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A CINC'S WORRY:
THE DEFENSE REFORM INITIATIVE

by

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Defence Reform Initiative  Joint Vision 2010  Cybercorp  NDP  Revolution in Business Affairs
INTRODUCTION

The Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP) budget projections are flatlined. To minimize the impact of the FYDP on the armed forces, and by extension the combatant commanders-in-chief (CINC), the Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) developed the Defense Reform Initiative (DRI). SECDEF used Joint Vision 2010 (JV 2010) as the template for development of the DRI transformation strategy.¹ Taken at face value, the DRI is nicely crafted and politically astute, but since it is neither comprehensive nor synergistic with JV 2010, the ability of a CINC to accomplish assigned responsibilities and missions is in jeopardy.

The following five part methodology will be used to demonstrate why the DRI and its lack of synergy with JV 2010 place the CINCs in jeopardy. First, CINC responsibilities and relationships will be briefly reviewed. Second, the DRI’s main areas, and subelements which might impact the CINC will be examined. Third, JV 2010 will be briefly reviewed. Fourth, the DRI and JV 2010 will be compared to develop conclusions for CINC consideration. Finally, recommendations for future CINC action will be presented.

The DRI is a broad scope document which contains many elements and details which do not directly impact the CINCs. To maintain focus, examination of the DRI will be limited to those items with linkage to the ability of a CINC to accomplish assigned responsibilities and missions. This analysis is not all inclusive, but does provide a representative sample of the major DRI elements which impact a CINC.
CINC RESPONSIBILITIES AND RELATIONSHIPS

To understand the significant power a CINC has been given by law one must understand the CINC responsibilities defined in U. S. Code Title 10:

- The commander of a combatant command is responsible to the President and the Secretary of Defense for the performance of missions assigned to that command by the President or by the Secretary with the approval of the President.

- Subject to the direction of the President, the commander of a combatant command
  ⇒ performs his duties under the authority, direction, and control of the Secretary of Defense; and
  ⇒ is directly responsible to the Secretary for the preparedness of the command to carry out missions assigned to the command.²

The CINC is directly responsible for the execution of the National Military Strategy in a conflict situation, be it declared or undeclared war, or a military operation other than war (MOOTW). The President and SECDEF are the two people a CINC reports to. This very short chain of command places a CINC in a special position of trust and responsibility. A CINC has direct access to SECDEF when needed.

The forces a CINC will employ for mission accomplishment are provided by the individual military departments. The military departments are responsible to equip and train the forces. A CINC has limited input on how the individual service organizations accomplish the train and equip function.

Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), SECDEF and their supporting staffs are the "inside the beltway" advocates for a CINC's concerns. As such, they interact with the military departments, Department of Defense (DoD) organizations and federal agencies to ensure CINC concerns are acted upon. This process is designed to provide the CINCs
with the forces they desire to fulfill their assigned missions. If CJCS or SECDEF do not support CINC concerns and requirements, a CINC could be in jeopardy.

In summary, the CINCs have national level responsibilities but little, if any, control over the manner in which assigned forces are trained and equipped. Although the system is convoluted, it works. The weak link is “inside the beltway,” where the DRI was developed.

DRI

The DRI is an outgrowth of two efforts: the Congressional directed Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) and the SECDEF directed National Defense Panel (NDP). The QDR and NDP are mutually supporting, but they are also different in militarily significant points. To better understand the genesis of the DRI, the QDR and NDP will be briefly reviewed.

The QDR was coordinated by the Joint Staff and supported by the military departments. In the broadest sense, the QDR was focused on determining what force levels would be needed to meet national security challenges through 2015. The QDR’s findings were not revolutionary. The findings basically rejustified the status quo with some tinkering at the force level margins. The NDP’s main criticism was “that the QDR did not go far enough in examining defense agencies, headquarters, and related infrastructure.”

The NDP was SECDEF’s effort to look further into the future: “Transforming Defense - National Security in the 21st Century.” The NDP’s efforts focused on the QDR results and “include[d] procurement reform and changes to the support structure.” The
NDP process and DRI development occurred nearly simultaneously. The DRI can be considered the implementor for much of the NDP's December 1997 report.

