Arms Control

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Reasons for U.S., FRG Disagreement Over SNF Modernization Viewed

HK3103074689 Beijing RENMIN RIBAO in Chinese
29 Mar 89 p 4

["International Outlook" column by Sai Bei: "An Episode That Has Attracted Attention"]

[Text] The spokesman for the Foreign Ministry of the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) issued a statement on 25 March denying the rumor spreading in Brussels that the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has reached an agreement on modernizing Europe's short-range missiles. The statement points out that the news is unfounded. This episode indicates that the United States and the FRG not only have a divergence of opinion on the problem of modernizing the short-range missiles, but they are also divided over the policy toward the Soviet Union and the appraisal of the situation in Europe.

Since the United States and the Soviet Union reached an agreement on medium-range missiles, which has been put into effect, the United States has maintained that the Soviet Union remains a threat to Western Europe and insisted that the short-range missiles be modernized so as to act as a nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union, strengthen NATO, and prevent Western Europe from developing a tendency of drifting away in the face of the Soviet Union's detente policy. However, the FRG objected, believing that the modernization of Europe's short-range missiles need not be placed on the agenda until 1992. The United States and the FRG have been at loggerheads over this issue for some time. At present U.S. President Bush is assessing U.S. foreign policies in an all-around way with his senior security advisers. Sino-U.S. relations, arms limitation talks, defense policy, and future demands on conventional and nuclear weapons are among the important subjects under review. The FRG's attitude has an important bearing on U.S. efforts to cook up new policies on these matters. It is not accidental that news of an agreement on modernizing the short-range missiles is spreading from Brussels at this moment.

The reason for the FRG's insistence on its position can be clearly found in a report carried by THE WASHINGTON POST on 18 March. The report says, "as Bush's administration is placing U.S. foreign policies on the agenda, the FRG’s Government under Chancellor Kohl is trying its best to carry out its policy toward the East European bloc." Clearly the FRG has its own plan for the East European bloc. To carry out this plan, the FRG has been more active in recent months in providing funds for the Soviet Union and the Eastern bloc in support of their reforms and in building closer relations with them. The FRG is behaving in a purposeful way.

But the West is worried that the FRG's strategy is not necessarily beneficial to the West even if it proves successful. They are afraid that if the FRG "is bent on playing a possible role in Middle Europe in the future," "it will sooner or later drift away from the West European union and play a vanguard role in a neutral Middle Europe bloc." Well-known American figures even pointed out that it is necessary to prevent the revival of the German Empire, which was all-powerful in Middle Europe before. Clearly if events go along this line, the United States will have to make a great change in its defense and foreign policies. It is possibly for this reason that the United States is eager to understand the FRG's position on the problem of modernizing the short-range missiles.

The remarks by Soviet Ambassador to Bonn Kvitsinskiy, which were quoted by THE WASHINGTON POST, merit our attention. He said that the Soviet Union is not hoping that the FRG will withdraw from NATO for fear that members of the Warsaw Pact will follow its example. It seems that both the United States and the Soviet Union do not wish to have a turbulent Europe. They hold the same view that the military confrontation between NATO and the Warsaw Pact has relaxed but they refuse to thoroughly change the status quo.

However, with the relaxation of the international situation, the international politics and relations will never be left intact. For a considerably long period to come, the two blocs as well as their members will have to readjust and coordinate their policies and international relations respectively. In this process, it is not likely that the United States will see eye to eye with its allied countries on every issue as it did in the past. This undoubtedly will make it more difficult for the Bush administration to examine its foreign policies.
would be transformed into a radioactive desert. The retention, modernization, or stock piling of tactical nuclear weapons are used in Europe, the continent conflict with the resulting consequences. In the event continent. They represent a great potential for destruction as well as the radical reduction of forces and the most destabilizing conventional weapons would, without doubt, significantly lessen the mutual danger of a surprise attack and large-scale offensive actions. The member states of the Warsaw Pact believe that the nuclear weapons would contribute toward the creation of a favorable political atmosphere for such negotiations and to be compatible with efforts directed toward solving disarmament problems on the continent.

In this context, the member states of the Warsaw Pact propose the commencement of separate negotiations in the near future on tactical nuclear weapons in Europe, including the nuclear components of dual capability weapons, to the member countries of the North Atlantic Alliance. The Warsaw Pact states are convinced that practical measures to reduce conventional arms and tactical nuclear weapons would complement one another in the process of reducing military confrontation between the two alliances and thereby increase their effect.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact start from the assumption that in addition to the removal of medium- and shorter-range missiles, the step-by-step reduction and eventual removal of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe would contribute to reducing the danger of war, the consolidation of confidence, and the creation of a more stable situation on the continent. The solving of this task would favor far-reaching reductions in strategic nuclear weapons, and ultimately the complete and global removal of all nuclear weapons.

II.

The questions of preparing for these proposed negotiations, their mandate, and the circle of participants could be discussed at special consultations. The allied socialist states are ready to start these without delay. The nuclear powers belonging to NATO, the Warsaw Pact and all other interested states of these alliances, particularly those who possess tactical weapons suitable for carrying nuclear ammunition, and those on whose territory tactical nuclear weapons are deployed, could be participants in the consultations.

Agreement could also be achieved from the very beginning on reducing tactical nuclear weapons as well as their elimination in stages.

In the negotiations, measures would be discussed for an effective international control of the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons, as well as a complex of confidence- and security-building measures with regard to these weapons and military activities, in which they are included. The possibility of creating an international control commission which is equipped with relevant powers could also be examined.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact believe that the mutual abandonment of a modernization of tactical nuclear weapons would contribute toward the creation of a favorable political atmosphere for such negotiations and to be consolidation of trust. The sides would, for example, neither improve qualitatively nor increase their number of land-based tactical missiles capable of using nuclear ammunition, missiles from the air forces,
or artillery systems, including their nuclear components. In this connection, the Warsaw Pact member states stress the significance of the declaration by the Soviet Union, that it is not modernizing its tactical nuclear weapons.

Other multi- and unilateral measures could also serve the goal of the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons on the basis of reciprocity.

III.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact underscore the great danger to stability in Europe which emanates from the high concentration of tactical nuclear weapons, particularly in central Europe, but also on the southern flank of the line of contact between the two alliances. They believe that the significant reduction of Soviet troops in central Europe, including the withdrawal and disbandment of six tank divisions by the Soviet Union from this area; the considerable reduction of armament and combat technology, including tactical nuclear weapons; and the other unilateral steps adopted by the member states of the Warsaw Pact to reduce armed forces and armaments create favorable conditions on the continent for implementing the proposals for the formation of a zone of reduced arms and increased trust, as well as the establishment of nuclear weapon-free zones in central Europe, in the Balkans, and in other regions of the continent, from where all nuclear weapons will be withdrawn.

For these zones, a regime would be created which provides for mutual controls, including on-site inspections, and relevant guarantees from those states which possess nuclear weapons.

IV.

The member states of the Warsaw Pact are also prepared to discuss other possible measures and proposals which are aimed at the reduction and elimination of tactical nuclear weapons in Europe and which strengthen the stability on the continent to an increasingly low level of military power, while keeping the principles of equality and equal security, and while guaranteeing an effective control of the agreements reached.

Text of Appeal for Peace
LD1204161289 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1412 GMT 12 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—This is the text of an appeal "for a world without wars," adopted by the session of the Warsaw Pact member states in Berlin.

The foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states have met in Berlin, capital of the GDR. They deem it necessary on the eve of the 50th anniversary of World War II to state the following:

Half a century ago Nazi Germany unleashed the most tragic conflict in the history of mankind with an attack on Poland. The war arose out of the aggressive, revisionist policy of conquest, the division of the world, and the hegemony which was pursued by the most reactionary circles of imperialism. It demonstrated the dangerous policy of the Munich policy of concessions. As a result of the war, dozens of millions of people were killed. The earth was soaked with the blood of those killed and tortured. Thanks to massive efforts by the peoples and states united in the great anti-Hitler coalition and of the antifascist resistance movements, victory over fascism was achieved.

The memory of September 1939 and the other tragic events of World War II should not keep opening wounds forever. The memory of this greatest tragedy in the history of mankind should spur the peoples to undertake tireless efforts in order to guarantee each inhabitant of the planet the right to a peaceful life.

The lessons of the war underline the truth that there is no more important task for mankind than safeguarding peace. All the efforts and actions of the people must be subordinate to this aim. The present and the future of the peoples of Europe and their security are indivisible from the maintenance of peace on our continent.

The basic condition for preserving a lasting, stable European peace remains strict adherence to the existing territorial and political realities, all principles of the UN Charter, the stipulations of the Helsinki Final Act, and other universally recognized norms of international relations by all states. Of particular importance are the reduction and complete elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons and a radical reduction in armed forces and conventional armaments, guaranteeing a comprehensive security and strengthening mutually advantageous cooperation between the states to solve the urgent problems confronting all peoples of the continent. The results achieved by these means, including the start of negotiations on conventional armed forces and on confidence- and security-building measures in Europe, should prompt further efforts to guarantee a lasting peace. The experiences of the anti-Hitler coalition demonstrate that today too, it is possible to form a broad front for cooperation in the name of the peaceful development of Europe.

The ministers stressed the need to resolutely rebuff all manifestations of revanchism, chauvinism and nationalism, all forms of enmity between the peoples and attempts to contest the territorial integrity of states. They noted with particular concern the growing spread of neofascism in a number of European countries. Irrespective of their form and location, such manifestations pose a threat to peace and international security. Being on German soil, the foreign ministers stress the historical responsibility of the two German states to ensure that war is never again unleashed from German soil.
Mankind should enter the 21st century with the certainty of being able to live in peace. For this, determined action by all states and peoples and by everyone is necessary. Joint reflection on what happened in Europe 50 years ago must constantly prompt new and more effective action to create a world without weapons and wars. With their appeal, the foreign ministers of the Warsaw Pact member states urge that everything be done to preserve peace, to bring about disarmament and mutual understanding, to develop cooperation, and to guarantee the economic and social progress of every nation so that Europe and our planet do not experience the horror of a new world war.

**GDR, Polish Ministers Speak**

**LD1104200489 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1727 GMT 11 Apr 89**

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—GDR’s Foreign Minister Oskar Fischer held a dinner this evening in honor of his counterparts from the member states of the Warsaw Pact. Other members of the GDR’s state and party leadership were also present at the meeting in Berlin’s Palais Unter den Linden, which was held in a friendly atmosphere. They were members of the Socialist Unity Party [SED] Central Committee Politburo Hermann Axen, Horst Dohlus, Joachim Herrmann, Werner Jarowsinski, Guenther Kleiber, and Egon Krenz; Gerhard Schuerer, candidate member of the SED Central Committee Politburo; Dr Guenther Maleuda, deputy State Council chairman; and Manfred Flegel and Horst Soelle, deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The ambassadors of the Pact states accredited to the GDR also accepted the invitation.

During the course of the meal Oskar Fischer and Polish Foreign Minister Tadeusz Olechowski spoke.

In his toast Oskar Fischer said the Berlin meeting of the committee of foreign ministers is taking place at an important time, after the conclusion of the Vienna CSCE follow-up conference and at the start of fresh negotiations on conventional disarmament as well as on confidence- and security-building measures.

It has become clear in the balance, on the drawing up of which they were in agreement, that the common socialist peace program is being successfully fulfilled. It is realistic and open toward everything directed at disarmament and more security, and gives no one an advantage. Oskar Fischer said the persistent efforts by the states of the Warsaw Pact and above all the bold and truly trailblazing initiatives by the USSR have led to the first encouraging results.

The ability to take the next weighty step along the path of disarmament must now be worked on with great initiative. This path can not be trodden by anyone alone. The GDR’s foreign minister expressed the wish that the NATO states will soon decide to become reliable companions along the way, and not just drag their feet in Vienna and elsewhere, but to help determine the rapid pace of disarmament. The foreign ministers meeting made responsible decisions for this and has already approved far-reaching documents.

This year, when the 75th anniversary of the outbreak of World War I and the 50th anniversary of World War II will be marked, all states and people are called on to profess the obligation to peace once again.

This is significant particularly for the socialist German state and for its capital, Berlin, which is a “city of peace.” It accords with the anti-fascist legacy to accept responsibility for seeing that never again does war—only peace—emanate from German soil. The socialist German republic will do everything possible for this, Oskar Fischer said.

Tadeusz Olechowski stressed on behalf of the participating foreign ministers the interest of all Warsaw Pact states in rapid agreements to considerably lower the level of conventional arms, contribute to reducing the danger of a surprise attack, and consolidate mutual trust. He pointed to the unilateral decisions of the allied socialist states for the reduction of their conventional weapons, which will undoubtedly be helpful in achieving progress at the Vienna talks. The first response from these talks fills one with optimism. One could say that a further phase in the construction of the foundations for the common European home has begun. Minister Olechowski said that the start of negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons is an extremely important part of this. It will complement and support the process of reducing military confrontation between the two alliances.

Touching on relations between the socialist countries, Tadeusz Olechowski spoke of a new atmosphere in which understanding is deepening for the specific aspects of the individual states of the alliance, for their historical conditions, and for their national characteristics.

Fifty years after the start of World War II, reflection on the causes course, and consequences of this most terrible of wars must be a constant reminder and motivation to people to redouble their efforts for the creation of a world without war and violence. Tadeusz Olechowski expressed his deep satisfaction that the appeal for this, which was born of an initiative from Poland, which was the first victim of attack by Hitlerite Germany, is today ringing out from Berlin, the capital of the socialist German state.

Along with his thanks to the host, the Polish foreign minister extended an invitation to hold the next meeting of the committee of foreign ministers in Warsaw.
Turkey's Attitude Toward Vienna CFE/CSBM Talks Viewed

AU1004181389 Sofia NARODNA ARMIYA
in Bulgarian 7 Apr 89 p 3

[Lyubomir Gabrovski article: “Does Ankara Like the Vienna Waltz?”]

[Excerpts] The beginning of the parallel talks on reducing conventional weapons and armed forces from the Atlantic to the Urals and on measures on strengthening confidence and security in Europe is indicative of the striving of the Warsaw Pact and NATO to expand the sphere of agreement and to construct bridges between their positions until a consensus is reached. The road will be neither easy nor short; however, the goal justifies all efforts. Are all participants ready to make the necessary efforts?

The problems of Turkey, a country which has the second largest army in NATO in terms of numbers, represent a serious challenge at the Vienna talks. Turkey is afraid that it will be isolated by the present position of the allies at the talks. It thinks that NATO's proposal to create a main central European zone (without Turkey, Greece, Norway, and Iceland), which is being discussed, will isolate it at the talks and will hurt its security interests.

The serious problems in the area of defense range from the modernization of the tactical nuclear weapons to the reduction of conventional weapons. Undoubtedly, the Turkish politicians and military strategists will encounter serious difficulties while adopting relevant decisions and in determining the most correct approaches toward solving the issues.

The NATO members differ in their opinions. The basic theme of this Atlantic discord is well known: the influence of Mikhail Gorbachev's disarming foreign policy over West European public opinion. More and more people in the West believe that the military threat on the part of the Warsaw Pact Armed Forces, which are “superior to NATO,” is disappearing in the new era of relations between East and West. Turkey followed the position of its senior European allies and assumed a wait-and-see position.

Turkey's position is very delicate because of the fact that it has an extensive border with the USSR and Bulgaria. Some strategists think that in the future, Turkey must also rely on its conventional weapons rather than on the vague requirements of the “flexible defense.” It is their opinion that Turkey must continue to modernize its conventional weapons, which have become obsolete, and in this context, to request additional financial and military assistance from the United States and NATO. However, will this assistance not be linked to a commitment related to nuclear modernization?

