This study investigates the degree to which conventional infantry battalions (light, mechanized, airborne, and air assault) are conducting realistic home-station unit training to prepare soldiers to face a willing and able foe. The study analyzes training based largely upon three criteria developed from extensive literature review and analysis: cognitive mental stressors (uncertainty, ambiguity, information overload/deprivation, and so forth), environmental physical stressors (sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield), and conditions that unleash soldiers initiative (understanding the purpose and commander’s intent). Additionally, the study analyzes the degree to which U.S. Army training doctrine supports operational, leader development, and combat stress doctrine. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the study makes a set of inferences and generalizations about the current state of infantry training. The study concludes with recommendations to company and battalion commanders on how to improve their individual and collective home-station training.
INITIATIVE-ORIENTED TRAINING

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE

by

JAMES C. LARSEN, MAJ, USA
M.S., Saint Mary College, Leavenworth, Kansas, 1997

Fort Leavenworth, Kansas
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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)
ABSTRACT


This study investigates the degree to which conventional infantry battalions (light, mechanized, airborne, and air assault) are conducting realistic home-station unit training to prepare soldiers to face a willing and able foe. The study analyzes training based largely upon three criteria developed from extensive literature review and analysis: cognitive mental stressors (uncertainty, ambiguity, information overload/deprivation, and so forth), environmental physical stressors (sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield), and conditions that unleash soldiers initiative (understanding of purpose and commander’s intent). Additionally, the study analyzes the degree to which U.S. Army training doctrine supports operational, leader development, and combat stress doctrine. Using both quantitative and qualitative analysis, the study makes a set of inferences and generalizations about the current state of infantry training. The study concludes with recommendations to company and battalion commanders on how to improve their individual and collective home-station training.
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

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<td>Army After Next</td>
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<td>AAR</td>
<td>After Action Review</td>
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<td>AR</td>
<td>Army Regulation</td>
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<td>Army Research Institute</td>
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<td>ARTEP</td>
<td>Army Training and Evaluation Program</td>
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<td>BCTP</td>
<td>Battle Command Training Program</td>
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<td>BFV</td>
<td>Bradley Fighting Vehicle</td>
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<td>CALL</td>
<td>Center for Army Lessons Learned</td>
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<td>CAS</td>
<td>Close Air Support</td>
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<td>CBR</td>
<td>Chemical, Biological, Radiological</td>
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<td>Command and General Staff College</td>
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<td>CGSOC</td>
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<td>CMTC</td>
<td>Combat Maneuver Training Center</td>
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<td>CPX</td>
<td>Command Post Exercise</td>
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<td>CS</td>
<td>Chemical Smoke</td>
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<td>CTC</td>
<td>Combat Training Center</td>
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<td>DRMO</td>
<td>Defense Reutilization and Marketing Office</td>
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<td>Field Manual</td>
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<td>Description</td>
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<td>FTX</td>
<td>Field Training Exercise</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JRTC</td>
<td>Joint Readiness Training Center</td>
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<tr>
<td>LOC</td>
<td>Line(s) of Communications</td>
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<td>MILES</td>
<td>Multiple Integrated Laser Engagement System</td>
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<td>METL</td>
<td>Mission Essential Task List</td>
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<td>MTP</td>
<td>Mission Training Plan</td>
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<td>NBC</td>
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<td>O/C</td>
<td>Observer Controller</td>
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<td>OPORD</td>
<td>Operations Order</td>
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<td>RCMAT</td>
<td>Remote Control Model Airplane Training</td>
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<td>ROE</td>
<td>Rules of Engagement</td>
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<td>SAW</td>
<td>Squad Automatic Weapon</td>
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<td>SINCgars</td>
<td>Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System</td>
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<tr>
<td>STX</td>
<td>Situational Training Exercise</td>
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<td>TASC</td>
<td>Training and Audiovisual Support Center</td>
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<td>Tactical Operations Officer</td>
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<td>USAIC</td>
<td>United States Army Infantry Center</td>
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CHAPTER 1

INTRODUCTION

It had never occurred to me that naval gunfire passing over the heads of an infantry battalion could cause such panic that the battalion would take to its heels and disperse so that it required two days to collect the stragglers. Yet no shell fell within a thousand yards of the battalion, and no enemy was firing on it. Subsequent investigation disclosed two causes for this sudden abandonment of duty. The battalion was not familiar with the characteristic sound of naval gunfire passing overhead. Having just landed on a strange and hostile shore, advancing in darkness on a dangerous mission, and entering battle for the first time, the battalion was keyed to a high pitch of nervous tension. It broke completely under a new and terrifying sound. Our training had been at fault for we failed to accustom men to all of the unfamiliar sounds of battle, and we failed to instill the rigorous discipline and control to prevent these panics.¹

Lieutenant General L. K. Truscott, Command Missions

The Problem

Besides a few engagements in recent conflicts, the U.S. Army has not faced an organized enemy with a strong opposing will since Vietnam. Battlefields have continued to become increasingly complex with the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the tremendous strides made in technology. The intensity of combat, shock effect of weaponry, and speed of maneuver continue to advance. These changes have produced a need greater than ever before for soldiers to confront the physical and mental combat stressors in training—prior to the first shots fired in anger.

U.S. Army training doctrine instructs units to train realistically, yet training resources have diminished while safety and environmental concerns have increased. Training soldiers to successfully confront combat stressors and exercise initiative with
good judgment, rather than merely battle drills, may have subsequently been affected. Achieving the utmost in realistic training has been a concern for U.S. Army and Marine Corps leaders since World War Two. As explained in U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 25-101, Battle Focused Training, it was so much of a concern in the 1970s, that the Army developed the Combat Training Centers (CTCs), which are comprised of the National Training Center (NTC), the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC), the Combat Maneuver Training Center (CMTC), and the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP). The CTC program was designed to provide the most realistic training for battalions and brigades short of actual combat.

Even if CTCs adequately induce many combat stressors, unit rotations through one of the CTCs every 1 1/2 to 2 years are not sufficient for units to maintain proficiency in their wartime missions. Typical personnel turnover rates in an infantry battalion can range upwards ten percent per month. Adding to the turbulence resulting from the gains and losses of personnel, many of the soldiers and leaders change jobs within a unit that previously experienced a CTC rotation. Thus, by the time a battalion returns to a training center in eighteen to twenty-four months for a second rotation, much of the individual and collective experience gained is not useful. Therefore, it stands to reason that units spend the vast majority of their time conducting home-station unit training (individual, leader and collective), including deployments for training, and that this the key to achieving and maintaining unit proficiency.

Through home-station unit training, infantry battalions attempt to train realistically through Situational Training Exercises (STXs), Command Post Exercises (CPXs) and
Field Training Exercises (FTXs). The Army is increasingly incorporating simulations and simulators as low-cost alternatives to deployments and field exercises. But in so doing, is today’s infantry training truly incorporating all of the aspects of realism necessary to replicate combat with an enemy who possesses a strong opposing will? Are leaders doing all they can to prepare their soldiers for combat with an enemy who “votes” given the resource constraints imposed upon them?

The dynamics of the modern battlefield, much as they have been for this century, are such that leaders and soldiers must think, decide, and act quickly without orders and the benefit of perfect information; they must become accustomed to the rigors of combat prior to being exposed to it for the first time. U.S. Army Field Manual (FM) 100-5, Operations (Draft), mandates that leaders must demonstrate initiative “so that their forces can act and react faster than the enemy. Initiative requires a willingness and ability to act independently within the framework of the higher commander’s intent. They [unit leaders] must continually . . . push soldiers and systems to the limits of their endurance for as long as necessary.”7 FM 100-5 goes on to say that agility is a precursor to seizing and holding the initiative. “Forces must be able to strike and shift combat power repeatedly so that by the time the enemy reacts to one action, another has taken its place.”8 To maintain initiative and agility on the modern battlefield, units must develop a faster “decision cycle” than their enemy. Developing a faster decision cycle than the enemy means units must achieve three prerequisites: “lower the level that decisions are made and allow trained, subordinate leaders maximum freedom of action guided by the commander’s intent; train cohesive units capable of independent action; [and] instill the understanding that decisions
will be made without the availability of perfect information." So it follows that it is not enough to merely incorporate the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield and produce uncertainty, but leaders must teach soldiers to execute initiative if units are to fight in accordance with the Army's operations doctrine.

Historically, the U.S. Army has often been defeated or at least had its "nose bloodied" in the first engagements against an enemy with a strong opposing will. From Kasserine Pass in North Africa to Osan, Korea, to the Ia Drang Valley in the Republic of Vietnam and the streets of Mogadishu, Somalia, Americans were shocked at the first encounter with an enemy hell-bent on their defeat. Today, the Army may not be able to afford repeatedly high casualties as were the case in the battles above. The Army is significantly smaller than it was prior to Operation Desert Storm—with many infantry units at only 70 percent of their authorized personnel strength. To complicate this matter, the ubiquitous "CNN factor" can broadcast the effect of a soldier's poor decision to millions of households worldwide within minutes, potentially eroding public sentiment and undermining efforts to secure the national interest and/or perceived moral obligations. Therefore, it is of utmost importance that current training methodology be evaluated to determine if units are doing more than merely conforming to the checklists as prescribed in the Army Training and Evaluation Program-Mission Training Plan (ARTEP-MTP) manuals.

The Army cannot afford to rest on its laurels from quick and decisive victories obtained in Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm for it faced enemies with weak opposing wills. As such, its leaders have a foremost responsibility to prepare soldiers for
the most difficult of circumstances within the resource constraints imposed upon them. The challenge therefore, is to develop tough and truly realistic training that is safe, yet replicates the combat environment as closely as practicable.

Laboratory experiments that have been performed with young animals have indicated that those animals raised in very predictable and stable settings encountered substantial difficulty adapting to changes in their environment. These animals showed signs of stress and distress when they were put in unfamiliar settings. Conversely, “young animals who had been raised in a frequently changing environment adapted very quickly when changes were introduced.”11 Does the same hold true for humans? I recall some years ago that instructors at the Infantry School at Fort Benning, Georgia routinely showed a slide for leadership classes which quoted a famous German general following World War Two. The slide read words to the effect that the reason the Americans were so successful in the war was that war is chaos and the American Army operates in a state of chaos every day. Perhaps there is some merit to this bold assertion by the German general and the results of the lab experiment.

Assumptions

This study makes three assumptions. The first assumption is that today’s infantry soldiers are generally physically prepared to execute their wartime missions. The basis for this assumption is that, in my experience, the majority of soldiers in infantry units meet height and weight standards and physical fitness requirements as prescribed by Army Regulation (AR) 600-9 and as outlined FM 21-20, Physical Fitness Training. The need for
this assumption is that soldiers must be able to function physically in a stressful environment. The second assumption is that rifle squads are capable of executing basic battle drills to a reasonable degree of proficiency--as prescribed in the ARTEP-MTP. This assumption is necessary because a unit will have extreme difficulty conducting realistic training if it is not first proficient in executing the battle drills in a relatively stress-free environment. The third assumption is that infantry battalions primarily use ARTEP-MTPs in their planning, preparation and execution of collective training. The basis for this assumption is that the current training doctrine has been in place since 1988 and has been institutionalized through all Army leader development schools and combat training centers despite that operational doctrine changed in 1993 and is amidst change again.

The Research Question

This paper will focus on soldier and unit psychological preparedness for combat. Specifically, the following research question will be answered: Does home-station unit training conducted by conventional U.S. Army infantry battalions provide sufficient realism to adequately prepare soldiers for the cognitive and environmental stressors inherent within the environment of combat? In concert with this central question are four subordinate research questions. First, are units integrating cognitive mental stressors into their individual and collective training. Specifically, are units training soldiers to win in a complex environment in which there are no simple answers and cookie-cutter solutions; where unique problems require timely and appropriate solutions? The question will explore whether units are simply training to the checklists found in MTPs and ignoring
cognitive mental stressors, such as ambiguity, uncertainty and sensory/information overload/deprivation. Second, is unit training incorporating realistic environmental stressors such as sights, sounds and smells of the battlefield, thus exposing soldiers to the same conditions that are found in a combat environment? This question will examine to what extent small-unit training exercises are integrating the grim, rugged scenery associated with the battlefield. Third, is unit training designed to inculcate initiative in soldiers and leaders? The aim of this question is to discover if commanders are creating a learning environment whereby soldiers and leaders are being trained to take appropriate action in the absence of orders. Finally, does the Army’s training doctrine as expressed in FM 25-100, *Training the Force* ("authoritative foundations for individual, leader and unit training")\(^1\) and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training* (which "provides practical ‘how to’ guidelines for officers and NCOs")\(^2\) enhance or inhibit Initiative-Oriented Training? This question will determine if, (1) the Army’s training doctrine supports its operations doctrine, and, (2) if its training doctrine supports Initiative-Oriented Training.

**Research Methodology**

This thesis examines the Army’s training doctrine and home-station unit training conducted by conventional U.S. Army infantry battalions (light, mechanized, airborne and air assault). The proposed study lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The first phase of the research approach will be to analyze the literature in an effort to determine if current Army training doctrine fully supports operations, leader development and combat stress doctrine; as well as if training doctrine supports the concept of
Initiative-Oriented Training. The second phase will be the development of a questionnaire that will be distributed to a sample population of selected infantry officers who are attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer's Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During this phase, quantitative analysis will be used in an attempt to determine some descriptive statistics, such as frequencies, means and amounts; as well as establish correlations between selected data pertaining to infantry units conducting individual and collective training. The third phase of the research will be further qualitative analysis of infantry unit training. During this phase of the research, an infantry battalion task force will be observed in the performance of a company team STX for indicators of Initiative-Oriented Training. Unit leaders will also be interviewed in an attempt to provide insight on the observation. The fourth and final phase will be an attempt to determine common trends between the sample populations of CGSOC students and the infantry battalion task force. Taken together, the study will attempt to answer the research question and provide a generalization and a set of inferences on the state of home-station unit training within infantry battalions. As its end state, the thesis will provide specific recommendations to improve infantry home-station unit training to better prepare soldiers fight and will against an enemy with a strong opposing will.

**Key Definitions**

**Initiative-Oriented Training.** For the purpose of this study, Initiative-Oriented Training is defined as training which subjects soldiers, leaders and/or units to selected environmental and cognitive stressors present in a combat environment, thus requiring
quick action, without orders, while exercising reasonably prudent judgment. Initiative-Oriented Training has three inseparable components: First, the training must replicate environmental stressors of the battlefield as closely as practicable so that soldiers become accustomed to it. These stressors include the sights, sounds and smells associated with close combat. Second, the training must integrate cognitive stressors, such as uncertainty, ambiguity and sensory overload/deprivation that are prevalent on the battlefield. Third, Initiative-Oriented Training must be designed to inculcate initiative in subordinates so that units are capable of fighting in accordance with the Army’s operations doctrine.

**Stressors.** Stressors are defined as any “event or situation which requires a non-routine change in adaptation or behavior. Often it is unfamiliar, or creates conflicts among motives within the individual. It may pose a challenge or threat to the individual’s well-being or self-esteem. Stressors may be positive or negative.”

**Combat Stressors.** Combat Stressors are defined as a complex interaction of physical and mental “stressors occurring during the course of combat-related duties, whether due to enemy action or other sources. Many stressors in combat come from the soldier’s own unit, leaders, and mission demands.” Figure 1 provides examples of these stressors.

**Mental Stressors.** Mental Stressors are “one [type of stressor] in which only information reaches the brain, with no direct physical impact on the body. This information may place demands on either the cognitive (thinking) systems or the emotional (feelings, such as anger or fear) systems in the brain.”
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PHYSICAL STRESSORS</th>
<th>MENTAL STRESSORS</th>
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<tr>
<td>ENVIRONMENTAL</td>
<td>COGNITIVE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HEAT, COLD, OR WETNESS</td>
<td>INFORMATION, TOO MUCH; TOO LITTLE</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>VIBRATION, NOISE, BLAST</td>
<td>SENSORY OVERLOAD VERSUS</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HYPOXIA (INSUFFICIENT OXYGEN),</td>
<td>DEPRIVATION</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FUMES, POISONS, CHEMICALS</td>
<td>AMBIGUITY, UNCERTAINTY, ISOLATION</td>
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<td>DIRECTED ENERGY WEAPONS/DEVICES</td>
<td>TIME PRESSURE VERSUS WAITING</td>
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<td>SKIN IRRITANTS OR CORROSIVES</td>
<td>UNPREDICTABILITY</td>
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<td>DARKNESS, OBSURATION</td>
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<td>DIFFICULT OR ARDUOUS TERRAIN</td>
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<td>DEHYDRATION</td>
<td>FEAR, ANXIETY-PRODUCING THREATS</td>
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<tr>
<td>MALNUTRITION/POOR HYGEINE</td>
<td>(OF INJURY, PAIN, LOSS, PERSONAL</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MUSCULAR OR AEROBIC FATIGUE</td>
<td>OR MISSION FAILURE)</td>
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<tr>
<td>IMPAIRED IMMUNE SYSTEM</td>
<td>GRIEF-PRODUCING LOSSES</td>
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<td>OVERUSE OR UNDERUSE OF MUSCLES</td>
<td>RESENTMENT, ANGER, RAGE-</td>
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<td>ILLNESS OR INJURY</td>
<td>PRODUCING FRUSTRATION, GUILT</td>
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<tr>
<td>NOTE: THE ABOVE STRESSORS MAY ACT SINGLY OR INTERACT WITH EACH OTHER</td>
<td>CONFLICTING MOTIVES (WORRIES</td>
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<td></td>
<td>ABOUT HOME, DIVIDED LOYALTIES)</td>
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<td></td>
<td>SPIRITUAL CONFRONTATION OR</td>
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<td>TEMPTATION CAUSING LOSS OF FAITH</td>
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<td>INTERPERSONAL FEELINGS</td>
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Figure 1. Physical and Mental Stressors. Source: U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-51, Leader’s Manual for Combat Stress Control (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 1994), 2-2

Cognitive Mental Stressors. Cognitive stressors are essentially those mental stressors that cause the individual to think. Examples of Cognitive Mental Stressors include too much or too little information; sensory overload versus deprivation; ambiguity, uncertainty, isolation; time pressure versus waiting; unpredictability; rules of engagement (ROE), difficult judgments; organizational dynamics; hard choices versus no choices; recognition of impaired functioning.¹⁷
Physical Stressors. As perceived by the individual, physical stressors have a direct or potentially harmful impact on the individual. It may be external conditions in the environment or internal physiological demands of the body. Physical stressors evoke stress reflexes, such as loud noise which causes tension in the ear drum. “Physical stressors can also be mental stressors if they also provide information to the brain which creates a mental demand or poses a threat to well-being. Even if a physical stressor is not a threat to life and health, the discomfort, distraction, and performance degradation it causes may be emotionally upsetting.”

