ROLES, MISSIONS, FUNCTIONS, AND THE 1997 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW: NOW IS THE TIME FOR THE SERVICES TO RECOMMEND REAL CHANGE

by

Steven L. Andraschko, LTC, USA

A Research Report Submitted to the Faculty

In Partial Fulfillment of the Curriculum Requirements

Advisor: Colonel Miles A. Baldwin

Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama

April 1997
Disclaimer

The views expressed in this academic research paper are those of the author and do not reflect the official policy or position of the US government or the Department of Defense. In accordance with Air Force Instruction 51-303, it is not copyrighted, but is the property of the United States government.
## Contents

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>DISCLAIMER</td>
<td>ii</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PREFACE</td>
<td>iv</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ABSTRACT</td>
<td>v</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>INTRODUCTION</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Definition of Key Terms</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE HISTORY OF MILITARY ROLES AND FUNCTIONS</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The National Security Act of 1947</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Key West Agreement of March 1948</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1989 Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The 1993 Roles, Missions, and Functions Report</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The Commission on Roles and Missions</td>
<td>13</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>THE 1997 QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW AND ALTERNATIVE FORCE STRUCTURE ASSESSMENT</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SUGGESTED CHANGES IN ROLES, FUNCTIONS, AND TURF</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joint Criminal Investigations Agency</td>
<td>25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theater Air Defense/Theater Missile Defense</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>A Separate Space Service</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONCLUSION</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>GLOSSARY</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BIBLIOGRAPHY</td>
<td>37</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


Preface

This study examines the roles, missions, and functions of the United States Military Services since the National Security Act was codified in 1947. I wrote this paper to both educate myself concerning the history of this subject and to propose some of my own recommendations for change. I believe that military leaders should be responsible enough to make tough choices for the benefit of the nation—the greater good. Unfortunately, Service parochialism still rules the field in this debate. We in the military have not done a good job of exercising our responsibilities in this area and I hope to stimulate additional debate and action on roles, functions, and “jointness.”

I want to thank Colonel Miles Baldwin, USAF, for his assistance with this project. I particularly appreciated his willingness to be my advisor, since he did not know me from the man in the moon when I made my request. I also want to thank LTC Douglas R. (Rick) Scott, USA, an action officer in the Office of the Secretary of Defense Public Affairs Office, and Mr. Terry Hawkins, the Air War College Bibliographer, for their timely and selfless service on my behalf. I couldn’t have completed this project without their help and I truly appreciate their efforts.
Abstract

Roles, missions, and functions have been a source of continuing controversy in the Department of Defense since the early efforts of the Air Force to create a separate service. During the last 50 years, little significant change has occurred in this area, but it continues to be a topic for study, debate and discussion. Unfortunately, the senior leadership in the Services are unwilling or unable to find satisfactory solutions that do not look like the status quo. The demise of the U.S.S.R. and the resulting disappearance of our long term peer competitor have given the U.S. Defense Department a prime opportunity to logically address and resolve the long standing disputes on military roles, missions, and functions.

This paper reviews the history of the roles and missions debate over the last 50 years, and suggests specific areas that can be resolved without jeopardizing the national security of the United States. Many of the suggestions will anger one or all of the Services or branches of the Services. Significant change cannot be accomplished without changing the comfortable status quo. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review will recommend any more substantive changes than the previous roles and missions reports.
Chapter 1

Introduction

Military roles, missions, and functions continue to be a source of friction among the Services as competition for declining defense budgets becomes more intense. This friction existed when the National Security Act of 1947 became law, and it still exists in the Department of Defense, today. Unfortunately, rampant Service parochialism and survival concerns continue to dominate the roles and missions debate, which has resulted in little meaningful change over the years. If the Joint Chiefs of Staff remain unwilling to compromise on roles, missions, and functions, no real progress will be made during the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review.

The Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986 has forced the Services closer to the desired level of joint military training and cooperation, but the insecurities and mistrust that existed in the late 1940s still exist today. Some progress has been made, but at a snail’s pace. This situation is particularly frustrating since extremely intelligent, action-oriented, 4-star Generals are in charge of each of the Services and comprise the Joint Chiefs of Staff. They all espouse the need for jointness and mutual trust in their speeches and Service documents; yet, they are either unable or unwilling to compromise for the benefit of the Defense Department and national security. Hiding behind past history (“we have always done it that way”) does nothing to advance
the process or improve the ability of the military Services to fight and win our nation's wars. The ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review is proceeding in the usual 'close hold', 'protect the turf at all costs' style, as each of the Services prepare their strategic plans and try to retain as much force structure and as many roles, missions, and functions (read turf and budget share) as possible.

The purpose of this paper is to discuss the roles, missions, and functions assigned to each of the Services, and describe how they have evolved over the last 50 years. I will briefly describe the impact of the Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act on the roles and missions review process. A review of both the '89 and '93 Roles and Missions Reports will follow. The recommendations contained in both of those reports clearly illustrate the inertia and parochialism that have dominated the roles and missions review process during at least the last 10 years.

As a direct result of the intransigence of the Services and Joint Chiefs of Staff on roles, missions, and functions, a dissatisfied Congress required that a Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) be established as a stipulation of the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. This paper will review the recommendations of that commission, which was chaired by the Deputy Secretary of Defense, John P. White. I will then describe the current roles and missions review process and offer some predictions about the prospects for change as the result of both the ongoing Quadrennial Defense Review and the Alternative Force Structure Assessment required by the Lieberman Amendment to the 1997 National Defense Authorization Act. I will conclude this paper by suggesting several possible turf adjustments that would provide substantive change without
damaging the fragile egos (and budget shares) of the Services. More importantly, the suggested changes will not weaken the military capabilities of our great nation.

