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USCINCPAC: Operational Strategy ahead of U.S. Security Policy?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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### USCINCPAC: Operational Strategy Ahead of U.S. Security Policy? (U)

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**Abstract:**

AMERICA'S STRATEGIC INTERESTS IN ASIA HAVE REMAINED consistent FOR OVER 200 YEARS AND HAVE LARGELY PRESERVED THE STABILITY AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS OF THE REGION SINCE WORLD WAR II. THE CHANGING CHARACTER OF THE REGION, HOWEVER, HAS PRESENTED THE UNITED STATES WITH NEW CHALLENGES THAT MAY NOT BE MET WITH THE CURRENT THEATER STRATEGY. THE CLINTON ADMINISTRATION HAS ARTICULATED ITS GOALS IN THE NATIONAL SECURITY STRATEGY, HOWEVER, THAT GUIDANCE IS NEITHER SPECIFIC NOT FAITHFULLY IMPLEMENTED IN THE CURRENT USCINCPAC POLICY GUIDANCE. THE NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY CONTINUES TO ARTICULATE A REGIONAL BILATERAL SECURITY FRAMEWORK, WHILE AT THE SAME TIME, THE NATIONS OF THE REGION ARE MOVING CLOSER TO IMPLEMENTING A MULTINATIONAL COOPERATIVE SECURITY STRATEGY. THE ACTIONS OF THE UNITED STATES TO PARTICIPATE IN THIS FORUM WILL DRAMATICALLY INFLUENCE THE COURSE OF EVENTS IN THE THEATER IN THE NEXT TWENTY YEARS.

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Table of Contents

Abstract

USCINCPAC: Operational Strategy Ahead of U.S. National Security Policy?

End Notes

Appendix A: Excerpts from the National Security Strategy and National Military Strategy

Appendix B: Excerpts from USCINCPAC Mission and Intent

Appendix C: Excerpts from USARPAC AND USPACAF Mission and Intent

Appendix D: Excerpt from Hearing before the Asia-Pacific Subcommittee of the House National Security Committee, 7 May, 98

Bibliography
Abstract

America's strategic interests in Asia have remained consistent for over 200 years and have focused on ensuring the stability and security of the Asia-Pacific region. These interests include ensuring access to the region's markets, freedom of the seas, preventing the emergence of a hostile state or group that would limit or exclude American influence in the region, encouraging the spread of democracy, protecting the increasingly threatened environment, and articulating U.S. concerns for human rights. The principal requirements for successful strategic planning to ensure the protection of these vital interests are regional alliances, financial stability and interdependence, and U.S. relations with Asian countries, in particular Japan, China, Taiwan, and Korea.

Since the end of World War II, America's policies in Asia have been linked to an extensive network of alliances, a forward-deployed military presence, and robust support for an open international economic and trading system. As the year 2000 approaches, U.S. security ties to the region have been reduced to a few bilateral alliance treaties with Australia, Japan, the Philippines, the Republic of Korea, and Thailand. The size of the forward-deployed air, land, and naval presence has been cut significantly. Asia-Pacific economic growth and financial stability has been threatened by increasingly lax supervision of key markets and regional anxieties heightened by uncertain and conflicting signals from U.S. economic policy. The strategy which drove the region's phenomenally successful recovery from the devastation of WWII and ensured America’s successful protection of the oceans and littorals has not aged well.

The Clinton Administration's record in Asia can best be described as one of episodic engagement. Periodic executive-level meetings and summits, although
important, are no substitute for a full-time focus by members of the Administration's foreign policy. With the emergence of new economic superpowers like China and Japan, whose view of the world is not the same as America's, a review of the Pacific strategy is overdue. The Department of Defense interpretation of the guidance available has been shortsighted and self-serving, emphasizing the theater threats most easily met with current capabilities. Without a fundamental shift in the way the U.S. looks at security and economic policies in the largest and most unstable theater on the globe, American access and influence in Asia-Pacific will continue to decline.

Without full diplomatic and economic engagement synchronized with an underpinning of theater-wide multilateral military alliances, the United States will increasingly adopt a role as consumer of the region's products and services, fiscally hostage to Asian economic cartels, politically compelled by regional multinational cohesion, and militarily constrained by capable and belligerent hegemons.

USCINCPAC, of all the levels of U.S. government, has taken the lead in recognizing the need to expand U.S. security policy beyond the bilateral ties remaining from the Cold War and to join the growing expression of need for theater-wide defense, with uncertainty as the enemy, rather than other regional states.

The National Security Strategy and Military Strategy must profit from this revolution in Pacific theater planning, in order to coherently fuse the diplomatic and economic efforts of the United States to continue for another 200 years its profitable and secure relationship with the Asia Pacific region.
Regional Assessment

The end of the cold war effectively put a period to U.S.-Soviet conflict in Asia Pacific and the dangers of precipitating a global nuclear war. Nevertheless, the region is still subject to many destabilizing factors. Uncertainty surrounds Russia's Asia policy, North-South relations on the Korean Peninsula, Chinese relations with Taiwan and with Hong Kong following the Colony's return to the motherland, and the various disputes over the borders of exclusive economic zones in the East China Sea.

Of these concerns, uncertainty is most pronounced on the Korean Peninsula, where 1.5 million troops are massed at the thirty-eighth parallel, and in China, which continues its military modernization in step with its increasing economic power. The regional concern most prevalent is that China will become even more nationalistic and more assertive toward other countries both politically and in competition for resources.

China's influence as a great power will play one of the two critical roles in the 21st Asia-Pacific century. The other key partner will be Japan. Policy differences with the United States currently exist over China's proliferation and export of destabilizing weaponry, especially to Iran and Pakistan, China's course of action with Taiwan, its record of human rights abuses and religious persecution, and the growing chorus of smaller regional states voicing concern over China's future and ambitions.

China's military modernization efforts have been a source of growing anxiety throughout Asia as well as in the capitals of the Western world. Not only has Beijing increased its modernization program to include advanced weaponry and missiles, but it also demonstrated in March 1996, in the Taiwan Strait, its readiness to use military force to advance its interests. Over the past decade, China's claims of sovereignty have
increasingly engendered concern throughout the Asia-Pacific region. In February 1995, the Chinese navy occupied Mischief Reef, an atoll in the South China Sea that lies well within the Philippines' Exclusive Economic Zone, which is internationally recognized by the Law of the Sea Convention, landed on disputed islands in the Senkakus, and established military outposts in the hotly contested Spratley Islands.²

While pragmatic in most policy deliberations, China recently displayed a fit of pique in what may be a glimpse of future political temperament. In June 1995, Taiwanese President Lee Teng-hui visited Cornell University in New York. U.S. approval of Lee's visa and of his visit infuriated Beijing. In response, China conducted a campaign of military intimidation, staging a series of exercises in the South China Sea opposite Taiwan that summer. The exercises included surface ships, tactical aircraft, amphibious landings, and test firings of nuclear-capable intermediate range ballistic missiles. The exercise in intimidation culminated in March 1996, during Taiwan's first presidential election, when China fired three M-9 missiles into two zones astride Taiwan's largest ports and near international sea and air lanes. (The M-9 missile can carry conventional, chemical, or nuclear warheads.)³

China, which has been a nuclear weapons state since 1964, remains a source of concern primarily because of the role of Chinese companies in supplying a wide range of materials, equipment, and technologies that could contribute to NBC weapons and missile programs in countries of proliferation concern. Beijing has signaled some willingness to adopt a more responsible supply policy by adhering to international nonproliferation norms such as the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (1992) and reaffirming to the United States its pledge to abide by the basic tenets of the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR). However, Chinese firms' continued willingness to engage in nuclear and missile cooperation with countries such as Pakistan and Iran presents security concerns in many regions where the United States has defense commitments.

China has prominently pledged support for non-proliferation goals - in 1993, Beijing signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), and in 1994 also committed not to export ballistic missiles inherently capable of reaching a range of 300 km with a payload of 500 kg. In addition, China has expressed support for negotiating a multilateral convention banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons and endorsed the 1994 U.S.-North Korean Agreed Framework. And while China continues to conduct underground nuclear tests, it has stated that it intends to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty at some future date.⁴

Nonetheless, many Chinese commercial transactions, particularly transactions involving nuclear-, missile-, and chemical-related technologies to unstable regions such as the Middle East and South Asia, raise serious proliferation concerns. The Chinese continue to modernize their inventory of nuclear weapons systems, which now includes over a hundred warheads deployed operationally in medium range ballistic missiles (MRBM), intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBM), and intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBM).⁵

China has a mature chemical warfare capability and may well have maintained the biological warfare program it had prior to acceding to the Biological Weapons Convention in 1984. It has funded a chemical warfare program since the 1950s and has produced and weaponized a wide variety of agents, while its biological warfare program
includes manufacturing infectious microorganisms and toxins. China has a wide range
of delivery means available, including ballistic and cruise missiles and aircraft, and is
continuing to develop systems with upgraded capabilities. The country also plans to
expand its already substantial nuclear power program by constructing several new plants
during the next 20 years, and continues to market its growing expertise in nuclear power
technology to other countries to expand its influence abroad and sustain its defense
industries.