Environmental Physical Stressors. Environmental stressors are an individual’s reaction to the direct or potentially harmful effect of heat, cold, wetness, vibration, noise, blast, fumes, physical work, and so forth. For the purpose of this study, the research will examine the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield, such as realistic targetry, explosions, and collateral damage, and odors that would associated with death and destruction.

Limitations

This study is limited to conventional infantry (airborne, air assault, light, and mechanized) battalions, companies, and platoons. The home-station unit training of the four different types of conventional infantry units are examined in relation to environmental and cognitive mental stressors, and conditions that allow for subordinates to exercise initiative. One mechanized infantry battalion task force will be observed in the conduct of field training. Additionally, a survey of infantry officers with recent experience
within a rifle battalion provides supporting data. Together these observations and data collected attempt to provide a generalization of the degree of total realism currently being achieved in U.S. Army infantry battalion home-station unit training.

Further limitations of this study are evident in examining home-station unit training. Except for weapons qualification, units do not normally maintain sufficient training records of FTXs, STXs, CPXs, and so forth, to make analysis and determination of reasonable alternatives for improvement. Battalion quarterly training guidance (QTG) usually allows company commanders loose interpretation of degrees of realism. After action reviews (AARs) below battalion level are mostly conducted orally; however, records of resource requirements and possibly the training plans are maintained for future reference.

**Delimitations**

The study does not include an examination of training by special operations forces, such as Rangers, due to their higher level of resources than conventional infantry units. Additionally, the study will not analyze the impact of resource constraints upon unit training. It will, however, attempt to infer about the extent to which infantry units are using available resources in the planning, preparation, and execution of training. Finally, two types of combat stressors—physiological (for example sleep debt, dehydration) and emotional (e.g. fear and anxiety-producing threats)—are not within the scope of this study.
Significance of the Study

This study is significant for several reasons. First, it will define what is truly realistic training, vastly expanding on what is written in the Army’s training doctrine. Second, it will provide, in general terms, a view of how home-station unit infantry training within an infantry battalion is presently being conducted in comparison to the components of Initiative-Oriented Training. Third and as its end state, the study will provide concepts for Initiative-Oriented Training and, if needed, specific recommendations to infantry battalion and company commanders on how to improve individual and collective training to better prepare their soldiers for the cognitive and environmental stressors that they will face in future combat. These concepts for development of realistic training techniques will fill an extremely large void that heretofore has only been filled by exhaustive research or a vast amount of real-world experience.

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6Ibid., 240.


8Ibid., 7-2.


15Ibid.

16Ibid., 2-1, 2-2.

18Ibid., 2-3.
CHAPTER 2
LITERATURE REVIEW

It's no wonder they were so confused and ineffective when first exposed to intense enemy fire. When we had to evacuate a casualty under fire, some of the new men were reluctant to take the chances necessary to save the wounded Marine. . . .

This isn't to reflect on their bravery; they simply weren't trained and conditioned properly to cope with the shock, violence and hellish conditions into which they were thrown.¹

E. B. Sledge, With the Old Breed

Background

Initiative-Oriented Training has three inseparable components: environmental physical stressors (realistic sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield), cognitive mental stressors (ambiguity, uncertainty, and information overload, and/or deprivation and so forth), and conditions which require subordinate initiative. As a prelude to examining the relevant literature in each of these areas, it would be helpful review the environment of combat and how current and emerging Army doctrine aims at preparing soldiers for the rigors of future conflict. An understanding of the complexity and challenges of combat provides the foundation upon which the Army's operational doctrine is built. Training, leader development, and combat stress doctrine necessarily are derived from, and are intended to, support operational doctrine.² The chapter concludes with criteria developed from the analysis of literature that can be used by the leaders to determine if their units are providing adequate realism in training necessary to prepare soldiers for intense combat.
The Battlefield
Uncertainty in Combat

Military leaders and avid readers of military history have long understood that the battlefield is confusing, complex and unpredictable. There are brief moments of extreme violence, fear and information overload, preceded and followed by seemingly endless hours of boredom, loneliness, and sensory deprivation. As there have been millions of infantrymen in combat over the centuries, there have been equally as many unique experiences. Even two soldiers in the same battle often have completely different experiences. No two battles are ever the same and the only constants are soldiers' exposure to combat stressors; in twentieth century--decentralized warfare--the need for soldiers to demonstrate appropriate initiative in the absence of orders is prevalent.

Carl von Clausewitz in On War described war as he studied it in the eighteenth century as complex, unpredictable and "the realm of uncertainty . . . and chance." With respect to complexity, unpredictability, and uncertainty on the battlefield, very little has changed over the years. FM 100-5, Operations (Draft), aptly describes today's combat environment:

Commanders frequently exercise command of their forces in conditions of uncertainty and where there is risk of violence, fear, and danger. Friction, that factor which Clausewitz described as the "force that makes the apparently easy so difficult," adds further to the chaos and confusion of operations. Fog amplifies the effects of friction and increases uncertainty. Commanders must recognize that friction and fog are inevitable. They must see through the confusion and disorder and then dominate the complexity and chaos of the operational environment—or at least cope with that which they cannot dominate. Leaders, indeed all soldiers, seek to turn friction, complexity, and chaos to their advantage by imposing these disruptive elements on their opponents.
The Future Battlefield

Despite all of the excitement about the Army's Force XXI and the Army after next (AAN) and about many leaders' promises to remove some uncertainty due to more and better information, tomorrow's battlefield is most certainly going to be every bit as unpredictable and uncertain as those throughout history. Perfect information goes only so far. For instance, the Israelis had perfect information on the Egyptians in 1973--the Israelis saw a field training exercise. What they did not know was why the Egyptians were training so close to the Suez canal. If the Israelis had known the Egyptian intent, then they would have not been surprised by the attack. Only solid, reliable human intelligence, and in some cases signal intelligence, can answer the question of why.\(^5\)

A recent AAN wargame held at Army War College demonstrated that tomorrow's battlefield will be even more complex than today's due to higher rates of speed, increased weapons lethality, and considerably more moving parts to be synchronized. The exercise's after action report stated that "AAN soldiers and their units will require higher rates of mental agility and psychological resilience to successfully meet tomorrow's battlefield challenges."\(^6\)

Results of the AAN wargame suggest that the Army of 2025 must have leaders that can process far greater amounts of information at far greater speeds than they are currently required to do. Far from having perfect information, commanders will be forced into making decisions in a fast-paced, chaotic environment. Soldiers and leaders may consequently be exposed to "higher levels of physical and emotional stress, thereby creating a greater risk of cognitive and psychological impairment. AAN battle units
employed a larger number of *moving parts* functioning at higher rates of speed, which in the future may force leaders at all levels to cope with increasing levels of complexity.”

AAN leaders may find their decision-making capability quickly overwhelmed due to the voluminous amounts of information. Additionally, AAN soldiers may very well fight in isolated and decentralized situations unlike any previous war. These factors will require tomorrow’s leaders, soldiers and units to exhibit “a high level of mental agility and psychological resilience to operate in discrete, self-reliant, well-informed, autonomous small units.”

**Combat: The Ugly Side**

He moved to the left flank. Much smoke. Smoke changing now, blowing this way, blinding. He was caught in it, a smothering shroud, hot, white, the bitter smell of burned powder. It broke. He saw a man swinging a black rifle, grunts and yells and weird thick sounds unlike anything he had ever heard before. A Reb came over a rock, bayonet fixed, black thin point forward and poised, face seemed blinded, head twitched. Chamberlain aimed the pistol, fired, hit the man dead center, down he went, folding; smoke swallowed him. Chamberlain moved forward. He expected them to be everywhere, flood of brown bodies, gray bodies. But the smoke cleared and the line was firm.

Michael Shaara, *The Killer Angels*

The sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield are unique and often grim and disgusting, further adding to the uncertainty, unpredictability and complexity that is inherent in the environment of combat. But death and destruction are an integral and unfortunate byproduct of combat. Although inflicting as many casualties as possible has at times in history been a marker of success, the United States military today prefers to have as few friendly, enemy and civilian casualties as possible. However, the Army will never be
able to avoid the mayhem altogether. Consider this extract from an interview with a
soldier who served in Vietnam:

Now, there was a LURP [Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol] team from the First Brigade off of Highway One, that looked over the South China Sea. There was a bay there.... Now, they saw boats come in. And they suspected, now, uh – the word came down [that] they were unloading weapons off them. Three boats.

At that time we moved in. It was about ten o’clock at night. We moved down, across Highway One along the beach line and it took us [until] about three or four o’clock in the morning to get on line while these people were unloading their boats. And we opened up on them – aahh. The firepower was unreal, the firepower that we put into them boats. It was just a constant, constant firepower. It seemed like no one ever ran out of ammo. Daylight came [long pause], and we found out that we killed a lot of fishermen and kids.

I was sick over it, after this happened. I actually puked my guts out.10

The above passage illustrates that the environment of combat is not just one of complexity, uncertainty and riddled with misinformation, it is also one of extreme violence and danger, often followed by remorse. There are military as well as civilian casualties. Weather, terrain and continuous operations, coupled with the stress of fighting or the anxiety of waiting to fight, takes a heavy psychological toll on soldiers and units.

The toll from combat stress casualties can be significant. A famous study following World War Two that suggested that 98 percent of soldiers who experienced sixty days of continuous close combat became psychiatric casualties; the two percent who didn’t become psychiatric casualties were considered aggressively psychopathic.11 In an example from World War Two, Allied psychiatrists determined that ten to fifteen percent of all casualties were psychiatric during the first ten days of the Normandy invasion.12 Given the small size of the Army today, losing 10 percent to combat stress could be disastrous.
Operations Doctrine

Field Manual (FM) 100-5 is the foundation of Army operational doctrine. It provides guidance and direction to soldiers on how the Army intends to succeed in the environment of combat, as well accomplish other assigned missions in operations other total war. As the keystone manual, it establishes the basis from which subordinate Army doctrine is derived, such as training, leader and soldier development, and combat stress.\(^1\)

The Army envisions four different types of missions or operational categories: offensive, defensive, stability and support; with major operations combining two or more missions. Offensive-oriented operations, such as Operations Just Cause and Desert Storm in the broadest sense, are decisive and take the fight to the enemy. Defensive-oriented operations, such as Operation Desert Shield, are undertaken to posture forces in order to deter an attack, or if deterrence fails or is not desired, then to defeat an enemy’s attack. “Defensive operations must ultimately be combined with or followed by offensive action” as defensive operations in and of themselves are not decisive.\(^4\)

Stability operations, such as Operation Uphold Democracy in Haiti, “apply military power to influence the political environment, facilitate diplomacy, and disrupt specified illegal activities. They include both developmental and coercive actions.”\(^5\) Support operations, such as Operation Restore Hope in Northern Iraq or Hurricane Andrew relief, are focused on assisting domestic or foreign government or non-government organizations. “They are conducted mainly to relieve suffering and assist civil authorities respond to crises. Support operations are normally characterized by lack of an active opponent.”\(^6\)
In the conventional sense, offensive and defensive missions are relatively self-explanatory. Stability and support missions, however, are not quite so easy to grasp and place special burdens on soldiers who have been trained for conventional missions.

Consider the complexity of stability operations as expressed in FM 100-5:

Many stability operations are carried out in the full glare of public scrutiny. Knowing this, opponents of the stability effort will seize on relatively minor incidents to achieve strategic advantage. Experience shows that a single act of indiscipline or rash application of force has the potential to undo months and years of disciplined effort. Likewise, soldiers’ actions that are destructive to the natural or cultural environment may be perceived as disrespectful by the affected population and may become an issue with the media at large. Preventing this requires disciplined, knowledgeable leaders at every level who consider the potential consequences of every act they and their forces take.

And FM 100-5 continues:

Commanders guide the application of combat power with ROE. In stability operations, the need to prevent unnecessary suffering, to distinguish between combatants and noncombatants, and to minimize the loss of life and damage to property incidental to offensive or defensive operations often dictates that minimum force be used to accomplish the mission. All of these factors must be weighed in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage expected to be gained.\(^\text{17}\)

FM 100-5 leads one to believe that the constraints in stability operations, like those expressed above, do not necessarily diminish the Army’s effectiveness in that type of combat environment. It also states that units must be versatile enough to transition quickly from one operational category to another, such as was the case following the 100 hours of offensive action during Desert Storm.\(^\text{18}\) Some units that deployed to Somalia in 1993 experienced the reverse, albeit on a much smaller scale--stability and support quickly turning into offensive operations.
This raises the question: are soldiers who have been trained to conduct lethal combat operations equally adept at performing stability and support operations? Major General Scales, Commandant of the Army War College, believes that American soldiers are flexible enough to change focus as was proven following the Gulf War. To the contrary, Colonel Gery Greenfield, the Director of Psychological Applications for the Army Special Operations Command, opines that, “the notion that soldiers trained to conduct lethal combat operations can be equally adept at performing peace operations is nonsense” and that the personality types needed for combat are different than those for peace operations.¹⁹ The Army may never know the answer to the question of equal adeptness or have the luxury of having the right type of soldier in the right type of environment. What can be ascertained is that, even more than conventional offensive or defensive operations, stability and support operations are unique and present special challenges that require soldiers and units to have a high degree of mental agility, initiative and decision-making skills—these are skills that should be trained.

Regardless of the different missions or operational categories, FM 100-5 explains that “successful Army operations exhibit five essential characteristic: initiative, agility, depth, orchestration, and versatility.”²⁰ For the purpose of this study, the tenet of initiative will be examined, as well as the demands that initiative places on soldiers and units.
Initiative

FM 100-5 refers to initiative as the element that sustains leader and unit confidence. On the need to exhibit initiative, the manual states:

Initiative is essential if soldiers are to recognize and take advantage of opportunities. Therefore, a commander must be given the freedom to use his initiative, as well as provide that same freedom to subordinates. Soldiers have to believe they have the freedom to act in the best interests of the organization. Only with such tolerance can they develop boldness. A commander unwilling to risk subordinates’ mistakes or willing only to risk mistakes of such mundane nature as to be inconsequential cannot establish a command climate conducive to victory. Tolerance includes creating an environment that promotes taking risks to win rather than avoiding risks so as not to fail. Subordinates must, in turn, demonstrate discipline in their demonstration of initiative. They must understand that independent or misdirected success at their level which detracts from the focus of overall effort may endanger greater success within the context of larger operations.21

Even more powerful than the above passage, the manual goes on to require that leaders be bold and audacious in their decision making and develop subordinates to prosper in an environment of chaos and confusion:

Boldness includes making decisions in an environment in which outcomes are uncertain and chance constantly threatens to destroy the unprepared. It means making decisions when information is incomplete or contradictory. A successful commander prepares his subordinates for these environments, acts boldly, encourages his soldiers to do the same, and seizes opportunities. In so doing, he makes chance his ally and his adversary’s enemy. Such a commander is determined to achieve success regardless of the obstacles that confront his organization.22

The need to seize and maintain the initiative, as well as accept risk is readily apparent in the Army’s operational doctrine. What should be gathered from the above passages is that it would be a sin to expect soldiers to execute initiative and take risks in combat if they have not been trained for such. Initiative and risk taking have no place on the battlefield without an understanding of the commander’s intent.

23
To gain and maintain initiative on the battlefield, units must develop a faster "decision cycle" than the enemy. In simplest terms, a decision cycle is the ability for a commander or unit to observe an activity or set of activities and conduct inductive reasoning, orient himself and/or his forces in response to his conclusions, determine a course of action, then execute the decision. Developing a faster decision cycle than the enemy means units must achieve three prerequisites: "lower the level that decisions are made and allow trained, subordinate leaders maximum freedom of action guided by the commander's intent; train cohesive units capable of independent action; [and] instill the understanding that decisions will be made without the availability of perfect information." 23

It is readily apparent that there a need exists to train leaders, soldiers, and units to exercise initiative in combat if they are to fight in accordance with the Army's operational doctrine, or for that matter to simply win regardless of doctrine. Insofar as training initiative is concerned, this would require that units not always have perfect information about the enemy when conducting exercises, not necessarily even knowing the task, conditions and standards as prescribed a manual. Rather, once basic battle drill proficiency is achieved, training must include opportunities for leaders and soldiers to exhibit initiative and make decisions given imperfect information so that they become comfortable operating in accordance with the commander's intent in an unpredictable environment. The well-known military axiom sums it up best, "In combat it's better to make a decision to do something than to do nothing at all." So if soldiers are expected to do something, they ought to be educated on how to make a decision rather than relying on
their intuition—an intuition from which they may have no previous case on which to base their decision. In others words, leaders should be teaching soldiers how to think, not so much what to think.

Training initiative has at times lacked in the Army. General Truscott, following his World War Two experience, reflected the need to train initiative:

Senior officers had lectured endlessly on initiative as a quality which everyone should possess, or develop, and “Use your initiative” was a phrase dinned at men morning, noon, and night. Yet, in fact, no junior officer could deviate one iota from the text or regulations or orders without risking harsh criticism. “What the school teaches” was the definitive answer to almost all military discussions and questions. Far from encouraging junior officers and men to try things—to “stick their necks out”--we had concentrated on strict uniformity within a pattern which was not fully understood. Viewed in this light, it was hardly surprising that junior echelons lacked confidence to act boldly in the uncertain conditions of their first battle.24

Later, the study will explore if strict adherence to our training doctrine supports training initiative so that soldiers are not mavericks on the field of battle, rather understand their unique contribution in accordance with the commander’s intent and can act boldly to carry it out.

