strategic city (or two) by the forces of Tettenborn, et. al. That these operations were the outgrowth of the Russian experience, and largely opportunistic, vice being planned weeks in advance, does nothing to diminish their operational effect. Napoleon now had another front that he had to honor—in his rear. As far as the exhaustion criteria is concerned the armistice following Pleichwitz provides the evidence that both sides were exhausted.

We must also credit the Allies for not resting on the serendipitous results of the first raids, but continuing to press the French and bringing a new level of organization to these forces by appointing Wallmoden to command and synchronize these operations. Finally, the commitment of substantial French “deep forces”—their cavalry—can also be considered evidence of operational art because it denied Napoleon the tool he needed to engage the Allies throughout the depth of the battlefield following his tactical victories at Lutzen and Bautzen.

It might not be too much of an overstatement to say that it was during his campaign that the concepts of continuous logistics and distributed deployment can be said to have “arrived.” Nafziger, in his
piece, points this out by listing the mountains of British equipment the French captured when they retook Hamburg. This equipment only gives some indication of the far larger amounts that made it into the hands of the Hanoverian, Mecklinberg, Prussian and other levies to say nothing of the rearmament of the Cossacks with better equipment. The British not only armed the Germans, but they armed them (and trained them) where they were, thus integrating the processes of mobilization and deployment by avoiding the classical practice of marching unarmed levies to a depot or collection point. We must mention that Napoleon was doing the same extraordinary thing, arming and training his young conscripts on the march.

The battles of Lutzen and Bautzen provide evidence that the Allied armies had reached new levels of operational durability. This durability was admittedly immature, they were exhausted after six weeks of constant fighting. However, when we factor in that the Russians had been fighting for almost a year without pause, we realize that the Russians may have been more durable, and exhausted, than their Prussian ally. Imagine the coalition army of 1805 holding together after a Bautzen or a Lutzen—the Allied coalition itself had become more durable.

Two areas which superficially appear less mature than the others discussed are operational vision and instantaneous command and control. Instantaneous command and control is the more problematic of the two. The only medium of “instant” communications was that of the shared vision of the participants. All wanted to fight the French, hurt them as much as possible, and ostensibly liberate Germany. This led to an environment that favored commanders willing to make independent decisions. This sort of rapid decision making, in response to opportunities, seemed to yield the most fruit in the deep operations along the Elbe and in Napoleon’s rear.

As for operational vision, the Allies were hurt by the deaths of Kutusov and Scharnhorst; particularly Scharnhorst if we are to believe Mueffling, Clausewitz, and Gneisenau. But we catch a glimpse of Scharnhorst’s operational vision as we see the product of his creativity in action—the mobilization and performance of the Prussian Army. Well might Napoleon say, “These animals have learned something” after Lutzen. The survival and will to fight of that army after Lutzen and Bautzen and the shared vision that remained in force after Scharnhorst died provide our evidence. Perhaps the true measure of operational
vision is the ability to pass it along to one’s peers and subordinates, rather than merely to rely on electronic communication.

We must also recognize that the coalition itself had improved and was improving. The effort this new coalition expended in maintaining its unity was unique for the Napoleonic Wars. Blucher’s willing subordination to Wittgenstein is one example. Even the choice of the line of operation, south away from the threatened capital of Berlin, was a departure from the classical strategy of the past. It was as if Kutusov retreated toward Kiev instead of Moscow after the battle of Smolensk or Borodino. The signing of the armistice in June 1813, too, has a modern flavor. The Allies might well have kept fighting, which might have kept Austria permanently out of the fight, or done as Austria did after Wagram and negotiated an unfavorable peace. Instead they chose the best solution, an operational solution—the operational pause in the form of an armistice.

In many ways the vision we find evidence of was a collective vision: coalition unity for the sake of high ideals—liberation for Germany and the restoration of the balance of power. This vision provided fertile soil for operational commanders, but the harvest was yet to come except in the case of the “deep” operations along the Elbe.

Finally one must give “the God of War himself” his due. Napoleon was learning new ways of war, despite his search for the decisive battle to climax his campaign. The battle of Bautzen provides the best evidence of Napoleon fighting in a distributed fashion. Napoleon, like Lee at Chancellorsville, assigned himself the job of fixing the Allies, while Ney delivered the coup de gras from the flank with another entire army. Napoleon had been effectively fighting as an “army group” commander since Russia and this campaign shows that his sophistication at maneuvering armies was increasing despite the degradation of his tools.

Finally, Napoleon recognized that he must respond to the operational threat to his rear and flanks, another lesson from Russia. The Emperor allotted his precious cavalry and possibly most capable Marshal to these tasks. However, Napoleon’s own distributed efforts against the Allied rear failed primarily because the sophistication of the Allies’ response. His strategy of retaining fortresses evoked a non-
classical response from the Allies—they simply masked these fortresses. Nevertheless, Napoleon, too, was evolving, and fighting in a more distributed manner.

In summary there is significant evidence that elements of operational art were present during the spring phase of the campaign of 1813. Problem areas for the Allied coalition are also those areas of operational art that seem immature or have not yet manifested themselves—command and control and to a lesser extent operational vision. In order to understand more fully these trends we must now proceed to the remainder of the campaign, the operational pause and its sequel—the fall operations that liberated Germany.
III. FALL 1813 OPERATIONS

On 9 October, 1813 Napoleon arrived with 150,000 troops opposite the town of Duben on the Mulde River. He had made the decision two days earlier to march west from his position at Dresden in order to intercept two Allied Armies that had united and moved into his rear south of the Elbe River; one army under Field Marshal Blucher and the other under the Crown Prince Charles John of Sweden (the former Marshal Bernadotte). Napoleon's advance guard had engaged the rear guard of Blucher's army (Sacken's Corps) for most of the day and as these combats died down and darkness closed in Napoleon realized that the Allies had refused battle...again. Where had the Allies gone? More importantly why had two undefeated Allied armies, both recently victorious in combat against Napoleon's flank armies and with approximate numerical parity in numbers of troops, refused to give Napoleon battle?

Historical hindsight provides a clue. One week later these same Allied armies, particularly the aggressive Blucher's, effectively united with an even larger Allied force, the Army of Bohemia (180,000 troops), advancing from the south in the sprawling Saxon countryside around the city of Leipzig. During a bloody battle of attrition from 14 - 19 October these forces, in Europe's largest battle to date, defeated Napoleon and forced him to withdraw completely from Germany east of the Rhine. This result was no accident, and had in fact been outlined in an operational plan for the campaign developed earlier that July at Trachenberg in Silesia. Therefore, the answer to the above questions, was that the Allies refused battle in order to maneuver as planned to gain more favorable conditions for an engagement in the future.

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the development of the operations plan for the fall of 1813 and its historic execution. This monograph will then discuss any elements of operational art that emerge from the fall period of the campaign using the criteria already discussed in the previous chapters.

The situation after the armistice, it will be remembered, was one of acute exhaustion on both sides. Gneisenau freely admits as much in his memoir and stated that "Austria had given Russians and Prussians to understand that such a period of time was necessary to complete her armaments." He additionally listed eight objectives that he felt needed to be accomplished in order renew the combat with Napoleon: reinforce the Russians, principally through a new army forming in Poland under Count Bennigsen, complete the Manning of the Prussian Line Regiments, obtain arms and ammunition from Great
Britain and Austria, preparation of “accoutrements,” arm, form, and discipline the Landwehr, provision and repair fortresses, establish bridgeheads on the Oder river (the main crossing sites were in French hands), and procure and collect provisions.  

The accession of Austria as an active belligerent against Napoleon was by far the most important task. Ironically this goal, and many others Gneisenau listed, were shared by Austria’s foreign minister Metternich who commented upon the armistice as follows: “An Armistice will be the greatest of blessings. ...it will give us an opportunity to get to know each other, to concert military measures with the Allies and to bring reinforcements to the most threatened points.” (italics mine) From this quote it appears that Austria’s participation was a forgone conclusion. However, as Charles Stewart observed, “It is difficult to give an adequate idea of the anxiety that prevailed (on the part of Great Britain, Russian, and Prussia)...with respect to the decision of Austria.” (parenthesis mine)

Metternich’s master Francis I was not as committed to war with Napoleon as his minister and hoped that the armistice might give Austrian diplomacy the opportunity to negotiate a lasting peace. The terms of this peace were: the return of Illyria (the Dalmatian coast) to Austria, the territorial aggrandizement of Prussia via the dissolution of the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, the break up of the Confederation of the Rhine, and the re-establishment of France’s eastern boundary along the Rhine. The acceptance of these terms by Napoleon would have guaranteed Austrian neutrality and certainly freed Germany geographically from French influence. On 26 June, 1813 Metternich presented these terms to Napoleon at Dresden and was rudely rebuffed...Napoleon would accept the Illyrian concession only. Metternich departed Dresden convinced that peace with Napoleon was not possible.

From Dresden Metternich proceeded to Reichenbach in Silesia where he committed Austria to join the Sixth Coalition should Napoleon remain intransigent. Since Napoleon had already made clear his intent, the Treaty of Reichenbach was in effect Austria’s declaration of war. Now the Allies proceeded to plan in earnest for a resumption of hostilities in August (the armistice had been extended to August as an outgrowth of the Dresden interview). Napoleon did the same, especially since he had learned about Wellington’s victory at Vitoria and its effect in hardening the resolve of the Allies. As for the Allies they scheduled a series of meetings at Trachenberg in Silesia in order to shore up their command structure.
for the coming campaign and work out a plan of operations.

A veritable “galaxy” of diplomats and leaders of the Sixth Coalition descended on 9-12 July upon the castle of Trachenberg in Silesia to discuss how to “act in concert in the distribution of their forces” and “have a fixed general plan of operations.” These included the Tsar, the King of Prussia, and the Crown Prince of Sweden. However, it is important to remember that it included mostly the political leaders and their personal military advisors. Radetzky, Gneisenau, Blucher, Schwarzenberg, and even Moreau, who the Tsar had persuaded to come from the United States, were not there—but their input was. The names of the generals who were actually there are not as well known: Lowenhielm (Swedish), Toll and Volkonosky (Russian), and Knesebeck (Prussian).