**Definition of Key Terms**

There are four terms that must be defined to ensure that the focus for this study is clearly understood. Roles are the broad and enduring purposes for which the Services and U.S. Special Operations Command were established in law by Congress. Missions are the tasks assigned by the President or Secretary of Defense to the combatant commanders (theater CINCs). Functions are the specific responsibilities assigned by the President and Secretary of Defense which enable the Services to fulfill their role.\(^1\) Parochialism is defined as restricting one's view to a small area or scope; a narrow, limited or provincial view.\(^2\) The narrow view held by each one of the Services in the roles, missions, and functions review process is that their Service can accomplish the role, mission, or function better than the others and thus justify that share of the Defense budget for itself.

Since missions are assigned to the combatant commanders for execution, missions are really outside the scope of this study. Roles and functions are the major areas of concern to the Services and they are also the areas that can be adjusted with a view to optimizing military resource utilization.

**Notes**


Chapter 2

The History of Military Roles and Functions

The National Security Act of 1947

The National Security Act of 1947 provides the starting point for this examination of Service roles and functions. The roles and functions were prescribed in that public law as follows:

Section 205 (e) addressed the Army’s roles and functions:

In general the United States Army, within the Department of the Army, shall include land combat and services forces and such aviation and water transport as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land. It shall be responsible for the preparation of land forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Army to meet the needs of war.

Section 206 (b) addressed the Navy’s roles and functions:

In general the United States Navy, within the Department of the Navy, shall include naval combat and services forces and such aviation as may be organic therein. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea. It shall be responsible for the preparation of naval forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the peacetime components of the Navy to meet the needs of war.

All naval aviation shall be integrated with the naval service as part thereof within the Department of the Navy. Naval aviation shall consist of combat
and service and training forces, and shall include land-based naval aviation, air transport essential for naval operations, all air weapons and air techniques involved in the operations and activities of the United States Navy, and the entire remainder of the aeronautical organization of the United States Navy, together with the personnel therefor.

The Navy shall be generally responsible for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping.

The Navy shall develop aircraft, weapons, tactics, technique, organization and equipment of naval combat and service elements; matters of joint concern as to these functions shall be coordinated between the Army, and Air Force, and the Navy.

Section 206 (c) addressed the Marine Corps’ roles and functions:

The United States Marine Corps, within the Department of the Navy, shall be so organized as to include not less than three combat divisions and three air wings, and such other land combat, aviation, and other services forces as may be organic therein, and except in time of war or national emergency hereafter declared by the Congress, the personnel strength of the Regular Marine Corps shall be maintained at no more than four hundred thousand. The Marine Corps shall be organized, trained, and equipped to provide fleet marine components of combined arms, together with supporting air components, for service with the fleet in the seizure or defense of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign. It shall be the duty of the Marine Corps to develop, in coordination with the Army and the Air Force, those phases of amphibious operations which pertain to the tactics, technique, and equipment employed by landing forces. In addition, the Marine Corps shall provide detachments and organizations for service on armed vessels of the Navy, shall provide security detachments for the protection of naval property at naval stations and bases, and shall perform such other duties as the President may direct: Provided, That such additional duties shall not detract from or interfere with the operations for which the Marine Corps is primarily organized. The Marine Corps shall be responsible, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of peacetime components of the Marine Corps to meet the needs of war.

Section 208 (f) addressed the roles and functions of the independent Air Force:

"In general the United States Air Force shall include aviation forces both combat and service not otherwise assigned. It shall be organized, trained, and equipped primarily for
prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations. The Air Force shall be responsible for the preparation of the air forces necessary for the effective prosecution of war except as otherwise assigned and, in accordance with integrated joint mobilization plans, for the expansion of the Air Force to meet the needs of war.”

So, what does the National Security Act really specify? First, that the Army is responsible for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations on land.” It also authorizes the Army to retain aviation and water transport. The Army section of this law is the smallest section in terms of defining roles, missions and functions.

Second, the National Security Act makes the Navy responsible for “prompt and sustained combat incident to operations at sea.” It also allows the Navy to retain Naval aviation, including land-based naval aviation and air transport. The Navy section of this law is more detailed than the Army section, addressing many of the specific concerns of the Navy community.

The Marine Corps section of this law is the most specific. Not only does it specify a Marine Corps of “...not less than three combat divisions and three air wings...,” but it lists numerous other roles and functions besides the “…seizure of advanced naval bases and for the conduct of such land operations as may be essential for the prosecution of a naval campaign.” It seems pretty obvious that the Marines had strong support in the Congress, which is reflected in the National Security Act.

The Air Force is given responsibility for “prompt and sustained offensive and defensive air operations.”