**Mission Orders**

The need to execute initiative and agility on the battlefield is enabled by the doctrinal concept of mission orders. Mission orders tell subordinates what to do but not how to do it; they provide a task to be accomplished and for what purpose. The “how” of the operation is best left to the subordinate.25 A unit’s purpose in an operation takes priority over the task assigned to it, and is paramount. The unit’s purpose--its unique contribution to the fight--must be understood by all soldiers in the unit, as well as the unit’s relationship to units around it, enemy forces and/or terrain and to its higher headquarters two levels up. This is an extremely important concept for leaders to
understand because it is principally through the use mission orders that initiative is unleashed on the battlefield.26

Training Doctrine

Insofar as truly realistic, Initiative-Oriented Training is concerned, today’s trainer must conduct an inordinate amount of research to gain knowledge or he must possess a wealth of real-world experience. The Army’s training doctrine, as expressed in FM 25-100, Training The Force, and 25-101, Battle Focused Training, offers little more than a few paragraphs on the importance of realism in training, providing only some tips on the integration of battlefield conditions. Even FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, devotes a just a few short statements about the importance of realism and posits as many suggestions on how to incorporate certain aspects of realistic training, such as casualties and integration of combat support and combat service support assets. Given the Army’s training doctrine alone, the infantry commander has a definite handicap as he wrestles with developing training that addresses the components of Initiative-Oriented Training.

The Army does provide “Principles of Training” that offers some help in guiding leaders during the development of effective training. These principles are listed below:

Principles of Training

FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, insists that leaders understand and apply the nine principles of training.27

1. Train as a combined arms and services team

2. Train as you fight
3. Use appropriate doctrine
4. Use performance-oriented training
5. Train to challenge
6. Train to sustain proficiency
7. Train using multi-echelon techniques
8. Train to maintain
9. Make commanders the primary trainers

Three of these principles, Train as you fight, Train to challenge, and Use performance-oriented training, are directly linked to the concept of Initiative-Oriented Training. “Train as you fight” demands that units replicate realistic combat conditions into our training. Specifically, the principle states that “leaders must ensure that soldiers are trained to cope with complex, stressful, and lethal situations they will encounter in combat.”

“Train to challenge” expands on the previous principle by explaining that training which is tough, demanding and realistic produces aggressive, proficient soldiers and innovative leaders.

Finally, “Use performance-oriented training” is a time-honored principle that is synonymous with the adult learning model adage of “learning by doing” and is focused on achieving a set performance standard.

The Operational and Training Doctrine Dichotomies

Interestingly, there appears to be somewhat of a dichotomy within training doctrine itself, and between operational and training doctrine. When examining the definitions of the principles of training as outlined in FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training,
there appears to be some contradiction between the principles of “Use performance-oriented training” and “Train as you fight.” Although probably not the intent of the authors, stating that soldiers “train better and faster, and to a higher degree of proficiency, when they know the tasks, conditions and standards”\(^\text{31}\) (in accordance with performance-oriented training) then soldiers are not being exposed to complex and unpredictable situations as they would experience if they were training as they would fight. If the Army’s well known training approach of “crawl, walk, run” is considered, it stands to reason that tasks, conditions and standards have their place in the early stages of individual and collective training. Once proficiency is achieved, however, training as a soldier or unit fights would presumably take on a much larger role. In other words, when a soldier or unit enters the “run” phase of training, they would be given a mission order (task and purpose as a minimum),\(^\text{32}\) not necessarily knowing the specific task or conditions prior to execution, and the standard would be based on the effectiveness of the solution as it relates to the purpose and commander’s intent, much like it would be in combat. This appears to be a reasonable assumption but it is not clearly stated in the manuals that dictate more specifically the conduct of training.

Within the Army Training and Evaluation Program (ARTEP) Mission Training Plans (MTPs) there is also somewhat of a dichotomy. ARTEP-MTPs provide “a descriptive, performance-oriented training program to assist leaders in training their units”\(^\text{33}\) and are used to evaluate unit effectiveness in executing missions. Essentially, MTPs are comprised of tasks that support higher unit missions as those missions are expected to be performed in combat. The broken, or at least frayed, thread of continuity
is evident with examination of MTPs' examples of mission statements, suggested scenarios for Situational Training Exercises (STXs), and performance measure checklists that ensure units achieve the prescribed standards.

In reviewing ARTEP-MTP 7-8, Mission Training Plan for the Infantry Platoon and Squad, the examples of mission statements to be used for training exercises are not in accordance with operational doctrine. For instance, a mission statement for a defensive operation reads, “1st Platoon defends in the vicinity of TT131003 (HAP HANSEN) NLT 250600JunXX to deny enemy the use of the avenue of approach.”\(^{34}\) As previously stated, study of operational doctrine tells us that as a minimum, a unit must be assigned a task and a purpose. Defend is not a task, it is an operation; denying an avenue of approach relates absolutely nothing to the unit’s unique contribution to its higher headquarters or units adjacent to it. This may seem trivial to the casual observer; however, if soldiers do not understand the true purpose for which they are fighting then they cannot be expected to apply initiative that is of value to the higher headquarters’ concept and the commanders’ intent. In an example of an order for a STX in ARTEP 7-8 MTP, a unit is given a mission to “seize Objective (____) and destroy enemy supply trains.”\(^{35}\) Seize and destroy are both considered to be tactical tasks with measurable results, but no purpose for the mission is given. Here again, without a soldier’s understanding of purpose there is little hope for meaningful initiative.

Insofar as performance measure checklists are concerned, which are used to determine if the evaluated unit achieves the task standards, the standards for each task are to be “understood by every soldier prior to the conduct of the training . . . ; task steps are
The net result appears to remove all cognitive mental stressors and leave little room for initiative on the part of the evaluated unit’s leaders.

The MTP also tells us that “conditions should be the same for all evaluated elements. This establishes a common baseline for platoon performance.” This poses the questions, how do platoons, for example, “train to challenge” if one squad within the platoon is more proficient than the others? If every platoon is comprised of different soldiers and leaders with different levels of proficiency, then it stands to reason that units ought to toughen the conditions to challenge the more proficient squad and not concern themselves with which squad is the best in the platoon or company.

**Army Senior Leadership on Training Doctrine and Realism**

Even the Army’s recent senior leaders have been relatively silent on their interpretation of training doctrine vis a vis realistic training. Army Chief of Staff, General Dennis J. Reimer, wrote an article that appeared in *Military Review* stating that “training realism must be achieved at home [and]... we must design our training program so that there is a smooth transition from what we do at home to what we do at the CTCs.” Other than stating this need, he did not provide any substantial guidance on how to accomplish this task. General (Retired) Wayne A. Downing, former Commanding General of the United States Special Operations Command, wrote an article entitled “Training to Fight,” which appeared in *Military Review* eleven years ago. This article provides commanders a few ideas for integrating cognitive mental stressors and initiative into training and explains the reasons why it is so important. General Downing opined that
"commanders should structure training events where a subordinate must violate his specific instructions, to include control measures, in order to accomplish the unit’s mission and support the commander’s intent. We must teach our soldiers to adapt to any situation they might find themselves in, even if we have to create the unforeseen in training."\textsuperscript{39}

These two articles are the only ones discovered during the course of this research where senior Army leaders made mention of the importance of truly realistic training and, with regards to General Downing’s article, some guidance for how to conduct it. General Downing included in his article the diagram in Figure 2 as his interpretation of the various types of collective training vis-a-vis the degrees of realism:\textsuperscript{40}

![A Training Model](image)

Although most Army leaders would agree with General Downing's assessment and model, many are sure to argue that safety considerations and command policies governing live-fire ranges often preclude truly realistic training at home station—training that incorporates uncertainty and initiative in addition to realistic sights, sounds, and smells.

With regards to force-on-force, or free-play MILES exercises, uncertainty and initiative can easily be incorporated but the effects of live ammunition are not possible.

Furthermore, soldiers are not as afraid of MILES lasers as they are of bullets, and in the researcher's experience, tend to be rather bold and audacious without the element of fear.

In light of this dilemma, one solution that seems to be congruent with General Downing's philosophy is to use both types of exercises to achieve the end state of realistic training: live-fire exercises to teach fire control/coordination and the interrelationship/synchronization of combined arms while exposing soldiers to the sights, sounds, and (to some degree) smells of the battlefield; use MILES force-on-force, free-play exercises to incorporate cognitive mental stressors and produce an environment to unleash soldier's initiative.

**Leadership Doctrine**

A unit's character reflects the character of its leaders and its troops. If the soldiers have discipline, courage, and initiative and think creatively, the unit develops a personality—a character—with these elements as its foundation.  

U. S. Department of the Army, FM 22-100, *Military Leadership*

The Army's leadership doctrine instructs leaders to demonstrate initiative and operate independently within the commander's intent, exploiting opportunities and taking
"well-calculated risks." Furthermore, leadership doctrine demands that leaders provide purpose and direction to soldiers "so they will function in an efficient and disciplined manner." Initiative has no place without discipline; disciplined soldiers respond quickly and properly to orders given by their leaders and act appropriately, even in the absence of orders. Discipline in a unit is derived from realistic training and caring leaders—leaders that make soldiers feel special. It occurs when a unit’s members are selfless in their service and morale is high "because each soldier knows that what he is doing is important and contributes to accomplishing an important mission."44

FM 22-100, Military Leadership, devotes a large portion of its content to leadership in battle and stress in combat, citing historical examples of successful leadership during the rigors of combat operations. The intent of many of these examples is to expose the reader to the leadership that is required to confront the cognitive mental stressors, such as the uncertainty and dilemmas that occur in battle, as well as the emotional mental stressors, such as fear and anger. Physical stressors, like sleep deprivation in continuous operations is also addressed in the manual.

The Leadership Doctrine and Training Doctrine Dichotomy

Leadership doctrine “dove-tails” into operational doctrine extremely well. This is evidenced by statements, such as, “Our warfighting doctrine requires bold leaders at all levels who exercise initiative, are resourceful, and take advantage of opportunities on the battlefield that will lead to victory.” Clearly, the leadership doctrine writers were keenly aware of the tenet of initiative as expressed in FM 100-5, Operations.
As training doctrine relates to leadership doctrine however, some of the same disconnects between operational and training doctrine are also evident. Army training doctrine does not appear to horizontally tie into leadership doctrine. By not incorporating missions with true purpose into training scenario examples and using the “checklists” found in the MTPs, leaders simply are not training initiative. If soldiers always know the tasks, conditions and standards to which they will confront, then they are not learning to deal with the cognitive mental stressors inherent within the environment of combat.

**Combat Stress Doctrine**

Army Combat Stress Doctrine, as expressed in the 1997 version of FM 22-51, *Combat Stress Behaviors* (Draft), as well as the 1994 version entitled, *Leaders’ Manual For Combat Stress Control*, support operational, leadership doctrine and the “train as you fight” principle in training doctrine. The combat stress manuals discuss the complexity and intensity of the combat environment while underscoring the need for “traditional military qualities of skill, tenacity, boldness, and courage, together with the technological prowess, self-reliance, and aggressive spirit which characterizes the American soldier.” Combat stress doctrine describes the stressors involved with Army operations and provides leaders with tools and recommendations to control situations that can lead to battle fatigue. Battle fatigue, also called combat stress reaction, is comprised of symptoms which may include “hyper-alertness, fear, anxiety, irritability, anger and many other physiologically dysfunctional behaviors.”
Combat Stress Doctrine vis-a-vis Operational Doctrine

In concert with the characteristics of Army operations (agility, initiative, depth, orchestration and versatility), FM 22-15 explains what stress issues are inherent within these characteristics and what leader actions are appropriate to control stress. Note in Figure 3 the relationship of the need for realism, uncertainty and initiative in training.

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<td>DETERIORATION IN ABILITY TO SEE PATTERNS AND MAKE DECISIONS DUE TO SLEEP LOSS AND STRESS.</td>
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<td>RECOMMENDED ACTIONS FOR COMMANDERS AND LEADERS</td>
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<td>PRACTICE STATING CLEARLY AND SIMPLY.</td>
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<td>TEACH PROBLEM SOLVING AND PLANNING SKILLS AT ALL LEVELS.</td>
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<td>LET JUNIOR LEADERS BE RESPONSIBLE WITHOUT OVERMANAGEMENT.</td>
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<td>PRACTICE FIGHTING WITH LESS AND ACHIEVING MORE.</td>
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<td>PRACTICE SLEEP PLANNING AND STRESS CONTROL TECHNIQUES.</td>
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<td>TRAIN IN SMOKE, MOPP, AND ADVERSE WEATHER.</td>
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Combat Stress Doctrine vis-a-vis Training Doctrine

As stated previously, Combat Stress Doctrine strongly supports the “train as you fight” principle in training doctrine, citing numerous examples for the need to replicate combat conditions as closely as possible. Training must incorporate live-fire exercises and integrate “noise, smoke, dust, confusion, delays, setbacks, and simulated danger and sights” that are directly related to the combat mission that soldiers will perform.49

Combat Stress Doctrine also supports the Army’s “crawl, walk, run” approach to training. FM 22-51 (Draft) suggests that soldiers can increase their tolerance to mental stressors by “successfully mastering similar stressors. . . . However, being overwhelmed by emotional or mental stress too early in training may temporarily or permanently impair future tolerance. . . . Up to a point, mental stress may increase tolerance to future stress without any current impairment.”50 The implication for training soldiers is that units should not introduce too many stressors too early when learning a task, but they must ensure that soldiers are exposed to as many combat stressors in training as is possible.

Incorporating Environmental Stressors into Training

Anyone who complains about not being able to make training realistic lacks the power of observation, tactical knowledge, or imagination.51

Lieutenant General (Retired) Collins, Common Sense Training

Achieving realistic sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield is something that all Army leaders can agree is important. Actually acquiring and integrating the required ammunition, pyrotechnics, combined arms, obstacles, realistic targetry, and grim scenery to closely approximate realism is something that leaders would also agree is extremely
difficult. Preparation is extremely resource intensive and in a time of constrained resources with a host of conventional and unconventional threats for which a unit must prepare, it is easy to leave realism to the Combat Training Centers. The CTCs have the resources and even advertise that they can conduct training that cannot be replicated at home station. The Joint Readiness Training Center’s platoon live fire exercise is the hallmark of training realism:

Everything is as realistic as we can make it other than having live lead coming back at them. Our target arrays are all three dimensional. . . . You can pick up profiles. We have from children all the way to adult male and female. When they go into a village, they have sights and sounds of animals, livestock, and screaming children and women. They have to go into rooms and make a quick decision on whether that is a belligerent or an innocent civilian. We can do that with muzzle flashes and with gunfire sounds. So, it is not only the live fire, go in and attack violently, but then they have to make the decision based upon the rules of engagement.

Given available resources, units may not be able to achieve the exact same degree of realistic sights and sounds that can be achieved at the CTCs, but they can come pretty close. Lieutenant General (Retired) Collins in his book, Common Sense Training, asserts that leaders often ignore realism when it is most easily achieved in training. In his three wars and forty years of combat arms experience, he found that leaders who put realistic training as a priority achieved it most often. He also posits that realistic sights and sounds are best kept at the small unit level due to difficulties encountered with control, space, and diverse mission requirements of larger units. General Collins, who derives much of his reasoning from General Mahin, the 33d Infantry Division Commander during World War Two, is adamant that resources should not constrain realism. In General Mahin’s guidance to his commanders:
Realism can be achieved by assessing several casualties, including the leader, when a group leaves cover without first studying the terrain. The action should be an exclamation: “Blast from machine gun fire from the left front. You, you, and you are casualties.” Let the casualties follow and observe. See what the second in command does. At the first reasonable opportunity when he has exposed himself, say: “A sniper over there has hit you as you stood there. You are severely wounded and unconscious.” Then see what happens. Someone must take command. The private who does so without being told is probably good NCO material. You can get realism by suddenly shouting: ‘Artillery shells!’ Use your ingenuity and imagination. It will be worse than anything you can imagine the first time you are under real fire.54

General Collins, who wrote Common Sense Training in 1976—a time of cost cutting and resource shortages in the aftermath of Vietnam—was keenly aware of the problems infantry leaders face in preparing training. His solutions for realistic training involve imagination, innovation, and determination.

Several historical examples of training that incorporates environmental stressors which replicates the sights, sounds and smells of the battlefield are numerous. Many of these examples include the use of infiltration courses, dead animal carcasses, and training in the sounds of friendly and enemy weapons. Much of the literature indicates that infiltration courses (lanes designed for soldiers to move underneath machine gun fire that was relatively safe) offered limited value to all but the most inexperienced soldiers. This is largely due to soldiers knowing that they would not be injured by the fire.55 Extreme attempts to incorporate the sights and smells of the battlefield, such as the British used in 1941-2, included the use of dead animal carcasses (against the advice of psychiatrists). Aimed at instilling “hatred and aggression,” it had nearly the opposite effect and “proved markedly unsuccessful.”56 The soldiers’ backlash appears to be a result of the sense of kinship that a man feels towards animals.57 To the contrary, many combat veterans have
remarked that some of the most valuable training that they received prior to combat was that which familiarized them with the sounds of different weapons and at different ranges.\textsuperscript{58}

The value of this training to the infantryman is immeasurable. Supported by several books and articles, John English in \textit{On Infantry} sums up the value of weapons familiarization training in relation to infiltration courses from the words of a combat veteran, "battle inoculation in which you are shot at with the intention of being missed . . . [was] of little consequence. A better system was to teach the soldier how to recognize various weapons by their sounds, to tell the difference between a Bren or a \textit{Spandau}, and to learn by the crack of a bullet whether it missed you by inches or yards. The real aim of all such training, of course, was to make it psychologically easier for the average infantryman to return fire."\textsuperscript{59}

My father's memories from World War Two as an infantryman at Normandy through the Battle of the Bulge, as well as my own experience at Rio Hato, Panama, during Operation Just Cause, further support weapons-sound familiarization training. Dad often remarked that I would know when rounds were close because I could hear the distinctive, piercing "crack" close to my ear. Having been caught between a Panamanian with an AK-47 and a most anxious Ranger M-60 machine gunner on the drop zone following the parachute assault into Panama, I was most appreciative of the training that I had received as an enlisted man in the Rangers some years before.
Incorporating Cognitive Mental Stressors

The need for incorporating cognitive mental stressors into training has been well documented since World War Two. If units are to prepare for the ambiguity, confusion, and information problems inherent within the complex environment of combat, then soldiers must be properly conditioned to that end. In the years preceding the war, several Army leaders foresaw the need to prepare soldiers for the inevitable “fog and friction” that they would encounter. General Omar Bradley sums up this need in his book, A General’s Life: “In field exercises, both Marshall and Stilwell would deliberately create disorder and confusion during the problems, throwing in the wholly unexpected in order to encourage almost instantaneous clear, correct, improvised solutions. One of the student officers in tactics that year, Matt Ridgway, who was subjected to one of these contrived confusions, profited by it and declared that that sort of ‘mental conditioning’ was ‘more important to a combat officer that and number of learned experiences.”

