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CATF and CLF - Will These Traditional Roles Carry Us Into the 21st Century?

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Military Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

Signature:  

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**Abstract:**

It can be argued that amphibious operations are the heart and soul of the Navy-Marine Corps Team. A facet generally accepted as near sacred, and at a minimum as fundamental to these operations, is the formal command relationship between the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander Landing Force (CLF).

The 21st century will experience a revolutionary change in how the United States armed forces will conduct amphibious operations. The driving force behind these changes is the Marine Corps' White Paper *Operational Maneuver From The Sea* (OMFTS) and the Navy’s papers, *Forward From the Sea*, and *Forward From the Sea*. These forward thinking documents emphasize use of the sea as the operational commander's maneuver space from which seamless operations will be launched to dominate the littoral battlespace. Furthermore, they recognize that the Navy’s and Marine Corps’ roles must adapt to a changing environment and acknowledge the need for new doctrine.

To address the need for doctrinal changes in amphibious operations, this paper will recoup the development of current doctrine and examine calls to replace the traditional CATF-CLF command structure with accepted, joint terminology of "supported/supporting" command relations. This change will provide the operational commander with the best way to maintain both "unity of command" and "focus of effort" while achieving the Joint Task Force Commander's intent and realizing the desired end state of an operation or campaign.

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CATF and CLF – Will These Traditional Roles Carry Us Into the 21st Century?

“The Marine Commander prepares a tactical plan and executes his part of it. The Naval Commander prepares a supporting plan which involves the initial execution of the tactical plan and the support of the landing forces to the end of the action.”

Col. E.B. Miller, USMC

*Marine Corps Gazette*, May 1932

THESIS

Amphibious operations, as we in the United States know them, were born between the two world wars. The island hopping, Pacific Theater successes of WWII were the direct results of refining a fledgling amphibious doctrine grounded in a philosophy similar to the above-cited passage. More than fifty years after World War II, the Navy and Marine Corps remain committed to a world-wide, forward presence and to the requisite need to introduce forces ashore in both benign and hostile situations. However, since the end of WWII, much - including, capabilities, equipment, and the focus of our military - has changed. The mindset of “how” to fight wars is currently undergoing dramatic changes as each of the services and the joint community focus upon our nation’s future needs. Within the arena of amphibious operations (joint or otherwise) much debate has arisen as to whether or not command relationships – specifically those which govern the Commander Amphibious Task Force (CATF) and the Commander Landing Force (CLF) – remain applicable to the visionary course charted for our operational forces as we prepare to fight in the next millenium. The answer is, “No, current amphibious doctrinal command relationships are not sufficient for the anticipated joint warfare engagements in the year 2010 and beyond.” This paper urges the use of “supporting” and “supported” command relationships to replace the terms “CATF” and

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“CLF.” These are accepted joint, DoD definitions, which can be effectively used to expand the command relationships of amphibious operations for joint service usage, understanding and acceptance.

Need For Change

To understand this controversy, one must review current amphibious command and control relationships, and then, compare them to the proposed concepts espoused by documents such as, Joint Vision 2010, Forward...From the Sea, and Operational Maneuver From the Sea (OMFTS). This paper will conduct a brief recap of the anticipated uniqueness of future battlespace requirements, compare this with the tenets of current doctrine, and finally, address proposed ideas to bridge that gap.

The focus of this paper will remain on the command relationship that exists between CATF and CLF. Joint Pub 1-02 defines these command positions as:

“**Commander, amphibious task force** – The US Navy officer designated as commander of the amphibious task force. *Also called CATF.*”

“**Commander, landing force** – The officer designated in the initiating directive for an amphibious operation to command the landing force. *Also called CLF.*”

Department of the Navy and Marine Corps concept papers call for a major shift in focus to an area known as the “littorals,” that land area located within 300 miles of the world’s oceans. These are critical areas due to population and economic growth. The littoral concept is as equally applicable to Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW) as it is to full-scale warfare.

The Marine Corps’ OMFTS concept is based on the maneuver of naval forces at

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3 Ibid., 79.
an operational level to achieve a bold bid for victory which is aimed at exploiting a significant enemy weakness to deliver a decisive blow. "What distinguishes OMFTS from all other examples of operational maneuver is the extensive use of the sea as a means to gain advantage, and as an avenue for friendly movement that is simultaneously a barrier to the enemy and a means of avoiding disadvantageous engagements. It will maximize the use of sea-based logistics, sea-based fire support and the use of the sea as a medium for tactical and operational movement." OMFTS plans to employ less personnel, but with more capabilities than our current forces possess, over greater expanses, and without a build-up of logistics bases ashore; these precepts are critical to OMFTS. The mobility increase afforded by the Landing Craft Air Cushion (LCAC), combined with the soon-to-be fielded, tilt-rotor, MV-22 Osprey, and the Advanced Amphibious Assault Vehicle (AAAV) will provide the commander with drastically increased operational reach. This reach, combined with technological advances in communications and weaponry will bring the landing forces enhanced flexibility, simultaneity, and depth.

