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"The CJTF and NGOs – One Team, One Mission?"

A description of the military-NGO relationship and its effects on operational planning and mission execution.

By

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal view and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College, the Department of the Navy, or the interviewed organizations.

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   Within this environment, NGOs should be viewed by the military as force multipliers because their knowledge and expertise can help the CJTF develop a more complete military operations plan and execute the mission more effectively. To maximize NGO contributions, the CJTF must first adopt a different operational leadership style – one that is based on a greater understanding of NGOs and that will cultivate a more productive working relationship. Further, the CJTF must solicit and encourage NGO participation in the areas of mission assessment, operations and transition planning, and in-country coordination. Each of these subjects will be analyzed to show how a strong military-NGO relationship can contribute to both the development of the operations plan and to mission effectiveness. Supporting the analysis are summaries of pertinent joint doctrines, insights from NGO representatives and military personnel, and recommendations for specific improvements.

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Preface

The author wishes to acknowledge the contributions made by the following organizations: International Rescue Committee, Partners for the Americas, and InterAction. During the course of telephone or email interviews, representatives from these organizations provided a generally balanced view of the military-NGO interaction and took the time to emphasize areas for improvement. Where possible, the author cites specific individuals. The author would also like to acknowledge the contributions made by several military officers attending the U.S. Naval War College, College of Naval Warfare class of 1998. These officers either served in the referenced humanitarian operations or helped develop doctrine at the Joint Warfighting Center. Their comments provide additional richness to the subject.
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Introduction

According to the current National Security Strategy and supporting National Military Strategy, the U.S. military will be called upon to conduct smaller-scale contingencies, which includes humanitarian assistance operations, in support of national interests.¹ Whether unilaterally or as part of a combined coalition, and often under the auspices of the UN, joint forces will be expected to achieve mission success in even the most complicated circumstances, such as in a simultaneous peace enforcement and humanitarian operation.² It is against this background that key doctrinal documents and service school essays have been published in recent years to provide guidance to a joint force commander, and more specifically to a commander, joint task force (CJTF), on more effective ways to conduct these kinds of operations.³

According to joint doctrine, the U.S. military will be working with a wide variety of organizations in most humanitarian operations. These organizations include U.S. civilian agencies, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs).⁴ NGOs, the focus of this paper, may or may not be working toward the same underlying political objectives as the military; also, they may or may not wish to be involved with the military in order to maintain their desired independence and perceived impartiality. The CJTF nonetheless is expected to develop the necessary atmosphere to achieve the best unity of effort possible with NGOs.

Despite this often conflicted environment, NGOs should be viewed by the military as force multipliers because their knowledge and expertise can help the CJTF develop a more complete military operations plan and execute the mission more effectively. To maximize NGO contributions, the CJTF must first adopt a different operational leadership style – one that is based on a greater understanding of NGOs and
that will cultivate a more productive working relationship. Further, the CJTF must solicit and encourage NGO participation in the areas of mission assessment, operations and transition planning, and in-country coordination. Each of these subjects will be analyzed to show how a strong military-NGO relationship can contribute both to the development of the operations plan and to mission effectiveness. Supporting the analysis are summaries of pertinent joint doctrines, insights from NGO representatives and military personnel, and recommendations for specific improvements.

* **Operational Leadership:** First in importance and permeating all actions is the adoption of the appropriate mindset by the commander. Several key tenets made by joint doctrine are reviewed and augmented by insights from the interviewed NGO representatives that, combined, can set the conditions by which a more favorable military-NGO working atmosphere can be developed. A better interaction will reduce friction and increase the probability that a better operations plan will be developed and more unity of effort can be achieved.

* **Mission Assessment:** As recommended in doctrine, the CJTF is encouraged to perform a detailed assessment of the crisis area, ideally prior to full-scale deployment. This initial assessment can be significantly refined if NGOs, already operating in the area, are consulted. Recommendations are provided about the kinds of information that can and cannot be asked of NGOs that will lead to a better commander’s estimate.
* Operations and Transition Plans: A humanitarian operation presents different planning challenges than those normally found in combat operations, but still does not obviate the need for a complete operations plan. This kind of planning is especially important given the fluidity of most humanitarian operations and the fact that the military will typically re-deploy before long-term efforts have been completed. A methodology consistent with operational planning principles is suggested and areas showing NGO involvement and influence are highlighted.

