STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT

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ANARCHY IN THE STREETS:
RESTORING PUBLIC SECURITY IN COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES

BY

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Anarchy in the Streets

Restoring Public Security in Complex Contingencies

1 May 1998

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Executive Summary

THESIS QUESTION

When US military forces are performing public security functions during complex contingency operations, what conditions must they establish in order to transfer those functions successfully back to the host nation?

ANARCHY IN THE STREETS: RESTORING PUBLIC SECURITY IN COMPLEX CONTINGENCIES

In several recent complex contingency operations the intervening military force had to maintain minimum essential public order because the host nation capabilities were either overwhelmed by the magnitude of disorder, or because corrupt, repressive military and police were removed by the intervention. As the host nation public security capability is reinforced or rebuilt, military and political leaders must determine when conditions permit the transfer of public security functions from combat forces to military or international police and finally to the host nation public security forces. Indeed, the possible requirement to restructure the host nation public security forces may become an essential element of the intervention strategy, and would involve both military and civilian agencies. This paper proposes objective conditions to guide joint task force commanders, country teams, and interagency planners in making those transfer decisions.

A MODEL FOR CIVIL STABILITY

By studying recent cases of peace operations (Panama and Haiti) and foreign humanitarian assistance (Somalia during UNITAF), we developed a model for public security effectiveness that defines end state conditions for public security viability. The key elements of this strategy are:

- A legitimate, credible government that maintains a monopoly on the use of force.
- Effective law enforcement, judicial, and penal structures.
- Adequate public services to reduce internal and external refugee destabilization of the nation and the region.
- Secure borders to prevent external destabilization.

We examine these elements through three phases of public security operations, to identify criteria for success for each phase. These are summarized in the figures below.

**Figure 1-1**  
**Phases of public security operations**

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The following figure lists conditions necessary for the successful transition between the phases identified above.
Figure 1-2
Transfer conditions by phase

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</tbody>
</table>

RECOMMENDATIONS

International

*International Gendarmerie.* The United States should support efforts in the United Nations to expand the capabilities of UN CIVPOL within the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO). This should include increasing staffing to permit adequate planning, training, and supervision of CIVPOL operations. We should support funding of a reserve of equipment that should include tactical vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons. Most critically, we should contribute, and encourage other UN member nations to contribute, qualified police to a standby contingent available for rapid deployment and trained and organized as tactical gendarmes. Former military policemen and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) police would be ideally suited. To maximize interoperability, these national contingents and the staff should conduct periodic training and exercises.

National
Interagency Public Security Working Group. PDD-56 planning process should have a public security working group. Membership should include representatives from: Defense (JCS J-3, JCS J-5, and Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC), State (Bureau of International Organizations Affairs and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)), USAID, and Justice (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, ICITAP, and Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT)).

Revised Role for Military Government. Revise CMO doctrine for complex contingencies to reflect limited military role in development of a government, except for the short period of time necessary to get other organizations in place.

Military Training of Foreign Public Security Forces. Revise 22 USC 2420 to recognize Department of Justice training of foreign security forces but to allow US military elements to develop US military doctrine for and to conduct contingency planning for the advising of foreign public security forces during the specific conditions of a declared complex contingency.

Enhancing US Civilian Assistance for Penal and Judicial Reform. DOJ should lead in developing and coordinating judicial and penal versions of ICITAP. The Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT) program is a first step in this training process. It should be expanded to include judges and prison managers or parallel efforts should be established to implement reforms in these areas.

Department of Defense

Military Doctrine for Public Security Operations Develop a multiservice (vice Joint) publication for Public Security Operations that collects the lessons learned from recent complex contingencies as well as historical studies such as Small Wars' to provide a doctrinal framework for the conduct of public security operations. Framework should include objectives of public security operations, principles of public security operations, and discussion of the capabilities that military branches and services and other national and
international agencies bring to the effort. Include Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs) and develop a Mission Training Plan that identifies tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for units to train for these tasks. Some suggested topics include: joint patrolling, search and seizure, command, control, communications, and liaison, rules of engagement, use of force, crowd control, and negotiation.

**Proponent for Civil Military Operations.** Designate United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the proponent for CMO. Specifically task USSOCOM J5/J7 to develop plans, policy, doctrine, simulations, and analysis. This should include development, in coordination with all agencies having potential crisis responsibilities, of CMOC staffing guides and guides for liaison cells at the Joint Task Force headquarters. USSOCOM should sponsor global threat analysis, exercises and simulations, so that relevant agencies can develop TTPs, for coordinating interagency missions at the CMOC and JTF commander levels.

**Synchronization of PDD-56 Planning with DOD Crisis Action Planning.** JCS issue a Warning Order only after the PDD-56 process has produced overall guidance on desired military response. This should require a preliminary National Command Authority decision on an overall national Course of Action (COA) to pursue.

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1 United States, Marine Corps, *Small Wars Manual, United States Marine Corps, 1940.*
Chapter 1:
Anarchy in the Streets

And then there are the ruins, blackened monuments to anarchy in our streets, which I've seen personally. Anarchy, criminal anarchy, threatens to erupt again and again, to cripple our nation, hinder our production, destroy life and property, demoralize our military forces and defeat America abroad.

Richard Barrett
United States Senate Judiciary Committee
Washington, DC
June 22, 1968

The evening television news broadcasts almost routinely depict violence in the streets of cities throughout the world as political, ethnic, and religious factions attack their enemies. Torn and bleeding bodies graphically demonstrate the deadly anarchy that has repeatedly resulted from the failure of political institutions to maintain domestic peace and security. These scenes call for action by the world community to protect the weak from the depredations of those who would prey upon them. Increasingly, the United States, usually in conjunction with allied coalitions, has responded with military forces to stop the killing and impose order. But the building of sustainable political institutions has been of considerably greater difficulty. How do you create legal and police structures that are fair and impartial to all citizens when they have never existed previously. How long does it take? And, most importantly for the American public, when can the intervening US military forces hand off public security responsibilities to qualified civilian authorities?

This paper seeks to answer the question, "When US military forces are performing public security functions during complex contingency operations, what conditions must they establish in order to transfer those functions successfully back to the host nation?"

Presidential Decision Directive 56 describes complex contingency operations as "... territorial disputes, armed ethnic conflicts, and civil wars" that require "... multidimensional operations composed of such components as political/diplomatic, humanitarian, intelligence, economic development, and security: hence the term complex contingency operations."

divides these operations into two categories, peace operations and foreign humanitarian assistance operations. We examine two cases of peace operations (Panama and Haiti) and one case of foreign humanitarian assistance (Somalia) to determine how US involvement, particularly military involvement, can, in the future, most efficiently reduce and then eliminate anarchy in the streets by establishing the conditions necessary to create an effective public security structure maintained by the local government. These three cases all involve large numbers of US forces and are essentially completed, thus allowing an evaluation of success and failure.

In these and other recent complex contingency operations the intervening military force has had to maintain minimum essential public order because the host nation capabilities were either overwhelmed by the magnitude of disorder, or because corrupt, repressive military and police were removed by the intervention. As the host nation public security capability is reinforced or rebuilt, military and political leaders must determine when conditions permit the transfer of public security functions from combat forces to military police or international police monitors and finally to the host nation public security forces. Indeed, the possible requirement to restructure the host nation public security forces may become an essential element of the intervention strategy, involving both military and civilian agencies. This paper presents objective conditions to guide contingency planners in the National Security Council and Department of Defense, leaders of US country teams, and US military commanders of unified commands and joint task forces in making decisions concerning intervention.

A key assumption underlying our thesis is that conventional military combat forces will be disengaged and redeployed from the intervention as soon as adequate conditions for order have been restored. This is due to several pressures. The first is the budgetary drain of complex contingency operations on programmed operations and maintenance. Typically, the armed services have absorbed the unprogrammed costs of these operations which has cut deeply into training and operations elsewhere. Another pressure is that the training and preparing for the

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complex contingency operations is “peace operations such as the peace accord implementation operation conducted by NATO in Bosnia (1995-present) and the humanitarian intervention in northern Iraq called Operation Provide Comfort (1991); and foreign humanitarian assistance operations, such as Operation Support Hope in central Africa (1994) and Operation Sea Angel in Bangladesh (1991). Unless otherwise directed, PDD-56 does not apply to domestic disaster relief or to relatively routine or small-scale operations, nor to military operations conducted in defense of US citizens, territory, or property, including counter-terrorism and hostage-rescue operations and international armed conflict.”

2 *White Paper for PDD-56.*
primary mission of the US Armed Forces, "... to fight and win the Nation's wars,"\textsuperscript{3} is diluted by the perceived divergence of roles and tasks in complex contingency operations. Finally, the impact of multiple deployments, many of them both unpredicted and indeterminate in length, on servicepeople and their families is to degrade morale and retention. In this paper, we lay out a framework for planning and conducting the public security mission, using all instruments of our national power in a sequenced manner, to produce a stable, effectively resolved situation from which we can withdraw military forces at the earliest feasible opportunity.

