REFORMING NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURES: The Long-Term Study and Its Implications for Land Forces

Thomas-Durell Young

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The author analyzes the Long-Term Study, an important effort on the part of the NATO Alliance to achieve "internal adaptation." He explains the attempts to reform and reorganize the Alliance's integrated command structure which provides the basis for NATO's collective defense and its ability to undertake peace support operations. The author lists fundamental negative implications the proposed reforms could have for command of NATO's forces and provides recommendations to ease implementation of this reform process.

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FOREWORD

The contemporary debate over the expansion of NATO to include Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary has largely overshadowed an important effort on the part of the Alliance to achieve "internal adaptation" through the work of the Long-Term Study. Part of this process has been a tortuous attempt to reform and reorganize the Alliance's integrated command structure. Often taken for granted, this structure provides the basis for NATO's collective defense, and increasingly, as seen in Bosnia, its ability to undertake peace support operations. However, the very value by which nations hold the structure has resulted in a difficult and time-consuming reorganization process which has produced only limited reforms.

It is indeed surprising that the reorganization of the bedrock of the Alliance's military structure has garnered only limited attention outside of NATO cognoscenti. This can be explained, in part, by the fact that until recently the Long-Term Study has been cloaked in secrecy. Most key aspects of the reform process are now out in the public and require debate: a task in which the Strategic Studies Institute is keen to assist. And, let there be no mistake that the proposed reforms outlined by Long-Term Study have major implications for land forces in the Alliance. As argued in this essay, there are a number of proposed reforms which could have fundamental negative implications for command of these forces.

The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this contribution to the ongoing debate to reform NATO's integrated command structure.

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REFORMING NATO'S MILITARY STRUCTURES: THE LONG-TERM STUDY AND ITS IMPLICATIONS FOR LAND FORCES

At the NATO Madrid Summit of July 1997, heads of state and government irreversibly cast the die to expand the Alliance to encompass three former adversaries: the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary. Accession negotiations have commenced with the objective of those countries becoming members of the Alliance in 1999, the 50th anniversary of the Alliance's founding. There are, of course, many important issues which have yet to be decided by the Alliance, to include how the new members are to be integrated into NATO's command structure. While the integrated command structure has sometimes been perceived as being over-sold as constituting the most important element of the Alliance, it has been of immeasurable value. In addition to providing for the unified command of allied efforts to defend members' sovereignty, the command structure has also acted as an important means to achieve transparency among allied nations' militaries.

As to the question of exactly into which NATO commands the new members will fall casts light on what has heretofore been a largely ignored effort by the Alliance to reform its command structure. Since Fall 1994, an important element of the "NATO Adaption Long-Term Study" (LTS) has been finding solutions to the challenges of reducing the size of the integrated command structure to save resources and enabling it to respond to future security risks. While not a stated mission of the study, the issue of expansion cannot have been far from the minds of many of the officials attempting to achieve consensus to reform the integrated command structure. Yet, it has been the very issue of reaching "consensus" to reform the command
structure that has frustrated officials in their attempt to find a compromise acceptable to all. Notwithstanding predictions by officials that the LTS would produce agreement by the Madrid Summit (and thereby contribute to “internal adaption”), consensus to reorganize the command structure has been slow in coming.5

The inability of the Alliance to find agreement within its membership, and indeed, among its senior military commands, to reorganize the integrated command structure offers insight into the civil-military decision-making process of NATO. What one can observe from a review of the LTS and, specifically, NATO’s efforts to change its command structure is how national political interests and sensitivities can impede needed military reforms. Indeed, for what can only be categorized as seemingly “petty” political rationales, the concerted effort of the Alliance to reform its military structures has produced only modest results. Yet it would be a mistake to conclude that the Alliance is suffering from a profound state of stasis at this critical juncture in its history. Rather, what the LTS demonstrates is that Alliance politics, especially concerning military issues, have always been hard fought, and even the imperative for change necessitated to respond to the changed security environment has had only a limited impact on efforts to reorganize.

This essay will argue that the effort to reform command structures in NATO (i.e., an element of internal adaption) is proving to be one of the most contentious issues the Alliance has confronted since 1991, perhaps even more than membership expansion. As a result, current proposals in the LTS could produce structures which would inhibit the manner in which land forces are integrated into multinational formations and impede their effective command in wartime by multinational commanders. In short, reform efforts have pitted military rationales against national political agenda, the latter of which are based largely on the issues of prestige, historic animosities, and maintaining/improving a nation’s standing in the Alliance.
This essay will be organized in the following manner. The essay begins with a précis of the LTS and what appears to be emerging as the “reformed” command structure (i.e., number, type, and location of headquarters) as agreed at the Defence Planning Committee (DPC) meeting in December 1997. Next, three case studies will illustrate how the reform process has been stymied by inflexible national political agenda: (1) the Danish position regarding Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP), (2) Portugal and its command of Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (IBERLANT), and (3) France’s claim that the Commander-in-Chief Southern Region should be a European, vice an American, flag officer. The purpose behind reviewing these controversies is to illustrate the difficulties that confront Alliance officials in reorganizing the command structure and explain why militarily imperfect command arrangements have been adopted. Then, a critical analysis of the reformed command as it appears to be developing will examine the implications, particularly for land forces. Finally, solutions to identified problems will be proffered.

Reforming NATO’s Military Structure.

The Long-Term Study. During the early 1990s, a number of important developments made defense and foreign ministers aware of the need to reform the integrated command structure. First, although heads of state and government approved the Alliance’s New Strategic Concept and its military implementation (contained in document MC 400) in 1991, these documents were quickly being overtaken by events:

(1) By the decision by Ministers in June 1992 to engage in peace support operations.

