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THE LITTORAL ROLE OF THE U.S. COAST GUARD: A SIGNIFICANT NAVAL ASSET IN SMALL SCALE CONFLICTS/MOOTW  
by  
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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.  
The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the United States Coast Guard.  

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GLOBAL LITTORAL OPERATIONS FOR THE USCG TRANSLATES INTO AN EXPANSION OF THE COAST GUARD'S CORE CAPABILITIES TO WORLDWIDE PROPORTIONS. THE COAST GUARD WOULD REQUIRE ADDITIONAL RESOURCES TO ACCOMPLISH THIS BROADER MISSION. A PREFERRED ALTERNATIVE WOULD BE TO CREATE A "SHELL" USCG FORCE (I.E., COGARDPER SHELL) THAT CAN ACCOMPLISH NATIONAL USCG MISSIONS AND BE PULLED AWAY TO RESPOND TO SSCs AND MOOTWs WITHOUT DEPLETING THE COAST GUARD'S OPERATIONAL TEMPO. IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COGARDPER SHELL CONCEPT WILL REQUIRE CHANGES WITHIN THE USCG AND USN'S ORGANIZATIONS (I.E., OPERATING PROCEDURES, SUPPORT LINKS, AND RESOURCES). IT WILL ALSO REQUIRE NCA, CONGRESSIONAL, AND DEPARTMENTAL APPROVAL.

THE OPPORTUNITIES GAINED BY AN INCREASED GLOBAL LITTORAL MISSION FOR THE COAST GUARD OUTFWEIGHT THE CHALLENGES. THE USCG HAS A LOT TO OFFER THE DOD/USN OPERATIONALLY AND CAN "FREE-UP" PRECIOUS NAVY ASSETS FOR ADDITIONAL OPERATIONAL AND TRAINING OPPORTUNITIES.

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ABSTRACT

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) can partner with the Department of Defense (DOD)/U.S. Navy (USN) in meeting many of the maritime challenges of the 21st century – i.e., global littoral operations, including small scale conflicts (SSCs) and military operations other than war (MOOTW) – and can alleviate some of the burden placed on the Navy's shrinking forces. The Coast Guard offers a complementary naval force that can fill niches the Navy cannot or should not fill. The benefits of the Coast Guard working with the Navy in the littorals are great. They include: integrating USCG/USN assets into a more jointly linked force; increasing USCG's contingency response capabilities; economizing forces through reductions in duplicative operations and maximization of efficiencies; and expanding area control in support of national military objectives.

Global littoral operations for the USCG translate into an expansion of the Coast Guard's core capabilities to worldwide proportions. The Coast Guard would require additional resources to accomplish this broader mission. A preferred alternative would be to create a "shell" USCG force (i.e., COGARDFOR shell) that can accomplish national USCG missions and be pulled away to respond to SSCs and MOOTWs without depleting the Coast Guard's operational tempo. Implementation of the COGARDFOR shell concept will require changes within both the USCG and USN's organizations (i.e., operating procedures, support links, and resources). It will also require National Command Authority, Congressional, and Departmental approval.

The opportunities gained by an increased global littoral mission for the Coast Guard outweigh the challenges. The Coast Guard has a lot to offer the DOD/USN operationally and can "free-up" precious Navy assets for additional operational and training opportunities.
PREFACE

The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) is already working in the national littorals and surrounding areas, and acts as Maritime Defense Zone Commander in this region. This paper focuses on the USCG's ability to partner with the U.S. Navy (USN) in the international littorals to meet the increasing number of low intensity threats of the next century. It addresses the challenges and opportunities facing the USCG/USN, if the Coast Guard expands its core capabilities to daily global response operations.

This paper is the first step in addressing the Coast Guard's future global littoral role. Further analyses would be required – e.g., cost-benefit analyses – to verify the findings and opinions provided. The paper focuses on the major issues and concerns a Commander in Chief, an USCG or USN headquarters staff, or joint planning staff might consider when beginning their analyses of the Coast Guard's expanded role in the international littorals.
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THE LITTORAL THREAT

*Definition of Littoral:* "[T]he 'near land' areas of the world; that is, any land or ocean within 650 miles (1046 km) of the coastline, or striking range of naval forces."

Littoral Warfare has become the focus of many countries around the world, including the United States. The ability to project power from the sea has made the littorals a focal point for national security. Eighty-five percent of the world’s population lives within 150 miles of the coastline and is accessible to this emerging threat. Although coastal seas have always been economically important, they have also served as an extension of sovereignty and national defense. Not only can large quantities of goods and people transit this area; the littorals can now be used as a place to launch attacks on other states. The use of the littorals for commerce also continues to make it a target for pirates/terrorists, traffic congestion, fisheries violations, illegal trafficking (i.e., drug, arms, and illegal migrant trafficking), large-scale accidents and ecological disasters/terrorism (e.g., oil fires in Iraq). The multi-faceted requirements of littoral – i.e., “green water” – operations and warfare “extend far beyond combat operations to include maritime policing and humanitarian tasks.”