The roles and functions specified in the National Security Act were especially redundant in aviation matters, and this law was written so broadly that it resulted in
different interpretations by the Services. Since it did not spell out adequately the roles and functions for the Services, then Secretary of Defense Forrestal scheduled a meeting at Key West Naval Base to try and resolve some of the areas of concern.\textsuperscript{2}

**The Key West Agreement of March 1948**

The Navy was the big winner in the Key West meetings. They were allowed to retain the following roles/functions: ground launched aviation for naval reconnaissance, antisubmarine warfare, and protection of shipping. The Army and the Air Force agreed to work together (which they had already agreed to do in an initial implementation agreement of the National Security Act of 1947 signed by General Eisenhower and General Spaatz, which was published on 15 Sep 47).\textsuperscript{3} For example, the Air Force agreed to support Army operations with close air support and air transportation.\textsuperscript{4} The bottom line: the Key West agreement met the basic desires of the Services, without making significant changes in roles and functions. The resulting redundancies continue to exist in the Department of Defense, today.\textsuperscript{5}

The National Security Act was amended in 1949 and 1953 but those amendments did not address the contentious roles and functions or the existing redundancies.\textsuperscript{6} The Defense Reorganization Act of 1958 provided a modicum of relief. It gave the combatant commanders (then called unified commanders) total authority over the units under them. It also gave the Secretary of Defense control of the budgets of the Services.\textsuperscript{7} These developments did not resolve the arguments about roles and functions, reduce service parochialism, or improve the level of cooperation among the Services.
The Goldwater-Nichols Defense Reorganization Act was a critically important new law. It required the Services and the Department of Defense to concentrate on joint professional military education, training, and exercises; made the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) the principal military advisor to the President and National Command Authority; established a 4-star Vice Chairman; provided detailed guidance on joint officer personnel management; and required the CJCS to submit a "Report on Assignment of Roles and Missions" every three years (or less), or when requested by the President or Secretary of Defense. The report had to address "such recommendations for changes in the assignment of functions (or roles and missions) to the armed forces as the Chairman considers necessary to achieve maximum effectiveness of the armed forces." It must also address changes in the threat, unnecessary duplication among the Services, and changes in technology that impact on warfighting.8

This piece of legislation significantly addressed the failure of the Services to cooperate with each other. It has improved joint professional military education programs, increased the assignment of quality officers to joint duty positions, and improved the level of joint training and exercises. Obviously the law itself did not create the improvements, but it did provide the needed push for the Services and the Department of Defense to get beyond the usual Service rivalries. Unfortunately, it has not cracked the roles and functions stalemate to any significant degree. The initial roles and functions report submitted by Admiral William J. Crowe, Jr., then Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, provides the evidence for the continuing stalemate.
The 1989 Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces

The 1989 Report on Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces merely ‘checked the block’ in meeting the Goldwater-Nichols’ requirement for a roles and missions review. Admiral Crowe’s report determined that current Service roles were “fundamentally sound.” He offered some minor changes in functions as follows: that all four Services be tasked to provide close air support; that the Air Force should be given primary responsibility for space functions, except that the Army should have responsibility for space functions “which directly contribute to land operations,” and the Navy should have responsibility for space functions “which directly contribute to maritime operations.” This report is almost never mentioned in the huge body of literature addressing roles and functions, perhaps because it says so little. It did meet the requirement specified in the Goldwater-Nichols Act, but it did not address any substantive matters. In the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union (our Cold War era threat), General Colin L. Powell, the new Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, had a tremendous opportunity and responsibility to address possible changes in service roles and functions.

The 1993 Roles, Missions, and Functions Report

Between 1989, when the Berlin wall came down, and 1991, when the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact dissolved, it became clear that the United States and our Western European allies had won the cold war. Almost immediately, Congress began to discuss cutting the U.S. defense budget and using the resulting “peace dividend” to reduce our budget deficits and support other domestic programs.
This talk of budget cutting caused the Service Chiefs to pull out all the stops in an effort to portray their Service as the force of choice. The speeches and interviews of the Army Chief of Staff, General Carl Vuono, emphasized the Army’s claim to be the nation’s strategic force. In September 1990, the Air Force Chief of Staff, General Michael Dugan, was fired by Secretary of Defense Cheney when he (Dugan) revealed classified information about gulf war plans and stated that “airpower was the key to winning a war with Iraq.”

It was a depressing public relations effort because the blatant parochialism they each espoused did nothing to help shape an effective review of existing roles and functions. While I have no firm evidence, the Services’ claims and counter-claims appeared to be designed to increase the fog and friction surrounding the issues, and made substantive changes more difficult to achieve. Compromise was not evident in the process or the outcome, and the report published by General Powell was the result of that obfuscation.

As an action officer in the Counterdrug Division, J3/G3, Forces Command, Fort McPherson, Georgia, from 1990-1994, I observed many of these phenomena on a daily basis. The counterdrug actions I coordinated required me to work with each of the Service staffs and the Joint Staff, as well as most other headquarters elements in the Department of Defense. Too often, looking good as a Service was more important than assigning missions based on capabilities, cost effectiveness, or legitimate roles and functions. To make matters worse, the open bickering among the Services often reached the print media and further exacerbated the competition and parochialism.