The second and more immediate aspect of the security environment in Northeast
Asia at present is the North Korean regime characterized by its opaque hierarchy of
authority, its implacable hostility toward South Korea, and its continued missile
development and possession of chemical weapons even as it grapples with severe food
shortages.

Pyongyang and the Kim regime are masters of sending conflicting signals. North
Korea’s economy is bordering on collapse, yet on one hand, it is reported to be
maintaining combat readiness as the military gains increased influence; on the other,
starvation threatens its population with an estimated 80 per cent of children suffering
from malnutrition, even as it is pushing ahead with construction of light-water reactors
with the assistance of Japan, South Korea, and the United States. 7

Because of its failed agricultural sector, North Korea continues to appeal to the
international community for food aid and other assistance. At the same time, it is
outfitting its million-man army with 11,000 artillery tubes, rockets, SCUD missiles, and
chemical weapons. Its artillery and missiles are capable of reaching Seoul, placing nearly
one-quarter of South Korea’s population at risk.
During the 1970s and 1980s, North Korea pursued a nuclear weapons program that eventually was frozen under the 1994 Agreed Framework signed by the United States and North Korea, but not before North Korea's graphite-moderated reactors produced between seven and 22 kilograms of plutonium, enough for two to six nuclear devices. North Korea also has an active missile development program. Its Soviet-inspired SCUD ballistic missiles are capable of reaching Seoul and threaten U.S. forces in Japan.

Although the October 1994 Agreed Framework with North Korea over its nuclear facilities mitigated the immediate nuclear threat, Pyongyang still possesses an unnecessarily large conventional force - its million-man conventional army is deployed within 26 miles of Seoul - as well as militarily significant chemical weapons and the means to deliver them.

For many decades Pyongyang has mounted an all-out effort to build and strengthen its military. As a result, it has one of the five largest armed forces in the world -- over one million active duty personnel. Over the years, Pyongyang has worked to improve its capability to launch a surprise attack against South Korea. With the right conditions, or with the misperception of the right conditions, Pyongyang could launch an attack supported by massive artillery strikes, chemical weapons and SCUD missiles against any military or civilian targets in South Korea, including key logistics facilities at Pusan, Taegu, and Kwangju.

Proliferation, particularly the broad-based NBC weapons and missile programs that North Korea has implemented, poses a significant challenge to U.S. security interests as well as to those of our allies and friends in the region.
North Korea has significantly advanced its nuclear, chemical and ballistic missile programs during the last 10 years. While agreeing to freeze activity at and eventually eliminate its existing plutonium production nuclear reactors and associated facilities, North Korea maintains chemical warfare and ballistic missile capabilities.

In the event of another war on the Korean peninsula, these weapons present a significant threat to our forces and the security of our allies. Should a conflict occur, North Korea likely will try to consolidate and control strategic areas of South Korea by striking quickly and attempting to destroy allied defenses before the United States can provide adequate reinforcements.\textsuperscript{11}

Despite its isolation, North Korea uses several methods to acquire technology related to nuclear, biological, or chemical warfare and missiles. For example, the Japan-based General Association of Korean Residents - the Chosen Soren - has among other activities an ongoing effort to acquire and export advanced technology to North Korea. In addition, North Korean intelligence organizations are involved in clandestine operations to acquire technology, equipment, and scientific and technical information to aid the full spectrum of North Korea's conventional and NBC weapons programs.\textsuperscript{12}

North Korea has provided hundreds of SCUD missiles to countries in the Middle East, such as Iran and Syria, and is developing and marketing the new 1,000 kilometer-range NODONG missile. These sales provide Pyongyang with critically needed foreign exchange - a crucial incentive in the absence of theater-sponsored alternatives. North Korea is an active supplier of missiles and related production technology, dependent on millions of dollars worth of bartered goods and services and hard currency for its
deliveries, and it will continue to market missiles and missile-related technology to support its fragile economy.\textsuperscript{13}

Military and political tensions on the Korean peninsula will continue, and despite some indications of increasing vulnerability of the Kim regime to outside inducements of food aid in return for increased transparency, North Korea remains a major source of concern for those in the north Pacific and for the United States.

While China and the Korean Peninsula present the greatest immediate challenges to U.S. strategic planners, those two trouble spots are only two of many potential reefs on which American policy in Asia can easily founder.

The rebellions that developing states are witnessing throughout the region were either spawned or heightened during the Cold War. These cold war proxy conflicts have led to today's saturation of the arms market, easy access to lethal technologies, and greater interaction between rebel groups. To advance foreign policy goals, Southwest, Southeast and South Asian states have provided weapons to rebels acting against unfriendly regimes.

Since 1989-90, international and regional security and intelligence agencies report that insurgent organizations transship and procure light weapons jointly to cut down costs.\textsuperscript{14} Like states cooperate to strengthen security, non-state actors cooperate to survive or to succeed. With the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the Cold War, saturated arms markets have both fuelled existing rebellions and promoted emerging conflicts. Although the number of conflicts has declined since 1990, their intensity and resilience has increased.
For example, in South Asia, India has provided weapons to Sri Lankan rebels (notably the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam, the LTTE), Bangladeshi rebels (Shanti Bahini), East Pakistan rebels (Mukti Bahini) and Pakistani rebels (Al Zulfiqar Organization); while Pakistan has provided weapons to Indian rebels (Nagas, Mizos and Sikhs) and the Kashmiri rebels (the Jammu and Kashmir Liberation Front) and the Moro National Liberation Front operating on the southern Philippine island of Mindanao.  

In South Asia, regional security and intelligence cooperation is virtually non-existent because of the dispute between India and Pakistan over Kashmir. In Southeast Asia, similar restraints exist between ASEAN members as intramural security suspicions linger on after the success of economic cooperation.

The bitter rivalry between India and Pakistan, which dates to the partitioning of the subcontinent in 1947, remains the impetus behind the proliferation of NBC weapons and missiles in the region. The security dynamics are complicated further by India's perception of China as a threat. Pakistan's efforts to develop NBC weapons and missile systems are intended primarily to counter India's substantial conventional military advantage and its perception of India's nuclear threat.

India and Pakistan continue to cloak their NBC weapons programs in secrecy or deliberate ambiguity. Both continue to deny possessing nuclear weapons, while periodically issuing veiled threats alluding to their capability to employ these weapons if necessary. Both deny possessing chemical and biological weapons, but point with pride to the progress of their indigenous missile development programs.

India's pursuit of nuclear weapons was first spurred by a 1962 border clash with China and by Beijing's 1964 nuclear test. New Delhi continues to view its northern
neighbor as a long-term enemy despite recently improved relations and sees Pakistan's NBC weapons and missile capabilities as a more immediate threat. Nuclear rhetoric from Pakistani leaders and Islamabad's pursuit of a mobile SRBM capability reinforce India's perception that New Delhi continues to need a nuclear capability.

Pakistani leaders, in turn, believe that a nuclear capability is essential to deter war with India, or failing that, to ensure the survival of the nation and its nuclear program has widespread domestic political and popular support.18

In addition to these pressing issues of proliferation and arms modernization in the regional powers, Asia-Pacific suffers the more prosaic, yet just as devastating symptoms common to developing nations: overcrowding, pollution, and ethnic violence.

