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OPTIMIZING UNITY OF EFFORT DURING
HUMANITARIAN ASSISTANCE OPERATIONS:
CIVIL-MILITARY OPERATIONS CENTERS "INSIDE AND OUTSIDE THE WIRE"

by

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The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Since 1991, the U.S. military has participated in Humanitarian Assistance (HA) operations in Iraq, Somalia, Bangladesh, Rwanda, Haiti, and Bosnia. As a result, U.S. Armed Forces have become increasingly involved in working with a plethora of independent non-military actors during humanitarian relief operations. The unique nature of this relationship is recognized in the Military Operations Other Than War principle of unity of effort. For the Joint Task Force commander (JFC), unity of effort acknowledges the fact that coordination and cooperation replace command and control as guiding principles during HA operations.

To support the JFC conducting humanitarian relief operations, doctrine has been developed identifying the Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as the engine that drives the coordination process. However, current doctrine is incomplete. While focusing on the who, what, when, why, and how of CMOC operations, guidance discussing where is conspicuously absent.

To optimize unity of effort, standardized doctrine must be developed and instituted identifying where to physically locate the CMOC during HA operations. Based on the divergent cultures of the participating military and non-military actors, parallel civil-military operations centers located inside and outside the wire offer the best opportunity for optimizing unity of effort between the Joint Task Force and Humanitarian Relief Organizations supporting HA operations.
Abstract of

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What's the relationship between a just arrived military force and the NGO and PVO that might have been working in a crisis-torn area all along? What we have is a partnership. If you are successful, they are successful; and, if they are successful, you are successful. We need each other.¹

General J.M. Shalikashvili
Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff

Introduction

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union, the U.S. military has become increasingly involved in HA operations around the world. Thus, it is imperative the JFC establish successful partnerships with the plethora of International Organizations (IOs), Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs), and Private Volunteer Organizations (PVOs) participating simultaneously in humanitarian relief efforts.² Emphasizing the importance of this relationship, the Chairman's National Military Strategy states that:

"Achieving interagency and civil interoperability through the continuing development of our doctrine and interagency participation in our training exercises is important to the unity of effort upon which success in many missions depends" (emphasis added)³

To support the JFC, joint and service doctrine provide recommendations on how to develop and maintain unity of effort with HROs during HA operations. Current doctrine emphasizes the importance of establishing a Civil-Military Operations Center (CMOC) as the primary engine for driving coordination and consultation efforts between the Joint Task Force (JTF) and HROs. While the civilian and military communities generally agree on the who, what, when, why, and how of CMOC operations, the jury is still out regarding the where. A review of current and draft joint pubs, field manuals, handbooks, and unified command after action reports find CMOC location recommendations ranging from the JFC's specialized staff inside the wire to collocation with United Nations entities outside the wire.⁴ As ensuing discussions will reveal, the lack of doctrine identifying where to physically locate the CMOC complicates endeavors focused on enhancing JTF/HRO unity of effort.
Thesis

JTF/HRO unity of effort can be optimized by instituting a parallel civil-military operations centers concept that collocates the CMOC with the JTF headquarters inside the wire, and a Humanitarian Operations Center (HOC) with the HROs outside the wire. In this configuration, parallel civil-military operations centers will maximize the two-way flow of information and services between the JTF and HROs, and standardize the organizational framework supporting future HA operations.

This paper supports the above thesis by first examining the unity of effort concept in addition to discussing the roles of the JTF, the HROs, and the CMOC in HA operations. The second section provides a general overview of the HA operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti from the CMOC perspective. The third section examines current doctrine regarding the physical location of the CMOC. Based on the findings in sections two and three, section four argues for the establishment of parallel civil-military operations centers inside and outside the wire. Section five discusses counter-arguments to the parallel civil-military operations centers concept. Lastly, the paper closes with concluding comments.