(2) By a growing consensus that traditional collective defense was being recognized as constituting regional collective defense (i.e., a need for nations to be capable of deploying forces outside of their own immediate sub-region). These events had two important implications: a
blurring of distinctions between traditional Article V collective defense and non-Article V missions, and a widening in the mission spectrum well beyond traditional collective defense for many allied forces.

Second, the 1992 “Four Powers” reorganization agreement which transformed Allied Forces Northern Europe (AFNORTH) into Allied Forces Northwest Europe (AFNORTHWEST) raised doubts in the minds of many NATO officials about the suitability of the command structure to carry out these new missions.

Third, the approval in principle of the Combined Joint Task Force (CJTF) concept at the January 1994 NATO summit\textsuperscript{11} led to questions being raised as to the ability of the existing command structure to support such ad hoc deployments.\textsuperscript{12}

On the initiative of the Chiefs of Defense, the Long-Term Study was launched with two general objectives. First, MC 400 required revision to bring military guidance into line with the important changes outlined above, a politically-delicate task, to be sure, since the military inadequacies of the New Strategic Concept could be made patently obvious. Ministerial Guidance 1995 recognized the need for the Alliance to be directed at the whole spectrum of tasks for both Article V and non-Article V missions. As a result, the document was successfully revised (becoming MC 400/1) in November 1995. Second, with the completion of the revision of MC 400/1, attention was changed to focus on reforming the command structure, the better to support this new guidance.

\textit{The Proposed LTS Command Structure} (see Figure 1). As a general observation, the NATO effort to develop an acceptable new command organization has been hampered by pressures from political officials who have pressed for the Alliance to demonstrate that it has abandoned its Cold War structures (and appearances), and from military authorities (specifically Allied Command Europe [see Figure 2] and Allied Command Atlantic [see Figure 3]) who have argued
for reformed structures based upon military requirements (recommendations which were not necessarily in agreement). This is, of course, an old tension in the Alliance, as a study of the early creation of the integrated command structure demonstrates. The results of these almost immutable tensions can be seen in the following four areas of “reform.”
It is important to note that while the reformed command structure has been accepted by defense ministers, many details remain to be determined. It is intended to have a detailed reorganization plan for consideration by ministers by autumn 1998. In the interim, formal titles of headquarters have yet to be determined. When this implementation plan has been approved by ministers, an amended MC 324, “The NATO Military Command Structure” will be issued. While perhaps optimistic, new command arrangements are envisaged to be activated around April 1999: the 50th anniversary of the Alliance.16

Figure 2. Allied Command Europe.
1) The levels of command will have new names (see Figure 4), to “demonstrate,” perhaps, the Alliance’s transformation. Note that until the LTS is finalized, new and old nomenclature continues to be used.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Old</th>
<th>New</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>• Major NATO Commander (MNC)</td>
<td>• Strategic Commander (SC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Major Subordinate Commander (MSC)</td>
<td>• Regional Commander (RC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Principal Subordinate Commander (PSC)</td>
<td>• Sub-Regional Commander:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Joint Sub-Regional Commander (JSRC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>• Component Commanders (CC)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Sub-Principal Subordinate Commander (Sub-PSC)</td>
<td>• (Abolished as recognized NATO headquarters)</td>
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Figure 4. New NATO Command Structure Nomenclature.
2) The number of NATO headquarters will diminish, from 65 to 20 (see Appendix). This "achievement" is less significant than one might think. Although the new structure abolishes the fourth level of command, i.e., Sub-Principal Subordinate Commanders (Sub-PSCs), many of these headquarters are essentially national headquarters; therefore, very few of them will actually close.

3) Just as the number of Major NATO Commanders (MNCs) fell from three to two in 1994, so, too, in ACE, the number of Major Subordinate Commanders (MSC) will be reduced from three to two. AFNORTHWEST, High Wycombe, will be disbanded, and the two remaining, but renamed, regional commanders (Region North, Brunssum and Region South, Naples) will report to Strategic Commander Europe. It is interesting to note that this rationalization has been accepted despite the recommendations of the Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR) for the continued need for three Regional Commanders.

4) Sub-Regional Commanders will replace Principal Subordinate Commanders (PSCs) and will either be specified component or joint commanders. This move will have less significance for Regional Commander North where there already exist two important component commanders: Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AIRCENT), Ramstein, and Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe (LANDCENT), Heidelberg. On the other hand, Regional Commander South will see the creation of two new Joint Sub-Regional Commanders (JSRC) ("SouthWest" and "SouthCenter," in Madrid and Larissa, respectively) and the transformation of two existing land component commanders, Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe in Italy and Commander Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe in Turkey into JSRCs ("South" and "SouthEast," respectively), along with the continued existence of separate air and naval component commanders.
The above, in sum, represents the principal changes which the Alliance thus far has been able to find consensus to support. At first blush, one might be forgiven for concluding that the new command structure appears to constitute "old wine in a new bottle." Indeed, respected German defense correspondent Karl Feldmeyer argued that the LTS reorganization efforts simply have been an exercise in the redistribution of political influence among key allies, vice effecting greater efficiency in the structure. Yet, Feldmeyer's views may arguably be an understatement. The structure endorsed by the DPC contains a number of potentially destructive trends, which, while perhaps politically palatable, could have negative long-term implications for the Alliance in the manner by which it commands military operations. However, before the essay turns to identify these problems, it would be instructive to examine a number of specific cases which have stymied reform.

**Impediments to Reform.**

At the outset, three very important truisms concerning the integrated command structure need to be recognized. First, the structure that the Long-Term Study has attempted to reform was not "created" in one single act. Rather, the structure has continued to evolve since its establishment in 1951. Little wonder, therefore, that the Alliance's approach to reforming this structure in a single, concerted fashion has proven to be difficult.