**SUCCESS**

There would be no need for this paper if we had a long history of demonstrated success in establishing public security in complex contingency operations. The results of Panama, Somalia, Haiti, and Bosnia are mixed, although it is probably too early to make a final judgment in the cases of Haiti and Bosnia. How do you know the operation was a success? We use one criteria. After US military forces are returned to pre-crisis levels in a region, is public security maintained by local or other forces for at least two years. If conflict reignites such that outside intervention is required to stop it or if the local government, perhaps assisted by non-governmental organizations (NGOs), private volunteer organizations (PVOs), or other international agencies, cannot recover from the humanitarian crisis due to public security problems, the mission was unsuccessful. Two years for the evaluation period is chosen somewhat arbitrarily. There is growing consensus that it takes about five years to build a sustainable public security capability from scratch. Typically, during the initial months and years of this effort, public security is ensured or reinforced by the active presence of intervening military forces, UN Civilian Police (CIVPOL), or international police monitors. Measuring for success two years from the departure of external reinforcement requires a fairly significant maturation of indigenous public security professionalism to have taken place during that period. The impact of any outside involvement in a country decays over time. Local conditions unrelated to the outside involvement come to dominate the public security environment. Two years may be too short a time for evaluation if there is a multi-year

\footnote{United States, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Shape, Respond, Prepare Now: A Military Strategy for a New Era* (Washington : GPO) 1997.}
commitment of US forces; it may be too long for a short (month or two) commitment. As a first order measure of effectiveness, two years works.

This evaluation criteria structured our choice of cases to examine. Bosnia would be another good choice, but military operations there are not complete as this paper is written, so no evaluation of success could have been made.

ENABLING CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS

When US forces return to pre-crisis levels, they should leave behind a stable government with no significant armed opposition, with an effective police structure, with a refugee level that does not overwhelm security forces, and with enforceable borders. The paragraphs below expand on these conditions.

Government

A viable government must be in place to supervise the public security forces. The nature and form of the government is not critical, although US involvement seems to indicate some form of democracy is preferred, if not required. A constitution of some type must specify the legal structure of the government and provide the basis of a code of law so that there is a prospect for long term stability. External recognition, by the UN, provides international legitimacy. In peace operations, the government may be put in place as a result of a brokered agreement. The government has to develop and maintain internal legitimacy, perhaps by fair elections, perhaps just by efficiently providing services. Absent a government, a military governor or UN trustee must exercise authority until a local government can be organized.\(^4\)

No significant armed opposition

Significant armed opposition would be anything greater than a terrorist threat. A significant opposition would have crew served weapons in some numbers. It would be able to conduct sustained operations due to its command and control network and its material

sustainment capability. Terrorism is a significant threat, but it is one faced by all nations, one that has to be resisted and contained by the government and its public security forces. Absent this condition, peace operations should continue or military forces should continue to provide security for humanitarian operations.

**Effective police structure**

This includes a police force, a judicial system, and a penal system. There must be adequate numbers of police, considering the population size and the level of crime and violence in society. The police force must have suitable membership. It should effectively mirror the society it serves, support the constitutional government, and observe basic international norms of human rights. It needs adequate training to develop the proper skills. It should have suitable equipment (communications, transportation, and armament). There must be an effective judicial system that efficiently tries cases using a rule of law based upon the constitution. An effective penal system must be in place that houses convicted criminals in accordance with the constitution and international standards of decency. Absent this condition, the government loses its capability to secure its population.

**Few refugees**

Internally displaced persons are mobs waiting to be mobilized. They pose a threat to the stability of the government. In peace operations, demobilized soldiers, with limited civilian skill sets, pose a particular problem, even if disarmed. They have training, leadership, and a command structure that can, even with few or no crew served weapons, establish a criminal or insurgent element that can overwhelm public security forces. Refugees pose a problem for neighboring governments, potentially destabilizing the region as other nations intervene across borders in response to the refugee movements. Absent this condition, security forces can be overwhelmed by the numbers who might use violence to better their condition.
Enforceable borders

A security force capable of defending the nation from cross-border destabilization must exist. Absent this condition, the government relies on the good intentions of its neighbors and the disinterest of international criminals to secure its population.

Chapters 2, 3, and 4 evaluate recent US military operations that are characterized as complex contingency operations. The degree to which each operation achieves these enabling conditions and the overall success or failure of the operation is discussed in each chapter.

The US military has previously demonstrated the ability to carry out the missions listed above, as in Germany and Japan after WWII. There are now specially trained Civil Affairs (CA) units and doctrine for conducting Civil Military Operations (CMO). In addition, the Military Police (MP) have special training and doctrine for operations in controlling rear areas that have some utility in complex contingency operations. It seems unlikely today, though, that the US military will be relied upon solely to conduct these nation building type operations. The huge cost of these operations and the continued involvement of more international organizations, both United Nations (UN) and NGOs/PVOs, mean the military will be one component of a national response that is coordinated (hopefully) with international actors. Chapter 5 will discuss in more detail how the elements of national power can be marshaled to create these enabling conditions.

PHASES OF THE PUBLIC SECURITY MISSION

As with most military missions, public security has a series of phases that help describe both the intent and the structure of the mission. Based on our evaluation of the cases we examined in detail, and other post-Cold War US complex contingency type operations we evaluated, we see the public security mission as breaking down into three phases.

Phase I: Total instability

Anarchy in the streets. A total breakdown in government-supplied public security is created either by conflict (peace operations) or natural disaster (humanitarian assistance). Due to the size or nature of the situation, large numbers of forces are required. Combat forces, with their
supporting forces, must be used because they have the numbers and the equipment to deal with any situation and the means to deploy rapidly. A form of martial law is used to reduce the anarchy and introduce a rule of law in the streets. Particularly in peace operations, when intervening military forces have to enforce a peace, the troops engaged in phase I should probably not continue to be elements of the public security force of phase II because of the likelihood that the phase I forces will not be seen as impartial.

**Phase II: Military enforced stability**

Unsafe streets. Combat forces are drawn down in number to that necessary for border security and located largely outside major metropolitan areas. A smaller Military Police/Special Operations Forces (MP/SOF) force conducts the internal public security mission often in conjunction with local police or military who have been vetted to some minimally acceptable standard of political and human rights compliance. MP/SOF will hand off to UN CIVPOL or international police monitors when they can be recruited and deployed to replace the MP/SOF. This phase is a transition phase. Martial law is phased out as civilian government structures are put in place.

**Phase III: Stability**

Acceptable level of routine crime in the streets. The local government provides all security functions, though training and advising of local public security forces may continue. US and UN military forces may remain in country as part of reconstruction teams or peace observers to provide a stabilizing presence.
Figure 1-1
Phases of public security operations

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We chose not to add phases solely for transitions between the three major phases because we think that there is a continuum across the three phases that occurs during the operation. For example, there is a gradual reduction of combatant forces in phase I, as the MP/SOF forces deploy and begin their operations. We chose not to call this time period a separate phase, because this transition will be continually ongoing throughout phase I, as we attempt to reduce the cost of the operation.

TRANSFER CONDITIONS

When to shift from phase I to phase II is the difficult decision of the commander in the field. We offer the following suggestions to indicate when MP/SOF forces should be able to handle the public security mission. Either a government should be in place or there should be general acceptance of the intervening combat force, either as part of a peace process or reconstitution after a natural disaster. The armament level of any opposition to the government (or of military law if a government is not yet in place) should be at a low enough level to be countered by normally armed MP/SOF units. Although available, reliance on combat forces for "backup" indicates that phase II conditions are not present. The internal refugees should have been reduced in size and location to a situation able to be controlled by the MP/SOF force. Local, US, or international forces are preventing cross-border destabilization. To start phase II, there does not have to be a local public security force though it is desirable to have at least an interim local force with whom to patrol. Culturally and politically it is preferable for local officials
to make arrests and be seen enforcing laws. The development and deployment of a policing structure will be the major activity in phase II, while the remaining refugee and opposition force problems are also addressed. There must be a published set of laws that are to be enforced. In most complex contingencies, the pre-conflict set of laws (although not necessarily enforced at the beginning of Phase II) are used, supplemented by military regulations in accordance with the 4th Geneva Convention.\(^5\) When the contingency involves the creation of a new state, some set of laws must be established as a basis for public security until a constitutionally directed code can be put in place.

**Figure 1-2**

Transfer conditions by phase

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With this framework in mind, we will explore the three cases of Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, in that order. Because the US had a chance to incorporate lessons learned from each of these operations prior to conducting the following one, we should see an increasing sophistication in approach and an increased likelihood for success.