Of course, the issue of the Turkish Army is crucial in adopting any important decision. However, it must be pointed out that different opinions exist in the various Turkish ministries and institutions engaged in setting the country's policy. “There is a limit below which Turkey will not go in reducing its conventional weapons,” Vuralhan, the Turkish minister of national defense, said at a press conference, referring to the long border with Warsaw Pact countries and its proximity to the Middle East. This premise was confirmed by Turkish Premier Ozal at the 1988 UN General Assembly special session on disarmament. "Turkey attributes a great importance to disarmament; however, it must also take into consideration its geopolitical situation, which jeopardizes its territorial integrity." According to the former chief of the Pentagon, Carlucci, between 1976 and 1986 the number of troops in the Turkish Armed Forces has increased from 614,500 to 860,200 because of this "threat." This increase fully covers NATO's deficit, created during the 1976-86 period because of the reduction of the UK troops. The same report points out that during the aforementioned period, Turkey's military expenditures have increased by 153 percent.

The coordination of the mandate of the forum on reducing conventional weapons and armed forces in Europe continued for 11 months, and took 100 meetings. However, the great goal merits great efforts. The opportunity to create a new Europe, free of the burden of weapons, must not be missed. Ankara must make its choice.

Editorial Article Praises Soviet Troops, Arms Reductions

AU1104090789 Sofia RABOTNICHESKO DELO
in Bulgarian 9 Apr 89 p 5

[Editorial article: “Moving Closer to Each Other, Instead of Braking Maneuvers”]

[Text] In his speech at the London Guildhall, Mikhail Gorbachev, the first Soviet leader, countered the formula of “nuclear deterrence,” which British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher considers “miraculous,” with a proposal to actually deter nuclear weapons themselves.

Naturally, even the most brilliantly defined goal can remain only wishful thinking if it does not result in specific actions. The high-ranking Soviet guest to the British capital once more confirmed that the diplomacy of the USSR, the first country where socialism was victorious, is a diplomacy of peace and personal example. The Soviet Union, as well as its Warsaw Pact allies, have already announced one-sided reductions of their armed forces and conventional arms, while Mikhail Gorbachev, in his London Guildhall speech, announced a new step toward a complete end to the production of fissionable material as a specific measure for a reduction of and a total halt to the manufacture of nuclear weapons. The first industrial reactor for the production of weapons-grade plutonium was closed down in 1987, and the Soviet Union will cease the production of highly
enriched uranium this year. Two more reactors for the production of plutonium will be closed down in 1989 and 1990. The Soviet Union has decided not to replace them with new capacities for the production of nuclear weapons. This means that the already announced reductions in armed forces and conventional weapons in the Soviet Union are being complemented in practice by a restriction of nuclear arms production. This is a very important practical step toward a real and universal, humanitarian goal: the elimination of nuclear arms from our planet.

The Soviet-American INF Treaty, as well as the present 50-percent reductions of strategic strike arms on both sides are subjected to this goal, as is known. There is no doubt that if the United States and NATO adopt similar measures to reduce the production of fissionable material, this would result in an absolute reduction of new nuclear weapons produced all over the world.

As has already been announced, the Soviet Union will enter the last decade of this century by having unilaterally reduced 500,000 soldiers—12 percent of its total number of Armed Forces—reducing its military budget by 14 percent and its arms production by nearly 20 percent. It is fortunate that these specific measures for the reduction of the Soviet military potential evoke a positive reaction abroad, but it would be even better if they were to result in reciprocal actions on the other side. In addition to this, the Soviet Union proposes that the question of naval forces also be raised at the negotiating tables between the United States and the USSR, as well as between the two military-political blocs. This is how the cycle of arms negotiations could be closed by encompassing all types of armaments—nuclear, conventional, air force, and naval. This is how each of the two sides will provide full guarantees that the other side will not and cannot rely on one-sided advantages concerning any type of armaments whatsoever.

Unfortunately, instead of "moving closer to each other," the other side, for the time being at least, is "braking maneuvers," which are expressed either by efforts to interpret the balance of armed forces of the two blocs arbitrarily, or by a refusal to include certain types of weapons in the negotiations, or by preparing for the "modernization" of tactical nuclear weapons. Considered separately and in their entirety, such actions can only depreciate the great progress marked in East-West relations by the signing of the Soviet-American INF Treaty and by the continuation of the European process.

The European spring offensive, started by Soviet diplomacy from the geographical area of the warm Gulf stream, will soon extend to two other important West European states—France and the FRG. It is high time for Europe to demonstrate that weapons are not and cannot be the appropriate construction material for the common European home.

What is decisive in politics, as in the whole of human behavior, is, in the final analysis, its outcome. This thought-deed chain must not be broken. Gorbachev announced that the USSR will halt the production of highly enriched uranium for nuclear weapons and will close down two further reactors (in total, then, three) which produced fissile materials for military purposes. He announced that the USSR is no longer modernizing its nuclear weapons and will not do so as long as it is not forced into this by the ill-considered steps of others.

Quite clearly, the Soviet leadership is striving for radical progress in disarmament; first and foremost, in the sphere of nuclear disarmament. It regards this as a primary task, as the key which will open up the possibility of creating a new system of international relations and the coexistence of the world community.

Once again unilateral measures are involved, and therefore it is appropriate to ask why the USSR is proceeding in such a manner, and why it has chosen this method in particular?

It is necessary to state beforehand that disarmament cannot be achieved on a unilateral principle. It is logical and understandable that only an agreement, a guarantee, and verification that is a joint course of action will lead to the aim that is so much expected. For in adopting unilateral disarmament measures there exists a limit which it is impossible to exceed without prejudicing one's own security. The Soviet course of action, then, has objective limits and limitations and the Soviet leadership is trying to use the space which it has left to influence and change the attitudes of its Western partners, in this case, on the issue of nuclear disarmament. The method is by example, it is a dynamic policy which directly necessitates a positive reply.
In my opinion, the USSR is pursuing some practical aims.

In the West there exists a sizable group of politicians which either agrees with or sympathizes with the Soviet program for a world without nuclear weapons. For example, in London itself, among the groups today in opposition to the government, the idea of even a program for a nuclear-free Britain can be heard. The Soviet course of action strengthens their position, it gives them cogent arguments in internal policy debates and in the struggle to gain political influence.

Gorbachev turns directly to broad sections of the Western public. Opposition to nuclear weapons is overwhelming among the public and is growing—this is a known fact. The situation will change when it will be conferred as a factor to the level of political decision making in parliament and government cabinets. Chancellor Kohl of West Germany is delaying the modernization of nuclear weapons within the framework of NATO because he is simply afraid that he would lose out in the elections. The idea that a Western politician will not dare, as long as he wants to be successful, to appear before the electorate with a program of support for nuclear weapons is not so far off or too far-fetched.

The last USSR measure is, understandably, also addressed to Washington, to its main partner in negotiations. The American administration announced that it will strive for an agreement and for a 50-percent reduction in nuclear arsenals. This is good, but the fact that arguments are still raging in the United States as to how to proceed is less heartening. Now, those who proclaim that the USSR is a serious and honorable partner in the negotiations have acquired more arguments. The United States, which declares its concern for the peaceful future of the world and wants to continue in the process of disarmament, cannot be silent, cannot sit back and arouse in the world the justified doubt that it is not taking disarmament particularly seriously.

Putting it briefly, the USSR is not saying we could do this, if.... It is announcing: We have done this. Thereby its policy has immeasurably gained in cogency and in striking power. The Soviet leadership is literally driving the matter of disarmament forward. Of course, there are doubters, confusion prevails, there remains a lack of trust from the period of the policy of confrontation, and in the meantime there are also irreconcilable opponents. Their ranks will once again thin out after Gorbachev's speech at the Guildhall in London. Prime Minister Thatcher of Britain, in an evaluation of the Soviet concept of a world without nuclear weapons, chose the word—romanticism. Well, in human history a number of dreams, wishes, and desires for a better life have been given attributes—utopia, fantasy, unfeasable, idealist, and romanticism. They have been implemented, others will be the reality of tomorrow. Between the optimistic program of peace and the fatalistic, pessimistic notion of a possible catastrophe for the human race, one will choose life. If such a choice is an expression of romanticism, let us be romantics!

Gorbachev Plan on Uranium Production Welcomed
LD0904103289 Prague Domestic Service in Czech 0730 GMT 9 Apr 89

[Tomas Chudlarsky commentary]

[Excerpt] [Passage omitted] At the center of attention in the media is the new Soviet initiative with which Mikhail Gorbachev came forward during his visit to Great Britain: the unilateral undertaking to end this year the production of highly enriched uranium for military purposes. No matter how much they try in the West to make light of the significance of this decision, it is certain that it represents another result of the new political thinking on disarmament questions. It goes against the grain, above all for representatives of NATO, who strive for the modernization of nuclear means. Considerable differences remain in Soviet-British attitudes, as emerged from the talks between Mikhail Gorbachev and British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, but a characteristic of the growing trust in relations between East and West is that despite the opposite standpoints, the talks did not take place in an atmosphere of enmity. [passage omitted]

GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC

NEUES DEUTSCHLAND Commentary on NATO Anniversary
LD0404085589 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 0223 GMT 4 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The realities of the nuclear age have caused realistically minded politicians in the West to look for ways to reduce the dangers that have arisen from the arms race they themselves initiated. But a clear answer from NATO, a measurable contribution to the securing of peace has still not been made, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND states in its comment on the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty 40 years ago. "At last to draw the necessary conclusions and to resolve the contradiction between words and deeds—the 40th anniversary of the military pact should be the proper occasion for this."

The newspaper refers to the strategy document which the 16 member states intend to adopt in May. "Much depends on these decisions—for Europe and for the world. Possibilities for a profound change toward peace with ever fewer weapons, toward more trust and mutually advantageous East-West cooperation are beginning to emerge." In this connection, NEUES DEUTSCHLAND reminds its readers of the INF agreement, the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament and confidence-building, and of the Geneva negotiations
on strategic and space weapons. The offer from the Warsaw Pact to negotiate away nuclear short-range weapons is also on the agenda.

"Now it's NATO's turn. No one can ignore the fact that its policies have been marked for 40 years by profound contradictions between word and deed," the newspaper continues.

"There are declarations from NATO on the need for building confidence. However, they still insist on the doctrine of nuclear and conventional deterrence. They expressly state the cardinal thesis that a nuclear war cannot be won. Yet at the same time they refuse to renounce nuclear weapons, reject negotiations offered by the Warsaw Pact states on further zero solutions on the nuclear weapons remaining in Europe and apparently long ago agreed not simply to 'modernize' tactical nuclear missiles but to replace them with new systems with ranges up to 500 km. There is no lack of verbal declarations of faith in disarmament. But the arms buildup is being further escalated in the nuclear and in the conventional sphere. Disarmament treaties which have already been signed are being devalued by new weapons systems, scrapped missiles are being compensated for by modern ones."

NATO has also repeatedly advocated improved East-West relations. But hand in hand with this goes the attempt to misuse the changed international relations consistently to implement their own goals vis-a-vis socialism, and in so doing to rely further on the trump card of military strength.

"European public opinion," NEUES DEUTSCHLAND writes, "has seen for itself that with the socialist states—by contrast with NATO—words and deeds are in harmony. On the basis of the joint peace program results not only have been achieved in complicated negotiations, results which are of benefit to the security of both sides and exert a beneficial influence on the international situation. With the unilateral reduction in forces, weapons and military budgets, the defensive nature of the armies of the Warsaw Pact states is becoming even more obvious, also in the sector of military technology.

U.S. SDI 'Delta Star' Satellite Program Criticized
AU0504124389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 4 Apr 89 p 2

["-ng" article: "SDI Satellite in Space"]

[Text] The first unmanned research station from the U.S. SDI space armament program has been in orbit for a few days. There is a platform with instruments at the center of the $140 million, 3-tonne "Delta Star" satellite which was developed on Pentagon orders. Equipped with seven different sensors, it is designed to locate and monitor, in the course of a 6-month experiment, several rockets, which will be launched from Hawaii and Alaska.

The "Delta Star" satellite was launched into orbit from Cape Canaveral almost exactly 6 years after the then U.S. president frightened the world public with his "Star Wars" speech. The vision of an impenetrable protective shield in space, which Reagan announced in March 1983 and which was to render "nuclear arms ineffective and superfluous," has long since proved unrealistic. Even the most ardent supporters have abandoned this vision. Nevertheless, they agree that SDI must continue at any rate and at any price.

At any price: Until now the Pentagon has spent some $16 billion on this project. According to its plans, more billions of dollars are to be directed into this bottomless barrel. For the 1990 budget—at a zero-growth of the U.S. armaments budget, adjusted by the inflation rate—they call for increasing SDI means by 44 percent from $4.1 to $5.9 billion. In accordance with this plan, the SDI budget for the first time provides a sum for the comprehensive development of a satellite-based sensor system for the location and tracking of missiles in their launching phase.

A number of additional tests are scheduled for this year, for example with particle weapons, an antimissile missile, and antisatellite weapons. Washington is well aware of the fact that what this boils down to is a breach of the 1972 ABM Treaty concluded with the Soviet Union for an unlimited period. It also knows that this threatens the halving of the strategic nuclear potentials that was agreed on with the USSR....

Nevertheless, it is also obvious that such dangerous plans have met with considerable resistance in Congress and have by no means been generally acclaimed by the administration. Neither have reasonable forces in Washington been impressed by the absurd argument which SDI initiator Edward Teller uses to generally promote tests like "Delta Star" and space armaments: He claims that these tests are necessary so that meteories approaching the earth can be detected and destroyed.

Article Views U.S. Antisatellite Weapons
AU0604124389 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND in German 5 Apr 89 p 2

["-ng" article: "ASAT Weapons—What for?"]

[Text] Bernard Weigang from Leipzig has asked what the construction of antisatellite weapons by the U.S. Army, which was ordered by the Pentagon, is all about.

According to THE WASHINGTON TIMES, the system, which is to be fully operational by the mid-nineties, consists of missiles that can be launched from land and sea against satellites. This is one of several conceivable possibilities for the destruction of reconnaissance satellites and other bodies in space. Like space weapons for the destruction of ballistic missiles, ASAT weapons (the
name is derived from the English abbreviation) are an
element of the militarization of space, toward which
aggressive U.S. forces are aiming within the framework
of the SDI program.

The presence of ASAT weapons would not only endanger
the peaceful research and use of space, but also impede
international security and confidence-building. This
results from the fact that certain satellites, especially those
belonging to the United States and the USSR, serve to gain
information about the location of weapons systems. As
national technological means, they provide indispensable
verification and monitoring of the observation of con-
cluded agreements on arms limitation and disarmament.

On 18 August 1983 the USSR introduced a unilateral
moratorium on ASAT weapons, which remains in force
as long as other states abstain from sending such systems
into space. The testing of such weapons was banned by
the U.S. Congress in 1983. Nevertheless, the Pentagon
carried out several such tests, for example with a small
missile that was launched from the F-15 bomber, with
which a weather satellite at an altitude of 500 km was
destroyed in September 1985. Since 1986, the U.S. Air
Force has been testing a laser cannon at the White Sands
testing ground in New Mexico.

The Pentagon project has met with criticism and resis-
tance, even in the United States itself. Scientific and
political experts have warned that it undermines U.S.-
USSR disarmament efforts and threatens U.S. national
security. It remains to be seen whether Congress will
again curb the protagonists of ASAT weapons.

Government Grants FRG Inspection Request

CDE Accords Cited

LD0904103689 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 0958 GMT 9 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The FRG Government, on the
basis of the guidelines of the Stockholm document on
confidence-building measures and security and disarmament
in Europe, applied for an inspection on GDR
territory on 7 April 1989.

The inspection will begin on 9 April 1989 and be
conducted in the region of Gardelegen, Wittenberge,
Sternberg, Waren, Mirow, Stackelitz, and Seehausen. In
this region at present, a troop exercise of the GDR
National People's Army designated "Zyklus 89" is tak-
ing place. Up to 13,500 army members are taking part, in
accordance with the annual review of military activities
of the GDR for 1989. This exercise was announced to all
participant states of the Stockholm conference.

The GDR Government has granted the request and
entry of the FRG inspectors. All participant states of the
Stockholm conference are being informed by diplomatic
means.

FRG Completes Observation of Army Exercise

LD1104133689 East Berlin ADN International
Service in German 1253 GMT 11 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—In accordance with the rules laid
down in the Stockholm document for the observation
and control of military activities, four officers of the
FRG Army inspected actions by the troops of the
National People's Army within the framework of the
exercise "Zyklus 89" in the areas of Gardelegen, Witt-
tenberge, Sternberge, Waren, Mirow, Stackelitz, and
Seehausen from 9 to 11 April.