Second, in NATO (as in any coalition or alliance) there is an informal political "matrix" which must balance each nation's tangibles (military capabilities) and intangibles (political ambitions) in order to produce consensus. Thus, any effort to reform something as politically sensitive and important as which nation will host a headquarters, who will provide its commander and senior staff positions, etc., must be acceptable to affected nations. (Note, as well, that key allies have interests and participate in several
commands which add additional complications to this matrix.) And in an evolutionary manner, agreements and arrangements have been worked out to placate nations who have felt slighted or under-represented.

Third, and related to the above two points, this matrix that seeks to balance nations’ ambitions is perceived without doubt as a zero-sum game. As a result, as witnessed in the Long-Term Study, nothing is truly agreed on until such time that everything has been accepted by all. Despite the DPC communiqué language, therefore, that “... agreement as been reached on a new command structure as a whole, and in particular on the type, number and location of headquarters,” in reality, immense challenges remain to be overcome before a final agreement reforming the total command structure can be achieved. Specifically, national agenda of 14 nations (15, should France decide to “play”) must now be balanced; recalling that there are now fewer allied headquarters for which countries can compete.

With these realities in mind, the essay now examines three brief, but representative, case studies which show how national political agenda have impeded not only reforming the integrated command structure, but could inhibit the effective allied command of a future campaign. The case studies should leave few readers in doubt of the accuracy of the adage that “command” is inherently a political act and this is even more so the case when applied to alliances.

Case 1: Allied Forces Baltic Approaches (BALTAP). Until October 1, 1993, allied command arrangements for the Baltic fell under the responsibility of Commander-in-Chief AFNORTH whose responsibilities extended from northern Norway south to the Elbe River. The command arrangement divided the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany between two MSCs. Shortly after German unification, Bonn argued that this “singularization” was intolerable and insisted that its territory should fall under the responsibility of one MSC (who is, coincidentally, a
German general, Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe—CINCENT). The ensuing negotiations among the “Four Powers” that were directly affected (Britain, Denmark, Germany, and Norway) resulted in BALTAP, a PSC of AFNORTH being transferred to Allied Forces Central Europe (AFCENT), and thereby becoming the only geographically-defined PSC in that command (the other PSCs being component commanders).

This seemingly innocuous reorganization in reality underscores how national objectives can have a negative impact upon the integrated command structure. In effect, the Four Powers agreement resulted in a convoluted command arrangement concerning peacetime coordinating authorities between CINCENT and Commander BALTAP (see below). Moreover, three of the countries involved in this reorganization “lost” in terms of achieving their national objectives. Britain retained command of the newly formed AFNORTHWEST, but at the expense of losing Commander-in-Chief Channel (an MNC), and Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Eastern Atlantic (who became dual-hatted as Commander Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe), as well as UK Air (an MSC). Germany achieved the objective of removing the MSC boundary from the Elbe River, but at the cost of leaving a PSC boundary at the Elbe, as well as continuing to transfer in wartime the Bundesmarine to Commander BALTAP. As AFNORTHWEST no longer extends to the Elbe River, Norway lost its long-valued “pied de terre” to the Central Region.

The “winner” in this reorganization was clearly Denmark, which speaks legions to that country’s understanding of NATO’s staff culture and influencing its eventual agreements. Copenhagen was able to maintain not only the continued existence of BALTAP (recall, it is a geographically-defined PSC, as well as possessing the important cachet of being “joint”), which was transferred to AFCENT, but also retain leadership of this command. As to the former point, while Danish officials claim there is need for a joint commander for their unique archipelagic
environment, this does not necessarily establish the requirement for the continued existence of a PSC/JSRC commander. As to the latter issue, Commander BALTP is always a Danish three-star, who is also, coincidentally, dual-hatted as national Commander of Danish Forces.

Not surprisingly, Danish officials have endeavored to ensure that BALTP continued to exist in the current reform process. Efforts to rationalize command structures in AFCENT and contribute to the trend toward developing component commands of forces (the better, for example, to contribute integrated forces to a CJTF) under a Regional Commander have been opposed by Copenhagen as a threat to BALTP. And, indeed, in the present DPC-approved command structure reorganization plan, Commander BALTP will continue in existence as Commander Joint Sub-Regional Command NorthEast Karup. Yet to be determined is whether Commander BALTP's current components will fall under him in wartime or become component commanders under Regional Commander North.

This is not an unimportant consideration. For example, under existing peacetime coordination arrangements, one of Commander BALTP's land components, Commander Allied Land Forces Schleswig-Holstein and Jutland ("Corps LANDJUT") does not fall under the peacetime or wartime command of Commander LANDCENT. This has resulted in a convoluted peacetime planning relationship between Corps LANDJUT (and its assigned divisions) and its land counterparts in the Central Region. This corps will take on added importance when Corps LANDJUT becomes "Multinational Corps Northeast" and moves to Szczecin following the admittance of Poland to the Alliance in 1999. Continuation of this current command arrangement would act to obstruct the creation of a close relationship between Polish army forces declared to this JSRC (12th Polish Mechanized Division) and their land counterparts in the Central Region.
Case 2: Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area (IBERLANT). An interesting and little appreciated anomaly in the integrated command structure is that Portugal does not fall within ACE, but rather, in ACLANT. Why a nation on the European continent and one of the early members of the Alliance enjoys this unique distinction is a result, in large part, of Portuguese politics and attitudes. Portugal has traditionally considered itself a maritime nation, and, whenever it has ventured to engage in European power politics, it has emerged as the loser for its efforts (e.g., the First World War). In consequence, its traditional alliances have been maritime. It enjoys the world's longest defense treaty (with Great Britain since 1373) and, since the end of the Second World War, has used its membership in NATO to effect a close bilateral defense relationship with the United States through access to Lajes air base on the Azores.28

Two important implications for NATO become apparent from the IBERLANT arrangement. First, as Lisbon hosts Headquarters IBERLANT, an MSC, and provides the Commander-in-Chief IBERLANT, it provides Portugal a significant degree of influence in the Alliance. In fact, given the small size and modest capabilities of its armed forces, one could argue that this command influence exceeds its contributions to NATO's collective defense. Indeed, according to press reports, Portugal was able to increase the command status of Commander IBERLANT to Commander-in-Chief IBERLANT (from a PSC to an MSC) as a quid pro quo for allowing Spain to enter the Alliance.29 This is another excellent example of how smaller nations can exert influence in the Alliance.