To be fair to General Powell, his report did change the Department of Defense structure, but substantive roles and functions changes were not recommended. The
creation of Strategic Command (which replaced Strategic Air Command) as the headquarters in charge of the nuclear forces for the United States was the most significant change. That made one combatant commander responsible for the entire nuclear triad (the strategic bomber force, the submarine missile force, and the land-based, intercontinental ballistic missile force). Simultaneously, the nuclear functions in both the Army and the Marine Corps were eliminated.\textsuperscript{13}

General Powell’s report also addressed many changes in our intelligence systems designed to improve the collection, analysis, and sharing of intelligence by the military and the Central Intelligence Agency. While this was not a substantial roles and functions change, it did address needed improvements in intelligence support of the warfighting effort.\textsuperscript{14}

The 1993 Roles and Missions Report recommended assignment of all CONUS-based forces to U.S. Atlantic Command (USACOM) and recommended elimination of Forces Command as a Specified Command. Those recommendations were both enacted. Forces Command became the Army Component Command for USACOM.\textsuperscript{15}

General Powell dodged two major roles and functions issues in his report by recommending that they be studied for a future decision. The first major issue involved the space mission and who should be in charge. General Powell recommended that a review be conducted to determine if the space mission should be turned over to Strategic Command. His reasoning was that it would be a more efficient use of resources and increase operational effectiveness.\textsuperscript{16} These are both great reasons to make the change and eliminate many unnecessary headquarters. I will suggest another alternative concerning
responsibility for the space mission later in this paper. The second major issue that General Powell did not address head-on involved theater air defense.

The theater air defense function is a good example of the lack of trust and cooperation that dominates the roles and functions debate. None of the Services is willing to trust the others with air defense of their forces in theater. None of them want to relinquish control of their assets (budget share). Consequently, each of the Services continues to develop expensive systems designed to protect their individual Service forces. The Joint Requirements Oversight Council is responsible for exercising some level of oversight on these matters, but it is not clear that the Department of Defense will end up with an integrated air defense system from the independently developed Service air defense systems (Patriot, Corps Air Defense System, Theater High Altitude Area Defense System, Navy Upper Tier and Navy Lower Tier systems, etc.). The Powell Report created a Joint Staff study group to conduct further research on the subject.17

Since all of the Services develop and maintain their own independent theater air defense weapons/capabilities, it seems likely that our systems are not well integrated and contain some redundancy. The roles and functions review process specifically requires that such redundancies be rooted out and resolved. General Powell apparently was not ready to take on that issue because he punted and left it for his successor to address. I will provide my own recommendations concerning the theater air defense function later in this paper.

General Powell’s report was criticized for his failure to consolidate the four air forces (each of the Services aviation components). That is one divisive area where he properly left our existing systems mostly intact. While there are probably savings that can be
realized in joint procurement of aviation assets, and in joint training of pilots, the aviation arms of each Service are an integral part of their warfighting machines and doctrines. This is one area where the maxim, 'if it's not broken, don't fix it' applies.

**The Commission on Roles and Missions**

Congress was not pleased with either of the roles, missions, and functions reports submitted by Crowe or Powell.\(^{18}\) They felt that an independent, impartial review by "a panel of distinguished civilians from the private sector, retired military officers, and hand picked assistants" was needed to overcome the roles and missions inertia in the Services and Joint Staff (as evidenced by the results of the two roles and missions reports). So, Congress required that a Commission on Roles and Missions (CORM) be established as part of the 1994 National Defense Authorization Act. The legislation required the commission to provide recommendations on possible adjustments to military roles, missions, and functions not later than 24 May 1995.\(^{19}\)

The CORM study group approached the roles and functions review process in a non-traditional way. Instead of providing a list of proposed roles and functions changes for each of the Services, this report provided recommendations in three areas: effective unified military operations, productive and responsive support, and improved management and direction.\(^{20}\)

Effective unified military operations recommendations addressed the need for continued improvements in joint operations. The commission recommended that a brand new functional unified command be established to provide training and integration of all CONUS forces. This new command would provide the force packages to the combatant
CINCs for training exercises and actual operations. The commission also recommended some functional changes to improve unified military operations. Some of those recommendations included: giving the Air Force Executive Agent responsibility for Combat Search and Rescue; making the Air Force responsible for acquisition and operation of multi-user space systems; and giving all operational support airlift aircraft to the Air Force for use/management by U.S. Transportation Command (except for Navy C-9 aircraft). The report recommended that the Marines be responsible for “management of sea-based pre-positioning programs” and that the Army be responsible for “management of land-based pre-positioning programs.” The report also recommended that the Army be given responsibility for providing ground based air defense, heavy engineer support, and supplemental logistics support to the Marine Corps.

The CORM team was unable or unwilling to provide a definitive recommendation on deep attack and it recommended that the issue receive further study “to determine the best mix of these systems for the future.”

Under the heading of productive and responsive support, the CORM study recommended substantial privatization of depot maintenance, warehousing and distribution, property control and disposal, and many other commercial activities such as family housing, data processing, and base/facility maintenance. They also recommended reengineering of support activities like the military aircraft support infrastructure. For example, they felt that duplication of efforts by the Services in aircraft logistics support could be eliminated by establishing a single fixed-wing aircraft manager and a single rotary wing aircraft manager.
In the recommendations concerning improved management and direction, the commission suggested improvements to the planning, programming, and budgeting system and changes in the Department of Defense Headquarters. Developing a joint vision (which the Chairman has done with the publication of Joint Vision 2010), strengthening the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC), and combining the staffs that support the Service Chiefs and the Military Department Secretaries, were the main recommendations in this area.25

Dr. John P. White and the commission provided many excellent recommendations with one purpose in mind: improving unified military operations.