*Joint Vision 2010* reflects this in the realization that "new technologies will allow increased capability at lower echelons to control more lethal forces over larger areas, thus leveraging the skills and initiative of individuals and small units. These capabilities enable a degree of independent maneuver and planning, and coordination at lower echelons, which were normally exercised by more senior commanders in the past." These abilities zero in on the heart of the discussion of this paper. More will be

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accomplished through massing the effects of firepower and Command, Control, Communications, Computers, Information, Reconnaissance and Surveillance (C4IRS) capabilities vice physically massing personnel and assets. Operational surprise, enhanced by increased mobility and technological advances will allow the landing force commander to accomplish his mission without completely deploying ashore as in the past.

This aspect of being able to control forces ashore without departing the confines of an integrated, state of the art, Landing Force Operations Center on ship lends itself to no longer needing to transfer command of the landing force ashore. Doctrinally, CATF is in OPCON of the landing force until command passes ashore. CLF exercises TACON over his forces, but does not have OPCON until CATF concurs that CLF can control his forces from a position ashore and is able to defend the beachhead. In the future, since OMFTS requires no initial force beachhead, and since communications will allow as good, if not better control of widely dispersed forces from the ship, CLF may never need to go ashore. Should this occur, under today’s doctrine, he will never be in full command his force and not responsible for the pursuit of his unit’s operational goals.

The OMFTS concept represents a significant departure from traditional amphibious operations. Command authority and responsibility during the transition from strategic movement to operational maneuver from the sea must be addressed. OMFTS requires a clear delineation of command authority and that responsibility be established by a higher headquarters. Who is best suited to be the operational commander, responsible for the fluid pursuit of tactical, operational, and possibly, strategic goals? Commanders (and their staffs) will most likely fight future engagements in shortened
reaction periods, requiring quick, decisive action. These commanders must be in a position to influence and to control the assets required to support their scheme of maneuver. To answer these types of questions, we must understand how we reached the pinnacle of amphibious doctrine at which we are today.

**Development of Current Amphibious Doctrine**

In 1934, a board of Marine Corps officers met at Quantico and developed the *Tentative Manual for Landing Operations*. 1935 saw a revision and acceptance by both the Navy and the Marine Corps. Although this version did not address the CATF–CLF command relationship, it acknowledged the need for command relationships to be flexible and based upon the composition of the attack force. The proper attack force was already recognized as a task organization especially constituted for the conduct of landing force operations and one that would include naval task groupings and a landing force. The manual also ensured that naval forces would be organized to be responsive to the needs of the landing force.⁶

Fleet exercises conducted between 1937 and 1941 brought to light the command relationship strains between the Navy and Marine commanders. Up to this point, it was generally agreed that the need for "unity of command" mandated that overall command belonged to the commander of the naval task force. Disputes arose when the landing force commander, once established ashore and capable of maintaining his forces, deemed it necessary to be free to conduct further operations as he saw fit. The necessity to phase amphibious operations, and a corresponding need to phase command relationships, arose quickly as commanders of the landing force and of the naval task groups operated on the

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same level under the overall command of the attack force commander throughout the operation."\(^7\)

The first amphibious operation of WWII, the seizure of Guadalcanal, Operation WATCHTOWER, put this fledgling amphibious doctrine to the test. The operations plan issued by CNO on 29 April 1942 (and confirmed by JCS on 2 July) placed Major General Vandegrift’s 1st Marine Division “under command” of Vice Admiral Turner, the commander of South Pacific amphibious forces. Vice Admiral Ghormley, COMSOPAC, was in “strategic command” of the overall operation, but he placed Vice Admiral Fletcher in charge of Expeditionary Task Force (TF) 61, the task force whose mission it was to seize Guadalcanal. Admiral Turner was subordinate to not only Admiral Fletcher, but also to the land based aircraft (TF 63) and only on an equal footing with the carrier based air, Task Group (TG) 61.1 – all command’s whose support was integral to accomplishment of his mission. Many of the difficulties for which Guadalcanal is remembered were largely due to flaws in command relationships. Vandegrift was relegated to little more than a detachment, albeit large, assigned to Turner’s TF 62, and Turner, although tasked to accomplish all three tasks of the operation, did have operational control of the assets that he needed.\(^8\) As a side note, General Vandegrift’s placement within the command structure as TG 61.8, made him a co-equal to the Fire Support Gp. (TG 62.3), the Minesweeping Gp. (TG 62.5), the Screening Gp (TG 62.6) and the Air Support Group (TG 62.7) - - a strikingly similar model to the modern, Naval Expeditionary Task Force (NETF) proposal to be discussed later in this paper.