President William Clinton’s 1997 National Security Strategy (NSS) emphasized the political, economic, social, and military challenges facing the United States as a global leader, and the need to proactively engage other countries in making the world a safer more secure place. With the end of the Cold War and the increased technological capabilities to project power from the sea, the threats to national security are less clearly defined. The 1997 Report of the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the National Military Strategy (NMS) predict an increase in multi-dimensional threats ranging from a rise in humanitarian relief to small scale conflicts – involving “regional dangers, asymmetric challenges, transnational
threats, and “wild cards”5 – to preparing to fight and win two nearly simultaneous major theater wars. It is speculated that the next 30 years will be plagued with numerous low-end conflicts which will place a heavy burden on our military resources. The military is preparing itself to meet the multitude of national security missions of the next century.

While the U.S. Navy (USN) is positioning itself for the new challenges posed by “green water” threats, it must not overlook one of its most valuable assets – the U.S. Coast Guard (USCG). The Coast Guard is a “force-in-being.” It is trained and ready to operate in low intensity threat environments at home and abroad. The traditional Coast Guard core capabilities (e.g., national defense, maritime law enforcement, maritime safety, and environmental protection) transcend the national and international littorals. The Coast Guard can partner with the Department of Defense (DOD)/USN in meeting many of the maritime challenges of the 21st century – i.e., the myriad of small scale conflicts (SSCs) and military operations other than war (MOOTWs) – and alleviate some of the burden placed on the Navy’s shrinking forces.

THE COAST GUARD IN THE LITTORAL

What national security missions can the Coast Guard perform in the littorals?

Joint Vision (JV) 2010 and top leadership recognize that no single service can respond to every situation or threat alone. The military must create the best fit of assets and use every ounce of capability available.6 Many Coast Guard missions complement or replicate some of the Navy’s national security missions. I contend that economies of scale can reduce the duplicative operations in some circumstances, as well as provide a symbiotic relationship between the two services. The goal is to create a more efficient and effective
maritime capability which can provide a transition between the multinational threats of the next century.

Expanding the USCG Mission

The Coast Guard epitomizes a flexible, adaptable, multi-mission organization. Since its early inception as the Revenue Cutter Service over 200 years ago up to the present, the Coast Guard’s “can do attitude” has placed it in a unique position. Its traditional claim to fame – life saving – shares equal billing with other high profile missions, such as drug interdiction, alien interdiction, and environmental response. Increasing the spectrum of the Coast Guard’s missions to include operating in the littorals worldwide elevates the USCG’s national role to include a more globally focused joint maritime service. It would not, however, change the type of missions the Coast Guard does best: aids to navigation, defense readiness, enforcement of laws and treaties, ice operations, marine environmental protection, marine safety (including port safety and security), and search and rescue. Table I illustrates the slight changes in current Coast Guard missions required to adapt them to the global littoral regions.
Table I

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>CURRENT COAST GUARD MISSIONS</th>
<th>PROPOSED COAST GUARD LITTORAL MISSIONS</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1. Aids to Navigation (AtoN)</td>
<td>1. International Aids to Navigation Assistance/Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5. Marine Environmental Protection</td>
<td>5. Environmental Defense Operations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7. Search and Rescue</td>
<td>7. Combat Search and Rescue</td>
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Appendix A provides a detailed breakout of each of these missions and their proposed functions in support of military operations in the littoral.

Currently, many of the Coast Guard’s peacetime missions/functions complement the Navy’s national security missions relating to small scale contingencies and MOOTW, such as search and rescue, maritime interdiction, counterdrug operations, and enforcement of exclusion zones. The seven Coast Guard missions highlighted in Table I also directly support joint military operations required to respond to small scale contingencies and MOOTW operations. The following table illustrates the USCG’s contributions to each of the missions/operations for both. (The asterisks designate proposed and/or actual contribution the USCG can make in the SSCs and MOOTW.)
Table II

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>SMALL SCALE CONFLICTS (SSCs)**</th>
<th>TYPES OF MOOTW OPERATIONS</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Disaster Relief</td>
<td>• Arms Control*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Humanitarian Assistance</td>
<td>• Combating Terrorism*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Peacekeeping</td>
<td>• DOD Support to Counterdrug Operations**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Aid in Assisting Disaster Victims</td>
<td>• Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Ops**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Non-Combatant Evacuation Operations</td>
<td>• Enforcing Exclusion Zones**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Other Related Operations Short of War</td>
<td>• Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Humanitarian Assistance**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Nation Assistance/Support to Counterinsurgency</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Peace Operations (PO)*</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Protection of Shipping**</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Recovery Operations</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Show of Force Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Strikes and Raids</td>
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<td></td>
<td>• Support to Insurgency</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

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** USCG can contribution to missions/operations
* Potential USCG contribution
** USCG can significantly contribute to this operation

Appendix B provides a description of USCG proposed/actual contribution to MOOTW missions with "**" or "***".