According to Baron Mueffling, the meeting at Trachenberg resulted from the Tsar’s desire to resolve outstanding command and control issues revolving around the Crown Prince of Sweden, Jean-Batiste Bernadotte ex-Marshall of the French Empire. Bernadotte, it will be remembered, was still awaiting Prussian and Russian ratification of the treaty he had signed in April that guaranteed his country compensation in Norway at the expense of Napoleon’s Danish ally. Bernadotte had been so disillusioned by events in May that he had threatened to withdraw from the coalition in June. Bernadotte’s terms for participation included command of one of the principal Allied armies. In addition to the approximately 110,000 Swedes, Prussians, Russians, British, and North German troops already under his command, Bernadotte’s demands included command over the army of Silesia commanded by Marshal Blucher. The command and control question was to have a major impact on the final form of the operations plan and may be one reason that Bernadotte has received credit for authorship of the entire plan.

However, Bernadotte did not receive everything he asked for. His “demands were too great, and could not be conceded by the Sovereigns. They wished however to see him return satisfied from Trachenberg… and admitted that circumstances might [italics mine] render it necessary for him also to take the command of… the Silesian army.” This compromise had a negative impact during the upcoming operations because it created an environment for conflict with Blucher over combined command of the armies.
As already mentioned, the fiery Blücher, with Gneisenau as his chief of staff, commanded the Russo-Prussian force based in Silesia. This force, however, was to be the smallest of the three because nearly 100,000 troops, Russians and Prussians, were to accompany the Tsar of Russia and the King of Prussia to join the Austrian army in Bohemia. This led to a squabble of a far more serious nature over the command of the main army—the Army of Bohemia.

Tsar Alexander hoped for the appointment of the Archduke Charles as the commander of the main Austrian field army, and thus also serve as commander of the combined army formed when the Russians and Prussians joined forces with the Austrians in Bohemia. In May, Francis and Metternich had appointed Prince Schwarzenberg as the Austrian commander-in-chief. The Tsar subsequently nominated himself as supreme commander of the Bohemian army, which would number more than 200,000 troops. Metternich countered with the argument that the country with the preponderance of force should command the main army. On 6 August the issue came to a head. Metternich threatened to maintain Austrian neutrality should Alexander replace Schwarzenberg as supreme commander. The Tsar reluctantly acquiesced in this decision.

The problem with this arrangement was that the Austrians assumed command at three levels with only one undermanned staff led by Radetzky, the Austrian chief of staff (see Figure 2). The first level was that of the Austrian field army—the largest army Austria had fielded to date and which the staff was barely adequate to handle. The next level up—the Army of Bohemia—encompassed both the combined Russian-Prussian field army commanded by Barclay de Tolly as well as the Austrian army. This force was effectively an army group, but no additional staff was provided to control it. Instead Schwarzenberg and his overworked staff had to control this group as well. This was a problem the Allies were to never resolve, as with the Swedish issue, command of the Army of Bohemia would raise its ugly head repeatedly during the upcoming campaign. Finally, Schwarzenberg et. al. were also responsible for the operational direction of Blücher and Bernadotte’s forces as well, a task far beyond their means or inclination which they wisely left to the expedient of decentralized execution, as we shall see.

The choice of Schwarzenberg was to prove a wise one despite critics of his generalship. His handling of the Austrian corps attached to the Grande Armée in the fall of 1812 had earned the approval of
Napoleon himself, who recommended that Francis promote him to the rank of field marshal. It was Schwarzenberg who had recommended attaching major Russian and Prussian corps to the Austrian army to further improve unity of effort. Gordon Craig’s evaluation of Schwarzenberg eloquently summarizes his suitability for a multinational coalition command:

The new supreme commander’s talents were, to be sure, more diplomatic than strictly military, and it was probably a good thing that this was so. Like Dwight D. Eisenhower in another great coalition a hundred and thirty years later, his great gift was his ability, by patience and the arts of ingratiation, to hold together a military alliance which before Napoleon was finally defeated comprised fourteen members, and to persuade the quarreling monarchs and their field commanders to pay more than lip service to the alliance’s strategical plan.

Not only did Austria command the largest army, she also provided the operational plan that served as the blueprint for the entire campaign. This was because Schwarzenberg was ably assisted by Fieldmarshalleutnant Josef Radetzky as his chief of staff. Up to this point Radetzky had been a quiet but effective force for reform in the Austrian Army. Radetzky led Austria’s mobilization and planning effort as soon as the extent of Napoleon’s disaster in Russia became known. When Radetzky saw his initial operations plan, based on a successful advance to the Rhine, become obsolescent due to the sledge hammer blows of Napoleon during the spring of 1813, he immediately began work on a new plan to defeat the French. The general form of this plan could already be gleaned from the Russian experience, a campaign of attrition that concentrated on the flanks and avoided combat with Napoleon. Radetzky shared his ideas with Scharnhorst and probably received his blessing before the Prussian’s untimely death. Radetzky explained his plan to the British envoy Sir Robert Wilson as a “system of defense combined with offensive operations on a small scale over a general offensive movement which might win much, but also might lose all.” Radetzky presented this plan to General Toll in June 1813, who then presented it to the conference attendees at Trachenberg on 12 July.

The substance of the plan involved three main armies (see Appendix II for the entire translated convention). The two larger armies, under Bernadotte and Schwarzenberg, would threaten Napoleon’s flanks from the north and south. Blucher’s smaller Silesian army would face Napoleon to the east and was specifically directed to “avoid committing itself except in the case of an extremely favorable situation.” Any two armies not engaged by the French main effort were to attack the French flank, rear, and lines of
communications. Contrary to some interpretations of this plan, it never directed retreat from Napoleon. Rather it directed “vigorou

s offensive” through Napoleon’s rear by the unengaged armies “to join battle.” The culmination of these efforts was to be a “rendezvous in the camp of the enemy” by all three armies.

There were other inputs that did not make it into the actual plan itself, but affected the operational execution. Most of these had the effect of reinforcing the intent of the operational plan. Moreau, for example, advised the Tsar: “Expect a defeat whenever the Emperor attacks in person. Attack and fight his lieutenants whenever you can. Once they are beaten, assemble all your forces against Napoleon and give him no respite.” Jomini, recently come over from the French camp, also advised caution in dealing with Napoleon—stating that he was still “the ablest of men.”

Finally, the equipping and training of the Allied armies during the armistice, including a ten week rest for the veterans, yielded an immense force for the coming campaign. The Army of Bohemia passed in review on 19 August outside Prague for the monarchs of Austria, Prussia, and Russia. The British observers, whose government’s money had largely paid for much of what was on display, noted that the funds had been well spent and were completely satisfied with the state of the soldiers and equipment. In central Europe alone the coalition would send over 570,000 Allied soldiers against the approximately 410,000 troops of the reconstituted Grande Armee. This disparity is even greater given the more than 50,000 veteran French troops cut off in fortresses by lesser numbers of second line coalition forces.

Napoleon’s Grand Armee of August 1813 was also a more potent force than the one he had marched and fought to exhaustion in the spring. His Imperial Guard and cavalry had been reconstituted by extraordinary efforts, especially by the expedient of denuding the armies in Spain. Napoleon’s artillery was also numerous and excellent—but not nearly as mobile. However, his army remained overwhelmingly young—two-thirds of his troops were between 18 and 20 years of age. Ninety thousand of these troops would be on the sick lists before hostilities began. The many foreign troops, especially Germans, in this army exacerbated these factors because they composed a significant number of the Grand Armee’s true veterans. Napoleon compounded his problems by apportioning the majority of these German troops, Saxons, Bavarians, Westphalians, and Wurttemburgers, to his flank forces. These forces predominantly opposed fellow Germans instead of the more ethnically diverse force of the Bohemian army.

29
Napoleon was forced by circumstance to employ the best of his remaining independent commanders elsewhere: Eugene in Italy, Soult and Suchet in Spain, and Davout holding the lower Elbe.

And so the fall phase of the campaign in Germany began. The Allies executed in general the “convention” signed at Trachenberg; they adhered to the spirit if not the letter of the document. The coalition’s leaders centrally planned at Trachenberg to overcome the difficulty of communication over the vast theater that spread around Napoleon’s salient in Saxony. Only decentralized execution by the three independent armies, following the general guidelines provided, overcame this constraint. Indeed, decentralized execution contributed in large measure to their success.

One more command arrangement must be discussed before proceeding to the operations—the Prussian General Staff system. Although the Prussians commanded the numerically smallest of the principal armies, they wielded an operational influence out of all proportion to their legitimate command assignments. Gneisenau took what might be seen as a disadvantage, the breakup and distribution of the four Prussian front line corps among the three armies and turned it to his advantage. He did this by assigning professionally competent Quartermaster General-trained staff officers as chiefs of staff to all of the main corps and even some of the non-Prussian ones (e.g. Clausewitz was the chief of staff to Count Wallmoden commanding the corps of observation opposed principally to Davout).109

General Boyen, a major reformer of 1807 and protégé of Scharnhorst, was assigned to the critical corps of General Bulow serving under Bernadotte. In the same manner General Grolman, also a reformer and former Prussian Minister of War, was assigned to the corps of Kleist serving with the Bohemian army. Gneisenau instructed these men to coordinate, as much as possible, their actions with his in Silesia. If problems arose the chief of staff “had special avenues open to him. He communicated any complaints or doubts directly to the chief of the General Staff himself.”110

The campaign commenced in earnest shortly after Schwarzenberg’s grand review outside Prague. Napoleon’s apparent inaction since the end of the armistice caused the Allies to reconsider their plan. It had not allowed for an inert defense by their opponent, but anticipated a move on his part in order to react with the armies not opposed to him. A “general offensive” movement, contrary to Schwarzenberg and Radetzky’s desires was agreed to by a council of war. Schwarzenberg had set up the logistics for the
Austrian Army to support an eventual advance on Leipzig, and now that an offensive was to be conducted he naturally recommended Leipzig as the objective. Orders were sent and the Army of Bohemia began to advance.