Second, given historic Portuguese suspicions of Spain, the inclusion of Madrid in a militarily logical manner into the integrated command structure has been hampered by Portugal's unique status. Notwithstanding the Portuguese Army's desire to transfer the country to ACE and participate in a stronger manner in ACE planning,30 suspicions of Spain and the country's tradition of relying on
maritime alliances have proven too strong. During the LTS negotiations, Lisbon opposed proposals to reduce IBERLANT's status to a third level headquarters (JSRC) and transfer it to ACE. Rather, Lisbon insisted upon staying in Strategic Command Atlantic (IBERLANT will become Regional Command SouthEast) which eliminates the possibility of creating a unified Iberian command within ACE. Indeed, the current command proposal has the Spanish Canary Islands ensconced within a national Spanish command “bubble” which lays within JSRC SouthWest Madrid and Strategic Command Europe’s area of responsibility. Given that the risks to the Alliance have clearly shifted from eastern Europe to the Southern Region, Portuguese intransigence over IBERLANT could complicate NATO’s ability to respond effectively to crises in the greater Iberian/southern Mediterranean region.

Case 3: France and Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern Region. Since 1966, France has publicly excluded itself from the integrated command structure while maintaining close ties with MNCs, MSCs and PSCs for wartime contingencies. Since the early 1990s, French policy toward NATO underwent a sea change as Paris struggled to come to terms with a situation where its distant relationship to NATO, which suited its national objectives nicely from 1967 to 1989, was no longer relevant. A key part of French policy toward reassessing its relationship toward the Alliance has been its stated desire to rejoin the integrated command structure, but only if certain key reforms were implemented. The most important changes upon which France has insisted are that the Alliance provides the military wherewithal to support the European Security and Defense Identity, as well as arrange for greater European leadership in the Alliance.

While discussions and negotiations have been ongoing between France and NATO since the early 1990s, French policy took a significant turn in Fall 1996, when President Jacques Chirac wrote to President William Clinton arguing that the Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Southern
Region (CINCSOUTH) should be a European as part of the effort to reorganize the integrated command structure. A "European" officer quickly became a "French" general officer and an all but full blown diplomatic contretemps ensued, with Americans (and many Europeans) arguing that the United States was the only NATO power that had the ability to bring together what has been the most disparate and least integrated MSC in NATO. The issue continued to simmer until just prior to the Madrid Summit when Paris claimed that the failure of the Alliance (read: les américains) to accept this concession would preclude France from rejoining the integrated command structure.

The CINCSOUTH controversy underscores two important realities of the politics of command in NATO. First, for a variety of reasons, France has yet to adopt, indeed, perhaps even understand, the importance of the "NATO staff culture." By this, an issue tends to be coordinated and worked by field grade officers at the staff level in NATO, national commands, and defense ministries in order to achieve a degree of consensus long before it is elevated to the level of Chiefs of Defense and ambassadors, let alone heads of state/government. Because France does not belong to NATO's integrated military structure and the fact that NATO issues are strongly influenced by domestic political forces in France, junior French officials often have little or no ability to work NATO issues with their allied counterparts. As a result, once an issue is forwarded to a French official in the Ministry of Defense for coordination, there is a strong possibility that the matter will be seized immediately by the Elysée and raised to the senior government level, to wit: Chirac's letter to Clinton over the nationality of an MSC. The result of this French style of conducting NATO business often results in France's inability to contribute constructively to Alliance affairs. That President Chirac would propose such a dramatic change in command arrangements as a precondition to reentering the integrated command structure is outside of Alliance norms. Notwithstanding some early support for
the French position by some European nations, that the proposal came from a nation that has yet formally to declare forces to the Alliance\textsuperscript{42} ensured that it would have little chance of being adopted.

Second, command billets in the integrated command structure are important, irrespective of status, to many NATO nations and are hotly contested. Even a seemingly innocuous one- or two-star flag position in a third level headquarters could be a non-negotiable issue for a nation which sees that position as essential. Indeed, as the Alliance moves in the LTS process to align command billets (in a fewer number of Alliance headquarters) to forces declared to NATO, negotiations can be expected to become even more contentious then they have been to date.

**The Proposed New Command Structure: A Critique.**

Despite the difficulties confronting the reorganization of the Alliance's integrated command structure, a review of current trends in command reorganization, as announced at the December 1997 DPC, demonstrates that nations have made some difficult decisions which could have a lasting impact on how the Alliance conducts military operations. While the Alliance and officials associated with the LTS should be complimented for the mere fact that consensus was found to make some changes, two decisions could have long-term negative implications for the Alliance: the move to reduce the number of headquarters, and the move to create Joint Sub-Regional Commanders.

**Allied Headquarters: Are Fewer Better than More?** It has become almost a *paean* in NATO in recent years that a smaller number of Alliance headquarters is unquestionably “better.” After all, given smaller defense budgets and the end of the Cold War, the Alliance should, realistically, move to create a smaller, more efficient integrated command structure. And, from the perspectives of defense ministers, if they are unable to effect such reforms, many countries'
finance ministers would be quite willing to perform this task for them.