\(^7\) ibid., 2.

The unworkable command relationships of this expeditionary model were superceded in October 1942 and placed the responsibility for operations afloat with the amphibious force commander and determined that the landing force commander should have responsibility for operations ashore.\(^9\) Still, the CATF-CLF relationship did not formally evolve in doctrine until 1958. That same version formalized the Initiating Directive as a document written by a higher headquarters to identify elements and command relationships of an amphibious operation. Other firsts included, the Amphibious Objective Area (AOA) being doctrinally recognized and CATF’s identification as the overall coordinator of all units and elements that operated therein.\(^10\)

The co-equal planning status of CATF and CLF, introduced in 1967, remains in effect today. Throughout the years, co-equality for planning purposes, has remained the bedrock for amphibious operations. It is probably the greatest, singularly attributable factor for the relatively minor changes required to transform a bi-service doctrine into joint service doctrine. As figure 1 (Appendix A) highlights, CATF retains the ultimate approval for all decisions; success is the result of the “co-equal for planning status” between CATF, CLF, and the other commanders involved short of the execution phase of the operation.

**WHY IS A CHANGE REQUIRED?**

Future, littoral, battlespace engagements will require not only “unity of effort,” but as much as ever – “unity of command.” Massing the effects of technology and

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\(^10\) ibid.
weaponry to realize the synergistic effect of all the forces within a Joint Task Force (JTF) will be of little consequence without it. As part of a look toward the future, the Center for Naval Analysis (CNA) evaluated the current command and control doctrine and the practice of US naval forces. CNA specifically focused on doctrine associated with the Amphibious Task Force (ATF), and the integration of the Carrier Battle Groups (CVBGs), Amphibious Readiness Groups (ARGs) and the embarked Marine Expeditionary Units (MEUs). Their results call for new doctrine to address integrating naval battle groups into joint and multinational, theater command structures because current doctrine and procedures fail to adequately address the integration of CVBGs and amphibious forces into combined Naval Groups.11 Whether in response to these studies, or as independent initiatives, both the Navy and the Marine Corps have focused a great deal of effort, energy and debate on these issues.

Just as the current force structure of the Navy is built around its fleet centerpiece, the aircraft carrier and its battle group, the Navy’s response to calls for support in the littorals is also built upon a CVBG-based solution. Recent years have seen repeated, concurrent employment of CVBGs and ARGs/MEUs in both fleet exercises and real world contingencies. Much like the 1937-1941 period, Navy fleet exercises have experimented to determine the best way to integrate the CVBG/ARG/MEU components into one, well orchestrated, tactical and operational command structure.

These fleet exercises have focused upon the CVBG forming the senior command umbrella for all forces arrayed within the NETF. The logic behind this lies with the CVBG commander’s seniority and the carrier’s essential role to establish air superiority.

and to project strike capabilities inland in execution of a campaign’s desired end state.

Within the NETF concept, the responsibility for the mission of power projection - including the amphibious operation - has been relegated to the CVBG commander and the amphibious operations command structure has been shoe-horned into the CVBG’s Composite Warfare Commander (CWC) organization. However, the CWC structure within which it is recommended that the ARG/MEU commanders (CATF/CLF) become equals among functional warfare commanders (Mine Warfare Commander, Sea Combat Commander, Air Combat Commander, etc.), is a purely naval structure which lends itself to defense of the fleet and maintenance of sea control in deep blue waters. But what about the littorals that encompass the battlespace up to 100 NM out to sea and 300 miles inland of the high water mark? Multiple problems arise when a CWC controlled NETF is viewed in terms of a joint, littoral environment, foremost is that CWC doctrine was designed for CVBG defense from Soviet air and submarine threats. It is a tool for implementing combat command at sea, and it is not the goal of naval command-and-control doctrine.