Secretary Cohen clearly stated in his introductory message to the November 1997 DRI report that:

Our strategy will ensure that America continues to lead a world of accelerating change - shaping the emerging security environment and responding to crises that threaten our interests. We will execute the strategy with superior military forces that fully exploit advances in technology by employing new operational concepts and organizational structures. And we will support our forces with a department that is as lean, agile, and focused as our warfighters.\(^\text{6}\)

Secretary Cohen's statement appears to be introducing a corporate-level strategy.

Other positive messages were embedded in the Secretary's introductory remarks as well. A comment which CJCS wanted to hear was present: "The conceptual framework for how US forces will fight in the future is *Joint Vision 2010*, which charts a path to ensure that US forces will be able to conduct decisive operations in any environment. *Joint Vision 2010* describes this goal as 'full spectrum dominance.'\(^\text{7}\)" SECDEF thus reinforced the legitimacy of JV 2010.

It also included a comment for Congress and the rest of DoD. "I [Cohen] noted that DoD needed to slough off excess pounds built up during the long winter of the Cold War. Losing weight successfully requires not a one-time diet, but a permanent change in lifestyle."\(^\text{8}\) A very powerful message that indicates Cohen's conviction to change.

The driving factors behind the introductory messages were the Revolution in Military Affairs, as represented by JV 2010, and the Revolution in Business Affairs, as represented by the DRI. SECDEF appears ready to embrace the practices employed by
successful business leaders and move DoD to a flat and networked “cybercorp”
organization that supports the JV 2010 conceptual framework.

The DRI has four major areas with a host of supporting implementation actions.
The four major areas of the DRI are:

- **Reengineer**: Adopt modern business practices to achieve world-class standards of performance.
- **Consolidate**: Streamline organizations to remove redundancy and maximize synergy.
- **Compete**: Apply market mechanisms to improve quality, reduce costs, and respond to customer needs.
- **Eliminate**: Reduce excess support structures to free resources and focus on core competencies.9

The four areas are very broad and incorporate many issues which are not germane to the main focus of this paper. To maintain a boundary for the following analysis, the Reengineer, Compete and Eliminate areas will only be briefly reviewed since actions within these areas should only minimally impact the CINC's. The main analysis effort will be focused on the Consolidate area. This area will have immediate impact on a CINC's ability to complete assigned responsibilities and missions.

The Reengineer area is focused on adopting modern, networked business practices. The key subelements are: Electronic Business Operations which includes electronic contract administration and internet-based commence, Prime Vendor Contracting with the goal of reducing on hand inventories, Travel Reengineering with the goal of cutting travel claim transaction cost, Household Goods Transportation with the goal to reduce cost and improve service, and Consolidating Logistics and Transportation. The last subelement
should have a positive impact on a CINC by reducing the logistics tail and improving asset visibility.

Much like the Reengineer area, the Compete area is business practice related. The overall goal of the Compete area is to streamline through competition, or in other words push work that is private sector in nature to the private sector. This effort should have minimal impact on a CINC as long as the service provided by the private sector agent equals or exceeds what was done by the government organization. A CINC should be concerned with the ability of the private sector to perform at an acceptable level during a major conflict (declared or undeclared war of some duration).

The Eliminate area is base closure continued. SECDEF wants two more rounds of base closure and the DRI makes a good case for why it is needed. The CINCs should support this initiative as it frees up total obligation authority (TOA) for procurement. The only perceived downside is the potential loss of military training areas; particularly live fire ordnance training and research areas. Once these areas are given up in the base closure process, it will be extremely difficult under current environmental law to re-open them. The CINCs need to be aware of this potential downside as it may impact the training and equipping of future forces.