The problem with the truism that “fewer NATO headquarters is better” is the simple fact that this may not be the case once you get beyond the budget issue. Perhaps most obvious is that finding political consensus to create a smaller command structure becomes more difficult with the fewer headquarters available, since this results in even more tenacious fighting among nations for the remaining headquarters and command positions. Moreover, the counting of NATO “headquarters” is not as clear cut as one might think. The congratulatory tone of the DPC communique noting that the Alliance will reduce the number of its headquarters from 65 to 20 is much less significant than it appears, both from the perspective of what real savings will be realized and the important functions provided by these headquarters. As to the former point, most of the headquarters to be “disbanded” are Sub-PSCs and therefore already do not receive NATO infrastructure funding. Moreover, as stated above, most of these headquarters are all but national ones which conduct important national business, and therefore will not close and thereby result in economies for nations, let alone for NATO.

As to the important missions of these headquarters, two broader issues need to be assessed. First, since 1991 the Alliance has created a large number of multinational land formations (corps and divisions) to compensate for reductions in national land forces. Thus, in lieu of having national corps integrated at the Army Group level, as was the case during the Cold War and thereby avoiding the integration of armies, the Alliance now “enjoys” a number of bi-/multi-national corps and divisions. Complicating the move to effect multinationality at this new lower level is that NATO must now prepare land forces for challenging new missions: peace support operations and Article V collective defense missions which are outside of traditional areas of operation.
It has been among land, vice air or naval, forces that the Alliance has experienced its greatest difficulty effecting multinationality. The reason for this state of affairs is that "land forces" are not discrete independent units which can be easily employed tactically in combined operations (like ships and aircraft), but rather are comprised of combined arms teams made up of various subset formations, each of which may have different mission-essential tasks assigned to them. Land forces are more costly and difficult to deploy, manifest greater national commitment and are likely to experience the greatest potential for casualties. Not surprisingly, nations have been unwilling to grant foreign multinational land commanders critical command authorities over what have traditionally been sovereign national prerogatives (e.g., task organization of forces, logistics redistribution, establishment of training standards), thereby impeding a commander's ability effectively to plan operations in peacetime, let alone conduct them in wartime. In consequence, one now has a tension in NATO where nations have established bi-/multi-national land formations, while placing severe caveats upon the ability of their wartime commanders to "command" them.45

This situation is a relatively new one in the Alliance, and to its credit, efforts have been made, for instance, by the Central Region Chiefs of Army Staff to ascertain which reforms are needed to enable multinational land force commanders to carry out effectively their stated missions.46 However, under the proposed LTS reorganization, the third level of Alliance command will be comprised of Naval, Air, and Joint Sub-Regional Commanders.47 In other words, at that critical nexus where national armies are integrated into the command structure in wartime and where in peacetime essential planning takes place, there apparently will be no exclusively allied land commander to oversee what has traditionally been a very vexatious task: the peacetime coordination and wartime command of multinational land forces.
Equally disconcerting now that the fourth level of command is to lose its Alliance designation and adopt the nebulous appellation, “headquarters and forces,” the Alliance could be impeded in establishing “tasks, conditions, and standards” for existing bi-/multi-national land headquarters. This would have exactly the opposite effect one should expect that the Alliance would have desired. Given that multinational land headquarters will take on greater importance than they do currently in the area of providing the necessary link between national land forces and the integrated command structure, the Alliance should be striving to ensure that these headquarters form part of the integrated command structure at the fourth level. Costs are certainly not a factor since participating nations are responsible for the cost of operations of these headquarters, not the Alliance. 48

Second, it is indeed unusual to stress the importance of reducing the number of headquarters precisely when the Alliance will be adding a number of new allied nations over the next few years. If one limits this analysis to Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary, will the new structure support their inclusion as currently proposed? To be sure, political, military and financial realities would likely preclude the establishment of a second level command specifically for this region. Component commanders with sufficient peacetime authority are needed to work with the armed forces of the new members to bring them to a level of proficiency so that they can be integrated into allied efforts, to include contributing forces to support CJTFs. However, what could very likely develop is that these new members might insist upon creating JSRCs, as have been proposed for the Southern and Nordic regions, whose existence is likely to impede the effective operation of component commands.

Joint Sub-Regional Commanders: Nationalizing Defense Postures? Heretofore NATO has suffered the practice of funding a number of commands which, in large part, conducted national business and were essentially
national in manning. In recent years, NATO has responded to this situation by insisting that PSCs have a truly international character and possess an international staff, or lose Alliance infrastructure funding. Nonetheless, these all but national commands were essentially winked at during the Cold War due to their relative insignificance to the greater immediacy presented by the Soviet threat.

Since the end of the Cold War, the Alliance, almost to a fault, has endeavored to mitigate against nations re-nationalizing their defense policies and forces. Any move to renationalize defense policies and structures is perceived as being inimical to the collective defense orientation of the Alliance (and at odds with basic political goals). Thus, integrated defense planning continues apace as do efforts to retain the integrated command structure. These two manifestations of Alliance solidarity are important to the ability of NATO to respond to Article V collective defense missions, as well as providing a rather subtle means by which nations can ascertain the defense planning objectives of their neighbors (i.e., transparency). Thus, these allied activities and structures continue to serve as effective de facto “confidence- and security-building measures.”

With this point in mind, it is indeed remarkable that the Alliance has apparently decided to implement a type of headquarters at the third command level that has the potential of undermining the collective defense capabilities and mutual reassurance benefits of the command structure. JSRCs have existed in the Alliance but under different nomenclature. For example, under the pre-LTS command structure Commander BALTAP and Commander Allied Forces Northern Europe could be accurately described as joint sub-regional commanders. It is understandable that countries already possessing these commands would block attempts either to disband them or efforts to undermine their positions of leadership in them. However, what is disturbing is that the LTS has proposed and the DPC has accepted that JSRC templates should be employed in AFSOUTH/Regional Command South: a region which has
long-suffered from having the least degree of multinational integration in the Alliance.