As Table II illustrates, the Coast Guard can contribute significantly to both small scale conflicts and MOOTWs. It also highlights the areas of possible duplication between the services and where efficiencies may be gained by a joint USN/USCG force operating in the littorals.

**Joint USCG/USN Operations**

The USCG's multi-mission capability transcends the littorals and overlays nicely onto the SSC and MOOTW operational requirements. The Coast Guard can be integrated into the DOD/USN fold for these operations and used regularly as a significant maritime/military force. The Department of Defense has several options available which will help it accomplish maritime littoral operations that only the U.S. military can achieve.
First, DOD could use DOD/USN forces only. This obviates the essence of JV 2010 and the QDR’s efforts to move toward a more integrated joint force. As the fifth military service, the USCG should receive more consideration as a viable resource. Economies may be gained by incorporating the Coast Guard in global littoral operations, where appropriate. The following three alternatives provide options to include the USCG into a joint USCG/USN force.

Second, the Coast Guard could establish a standing force poised to respond to crises around the world in short notice. While this concept seems ideal, a standing force is not economically feasible in the current budget climate. (It also goes against the USCG traditional multi-mission unit capability.) Third, the Coast Guard could establish a skeleton or a “shell” standing force that can accomplish day to day Coast Guard missions and be pulled away for global littoral operations as needed. This option boosts the Coast Guard’s daily operating tempo during non-crisis situations and reduces the tempo to acceptable levels during crisis response. The final option is to provide Coast Guard forces from existing resources. This option is unacceptable. The Coast Guard has cut its personnel and operating funds by 12%, resulting in the leanest USCG force in 30 years responsible for the most missions to date. The Coast Guard is at “its bare-bones level.” To expand the USCG missions without additional resources would cause grave damage to the organization’s morale, operations, efficiency and effectiveness.

The third alternative, to create a skeleton/shell standing force, is the preferred alternative to accomplish the new tasking in the littoral. This Coast Guard Force (COGARDFOR) would be a “force in being” poised to respond to contingencies.
Recommendation(s)

1. Integrate USCG into DOD/USN littoral operations

2. Establish COGARDFOR shell to respond to national security needs without depleting necessary resources in CONUS

OPERATIONAL PROS & CONS

Opportunities & Challenges

Just because the Coast Guard can perform many of the functions required for SSCs and MOOTWs does not automatically make it the right resource for the mission. The operational requirements of each situation need to be matched with the correct resources to accomplish the strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. This includes an evaluation of the multiple tasks each asset can perform and the right mix required to accomplish the operation, as well as, an appraisal of any economies of force. The following sections highlight some of the operational opportunities and challenges to incorporating the COGARDFOR shell into DOD/USN global littoral missions.

Frees USN Assets to Conduct Other Missions

By incorporating the USCG into littoral operations, redundancies and economies of forces may be achieved. That is, the Coast Guard could perform complementary and duplicative functions which would “free-up” Navy resources to focus on primary mission responsibilities. Naval surface combatants are expensive heavily armed warfighting machines. To utilize these assets in all mission areas, other than what they were designed, does not make sound economical sense. By partnering with the Coast Guard, the Navy can achieve “area control” in support of the U.S.’s military strategy based on forward presence and power projection, and can accomplish a broader spectrum of operations and training.
On the other hand, both the USCG and the USN can do multiple functions/missions while conducting littoral operations. Although the Coast Guard’s multi-mission capability allows it to accomplish many tasks at once, will it contribute the right mix for the operation? The question revolves around what are the Navy and the taxpayer getting for their money. Is it economically feasible for both the USCG and the USN to conduct an operation vice the Navy alone? What benefits will be gained? Each case (i.e., crisis) will dictate the answer to these questions. Nevertheless, the Coast Guard should be considered as part of DOD’s decision making process when assessing asset and resource mixes for global littoral operation.

I believe that the Coast Guard can provide many services more cheaply based on the size and scale of USCG assets. Cheaper does not always mean better. Therefore, effectiveness of forces must be factored into the equation as well. The USCG’s efficiency and effectiveness rate in its national responsibilities is outstanding. For every tax dollar provided to the Coast Guard, it returns $4 worth of benefit.⁹ If the Coast Guard can provide similar benefits in the international littorals, the Navy may reap the benefits, by freeing USN assets to conduct other missions and training.