By agreeing to the inspection and facilitating the activity
of the inspectors, the GDR strictly fulfilled its obliga-
tions entailed in the Stockholm document.

The inspection group had land vehicles and aircraft
made available to it. During their stay on GDR territory
the members of the FRG Army were accompanied by
officers of the National People’s Army.

As the inspecting state, the FRG is now obliged to send
an inspectors' report to all states participating in the
Stockholm conference.

FRG, GDR Scientists Discuss Disarmament
Process

AU1104105489 East Berlin NEUES DEUTSCHLAND
in German 10 Apr 89 p 5

[Text] Frankfurt/Main (ADN)—The policy of nuclear
deterrence opposes the formation of a joint security
partnership of East and West. This is the view arrived at
by FRG and GDR scientists in Frankfurt/Main on
Saturday [8 April]. At a colloquium of the Center for
Marxist Peace Research and the GDR Institute for
International Politics and Economy (IPW) the partici-
pants, who included members of the peace movement,
Communists, Social Democrats, and Greens, spoke up in
favor of continuing the disarmament process in favor of
European cooperation.

IPW Director Max Schmidt characterized safeguarding
peace by disarmament as a matter of epochal and exis-
tential importance. Even though the basic tendencies of
the international development are taking a positive
direction, a more profound look shows contradictory
trends in the area of security policy.

HUNGARY

Soviet Troop Withdrawal To Begin 25 Apr
LD0604171689 Budapest Domestic Service
in Hungarian 1630 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Excerpts] The Council of Ministers met today. Gabor
Bankuti reports: [passage omitted]
The previously announced Soviet troop withdrawal will begin on 25 April and will conclude at the end of June. So much for the brief introduction of today's Council of Ministers session and the international news conference following it.

Warsaw Pact Commander Lushev Visits Budapest

Welcomed by Defense Minister
LD0704103189 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1000 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] The commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces has arrived in Budapest. Army General Petr Lushev was received at Ferihegy Airport by Defense Minister Colonel General Ferenc Karpati.

Received by Grosz, Nemeth
LD0704124789 Budapest Domestic Service in Hungarian 1200 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] The Hungarian party and state leadership will consider the existence of the Warsaw Pact necessary and justified as long as military alliance systems exist in Europe. This was stated by Karoly Grosz, general secretary of the Hungarian Socialist Workers Party when, in the company of Miklos Nemeth, head of government, he received Army General Petr Lushev, the new commander in chief of the Warsaw Pact Joint Armed Forces.

At the same time, Karoly Grosz stressed that our country urges the modernization of the military alliance and that it will in the future take a decisive stand in favor of the simultaneous elimination of the military blocs.

Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defense, also took part in the meeting.

Departs Budapest 7 Mar
LD0704172189 Budapest MTI in English 1543 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] Budapest, April 7 (MTI)—Colonel General Ferenc Karpati, minister of defence, held talks on topical military policy issues and further cooperation with Army General Pyotr Lushev, commander-in-chief of the Joint Armed Forces of the Warsaw Treaty member states, and Army General Vladimir Lobov, chief-of-staff of the Joint Armed Forces, in Budapest on Friday [7 April].

Army Generals Pyotr Lushev and Vladimir Lobov left Budapest Friday in the afternoon.

ROMANIA

Arms, Military Spending Reductions Advocated
AU0804164789 Bucharest AGERPRES in English 1524 GMT 8 Apr 89

["Romania—An Active Promoter of Conventional Weapon Cuts"—AGERPRES headline]

[Text] Bucharest, AGERPRES, 08/04/1989—Romania has been underscoring that the universal desideratum of peace cannot become a reality as long as, concomitantly with the spiralling nuclear and chemical arms race, conventional weapons, which have become so dangerous, following uninterrupted improvements, account for a substantial part of the means of destruction that seriously threaten mankind, getting closer from this point of view to the nuclear and chemical weapons. These are the considerations on the basis of which Romania pleads for the concomitant elimination of nuclear and chemical weapons to be paralleled by a substantial cut in conventional weapons, more particularly in Europe, and obviously, by an appropriate reduction of the matching troops and military spending.

In keeping with this principled stand, as early as 1986 Romania unilaterally reduced its arms and troops by five per cent and its military spending by actually ten per cent.

Romania is for an at least 50-per cent cut in conventional weapons and military spending by the end of this century and for the utilization of the means thus released for the progress of all states, materializing thus the direct relationship between disarmament and development, permanently stressed by Romania.

Likewise, Romania consistently works for the as soon as possible beginning of negotiations between the Warsaw Treaty participation of the other European states as well, on the 20-per cent reduction of conventional arms in Europe in the ensuing years, and an at least 50 per cent cut until the year 2000. [sentence as received]

Besides the achievement of these troops, arms and military spending reduction measures, Romania considers as highly important the setting of measures meant to build up confidence among states which, in their turn, should bear favourably on the disarmament process. Thus, among the confidence-building measures of great importance would be tangible steps pursuing the dismantlement of all military bases in the territory of other states and the withdrawal of foreign troops to within the limits of national territory, Romania is also of the opinion that all states should firmly pledge not to locate new troops and arms in the territory of other states. Romania has militated for the renunciation of shows of force, wide-scope military manoeuvres, more particularly the multinational ones and those close to the frontiers of other states or in international waters. Another important idea is the creation of zones of
security along national frontiers, maritime frontiers included, with no manoeuvres, dislodgements and concentrations of armed forces or other military activities that can generate mistrust and insecurity.

In Romania's opinion, the actions aiming at surmounting Europe's division into opposed military blocs and, more particularly, the simultaneous dissolution of NATO and the Warsaw Treaty are of utmost importance.

In Romania's opinion, too, the reduction and freezing of military budgets are basic elements in halting the arms race and beginning negotiations on disarmament, in alleviating the ever heavier burden of military spending from the peoples' shoulders. That is why Romania has been very active along this line. In the spirit of the proposals it advanced several times, at the 1979 session of the UN General Assembly, Romania initiated, together with other states, a resolution on the freezing and reduction of military budgets, which calls on all states, especially the best-armed ones, to show self-restraint in military expenditure, and requests the UN Commission for Disarmament to examine the ways and means of concluding international accords in the area. Upon Romania's proposal, the commission passed on to identifying the principles guiding the states in their efforts toward cutting military spending. Within the Warsaw Treaty, Romania also initiated the elaboration of specific proposals regarding military budgets.

Considering that the UN will not be able to fulfil its historic mission if it does not ensure the halting of the arms race and the adoption of real disarmament measures, over the years Romania has consistently advanced numerous concrete proposals for its growing role in disarmament. Last year, the considerations and proposals of Romania and of President Nicolae Ceausescu on disarmament and the countries' directions of action to solve them were tabled at the United Nations. The document contains several specific proposals apt to contribute to stopping the arms race and passing to disarmament, nuclear in the first place.
ARGENTINA

BBC Program on Condor Missile Development
PM1104035389 London BBC Television Service in English 2035 GMT 10 Apr 89

[From the “Panorama” program presented by Jane Corbin—recorded]

[Text] [Corbin] The condor, the world’s largest bird of prey, inhabits the remote mountains of South America. The condor has given its name to a new weapon of mass terror—a missile being developed by Argentina in a secret hilltop bunker. But the Condor will fly not only in South American skies but over the deserts of the Middle East where Egypt and Iraq are Argentina’s collaborators in the project.

Here, a chemical attack is Israel’s nightmare—her army trains for such an emergency: a fear that a Condor missile—equipped with a poison warhead—could be aimed at Israel’s cities. This prospect has thrust the issue of missile proliferation to the top of the West’s political agenda.

[Dan Quayle, U.S. vice president] The acquisition of the ballistic missile capability is on the march, and therefore, there is more attention being paid to this. Probably one of the reasons that we’re having this interview right now, there is much more of an interest in the acquisition of this ballistic missile and capability by countries that didn’t have it before. And then you take not just the ballistic missile capability, but add a chemical warhead to that—and the two, unfortunately, are beginning to merge—and by having a chemical capability on the top of a ballistic missile, you have real problems and a potential for real destabilization, regionally as well as globally.

[Corbin] This is the story of a top secret missile named the Condor, a weapon which could revolutionize warfare here in the Middle East, where two countries—Iraq and Egypt—are building this missile. The Condor was conceived and developed in Argentina, and it could pose a threat to the Falkland Islands and to Britain’s interests, too. The West has tried to stop what it fears will be a deadly marriage between chemical weapons and rocket technology; but the Condor is well down the road towards completion—thanks to European companies and European scientists prepared to risk the consequences of selling their expertise to build this missile.

The Condor was conceived in Argentina in the early 1980’s—the pet project of the commander of the Air Force. A site was chosen in the province of Cordoba, Argentina’s observatory and satellite ground station are conveniently nearby. The military control the 1 billion pound program based at Faldo del Carmen in the Sierra Chica Mountains. Here a series of reinforced bunkers have been built deep into the mountain: Inside are laboratories for assembling and testing missile parts.

According to locals like Pascal Suez, who was a laborer on the site, the works director was a German. It was widely known locally that Faldo del Carmen was a missile factory.

[Suez, in Spanish fading into superimposed English] The building works started with moving earth, then laying the foundations. There were at least 8 or 10 buildings, and it took 3 years to build, finishing in 1986. It was the German who was the boss: He managed everything—materials for the site, transport. Computers were brought in on closed trucks in containers—nobody knew a thing.

[Corbin] The nearby resort town of Alta Gracia saw an influx of foreigners: engineers and scientists brought in to provide the technical know-how and logistical support to build the missiles. Up to 150 people from Germany, France, and Italy arrived. Many of them stayed in the Sierras Hotel, according to the work manager there.

[Rosendo Zacharias, in Spanish fading into superimposed English] We didn’t have any contact with them—we just saw them around. They used to leave at seven in the morning by coach to work at Faldo de Carmen. We knew they were scientists because they wore identity cards. The order to put them up in the hotel came from the presidential palace, from Buenos Aires.

[Corbin] In 1985 the Argentinians displayed an early version of the Condor, the Condor Ia, at the Paris air show. They claimed it was for civilian uses, for meteorological research. Since then, this prototype’s been developed into a missile, the Condor 2. Condor 2 is a ballistic missile, fired from a ground-launch vehicle: It has a two-stage rocket to be powered by solid fuel motors. The missile’s guidance system is preset before launch, and at the back, fins and nozzles help control the flight direction. After launch, the first stage falls away, the second stage propels the rocket on. Condor can carry a warhead of up to 500 kg; It has a range of 1,000 km and is accurate to within 750 meters.

[Quayle] If you take a missile that, say, has a range of 1,000 km, it could very easily be adjusted through engineering devices to take the range from 1,000 km to 1,500 km or 2,000 km or 2,500 km—and then, you have countries that possess these weapons really having potential to destabilize much beyond the region. This concerns me about the Condor missile as well as other missiles that have this capability.

[Corbin] Theoretically, Condor could carry a nuclear warhead, but it’s more likely to have a chemical or explosive warhead. A chemical warhead is simple to make: An outside casing containing, for example, a nerve agent, and a bursting charge to disperse the contents. But Argentina is developing a high explosive—a state of the art conventional warhead for Condor. As the missile nears its target, fuel explodes, creating temperatures of
2,000 degrees, suffocating people on the ground; submunitions, small bomblets spray out devastating strategic installations. Such a warhead might be aimed at Port Stanley or the Falklands runway.

[William Waldegrave, U.K. Foreign Office minister] We have to consider that it might be used against the Falklands, though it would be a very stupid weapon with which to pursue a claim to the Falklands—but it's another example in a region which isn't inherently stable of something that might start up a dangerous arms race which may lead who knows where. It has two other aspects which are worrying: first, that it might get sold into other markets around the world because all these countries are short of real money, and they'll [Waldegrave changes thought] Potentially, there's a danger of them selling it to anybody who can pay; and second, according to the Argentinian press, the partners—Egypt and Iraq—are Middle Eastern partners, and that is of all regions, the region where it's easiest to imagine a scenario where the introduction of medium-range rocketry leads pretty swiftly to war.

[Cornub] The Middle Eastern connection was established in 1984. By then, Argentina was running short of money, and Egypt—in partnership with Iraq—offered financial support. Abu Ghazalah 'Abd al-Halim Egypt's defense minister, and a man committed to the expansion of his country's armament industry, sent a delegation to Buenos Aires to negotiate a deal. Egypt, supported by Iraq, provides the bulk of the money. In return, both countries will eventually be able to produce their own Condor missiles in the Middle East. Abu Ghazalah himself oversees the Egyptian production of Condor at factory 17, a military site north of Cairo. Documents obtained by "Panorama" reveal for the first time the agreement between Argentina and Egypt on the BME. Ballistic Missile Egypt program, another name for Condor. This letter to Abu Ghazalah from Raoul Thomas of the Argentinian Defense Department refers to the cooperation between the two countries. A second letter confirms contracts have been signed.

Intelligence sources fear that Iraq's participation in the Condor project is linked with her interest in chemical warfare. These pictures were taken at Halabjah, the Kurdish town captured last year by Iran in the Gulf war. Iraqi jets dropped nerve agents and mustard gas on the people. [video shows nerve gas attack and victims] When the poison clouds cleared, hundreds of bloated bodies littered the streets. Condor could drop hundreds of kilometers of deadly gas on civilians. Iraq has shown its willingness to use not only chemical weapons but missiles, too. Scud rockets were fired against Iran in the Gulf War.

The Israeli Military say Tel Aviv is vulnerable to Condor missiles launched from both Cairo and Baghdad, missiles that could be equipped with chemical warheads. [Major General Ehud Baraq, deputy chief of staff Israel Defense Forces] In some sense, the growing focus of the world public opinion about this issue is dealing, you know, with the point of closing the barn door after the horse has already run away, but the use of these missiles during the Iraq-Iran war and the use in the same war of chemical warfare agents—even if not by missiles—makes the whole problem more severe and more serious for the future.

[Corinub] Until now, the Israeli Air Force has reigned supreme in the skies of the Middle East, but Condor could change that. The missile flies seven times faster than a jet fighter. As yet, there's no real defense against it—no star wars shield—except to build more missiles to retaliate with. Though Israel won't admit it, she has developed her own missile capability. This rocket race alarms the West: The chemical dimension is an added fear.

[Dr Steve Bryen, director, Pentagon Technology Security Agency, 1981-88] Our understanding of the Condor system is that it's not an especially accurate missile, so that being fitted with a conventional warhead or with a nuclear warhead, it, it—we wouldn't hit the broadside of a barn, we say—it's just not a very keenly accurate system. It might much more be suited to carrying a chemical warhead where—as a terror weapon—and it has all the flavor of being that sort of system.

[Waldegrave] It's all too easy to imagine a scenario, for example, in the Middle East, where you might get the Israelis believing that they were threatened by weapons that could only be effectively surprise attack weapons; that is, they wouldn't have any purpose as defensive weapons, and that the Israelis on past [word indistinct] might take that as an invitation to make preemptive strikes, and I think there is a clear step downwards towards the abyss in spreading these kinds of missiles.

[Corinub] The Condor story begins in 1980 on the shores of a Swiss lake: This is Zug, a peaceful canton, which owes its prosperity to discreet Swiss banking. From here, a group of companies affiliated to the German conglomerate Bolen Industries provided technology for the Condor project. Outside a large house above the lake, signboards proclaim the home of Consen S.A.; its sister company, IFAT [expansion unknown]; and subsidiary, Desintec. Consen's staff are somewhat shy of publicity.

[Corinub] Excuse me, I wonder if you can give me any information about this company, Consen?

[Unidentified Consen employee] I can't give you any information. I'm sorry.

[Corinub] Consen's headquarters in Zug are at the heart of a network of companies set up to service the Condor project—companies in Argentina, Germany, Monaco, Austria, Jersey, even one in England. For 7 years now, intelligence agencies in Britain, America, and Israel have
been trying to piece together the jigsaw of the Consen connections to find out exactly how Western missile technology is being diverted to build the Condor.