Unity of Effort, the JTF, HROs, and the CMOC

Unity of Effort

Because of the cultural differences existing between the U.S. military and civilian relief agencies, unity of effort is one of the most important issues the JFC must contend with during HA operations. Joint Pub 3-07 (JP 3-07), Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War, states that:

"achieving unity of effort is often complicated by a variety of international foreign and domestic military and non-military participants, the lack of definitive command arrangements among them, and varying views of the objective. This requires that JFCs, or other designated directors of the operation, rely heavily on consensus building to achieve unity of effort (emphasis added)."
The importance of attaining unity of effort is based on the fact that, irrespective of their inherent differences, the JTF and HROs share similar goals. "The goals include stabilizing the situation (to include deterring war), promoting peace, saving lives, and resolving the problem/conflict or hardship--while supporting civil authorities or the recognized governing body." Furthermore, the JTF and HROs clearly understand that sharing culturally distinct information and services is a "win-win" proposition. In *The U.S. Military/NGO Relationship in Humanitarian Interventions*, Chris Seiple elaborates:

"In order for the NGO/military relationship to work, there must be an exchange of services: the relationship must be mutually beneficial... There must be a clear understanding that information and services operate on a two-way, transparent street. Otherwise, each acts as if the other did not exist: NGOs pursuing exclusively humanitarian purposes and the military providing its own solution according to its self-contained infrastructure." JTF/HRO unity of effort is thus based on consensus building and the understanding that cooperation begets cooperation. Without cooperation there is no partnership; without a partnership there is no success.

**The JTF**

During HA operations, the JTF's primary missions are to enhance or assure security, create a stable environment, and disengage from the relief effort as soon as feasible. The JTF accomplishes these missions by providing the relief effort with security, information, logistics and communications. Security support not only includes physical security for HRO convoys, storage warehouses, and personnel, but also the sharing of information regarding the location of landmines and other hazardous areas. Additional support can include countering disinformation. In *Strengthening Military Relationships with NGOs During Complex Humanitarian Emergencies*, COL G. C. Swan states that:

"In a CHE [complex humanitarian emergency] military forces and NGOs will face concerted attempts by warring parties to influence the population through media broadcasts. Information exchange and cooperation between military forces and NGOs is essential to
providing accurate information to the population so the effectiveness of humanitarian relief efforts can be maximized. "

Furthermore, the JTF can provide communications support, and logistics support such as airlift and ground transportation. In addition to providing security, information, logistics, and communications support, the U.S. military also provides intangible support. American participation in humanitarian relief efforts draws media attention to the crisis, which can serve as a revenue generator, and can also offer an air of legitimacy to the relief effort. 

**The HROs**

As a general rule, HROs will have been engaged in the crisis area long before the JTF arrives. Therefore, the HROs can provide the JTF with knowledge and understanding of the crisis at hand. "NGOs can provide military commanders...key information regarding the existing political situation in the host nation which can then assist commanders in seeking out or avoiding politically sensitive contact that could affect local perception of the military's neutrality." As discussed in Joint Pub 3-08 (JP 3-08), *Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations Vol I*, HROs also provide information regarding the following:

"(a) Historical perspective and insights into factors contributing to the situation at hand. (b) Local cultural practices that will bear on the relationship of military forces to the populace. (c) Local political structure, political aims of various parties, and the roles of key leaders. (d) Security situation. (e) Role and capabilities of the host-nation government" USEUCOM's Operation SUPPORT HOPE After Action Report further finds that "Most [HROs] are more than eager to share their information and thoughts with the U.S. military representatives as long as the exchange is not couched in terms of intelligence gathering."

**The CMOC**

Originating in Northern Iraq during Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, CMOCs have been employed in every U.S. military HA operation since 1991. "The CMOC is a facility where representatives from NGOs, PVOs and others can meet to coordinate their activities as..."
they relate to serving the indigenous population in the theater of operations. Furthermore, as the JTF/HRO central clearing house for information and service requests, the CMOC is the focal point for humanitarian relief operations. Core CMOC functions include:

"(1) coordination with NGOs and other non-military organizations impacting on the mission, (2) receiving, processing, and coordinating requests from these organizations (especially in terms of security and transport), (3) gathering information/intelligence, disseminating information from the military to NGOs, and (4) attempting to focus the efforts of the NGOs in a manner which supports the objectives of the commander." Additional functions include providing access to key military assets while reducing duplication of effort between military and non-military resources. Moreover, "the CMOC represents the military's only institutional chance for accurate feedback on whether or not the humanitarian intent is being met (emphasis added)."

The CMOC is an ideal mechanism for coordinating the exchange of mutually beneficial information and services between the JTF and HROs. Thus, the CMOC plays a vital role in providing a venue for enhancing civil-military unity of effort during HA operations.