The Tsar, advised by Moreau, now interfered with the arrangements of the nominal commander-in-chief. Alexander and Moreau felt a move closer to Blucher in Silesia warranted, indeed that was where Napoleon had gone in response to an advance by the Prussian firebrand. The Tsar’s view prevailed, despite the opposition of Schwarzenberg, and Dresden was chosen as the new objective. Schwarzenberg had considered moving on Dresden as well but had wanted to take advantage of his logistics preparations and wheel on the city after advancing through the Bohemian mountains. Metternich, responding to Schwarzenberg’s consternation over these events, wrote, “the most sincere understanding between us and our allies is so important that we cannot offer too great a sacrifice” (italics mine).  

Logistic support, set up for an advance on Leipzig, soon broke down in the advance to Dresden. The effects of countermarching and the wet, rainy weather further fatigued and slowed the advance of the Allies. The lead elements of the Army of Bohemia arrived south of Dresden on 25 August; cold, tired, wet, and hungry. Napoleon was not yet there. Instead of attacking while Napoleon was still absent, another war council was held by the “military college” accompanying the army. Schwarzenberg and Jomini supported the Tsar’s desire for an immediate attack, but Moreau and Toll advised against it. The attack was eventually put off until the next day, when discussion as to its merit resumed while the troops formed up for battle.

Marshal Gouvion St. Cyr opposed the Allies at Dresden. He earned his Marshal’s baton in Russia at Polotsk fighting just the type of battle the Allies now contemplated. The Allied skirmishers had already found Dresden’s walled houses and gardens well fortified in response to their threatened assault. It was at this point that St. Cyr’s master dramatically arrived. Once Napoleon’s arrival became known the mood at headquarters rapidly changed and Alexander now favored a withdrawal, in accordance with the advice he had received from Moreau. The Prussian King, unfortunately for the Allies, asserted himself and urged the attack to continue.
While the supreme command bickered, the assault began in response to the orders already issued. The result was a defeat for the coalition. Already half-beaten, the Allies compounded their mistake and fought until forced to withdraw on 27 August. Their losses were, even by Napoleonic standards, stupendous. Some 38,000 Austrians, Prussians, and Russians were casualties, including many prisoners versus some 10,000 casualties for the French.

Dresden was the exception that proved the rule. The Trachenberg plan had never intended an offensive battle against Napoleon and his main army by a single coalition Army--particularly a strong defensive position like Dresden. The Allied leaders, partially as a result of the ponderous command process of the Bohemian Army, diverted in spirit from the agreed plan, and fought Napoleon on his terms. Moreau, whose legs were shot off by a cannonball that just missed the Tsar, wrote his wife an assessment with his dying hand, “That scoundrel Bonaparte is always fortunate . . . . Though the army has made a retrograde movement, it is not at all the consequence of defeat, but from want of ensemble [italics mine], and in order to get nearer General Blucher.” Wilson, who was also there and led several cavalry charges, was less charitable in his assessment; he called the battle “an ill-advised enterprise executed with great vigour.”

For the French Dresden validated the improvements Napoleon made to his army during the armistice. His Young Guard had resolutely defended the city on 26 August and his cavalry and horse artillery had been critical in the counteroffensive that forced the Allied withdrawal the following day. However, Marmont had earlier (16 August) expressed to Napoleon his concern about fighting on such a widely extended front with the prophetic words, “I greatly fear lest on the day on which Your Majesty gains a great victory, and believes you have won a decisive battle, you may learn you have lost two.” These concerns were about to literally come true.

The operational strategy paid handsome dividends on the other fronts while the Bohemian army bickered and stumbled to defeat at Dresden. Marshal Oudinot, the commander of the army opposed to Bernadotte, had been assigned the mission of taking Berlin and began his advance on 18 August. He initially gained some minor victories but was forced to divide his army into three corps-sized columns as he advanced through the heavily wooded, wet terrain south of Berlin. At the same time Davout advanced
in support from the west, including Girard’s Division out of Magdeburg. Bernadotte’s reaction was typical of a sovereign whose chief concern was the preservation of his army (for the conquest of Norway)—he built additional bridges over the Spree to facilitate a withdrawal to the north with the intention of leaving Berlin to Oudinot.\textsuperscript{117}

Bulow, the commander of Bernadotte’s Prussian corps, refused to abandon Berlin, possibly as a result of previous coordination with Gneisenau.\textsuperscript{118} In any case, Oudinot’s separated columns offered Bulow a “favorable situation” in which to attack the French—dispersed with wooded country to their immediate rear. Meanwhile, Oudinot’s right-hand column under General Bertrand successfully repulsed an attack by Tauenzien’s Prussian corps at Junsdorf on 22 August. Bertrand advanced on 23 August and was in turn repulsed at Blakenfeld by Tauenzien’s Landwehr. This repulse effectively prevented Bertrand (who was closest) from responding to Bulow’s offensive against Oudinot’s central column, the Saxon corps under Reynier. In a driving rain Bulow attacked and defeated this column at Grossbeeren on 23 August forcing it to withdraw before Oudinot, personally leading the left-hand column, could come over in support. Oudinot’s entire army was forced to fall back as a result. The domino effect also extended to Davout, now exposed by Oudinot’s retreat, and he withdrew to Hamburg. Girard was unluckiest of all, he was caught completely out of position and savaged by the ubiquitous Czernicheff on August 27 losing almost half his division in the process.\textsuperscript{119}

In Silesia, Blücher’s general adherence to the overall plan also led to victory on a larger scale. As in the north, command and control between the nominal commander and his subordinates caused initial problems. The situation with Blücher’s army was the reverse of that in Bernadotte’s—it was the subordinate, the Russian General Langeron, who was the more cautious. Blücher was under the nominal command and control of Barclay de Tolly, who had been delegated the responsibility of coordinating the operational movements of the Army of Silesia with respect to the Army of Bohemia by Schwarzenberg.

Barclay and Blücher met on 11 August at Reichenbach to ensure the proper coordination and understanding prior to the Russian’s departure for the Bohemian army in Prague. Blücher’s initial instructions per the Trachenberg Convention were translated as:
1. To move towards the enemy. 2. Never to lose sight of them, and to approach them immediately if they attacked the Grand Army (the Bohemian army); but, 3. To avoid all decisive actions. (parenthesis mine)120

Blucher proposed a more aggressive role for his army that involved attacking the French if Napoleon was not present and if the French had not attacked first. This course of action, implied but not explicitly stated, was approved by Barclay. However Barclay neglected to inform Langeron, the commander of one of Blucher's Russian Corps, of this change. As a result, Blucher's advance on 20 August against the French was robbed of its success when Langeron refused to cooperate in an effort to cut off an isolated corps under Ney near the Bober River.

Meanwhile, Napoleon arrived on 21 August with considerable reserves to confront Blucher's advance. Blucher, greatly outnumbered, fell back to a previously prepared defensive position on the Deichsel stream according to plan. Langeron undermined Blucher's plans yet again by falling back as soon as he was attacked on 22 August beyond the prepared position. This precipitate retreat undermined the integrity of Blucher's entire position and he again fell back to a position behind the Katzbach. It was at this time that Blucher noted a lack of aggressiveness in the French approach and pursuit, correctly guessing that Napoleon had departed.121 Almost 5,000 Allied troops were lost as a result of these misdirected actions. However, Blucher denied Napoleon a major battle and French casualties roughly equaled those of the Allies--attrition in this manner favored the Allies.

The broad mechanism of Trachenberg now influenced the operational situation in Silesia. Schwarzenberg's lumbering advance on Dresden pulled Napoleon and his reserves away to assist St. Cyr as already discussed. Napoleon left Marshal Macdonald in command of his own corps and three others (including one cavalry corps under Sebastiani) with strict orders not to advance beyond the Katzbach River. Now it was the French turn for generals to disobey their commander. Macdonald followed Blucher's Russians and Prussians to the Katzbach, a small tributary of the Oder River. Macdonald crossed the Katzbach on 26 August and continued the pursuit.122

Blucher and Gneisenau, now aware that Napoleon was no longer in charge, had independently decided to resume the offensive in accordance with their agreement with Barclay. The result was a meeting engagement along the shallow Katzbach which a driving rain had swollen into a raging torrent.
Blucher waited until about half of Macdonald’s army was across before attacking in force on the plateau above the stream. The portion of Macdonald’s army on the Prussian side of the river was totally defeated and thrown into the river. Many French drowned as they attempted to recross. Macdonald lost over 15,000 men and many cannon. Far worse was the disintegration of his army as Blucher followed up his victory with a relentless pursuit with his numerous (almost 20,000) cavalry.

Gneisenau’s comment on the operations of the Silesian army illuminate the perceptions of those present: “In the course of eight days he (Blucher) had fought him (the French) in eight bloody encounters, not to mention trifling affairs; beat him completely in a pitched battle and directly afterwards made three serious attacks upon him. We may venture to affirm, that in modern military annals, no example of such a succession of bloody and eventful days is to be found as those between the 18th and 29th August 1813.” (parenthesis and italics mine) Gneisenau, no minor figure in history, obviously felt he was seeing and participating in a new type of war.

The results of the Katzbach and Grossbeeren validated the Allies’ operational plan, despite the serious setback at Dresden. Dresden was the exception that proved the rule because it was a deviation from the plan. Local disunity in both of the smaller armies had threatened failure: Bulow’s clash with Bernadotte and Langeron’s insubordination with Blucher. Nevertheless, operational unity via general adherence by the Allies to the overall plan yielded two significant victories that effectively negated the results of Dresden, just as Marmont had predicted.

More victories soon followed. Despite the pounding at Dresden, the army of Bohemia conducted a fighting withdrawal through the forests of the Bohemian mountains. Partly due to tenacity, and partly due to luck, a victory was finally obtained on the southern front, too. This victory, at Kulm, was gained despite the ongoing command feud between Schwarzenberg and the Tsar.

After Dresden, Schwarzenberg complained bitterly to Metternich and wrote that either the Russian and Prussian corps be placed “under my immediate orders, or someone else be entrusted with the command.” While Schwarzenberg entrusted his frustration to paper, he and Radetzky resolved to halt the French pursuit by General Vandamme that was threatening to cut off the entire army. On 29 August, at Preisten, Schwarzenberg turned and fought, sacrificing the Russian Guards in a vicious counterattack that
halted Vandamme for the moment. The next day Vandamme renewed his assault on the Army of Bohemia. Meanwhile, Kleist’s Prussian Corps, which had been effectively cut off by Vandamme’s pursuit, unexpectedly debauched on the French rear at Kulm. Vandamme was captured and more than half his Corps destroyed--crushed between Allied forces advancing both up and down a narrow valley.