Opposite Consen's office lives the man behind the company, Helmut Raiser, a German engineer. He was at home when we tried to ask him about Condor: He didn't seem keen to speak to us either. Mr Raiser has extensive contacts in Argentina—he set up the original Condor deal. Intelligence sources call Raiser and his colleagues techno-mercenaries—men willing to sell their expertise for the highest price.

[Karp] Around 1984 the Argentine program became fairly well-known in missile circles, and the foreign engineers that were most heavily involved—apparently from West Germany—began to bring the two countries, Egypt and Argentina, together. In the one, they had a client who wanted to build a missile; and in the other, they had a nation without the technology, but who wanted to buy, and the Germans seemed to have been the key brokers there—although both governments clearly were very interested themselves.

[Corbin] In the letters confirming the cooperation between Egypt and Argentina on the Condor missile deal, IFAT—Consen's sister company—is named as general contractor.

[Corbin] By the mid-1980's, the Washington Administration and its Western allies realized they no longer controlled what had been an exclusive missile club. Alarmed about Third World missile proliferation and concerned at the part played by European companies in transferring technology, they decided to act.

In 1985 the United States Administration persuaded Western governments to lay down informal guidelines to stop the spread of missile technology to Third World countries, and in April 1987, President Reagan announced that seven industrialized nations—including the United States, Britain, Germany, and Italy—had signed a formal missile technology control regime. The MTCR, as its called, requires its signatories to impose export controls on the technology needed for missiles. It was intended to stop countries like Argentina from developing projects like the Condor. The MTCR may have slowed such programs down, but it hasn't stopped them.

[Quayle] It is a good faith effort to move forward and say: How can we deal with this in a collective way? I can say this: That if we did not have the missile control regime, the situation would be far worse than it is today. The situation has gotten worse, in a sense, but it would have gotten much worse if we did not have this regime that is seriously looking at the problem, offering remedies.

[Corbin] Until recently, Dr Steve Bryen headed the Pentagon department which polices the transfer of missile technology—an impossible task, he says. Each country has different export restrictions and existing laws can't prevent the transfer of knowledge or restrict the movement of individuals.

[Bryen] I, I'm not clear in my own mind, the degree to which we in the West are really serious about controlling missile technology. I think we're serious about trying to convince the public that we're controlling missile technology, but if we want to be serious, we sure are doing it the wrong way—in terms of implementing a regime that can work. Missile technology agreement is a promise without institutions: It's a promise without laws, and its unenforceable.

[Corbin] The countries developing Condor, and the techno-mercenaries of the Consen group, were determined to get around the new rules. Last summer, California was the scene of a daring attempt to smuggle missile components out under the noses of the U.S. authorities. March 19, 1988, American Airlines flight 123 arrives at Sacramento. Among the passengers was an Egyptian, Colonel Algamal. He was met by 'Abdelkader Helmy, an Egyptian scientist living in California. Unknown to them, they were being followed by customs agents. Helmy drove his guest to a local motel, the La Quinta Inn. Customs had a tip-off that 'Abdelkader Helmy was smuggling missile parts to Egypt. He was a rocket scientist with Aerojet, a company involved in the U.S. space program. Helmy was using his security clearance and access to classified information without the knowledge of his employers. Helmy lived in the hills above Sacramento. Agents who followed him there the afternoon Algamal arrived saw Helmy storing several large cardboard boxes in his garage. These boxes accompanied the two men on a flight to Washington 2 days later, where it became clear this operation involved the Egyptian Embassy. Algamal and the boxes were driven by diplomatic car to a house on T Street used as a residence for embassy employees. Algamal returned to Cairo, the boxes stayed in the embassy.

A court order allowed customs to tap Helmy's phone. "Panorama" has obtained the transcripts of Helmy's conversations with his control. Colonel Youssef, an Egyptian diplomat in Austria. Helmy complained that the shipping clerk in the Egyptian Embassy was asking awkward questions.
[Begin reconstruction of Helmy conversation in Arabic, fading into superimposed English] I told him these items are controlled, they can’t be exported outside the United States. I told him if they knew I’m buying it to export, I’ll be thrown in jail. I said to him, we’re acquiring the material for a special purpose, and no one knows about it except the minister.

[Corbin] The minister is believed by intelligence sources to be a reference to Abu Ghazalah, Egypt’s defense minister. Phone taps, surveillance, and a painstaking examination of Helmy’s dustbins, reveals an extensive shopping list of chemical and technical components, in the words of one expert, a complete package to build or upgrade a tactical missile system. The companies that Helmy approached were unaware that the materials were destined for export to a Third World missile program.

The content of the boxes was revealed as carbon-carbon, a material that wraps around the missile’s nose to protect it from the intense heat of re-entry. Two missile nose cones were on the list, a microwave telemetry antenna, suitable for a tactical missile system, and rocket fuel ingredients: anti-oxident 2246, and powdered aluminium, MAPO, a rocket propellant component, and Ver-simide 125, a rocket glue).

[John C. Kelly, U.S. Customs] As soon as we realized the technology, we knew we were dealing with something very large, and when we introduced, or were able to identify the fact that you had diplomatic ties to it, we knew that it was a very sensitive investigation.

[Corbin] Customs had to act when phone taps revealed the boxes had been taken to Baltimore Airport. They were seized as they were being loaded onto an Egyptian Air Force flight to Cairo. Helmy will stand trial in August for conspiracy to violate export control laws. Abu Ghazalah’s part was played down. Egypt’s a major U.S. ally. The affair was embarrassing for both countries.

[Karp] Carbon-carbon is used at the two hot ends of the missile, the re-entry vehicle and the engines, the guidance systems down by the engines, the steering veins, and such. Those are two key areas and there are no easy substitutes; there are no obvious technologies to turn to, and these are not things that Third World countries can manufacture themselves. They’ve got to get it from somewhere. And what the case showed was that these countries will turn anywhere, even to stealing from very close allies in order to get the technology they need.

[Corbin] Helmy’s dustbins revealed that the Consen-IFAT group was financing this smuggling operation. IFAT wired checks for over a million dollars to Helmy’s account via a German bank. Two months later, the techno-mercenaries received a warning: Their activities hadn’t gone unnoticed.

Three a.m. on May the 8th, 1988, the square in (Sparacede), a village in the south of France, a Peugeot car belonging to Ekkhard Schrotz, a wealthy German living here. A power bomb destroyed the Peugeot. [video shows car destroyed by bomb]

[Unidentified woman in French, fading into superimposed English] The car literally exploded, and my car next to it caught fire. The police carried out an investigation but we weren’t told anything. Mr Schrotz is a German businessman who has lived here quite a few years. He has a company called Consen with a head office in Monaco. He was the real target of the attack.

[Corbin] This is the home of Ekkhard Schrotz. [video shows still picture of house] There are no pictures of this shadowy German engineer who took over from Helmut Raiser as Consen’s general manager. Intelligence services say Schrotz is the Mr fix-it of the Condor project. An obscure group, the Guardians of Islam, said they planted the bomb because Schrotz sold rockets to Iraq, the enemy of Iran, but some believe Mosad, the Israeli secret service was responsible. Whoever it was, the message was clear: Stop the Condor project.

The bombers knew that Schrotz was channelling technology through a second Consen office in Monaco, a tiny but wealthy principality where no one inquires too closely into a company’s dealings. Schrotz entertained engineers and military officers from Argentina and from Egypt at the Beach Plaza Hotel, Condor clients prepared to pay many times the going rate for missile technology. Today Mr Schrotz spends his time behind the walls of his villa in (Sparacede), protected by cameras and electronic gates, and by local gendarmes, who have advised him not to talk to journalists. Visitors are threatened with arrest. Mr Schrotz is a frightened man. So too is his caretaker, the man who normally drove the Peugeot.

[Caretaker in French, fading into superimposed English] Listen, when you see your car burning in the middle of the night, it has an effect of you. I don’t want, I can’t say anything, because I don’t want it to happen again. I’ve got nothing to do with it. I’m not involved in all this. I’m just the man’s chauffeur. It’s dangerous to stir all this up again. People’s private lives are at stake.

[Corbin] Since the car bomb, the Consen group worldwide has tried to keep a low profile. But we’ve traced nine companies, four in Argentina, five in Europe, involved in the Condor project.

Consen and IFAT, the main companies, are still based in Zug. But a third company, in Salzburg, Austria, is now active in the missile’s development. This company is called Delta Consult. We visited Delta Consult in Salzburg.

We understand that this company is involved with the Condor project, with missile technology.

[Unidentified man] This is definitely not.
[Corbin] Do you have any connection to the Consen Group?

[Man] No, definitely not.

[Corbin] To IFAT?

[Man] No, definitely not.

[Corbin] But Austrian business registers confirm the major shareholder in Delta Consult is IFAT. Neither Austria nor Switzerland are signatories to the missile agreement, but Germany is, and the Consen group has a majority holding in a German company, PBG, located in Freising, a town north of Munich. Intelligence services believe these Consen companies have acted as a conduit for technology and expertise from some of Europe's biggest defense contractors who've supplied the launch track for Condor 2, elements of the guidance system, the engines, and the specialist fuels needed for them, and equipment for assessing the missile's performance. "Panorama" has obtained Consen internal documents dated after the missile control regime was implemented. These name and number the companies, describing them as most important in cooperation and as subcontractors. First on the list is the giant German industrial group (Messerschmidt-Boelkow-Blohm). [video shows commercial for MBB]

MBB is Germany's largest aerospace group, a partner in the European airbus, and one of NATO's chief contractors. The company, based in Munich, specializes in making missiles. When we first approached them, MBB told us they had worked on Condor 1, a civilian project, but said they withdrew in 1985, concerned about its military applications. The German Government backed their claim.

[Erich Riedl, FRG minister of state, Economic Affairs Ministry, in German, fading into superimposed English] The German firm, MBB, withdrew from the Condor project back in 1985, after information had been obtained to the effect that the project had acquired a military dimension. The firm did what was correct under the circumstances. More recent checks by the German authorities do not indicate that this situation has changed, so it would be fair to say that nothing illegal has taken place.

[Corbin] But, despite German assurances, the Israeli Government, for one, believes MBB has not severed all its links with Condor.

[Barak] We do know that MBB, the West German firm, is the overall ... [Barak changes thought] responsible for the overall planning of the project and for the system in it.

[Corbin] Do you have evidence that MBB has been involved in the Condor project?

[Barak] I have no evidence here in this room, but it is well known I am sure, that every intelligence service in the Western world might find the evidence very easily.

[Corbin] MBB disputes this accusation of continuing involvement in the Condor project. But "Panorama" understands the part they've played is more significant than they're prepared to admit. One of the companies' divisions, MBB Transtechnica, specializes in missile programs and technology transfer. It provides rocket testing laboratories and specialist engineers. To begin with, Transtechnica worked openly on Condor, but even after MBB says they began to pull out of the project, sources in this company say this division continued work in Argentina without the MBB chairman's knowledge. Transtechnica delivered a laboratory for measuring the missile's ballistic curve and worked on Condor's warhead.

This is the high security Munich home of the elusive Adolph Hammer, former MBB head of military research, responsible for Transtechnica's Condor work, the man MBB sources say continued to work on Condor in Argentina. [video shows photo of home] Hammer is now a director of IFAT and works from Delta (?Consult's) Salzburg office. MBB have banned him from their premises. But intelligence sources say he maintains links with his old colleagues inside MBB who are still working on Middle Eastern missile projects. MBB management have refused to be interviewed. They've given us a short statement admitting now that the company carried out a feasibility study for Condor 2, a military project as late as 1987. They say they withdrew when they became suspicious about how Argentina intended to use Condor 2. However, MBB have admitted to us that they are still supplying parts for a missile research laboratory in Iraq, a laboratory due to go into operation this summer. They say that obtaining the necessary export licenses was not MBB's responsibility, and that no German regulations were broken.

The Iraq missile laboratory MBB is involved in is near the town of Mosul. This top secret site is called Saad 16. These pictures were taken secretly at Saad 16. [video shows still photos of Saad 16 missile laboratory] Iraq claims the project is a civilian one, but Western agencies say it's a research laboratory for Condor and other missiles. This plan of Saad 16 shows launch pads, wind tunnels, a hanger for prototypes, and chemical laboratories. [video shows building plans] The building work begun in 1983 was supervised by a German company, Guildemeister Projector. "Panorama" has obtained a copy of the contract for Saad 16. [video shows picture of contract] In it, the Iraqi Government confirms Guildemeister and its partner, MBB, will provide technical assistance in research and development. Attached is a detailed list of laboratory equipment, which experts say could be applied to missile research and production. Guildemeister say they have obtained government clearance for what they believe to be a civilian project. Yet
MBB and Guildemeister are supplying apparatus including equipment for studying aerodynamics, fuel production, the flight path of missiles, and antennas and microwaves.

Back in Germany, MBB kept the Saad 16 contract secret, even from some members of the board like Klaus Mehrens, the representative of I.G. Metal, the metalworkers trade union. He heard rumors MBB had supplied rocket laboratories to Iraq and to Egypt.

[Mehrens] We asked for information about these exports of MBB and we got information from the management, of course confidential information, and we heard MBB was involved in transferring technology which at least could be used, and was intended to be used for military purposes, especially in a number of countries in the Middle East.

[Corbin] And what did MBB say was the reason that they were still involved in this trade after Germany had signed a missile technology control regime?

[Mehrens] Well, concerning these countries in the Middle East, they said that this again went back into the past and was not under responsibility of the present management, and they themselves felt concerned about that, they would like to move out of this business but were not able because of, well, obligations they had according to the treaties they signed.

[Corbin] So the contracts are still ongoing?

[Mehrens] Well again, we were told that this would cost the company a large amount of money, and for this reason it is not possible to withdraw from these contracts immediately.

[Corbin] The German Export Bureau polices the transfer of military technology, including that covered by the missile agreement. December's revelations that German companies were involved in a Libyan chemical weapons plant at Al-Rabitah caused this office and the government acute embarrassment. A note on a computer reminds them of that. The government says checks are tighter now, penalties tougher. With missile components, staff check export applications against equipment controlled under the MTCR agreement. But a missile consists of hundreds of parts, many with civilian as well as military uses. This office depends on companies telling them what the parts going to place like Saad 16 are intended for.

[Corbin to Mehrens] Do you think the government knows of MBB's involvement? If so, why hasn't it acted sooner?

[Mehrens] It has become clear that the instruments of control that the government uses are not very effective and my information is that all these contracts were licensed by the government. I don't know if the information the government received from MBB were detailed enough to make the right judgment, but I do not think that anything they transferred to those countries was really illegal. They feel very uncomfortable in the situation they have come in and this is because they realize that even if the contract and the deal was legal it's politically and morally a very doubtful business and so I think it's correct to say that they violated the spirit of the German restrictions on arms exports, even if they got legal licenses.

[Corbin to Bryen] How far is it a question of political will in terms of stopping this kind of transfer?

[Bryen] I think it's entirely a question of political will. I don't think we need a missile technology agreement to prevent these kinds of transactions. We need the governments to tell their major defense contractors not to do this sort of thing. If they did that, that would be the end of it. There is not a doubt in my mind that if the German Government told MBB of any other German company that it didn't want them selling missile guidance systems or missile technology to Argentina or to Egypt or any place else they wouldn't sell it.

[Corbin to Quayle] German companies have been named, the Messerschmidt company, for example. Are you and the United States prepared to pressure the German Government to do something about that?

[Quayle] We are very sensitive, and very informed on this particular issue. And when the matters of concern to this proliferation of ballistic missile technology can be documented and established, there is no doubt about it that there will be communications. I can certainly appreciate any country that wants to advance exports. But to advance exports in fact that are going to come back and be detrimental to that country is really counterproductive to their national security interests, not only to the national security interests of that particular country, but the national security interests of the entire West.
Defense Minister Denies UK Press Reports on Missile Project with Iraq

[Report on interview with Argentine Defense Minister Dr Jose Horacio Juanarena by Shlomo Slutzky, date and place not given]

Juanarena is the third defense minister in Alfonsin’s government. Toward the end of his trip to Israel, there was a sudden spate of media items about cooperation between Argentina and Iraq on the construction of a long-range missile, and Argentina’s delivery of a nuclear reactor to Algeria.