* In-Country Coordination: The CJTF can adopt certain in-country operating procedures, including both policy and field coordinating groups, which will help achieve military-NGO unity of effort. Much has already been written about this particular subject in joint doctrine and in other military essays; this section provides additional ideas and recommendations from the interviewed NGO and military personnel that further delimits the CJTF – NGO coordination structure and roles.

The paper is not intended to be a restatement of lessons learned already amply documented in other essays. Nor should the reader view the prescriptions as the only factors that need to be considered. Given the complexity of the environment, each situation will be decidedly unique and place great demands on the skills of the operational leader. However, even under these circumstances, the CJTF can use the recommendations found in this paper to build a stronger military-NGO interaction, develop a better operations plan and execute the military mission more effectively.
Operational Leadership

Building upon an increasing experience base, the U.S. military has updated and published new joint doctrine that details how a CJTF can conduct small-scale contingencies and specifically humanitarian operations. According to military documents, the U.S. military paradigm has shifted increasingly to a coordinating, rather than commanding, function in these kinds of operations. Often, the U.S. military performs a supplementary role and is providing assistance of limited scope and duration. These differences underscore the need for the CJTF to adopt a different operational leadership style than that needed for combat. According to one NGO representative, this style should include consensus-style decision-making, the realization that the military may not have all the answers, some humility towards the local population, and flexibility towards non-military ways of doing business. Another NGO official points out that the NGO and military communities need better cultural awareness programs, which will sensitize leaders over the long-term and provide benefits while operating together in-country.

While the need for a different leadership style is supported in many of the research papers that describe lessons learned from a number of humanitarian operations, individuals inside NGOs suggest other important qualifiers that need further detail and that should further prepare the CJTF’s mindset before entering the environment.

1. Should NGOs be viewed as a coalition partner?

A CJTF can view NGOs as having similar characteristics as coalition partners – separate command and control structure; common, overarching objectives; reliance on coordination and consensus style decision-making; and capability to be a force multiplier. The military and NGOs bring to the situation unique and beneficial attributes that should
be synthesized in a complementary way. Increasingly, NGOs recognize the critical need to coordinate actions in country with the military and see such cooperation as beneficial to their mission. In the final analysis, both NGOs and the military want to solve the root cause of the crises and each is essentially working toward that end.  

*Recommendation:* In interacting with other members of a military coalition, U.S. joint force commanders understand the need to treat their allies as important partners who are part of the team needed to achieve the mission. A CJTF must approach interactions with NGOs in a similar fashion, treating NGO representatives with the same legitimacy and respect, and as part of the team contributing to the overall mission.

2. *Force protection – does that include NGOs?*

According to one military source, security is one of the capabilities that "is most needed" by the NGO,\(^1\) while another source states that providing security for NGOs is a specific military task.\(^1\) Although these views are widely accepted, the CJTF should not expect to be automatically welcomed as the "protector" by NGOs operating in the area. While NGO officials certainly see the benefits of a secure operating area and the increased ease with which they can provide needed relief,\(^1\) they display some sensitivity on this point and emphasize that the true purpose of U.S. military intervention should be focused on providing security for the local population.\(^1\) NGO officials argue that they have been and will remain in the area for much longer and under more hazardous conditions with or without the military. They believe that often the security brings restrictions (e.g., the U.S. military program to confiscate weapons carried by locally hired drivers in Somalia) that inhibit their capability to operate.\(^1\)
**Recommendation:** While the CJTF must be sensitive to these NGO concerns, the CJTF will be under orders, in most situations, to secure the safety of U.S. citizens in the area, many of whom are these same NGO employees. The commander should explain to NGO officials these U.S. military responsibilities but, in order to avoid unnecessary friction, should not use the provision of security as leverage. Rather, both groups should agree that most organizational missions could be more efficiently accomplished when conducted in a secure operating environment, and work together to ensure that security provisions do not unnecessarily hamper relief efforts. This can be a stated objective of the Civil Military Operations Center, described in detail later.