Military Capability and Compatibility

The Coast Guard has specific capabilities to offer DOD, as outlined in Appendices A and B, and requires some improvements to operate jointly in the littorals. Currently, the USCG resources require some technological upgrades and the weapons systems on many USCG cutters are first or second generation. The cutters also lack the latest point defense systems. Although most are equipped with Chaff launchers and CIWS, they lack the sensors for early warning of incoming missiles. The Coast Guard could perform its core competency
missions while under the protective umbrella established by the naval surface and air defenses.¹⁰

Technological enhancements are an on-going process and the Coast Guard proactively incorporates improvements wherever feasible with each upgrade. For example, the USCG's Deepwater Mission Analysis team is developing a new platform that will specifically enhance joint operations by linking capabilities required by the Navy with USCG multi-mission capabilities. With support from DOD/USN and Congress, the Coast Guard can make greater strides in expanding and improving its connectivity with the Navy.

To work in the global littoral, the USCG will have to become more compatible out of necessity. The gains made by these linkages will reap far-reaching benefits beyond the small scale conflicts and MOOTW. The USCG will gain the practical joint operational training and experience required for a wide spectrum of contingencies. If the Coast Guard is able to successfully operate with the Navy in the littoral, it will undoubtedly have a smooth(er) transition to operating jointly in larger conflicts. The United States will also be better equipped and prepared to face worldwide threats using all of its services to their full potential.

Logistics

Currently, the USCG is unable to sustain itself for long periods of extended deployments. Unlike the Navy, the Coast Guard does not have long lines of logistical support capability. The USCG will either have to rely on the Navy to provide logistical support or develop its own lines of communication. To build-up the Coast Guard's sustainment capability would require additional resources (e.g., personnel and funding). If the USCG relied on the Department of Defense to provide this support, it would require
fewer resources and funding to piggy-back onto DOD’s logistical support network.

Nevertheless, logistical support could be a "show stopper" if not properly considered and incorporated into the plan to make the Coast Guard part of global littoral operations.

Accessing the USCG

Another challenge concerns the establishment and access of the COGARDFOR shell. During peacetime operations, the Coast Guard is part of the Department of Transportation (DOT). Title 14, Section 3 of U.S. Code directs that the Coast Guard come under the Navy (1) upon declaration of war, or (2) when the President directs.\(^{11}\) (Only twice in the history of the Coast Guard did this happen, WW I and WW II).\(^ {12}\) The National Command Authority (NCA) – i.e., the President and the Secretary of Defense – is also required for all cases (i.e., crises) to partially or completely transfer forces to the Navy.\(^ {13}\) This does not preclude the USCG from working with the Navy or having it “chopped” to a Commander in Chief (CINC) for other purposes. The Navy/Coast Guard (NAVGARD) Board, headed by the Vice Chief of Naval Operations and the Vice Commandant of the Coast Guard, developed a Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) that allows the USN to access the USCG for three missions without going through the long approval process. These include: (1) maritime interdiction operations, (2) port security, and (3) environmental response.\(^ {14}\) To utilize the USCG for the myriad of missions and functions outlined in Appendices A and B is beyond the scope of the 1996 MOA.

It is unlikely that Title 14, Section 3 of the U.S. Code will be, nor should be, changed to allow DOD more access to the USCG. Updating the 1996 MOA would appear simple, but it requires Departmental (e.g., Department of Transportation and Defense), Congressional, and NCA approval. The mission expansion, establishment of a COGARDFOR shell, and
additional resource requirements preclude a simple arrangement between the two services. Political and budgetary support will play a major role and may create a significant challenge. (I will expand upon the political and budgetary aspects under "Other Considerations").

**Planning and Issues of Jointness**

The Coast Guard enjoys more day to day recognition as the fifth military service than ever in its history. The Commandant acts as an adjunct member of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) and the Coast Guard has been included in the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP) and JCS doctrine, i.e., the Joint Pubs. These major changes are partly due to the Goldwater-Nichols Act's push toward "jointness" among the services. Yet, the Coast Guard still struggles for inclusion. Although the JSCP and the Joint Pubs account for the Coast Guard, DOD could do more to incorporate it into the system. Instead of being "perceived" as an afterthought, the Coast Guard could be a more significant part of the checklist of assets to be used during DOD's deliberate and crisis response planning (and actions) for small scale and MOOTW conflicts.