General Bradley’s reflections strongly uphold combat stress doctrine’s view that training should include “confusion, delays and setbacks,” and also supports the Army Research Institute’s findings that soldiers need to be exposed to the intensity and stress of the environment of combat prior to entering it.

The Component of Initiative

Military organizations present us with special problems, for while on the one hand they are especially rigidly hierarchical, they are also designed to function in situations where chains of authority may break down or where higher direction may be temporarily intermittent or nonexistent.

Elliot A. Cohen and John Gooch, Military Misfortunes
Three monographs from the School of Advanced Military Studies address the importance of uncertainty in training in order to unleash initiative on the battlefield. These works suggest that if units incorporate uncertainty into their training; soldiers and leaders understand the commanders’ intent two level up, the purpose of their mission, are trusted by their superiors, and are willing to accept less than perfect information, then they are well-armed to take initiative while exercising good judgment. One of these monographs, “Training For Uncertainty” by Major Frederick B. Hodges, suggests that another prerequisite in preparing soldiers to execute initiative is a unit commander who truly believes in uncertainty in training, and clearly articulates his philosophy and vision; instilling it in his organization. His unit’s command climate is one that rewards action and despises inaction; promotes mistakes made while pursuing initiative; and is concerned more with leader decision-making ability than high gunnery and APFT scores. This must be a commander who is willing to accept risk such that he will endure harsh criticism and admonishment from peers and superiors, respectively. This commander is a commander who possesses tremendous moral courage and is not out for himself and his next promotion. Hence, he has unit leaders and soldiers that are comfortable with taking risks and making decisions in an uncertain and complex environment.  

Another factor that enters into a leader’s and soldier’s ability to exercise initiative that adds value to his unit is situational awareness. A soldier may be able to exercise initiative without knowing what is going on around him but he certainly will not be able to exercise sound judgment, thereby adding value to his unit. Situational awareness is more than knowing the task and purpose of one’s own mission and the task and purpose of
related units, it is also the knowledge of the relationship of oneself to one’s unit and to the enemy, neutral population, and/or terrain.

For a soldier to exercise initiative on the battlefield, he must overcome fear and have confidence in himself, his unit and his weapons. He must also be mentally tough enough to push himself to a point beyond which he has never gone psychologically. Most importantly, he must have an understanding of the situation he will face. Not from merely talking to veterans of recent conflicts, but from exposure to the sights, sounds and smell of the battlefield.

**Truly Realistic Training**

One of the most powerful books on preparing soldiers for combat, *Realistic Combat Training and How to Conduct It*, effectively addresses the problem of training soldiers “to have confidence in their own weapons, react quickly and aggressively, and avoid repetition of [historical] episodes in which ‘mean’ attitude is completely lacking.” The author, Lieutenant Colonel Robert Rigg, an experienced military observer of six Allied armies during World War Two, explains thoroughly the intensity of combat and suggests numerous techniques to improve soldiers’ confidence and skills. Not just an explanation of theory, Lieutenant Colonel Rigg applied his techniques very successfully with tank crews while stationed at Fort Knox in the early 1950s. His methods for training individuals, crews, and small units integrate all of the elements of Initiative-Oriented Training, incorporating environmental and cognitive stressors, as well as creating an environment for initiative. The rules he developed for small-unit training are as follows.
1. Provide grim, rugged scenery and surroundings
2. Inject the maximum amount of explosives, smoke, fire, and noise into the exercise
3. Project problems into full reality of situation and objective
4. Frame all exercises in logical sequence
5. Utilize all possible devices of pressure and suspense
6. Insure that Aggressors are “lean and mean”
7. Delay, disrupt, divert, and surprise all units
8. Stress competition between opposing sides
9. Declare sudden and lasting casualties in men and vehicles on both sides
10. Make medics and aid men take active part in all actions of combat nature
11. Allow no attacks against well-organized positions until the attacker has good information.
12. Insist on a high standard for gunnery
13. Train consistently and proportionately at night
14. Integrate CBR (chemical, biological, radiological) and intelligence into all problems
15. Pose constant and positive aggressor threat

Combat veterans from World War Two and Korea assisted Lieutenant Colonel Rigg in developing a training methodology that was revolutionary for its time. Some 95 percent of the soldiers that went through the training he designed remarked that it was the most beneficial training they had ever received.66
Training Leaders How to Fight

Training leaders how to fight is another subject that is not readily apparent in the examination of literature relevant to infantry combat training. As described throughout this chapter, there exists a few hints for how to replicate the sights, sounds and smells of the battlefield. There also are credible proponents for creating confusion, disorder and chaos to approximate the cognitive mental stressors found on the field of battle. Quite a few authors have published works relating to the need for soldiers to demonstrate initiative in accordance with their commander's intent. Absent, however, is the crucial piece of the puzzle concerning how to train leaders to fight a decentralized battle, when a concept is no longer feasible or command, control, and communications have been lost. Absent, except for the personal thoughts of Lieutenant Colonel Edward (Butch) J. Brennan—a senior tactics instructor at the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.

Lieutenant Colonel Brennan, an infantry officer who is a Desert Storm veteran and who was an observer-controller at the Army's National Training Center for nearly four years, suggests that if units are to succeed against able and willing opponents then we must train leaders accordingly. In an unpublished paper, co-authored with this researcher, entitled "Thoughts on Training Leaders How to Fight," he posits that we must focus on the "leader's role during execution of the fight. Peacetime training of leaders should focus on the leader's decisions, his ability to translate decisions into orders, and the ability of his subordinates to carry out those orders." Lieutenant Colonel Brennan points out four characteristics that a leader should exhibit during execution of a training mission.
1. A leader can make decisions during the fight. Can he assess the problems of his situation, anticipate requirements, and develop a concept that is appropriate to the situation and consistent with the higher commander’s intent?

2. The leader can articulate his decisions during the fight. Will he issue clear concise oral FRAGOs (Fragmentary Orders) that effectively convey a relationship between friendly forces to other friendly forces, to the enemy, and to the terrain, that are consistent with his subordinates’ real, not doctrinal capabilities, and which clearly assigns responsibility to subordinates?

3. The leader’s subordinates have the appropriate discipline and functional (for example, technical skills, battle drills, gunnery skills, and so forth) proficiency to carry out his orders.

4. The leader commands through his subordinate leaders’ actions rather than through his personal directives.

Lieutenant Colonel Brennan concludes the paper with his opinion of how one knows if leaders are being trained effectively. First, units should be assigned a purpose but not necessarily a task that they are to perform. Second, friction must be introduced into the scenario, including an opposing force with a free will, to determine if the unit can accomplish its mission in accordance with their commander’s intent. Third, the unit’s leaders must be willing to admit mistakes in front of their peers, superiors and subordinates during after action reviews (AARs). Fourth and finally, soldiers must be excited about the training that they have participated in. They must never return to the barracks bored from the day’s training.69
Conclusion

The Need for Initiative-Oriented Training

There is conclusive evidence for training that incorporates all of the components of Initiative-Oriented Training: environmental physical stressors, such as the sights, sounds and smells of the battlefield; cognitive mental stressors, such as ambiguity, unpredictability, and sensory overload/deprivation; and an environment conducive to unleashing subordinates' initiative. The need for this type of training is reflected in operational, leadership and combat stress doctrine and is substantiated by numerous studies and the reflections of combat veterans.

Criteria for Initiative-Oriented Training

Based on the literature review, the following criteria should be used in determining if home-station unit training is initiative-oriented. Each of the criterion relates directly to the components of Initiative-Oriented Training:

1. Incorporates environmental stressors, such as grim, rugged scenery, realistic targetry, smoke, fire, explosions, and so forth

2. Induces cognitive mental stressors, such as lack of perfect information, confusion, ambiguity (for example, tasks that will not achieve purposes)

3. Includes opposing forces with a strong will to win; stresses competition between opposing sides

4. Integrates casualties to the utmost reality

5. Uses mission orders to allow for subordinate initiative
These criteria were developed from a view of the cognitive and environmental stressors of the battlefield and historical accounts of intense combat. They also considered operational, leadership and combat stress doctrine, which are firmly based on the successes and failures of U.S. soldiers in combat and the perceived future requirements of soldiers and units on tomorrow's battlefield. The components of Initiative-Oriented Training are tried and true and are well within the grasp of any platoon leader, company or battalion commander given foresight, imagination and ingenuity.

4FM 100-5, 8-2.
7Ibid., 22.
8Ibid.
13 FM 100-5, 1-4.

14 Ibid., 12-2.

15 Ibid.

16 Ibid.

17 Ibid., 15-5.

18 Ibid., 7-5.


20 FM 100-5, 7-2.

21 Ibid., 8-4.

22 Ibid., 8-5.


28 Ibid., 1-4.

29 Ibid., 1-6

30 Ibid., 1-5
31 Ibid.
32 FM 100-5, 9-2
34 Ibid., 3-18.
35 Ibid., 4-8.
36 Ibid., 5-2.
37 Ibid.
40 Ibid., 25.
41 U.S. Department of the Army, FM 22-100, Military Leadership (Washington, D.C: Department of the Army, 1990), 42.
42 Ibid., vi.
43 Ibid., 1.
44 Ibid., 42.
47 Ibid., 2-12.
48 Ibid., 7-5.
49 Ibid., A-10.
50 Department of the Army, FM 22-51, Combat Stress Behaviors (Draft) (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, 1997), 2-6.


53 Ibid.


57 Ibid., 106.

58 English, 220.

59 Ibid.


65 Ibid., 15.
66 Ibid., 2-3.


68 Ibid., 2.

69 Ibid., 13.
CHAPTER 3
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Research Approach

The proposed study lends itself to both qualitative and quantitative analysis. The first phase of the research approach will be to analyze the literature in an effort to determine if current Army training doctrine fully supports operations, leader development and combat stress doctrine; as well as if training doctrine supports the concept of Initiative-Oriented Training. The second phase will be the development of a questionnaire that will be distributed to a sample population of students attending the U.S. Army Command and General Staff Officer’s Course (CGSOC) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. During this phase, quantitative analysis will be used in an attempt to determine some descriptive statistics, such as frequencies, means, and amounts; as well as establish correlations between selected data pertaining to infantry units conducting individual and collective training. The third phase of the research will be further qualitative analysis of infantry unit training. During this phase of the research, an infantry battalion task force will be observed in the performance of a company team situational training exercise (STX) for indicators of Initiative-Oriented Training. Unit leaders will also be interviewed in an attempt to provide insight on the observation. The fourth and final phase will be an attempt to determine common trends between the sample populations of CGSOC students and the infantry battalion task force. Taken together, the study will attempt to answer the
research question below and provide a generalization and a set of inferences on the state of home-station unit training within infantry battalions.

Research Question

This study focuses on soldier and unit psychological preparedness for combat. Specifically, the following research question will be answered: Does home-station unit training by conventional U.S. Army infantry battalions provide sufficient realism to adequately prepare soldiers for the cognitive and environmental stressors inherent within the environment of combat? The subordinate research questions below serve as baseline criteria to determine if, and to what extent, infantry units are conducting Initiative-Oriented Training:

1. Is unit training incorporating realistic environmental stressors?
2. Are units integrating cognitive stressors into their training?
3. Is unit training designed to inculcate initiative in soldiers and leaders?

The literature review resulted in the development of two hypotheses to be tested to measure the degree of initiative within the sample population of CGSOC students. The method to test each hypothesis will be to determine the correlation between the dependent variable (initiative) and the independent variables:

1. The greater the use of mission orders, changing of conditions, aggressive OPFOR (opposing forces), increased latitude of the OPFOR commander, MILES (multiple integrated laser engagement system) free-play exercises and casualty play, the
greater the probability that leaders and soldiers will exercise initiative in accordance with
the commander’s intent.

2. The more focused a unit is on leader decision making during training, the more
likely it is that its leaders and soldiers will exercise initiative in accordance with the
commander’s intent.

Research Instruments

The following instruments are designed to assist in answering one or more of the
subordinate research questions and hypotheses:

1. Although technically not a research instrument, an analysis of the literature
attempts to answer the subordinate research question: Does the Army’s training doctrine
as expressed in FM 25-100, Training the Force, and FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training,
enhance or inhibit Initiative-Oriented Training?

2. Observation of an infantry battalion conducting collective training

3. Interviews with leaders of the observed infantry battalion

4. Questionnaire administered to selected infantry officers attending the CGSOC

Literature Analysis

The literature analysis has four objectives. The first objective will be to determine
if Initiative-Oriented Training is needed in infantry battalions. The second objective will
be to understand if the Army’s training, combat stress and leader development doctrine
support each other and support operational doctrine. Army training doctrine will be
analyzed to determine whether following it, as written in training manuals, enhances or

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inhibits Initiative-Oriented Training. This determination will answer the related subordinate research question: Does the Army’s training doctrine as expressed in FM 25-100, *Training the Force*, and FM 25-101, *Battle Focused Training*, enhance or inhibit Initiative-Oriented Training? The third part of the literature analysis will be the development of criteria to assist leaders in the development of Initiative-Oriented Training in their unit. The fourth and final objective will be the development of hypotheses vis-a-vis initiative to test during the remainder of the research.

**Unit Observation**

One mechanized infantry battalion task force (two mechanized infantry company teams; two armor company teams under the command of an infantry lieutenant colonel) will be observed while conducting home-station training. The training will be conducted over a three-day period and will primarily involve observation of two company teams (mixture of armor and infantry platoons under the command of either an armor or infantry captain), which will be performing a force-on-force STX using MILES. The training will be observed for indicators of cognitive mental stressors, environmental physical stressors and conditions for unleashing soldiers’ initiative (see appendix A). Data from the observation will be compared to the questionnaire results from the CGSOC students.

**Interviews**

While observing the above training, interviews with unit leaders will be conducted to the extent practicable. Questionnaires will be disseminated to those leaders who are unavailable for interviews. The interviews and questionnaires will be structured such as
to attempt to gain an understanding of the degree that Initiative-Oriented Training is being conducted by the platoons, companies and the battalion. Furthermore, the interviews may provide a unique viewpoint on the above subordinate research questions, contribute insight into the challenges that field grade commanders have in developing realistic training, and expand upon the results of the questionnaire to CGSOC students.

Questionnaire

The primary instrument will be a questionnaire (see appendix B), which will focus on the three subordinate research questions in relation to environmental stressors, cognitive stressors and the degree to which unit training inculcates initiative in subordinates. The purpose of the questionnaire is to provide a sampling of the degree to which Initiative-Oriented Training is being conducted in infantry battalions and companies.

The questionnaire will be distributed to eighty-three infantry officers attending the CGSOC. This sample population includes every active duty infantry officer in the CGSOC, class of 1997-1998, whose last infantry battalion was non-Ranger. Ranger units are comprised of volunteers and were not selected for participation in the study due to the increased resources they receive and their ability to screen soldiers and leaders from assignment.

The questionnaire was successfully pre-tested on ten people, which included seven infantry officers in the grade of captain, major and lieutenant colonel, as well as three civilians. The questionnaire will be personally delivered by the researcher to the selected infantry officers. The respondents will have one week to return the questionnaire to the
researcher. The results of the questionnaire will be entered into a computer spread sheet program, checked for accuracy, then imported into a computer statistics program to determine correlations, frequencies, means, amounts and standard deviations. These statistics will be examined in relation to environmental and cognitive stressors, as well as perceptions of subordinates' initiative. The desired results and construction of the survey pertaining to each of these areas are described in detail below.

Incorporation of Environmental Stressors

The questionnaire will attempt to determine the degree to which infantry units are replicating the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield. The literature review suggests that the more often that units subject soldiers in training to harsh battlefield-like conditions by incorporating live-fire exercises with supporting arms, simulated casualties, realistic objectives, night operations, and severe weather, the better prepared soldiers are to deal with intense combat. Determination of the amount, mean, and standard deviations will be the desired results.

The survey respondents will be asked about the amount of home-station training time they spent conducting live-fire exercises; to what extent blank and live-fire STXs incorporated casualties, large amounts of smoke, demolitions, pyrotechnics, realistic objectives (simulated corpses, mock weapons, pneumatic machineguns, ammunition crates, debris, and so forth); and how often live-fire STXs incorporated supporting indirect fires (artillery, mortars), close air support (CAS), and/or naval gunfire (NGF) that were close enough for soldiers to hear and observe the effects.
Integration of Cognitive Stressors

The questionnaire will attempt to determine the degree to which infantry units are inducing cognitive mental stressors into their training, which is similar to those historically found on the battlefield when confronted by an able and determined foe. The literature review suggests that the more uncertainty and confusion a soldier encounters in training, the better he will be able to deal with similar stressors in combat. Determination of the amount, mean, and standard deviations will be the desired results.

The survey respondents will be asked how often their soldiers knew the tasks, conditions and standards prior to the execution of individual training; how much information their soldiers had concerning the enemy situation prior to conducting STXs; and how often the conditions were changed between STX iterations to challenge the more experienced and proficient soldiers and/or units.

