COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SUPPORT COMMAND

JOINT VISION 2010 REQUIRES NEW ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations Department.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature

18 May 1998

CAPT Alexander Read Saunders, USN
Joint Vision 2010 states that four new operational concepts will be developed to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting. In particular, two of these new concepts, Dominate Maneuver and Focused Logistics, will require a lean and responsive support structure to be successful. Both concepts will require some sort of warm base to receive sustainment supplies and to disperse forces into the fighting area. However, the base structure today does not resemble the structure needed by the warfighting CINC. The Combatant Commander needs a joint forces base designed to receive sustainment and provide support to all warfighters regardless of Service affiliation.

The Combatant Commander needs a complete overhaul in the existing support infrastructure. This paper proposes just that--- a Commander in Chief, Support Command. This paper looks at previously implemented initiatives--Consolidation, Outsourcing, Privatization and Reengineering. It discusses the positive and negative aspects of each. It also points out why a complete overhaul is necessary and who says it's important. The paper further delineates how a joint installation infrastructure will help the Combatant Commander and provides a conceptual plan for accomplishment of the objective.
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Commander in Chief, Support Command
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INTRODUCTION

COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SUPPORT COMMAND has a nice ring, doesn’t it?

CINCSUP, it fits right in, with CINCTRANS or CINCSOC. How about an engineer as a CINC?

It really isn’t that far out of the box. When we admitted to the shortfalls in the transportation community, we created a CINC headed up by a logistician. So let’s do it again, except this time the new command could be headed up by a logistician or an engineer.

Joint Vision 2010 states that four new operational concepts will be developed to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.¹ In particular, two of these new concepts, Dominant Maneuver and Focused Logistics, will require a lean and responsive support structure to be successful. A key element of Dominant Maneuver is the combination of seamless operations with reduced buildup time and a smaller, more widely dispersed footprint². Focused Logistics will require tailored logistics packages and sustainment to be delivered directly to the strategic, operational and tactical levels of operations.³ Hence, both concepts will require some sort of warm base⁴ to receive sustainment supplies and to disperse forces into the fighting area. If you believe in the theory that you should train as you will fight, you can buy into the idea that this warm base should resemble the base structure back home. However, the base structure back home today does not resemble the structure needed by the warfighting CINC. The Combatant CINC needs a joint forces base designed to receive sustainment and provide support to all warfighters regardless of Service affiliation.

In the Department of Defense today, each Military Department shares the common

¹ Joint Vision 2010 published by the Chairman of the Joints Chiefs of Staff
² Ibid p. 21
³ Ibid p. 24
⁴ Warmbase—a place established in theater early on to receive supplies and follow on troops
functions to develop, garrison, supply, equip and maintain bases and other installations. This means that when the warfighting CINC needs to establish his theater bases, he has to turn to each of the different Services to tap into the experienced resources. A much better solution would be for him to request a slice of an existing base operating as a joint installation during peacetime conditions. Each military department owning and operating their own bases does not lend itself to the development of joint installations that the CINC could rely on for experienced staff or a quick adaptation to the type base JV 2010 requires to support the warfighter vision.

Not only will this initiative support the combatant commander, it will save enormous sums of money. Some may even argue the greatest benefit achieved by adopting this idea would be the reduced cost associated with support infrastructures. I do not believe this is true. I believe the greatest benefit is the long term efficiencies that will grow out of a common support structure. Consequently, a common language will be spoken among all the service providers in the support establishment. No longer will the various Services have the urge to create their own version of each element of support. Even if they still have this urge they will not have the power to implement their ideas. This responsibility will reside in the new Support Command. For instance, the Information Warfare Centers created by each of the Services in the early 90's would not have been created if a common Support Commander was responsible for each of these organizations. However, to get the Combatant Commander the infrastructure he needs, the existing structure must be changed. Money must be found within the existing structure to make these changes. For this reason, the potential ways to generate these funds can not be ignored.

The duplication of efforts at the management and policy development level to maintain separate organizations creating different sets of rules and procedures for each Service is

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5 Adapted from DOD Directive 5100.1
redundant and not supportive of the Combatant Commanders needs. Due to various bureaucratic processes implemented by the different Services, the existing installation infrastructure is both costly and confusing. Over the years many techniques to lower infrastructure costs have been recommended and implemented with varying degrees of success. These initiatives include consolidation, outsourcing, privatization and reengineering. There are a number of reasons that the foregoing initiatives have had only limited success. The main reason is they are being tried by a lot of different organizations with no real economies of scale. To continue to pursue these initiatives in the same disjointed fashion will not produce the kind of organization the warfighter needs. What the Combatant Commander needs is a complete overhaul in the support infrastructure.