Juanarena says: “If you trace the source of these reports, you will discover that they lead to the British Foreign Office. There is not a kernel of truth in the two charges you mentioned. It is no coincidence that these reports reached Israel from British sources, and just at this time. We are talking about a psychological war directed by Britain against Argentina.” [passage omitted]

BRAZIL

Sonda IV Missile To Be Test Fired on 15 Apr

[Text] Sao Jose dos Campos, Sao Paulo—On 15 April, the Aerospace Technology Center (CTA) will launch the fourth prototype of the Sonda IV missile from a base at Barreira do Inferno, near Natal, in Rio Grande do Norte. Preparations for the launch have been kept secret. The launch is meant to test the missile’s guidance and control system, propellants, and ignition system.
This will be the fourth launching for this missile which is 11.5 meters long, has a launchpad weight of 7.3 tons, a top speed of 10,800 km per hour, and can reach an altitude of 600 km. The missile was last launched unsuccessfully on 8 October 1987 when the ignition system for its second stage failed. At that time the missile did not achieve its expected altitude, nor did it accomplish all the tests that had been programmed.

Also on 15 April, the Brazilian Commission for Space Activities (COBAE) will meet at Barreira do Inferno to decide on a new schedule for the Brazilian Complete Space Mission, which envisions the launching of four Brazilian satellites by Brazilian-made missiles. COBAE will base its schedule decision on a report to be issued by CTA and INPE [National Institute for Space Research] scientists.

Scientists held preliminary discussions yesterday at which time they were informed that it is unlikely that the full budget for the space program—cut by 55 percent by the “Plano Verão”—will be reinstituted. The budget cuts will delay for a few months the development of the first remote sensing satellite that INPE had expected to complete by December.
INDIA

Defense Studies Director on Pakistan Missiles

460001261z Bombay THE TIMES OF INDIA in English 28 Feb 89 p 12

[Article by Jasjit Singh; Air Commodore Jasjit Singh is the Director of the Institute for Defence Studies and Analyses.]

[Text] All of a sudden a rash of ballistic missiles appears to have erupted in Pakistan, which has left many people wondering and worried. The country's tentative moves into space launch capabilities via a sounding rocket programme was generally known, but the achievement of a significant ballistic capability had been perceived as a remote future possibility. This was not only the general view in India, but even in countries like the United States.

The U.S. congressional research service's report on the potential for ballistic missile proliferation in the third world issued in April 1986 merely noted the launches of sounding rockets from a range near Karachi under cooperative programmes with the United States, the U.K. and France. A brief mention was made of reports of "an intention to develop" an indigenous space launch vehicle (SLV). U.S. non-proliferation expert, Mr Leonard Spector, writing on nuclear weapon proliferation in 1987 assumed only aircraft as the potential delivery system in Pakistan. However, by 1988, he was wondering about the distinct possibility of Pakistan acquiring ballistic missiles from China; it had already supplied one version with a range of 2,500 km to Saudi Arabia, presumably with Pakistan acting as the intermediary for the deal.

Thus, when reports emerged of Pakistan having test-fired a "nuclear capable" missile on 25 April 1988, the issue was shrugged off as a possible launch of a Chinese-built one in furtherance of political purposes related to domestic compulsions of General Zia-ul-Haq. Then senator and now U.S. vice-president, Mr Dan Quayle, however, took more serious note of the development in a report in June 1988, stating that "Pakistan took a quantum leap forward last month in its effort to develop its own ballistic missile arsenal..."

Sounding Rockets

Pakistan's Space and Upper Atmosphere Research Commission (SUPARCO) has been working on sounding rockets for many years. These rockets carry payloads of less than 10 kg and are not believed to provide an adequate development base for an SLV or ballistic missile.

However, Pakistan had obtained a licence from France in the 1970s to produce a rocket motor similar to the French mammoth propulsion system. Such a system could be readily deployed as a two-stage rocket using a mammoth engine for each stage, and a 500 kg payload could be launched to a range of 800 km. It should be noted that, starting with the decision initiated in January 1972 for a nuclear weapons programme, Pakistan adopted a multi-pronged approach which extended to delivery systems as well.

The missile which was reportedly test-fired on 25 April 1988, was claimed to be capable of reaching Bombay and New Delhi, a range in excess of 800 km. The NEW YORK TIMES cited U.S. official sources confirming the development and reported their guess that the missile was of "home design" but produced with the help of Chinese experts. Earlier reports indicated that the effort might have received assistance from the Federation Republic of Germany also.

It is against this background that the launching of a "multi-stage rocket" into deep space from the test range at Sonmiani on 10 January 1989, the statement of General Mirza Aslam Beg on 5 February that Pakistan had successfully fired and tested two types of missiles having been tested on 11 February need to be viewed. From the limited information available at this stage, the tests on 5 and 11 February may be related to the same set of missiles.

The multi-stage rocket, designed and built by SUPARCO and fired on 10 January, carried, it was claimed, a payload of 150 kg to an altitude exceeding 640 km (previous efforts had achieved a 50 kg/480 kg performance). The payload was recovered over national territory. This was a creditable performance for a country with a small scientific-technological base. The height-payload combination would suggest that, as a ballistic SSM (surface-to-surface missile), it could have a range of 2,000 km or more. However, many technical problems (including those of dynamic and thermal loads, besides the guidance system) will have to be solved before such a conversion becomes an operational reality.

The two SSMs test-fired in February from the Makran coast, named HATF-I and HATF-II, have a range of 80 km and 300 km respectively. HATF-I would correspond to a number of battlefield support SSMs, the most notable among them being the U.S. Lance and the soviet Frog-7, of which the Chinese has its own version, and their indigenous derivatives in the arsenals of Libya, Egypt, Iraq and North Korea.

There have been a number of reports of SSM attacks by the Afghan Mujahideen based in Pakistan. These missiles may have been supplied by China or some of the Muslim countries; the Western press last year spoke of Pakistani military assistance in operating these. Missiles of this type provide virtually no military value. Although over 230 such missiles were launched by both Iraq and Iran in their long war, the effect was limited to random damage in cities and psychological concern.

The longer-range Soviet SSM Scud and its equivalents have been proliferating rapidly in the past few years. Over 632 of this type were fired by both sides in the
Iran-Iraq war after 1983, mostly against cities. The missile is believed to cost around $1 million a piece and is fired from mobile launchers. The basic design permits a 1,000 kg payload and a range of 300 km. It requires less than two hours for erection and launch. However, such missiles with conventional warheads have marginal military significance. These have a CEP (circular error of probability, measuring the radius of a circle within which 50 per cent of the warheads may impact) of 1,000 metres. An earlier version had a CEP of 4,000 metres.

The 300 km SSM tested by Pakistan is apparently based on the Scud variants—the Soviet R-300 and the Chinese M-11. There is every likelihood that Chinese assistance contributed to the developments. China had agreed to assist Brazil in missile related technologies in 1986. It had started marketing the M-11 by 1988. China is not a party to the U.S.-led seven-nation group set up to impose a missile technology control regime in April 1987 to prevent the spread of relevant technologies, especially to third world countries.

Level of Maturity

At the same time assistance from other sources, including Western countries, cannot be ruled out. Their control regime ostensibly seeks to prevent proliferation of only nuclear capable missiles (defined as those beyond 300 km range and 500 kg payloads). Keeping this context in mind, the reality of a ballistic missile programme reaching a level of maturity in Pakistan must be recognised.

Besides the concerns in the United States about possible transfer of IRBMs to Pakistan by China, the important point to note is it would be possible for Pakistan to extend the range of its HATF-II. Iraq remodelled its Scuds (from al-Husayn tested in 1987 to the new al-Abbas version) by lengthening the missile to carry additional propellant. This was reportedly achieved by cannibalising the propellant tanks from other such missiles to produce two from three of them. This increased the range from 300 km to 650 km without reduction in the 1,000 kg warhead payload. With reduced payload, ranges of 1,000 km may become feasible. The claim of tests last year will need evaluation in this context. After April 1988 Pakistan may have considered it expedient to downplay the long-range missile plans, while perfecting the 300 km range missile.

It would be a very long time before Pakistan by itself can improve accuracies to levels where conventionally armed ballistic missiles will be of significant military value (usually thought to require less than 20 metres CEP). However, other countries have undertaken conversions and adaptations. South Korea converted the Nike-Hercules surface-to-air missile to SSM role, while Israel adapted the Lance guidance system to its Jericho-II IRBM. Without significant improvements in accuracy (which also requires highly accurate target data), HATF-II and its future developments would be effective only with chemical or nuclear warheads.

Editorial Cautions Against Bhutto Weapons Proposals

52500026 New Delhi PATRIOT in English
4 Mar 89 p 4

[Text] Premier Benazir Bhutto commands much goodwill in India. Other Pakistani heads of government had lobbies of their own but not goodwill in India. That is why every statement she makes on India-Pakistan relations is studied with care in India in the hope that Ms Bhutto has the capacity to modify and moderate Pakistan's India Policy. Ms Bhutto has stated that she would propose (or has already proposed) a mutual arms reduction plan between India and Pakistan. Indeed, it would seem that the Zia regime had made a similar proposition before Ms Bhutto's appointment as Prime Minister. However, we have no knowledge of any US-American assistance for arms and force reduction, we are in no position to comment on this. We are not sure if Premier Bhutto was referring to expressions of a wish for arms reduction or the existence of a Pakistani plan to achieve this end.

But any allusion to Salt in this context is both inappropriate and premature. When the superpowers negotiate a limitation on strategic weapon systems, their decision is autonomous and they are conscious that no other military power can gain superior military capability beyond the limitation they have chosen to enjoin on themselves. This is far from being the case in relation to India and Pakistan. Neither country is truly autonomous in relation to the strategic weapon systems they and other lesser powers can command. Just as Pakistan, Israel and South Africa have become considerable military powers on the strength of the strategic weapons acquired from the great powers, other lesser powers too can gain strength to unsettle the balance established between India and Pakistan. Furthermore, it is preposterous for India to see her national security problem only in relation to Pakistan. There are other powers, besides Pakistan, whose military capabilities have a direct bearing on India's security. Even the emotional sympathy Ms Bhutto elicits in India should not be allowed to obscure this reality.

There are well-meaning Indians (aside from lobbyists who have long pleaded for Indian 'concessions' to Pakistan) who would like to believe that unilateral, renunciatory military gestures would secure for India Pakistan's undying friendship. Such people are unversed in the true state of Pakistan's existing military capability and the planned growth of this potential contemplated as part of the US plans for South-South-West Asia. These plans have been restated recently by US Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Near East and South Asia Howard Schaffer. The postulates of US policy, molding the India-Pakistan military balance, remain unaltered. It is not even clear if Ms Bhutto's government exercises anything more than a formal and nominal control on the Pakistan military and its aims. Still, there is a strong case for exploring all chances of detente in India-Pakistan relations; but only morons would approach with sentimentality the issue of arms reduction. There is, however, a stronger case for finding out whether India is getting her money's worth in the defence potential she ought to have for her security.
Commentary on ‘New Thinking’: Sufficiency Preferred Over Parity
52000024 Moscow KRASNYA ZVEZDA in Russian 7 Mar 89 p 3

[Article by Col V. Strebkov, candidate of philosophical sciences and lecturer, under “From the Positions of the New Thinking” rubric: “Philosophy of a Secure World”]

[Text] The farther December 1988 goes into history, the closer the public is looking at the philosophical aspect of the speech of M.S. Gorbachev before the United Nations. This attention is no accident. It is dictated by the growing interest of the world public in global problems, in the hierarchy of which priority belongs to the most acute of them—the preservation of peace and the prevention of a world thermonuclear catastrophe. Everywhere there is a growing consciousness of the necessity of a joint search for ways to ensure national and international security, being guided by the new political thinking.

This thinking comes from two basic ideas.

In the first place, it focuses on the concept of an interrelated world, its integrity and unity. There are states in the world that belong to different social systems. But they not only are not isolated from each other but are becoming more and more interlinked and interdependent. At the same time, there is a greater and greater sense of the increasing variation in the development of different countries. This applies to the capitalist as well as the socialist system.

In the second place, it is becoming obvious that an unprecedented structure of priorities is developing in the world. Common human interests requiring joint, collective and international actions have sovereignly burst into life and are manifesting themselves. The conclusion about the primary role of common human values constitutes the core and heart of the new political thinking.

As surprising as this may seem today, the realization of the interdependence of our contradictory world began to materialize as far back as the 1970’s. When the USSR achieved military strategic parity with the United States, this was a real claim of equal security with the capitalist West by socialism. And the recognition of this fact by treaty (let us recall SALT I and SALT II) was one of the first manifestations of the consideration of the balance of interests.

But the other side did not want to accept this position. In those same 1970’s, and especially at the beginning of the 1980’s, the United States tried to upset the military balance and attain military superiority and therefore to ensure for itself not only greater security at our expense but also hopes for victory in a nuclear war. These attempts were destined to fail. The actual military equilibrium between the USSR and United States, Warsaw Pact and NATO essentially led to the negation of war itself as a means of achieving political, economic, ideological and in general any other objectives. It became clear that global war has ceased to be a political means and become a means of suicide. And this applies not only to the superpowers and the military-political alliances to which they belong. A major change is also taking place in the notions on regional conflicts. People have come to understand that they cannot be resolved through military methods.

Thus, the military equilibrium does indeed appear as a mechanism to prevent war. The paradox, however, is that the growing amount of military power is inversely proportionate to the security of states. And such objective realities require a dialectical (but not destructive) denial of parity itself in its existing irrational form to substantially lower levels while maintaining a stable balance at each level.

This is why it is so essential for there to be a qualitative transition from the principle of excess armament to the principle of reasonable sufficiency for defense, which will personify the legitimate right of the sides to equal security.

At the same time, we have to be realists. The qualitative transformations and the exclusion of nuclear missiles and other types of offensive weapons from the structure of parity do not depend upon one side. Most sides must take this path simultaneously. This is the dialectics of a secure world.

The devaluation of the dominant role of offensive military power and the recognition of the senselessness of striving to overcome the conflicts between different social and political systems through the arms race and the preparation for war dictated not simply the increased importance but the primacy of political and legal means to ensure the paramount common human need of survival. The realization of this conclusion is not one of the alternative versions of a historic process but the only one possible. And this is an indisputable fact of the present day.

But the objective tendencies in public life find their way through the actions of people. Greater and greater efforts are necessary to achieve the common objective of the survival of the human race. Much is already being done successfully in our policy: extensive contacts with representatives of other countries—from heads of state and governments to ordinary citizens (national diplomacy), authorities in science and culture, and representatives of political parties, public organizations and movements; increasing dialogue in the disarmament area; willingness for mutual verification, etc. In the future, no doubt, many new political means will appear, about which it is still too early today to talk conclusively.

The new political thinking requires the overcoming of many stereotypes and dogmas. As it turned out, the reexamination of the previous manner of political thinking is a painful process. And it is complex and painful not just in the West.
On one side, they consider the new thinking merely a “tactical move,” a “propaganda decoy” of Moscow. On the other, one sometimes hears voices about the “surrender of class positions” and the “forgetting of revolutionary ideals and reference points.” Common human interests and values do not, however, contradict the class interests of socialism, the working class and the working people of all countries but, on the contrary, include them. The popular masses of capitalist as well as socialist societies are interested in seeing humanity freed from the threat of nuclear catastrophe. But this can be guaranteed only under the conditions of peaceful coexistence of states with different systems. This problem is above all political and between states. It is not a subject for ideological confrontation. This is our response to the ideas that are still rather widespread in the West, according to which differences in ideology supposedly inevitably plunge peoples into bloody “religious wars.” The opponents of the cessation of the arms race and normalization of relations between states are holding on to such notions especially stubbornly.