The JSRC proposal is fraught with a number of implications which are likely to have a negative effect on the operation of these headquarters within the integrated command structure. First, from a planning perspective, the reduction of the integrated command to three levels is likely to complicate and impede effective deliberate planning for both Article V collective defense missions and peace support operations. In Strategic Command Europe, the two Regional Commanders must coordinate all planning tasks for immense geographic areas with disparate threats, risks, and operational conditions. Because of these increased responsibilities given to Regional Commanders, one can expect them to delegate deliberative planning responsibilities to JSRCs, responsibilities which they may or may not be capable of carrying out. One must recall that many of these proposed JSRCs are essentially national headquarters which may result in institutionalizing strong national biases in what should be collective allied plans. Moreover, in effect, the Alliance will be expecting these national commands partially to operate at the strategic command level, an area in which some of them have little experience.

Second, what will be the peacetime and wartime relationships between JSRCs and the Component Commanders in their respective regions? As both joint and component commanders will be of equal allied status, developing complementary terms of reference which specify their responsibilities and relationships should prove to be challenging, particularly given that JSRCs will effectively be senior national commanders in their own right. For example, will component commanders in peacetime have Coordinating Authority regarding training standards for their respective components, or will the JSRCs claim this responsibility? In other words, will component commanders be hindered or assisted by JSRCs in preparing forces for Alliance missions? Perhaps even more worrisome is the fact
that under Regional Commander North, there is no clearly-defined land component commander (will JSRC Heidelberg have land force component responsibilities for Regional Commander North?),\textsuperscript{49} while in Regional Command South there are currently no plans to create such a headquarters. Clearly, the current LTS structure does not immediately demonstrate how it will support the objective of improving the Alliance’s ability the better to integrate land forces, particularly in the potentially volatile Southern Region.

Third, a criticism privately raised by some NATO officials is that the LTS has been conducted without close coordination with the Alliance’s development of the CJTF concept. While the current writer may be guilty of being deterministic, given that JSRCs are essentially national commands, one could expect their governments to press for their designation as CJTF headquarters. The CJTF proposal has evolved into one that enjoys a prestigious cachet and one could expect arguments being made that JSRCs would be ideal commanders for CJTFs. JSRCs, one should recall, are not strategically mobile in orientation, but rather are operational commanders with limited geographic focus, which should obviate against their being given this designation or mission. Rather, Regional Commanders, acting as CJTF commanders, should have the authority to direct their Component Commanders to organize their forces to support a CJTF operation. Note, once again, the lack of an unambiguous Component Commander Land in Regional Command North and no such commander in Regional Command South to support a Regional Commander in this role.

Fourth and last, the important question of the manning of JSRC headquarters has yet to be addressed in detail. In an attempt to moderate strong national tendencies in JSRCs, it has been reported that the LTS has proposed that each of these headquarters should have at least 50 percent international manning.\textsuperscript{50} While clearly a noteworthy initiative, the reality of the manning of these headquarters
could prove to be problematic. Nations have only a finite number of qualified staff officers available for international assignments. Specifically, nations will be required to provide manning for the following new (i.e., additional) NATO commands: JSRC SouthWest Madrid, and JSRC SouthCenter Larissa, in addition to the existing commands which do not meet the 50 percent objectives: JSRC SouthEast Izmir, JSRC South Verona, and JSRC North Stavanger. One could also question whether the 50 percent rule will apply to Regional Commands, given that some them might not meet this requirement (e.g., Regional Command SouthEast Lisbon).

Moreover, the abolition of the fourth level of command will not necessarily result in the closure or realignment of national headquarters. Hence, it would appear that the creation of JSRCs and the attending requirement to meet a 50 percent international manning goal will actually result in an increased demand upon nations to find qualified personnel to man these new and transformed headquarters. It also would be naive to assume that countries will second their best English-speaking officers to international assignments indiscriminately. Obviously, the priority will likely go to having a strong presence at Strategic Commands and at JSRCs for those countries that have them, while Regional Commands and particularly Component Commands (who have important supporting and force integration roles) are likely to suffer.

And Should the LTS Proposals Fail . . .

After assessing the proposed LTS command structure, one could conclude that while little has changed (e.g., nomenclature), some of the changes that have been proposed could have long-term negative implications for the Alliance (e.g., JSRCs). Clearly, the method employed by the Alliance to address command reorganization (i.e., to attempt to reform everything) opened a veritable Pandora's Box of national political agenda which have impeded
progress in the LTS. Yet, for officials to surrender in frustration will only allow national agenda to prevail in the end.

It bears repeating that the LTS is far from being a completed agreement. All that has been agreed to date are general organizational guidelines, while many of the details of the new structure have yet to find consensus. The “LTS Manpower Study” is currently being conducted which may well find that the new structure will require greater seconded manpower, and therefore additional resources. As a number of key allies (e.g., the United Kingdom) have stated that they will not approve a new command organization that does not result in other nations equally giving up commands and positions, let alone resulting in economies, the LTS structure might be rejected and its terms of reference might be revisited. Should this come to pass, nations should reexamine the weaknesses in their collective efforts in the LTS to date. Some key areas which warrant reexamination follow.

Major NATO Commanders / Strategic Commanders. It is interesting to note that the reorganization of the integrated command structure has almost exclusively addressed Allied Command Europe/Strategic Command Europe. Why has Allied Command Atlantic been all but ignored? With the exception of the shedding the command’s fourth and third levels of command, the only changes that will affect that command are those related to nomenclature. Certainly, the security outlook for this command’s area of responsibility is much more optimistic than the uncertainties and risks which confront the Alliance in the Southern Region. Even if the mission of SACLANT remains, does this command continue to warrant Strategic Commander status, vice becoming a Regional Commander, or a second level component commander supporting strategic commander(s) in Europe? Given the shift in the Alliance’s risk orientation, surely Commander-in-Chief Southern Europe has greater claim to be a Strategic Commander than SACLANT. A first level Allied Commander status for
CINCSOUTH would also strengthen the hand of those in the Alliance who feel this key command billet should remain a U.S. flag officer.

