Defining U.S. Atlantic Command's Role in the Power Projection Strategy

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Thomas-Durell Young
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The authors argue that the lynch-pin in the power projection strategy of the United States is a completely transformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The monograph details how USACOM has been allowed to "evolve" since its inception in 1993 but is yet to achieve its full potential for implementing the CONUS-based power projection strategy. Recognizing USACOM as a principal actor in support of this new strategy, the authors recommend that USACOM should be further transformed into a "Joint Forces Command." Their analysis exposes the need for a significant review of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and a reexamination of some of the fundamental tenets underlying the structure and command of the U.S. armed forces. The reappraisals they propose will impact the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the unified combatant commands in important ways.

U.S. Atlantic Command; CONUS-based forces; power projection strategy; joint training; geographic CINCs

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IN THE POWER PROJECTION STRATEGY

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Contents

Foreword v
Abbreviations vii
Acknowledgments ix
Summary xi
1. Introduction 1
2. USACOM's Precedents and Creation 3
3. Defining USACOM: An "Uncertain" Evolution 7
4. Assessing USACOM: Successes, Challenges and Imperatives for Change 25
5. USACOM: Need for Further Reform 37
6. Conclusion 41
7. Recommendations 45
Notes 47
Index 63
Foreword

One could argue strongly that since the end of the Second World War "power projection" has been an indispensable characteristic of the U.S. armed forces. Since the early 1990s, however, it has become a fundamental strategic concept in support of the President's National Security Strategy of the United States. Over 80 percent of U.S. combat forces are now based in the continental United States (CONUS). Forces stationed overseas number only about 200,000, contrasted with over 500,000 during the Cold War. The strategic ambiguity of the post-Cold War era justifies concentrating U.S. forces in CONUS to enable them to respond more effectively to unforeseen crises erupting within a volatile international security environment. But, how are these CONUS-based forces trained, integrated, and packaged to enable them to support optimally the geographic CINC's requirements?

The authors of this monograph argue that the lynch-pin in the power projection strategy of the United States is a completely transformed U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM). The monograph details how USACOM has been allowed to "evolve" since its inception in 1993 but is yet to achieve its full potential for implementing the CONUS-based power projection strategy. Recognizing USACOM as a principal actor in support of this new strategy, the authors recommend that USACOM should be further transformed into a "Joint Forces Command." Their analysis exposes the need for a significant review of Title 10 of the U.S. Code and a reexamination of some of the fundamental tenets underlying the structure and command of the U.S. armed forces. The reappraisals they propose will impact the Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, the Military Departments, and the unified combatant commands in important ways.

To be sure, the very subject of power projection and the authors' recommendations address some of the most basic aspects of the roles and missions of the Services and raise issues very sensitive among the unified combatant commands. Nevertheless, their arguments are unconstrained but persuasive. Although they do not pose solutions in every case, they illuminate the most important and troubling issues.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this study as a contribution to the debate of how to best posture USACOM to implement the U.S. power projection strategy.

LARRY M. WORTZEL
Colonel, U.S. Army
Director, Strategic Studies Institute
### Abbreviations

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<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>ACC</td>
<td>Air Combat Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>ACTD</td>
<td>Advanced Concepts and Technology Demonstration</td>
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<td>AJFP</td>
<td>Adaptive Joint Force Package</td>
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<tr>
<td>AOR</td>
<td>area of responsibility</td>
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<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>CINCCENT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Central Command</td>
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<td>CINCLANT</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCPAC</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINCREDS</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief Readiness Command</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINCUSACOM</td>
<td>Commander-in-Chief U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<tr>
<td>COCOM</td>
<td>combatant command</td>
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<tr>
<td>COMNAVUSA</td>
<td>Commander, Naval Forces in the United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>continental United States</td>
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<tr>
<td>DCINC</td>
<td>Deputy Commander-in-Chief</td>
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<td>DoD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
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<td>FORSCOM</td>
<td>Forces Command</td>
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<td>JCS</td>
<td>Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
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<td>JECG</td>
<td>joint exercise control group</td>
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<td>JFITL</td>
<td>Joint Force Integrator Task List</td>
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<td>JMETs</td>
<td>joint mission essential tasks</td>
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<td>JTASC</td>
<td>Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center</td>
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<td>JTF</td>
<td>joint task force</td>
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<td>Abbreviation</td>
<td>Description</td>
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<tr>
<td>MEAFSA</td>
<td>Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia</td>
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<td>NCA</td>
<td>National Command Authorities</td>
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<tr>
<td>OPFOR</td>
<td>opposing force</td>
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<td>RDJTF</td>
<td>Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force</td>
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<td>REDCOM</td>
<td>Readiness Command</td>
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<td>SAC</td>
<td>Strategic Air Command</td>
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<td>SOCOM</td>
<td>Special Operations Command</td>
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<td>SOUTHCOM</td>
<td>Southern Command</td>
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<td>SPACECOM</td>
<td>Space Command</td>
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<td>STRATCOM</td>
<td>Strategic Command</td>
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<td>STRICOM</td>
<td>Strike Command</td>
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<tr>
<td>TMD</td>
<td>theater missile defense</td>
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<td>TRANSCOM</td>
<td>Transportation Command</td>
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<td>TRO</td>
<td>Training and Readiness Oversight</td>
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<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
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<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command (since 1993)</td>
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<tr>
<td>USLANTCOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command (prior to 1993)</td>
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Acknowledgments

Producing a study on the transformation and subsequent record of USACOM is a daunting task. USACOM is truly at the epicenter of the new U.S. strategy which is based upon the concept of power projection. But because of its centrality in America's defense posture, assessing USACOM's successes and failures simply does not easily lend itself to a linear approach.

In recognition of the difficulties presented in addressing the role of USACOM in the power projection strategy, we would like to express our sincere gratitude to those individuals who assisted us in preparing this work. We would like to thank foremost, USACOM itself, whose very professional representative, Lieutenant Colonel Douglas Rodgers, USAF, graciously hosted a visit to the headquarters by Doug Lovelace.

We benefitted greatly from the external review of early drafts of this work by the following individuals: Mr. Allen Miller, Colonel Thomas Littlefield, USA, Commander Chris Janiec, USN, Colonel Thomas R. Carstens, USMC, and Colonel Dennis Murphy, USA. From the Strategic Studies Institute we greatly profited from the counsel of Dr. William T. Johnsen, Colonel Richard McCallum, USANG, Dr. Earl J. Tilford, and Colonel Larry Wortzel, USA.

Mrs. Mary Jane Semple has once again risen to the occasion in preparing the text of this manuscript for publication. Ms. Marianne Cowling expertly edited the manuscript and saw it through publication.

Notwithstanding the sage advice and assistance given to us by the above individuals, all conclusions and recommendations in this work are ours alone. Additionally, we alone remain responsible for any errors of fact.

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
Thomas-Durell Young
Summary

During the early years of this decade several events coalesced to convince the Department of Defense that fundamental change was needed in the manner in which U.S. forces are provided to the geographic combatant commands. The new international security environment precipitated by the end of the Cold War allowed for the return of large numbers of U.S. forces from their overseas bases to the continental United States (CONUS). With over 80 percent of U.S. general purpose forces residing in the CONUS, the United States adopted a CONUS-based power projection strategy to promote and protect U.S. global interests against challengers large and small. The Persian Gulf War was the first test of the new U.S. strategy for responding to a major regional crisis.

Although decades of Cold War planning were devoted to deploying large U.S. formations great distances, almost 6 months were required to establish sufficient forces in the Persian Gulf region to mount Operation DESERT STORM. Notwithstanding the resounding victory over Iraq, critics charged that the United States failed this first test of its post-Cold War power-projection strategy. In addition to taking 6 months to build up forces in theater, deployments were inefficient in terms of type of units, supplies, and munitions, and the force capabilities provided by each Service were not optimally rationalized to effect the CINC's strategic concept and eliminate the Iraqi threat. These inefficiencies resulted in large measure from the inability of the U.S. Central Command's Service components to assist in planning and preparing forces for subsequent operations, while simultaneously helping to identify and deploy force packages from the CONUS.

The experiences of DESERT STORM and numerous smaller operations taught the United States that military forces could be effectively and efficiently projected from the CONUS to meet the requirements of the geographic combatant commands only if their joint training and integration were under the supervision of a single CONUS-based command. Consequently, in October 1993, the Secretary of Defense designated U.S. Atlantic Command as the joint force provider, trainer and integrator of the vast majority of CONUS-based general purpose forces. This new mission and others were added to the command's missions associated with its Atlantic Ocean area of responsibility. The command's acronym was changed from USLANTCOM to USACOM, and, since 1993, it deliberately has
pursued an evolutionary and sometimes indirect approach to adapting
to its new and ambitious roles.

Beyond publication of the 1993 Implementation Plan, USACOM
has received little external support and guidance from higher authorities
and has encountered significant resistance from the other combatant
commanders and the Services. The command has persistently pursued
its new roles as its geographic area of responsibility was significantly
diminished. Still, USACOM has not matured fully to become capable
of implementing effectively and efficiently the CONUS-based power
projection strategy. To do so, the command must continue to evolve
into a sui generis organization that combines attributes of a combatant
command, a Service, and the Joint Staff.

Although it was clear to the drafters of the implementation plan that
USACOM would assume increased responsibility for joint force
training and integration, they may not have foreseen the manifold
ramifications of USACOM’s complete maturation. The failure to
anticipate and forestall potentially negative aspects of USACOM’s
transformation has seriously hindered the command’s ability to
accomplish the missions assigned in its implementation plan. Impediments to USACOM’s development include:

1) Disagreement over CINCUSACOM’s authority vis-à-vis that of
the other combatant commands and the Services.

2) The creation of ambiguity regarding the roles of the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCUSACOM for assessing joint force
readiness, identifying unnecessarily duplicative Service capabilities,
promulgating joint doctrine, establishing joint training policy, and
determining future joint requirements.

3) The de facto evolution of USACOM into a type of organization
that is not provided for in current law or policy.

4) The creation of asymmetry between responsibilities and funding
with respect to force training and integration.

Based on our analysis, USACOM’s (or its proposed successor’s)
efficacy in implementing the power projection strategy of the United
States can be improved. To that end, this study concludes that the
following actions should be taken:

1) USACOM should be disestablished and its area of responsibility
reassigned to a newly formed Americas Command. The USACOM
missions and functions not assigned to Americas Command should be
vested in a new Joint Forces Command.
2) The Joint Forces Command should contain all CONUS-based general purpose forces, i.e., including West Coast forces currently assigned to Pacific Command.

3) The Special Operations Command and the Transportation Command should be subordinated to the Joint Forces Command.

4) Americas Command should succeed the Southern Command and be headquartered in the former Southern Command’s facilities. The Americas Command area of responsibility also should include North, Central, and South America and adjacent waters. Americas Command should inherit all of the former Southern Command’s missions and assume the former USACOM missions of planning for the land defense of the continental United States and the combined defense of Canada. Additionally, the Americas Command should be responsible for providing military support to civilian authorities, providing military assistance for civil disturbances, protecting key domestic assets, and participating in the counter-drug program.

5) The commander of Americas Command’s naval component should fulfill the U.S. responsibility for providing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic (to be renamed “Strategic Commander Atlantic”). A naval component command under the Joint Forces Command should be established for all CONUS-based U.S. Navy forces.

6) The three-tier training process developed by USACOM should be formalized in joint training policy promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman’s training policy should provide distinct and comprehensive definitions of the three categories of training. Additionally, the policy should draw clear lines between the training responsibilities of the Services and those of the Joint Forces Command.

7) Joint Forces Command’s primary mission should be to provide jointly trained and integrated forces to meet supported command requirements for theater engagement activities, as well as for contingencies. With regard to deliberate operation planning, Joint Forces Command’s provision of integrated joint forces should be accomplished by a process that features pre-designated joint task forces based on supported command operation plans.

8) Joint Forces Command’s mission also should include identification, rationalization, and integration of joint requirements for future military capabilities.

9) Joint Forces Command, using the command’s cross-Service visibility of readiness and cross-combatant command view of force
requirements, should develop the capability of providing independent risk assessments to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enhance his military advice to the National Command Authorities.

10) The respective roles of Joint Forces Command’s Service components and the Service components of the geographic combatant commands should be evaluated and unnecessary redundancies eliminated.

11) Joint Forces Command should identify and report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unnecessary duplicative capabilities among the forces of the various Services.

12) Since the Joint Forces Command will be a *sui generis* organization performing roles currently assigned by law to the combatant commands, the Services, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nature, responsibilities, and authority of the new organization should be specified in Title 10 of the United States Code.

13) Whether the new Joint Forces Command should be funded directly as a separate program for all of the joint force training and integration activities for which it is responsible requires further evaluation.
DEFINING U.S. ATLANTIC COMMAND'S ROLE
IN THE POWER PROJECTION STRATEGY
Introduction

During the Cold War, the United States stationed large numbers of forces overseas to be reinforced by forces from the continental United States (CONUS) should the need arise. The Cold War's relatively predictable, bipolar international security system provided sufficient focus for Department of Defense (DoD) strategic planning to permit extensive, permanent commitment of considerable U.S. forces to particular regions.

The demise of the Warsaw Pact and disintegration of the Soviet empire, however, made possible the return home of the bulk of forward stationed U.S. forces.¹ The post-Cold War geostrategic environment, therefore, called for a new U.S. national security strategy. With most U.S. forces based in the continental United States (CONUS),² the need for a new power projection strategy became apparent. While the implementation of this new strategy depends in part on the overseas presence of U.S. forces, it rests principally upon the projection of military capability from the CONUS.³

Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM provided an early test of the power projection strategy. One of the lessons learned from the Persian Gulf War was that:

[d]eploying component headquarters should not be burdened with the details of deploying forces when their primary task is to prepare arriving forces for combat. While recognizing there are some deployment functions best accomplished in-theater, overall deployment management effort should reside in a headquarters not preoccupied with the preparation for combat. Force deployment responsibilities need to be revalidated.⁴

In short, the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Central Command and his subordinate component commanders had to split their efforts between planning for upcoming combat operations and “pulling” forces from outside the theater.
Implementation of the new power projection strategy requires doctrinal and organizational innovation as well as exploitation of technology to provide timely satisfaction of the requirements of geographic CINC's for CONUS-based forces. The U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM)\textsuperscript{5} is a result of, and essential to, the new strategy. However, over the past 5 years, USACOM has encountered significant obstacles in developing the ability to support the power projection strategy effectively and efficiently. First, disagreement has surfaced over CINCUSACOM's authority \textit{vis-à-vis} the other combatant commands and the Services. Second, ambiguity was created regarding the roles of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and CINCUSACOM for assessing joint force readiness, identifying unnecessarily duplicative Service capabilities, promulgating joint doctrine, establishing joint training policy, and determining future joint requirements. Third, USACOM has become a \textit{de facto} type of organization that is not provided for in current law or policy. Fourth, asymmetry has been created between the assignment of responsibilities and the allocation of funds with respect to force training and integration.