And what is the situation with respect to relations between antagonistic classes, the oppressed and the oppressors? No one has revoked them, nor is this possible. The new thinking does not preclude either class struggle or revolutionary transformations of political and social structures and the necessity of their defense and therefore their class approach to the evaluation of phenomena and processes. One cannot deny the actuality of the struggle with bourgeois ideology or the necessity of defending our national class interests. Just as it would be unrealistic to demand from the bourgeoisie that it give up its class interests. Consequently, the class approach and class position remain but they yield their priority to the common human interest and position.

The building of an up-to-date political structure of the world community is helped by strengthening interrelationships and interdependence in the economic sphere: the international division of labor, the formation of an integrated world market, and the internationalization of the mechanisms of exchange. This problem is exceptionally complex and is also raised in a unique way. It is necessary to find ways to work out normal economic relations between developed capitalist, socialist and developing countries.

Economic security cannot be guaranteed without this. Whereas previously the way to achieve it was considered to be primarily economic independence from the outside world, today isolation and autarky do not help to increase security but lead to a weakening of the aggregate potential of the state or association of states, including a military alliance. Today true security is determined by inclusion in the world economy, intensive mutually beneficial interaction, and interdependence. In essence, such interrelationships are the material basis for a comprehensive system of international security.

In this connection, it should be noted that the growing industrial and, in general, economic activities of man led to the rise of still another problem—the threat of global destruction of the environment and the resulting necessity of ensuring ecological security. Such phenomena as the greenhouse effect, acid rain, the pollution of the world oceans, the reduction of the variety of biological species, and others are snowballing.

The interdependence of the world in the ecological area is manifested extremely concisely: the climate and winds know no borders and effect all countries without exception. And the menacing problems that have arisen can be resolved only under the principle of the supremacy of the common human idea.

Growing French Involvement in NATO Deplored

[Article by Andrey Balebanov under “Opinion of a Commentator” rubric: “In Harness With NATO”]

[Text] In March 1966, when Gen Charles de Gaulle declared France’s intention to withdraw from the NATO military organization, this resolute step by Paris evoked fierce attacks from the United States and other NATO allies who clearly had not counted on losing control of such an important bridgehead in Western Europe. All of the top leaders of the Fifth Republic who followed de Gaulle affirmed their dedication to keeping France outside the military structure of NATO. And the current President F. Mitterrand has repeatedly declared that there can be no talk of returning the country to the NATO military organization.

As early as 1983, however, the French Government agreed for the first time to hold the next session of the NATO Council at the foreign minister level in Paris. But quite recently, according to the London TIMES, the French Government approved the plans for the greatest expansion of its military ties with NATO in more than 20 years. The newspaper points out that President Mitterrand approved the intention of the French Ministry of Defense to begin negotiations with the alliance on French participation in the costly contemporary air defense system. British experts justifiably noted that this decision actually “obligates France to strengthen its ties with NATO,” which will do even more to draw the country into West European military strategy.”
Still another step by France toward strengthening its military ties with NATO was its participation in the largest naval maneuvers last month with the United States, the main partner in the bloc. And although in the last decade Paris has repeatedly participated in NATO "military games" in Western Europe, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean, the present exercises were much more significant. As the French television company Antenne-2 stressed, the French-American maneuvers "indicated a certain drawing together of France militarily with the United States," and consequently, with NATO as well.

Especially close relations in the military area developed between Paris and Bonn. The noticeable expansion of military cooperation with another member of NATO—Great Britain—is shown by the results of the French-British summit meeting with the participation of the defense ministers at the end of February of this year.

"There are many ties between France and NATO and I am striving to develop them further," said F. Mitterrand in a speech last fall at the Institute of Higher National Defense Studies. Well, the French head of state is keeping his word with his specific actions in this area. In my view, such vigorous development of French-Atlantic military ties, which essentially is leading to the renunciation of the course proclaimed by Charles de Gaulle, hardly goes along with the growing tendency toward a reduction of military activity and an increase in trust in the relations between East and West.

Akhromeyev Discusses European Forces Balance

LD0604125189 East Berlin ADN International Service in German 1056 GMT 6 Apr 89

[Text] Berlin (ADN)—The alleged military superiority of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact over NATO is a "myth of Western propaganda which has been affecting the consciousness of people in the United States and Western Europe," Sergey Fedorovich Akhromeyev, marshal of the Soviet Union and advisor to the chairman of the Supreme Soviet Presidium, said in an interview with the GDR's FREIE WELT. "The size of the forces of both sides in Europe has been published in the 30 January statement by the Warsaw Pact defense ministers. Their study makes it clear that approximate military parity exists."

Akhromeyev described the NATO states' intention to modernize their nuclear weapons as being completely unreasonable. In view of the high number of tactical nuclear weapons in existence in Europe, it is not a matter of "enlarging these weapons arsenals but rather reducing them. We, the Warsaw Pact, are in favor of the complete liquidation of these weapons. However, if NATO does not agree to their complete elimination, then negotiations must be held on reducing these weapons but not on their modernization."

Marshal Akhromeyev went on to say: "Guided by a defensive military doctrine, we are of course perfecting the organization of our forces in this spirit and are first changing the structure of forces by solving defensive tasks. Therefore, in the Group of Soviet Forces in Germany (and as far as I know in the GDR Army), the structure of general divisions will be changed over the next few years. The number of their tanks as means of attack will be reduced while the number of their antitank weapons will be increased."

"Let it also be said, however, that the West, too, must deal with this, for the structure of the U.S. troops based in the FRG, of the Bundeswehr, and that of Great Britain's forces has so far had an offensive character. They also have at their disposal a very large number of tanks and means of building pontoon bridges. The U.S. and NATO naval forces have an offensive character. For this reason, we expect that their structure will also be changed and will be directed toward accomplishing defensive tasks."
Prime Minister Announces SNF Decision Postponed Until at Least 1991

Addresses Parliamentary Committees

Brussels DE STANDAARD in Dutch 12 Apr p 1

["Prime Minister Martens Addresses Parliament"]

[Text] The Belgian Government intends to ask NATO not to make any decision on modernizing short-range nuclear forces (SNF) before 1991-1992. Belgium is willing to keep these weapons at the present level if it seems necessary to do so, but without significantly increasing their ranges. Consequently the government will not push for a third zero option whereby the SNF would be eliminated from Europe.

Prime Minister Martens made this statement yesterday in his long-awaited speech to the Committees for Foreign Affairs and National Defense of the Chamber of Deputies. At the end of the meeting, the majority adopted, by a vote of 25 to 7, a resolution supporting the government's position. A minor detail: the resolution states that the government will now not pursue the third zero option, leaving everything open for the future.

The Ministers of Defense of the NATO countries are scheduled to meet on 18-19 April. The council meeting reached agreement on the position that Belgium is to take as regards the modernization of short-range nuclear forces. The corresponding ministerial committee had prepared this position last Friday.

Belgium would like SNF negotiations to begin as soon as possible, said Martens. He made reference to the government statement that mentions simultaneous negotiations on SNF and conventional forces. The range of the existing SNF should not be increased "in order to avoid undermining the spirit of the Washington treaty."

Martens devoted a large portion of his speech to the "overall concept" that NATO has developed and to the fact that a kind of charter has to be developed that takes into account the prospects for the disarmament negotiations and the requirements of security and deterrence. He said that our country continues to support NATO's general strategy. He made reference to the March 1988 NATO summit conference where it was expressly stated that for the foreseeable future credible deterrence has to be based on a combination of nuclear and conventional defense.

In his reaction to Martens statement, SP [Socialist Party] Chairman Vandenbroucke said he applauded the very open style of decision-making of the government. It was necessary for the Government to take a position on the basics of the issue in order to make another case of "end-run decision-making" within NATO impossible. The follow-on model to the Lance short-range missile, the FOTL [Follow-On to the Lance], and the missile that is launched by the F-16 aircraft, the TASM [Tactical Air-to-Surface Missile], are now impossible and should remain so in the future, said Vandenbroucke.

A purely military defense with conventional means alone would be prohibitively expensive for Europe and also difficult to implement due to the geographic situation. The nuclear option is no longer feasible, either. Therefore, we have to more toward a system of mutual security. "NATO must modernize its thinking rather than its weapons." Vandenbroucke added that his party still advocates the third zero option.

Van Wambbeke (CVP [Christian Peoples Party]) supported the government's position. He emphasized the evolution that has taken place in Eastern Europe where Gorbachev's rise to the top leadership of the Soviet Union has opened up unprecedented prospects for East-West detente.

Vic Anciaux (VU [National Unity]) struck the same note in his address. He said expressly that the government is not ruling out the third zero option for the future. He said that NATO urgently needs to revise its strategy.

PVV [Party for Freedom and Progress] chairwoman Annemie Nevt sounded a somewhat different note. She supported postponing the decision on modernization, but postponement does not necessarily mean forever. Whether or not SNF modernization takes place depends on how the negotiations proceed. Parliament should conduct semi-annual reviews of the status of these negotiations, she stated.

Minister of Defense Coeme emphasized that there is a political logic in addition to the military logic. In the political arena the government's goal is to avoid undermining the spirit of the INF Treaty.

Prime Minister Martens added that the weapons systems that are now being proposed and which have ranges of over 400 kilometers are a violation of the INF Treaty.

Both Martens and Minister of Foreign Affairs Tindermans made repeated references to the positions of the FRG Minister of Foreign Affairs, Hans-Dietrich Genscher. "This means we are not alone," said Tindermans.

When asked whether Belgium's position regarding the postponement conflicted with the U.S. decision to develop new SNF weapons, Martens replied that Belgium was concerned only with production and deployment. "Development is not a NATO decision," he said.
Further Report
Brussels BELGA in French 1524 GMT 11 Apr 89

["Premier Martens Defines Position of Belgian Government at the Meeting of the NPG"]

[Text] On Tuesday the Prime Minister, Mr. Wilfried Martens, revealed to the Chamber the position of the government on short-range nuclear forces [SNF].

Mr. Martens indicated that the government had instructed the Minister of Defense, Mr. Guy Coeme, to present the following position at the meeting of the NPG (Nuclear Planning Group) on 18-19 April:

1. reaffirm the government's hope that negotiations on tactical nuclear weapons begin as soon as possible. The government's statement calls for negotiations on conventional forces to be conducted in parallel with those on SNF.

2. emphasize the favorable climate that prevailed at the opening of the negotiations on conventional forces in Vienna;

3. state that no decision is to be made before 1991-1992;

4. within this framework, mention that Belgium is willing to keep tactical nuclear forces at whatever level may be necessary, [but] without significantly increasing their ranges in order to avoid undermining the spirit of the Washington treaty and that, in this context, Belgium is not thus contemplating a third zero option.

Mr. Martens emphasized that, by adopting this position, Belgium hopes that it is making a contribution toward defining the overall concept of arms control and disarmament.

"Our country continues to support the general strategy of the Atlantic Alliance and wants to stand shoulder to shoulder with its allies. Belgium wants to maintain the continuity of its policy in the area of peace," said the Prime Minister on Tuesday afternoon to the joint Committees of Foreign Relations and Defense of the Chamber of Deputies.

This is the context in which Mr Martens mentioned that during the summit conference on 2-3 March 1988 the allies confirmed that, for the foreseeable future, an effective and credible deterrent must continue to be based on a combination of conventional and nuclear weapons systems, that will be maintained at whatever level is necessary.

Then turning to the issue of short-range nuclear forces (SNF), the Prime Minister stated that "the government hopes that negotiations on SNF can be opened as soon as possible." In order to move toward this goal, he said, the government is determined to initiate a "vigorous diplomatic effort," both within the framework of the discussions within the Atlantic Alliance aimed at developing the overall concept and through bilateral contacts.

"The countries of the Atlantic Alliance cannot remain insensitive to the policies of perestroyka and glasnost. At the NATO summit conference, coming up in seven weeks, the NATO countries must expressly define their attitude toward this new element and develop a long-term view. The attitude of the Alliance must therefore take the form of what is called an 'overall concept,' which is to be finalized later".

Prime Minister Martens Cited on Conventional Arms, SNF Talks
LD0904201189 Brussels Domestic Service in French 1600 GMT 9 Apr 89

[Text] Our colleagues from Flemish Television have met with Prime Minister Wilfried Martens. At the center of the debate was the modernization of short-range nuclear weapons and the decision which the Belgian Government is to take in this respect and which it is to announce next Tuesday. Marie Lepeyre reports.

[Lepeyre] The president of the Socialist Party, Guy Spitaels, insisted yesterday on the need to negotiate the limitation of conventional weapons, such as armored cars, for example, before discussing the modernization of nuclear missiles with a range of less than 500 meters. Interviewed on Belgian Radio and Television, Prime Minister Martens in fact said nothing different today at noon. We want parallel talks on conventional weapons and on the short-range missiles, he said. Wilfried Martens also rejected any new arms system which would run counter to the East-West treaty on medium-range nuclear weapons.

DENMARK

New Study Center To Stress 'Defensive Defense'
36130051 Copenhagen INFORMATION in Danish 7 Mar 89 p 4

[Article by Jorgen Dragsdahl: "New Peace Research Center Wants to Make a More Problem-Oriented Contribution"]

[Excerpts] Boserup stresses practical and outgoing research for East-West relaxation of tension.

At the opening of a new peace research center on Monday, 6 March 1989, in Copenhagen, its director, Anders Boserup, stressed that it was the center's desire to work in "a way that is unusual in Denmark" in that the research is to be "closely linked to concrete problems."

Parallel with the East-West contact on the official level in connection with the disarmament negotiations that have just been initiated, the center wants to provide an
opportunity for the exchanging of points of view on an unofficial level and developing proposals that "the diplomats themselves don't think of."

It is affiliated with the "European Center for International Security," which also has a research department in Starnberg, near Munich, that is closely connected with the West German Max Plank Institute. A board of outstanding security experts from the United States, the Soviet Union, France, West Germany, and Great Britain is supporting the initiative. The bulk of the financial means comes from the Volkswagen Factories Fund.

**Completely Different**

Anders Boserup, who formerly was employed at the Center for Peace and Conflict Research at the University of Copenhagen, said that there is a "complete difference" between the two centers "in the ways they perceive research tasks."

"We will attach importance to problem-oriented research, and the other center is less characterized by that attitude, although that was the main idea in its mandate from the Folketing," Boserup said. But he denied that a situation involving actual competition exists where appropriations by the public authorities are concerned.

**Courting the Business Community**

The new center's existence is secured for a year since the Danish peace movement's financial benefactor, Lise Munk Plum, has made offices available. Furthermore, they have gotten a contribution from Hermod Lannung's fund. Other expenditures are covered by funds derived from the "European Center for International Security."

The center will seek financial support from business-community funds, among other things, since one of its projects is to investigate the possibilities resulting from opening up the northeast passage to the Pacific Ocean area north of the Soviet Union. In that connection, they also want to carry out concrete research regarding private business' new approach to the setting up of joint-venture enterprises. That research can make use of close contacts with the Academy of Sciences of the Soviet Union.

**Defensive Defense**

Where security policy is concerned, the center will attach great importance to the development of a nonoffensive defense, even in the Danish area.

They want to bring officers and diplomats on active service together. The research workers want to consider the criteria by which stability is judged. Among other things, concrete proposals are to be developed by means of computers. The importance of modernizing weapons systems is to be evaluated. Technological possibilities in connection with new defensive structures will also be included in that research.

**Social Democrats Hold Disarmament Conference**

Social Democrats Hold Disarmament Conference

PM1304152089 Copenhagen DET FRIAKTUELT in Danish 10 Apr 89 p 10

[Britta Sondergaard report: "Nordic Area Scene of New War"]

**[Text] The northern sea areas could become the macabre theater for a nuclear war between the United States and the Soviet Union, if NATO adheres to its doctrine that any attack on the West could be answered using nuclear arms.**

This is the view of Norwegian peace researcher Sverre Lodgaard, who was speaking at a Social Democratic disarmament conference in Copenhagen over the weekend.

"If the West wants to retaliate to every attack using nuclear arms, and the scope for such a response is reduced in central Europe because of the INF Treaty, there will be a need for new areas for the deployment of nuclear arms," Sverre Lodgaard said.

The Norwegian peace researcher fears that the Nordic area could very quickly become the big loser in the disarmament game. He pointed out that the deployment of medium-range nuclear arms is continuing in the northern sea areas despite the INF Treaty.