\(^5\) 4th Geneva Convention, Article 64.
Chapter 2
Panama:
Operations Just Cause & Promote Liberty

OBJECTIVES

On 20 December 1989, US military forces executed Operation Just Cause in Panama. The objectives of the operation included protecting US lives and key sites and facilities; capturing and delivering Manuel Noriega to competent authority, neutralizing the Panamanian Defense Forces (PDF); supporting the establishment of US-recognized government in Panama; and the restructuring of the PDF. United States Southern Command (USSOUTHCOM) converted these objectives into the assigned mission of the Joint Task Force that would do the fighting.

Conduct joint offensive operations to neutralize the PDF and other combatants, as required, so as to protect US lives, property, and interests in Panama and to assure the full treaty rights accorded by international law and the US Panama Canal treaties.

USSOUTHCOM had developed, over a long period of time, a series of interlocking contingency plans for operations in Panama. Known as the Prayer Book series, the plans were designed to provide a flexible set of options for decisionmakers to select from, based on conditions in Panama and the desired type and level of US response. For example, combat operations in Panama were a plan called Blue Spoon. The particular plan that dealt with Civil-Military Operations (CMO) was one originally known as Krystal Ball and then Blind Logic. It dealt with stability and civil affairs operations to be conducted after fighting was completed. Blind Logic would have to address the public security mission directly, because neutralizing the PDF would entail much more than defeating the military of Panama.

The PDF had been remade since Manuel Noriega took over the National Guard of Panama in 1983. He had consolidated the National Guard with the small navy and air force into the PDF. The 3,500 members of combatant PDF units were primarily a ground force with two battalions,

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7 Flanagan 40.
ten independent infantry companies, a cavalry squadron, a riot control company, and a special forces commando unit. In addition, Noriega had formed Dignity Battalions, an undetermined number of mostly armed thugs who were personally loyal to him. The naval component of the PDF had twelve vessels, mostly fast patrol boats, and a company of marines. The air component had 38 fixed wing aircraft of various types, 17 helicopters, and an assortment of air defense guns, including the feared ZPU-4, a Soviet made mobile quad gun.9

Not content with control over the military, Noriega arranged for the legal transfer of numerous other missions to the PDF. The remainder of the 15,000 man PDF were police forces, conservation officers, forest police, customs officials, and administrative personnel. As an example of how thoroughly the PDF was embedded in the fabric of Panamanian life, the entire vehicular control system, from vehicle registration, to title transfer, licensing, and traffic control was administered by the same PDF that was the nation’s army, navy, and air force.10 Decapitating the PDF, by removing Noriega, was considered, but the opinion of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) was that it was too likely that another individual, with similar temperament and goals, would just replace him.11 Neutralizing the PDF would be required and that would mean the paralysis of the entire public security structure.

THE PLAN

The overall plan for action in Panama involved three phases. Phase 1: Combat operations designed to neutralize and fix in place the PDF, capture Noriega, install a new government, and protect and defend US citizens and key facilities. Phase 2: Stability operations to ensure law and order and begin the transition to support a newly installed government. Phase 3: Nation-building that supports the new government to include restructuring and training that government. This phase would eventually be turned over to the State Department and other agencies of the US Government.12 The USSOUTHCOM & JCS decision to have separate plans for combat operations and for CMO operations created a situation where two different organizations planned

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9 Flanagan 7.
10 Donnelly 41.
11 Donnelly 66.
separate operations. It is clear that Blue Spoon planners would address Phase 1 and that Blind Logic planners would do the same for Phase 3. What was not necessarily clear was: 1) Who was responsible for Phase 2, and how was it done? 2) How would the transition between the two organizations take place? and, 3) Were the two separate plans compatible?

Operation Just Cause (Blue Spoon) planning and Operation Promote Liberty (Blind Logic) planning were not synchronized. There are several references that review the planning of the two operations. All seem to agree that Blue Spoon was a plan that was aggressively updated to reflect the thoughts of General Maxwell Thurman, Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command (CINCSOUTH) and that it had been approved by the JCS. Blind Logic was neither of those. When Blue Spoon was executed as Operation Just Cause, there was no approved update to Blind Logic, even though the operational concept of Blue Spoon had changed dramatically after General Thurman relieved General Woerner as CINCSOUTH in October 1989. Even before the change, General Woerner felt that the Blind Logic plan was weak, at least in part because inter-agency consultation was not allowed due to security considerations. As it played out, that weak plan, disconnected from the operational plan that preceded it, lead to an uncoordinated US response.

The initial planning for Blind Logic began in March 1988. General Woerner, CINCSOUTH, initiated an effort to outline a CMO plan for restoration of Panama in the wake of US combat operations against the PDF. The planning assumptions were that CINCSOUTH would be in charge of the government of Panama for a period not in excess of 30 days, with transfer of US responsibility to the US Embassy as soon as practicable after a Panamanian government was in place, and that if the plan was implemented without previous combat operations, the US Ambassador would be in charge of CMO. The second assumption was that the plan would focus on Panama City and Colon, with only minimum control exercised in David and essentially only a monitoring function throughout the rest of the country.

To implement the plan they developed, USSOUTHCOM assumed that United States Army Reserve (USAR) Civil Affairs units assigned to them would be available either in the form

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12 Flanagan 40.
13 Donnelly, Flanagan, and Fishel.
14 Donnelly 25.
of units or individual volunteers. For this to happen, the President would exercise his authority to call up individual members and units of the Selected Reserve for up to 90 days. This would place units, trained as units, with five years experience working in Panama, in the role of executing the plan. The Blind Logic plan was completed, primarily by Reserve 361st CA Brigade officers, in August 1988. At the end of the process, General Woerner said that, “We never anticipated having to do that plan . . .”16

Triggered by the March 1989 temporary seizure of US school buses by the PDF, Blind Logic was brought up for review and updating. The sourcing of personnel and units, particularly the reserve components, was discussed but their planning was flawed because not all aspects of the plan were evaluated and approved.

A plan to use Augmentation Reserve Component Volunteers was developed. However, when Blind Logic was executed, the availability of reserves became an issue because bureaucratic rules implemented during Just Cause required reserves to support for over four months, instead of the one month the Blind Logic plan called for, something difficult for reserve volunteers to do.

Recognizing the necessity for their early arrival, Blind Logic planners discussed including some of their CMO forces (MPs, engineers, medical personnel, and the 96th CA Battalion) in the time-phased deployments plans of Blue Spoon. Blue Spoon planners did not, however, incorporate these requirements into their plan because the Blind Logic plan was neither formally approved by JCS nor approved by the incoming CINCSOUTH, General Thurman.

Limited inter-agency coordination was also conducted in Panama. USSOUTHCOM planners discussed the type of follow-on public security forces the embassy expected in the wake of US military intervention. After the destruction of the PDF, a Costa Rican model of police forces with no army was the expected posture. Blind Logic planning was essentially complete in August 1989. Blue Spoon plan changes began in August, as General Thurman, the incoming CINC, began the relief of General Woerner and informed the staff of what his version of a heavily revised Blue Spoon plan would be.17

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16 Fishel 13.
17 Fishel 17-24.
Between 30 September, when General Thurman took over USSOUTHCOM, and 16 December, when Marine Lieutenant Robert Paz was killed and Navy Lieutenant Adam Curtis and his wife were assaulted by PDF forces, Blue Spoon planning proceeded. General Thurman’s operational vision was developed and approved. On 18 December when the Blue Spoon plan was executed as Operation Just Cause, there was a crash effort to update Blind Logic. On 20 December, as Brigadier General Gann, the USSOUTHCOM J-5, was moving his staff from Quarry Heights to the Legislative Assembly building to become the Commander, Civil-Military Operations Task Force, the final version of Blind Logic was forwarded to JCS for approval, as Operation Promote Liberty.\(^{18}\) The plan that was approved had assumptions that did not reflect existing conditions in Panama. CINCSOUTH would not be in charge of a temporary military government because just prior to the commencement of Operation Just Cause a Panamanian government had been sworn in. There was, however, no Ambassador to conduct CMO with this new government.

**OPERATIONS**

Operation Just Cause was very successful in eliminating the PDF and in finally capturing Noriega. The scheme of maneuver did, however, leave very few US troops in Panama City and its surroundings. With the PDF no longer able to provide security in the city, wide spread looting began on the 20th. On the 22nd, four Brigade Task Forces from the 82nd Airborne, augmented by the 193rd Infantry Brigade, were assigned to clear Panama City of hostiles, enforce a curfew, stop chaos and looting and assume temporary law enforcement functions. As they cleared zones, MPs would take over, man the old PDF posts and begin active patrols.\(^{19}\) This process ended the rampant lawlessness before Christmas.