As a result of these impediments, USACOM has been unable to mature fully as the provider of trained and integrated joint forces to effect the post-Cold War power projection strategy. This study, therefore, assesses USACOM's roles in implementing the new strategy. To provide context, Chapter 2 begins with a review of the command's pseudo-antecedents—Strike Command (STRICOM) and Readiness Command (REDCOM). Chapter 2 also provides a discussion of how U.S. Atlantic Command was transformed into USACOM, highlighting their distinguishing features. The third chapter reviews in depth USACOM's evolution emphasizing how the command has attempted to execute its roles and missions in the face of opposition from the Services and combatant commanders. Chapter 4 discusses how the command's positive and negative experiences resulted in planned and reactive changes in its roles and missions. Penultimately, Chapter 5 suggests areas in which the command should concentrate its future efforts and discusses actions needed for USACOM to facilitate better implementation of the power projection strategy. The final chapter contains specific recommendations for further reforming USACOM.
USACOM’s Precedents and Creation

The STRICOM/REDCOM Experience.

The 1993 reformation of the U.S. Atlantic Command was not the first time the DoD addressed the need for integrating CONUS-based forces. In 1962, the Secretary of Defense created the U.S. Strike Command (STRICOM) by integrating the CONUS-based forces of the Army’s Continental Army Command and the Air Force’s Tactical Air Command. Although the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) and the Chiefs of Staff of the Army and Air Force argued for including Navy and Marine forces in the new unified command, 4 years elapsed before the Atlantic Fleet became STRICOM’s naval component command. Initially, STRICOM’s assigned missions were to: 1) provide a reserve of general purpose forces for reinforcing the other unified commands, 2) train the general reserve, 3) develop joint doctrine and, 4) plan for and execute contingency operations. Subsequently, STRICOM’s missions were expanded to include planning for, and execution of, operations in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and Southern Asia (MEAFSA). As the first of many critics of the command, the Commandant of the Marine Corps voiced concern that STRICOM was becoming a “world-wide General Purpose Forces Command.”

In 1970, responding to fiscal constraints and strategic guidance, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) instructed the CINC of STRICOM to reduce his headquarters and the command’s capabilities for conducting operations in MEAFSA. The 1971 revision of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) replaced STRICOM with Readiness Command (REDCOM). Essentially, the change was nothing more than a redesignation, except that the command was divested of its MEAFSA responsibilities. The redesignated command’s missions included integrating, training, and providing CONUS-based general purpose forces, as well as planning and providing joint task force headquarters
and forces for operations in areas not assigned to other unified commands.\(^5\)

In 1979, the national command authorities ordered the CINC of REDCOM (CINCREDC) to establish the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) headquarters as a separate subordinate command within REDCOM. The RDJTF was to plan for, train for, and conduct operations anywhere in the world employing REDCOM forces, but was to focus on the Middle East and Africa. If deployed to the area of responsibility of another unified command, the RDJTF would be controlled by the other command. Although CINCREDC endorsed the establishment of the RDJTF, he believed that the strategic importance of the Middle East warranted the creation of a new unified command. The Secretary of Defense agreed and in 1981 directed that the RDJTF be converted into a unified command for Southwest Asia by 1983. The U.S. Central Command was born, but REDCOM retained the mission to provide a joint task force headquarters to plan for and execute contingency operations worldwide, employing REDCOM forces. REDCOM also had responsibility for the land defense of the CONUS.\(^6\)

In November 1986, the President signed into law the requirement to establish a unified command for the special operations forces of all Services. In order to create the new command, a significant number of personnel billets had to be found as well as real estate and facilities for a headquarters. The CINC of Central Command (CINCCENT) believed that REDCOM’s responsibility for maintaining strategic reserves could revert to the Services, particularly since the bulk of the CONUS-based reserves not assigned to another CINC were Army forces. The Joint Staff J-3 suggested that REDCOM could be eliminated by distributing its missions to other CINCs and the Army’s Forces Command (FORSCOM). Thus, disestablishment of REDCOM provided the personnel billets and facilities for the new Special Operations Command (SOCOM). FORSCOM became a specified command responsible for providing a ready reserve of Army forces. Also, it assumed responsibility for force readiness and deployment, joint training of assigned forces, and the land defense of the CONUS.\(^7\)

Notwithstanding the STRICOM/REDCOM experience, its attendant conflicts, controversies, and ultimate abandonment, the CJCS in 1993 made the case anew for a unified command for CONUS-based forces. His reasoning, however, departed from the STRICOM/REDCOM precedent in two important respects. First, the recommended command would not have responsibility for planning for and conducting contingency operations worldwide nor in all the areas not assigned to other commands. Second, the international security
USACOM’s Precedents and Creation

environment had changed and relatively few forces were to remain stationed overseas. These two overarching differences are critical in distinguishing the STRICOM/REDCOM experience from the reformation of the U.S. Atlantic Command.

Transformation of USLANTCOM to USACOM.

Significantly different from STRICOM and REDCOM, USACOM was largely the product of compromise and consensus. By 1990, visionary strategic leaders such as then CICS General Colin Powell and his Director for Strategic Plans and Policy, General George Lee Butler, realized that the permanent withdrawal of a significant percentage of U.S. forces from their overseas bases required U.S. forces to be more strategically agile in order to respond effectively to myriad, unforeseeable threats to U.S. interests. They also realized that in the future the United States must project its military forces principally from CONUS for employment by the various geographic CINCs. Consequently, in November 1990, General Butler suggested, and General Powell initially supported, a new concept for the unified and specified combatant command structure.

This envisaged command structure was designed to facilitate the projection of U.S. forces from CONUS on westerly, easterly, and southerly axes. It would have reduced the 10 combatant commands then in existence to six:

1) Strategic Command would oversee all strategic and space systems.
2) Contingency Command would have been composed of crisis response forces including Special Operations Command.
3) Atlantic Command was to absorb the European and Central Commands.
4) Pacific Command would have retained the Pacific Ocean and Pacific Rim countries, while creating a Northeast Asia subunified command.
5) A new Americas Command would have included North, Central, and South America.
6) Transportation Command would have overseen all of the Department of Defense’s strategic transportation assets.

After a few months, it became clear that this proposal was too radical for the Service chiefs and the CINCs to accept. General Powell limited his public support for the proposal to describing the proposed commands as nothing more than conceptual force packages.
Consequently, the Unified Command Plan modifications ultimately proposed to the Service chiefs in May 1991 called for replacing Strategic Air Command (SAC) with Strategic Command (STRATCOM) and replacing Southern Command (SOUTHERCOM) and Forces Command (FORSCOM) with Americas Command, thus reducing the number of commands from 10 to 9.

The purpose behind creating the Americas Command was to reduce ad hoc responses to crises by providing a CONUS-based command that could tailor force packages for deployment to other commands. An additional reason was to permit the elimination of a combatant command to demonstrate that the Department of Defense was getting smaller. The creation of Americas Command, however, was soundly rejected during the August 1991 CINCs' conference. Even that limited change in the combatant command structure was considered too radical.

Nonetheless, General Powell, still convinced that change was necessary to support the new power projection strategy, raised the issue again at the August 1992 CINCs' conference. He proposed a seemingly less radical change—to assign all CONUS-based forces to the Atlantic Command, making it the joint force integrator and trainer for those forces in support of the other geographic commands. In the process, FORSCOM would become a Service component command of Atlantic Command, allowing for the elimination of a combatant command. General Powell argued further that the Atlantic Command could ensure that forces were "trained to operate jointly as a way of life and not just for occasional exercises." He also argued that the command could take the DoD lead in supporting peace operations, disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance operations and could test joint doctrine. General Powell successfully marketed the concept over the next several months and by October 1993 almost all CONUS-based conventional forces were assigned to the Atlantic Command, its mission officially was expanded, and the command became known as USACOM.
Defining USACOM: An “Uncertain” Evolution

The transformation of USLANTCOM into USACOM was intended to provide integrated unified command over the bulk of the U.S. general purpose forces stationed in CONUS. Precisely how the command was to accomplish its mission, and indeed, exactly what comprised USACOM’s mission were left somewhat vague. CINC's of USACOM have been quite successful in achieving some key objectives envisaged in 1993. Moreover, USACOM successfully has assumed some missions not initially assigned to the command, while other important roles and missions still remain outside the CINC's influence and control.

One should not be too critical of the slow pace of USACOMs maturation. For reasons outlined below, both the guidance provided to the CINC's of USACOM and the means employed by them, envisaged an evolutionary, vice revolutionary, formation of the command. For example, upon submitting for approval the plan to reform U.S. Atlantic Command into USACOM, CINCLANT and later the first CINCUSACOM, Admiral Paul David Miller, wrote that he was not going to turn on a light switch but, instead, install a rheostat. He assessed that USACOM would require months, perhaps years, to become capable of accomplishing its newly assigned missions. A review of the command’s almost 5-year evolution reveals that the rheostat has yet to be turned to full bright. It also exposes several impediments encountered by the command as it has striven to mature. Despite the best efforts of Admiral Miller and his successors, many of the hindrances remain unresolved. The purpose of this chapter is to describe the evolution of USACOM as the command has attempted to fulfill its crucial role of supporting the power projection strategy. The logical starting point for reviewing USACOM's evolution is the publication and initial reaction to the command's implementation plan.
USCOM's Implementation Plan.

One of General Powell's rationales for creating USCOM was to provide CONUS-based forces the same advantages that overseas forces enjoyed under the unified direction of geographic CINCs. He believed that:

unification has never been achieved in the United States to the same degree as overseas. While forces based in the United States are assigned, by law, to one CINC, many are assigned to overseas CINCs and have limited opportunities to train jointly with the overseas-based forces they would join for military operations in crisis or war.3

Based on the Chairman's recommendations which were endorsed by the Secretary of Defense, the President approved a new Unified Command Plan that was published on October 1, 1993, establishing USCOM. On the same date, the Secretary of Defense approved the USCOM Implementation Plan.4 The stated purpose for creating the command was to provide highly skilled, rapidly deliverable, and fully capable joint forces to other combatant commands in an era of reduced U.S. overseas presence. In its primary role, USCOM was to serve as "Joint Force Integrator." In that role, the command was to "facilitate the identification, packaging, joint and combined training, [and] preparation of CONUS-based joint formations and expedite their deployment in accordance with combatant commander priorities."5

The primary mission assigned to the command in the implementation plan was "[t]o provide military forces where needed throughout the world, and to ensure those forces are integrated and trained as joint forces capable of carrying out their assigned tasks."6 USCOM also was made responsible for "[d]eveloping, training, and facilitating deployment of force packages in support of peace operations and/or humanitarian assistance operations."7 The command was assigned other significant responsibilities, including those previously assigned to USLANTCOM and FORSCOM.8 Notably, USCOM was to "[a]ssist the CJCS process in developing inputs to joint doctrine; . . . testing joint doctrine, and writing appropriate joint doctrine publications."9

USCOM initially retained all of USLANTCOM's area of responsibility (AOR) and its missions. USCOM, however, was not given global contingency planning responsibilities like those given its historical antecedors, STRICOM and REDCOM. Later, the
command's AOR would be reduced substantially, thereby truncating USACOM's responsibilities for counter-drug planning and operations and for national security issues involving Cuba. Ultimately, USACOM would be left with an AOR in which there are very few threats to U.S. national security interests. This divestiture of territorial responsibility had the beneficial effect of forcing USACOM to focus more on its mission of providing joint forces to supported commands and its joint force trainer and integrator roles.

The Secretary of Defense assigned to USACOM virtually all CONUS-based conventional forces that were not assigned to SOCOM and the U.S. Transportation Command (TRANSCOM). Significantly, however, the Secretary did not give CINCUSACOM command of West Coast, CONUS-based Navy, Marine, and Army forces. Out of deference to the U.S. Navy's command structure (that has no operational headquarters counterpart to FORSCOM or Air Combat Command [ACC] to control both the Atlantic and Pacific Coast fleets), these West Coast forces still remain under the command of the CINC of U.S. Pacific Command (CINCPAC). That decision limited CINCUSACOM's ability to carry out his joint training and integration responsibilities.

Although the decision to leave Pacific Coast forces assigned to CINCPAC was contended, the issue that evoked the clearest negative reaction by the geographic CINCs to USACOM's implementation plan was CINCUSACOM's concept of Adaptive Joint Force Packages (AJFPs). This was the name initially applied to the groups of forces that USACOM was to train, integrate, and provide to the geographic CINCs. USACOM formally defined an AJFP as "a capabilities centered grouping of forces and headquarters trained and organized to meet specific peacetime, crisis, or wartime requirements of the supported combatant commander." In spite of USACOM's emphasis on satisfying the requirements of the geographic CINCs, their resistance to the AJFP concept became apparent by 1994. The most significant issues involved the "packaging" and training of joint forces by USACOM for deployment to the geographic CINCs. The CINCs were concerned that their authority to select joint task force (JTF) commanders, as well as their ability to influence JTF training, might be diluted by USACOM's assumption of its joint force integrator and trainer roles. Additionally, the CINCs and the Services felt that any growth in USACOMs authority and responsibilities might be at their expense.

This brief review of USACOM's Implementation Plan and negative reactions to it provides a foundation for continuing an examination of
the command’s evolution in two general respects: joint training and joint force integration. The following sections provide a chronological summary of the command’s experiences in these key areas during three time periods: 1994-95, 1996, and 1997-98.

1994-95: Limited Successes and Setbacks.

In USACOM’s Strategic Plan 1994, CINCUSACOM sought to reinforce his commitment to satisfying the requirements of the geographic CINCs while assuaging the concerns of the Services.14 In the plan, the CINC described the command’s mission as training forces as joint units, providing joint forces to warfighting CINCs, and executing other responsibilities assigned to the command.15 In order to accomplish his mission, the CINC established several goals for the command. The first was to complete USACOM’s transition within 2 years. The second was to enhance the supported CINCs’ capabilities to accomplish their missions. The latter was to be achieved by identifying, preparing, training, and deploying joint forces in response to supported CINCs’ needs. Additionally, USACOM would augment the geographic CINCs’ theater headquarters and other staffs as needed. The USACOM staff was to anticipate and satisfy supported commanders’ requirements to enable them to focus better on contingency or mission planning. That called for assisting the CINCs in the areas of joint training, maintaining readiness, and deployment planning.16

In addition to focusing on support to the geographic CINCs, the 1994 plan also addressed USACOM’s responsibilities within the context of its relationship to the Services. In improving processes to maximize flexibility and efficiency, the CINC directed that USACOM’s activities should have minimum impact on Service-specific training. He also instructed the USACOM staff to coordinate and combine joint and Service component exercises to achieve optimal interoperability and efficient resource allocation.17 Accepting that unit readiness is primarily a Service responsibility, the CINC directed that USACOM would focus on the readiness of joint force packages. He instructed his staff to improve the command’s abilities to evaluate readiness and to develop a readiness reporting system that provides accurate assessments of joint force readiness as well as unit capability. He also charged his staff to improve the command’s ability to identify and use lessons learned from prior exercises.18

Joint Training. 1994-95. Partially to address Service concerns, the USACOM director of training19 suggested creating a complementary
relationship between Service- and USACOM-conducted training by introducing a three-tier concept:

1) The first tier would be traditional Service training conducted by the Services; USACOM would not be involved.