Our most important finding is that traditional approaches to roles and missions issues are no longer appropriate. The context has changed significantly since the 1948 Key West Agreement about who should do what in the U.S. military. Instead, it is clear that our emphasis must be on molding DOD into a more cohesive set of institutions that work toward a common purpose—effective unified military operations—with the efforts of all organizations, processes and systems focused on that goal from the very beginning.26

Notes

4Hall, 16.
5Barry M. Blechman and others, “Key West Revisited: Roles and Missions of the U.S. Armed Forces.” The Henry L. Stimson Center, Report no.8 (March 1993), iii.
6National Security Act, 34-38.
7Hall, 17-18.
Notes

8 William J. Crowe, Jr., “Roles and Functions of the Armed Forces” (Washington, D.C.: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 28 September 1989), Executive Summary, ii.


14 Ibid., II-12 thru II-15.

15 Ibid., III-5.

16 Ibid., III-7.

17 Ibid., III-39 thru III-41.


19 Ibid.


21 Ibid.

22 Ibid., ES-5.

23 Ibid.

24 Ibid., ES-6, ES-7.


Chapter 3

The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review and Alternative Force Structure Assessment

The CORM report recommended that a Quadrennial Strategy Review be conducted at the beginning of each new Presidential term/administration. A bill recently passed by Congress, the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for 1997, established the requirement for a Quadrennial Defense Review in law so that the CORM recommendation would not be forgotten or ignored. That law also addressed several key areas for additional study. Those areas all have the possibility of changing roles, missions and functions for the Armed Services.

Section 907 requires the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff to evaluate reducing the total number of unified commands to five or less. It also directs the Chairman to evaluate regionally oriented commands versus purely functional commands. This required review of the Unified Command Plan (UCP) is not part of the Quadrennial Defense Review, but it has potentially significant implications for the Department of Defense in terms of missions and functions. This study will briefly address possible UCP changes when I propose my recommendations for roles and functions changes.

Section 1093 of the 1997 NDAA specifically addresses the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) process.
The review shall include a comprehensive examination of the defense strategy, force structure, force modernization plans, infrastructure, and other elements of the defense program and policies with a view toward determining and expressing the defense strategy of the United States and establishing a revised defense program through the year 2005.4

The QDR must also address the appropriate ratio of combat forces to support forces, plus the number and size of headquarters units and Defense agencies. The legislation establishes several suspense dates for the QDR process which must be met by both the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) QDR team and the National Defense Panel (NDP).

The NDP is described in section 1094 of the 1997 NDAA. It is a 9 person, independent, non-partisan group of defense experts.5 The NDP was supposed to be selected and announced by the Secretary of Defense in December 96 (in consultation with Congress). Unfortunately, disagreements between Congress and the Secretary of Defense prevented the final panel from being announced until 6 February 1997.6 Hopefully, that two month delay will not impact on the ability of the panel to accomplish its mission since the suspense dates for their actions have not been adjusted. The NDP will review the draft OSD QDR report and provide initial review input not later than 14 March 1997.7

The Secretary of Defense must submit the QDR report, with comments from the NDP and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to the Committee on Armed Services of the Senate and the Committee on National Security for the House of Representatives not later than 15 May 97.8

The OSD QDR team and NDP both have very broad charters as evidenced by the subjects the legislation requires them to address. The NDP has a second major function as a result of the Lieberman Amendment to the 1997 NDAA:
The amendment also requires the Panel to conduct an alternative force structure assessment which would result in a variety of proposed force structures that could meet anticipated threats to our national security. In this case we take it through the year 2010, and if the panel determines it is appropriate and rational, beyond the year 2010.9

The NDP must address both near and long-term threats in this Alternative Force Structure Assessment including: weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, information warfare, and large and small conflicts. The NDP's Alternative Force Structure Assessment must be submitted to the Secretary of Defense for his review and comments and the entire package in turn must be submitted to Congress by 15 Dec 97.10

The QDR process is moving into high gear now that the 1996 Presidential election is over. Telephone conversations with action officers at the Joint Staff and Army Staff, and a review of Dr. White's press release, indicate that this will be a group effort, involving members from the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Services, the Joint Staff, and the Combatant Commands.11 Representatives of each of these staffs have been organized into six different working groups, each with responsibility for a specific area: strategy, infrastructure, modernization, readiness, human resources, and force structure.12 The OSD lead for the QDR is Mr. Ted Warner, the assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy and Requirements. MG Mark Hamilton, the vice director of the Joint Staff's Force Structure, Resources, and Assessments Directorate (J8), has the lead for the Joint Staff.13

The current attempt to conduct an integrated roles and functions review by involving players from all the interested staffs offers some promise that real changes will be forthcoming from this QDR effort. The ongoing effort seems to be more open with the hope of better cooperation among the Services. This is all conjecture on my part, since the QDR process is just getting started. However, numerous Air War College guest
speakers (both retired and active duty General Officers, and visiting professors) uniformly believe that no significant changes will be forthcoming from the DOD effort on the QDR.

The staff officers currently working the QDR issues are unwilling to comment on possible outcomes. That is certainly understandable since accurate predictions about such controversial subjects are difficult, if not impossible. Secondly, the shroud of secrecy (to protect parochial interests) is always present when any discussion of roles and functions takes place with an outsider. The latest articles on the QDR seem to indicate that my thesis is accurate. The services have adopted a belligerent posture: "Hold onto everything you've got and fight the other services to the death."14

While I hope that I will be proven wrong when the QDR results are finalized, I predict that no significant roles and functions changes will result from this QDR. The status quo is tough to adjust since bureaucracies strongly resist substantive changes. A quote from the mid-1980s is as applicable today as it was then:

Service parochialism is as ubiquitous as it is legendary, and the Services, which the chiefs individually represent, cooperate only grudgingly.... The JCS, not surprisingly, has proved incapable of altering established roles and missions allocations...15

I know that the Services have matured and grown in the jointness experience but I am afraid that maturation will not extend to resolution of the roles and functions issues.