Apart from Korean Peninsula tensions, the PRC-Taiwan relationship, and the Japan-China-Taiwan dispute over the Senkaku Islands, the Kurile Island dispute remains unresolved between Russia and Japan. Competing border claims in the Spratly Islands, the continuing Cambodian internal discord, Sino-Vietnamese tensions, territorial claims among ASEAN members, the India-China border problem, the secession in Papua-New Guinea, piracy, and threats to sea lanes between the Pacific and Indian Oceans, and the flaring long-dormant political unrest in Indonesia all simmer under the pressure of competing claims and the potential for misread signals leading to conflict.19 But not all regional tensions center on territory. Population growth continues to be a concern in Indonesia, India, China and other nations. Political instability in India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, the Philippines, Indonesia, and Sri Lanka is often rooted in ethnic and religious rivalry. Human rights are not protected in many places, and repression is rampant in China and North Korea, Vietnam, Indonesia, and to a lesser extent in Singapore,
Malaysia, and Thailand. Infanticide continues in China and India, as do abuses of child labor across South Asia. Despite dynamic economic vitality, poverty persists, as does pollution from the industries that create the wealth. Education for women and in rural areas lags behind the West. Cities are increasingly choked with traffic, slums and smog. The World Bank reports that, "In the next decade East Asia will account for more than half of the world's carbon dioxide and sulfur dioxide noxious emissions." Demand for energy is increasingly seen as provoking intense competition, confrontation and potential conflict.

The rapid growth of Asia-Pacific economies will have a significant and growing impact on global oil supplies, as the region becomes the world's largest petroleum importing region. From 70 per cent today, Asia's dependence on oil from the Middle East will rise to 95 per cent of its oil imports in the next fifteen years. In 1993, China became a net oil importer for the first time in a quarter century and its deficit has risen to about 600,000 barrels per day. Estimates put China's oil deficit at three million barrels per day by 2010 and that thirst for oil will inevitably turn China's attention to the Middle East, Southeast Asia, and Siberia, and will become a significant source of potential Asian conflict in the coming years.

Review of Current U.S. National Security Strategy

Faced with the realities of instability in Asia Pacific, in discussing the theater strategy, a logical starting point is the President's guidance as published in the National Security Strategy (NSS). This document purports to establish the United States
overarching national strategy, however, as an examination will prove, the guidance is of little practical value in assigning missions and forces to the theater commander. The rhetoric is graceful, the content readable - though slim - and the guidance inoffensive, while steering a predictable course towards defense of the homeland, preservation of values, economic well-being, and favorable world order.

In a side-by-side reading, the Defense Department's interpretation of these major themes, as articulated in the companion National Military Strategy (NMS) comes off even less applicable as a guide for developing coherent successful theater strategy, and does not consistently adhere to the NSS theme. The document reveals some discontinuity resulting in part from the inherent ambiguities of the NSS, and in part from DOD's reluctance to recognize and develop strategies for other than on-the-shelf applications of military capabilities and forces to achieve the President's goals. A few examples illustrate the point:

In the NSS discussion of Asia Pacific, the national goals are to promote prosperity, remain alert to the challenges, and reinforce our ties to our allies.\textsuperscript{22} The NMS is generally supportive, however, there has no regional focus and its application of alliance ties is defined primarily as deterring aggression and conflict.\textsuperscript{23} The contrasting language is available in Appendix A: Excerpts from the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy, Section 1.

The NSS goes on to pursue a discussion of the necessity to maintain a constructive relationship with China, however the NMS provides no guidance to the CINC, mentioning only that it is likely that more than one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and means to challenge the United States militarily. Appendix A,
Section 2. The NSS describes in some detail the security situation in Northeast Asia and specifically provides guidance for resolution of the Korean problem, however, the NMS ignores this direction and instead declines to responsibly highlight known potential flashpoints, preferring instead to offer the less compelling guidance “wild card” conflicts may occur at locations we will not anticipate. Appendix A, Section 3.

The National Security intelligence guidance to emphasize what General Zinni characterizes as “cultural intelligence” support to policymakers is rethought in the NMS and directs instead a high tech network-centric approach to sensor to shooter solutions. Appendix A, Section 4. Perhaps the key thinking and strategic guidance found in the NSS, the discussion of Asia Pacific alliances and the importance of ASEAN as a multilateral partner is largely ignored in the NMS, in favor of a definition of deterrence as the ability and willingness to defeat our enemies. Appendix A, Sections 5 and 6. Finally, in a glaring omission, there is no counterpart discussion in the NMS of the President’s guidance on economic growth enabling, nor a sense that more and more of the crises we face will share largely economic-based root issues.

As the above comparison illustrates, a one-for-one match-up of national security goals with a national military strategy would be difficult, even were the goals clearly defined. With several geographic theaters vying for limited diplomatic, economic and military resources, one military strategy would be hard pressed to coherently discuss all the potential theater challenges and goals. It would be reasonable, however, to expect the regional combatant commanders, the Commanders in Chief (CINCs) to succinctly extrapolate their understanding of the roles, missions, and forces assigned them to execute U.S. overseas military presence.
United States Commander in Chief, Pacific, USCINCPAC, is required, as are all the CINCs, to produce documents explaining his strategy to achieve the goals assigned him by the President and the Secretary of Defense, acting as the National Command Authorities. USCINCPAC's statement of his understanding is expressed in his mission, CINC's intent, and his strategic concept:

"USPACOM promotes peace, deters aggression, responds to crises and, if necessary, will fight and win to advance security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region." USCINCPAC, in his statement of intent appears to recognize the need for coordination of all government levers of power: "To be successful, we, whose responsibility is security, need to harmonize the diplomatic/political and economic instruments." In the clearest example seen throughout the hierarchy of documented guidance to the theater, from National Command to the warfighter, USCINCPAC captures the essence of the need for change in the nature of our security relations with all nations in the region including our emerging relationship with China, and nascent relationships such as with Vietnam. "We believe multilateral relationships hold promise for future stability in the region. One of the key element of this strategy is teamwork with the State and Commerce Departments, and other U.S. government agencies – ensuring our views are reflected in the interagency process."25

This is an obvious appreciation of the characteristics of the theater, the value to U.S. economic success, and of the effectiveness of offering a coherent political, economic and military strategy to Asia Pacific issues, and the first example of thinking beyond the aging and increasingly provocative system of bilateral alliances to consider the concept of a theater multilateral security alliance.
The Service components, which make up the U.S. Pacific Command share insightful understanding of the region’s demands on U.S. security, and offer solutions to support the CINC’s strategy however, there is scarce evidence of thinking beyond Joint U.S. and bilateral relations. The Navy and Marine Corps, which make up the theater maritime forces, offer their capabilities in the companion documents “Forward...From the Sea” and “Operational Maneuver From the Sea”. These capabilities are summarized in a recent article, which appeared in Defense 97, which, like the Commandant of the Marine Corps, characterized the theater and the next century as one of chaos.

The article makes the claim that maritime forces are the nation’s force of choice in dangerous times: “Focusing on the littoral area, Navy and Marine Corps forces can seize and defend advanced ports and airfields to enable the flow of land-based air and ground forces, while providing the necessary command and control for all joint and allied forces. The power-projection capabilities of specifically tailored naval expeditionary forces can contribute to blunting an initial attack and, ultimately, assuring victory. The keys to our enabling mission are effective means in place to dominate and exploit littoral battlespace during the earliest phases of hostilities.”

The U.S. Army’s Pacific Command has an equally compelling view of its contributions to the Pacific strategy with its Mission Essential Task List, which includes key provisions for USCINCPAC mission accomplishment, including providing trained and ready Army forces for both military operations and peacetime engagements, however, significantly, USARPAC provides specific planning to develop and maintain alliance and regional stability.
Theater Air Forces provide rationale for their contribution to accomplishment of the theater mission expressed in the U.S. Pacific Air Forces mission overview. PACAF's primary mission is to plan, conduct and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations in the Pacific and Asian theaters. The command provides advice on the use of aerospace power throughout the theater. PACAF's extends USPACOM's power and reach by supporting air operations, maintaining combat ready forces, and providing quality services and support in the Pacific, and like USARPAC, includes a specific mention of building quality partnerships with allies.  

USCINCPAC and his subordinate component commanders clearly understand they have a mission to support a national security strategy. Two of his four components support the CINC's intention to plan in such a way that accommodates bilateral partners, regional alliances like ASEAN and ANZUS, and other Pacific nations' discussion of theater-wide multinational approaches to crisis management and regional security. But the examination of doctrine discussed here shows the military strategy at successively higher levels of command does not support USCINCPAC's articulation of his intent to pursue multinational alliances. The theater commander is clearly in tune with the changing requirements of Asia Pacific security policy. However, without national strategy clearly giving direction to not only the CINCs and military departments, but also to the Cabinet level secretaries to synchronize their efforts to bring all the beneficial resources of the nation to bear in the theater, the military aspect of U.S. influence will not alone be sufficient to bind the fragmenting region together, nor to ensure U.S. influence and access to goods and peoples throughout the region.
Strategy Critique and Alternative Strategies

The President has provided strategic direction for the nation to follow in pursuit of regional stability and continued U.S. economic success in Asia Pacific. The Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff have interpreted that guidance and provided the Services and Commanders in Chief their direction for accomplishment of those goals. The CINCs in turn, have published their own rendering of higher headquarters intent to the component commands in the theater.