So far the DRI does not appear to place the CINC’s ability to accomplish assigned responsibilities and missions in jeopardy, but the Consolidate area changes this perception. The Consolidate area is neither comprehensive nor sound from a strategic management perspective, but the overall goal appears noble:

There are three central principles guiding the changes: Department headquarters should be flexible enough to deal with future challenges; the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) should focus on corporate-level tasks; and operational
management tasks should be pushed to the lowest appropriate level. As a result, all headquarters should be thinned, flattened and streamlined, both to avoid the temptation to take on new non-core responsibilities, and to provide the resources to organizations receiving the devolved functions.\textsuperscript{10}

The DRI appears altruistic until the subelement details are examined. Key personnel reduction subelements follow:

- Reduce CINC staffs by 7% by the end of FY 2003
- Reduce Military Departments by 10% from their FY 1998 level by FY 2003
- Reduce Joint Staff and related personnel by 29% from FY 1996 level by FY 2003
- Reduce OSD and associated personnel 33% from FY 1996 levels within 18 months
- Reduce Defense Agencies by 21% over next five years
- Reduce DoD Field Activities reporting to OSD 36% over the next two years\textsuperscript{11}

These reductions represent a real threat to a CINC. The CINC’s staff will be cut. At the same time, additional management tasks will be “pushed” to the reduced staff.

Additionally, since other supporting staffs (i.e. DoD agencies, military departments) are being cut, a CINC will likely experience a reduction in the quality of support he receives.

The above is not the only threat a CINC faces in the Consolidate area. It appears that conflict exists between the CINC’s two advocates.

As with OSD, the basic structure of the Joint Staff is sound, but issues have arisen as the Joint Staff has taken on additional responsibilities since the enactment in 1986 of the Goldwater-Nichols Act. Some of these additional responsibilities resulted in Joint Staff growth while others resulted in the creation of Chairman-controlled activities. Numerous parallel functions also exist in the Joint Staff and OSD. In some cases, such redundancy is warranted; however, in many it is not. As a result of restructuring, the Joint Staff will eliminate or transfer approximately 170 billets. Functions that parallel those of OSD will be rationalized, eliminating duplication. In addition, most of the Chairman-controlled activities will be transferred to the CINCs, Services or Joint Agencies.\textsuperscript{12}

In addition to the CINC’s staffs being reduced and receiving more work, the CINC’s advocates are involved in a power struggle. Secretary Cohen obviously desires to reverse
the recent trend of the Joint Staff overshadowing OSD. Reversing this trend will "shake-up" the status quo and amplify resistance to the DRI directed staff reductions.

The following summary of the Organizational area is presented to add clarity to the analysis. Organizational change is needed to implement the DRI, but the change is incomplete. The military departments are directed to reduce numbers, but the DRI does not specify where or how the reductions will be made. Basically, OSD will set the example for change and subordinate organizations will follow as they see fit.\textsuperscript{13} The missing piece in this game plan is a definitive strategic management direction for all of DoD. The Defense Management Council (DMC), chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense (DEPSECDEF) and comprised of the under secretaries and vice chiefs, is the group which will fill in this major missing piece, and they will do so while the staffs reduce and DoD is in a state of disorder. The CINCs should be very worried about this situation. Their advocates on the council, DEPSECDEF and the Vice Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff (VCJCS), are involved in their own power struggle which could over shadow CINC concerns. The CINC's current and future requirements may not be heard as clearly as they once were.

Overall, the DRI could be taken as a positive step forward which fills in the missing portion of the Revolution in Military Affairs; but one should not view it as such. The DRI is a partial answer that does not even conform to the five recognized tasks of strategic management. They are:

1. Developing a concept of the business and forming a vision of where the organization needs to be headed
2. Converting the mission into specific performance objectives
3. Crafting a strategy to achieve the targeted performance
4. Implementing and executing the chosen strategy efficiently and effectively
5. Evaluating performance, reviewing the situation, and initiating corrective adjustments in mission, objectives\textsuperscript{14}

The main shortcoming of the DRI is its piecemeal management approach; it lacks a complete corporate strategy and does not have specific performance objectives. This condition may exist due to political realities. SECDEF, no matter how proactive he wants to be, still needs congressional approval for changes to existing law. In some cases, the law is specifically designed to support an inefficient DoD organization to ensure defense dollars cover the political needs of congressional members. SECDEF’s goal may be a Revolution in Business Affairs, but the reality is that this revolution will progress only as quickly as political will allows. A similar analogy exists for JV 2010.