**Mission Assessment**

In order to develop a commander’s estimate and ultimately an operations plan, the CJTF should send, when the opportunity permits, an assessment team to the affected area and contact NGO officials for information. This is especially important considering NGOs have most likely been operating in the environment for some time and will have a greater appreciation for the overall needs of the situation. Given the potential positive impact of this kind of information on the assessment, the U.S. military should meet and incorporate NGO officials into the assessment process as early as possible, with the following additional qualifiers:

1. **NGOs are a source of information...**

   Many NGOs in fact would welcome the opportunity to share information or explain to the military exactly where they would be of most immediate benefit. NGOs can provide information on services already being provided; additional services needed;
assets they have available; their stated mission; their perspective of the political end-state; local sources of logistics support; cultural sensitivities; how they expect the military to support their efforts; and their disposition toward the military presence.\textsuperscript{19} This information directly impacts on the military mission, especially on the type and quantity of materiel and personnel that need to be deployed.

NGOs are sometimes overlooked by the military as a source of information for a number of reasons (e.g., NGOs are not viewed as meaningful participants, but rather as obstructionists).\textsuperscript{20} In some instances, military leaders assume they know the answers prior to deployment and do not believe coordination of their actions with NGOs or other relief organizations is necessary. For example, the military quickly deployed mobile surgical tents and large quantities of MREs in the wake of Hurricane Andrew (US-1992). However, a quick check with the American Red Cross would have revealed that, given the adequacy of hospitals in the area, tents were not needed nor would the local ethnic groups be likely to eat MREs.\textsuperscript{21} In Somalia, the military brought in large quantities of food, which provided necessary and immediate relief in many cases. However, in some instances – particularly outside the Mogadishu area – this action seriously disrupted longer-term NGO economic recovery plans for having the local grocers attempt to buy and sell food. Essentially, the military put these small-time merchants out of business.\textsuperscript{22}

In addition to direct contact with the NGOs, the CJTF also has the ability to access an increasingly extensive source of on-line data concerning on-going, worldwide humanitarian operations. The UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs web site, for instance, can provide the CJTF with timely and detailed information on disaster efforts, complex emergencies and organizations present in the area.\textsuperscript{23} Most
NGOs also have websites highlighting locations served and services provided. All of these sources can help the CJTF develop a comprehensive assessment of the operation and of the organizations involved before entering the area.

Recommendation: Regardless of time constraints, the CJTF or representative should ensure that NGOs are contacted and queried for information in order to more effectively plan for the follow-on military logistics and personnel requirements. If possible, the CJTF should also make it a point to visit NGOs personally in order to establish early liaison and trust, which will only increase the perception that they are viewed as valued members of the team. In addition, the CJTF should take full advantage of web sites to gain a better estimate of the situation.

2. ...but NGOs are not a source of intelligence.

The language in joint doctrine is very careful about using the term “information” versus “intelligence,” which is entirely appropriate considering the sensitivities of the NGOs. A review of the Principles of Conduct for the International Federation of the Red Cross reveals an entire section on how member NGOs would not knowingly be a source of intelligence gathering by any organization.

Recommendation: During an assessment, the CJTF or representative must be aware of this sensitivity and conduct information gathering in a non-threatening and open atmosphere. Given their ascribed principles of conduct, NGO officials insist that they need to understand why the information is being asked and how it relates to the military mission.
3. The CJTF cannot control or direct the use of NGO assets.

NGOs "can lessen the civil-military resources that a commander would otherwise have to devote to an operation." Accordingly, the CJTF may purposely NOT bring assets to the area if NGOs are already providing a particular service or have the needed equipment; i.e., with proper coordination, NGO assets could be used to support the requirements of the U.S. military mission. However, it is critical to understand that, although the NGO may be willing to coordinate the use of assets with the military, in all likelihood it will be on a completely different time schedule, priority or purpose. If the CJTF doesn't accept this limitation but rather attempts to force the use or scheduling of those assets as if they belonged to the military, the military-NGO interaction will suffer.