There is a clear chain of guidance running from the National Command Authority to the business end of the Defense Department, the divisions and wings in the field. So why is U.S. access, influence and coalition partnership in Asia Pacific at its lowest ebb since the Second World War? Why are regional tensions high, economic crisis pervasive, and theater bilateral ties at their most strained since the Vietnam War?

The answer perhaps may be found in remembering the old parlor game in which one person in a circle would whisper a message in the ear of his neighbor who would whisper it to the next, and so on until it had gone full circle. The resulting confusion is reminiscent of the operational implementation of the national guidance in the Pacific theater. Each successive layer of interpretation adds its own bureaucratic perspective and fails to pass on some of the essence of the next higher level. The result around the theater among both allies and adversaries, like the end of the parlor game, is surprise, confusion, finger-pointing, and blame for who passed the wrong signal. The basic principles of unity, simplicity, and clarity, have not been applied at any of the levels of command against valid measure of effectiveness.
This fragmentation of direction and execution at the operational level, however, as we have argued above, is not the product of inept theater planners. Some of America’s most talented analysts and operators daily review the strategy for charting a safe and productive course through the troubled Pacific waters and have already taken the lead in proposing the consideration of new multinational alliances. We must look at the senior level of leadership to find the first weak link in the chain of policy that is in danger of failing in the 21st century.

In the most recent Chairman’s Posture Statement before Congress, in 27 pages of testimony supported by over 50 PowerPoint slides, one short paragraph was the total comment on the Pacific theater offered by General Shelton to the Congress, the nation, and to the Pacific theater. In that paragraph, the CJCS specifically mentioned our existing bilateral ties in Asia Pacific, in lockstep with the published National Military Strategy. “In addition to our five mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Japan, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, we are stepping up military to military contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to promote mutual understanding, transparency, and trust.”31 There is a distinct message of guidance in the CJCS comments that sends a strong signal to the Congress that this administration is committed to bilateral defense alliances in the Pacific theater, and that China nor current bilateral treaty members are clearly not candidates for more than military to military contacts.

This interpretation of the NSS leaves out much of the intent of that document and provides little new guidance to the CINC for other than business as usual coordination of U.S. policies issues, economic, political and military. But DOD is not the sole source for the less than comprehensive direction.
Whoever won the 1992 presidential election would have operated in a rapidly changing security setting. The winning administration entered office committed not only to a reduction in emphasis on foreign policy – in an era of political fragmentation, regional and ethnic conflict, and weapons proliferation – but also to the belief that an emerging global consensus, enshrined in the resolutions of the United Nations, could furnish an important conceptual basis for foreign policy.  

When such an approach proved to be inadequate, the administration was left with the need to develop a post-Cold War national strategy, a task that remains incomplete. In the absence of this overarching global strategy, the U.S. lacks the framework to guide us in allocating constrained resources that are needed to provide for the common defense in an era of change, surprise, uncertainty, and danger. While the European theater enjoys a mature and robust military alliance that has given rise to numerous economic and political initiatives, the Pacific theater remains locked in the post-World War II bilateral military ties that both contributed to Asia Pacific Cold War proxy wars, and ensured they were limited to the theater. 

In the Asia Pacific area, the new Democratic administration found itself facing a series of challenges for which its commitment to halting proliferation, promoting human rights, and opening Japan's markets left it less than adequately prepared. Previous administrations had maintained a satisfactory relationship with one or the other of the Pacific Rim's major powers – China and Japan – at most times since WWII, but nearly simultaneously with its inauguration, the administration began to press China on its human rights policy by threatening to revoke Beijing's most favored nation status.
At the same time the administration confronted the problem of what to do about North Korea's unwillingness to open its nuclear sites to international inspection. The United States faced the possibility of military operations against North Korea even as the prospect of a trade war with Japan loomed.

The administration's Bottom Up Review, released in September 1993, had called for the United States to be able to respond to two major regional conflicts "nearly simultaneously." The force structure was reduced well beyond the cuts envisaged by the Bush administration, and in the second administration has been cut to levels adequate for only one conflict at best. Yet, the release of the National Security Strategy developed a framework based on the concepts of "engagement and enlargement", apparently an invitation to multinational security initiatives. United States forces received guidance to remain engaged in global security for the purpose of promoting political-military as well as economic security – the size and capabilities of the force structure apparently incidental to the guidance. The articulated purpose of "engagement" would be the "enlargement" of the numbers of states with democratic political systems and market economies. Such a concept, whatever its intrinsic merits, lacks criteria for deciding when, where, whether, or with what force structure to employ American military or other capabilities. And while engagement and enlargement were the mantra, the administration could not overcome the inertia of the Defense elite in refusing to look beyond the familiar bilateral security blanket and consider the characteristics of the theater in providing the national strategic guidance to plan into the new millenium.

In dealing with the Pacific theater in particular, the administration has made process a substitute for policy. Despite the President's proclaimed policy of engagement,
serious differences with Beijing exist over China's involvement with Iran and Pakistan, its proliferation and export of destabilizing weaponry, and its record of human rights abuses and religious persecution. Ignoring these issues at the October summit, the President proclaimed his intent to work toward a constructive strategic partnership with China. However, his episodic engagement with China over the past few years has caused many to question America's leadership ability. The administration was virtually silent during an important debate in 1997 on extending most favored nation (MFN) trading status to China, and he addressed the issue of Sino-American relations only a week before the October summit.34

Beijing's growing power should be of major concern to the Clinton Administration, whose constitutional responsibility it is to guide U.S. forces deployed in the region and to support America's allies. The March 1996 deployment of two aircraft carrier battle groups to the waters off Taiwan in response to Beijing's military intimidation of the Republic of China swung the weathervane 180 degrees by emphasizing U.S. commitment to a resolution of the issues between the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China on Taiwan. One policy and one commitment must be clearly articulated to USCINCPAC, the ambassadors in the region, and the economic and political establishment to work together to forge a unified theater strategy. The United States cannot long walk the tightrope between Beijing on the left and Taipei on the right without losing diplomatic balance – with theaterwide repercussions inevitable.

In March 1996, Lee Teng-hui was elected president of Taiwan in the first direct election of a national leader in China's long history. Elections to Taiwan's legislature will
take place in December 1998, and a successor to President Lee will be elected in March 2000. Fearing Beijing's reaction to these democratic events, however, the Clinton Administration has failed either to acknowledge appropriately Taiwan's transformation to democracy or to support its legitimate aspirations to join such international organizations as the World Trade Organization (WTO) or the World Bank. Taiwan deserves membership in such organizations because of its growing status as an international economic powerhouse and as an established democracy and USCINCPAC is both deserving of strategic guidance and responsible to articulate theater plans to include Taiwan in regional security issues.

Concern over Beijing's reaction is also a major reason the Administration has not moved to help Taiwan build a defense against China's missile threat, and been largely silent with respect to the development and deployment of a theaterwide missile defense system to protect allies and U.S. forces deployed in the region. Cuts in defense spending, confusion in the CINC's priorities of forces and capabilities, and uncoordinated economic and diplomatic pressures on the current bilateral security system unless addressed soon, will put at risk America's ability to meet its security commitments in the event of a crisis developing in, say, both the Persian Gulf and Asia when China, India, and Pakistan all have theater ballistic missile capabilities.

On the Korean Peninsula, the primary issues revolve around America's critical alliance with the Republic of Korea and how Washington and Seoul should coordinate their policies to deal with the threats to peace posed by North Korea's nuclear program, million-man army, and failure to reduce tensions by dealing with South Korea directly. Under the Agreed Framework signed in October 1994, North Korea committed to
freezing its nuclear weapons program in return for two internationally financed and constructed light-water reactors. The United States agreed to pay for an annual $50 million supply of heavy fuel while the reactors are being constructed. However, the Administration has backed down from its demand that North Korea provide a full accounting of the bomb-grade material in its possession. Because of this, the North is able to delay full international inspection of its nuclear program until just before the new reactors are operational. The United States also agreed to allow the North to put off full international inspection of its nuclear program for at least five years until just before the replacement reactors are ready for start-up.