Training Designed to Inculcate Initiative

The questionnaire will attempt to determine the extent to which the conditions for soldier and leader initiative are present within a unit, as well as how much disciplined initiative (initiative demonstrated in accordance with the commander's intent) exists within infantry units. The survey respondents will be asked how their unit's training sites were configured for individual training and how that training was executed; how often soldiers received mission orders prior to the execution of STXs; what was the focus of their unit's home-station training (task completion versus leader development) and after action reviews; how often their subordinates exercised initiative in accordance with the.
commander's intent during field exercises, CTC rotations, and/or combat. Additional questions concerning the aggressiveness of the OPFOR and extent of casualty play will also be asked.

Summary

Qualitative analysis will be the primary method to analyze the literature. It will also be used during the observation of the company team STX and interviews with unit leaders. Quantitative analysis will be used to determine descriptive statistics derived from the questionnaire. Four research processes are used: literature analysis, questionnaire, interview, and observation of home-station unit training. Of these processes, the questionnaire will be the primary instrument and the results from it will be compared to the results of the unit observation. The baseline criteria for measurement are the subordinate research questions in relation to cognitive and environmental stressors, as well as initiative.

The next chapter describes the analysis of the research. The analysis will first attempt to gain an understanding of the perceptions of the survey population of CGSOC students, then compare those results with the observation of the unit undergoing the STX. The results of the literature analysis will be discussed in Chapter Five. Taken together, the study will attempt to identify potential trends and answer the research question.
CHAPTER 4

ANALYSIS

This chapter analyzes, interprets, and makes inferences about the degree to which two sample populations (selected Command and General Staff Officer Course (CGSOC) students and an infantry unit) conducted individual and collective training in relation to the subordinate research questions. As described in the previous chapter, the subordinate research questions serve as baseline criteria for evaluating the degree to which infantry units are conducting Initiative-Oriented Training. The first section describes in detail the sample populations studied. The second section examines the results of the questionnaire distributed to the CGSOC students. The third section of the analysis examines the observation and interview results of the infantry unit and its leaders in the performance of a situational training exercise (STX). The last section identifies common trends between the sample populations.

Sample Populations

Selected Infantry CGSOC Students

The CGSOC students were selected based upon the criteria outlined in Chapter Three (Research Methodology). Of the 83 questionnaires distributed, 72 were returned (86.7 percent). In their last infantry battalion, 95.8 percent were company commanders. The amount from each type of infantry is shown in Figure 4.
Infantry Task Force Case Study

On the condition of anonymity, a balanced infantry task force (two armor companies and two mechanized companies) was observed at their post. The infantry battalion, from which the two companies organically belong, returned three months ago from Bosnia. During their approximate six-month rotation in Bosnia, they performed a wide variety of peacekeeping missions, but few of which were directly related to their conventional warfighting missions. At the time of the observation, the task force had a rotation to the National Training Center (NTC) scheduled in four months. This was the training that the researcher observed. The brigade to which the task force belongs, planned, coordinated and executed the company team (defensive scenario) STX to prepare companies for the upcoming NTC rotation. In preparation for the STX, the task force had conducted squad/section and platoon STXs comprised of battle drills (live and blank-fire).

In addition to the challenges inherent with the task force’s return from Bosnia, they faced many other obstacles as they prepared for NTC. The infantry task force

Figure 4. Types and percentages of infantry in the surveyed population of CGSOC students
commander indicated that none of his Bradley Fighting Vehicle (BFV) crews were qualified on their vehicle weapons systems (qualification range scheduled in two months). The armor task force commander, who was controlling the opposing force (OPFOR) during the STX, remarked that he had 35 three-man tank crews (four men comprise a full crew) out of 54 in his battalion. Two of his tanks did not have crews available for the STX. According to the brigade personnel officer (S1), the infantry task force was at approximately 70 percent of its authorized strength. To maintain full three-man crews for the BFVs, dismounted infantry strength was reduced to near 50 percent. This meant that only one infantry squad was available per platoon. Additionally, the personnel turnover rate ranged between 9 and 12 percent per month. This turn-over rate essentially meant that the entire infantry battalion had new personnel since it last deployed to train their conventional missions in the spring of 1997. The battalion commander and three of his four company commanders had only recently taken command.

The infantry task force operations officer (S3) indicated that the task force’s Tactical Operations Center (TOC) had not been to the field since before the Bosnia rotation. Due to this training deficiency, the TOC would be operational but would only provide limited command and control of the company teams during the exercise. Finally, according to the brigade logistics officer (S4), if the brigade spent as much money on this company team STX as he had budgeted, no battalion task force STX would be possible prior to the brigade’s rotation to NTC, aside from a computer simulation. This severe budget shortfall, necessitated that the STX incorporate the task force TOC and supporting
units (engineers, air defense artillery) to the maximum degree possible. The brigade referred to this concept as “linked lanes.”

**Results of the Questionnaire to CGSOC Students**

Is Unit Training Incorporating Realistic Environmental Stressors?

The questionnaire attempted to determine the degree to which infantry units are replicating the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield. The survey respondents were asked about the amount of home-station training time they spent conducting live-fire exercises; to what extent blank and live-fire STXs incorporated casualties, large amounts of smoke, demolitions, pyrotechnics, realistic objectives (simulated corpses, mock weapons, pneumatic machineguns, ammunition crates, debris, and so forth); and how often live-fire STXs incorporated supporting indirect fires (artillery, mortars), close air support (CAS), naval gunfire (NGF) were close enough for soldiers to hear and observe the effects. Each indicator of environmental stressors is illustrated separately below.

**Extent of Casualty, Leader Replacement Integration**

Integration of casualties into STXs is shown in Figure 5 as very strong with 68 percent of the survey population indicated that they assessed casualties and replaced leaders at least half of the time.
Figure 5. Extent of casualty and leader replacement integration into STXs

However, the figure also shows that 31.9 percent of the respondents assessed casualties less than half of the time, or rarely did so. No data was collected to explain why fully one-third of the population were not maximizing this training opportunity. Common sense would indicate that this failing is the direct result of a lack of command emphasis and motivation.

**Frequency of Live-Fire Exercises**

The figure below shows that majority of the survey population (57.3 percent) spent at least half of their collective training time conducting live-fire exercises. Nearly 23 percent, or 16 of the 72 respondents indicated that they almost always conducted live-fire STXs, while 30.6 percent conducted live-fires more than half of the time.
Figure 6. Frequency of live-fire exercises during collective training

Although the amount of live-fire STXs appears to be acceptable for subjecting soldiers to the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield, examination of degree of realism (as measured by the amount of smoke, pyrotechniques, demolitions, and so forth) shows a contradiction.

**Extent Live-Fire STXs Incorporate Battlefield Effects**

Figure 7. Extent to which live-fire STXs incorporated battlefield effects
Nearly 70 percent of the population reported that their integrated realistic battlefield effects into their live-fire STXs more than half of the time. However, 22.2 percent responded that their unit rarely or never incorporated notable battlefield effects. Further analysis of the data collected does not explain this bimodal relationship. There is no correlation between the type of infantry and the amount battlefield effects. This suggests that the relationship is possibly caused by either the availability of resources and/or leadership motivation, ingenuity and imagination.

**Extent Live-Fire STXs Incorporate Artillery and/or Mortars**

Similar to the extent to which units are incorporating notable battlefield effects into their live-fire STXs, Figure 8 illustrates that while 47.3 percent of population recalled employing indirect fires at least half of the time, 31.9 percent indicated that their unit rarely or never employed these assets.

![Figure 8. Extent to which live-fire STXs incorporated artillery and/or mortars](image-url)
The data collected does not explain this contradictory relationship for employment of indirect fires during live-fire STXs, such as statistical significance between light, mechanized airborne or air assault units. The dispersion could be caused from differences in the amount of resources, coordination difficulties, adjacent indirect fire impact areas to maneuver areas, and/or safety concerns by unit leaders. As with battlefield effects, it could also be the result of the imagination and motivation of unit leadership.

**Extent Live-Fire STXs Incorporate Close Air Support (CAS) and Naval Gunfire (NGF)**

To gain insight into other supporting systems that are likely to be found on the battlefield, the study inquired into the use of close air support and naval gunfire. The figures below show the result of their integration into live-fire STXs.

![Figure 9. Extent to which live-fire STXs incorporated close air support](image-url)
Figures 9 and 10 illustrate that the majority of the survey population rarely or never incorporated CAS or NGF into their live-fire exercises. Only 9.7 percent of the population indicated their unit employed CAS at least half of the time, while 75 percent said that their unit rarely or never employed CAS. As one might expect, 100 percent of the respondents indicated that their unit rarely or never employed NGF into their live-fire exercises.

Are Units Integrating Cognitive Stressors Into Their Training?

The questionnaire attempted to determine the degree to which infantry units are inducing cognitive mental stressors into their training, which are similar to those historically found on the battlefield when confronted by an able and determined foe. The survey respondents were asked how often their soldiers knew the tasks, conditions, and standards prior to the execution of training; how much information did their soldiers have on the enemy situation prior to conducting STXs; latitude, composition, and aggressiveness of their OPFOR; and how often the conditions were changed between STX
iterations to challenge the more experienced and proficient soldiers and/or units. Each indicator of cognitive stressors that was significant to the study is illustrated separately below.

**Knowledge of Tasks, Conditions, and Standards**

As suggested in the literature review, Army training doctrine insists that soldiers know the tasks, conditions, and standards prior to training because they will learn more quickly than if they do not know. However, as the literature review also points out, soldiers must learn how to deal with the unpredictable, ambiguous, and uncertain nature of a complex battlefield. The study attempted to understand the degree soldiers faced the unknown in training insofar as what tasks they were to perform. The following two figures illustrate the findings.

![Knowledge of tasks, conditions, and standards (individual training)](image)

Figure 11. Knowledge of tasks, conditions, and standards (individual training)
The data in figures 11 and 12 strongly suggest that soldiers in the sample population encountered little if any cognitive stressors (uncertainty, ambiguity, and/or unpredictability) relating to what tasks they would need to perform, under what conditions, and what standards they were expected to achieve. When conducting individual training, 88.9 percent of the survey population said that their soldiers knew the tasks, conditions, and standards at least half of the time. Prior to an STX, the population indicated that 75 percent of their soldiers knew the tasks, conditions, and standards. Most noteworthy is that 58.3 percent of the respondents indicated that their soldiers almost always knew the tasks, conditions, and standards prior to executing an STX.

Knowledge of the Enemy Situation Prior to STXs

If soldiers almost always knew the task, conditions, and standards for the missions that they would perform in training, did they also know as much about the enemy situation? The study attempted to understand if units are inducing uncertainty into their STXs by depriving them of information pertaining to the enemy situation.
Figure 13 shows that over 75 percent of the sample population perceived that soldiers had full knowledge of the enemy situation or it was just sometimes vague. The data suggest that the respondents' use of OPFOR to induce cognitive stressors was not maximized. Only about 25 percent presented their soldiers with usually or almost always vague intelligence on the OPFOR.

Frequency of MILES Free-Play Exercises

A technique discussed in the literature review that is successful in subjecting soldiers to cognitive stressors is MILES free-play exercises. These exercises can expose soldiers to many of the same cognitive mental stressors found in actual combat. The actions of the OPFOR and of one's own forces may subject soldiers to high levels of uncertainty and unpredictability. Casualties are often inflicted, which may cause leader replacement. When either situation occurs, it results in additional environmental and cognitive stressors and sets some of the conditions for soldier initiative. The surveyed
population was asked how often their unit conducted these type of exercises, as well as the composition, aggressiveness, and latitude of their OPFOR.

![Bar chart](image)

**Figure 14. Frequency of collective training time conducting MILES free-play exercises**

Figure 14 shows that MILES free-play exercises are frequent with 77.8 percent of the respondents indicated that their unit conducted this type of training at least half of the collective training time available. Note that only 9.7 percent of the sample population rarely or never conducted MILES free-play exercises.

**OPFOR Aggressiveness**

The aggressiveness of the OPFOR and latitude given to the OPFOR commander in MILES free-play exercises are important to the analysis of cognitive stressors because the more OPFOR aggressiveness and latitude given to their commander, the greater the
stresses present. The figures below illustrate the sample population’s perception of their OPFOR’s aggressiveness and latitude the OPFOR had during these exercises.

Figure 15. Aggressiveness of OPFOR during MILES free-play exercises

Figure 15 suggests that 90.5 percent of the surveyed population perceived that their OPFOR was at least somewhat aggressive. Fully one-third responded that the OPFOR was extremely aggressive in accomplishing their mission. Less than 10 percent said that their OPFOR was marginally aggressive or not aggressive at all. The data suggest that OPFOR used during home-station is sufficiently aggressive to replicate an able and willing foe on the battlefield provided that they are given the latitude to accomplish their mission.
Latitude Given to OPFOR Commanders

While the preceding figure indicated that home-station OPFOR was usually aggressive in the execution of their mission, the figure below depicts that OPFOR commanders are generally constrained in their attempt to win.

![Latitude given to OPFOR commanders](image)

Figure 16. Latitude given to OPFOR commanders

The data in Figure 16 suggest that the majority of the sample population (63.9 percent) perceived that the OPFOR was either a training aid and was given no latitude, or was given just some latitude to accomplish their assigned mission. However, 36.1 percent of the respondents indicated that their OPFOR was given total or much freedom. Further analysis of the data suggest that the respondents’ perception of MILES free-play exercises may not be realistic in their design. Cognitive stressors are significantly reduced by the emplacement of severe restrictions on an otherwise aggressive OPFOR.
Is Unit Training Designed to Inculcate Initiative?

The questionnaire attempted to determine the extent to which the conditions for soldier and leader initiative are present within a unit, as well as how much disciplined initiative exists within infantry units. In addition to some of the questions previously asked, the survey respondents were asked how their unit’s training sites were configured for individual training and how that training was executed; how often soldiers received mission orders (task and purpose) prior to the execution of STXs; what was the focus of their unit’s home-station training (task completion versus leader development) and after action reviews (AARs); how often their subordinates exercised initiative in accordance with the commander’s intent during field exercises, CTC rotations, and/or combat. Additional questions concerning the aggressiveness of the OPFOR and extent of casualty play were also asked. For brevity, related figures and data previously shown will not be repeated is this section.

Use of Mission Orders During STXs

As the literature review suggests, mission orders serve to unleash initiative on the battlefield. The study attempted to understand the extent to which mission orders were being used. The figure below illustrates the pervasiveness of mission orders during the sample population’s training.
Figure 17 shows that majority of the survey population (84.7 percent) said that their soldiers were issued mission orders (task and purpose) when performing STXs. Almost 57 percent, or 41 of the 72 respondents indicated that their soldiers almost always received mission orders, while 27.8 percent used mission orders about half of the time. Only 1.4 percent of the population recalled that their soldiers were rarely or never issued mission orders. If the high use of mission orders is correct, this indicates that soldiers have latitude to take initiative during exercises—provided that soldiers understand the importance and essence of their purpose. No data from the surveyed population was collected to determine if the purpose as stated in the above mission orders was meaningful, or the frequency that soldiers were placed into a situation where they must have relied only upon purpose to successfully accomplish their mission.
Type of Individual Training Site

Mission orders can also be used for individual training. As such, the study endeavored to understand to what degree that this was done in the sample population's previous battalion. Figure 18 describes this tendency.

Figure 18. Types of individual training sites

When asked about the conditions best describes their unit's typical training site for individual training, 50 percent of the respondents recalled a near-field environment where an NCO issued task, conditions, and standards prior to execution; task was performed in a sterile setting with no distracters (such as noise, smoke, or changes to the conditions during the task); soldiers rotated through one station at a time in a controlled manner; and the task was evaluated in accordance with prescribed standards. Approximately 22 percent said that their unit used a similar environment as above, but constructed camouflage nets and other structures with field tables. In both cases, environmental and
cognitive stressors would largely be absent from the training. 1/4 of the respondents indicated that their unit closely replicated combat conditions by establishing a lane for soldiers to negotiate. Given a mission order and environmental and/or cognitive stressors, the soldiers completed several tasks arranged sequentially or concurrently. Mission accomplishment was the goal, not whether specific performance measures were met in a set order. Nearly 3 percent of the sample population used various combinations of the other techniques.

**Disciplined Initiative**

If units are using mission orders frequently and correctly, then initiative within the units may also be positively affected. In an effort to understand the degree of subordinates' initiative within the sample population, the respondents were asked to rate how often their soldiers executed initiative within the commander's intent (disciplined initiative).

![Figure 19. Frequency of disciplined initiative by subordinates](image-url)

Figure 19. Frequency of disciplined initiative by subordinates
Figure 19 shows the majority of the sample population (66.7 percent) perceived that their soldiers exercised initiative more than half of the time, or almost always, while conducting field training exercises, at the Combat Training Centers or in combat. Nearly 13 percent indicated that their soldiers demonstrated initiative less than half of the time, while only 2.8 percent of the respondents said that their soldiers rarely or never demonstrated initiative. These high levels of initiative are potentially explained in Table 1.

### TABLE 1

**CORRELATION OF INITIATIVE TO OTHER VARIABLES**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Dev</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Mission orders during STXs</th>
<th>Changing conditions between iterations+</th>
<th>Latitude of OPFOR</th>
<th>MILES free-play versus OPFOR</th>
<th>MILES free-play versus other unit</th>
<th>Integration of casualties</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>3.736</td>
<td>1.061</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.310**</td>
<td>.324**</td>
<td>.240*</td>
<td>.511**</td>
<td>.442**</td>
<td>.183</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mission orders during STXs</td>
<td>4.361</td>
<td>.8929</td>
<td>.310**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.306**</td>
<td>.292*</td>
<td>.326**</td>
<td>.308**</td>
<td>.418**</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changing conditions between iterations+</td>
<td>2.888</td>
<td>1.278</td>
<td>.324**</td>
<td>.306**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.245*</td>
<td>.398**</td>
<td>.308**</td>
<td>.223</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latitude of OPFOR</td>
<td>2.347</td>
<td>.8077</td>
<td>.240*</td>
<td>.292*</td>
<td>.245*</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.293*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILES free-play versus OPFOR</td>
<td>3.361</td>
<td>1.190</td>
<td>.511**</td>
<td>.326**</td>
<td>.398**</td>
<td>.205</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.669**</td>
<td>.214</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MILES free-play versus other unit</td>
<td>2.569</td>
<td>1.136</td>
<td>.442**</td>
<td>.308**</td>
<td>.308**</td>
<td>.042</td>
<td>.669**</td>
<td>1.00</td>
<td>.046</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Integration of casualties</td>
<td>3.319</td>
<td>1.309</td>
<td>.183</td>
<td>.418**</td>
<td>.223</td>
<td>.293*</td>
<td>.214</td>
<td>.046</td>
<td>1.00</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
+ Denotes average between two closely related questions.
The first line in Table 1 suggests that a statistically significant, positive correlation exists between initiative and use of mission orders during STXs, changing conditions, MILES free-play exercises against an aggressive OPFOR that has much latitude. Specifically, the hypothesis tested demonstrates that the sample population reported higher levels of initiative when exercises had these variables. This is a major finding during the course of this research, and therefore, the potential reasons for these relationships are discussed in the next chapter.