Recommendation: During the assessment team visit with the NGOs, the CJTF must ensure that clear lines of responsibility are understood in order to reduce redundant efforts, minimize deployment of unneeded material, and facilitate unity of effort. This is especially important if there is to be a shared responsibility or access to assets. In Rwanda, for example, this clarification of roles was characterized as the military providing the "wholesale services" whereas the NGOs were providing "retail services". That is, the military was handling bulk water purification processes while the NGOs were handling individual distribution, thereby minimizing the burden on both organizations.

Operations and Transition Plans

During wartime operations, military leaders attempt to determine an end-state that delineates the conditions for mission success and then typically perform a regression analysis to specify intermediate steps leading to that end-state. This kind of analysis is
sometimes difficult to perform in humanitarian operations where "evolutions on the ground and in the political context" could quickly change the nature of the operation and the role and departure date for the military. Conditions for and the meaning of success are often equally transitory. NGO officials note that, under these circumstances, the military is often operating under an "end-date" rather than "end-state" condition, which negatively affects the unity of effort. These dilemmas, while frustrating to the CJTF, underscore the need to perform operational planning and, related, to keep the mission limited. Comprehensive CJTF operations plan development, with special attention to branches to anticipate contingencies, will maximize deployment of the proper mix of assets and, later, facilitate transition. The CJTF should also consider the following while developing and executing the plan:

1. *Expect to be a gap-filler.*

The CJTF must recognize the impact of and the limitations to "arriving late" and "departing early" (typical of many military interventions) on the operations plan. As a result, military forces frequently will be placed in a supportive role, often filling-in where needed rather than in command of the entire operation. This situation increases the importance of the initial assessment and of understanding where the military can blend in to existing actions. By understanding this gap-filling role, military leaders can, in turn, be much more deliberate in selecting the types of personnel and equipment to be initially deployed, and then developing the appropriate scheduling matrices. This type of regression analysis is consistent with normal operational planning methodologies.

The gap-filling role has another context that, as experience has proved, impacts on force deployment planning. For instance, the military has often been pressured to fill in
when civilian agencies, due to lack of funds or personnel, fall through on commitments. For example, the military assumed police duties in Panama after the State Department was unable to complete local contracts for that service. Further, the military should also anticipate that NGOs may not be able to deploy the required personnel or equipment into the area and may request that the military supply the needed effort.

Recommendation: The individual actions performed by the military in country may appear to be a patchwork of activity given the asymmetric application of forces dependent on the needs. Even though the military force requirement may indeed be gap-filling, the CJTF must develop an overall operations plan that specifies the end-state for each of these individual activities, which supports a regression analysis back to the resources needing to be deployed. The CJTF should also actively incorporate branches into the operations plan that anticipate additional functions that may be directed. One study suggests actually deploying additional assets into the area to handle these branches more quickly.

2. **Limited missions ease transition planning with NGOs.**

As previously mentioned, the U.S. military will also typically perform more of a transient role in relation to the longer-term development effort needed to solve the underlying cause of the problem. This underscores the need for the CJTF to be mindful of the delicate balance between filling-in where required and unintentional mission creep. When asked to perform some service, the CJTF should ask, "does that contribute to the military end-state" before accepting the duty. By limiting mission creep, the CJTF also reduces the complexity of transition planning. Research reveals a number of examples
where the military had unintentionally expanded its mission and raised expectations among the local population to expect that level of sustained support. When the military departed, support naturally diminished significantly, causing NGOs to bear the brunt of the disgruntled and often demoralized population.\textsuperscript{37} Research also reveals that when the military stays focused on the immediate, short-term mission, transitioning activities to others becomes less problematic, such as in the Bangladesh operation.\textsuperscript{38}

\textit{Recommendation:} Recognizing that the military presence often will be short-term, the CJTF must attempt to keep the mission limited to those essential tasks contributing to the U.S. military's determination of the end-state and to those that can be sustainable once the military re-deploys. The CJTF can further facilitate transition planning by involving NGOs in the process early and by specifying how each military task will be assumed by NGOs or other organizations once the military departs.