2) The second tier would include joint field training conducted by the Service components. USACOM would establish joint objectives for such training.

3) The third tier would be USACOM administered training and exercises for joint task forces.  

In describing this three-tier concept, the training director explained that USACOM did not intend to replace Service training, but rather integrate joint training with it, as well as to provide CINC-sponsored joint training of joint task forces. To that end, CINCUSACOM unveiled his intent to establish “a world-class joint training and simulation center.”

Early in 1995, USACOM’s new CINC, General John J. Sheehan, reporting to the Senate Armed Services Committee, elaborated on USACOM’s mission. He explained that USACOM’s primary objective was to sustain and improve the readiness of CONUS-based forces through planning, training, organizing, exercising, rehearsing, and deploying units and individuals capable of operating as joint task forces in a joint environment. His responsibilities also included providing trained and ready forces for peacetime presence missions. He informed the committee of USACOM’s three-tier training program, that the third tier would rely heavily on simulations via the Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC), and that joint training objectives would be based on essential tasks derived from USACOM’s and the geographic CINCs’ missions.

From January through April 1995, USACOM conducted its first Tier 3 training: the Unified Endeavor ’95 joint training exercise. The Unified Endeavor series of exercises was designed to “[train] joint task forces and their component staffs to operate as coherent units prior to deployment overseas...” Through the use of distributed and interactive computer assisted modeling and simulation, a Unified Endeavor exercise trains a target audience consisting of a three-star operational commander and his staff. The CJCS is considered the principal trainer assisted by the USACOM staff. At the option of the training audience, much of the training can be conducted at USACOM’s JTASC at Norfolk, Virginia, or the training may be distributed to the home stations of the training audiences. The exercise uses a network of computer models, employs a thinking and reacting
opposing force (OPFOR), and USACOM provides training teams of subject matter experts as well as a joint exercise control group (JECG). USACOM also provides after action reviews and compiles lessons learned. USACOM initially estimated that a Unified Endeavor exercise costs 95 percent less than a field training exercise capable of providing comparable training for a joint task force. Additionally, a Unified Endeavor exercise can be designed to focus more precisely on specific doctrinal issues. The majority (85 percent) of Unified Endeavor '95 participants felt that the exercise provided more effective joint task force headquarters training than would a field exercise.

Unified Endeavor '95 involved about 4,000 personnel, half of whom received joint task force staff training. A typical field exercise, such as Agile Provider '94, required nearly 45,000 personnel and provided less effective joint task force staff training. Consequently, the Unified Endeavor series of exercises is a better focused, more cost effective replacement for joint staff training accomplished via field exercises. Although considered an experimental exercise, the success of Unified Endeavor '95 provided a basis of validity to USACOM's joint task force training and by summer 1995, USACOM's three-tier joint training program was becoming more accepted.

An issue related to the Services' acceptance of USACOM's expanded role of managing the joint training of over 80 percent of the U.S. armed forces involves funding. For the most part, military training is funded through the Services' budgets. The Services have steadfastly guarded the responsibilities and authority given them in Title 10, United States Code, to train forces and ensure their readiness. With regard to training, the CINC's historically have been provided only limited funds to pay for associated transportation costs. Therefore, for USACOM to conduct joint training of any consequence, it must seek, through its Service components, the willing participation of the Services. Since CINCUSACOM does not control how the Services construct their budgets or spend their funds, he does not exercise unfettered authority over the command's joint training program. In short, while USACOM achieved significant success in the area of joint training during 1994 and 1995, significant issues remain.

**Joint Force Integration, 1994-95.** The 1994 Strategic Plan intended for USACOM to assume a role in reducing unnecessary redundancy among its Service components by better harmonizing Service capabilities. The CINC believed that the resulting efficiencies and unity of effort would improve the command's ability to form, exercise, deploy, and logistically support AJFPs. The AJFP concept
was to be further fortified by establishing a core of joint officers in Service operational headquarters and joint task force staffs.32

By focusing on satisfying the requirements of the geographic CINC's and establishing constructive relationships with the Services through USACOM's Service components, the CINC intended to generate and deploy trained and flexible AJFPs with capabilities tailored to the supported CINC's requirements. To do so, he wanted to provide a menu of options from which the geographic CINC's could choose the most appropriate responses to current and projected mission requirements. Additionally, CINCUSACOM suggested that the centrality of the command's role in preparing forces and projecting U.S. military power would produce the added benefit of placing the command in a unique position to assist the CJCS in developing and evaluating joint doctrine. Through its integration responsibilities USACOM would have greater appreciation for the best ways to integrate other U.S. Government agencies and multinational processes for missions such as humanitarian assistance, peacekeeping, disaster relief, and counter-drug operations.33

Although USACOM's Strategic Plan 1994 was not intended to threaten the authority of the other CINC's or the Service chiefs, resistance to USACOM assuming greater responsibilities persisted. The geographic CINC's had become accustomed to negotiating directly with the Joint Staff regarding the forces that would be apportioned for deliberate contingency planning and actually provided in the event of crises. The geographic CINC's, through their Service components, also communicate with the Services concerning preferences for such forces. Hence, they saw little benefit in interposing USACOM into those processes and generally feared an eventual loss of control over the selection of forces they may have to employ in the event of crises.

The resistance of the geographic CINC's to USACOM's efforts to become the joint force integrator became sufficiently severe to prompt the USACOM Deputy CINC (DCINC) to assess in early 1994 that acceptance of USACOM's joint force packaging concept would not be possible until the current CINC's rotated out.34 Admiral Jeremy M. Boorda's criticism of the AJFP concept, opined during his confirmation hearing to become Chief of Naval Operations before the Senate Armed Services Committee, reflected the resistance of the geographic CINC's to USACOM's expanded role.35 He maintained that AJFPs would not necessarily fill the CINC's warfighting requirements, that geographic CINCS should remain responsible for organizing and employing their own forces as well as any received from USACOM, and that USACOM
should not determine how to organize forces to be employed by other CINCs.\textsuperscript{36}

Shortly thereafter the DCINC explained USACOM’s role in identifying the forces required by a geographic CINC. He said that the supported CINCs would inform the CJCS and USACOM of what needs to be done and USACOM would suggest a force package to accomplish the task. He noted, however, that “[t]he CINCs are in the driver seat. [CINCUSACOM] is the supporting CINC and [has] to provide what [the supported CINC] needs.”\textsuperscript{37} Still, USACOM’s joint vetting of capability requirements was a way of conducting joint force integration and reducing unnecessary redundancy. By summer 1994, the DCINC acknowledged that the biggest challenge to USACOM remained making its joint force packaging concept acceptable to the geographic CINCs and the Service chiefs.\textsuperscript{38}

The Services have had their own reasons for being uncomfortable with USACOM’s evolution as joint force integrator. Congress was unsatisfied with the 1993 Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Mission, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States.\textsuperscript{39} Consequently, in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, Congress directed the Secretary of Defense to establish an independent commission to examine, \textit{inter alia}, the roles and functions of the Services and to identify potential fiscal savings through the elimination of unnecessary duplication and redundancy. The commission performed the bulk of its work in 1994, the same period during which USACOM was trying to establish the practical scope of its responsibilities and authority.\textsuperscript{40} During the Commission’s deliberations, parochialism surfaced and the Services advanced arguments for retaining their respective capabilities. Thus, they could not very well cooperate with USACOM to reduce duplicative capabilities and redundancies while fending off the Commission on Roles and Missions’ efforts to earmark such reductions.

Throughout the summer and into the fall of 1994, USACOM’s leadership continued to attempt to ease the concerns of the Service Chiefs and the geographic CINCs by explaining the command’s mission and purpose more clearly. The CINC of USACOM continued to emphasize that the U.S. armed forces’ leadership must do better with the resources provided by the nation and “better utilize the total kit of capabilities.” The motto of the command became “[n]o more pick-up games,” borrowing from remarks made by General Powell\textsuperscript{41} and reinforced by Secretary of Defense Aspin when he announced Atlantic Command’s reformation. The motto signified that when a crisis erupted not only would all the Services respond, but they would respond with
jointly trained and ready forces. The DCINC said that “[n]o more pick-up games [meant] no more ad hoc joint task forces.”

Although the command was maturing into its joint force trainer role, the opposition of the Services and combatant commanders to its development as joint force integrator was evidenced in the U.S. intervention in Haiti. In the fall of 1994, events in Haiti provided USACOM the opportunity to demonstrate the advantages of its AJFP concept. In response to the crisis, the CINC of USACOM recommended and the National Command Authorities (NCA) approved a uniquely integrated joint task force. During Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, Admiral Miller embarked Army forces including helicopters, special operations units, police, and logistic support forces aboard two aircraft carriers. Due to the success of diplomatic negotiations, an invasion proved unnecessary. Because of the varied makeup of the joint task force, the JTF commander rapidly changed the sequence of forces and sent humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping forces ashore.

Although the Secretary of Defense described the inherent flexibility built into the joint task force as a “brilliant strategy” which was both “novel” and “unique,” critics quickly attacked the CINC’s force packaging strategy. First, some suggested that such an experimental force would not have been employed if the crisis had occurred in another geographic CINC’s area of responsibility. Others pointed out that the Haiti crisis was too unique to provide any general insights as to the worth of the AJFP concept. Critics discounted the importance of the operation by claiming that the environment was too benign and too close to U.S. shores. Still others emphasized the many reasons for keeping Navy aircraft on aircraft carriers, vice Army helicopters. Some critics even went so far as to claim that soldiers, unlike sailors or marines, cannot tolerate more than a couple weeks at sea.

In the end, the Haiti operation did not provide a watershed for USACOM’s evolution. In fact, by the end of 1994, a community of views developed that questioned whether joint force integration was being pursued for its own sake. The argument contained several prongs. Skeptics claimed that joint operations are not by definition preferable to single Service operations; many scenarios require only the capabilities of one Service. Others argued that the potential requirements for the application of military capabilities are so diverse as to preclude practical organization of preexisting AJFPs. Instead, USACOM should focus on training officers who might serve in ad hoc joint task forces. Still another argument held that suppressing the Services’ unique cultures could lead to an inflexible and predictable military. Finally,
critics contended that the need to operate jointly actually affects only a small fraction of the armed forces and joint training is conducted at the expense of other training, such as Service branch proficiency.47

Thus, after only a year in existence, CINCUSACOM was in a very difficult position. He found few allies among the geographic CINCs and Service chiefs; both groups directly or indirectly opposed USCOM’s evolution out of fear that USCOM’s development would be at the expense of their responsibilities and authorities. Additionally, USCOM’s most influential proponent, General Powell, retired and was replaced by a former geographic CINC.48 Recognizing that resistance to the AJFP concept would not be easy to overcome, CINCUSACOM and his staff began exploring alternative approaches to joint force integration that would bypass the AJFP issue.49

For example, during his 1995 testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Sheehan reported his intention to develop a methodology for evaluating and measuring joint readiness. Signaling a new area of emphasis, the CINC stated that USCOM also would actively participate in the acquisition process through the submission of requirements to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council.50

The final issue to surface during the 1994-95 period that impacted USCOM’s evolution was the December 1995 revision of the Unified Command Plan. USCOM’s success in Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY notwithstanding, the CJCS’s review of the Unified Command Plan51 concluded that a significant portion of USCOM’s AOR, including the Caribbean Sea and its islands, should be transferred SOUTHCOM.52 CINCUSACOM opposed reducing the command’s AOR believing that the loss of this area would damage USCOM’s credibility and prevent it from fully developing its roles of joint force trainer, integrator, and provider.53

Loss of the Caribbean and the waters adjacent to South and Central America left USCOM with an area of responsibility that contained few threats to U.S. interests and little likelihood that USCOM would have to deploy and employ forces in its area of responsibility. In resisting USCOM’s AJFP concept, one of the arguments raised by the geographic CINCs was that USCOM’s area of responsibility presented it with a conflict of interest in packaging forces—that it would be tempted to provide itself with the most efficacious force packages. Although that consideration was not the sole, or even predominant reason for the reduction of USCOM’s area of responsibility, it did make USCOM’s resistance to the reduction seem counterintuitive. Yet, a smaller area of responsibility would provide USCOM with fewer unfettered opportunities to demonstrate (as it did
in the Haiti operation) the soundness of the AJFP concept. Partially to assuage USACOM’s concerns, the new Unified Command Plan reaffirmed the command’s responsibility for “…identifying and preparing for review by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, joint force packages for worldwide employment.”

1996: Defining and Refining USACOM’s Missions.

In January 1996, CINCUSACOM published a strategic plan for USACOM entitled Moving Forward.⁵⁵ In it the CINC restated the command’s mission as “[m]aximizing America’s military capability through joint training, force integration and deployment of ready CONUS-based forces to support forward CINC, Atlantic theater, and domestic requirements.”⁵⁶ The goals set in the plan indicated continued and significant evolution of the command with respect to its joint force trainer role.

Joint Training Developments, 1996. The CINC resolved to improve the joint combat capability of assigned CONUS-based military forces to meet the requirements of the geographic CINCs. To accomplish that goal, he established subordinate objectives. They included:

1) designing a warfighting requirements task list to assist in the development of joint mission essential tasks (JMETs) by other CINCs;⁵⁷

2) developing requirements-based joint exercise priorities and a scheduling process to maximize USACOM’s ability to meet the training needs of customer CINCs; and,

3) conducting realistic, mission-based joint exercises for CONUS-based forces.

In the plan the CINC established other objectives relating to USACOM’s role as joint force trainer. In addition to training, packaging, deploying, and logistically supporting rotational forces with capabilities to satisfy supported CINCs’ mission-based requirements, USACOM would develop a readiness measuring and reporting system to provide an accurate and predictive assessment of joint force capabilities.

The command developed a unique training tool called the Joint Force Integrator Task List (JFITL) for use in USACOM-sponsored exercises. The task list represents 80-85 percent of all the geographic CINCs’ mission requirements. The requirements-based training scheme outlined by the JFITL enables USACOM to reduce redundant, unnecessary participation by USACOM units in joint exercises around
the world. USACOM can track what tasks have been trained to what level of proficiency for different USACOM units and use that data to design more focused joint exercises.\textsuperscript{58} In that manner, USACOM can provide needed joint training rationalization. Given USACOM’s cross-CINC and cross-Service cognizance of the bulk of the U.S. armed forces, this initiative made eminent sense.