Currently, the Coast Guard is included in joint planning, particularly as commander of the Maritime Defense Zone (MDZ) plans. These plans focus mainly on the protection of the U.S. littoral. Planning for crises abroad also includes the Coast Guard for particular circumstances. The DOD may need to reevaluate the Universal Joint Task List (UJTL) process to incorporate the cost-benefit of using USCG vice the Navy for specific global littoral missions. A CINC or Joint Task Force Commander (CJTF) may choose a different mix of assets if the Coast Guard is readily available for all littoral operations. An approved COGARDFOR shell and an agreement between the USN/USCG would also provide the CINC/CJTF more leverage with respect to Coast Guard assets.
Increased inclusion at the CINC stage is a start toward further integrating the USCG into the joint realm of DOD. The Coast Guard could also become a more formal part of DOD’s overall planning process (e.g., JOPES/PPBS). Although the USCG was not officially part of the 1997 QDR, the Coast Guard asked to review it. If the USCG is going to be an active participant in global littoral operations, it would stand to reason that they should also be a larger part of the planning process for several reasons. First, the Coast Guard receives Navy funding for most joint military operations and is accountable for the services it provides. Second, DOD needs to properly plan and prepare for the use of USCG assets. Littoral operations will require a wider spectrum of support and future planning considerations, such as technological and equipment upgrades. By including the USCG in the formal process, Coast Guard capabilities can be properly incorporated into DOD’s plans and budget.

**Recommendation(s)**

1. Evaluate the efficiency and effectiveness of using USCG in overlapping USCG/USN functions (e.g., blockades, port security/harbor defense, CSAR)
   - Strive for economy of forces with USN/USCG mix
2. Continue to improve and support interoperability between USCG/USN
3. Extend DOD logistical support to USCG in global littoral operations
4. Seek NCA, Congressional, and Departmental approval to extend USCG missions in the littorals and for COGARDFOR shell concept
   - Revise MOA/MOU between USCG/USN
5. Increase USCG involvement in DOD planning cycle
   - Include USCG in formal planning process
   - Reevaluate UJTL input
   - Establish USCG as part of littoral operations resource checklist
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS

Perceptions & Reality

International Partnering

There are synergies to be gained by utilizing the Coast Guard with the Navy. Both the USCG and USN offer peacetime interoperability with friendly and allied forces. They both build relationships for ad hoc coalitions and short notice crises. Together they can pool their resources to gain greater area control. For example, the USCG participates in NATO’s partnership for peace initiative; trains Caribbean nations in coast guard missions; participates in bilateral exchanges with coast guards around the world; and represents the United States, as lead agency, on several international forums, such as the United Nation’s International Maritime Organization. The Coast Guard also participates in joint international military NATO exercises with the USN, such as BALTOPS, training other nations to work together militarily and teaching them how to perform traditional "coast guard" missions.

The Coast Guard’s international exchanges also promote global stability. The world’s maritime nations operate mainly in the littoral seas and conduct mostly coast guard-type missions. These missions appeal to many nations and the United States markets this commodity to other countries. International forums and partnerships provide a venue for the U.S., via the USCG, to advocate world standards, security, and stability. In essence, the United States is promoting a more peaceful world focused on intercontinental and national threats that are universal, as opposed to building-up huge warfighting militaries.

Perceptions/Image/Realities

The Coast Guard, for the most part, enjoys a positive image as the guardians and stewards of America’s waterways. The USCG is seen as “public servants with a public
trust...accomplishing work that benefits society,” whereas the Army, Navy, Marines and Air Force are viewed as the warfighting services. The multi-missioned Coast Guard has universal characteristic that can transcend nationalities in a non-threatening way. Its culture reflects a humanitarian focused military organization with an ability to respond rapidly in a cooperative and coordinated effort to obtain results.

There are several levels of possible perceptions, images, and realities that surround the expansion of the Coast Guard’s role in international littorals. These range from Congressional support to the impact on recruiting. Although the Coast Guard has been involved in many recent crises, such as Haiti and the Persian Gulf, an increased role in the littorals may garner the humanitarian image and promote the warfighting aspects of the service. It may also raise questions of who is watching the U.S. shores. The intent to include the USCG in the littoral area is not to have the Coast Guard become more like the Navy, but to complement it. The Coast Guard undoubtedly wants to remain the lifesaving humanitarian law enforcers of the sea.

The desire to use the Coast Guard in the littoral is not to apply a threatening naval presence (i.e., “gunboat diplomacy”) but to enforce laws, regulations, treaties and sanctions; and to provide humanitarian and international assistance. Enforcement in a low intensity conflict may be perceived as less threatening than a high intensity one. The image of the Coast Guard will change, even if only slightly, if it becomes an “international” coast guard.

The USCG’s employment in the littorals could be a political feather in the U.S. government’s diplomatic cap. The USCG already partners with other nations around the world. To increase the Coast Guard’s presence during international conflict resolutions will
further promote the use of coast guard-like navies around the world. In other words, if the United States continues to promote peaceful navies, it will be practicing what it teaches.