Meanwhile, Bernadotte, encouraged by Bulow’s victory, cautiously advanced toward the Elbe on Napoleon’s northern flank. Napoleon would have preferred to face the Crown Prince personally, but had to rescue Macdonald in Silesia. Accordingly, he replaced Oudinot with the more aggressive Marshal Ney. Ney immediately resumed the offensive against Bernadotte’s victorious troops. On 6 September, Ney stumbled into a trap that Bernadotte and Bulow laid for him north of the Elbe at Dennewitz. The fighting followed a characteristic pattern: furious Prussian and Russian attacks with Bernadotte holding his precious Swedes in reserve. Nonetheless, the Allies won the battle, shattering Ney’s army in the process.

To fully understand Napoleon’s operational problem one need only follow his movements in September. In early September he moved from Dresden east to Macdonald’s army to halt, and hopefully defeat, the advancing Blucher. Blucher responded by conducting a fighting withdrawal, correctly guessing that Napoleon was now again with Macdonald’s army. Napoleon then proceeded back to Dresden in response to St. Cyr’s renewed call for help against the Army of Bohemia, again advancing after having recovered and reorganized. The command and control situation in the Bohemian army had further deteriorated to the point where the army had effectively split into two separate maneuver commands; one under Schwarzenberg and one under Alexander and his advisors. However, their response to a renewed offensive from Dresden by Napoleon accorded with the established procedure--they separately withdrew. Napoleon considered attacking Alexander’s column, which was just out of supporting range from the Austrians, but he was again called to other fronts to put out fires that re-ignited in his absence.

It was the news of Dennewitz that pulled him away. Before he could deal with Bernadotte, he learned that Schwarzenberg was advancing again this time to Pirna--and rushed there to contain the threat. He again stabilized the situation only to learn of a renewed advance by Bernadotte to the Elbe. While Napoleon rushed north to deal with this problem he was further diverted to the east to again deal with
Blucher. On 22 September he repulsed Blucher’s forces in the vicinity of Bautzen. Blucher again withdrew in response to Napoleon’s presence.

In this manner the Allies prevented Napoleon from regaining the initiative. Most of Napoleon’s comings and goings included a corresponding movement of portions of his reserves. All this marching and countermarching had the result of another defeat on the strength of the Grande Armée as thousands of Napoleon’s young conscripts dropped out of ranks. Hunger also became a huge problem as the rapidly shifting moves outstripped Napoleon’s careful logistics arrangements.

The Allies were well-informed of Napoleon’s deteriorating situation. Vital intelligence was provided on the Grande Armée’s dispositions, intentions, and morale by the roving Allied cavalry and raiding corps. Wilson referred to this lucrative information source as “an infinity of intercepted official and private letters.”¹²⁵ As in the spring phase, these corps wrought havoc on Napoleon’s communications, causing him to detach major formations to deal with them. Again, a few example will suffice to illustrate that this phase of the campaign included many, if not more, of the type of “deep” operations seen earlier that year.

Blucher “harassed the rear of the French Army” using the Cossacks attached to the Russian corps in his army. One enterprising Cossack leader named Matadoff captured an entire French infantry battalion at Wurschen on 2 September. These Cossacks also provided Blucher a wealth of intelligence including the states and intentions of the Polish Corps of Poniatowski.¹²⁶ Both Stewart and Gneisenau also emphasize the importance of these operations on Bernadotte’s front. These included, Cossacks, raiding freikorps, and partisan activity. One such corps under Thielman captured some 1300 prisoners at Weissenfels, far to the west on the Saale river. The booty also included dispatches relating “the most doleful details of the French Army.”¹²⁷ Napoleon’s communications were so disrupted by this activity that he detached a light cavalry division from the Imperial Guard under General Lefèbvre-Desnouettes to deal with it. On 30 September this corps ran into Schwarzenberg’s raiders led by the Cossack Hetman Platov who were raiding from the south. According to Stewart, the French, contrary to some accounts, had the worst of this encounter...losing more of their precious trained cavalry in the process.¹²⁸
The time was ripe for an audacious move. Schwarzenberg requested Blucher join him for a concerted drive on Leipzig. Blucher countered by recommending a flank march to unite with Bernadotte. With “extraordinary flexibility” Schwarzenberg endorsed Blucher’s course of action. In a rare spirit of cooperation, Blucher and Bernadotte both proceeded to force the line of Elbe on the same day—and to force Napoleon’s hand. Bernadotte established a bridgehead at Rossau on 3 October. Blucher’s advance guard under Yorck defeated a part of Marmont’s corps at Wartenberg further upstream and also crossed.

Napoleon’s response was swift. He marched on Blucher with the mass of his army, 150,000 men, leaving St. Cyr to hold Dresden with 20,000. This move exposed the instability of the relationship between Bernadotte and Blucher and also the general problem of synchronizing the movements of these massive armies. Blucher had counted on Schwarzenberg to resume his offensive to distract Napoleon and counted on Bernadotte for support. The sluggish Army of Bohemia had scarcely moved. Worse yet, when Bernadotte learned of Napoleon’s approach, he pulled back, out of supporting distance of Blucher.

However, timely intelligence of Napoleon’s advance and excellent Prussian staff work by Gneisenau in developing a new line of operations prevented Blucher’s demise. Blucher, taking a page from Napoleon’s play book, abandoned his line of communications with Berlin and barely dodged Napoleon’s counterstroke at Duben on 9 October by moving to the west. Here was the ultimate in battle being subordinated to maneuver:

The offensive movements of the Allied powers...by their execution exposed their richest provinces to the inroads of the enemy and by attempting to throw themselves between Napoleon and France left close in their rear an army of 200,000 men, headed by an enterprising military genius and a number of strongholds well garrisoned while they themselves had no fortified place to serve them as a rallying point or as a position to rest upon.  

The stage was now set for the climatic battle of Leipzig. While Napoleon attempted to trap Blucher, Schwarzenberg executed the plan he had been thwarted from in August by the Tsar—he advanced on Leipzig. The arrival of Bennigsen’s Army of Poland emboldened the high command in Bohemia. As the main army advanced, they received the further good news on 8 October that the King of Bavaria had switched sides. Napoleon now had two armies across his communications: Blucher’s and another combined Austro-Bavarian army under the Bavarian General Wrede. Napoleon lost the equivalent of
50,000 men with the defection of Bavaria and now realized that the 20,000 with St. Cyr in Dresden were probably lost as well. Nevertheless he concentrated his forces at Leipzig for the final battle—perhaps he could smash the Austrians before Blucher and Bernadotte arrived.

The battle of Leipzig was, in many ways, a microcosm of the entire fall campaign. All the elements were there on a tactical level. Blucher's aggressive offensive into the northern suburbs on 16 October; Bernadotte's belated advance that avoided combat the first two days of the battle; Schwarzenberg and the Tsar clashed over when and where to fight, finally fighting almost two distinct battles on either side of the Pleisse river, neither achieving success. The similarities were not accidental. The Allies just kept doing what they had done all along.

While Schwarzenberg's mass engaged the bulk of Napoleon's force in the south and east, Blucher's efforts in the north, along with a direct threat to Napoleon's line of retreat by the Austrian corps of Guylai, sealed the tactical victory by denying Napoleon the resources he needed to exploit his local successes. The Army of Bohemia was pushed back, but it was not defeated. A relative lull in the battle occurred on the 17th—allogous to the period of relative inactivity in September after Dennewitz. The Allies were content to bring up their reserves—the fresh armies of Bennigsen and Bernadotte. With the arrival of these forces Napoleon realized he was now just buying time to secure his retreat.

Fortune now deserted Napoleon. After a hard day's fighting on 18 October that saw the French line constrict but not break, Napoleon began a well-ordered retreat from Leipzig. At midday on 19 October the only bridge over the Elster River leading out of Leipzig to the west was prematurely blown-up, cutting off three entire corps of Napoleon's army. This disaster converted the tactical victory of the coalition into an operational victory. Napoleon's retreat would not end in Germany, but in France. Napoleon completed the campaign when he defeated the Austro-Bavarian blocking army at Hanau on 30 October gaining a clear path for his final withdrawal across the Rhine into France—thus proving that the last battle is not necessarily the most important.

There was clearly evidence of operational art present during the fall operations of the armies of the Sixth Coalition in 1813. The single most compelling piece of evidence was the development, promulgation, and execution of the Trachenberg Convention (Appendix II). This plan might be among the first of the
modern operations orders that are the so familiar to the military staffs of today. Perhaps the most arresting aspect of the plan was its brevity. Its evolution was modern in every sense of the word, combining military staff work (mostly Austrian if we believe Gordon Craig) with a supremely political approval process. The other astonishing aspect of the plan was its execution, which was adhered to implicitly throughout the campaign terminating in precisely the endstate aimed for—a union of all the major Allied armies, after a campaign of maneuver and exhaustion, in “the enemy camp” around Leipzig.

Specifically the Trachenberg plan provides evidence of planning for a distributed operation where battle was literally subordinate to maneuver the majority of the time. This alone provides evidence, even if the Allies had not executed as they had planned. However, the Allies did execute as they planned (except at Dresden), completely in the spirit of the intent of the plan. The maneuvers of the armies along Napoleon’s flanks and rear had the effect of engaging him throughout the depth of the battlefield. The forces of raiding Cossacks and freikorps, too, as in the spring, had their effects throughout the depth of the battlefield that synergized with the maneuvers of the larger forces. Again and again the Allies refused battle: in Bohemia, in Silesia, and most outstandingly at Duben. Battles occurred, but their results were not expected to be decisive in the short term, Gneisenau compared it to “...baiting the ravenous tiger in his den.”