**JTF/HRO Relations:**
**Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti**

Unity of effort was achieved during Operations RESTORE HOPE, SUPPORT HOPE, and UPHOLD DEMOCRACY due to the role the CMOC played as a two-way clearing house for service and information requests. However, CMOC personnel did experience coordination problems with the HROs and JTF staffs. While unity of effort was attained in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, room for improvement exists.

**Somalia**

U.S. military participation in humanitarian crises support both U.N. directed relief missions and unilateral U.S. operations. In Somalia, HA operations supported U.N. led relief efforts during PROVIDE RELIEF and RESTORE HOPE. "Set up in December 1992 during
the early stages of UNITAF [United Task Force], CMOC became the key coordinating point between the task force and the HRO's. Liaison officers from the major multinational contingents, together with the U.S. command, used this center as a means of coordinating their activities... Equally important in fostering unity of effort was the U.N. led and operated HOC. Key to the CMOC/HOC relationship was the fact that the CMOC director also served as the HOC deputy director. CMOC/HOC connectivity resulted in the timely processing of HRO requests for convoy escorts, space-available air travel, a variety of technical assistance requests, and security for HRO personnel, equipment and supplies.

While the CMOC/HOC relationship fostered unity of effort, there were several problem areas. In Military Relations With Humanitarian Relief Organizations: Observations From Restore Hope, J. T. Dworken finds that although the military convoy system implemented to assist HROs in transporting relief supplies worked well, problems existed. "The military-HRO link-up was not always smooth. When the HRO was delayed, it was sometimes difficult to communicate the delay to the escort before the escort arrived. On occasion, the problem was due to communications difficulties. At other times, it was compounded by the fact that the CMOC, which received HRO calls, was not collocated with the force headquarters, which would often have to notify the command providing the escort (emphasis added)."

Not being collocated with the JTF caused additional problems in the security arena. Dworken adds that although the JTF possessed overwhelming military force, "providing security for the HROs was not always easy, especially in Mogadishu. There was a communications problem at times. Like the communications problems with convoy link-ups, this one can be attributed to the CMOC not being collocated with the UNITAF headquarters."

In addition to transportation and security coordination difficulties, conflicts also existed between CMOC personnel and JTF staff members. In Tracing the Evolution of the Civil Military Operations Center (CMOC) in the 90s: What is the Best Model?, LTC M. A.
Davis finds that petty jealousies existed between JTF and CMOC personnel and were based on accusations that CMOC personnel had been "co-opted by the NGOs." Davis attributes these jealousies to two factors: "(1) living conditions at the CMOC/HOC were much better than there at the JTF, and (2) MOOTW [Military Operations Other Than War], CMOCs, and dealing with the UN and NGOs was new...and bound to create some misunderstandings."  

Rwanda

As in Somalia, humanitarian relief efforts supporting SUPPORT HOPE were led by the U.N. Furthermore, the U.N. created and ran a multi-agency relief operations center in Kigali called the On Site Operations Coordination Center (OSOCC). Representatives to the OSOCC included various U.N. agencies, the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), the Office of United States Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), the JTF CMOC cell, host nation representatives, and a variety other international organizations. From the U.S. military perspective, JTF Support Hope (JTFSH) created two CMOCs for HRO coordination purposes, CMOC Entebbe and CMOC Kigali.

CMOC Entebbe, collocated with the JTFSH headquarters and support elements, served as the region's transportation hub and staging base for coordinating and prioritizing the movement of military and HRO personnel, and relief supplies into and out of the crisis areas. CMOC Kigali prepared contingency plans to support refugee movements, coordinated logistics requests, and coordinated CMOC activities with the U.S. Embassy in addition to serving as a member of the ambassador's country team. As the JTFSH CMOC liaison to the OSOCC, CMOC Kigali "gave the OSOCC the expertise and depth of personnel for it to succeed and further reinforced unity of effort with the U.N. and NGOs present in Rwanda."
Once again, the benefits of a JTF owned and operated CMOC working hand-in-hand with a U.N. led humanitarian relief center proved to be of tremendous value during a HA operation. While SUPPORT HOPE is recognized as another success story in the HA arena, perception problems between CMOC and JTF staff personnel affected JTF/HRO unity of effort. "Officers at both the Kigali and Entebbe CMOCs indicate that the JTF staff did not fully appreciate how the CMOCs were contributing to the overall humanitarian relief effort, but were overly concerned with force protection, redeployment and situation reports."25