\textbf{In-country coordination}

In recent years, the subject of military-NGO interaction during the actual execution of an operation has become the subject of numerous studies throughout the military and humanitarian communities. Broadly speaking, these studies have reviewed lessons learned from NGO interaction in order to improve existing doctrine; suggested military-NGO cross-cultural awareness programs to improve interoperability while in country; and focused on individual actions a CJTF may take while conducting an operation.\textsuperscript{39} The following suggestions amplify this research and focus on the actual coordination mechanisms through which the CJTF can increase the effectiveness of the military-NGO interaction:
1. Possibilities for coordination with NGOs.

The CJTF can coordinate in-country issues with NGOs through a number of planning groups. According to joint doctrine, the CJTF should establish an Executive Steering Group (ESG) to handle strategic, policy issues, and a Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) to deal with tactical-level problems, such as convoy scheduling or food distribution.\(^{40}\) The CJTF will also need to coordinate strategic issues with the CINC’s Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) and also, when operating with the UN, the Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC).\(^ {41}\) Each of these groups typically will have representatives from NGOs; therefore, most issues with NGOs can be resolved in these forums.

Some of the earlier CMOCs, such as the one in Somalia, were overwhelmed with both policy and field-level problems. Instead, NGO officials generally stress the importance of establishing separate groups to handle the different levels of problems. In fact, they are now expecting the military to establish these groups, especially the CMOC, once it deploys. They further emphasize that the CJTF can make the most impact by active participation in the ESG or HOC groups, since it is in these groups that the strategic direction of the operation is typically decided. NGOs view this level of interaction as important since it reveals each organization’s priorities for action and provides an increased awareness of the military end-state.\(^ {42}\)

Recommendation: The CJTF should build upon past successes and establish both the policy- and field-level coordinating groups. Personal participation by the CJTF in the policy group would allow continuous reassessment of the overall success of the military mission to determine if the measures of effectiveness (MOE) and end-state criteria have
been met. NGOs can help the CJTF refine the MOE in these fora and help with end-state planning as well. Further, these planning and execution groups provide a sense of credibility, legitimacy and ownership to the process and enhance the military-NGO unity of effort.43


Several officials interviewed stressed the need for liaison officers (LNOs) between the military and NGOs.44 These military officers would not replace the need for the CMOC or policy-level coordinating groups, but would serve as a two-way source of information for both the CJTF and NGOs and provide early warning on issues impacting both missions. From a military perspective, these LNOs would establish rapport with the NGOs, reinforce the commander’s intent, and give NGOs the sense they had a direct line to the commander. The CJTF should be aware that not all NGOs would want this level of interaction and some may even avoid it; however, the benefits that could accrue to both sides seems worthwhile.

Recommendation: Given the benefits that could be gained, the CJTF should be proactive in military-NGO relations and deploy LNOs to NGOs. Several NGO officials and authors of other studies have suggested the use of civil affairs personnel as the LNO, citing positive experiences with that kind of expertise.45 Two problems emerge, however, with this recommendation. First, the large number of NGOs involved in a given operation means that either an equally large number of LNOs needs to be deployed or some selection process is performed by which only the “most important” NGOs would receive the LNO. This may unintentionally alienate some neglected NGOs, but could be
mitigated by rotating LNOs among the NGOs based on the phase of the operation. Second, most of the civil affair officers are in reserve components and the CJTF may have difficulty calling up the required numbers in the timeframe needed. Those that serve during reserve duty are not in country long enough to establish the desired rapport. As an alternative, the CJTF can use personnel with other skills such as legal personnel or Special Operation Forces, e.g., PSYOP specialists, as LNOs.

Conclusion

The recommendations contained in this paper reflect the synthesis of NGO and military perspectives and of conclusions drawn from a wide variety of research. They should help the CJTF recognize that NGOs can be a force multiplier and, if dealt with appropriately, make significant contributions in developing a more substantive operations plan. While helpful, the analysis should not be taken as a “cure-all”, since there are numerous, outstanding issues that will, at the same time, work against developing an ideally symbiotic relationship. The differences in organizational culture, perspectives of time, and mission priorities will always be present and will be a source of friction in the relationship. It is hoped that if the selected CJTF adopts the above recommendations, then these problems will be reduced to the point where the two organizations can move closer to a “one team, one mission” concept. They will then NOT be wasting resources on military-NGO difficulties, but can instead concentrate their combined efforts on solving the underlying humanitarian problem.
ENDNOTES


2 Joint Warfighting Center, Joint Task Force Commander’s Handbook for Peace Operations (Fort Monroe, VA: June 16,1997), xiii.