Notes

1White, "Directions for Defense...," ES-8.
3Ibid., Section 907.
4Ibid., Section 1093.
Notes

Review (QDR) and that a National Defense Panel would review the QDR and conduct an Alternative Force Structure Assessment during 1997, 4.


7. Senate Bill 1745, Section 1094.

8. Senate Bill 1745, Sections 1093 and 1094.


10. Ibid., 5.


Chapter 4

Suggested Changes in Roles, Functions, and Turf

Some of my suggestions address roles and functions changes, but several address miscellaneous turf and jointness changes. Each of these proposed changes will not be addressed in detail, but the entire list is provided here to suggest possible turf adjustments as well as consolidations of several functions in joint entities to achieve resource savings. Two major roles and functions changes will be addressed in detail: responsibility for theater air/missile defense and space operations.

My list of suggested changes includes:

• close all military prisons and eliminate the corrections function currently maintained by each of the Service components. This is a function that can be assumed by existing civilian prison systems at the local, state, and/or Federal level. The function could also be privatized or contracted out without any impact on the Services' ability to fight and win our nation’s wars.

• cut existing staffs by eliminating layers and entire headquarters, where appropriate. For example, Southern Command could be eliminated and their mission could be assumed by Atlantic Command. When I was stationed in Northern Virginia in 1983, the Pentagon staff population exceeded 23,000. The current population of the Pentagon is still pegged at 23,000. Since the military strength of the United States has
declined by 30% over the last 5 years, why has the need for a Pentagon staff of 23,000 remained? Bureaucracy finds a way to justify its' continued existence, that is why. The plethora of field operating agencies and other shadow military headquarters in the Washington, DC, area is a reflection of the Defense Department's continued unwillingness or inability to come to grips with this issue. Similar suggestions have been made by General John Sheehan, Commander of U.S. Atlantic Command. He is concerned that future force structure cuts will target combat forces and fail to reduce excessively large staff bureaucracies.¹

- consolidate infrastructure staffing when circumstances permit. For instance, Fort Lewis and McChord Air Force Base in Washington State are adjacent to each other and share a common (fenced) border. A similar situation exists in North Carolina with Fort Bragg and Pope Air Force Base. Many of the base and post support functions should be consolidated to eliminate redundancy and save personnel costs. Housing management, facilities engineering, military police support, Exchanges and Commissaries, recreation management, and garrison support staffs are all prime candidates for consolidation. A suggestion was made by my former supervisor to conduct joint law enforcement operations at Fort Lewis and McChord AFB in 1995, but the idea was rejected by the Air Force. The privatization and outsourcing concepts recommended in the CORM report will resolve many of these personnel redundancies, if privatization or outsourcing actually takes place. If that does not occur, consolidation is another possible way to reduce personnel costs and staff redundancy.
• establish consolidated, joint service schools for Professional Military Education (PME). Close the excess schools and realize the cost savings for personnel and facilities. For example, all Command and General Staff College education (intermediate level) could be consolidated in one school at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. All Senior Service College education could be consolidated at Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama. The other intermediate and senior service schools could be closed, including the Joint and Combined Staff Officer's School at Norfolk, Virginia. The course curriculum at each school would have to be adjusted to address the joint PME requirements specified by the Goldwater-Nichols Act. A mix of civilian and military instructors from each Service would staff each school, which would result in truly joint PME. All graduates of intermediate and senior service schools would then have the requisite joint professional military education qualifications which would ease the assignment process for joint duty positions.

• create integrated, joint intelligence and communications commands/architecture/elements. This will result in improved interoperability of joint task forces and enhanced C4I. It would be a significant improvement to have all of DOD on the same sheet of music in intelligence gathering and sharing, while enabling all of DOD to communicate and fight using future systems. Ultimately that is our primary reason for existence—to fight jointly and win our Nation's wars. We must not lose sight of that fact.

• consolidate all DOD criminal investigation elements in a joint criminal investigation organization. This is one of the areas I will address in more detail.
• divest the Army of responsibility for the Theater Air Defense/Theater Missile Defense missions.

• create a separate Space Service with responsibility for all DOD space operations, including research and development, and system acquisition. Or, if that suggestion is too radical, then consolidate U.S. Space Command with U.S. Strategic Command (which was previously recommended by General Powell) and bring all of the Service space operations and headquarters into this new unified command.

**Joint Criminal Investigations Agency**

Currently each Service has its own criminal investigation element with the mission of investigating serious crimes (felonies). The military organizations include the Navy Criminal Investigation Service (NCIS), the Air Force Office of Special Investigations (AFOSI), and the Army Criminal Investigation Command (USACIDC). These units are stovepiped, with local units reporting directly to their own headquarters and not to the supported headquarters at their local military post or base. The Air Force and Navy elements also have the charter of conducting counter-intelligence support.