The Administration, however, has not held North Korea to all the terms of the Agreed Framework, which also committed Pyongyang to substantive high-level dialogue with South Korea. Because of the North's refusal to engage in direct North-South talks, the Administration in April 1996 proposed holding Four Party talks between China, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States instead. Two years later, this proposal still lacks a clear purpose or agenda. Furthermore, to draw the North into the proposed Four Party talks, the Administration, encouraged by USCINCPAC, has offered Pyongyang an array of enticements and concessions, including food aid. As a result, the North shows greater interest in dealing with the United States than with its neighbor to the South. Moreover, the Administration's concessions to North Korea have caused tension between the United States and South Korea.

These are problems which not addressed will, like layers of paint applied over a rusty fender, eventually eat through and attack the structural integrity of the theater and the cohesion of the several security structures which maintain the fragile balance. This
multiplicity of alliances, formal and informal is the basis of the dilemma and the source of the confusion that US CINC PAC both creates, in its advice up the chain and suffers from as strategic guidance flows downward to the theater.

In the past year, the administration has taken steps to reaffirm the U.S. Japan security alliance, which is the core of the U.S.-led bilateral alliance structure in the Asia-Pacific region. This reaffirmation took place at the U.S.-Japan Summit held in Tokyo in April 1996 where the President and Prime Minister Hashimoto agreed the Japan-U.S. security arrangement was “the most effective way of defending Japan and striving to achieve a more peaceful and stable security environment in the Asia-Pacific region”.

Two key considerations enter into any discussion of the dimensions of this alliance: the potential concern many theater states express over a newly armed and regionally active Japanese military; and the very real fear expressed in private by ASEAN states and Korea over the Chinese reaction to an alliance including a powerful Japan. It is a problem worth discussion. As the United States force draws down in Asia Pacific, the stronger is the incentive to encourage Japan to shoulder more of the security responsibility – but to retain influence and control of the alliance through a strategic partnership. And while the governments of Australia, Canada, New Zealand, the Philippines, and South Korea have all expressed official support for a strengthened Japanese role in the alliance, others have unofficially expressed doubts. China has made no confusion over where it stands on the issue. On April 18, 1997, a Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman cautioned against a stronger Japan-U.S. alliance stating that “...the defense alliance cannot go beyond bilateral limits. If it should, this would complicate regional conditions.”
On the other hand, there is little doubt that if the U.S.-Japan alliance became unstable, China’s age-old worries about Japan’s military power would quickly destabilize the regional into a struggle for regional hegemony. Russia’s wariness of China has moved it closer to both Japan and the U.S., however, increasing Sino-Russian military sales and contacts clearly are evidence of cooperation to limit the growth and influence of the Japan-U.S. alliance. Further complicating the Northeast Asian strategic picture is the close relationship between the U.S. and the ROK. While North Korea and China still are signatories to a military alliance, China has criticized Pyongyang’s foreign policy, but at the same time Japanese and ROK military ties are characterized by wariness, and the U.S. has tended to attempt to control South Korea’s foreign policies.

Confusing and potentially unstable as is Northeast Asia, its southern counterpart, Southeast Asia is a smaller puzzle of more intricate pieces.

The countries of ASEAN: Brunei, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam, with current observers from Cambodia and Papua New Guinea grew out of the Cold War requirements for Southeast Asian nations to form a security community of non-communist nations. However, ASEAN itself became enmeshed in the Cold War and its most formative years and policies evolved during the Vietnam War. The Asia Pacific grouping has become interdependent economically and its ties to the United States early on secured the vital sea lanes of communication, regional stability, and trading partner largely responsible for the region’s phenomenal growth over the past three decades.

While a unified economic policy has long been one of ASEAN’s notable characteristics, strong regional security policy has not been the hallmark of the
organization. Dr. Amitav Acharya, writing in *A New Regional Order in South-east Asia*, believes ASEAN past apathy to multilateral security — as opposed to the tendency toward that form of security in Northeast Asia — is due both to a conscious rejection of the European style of NATO, and also as a result of Asian culture which avoids identification of adversaries and formal arrangements for resolving conflicts.\(^{41}\)

The principal characteristic of security relations in the region has been one of bilateral ties with one or the other of the superpowers. However, in the wake of the near complete Russian disappearance from the region, and in the looming shadow of China, there is a newly created body of advocates of multilateral interdependent defense that is gaining momentum.

In July 97, ASEAN foreign ministers meeting in Malaysia underlined their commitment to working together to enhance peace and strengthen regional stability through the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF).\(^{42}\) The ARF role as the multilateral forum for promoting security dialogue and cooperation in the area contrasts with the traditional evolutionary approach ASEAN has taken to regional stability especially in the inclusion of dialogue partners from outside the region as ARF’s members now include Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, India, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States.\(^{43}\)

In view of the significant issues bilateral security arrangements have created and fostered in Northeast Asia: the growing potential for friction between China and Japan in dueling bilateral arrangements with the U.S.; the difficulties in coordinating coherent allied policy over even such a potentially dangerous region as the Korean Peninsula; and the obvious benefits a geographic grouping can offer to widely differing countries in the
example NATO sets; the U.S., of all the major powers, rejects the concept of an umbrella cooperative security alliance for pan-Asia.

In this examination of Pacific theater strategy four themes have persisted: the growing perception of a regional China threat; the fears of not only Southeast Asia but also of China and Korea of the dangers of a newly militarized Japan; the as yet undeclared Russian strategy for managing its huge Pacific security problem; and finally, the dangers of an unmoderated South Asian arms race between India and Pakistan.

This is a region with enormous impact on America life, eclipsing trade with Europe and South America – a region with states which possess the capabilities to launch ballistic missiles against the United States and to put our theater forces at danger from tactical missiles tipped with chemical and biological weapons. And this is a region in which over the past six years American influence has been increasingly in doubt, economic growth has to some degree stagnated, and diplomatic dialogue had been acrid among friends as well as enemies.

Presented with the success of NATO in not only deterring Soviet Communism, but also credited with creating the conditions which led to the economic revival of Europe after WWII and through the present, U.S. national strategy, nonetheless persists in denying the validity of sponsoring a security arrangement in the mold of the European model, on which territory there has not been a conflict since the alliance was created.

Our major bilateral partners in the region advocate a theater alliance. Prime Minister Hashimoto offered to elevate relations between his country’s security forces and ASEAN last year, however, was rebuffed. The published rationale was twofold: fear of antagonizing China; and suspicions of Japan that date back to the wars of the ‘30s and
40s. A third and perhaps larger reason is U.S. disinclination to discuss any form of multilateral security that takes precedence over the established network of bilateral ties.44

Russia has gone on record calling for increasing the responsibilities and scope of the ARF, and advocating inclusion of North Korea in the forum. Yevgeny Primakov last July, attending the fourth session of the ARF urged the body to participate fully in resolving the worst threat to security in Asia and to call on Seoul and Pyongyang to resume and inter-Korean dialogue.45

China itself, unhappy with the newly burnished U.S.-Japan security treaty has started wooing ASEAN countries, offering as incentive to a regional security cooperative moderating its position on the South China Sea islands.46 China’s top priority of the moment is to obtain reassurance that no other country, be it the U.S. or a member of ASEAN supports Taiwan’s bid for recognition as the legitimate China. Just as NATO grew from a purely security oriented alliance to sponsor trade groups, China needs to convince the U.S. and Japan that its inclusion in any Pacific alliance will ensure China’s rapid economic growth is good for the region.47

After years of indifference, ASEAN leaders are expressing concern over the situation in South Asia and looking for ways to engage their two large Asian neighbors. The Indo-Pakistan arms race has come to be seen as potentially one of the most destabilizing factors in the region – especially after the Indian nuclear tests of this week – after the Korean peninsula and the South China Sea. India has become a full dialogue partner in ARF, and ASEAN has shifted from the formal U.S. position of condemning Pakistan to rapid incorporation into regional economic and security groups as soon as possible.48 These pragmatic initiatives to enhance Asia Pacific stability and integration

27
point to the growing maturity of the ASEAN grouping and argue for United States support in co-sponsoring not only economic ties but pan-Asian security ties as well.

However, the U.S. has made its position on the subject of Pacific alliances very clear in a number of announcements. Warren Christopher, Secretary of State in 1996 addressing ASEAN stated, “The cornerstone our engagement in the Pacific remains our partnership with Japan…and this Declaration will meet the challenges of the next century.” Later in the same remarks (at which all members of ASEAN and ARF were present), Christopher clouded the issue by declaring, “…no nation will play a larger role in shaping the future of Asia than China. The United States seeks a constructive relationship with China that will enable us to advance an array of common important interests.” China’s misgivings about the nature of the U.S.-Japan relationship become somewhat more understandable when language so contradictory is presented within moments by the American Secretary of State. The speech went on to limit the expectations the U.S. has for ARF, “We welcome the progress that the ARF has made over the past year. In particular, ARF’s work in areas such as confidence-building, peacekeeping operations, and search and rescue will enhance security and stability.” The absence of suggestion for ASEAN/ARF to develop into an important regional security role is consistent with other U.S. pronouncements on Pacific strategy.