In this refined role, USACOM began to evolve into a “joint” advocate. Unified Endeavor exercises continued and improved with experience. These computer assisted exercises remain considerably more cost effective than alternative field training exercises.\textsuperscript{59}

Pursuing another training related initiative, the command began the development and implementation of a uniform method of measuring and reporting joint training readiness. Such a system would establish a more direct linkage between training tasks and priorities established by the CINCs and those used to guide both joint and Service training. The logical consequence of this initiative was the need for a uniform way of measuring training readiness on a mission-by-mission basis. USACOM, by virtue of its command over the bulk of the U.S. armed forces and its unique ability to observe training across the Services, was in an excellent position to develop and implement a uniform joint training readiness assessment and reporting system.\textsuperscript{60}

In describing USACOM’s three-tier training construct to the Senate Committee on Armed Services in March 1996, General Sheehan said that the command adds most value at the third-tier level; the training of joint task force commanders.\textsuperscript{61} Notably, the CINC suggested a subtle but important change in the focus of USACOM’s joint training. No longer did the command see its mission as training joint task forces but training personnel who potentially could become members of joint task forces. To that end, he cited USACOM’s use of the newly operational JTASC to train three-star commanders and their staffs.\textsuperscript{62}

\textit{Joint Force Integration Efforts, 1996.} The 1996 strategic plan advocated improving the competitive advantages of America’s armed forces, particularly in the areas of strategic lift, logistic agility, communications and intelligence, technology, and personnel. USACOM was to accomplish that by working with TRANSCOM to refine transportation support packages and then make transportation requirements known to the CJCS.\textsuperscript{63} CINCUSACOM also planned to integrate Service logistic support capabilities to provide a single, fully coordinated support stream for forward operations. Finally, albeit not a mission envisaged by the creators of the command, the CINC believed that by participating with the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, U.S. Space Command (SPACECOM), and the Services in the
development of tactics, techniques, and procedures for a mobile joint theater missile defense capability, USACOM could achieve greater force integration through interoperability initiatives. The 1996 strategic plan set forth other ambitious goals. The CINC sought to enhance multinational readiness by encouraging combined exercises. He planned to engage other government agencies in contingency planning, training, exercises, and operations. Finally, he intended to increase the command’s participation in the Department of Defense program planning and acquisition processes by more effectively informing the Secretary of Defense, the CJCS, and Congress of USACOM’s current and future requirements. Complementing his intent for USACOM to play a significant role in determining future military requirements, the CINC informed the Senate Committee on Armed Services that the command would evaluate current force readiness, force structure, and recapitalization. Specifically, he suggested that it was time to review the size and number of headquarters and defense agencies.

By summer 1996, it was clear that USACOM’s role in developing joint force packages had evolved into one in which the USACOM staff would only assist the geographic CINCs in developing packages during the deliberate planning process. The USACOM staff did not presume to identify joint task forces that would be provided to supported CINCs in the event of particular types of crises and train the joint task forces for those eventualities. As the USACOM DCINC explained, so long as joint doctrine called for ad hoc, rather than deliberate, formation of joint task forces, USACOM was constrained to training staffs that might be called upon to serve as joint task force staffs.

Still, rather than narrowing the command’s interpretation of its force integrator role in the face of geographic CINC resistance, General Sheehan, in the 1996 strategic plan, in fact broadened the scope of his force integration mission. He abandoned the AJFP label because of the negative connotations the term raised with the geographic CINCs and the Service chiefs, but remained committed to the concept behind the term. Believing that the geographic CINCs had responded emotionally rather than listening to the rationale behind the concept, the USACOM staff began using the less contentious phrase “joint force integration” in referring to the AJFP concept. The USACOM DCINC, Vice Admiral Harold Gehman, described a process by which a geographic CINC would inform USACOM of the military capabilities (vice units) the CINC required, USACOM would suggest types of units to provide the capabilities, and with the supported CINC’s concurrence, USACOM would nominate specific force packages.
As well as evolving as the nexus between CONUS-based forces and the geographic CINCs, the command began viewing itself as a vehicle for overcoming Service parochialism by serving as the joint rationalizer and arbitrator. Significantly, it no longer identified joint issues within the context of its geographic AOR. On the contrary, it viewed itself as responsible for the readiness of the bulk of the U.S. armed forces. As a result, by 1996 USACOM’s senior leaders believed that forces based on the U.S. West Coast that remained assigned to the U.S. Pacific Command must be assigned to CINCUSACOM, if greater training and integration efficiencies were to be realized for CONUS-based forces. Additionally, they felt that the command was in the best position to decide which forces should be provided for employment by a supported CINC because of USACOM’s superior, cross-Service visibility over readiness factors.

The command’s leadership also believed that USACOM had matured to a state in which it could make greater contributions to the development of joint doctrinal concepts and in articulating requirements for future military capabilities. One way of realizing that potential would be for USACOM to integrate the Joint Warfighting Center into the command. Additionally, USACOM’s senior leaders assessed that the command could achieve greater force integration by focusing its attention increasingly on technological advances to ensure that all military systems are initially designed for synergistic operation.

During the autumn of 1996, CINCUSACOM better defined the approach the command would take to improve the effectiveness of the forces under his command. He directed that USACOM focus on the integration of joint forces to exploit synergism fully, while reducing unnecessary redundancy through force structure changes and technological exploitation. Such an approach would require better integration of Service maneuver and precision-strike capabilities. He pointed out that during Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM, Service capabilities were deconflicted rather than integrated. He envisaged a new higher level of joint force integration where various force capabilities are orchestrated to produce the exact harmony needed. Perhaps most importantly, this new approach would expose unnecessary redundancies and other inefficiencies. He saw such a role for USACOM as a natural extension of congressional intent to integrate U.S. military capabilities when it passed the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act.

In pursuing this new approach to force integration, CINCUSACOM signaled an initiative to link integration with future requirements.
General Sheehan stated that the command would work with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Requirements Oversight Council and within the Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments process. Heretofore, those processes had been dominated by the Services and Joint Staff. Additionally, the command would address force interoperability issues focusing on theater missile defense, joint training and exercises focused on the supported CINCs' requirements, training and readiness oversight over reserve component forces, and reducing unnecessary overhead.  

Two broad conclusions concerning USACOM's troubled evolution could be drawn by the end of 1996. First, the CINC seemed to be willing to yield to the geographic CINCs' concern that they, not he, identify the joint task forces that they might employ. Second, the CINC stated an intent to focus on areas that traditionally had been predominantly the responsibilities of the Services, e.g., ascertaining future requirements. 


During 1997 and 1998, USACOM continued its evolution. The command's role as joint force trainer did not change significantly as the contours of the three-tier training program became more definite. The command did receive, however, considerable attention regarding its joint force integrator role.

Joint Training Developments, 1997-98. Although USACOM's three-tier training construct began to take root, the CINC remained reluctant to assert his authority too forcefully, particularly with respect to tier two training. The Unified Endeavor exercise program had become well-established and accepted but it still did not train integrated joint task forces, per se. However, USACOM's three-tier training construct was not elaborated upon, or even reflected, in the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff's Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States published in July 1997. Consequently, ambiguity remains concerning responsibilities and authorities for the various tiers, and particularly for second tier training. 

General Sheehan noted that the recent assignment to USACOM of Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO) authority over reserve component forces allows the command to influence reserve component training, readiness, and fiscal programs in anticipation of assuming command over assigned reserve component units ordered to active duty. The new authority enables USACOM to integrate active and reserve forces more effectively. Specifically, the CINC observed that
USACOM would be able to align reserve forces correctly with operations and contingency plans, and train units accordingly.\textsuperscript{77}

\textit{Joint Force Integration Initiatives, 1997-98}. CINCUSACOM reiterated his vision for increasing joint force integration in testimony to members of the Senate Armed Services Committee in March 1997. He stated, however, that the U.S. armed forces “are still a long way from achieving the efficiency and effectiveness envisioned by the drafters of the Goldwater-Nichols legislation, [but] . . . are making great strides to that end.”\textsuperscript{78} He described joint force integration as the most challenging, least developed, and possibly most critical element of USACOM’s mission.

The CINC went on to explain that the command is addressing joint force integration primarily through its Advanced Concepts and Technology Demonstration (ACTD) program—a process that seeks to transfer technology rapidly into military systems.\textsuperscript{79} Viewing theater missile defense (TMD) as the quintessential joint operation, the CINC informed committee members that the command was focusing on TMD as a prime route for pursuing joint force integration. He reported that the command was collecting and coordinating TMD operational requirements identified by the other CINCs and developing a list of joint TMD-related tasks to guide joint training. Recognizing that each Service offers unique capabilities for providing TMD, he suggested that USACOM was integrating the various approaches to performing the task.\textsuperscript{80}

He discussed in his testimony another area in which USACOM was pursuing joint force integration—information operations. Assessing information operations to be a significant asymmetrical threat to the U.S. armed forces as well as to the U.S. national infrastructure, the CINC stated that USACOM had taken the initiative to help define the concept for information operations as a new warfare area. In doing so, the command entered into consultations with both the Defense Science Board and the President’s Commission on Critical Infrastructure Protection.\textsuperscript{81}

Explaining his command’s responsibility to provide joint forces to the other geographic CINCs, CINCUSACOM described a process by which a supported CINC makes his force requirements known to the CJCS. The Chairman validates the requirements and instructs USACOM to satisfy them to the extent it is able. USACOM then selects the appropriate units, provides mission-specific training, and deploys the force to the supported CINC who employs the force.\textsuperscript{82}

Late in 1997 USACOM’s joint force integrator role received additional attention within the context of defining future requirements
of the U.S. armed forces. Commenting on the divergent visions of the required characteristics of future U.S. armed forces espoused by each Service and that set forth in the CJCS’ Joint Vision 2010,83 U.S. Senator Dan Coats (R-IN) observed that the “[United States needs] a viable organization for joint experimentation with someone clearly in charge, and empowered to create change. This could be the Commander-in-Chief (CINC) of U.S. Atlantic Command....”84 Senator Coats distinguished joint experimentation from joint training, the latter being a statutory responsibility of all CINCs. He also stated that joint experimentation under the oversight of a CINC would not stifle inter-service competition but would constructively sponsor it.

A month later Secretary of Defense William Cohen announced a defense reform initiative that would transfer to CINCUSACOM several functions previously the responsibility of the CJCS. Under the initiative, the Joint Communications Support Element, Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Battle Center, and Joint Warfighting Analysis Center will be transferred to USACOM.85 The Secretary’s intent is to strengthen USACOM’s responsibilities and capabilities for joint training, joint warfighting support, and joint doctrine development.

Shortly after the Secretary released his report, the National Defense Panel, an independent group of defense experts chartered by Congress to identify future U.S. military requirements, released a report combining Senator Coats’s and Secretary Cohen’s ideas into a somewhat different proposal. The panel recommended that:

1) a new Americas Command should be created to attend to national security issues associated with North, Central, and South Americas and adjacent waters;

2) the U.S. Southern Command be subordinated to Americas Command;

3) that USACOM should be disestablished; and,

4) a “Joint Forces Command” should be established to be the force provider to the geographic CINCs, address standardization among the various Unified commands, oversee joint training and experimentation, and coordinate among and integrate the networked service battle labs.86

The panel recommended that the organizations that the Secretary of Defense intended to transfer to USACOM should be transferred to the new Joint Forces Command.87 In simpler form, the proposal called for the U.S. Southern Command to be renamed Americas Command and its area of responsibility expanded to include all the Americas and adjacent waters. USACOM would be renamed Joint Forces Command and given
the additional organizations and functions identified by Senator Coats and the Secretary of Defense.

In early 1998, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff suggested that USACOM might be assigned responsibilities for conducting joint experimentation as well as monitoring, and perhaps integrating, experiments conducted by other combatant commands and the Services. But, at the same time more aggressive empowerment of USACOM came under congressional consideration. Senators Coats and Joseph Lieberman (D-CT), supported by other members of the Senate Committee on Armed Services, expressed their intention to introduce legislation that would assign to a command (presumably USACOM or its nominal successor) several joint missions consistent with Senator Coats’s earlier statements. They would include joint training and exercises, identification and management of future joint capabilities, developing future joint concepts, and conducting joint experiments.

In summary, by early 1998, it was apparent that for certain areas USACOM had not evolved to the extent envisaged in its implementation plan. Its role as joint force trainer was the most clearly defined, but even this area of success was conditioned by the fact that it continued to evolve. The command had been effectively frustrated in its efforts to integrate joint force packages and provide them to supported commands for use in contingencies. On the other hand, USACOM was moving in directions not foreseen by the drafters of its implementation plan. The next chapter assesses USACOM’s successes and challenges.
Assessing USACOM: Successes, Challenges and Imperatives for Change

The previous chapter describing USACOM’s evolution reveals that the command today is considerably different from that initially envisaged in 1993. As a result of its halting evolution the command has yet to realize its potential for supporting fully the U.S. power projection strategy. The reasons for USACOM’s limited progress are manifold, but in large measure center around resistance from the combatant commands and Services in allowing USACOM to expand its responsibilities into areas which they have traditionally held as their own. Another key difficulty has been the ambiguous direction given the command since its inception concerning its proper role in supporting the power projection strategy. Not surprisingly, the command’s roles have varied with different CINCs, and the command’s successes have varied inversely with the degree of opposition from the combatant commanders and Services to each of its initiatives.

Complicating USACOM’s development has been the changes that have taken place in the international environment. The ability of the command to develop its role of supporting the power projection strategy of the United States would have been less problematic if the command were evolving in a stable strategic environment, but such has not been the case. Not only does the international strategic environment continue to change, but so do the U.S. national security and military strategies. The Cold War’s reactive defense strategy of containment was replaced by the post-Cold War regional stability strategy. The latter, in turn, has yielded to A National Security Strategy for a New Century that emphasizes global engagement to seize opportunities to shape the international security environment in ways that further U.S. interests. The new strategy requires CINCs to plan for and conduct activities to shape the security environments within their relative areas of responsibility.
The task of analyzing the evolution of USACOM in light of all these changes is indeed difficult. Furthermore, merely assessing the command’s current state against that envisaged by the 1993 Implementation Plan would be of limited benefit. Rather, analysis must be tempered by the need for USACOM to adjust to the national and international security environments as the command postured itself to execute its mission of providing joint forces to supported commands. USACOM’s attention has correctly focused on the roles of joint force training and joint force integration. The analysis provided in this chapter demonstrates that the command’s evolution regarding the responsibilities associated with those areas has been uneven.3

Joint Force Training.