The Trachenberg plan also provides evidence of operational art using Schneider’s criteria was its solution of the problem of command and control. Instantaneous command and control is possible on a broad front when intent is well understood. That intent, not to fight Napoleon commanding the main forces but to operate against his flanks and rear when he was not present, was well understood according to the historic record we have examined. It offered the ultimate in centralized planning and decentralized execution. It had the effect of minimizing the negative aspects resulting from friction and fog in war; enabling success, and minimizing setbacks as long as the coalition’s commanders remained true to it.

On a practical level the Prussians further enhanced command and control and unity by Gneisenau’s system of having the chiefs of staff of the Prussian corps in the armies of Schwarzenberg and Bernadotte answer to him for the professional conduct of their operations. In this manner the Prussians, by a redundant mechanism to the Trachenberg plan, reinforced and enhanced its operational execution.
This plan also provided the essential military unity of effort that can be translated as evidence of corporate operational vision. The Allied accounts of this operation constantly refer to this or that action being taken in accordance with the agreed plan of operations. Gneisenau, writing about the time frame of mid-September, summarizes the shared operational vision: "...the great plan of the Allies was only ripening and the main object, of acting on the flanks of Napoleon's Army, was never lost sight of" (emphasis mine)\(^\text{134}\). Gneisenau's system within his own army empowered each corps with this vision by means of a chief-of-staff selected from the talented pool of officers mentored by Scharnhorst. It was no accident that Boyen was behind Bulow at Grossbeeren and Dennewitz or that Grolman performed the same function for Kleist at Kulm.

The wide expanse and number of these operations, along with the deployment of the major armies as specified in the plan also provides proof of distributed deployment. Instead of concentrating the major forces into one huge juggernaut, the Allies broke their forces up into three independent field armies. However, this deployment did cause problems, especially with the main army operating out of Bohemia. Nowhere during the fall phase of the campaign did logistics play as important a role as in Schwarzenberg's area of operations. His careful logistics planning for an advance through the Bohemian mountains toward Leipzig was frustrated by the Tsar and resulted in inadequate support during the advance to Dresden. On the northern front the supply situation was more in line with operational art because of the flow of British supplies from the Baltic ports across much less difficult terrain (see Appendix 1).

The case of the Army of Bohemia and the Allied command and control structure (see Figure 2) also provides more evidence in the form of operational durability. Despite a defeat of incredible magnitude at Dresden, this army survived only to turn the tables on Napoleon a few days later at Kulm. Napoleon's armies themselves also provide evidence of operational durability, suffering major defeats at the Katzbach, Grossbeeren, Dennewitz, and even Leipzig, yet fighting on. Blucher's army might be the best example of all, constantly retreating and advancing, continually fighting, right up to Leipzig where Yorck's corps was fed into a meat grinder that nevertheless upset Napoleon's success against Schwarzenberg.

When we compare the Allied command and control structure in 1813 with Grant's situation discussed earlier, we find more than a rough similarity between the two. Schwarzenberg, like Grant,
commanded at three levels, although his situation was far more complicated because of the coalition nature of his two higher levels of command (the Supreme Command and the Army of Bohemia) and the presence of the three heads of state with his army. The other big difference was the absence of telegraph; but, considering the presence of the Monarchs, none was needed. Schwarzenberg may well have envied Grant's separation from Lincoln by the telegraph!

Finally there was the distributed enemy, Napoleon and his lieutenants. Napoleon's defense was obviously meant to take advantage of interior lines using a mobile reserve and giving ground (except the Saxon capital of Dresden) as necessary. That he was defeated doesn't mean that he was not distributed. He opposed Bernadotte with armies under Davout and Oudinot, Blucher with Macdonald, and left the capable St. Cyr in Dresden to watch Bohemia. He also responded to threats to his rear with significant forces while he continued, as did the Allies, to bring up new forces that had mobilized in his rear (Augereau's corps in particular). Perhaps Napoleon's greatest operational failing was to leave so many of his veteran troops tied up holding fortresses (particularly Hamburg and Dresden) in the best Eighteenth century fashion as if he was fighting a limited war where cities could be traded at the peace table.

In summary, the planning and execution of the fall phase of the campaign of 1813 provides evidence that attributes of operational art were not only present, but that they were becoming more sophisticated in their manifestation. The Trachenberg plan is merely an antecedent of the more complex operations plans of the future. It took what had been a monolithic Allied main effort and divided it into three multi-national armies distributed throughout the breadth of the theater--almost three separate fronts. It unified and simplified command and harmony by essentially depersonalizing the operational strategy into a document approved at a political level by a committee of political generals. Above all it subordinated battle to a strategy of exhaustion using superior strength and maneuver. Perhaps the best evidence of the Allies' operational maturity was that their plan did achieve its objective...the defeat of the "enterprising genius" of Napoleon Bonaparte--the whole was greater than the sum of its parts.
IV. CONCLUSIONS

The purpose of this monograph has been to search for, identify, and discuss the emergence of elements of operational art during the Napoleonic Wars, specifically the 1813 campaign by the Sixth Coalition against Napoleon in Germany. The elements used were those defined by Schneider: a distributed operation, distributed campaign, continuous logistics, instantaneous command and control, operationally durable formations, operational vision, distributed enemy, and distributed deployment. All of these elements were present, in varying degrees of maturity and sophistication in the campaign of 1813.

A short summary of both phases of this campaign, the third such campaign since the emergence of modern war as defined by Epstein, is in order before proceeding to each individual element's consideration in light of the totality of the campaign. The first phase, from January to June of 1813 was essentially a pursuit until Napoleon regained the operational initiative at the battle of Lutzen. From there the campaign assumed the form of a delaying action along a single line of operations terminating in an uncharacteristic, for Napoleon, armistice. Successful deep operations in the form of raids in Napoleon’s rear and along his flanks enabled the engagement of the French by the Allies throughout the depth of the battlefield. The success of these operations established deep operations as an integral part of Allied operations for remainder of campaign. These operations also helped attenuate Napoleon’s limited battlefield successes by diverting significant numbers of Napoleon’s precious cavalry assets to deal with them. The first phase ended with both sides exhausted.

The second phase of this campaign began after a two month operational pause and was a campaign of maneuver and attrition also aided by deep operations. Napoleon attempted to employ a defense along interior lines that was co-opted by his own offensive operations (against Berlin and by Macdonald along the Katzbach) and by the Allies' operational strategy, worked out during the Armistice at Trachenberg, of avoiding battle with forces led by Napoleon himself. The Allies, for their part, maneuvered constantly against those fronts not commanded by Napoleon, defeating his lieutenants but never the Emperor himself until they had concentrated overwhelming combat power on the ground of their choosing at Leipzig. Napoleon withdrew after horrendous losses surrendering Germany and effectively
ending the campaign—although his victory at Hanau provided further evidence of the wisdom of the Allied operational strategy.

The first element to be discussed in light of both phases of the campaign is that of the distributed operation. Recalling that Schneider’s criteria for this element is characterized by operations throughout the depth of the battlefield we found that the raiding operations of the Cossacks, freikorps, and other independent Allied units provided evidence of distributed operations during both phases of the campaign. The level of sophistication of these operations increased as the campaign continued; in today’s parlance we might say that they became standard operating procedure. The product was again a substantial diversion of combat power from Napoleon’s Grande Armee, particularly cavalry from the central reserves. These forces also provided the Allies an overwhelming advantage in the area of operational and tactical intelligence...one reason they managed to always seem to stay one step ahead of the hard marching French and their dynamic Emperor.

Main field armies eventually conducted deep maneuver operations during phase two of the campaign. The Army of Silesia’s flank march along the Elbe and then advance across that river into the French rear was the most outstanding example of this sort of operation. Once Napoleon’s attention was on Blucher and Bernadotte to the north, the Army of Bohemia was able to conduct a similar, but more modest, maneuver to the south that set the conditions for the battle of Leipzig.

When we examine the next element, that of the distributed campaign, we discover an area of improvement between the two phases of the campaign. As already mentioned, the spring phase of the campaign was more than a search for decisive battle along one line of operation. Napoleon fought distributed, but in a more limited manner than we see in the second phase of the campaign. In the spring phase he only concentrated his forces, the new Grande Armee and Eugene’s Army of the Elbe, for the battle that eventually occurred at Lutzen when he saw an opportunity to perhaps repeat his masterpiece maneuver that had resulted in the twin victories of Jena-Auerstadt. The Allies, in their turn, precipitated a battle which they predicted would have decisive and positive results for them based on their (under)estimation of the combat power of the French troops.
After Lutzen Napoleon still fought in a distributed manner, but more limited than he was to do later that year. He operated with two wings for his main army, one under himself and the other under Ney, but he also had the forces of Davout fighting to regain the lower Elbe and the city of Hamburg. Napoleon’s and Ney’s wings never really moved beyond supporting distance of each other and the result was the distributed maneuver at Bautzen that nearly won the campaign for Napoleon. We must also mention that after Bautzen, the decisive battle that failed to decide, Napoleon again divided his forces when he sent Oudinot’s corps north to contest Berlin with the forces of Bulow. Schneider’s criteria that the distributed campaign is “inherently exhaustive” was met during this phase as proved by its mutual termination by both exhausted parties via the Armistice of Pleischwitz.135

However, the other aspect of this element, the subordination of battle to maneuver, was not met by the main operations of the spring campaign. During the second phase this aspect was not only present, it was the hallmark of the operational strategy agreed to in the Trachenberg Convention. Radetzky’s strategy of attrition was adopted with the subsequent proviso of avoiding battle with Napoleon personally. All three main Allied field armies are documented refusing battle on numerous occasions and even Napoleon, in September against the Army of Bohemia, refused battle--another indicator of the success of the attrition operations he was forced into.

The first phase of the campaign represented a rudimentary form of distributed deployment. The Allied armies, particularly the Prussians and pro-Allied Germans, mobilized and deployed geographically where they were located, more by accident than design. In many ways it was a popular rising supported by British goods via the medium of the sea much in the same way as the rising years earlier in Spain. The effect was initially that of a distributed deployment. The actual employment of field armies for combat in the spring of 1813 was not distributed with the exception of the raiding operations.