Walter Slocumbe, Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, in testimony before the Congressional Subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific reaffirmed earlier this year his agenda:

“First of all we have to maintain the vitality of our bilateral alliances – and our friendships with countries with whom we do not have formal alliances.”
“Secondly, we need to maintain our forward presence....”

“Third, we have to promote a stable sound and lasting relation with China....”

“And finally, we must seize the opportunity that are offered by multilateral fora, organizations like ARF to advance transparency, resolve tensions and improve confidence.”

U.S. defense policy seems to be the Chinese restaurant approach: if you can’t decide what you want, take one from column A and one from column B.

Finally, the Secretary of Defense: “The enduring feature that defines the regional security landscape is the crucial role of strong bilateral relationships, not only those the United States maintains, but increasingly, those between Korea and Japan, Japan and China, Russian and Japan.” Secretary Cohen apparently never met a bilateral alliance he didn’t like – even those between potential adversaries. He goes on to say, “Here in Southeast Asia we have excellent bilateral security relationships, far better than many realize, with many ASEAN states.”

But, the Secretary warns, “…we see several patterns of change. The first of these changes is the emergence of multilateral frameworks for discussion and cooperation, which in a few short years have become important, and permanent, features of the regional security structure. Some would like to see multilateral security dialogues and cooperation replace bilateral relationships as the primary feature of regional stability in the coming era. The United States views these multilateral mechanisms as important, and having a greater role to play in the future. But we also believe that they will be successful only if they are built upon the foundation of solid bilateral relationships and a continued U.S. forward presence in the region.”

52
Secretary Cohen's communication to ASEAN members is that regardless of a collective decision to explore multinational security for their governance of the Asia Pacific via the ASEAN Regional Forum model, the U.S. will continue to maintain the same bilateral mechanisms that have produced the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the ejection of the United States from the Philippines, communist insurrections in Laos and Cambodia, the splintering of Malaya, the isolation of Burma, the communal violence in Indonesia and the defeat of Chiang Kai-shek's Nationalists by Mao's communists in China.

As the evidence examined in this paper demonstrates, the administration has articulated an ambiguous vision of strategic guidance to the nation. That guidance, however, is both more broad in scope and more insightful than the Defense Department's narrowly focused interpretation of the national strategy. The lack of imagination found in the National Military Strategy selecting those tasks which most conveniently fit defense planning appropriation future concepts rather than the prosaic and unglamorous tasks of coordinating basic military policies within the framework of the totality of the nation's power, military, economic, and diplomatic, demonstrates to the countries of Asia Pacific the bankruptcy of U.S. foreign policy in their region. Within the executive branch of government, there is little agreement on interagency coordination of policy issues, and no firm leadership directing the Departments to work together toward to common goals. As fragmented and ad hoc as this approach to unifying implementation of U.S. power is, there is even greater discontinuity between the executive departments and the Congress. The often acrid debate over not only who is in charge of foreign policy, but what that policy should be is dismaying to our allies and security partners.53
Even as the nations of Asia Pacific talk among themselves and to U.S. representatives of the potential of multinational approaches to slow arms traffic and nuclear proliferation, and for normalizing full diplomatic relations throughout the region and providing an overarching theater alliance for resolving security policy issues, the U.S. more and more mortgages its future in Asia to the aging policies of bilateralism. With the Congress increasingly active in criticizing administration conduct of foreign policy, exchanges such as the one last week between Representative Rohrabacher and Assistant Secretary of State for Asia and the Pacific Ross are seen as indications of growing lack of resolve to participate in the evolving political, economic, and security dialogue in the theater. See Appendix D for a partial transcript of this exchange.

Conclusion

The examination of the regional situation revealed that despite stunning economic success, Asia Pacific is facing enormous security problems in the next two decades. The relationship between the U.S. and Japan is one of almost tragic proportions. If the United States withdrew from the alliance, Japan would have no choice but to unilaterally rearm for self-defense against the threat of China. If the United States makes that bilateral alliance too strong, resurgent Chinese fears of alliance hemming its diplomatic and economic growth will certainly spur China to take a more belligerent role in the security affairs of the region. America has painted the nations of Asia into a corner they cannot easily escape: while regional countries now embrace the concept of security cooperation as they earlier did the concept of economic cooperation, the U.S. has become a reluctant partner but an all-too-present forward presence. With the strengthened U.S.-Japan
alliance as the cornerstone of Pacific security, remaining Asian nations are forced with a gambler’s choice.

Openly endorsing the enhanced relationship between the U.S. and Japan is a certain path to offending China. But choosing regional cooperative security will certainly lead to a limited U.S. security role in the region. Neither is an attractive proposition. The competition between a rearmed Japan and a newly rich China is a history the young democracies of Asia do not want to live again. The United States must accept the imperative of regional cooperation without domination, as it did in the early years following the European War.

The lead that USCINCPAC has taken on the operational level to recognize the strategic shortfalls in U.S. policy must be continued. CINC planning must continue to include the economic and political advisors, and they in turn, must emphasize to their agencies the significance of multinational cooperation in fusing a coherent strategy for the theater. USCINCPAC should encourage Army and Air Force initiatives that include regional security planning beyond the traditional bilateral arrangements the U.S. has employed for fifty years and take positive steps to encourage the U.S. Navy and Marine Corps toward that goal. Theater-wide exercises will be the first step toward realizing regional security policy, and the most efficient of those exercises is naval in nature, surface PASEXs, evolving into combined arms exercises including amphibious forces exercising against regional natural disaster threats is a potential first step.

From there, inclusion of regional forces in larger exercises will foster good will and build confidence among the nations of the area. Eventual inclusion of air, sea, and land forces in a variety of environments and scenarios to plan against regional instability,
arms proliferation, chemical and biological agents release, insurgencies, and restriction of
lines of communication by forces opposed to or misunderstanding of regional economic
forces will forge a union for growth much as NATO in Europe has.

The theater commander must also articulate to the national command
headquarters his assessment of the situation in order to impact national security planning.
The U.S. is on the precipice of a downturn in Asia Pacific, where 200 years of influence
and access to the area’s goods and commerce have built the nation to the status it enjoys
today. As regional perspectives and concerns increasingly overshadow reliance on U.S.
military policy alone, the time is overdue for America to take the lead and join the
ASEAN nations to synchronize diplomatic dialogue, economic policy, and military-to-
military training with all the nations of the Pacific Theater.

If a U.S. accommodation to theater trends to regional security alliances is not
understood and articulated from the national security perspective through the operational
theater commander to the fleets, divisions and wings on the line, the quip in a recent
edition of the Economist may become more truth than poetry. In an editorial in August,
1997, the magazine observed: “When the ASEAN Regional Forum was formed in 1994,
it was discreetly advertised as a way of engaging China in a regional security discussion.
It is beginning to look more like a way of engaging the United States.”

USCINCPAC has the concept right. Asia is increasingly linked, just as is Europe.
The expanding role of NATO must serve as a model for U.S. operational leadership in
Asia, in order to lead the way strategically to continued economic and diplomatic success
in this region so vital to U.S. strategic security interests.
Endnotes

5 Ibid., 9.
6 Ibid., 10.
8 Przystup, U.S. Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, 492.
9 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 7.
10 Przystup, U.S. Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, 493.
11 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 8.
12 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 54.
13 Ibid., 9.
15 Ibid.
17 Proliferation: Threat and Response, 36.
18 Ibid.
26 Forward...From the Sea, Department of the Navy, Washington, DC.
27 Operational Maneuver From the Sea, Commandant of the Marine Corps, Washington, DC.
33 Ibid. 25.
34 Przystup, U.S. Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, 493.
35 Ibid. 494.
36 Ibid. 491.
37 Ibid. 491.
39 Ibid.
Ibid. 25.
34 Przustup, U.S. Interests in the Asia-Pacific Region, 493.
35 Ibid. 494.
36 Ibid. 491.
37 Ibid. 491.
39 Ibid.
50 Ibid.
Appendix A:

Extracts from the National Security Strategy and the National Military Strategy

Section 1.