The Defense Criminal Investigation Service (DCIS) is another DOD investigative entity organized within the structure of the Department of Defense Inspector General’s office. This organization has the mission of conducting some fraud investigations for DOD. Other fraud investigations are conducted by the Service investigative organizations, with the determination of investigative jurisdiction governed by an interim guidance document.
Since the early 1980s, there has been talk of combining the military investigative agencies with DCIS, but that has not occurred. The Services have successfully banded together to resist such consolidation. There are continuing discussions about this idea, but they are unlikely to result in any agreement in the near term for purely parochial reasons. Mr. Sam Maxey, Deputy Director of Operations, for DCIS, indicated that there have been recent discussions about consolidation of fraud investigations under DCIS, but even that has not been agreed upon.

The Defense Investigative Service (DIS) is responsible for conducting background investigations for DOD personnel security clearances. DIS agents spend their time interviewing character references provided by each DOD member who requires a new or updated security clearance.

The missions of these five organizations are similar enough that they could be consolidated into one joint criminal investigation agency/command and achieve a significant resource savings without sacrificing any warfighting support or capability.

Each of these organizations is regionally oriented to accomplish its worldwide missions. That does not result in efficiencies in personnel utilization. For example, Army CID has an investigative element at Fort Lewis, Washington, and Air Force OSI has one at McChord AFB, Washington, while the Navy has an NCIS element at Bangor Submarine Base, Washington, and DCIS has an office in Seattle, Washington. DIS has an office located on Fort Lewis. The bottom line: all of these investigative agencies have offices within 30 miles of each other in the Pacific Northwest (and there may be other offices for each of these organizations in that area of which I am simply not aware). They all have administrative and overhead requirements that are duplicated in each location.
One joint organization could support the regional investigation requirements for DOD with a reduction in administrative overhead and infrastructure required. Since all the Services are governed by the same criminal statutes, the transition to a new joint organization would not require significant retraining of investigators. Counterintelligence investigative requirements could continue to be met using the trained agents from OSI and NCIS in concert with the Army Military Intelligence community.

There are many who will argue that such consolidation is a bad idea, but the bottom line is this: the Services do not want to lose control of their own criminal investigative agencies. I do not understand this fear, but it exists and it is very real. I am convinced that a consolidated joint criminal investigation agency could accomplish the missions required with substantial cost savings and virtually no negative impact on the warfighting capabilities of the United States.

**Theater Air Defense/Theater Missile Defense**

The Pentagon plans to spend $17 billion on missile defenses in the period 1995-1998. It is developing several types of high-speed missile interceptors, launchers, radars, and battle management systems capable of shooting down Scuds and their longer-range brethren, whether they are detected shortly after launch, in midcourse, or upon reentering the atmosphere.\(^3\)

A major area of continuing controversy among the Services involves responsibility for and control of theater air and missile defenses. This controversy has become extremely confusing with the issues of airspace control, deep attack, missile defense, air defense, and joint fires coordination all intertwined. The Air Force strongly believes that the Joint Force Air Component Commander (JFACC) should be triple-hatted as airspace control authority (ACA), and area air defense commander (AADC). The Army and the
Marine Corps see theater missile defense as a separate and distinct requirement from counterair operations (shooting down manned enemy aircraft). I believe the Air Force holds the high ground on this issue. This is a joint problem that requires an integrated solution. Creating separate authorities to deal with air defense, missile defense, and airspace control does not pass the common sense test. Air defense weapons systems need to be part of a coordinated, integrated defense network designed to defeat all incoming threats from the air: manned or unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, land attack missiles, and theater ballistic missiles. An integrated system is required to avoid fratricide and "...wasteful, redundant command and control." |

The solution is clear to me. Each Service needs to retain its own local area air defense responsibilities. The Army should retain Stinger/Avenger and Patriot elements with all maneuver brigades for close air defense/self defense. The Navy must maintain its own air defense support using manned aircraft and the AEGIS system to protect its carrier battle groups. However, these weapons systems should all be part of an integrated air defense/theater missile defense plan coordinated with the JFACC/ACA/AADC.

While I know this recommendation will anger my Army brethren in the Air Defense Artillery community, I think that overall air defense responsibility should be transferred to the Air Force. The Army and DOD cannot afford the weapons research, development, and acquisition costs or the continuing aggravation over functions.

The original agreement reached by General Eisenhower and General Spaatz in 1947, supports this recommendation. That agreement assigned responsibility for tactical surface to surface missiles to the Army along with security surface to air missiles required for support of Army tactical operations. The Air Force was given responsibility for
strategic surface to surface missiles and surface to air missiles “...designed for employment in area air defense.”

There is some evidence that the Army may be softening its’ position on theater air defense/theater missile defense. General Dennis Reimer, the Army Chief of Staff, indicated that in a message he recently sent to his subordinate general officers:

We still have some differences concerning the control of air defense units. The Air Force clearly indicated no desire to mess with our units at the Corps level or below. What they’re concerned about is airspace management and putting together an Integrated Air Defense System. In that regard, I think they have a valid point and we may be too rigid in our approach to theater level air defense units than what the Air Force can and cannot do with them. From an Army perspective, I will take a look at taking some of the rigidity out of the system and giving the Joint Force Commander the flexibility he needs to provide force protection. I can see where he may want to give the different components mission type orders and I also can see where he may want to hold one component commander responsible for theater level air defense. I think he needs that flexibility.

It is definitely time to get this issue resolved for the benefit of all the Services and the Defense Department.

A Separate Space Service

Each of the Services have captured a slice of the space mission which has resulted in a lack of a clear direction for military space efforts. The United States Space Command, a unified command, should have command and control of all U.S. Space Headquarters and operations, but amazingly, it does not. Each Service has a multitude of subordinate space headquarters with varying mission responsibilities.