3 In addition to the preceding non-doctrinal document, the following joint publications were used as source material:


4 Joint Pub 3-08 distinguishes between these three groups as follows. International Organizations have “global influence, such as the United Nations, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.” The terms non-governmental organizations and private voluntary organizations are used synonymously but do have some distinction. Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are “transnational organizations of private citizens that maintain a consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations. NGOs may be professional associations, foundations...or simply groups with a common interest in humanitarian assistance activities. NGOs is a term normally used by non-US organizations.” Private voluntary organizations (PVOs) are “private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organizations involved in development and relief activities. PVOs are normally United States-based.”

All of these organizations contribute to the success of a humanitarian operation, but the analysis of this paper is focused on the military-NGO interaction. However, given the definitions and relative similarity of these organizations, the recommendations could also apply to these other organizations.

For an in-depth analysis of the differences between and an interesting categorization of these organizations, see:


5 Research papers that have documented the lessons learned from humanitarian operations include:

Flor, 39-55.


Jennifer Morrison Taw, Interagency Coordination in Military Operations Other Than War – Implications for the U.S. Army, (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1997), 6-27.

Joint Warfighting Center, II-6-7.

Also, for an interesting discussion on the differences between Command, Control, Control, Intelligence (C3I) perspective of the military and the Coordination, Cooperation, Consensus, Assessment (C3A) perspective in the civilian relief community, see: Taw, 18.

7 Joint Pub 3-07, III-5.

8 Mary Hope Schwobel, Senior Program Associate, InterAction Disaster Response Unit, telephone conversations with author, 16 and 23 April, 1998.


An excerpt from the speech may interest the reader, which clearly shows a delineation between humanitarian agencies and the military, and their relationships with political objectives:

"We must also recognize that military operations are subordinated to political authority, direction and control. Unlike humanitarian agencies, military forces may not pick and choose where they go and what they do. By and large, the military do what they are instructed to do.

As experience has shown in Bosnia-Herzegovina and elsewhere, the effectiveness of military intervention depends on the firmness of political resolve and a clearly defined mandate. Taking Clausewitz's idea that war is the continuation of politics by other means a little further we could say that the deployment of military forces must always be in pursuance of a clear political goal."

11 Joint Warfighting Center, II-6.

12 Flor, 2.

13 For example, InterAction led a consortium of 13 NGOs to petition President Clinton to keep the U.S. military in Bosnia past the previously announced June 1998 withdrawal date. They specifically cited the fear that a military pull-out before the provisions of the Dayton Peace Accord were completed would reignite hostilities, significantly reduce security in the area and hamper NGO efforts. See:


14 Schwobel.
Sommaruga.

A further excerpt from the International Committee of the Red Cross speech may be of interest:

"The primary aim of political and military action should always be to restore law and order and thus contribute to reaching a comprehensive solution. This means that such action can have a positive impact on the activities of humanitarian organizations. Military action may be geared at creating conditions that
permit the delivery of humanitarian aid. But these conditions are merely a subsidiary consequence thereof and should not be its primary aim. The deployment of military forces for the sole purpose of delivering humanitarian aid would fail to address the underlying political issues that created the need for such aid."

15 Schwobel.

16 The interaction between the CJTF and higher authorities to resolve mission ambiguities is outside the scope of this paper. A discussion of this process and the relationship between DOD and political decision processes are documented in: Taw, 6-7.

17 Joint Warfighting Center, I-11-12.


19 Ibid. Schwobel.

Additional items to consider that contribute to the commander’s estimate and ultimately Measures of Effectiveness are provided in:


20 Allen.

21 Ibid. This refers to Mr. Allen’s experience while employed at the American Red Cross.


24 As examples, see:

http://www.dwb.org, Doctors Without Borders Home Page
http://www.interaction.org, InterAction Home Page, which also provides links to member NGOs.