Haiti

Unlike RESTORE HOPE and SUPPORT HOPE, UPHOLD DEMOCRACY was an U.S. unilateral mission directed to reinstate Jean-Bertrand Aristide as the democratically elected President of Haiti. During UPHOLD DEMOCRACY, JTF Haiti's primary mission was to restore the Government of Haiti (GOH); humanitarian relief efforts were secondary missions. Nevertheless, HA operations played a key role in helping produce a secure and stable environment during the restoration of the GOH.

JTF Haiti established two CMOCs during UPHOLD DEMOCRACY. One CMOC resided with the JTF/J3-Civil Affairs section within the JTF Headquarters in Port-au-Prince. The second CMOC was with the 10th Mountain Division Headquarters in Cap-Haitien. "The CMOC in the JTF Headquarters had little or no contact with the NGOs. Instead, a Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC) was established as a meeting place for NGOs, and requests for support were then sent to the CMOC cell in the J3."26 The HACC was established for two main reasons. First, the HACC served as an alternate coordination site due to the perception of JTF Haiti planners that many of the HROs were uncomfortable working in and around the military CMOC. Secondly, the HACC was created to prevent
security problems from developing because the CMOC, collocated with the Joint Operations Center (JOC), was in a secure area. HRO assistance requests centered on transportation and security and were coordinated through the HACC. As in Somalia and Rwanda, unity of effort was again achieved; however, problems between JTF Haiti and the HROs did exist.

During relief efforts in Somalia and Rwanda, the U.N. was the lead agent and HA operations were conducted within a familiar framework, this was not the case during the U.S. led Haiti operation. The JTF Haiti established HACC was not an organization with which the HROs were familiar. Diverging from doctrine caused confusion. Based on previous experience, the HROs sought out the CMOC located in the JOC to coordinate relief efforts and requests for services. Furthermore, "Joint Pub 3-08 defines HACC as a CINC level organization and instructs us to use CMOC as the JTF and lower level center for NGOs to make contact with the military." As LTC Davis concludes, "Hopefully the lessons captured from Haiti will be leavened with those from previous operations to develop a more comprehensive and coherent doctrine for the CMOC (emphasis added)."

While HA operations in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti reflected unity of effort between the U.S. military and participating HROs, several problem areas were identified. Of these, the most significant focuses on the physical location of the CMOC during U.N. or U.S. led operations. If unity of effort is to be optimized, a doctrinal concept regarding CMOC location, regardless of the nature of the operation, must be established.

CMOC Location: What Doctrine Says

A review of MOOTW related joint publications, field manuals, and the Joint Warfighting Center's handbook on Peace Operations clearly reveals the absence of doctrine recommending where to physically locate the CMOC during HA operations. What makes this
issue relevant to the JFC is the fact that while doctrine has been developed discussing the who, what, when, and why of CMOC operations, discussions focusing on the where are conspicuously lacking. In other words, doctrine is incomplete. This point is particularly troubling given the current emphasis placed on the CMOC as a mechanism enhancing civil-military liaison, communications, coordination, cooperation, consensus building, and, ultimately, unity of effort during humanitarian relief missions.29 The following examples are provided to emphasize the incompleteness of doctrine relating to CMOC operations.

JP 3-07 focuses on the flexibility of the CMOC's internal organization. Additionally, JP 3-07 states that "There is no established structure for a CMOC; its size and composition depend on the situation..."30 JP 3-08 echoes JP 3-07's comments on the flexible nature of the CMOC's internal structure and further states that "The organization of the CMOC is theater- and mission-dependent-flexible in size and composition."31 JP 3-08 provides additional guidance relating to the establishment of multiple CMOCs within the area of interest in addition to discussing the functions of the HACC and HOC at the unified commander [CINC] and JTF levels. Joint Pubs 3-57 and 5-00.2 specifically discuss CMOC ownership and place the CMOC within the JTF/J3 organization. While Army Field Manual (FM) 100-23 discusses the CMOC concept from a "what it brings to the fight" perspective, Army FM 100-23-1 focuses more on operational considerations. Of specific importance to our discussions here, FM 100-23-1 "discusses the nature of NGOs and recommends that the commander use either OFDA personnel or some third party to reach NGOs reluctant to visit the CMOC."32 Furthermore, FM 100-23-1 recommends the CMOC director also serve as the HOC deputy director as in Somalia. The Joint Warfighting Center's Joint Task Force Commander's Handbook for Peace Operations finds the CMOC forum appealing to the HROs "because it
avoids the guess work by providing these organizations a single point of coordination with the military for their needs. The handbook also emphasizes the need for the CMOC director to have unlimited access to the JFC throughout the HA operation.