In the countryside, the process was simpler. Infantry would move into a town and begin patrols. The soldiers would observe to see who the townspeople hissed at and who they applauded. Those applauded were considered good guys and were moved into positions of authority. On the second or third day in town, soldiers would conduct joint patrol with the good

\(^{18}\) Fishel 32-33.
guy policemen. On the third or fourth day, the policemen would be given sidearms and allowed to patrol on their own.20

There appeared to be no central planning or guidance on public security procedures to be used during this time. MPs in Colon organized the new police force from scratch. The structure was based on the 1977 organizational chart of the Columbus, Ohio police department which an MP Captain's wife in Fort Ord read over the phone to her husband in Panama.21 US troops used a simple, but arbitrary procedure for investigations, "If you saw somebody that looked suspicious, you could arrest them. If you saw a house that looked suspicious, you could go in."22 In Colon, after surrendering to US forces and being released, Major Luis Guardia became the new police commander, at least in part because JTF-Panama had scrubbed plans for MPs to screen all new Panamanian police because there was not time. Separately, Major Guardia's name was added to a most wanted list; a few days after taking charge, he was arrested and replaced.23

While the forces and organization for Operation Promote Liberty were deploying to Panama, Just Cause forces began establishing the conditions for transfer of responsibility so they could redeploy. The Policía Nacional de Panamá (PNP) organization was created and manned, a Judicial Liaison Group was formed to get the local night courts in operation, civil affairs assessments were conducted, immediate assistance for refugees was provided, and key facilities were protected. Public security was provided by joint patrols between Just Cause MPs and new PNP police, with a night court system and a local jail in place for minor civil offenses; a separate military camp for PDF detainees and most wanted prisoners was operated by US MPs. A coordinated use of Reserve personnel who were policemen and SOF personnel was established. Small detachments were put in place in each city precinct and rural police zone.24

By mid-January 1990, Operation Promote Liberty was in place in the form of the Military Support Group-Panama. The American Embassy was operational with an ambassador and the majority of its pre-crisis staff in place. The goal of Promote Liberty forces was to establish the


20 Donnelly 355.
21 Donnelly 370.
22 Donnelly 357.
23 Donnelly 369.
24 Fishel 49.
final conditions for return of the public security mission to local forces. Constructing a police force, although begun by Just Cause, was not to be a military mission. Congressional approval of emergency funding for Panamanian assistance included a reaffirmation of previous legislation that prohibited police training by the US military. The Department of Justice’s International Criminal Investigation Training Assistance Program (ICITAP) was given the mission and funding. ICITAP had no previous experience doing this, and no plans either. Until ICITAP programs could be put in place, the US military provided “liaison and coordination” to the PNP, avoiding the outright violation of Congressional intent. This included screening former PDF police to eliminate corrupt members and human rights abusers, providing a 20 hour transition training course, and equipping the force with weapons, uniforms, radios, and vehicles using existing US security assistance funds, captured equipment, and excess US uniforms and equipment. Military Support Group (MSG)-Panama also coordinated with the Embassy in providing assistance to the nation-building activities. The Embassy coordinated judicial reform and other assistance programs through the US Agency for International Development (USAID).

Operation Promote Liberty wound down throughout the remainder of 1990. Force levels returned to those routinely stationed in Panama prior to Operation Just Cause, with the exception of a small contingent at MSG-Panama who planned to turnover their mission to USSOUTHCOM in December. The plan was interrupted by a police mutiny on 5 December 1990, which delayed the closing of MSG-Panama until 17 January 1991.

ANALYSIS

Ultimately, we consider the public security mission a failure due to the requirement for renewed US military intervention. On 5 December 1990, with US forces at essentially pre-Just Cause levels, President Endara called for US military assistance in putting down a police action that was variously described as a coup, uprising, and “a movement” lead by the former (post-Just Cause) police chief Eduardo Herrera Hassan. US forces spent a day putting down the coup. The majority of Operation Promote Liberty forces finally redeployed on 17 January 1991 when MSG-Panama was deactivated.

25 Gray and Manwaring 41. Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act prohibits police training by the US military.
26 Donnelly 385.
Government

One of the reasons for the US intervention was that Manuel Noriega had invalidated an internationally-monitored election in Panama that would have replaced his regime with a government headed by Guillermo Endara. On the evening of 19 December, just before US forces began executing Operation Just Cause, the US coordinated the swearing in of Endara as President at Howard Air Force Base, actually US territory although located in Panama. Putting in place the popularly elected government should have met the condition of a government in place to supervise the public security forces.

Although the President and his two Vice Presidents were in place, virtually nothing else was. Because the PDF provided so much of the government’s services, its destruction left the new government with little or no structure to carry out normal functions. For the first two weeks it was in office, it was totally dependent on US officials. US advisers occupied an entire floor of the provisional government’s headquarters at the Foreign Ministry building. Endara did not even have a telephone in his office, he had to borrow cellular phones from US officials.27

The Endara government’s visible reliance on US officials and troops added to pre-existing emotional baggage in Central America. The Yanqui Big Brother image was not a positive one for the new government to be saddled with. The perception that “the Endara government could not have survived without US troops and officials”28, combined with its inability to deliver services, significantly reduced the internal legitimacy of the government.

Although not observed in Panama, returning a regime to power that was previously providing services might be a feasible way to establish a legitimate government. Lacking this pre-existing structure, an intervening force should plan on establishing a legitimate government, which might include an election phase, but must include a phase which puts into place a functioning structure. In the case of Panama, elections had been held, but a functioning structure based on

those elections was not available when Operation Just Cause began. When Promote Liberty ended, a structure with limited functional ability existed.

No significant armed opposition

There was no significant armed opposition. The PDF remnants had no crew served weapons. There were, however, still large numbers of former PDF soldiers with access to small arms. This ultimately contributed to the coup attempt of December 1990.

Effective police structure

The police structure existing at the completion of Promote Liberty was suspect at best. Although all the colonels, 83 per cent of the lieutenant colonels, 39 percent of the majors, 31 percent of the captains, and 19 percent of the lieutenants were purged during the processing of PDF personnel for membership in the new PNP, the majority of the new force’s membership remained former PDF personnel, who had extensive experience in the corrupt practices of the Noriega era. The ICITAP training program was just getting started, the first 250 graduates becoming members of the PNP in February 1991.

Neither the judicial process nor the penal system had been significantly improved. As late as 1997, 68% of the prison population were estimated to be pre-trial detainees. This may be near the norm for nations in the region, but it does not indicate success in establishing a judicial process that ensures public security in accordance with the constitution. Due at least in part to the large number of pre-trial detainees, the prison system remains overcrowded and violent.

The large number of armed private security guards that exist in Panama today, approximately equaling the number of armed PNP personnel, is a clear indication that the police structure is not providing public security at an adequate level.29

Few refugees

There is one claim of 20,000 homeless as a result of the war30 (out of a population of 2.4 million). Many of them may have been due to the lawlessness and looting that occurred in

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Panama City before US forces started keeping order. This number, although unfortunately large, existed when US forces numbered more than 20,000, indicating that US forces would not be overwhelmed by the refugees. A displaced persons camp established by the US 96th CA Battalion at the Balboa High School athletic stadium processed 11,000 individuals, with an average camp population of 3,500, alleviating the immediate refugee problem. The camp was located close to the site of maximum housing dislocation to minimize the refugee movement required to use it.\(^{31}\) There is no evidence that there were large numbers of internal refugees when Panamanian security forces took over the public security mission, although there remained a significant unemployment problem (up to 50 percent) in major cities, one that pre-dated Operation Promote Liberty.

Civil affairs (CA) activity was not well coordinated with USAID. The previously discussed security issues had prevented inter-agency coordination prior to execution of the Blind Logic plan. In addition, CA was hampered by lack of funding and contracting officers to resolve war damage claims that would have improved the long term prospect for Panamanian support for the US military operation.\(^{32}\) Another negative impact on US perception, and by extension the Endara government, was financial assistance from the US. On 20 December 1990, as US troops were beginning Operation Just Cause, President Bush promised to request $1 billion in aid for Panama. Ultimately, two monetary packages were provided, $41 million was provided quickly for emergency assistance in shelter and low income housing. The second package was less than half what the Panamanians felt they had been promised ($420 million vice $1 billion) and it was not approved until May 1990, and only slightly more than $100 million had been delivered before Operation Promote Liberty essentially ended. While the limited, delayed aid package impacted the number of internally displaced persons in Panama by affecting the economic climate, a significant factor in creating the perception of impotence of the Endara government that eroded its internal legitimacy.

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\(^{30}\) Johns and Johnson. 89.

\(^{31}\) Flanagan 212.

Enforceable borders

There was no significant cross-border threat to Panama’s stability beyond the regional problem of narco-criminality before or after Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty.

SUMMARY

This was the first complex contingency operation conducted by the US military since the collapse of the Soviet Union. The model for the public security mission used in the planning phase was the CMO model of post-WWII, scaled back for the size of Panama. As it was executed, the public security mission was carried out in roughly the three phases identified above, but without the overarching political-military plan necessary to create a successful outcome. The nation building effort necessary to create an internally legitimate government was not coordinated at the national level and was minimally successful in creating a successful Endara government. The policing structure was lacking in all three areas, although the police function achieved some success as ICITAP started its learning process in training foreign police forces.