Sverre Lodgaard asked therefore whether the many military operations in the waters round the Nordic area are being forgotten in the current euphoria over the results of detente between the Soviet Union and the United States.

The Norwegian peace researcher called for a revision of the whole of NATO strategy, as did West German Social Democratic foreign policy spokesman Karsten Voigt.

"We are not in favor of the dissolution of NATO in the near future. But the alliance must implement a total transformation of its strategy. The bugaboos of the fifties are obsolete. The Eastern bloc is no longer an enemy. That is why it is important that one of NATO's fundamental concepts—namely the strategy of nuclear retaliation in the event of an attack—should be reviewed," Karsten Voigt said.

He was therefore also opposed to NATO's plans to replace the short-range Lance missiles in Europe, because modernization at this time could mean a new arms race between East and West—a view shared by the Danish Social Democrats.
"In the long term we want to get rid of nuclear arms in Europe. That is why there is no reason for modernization." Social Democratic Folketing deputy Ole Espersen said. He said that the Danish Government can under no circumstances vote for the modernization of the Lance missiles before the Folketing has been consulted. The modernization plans will be discussed at a NATO ministerial meeting in May, and it is already clear in advance that both Britain and the United States are warm supporters of the proposal.

FEDERAL REPUBLIC OF GERMANY

Defense Minister Scholz Disparages Gorbachev
Uranium Announcement
LD0704175789 Hamburg DPA in German
1645 GMT 7 Apr 89

[Text] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Defense Minister Rupert Scholz (Christian Democratic Union) has assessed a part of the disarmament steps set out by the Soviet state leader Mikhail Gorbachev in London as propaganda. Scholz said to north German radio on Saturday [8 April] that Moscow's announcement to halt the production of fissionable material for nuclear weapons by the end of the year "is not very relevant or important for disarmament." It is certainly a sign of good will, but also "very much oriented toward publicity." The Soviet Union has already so much material of this type that it is not reliant on further supplies. Gorbachev's statement is definitely to be greeted as an expression of the will to disarm.

Scholz said that the assurance from the Soviet party head that Moscow has no plans to modernize nuclear weapons "overlooks of course the realities." Within it there is "above all an element of propagandistic and political pressure" on the NATO states, which have to decide on a modernization of their short-range systems. On the Eastern side this modernization process in the short-range area has long been carried out.

Referring to Gorbachev's statement that modernization by the NATO states would affect the disarmament talks in Vienna, the defense minister said that such statements are in his view nothing more "than propaganda with the usual, familiar means." It is "the same old tune the other side has always played." This "old melody" does not "really fit in with the new times, which Gorbachev has stressed so often," Scholz said.

Genscher Urges Agreement To Cut Short-Range Missiles
LD0104102489 Hamburg DPA in German 0952 GMT 10 Apr 89

[Excerpts] Bonn (DPA)—Federal Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher sees "very broad agreement on the reduction of short-range missiles. In an interview with Deutschlandfunk (radio), Genscher said on Monday that numerous comments on this at home and abroad will not be without effect on all partners in the Western alliance.

Marking his return to work in Bonn after a 5-week break for illness with this interview, the foreign minister stressed hopes for an appropriate negotiating mandate in the comprehensive concept for NATO. In such negotiations, equal but lower top limits should be sought for short-range missiles and thus the 15-fold superiority of the Soviets would be reduced. [passage omitted]

A double decision would make the modernization of the 88 Lance missile systems with 120 km range dependent on progress in the Vienna negotiations on conventional disarmament, he said.

One week before talks with Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard Shevardnadze in Bonn, Genscher stressed in his interview that the "new Soviet policy is also typified by a democratization in the Soviet Union." This opportunity has to be used. The foreign minister stressed the great importance of the visit planned for June of Soviet party and state leader Mikhail Gorbachev to Bonn; the visit is to be prepared in the talks with Shevardnadze.

FRANCE

Defense Minister Has Talks in Moscow
PM1004143689 Paris LE MONDE in French
6 Apr 89 p 3

[Jacques Isnard dispatch: "Soviet Defense Minister Questions France's Independence From NATO"]

[Excerpt] Moscow—[Passage omitted] The talks between General Yazov and Mr Chevremont at the Soviet Defense Ministry, were described as "sincere and not backward looking" [sans retour]. The previous visit by a French defense minister was in 1977, because Paris did not want to resume dialogue before the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.

The two ministers bombarded each other with historical reminiscences, General Yazov condemning the "spirit of Munich" and his French interlocutor recalling the signing of the German-Soviet pact just before World War II. "It is now fashionable to criticize Stalin," the 66-year old Soviet minister conceded.

According to members of the French delegation, Gen Yazov said that "France follows NATO and the Americans," "NATO is trying to have discussions from a position of strength," the Soviet minister also said, "and the USSR has made unilateral efforts to reduce its manpower and weapons without there being any response from its different partners so far. What other proof do you need of our decision to adopt a defensive posture in our military system" the Soviet minister asked. As an example, he cited the current one third
reduction (by around 100) in the number of tanks, and the reduction of one armored division within an Army corps which would only have two or even one such division instead of the present three.

“We are not anybody’s hostage,” Mr Chevenement replied, “but we would defend our allies if they were attacked. You frightened us, and Stalin frightened us. As a socialist leader, I have not forgotten the fact that the Communist Party eliminated the Socialists from Czechoslovakia in 1948. On the basis of its experience in two world wars, France now intends to prevent war by showing any aggressor its determination to inflict unacceptable damage on him if its vital interests are threatened.”

Gen Yazov remained dubious about the reality of the threat to France, but said he is worried about the dangers of nuclear proliferation leading to accidents at nuclear power stations, like the one at Chernobyl, or the appearance of missiles in Near East countries or elsewhere. He called on France, and also Britain and the PRC to join the American-Soviet strategic arms limitation negotiations “at an appropriate time.”

Defense Minister Chevenement on Soviet Strategy, European Security

AU1304100389 Hamburg DIE WELT in German
13 Apr 89 p 8

[Interview with Defense Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement by Ruediger Moniac: “Chevenement: I Think We Have To Support Gorbachev’s Policy”; date and place not given]

[Text] [Moniac] Mr Minister, you have just returned from a visit to the Soviet Union. What is predominant in your assessment of Soviet politics? Skepticism or optimism?

[Chevenement] I was in the Soviet Union for 1 week and I was the first French defense minister to go to this country in 12 years. I went to Moscow, to Murmansk, to the Severomorsk Navy Base, and to Volgograd.

It is indisputable that new things are happening in the Soviet Union—truly a cultural revolution. Questions that have long been hushed up are now being dealt with publicly. I am convinced that Mr Gorbachev is aware of the rather pronounced underdevelopment of the Soviet economy and of the impasse into which the arms race leads.

However, I would like to distinguish between Gorbachev’s intentions and what is still reality in the Soviet Union. There are certainly no doubts about his intentions. In reality, however, a change of the options of the Soviet or, generally, the Eastern armed forces from attack to mere defense cannot be carried through so quickly. It is easier to reduce the scope of the armed forces but less easy to change the military-industrial complex.

The Soviets explained to me the development of their strategy and tactics for advancing toward a defensive orientation. However, it is very difficult to distinguish between a counterattack and an attack, even if the exercise, which I was shown at the military academy, took place in the Minsk region or on the Kola peninsula.

I think we have to support Gorbachev’s policy. There is no alternative. Much can be expected of it—for Europe and for the world. The withdrawal of the Soviet troops from Afghanistan and the peaceful solutions to certain regional conflicts clearly show this.

[Moniac] Thus do you think that serious security policy cooperation with the Soviet Union will be possible in the future?

[Chevenement] I think that European security depends on two factors: on progress in disarmament on the one hand, and on a strict orientation toward defense positions on the other, in particular regarding the Warsaw Pact states. In the West the latter includes the preservation of a sufficient defense capability, which I call minimum deterrence.

We, as the West, have to want opening up and to remain vigilant at the same time. The efforts that the East has made to arm have not really slowed down, despite its declared intentions, which—I stress again—should not be doubted.

However, I would like to warn against reducing security to exclusively the military aspect. In order to put the trust between West and East on a solid basis, we have to come closer in our concepts of human and civil rights. What is happening because of perestroyka is very promising in this respect. In a country without a democratic tradition like the Soviet Union, one sees for the first time the development of a certain leeway within society and also of free speech about those in power.

[Moniac] Over the next few days top French and German politicians will meet for consultations in Paris. Then the German-French Defense and Security Council will also be founded. What are its tasks, in your view?

[Chevenement] This council is to reach several goals: 1. working out common concepts for defense and security; 2. securing coordination between the two states on issues of arms control and disarmament; 3. monitoring the establishment of the German-French brigade; and 4. preparing decisions on joint maneuvers, training of military personnel of both armed forces, and on logistic agreements which are to improve the defense capabilities of our two countries.

In this connection, we have proposed training German helicopter pilots in France. At the request of my colleague Scholz, we will start tackling jointly, for instance, a new program for a small aircraft for target location and battlefield surveillance—called “Brevel.”
In more general terms, we have to improve our cooperation in armament. In the meantime, it has declined considerably, falling below the level already achieved in the 1960's. Even though we have joint helicopter projects, the financing shows gaps, particularly on the German side for the transport helicopter. Our arms industries have to learn to cooperate more closely.

[Moniac] You say that the council that is to be established should also work out a joint French-German security concept. In which direction should this point?

[Chevenement] I am convinced that West-East dialogue in Europe can develop only under the protection of a Western security system. It can be compared with a protective wall that has to be built bit by bit. It is necessary to reach a balance at the lowest level. However, we are still far away from this. There are considerable accumulations of weapons in the heart of Europe, particularly in the East. I want the number on both sides to be considerably reduced, that of offensive weapons stationed in the East in particular.

[Moniac] Does one thing not exclude the other? On the one hand, you want the development of a security policy concept of our two countries, and on the other you want to take pragmatic steps?

[Chevenement] Our security is developing at the border line between sufficient defense, as I already mentioned, and the efforts to reduce armament, which then permits a certain balance at the lowest conceivable level. To be quite clear: In view of the geographic asymmetry between Western Europe and the Soviet Union, I do not think that one can do without nuclear weapons. Of course, the fear caused by them is severe. However, the good thing is that this fear saves us from something even worse—World War III. Deterrence prevents it. This is the only important thing. This is the only concept which is—if one really thinks about it—appropriate to the situation in Europe.

[Moniac] Mr Minister, what is your vision for this Europe, which, in 30 years, will perhaps no longer consist of individual nations but of the United States of Europe? Should the nuclear weapons of your country and the British nuclear weapons then be controlled by a European government?

[Chevenement] I do not think that one can conceive of a European government for the future, because the democratic legitimation is derived from the national framework and this will remain so in the future. It is, however, conceivable that certain agreements will be reached, both within the West European framework and also at an even higher level, on the continental scope, for instance. Such a system could provide guarantees for the security of every state.

[Moniac] You already said that armament cooperation between our countries has to be improved—but how should this be done, after it has been very difficult for almost 1 decade?

[Chevenement] The political will is lacking. I think this is very bad.

[Moniac] On both sides?

[Chevenement] Yes, on both sides. I think that governments have let their decisions be dictated to them by industry. Everyone only pursues his own interests. Politicians come and go, but the economic managers remain. This is a weakness of democracy. One has to say this clearly.

[Moniac] What can be changed in this respect, since politicians always come and go, and the managers will always remain?

[Chevenement] Well, there are reportedly politicians who have an extraordinary will. The worst is not always the rule, even if it is often reality.

[Moniac] Let us be specific: Which armament projects are to be tackled in the future?

[Chevenement] We must do what we have decided. Cooperation must become more intensive concerning helicopters, but also concerning missiles. I particularly think of third-generation antitank missiles in this respect. Sooner or later we also need a new generation of tanks and planes, which we really have to build together. This is a task we will have to face in about 15 years. Today we have certainly not yet reached this goal. Therefore, I proposed to develop together at least certain parts for the planes that have to be built now—the altimeter, for instance, or the landing gear, or the radar equipment.

However, I would like to leave the field of defense now when we think about Europe's future. I am convinced that our two peoples have to come together more closely in the field of culture. We have to do much so that we learn to understand each other better.

[Moniac] More exchanges of students, of people in general?

[Chevenement] Unfortunately, learning other languages is on the decline. Formerly, 80 percent of the young people in Belfort, the region where I am mayor, learned German. Today only 20 percent of them do so. It must be a goal to learn two languages in addition to one's mother tongue, otherwise our fated community would finally speak only English. This would be Europe's decline. I have also proposed to jointly compile a history book for the schools, because we cannot shape the future together if we do not have a common way of looking at
the past. It would be a mistake to think that only questions of defense are at issue. We can solve the problems of security, but our real problems are cultural, economic, and environmental problems.

It is a very ambitious plan if Frenchmen and Germans want to work together in all these fields. Our cultures—Romanic and Germanic—are so totally different, but what is going on between the FRG and France is decisive for Europe. This is the hinge for Europe. One has to grease it constantly so as to prevent it from creaking or rusting.

[Moniac] Mr Minister, back once again to security. France probably has to cut down on costs in the defense budget in the same way that the FRG does. Will you have to reduce the Army, for instance? The figure of 50,000 less men has been heard.

[Chevenement] No, this is out of the question. This figure does not correspond to any specific hypothesis that is studied in my ministry. If we had to carry through such a drastic reduction, we would call the foundation of our defense into question—even compulsory military service. Many young people are already exempt today. The system of compulsory military service would be unable to survive if the inequalities that are connected with it were to be increased even more.

[Moniac] Which savings do you envisage?

[Chevenement] We can only modernize our structures so that the Armed Forces are able to operate better. If we do this, certain savings are conceivable. Our basic defense concept remains that of sufficiency. Our strategy aims at achieving effective deterrence at the lowest possible costs. War must be considered absurd.

Today we are forced to become more intelligent. War no longer is a means to solve problems. We have to look for solutions in international cooperation. Technology must serve joint development, as well as the solving of environmental questions all over our planet. We are facing a profound cultural change, which is necessary today.

ITALY

Defense Minister Zanone on SNF Question, NATO's Future

PM1304083689 Rome LA REPUBBLICA in Italian 8 Apr 89 p 17

[Interview with Defense Minister Valerio Zanone by Vladimiro Odinov; date, place not given]

[Text] Rome—NATO is 40 years old. People are taking stock and assessing the ground covered by an alliance frequently assailed by crises and collapses considered insuperable and incurable. After the celebrations, the speeches, and the reminiscences, what is the future of this NATO, which risks being left behind by Gorbachev’s initiatives, and of the Single Act of the EEC, whose common policy will inevitably be reflected in a more “continental” management of European security?

"Now, 40 years on, the picture of international relations has definitely changed for the better. There is a clear reduction of antagonism between the two poles on the political plane and—at least in terms of declarations of intent—in the military field as well." Defense Minister Valerio Zanone said in an interview granted to LA REPUBBLICA on his return from London, where he attended the West European Union [WEU] ministers meeting.

"Some people wonder what NATO will be like when it is no longer threatened. There is almost an idea that an improvement in the climate is tantamount to a crisis in the alliance. It is necessary to prevent the idea that the lowering of the threat creates a crisis for NATO, because the Atlantic alliance still seems indispensable and irreplaceable in the military field too in at least three respects: for coordinated action in negotiations for further conventional weapons reductions in a manner that will not differentiate between levels of security in the various areas of the alliance; for the definition of a global defense concept, expected from the next Atlantic Council session; and for a sharing of responsibilities and burdens among individual allies and between the European and American pillars as a whole.

[Odinzov] There are still threats and tensions, albeit smaller than 40 years ago. However, the military side does not now always keep pace with the political side, as though reluctant to acknowledge that the “enemy” is not so threatening after all. What lies in the future for NATO?

[Zanone] It is inappropriate to speak in terms of a refounding of its doctrine, because the Atlantic alliance has always succeeded in adapting to the changes and requirements of the time. What is needed, if anything, is an evolution of its political outlook. The next step is to define a global defense concept. The problem to be resolved is the modernization of short-range nuclear forces.