This overhaul should create a single Commander-in-Chief tasked with providing all support required by combatant commands as well as other specific commands. This new command would then be able to achieve economies of scale and use the best that each of these previously mentioned alternatives have to offer. Incorporation of this suggestion will move the Department of Defense to the next level of fully implementing the Goldwater-Nichols Act. The spirit of this law is to combine resources where practical, whether it is combat capabilities or common user support. Implementation of this idea would assign responsibility for all support services to a COMMANDER IN CHIEF, SUPPORT COMMAND.

WHY IT'S IMPORTANT?

During the conflict in Grenada there was the problem of Army and Navy radios not being able to talk with each other. A common support structure would have precluded this from happening. No organization working from a common data base would have knowingly gone out
and bought radios using different frequencies. In fact, just the opposite would have happened (by
design) when the organization was developing the requirement the commonality issue would have
surfaced and been addressed before it became an operational problem. This is not to discount the
fact that on some occasions different radios would be necessary. This is true and those times
would be addressed also. The point is that during requirements generation, all appropriate parties
would be represented and their individual reasons for common and/or different items would
surface and informed decisions would be made.

Although this radio issue was not the only problem the Goldwater-Nichols Act tried to
correct, it was a major point of discussion leading up to the legislation. The law passed during the
late 80’s sought to create an organization that would combine functions into common
organizations where it made sense to do so. Yet, in the 90’s the stovepipe organizations of the
various Services was still making decisions that developed redundant support structures serving
individual Service needs. The case in point is three different Information Warfare Commands
created to service the Army, Navy and Air Force independently. The argument may be that the
individual Services have different needs at the tactical level but when Information Warfare gets to
the Operational Commander level, he needs a system that looks across the entire spectrum. My
proposed structure would provide the system.

The Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC) has tasked the Director of Logistics (J-4)
and the Director of Resources Management (J-8) to sponsor a new mission area assessment
known as Reengineering Infrastructure. According to Captain Quilsei, USN\(^6\), a member of the
Readiness and Requirements Division within the Logistics Directorate, no specific guidance was
provided by the JROC. No specific savings were targeted and the field of study was left open to

\(^6\)Phonecon 2 Sept. 97 with Captain Quilsei, USN, member of the J4 staff
ideas and initiatives where the infrastructure could truly be reengineered.

A review of the Quadrennial Defense Review\(^7\) provides a sound assumption of where this initiative could have generated. The infrastructure within the Department of Defense is huge. To free up funding for weapons modernization programs and the proposed Support Command, radical changes in business practices must be instituted. A General Accounting Office\(^8\) study cites DOD estimates of about $146 billion, or almost two thirds of its budget for FY-97, earmarked for support infrastructure. Another GAO study\(^9\) states that wasteful or inefficient activities divert limited defense funds from pressing needs such as weapons modernization. This study also suggests consolidations, privatization, outsourcing, reengineering and interservice agreements to achieve the desired savings. Acquisition Infrastructure, Central Logistics, Installation Support, Central Training, Force Management, and Central Medical are all areas the GAO identified as potential sources where savings may be available. All the foregoing, except Force Management, would fall under the purview of the proposed Commander-in-Chief for Support. Additionally, if this idea was adopted and fully implemented, a reduced force management organization would be a by-product.

Former Assistant Secretary of Defense John White says it’s important. His paper,\(^10\) developed about this time, stated that the way we support the warfighter must change. He went on to say DOD must be leaner, more efficient, and more cost effective in order to serve the warfighter faster, better, and cheaper. We not only have the opportunity to change, we have the requirement to change, according to White. The forces envisioned in Joint Vision 2010 will

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\(^7\) Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review, William S. Cohen, Secretary offense, May 1997
\(^8\) General Accounting Office report, Defense Outsourcing, Challenges facing DOD as it attempts to save billions in infrastructure costs, p. 1, GAO/T-NSIAD-97-110
\(^9\) General Accounting Office report, Defense Infrastructure, GAO/HR-97-7
\(^10\) Outsourcing: DoD's Strategy for Better Management Header by John P. White
require a radically different support structure. Achieving those forces will also require steadily increasing investments. To afford these investments, the Department of Defense will need to achieve offsetting efficiencies in support operations. The best source of funds for those investments is within the existing support infrastructure.\textsuperscript{11}

It is time step back and take a hard look. Redundancy in support services must end. The Combatant Commanders need a platform that will support future concepts and the bean counters need ideas to save funds. Consider the alternative approaches that have been tried in the past. But consider them with an eye toward how the savings can be extrapolated to other organizations, because with the Support Command that is what I’m proposing.