Overall, the plan for public security was not given the attention by military leaders at USSOUTHCOM and JCS that it needed. The existing CMO plan, Blind Logic, was 1) not coordinated with the combat operations plan, Blue Spoon, 2) not coordinated with other US agencies in Panama due to security concerns and 3) not synchronized with national strategy for Panama as finally expressed by the actions (or lack of them) by US national leadership. PDD-56 should prevent this obvious lack of national coordination in the future, but it does not guarantee that a future coordinated plan will necessarily be successful just because it is coordinated.
Chapter 3
Somalia:
Operation Restore Hope

OBJECTIVES

Without a national government for more than two years, a combination of drought, widespread starvation, and warring clans fueled mass refugee migration in Somalia which demanded a United Nations response. In the Spring and Summer of 1992, the UN Security Council passed five resolutions pertaining to Somalia. The initial resolutions imposed an arms embargo, established UN Operation in Somalia (UNOSOM I), began the planning process for humanitarian aid, and authorized observers to monitor a tenable cease fire agreement between clans. One month after deployment of 500 Pakistani soldiers, the UN passed resolution 775 which increased the authorization of military personnel to 3,500. In a nation that seemed to be imploding, the security force required to provide stability was far beyond the capabilities of UNOSOM I. In December 1992, the UN Security Council passed Resolution 794. The resolution established a Chapter VII\(^3\) peace enforcement operation under US command called Unified Task Force (UNITAF). Their mission was to enforce peace “using all necessary means to establish as soon as possible a secure environment for humanitarian relief operations in Somalia.”\(^4\) Finally, attempting to expand on the success of UNITAF, the UN Security Council passed resolution 814 in March 1993. The new resolution established a Chapter VII peace enforcement operation under command of the UN Secretary General called UN Operation Somalia II (UNOSOM II), and increased its scope to cover the whole country. UNITAF was only responsible for one-third of the country in the South. This new mission re-emphasized security and still had the full support of the United States.

THE PLAN

Non-existent public security was the catalyst which allowed the starvation to lead into

\(^3\) Chapter VII of the UN Charter authorizes international intervention “... to maintain or restore international peace and security.”

mass refugee migration, threatening regional stability. By failing to develop an adequate plan to deal with the public security crisis in the UN operations, the UN efforts eventually failed. The intervention in Somalia was composed of three separate and distinct operations with varied missions, goals, command structures, and financing. However, public security issues remained a common denominator throughout operations in Somalia. During UNOSOM I, the 500 man Pakistani security force planned to protect humanitarian aid from theft enroute to its final destinations. However, the security force was contained in Mogadishu by warring clans and unable to protect humanitarian supplies beyond the airport. Following UNOSOM I, UNITAF planned a three phase mission: 1) Secure the airfield, seaport and capital city of Mogadishu; 2) Secure the towns to be used as relief centers; 3) Plan for a follow-on UN peacekeeping force.35 In March 1993, UNOSOM II was seen as the UN follow-on force which planned to build on the success of UNITAF and expand operations to all of Somalia. UNOSOM II planning included a public security program using resources such as ICITAP and the eventual deployment of a 152 person Civilian Police (CIVPOL) organization. The plan detailed programs for re-establishing a national police force, penal, and judicial systems. As soon as the Somali government seemed capable, a final operational hand-off would take place.

**OPERATIONS**

UNOSOM I was never able to gain and maintain control of the security situation required to ensure the protection of humanitarian aid. UN Forces were inadequate and underestimated the power local clans had over their protected areas. Relief workers were forced to negotiate protection and transportation from local clans which provided security as a means of extortion.

By 1993, when UNITAF intervention began, societal breakdown in Somalia had reached critical mass. More than 2,000 people a day were dying, and there seemed no end in sight. UNITAF entered Somalia with 38,000 troops. The first mission was to provide stability by confiscating and destroying heavy weapons belonging to local warlords. UNITAF was authorized to use “all means necessary” and this established credibility with the Somali people. They saw the new mission, which was led by the United States, as effective and reliable. A Civil Military

Operations Center (CMOC) was created to coordinate the military, political, and humanitarian agencies. The re-establishment of local security, in the form of Somali police, was included as a target sector of the UN Relief and Rehabilitation Program developed during UNITAF.\textsuperscript{36} Contentious debate over how to develop a Somali security force, its legality, and the unwillingness of the US to get directly involved, led to the creation of an interim force named the Auxiliary Security Force (ASF).

Assisting the developing ASF was also dangerous for US military commanders because the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 prohibited US forces from becoming involved with local law enforcement operations. The ASF was finally agreed to by all Somali committee members, warlords, and UNITAF. Public security through the establishment of police, penal, and judicial systems was seen as critical to future stability. "The reconstituted police forces were most effective in areas where UNITAF provided coordination, oversight, and support; however, one factor that promoted their acceptance was their willingness to let members of the local community believe that they controlled the police."\textsuperscript{37} The UN, UNITAF, and warlords provided funding, training, and equipment for the ASF. The UN and other agencies also provided funding for salaries and food for the families of ASF members. This support was seen as crucial to sustaining an apolitical force. The ASF program was successful throughout most of the UNITAF Humanitarian Relief Sector (HRS). Local laws were enforced and humanitarian aid was protected. However, the lack of penal and judicial systems limited ASF effectiveness and its ability to act unilaterally. UNITAF soldiers were needed to provide reinforcement and credibility. Prisoners could be detained by UNITAF soldiers for only 72 hours, at which time they were transferred to the ASF and varying local justice systems. By February 1993, the limited Somali security force had established legitimacy with Somalis.

UNOSOM II had US support but far inferior forces to meet its expectations in expanding the now UN led operation to the rest of the country. The added mission of confiscating small arms from clans met with stiff resistance from warlords. The UN command and control structure was unable to meet the operational demands required to synergize the multinational effort. Public security was still seen as the key to stability and the UN solicited the help of ICITAP to train a

\textsuperscript{36} Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg, 177.
\textsuperscript{37} Roxanne Sismanidis, \textit{Police Functions in Peace Operations, Workshop Report 11}.
national police force using the ASF as a starting point. The various military commands would remain in place until a CIVPOL structure, coupled with the Somali national police, were in place to assume the public security mission. The undermanned and untrained UNOSOM II structure was unable to maintain control over the ASF program. Without the reinforcement of UNITAF, the ASF began to collapse. Joint military and ASF operations ended and the ASF was no match for militia clans. Only one month after assuming control, UNOSOM II soldiers were attacked and 24 Pakistani peacekeepers were killed. The UN Security Council passed Resolution 837, which gave UNOSOM II the authority to bring the responsible parties to justice. The mission was outside of the scope, structure, and capabilities of UNOSOM II. After a long summer of fighting between clans, UNOSOM II failed to capture the warlord responsible for the Pakistani attack. The ASF was completely ineffective without financial support and military reinforcement. Warlords continued to press UNOSOM II soldiers and were soon regaining control. In October, 18 US soldiers were killed, 78 wounded, and one hostage was taken after a short battle with local clan militia. The loss of life resulted in a call for American withdrawal at home. The exit strategy became focused on building a Somali police force to provide stability after the US withdrawal, now scheduled for March 1994. The US appropriated $37 million in DOD aid and police support. However, ICITAP was never able to establish an effective training effort prior to June 1994. At that time, the public security situation had become untenable, and all UN forces were withdrawn.

**Analysis**

The three UN operations failed to adequately address public security needs, critical for long-term stability and success. Without a legitimate, recognized government structure, police, penal, and judicial programs were unable to be synergized into one public security system. The intervention strategy never looked beyond the immediate horizon to see what type of infrastructure would be necessary to facilitate Somali autonomy. Finally, the UN was overreaching in its expectations of UNOSOM II, which had neither adequate resources in place, nor a strategy with clear intermediate and long-term objectives and measures of success.
Government

Historically, Somalia has had a nomadic, clan based culture. The leader of Somalia for two decades prior to the intervention was General Mohammed Siad Barre. Barre ruled by using an oppressive military to maintain control of the civil population and rival clans. After several years of civil war, Barre fled Somalia in 1991. By 1992, Somalia had borders with no government structure at any level. The lack of any government gave de facto authority and legitimacy to warlord clan leaders. With no one else to turn to internally, Somalis were forced to bargain their existence with those in control of the most guns. This was, to some degree, true of all three operations. Only the UNITAF operation provided alternative courses of action for Somalis, and only when UNITAF provided the umbrella of security and stability. Although a committee which included warlords was established to achieve some consensus during UN operations, no legitimate government was ever formalized and a strategy to create a government structure was never developed.