[Odinzov] Who is causing this problem?

[Zanone] It is principally a German problem. However all NATO countries agree on three essential points.

The first is that everyone, including the Germans, rules out the triple zero option, in the belief that the global defense concept embodies a component of land-based short-range nuclear forces, albeit confined to a strict deterrence role.
Second, everyone acknowledges that for this deterrent role to be effective the weapons systems responsible for performing it must be kept up to date and must therefore be modernized if and when it is necessary.

The third point on which everyone basically agrees is that modernization does not conflict with the commitment to seek quantitative reduction and stability at a lower level of armaments.

[Odinzov] Do you mean that it could become a bargaining chip?

[Zanone] If you modernize you need to deploy less. The first negotiating objective in Vienna—and there is complete Western agreement on this—is to correct the imbalance in the most explicitly offensive land-based weapons: tanks, artillery, and armored troop carriers. If this initial step is taken, there ensues the subsequent objective of a restructuring that will grant the military instrument on both sides a strictly defensive character.

[Odinzov] Where does modernization fit within the context of this objective?

[Zanone] The 1987 Reykjavik agreement is based on four points: the total elimination of chemical weapons, a 50-percent reduction of strategic nuclear weapons, the elimination of the imbalances in conventional weapons in Europe, and a tangible and verifiable reduction to equal levels of land-based short-range weapons. The Western position is to secure an immediate ban on chemical weapons and an initial significant step toward reducing the imbalances in conventional weapons, as the necessary prelude to further negotiations embracing the reduction of short-range nuclear weapons to the same levels.

[Odinzov] If the USSR were to eliminate the current imbalances in its favor in short-range nuclear weapons, will a negotiated reduction of such systems also appear on the agenda?

[Zanone] The aim of the negotiations is to reach stability at the lowest level of armaments. Nevertheless negotiations cannot extend to the total elimination of short-range nuclear weapons because they are among the guarantees of Western security and solidarity, albeit in a deterrent capacity. The mandate for the current Vienna talks explicitly states that the negotiations exclusively concern conventional weapons and exclude nuclear weapons. It adds, however, that dual-capability systems will be included in the negotiations as far as their conventional part is concerned.

[Odinzov] If the USSR were to eliminate the current imbalances in its favor in short-range nuclear weapons, will a negotiated reduction of such systems also appear on the agenda?

[Zanone] The possible political risks have been defused in advance by the WEU platform, with a declaration of principles of unquestionable Atlantic orthodoxy that protects against the danger of misunderstanding the strengthening of Europe in antagonistic terms. Security is indivisible, and we cannot turn either Europe or America into a fortress. Even Gorbachev admits the United States' and Canada's indivisibility from Europe. Europe's security identity embodies Europe's indivisibility from the West and from North America.

PORTUGAL

Caution Urged Over Soviet Arms Control Motives

52002420 Lisbon DIARIO DE NOTICIAS
in Portuguese 3 Mar 89 p 4

[Excerpts] On Monday, the foreign ministers of the 23 NATO and Warsaw Pact countries will meet in Vienna to begin a process of negotiations aimed at creating parity
conditions in the area of conventional forces in Europe, and improving the system of confidence and security measures decided on at Stockholm. Lisbon will defend the consistency of the Euro-Atlantic reality and global solutions that will make lasting, balanced progress possible.

At Vienna, Portugal will defend the holding of negotiations with the Warsaw Pact in a global context, involving political, economic, and security matters, based on the hypothesis that Western defense justifies and requires the simultaneous, concerted existence of the European and Atlantic supporters of NATO.

Confidence and Security Measures

Not only conventional weaponry will be discussed at Vienna. Starting Monday, the Confidence and Security Measures System, CSBM, decided on 2 and a half years ago at Stockholm by the 35 countries participating in the European Security and Cooperation Conference, will also be the subject of new negotiations, aimed at improving and expanding it.

The minister of foreign affairs, Joao de Deus Pinheiro, maintains that, in Portugal's view, the relations with the East must also be globalized in all instances; “that is, simultaneously involving the political, economic, and security areas, so that balanced and lasting progress may be achieved.”

The Portuguese authorities consider it impossible to subordinate security considerations to the economic and political dynamics of East-West relations. Hence, the head of Lisbon's diplomatic service claims: “It is important to avoid isolated decisions and initiatives, dissociated from global strategies, which could jeopardize or delay the ultimate goals that are desired”; however, without failing to bear in mind that security “is linked to everything else but is also, to some extent, independent, possibly taking precedence over everything else.”

In Portugal's opinion, the negotiations on arms control “should contribute to an increase in the individual and collective security of nations,” and should not be viewed “as an end in themselves, unrelated to the background and consequences.”

Lisbon maintains that, in the global context of the political, economic, and security aspects that East-West relations should include, it would be fitting to attempt in some cases to individualize relations with the Eastern countries that give evidence of greater democratic openness, especially to aid the adjustment of their economies and open systems of competition, and to give an incentive for exchange and circulation of individuals and ideas. This does not mean a change in the essential bases of NATO policy.

Portugal belongs to the group of NATO countries holding the view that the changes introduced by Gorbachev have not yet allowed for a change in the essential bases of the Atlantic Alliance policy; as opposed to others who think that the current atmosphere favoring East-West relations will be enduring and that, as such, it should serve as a frame of reference for the negotiations.

Joao de Deus Pinheiro expresses the view that, “Portugal is not in the center of Europe, nor does it have troops stationed there. Hence, it can observe from a greater distance and perhaps more dispassionately what is going on there; thus helping to keep the Alliance on a safe path without succumbing to temptations toward softness or neutrality which, for various national and ideological reasons, might more likely occur among other countries.” He adds: “Our geostategic position enables us, more than others, not to lose sight of the structural realities, even when circumstantial situations appear to contradict them.”

Gorbachev's Sincerity Is Not in Question

In this area, the Portuguese position is one of discretion. The sincerity of Mikhail Gorbachev or the assessment of the prospects for “perestroika’s” success are not in question.

What Lisbon deems important is, without a letdown in firmness, to take advantage of the current circumstances in an attempt to make progress in the arms control area, without reducing “our security” or discounting the fact that, in announcing reductions that essentially affect obsolete war materiel and more poorly equipped and trained forces, Gorbachev could, after all, be paving the way to make the Soviet Armed Forces more effective.

The Portuguese foreign minister maintains: “It is legitimate to think so, because the Soviet military effort has not declined; on the contrary, since Gorbachev's selection as secretary general of the Soviet Communist Party, the Soviet Union has allocated over 13 percent of its GDP for military spending (in NATO, it is from 3 to 7 percent), and is currently producing 280 tanks per month, 30 back-fire strategic bomber planes per year, and one atomic submarine every 37 days.”

Consistent Euro-Atlantic Reality

The Soviet position (and there is an awareness of this in Lisbon) has brought about division among the NATO allies. In order to procure Western participation, the Soviets have offered opportunities for cooperation and investment to European industries and markets, specifically in the EEC, aimed at creating a large economic space. As a complement, Moscow is also beckoning with a tempting set of political proposals: easing of the tensions with the West, development of cultural cooperation, a more open human rights policy, increased inter-European cooperation in all fields, progress in the solution to regional conflicts, a nonexpansionist and nondestabilizing foreign policy, and, finally, an asymmetrical reduction in the level of nuclear and conventional
weapons. It is the “European common household” advocated by Gorbachev which, as a corollary, would theoretically create the conditions for Europe's dissociation from the U.S. This package of proposals even has a supplementary enticement for the FRG, that of fostering conditions for a possible reunification of Germany.

The picture of openness heretofore described has caused perplexity and division among the public and in political and intellectual circles in the West. It also offers two options: development of inter-European ties and cooperation and acceptance of a reneging on American participation in Europe's defense; or recognition of the fact that the Euro-Atlantic reality has a consistency exceeding that of the continent, and the resultant confirmation of the strength and permanence of the ties between Europe and the United States, and of the interpenetration of the two economies.

Lisbon subscribes to the second option. It subscribes to it because it considers Western Europe incapable, all by itself, of producing and supporting a credible strategy of nuclear and conventional deterrence, and because it regards it as important not to revive a logic that has been persistently followed, without success, for years, assuming that a certain type of pan-European cooperation would lead to autonomy for the Old Continent.

TURKEY

Chief of Staff Expresses Support for Conventional Stability Talks

TA1204103389 Istanbul MILLIYET in Turkish 9 Apr 89 p 11

[Excerpts] General Necip Torumtay, chief of the General Staff, has announced that 95 military students have been expelled from their schools for engaging in fundamentalist activities in military schools. [passage omitted].

General Torumtay also expressed his views on the Conventional Stability Talks [CST], which have recently occupied an important place on Turkey's political agenda.

Torumtay remarked that during the talks between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Vienna, from now on Turkey will particularly stress that “Turkey's modernization plan should not be adversely affected by arms reduction efforts.” “In adopting joint stands, Turkey's needs and modernization programs should not be adversely affected.”

The chief of staff added: “The Chief of the General Staff's Office supports the European CST and the negotiations on confidence building measures, which are being conducted with the aim of establishing a secure and lasting atmosphere of peace in Europe.”

The elimination of the inequalities between the military power of Turkey and the Warsaw Pact forces in the region, and the reduction of their power to a common ceiling lacking the ability to raid or initiate a large-scale attack, are being assessed as a main goal within the framework of conventional arms reduction.

A global and regional common ceiling will be used in the elimination of imbalances. We are, however, being very careful not to allow these common denominators to drop below the level of our minimum military needs or adversely affect our country's modernization and procurement programs, which were determined in accordance with these minimum requirements.

Another aspect we must take into account in this context is the fact that Turkey borders countries that are not party to the European CST. We, therefore, insisted on excluding Turkey's southeastern Anatolia and Mediterranean regions from the area of implementation in the stability talks. We achieved this aim.

In conclusion, we believe that the disarmament talks will yield positive results, which, in turn, will contribute to the establishment of a secure and lasting atmosphere of peace in Europe.” [passage omitted]

Nuclear Policy on Eve of NATO Meeting

Released

TA1404102189 Istanbul GUNAYDIN in Turkish 12 Apr 89 p 8

[Report by Ali Riza Kuranel]

[Text] Ankara, (GUNAYDIN)—On the eve of the NATO Nuclear Planning Group meeting, which will be held in Brussels on 19-20 April and which National Defense Minister Safa Giray will be attending for the first time, the alliance is reported to be applying “nuclear pressure” on Turkey once again.

The FRG’s rejection of the U.S. policy of modernizing nuclear weapons in Europe within the framework of the disarmament talks with the Warsaw Pact has again and more “forcefully” raised the issue of redeploying in Turkey the nuclear missiles to be dismantled in Central Europe.

Since the 1963 Montebello meeting, which reformulated NATO’s nuclear policy, Turkey has been reluctant to assume “additional nuclear responsibilities.” This stand was also influenced by Turkey's relations with the Soviet Union. The Foreign and National Defense Ministries and the General Staff determined Turkey's policy for the new era as follows:
Double-Faceted Policy

1. During the meetings, Turkey will again declare that it does not want to assume “additional nuclear responsibilities.” It will, however, take into account the balances within NATO and the Soviet missiles directed at its territory and will not oppose decisions concerning Lance nuclear missiles to be initiated by the United States and Britain.

2. Turkey will advocate the necessity of nuclear modernization within the alliance, but it will also favor—together with the FRG—the inclusion of the 0-500 km tactical nuclear weapons, which were introduced to the disarmament talks by the Soviet Union, in the scope of the Vienna talks.

Spokesman Denies Knowledge of Participation in Iraqi CW Plant

TA1204151489 Ankara ANATOLIA in English 1455 GMT 12 Apr 89

[Excerpt] Ankara (A.A.)—Foreign Ministry spokesman Ambassador Inal Batu told a news conference today that Turkey was not a party to the claims that a Turkish firm was involved in the construction of a chemical arms factory construction in Iraq. [sentence as received]

Answering a question on the issue, spokesman Batu said that the company in question was only carrying out the rough construction of the installation and Turkey was not the addressee of such accusations.

He went on to say that no information was available that the plant in Iraq was to produce chemical arms, adding “even though that would be the intention, we have learned that the section to be constructed by a Turkish firm had no connection with this.”

“Naturally we will take the necessary action if there would be any serious evidence” he said, adding “it is out of question for Turkey to facilitate chemical arms production.”

He added that no warning came from any country or international organization on the factory in Iraq. [passage omitted]

UNITED KINGDOM

Defense Secretary Younger Urges NATO ‘Military Vigilance’

PM0504141489 London THE DAILY TELEGRAPH in English 0933 GMT 9 Apr 89

[Adela Gooch report: “Younger Stresses NATO Caution on Soviet ‘Rhetoric’”]

[Text] Mr Younger, Defence Secretary, marked NATO’s 40th anniversary yesterday with a glowing personal tribute to President Gorbachev. But Mr Younger also stressed the need for military vigilance in case the Soviet leader’s attempts at reform fail.

He said: “I trust him (Mr Gorbachev). I think he is impressive, courageous and trustworthy and I think he is doing his best in the difficult course he has embarked on.

“I hope he succeeds. But he may not, and we must keep our defences strong in case things do not turn out as we would hope.”

His words indicated a divorce between Britain’s attitude to Mr Gorbachev personally and to the Soviet system as a whole.

They follow a harsh appraisal of the threat from the “Russian Bear”—the Soviet Army—given by Sir Geoffrey Howe, Foreign Secretary, on Monday.

Mr Younger said: “The new Soviet rhetoric of ‘defensive sufficiency’ may seem impressive in some quarters.

“But it cuts little ice with an Alliance that has been concerned solely with defence from its inception,” he said at Britain’s NATO headquarters in Northwood, Middlesex.

He continued: “The strength and resolution of NATO has been a key factor in bringing about the long overdue changes now under way in the East. Of course, it is too early to know whether all Mr Gorbachev’s plans will be made good. And even if he succeeds it will only be a first step.

“But let there be no doubt the change in atmosphere and the promised reductions are welcome to us.”

Mr Younger added, “NATO has set the agenda on arms control and NATO has taken the initiative time and time again...we may be moving on to new ground, but it is a movement in our direction and on to ground of our choice.

“For the future, we will continue to seek increased security at lower levels of forces, but in doing this, we will keep an eye on Soviet capabilities as well as intentions.”

Earlier, as an anniversary gesture, officials at the Northwood base sent tea to five Christian Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament members who were demonstrating for NATO’s “early retirement” in snow outside.

Thatcher To Continue Campaign for SNF Modernization

LD0904104289 London PRESS ASSOCIATION in English 0933 GMT 9 Apr 89

[Text] Mrs Thatcher indicated today that she is to continue her campaign for the modernisation of short range nuclear weapons despite the opposition of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

One of her first challenges will come next month when she meets West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, to be followed a month later by the NATO summit in Brussels.
West German public opinion as shown in the polls is now running strongly against modernisation.

The prime minister was asked in a TV-AM interview recorded after the summit with Mr Gorbachev on Friday whether she thought Mr Kohl would listen to her or to Mr Gorbachev.

She replied: "I shall put the argument to him again and again. The Soviet Union has modernised her weapons. We believe in the nuclear weapon. It is part of NATO’s flexible response."

She said: "Obsolete weapons do not deter. You do not base a defence policy on someone else's good intentions. You base it on their armoury and what they have got. You also look around the rest of the world.

"There are some pretty unpleasant people around. There is some heavy weaponry. They are being sold some pretty nasty attack aircraft."

This was seen as a reference to the Soviet sale of attack bombers to Colonel Al-Qadhdhafi’s Libya.

The prime minister added: "So you have to have a defence which is strong enough whatever unpredictable events may happen. If you do not keep it you may find that other people are quietly accumulating weapons and are in a position to use them long before we can make them. Today’s weapons are so much more complicated. It takes years to design and produce them. So you stay strong."

Asked if she implicitly trusted Mr Gorbachev she replied: "If he promised me he would do certain things he has carried out those promises. Therefore I have come to the conclusion that he is not the sort of person who will make a promise unless he is resolved to carry it through. That is a very good basis for personal trust between two leaders."
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