\textbf{ALTERNATIVE: CONSOLIDATION}

Consolidation efforts have been a proven winner when the objective is to reduce overhead costs. Numerous industries, both private and public, have recognized the merits of consolidation and implemented the practice. The objective is to move all the service providers to a limited number of central locations and have all the service receivers acquire their required services accordingly. The benefits are in reduced numbers of supervisors, in particular middle managers, as well as other support staffs. Quantities of equipment, supplies and facilities can be reduced. Obviously it is less costly, due to lower overhead costs, to provide services from one or two locations than it is to provide the same services from several locations.

Major consolidation efforts have been going on over the last few years throughout the Department of Defense. One example is the Department of Army Civilian Personnel community. They have determined that regional offices strategically located could provide all the personnel

\textsuperscript{11} ibid
services required by Army Commands located within their respective regions. Another example of consolidation efforts under way within the Army is in the Contracting community. They are forming what is known as a Center and Satellite organization. This concept has each Major Command limiting the number of Contracting Centers throughout their area of responsibility. Each of these centers provides the contracting expertise for larger dollar value contracts required by the command customers. The smaller dollar contracts are still performed by the satellites located at each installation, office or unit, as appropriate.

ALTERNATIVE: PRIVATIZATION

Privatization is the latest buzzword being used by all the management consultants hired by the DOD. A private company gets a contract to provide a certain amount of service work for an extended number of years. As part of the contract they get the government facilities, equipment, materials and experienced workforce. The premise being that a private company can provide the product or service at a lower cost than the public entity; the fallacy being that the private company has to make a profit. Profit is a line item not required by a government organization. Existing DOD owned facilities, equipment and materials would have to be turned over to the contractor at less than market rates for the private contractor to operate at a lower cost. Theoretically, because the public entity cost without the profit will be less than the private company, the private company supposedly gets more productivity out of the same workforce. The truth is the only way these firms can operate at a lower cost is to pay the employees a lower wage. This is a big fear of the government employee and the reason behind their resistance to make the process work.

During the 1995 Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process, Kelly Air Force Base in Texas and McClellan Air Force Base in California were identified for closure. Politics became
involved and these two facilities were subsequently removed from the closure list and identified as privatization candidates. This action brought the spotlight to the privatization initiative and guarantees that these two installations will succeed, at least in the near term. The jury is still out as to the true long term cost savings that can be achieved without the political influence.

ALTERNATIVE: OUTSOURCING

Outsourcing is another word for contracting out. This practice has been around DOD since it became popular during the Eisenhower administration. Every administration comes into office saying they are going to improve the federal bureaucracy and make it more efficient. All of them have tried various approaches with varying degrees of success. The most common approach is to contract-out for the services previously provided by government employees. The procedure usually followed is laid out in the OMB Circular A-76. This is a procedure whereby the government identifies the product or service desired, then private industry and the government organization provide bids stating how much they will charge to perform the service. If the private organization can perform the service less costly to the government, the work is turned over to them as a contract. Rules state the contractor must win the bid by a certain percentage or the work will remain with the government organization. Also, there are follow-on employee rights for the incumbent government employees with the new contractor. All in all, it is not a bad system and many services such as janitorial, refuse pick up, post mail service, warehousing and grass cutting are currently performed by contractors.

Although this practice is widespread and has proven less costly to DOD in a number of instances, it does have limitations. Easy things, mainly janitorial and grass cutting, have been contracted out for a number of years. The things still in-house are functions hard to identify,
quantify and measure. Functions such as design review of a set of building drawings or policy interpretation for supply procedure are just plain hard to contract-out. Another problem with expanding outsourcing into new areas is the organizational resistance. Organizations really work against anyone advocating their demise, creating resistance nearly impossible to overcome.

ALTERNATIVE: REENGINEERING

Reengineering is the process of taking existing work procedures and redesigning them to produce a more effective end result with less and better individual steps in between input and output. It is the process of using modern technology to break away from old rules about how business is organized and conducted. Reengineering involves recognizing rules no longer functional and discarding them; finding imaginative new ways to complete the task at hand.