\textbf{JV 2010}

\textit{“Joint Vision 2010 is the conceptual template for how America’s Armed Forces will channel the vitality and innovation of our people and leverage technological opportunities to achieve new levels of effectiveness in joint warfighting.”}\textsuperscript{15}

JV 2010 is focused on warfighting. JV 2010 was published in July 1996 and has been complemented by numerous service and agency visions. All these documents and visions taken together define how “we [the military] will move toward a common goal: a joint force - persuasive in peace, decisive in war, preeminent in any form of conflict.”\textsuperscript{16}

It is obvious that the main focus of all the visions is the development of a future force that can meet all the possible missions assigned by the President. The CINCs are thus directly involved with JV 2010 and the other related visions. Future force structure and warfighting concepts are flowing from the tenants of JV 2010. The military
departments are using these tenants to make resource decisions for the future, and as previously discussed, SECDEF is applying the same tenants to the DRI.

The basic tenants of JV 2010 are bounded by information superiority. Information superiority is the linchpin for the new conceptual framework of improved command, control, and intelligence. This framework is supported by four operational concepts: dominant maneuver; precision engagement; full dimensional protection; and focused logistics. “The [JV 2010] implementation plan will involve CINCs, Services, and joint organizations. Each element must participate in developing and testing these new concepts and their overall integration.” Additionally, in order to turn these concepts into capabilities, implementing organizations need to be adaptable, flexible and information responsive. In other words, a Revolution in Business Affairs is required to implement the concepts.

The critical missing portion of JV 2010 is the who, how and what of organizational structure required to support implementation of JV 2010 concepts. The CJCS does not have the power to restructure DoD in support of JV 2010. The DRI appears to be an attempt to fill this void. SECDEF, as constrained by Congress and law, can shape DoD to implement JV 2010. The problem is that the DRI and JV 2010 lack synergy.

DRI & JV 2010 Compared - Conclusions

Compared

The accelerating changes in technology would be difficult enough to cope with, but in addition there are radically new views about how to organize people better. Many corporations that require fundamental redesign today are paying lip service to reengineering but in reality are missing the boat. They are not carrying through or even understanding the reinvention that the cybercorp world demands.
JV 2010 is focused on warfighting via information superiority, whereas the DRI is focused on a Revolution in Business Affairs. The gap between the two approaches is the lack of a synergistic implementation vision. As stated, JV 2010 is not specific on what organizational structure is required for implementation. The DRI, on the other hand, does not define what organizational structure will support the warfighting template. The corporate strategic level of detail required to reorganize DoD to support JV 2010 is not found in the DRI. The DRI approach is to slash and burn the organization by reducing and consolidating existing staff with the belief that the DMC will develop a coherent DoD organization from what remains.

JV 2010 requires more than this haphazard DRI approach if it is to have a chance for success. JV 2010 advocates a joint approach to warfare and warfare support. A decentralized organization which maintains its own parochialism within existing stovepipes will not have this joint outlook. The DRI is counter to the trend of the cybercorp and does not adequately support JV 2010's joint warfare approach. As an example, JV 2010 has focused logistics as one of its tenants, yet the DRI only bespeaks the value of “just-in-time” logistics without relating the organizational changes required to make this occur. This same trend can be seen with regard to the other operational concepts of JV 2010. The DRI supports the concepts but fails to define the administrative management organization required to implement the concepts.

The one constant in both the DRI and JV 2010 is the realization that the budget is flatlined and will not support CINC identified future requirements. Enabling the CINC to accomplish assigned responsibilities and missions is important to the authors of both
documents. The problem is that neither author has the power to develop a DoD corporate strategy that can be implemented without congressional interface. DoD is subject to the fiscal and political control of Congress. Additionally, the size of DoD is an impediment to change. Each military department has its own culture, ingrained parochialism and individual congressional support block impeding change. The CINC is at the “pointy end of the spear,” but the shaft has a lot of splinters that need attention if the DRI or JV 2010 are to be implemented in a synergistic fashion. Congress should look closely at the splinters to ensure the CINCs can continue to accomplish assigned missions.