No significant armed opposition

Initially, UNOSOM I failed because it was unable to counter the warlords and their local militias. UNITAF was immediately successful because it was powerful enough to confiscate heavy weapons with minimal confrontation. It was also seen as effective, and therefore, was respected by Somali warlords. UNOSOM II failed because it attempted to seize small arms which was far beyond their limited military capacity to enforce. It was also seen as unnecessary by the clan leaders and was met with strong resistance. The ability to enforce such demands must be matched with adequate resources which deters confrontational non-compliance.

Effective Police Structure

The pre-conflict Somali police force, unlike the military, was well respected by most Somalis. It was seen as separate from the military and apolitical. This helped UNITAF when it attempted to create the 5,000 member ASF, and in its plans for the follow-on national police force. However, for any police structure to be effective it must have supporting penal and judicial structures operating in a concerted effort under the umbrella of a recognized, legitimate
government. The failure of all three UN operations to develop an all encompassing strategy to deal with these requirements led to their eventual failure. ICITAP was brought into the UNOSOM II operation too late. To be effective, ICITAP and CIVPOL must be a part of any public security planning initiative prior to intervention and must deploy soon after the initial security force to provide immediate assessment and begin training at the earliest opportunity. ICITAP and CIVPOL operations must take place simultaneously with military operations to have the time necessary to be effective.

Few refugees

During the civil war hundreds of thousands of Somalis sought refuge beyond the Somali border in Kenya, Ethiopia, and Yemen. Most of the societal elite, those with an education and/or professional credentials, fled to Europe and the United States. This mass exodus left a vacuum in Somali society. There were just too few capable leaders with the skills necessary to rebuild the infrastructure destroyed by the civil war and government collapse. By 1992, over 300,000 Somalis had died and more than 1,500,000 Somalis were displaced, either internally or externally. The UN strategy never considered soliciting the repatriation of refugees with requisite skills who could have enhanced the long term success of the operations.

Enforceable borders

Somalia was fortunate it was never faced with an external threat during its civil war and the UN operations. Long time rival Ethiopia could have taken advantage of the internal chaos in Somalia, but there was little reward for doing so. Had an external threat developed, it is doubtful any resistance could have been coordinated by the Somalis alone.

SUMMARY

Somalia is a case study in societal meltdown; a people within a recognized boundary, without a government, infrastructure, or the resources to form a rallying point upon which to build. Non-existent public security led to starvation and refugee migration. The United Nations clearly underestimated the scope and magnitude of Somalia’s problems, and never established a
plan and timeline to deal with the myriad of complex issues which could lead to some form of order. The strategic failures in Somalia all point to a lack of interagency coordination and cooperation to reach common goals. An established and recognized government, law enforcement, judicial, and penal systems, and a comprehensive economic and humanitarian aid package, were all required to realize any degree of long-term success. Military forces can provide interim stability and security, but there must be simultaneous efforts to assess, plan, train, and implement internal security systems for follow-on stability. The key to success is interagency planning prior to deployment. The clear enemy in all humanitarian endeavors is time. There is always an outcry for the international community to act when loss of life is widespread. The United Nations needs to rally support and assistance at the early signs of crisis and at the same time begin assessment of required resources to meet short-term, intermediate, and long-term goals. All agencies must begin an early assessment process and coordination to plan how best to respond to the immediate humanitarian needs as well as long term security and infrastructure requirements. To better prepare for these types of missions in the future we should develop exercises and simulations which allow us to create doctrine and operational plans.

If UN operations in Somalia accomplished anything, they certainly proved that a comprehensive interagency effort, executing a well developed plan, is the key to maximizing the limited time available to best meet the future needs of nations in crisis.
Chapter 4
Haiti: Operation Uphold Democracy
and Subsequent United Nations Operations

OBJECTIVES

A US led Multinational Force (MNF) began landing in Haiti on 19 September 1994 to restore the elected government of Jean Bertrand Aristide who had been ousted by a military *coup d'état* in 1991. The United Nations Security Council sanctioned an intervention with the specified objectives of facilitating the departure from Haiti of the military leadership, the prompt return of the legitimately elected President, the restoration of the legitimate authorities of the Government of Haiti, establishment and maintenance of a secure and stable environment, and transfer of functions to the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH)\(^{38}\).

UNMIH had been created in 1993 but was never permitted to deploy by the *coup* leaders. The mandate, reinforced and extended by Resolution 940, was to sustain the secure and stable environment established during the multinational phase and protect international personnel and key installations, professionalize the Haitian armed forces, create a separate police force, and assist the legitimate Government of Haiti in establishing an environment conducive to the organization of free and fair legislative elections.\(^{39}\)

Military planners at US Atlantic Command (USACOM) translated these political objectives into the following operational missions for Operation Uphold Democracy: neutralize Haitian armed forces and police in order to protect US citizens and interests, designated Haitians, and third country nationals; restore civil order; conduct nation assistance to stabilize the internal situation; and assist the transition to a democratic government in Haiti.\(^{40}\)

THE PLAN

Almost immediately after the *coup d'état* that ousted President Aristide in September 1991, the international community began efforts aimed at restoring him to power and reforming


the political, military and police, economic, and social conditions that have been perpetuated throughout the country’s history. These efforts included economic sanctions coupled with political negotiations which led to the Governors Island Agreement in July 1993. At Governors Island, the military junta agreed to step down and permit Aristide’s return by 30 October 1993.\footnote{XVIII Airborne Corps Historian, \textit{JTF-180 Uphold Democracy: Oral History Interviews} (Fort Bragg, NC: XVIII Airborne Corps and Fort Bragg Training Support Center, 1994) 4.}

In preparation for the transfer of power back to the duly elected government, the UN created UNMIH to direct the international effort to reform the military and police. However, when right-wing crowds prevented the \textit{USS Harlan County} from landing the lead elements of US and Canadian military and police trainers on October 12, the situation progressively worsened. USACOM activated a planning cell to begin planning for a military intervention. In March 1994, the Secretary of Defense directed the Pentagon to begin interagency planning.\footnote{Margaret Daly Hayes and Gary F. Wheatley, eds., \textit{Interagency and Political-Military Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti - A Case Study} (Washington: National Defense University, 1996) 11.}

President Aristide insisted from the beginning that the \textit{Forces Armées d’Haïti} (FAd’H), the Haitian armed forces, must be neutralized, disarmed, and demobilized, and a separate police force created.\footnote{Hayes and Wheatley 12.} These became essential elements of the interagency strategy both for the US led Multinational Force and for UNMIH. The plan called for combat forces to enter the country by permissive or nonpermissive means at the capital of Port-au-Prince and the country’s northern port of Cap Haitien. Conventional Army and Marine forces were to neutralize the FAd’H in those cities where the bulk of the Haitian armed forces were located and disarm military, police, and paramilitary elements. US Army Special Forces were to perform similar tasks in smaller towns and rural villages. International Police Monitors (IPM) would deploy as soon as practicable to begin working with existing police elements, while Department of Justice’s ICITAP initiated programs to create a new nonpoliticalized police force. After transfer of these missions to UNMIH, UN CIVPOL would replace IPM and other UN and bilateral agencies would continue police reform as well as legal and penal reforms, while a reduced military presence would remain to reinforce the fledgling police force, if required.

The interagency planning and coordination effort at the strategic level included the US Departments of Defense, State, and Justice and the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations

\footnote{Hayes and Wheatley 44-45.}
(DPKO). This resulted in broad agreement as to the sequencing of events, responsibilities of the agencies, and broad requirements. However, due to operational security requirements, planning at the operational and tactical levels was much more compartmentalized. As a result, many of the people who would actually be executing the tasks on the ground had little or no contact with each other prior to deployment.  

**OPERATIONS**

At literally the eleventh hour, the intervention changed from nonpermissive to permissive following former President Carter's mission to convince General Raoul Cedras to step down as Commander-in-Chief of the FAd'H and head of the de facto government. The military task force quickly secured their military objectives with the cooperation of the FAd'H. However, restrictive rules of engagement initially prevented MNF soldiers from intervening in Haitian-on-Haitian violence and disorder. This soon changed when it became apparent the FAd'H was being permitted to continue their abusive practices and that social and criminal violence were not being policed at all. This also necessitated acceleration of the deployment of military police and IPM to establish, train, and monitor an Interim Public Security Force (IPSF) comprised largely of vetted former FAd'H personnel. Concurrently, military forces concentrated on disarming the factions through weapons seizures and a "buy back" program.

On 31 March 1995, the MNF completed transfer of all missions to UNMIH. While a reduced US and later Canadian military force maintained presence in the cities, CIVPOL replaced the IPM and military police in working with the interim police force. ICITAP implemented an eighteen month police academy to train 4,000 new policemen. As of November 1997, all military forces (except for some civic action medical and engineer personnel\(^ {45} \)) have departed the country. The mandate for CIVPOL continues until November 1998.

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\(^{44}\) Hayes and Wheatley 29-35.