Phase two of the operations however shows evolutionary improvement, war being the great organizer and catalyst that allowed unconventional ideas to be employed as a matter of course. The Allies again mobilized, trained, and deployed at multiple sites throughout the theater. As much as possible arms and supplies were brought to the forces as they were mobilized, reconstituted and/or re-equipped. The Russians mobilized an entirely new army, the army of Poland under Bennigsen, with a view to the
sustainment of combat operations for successive operations—they foresaw the toll of attrition and accounted for it. The mobilization of this entirely new army paid large dividends at Leipzig.

More importantly, and differing from the first phase, the Allies divided their huge army into three maneuver forces that took advantage of this distributed mobilization across a wide geographic area. They could only do this against a Napoleon if they intended to maneuver and give ground as necessary...otherwise they risked defeat in detail. To their credit they continued the deep operations that had paid such handsome dividends in the spring. These deliberate operations, too, provide evidence of distributed deployment. Each army allocated forces for these operations, mostly Cossacks for the Army of Bohemia, but significant numbers of non-Cossack raiding units worked in coordination with the Armies of the North and Silesia.

The Trachenberg plan also clearly delineates a sophisticated improvement between the two phases of the campaign with regard to operational vision and instantaneous command and control. The vision seen in the spring campaign was more of a strategic vision vice an operational one. The Russians and Prussians shared a common vision regarding the liberation of Germany. Additionally, the Prussians had instituted within their army an organizational vision that did not really blossom until the fall phase of the campaign which saw Prussian corps executing the vision of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau—the general staff team approach to the problem of a Napoleon.

During the Armistice another vision emerged, probably one that originated with the Austrians, but one also composed of the “terrible lessons,” as Tsar Alexander termed them, of years of combat with the “most competent human being” in military history up to that point. This vision was articulated in written form as the Trachenberg plan and executed as operational art that fall. It was operational vision, perhaps the first of its kind in modern history, although Napoleon himself may provide a case for the first of the operational visionaries. In any case, the Trachenberg plan was certainly the first operational vision arrived at by committee in a modern coalition environment vice the mind of one genius.

Command and control, although not perfected by any means, was greatly enhanced by the operational vision agreed to at Trachenberg. The plan provided a command and control structure that we have seen was merely adequate to the tasks, yet we forget that many of the tasks were new and
unprecedented in their scope. The necessity for the creation of higher levels of command, such as the modern army group, are foreshadowed in this campaign—on both sides. Operationally, the Army of Bohemia was an army group without the staff resources and the requisite authority for the nominal commander (Schwarzenberg). Despite these problems, the intent of the Trachenberg plan was generally well understood and interpreted correctly in the light of the local situation by the command structures of all the field armies. This commonality of understanding led to clear-cut tactical victories in three out of the first four battles (Dresden being the exception). One reason the Trachenberg plan worked was because it was centrally planned with decentralized execution in mind in order to overcome the sheer span of the theater.

The creation of new forces and reconstitution of those already in the field would not have been possible without the efforts of Great Britain. Using the unimpeded medium of the sea, which Great Britain controlled absolutely, the English were able to provide continuous logistics support for the huge Allied armies in this campaign. Once operations moved substantially away from the sea and river lines the old bugbear of logistics support prior to the railroad appeared. Despite immense planning the Army of Bohemia still arrived before Dresden hungry. The logistical requirements for operational art, then, would appear to have been more prevalent in a theater with significant river and or littoral communication. This is perhaps one useful lesson to be learned, that a maritime or river interface may in fact alleviate the logistic requirements for operational art and thus favor its practice. The example of Grant and the Vicksburg campaign, conducted in an almost rail-less environment, comes most readily to mind.

Throughout the campaign we see evidence of operationally durable formations. In the spring the examples include not only the much battered main army under Wittgenstein and then Barclay de Tolly, but the French remnant under Eugene which held up the advance until Napoleon could arrive with the reconstituted Grande Armee. Spring operations terminated in mutual exhaustion vice the break-up or destruction of any of the field armies. In the fall phase the outstanding example of durability was the Army of Bohemia, which survived a defeat at Dresden as physically severe and potentially crippling as an Austerlitz or, more analogous, a Wagram. Napoleon's armies, too, showed a certain degree of durability after the disasters on the Katzbach and Dennewitz. We must, however, recognize that these armies,
Macdonald’s and Ney’s, may have in fact been completely destroyed had it not been for the power of Napoleon’s leadership in restoring to them their cohesion after those signal defeats. After Leipzig, we again see the French durability in the form of an army defeated but not a rabble; able to almost casually brush aside a fresh Allied army (albeit badly led) at Hanau.\textsuperscript{137}

Which brings us to the \textit{distributed enemy} criteria--represented in this campaign by Napoleon and the \textit{Grande Armee}. As mentioned above, Napoleon’s personality played a key role in maintaining the durability of the French formations until Leipzig, where despite everything the French forces, defeated time and time again, were able to withdraw in relatively good order until the premature demolition of the Elster bridge. Thus was Napoleon, somewhat artificially, able to distribute his forces across the theater during the fall campaign. In the spring he was admittedly less of a distributed enemy, responding in kind to the Allies’ concentration by remaining concentrated.

As already mentioned, Napoleon employed distributed maneuver on more than one occasion in both the spring and fall, the supreme example in the spring being Ney’s army at Bautzen.\textsuperscript{138} In the fall at Dresden Napoleon used Vandamme in a similar manner. That General nearly succeeded in cutting off the entire Prussian corps of Kleist (and was instead cut off in turn by that corps). I will emphasize again, Napoleon’s defeat does not prove he did not fight distributed or employ operational art, instead it may prove that the Allies had a better operational plan and may have in fact superseded the master in administering the “terrible lessons” of operational art.

This leads us naturally to the relevance of this monograph to modern military thought and practice. The 1813 campaign is an important link in the evolution of war in general and operational art in particular. It was the largest most complex of Napoleonic campaigns in central Europe. It would be trite to say that numbers win--the Allies had the preponderance of force in both 1798 and 1805, in both cases they lost. The Allied side of the problem is worthy of study because its sheer size and the all important question it resolved--the hegemony of Germany and ultimately Europe by France or by a “concert of Europe,” a new balance of power as established by the Congress of Vienna.

Campaigns such as this one, late in a conflict when the sophistication and experience of the opponents is highly developed, offer views, as it were, into the future. It is at this point that the
protagonists are no longer relearning the “terrible lessons” of the last war but breaking new and unexplored ground. The Allied operations of this campaign have been somewhat neglected in their historical treatment—other than inflated patriotic accounts (including to a lesser degree Gneisenau’s and Mueffling’s) by the victors that tend to overemphasize the righteousness of the Allied cause in inverse proportion to the actual operational aspects. There was more to the Allied victory than the simple mathematics of the weight of numbers—which they did not have in any case during the spring phase of operations.

This campaign also deserves more study because its nature is more in line with American military thought and practice—it was supremely a coalition contest. As former Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Rissassi stated, the *modus operandi* of today’s joint force beyond our shores is normally within the context of some sort of coalition. Additionally, the primacy of politics, maneuver, and deep operations in this campaign emphasize areas of similar importance in current U.S. Army doctrine. Although the Allied solutions and reactions to their problems cannot be applied to today’s challenges, the process of operational art, and the dynamics of human behavior on the grand scale of military history *can be* understood so as to better understand those same modern challenges and a process which could lead to their resolution.

In summary, substantial historical evidence exists to support the existence and practice of operational art by the Allies of the Sixth Coalition during the 1813 campaign. The thesis that war is cumulatively an organizer and innovator in and of itself is supported by the course of the campaign of 1813. Technological limitations aside, the Allies managed to perform at an operational level that was not seen again in Europe until the wars of German reunification some fifty years later. That this level of sophistication occurred should not surprise us. After twenty years of continuous war, fifteen of them against an “enterprising military genius,” Napoleon’s opponents, and indeed Napoleon himself, were able to reach levels of sophistication and practice of the art of war, specifically operational art, that were not to be matched until the 1860’s.
ENDNOTES

Section I


3 Ibid.


5 _______. Napoleon’s Last Victory: 1809 and the Emergence of Modern War (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1994), 11.

6 Ibid.

7 This convention for the war begun in 1813 is Weigley’s. Russell F. Weigley, The Age of Battles (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1991), 454. Chandler, in the index to his Campaigns of Napoleon(New York: Macmillan Co., 1966) references both the 1812 and 1813 campaigns as part of the Sixth Coalition. The Sixth Coalition’s campaign in 1813 is also known as the War of German Liberation. Reference to the Sixth Coalition is reference to the coalition that fought the War of German Liberation--Great Britain, Austria, Prussia, Russia, and a host of lesser powers such as Sweden.

8 The Battle of Vitoria was fought in Northern Spain in the summer of 1813 between Joseph Bonaparte (Napoleon’s brother) and Wellington and was a disastrous defeat for the French, essentially expelling them form Spain.

9 John T. Kuehn, The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition Against Napoleon in 1813 (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997), 34, chapter 3 passim.


11 See Appendix II. The Trachenberg Convention was an agreement signed by the representatives of Sweden, Russia, Austria, and Prussia in the summer of 1813 that detailed the operational plan for the defeat of Napoleon in Germany.

12 Schneider, 39.

13 Ibid., 40-41.

14 Ibid., 45-46.
17 Weigley, xii. Weigley’s thesis is that battles, in the context of winning a war in an afternoon, are indecisive. The durability of armies, particularly the nation-state army of mass conscription, is one element that contributed to this indecisiveness. Christopher Duffy’s excellent *Russia’s Military Way to the West* (London: Rutledge & Kegan Paul, 1981), provides an excellent account of the Battle of Zorndorf and the development of the Russian Army, perhaps the most durable of European Armies across the span of time.

18 Epstein, *Napoleon’s Last Victory*, 173.


20 Schneider, 58-60.

21 Ibid., all contextual condition definitions are from Schneider.

22 Nosworthy, Brent, *With Cannon, Musket and Sword* (New York: Sarpedon, 1996), 256. Rothenberg, Gunther, *The Art of Warfare in the Age of Napoleon* (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1978), ... The British rifle regiment and one battalion of the 60th Foot carried the famous Baker rifle. Some Russian and Prussian units used the Tula rifle as well as the shuetzengewehr of 1787 and handcrafted rifles for game purposes. The efficacy of these weapons was limted by their much slower rate of fire than the standard musket.