In a March 1995 Marine Corps Gazette article, former Commandant of the Marine Corps, General Carl E. Mundy said that the littoral area commander needed to be a warfare generalist, not a warfare specialist. This statement recognized the need for a commander’s balanced approach to accomplish the mission at hand. The same periodical’s preceding article, written by Admiral Boorda (then CNO) espoused that in

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order to “capitalize on the complex and varied assets ... [the NETF] must have a single, unified commander who understands how to bind the tools together into a seamless fighting force.”  

Admiral Boorda further went on to emphasize that, “The Battle Group/NEF commander and his staff must be experts in the operational art, able to integrate Marine, amphibious, and carrier battle group capabilities and expertise.”

Although these points drive toward resolution of the overall commander, and do not address the specifics of CATF-CLF, their applicability derives from their recognition that the “best” commander may not be the obvious one. Despite the CVBG commander’s important role in force projection and protection of the fleet, including the ARG, he will typically remain outside of the Littoral Penetration Area (LPA). This begins to beg the issue of whether or not he really is the best overall commander to command an amphibious operation. A CNA study completed in October 1994 suggested the use of a single “transit” task group consisting of the CVBG and the ARG/MEU, but recommended that two separate task groups be formed upon reaching the littorals. This concept would place the CLF into a supported commander’s role for the amphibious operation and the CVBG commander into that of a supporting commander.

The NETF concept and the Marine Corps’s interpretation of it diverge at several points; the most discernable is on the issue of command relationships. Integral to the NETF concept, the Navy strongly advocates retention of the traditional CATF-CLF relationship, but as functional warfare commanders, recreating a C2 hierarchy similar to that of Operation WATCHTOWER. The Marine Corps, although an overall proponent of

16 Ibid., 25.  
NETF because it supports the its maneuver-based, OMFTS concept, sees little benefit from retaining the outdated CATF-CLF command relation. Rather, it recommends use of the more jointly familiar command relationship of "supported and supporting commanders" roles in lieu of CATF-CLF. The supported/supporting command relationship defines mission responsibility, decision making authority and clearly identifies which commander is to receive maximum support and cooperation as the focus of effort within a given phase of a campaign or operation. Bottomline, NETF is not a littoral warfighting method, but a C2 concept that removes the landing force commander from the decision makers.\(^\text{18}\)

To ensure clarity for further discussions the terms "supported" and "supporting" commanders are defined as:

**Supported Commander** – The commander having primary responsibility for all aspects of a task assigned by the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan or other joint operation planning authority. In the context of joint operation planning, this term refers to the commander who prepares operation plans or operation orders in response to the requirements of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.\(^\text{19}\)

**Supporting Commander** – A commander who provides augmentation forces or other support to a supported commander or who develops a supporting plan. Includes the designated combatant commands and Defense agencies as appropriate.\(^\text{20}\)

NETF proposals create additional flag-level, bi-service, permanent staffs to lead naval deployed forces. These commanders, rear admirals, would be supported by integrated Navy/Marine Corps staffs organized along warfare mission lines.\(^\text{21}\) Creation of additional, standing, flag-level staffs does nothing for the operational commander

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\(^{18}\) Interview conducted with M.L. Richmond, Branch Head, Joint Terminology Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, telephone conversation with author, 27 Jan 1998.


whose greatest concern is to identify an enemy center of gravity and then to occupy or deny use of decisive points in order to destroy or neutralize it. Tying the need for unity of command with the expectation that the operational commander will direct engagements over far greater expanses than ever before, one can quickly grasp the impact of streamlining the layers of command associated with an operation. As such, creating another naval staff within a CINC’s theater will not benefit the mission or its commander.

The majority of the approximately fifty-one operations in which US forces participated between 1991 and 1995, were all joint operations. Most of these operations occurred in the littorals, included naval forces and most utilized the supported/supporting command relationship.22 This is a clear indication that, along with legal mandates by the Goldwater-Nichols Act, most future operations will also be joint. As such, command of these operations needs to be executed from a joint service perspective, vice the bi-service focus that NETF calls for.

The Marine Corps believes that it is time to expand command relation options in amphibious doctrine. Joint requirements, Marine Corps service componency, and the operational and tactical realities of operations in the littorals require the present “CLF OPCON to CATF-only” operations be expanded to include “TACON” and “supported/supporting” command relationship options.23

In doing so, the traditional CATF-CLF command relation, which has rarely been used in recent years due to the accepted capabilities of MEU(SOC)s and their associated ARGs, can be replaced. The commander whose forces are the operational focus of effort

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22 Interview conducted with M.L. Richmond, Branch Head, Joint Terminology Doctrine Division, Marine Corps Combat Development Command, telephone conversation with author, 27 Jan 1998.
23 Ibid.
is the one most logical to be designated as the “supported” commander. As defined by Joint Pub 1-02, the supported commander has the primary responsibility for all aspects of the mission assigned to him by a CJTF or a CINC.