The second hypothesis tested was that the more focused a unit is on leader decision-making during training, the more likely that leaders will exercise disciplined initiative. The surveyed population was asked how often their soldiers executed initiative in accordance with the commander’s intent during training exercises, at the CTCs or in combat. They were also asked about their perception of their units’ focus for home-station training with choices that ranges from completely task-focused (relating to the Mission Essential Task List (METL)) to completely focused on leader decision-making. Table 2 depicts the result of the test.

TABLE 2
CORRELATION BETWEEN INITIATIVE AND UNIT TRAINING FOCUS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>Std Deviation</th>
<th>Initiative</th>
<th>Ldr Decisions versus Task Completion</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Initiative</td>
<td>3.7361</td>
<td>1.0614</td>
<td>1.000</td>
<td>.020</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ldr Decisions versus Task Completion</td>
<td>1.9028</td>
<td>.7536</td>
<td>.020</td>
<td>1.000</td>
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</tbody>
</table>
Table 2 suggests that there is no statistically significant correlation (at the point 0.05 level) between the respondents' perception of the degree of their soldiers' initiative and the focus of their home-station unit training. The mean of 3.7361 (Initiative) suggests that 69.4 percent of the sample population perceived that their soldiers exercised disciplined initiative at least half of the time. The mean of 1.9028 (Leader decision-making versus Task-focused) suggests that 58.3 percent of the respondents perceived that their unit's focus was mostly on METL task completion with some emphasis on leader development.

Development of Initiative-Oriented Training

In an attempt to gain insight into some of the problems infantry unit leaders may encounter in developing Initiative-Oriented Training, the surveyed population was asked how much control as a company commander they perceived they had over the development of their collective training without regard to the availability of ammunition, ranges and/or training areas. Additionally, they were asked to list up to three reasons for units not having realistic training. Figure 20 and Table 3 depict the results of the inquiry.

Figure 20. Surveyed population’s perception of control over collective training.
TABLE 3

SURVEYED POPULATION’S PERCEPTION OF WHY UNITS DO NOT HAVE REALISTIC TRAINING.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Lack of resources other than time</th>
<th>Time to prepare training</th>
<th>Higher HQ changes to training schedule</th>
<th>Safety and/or environmental concerns</th>
<th>Leader imagination, ingenuity and motivation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Frequency</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The data presented above indicate that 58.4 percent of the respondents perceived while they had at least a great deal of control over their training, the majority (44) also indicated that a lack of resources was the top reason for units not developing realistic training. In the literature review, General Collins and Lieutenant Colonel Rigg suggest that leader imagination, ingenuity, and motivation were often the primary reasons for units not achieving realism in training. Taken together with the literature, the data infer that the sample population may not have a framework to develop Initiative-Oriented Training. Furthermore, since 95.8 percent of the sample population were company commanders, it may be reasonable to assume that they do not see themselves as the reason for not having realistic training in their own unit. As long as resource constraints, higher headquarters’ changes to training schedules, safety and/or environmental concerns are foremost in an infantry trainer’s mind as impediments to creating realistic combat training then the delta that exists between actual combat and peacetime training will remain wide.
Infantry Task Force Case Study Results

Is Unit Training Incorporating Realistic Environmental Stressors?

The weather an infantryman often endures can be extreme and produce stress responses, as was the case while observing the mechanized infantry battalion task force in the conduct of a company team STX. During the three days of observing the unit, the temperatures often fell below freezing with wind in excess of fifteen knots; snow and heavy rain resulted in many vehicles becoming mired in mud. Numerous soldiers, who had not effectively dressed for the serious effects of continuous exposure to the elements, were seen nearly saturated and cold (despite having been issued adequate protective clothing). Overlooked in the beginning of this study as a significant stressor, the weather during the STX was consequential and subjected soldiers to harsh battlefield conditions.

In addition to the weather, the STX incorporated limited night operations and obscuration. M2 Bradley Fighting Vehicles (BFVs) and M1 Abrams tanks were equipped with MILES and flash simulators. Dismounted infantrymen were issued blank ammunition; artillery and/or grenade simulators were issued to observer/controllers (O/Cs). Several fire markers (selected controllers designated to simulate artillery impact using artillery simulators) were employed. However, as one platoon leader remarked, "one artillery simulator thrown by a fire marker or O/C hardly replicates an enemy artillery barrage." Additionally, the brigade commander imposed constraints on the amount of simulated chemical agent that would be used (only one canister of chemical smoke was observed being thrown by an O/C). Hearing the brigade commander's guidance, the O/C detonated one canister of CS gas (at least ten were available), which was intended to
replicate a barrage of enemy artillery-delivered non-persistent chemical agent. The STX did not incorporate CAS due to a scheduling conflict with the Air Force, however, the unit did request it in sufficient time according to the brigade’s air liaison officer. A remote control airplane trainer (RCMAT) was employed to simulate OPFOR fixed-wing aircraft.

Casualty play was analyzed while observing the company team STX to provide additional data to the questionnaire. The observation examined how casualties were assessed, what measures the unit or observer-controllers took to ensure that the soldiers had realistic injuries, and to what extent the casualty evacuation process occurred. As a MILES exercise, vehicle and personnel became casualties based upon the accuracy of engagement. The O/Cs had the authority to inflict casualties from indirect fire if they deemed it appropriate. Numerous vehicles were observed with blinking yellow lights (indicating that they had been destroyed or damaged) and three soldiers were observed as casualties. However, discussions with the O/Cs indicated that simulated damaged vehicles were not evacuated; simulated individual casualties received no treatment beyond buddy aid.

Are Units Integrating Cognitive Mental Stressors Into Their Training?

While observing the company team STX, the following indicators were analyzed for the degree to which the unit incorporated and/or introduced cognitive stressors:

- Known collective tasks to be performed; planned and unplanned changes which caused subordinates to react to the unexpected; uncertainty concerning the enemy, ambiguity, information overload versus deprivation; time pressure versus waiting, OPFOR
unpredictability and aggressiveness; and engagement, maneuver, and rules of engagement (ROE) judgments.

As noted earlier, this exercise was the first time the company teams had maneuvered in the field since before deploying to Bosnia in the spring of 1997. The battalion commander was cognizant that his company teams were not ready for drastic changes to the operations order. He did not plan on introducing any cognitive stressors into the exercise, other than what the teams may be forced to do by the OPFOR’s actions.

Although not planned by the brigade, battalion, or any company commander, numerous cognitive stressors were observed during the course of the three-day STX. The cognitive stressors were first observed with ambiguity in the operations order, which assigned the same purpose to three company teams during the first phase of the operation (counter-reconnaissance). During the second phase (defense of the main battle area), the operations order assigned two purposes to each company team, which had the potential to cause a dilemma for the teams as they decided which purpose was more important. As the exercise progressed, confusion, ambiguity, and uncertainty were prevalent as vehicles became mired in the mud, logistical resupply of fuel and food were late or misdirected, changes to the original concept were made mid-stream, and communications became partially disrupted (due to the fact that this was the first time the task force had been to the field with a new a type of radio (Single Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS)) and the task force TOC was not fully trained. Leaders appeared to be under time pressure during the planning while their soldiers waited without all of the information needed to proceed with their mission.
The OPFOR (an armor task force from the same brigade) also created some uncertainty and was somewhat unpredictable despite the brigade commander’s statement that OPFOR was a training aid. The OPFOR caused the evaluated units to react to the unexpected on several occasions and demonstrated a strong will to win. This is evidenced by the results of the ten unit leaders interviewed. Seven perceived the OPFOR as extremely aggressive; three perceived the OPFOR as somewhat aggressive. Furthermore, interviews with the OPFOR commanders suggested that they had a high level of competitive spirit and will to win. Their comments, such as “commanders will be given a task and purpose . . . they’re going for blood and as much shit as they can blow up” accurately reflect the desire of the OPFOR during the STX. The OPFOR’s aggressiveness enabled their reconnaissance elements to infiltrate into and around the evaluated company teams’ defensive area and identify most of the unit’s positions. During the course of the main battle, the OPFOR task force commander realized his original concept was no longer feasible and adjusted his plan accordingly. As such, he was successful in enveloping a flank of the task force before the exercise ended. The evaluated unit observed OPFOR’s actions, and for reasons explained later, was unable or unwilling to react quickly enough to effectively counter the envelopment.

Is Unit Training Designed to Inculcate Initiative?

While observing the company team STX, the conditions for initiative and, to the extent possible, actual witness of soldiers taking initiative (or not taking initiative when it would be appropriate), was examined. Operations orders were reviewed to determine if
they contained tasks and meaningful purposes, soldiers and leaders were interviewed for their understanding of the commander's intent. Finally, the AAR was observed for the degree to which discussion is on decision making versus task completion; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and lessons learned.

As stated previously, the task force's operation order that was issued to the company teams for the STX contained some significant doctrinal errors as it related to purpose. One company team observed did not issue an operation order, only a series of partial fragmentary orders that appeared void of purpose. The other company team issued an oral order. Soldiers interviewed in the company that issued the oral operations order appeared to have a much clearer understanding of their unit's purpose and unique contribution to the task force's mission than the unit that did not issue an operations order. However, nine of the ten soldiers interviewed across both company teams demonstrated a reasonable understanding of their company and battalion commanders' intent. In sum, the conditions for initiative in the two company teams were mixed: meaningful purpose in relation to other company teams was often absent but the commanders' intent was fairly understood.

Leader Perception of Subordinates' Initiative

Thirteen leaders within the task force were asked to rate the level of initiative demonstrated by their soldiers and junior leaders on a scale of one to five, with five being the highest. Figure 21 depicts the results of the interview.
The data suggest that the majority of the sample population (6) perceive that their subordinates demonstrated disciplined initiative 50 percent of the time. The one leader who rated his soldiers the highest was adamant that his soldiers will do anything to win. However on the other end of the scale, a platoon sergeant remarked that his soldiers tended to be self-centered and would often wait to be told what to do rather than take appropriate initiative to solve a problem.

During the STX, initiative was observed on one account during the main battle. As the company teams defended to the south from their battle positions into an engagement area, several OPFOR tanks had enveloped the task force’s western flank and threatened the rear area. The commander of company team in the east (who had issued the oral operations order complete with meaningful purpose), given little if any information from the task force TOC, ordered his company team out of their battle position to counterattack to the west, behind the task force to deny further penetration by the OPFOR task force.
On the other side of the battlefield, however, the company team commander in the west appeared not to take appropriate initiative when several OPFOR tanks had enveloped his battle position. Apparently knowing that the OPFOR had penetrated his flank platoon’s position and had maneuvered behind his company team, he refused to move any of his team to counter the threat—this was despite that his subordinates reported they no longer observed any OPFOR to their front. In the post-battle update to the brigade commander, the O/Cs confirmed that this company did not take appropriate initiative when their original concept was no longer feasible.

Following the STX, two company team After Action Reviews (AARs) were observed to gain an understanding on whether the AAR was focused on tasks or leader decision-making. This was done because the literature suggests that for Initiative-Oriented Training to be present, AARs should focus on leader decision-making. In both cases, the AARs were led by the O/Cs and focused entirely on lessons learned and tactics, techniques, and procedures for accomplishing the mission. No mention of what decisions were made, or why they were made, was observed during the AARs.

**Common Trends Between the Sample Populations**

**Little Integration of Combat Multipliers**

In analyzing the integration of supporting assets (mortars, artillery, CAS, and NGF) that are likely to be found on the battlefield, the data from the surveyed population of CGSOC students suggest that infantry units are conducting the vast majority of their live-fires using only their organic weapons systems. Hence, they are not training as they
will fight in combat—as a combined arms and services team. While no data was collected to determine why these assets are rarely integrated into live-fire STXs, possible causes could be inadequate impact area adjacent to maneuver areas, safety and environmental concerns and/or coordination difficulties. It could also be a result of imagination and motivation on the part of unit leadership.

The observed unit did employ engineers, air defense artillery, and mortars during their STX. However, the direct support artillery battalion that would normally deploy with the infantry unit if it were to go to combat, did not participate in the exercise aside from providing personnel to assist in O/C and “fire marker” duties. The unit also attempted to employ CAS but was unable to do so due to a scheduling conflict with the Air Force. Interviews with unit leaders indicated that integration of the above combat multipliers is rare in the unit’s training. As the task force commander put it, “this exercise had all the bells and whistles.”

Aggressive OPFOR Given Limited Latitude

In both sample populations, the OPFOR’s aggressiveness was determined to be somewhat or extremely aggressive. Conversely, the OPFOR commander was usually constrained by method, task, and/or control measures in accomplishing his mission. These constraints, although normally intended to cause a certain task to occur so it can be evaluated, has the net result of removing uncertainty and unpredictability that would normally be associated with actual combat.
Potential Poor Understanding of Mission Orders

If the order quality noted in the case study is an indicator, then the data suggest that the concept of mission orders may not be completely understood in the infantry and armor community. Analysis of the sample populations' perception of the quality of mission orders was overlooked when designing the questionnaires. As shown in the literature review, the examples of mission orders used in Army training manuals seldom conform to operational doctrine. Improper use of mission orders, specifically those void of meaningful purpose that relate to the enemy, terrain, or friendly forces around the unit, can have the same effect of not issuing a mission order at all. Hence, it is quite conceivable that the majority of the survey populations do not have adequate understanding of what mission orders are, and/or how they are most effectively used.

High Levels of Subordinate Initiative

The majority of the population of CGSOC students perceived that their subordinates exercised disciplined initiative over half of the time while in a field environment. Interviews with the observed unit's leaders also showed a similar trend. The data suggest that those units who frequently use mission orders, change conditions, and conduct MILES free-play exercises against an aggressive OPFOR with latitude, will have higher levels of subordinate initiative. Certainly, these are not the only factors that may positively contribute to initiative in a unit but they appear to have some influence within the sample population of CGSOC students.
In the next chapter, the major findings and implications will be explored in greater detail, as well as what leaders within an infantry battalion are capable of doing to narrow the training gap given limited resources. Uncertainty, ambiguity, and confusion cost little if any money. Numerous low-cost and no-cost training aids are available to add environmental realism. Teaching soldiers to act independently and prudently on the battlefield is what Army leaders are supposed to do by operational, leader development and combat stress doctrine. Through the introduction of cognitive and environmental stressors, and the teaching of soldiers to take disciplined initiative, the gap between combat and peacetime training can be significantly reduced.
CHAPTER 5

CONCLUSIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Technology does not win wars; soldiers and leaders do. Soldiers confident in themselves and their equipment, the competency of their buddies and leaders, and their unit win wars. Leaders confident in their ability to execute combined arms operations under any conditions, in their unit's ability to success, and in their higher headquarter's ability to support them win wars. Thinking soldiers and leaders using their creativity and initiative, imbued with aggressive disciplined spirit, and molded into cohesive units that trust one another win wars. Realistic training creates these kind of soldiers, leaders, and units.¹

Brigadier General James M. Dubik, "The Army's 2nd Training Revolution"

Conclusions

This study attempted to answer the research question, "Does home-station unit training conducted by conventional U. S. Army infantry battalions provide sufficient realism to adequately prepare soldiers for the cognitive and environmental stressors inherent within the environment of combat? Subordinate research questions related to the degree to which cognitive and environmental stressors are present in unit training, as well as if training is designed to inculcate initiative in soldiers; and if the Army's training doctrine enhances or inhibits Initiative-Oriented Training. The answers to these questions and the major findings of this research are listed below.
Major Findings

Army Doctrine Dichotomies

One of the most significant findings in the literature review, and an answer to the subordinate research question, “Does training doctrine support Initiative-Oriented Training?” is apparent: No, not if training doctrine is examined wholly by itself. Training doctrine must be viewed in concert with operational, leadership and combat stress doctrine. If not, training doctrine, as it is currently written in FM 25-100, Training the Force, FM 25-101, Battle Focused Training, and the Army Training and Evaluation Program - Mission Training Plans (ARTEP-MTP), does not fully support operational doctrine or the components of cognitive stressors and initiative that are integral to Initiative-Oriented Training for three reasons.

First, the examples of orders in the MTPs (that should have been directly derived from operational doctrine), which the Army uses to train units, do not generally include orders that exemplify mission orders—task and clear, meaningful purpose. The net result of this disconnect is that soldiers are not training initiative. If soldiers do not understand why they are fighting (their unique contribution), then there is little chance that any initiative they demonstrate will be of value to the greater good of the unit, adjacent units or its higher command.

The second reason is that tasks, conditions, and standards are, according to the MTPs, generally to be stated prior to the training in the belief that soldiers will learn more quickly.² Although this may be true when squads and platoons learn battle drills and procedures, however, combat is not so descriptive in its nature. At some point in training,
soldiers must also become proficient in dealing with uncertainty, confusion, and unpredictability. To fully support the concept of Initiative-Oriented Training, soldiers should not necessarily know the tasks that they would have to conduct so as to induce these cognitive stressors.

For the same reasons that training doctrine does not fully support operational doctrine, it was also discovered that training doctrine does not entirely support leadership or combat stress doctrine. In some cases, training doctrine perhaps even contradicts itself by indicating that, on one hand, conditions should be kept the same for all units going through training; while on the other hand stating that units must “train to challenge.” The end result appears to be a tendency to focus on comparing the competencies of units vis-a-vis prescribed task standards rather than fully challenging each of them.