24 Herson, James, *A Second Center of Peninsular Gravity: Wellington’s Logistical rescue of Cadiz in 1810*, A Monograph for the School of Advanced Military Studies (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997), 36. Herson’s monograph discusses how British Sea Power enabled Wellington to have a “second center of gravity” in Cadiz...maintained by the continuous flow of British arms and food from the Americas via Britain’s secure sea lines of communication.

25 Charles William Vane Stewart, Marquess of Londonderry, *Narrative of the War in Germany and France in 1813 and 1814* (London: Henry Colburn & Richard Bentley, 1830), 2. Stewart was sent to the northern front principally to monitor the Bernadotte’s use of these resources. General Robert Wilson, who had endured the 1812 campaign in Russia, was used on the southern front and was attached to Prince Schwarzenberg’s headquarters. The memoirs of these two officers provide some of the best primary source information on the 1813 campaign. Both officers, as consistent with their instructions, provide a wealth of logistical data. See Appendix I.


28 Schneider, 66. Schneider’s definition of a nation’s distributed capacity to wage war “included not only the nation’s armed forces, it also included its production capacity, its working population, its leadership, its resource base and its distribution infrastructure.” Germany, with possibly the most advanced infrastructure of any area of the civilized world, was married to the burgeoning industrial might of Britain via what remains the most effective medium for commodity movement—the sea.

29 Epstein, “Patterns of Change...,” 376. Also Martin Van Crevel, Command in War (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University, 1985), 64 for Napoleon’s computer-like brain. Finally, the comparison in command and control time-delay for the relay of orders to corps and their execution comes from a lecture by Dr. Epstein at the Smithsonian in November 1997 and can be easily confirmed using John Elting’s excellent chapter on the Grand Quartier-General from Swords Around a Throne (New York: Macmillan, 1988.)

30 Schneider, 65.

31 Robert M. Epstein, Napoleon’s Last Victory: 1809 and the Emergence of Modern War (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 1992), 7-8. See also Van Crevel Command in War, and Chandler’s Campaigns of Napoleon.

32 Schneider, 24.

33 For examples I cite: St. Cyr in Russia and Germany, Davout, Eugene in Italy, and Soult versus Wellington in 1813-14.


Section II


36 Kuehn, The Reasons for the Success of the Sixth Coalition, chapter 3 passim. This chapter outlines in detail the decline of the French and the improvement of their opponents. Scott Bowden’s book on the Grande Armee of 1813 extensively chronicles the weaknesses inherent in Napoleon’s recreated Grande Armee after the first was destroyed in Russia.

37 Ibid., chapter 4 passim.

38 Chandler, 879.

39 FM 100-5, 7-13. Freikorps had been in use in the Prussian Army since the time of Frederick the Great and were usually combined arms irregular forces, often led by line officers—example, Lutzw, a major in the Prussian Army whose unit included cavalry, infantry, and elite skirmishers. In the War of Liberation these units included a number of noted artists, poets, and musicians—and fought extremely well.

41 Mueffling, 31.


43 Mueffling, 31. Clausewitz’ account (213-214) also supports Mueffling’s broad judgement of Kutusov’s intentions had Russia remained alone against Napoleon.

44 Gneisenau, 73. Without Prussian assistance they “...must have ended on the Vistula.”

45 Reinh, 395-396.

46 Clausewitz, *Campaign...*, 251.

47 Kuehn, 60.

48 Ibid., 63-64.

49 Walter Goerlitz, *History of the German General Staff, 1657-1945*, trans. Brian Battershaw (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1953), 30. General Gerhard Johann Scharnhorst was not Prussian but Hanoverian. To the eternal credit of the Prussians he was accepted into their army as a Lieutenant Colonel and headed one of the three divisions of the Quartermaster General Staff prior to 1806. Both Clausewitz and Mueffling trained under Scharnhorst’s patronage. Scharnhorst emerged from the Fourth Coalition as one of the few success stories, having been the driving force in the Prussian rescue of the Russians at the bloody battle of Eylau. By 1813 his prestige was immense and he was Chief of Staff of the Prussian Army and the operational brain behind all of the initial plans for the Sixth Coalition’s spring campaign.

50 Gneisenau, 56. Hofschröer, 4-5. Hofschröer’s excellent discussion provides detailed numbers and the evolutionary path, as it were, of the average Prussian reservist from recruit to eventual full-fledged line or even guard membership.

51 Ibid., 58. Gneisenau was intimately familiar with the Prussian armament program—for a time after 1807 he was the minister of armaments within the reorganized General Staff. See also Goerlitz.

52 Hofschröer, 18-19.

53 Ibid., 58-61.

54 These figures come from both Gneisenau and Mueffling.

55 Chandler, 874.

56 John Kuehn, *Coalition Tactics on the Napoleonic Battlefield and Their Influence on Unity of Effort*, a Monograph for Term I of 97-98 Advanced Military Studies Course (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Command and General Staff College, 1997), 32.
57 Gneisenau, 79. Mueffling, 44. Stewart, 54.

58 Stewart, 20. One Saxon commander, Gen. Thielmann refused to allow either Allies or French to pass the Elbe at Torgau on the orders of his King. Thielmann later deserted to the Prussians when ordered, after Lutzen, to turn over Torgau to the French.

59 Mueffling, 32. When Mueffling says ‘we’ he is referring to Scharnhorst, Gneisenau and himself. He also discusses the fact that the Prussians underestimated Napoleon’s strength by some 40-50,000 men and that when they ascertained the real strength they decided to advance anyway and catch the French before they could concentrate trusting to their “older more disciplined soldiers.”

60 Chandler, op cit., 878.

61 Gneisenau, 106.

62 Bowden, 106.

63 Stewart, 54.

64 Kuehn, Coalition Tactics..., 36-38.

65 Bowden, op cit, for Napoleon’s quote, 111-112. Additionally Bowden provides substantial evidence in his excellent book of the deteriorating state of the Grande Armee.

66 Stewart, 30.

67 Ibid., 10.


70 Stewart, 5.

71 Nafziger, “Cossack Operations...,” 381-382. Nafziger estimates that this cavalry constituted some thirty-five percent of the total available French cavalry for the theater. The reason so much cavalry was required was because the nature of the threat by the Allies was mostly mounted.

72 Ibid., 376. The Russo-German legion was formed in 1812 composed of Prussian deserters and prisoners of war and eventually grew to the size of a small all arms division. It was incorporated into the Prussian Army after the peace of 1814 and fought again as a Prussian regiment in the Waterloo campaign.

73 Stewart, 65-66.

74 Nafziger, 381.

75 Chandler, op cit., 887.
Section III

Mueffling, 358-359. See also Chandler, 918. Mueffling provides an excellent precis of Napoleon's dilemma and the Allied side of events. Chandler provides a more French-biased view. Both accounts, however, do a good job of illuminating Napoleon's dilemma.

Gneisenau, 142-145.

Ibid., 142-145. By "accoutrements" we refer to Appendix I and Stewart's listing of all the items supplied by Great Britain for this campaign.


Stewart, 53.

Kissinger, 73.

The Battle of Vitoria was fought in northern Spain on 21 June 1813 between Wellington's allied army of British, Spanish, and Portuguese against the army of Joseph Bonaparte, Napoleon's puppet King of Spain. Although French manpower losses were not significant, the material and moral effect of Wellington's victory had the strategic effect of expelling the French once and for all from Spain.

Mueffling, 55.

Scott, 84.

Mueffling, 55-56.

Scott, 73.

Ibid., 87.

Mueffling, 56.

Britt, Albert S., The Wars of Napoleon (West Point, NY: United States Military Academy, 1973), 134. See also Appendix I for a primary source comparison of the sizes of the various Allied armies. Bernadotte's Army of the North included various independent commands, such as Walmoden's corps that was observing Davout and Tavenzien's Prussian Landwehr corps and when these are subtracted his strength was approximately that of Blucher. However, Tavenzien's corps essentially operated as part of Bernadotte's army and is often omitted form the order of battle of Bernadotte's army because it was not present at Leipzig.

93 Palmer, 271.

94 Britt, 198.

95 Craig, 5.

96 Britt, 198.

97 Wilson, 85.

98 Stewart, 372-372.

99 Chandler, 901.

100 Stewart, 373.


102 Wilson, 85.

103 Stewart, 106. Wilson, 84.

104 Mueffling, 56.


106 Roger Parkinson, *Clausewitz, a Biography* (New York: Stein & Day, 1970), 231. It was Clausewitz who orchestrated the defeat of an isolated French division from Davout's corps that was conducting anti-partisan operations on 16 September along the Goehrde river west of the Elbe.

107 Walter, 41-42.

108 Britt, 206.

109 Wilson, 104.

110 Britt, 207. Wilson, 91.


112 Wilson, 100.

113 Chandler, 903.

114 Poultney Bigelow, *History of the German Struggle for Liberty, Vol. II* (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1896) 187. Kuehn, 80. Bernadotte expected to be compensated with Norway for his participation in the Coalition, it is debatable as to whether he ever seriously intended to employ his troops against anything but Danish troops, Norway belonged to Denmark at that time. Bernadotte did use his Swedish troops aggressively against the Danes later in 1813-14 after Leipzig.
Gneisenau, 192. Gneisenau implies that Bulow’s instructions were very similar to Blucher’s...not to become decisively engaged with Napoleon. Additionally, Bulow’s actions are justified by the Trachenberg Convention itself—Oudinot had presented Bulow with a “favorable situation.”

116 Ibid., 192-197.

117 Mueffling, 292. See also Gneisenau, 154 for his interpretation which is identical.

118 Ibid., 311.

119 Macdonald, 55-56. Macdonald’s self-serving account contradicts all the other accounts of this battle regarding Napoleon’s instructions. He claims Napoleon instructed him to make a “diversion,” but from his account of his battle plan on page 56 he makes it clear that the attack he planned on 26 August was far more than a diversion, more like a mini-version of Bautzen with him as Napoleon and Souham’s corps as the manœuvre sur les derrières force. Macdonald also mentions the “ceaseless rain.”