Another possible factor to consider when assessing the impact of the Coast Guard taking on a larger littoral role is recruitment. Although USCG recruiting may seem like a minute consideration, emphasizing the warfighting aspect of the Coast Guard may affect retention rates and new recruitment. Many people join the Coast Guard for its peacetime missions vice its role as a sister service of the Navy. Some people are also drawn by the perception that the Coast Guard primarily stays within the confines of the U.S. coastal shores and surrounding regions. If the Coast Guard becomes involved in several far-reaching missions half way across the world, reenlistment may decrease. On the other hand, more people may be drawn to the Coast Guard and its global mission capabilities. They would still be the “good guys” assisting peoples around the world and protecting our national security.

**Austere Budget Climate for the Federal Government**

With the declining Federal budget and the major cuts in military funding, the Navy will be stretched thin with the myriad of low intensity conflicts. The Coast Guard could alleviate some of the burden from the Navy by: providing assistance in small scale contingencies and MOOTW; and freeing-up some of USN’s assets for additional operations and training. While the USCG may lessen DOD’s burdens, it still retains its own domestic responsibilities.

Despite the austere budget climate, the Coast Guard would require additional resources to accomplish an expanded mission. The Coast Guard’s primary responsibilities have traditionally been overwhelmingly domestic in nature.\(^{18}\) “Only about 4% of its operating (OE) budget is identified as supporting direct defense responsibilities.”\(^{19}\)
Increasing the USCG's defense responsibilities demands an increase in congressional funding. The Coast Guard cannot accomplish another mission out of hide. In response to the Administration/Congressional push to balance the Federal budget, the Coast Guard reorganized itself, cutting its budget by $400 million and 4,000 people. To add an additional/expanded mission to the already bare bones Coast Guard would require sacrificing other missions. This could be political suicide. It is doubtful that Congress will want to eliminate or reduce any of the Coast Guard's major national missions — such as drug law enforcement, environmental clean up or search and rescue — to pay for global littoral operations. If Congress supports the expanded USCG mission it will have to agree to additional funding as well.

**Political Support (e.g., Congressional)**

As presented earlier, the public and the politicians may or may not subscribe to an increased global littoral role for the Coast Guard depending on how they perceive this new mission. Yet Congress and the President are looking for ways to make government more efficient and effective -- to work better at less cost. Efficiencies can be gained by utilizing resources that are the most cost effective and provide similar services. Before approaching Congress or the NCA with a proposal to expand USCG's missions, a thorough cost-benefit analysis must be conducted as well as an internal marketing plan. DOD/DOT must understand and be prepared to address the strengths, weaknesses, opportunities, and challenges related to incorporating USCG into a significant littoral role.

Another possible problem is that not everyone in government seeks efficiencies per se. They are more interested in protecting their "rice bowls." On the other hand, the President's initiatives to reinvent government and Congress's implementation of the
Government Performance & Results Act make the government ripe for innovative changes, and increases the chances of acceptance of a USCG role in the littorals and the COGARDFOR shell concept. Nevertheless, a joint Navy/Coast Guard venture requires funding approval from different committees (i.e., DOT & DOD are funded via separate committees/subcommittees). Therefore, any proposal would need to gain support from a dual system. DOD’s committees would most likely focus more heavily on the financial aspects of the proposal and the DOT committees on the political ramifications (i.e., perceptions).

**Recommendation(s)**

1. Continue using USCG to build strong international support and relationships
2. Maintain USCG humanitarian image
3. Obtain Congressional support (This proposal builds on Recommendation 4 under “Pros and Cons”)
   - Highlight efficiencies and cost savings gained by joint operations
   - Request additional funding

**CONCLUSION**

*USCG – A Resource of Opportunity*

The U.S. Coast Guard can assist the U.S. Navy and the Department of Defense meet the “green water” challenges of the 21st century. Global littoral operations for the USCG translate into an additional or expanded mission, which would require adjustments in current operating procedures, support links, and resources. A viable option to this new mission involves creating a “shell” USCG force capable of responding to small scale contingencies and MOOTWs without depleting its national operational tempo.
The benefits of the Coast Guard working with the Navy in the littoral arena are great. They include: further integration of USCG/USN forces, increasing USCG's contingency response capabilities, economizing forces, improving interoperability between the USCG/USN, and expanding area control. The Coast Guard's assistance comes with a price though. It will cost money and resources, and will require changes within both the USCG and USN's organizations.

Finally, the Coast Guard cannot provide additional capabilities to littoral operations without NCA, Congressional (and indirectly public), and Departmental support. Proper marketing of the benefits and the challenges of an expanded international Coast Guard role will be critical. The Coast Guard has a lot to offer the Department of Defense operationally, particularly the Navy, and can help alleviate some of the burdens placed on the USN's shrinking forces.
NOTES


3 Guidance from CAPT F. Sutter Fox, USCG, U.S. Coast Guard Advisor. (May 1998).


8 Thorsen, 109.


10 Operational and technical capabilities of USCG gleaned from several conversations with senior Coast Guard personnel. (April/May 1998).