USACOM has made considerable progress in becoming the joint force trainer of the bulk of U.S. general purpose forces. The command has focused its efforts on training potential joint task force commanders and staffs at the three-star command level.4 To that end, USACOM created the JTASC, a world-class automated training facility. The Center provides high fidelity computer simulated exercises focusing on joint mission essential tasks, conditions, and standards. The Center also can be used to rehearse actually designated joint task force commanders and staffs.5 The Center made possible the Unified Endeavor series of exercises, a more cost effective means of training joint force packages.

To facilitate the training of joint forces, USACOM employs the JFITL that enables the command to train 80-85 percent of all the mission essential tasks of the other geographic combatant commands.6 With the forces provided by USACOM trained to that level of proficiency, the other commands can focus their joint exercises on their peculiar mission requirements and spare units unnecessarily redundant training. The product of this process is more effective and efficient joint training overall.7 While USACOM is funded for and directly administers the third tier training previously described, the command also recognizes that substantial joint training at the unit level can be and is conducted under the supervision of the Services or Service components.8 USACOM, by reserving the right to set the joint training objectives for such second tier training, exerts influence over training administered to entire units, not just to three-star headquarters.

Nonetheless, second tier training responsibilities and authorities are subject to controversy. Title 10 of the United States Code, as amended by the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization
Act, assigns the responsibility and authority for conducting joint training of all operational forces to the combatant CINCs. Title 10 also assigns the Secretaries of the Services the responsibility for training the forces of their respective Services. Although the Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act divided training responsibilities between the combatant commands and the Services, a clear line separating those responsibilities has yet to be drawn. Significantly, the Services, not the CINCs, continue to receive the bulk of all training funds.

Consequently, combatant commanders are all but powerless to impose their joint training requirements upon the Services for two reasons. First, the Services could contend that, by necessity, the competing joint training requirements of the various CINCs must be reconciled and prioritized by the Services. Second, the Services might argue that inherent to the stewardship of training funds is the responsibility and authority to decide how best to spend the funds. Neither of these arguments are dispositive, however.

USACOM is optimally situated to improve the rationalization of the joint training requirements of the other geographic combatant commands. In assuming this task, the inefficiency of allowing each Service to establish its own set of training priorities in response to the requirements of the combatant commands will become more apparent. USACOM, therefore, should be the critical nexus between the Services and the combatant commands that ensures joint training efficiency as well as effectiveness.

As USACOM increasingly serves as the keystone for joint training, a large portion of training funds need not be redirected from the Services to USACOM. Certainly, the lack of control over training funds leaves USACOM no apparent authority to direct remediation of what it perceives to be training deficiencies or to structure the training in the first instance. Nonetheless, the command has the actual authority to do so. While Title 10 grants authority to the Secretaries to train the forces of their respective Services, the Secretaries’ training authority is subject to the training authority granted the CINCs. Thus, CINCUSACOM, who possesses combatant command (COCOM), can and should impose joint training objectives upon Service-conducted second tier training. Moreover, since very little Service-conducted training beyond institutional training will not be joint in nature, second tier training should experience the greatest growth of USACOM influence in the future. Should that occur, it may be possible for USACOM to enhance joint training by better integrating second and third tier training. For example, it may be possible for USACOM to provide Unified
Endeavor-type training to the commanders and staffs of joint force packages at various levels simultaneously, not just to candidate three-star headquarters.

In short, whether the Services or USACOM administers training, funding is not the real issue. Funds are a training resource convertible into facilities, equipment, supplies, and maintenance. There is no pressing need to abridge the Services’ roles of resource providers. Notwithstanding the need for further clarification of some of the nuances of joint training policy, USACOM’s three-tier training architecture should achieve the increases in joint training effectiveness and efficiency intended by the command’s 1993 reformation. Additionally, USACOM’s approach to training responsibilities does not run afoul of current law or policy.

**Joint Force Integration.**

USACOM’s relative success in its role as joint force trainer has yet to be realized in the command’s capacity to serve as joint force integrator. A consensus is forming among the U.S. Congress, the Secretary of Defense, and defense analysts that USACOM, or a nominal successor, must evolve further with respect to joint force integration. The command continues to refine the concept, but as described in the previous chapter, its joint force integration efforts have evoked the most resistance from the other combatant commands and the Services.

Adding to USACOM’s challenges is the fact that the definition of joint force integration has expanded since the USACOM implementation plan was approved in 1993. The original mission of providing “integrated force packages” prepared to conduct joint operations to meet the needs of the geographic CINC’s during crises was mostly concerned with rationalizing and optimizing mixes of extant Service capabilities. More recently, with the acquiescence if not the blessing of the Secretary of Defense, USACOM has taken an active role in identifying future military capabilities that will be required collectively by the combatant commands. USACOM’s future joint force integration efforts, therefore, should include more direct participation in developing and experimenting with new operational concepts and improving joint doctrine. Significantly, joint force integration would result in the identification of unnecessarily duplicative capabilities among the Services.
The new emphasis on the responsibility of CINC's to conduct peacetime engagement activities will generate greater demands by supported CINC's for forces during peacetime and, therefore, will increase USACOM's force integration responsibilities and make efficient integration even more essential. Additionally, USACOM's joint force integration efforts must take into account the capabilities of other supporting commands, particularly TRANSCOM, SOCOM, and in some respects SPACECOM.

Joint force integration, fundamentally, must produce "an integrated joint force." Whether the force is called an adaptive joint force package, a predesignated joint task force, or a proposed joint force, is irrelevant. In the end, it is important that its components are specifically identified, rationalized, and harmonized to form a distinct and functioning whole. This integration also must be guided by a purpose. In most cases the purpose will be to accomplish a mission or fulfill a specific role that requires the forces of more than one Service. Separate Service units simply directed toward accomplishment of a common mission do not necessarily constitute an integrated joint force (Figures 1 and 2 below).

Similarly, the three-star headquarters currently trained under USACOM's third tier training are not products of joint force integration. Consequently, that training necessarily is suboptimal in terms of achieving joint force integration.

As a general rule, USACOM's joint force integration efforts should prepare forces in advance to meet the requirements of the geographic CINC's and should not be ad hoc measures taken after a crisis has developed. Logic dictates, and precedence exists for, the predesignation and peacetime integration of joint force packages. While recognizing
the impossibility of predicting precisely the joint task force that will be needed for a future contingency, it is possible, indeed preferable, to identify component units in advance and integrate their capabilities, planning, and training.

Traditionally, having been assigned a planning task, a CINC would be apportioned type units for deliberate planning. As planning progressed, the Services would "source" the CINC's plan by identifying specific units. The units reflected in the CINC's plans would construct their own plans based upon implicit or explicit tasks and missions that they were assigned in the CINC's plan. Subsequently, the units would tailor their training and posture their resources in accordance with their plans. There would be, therefore, traceable lines from the units' training and resourcing to the units' plans, to the CINC's plan, and ultimately to the CINC's mission. In a practical sense, then, a joint task force was pre-designated for the operation plan.

In many cases, however, there are no traceable lines of rationality among the units of different Services. In such cases, each Service provides what it deems appropriate considering the manifold claims the several CINC's make on the Service. In that scenario, it is left to the CINC to rationalize the multiple and often duplicative capabilities offered by each Service. The geographic CINC's, understandably, tend to view excess, redundant, or overlapping capabilities as hedges against risks. The CINC's, therefore, should not be expected to pursue efficiency aggressively.

USACOM has the ability to integrate joint force packages in advance of crisis by actively participating in the sourcing of the deliberate operation plans of the geographic CINC's. Of course, that is what Admiral Miller had in mind when he introduced the concept of adaptive joint force packages. Concerns by the geographic CINC's that they would lose control of the design and designation of joint task forces and selection of commanders, staffs, and units are not insurmountable anxieties. A solution to this conundrum is that each integrated joint force package proposed by USACOM be a collaborative product based on the supported CINC's operation plan. In the event that the supported CINC and USACOM cannot agree upon an integrated joint force package, their respective positions could be submitted to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for resolution.

Several advantages would accrue if USACOM, in collaboration with supported commands, would pre-designate integrated joint force packages. First, better rationalized, and thus more efficient, force packages could be developed to meet the requirements of the supported CINC's. USACOM has superior inter-Service knowledge of force
capabilities, limitations, readiness, and availability. Thus, USACOM can provide better tailored and integrated force packages to the supported CINC's. This would result in more timely, higher quality responses in crises and lead to greater efficiency in military operations overall.

Second, pre-designating integrated joint force packages can increase the effectiveness of joint training while making it more efficient. USACOM can administer third tier training to a pre-designated integrated joint task force based on the operation plan or plans for which the force package was designed. That would result in greater fidelity between the missions the supported CINC envisages for the integrated joint task force and the tasks, conditions, and standards that guide training. Additionally, since unit headquarters staffs may serve as the nucleus or contribute substantially to several integrated joint task forces, USACOM could increase joint training efficiency by better orchestrating third tier training. For example, if the same unit headquarters provides the nucleus for two different integrated joint task forces linked to distinct operation plans, USACOM can structure third tier training to emphasize tasks not previously or recently trained to standard, while avoiding unnecessarily redundant training.

Similar logic applies to Service-administered second tier joint training. USACOM can craft training objectives that emphasize the most critical training tasks in terms of successful execution of specific operation plans, focus on particular staff proficiencies, and avoid unnecessary repetition. The direct linkage of joint training tasks to most probable missions also would help the Services make better informed decisions concerning the allocation of training resources. Additionally, the joint training architecture would provide useful guidance for Service-specific training.

Third, and perhaps most important, by pre-designating integrated joint task forces keyed to specific contingency and theater engagement plans, USACOM in collaboration with the other combatant commands can achieve greater overall efficiency in the strategic application of the U.S. armed forces. The Services are less capable than USACOM of providing such rationalization because of their Service-oriented views. Likewise, the supported CINC's, individually, are ill-equipped to make informed decisions as to the effectiveness, efficiency, and risk trade-offs among combatant commands because of their limited appreciation of the urgency and magnitude of the specific force requirements of the other commands. But USACOM is well-suited to help optimize the overall utility of U.S. military capabilities because of the command's knowledge of the individual and
collective force requirements of the supported commands, its cross-Service visibility of force capabilities, and its wider view of the international security environment’s impact on U.S. interests.

It follows that USACOM also would be able to provide more comprehensive risk appraisals to the NCA, the other combatant commands, and the Services. Thus, USACOM can assist the Services’ short-term resource decision-making processes, help the other CINCs expose the strengths and weaknesses of their strategic and operational concepts, and better enable the NCA to blend the instruments of national power. Additionally, USACOM’s force integration efforts have the potential to become crucial to the U.S. armed forces as they execute the “shaping” element of the new national security and military strategies.

A corollary to expanding USACOM’s joint force integrator role to encompass identification and testing of potential future U.S. military capabilities involves the command in the development of doctrinal concepts and subsequent doctrine. Doctrine development should be accompanied by a continual survey of the technology base, joint force experimentation, definition of future joint capabilities, and promoting the elimination of unwarranted redundancy in the capabilities collectively provided by the Services. As USACOM evolves to fulfill this new dimension of its joint force integration role, its combatant command character will mutate as the organization takes on Service-like attributes within a joint context. Additionally, USACOM will in many respects become an extension of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

**Joint Doctrine, Future Requirements and a Different USACOM.**

Closely related to the joint integration of forces is the development of joint doctrine and identification of future requirements. USACOM and the other combatant commands have primary responsibility and authority for joint training. They do not, however, have primary responsibility for joint doctrine development, for integrating and evaluating requirements for future military capabilities, nor for providing those capabilities. Promulgating joint doctrine and integrating military requirements primarily are the responsibilities of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, while the Services are principally responsible for providing military capabilities. If USACOM is to assume an expanded role in supporting the U.S. power projection by taking the lead in joint doctrine development and joint
requirements determination, it will have to become something more than, or quite different from, a combatant command.

In fulfilling his statutory responsibility for developing joint doctrine, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff is assisted by the Joint Doctrine Division of the Joint Staff and the Joint Warfighting Center. The Joint Doctrine Division appropriately has played a staff supervision role while the Joint Warfighting Center has actively managed the now substantial joint doctrine development effort. The transfer of the Joint Warfighting Center to USACOM will render the command primus inter pares vis-à-vis the Services in the joint doctrine development process. There was nothing extraordinary about the Chairman’s delegation of his joint doctrine development responsibility to a directly subordinate Joint Warfighting Center. The migration of the Chairman’s joint doctrine responsibility to a combatant command, however, even if directed by the Secretary of Defense, does not appear to be provided for by current law. CINCUSACOM will essentially become the Chairman’s "executive agent" for joint doctrine just as he is for joint training.24 The authority to "command" the Joint Warfighting Center, however, does not derive from CINCUSACOM’s Cocom, but from some other assignment of authority which remains undefined.

The transfer of the Joint Warfighting Center also will facilitate USACOMs ability to identify and integrate required future force capabilities.25 The solicitation, integration, and evaluation of future force requirements is a statutory responsibility of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.26 The Chairman has created elaborate tools—the Joint Requirements Oversight Council and the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process—to help discharge his responsibilities for evaluating, integrating, and rationalizing future capabilities. Furthermore, the Chairman’s staff produces a Joint Planning Document that sets forth the Chairman’s advice concerning DoD requirements. The Joint Planning Document contains a Future Capabilities chapter that links required capabilities to future technologies.27

USACOM certainly will be in an advantageous position to influence this document by identifying and integrating required future force capabilities. Nonetheless, the specific authority vested in USACOM for determining future force requirements has yet to be clarified in U.S. Code and policy. New legislation that does so should establish USACOM’s relationships to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, the Joint Warfighting Capability Assessment process, and the Joint Staff in general.

Similarly, because of its knowledge of the individual and collective requirements of the supported commands and its cross-Service
perspective of available military capabilities, USACOM will be able to identify unnecessarily redundant capabilities and recommend ways to achieve greater efficiencies in the acquisition and application of the U.S. armed forces. Such recommendations, however, inevitably will involve suggested alterations in the roles, functions, and missions of various elements of the Department of Defense. Once again, however, in undertaking these responsibilities USACOM would be encroaching upon what remains the statutory domain of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.28

Joint Force Providing and the Service Components.

The combatant commands’ need for integrated joint forces was recognized long before USACOM’s reformation. Each command, therefore, was organized with subordinate Service component commands to help achieve the needed integration. The components served as the interface between the combatant commands and the Military Departments. They kept the Departments informed of the requirements of the combatant commands. They also advised the combatant commands of respective Service capabilities and how they could be applied to accomplish the missions of the combatant commands. Prior to the 1986 Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act, it was unclear to whom the component commands reported. But that legislation made clear that the Service components were subordinate to the combatant commands, not to the Services.29

The designation of USACOM as the joint force integrator of the vast majority of U.S. forces should lessen the geographic combatant commands’ reliance on their Service components to achieve joint force integration. In reforming USACOM in 1993, the intent was for the command to provide supported commands “one-stop shopping” for integrated joint forces from the CONUS base. As USACOM matures as joint force integrator, the supported commands’ Service components should focus more on providing Service-unique staff advice to the combatant commands and serving as logistics management organizations.