Major Subordinate Commanders/Regional Commanders. In the early work of the LTS, one proposal held for ACE to retain three, and perhaps add a fourth, MSC/RC. For instance, a "Regional Command West" was envisaged to include Norway, the United Kingdom, Portugal (difficult), and France (even more difficult) falling under one second level allied commander. Both proposals did not find acceptance among nations for a variety of reasons. While surely nations are loath to revisit contentious issues, which only with difficulty have been resolved, they should reflect upon their provisional decision to reduce Strategic Command Europe from three to two Regional Commanders. Given the problems associated with membership expansion and the massive responsibilities that would be placed upon two Regional Commanders, consideration should be given to creating a minimum of three such commanders to provide effective coverage for Europe.

Principal Subordinate Commanders/Sub-Region Commanders. Perhaps the most tenacious problem facing any command restructuring relates to the third level of command. With the exception of IBERLANT (which is an MSC/RC), at this level headquarters are most closely tied to a nation’s command structure and national territory. Not surprisingly, at this level of command very little in the way of reform has been achieved in the LTS. Given political realities it is unlikely that nations will entertain abolishing these headquarters. However, reform-minded officials should insist that JSRCs come at a cost. First, the Alliance should press for the creation of air, sea, and land component commanders under Regional Commanders with distinct and mutually supporting terms of reference. This would enable a more effective means of integrating nations’ forces. Second, as an effort to encourage the development of flexible multinational land headquarters, nations which participate in bi-/multi-national formations should be invited to declare
them to NATO and have them fall under the integrated command structure, i.e., thereby maintaining the fourth level of command, but only for bi-/multi-national land forces. The objective of this initiative would be to ensure that these headquarters adhere to NATO standards and enable them to be integrated more efficiently into CJTFs. Concomitantly, their commanders should also be delegated sufficient peacetime and wartime command authorities to effect a greater degree of multinationality. Such reforms would not only enable allied commanders to execute Article V collective defense missions, but would also provide Regional Commanders with trained and integrated forces which could operate under a CJTF.

Conclusion.

The foregoing analysis of the politics of command in NATO and the most recent proposal to reorganize the integrated command structure has been intentionally written in a rather blunt fashion. The lack of a wider understanding of the LTS proposals and their often nuanced characteristics necessitates such a candid assessment. However, two caveats must be kept firmly in mind. First, while critical of some of the solutions proposed in LTS, the efforts of those officials who have contributed to the process should not be disparaged. That any agreement was reached and endorsed by the DPC speaks legions to the dedication and perseverance of those involved.

Second, in his excellent recounting of NATO’s evolution since 1989, Dutch defense official Dr. Rob de Wijk writes that the lack of real process in the LTS regarding command structure reorganization demonstrates:

...how much NATO had developed from a traditional alliance to a security organisation within which national considerations rather than the improvement of military effectiveness often weighted heaviest when making decisions.59
It could very well be that most nations are quite comfortable with this new orientation, if not indeed fundamentally new characteristic of NATO. Yet one continues to hear many senior Alliance officials claim that the basis and strength of the Alliance remains its Article V collective defense mission and the collective ability to respond to real security challenges. In short, nations and Alliance officials need to recognize the growing dichotomy between their stated objectives and the evolving structure which has served as a basis for allied collective defense. The implications of allowing such dissonance to continue could lead to an undermining of allied solidarity and, eventually, its credibility.

Recommendations.

1) In light of the Department of Defense’s concurrence on the LTS proposed reorganization of the integrated command structure, it should not reverse its support of initiatives thus far accepted in principle by the Alliance. To raise objections to the arrangements which have already found acceptance by the Alliance would be politically untenable.

2) However, should the LTS implementation studies of the reformed command structure find shortcomings, then the Department of Defense should seize the initiative and introduce proposals to reform the command structure based on military requirements.

3) The following key points should guide the Department of Defense’s policy toward the reorganization of the integrated command structure:

(a) Given the historical difficulty of reforming the Alliance’s command structure, Department of Defense should press for future reorganization efforts be done incrementally, vice addressing this contentious issue in one single effort. A more modest approach to reorganization might afford Washington and other like minded allies
greater leverage in pressing for reforms based on military, vice political, rationales.

(b) The establishment of “Joint Sub-Regional Commanders” *per se* should be opposed unless accompanied by the concession that air, sea, and land component commanders with sufficient peacetime and wartime command authorities are established with the mission of integrating and training allied forces.

(c) All bi-/multi-national land headquarters should be declared to NATO and made part of the integrated command structure in order to ensure that they can be employed effectively by the Alliance. Their commanders should be granted sufficient peacetime Coordinating Authority and wartime command authorities to achieve their stated missions.61

**U.S. Army Issues.**

1) The U.S. Army has a stake in the outcome of the LTS. The President’s *National Security Strategy* places great importance upon the ability of U.S. armed forces to engage in coalition operations.62 However, achieving a more effective degree of multinational land operational capabilities in NATO will be hindered by the proposed LTS structure.

2) It should be a key U.S. Army objective to press for the creation of land component commanders under regional commanders and the recognition by the Alliance of bi-/multi-national land headquarters. These reforms would contribute to improving the ability of allied land forces to operate together at the corps and division level.

3) The U.S. Army is almost alone in possessing the professional credibility to provide the leadership necessary in the Alliance to press for greater unity of effort among land forces in Europe, north and, particularly, south.
# APPENDIX
## NEW COMMAND STRUCTURE

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<th>Old Major NATO Commanders</th>
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<td>• Allied Commander Atlantic</td>
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<th>Major Subordinate Commanders</th>
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<td>* Strategic Commander Europe:</td>
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<td>• CinC Allied Forces Southern Europe*</td>
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<td>• CinC Allied Forces Iberian Atlantic Area</td>
<td>• Regional Commander SouthEast, Lisbon</td>
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* (to be disbanded and merged into Regional Command North)
Regional Commander equivalents:

| Commander Striking Fleet Atlantic* | HQ Striking Fleet Atlantic |
| Commander Submarines Allied Command Atlantic | HQ Allied Command Submarines Atlantic |

* Designated as CJTF headquarters for trials and exercises.