11 Navy Department, Command Relationships when the Coast Guard is Operating as a Service in the Navy, SECNAVINST 5430.80B (Washington: 1987).

12 Guidance from CAPT F. Sutter Fox, USCG, U.S. Coast Guard Advisor. (May 1998).


15 Center for Naval Analyses, U.S. Coast Guard: Purpose, Characteristics, Contributions, and Worth to the Nation, CRM 97-17 (Alexandria, VA: 1997), 33.

16 Ibid., 41.


19 Ibid., 18-19.
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“U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities Brief.” CDR Susan Bibeau’s overhead slide presentation and notes from her Naval War College Seminar briefing on U.S. Coast Guard Capabilities. Newport, RI: April 1998.


PROPOSED COAST GUARD MISSIONS AND FUNCTIONS
IN SUPPORT OF
MILITARY OPERATIONS IN THE LITTORAL

1. Aids to Navigation (AtoN)
   International AtoN Assistance/Operations
   a. Maintain, establish and service short and long range aids to navigation
   b. Support mine countermeasure operations (e.g., enforcement of safe zones)
   c. Provide swept channel escorts for military vessels (and non-military vessels, when applicable)

2. Defense Readiness
   Defense Readiness/Operations (e.g., Conflict Escalation Readiness)
   a. Provide combat ready aircraft, cutters, boats, and selected forces to Naval Component Commanders of the Unified commands to perform Naval warfare missions (e.g., SUW, AW)
   b. Provide conflict ready aircraft, cutters, boats, and selected forces to Naval Component Commanders of the Unified commands for contingency purposes (e.g., Resources should be ready to respond to an escalation of a mission, as the situation dictates.)

3. Enforcement of Laws and Treaties
   Maritime Interdiction Operations & Transnational Threat Response
   (e.g., narcotics trafficking and illegal immigration)
   a. Conduct visit, board, and search operations:
      (1) Provide fully trained personnel to comprise visit and search teams aboard non-Coast Guard assets
      (2) Conduct visit, board, and search using Coast Guard assets
   b. Conduct other surveillance, interdiction, boarding and seizing operations in support of military operations
   c. Conduct blockade and quarantine operations in support of military operations (e.g., enforce exclusion zones)
   d. Enforce national and international laws, treaties, and agreements (e.g., UN resolutions), as applicable

4. Ice Operations
   International Ice Operations
   a. Open and maintain icebound waterways used by military vessels or vessels carrying military cargo or personnel
   b. Detect, identify, and track icebergs in the vicinity of the sea lines of communication (SLOCs)

APPENDIX A
5. **Marine Environmental Protection**  
**Environmental Defense Operations**  
(e.g., Respond to Transnational Environmental Threats)

a. Coordinate response, supervise cleanup and recovery operations, where incidents pose immediate threat of fire, explosion or impediment to movement of military cargoes or personnel in the littoral  
b. Perform specialized chemical response activities as necessary to minimize damage to military vessels or vessels carrying military cargo or personnel and facilities  
c. Provide guidance, training, and assistance for environmental clean-up activities in the littorals

6. **Marine Safety (Port Safety and Security)**  
**Harbor/Littoral Defense (International & National)**

a. Establish and enforce security zones around moving and anchored vessels carrying military cargo and/or personnel  
b. Establish and enforce security zones around moving and anchored vessels carrying cargo of particular hazard in ports where an accident would affect a military objective  
c. Establish and enforce security zones around waterfront facilities and anchorage handling military cargo, personnel, or hazardous materials in ports where an accident would affect a military objective  
d. Manage and control movement of all vessels in and around harbor movement of all vessels in and around harbor areas in coordination with Naval Control of Shipping Organization when military vessels or vessels carrying military cargo or personnel are operating in the harbor area  
e. Establish and enforce waterside security zones at designated military essential locks, dams, and bridges in coordination with other agencies  
f. Conduct harbor patrols to support military essential operations  
g. Monitor and/or direct actions of masters, owners, operators, and agents of vessels and waterfront facilities handling military essential cargo in discharging their primary responsibility for protection and security of such vessels and waterfront facilities  
h. Supervise loading, stowage and offloading of military ammunition and explosives at commercial waterfront facilities, military waterfront facilities, and anchorages  
i. Monitor loading, stowage and offloading petroleum products and hazardous materials  
j. Conduct surveys and inspections of designated military essential waterfront facilities to ensure adequate security measures are maintained and in compliance with applicable safety regulations  
k. Establish and enforce restricted waterfront areas at military essential waterfront facilities  
l. Provide firefighting support to military essential waterfront facility operators  
m. Protect shipping in support of military/political objectives, as follows and necessary: (1) Protect U.S. and allied flag vessels, U.S. citizens, and their property against unlawful violence in and over international waters (2) Provide/Assist in establishing coastal sea control