NSS: “America must look across the Pacific as well as across the Atlantic. Over the last four years we have made significant progress in creating a stable prosperous Asia Pacific community. In this endeavor, we must reinforce our close ties to Japan, the Republic of Korea, Australia and our ASEAN friends and allies. As we strengthen our security and promote our prosperity, we must remain alert to the challenges that remain.”

Counterpart NMS: US Armed Forces help shape the international environment primarily through their inherent deterrent qualities and through peacetime military engagement. The shaping element of our strategy helps foster the institutions and international relationships that constitute a peaceful strategic environment by promoting stability; preventing and reducing conflict and threats; and deterring aggression and coercion.

Comment: Supportive, however, there is no regional focus in the NMS and its application of alliance ties is defined primarily as deterring aggression and conflict.

Section 2.

NSS: “We must pursue a deeper dialogue with China. An isolated, inward-looking China is not good for America or the world. A China playing its rightful role as a responsible and active member of the international community is.”

NMS: The potential for conflict among states and groups of states remains our most serious security challenge. Despite the best efforts of engagement, it is likely that more than one aspiring regional power will have both the desire and means to challenge the
United States militarily. Iran, Iraq, and North Korea currently pose this challenge, with no guarantee that these threats will diminish significantly soon.

Comment: The NMS focus remains fixed on challenges to U.S. military power, rather than offering a complimentary tool-set to expanding the international community of diplomatic and economic ties.

Section 3

NSS: “Tensions on the Korean Peninsula remain the principal threat to the peace and stability of the East Asia region. A peaceful resolution of the Korean conflict with a non-nuclear peninsula is in our strategic interest. We are working to create conditions of stability by maintaining the U.S. Republic of Korea treaty alliance and our military presence; freezing and eventually dismantling the North Korean nuclear program under the Agreed Framework; developing bilateral contacts with the North aimed at drawing the North into a set of more normal relations with the region and the rest of the world.”

NMS: We can never know with certainty where or when the next conflict will occur, who our next adversary will be, how an enemy will fight, who will join us in a coalition, or precisely what demands will be placed on US forces. A number of "wild card" threats could emerge to put US interests at risk. Such threats range from the emergence of new technologies that neutralize some of our military capabilities, to the loss of key allies or alliances and the unexpected overthrow of friendly regimes by hostile parties.

Comment: Choosing to look for "wild card" threats rather than offering prescriptive strategic guidance for threats clearly identified as the U.S. top priorities is an easy answer to the critics of modernization over readiness. In this DOD interpretation, coalitions are made to be broken.
Comment: This view of U.S. intelligence needs starkly contrasts the divergence between the President's guidance and DOD's implementation. Support to the art of policymaking is lost to the sophistication of complex technology, while intelligence to support democracies, humanitarian and environmental concerns, and arms control regimens are foregone in pursuit of targeting brilliant weapons platforms.

Section 5

NSS: “Our military presence has been essential to maintaining the stability that has enabled most nations in the Asia Pacific region to build thriving economies for the benefit of all. To deter regional aggression and secure our own interests, we will maintain an active presence. Our treaty alliances with Japan, South Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines, and our commitment to keeping approximately 100,000 U.S. military personnel in the region, serve as the foundation for America's continuing security role. We have supported new regional dialogues - such as the ASEAN Regional Forum - on the full range of common security challenges to help enhance regional security and understanding. Our success in working with China as a partner in building a stable international order depends on establishing a productive relationship that will build sustained domestic support.”

NMS: Deterrence means preventing potential adversaries from taking aggressive actions that threaten our interests, allies, partners, or friends. It is the military's most important contribution to the shaping element of the President's strategy. Deterrence rests in large part on our demonstrated ability and willingness to defeat potential adversaries and deny them their strategic objectives. The critical elements of deterrence are our conventional warfighting capabilities: forces and equipment strategically positioned, our capability to
rapidly project and concentrate military power worldwide.... Our strategic nuclear forces complement our conventional capabilities by deterring any hostile foreign leadership with access to nuclear weapons from acting against our vital interests.

Comment: Presence, alliances, productive relationships enhancing regional stability to promote economic health all take a back seat in the NMS to warfighting capabilities. Deterrence in this document is defined solely in the context of the capability to defeat adversaries with either conventional or nuclear weapons.

Section 6

NSS: “Our strategic interest in Southeast Asia centers on developing regional and bilateral security and economic relationships that assist in conflict prevention and resolution and expand U.S. participation in the region's dynamic growth. Our policy combines two approaches: first, maintaining our increasingly productive relationship with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations; and second, pursuing bilateral objectives with ASEAN's individual members and other Southeast Asian nations.... We are committed to sustaining the Asia Pacific region's remarkable dynamism. Opportunities for economic growth abound in Asia and underlie our strong commitment to multilateral economic cooperation.”

NMS: US Armed Forces help shape the international environment through deterrence, peacetime engagement activities, and active participation and leadership in alliances. Critical to deterrence are our conventional warfighting capabilities and our nuclear forces. Deterrence rests on a potential adversary’s perception of our capabilities and commitment, which are demonstrated by our ability to bring decisive military power to bear and by communication of US intentions. By increasing understanding and reducing
uncertainty, engagement builds constructive security relationships, helps to promote the
development of democratic institutions, and helps keep some countries from becoming
adversaries tomorrow.

Comment: Dynamic growth, economic and productive relationships are characterized in
the NMS as best applied by U.S. conventional and nuclear warfighting capabilities.
Regional security is expressed as preventing the defection of allies to adversaries.

Section 7

NSS: “Our economic strength depends on our ability to seize opportunities in the
Asia Pacific region. U.S. initiatives in APEC will open new opportunities for economic
cooporation and permit U.S. companies to expand their involvement in substantial
infrastructure planning and construction throughout the region. While our progress in
APEC has been gratifying, we will explore options to encourage all Asia Pacific nations
to pursue open markets. Third, the American people must prosper in the global economy.
We have made it our mission to tear down trade barriers abroad in order to create jobs at
home.”

Comment: The NMS does not address economic growth in any enabling term.
However, any coherent military strategy must realize that unlike the Cold War period, the
post-Cold War incentive for drug trafficking, weapon transfers, and proliferation of
technologies, which the NMS does address, are largely not political but economic. The
solutions to their control must also have an economic dimension.
Appendix B

Mission: “USPACOM promotes peace, deters aggression, responds to crises and, if necessary, will fight and win to advance security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region.”

Vision: “A Joint Command directing and coordinating the employment of U.S. Forces in peace, crisis or war to advance U.S. interests as an active player, partner, and beneficiary in pursuit of a secure, prosperous, and democratic Asia-Pacific community.”

CINC's Intent: “My intent is to promote peace, deter aggression, respond to crises and, if necessary, fight and win to advance security and stability throughout the Asia-Pacific region. The Asia-Pacific region represents a unique confluence of security, diplomatic/political, and economic elements of national power. Confluence not only defines the significance of the region, but it also represents a framework for the way we perform our security role in the region. To be successful, we, whose responsibility is security, need to harmonize the diplomatic/political and economic instruments. My top priority is readiness. Ready forces composed of well trained people equipped with modern, sustainable technology and employing sound tactics underwrite Pacific Command's ability to be an active player in the region. Our forces will be engaged in peace, crisis, and war. Our peacetime engagement will consist of steadfast, credible forward military presence, strong bilateral relationships, and participation in multilateral exercises and dialogues. We will work to deter aggression and prevent conflict through a credible crisis response capability characterized by proximate, agile, ably controlled forces, and by promoting confidence building measures among the nations of the region. Should deterrence fail, we will be capable of fighting and winning - multilaterally if
possible, unilaterally if necessary. We will maintain a balance of decisive and ready forces throughout the theater - forward deployed, forward based, as well as continental U.S. based. Force protection is an important consideration for all our forces as we seek the appropriate balance between security and mission accomplishment. Teamwork is key. Our need to integrate capabilities will place a premium on joint/combined interoperability. In all our actions, we shall pursue a secure, prosperous Asia-Pacific community, which emphasizes democratic principles.”

Strategic Concept: “U.S. Pacific Command's regional strategy is designed to accomplish three major goals. In peacetime, we want to make conflicts and crises less likely. In times of crisis, we aim to resolve specific situations on terms that advance U.S. interests. In war, we want to win quickly and decisively, with minimum loss of life and resources. Today we put the preponderance of our resources into engagement and preparedness, which are the two ways we make conflicts and crises less likely. Engagement is our security dialogue with nations in the region and allows us to resolve security concerns before they erupt into crises or conflict. Preparedness enables us to respond to crises or conflict and to dissuade potential adversaries from using force as a means of resolving disputes.