A classic example of successful reengineering is the way Ford Motor Company handled their accounts payable department during the early 1980's. Ford analyzed the accounts payable process by breaking it down into pieces and asking why each piece was performed. As a result, they discovered that by upgrading their computer system and changing the accounts payable process, they were able to reduce from fourteen steps to just three. Ford also eliminated invoices by simply asking their vendors to quit sending them. Their system automatically issued checks based on entries made into the system by receiving clerks when they received materials at the dock. Countless man-hours were saved by this move alone. Ford made dramatic changes and received astonishing results.\(^{12}\)

Consider the work-years that could be saved within the Department of Defense if we simply

\(^{12}\)Fast Forward, The Best Ideas on Managing Business Change, p. 108
edited with an introduction and epilogue by James Champy and Nitin Nohria,
stopped having vendors send invoices. DOD can achieve the same results with a few regulation changes and some out of the box thinking. The problem with this initiative is that the DOD organizational structure does not lend itself to this kind of thinking. Reengineering business means a fundamental change in the way in which the whole business operates. It involves changing from the existing model, based on traditional organizational theory, to new ones specifically engineered to operate effectively in the current and future environment. The trend is away from a task-based organization to one built around the concept of redefining the task into homogeneous processes. Individuals are encouraged to challenge why certain activities are performed rather than just investigate how they can achieve the same results for less cost.

Improvements can and will be made throughout DOD by reengineering where appropriate, but huge cost savings will not be garnered without bold and innovative organizational changes. The existing organization is too fragmented and there is no real mechanism in place to export process improvements from one Service entity to another. An organizational culture change of that magnitude is just not possible without dynamic leadership making difficult decisions, such as the proposed Support Command.

ALTERNATIVE: SUPPORT COMMAND

Under this initiative DOD would turn all bases, installations, posts, camps and stations over to the ownership and direct responsibility of one Commander-in-Chief. No longer will there be Navy bases, Army posts or Marine Corps depots: instead, there will be Joint Installations. This CINC would also receive the current resources, staffs, facilities, monies and equipment assigned to these associated functions. It is true that the proposed Support Command would resemble the Services because POM, budget and contracting authority would have to flow to the command.
To do otherwise would stymie anticipated gains. However, the standing up of this organization would remove a major function from the Services and allow a greater offsetting reduction. Liken this move to the development of the European Union, no borders. Instead of creating a common currency with free trade across the borders, I am proposing common policies and cooperative support structures across the Services. I further propose that DOD develop a new career path for the officer interested in infrastructure support activities. This path would culminate in four-star level positions with responsibilities for all support activities for all Services.

Recognize the enormity of this suggestion. Earlier in the paper, I pointed out that this support infrastructure will consume over 60% of the entire DOD budget in FY-97. The fact is that when any one function consumes over 60% of the whole, it cannot be ignored. Focus on this area so this percentage can be lowered. It is now time to do something because support takes too much of the budget and is not providing efficient support that the Combatant Commander must have to implement Joint Vision 2010. We have forgotten our mission, that of fighting and winning wars, because we’re too busy building our own little pond to see that the customer needs a lake. Allow the warfighters to focus on their warfighting mission. Actually reengineer the support infrastructure as directed by the Quadrennial Defense Review.

Final design of this new organization would include the acquisition infrastructure, central logistics, installation support, central training and central medical. It does not include personnel and facilities associated with research, development and testing, nor does it include production and procurement resources that supports weapons systems. However, it does include logistics, equipment maintenance, material management, installation maintenance and management, communication and supply operations. Additionally, it would include all financial processes, training activities, legal assets, chaplain services and medical care provided to military members,
dependents and retirees. In locations where there currently exists two or more similar functions supporting two or more Services, consolidation would be mandatory without consideration of Service uniqueness standing in the way.

This new CINC-dom could use TRANSCOM as an organizational model. It would have a four star boss with a different Service three star deputy. Army, Navy, Marine Corps and Air Force would each provide components consisting of their existing personnel assigned to support functions, headed up by two star equivalents. The Service two stars would come from those existing jobs that are currently providing support functions such as the incumbent heads of Navy Facilities Engineering Command, Service headquarters installation management organizations, Navy Supply Systems Command and Air Force and Army Materiel Commands, for example. Of course, there are a number of other existing billets that would be appropriately placed throughout the organization such as Chaplains, Lawyers, Medical Services officers, etc. However, it would go beyond the scope of this paper to try to develop an organizational structure with placement for all of these individuals. The idea is to build the skeleton of a new organization that consists of senior leaders from each of the Services skilled in all the various support disciplines. These individuals should be not only skilled in their professional fields but proven leaders who could work out the organizational details.