ANALYSIS

Haiti represents a comparatively successful strategy for the restoration of public security following the neutralization of the existing abusive paramilitary. It provided combat forces, military police, and International Police Monitors initially to minimize disorder and to disarm and neutralize the repressive FAd’H, while UN CIVPOL and bilateral agencies rebuilt and trained a new, depoliticized police force. Although the government and social institutions in Haiti are still very fragile, the strategy permitted an orderly transition of public security functions and extrication of intervening military forces.

Government

Although free and fair elections brought about a new government following completion of President Aristide’s five year term of office, political infighting within Aristide’s Lavalas party has emasculated the government of President Preval with a deadlocked parliament that cannot pass legislation. However, right-wing parties associated with the former military and business elements have not mounted significant opposition either within parliament or by violence. Reform of the country’s legal system has lagged behind police reform, frustrating both the police and the people. The greatest threat is a descent into political, economic, and social chaos if the government is unable to provide essential regulation and services.

No significant armed opposition

The FAd’H has been entirely demobilized, along with their heavy weapons and explosives. However, many small arms are thought to remain in the hands of former FAd’H as well as paramilitary elements of other factions and criminal gangs. The true test of the Haitian National Police’s (HNP) viability will be its ability to withstand any organized armed attacks in the absence of international military reinforcement. A 90 man CIVPOL special police unit remains in Haiti as a rapid response force, but has the primary mission of protecting UN personnel and property.46

Effective Police Structure

The HNP is currently comprised of about 5,500 policemen; 1,500 are former FAd’H who were vetted, trained, and served with the interim police force, and 4,000 who have completed ICITAP’s eighteen month police academy. They have basic law enforcement skills, but lack sophisticated investigative training and experience. Since almost all have less than three years service, they lack seasoned leadership. Furthermore, they lack effective communications and mobility. International assistance efforts are primarily oriented on these deficiencies. Nevertheless, they are accepted by the general public and are generally regarded as impartial and nonpolitical. There have been reported incidents of police vigilantism and police brutality in pursuit of criminals, though their record is much improved since the dissolution of the FAh’D. They are considered to be acceptably effective at basic law enforcement but will require at least two more years of training, experience, and CIVPOL reinforcement before they will be capable of responding effectively to organized political or criminal violence or widespread public disorder.

Few refugees

Returning Haitian refugees have exacerbated the strain on unemployment and social services, but they have also become part of the solution. Recruits for the HNP came from Haitian expatriates in large numbers. Also, many Haitians have returned after living and working abroad bringing badly needed investment capital to the devastated economy. On the other hand, the Dominican Republic has attempted to forcibly repatriate Haitian workers who have also provided income to their families in Haiti. This has led to tensions between the neighboring countries and occasional border violence. The Dominican Republic has agreed not to forcibly repatriate Haitians for the time being, but large numbers of returnees could exacerbate already rampant unemployment and shortages of social services.47

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Enforceable borders

The border between Haiti and the Dominican Republic crosses extremely rugged, sparsely populated, mountainous terrain. Although border control at the crossing point of roads is adequately regulated by both countries, illegal crossing via trails and streams has always been rampant. During the economic sanctions, significant smuggling occurred across the border, and the Dominican Republic has often sheltered exiled Haitian opposition leaders in the past who have used Dominican sanctuary to foment opposition at home. However, recent cooperation between the Presidents of the two countries to limit cross border smuggling and to deny sanctuary to supporters of the former junta has mitigated the external threat to Haitian security.

SUMMARY

Peace operations in Haiti included a far greater role for the nonmilitary instruments in the strategy for restoring sustainable public security. The integrated planning of the US Departments of Defense, State, and Justice combined with the efforts of the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and other governmental and nongovernmental agencies insured that there was a coordinated involvement in police, penal, and judicial reform. These agencies in turn at least broadly coordinated with the United Nations, their departments and agencies, and international PVOs and NGOs. Finally, and perhaps more importantly, President Aristide's government-in-exile provided key input into the plan, especially the objectives of demobilizing the FAd'H and creating a new police force. The result was military effort that rapidly restored basic order and security for most citizens, the creation of an interim police force supervised by civilian police monitors, and the training and development of a professional civilian police force that is effectively maintaining basic law and order with UN CIVPOL guidance. Moreover, this process maintained its focus and equilibrium through transition from combat military troops, through military police and Special Forces jointly patrolling with IPSF, through hand off to UNMIH and a greater internationalization of the effort. Penal and judicial reform has lagged far behind policing and could yet undermine the stability of public security. The Government of Haiti must make the political compromises required to make these institutions an effective architecture for rule of law.
Chapter 5  
Policy Recommendations and Conclusions

RECOMMENDATIONS

To create the conditions for a successful public security mission, the United States government, including the Department of Defense, needs to make some changes in planning for future complex contingencies. PDD-56 has created a planning body and is implementing procedures to make the planning process effective. We think that there are actions that should be taken, at the national level and within the Department of Defense, that will improve the likelihood of getting the desired outcome as efficiently as possible. Also, the US can support one action at the international level that would have a dramatic impact on the conduct of the public security mission.

International

*International Gendarmerie.* The NATO Supreme Allied Commander in Europe (SACEUR) is actively considering the establishment of a paramilitary gendarmerie to assume many of the roles currently performed by military forces and international police monitors in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Organized, trained, and equipped along lines similar to the Italian *carabinieri*, the French *Gendarmes*, or the Spanish *Guardia Civil*, they would be capable of both law enforcement and investigation and light infantry missions.\(^{48}\) Such an organization could have great utility in reducing the deployment gap identified by Michael Dziedzik in *Policing the World Disorder: Peace Operations and Public Security*. This is the gap between the deployment of combat forces and the arrival of UN CIVPOL, international police monitors, or ICITAP contractors.\(^{49}\) It is caused primarily by the comparatively long lead time, from weeks to months, required to recruit, train, and deploy international police for a particular contingency since there is no permanently constituted and manned international police organization.\(^{50}\) Moreover, after military forces redeploy, international police monitors or UN CIVPOL are rarely armed and equipped to oppose

\(^{48}\) Elizabeth Neuffer “NATO plans ‘paramilitary’ force in Bosnia; Troops’ civilian focus would include refugee assistance, keeping order.” *The Boston Globe* 23 Feb. 1998. city ed.: A2.

\(^{49}\) Oakley, Dziedzic, and Goldberg 499.
any resurgent paramilitary or organized criminal threat that could overwhelm indigenous police. These threats have often required a continuing military presence well after basic street security has been restored. A paramilitary gendarmerie would have the capability of reinforcing an indigenous response to these threats, while continuing to perform conventional police monitor functions.

Recommendation. The United States should support efforts in the United Nations to expand the capabilities of UN CIVPOL within the Department of Peace-keeping Operations (DPKO). This should include increasing staffing to permit adequate planning, training, and supervision of CIVPOL operations. We should support funding of a reserve of equipment that should include tactical vehicles, communications equipment, and weapons. Most critically, we should contribute, and encourage other UN member nations to contribute, qualified police to a standby contingent available for rapid deployment and trained and organized as tactical gendarmes. Former military policemen and Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) police would be ideally suited. To maximize interoperability, these national contingents and the staff should conduct periodic training and exercises.

National

Interagency Public Security Working Group. While the US military is a large organization with an expansive breadth of capability, for policy, legal, and efficiency reasons, other organizations in the US government are the focal point for certain aspects of our national power. The PDD-56 interagency process was created to coordinate efforts to produce a comprehensive political-military solution. Operations Just Cause and Promote Liberty in Panama are examples of what happens when there is no national level coordinated planning conducted. Because the public security mission is a central focus of all complex contingencies, the PDD-56 political-military implementation planning process would benefit from some pre-established planning factors. These planning factors would match existing areas of expertise with roles to be filled in the public security mission. This should both improve the quality of the product and speed the plan development process.

Recommendation. PDD-56 planning process should have a public security working group. Membership should include representatives from: Defense (JCS J-3, JCS J-5, and

50 Robert M. Perito, Deputy Director, ICITAP, Personal Interview, 18 November 1997.
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict (ASD/SOLIC), State (Bureau of International Organizations Affairs and Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)), USAID, and Justice (Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, ICITAP, and Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT)).

Revised Role for Military Government. Although military CMO doctrine includes plans to develop and implement governments, this mission is unlikely to be assigned to the military in complex contingencies. Rescinding the Army Doctrine publication (FM 41-5 of November 1966) concerning Civil Affairs is an indication that the existing doctrine was not adequate for current operations. If no legitimate government is recognized by the UN, some internationally acceptable method of creating a government will be implemented, possibly as part of a negotiation during peace operations. The State Department will provide the liaison with the UN or other regional bodies that will be coordinating international response to the contingency. Because of the fundamental legal basis of constitution development, the Department of Justice Office of International Security and Peacekeeping Operations, should be the lead in the inter-agency process. To ensure the new government reflects the culture of the nation, the State Department would provide significant assistance to the planning process as the cultural experts about the region and as coordinators for working with representatives of local parties. Any electoral process involved in establishing a government would be monitored by international observers coordinated through the UN or a regional organization.