Granted, it makes sense for a naval officer to command ships at sea, rather than to have a Marine or Army officer attempt to do so. Who though, the naval officer or the Marine is better suited to command forces as they prepare to swiftly maneuver from ship to objective - landward objectives? Most people would agree that the Marine is the single, commander who understands how to bind the tools together into a seamless fighting force best suited for this mission. General Mundy’s well educated generalist in this case is the Marine, especially today’s Marine, one that is educated in joint warfighting (the Marine Corps stresses professional military education – unlike the Navy), and one who has probably served on a joint staff, already. As the supported commander, when supporting commanders (naval, air or otherwise) address tactical or operational concerns, this Marine will possess the tools to balance their concerns, requirements and limitations better than his predecessors because of his joint service and education. Furthermore, as with all joint operations, amphibious operations should be designed so that the tactical commander has the appropriate experience and staff to deal with the situation. 

When the focus of the mission is to place a landing force ashore in pursuit of the enemy center of gravity, then the commander of that force should be the designated as the supported commander by the Commander, JTF (CJTF). In this case, it would also logically, make sense that he assumes the responsibility for the operational success of

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the mission assigned by the CJTF. Following this train of thought, the landing force commander could easily find himself assigned as the overall amphibious commander for a portion of a campaign. "If sea and air control issues are the most vital, then NETF should command the operation. If ground forces are the most critical, the landing force commander should command."25 One must assume that multiple operations will be executed simultaneously by the CJTF to mold the theater of operations; as such, the CJTF will designate his focus of effort and associated command relationships.

At what point should the landing force commander be designated as the supported commander or as a supporting commander? The transition from embarked, forward deployed supporting commander to being the supported commander should occur, for planning purposes, upon receipt of the mission and, for executions, when designated in an Initiating Directive. Command relations must be clearly delineated so as to fully identify the time at which the landing force becomes the main effort; more than likely, this will be upon entering the LPA. Until that time, similar to current doctrine, planning will remain concurrent and co-equal between the supported and supporting commanders. Appendix B suggests a revised basic decision responsibilities matrix.

CONCLUSION

OMFTS will couple doctrine with technological advances in speed, mobility, fire support, communications, and navigation to seamlessly and rapidly identify and exploit enemy weaknesses across the entire spectrum of conflict.26 The landing force commander will be in the position to rapidly transition his forces from ship to objective to gain the leverage required to exploit his enemy’s weaknesses and to overwhelm him.

26 Headquarters Marine Corps, Operational Maneuver From The Sea (Washington: 1996), 14.
To do so, the commander must be able to integrate all assets of the JTF. As a supported commander, he will be assured the requisite control to develop and maintain the operational timing and tempo needed to achieve his, and the CJTF’s, desired end state.

World War II-based amphibious doctrine has reached its culmination point. The command relations of that doctrine are outdated, bi-service terms and responsibilities. Operational Maneuver From The Sea requires its own miniature revolution in military affairs to achieve its fullest potential. The mobility is, or shortly will be at hand to make it a reality. Information systems and enhanced communications are the technologies that still require development. However, when available, they will nearly complete the OMFTS loop. What is still required to execute OMFTS is revision of doctrine to adjust to a modern era in which our forces will fight. Gone are the days of attrition warfare. Gone are the days of landing four Marine divisions across a single beachhead to seize an island like Iwo Jima. Gone are the days of CATF and CLF.

In are the days of acceptance that joint forces require their commanders to be the best and the brightest and to be representative of the forces required to accomplish the mission. In are the days of decisive action by small units and individuals in the execution of tactical, operational, and possibly even strategic goals. In are the days of streamlined C4IRS systems which will allow the operational commander, be it a MEU(SOC) or a MEF(FWD), to remain embarked aboard supporting naval vessels and reliably maneuver his command ashore to the fullest depths of the littorals across an LPA of thousands of square miles. In are the days of amphibious operations when the supported commander is determined by mission needs, not by antiquated doctrine that fails to reflect the modern amphibious environment.
Basic Amphibious Decision Responsibilities Matrix

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*All basic decisions made by CLF are subject to the review/concurrence by CATF from a supportability perspective*

Figure 1

Revised Basic Amphibious Decision Responsibilities Matrix

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* All basic decisions made by the Supporting Commander(s) are subject to review/concurrence by the Supported Commander from a supportability perspective

Figure 2

Appendix B