The reader may be interested in the full contents of the cited paragraph, especially since NGOs are specifically referenced (emphasis added by author):

“4: We shall endeavour not to act as instruments of government foreign policy.

NGHAs (non-government humanitarian agencies) are agencies which act independently from governments. We therefore formulate our own policies and implementation strategies and do not seek to implement the policy of any government, except in so far as it coincides with our own independent policy. We will never knowingly - or through negligence - allow ourselves, or our employees, to be used to gather information of a political, military or economically sensitive nature for governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those which are strictly humanitarian, nor will
we act as instruments of foreign policy of donor governments. We will use the assistance we receive to respond to needs and this assistance should not be driven by the need to dispose of donor commodity surpluses, nor by the political interest of any particular donor. We value and promote the voluntary giving of labour and finances by concerned individuals to support our work and recognise the independence of action promoted by such voluntary motivation. In order to protect our independence we will seek to avoid dependence upon a single funding source."

27 Joint Warfighting Center, II-2 and II-7.

28 The author noted statements in other research papers that could lead one to the conclusion that the military believes it could regulate the use of NGO assets. If so, this will be a constant source of friction and one that, with the proper mindset, the CJTF can mostly avoid. For example, using such phrases as "assets that NGOs can offer to the JTF" and "making full use of their (NGO) capabilities" (Flor, 1) needs to be avoided.

29 Flor, 51.
Taw, 2.

30 Center for Naval Analysis, 18. Reference is for comments made by (then) LTG Zinni at the conference.

31 Schwobel.

32 Operations planning includes a description of the end-state (as best understood from the political objective), ways in which the mission can be accomplished, resources needed, and physical and political risks attendant to the mission.

33 Taw, 12.

34 Ibid., 35.

35 It is recognized that the CJTF may not always have that choice, especially in cases where political concerns may override the CJTF decision.

36 For a more detailed discussion of transition concerns and indicators for phase completion, see: Air Land Sea Application Center, 4-20.

37 Liston. A distinction can be drawn between programs developed for force protection and those designed for long-term sustainment. For example, LtCol Liston, the military port manager in Mogadishu during Operation RESTORE HOPE, provided small amounts of medicine and food to stop the local population from attacking U. S. forces. This level of support stopped when U.S. forces departed. However, this level of support is different from that which establishes large-scale building or distribution projects that cannot be completed once the military leaves. In the former case, the level of impact is low, whereas the latter case can have longer term, negative implications for the population once the military leaves.

Schwobel.

38 Taw, 21.

The Marines involved in Operation Sea Angel (Bangladesh, 1991) strictly avoided repairing anything beyond that which was destroyed in the cyclone. In addition, they restored things to local rather than American standards. Both actions helped avoid mission creep and raising expectations.
This endnote contains multiple references that would be of interest to the reader.

A. For a more detailed evaluation on the lessons learned from the military-NGO interaction during an operation and a comparison with doctrine, see:


Swan, et. al. 17-36.

Taw, 32.

B. For less doctrinal-oriented perspectives that suggest longer-term courses of action, such as cross-training activities, to improve the awareness of each other's culture, procedures, and capabilities so that in-country problems are minimized, see:

LtCol Howard Schick, USMC, Editor, Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, telephone conversation with author, 15 April 1998. LtCol Howard Schick, editor of the JTF Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations, concluded after 18 months of effort that education between the military and NGO cultures is probably the single most important factor that could increase cooperation.

Taw, 36.

C. Finally, for a study that focuses on individual actions a CJTF may take while conducting an operation, such as shared access to the media and communications equipment, as additional means to foster better military-NGO interaction, see:


Joint Pub 3-07, IV-7.

Joint Pub 3-08 Vol. 1, III-7, III-15. If a HOC has been established by the UN and is already operating, then it is implied in doctrine that the ESG does not need to be established.

Allen.

Schwobel.

Taw, 18-19.

Schwobel.

Allen.

Liston.

Allen.


Schwobel.
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Liston, Sonny. Mogadishu Port Manager, Operation RESTORE HOPE. Telephone conversation with author, 23 April 1998.


Schwobel, Mary H. Senior Program Associate, InterAction Disaster Response Unit. Telephone conversation with author, 16 and 23 April 1998.