120 Gneisenau, 171.

121 Britt, 208.

122 Wilson, 125.

123 Gneisenau, 177-178.


125 Chandler, 915. Stewart, 141-142. Bowden, 166. Bowden and Chandler simply state that Lefebvre-Desnouettes restored Napoleon’s communications. Closer examination reveals that the French cavalryman was in fact “put to the rout” losing some 1500 prisoners and five guns.

126 Britt, 212.

127 Gneisenau, 217-218. Gneisenau’s grudging admiration of Napoleon is quite evident in this passage and a departure from his usual rabid anti-French rhetoric, e.g. he uses “Napoleon” vice Bonaparte and terms him a “military genius.”

128 Craig, 5-6. Craig’s argument for Radetzky’s authorship of the plan is very convincing.

129 Stewart, 373. The Trachenberg Convention. See Appendix II for the English translation.

130 Gneisenau, 182.

131 Ibid., 179.

Section IV

132 Schneider, 40-41.

Bowden, *op cit.*, 197. Count Wrede, a Bavarian General who had served under Napoleon until Bavaria joined the Allies, commanded these forces. Napoleon’s comment was: “I could make him a Count, but I could never make him a general.”

Epstein, *Napoleon’s Last Victory…*, 8. Epstein discusses “distributed maneuver” in his work on the emergence of modern war as an element of the operational level of war. Specifically, he examines Napoleon’s use of such maneuver during the 1809 Wagram campaign.

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Memoirs


APPENDIX 1

Arms, Ammunition, and Military Stores, supplied by Great Britain for the Russian, Prussian, and Swedish governments, 1813.

1. Pieces of ordnance complete, with carriages and necessary stores for the field; [including] rounds of ammunition ...powder, wagons, etc. 218

2. Stand of arms. 124,119

3. Ball cartrdges (ammunition for #2). 18,231,000

4. Barrels of (gun) powder. 23,000

5. Swords, sabers, and spears. 34,443

6. Drums, trumpets, bugles, and cavalry standards. 624

7. Suits of clothing complete, with greatcoats, cloaks, pelisses and overalls. 150,000

8. Yards of cloth of various colours. 187,000

9. Boots and shoes, with a proportionate quantity of leather. 175,706

10. Blankets. 114,000

11. Linen shirts and drawers. 58,800

12. Pairs of gaiters. 87,190

13. Pairs of stockings. 69,624

14. Sets of accoutrements (?). 90,000

15. Knapsacks. 63,457

16. Saddles complete, with blankets. 14,620

17. Caps and feathers. 100,000

18. Forage caps. 22,000

19. Stocks and clasps. 14,000

20. Shoe brushes, combs, and black balls. 140,600

21. Gloves and bracers. 3,000

22. Greatcoat straps, brushes, pickers, sponge, etc. 20,000

23. Flannel shirts, gowns, caps, and trousers. 5,000
24. Sheets, paillasses, coverlids, etc. 14,000
23. Haversacks and canteens complete. 8,000
24. Lbs. of biscuit and flour. 702,000
25. Lbs. of beef and pork. 691,300
26. Gallons of brandy and rum. 28,625

Also included were: "Marquees, Tents, Forage Carts, and necessary Camp Equipage; Surgical Instrument Cases, Medicines, and all necessary Hospital Stores."
APPENDIX II
TRACHTENBERG CONVENTION

Convention signed at Trachenberg, 12th of July, 1813, as a basis for the Operations of the Campaign. 2

1. English translation.

The following general principles have been decided: the allied forces will always mass on the side of the larger enemy forces. As a consequence:

1. The Corps which have to conduct operations on the enemy flanks or rear will always cut as direct as possible the enemy line of operations.

2. The larger allied force must select a position which enables it to face the enemy wherever he advances. The salient of Bohemia seems to be proper to enable it. According to this principle, the combined armies will have to occupy the following positions before the end of armistice:

- A part of the allied army in Silesia (98,000 to 100,000 troops) will join as soon as possible, by the routes between Landshut and Gratz, the Austrian Army in order to form with it a 200,000 to 220,000 strength force in Bohemia.

The Army of the Crown Prince of Sweden, while leaving a 15,000 to 20,000 strength Corps screening the Danish and French from Lubeck and Hamburg, will mass approximately 70,000 troops near Trauenbrutzen. As soon as the armistice comes to an end, this Army will cross the Elbe River between Torgau and Magdebourg, then moves towards Leipzig.

The rest of the allied Army in Silesia, with 50,000 soldiers, will follow the enemy towards the Elbe River. This army will avoid committing itself except in the case of an extremely favorable situation. Once on the Elbe River, this force will try to cross the river between Torgau and Dresden in order to join the Crwon Prince of Sweden’s Army. The strength will be therefore 120,000 troops. If however, there is a need to reinforce the Allied Army in Bohemia, this Army, instead of joining the Swedish Army, will quickly move to Bohemia.

The Austrian part of the Allied force will advance either by Eger or by Hoff, or in Saxony, Silesia, or along the Danube.
If the Emperor Napoleon decides to march to fight the Bohemian Army, the Crown Prince of Sweden's Army will try as quick as possible to reach the enemy's rear. If, on the contrary, Napoleon moves toward the Swedish Army, the Allied Army will conduct a vigorous offensive operation through the enemy communications to join battle. All the armies will make the enemy camp the point of rendezvous.

The Russian Army (Reserve) led by General Benningsen will move from the Vistula River to the Oder River by Kalish in the direction of Glogau in order to be capable of moving towards the enemy if he stays in SILESIA, or denying him the ability to invade Poland.

II. Original French:

"Il a ete convenu d'adopter pour principe general, que toutes les forces des allies se porteront toujours du cote ou les plus grandes forces de l'ennemi se trouveront; de-la il s'ensuit:

1. Que les corps qui doivent agir sur les flancs et a dos de l'ennemi diviseront toujours la ligne qui conduit le plus directement sur la ligne d'operaions de l'ennemi.

2. Que la plus grande force des allies doit choisir une position qui la mette a meme de faire face partout ou l'ennemi voudra se porter. Le bastion saillant de Boheme paroit donner cet avantage.

Suivant ces maximes generales, les armeees combinees doivent donc avant l'expiration de l'armistice etre rendues aux point ci-dessus enonces, savoir:-

Une partie de l'armee alliée en Siliesie, forte de 98,000 a100,000 hommes, se portera quelques jours avant la fin de l'armistice par les routes de Landshut et de Gratz sur Zoung, Bunzlau, et Brandeis, pour se joindre dans le plus court delai a l'armee Autrichienne, afin de former avec elle en Boheme un total de 200,000 a 220,000 combattans.

L'armee du Prince royal de Suede, laissant un corps de 15 a 20,000 hommes contre les Danois et les Francais en observation vis-a-vis de Lubeck et de Hambourg, se rassemblera avec une force a-peu-pres de 70,000 hommes dans les environs de Trauenbrutzen, pour se porter au moment de l'expiration de l'armistice vers l'Elbe, et passer ce fleuve entre Torguas et Magdebourg, en se dirigeant de suite sur Leipzig.
Le reste de l'armée alliée en Silesie, fort de 50,000 hommes, suivra l'ennemi vers l'Elbe. Cette armée évitera d'engager une affaire générale à moins qu'elle n'ait toutes les chances de son côté. En arrivant sur l'Elbe, elle tachera de passer ce fleuve entre Torgau et Dresde, afin de se joindre à l'armée du Prince royal de Suede; ce qui fera monter celle-ci à 120,000 combattans; si cependant les circonstances exigeroient de renforces l'armée alliée en Bohême, avant que l'armée de Silesie se joingne a celle du Prince Royal de Suede, alors l'armée de Silisie marchera sans délai en Bohême.

L'armée Austrichienne, reunitie a l'armée alliée, debouchera d'apres les circonstances ou par Eger et Hoff, ou dans las Saxe, ou dans las Silisie, ou du cote de Danube.

Si l'Empereur Napoleon, voulant prevenir l'armée alliée en Bohême, marchoit a elle pour la combattre, l'armée du Prince Royal de Suede tachera par des marches forcees a se porter aussi vite que possible sur les derrieres de l'armee ennemie: si aus contraire l'Empereur Napoloen se dirigeoit contre l'armee du Prince Royal, l'armée alliée pendroit une offensive vigoureuse, et marheroit sur les communications de l'ennemi pour lui livrer bataille: toutes les armées combinees pendront l'offensive, et le camp de l'ennemi sera leur rendezvous.

L'armée de reserve Russe sous les ordres du General Bennignsen s'avancera de la Vistule par Kalish vers l'Oder dan la dirction de Glogau, pour etre a portee d'agir suivant les memes principes, et de se diriger sur l'ennemi, s'il reste en Silesie, ou de l'empecher de tenter une invasion en Pologne."

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1 Stewart, 366. Figures and language used are exact reproductions from Stewart's Appendix on the same subject.
2 Ibid., 372-373. Translation of the original French courtesy Major Jean Parlanti, Army of the Republic of France.
Figure 1. Map of the Theater of Operations

- Berlin
- Grossbeeren
- Magdeberg
- Dennewitz
- Duben, Mulde R.
- Leipzig
- Lutzen
- Altenburg
- Erfurt
- Saale R.
- Elster R.
- Bautzen
- Dresden
- Kulm
- Bohemian Mountains
- Toppitz
- Katzbach R.

Scale: 1 to 50 miles
Allied Command and Control in 1813

Political Level (military advisors in parenthesis)

Prussia: König Frederick William III - Russia: Tsar Alexander I - Austria: Kaiser Francis I
(Knesebeck) (Toll-Jomini - Moreau) (Hofkriegsrat)

Note: The three Monarchs and their "military college," except the Hofkriegsrat, accompanied the Army of Bohemia.

Military Level (Chief of Staff in parenthesis, where known. Numbered corps are Prussian)

Note: Dotted line represents Barclay’s coordination responsibility with Army of Silesia

*Moreau was killed in action at the Battle of Dresden.

1Britt, 134. Hofschroer, 21-36 passim. Thomas E. Griess, series editor, Atlas for the Wars of Napoleon (Wayne, New Jersey: Avery Publishing, 1986), 55. The above figure is a compilation of all these sources, Britt being the best but not identifying the commanders of several corps. Several of the corps attached to Bernadotte were loosely under his control and are indicated by a dotted line.