Implementation would be through a phased approach. First, the framework would be stood up on paper. Second, a geographic location such as Norfolk, VA would have all their assets and facilities turned over to this new organization without anyone physically moving. The new organization would then develop a growth plan to incrementally take over new areas when they could organizationally digest the beast. This process would take anywhere from 5-7 years before all the CONUS facilities could be effectively incorporated into the CINC-dom. Therefore, it is
imperative that the selection of the senior leaders be made with the utmost care. They should be selected with the idea that they would be left in place longer than a typical assignment. They would be left in place long enough to develop a vision and see it through implementation.

Within two or three years after the initial startup, it is expected that redundancy would start to become obvious. Service parochialism would fall apart when the organizational needs were satisfied without looking only to their Services for answers. After just a few short years, DOD would no longer be a bunch of different bases for each Service, but would consist of fewer Defense Installations where the Services trained together and received support from a common logistical support group. Combatant Commanders would no longer look toward different Services for warm bases to support Dominant Maneuver and Focused Logistics. They would look toward CINCSUPPORT for a slice of an existing joint installation.

O.K., SO WHAT

The so what has to be answered by “How the Combatant Commander can realize benefits from this initiative?” I pointed out that implementation of Joint Vision 2010 requires a new support infrastructure to effectively perform Dominate Maneuver and Focused Logistics. I pointed out that the proposed Support Command would develop joint bases that would be responsible for training and exercises as well as everyday support. This newly developed joint base would provide one stop shopping for the CINC. In turn, life would become simpler for the Combatant Commander. This new command would eliminate duplication of efforts which, in turn, would reduce the footprint in the theater. It would create an environment where all forces would be dealing with common organizations on a regular basis. When major exercises were performed, the combatant forces would look to their joint bases for the support tail which must
follow. They would no longer look toward different sources for different pieces of support. No longer would forces come from one location and the support element come from another completely different location. The saying “close but no cigar” would die when referring to the support element for the warfighter. This would have the forces truly training as they would fight.

General Michael Ryan has suggested the Air Force consolidate support units at 4-6 superbases located throughout the United States\textsuperscript{13}. He wants to reorganize to get rid of excess infrastructure and relieve the pressure caused by establishing bases at crisis points such as Bosnia, the Middle East, and Africa. His concern is that combat units deploy at a moment’s notice. Support units such as cooks, engineers, medical personnel, and others are not organized for immediate overseas deployment. Why just the Air Force? The proposed Support Command is a joint service organization that would provide the skilled resources as required.

Natural working relationships would form between the staffs of the Forces Commands, Support Command, and the Transportation Command. These working relationships would no longer have to form each time a major exercise was undertaken or, even more importantly, in the event of a real crisis. Because of this training commonality, logistics and support would be able to flow immediately to a theater whether it was a mature or immature theater. There would be no difference in the two theaters because there would be no learning curve time for the staff performing the various functions.

The Support Command would have global responsibility in peacetime and in wartime. Therefore, global teams could be formed to staff and develop the support infrastructure with either a regional focus or a force focus depending on the needs of the geographical Combatant Commander. In other words, the Combatant Commander would be truly supported.

CONCLUSION

The idea of this paper is to point out that “thinking outside the box” is necessary to develop solutions to implementation impediments of Joint Vision 2010. I gave you a solution, CINCSUPPORT. I told you why it is important and I told you who says it is important. I even told you how to find the money necessary to fund this initiative. And I told you how it will benefit the Combatant Commander. A by-product is the overall lower cost which will help the funding shortfall that the Department of Defense is experiencing.

The Support Command initiative is presented as that “thinking out of the box” approach. This initiative is the only practical way the Department of Defense can truly “Reengineer” and garner the huge amounts of funds necessary to fund the needed weapons modernization and develop new ways to provide the structure needed for Dominate Maneuver and Focused Logistics. The details are not included because this paper is intended as an overview and a framework for implementation over a ten year period. Obviously, a number of details will require study and analysis to develop the best method for resolution. A road map is laid out to give the broad overview of where the Department of Defense needs to go and how to start down this road. We must proceed down this road while implementing Joint Vision 2010, supporting the Combatant Commander and while sustaining our readiness and flexibility. The journey will be challenging and it should be interesting.
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