In summary, current CMOC doctrine recommends who the players should be, identifies what each community brings to the table, recommends when working relationships should be established, and addresses the importance of why and how the JTF and HROs should work together. However, aside from ownership comments, recommendations on where to physically locate the CMOC are not broached by current doctrine. How can unity of effort be optimized if doctrine does not include standardized recommendations on where to physically locate the CMOC in a HA operation?

Parallel Civil-Military Operations Centers: The Supporting Argument

The need to standardize doctrine focusing specifically on CMOC location is driven by the complex nature of HA operations, the diversity of the communities supporting relief efforts, and the lessons learned from previous humanitarian relief operations. Specifically, U.S. military participation can be in support of either U.N. or U.S. directed HA operations. Secondly, JTFs and HROs are divergent cultures working towards similar objectives. Additionally, from a force protection perspective, JTF headquarters operations are conducted in a secure environment. HROs, on the other hand, operate in an open environment. Furthermore, the JTF headquarters may not always be collocated with the relief effort as is the case when the JTF is located "afloat." Finally, despite JTF/HRO successes in Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti, obstacles exist. Perception problems between the U.S. military and the HROs are compounded by perception problems between JTF and CMOC personnel. Furthermore, HROs have had difficulty coordinating with the U.S. military due to the
implementation of multiple CMOC operational concepts and divergence from current doctrine.

Based on the above facts, doctrine must be developed and implemented standardizing the physical location of the CMOC. By implementing a civil-military operations center concept that institutes parallel operations centers inside and outside the wire, the opportunity to optimize unity of effort is greatly enhanced. The parallel civil-military operations center concept advocates collocating a CMOC with the JFC, JTF/J2, J3, J4, and J6 inside the wire, and collocating a HOC with the HROs outside the wire under the direction of USAID. Continuity between the JTF and the HOC would be provided by the CMOC director who would be dual-hatted as the HOC deputy director (Figure 1).

The parallel civil-military operations centers concept addresses each of the previously identified problem areas. In his dual-hatted role, the CMOC director would be responsible for ensuring civil-military objectives are understood inside and outside the wire thereby addressing perception problems between the JTF and HROs, and within the JTF itself. Moreover, the JFC would have unlimited access to the CMOC director. Furthermore, the CMOC would be collocated with the JTF/J2, J3, J4, and J6, the providers of information, security, logistics, and communications. By establishing USAID as the lead agency for the HOC and ensuring the HOC becomes a standardized concept during HA operations, HROs would have a single entry point for coordinating with the U.S. military regardless of the nature of the mission. Establishing a HOC would increase participation by those HROs reluctant to be seen as working directly with the military. Finally, parallel civil-military operations centers address the issue of an "afloat" JTF and the JFC's requirement for
Parallel Civil-Military Operations Centers

"Inside the Wire"

JFC

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<th>J2/JIC</th>
<th>J4/JMC</th>
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<td>J3/JOC</td>
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"Outside the Wire"

HOC
- Host Nation
- U.N.
- NGOs
- PVOs
- CMOC Liaison

(Figure 1)
maintaining the integrity and security of the JTF. Instituting doctrine leads to standardization, standardization leads to intimacy, intimacy will optimize unity of effort.