**Conclusions for CINC Consideration**

Legacy systems procured today will be at risk in 2010-2020. We must carefully scrutinize their utility for future conflicts as well as for peacetime military operations. Joint Vision 2010 and the visions of the services contain many of the capabilities we need in the future. However, the procurement budgets of the services are focused primarily on current systems and do not adequately support the central thrust of their visions.\(^\text{20}\)

In the end, the DRI and JV 2010 devolve to the root of all DoD power: money. Will the resources be made available for DRI and JV 2010 implementation, or will it be a piecemeal approach which leaves the CINC with an uncertain future? The following conclusions demonstrate that the future is uncertain and the CINCs are in jeopardy:

- JV 2010 and supporting service and agency visions need SECDEF support in order to be applicable to future warfare.
- CINC staff reductions and the “desire” to push management tasks to the lowest possible level pose significant risks for the CINCs. This “desire” is reminiscent of the old adage “do more with less.” In time, without a watchful eye, the CINCs will have too much “desire” and too little “means” available to accomplish assigned missions.
• The CINC's future is full of uncertainty and risk. The uncertainty and risk are bounded by the following questions:
  ◊ What will be the impact of the other SECDEF directed staff reductions?
  ◊ Will the quality of the armed forces decrease?
  ◊ Will the quality and quantity of support, physical and informational, diminish to the point where its usefulness is lost?
  ◊ Will the DRI actions provide funds for reinvestment?
  ◊ What will be the impact of the power struggle between the CINC's two "inside the beltway" advocates?

• The DRI is a piecemeal approach to corporate reorganization in the information era. The slash and burn DRI approach to management reorganization fails to breakdown ingrained military department parochialism and stovepipes, and fails to use information era type management principles. The DRI does not enable the formation of an organizational structure supportive of JV 2010's joint warfighting concepts.

• The DRI and JV 2010 are not synergistic. The warfighter and the administrator are not mutually supportive.

• Congressional action may be the only way to make the DRI and JV 2010 synergistic. Goldwater-Nichols type congressional action may be required to shape the entire DoD management restructure into an organization supportive of joint warfighting concepts. This action would directly impact and change the structure and authority of the military departments.
RECOMMENDATIONS

The CINCs should take the following recommendations as a form of political force protection.

- Communicate concerns about the DRI process directly with SECDEF. Challenge all DRI related actions that adversely effect mission accomplishment.
- Closely watch the power struggle between OSD and the Joint Staff. Ensure that only a minimal loss of advocacy occurs.
- Understand the impacts staff reductions and reorganizations will have on the forces provided for mission accomplishment.
- Maintain an open mind about congressional action to make the DRI and JV 2010 synergistic. This includes supporting the complete reorganization of the military departments. The goal is to develop flatter, flexible and integrated (joint) military departments that support JV 2010’s focus on information age technology.
- Watch the budget projections to ensure that any projected savings from DRI actions are maintained in the budget and available for reinvestment.
- Ensure that at least one member of the DMC is closely watching out for CINC interests.

In closing, the CINCs should be worried about the DRI. The DRI is moving in the correct direction but it appears to be proceeding down a dead-end road. The CINCs need to be actively engaged in the DRI process to ensure their mission accomplishment capabilities are not permanently placed in jeopardy. The CINCs are in jeopardy now, but with active engagement in the DRI process the negative impacts will be minimized. The
CINCs also must maintain an open mind if Congress decides to actively attempt to make the DRI and JV 2010 synergistic by changing the law: Title 10.
FOOTNOTES

5 Ibid, I.
7 Ibid, ii.
8 Ibid, iv.
9 Ibid, iii.
10 Ibid, 15.
11 Ibid, 15.
12 Ibid, 25.
13 Ibid, 18.
15 Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Joint Vision 2010 (Washington D.C.), 1.
16 Ibid, 2.
17 Ibid, 19.
18 Ibid, 32.
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