Principal Subordinate Commanders

### Strategic Command Atlantic:

All existing Principal Subordinate Commanders in ACLANT are to be dissolved or adopt the status of “forces” and therefore will fall outside of the formal integrated command structure.

### Strategic Command Europe:

| Commander Allied Naval Forces Northwest Europe | Component Commander Nav North, Northwood |
| Commander Allied Forces Northern Europe | Joint Sub-Regional Commander North, Stavanger |
| Commander Allied Forces Baltic Approaches | Joint Sub-Regional Commander NorthEast, Karup |
| Commander Allied Air Forces Central Europe | Component Commander Air North, Ramstein |
| Commander Allied Land Forces Central Europe | Joint Sub-Regional Commander Center, Heidelberg |
| Commander Allied Land Forces Southern Europe | Joint Sub-Regional Commander South, Verona |
| Commander Allied Naval Forces Southern Europe | Component Commander Nav South, Naples (may be relocated) |
• Commander Allied Air Forces Southern Europe
• Component Commander Air South, Naples (may be relocated)

• Commander Allied Land Forces Southeastern Europe
• Joint Sub-Regional Commander SouthEast, Izmir

• Commander Allied Land Forces South Central Europe
• Joint Sub-Regional Commander SouthCenter, Larissa (planned, never established)
• Joint Sub-Regional Commander SouthWest, Madrid

**Sub-Principal Subordinate Commanders:**

All fourth level commands in the integrated command structure are to be dissolved or lose their NATO status and revert to national commands.
ENDNOTES


7. Many of the details of the LTS have been cloaked in secrecy. The information used in this section is taken from a remarkable work which documents in great detail the Alliance’s internal evolution since 1990. It promises to become a classic. See Rob de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium: The Battle for Consensus, Brassey’s Atlantic Commentaries, London: Brassey’s, 1997, pp. 101-106; 128-130.


Annex A to Enclosure 1 to MC 324, “The NATO Military Command Structure.”

23. The best record and politico-military assessment of these negotiations and the subsequent “Four Powers” agreement is found in Michael H. Clemmesen, “Present and Future Command Structure: A Danish View,” in Command in NATO after the Cold War, pp. 190-194.

24. Evidence to support this observation is found in the fact that (surprise!) a Danish colonel (Colonel Eskil Nielsen) played a key role in the initial conceptual development of the LTS. See de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, p. 103.


26. Allied Land Forces Zealand is the other land component commander under Commander BALTAP. However, this is essentially an exclusively national command which, during the Cold War, would have been reinforced by Allied land forces.


30. Ibid., p. 179.

31. See the press report of this proposal suggested during a visit to Portugal by the Chairman of the Military Committee, General Klaus Naumann, in Diario de Notícias (Lisboa), September 11, 1996, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS)-WEU-96-179.

32. For an official Portuguese view of IBERLANT and Lisbon’s vision for the headquarters, see Jaime Gama, “Portugal and the Transformed NATO,” NATO Review, Vol. 44, No. 4, July 1996, particularly pp. 5-6.

33. See the following press report for background on this interesting compromise. Diario de Noticias (Lisboa), November 12, 1996 in FBIS-WEU-96-221.


37. See Libre Belgique (Bruxelles), March 22, 1996.

38. See Liberation (Paris), December 20, 1996, which claims that not only was it French policy that a French officer take the command, but a general officer had already been identified for the post!

39. For an excellent brief synopsis of this controversy, see Thomas L. Friedman's op-ed article in The New York Times, December 1, 1996.

40. See Neue Zürcher Zeitung, February 16, 1998; and, Estrella, “After the Madrid Summit,” particularly points 17-19, which are very critical of the French approach to this issue.

41. See Johnsen and Young, French Policy toward NATO, pp. 3-8.

42. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 5, 1996; and, Liberation (Paris), December 20, 1996.


45. For background on the problems associated with commanding land forces in NATO multinational formations, see Jon Whitford and Thomas-Durell Young, “Command Authorities and Multinationality in NATO: The Response of the Central Region's Armies,” Command in NATO after the Cold War, pp. 53-73.

46. See, for example, Multinational Force Command Authorities Handbook: Proceedings of the CR-CAST Working Group on Command
Authorities Required for a Multinational Force Commander, Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, September 1, 1995.


49. In all probability one could expect that Commander JSRC Heidelberg will be for all intents and purposes a land component commander. The designation “JSRC” is being given to the commander in deference to not embarrassing nations in Regional Command South; however, this arrangement has not been made formal.


51. Interestingly, BALTAP falls within the 50 percent guidelines: 40 percent of the Headquarters is Danish, 40 percent German and the remaining 20 percent consists of other allied officers, e.g., British, Canadian, and American.

52. For an insightful and very critical assessment of the proposed LTS command structure reorganization, see Estrella, “After the Madrid Summit,” particularly point 7.

53. Ibid., points 22 and 23.


57. See Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, August 5, 1996.


59. See de Wijk, NATO on the Brink of the New Millennium, p. 130.
60. See, for example, Helge Hansen, "Foreword," Command in NATO after the Cold War, p. ix. N.B.: General Hansen was Commander-in-Chief Allied Forces Central Europe until 1996.

61. I go into greater detail on this matter in Young, Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures, pp. 42-43.

62. "An important element of our security preparedness depends on durable relationships with allies and other friendly nations. Accordingly, a central thrust of our strategy is to strengthen and adapt the security relationships we have with key nations around the world and create new structures when necessary." A National Security Strategy for a New Century, Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, May 1997, p. 2.