APPENDIX A
(3) Provide port safety and security
(4) Support countermine operations (e.g., enforcement and escort)
(5) Provide escort operations
(6) Provide/Assist in environmental defense
(7) Enforce safety standards
(8) Enforce laws, regulations, treaties, and agreements

7. Search and Rescue
   Combat Search and Rescue
   
a. Provide Combat Search and Rescue assistance to military vessels and aircraft and
   SAR assistance to vessels and aircraft carrying military cargo or personnel

NOTE 1: This list is not all-inclusive. Items provided as “missions and functions” are
intended to be in direct support of littoral missions. Other USCG capabilities may
be applicable depending on the particular operation.

NOTE 2: Portions of the list were gleaned from the Coast Guard’s Readiness Manual,
COMDINTST 3010.11 (series), Joint Pub 3-08, and various other readings (see
Bibliography) relating to the Coast Guard and littoral operations.
PROPOSED/ACTUAL COAST GUARD CONTRIBUTIONS
to
MOOTW OPERATIONS

Arms Control*
• Escort authorized deliveries of weapons and other materials via maritime routes

Combatting Terrorism*
• Disrupt the transfer of illegal contraband (i.e., illegal arms) via maritime routes

Support to Counterdrug Operations**
• Disrupt the transfer of illegal drugs
  • Detect and monitor aerial and maritime transit of illegal drugs
  • Integrate command, control, communications, computer, and intelligence assets dedicated to interdicting illegal drugs

Enforcement of Sanctions/Maritime Intercept Operations**
• Interdict the movement of certain types of designated items via maritime routes
• Establish barriers (e.g., maritime blockades) allowing only authorized goods to enter and exit

Enforcing Exclusion Zones**
• Enforce established maritime exclusion zones prohibiting specific activities in a geographic area

Ensuring Freedom of Navigation and Overflight**
• Ensure freedom of navigation -- "innocent" passage of ships of other nations through a state’s territorial waters
• Ensure freedom of overflight using USCG assets (e.g., to conduct search and rescue)

Humanitarian Assistance**
• Assist in humanitarian assistance operations to relieve or reduce the results of natural or manmade disasters or other endemic conditions, including:
  • Assist in the reestablishment of navigable waters (e.g., Reestablish aids to navigation)
  • Assist in the verification of safe port facilities (e.g., Conduct inspections of essential waterfront facilities)
  • Escort relief ships
  • Coordinate response, supervise, and assist in environmental cleanup and recovery operations
  • Enforce security zones
  • Supervise loading, stowage and offloading of supplies
  • Provide firefighting support to waterfront facilities
  • Provide search and rescue assistance on internal and coastal waterways

APPENDIX B
Military Support to Civil Authorities (MSCA)**
- See items under Humanitarian Assistance above

Nation Assistance**
- Train other nations in "traditional coast guard" missions, such as
  - Enforcement of laws and treaties (e.g., drug and migrant interdiction)
  - Marine environmental response
  - Port safety and security
  - Search and Rescue
- Assist in developing an aids to navigation system (e.g., channel markers, buoys)

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations*
- Support noncombatant evacuation operations
  - Enforce security zones
  - Conduct military interdiction/interception operations
  - Provide surface and air assets as required

Peace Operations*
- Support peace operations
  - Enforce security zones
  - Protect shipping
  - Provide surface and air assets as required
- Provide training and assistance in "traditional coast guard" operations

Protection of Shipping**
- Protect shipping through:
  - Coastal sea control
  - Harbor/Littoral defense
  - Port safety and security
  - Support of counternmine operations (e.g., enforcement of safe zones and escort operations)
  - Environmental defense
  - Escort operations

* Potential USCG contribution
** USCG can significantly contribute to this operation

NOTE 1: This list is not all-inclusive. Other USCG capabilities may be applicable depending on the particular MOOTW requirements.

NOTE 2: Requirements of MOOTW operations gleaned from Joint Pub 3-08, "Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War," and overlaid onto proposed USCG missions in Appendix A.

APPENDIX B
# LIST OF ACRONYMS

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<tr>
<th>Acronym</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AW</td>
<td>Air Warfare</td>
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<tr>
<td>AtoN</td>
<td>Aids to Navigation</td>
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<tr>
<td>BALTOPS</td>
<td>Baltic Operations</td>
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<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
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<td>CIWS</td>
<td>Close in Weapon Support</td>
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<td>CJTF</td>
<td>Joint Task Force Commander</td>
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<td>COGARDFOR</td>
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