Additionally, as USACOM’s visibility of cross-Service capabilities and readiness continues to improve, USACOM should provide the critical feasibility analyses of supported command operation plans. At the same time, the analyses provided by each combatant command’s Service specialists should decrease in scope. Force capability concerns
would be better identified by USACOM from its cross-command and cross-Service perspectives and relayed to the Services through USACOM's Service components. Therefore, for USACOM and the combatant commands it supports, the present size, composition, and orientation of the Service components warrant review.
USACOM: Need for Further Reform

The foregoing analysis of USACOM leads to the conclusion that, given its current vector, the command will ultimately become an organization that features characteristics of a Service, discharges responsibilities of the office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Joint Staff, and possesses attributes of a combatant command. Such an organization, however, is not provided for by statute nor defined in any authoritative policy document. To date, however, the combatant commands and the Services generally have been able to resist USACOM’s attempts to exercise authority in areas traditionally considered within their exclusive or primary purview or that of other organizations. If USACOM is to realize its full potential for providing the necessary foundation for the CONUS-based power projection strategy, then its unique nature, responsibilities, and authority must be explicitly defined and legitimated. That will require significant legislative and policy initiatives.

U.S. Code and Policy.

Since the organization that USACOM is evolving into would discharge responsibilities currently assigned in Title 10 of the United States Code to the Services, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and to the other combatant commands, changes to Title 10 will be necessary. The changes must not only describe the new organization but also must define the responsibilities and authority assigned to the commander. “COCOM,” the authority granted current combatant commanders seems inappropriate; a new and distinct type of command authority is required. Other areas of activity which necessitate significant revision of policy documents are: 1) USACOM’s management of the bulk of the training administered to the vast majority of U.S. general purpose forces, 2) assumption of the role of the geographic combatant commands’ Service components in assessing
and recommending the sourcing of operation plans, 3) integration of the joint forces required by the supported combatant commands, and 4) identification and integration of the requirements for future military capabilities.

Revision of the Unified Command Plan.

A key policy document that must be adjusted to accommodate USACOM’s new roles is the Unified Command Plan. The foregoing discussion suggests several revisions. First, USACOM should be disestablished and its area of responsibility reassigned to a newly formed Americas Command. Americas Command should succeed the Southern Command and be headquartered in the former Southern Command’s facilities. The Americas Command area of responsibility should include North, Central, and South America and adjacent waters. The new command should inherit all of the current Southern Command’s missions and assume USACOM’s mission of planning for the land defense of the CONUS, as well as the combined defense of Canada. The Americas Command should be given responsibility for providing military support to civilian authorities, providing military assistance for civil disturbances, protecting key domestic assets, and participating in the counter-drug program. Finally, the commander of Americas Command’s naval component should fulfill the U.S. responsibility for providing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic (to become “Strategic Commander Atlantic”).

Second, USACOM should become a “Joint Forces Command” containing all CONUS-based general purpose forces, including the Pacific Coast forces currently assigned to PACOM. These forces should fall under Joint Forces Command in the interest of joint training and joint force integration effectiveness and efficiency in order to achieve maximum flexibility in meeting the force requirements of all supported commands. Likewise, SOCOM and TRANSCOM should be subordinated to the Joint Forces Command. Strong consideration should be given to establishing “Commander, Naval Forces in the United States (COMNAVUSA)” as recently recommended by Admiral J. Paul Reason, CINC U.S. Atlantic Fleet. This would establish an unambiguous naval component command comparable to the Army’s FORSCOM and the Air Force’s ACC in USACOM. The establishment of the new Navy component command would be essential with the
assignment of selected Navy Pacific Fleet assets to the Joint Forces Command.

There are several rationales for such a sweeping revision of the Unified Command Plan:

1) Disestablishing USACOM will mark a clear policy shift and clean break with the past. The geographic combatant commands could not reasonably accuse CINCUSACOM's successor, "Commander" Joint Forces Command, of inherent conflicts of interests since he will have no geographic combatant command responsibilities. The command will be a new and distinct organization that provides jointly trained and integrated forces for supported combatant commands.

2) Southern Command's transformation into Americas Command would accomplish several worthwhile purposes. First, it would bring under a single CINC all national security challenges within, or otherwise threatening, the Western Hemisphere. That would allow for more centralized military planning. It would permit more coherent application of military capabilities in better harmony with the other instruments of national power.

3) The requirements to plan for, and if necessary execute, the land defense of the CONUS and the combined defense of Canada argue strongly for including North America within Americas Command's area of responsibility. Adding to the argument is the potential for closer United States-Mexican cooperation in disaster relief, humanitarian assistance, and other situations where military capabilities may be brought to bear.

The requirements for reform outlined in this chapter should be viewed only as the initial, fundamental steps that must be taken to provide USACOM's successor clear definition, clarity of purpose, and firm direction. Obviously, numerous more specific actions must be taken to reform USACOM beyond its current state. Most importantly, USACOM should not be allowed to drift to wherever the currents of Service parochialism and geographic CINC recidivism may take it. The mission of providing fully trained and integrated joint forces to the warfighting CINCs in the most efficient manner is too important to be shunted by ghosts of the past.
Conclusion

Although the STRICOM/REDCOM experience provides some precedence, the reformation of the Atlantic Command into USACOM was motivated by different factors. Noteworthy among them are a geostrategic environment and national security strategy that have substantially increased Washington's need to more rapidly and efficiently project trained, ready, and integrated armed forces from CONUS to virtually any point on the globe. Yet, rather than being guided by specific national policy, USACOM has been allowed to evolve virtually on its own over the past 4 years. As acknowledged by USACOM, "the command was challenged to take general concepts and refine them into practical missions." That, coupled with significant changes in the geostrategic and domestic environments within which USACOM evolved, has precluded the orderly, deliberate development of the command's new roles. Consequently, "[a]long the way there have been false starts—initial concepts have led to forks in the road and down unexpected paths."

One unexpected result is that USACOM is not yet able to fulfill the intent of its 1993 Implementation Plan: "to provide military forces where needed throughout the world, and to ensure those forces are integrated and trained as joint forces capable of carrying out their assigned tasks." Furthermore, in developing capabilities to accomplish that mission, the command evolved in some directions neither foreseen nor provided for in the Implementation Plan (e.g., determining future force requirements). Nonetheless, these have proven to be beneficial to the implementation of a CONUS-based power projection strategy. It appears clear at this point, however, that if USACOM is to mature as the joint force provider of jointly trained and integrated general purpose forces to the supported commands, USACOM's ultimate roles, functions, and configuration must be more clearly described in the following ways.

First, the organization that USACOM should become, Joint Forces Command, is not provided for in extant law or policy. Such a command
would have responsibilities and perform roles similar or identical to those currently assigned to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Joint Staff, a Service, or a combatant command. Title 10 of the United States Code, therefore, must be revised to provide for this proposed hybrid command by describing its status, roles, functions, and missions, as well as the manner in which it receives resources, the type and extent of authority granted its “commander,” and the chain of command or channel of authority within which the command exists. Once the statutory basis of the new organization is established it should be precisely defined by policy promulgated by the Secretary of Defense in consultation with the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

With regard to USACOM’s joint training responsibilities, the three-tier training program should be formalized in the joint training policy promulgated by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. USACOM’s responsibilities for, and authority over, tiers two and three joint training should be clarified vis-à-vis the Services and the combatant commands. It may be advisable, but not necessary, to grant USACOM control over all training funding, save institutional training provided by the Services and joint exercises conducted by the combatant commands. In either case, USACOM must be provided a method by which it can direct, rather than merely request, Service conformance to its tiers two and three training programs. Additionally, the new organization must have the authority to evaluate the joint training of its forces, remediate deficiencies, and rationalize the joint training conducted by the combatant commands.

The development of USACOM’s joint force integrator role has been accompanied by considerable ambivalence. Initially adhering to its Implementation Plan’s description of joint force integration, the command attempted to apply the adaptive joint force packaging concept as the vehicle for guiding joint force integration efforts. After encountering stiff resistance from the supported geographic commands and receiving insufficient support from the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, USACOM redefined joint force integration to include identifying and integrating requirements for future force capabilities. Title 10 of the U.S. Code, however, assigns the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for integrating requirements for future capabilities.

While the command’s expanded definition of joint force integration cannot be found in the Implementation Plan and is not provided for in current law or policy, it could lead to more effective and efficient execution of the CONUS-based power projection strategy. USACOM, however, should not subordinate its efforts to identify, package, train,
and prepare CONUS-based joint formations and to expedite their deployment to the supported combatant commands. That task is its foremost joint force integrator responsibility, and it applies to deliberate planning and preparation as well as to crisis response situations.

Effective joint force integration requires a clear and logical trace from the supported commands' plans, through USACOM's rationalization and integration process, to the joint formations designed to execute the plans. The most efficient method of ensuring such mission-to-task-to-capabilities congruence is for USACOM, in collaboration with the supported combatant commands and the Services, and with the approval of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to pre-designate joint task forces against the missions and tasks identified by the combatant commands. Neither an *ad hoc* nor a generic approach to joint force integration will provide the efficiency required to implement an effective CONUS-based power projection strategy.

The need for improving joint force integration will become more apparent as the geographic combatant commands complete and begin execution of their theater engagement plans. Those peacetime efforts to shape the international security environment will place continuous, competing demands on military resources that must be evaluated from cross-Service and cross-command perspectives. USACOM will be in the best position to assist the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Secretary of Defense in providing jointly trained and integrated military capabilities to promote most efficiently the range of U.S. national security objectives during peacetime, given force structure and readiness constraints. Moreover, because of its familiarity with the combatant commands' contingency plans, USACOM will be able to assure the most effective transition from peacetime to wartime postures.

Once USACOM fully develops its joint force training and integration capabilities, duplication of effort between it and the Service components of the combatant commands can be resolved. Not all combatant commands will require a full suite of Service components as they exist today. For example, the European and Pacific Commands arguably may have a continuing need for Service components along traditional lines, but commands without substantial assigned forces may not. In the latter case, effective and efficient Service expertise may be provided by members of the CINC's staff and may focus on Service support and sustainment of the command's planned and on-going efforts.

Finally, USACOM's complete evolution can be facilitated by significant changes to the Unified Command Plan. First, the command should be shorn of the remainder of its area of responsibility.
Furthermore, the Unified Command Plan should recognize USACOM’s successor, the Joint Forces Command, as a *sui generis* organization that is neither a combatant command nor a Service. With that in mind, the missions currently assigned to USACOM that go beyond its mission of providing trained and integrated joint forces to supported commands should be reassigned to a newly created Americas Command that would subsume the U.S. Southern Command.

The actions suggested by the foregoing analysis and conclusions would enable USACOM to become an organization capable of implementing the CONUS-based power projection strategy. While USACOM’s implementation plan may not have envisaged such an organization, the mission assigned by the plan—to provide jointly trained and integrated forces to the supported combatant commands—remains valid. USACOM’s interpretation that its mission includes facilitating the integration of joint requirements for future military capabilities should be viewed as an expansion rather than redefinition of its mission. If the command were to receive necessary external support and assistance and take the internal actions suggested in this study, Admiral Miller’s “rheostat” could be turned to an intensity that even he and General Powell did not envisage.
7

Recommendations

To improve USACOM’s (or more properly its proposed successor’s) efficacy in implementing the power projection strategy of the United States, the following actions should be taken:

1) USACOM should be disestablished and its area of responsibility reassigned to a newly formed Americas Command. Those USACOM missions and functions not assigned to Americas Command should be vested in a new Joint Forces Command.

2) The Joint Forces Command should contain all CONUS-based general purpose forces, i.e., including West Coast forces currently assigned to Pacific Command. This new command’s principal headquarters should occupy the facilities of the disestablished USACOM.

3) SOCOM and TRANSCOM should be subordinated to the Joint Forces Command.

4) Americas Command should succeed Southern Command and be headquartered in the former Southern Command’s facilities. The Americas Command area of responsibility should include North, Central, and South America and adjacent waters and islands. Americas Command should inherit all of the former Southern Command’s missions and assume the former USACOM missions of planning for the land defense of the continental United States and the combined defense of Canada. Additionally, the Americas Command should be responsible for providing military support to civilian authorities, providing military assistance for civil disturbances, protecting key domestic assets, and participating in the counter-drug program.

5) The commander of Americas Command’s naval component should fulfill the U.S. responsibility for providing the North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic (to be renamed “Strategic Commander Atlantic”).

6) The three-tier training process developed by USACOM should be formalized in joint training policy promulgated by the Chairman of
the Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Chairman's training policy should provide distinct and comprehensive definitions of the three categories of training. Additionally, the policy should draw clear lines between the training responsibilities of the Services and those of the Joint Forces Command.

7) "Commander" Joint Forces Command's primary mission should be to provide jointly trained and integrated forces to meet supported command requirements for theater engagement activities, as well as for contingencies. With regard to deliberate operation planning, Joint Forces Command's provision of integrated joint forces should be accomplished by a process that features pre-designated joint task forces based on supported command operation plans.

8) "Commander" Joint Forces Command's mission should include identification, rationalization, and integration of joint requirements for future military capabilities.

9) "Commander" Joint Forces Command, using its cross-Service visibility of readiness and cross-combatant command view of force requirements, should develop the capability of providing independent risk assessments to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to enhance his military advice to the National Command Authorities.

10) The respective roles of the "Commander" Joint Forces Command's Service components and the Service components of the geographic combatant commands should be evaluated and unnecessary redundancies eliminated.

11) "Commander" Joint Forces Command should identify and report to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff unnecessary duplicative capabilities among the forces of the various Services.

12) Since the Joint Forces Command will be a *sui generis* organization performing roles currently assigned by law to the combatant commands, the Services, and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the nature, responsibilities, and authority of the new organization should be specified in Title 10 of the United States Code.

13) Whether the new Joint Forces Command should be funded directly as a separate program for all of the joint force training and integration activities for which it is responsible should be evaluated.
Notes

Chapter 1

1. Post-Cold War permanent overseas deployments of U.S. forces total only about 200,000. William J. Clinton, A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: The White House, May, 1997, pp. 21-28. As a more exact comparison, before the demise of the Soviet Union, over 500,000 U.S. personnel were deployed overseas. Of that number, about 340,000 were devoted to the European Command (EUCOM). The Pacific Command (PACOM) had about 135,000 forward deployed forces. By 1997, forces forward deployed in EUCOM’s area of responsibility (AOR) numbered about 111,000, and those in PACOM’s AOR totaled about 92,000. William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress 1998, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1998, p. C-2. Therefore, for U.S. presence in the PACOM AOR to equal the “approximately 100,000” claimed in A National Security Strategy for a New Century (p. 23), one would have to count the West Coast forces assigned to PACOM.