**Parallel Civil-Military Operations Centers: The CMOC**

From the JFC's perspective, locating the CMOC *inside the wire* offers the following advantages. First and foremost, it gives the JFC unlimited access to the CMOC director who can provide timely and accurate relief effort status updates. Due to the political nature of relief operations, timely and accurate updates are vital to the JFC for purposes of reporting to senior leadership. Furthermore, from an exit strategy perspective, timely and accurate updates allow the JFC to monitor preestablished indicators of success to aid in determining conditions necessary to bring operations to a favorable end. A collocated CMOC can improve the JFC's understanding of which HROs are working in the region, assist the JFC in determining the true nature of the crisis at hand, and allows the JFC to relay his intentions regarding levels of relief effort support directly to the HROs via the CMOC director. As advocated, the parallel operations centers concept requires direct interface between the JTF and State Department personnel. Organizational differences between the JTF and USAID demand the JFC closely monitor this relationship. Finally, by collocating the CMOC with the JFC, the JFC can ensure the CMOC remains focused on coordinating complicated relief efforts with the HROs and not policy issues such as disarmament and weapons retrieval as experienced in Somalia.

Locating the CMOC within the JTF headquarters will enhance JTF/J2, J3, J4, and J6 coordination while reducing perception problems. Because "The CMOC is not a unit, has no established support structure, and therefore should not be subordinate to a JTF or division: it should remain essentially at staff element." As an equal among equals, the CMOC would be
in a position to work closely with the Joint Intelligence Support Element (J2) for the two-way exchange of information/intelligence; the Joint Operations Center (J3) for HRO security/assistance requests; the Joint Movement Center/Logistics Readiness Center (J4) for coordinating HRO logistics support requests; and the Joint Communications Control Center (J6) for radio frequency coordination/allocation among both military and civilian players. Furthermore, the CMOC would be in a position to directly monitor the status of HRO support requests and would not be subjected to being physically 'overrun' by the multitude of relief agencies operating within the region.

Parallel Civil Military Operations Centers: The HOC

Joint doctrine and precedent support the argument for establishing a parallel HOC outside the wire. In JP 3-08, responsibility for establishing a HOC during large scale HA operations falls to the host nation. In the event the host nation is unable to set up the HOC, responsibility shifts to the U.N. During unilateral U.S. missions, USAID is responsible for forming the HOC. JP3-08 further states that the HOC is primarily responsible for coordinating "the overall relief strategy; identifying logistic requirements for NGOs, PVOs, and international and regional organizations; and identifying and prioritizing HA needs and requests for military support...It limits or eliminates interference in executing the mission and avoids working at cross-purposes to achieve unity of effort."37 In Operation RESTORE HOPE: Summary Report, D. J. Zvijac and K. W. McGrady find that:

"As in Operation Provide Relief, the Restore Hope experience showed that the military-HRO interaction is most efficient when coordinated through a single, central organization—the HOC. Military-HRO relations likely would have been worse had there not been a HOC and all the HROs had to find their way around UNITAF's headquarters searching for the officers to answer their questions."38

USAID should have primary responsibility for establishing the HOC in both U.N. and U.S. led HA operations. Found in nearly 80 countries, the majority of which are poor,
USAID is one of the largest agencies assigned to the U.S. Mission and the Embassy's Country Team. Because of its forward presence in country, USAID is in a superb position to take the lead on establishing and coordinating HOC activities by working closely with host nation and U.N. representatives. In the event the host nation is unable to coordinate HOC activities and there is no U.N. play, USAID would remain the lead agency throughout the HA operation. Additional justification supporting USAID as the HOC lead agent is based on its responsibility for administering non-military foreign assistance programs to host nations.

While this position advocates physically locating the HOC outside the wire, the HOC, if at all possible, should be within secure walking distance of the JTF headquarters. Regarding lessons learned from RESTORE HOPE, Chris Seiple finds that "The direct result of a need for continuing and mutually reinforcing dialogue is the greatest lesson learned of all: the HOC and the military operations center must be co-accessible (emphasis in the original)."

**Parallel Civil-Military Operations Centers: Counter-Arguments**

While specific counter-arguments to the parallel civil-military operations centers concept were not discovered during research, general comments debating the feasibility of this argument can be cultivated based on the content of the material reviewed.

The first counter-argument focuses on whether or not the U.S. State Department would be willing to take the lead and set up the HOC during U.N. led HA operations. As discussed, JP 3-08 identifies USAID as the lead agent for forming a HOC during unilateral U.S. missions. Whether or not USAID would be willing to assume HOC responsibility during U.N. led humanitarian relief efforts requires coordination with the State Department.