“The Asia-Pacific region, with economies, people, and key sea lanes, is a vital national interest. It contains over half of the world's surface, sixty percent of its population, largely along its littorals. The confluence of security, economic and diplomatic interests in the Asia-Pacific requires us to work security issues concurrently. Security provides the foundation for stability, which in turn, yields opportunities for nations to pursue economic prosperity.”
The Pacific Command strategy has six elements for ensuring regional security:

- U.S. Military forces--credible, combat capable; trained and ready to fight and win; balanced and joint.

- Forward stationing of critical capabilities--today the capability represented by about 100,000 U.S. troops--which provide the standard of U.S. commitment.

- Positive security relationships with all nations in the region—including our formal alliances with Japan, Korea, Australia, Thailand, and the Philippines; our emerging relationship with China, and nascent relationships such as with Vietnam. We believe multilateral relationships hold promise for future stability in the region.

- Long-term commitment and long-haul solutions--the U.S. is here to stay.

- Teamwork with the State and Commerce Departments, and other U.S. government agencies--ensuring our views are reflected in the interagency process.

Measured responses to regional events--promoting peaceful resolution, including preparation to provide humanitarian assistance and disaster relief.iii

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i USCINCPAC Vision. [http://www.pacom.mil/about/vmc](http://www.pacom.mil/about/vmc)

ii USCINCPAC Intent [http://www.pacom.mil/about/intent](http://www.pacom.mil/about/intent)

iii USCINCPAC Strategy [http://www.pacom.mil/about/strategy](http://www.pacom.mil/about/strategy)
USARPAC

- Provide trained and ready Army Forces for USCINCPAC in support of military operations and peacetime engagements in the Asia-Pacific area of operations in order to contribute to regional stability, crisis response and decisive victory.
- Develop and maintain alliance and regional relations and presence.
- Perform Title X Service responsibilities.
- Army power projection.
- Provide Army theater strategic C2.
- Sustain theater Army forces.
- Maintain Army theater readiness.
- Receive, store and transport obsolete chemical warfare stocks for demilitarization.
- Integrate theater Army reserve and National Guard into contingencies, exercises and conferences.
- Be relevant to the global strategies and emerging realities of the Asia-Pacific region in the 21st Century.
- Responsive to challenging missions worldwide; and
- Ready at all times to fight and win our Nation's wars.
Section 2

USPACAF

PACAF's primary mission is to plan, conduct and coordinate offensive and defensive air operations in the Pacific and Asian theaters. The command provides advice on the use of aerospace power throughout the theater and carries out missions as directed by the commander in chief of the U.S. Pacific Command.ii

As a major command, PACAF is responsible for most Air Force units, bases and facilities in the Pacific and Alaska. The command ensures that Air Force units in the region are properly trained, equipped and organized to conduct tactical air operations. PACAF's area of responsibility extends from the West Coast of the United States to the East Coast of Africa and from the Arctic to the Antarctic, more than 100 million square miles. The area is home to nearly two billion people who live in 44 countries. PACAF maintains a forward presence to help ensure stability in the region.

Mission: PACAF’s extends USPACOM’s power and reach by supporting air operations, maintaining combat ready forces, and providing quality services and support in the Pacific.

Vision: To be recognized for excellence as one uniquely proactive team, highly responsive to an evolving mission, loyal to our values.

Overview: Composed of nine wings in the USAF Pacific Air Forces (PACAF). Due to its location, it plays a pivotal role in the nation's defense posture and support of forces in the Western Pacific. On 13 April 1992, the Wing reorganized its forces under the objective wing structure mandated by the Air Force to streamline the chain of command and implement the Chief of Staff's vision of "one base, one wing, one boss". 
Under this concept, command and management levels are minimized, and duplicated functions and procedures are eliminated.

The Wing began its initial efforts to use the Quality Air Force (QAF) leadership and management approach in the early 1990s. The motivation behind the Wing's implementation of QAF is the realization that while the Air Force has proved itself the best in the world, the world is continuously changing as the Air Force mission. In order to provide for the nation's defense, we must be able to respond to changing missions and maximize the use of the resources entrusted to us by the American people.iii

PACAF's goals are to:

- Forge a fighting team second to none
- Make operations safe
- Continuously improve performance
- Maintain the highest standards of conduct and appearance
- Improve quality of life for all its people and
- Build quality partnerships with allies, other services and local Communities

Section 3
CJCS Posture Statement, 1997 (excerpt)

"In the vast Asia-Pacific region, our military forces exert as strong stabilizing influence in an often unpredictable area. In addition to our five mutual defense treaties with South Korea, Japan, Australia, Thailand and the Philippines, we are stepping up military to military contacts with the People's Republic of China (PRC) to
promote mutual understanding, transparency, and trust. Our forces in Korea continue to perform a vital role in deterring conflict and ensuring stability on that troubled peninsula.

U.S. Navy port calls to Hong Kong continue, and completion of the Military Maritime Consultation Agreement provides an historic framework for a U.S.-PRC dialog on military operations at sea.\textsuperscript{iv}

\textsuperscript{ii} USPACAF Mission, http://www.hickam.af.mil/Mission
\textsuperscript{iii} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{iv} Henry H. Shelton, FY99 Defense Authorization, Posture Statement by Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff before the 105th Congress Committee on National Security, 5 Feb, 1998.
Appendix D

The transcript below is from the Hearing of the House Asia and Pacific Subcommittee conducted on 7 May, 1998.

Representative Dana Rohrabacher (R-CA) to Stanley Roth, Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia and the Pacific:

Rohrabacher: You talked about a strategic partnership with China. Is that what you're talking about? Is that the word you're using -- strategic partnership?

ROTH: The words from the joint statement issued at the last sentence where that will be work towards moving towards a constructive strategic partnership.

ROHRABACHER: Partnership against who? The Philippines? Taiwan? Malaysia? Tibet? Who is this partnership going to be against?

ROTH: Nobody. Partnership is not a military alliance. All this was was...

ROHRABACHER: Strategic was the word that goes in there that makes it relevant.

ROTH: No. Nothing in the intention of this is anything resembling a military alliance. What it's an attempt to suggest is that we believe there are many regional problems where we can work together to advance our mutual interests. For example, you know, we believe that we have an increasingly
common interest in the Persian Gulf now that they've become an oil importer. We believe they have as much of a strategic interest in keeping the Gulf open to the free flow of oil at the lowest possible prices.

ROHRABACHER: Is there any indication that the Communist regime in Beijing is still transmitting technology to the Iranians? Have you had any intelligence indications that the Chinese regime right now, up to this date, are still transmitting technology to the Iranians?

ROTH: Obviously, I'm not in a position in an open hearing to talk about intelligence. Obviously, we've also had concerns with some Chinese activities -- not necessarily government activities -- with respect to Iran.

ROHRABACHER: So you're talking -- you're here in an open hearing talking about a strategic partnership with a country that's now engaged in providing missile technology to the Iranians, and you know it and I know it.

ROTH: It's pretty much the opposite. What we're talking about is trying to have the type of relationship and dialogue with China which gets us to have them to have policy changes consistent with our own. That's what we mean by this. No one is claiming that we have this constructive strategic partnership now. It's an objective we're trying to move towards. We've had some success in some areas, not in others. We work extremely well, for example, with respect to North Korea with them, in a very constructive way that advances our strategic interest. It's not an across-the-board statement. It's an objective.

ROHRABACHER: We have a disagreement on Korea. As far as I'm
concerned, by trying to promote stability in North Korea we've extended
the life of a really vicious, ugly regime. We have a disagreement on that. And, of
course, the Chinese were very willing to be helpful in
promoting stability -- meaning the longer life of that regime in North
Korea. Do you know about the -- do any of you know about the Chinese
presence on Mischief Reef? (Speaking to Secretary Roth, DUSD(P) Slocum and Admiral
Prueher) And you're sitting here talking to us
about a strategic partnership with the Chinese occupation of part of the Spratly Islands?
What kind of signal do you think that gives to our democratic allies in the Pacific, like the
Philippines or Malaysia or Singapore or the rest?
ROTH: The countries you mentioned each strongly support our
policy towards China, and particularly this notion of having an engagement policy and
getting along better for peaceful resolution.
ROHRABACHER: Well I'm sure they do. I mean after all, who else
-- where else is there for them to turn? If the United States is groveling, who else can
stand next to them? Nobody. I mean, that's not to mention human rights, of course.
Bibliography