6. Throughout this study, the United States Atlantic Command is referred to by the use of two acronyms. USLANTCOM is used to refer to the command before its 1993 reformation. USACOM is used to refer to the command after the beginning of its reformation in 1993.

Chapter 2

1. A unified command is one with broad continuing missions, established by the President through the Secretary of Defense with the advice of the CJCS, and
composed of forces from two or more Military Departments. A specified command (none of which currently exist) is similar except that it is normally composed of forces from a single Military Department. Department of Defense, Joint Pub 1-02, Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, March 25, 1994, pp. 354, 400.


3. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) is approved by the President and described in a memorandum published by the CJCS for the Service chiefs and the commanders of the combatant commands. The document sets forth basic guidance for all combatant commanders, delineates their geographic areas of responsibility, and specifies their functions.


5. Ibid., p. 46.

6. Ibid., pp. 68-85.

7. Ibid., pp. 98-100.


9. The unified and specified combatant command structure is authorized by § 161 of Title 10, United States Code. It is specifically described in a classified document published by the Secretary of Defense known as The Unified Command Plan. Currently, there are four geographic and one combined geographic and functional commands which account for all of the earth’s surface except for North America and some states of the former Soviet Union (including Russia). There are four functional commands which oversee functional areas to include space, strategic capabilities, special operations, and transportation.


11. Ibid., p. 112.

12. Ibid., pp. 114-116. When “USACOM” is used in this study, it is used to refer to the U.S. Atlantic Command after its 1993 reformation.

Chapter 3


2. Ibid.


8. These included “[d]eveloping a joint training program for providing joint military support to U.S. civilian authorities (MSCA) and military assistance for civil disturbances (MACDIS) as directed by the DoD Executive Agent (SECARMCY) within the 48 contiguous states, the District of Columbia, Puerto Rico, and the Virgin Islands . . . [p]lanning for the land defense of CONUS and combined Canada-United States land defense of Canada . . . [p]lanning for and conducting counterdrug operations in support of U.S. Law Enforcement (sic) agencies . . . [and] integrate DOD CONUS medical contingency planning.” *Implementation Plan for Establishing United States Atlantic Command as the Joint Force Integrator*, pp. I-3 through I-5.

9. *Implementation Plan for Establishing United States Atlantic Command as the Joint Force Integrator*, p. I-5. We note that §§ 153(a)(5) of Title 10, United States Code assigns the CJCS the responsibility for developing doctrine for the joint employment of the U.S. armed forces.


17. Ibid., p. 11, 13.
21. Ibid., p. 33.
23. Peacetime presence missions are distinguished from combat operations. Peacetime presence is designed to shape the international security environment in ways that reassure allies and friends, deter potential adversaries, and facilitate transition to combat should the need arise.
25. Unified Endeavor ’95 trained the Army’s III Corps.
31. Information provided to the authors by a member of the Joint Exercise and Training Division of the Operational Plans and Interoperability Directorate of the Joint Staff. Also, see “Training Goal: ‘Making Jointness Invisible,’” Army, July 1994, p. 32.
32. Paul David Miller, Strategic Plan 1994 United States Atlantic Command, p. 15.
33. Ibid., pp. 17, 19.


38. Ibid., p. 34.


41. During a National Press Club luncheon on September 28, 1993, General Powell remarked that USACOM meant “no more pick-up games. [Instead] you’re going to get forces ready to go to combat right away.”


43. Ibid., p. 30.

44. The NCA are the President and the Secretary of Defense.


47. Steven L. Canby, “Roles, Missions, and JTFs: Unintended Consequences,” Joint Force Quarterly, Autumn/Winter 1994-95, pp. 68-70. Canby points out the costs of “jointness” and that its worth should be assessed by comparing the synergy it creates against its costs, rather than merely measuring the extent to which it requires the Services to work together.

48. General John M. Shalikashvili became CJCS on October 25, 1993. His previous assignment was as Commander-in-Chief of European Command and Supreme Allied Commander Europe.

50. Statement of General John J. Sheehan, Commander-in-Chief United States Atlantic Command before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, February 14, 1995, pp. 3, 9-14. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is chaired by the Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its members include the Vice Chiefs of the Services. The council provides advice to the CJCS to assist him in fulfilling his responsibilities for advising the Secretary of Defense on military requirements and programs.

51. The Unified Command Plan (UCP) assigns general responsibilities and delineates geographic areas of responsibility for the unified combatant commands. Walter F. Cross, memorandum for the Service chiefs and the CINCs, subject: Implementation of the Unified Command Plan (MCM 11-96), Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, January 17, 1996, p. 2.

52. Ibid., pp. 1-2.


56. Ibid., p. 4.

57. A joint mission essential task is a task considered essential to the accomplishment of assigned or anticipated missions; that is, it would not be possible to accomplish the mission if the task were not performed. CINCs construct joint mission essential task lists (JMETLs) by assessing assigned missions to determine which tasks from the Universal Joint Tasks List (UJTL) should be selected and included in the JMETLs. The UJTL is a comprehensive listing of joint tasks, conditions, and standards. The JMETLs enable CINCs to focus and structure joint training of their assigned forces. Dennis C. Blair, Universal Joint Task List, CJCSM 3500.04A, Version 3.0, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 13, 1996, pp. 1.1, A-10 and Walter Kross, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, CJCSI 3500.01, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, November 21, 1994, pp. 18-19.

58. Ibid.


62. John J. Sheehan, Moving Forward, United States Atlantic Command 1996, pp. 4-14. Then DCINC, Admiral Gehman explained in an interview with one of the authors that since it appears that there will be no predesignated joint task forces and U.S. joint doctrine calls for ad hoc formation of joint task forces, it is not possible for USACOM to train joint task forces. The best it can do is create a pool of potential joint task force members who have received joint training.

63. This was to be accomplished by making the requirements known to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), an advisory council to the CJCS with respect to the requirements for new or additional military capabilities. The JROC also provides, on behalf of the CJCS, recommendations to the Defense Acquisition Board.


66. John J. Sheehan, Moving Forward, United States Atlantic Command 1996, pp. 10-13. The CINC covered another noteworthy point in his March 1996 testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services. He emphasized that the command would strive to work more effectively and efficiently with other U.S. government agencies. He reasoned that “[s]ince USACOM has [c]ombatant [c]ommand over most of the [U.S. based] force structure, [it is] in the position to lead in the process of bringing technology from the lab to the battlefield much faster.” Consequently, USACOM would “actively support the Department of Defense and Services’ program, planning and acquisition process” by identifying requirements and recommending priorities for future military capabilities. Statement of General John J. Sheehan, USMC, Commander-in-Chief United States Atlantic Command, before the Committee on Armed Services, United States Senate, Norfolk, VA: Headquarters U.S. Atlantic Command, March 19, 1996, p. 16.


68. Deliberate operation planning is distinguished from crisis action planning. The former involves a quasi-cyclical planning process that begins with the assignment of contingency planning tasks to the CINCs by the CJCS via the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP). This 18-24 month planning process, therefore,
is not focused on crises which have erupted, but on those that might. Crisis action planning, on the other hand, is operation planning conducted in response to a particular crisis. Crisis action planning can flow from, and be enhanced by, deliberate planning to the extent that prior deliberate planning accurately forecasted the type of crisis that occurred.


70. Ibid.

71. These views were expressed to one of the authors during interviews with the USACOM J-5 and DCINC.

72. Ibid. The argument for keeping some U.S. West Coast forces under the command of PACOM is that the immense size of the Pacific area of responsibility (AOR) and the relatively thin presence afforded by the roughly 92,000 personnel present in the AOR at any given time require CINCPAC to have immediate access to the West Coast forces presently under his command.

73. Ibid.

74. The joint force integration process that the CINC described has four principles:
   1) a future orientation that leverages technological advances;
   2) a focus on full interoperability;
   3) functionality across the conflict spectrum; and
   4) enhancement of the competitive advantage of U.S. forces over potential adversaries.

The (not necessarily sequential) five step process that USACOM would employ consists of:
   1) developing the operational concepts;
   2) formulating the organizational structure;
   3) specifying the materiel needed;
   4) establishing training requirements/standards; and
   5) developing leaders.


76. John M. Shalikashvili, Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, CJSI 3500.01A, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, July 1, 1997, pp. 7-20. This is true notwithstanding the inclusion of the three-tier training construct as the first three of the six categories of training associated with The Joint Training System by the Chairman a year earlier. Carlton W. Fulford, Jr., Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States, CJSRM 3500.03, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1, 1996, pp. II-3, II-4. Although the Joint Training System
was reported fully implemented as of October 1, 1997, USACOM's three-tier construct has yet to be addressed in formal joint training policy.

77. Ibid., pp. 4, 7.


79. Ibid., p. 2. The ACTD process allows representatives of ultimate users to evaluate the military utility of a technology before committing to it, provide feedback to technologists early in a system's development cycle, develop operational concepts for employing new technology, and retain a low cost residual operational capability.

80. Ibid., p. 6.

81. Ibid., p. 7.

82. Ibid., p. 4. We note, however, that the 1998 Unified Command Plan describes USACOM's mission as "[p]roviding trained and ready joint forces in response to the capability requirements of supported CINCs (emphasis added)." Dennis C. Blair, MCM 24-98, Subject: Implementation of the Unified Command Plan, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairmen of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 9, 1998, p. 9. The quoted language suggests that in the future the supported combatant commanders will state their force requirements in terms of capabilities needed, and USACOM will select those units best able to fulfill the requirements.


84. Dan Coats, Joint Experimentation—Unlocking the Promise of Future Capabilities, a presentation to the conference on "Preparing Now: Alternative Paths to Military Capabilities for an Uncertain Future" hosted by the Fletcher School of Diplomacy and International Law, Tufts University, Medford, MA, October 2-3, 1997, p. 6.

85. William S. Cohen, Defense Reform Initiative: The Business Strategy for Defense in the 21st Century, Washington, DC: Office of the Secretary of Defense, November 1997, pp. 72-73. On December 1, 1997 the CICS stated that the command to which the functions and organizations were to be transferred was USACOM. The Joint Command and Control Warfare Center supports the U.S. armed forces in planning and conducting information operations. The Joint Warfighting Center assists in the preparation of U.S. forces for joint and multinational operations, in the conceptualization, development, and assessment of current and future joint doctrine, and in the accomplishment of joint and multinational training and exercises. The Joint Battle Center supports the U.S. armed forces with joint command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance assessments and experimentation. The Joint Communications Support Element provides communications support to combatant commands in the event of crises. The Joint Warfighting Analysis
Center supports U.S. forces in precision targeting with analyses of engineering, scientific, and intelligence data in support of deliberate and crisis action operation planning.


87. Ibid., pp. v, 68-69.


Chapter 4


2. Joint Strategic Planning System, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, September 1, 1997, pp. C-1, C-2.

3. Beyond its very limited area of responsibility missions, USACOM’s mission areas are often referred to as joint training, joint force integration, and providing forces for other combatant commands. But joint training and joint force integration are requisite to providing forces to supported commands. Additionally, force providing consists of more than force deployment, which is the integration of operational forces with strategic mobility assets. Herein the authors, therefore, consider joint training and joint force integration to be sub-components of providing forces to supported commands.

4. Joint Training Master Plan 1998, (CJCSI 3500.02A) Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, December 8, 1995, p. A-5. The current objective of training individuals to serve effectively as members of potential joint task forces probably is less effective than pre-designating joint task forces and training the actual members.

5. World-Wide Web, http://www.jtasc.acom.mil. In addition to serving as a joint training vehicle, the JTASC also can be employed to assess joint readiness of forces and provide a laboratory for demonstrating and assessing technologies, systems, and joint doctrine.


7. The Chairman’s joint training policy is ambiguous regarding USACOM’s training responsibilities. Vice that of the other combatant commands to which USACOM provides forces. For example the Joint Training Master Plan 1998 states that USACOM’s training should focus on USACOM’s own joint
mission-essential task list (JMETL), common operational joint tasks, and joint tasks for units not trained by any other combatant command; Joint Training Master Plan 1998, p. A-5. A common joint task is one selected by more than one combatant command as a JMET. Ibid., p. GL-5. But in the same paragraph, the Plan also states that USACOM’s joint training should focus on the respective joint mission-essential task lists (JMETLs) of the supported combatant commands. Ibid., p. A-5. Thus the policy is unclear as to whether USACOM must train its assigned units to perform all the relevant mission-essential tasks identified by the commands to which the units may be provided. Current policy also is ambiguous regarding the evaluation of the training readiness of USACOM’s assigned forces. Policy suggests that USACOM and the commands to which it provides forces are concurrently responsible for assessing the training readiness of joint forces. This could lead to inconsistent joint force readiness assessments provided to the national command authorities and disagreements over the most appropriate remedial actions. Ibid., p. A-34.


10. Ibid., e.g., § 3013.

11. Service training is defined by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff as “[t]raining based on Service policy and doctrine to prepare individuals and interoperable units. Service training includes basic, technical, operational, and component-sponsored interoperability training in response to operational requirements deemed necessary by the combatant commands to execute assigned missions.” Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, p. GL-7. Interoperability training is defined as “[t]raining in which more than one Service component participates. The purpose is to ensure interoperability of combat, combat support, combat service support, and military equipment between two or more Service components. Ibid., p. GL-4. Joint training is defined as “...training based on joint doctrine to prepare joint forces and/or joint staffs to respond to operational requirements deemed necessary by the CINC to execute their assigned missions.” Ibid., p. GL-5. Joint training policy does not clarify the difference between interoperability training to meet the operational requirements established by the combatant commands and joint training conducted for the same purpose. Further confusing training responsibilities is USACOM’s narrow definition of Service or first tier training: “...service-mandated training focusing on the tactical level. Conducted at boot camps and individual service schools, it includes training that ensures forces are proficient in service tactics, techniques, and procedures—the skills and knowledge that military men and women must have to do their jobs.” According to USACOM, all other training of assigned forces is joint training conducted under the supervision of USACOM or one of its Service components. Joint Force Training, Norfolk, VA: Headquarters, United States Atlantic Command, http://www.acom.mil/public/facts/train.htm, June 1, 1997.
12. Although current training policy does not necessarily subordinate Service training to joint training, it envisages an alignment of Service-derived mission-essential tasks for training with the joint tasks developed by the combatant commands. *Joint Training Master Plan 1998*, p. A-22. But the vagaries of current policy are again revealed by the Plan’s inconsistent suggestion that Service training should be guided by tactical mission-essential tasks, while joint training should focus on operational level tasks. *Ibid*.