The majority of information found discussing CMOC location was from an ownership perspective. Arguments recommended collocating the CMOC with the JTF/J3, J4, and J5. In
The Joint Task Force for All Occasions, Military Operations Other Than War to War Fighting, D. W. Gillard finds that "placing the CMOC within the J-3 organization would help integrate it as an element of operations that could be emphasized or deemphasized depending on the situation." Based on experiences from Rwanda, USEUCOM staff officers advocate combining the CMOC with the JTF/J4 to develop a Logistical JOC because "it became readily apparent that CMOC and J4 planning synergism was critical to the mission...A Log JOC, manned primarily by CMOC and J4 planners/operators, would be the focal point of planning vice the traditional J3 JOC." An Army White Paper advocated placing the CMOC under the JTF/J5 stating that "The CMOC can be defined as a coordination center established and tailored to assist the G5 in anticipating, facilitating, coordinating and orchestrating those civil-military functions and activities pertaining to the civil population, government and economy in areas where armed forces, GOs [Government Organizations], IOs, NGOs and PVOs are employed." Additional counter-arguments focus on eliminating the wire as a dividing line between the JTF and HROs. One scenario advocates moving the CMOC out of the JTF headquarters, deleting the HOC, and collocating the CMOC with the HROs. In this scenario, the CMOC would coordinate HRO requests with the JTF/J3 JOC. Putting an almost philosophical spin on his argument, Chris Seiple states that a successful CMOC "is inherently a 'floating' concept. While there may be a designated spot, the process naturally occurs according to the moment and the personalities." In contrast to moving the CMOC out to the HROs, an alternate argument advocates collocating the HROs with the CMOC in the JTF headquarters. Proponents of this scenario contend that cooperation between the JTF and HROs would be
greatly improved if military planners had greater access to the multiple relief agencies operating in the region.

**Conclusion**

In the final analysis, the parallel civil-military operations centers concept represents the next evolutionary step in standardizing doctrine focused on enhancing unity of effort between the U.S. military and HROs during HA operations. As General Shalikashvili stated, success during humanitarian relief efforts is a two-way street. It is imperative doctrine be instituted to maximize the opportunity for success.

Lessons learned from Somalia, Rwanda, and Haiti clearly demonstrate the vital role a civil-military operations center plays as a mechanism for building consensus among the participating players. Moreover, these lessons reveal the importance of establishing operations centers *inside and outside the wire*. The Somali HOC, Rwandan OSOCC, and Haitian HACC clearly identify the need to standardize the civilian led HOC concept for coordinating and prioritizing requests for military support. Furthermore, HA lessons learned reveal the necessity for the JTF CMOC to be collocated with the JFC, JTF/J2, J3, J4, and J6. By tasking the CMOC director to serve as the HOC deputy director, the CMOC and HOC become inextricably linked while each operates within their own areas of expertise. The CMOC director thus becomes the conduit for the mutually beneficial two-way exchange of information and services between the JTF and HROs.

Supporting HA operations has become a way of life for the U.S. military. It is vitally important that doctrine be developed standardizing the who, what, *where*, when, why and how of civil-military operations centers. Developing doctrine standardizing parallel CMOC/HOC operating concepts will optimize JTF/HRO unity of effort during HA operations.
Notes


2 Unless otherwise specifically cited in a quote, IOs, NGOs, and PVOs will be collectively referred to as Humanitarian Relief Organizations (HROs).


4 The term "inside the wire" is used to describe the secure compound containing the JTF headquarters. "Outside the wire" refers to the unsecured area outside the JTF headquarters compound.


8 Hoogland, 6.


11 Swan, 3.


14 Davis, 1.

16 Davis, 51.


18 Seiple, 135.


21 Ibid., 24.

22 Davis, 40.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid, 44.

25 Ibid.

26 Ibid., 46.

27 Ibid., 48.

28 Ibid., 50.

29 JP 3-07, II-7.

30 Ibid., IV-7.

31 JP 3-08, III-16.

32 Davis, 28.

33 Joint Warfighting Center, II-9.

34 Joint Chiefs of Staff, Procedures for Forming and Operating a Joint Task Force Preliminary Coordination Draft (Joint Pub 5-00.2) (Washington D.C: March 19, 1996), IX-37.

35 Seiple, 173.

36 Davis, 54.

37 JP 3-08, III-24.


40 Ibid.

41 Seiple, 136.


45 Seiple, 44.
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