The military role in this area should be limited to advising the planning process on a proposed structure for the nation’s military and to providing logistic support for designated representatives on the ground in the contingency region. Until NGOs/PVOs or other US government organizations arrive, the US military must be prepared to provide governmental functions for short periods of time (less than one month).

Recommendation. Revise CMO doctrine for complex contingencies to reflect limited military role in development of a government, except for the short period of time necessary to get other organizations in place.
Military Training of Foreign Public Security Forces. 22 USC 2420 prohibits the US military from providing training or advice to foreign police, prison, and other law enforcement forces.\(^{51}\) During phase II of the public security mission, while ICITAP conducts the formal training process, MPs and SOF will be conducting public security patrols, initially by themselves and then in company with local security forces. It is necessary and beneficial to have these professionals monitor the actions of local public security forces and advise them on improving their performance. The alternative is to have a larger number of US forces perform the public security mission for a longer period of time, until ICITAP training is complete. In Haiti, the ICITAP training plan called for a five year commitment, with over 18 months required just to put a trained police force in the field.\(^{52}\) To avoid that type of commitment, local forces must be used before their training is complete. US military monitoring and advising speeds and improves the process. For complex contingency operations to date, the law has been commonly waived with exceptions requested and approved, after the operation is already in progress.

**Recommendation.** Revise 22 USC 2420 to recognize Department of Justice training of foreign security forces but to allow US military elements to develop US military doctrine for and to conduct contingency planning for the advising of foreign public security forces during the specific conditions of a declared complex contingency.

Enhancing US Civilian Assistance for Penal and Judicial Reform. In Panama, Somalia, and Haiti, the underlying justice system was unsatisfactory. The large majority of prisoners were just awaiting trial. The efficient and fair handling of their cases was hampered by the absence of judges, trained prosecutors, and administrative staff and procedures. While policing standards are upgraded by ICITAP training, the delay or unfair handling of cases will ultimately reduce the effectiveness of the entire public security process. Prison reform should also be part of the process to establish an effective and fair public security environment. We recognize that developing a judicial and penal structure is a long term project, certainly of several years duration. The long duration of these programs has implications for complex contingency operations.

Planning and execution of these long term projects must begin early in the process. Delaying the initiation of these actions ultimately either delays the time when US military forces can be withdrawn or reduces the overall likelihood for success. This does not mean that US forces must remain until these actions are complete. Just as a certain minimum level of police performance will allow the reduction of US force level, although ICITAP training continues for several years, so too certain minimum judicial and penal reforms need to be accomplished before US force levels drop while training in these areas continues. Operation Promote Liberty’s opening of night courts to handle minor cases is an example of rapid creation a court system that allowed reduction of US military presence in the public security mission.

**Recommendation.** Department of Justice should lead in developing and coordinating judicial and penal versions of ICITAP. The Overseas Prosecutorial Development and Training (OPDAT) program is a first step in this training process. It should be expanded to include judges and prison managers or parallel efforts should be established to implement reforms in these areas.

**Department of Defense**

*Military Doctrine for Public Security Operations.* US military Joint and service doctrine inadequately addresses the military role in public security operations. Where it is addressed at all, the publications merely identify that military forces may be called upon to restore order, provide security for civilians, and work with indigenous public security forces. However, there is virtually no discussion of the tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) that these forces should employ or of the unique training requirements to prepare them for these tasks.

**Recommendation.** Develop a multiservice (vice Joint) publication for Public Security Operations that collects the lessons learned from recent complex contingencies as well as historical studies such as *Small Wars*[^53] to provide a doctrinal framework for the conduct of public security operations. This Framework should include objectives of public security operations, principles of public security operations (as in the “principles of war”), and discussion of the capabilities that military branches and services and other national and international agencies bring.

to the effort. Include TTP and develop a Mission Training Plan that identifies tasks, conditions, and standards of performance for units to train for these tasks. Some suggested topics include:

- joint patrolling
- search and seizure
- command, control, communications, and liaison
- rules of engagement, use of force
- crowd control
- negotiation

**Proponent for Civil Military Operations.** DOD should designate a proponent for Civil Military Operations (CMO). Each service is currently conducting CMO exercises and simulations in an attempt to make early liaison and coordination with the other services, NGOs, and PVOs. While this is helping each service to individually prepare for CMO, it fails to leverage joint capabilities, to reduce redundancy, and to focus unity of effort.

**Recommendation.** Designate United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) as the proponent for CMO. Specifically task USSOCOM J5/J7 to develop plans, policy, doctrine, simulations, and analysis. This should include development, in coordination with all agencies having potential crisis responsibilities, of CMOC staffing guides and guides for liaison cells at the Joint Task Force headquarters. USSOCOM should sponsor global threat analysis, exercises and simulations, so that relevant agencies can develop Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), for coordinating interagency missions at the CMOC and JTF commander levels.

**Synchronization of PDD-56 Planning with DOD Crisis Action Planning.** DOD Crisis Action Planning has six identified phases. These phases must be synchronized with PDD-56 procedures because its Political-Military Implementation Plan (PIP) should include the final output of Department of Defense Crisis Action Planning, an Operation Order. Because the PDD-56 process has only one clearly defined output (PIP), JCS should choose not to release a Warning Order until the PDD-56 equivalent of a CINC’s Assessment is available. A National Command Authority decision on the national policy to be followed provides overarching political-military
guidance for all elements of the government. Creating military Courses of Action (COAs), which occurs in Phase III of Crisis Action Planning, without this guidance is either an exercise in futility or has the military tail wagging the policy dog. Defense participation in the PDD-56 planning process ensures that informal liaison is available to allow parallel planning.

**Recommendation.** JCS issue a Warning Order only after the PDD-56 process has produced overall guidance on desired military response. This should require a preliminary NCA decision on an overall national COA to pursue.

**CONCLUSIONS**

The role of the US military in peace operations in general and public security operations in particular is one that has seen considerable evolution during the months of our research effort. The military establishment is continuing to grapple with the new strategic realities of the post-Cold War era and with a new vision for the global security environment of the next twenty years. That a coherent consensus is still just emerging is evident in the open dialectic presented by the report of the Department of Defense’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the recommendations of the National Defense Panel appointed by the Congress to review the QDR, both released during 1997.

There are, however, clear indications that the US military must actively prepare for future involvement in public security operations.

- The National Security Council assigned the Department of Defense as the proponent for coordinating and publishing the *Handbook for Interagency Management of Complex Contingency Operations*, the implementation guidance for PDD-56.\(^\text{55}\)
- Continued US military involvement in Bosnia-Herzegovina has led to a detailed review of previous interventions to develop pertinent lessons for future US public security policy in the Balkans.
- A growing acknowledgment that while an emerging "peer competitor" in the next twenty years may present the most dangerous threat to the security interests of the United States, the

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\(^{54}\) United States, National Defense University, *The Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1997 (AFSC PUB 1)* Figure 7-1 7-4.

\(^{55}\) *White Paper for PDD-56.*
most likely near-term threat is lawlessness as a result of "failed states," transnational terrorism and crime, ethnic and political repression, and humanitarian emergencies.

- Pressures from the Administration, the Congress, the international community, and the American people for our extensive military establishment to be active and relevant in contributing to conflict resolution around the world.

- Agencies within the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Service Departments, and the unified and specified commands are actively coordinating amongst themselves and with other US Government agencies, international organizations, and NGO/PVOs to integrate policies for public security operations.

Until doctrine is issued, our model of the public security mission and its phase transitions can help to define the environment of public security operations in complex contingencies and it proposes a framework for analyzing the relative success of those operations. It addresses not only the military role in public security but also the value and desirability of US governmental organizations such as ICITAP and international police addressing the longer term nation building requirements for sustainable public security.

The case studies of Panama, Somalia, and Haiti demonstrate the key role that interagency coordination and planning plays in designing an effective public security strategy. Developing a common vision of public security objectives, interdepartmental synchronization, and integration of ways and means to achieve those are keys to creating a successful outcome. Each agency brings key pieces of the strategic puzzle to the policy table. The earlier a plan is coordinated and the more integrated its execution is, the better the chance for a coherent and effective strategy.

Our recommendations propose institutional improvements at the national and international level for public security intervention. This is not a comprehensive list of all the desirable enhancements to the public security system; rather, it tries to address the most salient issues common to our three cases and that we think are also pertinent to other US and international contingencies that we studied.

While few complex contingencies have or will invoke vital US national interests, it is a deeply moral American interest to stop the killing of innocents and to contribute to the creation of sustainable institutions for civil and human rights. If this remains a major policy objective of our Government, it requires an integrated approach to create clearly identifiable criteria for success, to
bring our vast spectrum of ability to bear on the situation, and to resolve it for the benefit of the victims, our nation, and humanity.
Works Consulted


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