Leadership doctrine instructs leaders to train soldiers to take initiative and deal with the confusing and unpredictable nature of combat. Similarly, combat stress doctrine provides guidance to leaders on dealing with stressful situations associated with initiative and the complex, confusing, and often violent nature of the battlefield. Both leadership and combat stress doctrine, however, do not intermesh so easily with training doctrine. Full and constant knowledge of what tasks are to be performed in a training event and under what conditions, removes rather than induces cognitive stressors. In doing so, soldiers are not learning to deal with an unpredictable battlefield. By always knowing exactly what standards need to be achieved to successfully accomplish the task they are to perform, soldiers are focused to that end. This has the effect of causing the unit to become purely task focused. What if the task is not required to accomplish the purpose of
the unit’s mission? Conceivably, a unit could accomplish its task to the letter of the MTP and fail its, or its higher headquarters’ mission.

For example, consider a platoon who has been ordered to attack to seize a hill in order to prevent the enemy from interdicting an adjacent friendly platoon’s attack. The platoon attacks and assaults the hill exactly in accordance with the performance measures and standards as outlines in the MTP. When the platoon crests the hill, they enemy is not there or is insignificant; meanwhile, the enemy that threatens the adjacent platoon is located several hundred meters away in a valley. A task-focused platoon would be content that it has accomplished its mission and would probably wait for orders to go elsewhere. A purpose-focused, initiative-oriented platoon on the other hand, would not hesitate to leave the hill and do whatever task is required to prevent the enemy from interdicting the adjacent platoon’s attack--without orders.

Incorporation of Environmental Stressors

The literature review suggests that the more often soldiers deal with the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield while in training, the better they will prepared for the harsh conditions of combat against an able and willing enemy. The data gathered on the surveyed population indicate that 57.3 percent of the sample exposed soldiers to environmental stressors through live-fire exercises at least half of their collective training time. Casualties were also integrated into training exercises with 68 percent of the population assessing casualties at least half of the time. While this data suggest units are
often subjecting soldiers to the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield, two potentially disturbing trends were identified that relate to live-fire STXs.

Integration of Battlefield Effects. At a cursory glance, 68 percent of the survey population responded that they incorporated large amounts of smoke, pyrotechniques and realistic objectives at least half of the time. However, closer examination of the data show 22.2 percent of the respondents that their unit rarely or never incorporated large amounts of battlefield effects into their live-fires—nearly 1/4 of units represented by the sample population did not fully expose soldiers to the harsh and violent conditions of intense combat. Conversely, analysis of the integration of battlefield effects into blank-fire STXs did not indicate such incongruity between units. The data suggest that there is no statistically significant difference between the types of infantry or when the respondents served in the unit. One explanation for the disparity may be insufficient resources needed to produce realistic battlefield effects in both live and blank fire STXs, thus resources are not being massed for either type of training. This has the likely effect of not providing soldiers realistic exposure to the sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield at any time during their collective training. Another explanation, as offered by Lieutenant General (Retired) Collins in his book, Common Sense Training, is that “[anyone] who complains about not being able to make training realistic lacks the power of observation, tactical knowledge, or imagination.” If General Collins’ viewpoint is accepted regarding battlefield effects, this would suggest that leaders in the sample population were not improvising. For example, trainers could burn tires or cans of diesel fuel and/or obtain mock weapons and pneumatic machine guns from their installation’s Training and
Audiovisual Support Center (TASC), or procuring discarded furniture from the post’s Defense and Reutilization Marketing Office (DRMO). The leaders were also not using their imagination or did not have the motivation to produce realistic battlefield effects.

Use of Indirect Fires, Close Air Support (CAS) and Naval Gunfire (NGF). The other major finding pertaining to environmental stressors was that while 47.3 percent of the sample population recalled employing indirect fires at least half of the time, 31.9 percent indicated that their unit rarely or never employed these assets. Although no statistically significant determination or correlation was able to be made as to why such disparity existed between units, several reasons are possible.

From reviewing the Army Research Institute’s report, Determinants of Effective Unit Performance, it can postulated that certain Army posts lend themselves better than others to STXs that can integrate both direct and indirect fire. Specifically, some posts have suitable maneuver areas adjacent to indirect fire impact areas. If General Collins’ opinion is correct, then another explanation could be leader tactical knowledge of indirect fires or leader imagination and motivation to include supporting fires into STXs. Finally, safety concerns could also weigh heavily in a leader’s decision to employ indirect fires.

CAS and NGF were rarely or never used by the sample population when conducting live-fire STXs. Although no data was collected that could be used to understand the absence of these combat multipliers in home-station unit training, it can be assumed that many of the same reasons for the absence of mortars and artillery (plus coordination difficulties and training location) apply to CAS and NGF. The implications
of not integrating these all of these assets into unit training are discussed later in this chapter.

**Incorporation of Cognitive Stressors**

The surveyed population of CGSOC students shows that the represented units are incorporating some cognitive mental stressors into their training. However, the data suggest that units are not introducing cognitive stressors where and when they are most easily integrated. For instance, 85 percent of the respondent's soldiers almost always knew the tasks, conditions, and standards for the major collective tasks they would perform during a STX. Nearly 80 percent of the sample indicated that their soldiers almost always had full knowledge of the enemy situation or it was only sometimes vague. Both of these figures infer that soldiers know far more than they would if they were in a combat environment—where the enemy often decides which tasks will be performed and perfect information is usually nonexistent. Numerous credible authors in the literature review noted the importance of uncertainty, confusion, and unpredictability in training to prepare soldiers for complex environment of combat. The data suggest that few units are heeding the call to structure their training events accordingly.

This data may not be surprising. As suggested in the literature review, Army training doctrine insists that soldiers know the tasks, conditions, and standards prior to training because they will learn more quickly than if they do not know. If units want certain tasks to be performed, then a good deal of information on the enemy is needed.
However, as the literature review also points out, soldiers must learn how to deal with the unpredictable, ambiguous, and uncertain nature of a complex battlefield.

MILES free-play exercises can add uncertainty provided that opposing forces or given considerable latitude in accomplishing their assigned mission. These exercises are frequent with 77.8 percent of the respondents indicated that their unit conducted this type of training at least half of the collective training time available. Only 9.7 percent of the sample population rarely or never conducted MILES free-play exercises. However, it is apparent from the analysis that the structure and design of these exercises are not maximizing cognitive stressors even though majority of the OPFOR was perceived by the respondent’s to be aggressive.

Over 90 percent of the surveyed population perceived that they had sufficiently aggressive OPFOR that challenged their soldiers. Despite the perceived aggressiveness, over 50 percent of the population indicated that their OPFOR was only given some latitude to accomplish their mission. The literature review suggests that more latitude given to the OPFOR, the more cognitive stressors would be present in the training. Two authors in the literature review, Lieutenant Colonels Rigg and Brennan indicated that the OPFOR needs to be aggressive and determined to accomplish their mission partly to induce cognitive stressors. Furthermore, a spirit of competitiveness must exist between opposing sides.5

Similar to environmental stressors, cognitive mental stressors may not have to be planned in order for them to be present in an exercise. It has been fairly well established throughout history that armies do not need the enemy to induce “fog and friction” on the
battlefield for they often do a good job all by themselves. Units will always have some cognitive stressors present by the very nature of warfighting and the stressors should decrease as the unit increases its proficiency. Thus, the inference is that units should increase the cognitive stressors as task proficiency increases if soldiers are to be kept thinking and operating effectively in a combat environment.

Training Designed to Inculcate Initiative

Almost 85 percent of the sample population recalled using mission orders during STXs. However, the quality of such orders is in question as the case study revealed. Often they appear to be void of meaningful purpose. If mission orders contain meaningful purpose, then this high level of usage serves to unleash initiative in subordinates. Other factors in this study have also been correlated with initiative. Two hypotheses were tested relating to initiative. First, the greater use of mission orders, changing of conditions, aggressive OPFOR, increased latitude of the OPFOR commander, MILES free-play exercises and casualty play, then the greater the probability that leaders and soldiers would exercise initiative in accordance with the commander’s intent. General (Retired) Downing in an article entitled, “Training to Fight” suggested that incorporation of many of the above variables would teach soldiers when and how to take disciplines initiative. The results of the test was that, within the sample population, there exists a positive, statistically significant correlation between all of the above variable (with the exception of integration of casualties) and the degree of soldier’s and leader’s disciplined initiative.
How does the increased presence of the above variables lead to increased initiative? The relationship between initiative and mission orders is quite clear, as the purpose of mission orders is to unleash soldier initiative. The other variables in the correlation are important because the more they are introduced, the more a soldier is likely to take initiative. For instance, a strong-willed OPFOR that is not constrained in its mission will cause dilemmas for his opponent that will, in turn, force initiative on the part of the unit's leaders and soldiers if they are to accomplish their mission. Similarly, the changing of conditions between iterations of a training event challenges a unit and its soldiers often to the point that its planned concept is no longer feasible, which also causes soldiers to take initiative. If mission orders have meaningful purpose, then the result is likely to be disciplined initiative (within the commander's intent) because soldiers understand their unique contribution and what actions are necessary to accomplish their higher headquarters' mission.

Further analysis of combat stress doctrine suggests that initiative is increased because soldiers are learning to deal with the stress-related issues vis-a-vis initiative: Subordinates must accomplish the commander's intent without direct orders; all soldiers (regardless of rank) are learning how to be problem solvers; soldiers must take action with too little information and while improvising; and soldiers are often put into situations without ideal force ratios, equipment, support, or communications. In short, those respondents in the sample population who had high levels of disciplined initiative in their unit, trained their soldiers to use initiative whether or not they realized that is what they were doing.
The second hypothesis tested in relation to initiative was that the more focused a unit is on leader decision-making during training, the more likely that soldiers will exercise disciplined initiative. Lieutenant Colonel Brennan suggests in “Thoughts on Training Leaders How to Fight” that one would know that Initiative-Oriented Training was occurring in a unit if the training emphasis was on the development of junior leaders rather than on task completion. However, analysis of the data gathered from the surveyed population showed no statistically significant correlation between the two variables. One reason for this variance may be that focus on leader development may not, in and of itself, be absolutely necessary to have high levels of initiative. Another reason could be that the sample population was too small to make sufficient analysis and determination that the correlation does or does not exist.

Development of Realistic Training

The majority of sample population perceived that the lack of resources was the major reason for not having realistic training, followed by higher headquarters changes to the unit training schedule. Leader imagination, ingenuity, and motivation was the third most likely reason indicated for lack of realistic training. General Collins and Lieutenant Colonel Rigg suggest that the absence of realistic training is largely the fault of the leader. Resources are important but in their view should be no excuse for not being able to achieve realistic training. Both of these leaders served in the Army in a time of cost cutting and austere resources. Lieutenant Colonel Rigg published his rules for realistic
combat training in the aftermath of the Korean War. General Collins developed his philosophy following Vietnam.

Why would the survey population perceive that leader imagination was not the primary reason for units not having realistic training? There are two possible explanations. In the sample population, 95.8 percent of the respondents were company commanders in their last infantry battalion. Over one-half of the sample perceived that, as a company commander, they had much or total control over the development of their unit's collective training. If General Collins and Lieutenant Colonel Rigg are correct, the sample population did not possess the tactical knowledge, necessary observation skills, or the imagination to develop such training. Put rather bluntly, the sample population does not see themselves as the impediment in the development of realistic training. If, on the other hand, the sample population is correct in their perception, then the Army could be facing severe resource constraints; increased operational tempo, multiple competing requirements may be causing unforeseen changes to unit training schedules. A combination of both theories could also be possible.

Implications

Resource constraints may require units to subject soldiers to maximum environmental stressors during live-fire exercises while minimizing their exposure during blank-fire exercises. In turn, units could make blank-fire exercises much more challenging than the data infer by subjecting their soldiers to maximum cognitive stressors; minimizing them during live-fire exercises. This two-pronged approach effectively masses the
available resources for live-fire exercises, which provides soldiers extremely realistic experiences vis-a-vis sights, sounds, and smells of the battlefield. Not incorporating large degrees of cognitive stressors during live-fire exercises decreases safety concerns and could conserve resources. In this manner, leaders would be focusing on fire control, distribution, and synchronization of weapons systems more than the possible outcome of an anxious and confused soldier's potentially catastrophic decision made while under pressure. Furthermore, limited resources would not be used inefficiently in the attempt of training the leader how to make decisions.

As noted earlier, limited resources may also have an impact on the integration of mortars, artillery, close air support (CAS) and naval gunfire (NGF) in home-station unit training. It should be noted though, that units routinely employ these assets at the Joint Readiness Training Center (JRTC). Granted, Air Force and Marine units usually control CAS and NGF respectively but Army artillery soldiers are trained (to varying degrees of proficiency) and infantry soldiers are often in close proximity to the effects of the tremendously explosive munitions that these platforms deliver.9 At JRTC, the effects of the ordnance is replicated by grenade and/or artillery simulators. The inferences are that JRTC provides the only experience of employing CAS and NGF that a infantryman will have outside of combat. Hence, rarely if at all, is a soldier experiencing the horrendous explosions and peculiar sounds associated with these assets. Reflecting on General Truscott's experience in World War Two, not subjecting soldiers to the effects of Naval Gunfire while in training resulted in sheer panic and mayhem for his units.10 To effectively
“train as a combined arms and services team,” infantry units must integrate supporting fires often.\textsuperscript{11}

Recommendations

Training Doctrine: Improvement of Mission Training Plans

There are three areas in which MTPs could be improved to help leaders in all units, infantry and non-infantry alike, conduct realistic combat training. First, MTPs should include examples of doctrinally correct mission orders that have tasks and clear, meaningful purposes--purposes that show the unit's unique contribution to their higher headquarters' mission, as well as the missions of adjacent units. As the examples in the literature review suggest, current MTPs do not contain doctrinally correct mission orders. Young leaders use these MTPs to plan their training. The vast majority of them have not been to the Infantry Officer Advanced Course or the Command and General Staff College to learn how to write a proper mission order. If the unit leadership is not taking strides to teach mission orders to their leaders, then what other examples do these young trainers have than the ARTEP-MTP?

The overriding importance of purpose must be emphasized during the conduct of training. An understanding of purpose sets at least one of the conditions for soldiers to take disciplined initiative during the training. Not including and emphasizing clear and meaningful purpose when conducting a task in the MTP can cause soldiers to be purely task-focused, which has two negative effects. One, the unit accomplishes its task successfully but its mission, or the mission of its higher headquarters or adjacent units,
fails or is not nearly as successful as it could otherwise have been. Two, soldiers cannot take initiative toward the greater good of the unit because they do not know why they are fighting. Both of these consequences can be absent or at least mitigated if MTPs contain doctrinally correct mission orders for soldiers to use as examples when planning training.

The second area in which MTPs could be improved is to encourage unit trainers to change the conditions to challenge the more proficient and experienced units and soldiers. It is generally accepted among Army leaders that conditions should be made more difficult as units or soldiers increases proficiency on a task; however, from my experience in six different infantry battalions over the past eighteen years, conditions are toughened to the same degree across all units simultaneously. The survey of CGSOC students confirmed this tendency, with only about 50 percent of them recalling that they changed the conditions between training iterations at least half of the time.

As it indicated in the literature review, MTPs currently instruct the trainer to keep the conditions the same for all evaluated units in order to establish a baseline of performance. Is it really more important that units have a baseline of performance (something that appears on the surface to be rather intuitive) than to “train to challenge?” Furthermore, changing of conditions between training iterations induces more cognitive stressors due to the increased level of uncertainty, unpredictability, and/or time pressure that soldiers will encounter. Lastly, the data from the surveyed population of CGSOC students suggest that those units which changed conditions between iterations of training events had statistically higher levels of initiative in their soldiers than those who did not. These higher levels of initiative can be attributed to the increased cognitive stressors,
whereby planned concepts are often no longer feasible and require initiative on the part of individual soldiers if the unit’s mission is to be successful.

The third area in which MTPs could be improved is to qualify when it is appropriate to inform soldiers of the task they will perform, under what conditions, and to what standard. As discussed in the literature review and earlier in this chapter, the net result of always stating tasks, conditions, and standards is the removal of cognitive mental stressors. It makes good sense in the early stages of training to ensure that soldiers understand tasks, conditions, and standards but it does not make nearly as much sense in the later stages of training. In combat, an infantry squad on patrol will usually have an idea of the potential tasks they will have to perform but the orderly sequence in which they will have to perform the tasks, and often under what conditions, is largely uncertain. The standards the patrol must achieve will be based on the effectiveness of the solution.

By no means am I abdicating standards. Standards are important for a commander to know what his units are capable of doing and to ensure uniformity of performance measurement. However, units should not be fixated on training to the checklists in the MTP beyond the initial stages of training. Once an acceptable level of proficiency is achieved, they should look more closely at how the evaluated unit accomplishes its purpose in relation to adjacent unit’s and higher headquarters’ purpose, as well as in accordance with their commander’s intent—that is the ultimate standard to effectively judge unit proficiency because that is how it will be done in combat.
Development of a Training Circular or Web Site

As the literature review suggests, Army leaders must conduct an inordinate amount of research or possess extensive “real-world” experience to develop truly realistic training. Army training manuals, such as 25-101, Battle Focused Training, and FM 25-4, How to Conduct Training Exercises, discuss the importance of training realistically but offer no substantive guidance or techniques. It would be extremely helpful for the Army to develop a manual that provides instruction and offers techniques to those leaders who are in the pursuit of realistic training.

Another method to communicate this information would be the establishment of a web site through Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) or the U.S. Army Infantry Center (USAIC), or a link to the Center for Army Lessons Learned (CALL) web site. This would allow for units to share experiences on the development of realistic training. In a time of cost cutting and austere resources, use of information technology would be the least expensive of the two options.