13. *Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces*, see e.g., § 3013(2)(b).

14. If joint training is defined as training that involves the forces of two or more Services, then virtually all unit-level training must be considered joint. The Army’s pervasive inculcation of combined arms training into all its exercises, even if the participation by other Services is notional, renders the vast majority of Army training joint. Even most independent Naval exercises rely to some extent on actual or notional joint space, transportation, or special operations capabilities. Similar observations could be made for Air Force unit-level training.


16. The authors note that USCOM has redefined its original mission of providing integrated force packages prepared to conduct joint operations to meet the needs of the geographic CINCs. It now defines that activity within the context of a separate role—that of joint force provider. In this newly partitioned role, USCOM is concerned with the process by which supported commands are provided forces to meet contingencies.


20. During the 1991 Persian Gulf War, for example, each Service deployed substantially more combat capability than required for its contribution to defeating the Iraqi military. The unnecessary duplication of capabilities created deployment delays and necessitated the destruction or redeployment of large amounts of supplies and munitions. The Persian Gulf War experience led to the introduction of “threat apportionment” into deliberate planning guidance.

21. For example, XVIII Airborne Corps might provide the nucleus of the integrated joint task force staff for a major campaign consisting of air, land, and sea operations. In that case, most of the Corps staff would participate in third tier training along with significant staff elements from other Services. The integrated joint task force staff would be structured to supervise both combat and support
activities. On the other hand, XVIII Airborne Corps might provide the nucleus of an integrated joint task force staff for a humanitarian assistance operation. In that case, the staff elements provided by the Corps and seconded by the other Services may differ considerably from the staff designed for combat. Some staff members, however, will likely participate in both integrated joint task force staffs. Therefore, a matrix approach to joint training may be required.

22. The requirement for geographic combatant commands to prepare and execute theater engagement plans is discussed in CJCSI 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System. It states that “[t]he JSCP provides guidance to the combatant commanders on the strategic objectives and priorities for theater engagement activities that are intended to shape the theater security environment in peacetime. From this guidance, combatant commands develop strategic theater engagement plans. These plans provide CINC intent, priorities, tasks, and resources required to achieve objectives over the FYDP. The combatant commanders may integrate the elements of Theater Engagement Plans into overall theater strategic plans.” Vice Admiral Dennis C. Blair, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3100.01, Joint Strategic Planning System, pp. C-1, C-2. Further details of “TEP” were subsequently issued in Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3113.01, Responsibilities for the Management and Review of Theater Engagement Plans, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, April 1, 1998; and, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Manual 3113.01, Theater Engagement Planning, Washington, DC: Office of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, February 1, 1998.

23. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, sections 153, 163, and e.g., 3013.

24. “Executive agent” is defined as “...delegation of authority by a superior to a subordinate to act on behalf of the superior... The exact nature and scope of the authority delegated must be stated in the document designating the executive agent.” Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF) (Joint Pub 0-2), p. GL-5. The authors note that the CINC of USACOM is not a subordinate of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but of the Secretary of Defense.

25. A current mission of the Concepts Division of the Joint Warfighting Center is to “[f]acilitate the implementation of Joint Vision 2010 by developing future operational and supporting concepts that expand and refine the vision; assist in developing an assessment strategy to evaluate alternative operational and organizational designs, materiel, systems, and concepts; and integrate the joint community’s efforts to determine the right set of joint and Service capabilities to meet projected 2010 military requirements.” http://www.jwfc.js.mil/PAGES/Jvdiv.htm.

26. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, sections 153 and 163.


28. Title 10, United States Code Armed Forces, section 153(b). This section assigns the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff the responsibility for assessing
triennially the roles, missions, and functions assigned to the U.S. armed forces and recommending appropriate changes.


30. Changes required in the size, nature, and scope of responsibilities of Service components of combatant commands which retain substantial assigned forces (European Command and Pacific Command) may be less dramatic than for other commands.

Chapter 5

1. Under current policy, a combatant command is of one of two types: geographic or functional. A geographic combatant command is one established on a geographic area basis for the purpose of conducting continuous operations within the area. A functional combatant command is established based on a military function independent of any specific geographic area for conducting specified types of continuing operations such as transportation, space, special operations, and strategic operations; Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), p. xiv. As USACOM matures, it will not meet the definition of either of the types of combatant commands.

2. The U.S. Special Operations Command is a partially analogous precedent for the type of organization USACOM is becoming. Changes to Title 10 similar to that accomplished to form the U.S. Special Operations Command must be made to clearly establish the organization USACOM is evolving into.

3. COCOM is the “authority of a combatant commander to perform those functions of command over assigned forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations, joint training (or in the case of USSOCOM, training of assigned forces), and logistics necessary to accomplish the missions assigned to the command; Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF), pp. xi-xii.

4. Taken to its logical conclusion, USACOM’s evolution would leave the Services with exclusive authority over institutional training only. All training of units assigned to USACOM will fall under the command’s purview. That will include training administered by USACOM’s Service components.


6. We do not envisage that the CINC of the U.S. Atlantic Fleet will fulfill this role if the Atlantic Fleet becomes the Joint Forces Command’s naval component.
Additionally, it would be unwise for the CINC of the Atlantic Fleet also to be Americas Command’s naval component and, thus, NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander for the Atlantic/Strategic Command Atlantic. The CINC of Atlantic Fleet’s focus would be on the Joint Forces Command’s force providing mission; he should not be forced to owe loyalties to multiple headquarters.

7. We draw this conclusion notwithstanding the fact that the removal of such forces from PACOM would render inaccurate the claim that the United States has about 100,000 forces forward deployed in the PACOM AOR as well as in the EUCOM AOR.

8. See J. Paul Reason, USN, with David Freymann, “Sailing New Seas,” Newport Papers Number 13, Newport, RI: U.S. Naval War College, March 1998, pp. 37-45. The authors would like to express their gratitude to Peter Swartz for making us aware of this paper.

9. We are at somewhat of a loss as to what should be the exact title of this military official. As he would not be charged with conducting military operations, he cannot formally be labeled a “CINC.” As we noted above, he should not have COCOM, but some new hybrid command authority, which currently does not exist in law. But, note that he would possess unique responsibilities currently held by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services. This implies that this individual would exercise joint command of forces in aspects of their training and joint integration. Our inability to identify an appropriate title for this individual has resulted in our usage in this essay of “Commander” Joint Forces Command.

Chapter 6


2. Ibid.

3. The Implementation Plan referred to joint force integration as to “facilitate the identification, packaging, joint and combined training, preparation of CONUS-based joint formations and expedites their deployment in accordance with combatant commander priorities.” Implementation Plan for Establishing United States Atlantic Command as the Joint Force Integrator, p. 1-1.
Index

Air Combat Command (ACC), 9, 38
Adaptive Joint Force Packages (AJFPs), 9, 12-17, 19, 30, 42
Advanced Concepts and Technology Demonstration (ACTD), 22, 55n.79
Americas Command, x, 5, 6, 23, 38, 39, 44, 45
area of responsibility (AOR), xi, 8-9, 16-17, 20, 38, 39
Aspin, Les, 14
Atlantic Fleet, 3, 9, 38
Ballistic Missile Defense Organization, 18-19
Boorda, Jeremy M., 13-14
Butler, George Lee, 5
Canada, xiii, 38, 39, 45
Central Command, 4, 5,
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), xii, xiii, 2, 3, 4, 8, 13, 14, 17, 18, 19, 21, 22, 30, 32, 33, 34, 37, 42, 43, 45-46
Joint Vision 2010, 23, 59n.25
Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Report on the Roles, Mission, and Functions of the Armed Forces of the United States, 14
CINCUSACOM. See Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command
Coats, Dan, 23-24
Cohen, William, 23
combatant command, xi, xii, xiv, 2, 3, 4, 5-6, 8, 9, 12-16, 17, 19, 21, 22, 25, 26-27, 28-33, 34-35, 37-38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47n.1, 48n.9
combatant command (COCOM), 2, 27, 33, 37
Combatant Commander (CINC). See combatant command; or specific combatant command
Commander, Naval Forces in the United States (COMNAVUSA), 38, 66n.6
Commander-in-Chief Atlantic Command (CINCLANT or CINCUSACOM), xii, 2, 7, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 20, 22, 27, 39
Commander-in-Chief Central Command (CINCCENT), xi, 1, 4
Commander-in-Chief Pacific Command (CINCPAC), 9,
Commander-in-Chief Readiness Command (CINCRED), 4
component command, xiv, 1, 11, 12, 13, 34-35, 37-38, 38-39, 43, 46
continental United States (CONUS), xi, xiii, 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 20, 34, 37, 39, 41, 42-43, 45
Contingency Command, 5
Department of Defense (DoD), xi, 1, 5, 6, 34
Directions for Defense, Report of the Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces, 14
European Command, 5, 43
Forces Command (FORSCOM), 4, 6, 8, 9, 38
Gehman, Harold, 19
integration. See joint force integration
Joint Battle Center, 23
Joint Chiefs of Staff, 3, 5
Joint Command and Control Warfare Center, 23
Joint Communications Support Element, 23
joint doctrine, xii, 2, 3, 6, 8, 12, 13, 19, 20, 23, 28, 32, 32-33
joint exercise control group (JECG), 12
joint exercises, 17-18, 21, 42. See also United Endeavor
joint experimentation, 23, 24, 28, 32
joint force integration, xii, xiii, xiv, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12-17, 17, 18-21, 22-23, 24, 26, 27-28, 28-32, 34, 38, 39, 41, 42-43, 44, 46, 54n.74
Joint Force Integrator, 8
Joint Force Integrator Task List (JFITL), 17-18, 26
joint force readiness, xii, xiii-xiv, 2, 10, 11, 16, 17, 18, 19, 34, 46
Joint Forces Command, xii-xiv, 23, 38-39, 41-42, 44, 45-46
joint mission essential tasks (JMETs), 17
Joint Planning Document, 33
joint requirements, xii, xiii, 2, 10, 19, 20, 21, 28, 32-34, 38, 41, 44, 46, 53n.66
Joint Requirements Oversight Council, 16, 21, 33, 52n.50, 53n.63
Joint Staff, xii, 4, 13, 21, 37, 42
Joint Doctrine Division, 33
joint task force (JTF), xiii, 3, 9, 11-12, 13, 14-16, 18, 19, 21, 26, 30, 31, 46, 53n.62
joint training. See training, joint
Joint Training, Analysis and Simulation Center (JTASC), 11-12, 18, 26
Joint Vision 2010. See Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010
Joint Warfighting Analysis Center, 23
Joint Warfighting Capabilities Assessments, 21, 33
Joint Warfighting Center, 20, 23, 33
Lieberman, Joseph, 24
Mexico, 39
Millar, Paul David, 7, 30, 44
National Command Authorities (NCA), xiv, 15, 46
National Defense Panel, 23
National Security Strategy for a New Century, 1, 25
NATO. See Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic
Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERST STORM, xi, 1, 20, 58n.20
Operation RESTORE DEMOCRACY, 15-17
Pacific Command (PACOM), xiii, 5, 20, 38, 43, 45
Pacific Fleet, 9, 39
Persian Gulf War. See Operation DESERT SHIELD/DESERST STORM
Powell, Colin, 5, 6, 8, 14, 16, 44
Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF), 4,
Readiness Command (REDCOM), 2, 3-5, 8, 41
Reason, J. Paul, 38
Secretary of Defense, xi, 3, 4, 8, 9, 15, 19, 23-24, 28, 42, 43
Service component command. See component command
Services, xii, xiii, 2, 3, 4, 10, 12-16, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 28-30, 31, 32, 33-35, 37-38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 46
“shaping,” 25, 32, 43
Sheehan, John J., 11, 16, 18, 19, 21
Southern Command (SOUTHCOM), xii-xiii, 6, 23, 38, 39, 44, 45
Space Command (SPACECOM), 18-19, 29
Special Operations Command (SOCOM), xiii, 4, 5, 9, 29, 38, 45
Strategic Command (STRATCOM), 5, 6
Strike Command (STRICOM), 2, 3-5, 8, 41
Supreme Allied Commander Atlantic (“Strategic Commander Atlantic”), xiii, 38, 45
theater engagement activities, xiii, 29, 43, 46, 59n.22
theater missile defense (TMD), 22
training. See also USACOM, three-tier training program
joint, xii, xiii, xiv, 2, 3, 4, 6, 8, 9, 10-12, 15, 16, 17-18, 21, 22-23,
24, 26-28, 30, 31, 32, 33, 38, 39, 41, 42-43, 44, 46, 56n.7, 57n.11

Joint Training Policy for the Armed Forces of the United States, 21
Service, 10-12, 26-27, 30, 31, 32, 42, 46, 57n.11

Training and Readiness Oversight (TRO), 21-22

Transportation Command (TRANSCOM), xiii, 5, 9, 18, 29, 38, 45

Unified Command Plan (UCP), 2, 3, 5-6, 8, 16-17, 38-39, 43-44

Unified Endeavor, 11-12, 18, 21, 26, 27-28

USACOM, xi, 2, 23

Implementation Plan (1993), xii, 7, 8-10, 24, 26, 28, 41, 42-43, 61n.3

Moving Forward (1996), 17-21

Strategic Plan 1994, 10-18

three-tier training program, xiii, 11-12, 18, 21-22, 24, 26, 26-28, 29, 31, 32, 37, 42, 45-46

transformation, 5-6, 8-10

U.S. Atlantic Command. See USACOM, or USLANTCOM.

United States Code,

Title 10, xii, xiv, 2, 12, 16, 20, 22, 26-27, 33, 34, 37-38, 42-43, 46

USLANTCOM, xi, 2, 3, 5-6, 8-9
Defining U.S. Atlantic Command’s Role in the Power Projection Strategy

Douglas C. Lovelace, Jr.
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Since the end of the Cold War, “power projection” has become the key strategic concept that guides the development and posture of the U.S. armed forces. Overseas presence, while still an important aspect of U.S. national security, is clearly subordinate to, and supportive of, projecting military power from the continental United States (CONUS). As demonstrated by the experience of U.S. Central Command in the Gulf War, there is, however, a clear need for forces stationed in CONUS to undergo joint training and integration prior to their arrival in theater and employment by a geographic Commander-in-Chief.

Since 1993, the responsibility for joint training and integration of CONUS-based forces has rested with the U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM), located in Norfolk, Virginia. Yet, since assuming these new joint responsibilities, opposition from many powerful quarters has forced the command to “evolve,” and it has yet to succeed fully in performing these new, extremely important tasks. This work critically assesses the record of USACOM as it has endeavored to support the power projection strategy of the United States. The authors argue that the command cannot succeed in its role of joint force training and integration unless it becomes a “Joint Forces Command.” The reform of USACOM also must be accompanied by the review of many key provisions in U.S. Code and policy.

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