Conduct of Initiative-Oriented Training

Based on the literature review, the following criteria should be used in determining if home-station unit training is truly initiative-oriented. These criteria are equally applicable to both individual and collective training:

1. Incorporates environmental stressors, such as grim, rugged scenery, realistic targetry, smoke, fire, explosions, and so forth
2. Induces cognitive mental stressors, such as lack of perfect information, confusion, ambiguity and tasks that will not achieve purposes
3. Includes opposing forces with a strong will to win; stresses competition between opposing sides
4. Integrates casualties to the utmost reality
5. Uses mission orders to allow for subordinate initiative

These criteria were developed from a view of the cognitive and environmental stressors of the battlefield and historical accounts of intense combat. They also considered operational, leadership, and combat stress doctrine, which are firmly based on the successes and failures of U.S. soldiers in combat and the perceived future requirements of soldiers and units on tomorrow's battlefield. The components of Initiative-Oriented Training are tried and true and are well within the grasp of any platoon leader, company or battalion commander given foresight, imagination, and ingenuity.

Individual Training

When applying the criteria of Initiative-Oriented Training to individual skills development, such as Common Task Training (CTT) or Expert Infantryman's Badge (EIB) training, the training should occur along lanes using mission orders. The essence of the lane is to replicate actual combat conditions as closely as possible, subjecting soldiers to both cognitive and environmental stressors. Ideally, the soldier's immediate chain of command would provide the leadership, inspiration and motivation during the course of the training, as it would be in combat. After deciding which tasks should be trained, one
technique would be to arrange the tasks sequentially and/or concurrently. Using
Lieutenant Colonel Brennan’s example in “Thoughts on Training Leaders How to Fight,”
the scenario would go something like this:

If we were to test the CTT[s] of Perform a Functions Check of a Squad
Automatic Weapon, Put into Operation a Squad Radio, Conduct First Aid on a
Soldier, and Navigate to a Known Location, … [the] soldier would be given the
order, “The squad on our right is in trouble an needs another man. The enemy has
infiltrated, you need to get the SAW position at TH 465328. You’ll get further
orders when you get there.” When the soldier reaches the SAW, the crew is dead
or wounded. The SAW has a stoppage, he must fix it and fire at an approaching
enemy. Next, one of the [wounded] soldiers say, “I’m okay, I can take over, you
need to get the commander on the radio and get reinforcements down here ASAP.
There is a radio in the position 100 meters to the east.” The soldier moves out
under fire to find the radio.

In the lane described above, the soldier is continually subjected to both cognitive
and environmental stressors, and he must exercise initiative to be successful. The soldier
encounters cognitive stressors as he faces the uncertainty and unpredictability about what
will happen next, he faces a dilemma between providing first aid to a soldier and engaging
an enemy, and he must deal with time pressure. A little imagination on the part of the
trainers can add to the existing environmental stressors: simulated blood and guts on the
SAW and wounded soldier, grenade simulators, debris scattered around the SAW
position, and so forth. The soldier must take initiative to solve the problems because no
one is telling him what task to do, and in what sequence. He is deciding what tasks he
needs to do to accomplish his mission.

Upon completion of the highly realistic combat lane, the soldier’s leader conducts
an AAR which, as Lieutenant Colonel Brennan writes, “focuses on the effectiveness of the
soldier’s solution. The order the tasks are done or the fact that all need to be done is only
important in relationship to accomplishing the mission.” After the AAR, one thing is for sure: the soldier will not have gone back to the barracks bored with the day’s training. As Field Marshall Erwin Rommel of the German Army in World War Two was well-known for saying, “the best way to achieve high morale is through difficult, demanding, and challenging training.”

**Collective Training**

In very broad terms, Initiative-Oriented Training at the collective-level demands that soldiers be subjected to cognitive and environmental stressors while inculcating initiative. If units mass resources as mentioned above, then the idea is to use live-fires to expose soldiers to environmental stressors and teach synchronization; use MILES free-play to subject them to cognitive stressors and teach initiative.

When conducting MILES free-play exercises, training should be company versus company, company versus platoon, and so forth. Opposing sides are given a great deal of latitude in the accomplishment of their mission. Lieutenant Colonel Brennan describes this concept of collective training in “Thoughts on Training Leaders How to Fight:”

There should be a clash of wills with the winning going to the unit whose leader and subordinates can decide, issue an order, and have his subordinates execute faster than the other. . . . [It is] important for companies to gain experience at fighting. It doesn’t matter that the “enemy” has the same equipment and tactics, as long as company commanders compete to win by imposing their wills. Instead of fighting a “template,” they must read the battlefield and decide what needs to be done to win. This incurs some risk. There may be no direct fire fight at all. One side may “win” by avoiding his “enemy’s” main force and cutting the LOC. This is great combat training.
Uncertainty and unpredictability can also be incorporated somewhat into live-fire exercises. Even though units normally conduct a blank-fire exercise immediately preceding the live-fire, civilian targets can replace enemy targets in scenarios where this is likely. Casualties can be assessed and evacuated, forcing leaders to make decisions and face dilemmas. Helicopters that may be scheduled to extract a company from an objective may for some reason not be able to do so, causing execution of a ground contingency plan. The possibilities are endless and largely up to the leader's imagination.

Closing

Where Initiative-Oriented Training Fits into Unit Training Plans

The recommendations of this study in no ways are intended to renounce typical U.S. Army training doctrine systemization—exemplified by task, conditions, and standards; performance measures, battle drills and the like. Initiative-Oriented Training serves to enhance, rather than totally replace the battle drill and task-oriented training typically conducted in conventional infantry units. As discussed in the literature review, it serves little good to expose soldiers to the task, as well as a high degree of stress in the early stages or phases of training. Either gradually introduce the stressors while becoming proficient on the task; or expose the soldier to the stressors separately from the task, then combine the two once task proficiency is achieved.

Ideally, it appears that Initiative-Oriented Training should comprise about half of the total training time available. In the spirit of "crawl, walk, run," it would be introduced gradually but not necessarily after all of the squads, platoons, and companies within a
battalion have achieved a “Trained” status on battle drills and those collective tasks critical
to the success of anticipated missions. Typical unit personnel turnover rates alone would
appear to preclude such near-perfection, never mind the routinely competing demands
placed on unit leader leaders and soldiers. It is reasonable to expect though, that all
squads, platoons, and companies within an infantry battalion can achieve a satisfactory
level of proficiency on those battle drills and critical collective tasks that are closely related
to their wartime mission. Once that satisfactory level of proficiency is achieved, the unit
can graduate to Initiative-Oriented Training. Actually, some squads and platoons will be
ready for greater stressors earlier than others. Hence, if “Train to Challenge” is an axiom,
then inducing stress based on the experience and proficiency of individual squads,
platoons, and companies would serve the greater good.

Recommended Additional Research

Additional research is needed in several areas. First, the data gathered during this
research suggest that approximately 1/4 of infantry units are not integrating indirect fires
and realistic battlefield effects into their live-fire STXs. A study that involves a larger
sample population than was available for this research should be conducted to determine if
this trend is widespread throughout the infantry, and if so, what the proximate causes may
be. Second, the data also infer that units are rarely or never incorporating close air
support and/or naval gunfire into their live-fire STXs. A study should be conducted to
determine if this is also prevalent throughout the infantry. The research should examine
the feasibility of more integration of CAS and NGF into training exercises. Third, this
study determined from the sample population that 84.7 percent used mission orders at least half of the time during STXs; however, no data was collected to determine if these mission orders are doctrinally correct and serve to unleash subordinates’ initiative.

Further research is needed to analyze mission orders used during training to determine if they include tasks and meaningful purposes—purposes that relate to higher headquarters and adjacent, supporting and/or supported units. Finally, whereas this study examined the degree to which cognitive and environmental stressors are being incorporated into infantry-home station training, additional research is needed concerning similar incorporation of emotional (fear, anxiety, conflicting motives, and so forth) and physiological (such as sleep deprivation) stressors into infantry home-station unit training.

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4 Army Research Institute, Determinants of Effective Unit Performance: Research on Measuring and Managing Unit Training Effectiveness (Alexandria, VA: Army Research Institute, 1993), 132.


12Brennan and Larsen, 12.

13Ibid.

14Ibid.
## Appendix A. Unit Observation Worksheet

### Cognitive Stressors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>T.C.S Known?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty—Know When, Where and/or How Enemy Will ATK?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ambiguity—Unclear Mission/Intent/Concept?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to Mission/Intent/Concept Imposed By TF Cdr?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Changes to Mission/Intent/Concept Imposed By Co Cdr/Plt Ldr?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Info Overload or Deprivation?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Time Pressure or Waiting?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppor Unpredictability?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engagement/ROE Judgments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maneuver Judgments?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Full Casualty Play?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
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</table>

### Environmental Stressors

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>&lt;40 Deg F?</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Rain/Snow?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;10 KT Wind?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Night Opn?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smoke?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Arty/Grenade Simulators?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CAS?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoffman Devices?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Blanks?</td>
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<td>SC/ParachTFLR?</td>
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<td>Demolitions?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Physical Work?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
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</table>

### Conditions for Initiative

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Mission Order (Nested)?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>CDR's Intent Understanding?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Order Deviations IAW CDR's Intent?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Focus on Decision Making in AAR (Much, Some, None)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppor CDR Latitude (Much, Some, None)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oppor Aggressiveness (Extremely, Somewhat, Marginal, Not)?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>TM 1</th>
<th>TM 2</th>
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</thead>
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</table>
APPENDIX B. QUESTIONNAIRE

Master of Military Art and Science (MMAS) Survey

Name ___________________________ (last, first, middle initial)  Rank __________

1. What was the last type of infantry battalion in which you served (circle one)?

   Light Infantry  Mechanized  Airborne  Air Assault  Ranger

   Infantry

   Note: If you circled “Ranger,” please stop and return the survey IAW paragraph 5 on the cover sheet.

2. When did you leave this unit (circle one)?


3. How long were you assigned to the above unit (circle one)?

   More than 48 months  36 to 48 months  24 to 35 months  12 to 23 months  Less than 23 months

4. What was/were your position(s) in the above unit (circle all that apply)?

   Company  S1/S4  S3  Assistant S3  Other (please specify)

   Commander  S3 Air

Circle one response to the following questions:

5. During your unit’s individual training (e.g. Expert Infantryman’s Badge training, Common Task Training, etc ...), how often did the trainees know the tasks, conditions and standards prior to execution of the tasks?

   Almost always  Most of the time  About half of the time  Some of the time  Rarely or never

6. When conducting the above training, was the training executed by the soldier’s immediate chain of command (e.g. squad or team leader) or by another member of the unit (e.g. an NCO in another platoon in a “Round Robin” technique)?

   Always by the immediate chain of command  Usually by the chain of command; occasionally by other unit members

   About half the time by the chain of command; half by other members

   Usually by other members of the unit

   Always by other members of the unit

7. Which level within your unit normally designated the individual skills that would be trained?

   Squad/Section  Platoon  Company  Battalion  Brigade
8. How often were the conditions changed to challenge more experienced and proficient soldiers undergoing the above training?

Almost always  More than half the time  About half of the time  Less than half the time  Rarely or never

9. Which of the following set-up and conditions best describes your unit’s typical individual training site?

Camouflage net; field desk; NCO who issued task, conditions, standards; task to be performed in sterile (no distracters, such as noise, smoke, changes to conditions) environment. Soldiers rotated through one station at a time in a controlled manner. Task evaluated IAW prescribed standards.

Near-field environment (no artificial structures); NCO who issued task, conditions, standards; task to be performed in sterile (no distracters, such as noise, smoke, changes to conditions) environment. Soldiers rotated in a controlled manner. Task evaluated IAW prescribed standards.

Near-field environment (no artificial structures); NCO who issued mission order (task and purpose); task performed with distracters, and/or changes in conditions. Soldiers completed several tasks arranged sequentially or concurrently in a lane. Mission accomplishment was the goal, not whether specific performance measures were met in a set order.

Other (please explain):

10. When conducting Situational Training Exercises (STXs), how often did units (teams, squads, platoons, etc...) know the tasks, conditions and standards prior to execution?

Almost always  More than half the time  About half of the time  Less than half the time  Rarely or never

11. When performing STXs, how often did units receive mission orders (task and purpose) prior to execution?

Almost always  More than half the time  About half of the time  Less than half the time  Rarely or never

12. When performing STXs or gunnery, how often were the conditions changed to challenge more experienced and/or proficient units/crews?

Almost always  More than half the time  About half of the time  Less than half the time  Rarely or never

13. Following training events, what appeared to be the focus of the After Action Review?

Degree to which standards in the ARTEP-MTP were met. Mostly standards in the ARTEP-MTP, partly on leaders’ decisions. About half ARTEP-MTP standards and half leaders’ decisions. Mostly leaders’ decisions, partly on standards in the ARTEP-MTP. What decisions leaders made and why they made them.
During AARs, how willing were your unit's leaders to admit mistakes in front of superior, peers and subordinates?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Always</th>
<th>Almost Always</th>
<th>Sometimes - depending on who was present</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

15. When performing blank-fire STXs with an OPFOR, how much latitude was the OPFOR leader usually given in his decision making ability?

| None. OPFOR was viewed as a training aid and was directed to perform a specific task. No free-play allowed. | Some. OPFOR leader was generally to perform a certain task but was allowed to modify the task to complete his mission. Some free-play allowed. | Much. OPFOR leader was generally given autonomy to accomplish his mission and was only marginally constrained. Considerable free-play allowed. | Total. OPFOR leader was given complete autonomy to accomplish his mission and was not constrained. Total free-play allowed. |

16. Approximately how much of your home-station collective training time did you spend conducting battle drills?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost all of the time</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

17. How would you rate ("Trained," "Needs Practice," or "Untrained") the battle drill proficiency of your squads, section and platoons in relation to the task standards found in the ARTEP-MTPs?

| "Trained" on all drills | "Trained" on most drills, "Needs Practice" on some drills. No "Untrained" drills. | "Needs Practice" on most drills, "Trained" on some drills. None or very few "Untrained" drills. | "Needs Practice" on most drills, "Trained" on some. None or very few "Untrained" drills. | "Untrained" on most drills, "Needs Practice" on some. None or very few "Trained" drills. |

18. Approximately how much of your home-station collective training time did you spend conducting MILES blank-fire exercises against an OPFOR in free-play scenarios?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost all of the time</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

19. What usually was the composition of the above OPFOR?

| Team, squad, platoon or company from the same unit as the evaluated element (e.g. different squad or platoon). | Team, squad, platoon or company from another unit (e.g. different company or battalion). | Ad hoc group comprised of profiles, short timers, etc ... | Other (please explain): |

20. How would you generally rate the aggressiveness of the above OPFOR?

| Extremely aggressive. Made leaders react to the unexpected. | Somewhat aggressive. Occasionally made leaders react to the unexpected. | Marginally aggressive. Leaders were generally not surprised with the OPFOR’s actions. | Not aggressive at all. Leaders seldom had any surprises from the OPFOR. |
21. Approximately how much of your home-station collective training time did you spend conducting MILES blank-fire exercises against another unit (e.g. company vs. company; platoon vs. company) in free-play scenarios?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost of the time</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

22. To what extent did units undergoing BLANK-FIRE STXs generally have concerning information on the enemy situation?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Units had full knowledge of the enemy situation.</th>
<th>Enemy situation was sometimes vague.</th>
<th>Enemy situation was usually vague.</th>
<th>Enemy situation was almost always vague.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

23. During STXs or FTXs, how often did soldiers violate specific instruction or control measures in order to accomplish their mission IAW the commander's intent?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

24. Approximately how much of your home-station collective training time did you spend conducting live-fire exercises?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

25. To what extent did your unit's STXs incorporate casualties, leader replacement and other unexpected changes?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

26. To what extent did BLANK-FIRE STXs incorporate large amounts of smoke, demolitions, pyrotechniques, realistic objectives (simulated corpses, mock weapons, pneumatic machine guns, ammunition crates, debris, etc ...)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

27. To what extent did LIVE-FIRE STXs incorporate large amounts of smoke, demolitions, pyrotechniques, realistic objectives (simulated corpses, mock weapons, pneumatic machine guns, ammunition crates, debris, etc ...)?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Almost always</th>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

28. To what extent did LIVE-FIRE STXs incorporate supporting indirect fires (artillery, mortars) that were close enough for soldiers to hear and observe the effects?

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>More than half the time</th>
<th>About half of the time</th>
<th>Less than half the time</th>
<th>Occasionally</th>
<th>Rarely or never</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>
29. To what extent did LIVE-FIRE STXs incorporate Close Air Support (CAS) that was close enough for soldiers to hear and observe the effects?

- More than half the time
- About half of the time
- Less than half the time
- Occasionally
- Rarely or never

30. To what extent did LIVE-FIRE STXs incorporate Naval Gunfire (NGF) that was close enough for soldiers to hear and observe the effects?

- More than half the time
- About half of the time
- Less than half the time
- Occasionally
- Rarely or never

31. Without regard to the availability of ammunition, ranges and/or training areas, how much control as a company commander do you feel you had over how you would conduct collective training?

- Almost total control
- A great deal of control
- A fair amount of control
- Very little control
- Almost no control

32. Which of the choices below best describes your unit's focus for home-station collective training?

- Tasks that support the unit's METL.
- Mostly tasks that supported the METL; some leader decision making.
- About half tasks that supported the unit's METL; half leader decision making.
- Mostly leader decision making; some tasks that supported the METL.
- Leader decision making

33. How often do you feel that your subordinates executed initiative IAW the commander's intent during Field Training Exercises (FTXs), combat and/or rotations at the Combat Training Centers?

- Almost always
- More than half the time
- About half of the time
- Less than half the time
- Rarely or never

34. Which of the following statements best describes your units command climate concerning training development?

- Brigade commander trusted the company commanders to develop realistic training but the battalion commander did not.
- Brigade and battalion commanders trusted the company commanders to develop realistic training.
- Battalion commander trusted the company commanders to develop realistic training but the brigade commander did not.
- Neither the brigade nor the battalion commander trusted the company commanders to develop realistic training.

Please circle up to three answers on the following question

35. What do you feel is/are the primary reason(s) for units not having realistic training?

- Lack of resources other than time
- Time to prepare training
- Higher HQ changes to training schedule
- Safety and/or environmental concerns
- Leader imagination, ingenuity, motivation
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   E Administrative Operational Use (7) / Chapter 2 / 13-32 E
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