For example, the Army has a “stand-alone Army component multifunctional command” called U.S. Army Space and Strategic Defense Command, in Arlington, Virginia. This is in addition to a forward U.S. Army Space Command in Colorado
Springs, Colorado, the Army Space Program Office, in Fairfax, Virginia, a presence in the Missile Defense and Space Technology Center, Huntsville, Alabama, the Wake Island Launch Facility, and the High Energy Laser Systems Test Facility at White Sands Missile Range, New Mexico. The Air Force Space Command has command and control of a similarly long list of subordinate headquarters involved in space operations. Admiral Crowe did nothing to improve this piecemeal approach to space operations in his 1989 report on roles and functions when he recommended that each of the Services retain that portion of the space mission that contributes to the medium they operate in: land, sea, or air.

Space operations today are in a similar situation to that faced by the Army Air Corps in the mid-1940s. There are elements in the Air Force that work in the space arena who believe a separate Space Service is needed to optimize our ability to utilize space. They see space as a completely separate medium, not an extension of the atmosphere which is frequently advocated by the air breathing elements of the Air Force. While some may argue that a separate Space Service is not necessary, it seems very clear that the Defense Department is violating the unity of command principle in space operations by maintaining so many different space headquarters. All space operations need to be under the command and control of one headquarters or in a separate Space Service. There is not sufficient funding available to each of the Services to adequately address the needs of space systems including research, development and utilization.

The Army does not need its own space headquarters. It is time for the Army to admit that and turn over its portion of the mission and budget to an independent Space Service, or to U.S. Space Command/U.S. Strategic Command. We need to overcome our
fear of giving up the space function, because it makes sense militarily, economically, and practically.

The Army does not need to be in charge of space operations. We merely need to be able to utilize the products and the technologies that space provides. We cannot afford to divert scarce Army resources to space operations if we are going to continue to downsize (which seems pretty likely), and still remain the dominant land army in the world. That is where our priority should be directed.

If a separate Space Service or a consolidated space headquarters with command and control of all space forces and operations is unacceptable, then we should enact General Powell’s idea to consolidate U.S. Space Command with U.S. Strategic Command. Each additional headquarters creates its own bureaucracy and ideological issues to rally around, which does not result in efficient, cost-effective defense operations. The projected decline in the defense budget should make such streamlining of headquarters a high priority. Redundancy is frequently addressed as a positive situation in these arguments, but too much of anything is not good for our defense situation. It is clearly time for the Services to agree on a common space headquarters and direction and let go of an irrationally maintained slice of the space mission. We cannot afford to continue in the direction we are going. It is time we admit that.

Notes

2 This information about fraud investigations was provided in a telephone conversation between the author and Mr. Sam Maxey, Deputy Director of Operations, Defense Criminal Investigation Service on 2 December 1996.
Notes

4Chief of Staff, U.S. Air Force, Draft Memorandum to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Subject: Joint Doctrine Issues. Accompanying staff paper by MAJ Schlapkohl is dated 22 October 1996. This document presents the Air Force positions juxtaposed with the positions of the other services on the controversial issues of countering air and missile threats, joint fire support, joint interdiction operations, and command and control, 2-5 (of background paper).

5Ibid., 2 (of background paper).

6Army-Air Force Agreements..., 11.

7Dennis J. Reimer, “Subject: Random Thoughts While Running.” E-mail he sent to his subordinate General Officers which included a section concerning command and control of air defense elements and the theater missile defense/theater air defense mission, dated 11 December 1995, 2.


Chapter 5

Conclusion

The thesis of this study was that Service rivalries and parochialism will again get in the way of any meaningful changes in roles, missions, and functions during the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review. I hoped that my research and the views expressed by the multitude of guest lecturers at the Air War College would show me that I was wrong. Unfortunately, all indicators I have seen to date reflect the same Service tendencies to circle the wagons and try to retain the status quo.

It is time for the Services to get beyond their concerns about survival. They are each important members of the U.S. defense team with unique capabilities and skills. Each of the Services has a role on the team. To use a football analogy which I believe captures the real meaning of jointness, each of the Services should worry about playing their own position well, and quit trying to assume a new position on the team. In football, the running back does not try to play center, guard, or tackle. He has the responsibility to do his best as a running back. The same applies to the Services. The Services need to bring their unique capabilities to the fight and contribute as part of a joint effort. That is why we should aggressively embrace jointness in everything possible that makes sense and saves money without giving up a military capability:
The point is that today the United States needs fewer forces in being and a wider menu of potential military capabilities from which to choose, precisely because we do not know what the threat will be or how it will fight.¹

This paper is not a call for a unified military in the United States. We need to retain the separate Services (and create an independent space component). However, each of the Services needs to be willing to compromise for the good of the Defense Department and the Nation if we are going to retain the best aspects of each of the components.

If the Joint Chiefs do not come up with a viable plan to resolve the turf issues discussed in this paper, we may find that Congress will resolve the roles, missions, and functions debate for us. If we decide to let Congress make the tough choices, we may end up with a less than optimum military structure in each of the Services. Why? Congress (in the aggregate) is not as well informed about military capabilities/needs/threats as we are. They are unlikely to come up with the optimum solution on their own. Especially when pork barrel politics help frame the political discussions and decisions. Congressional motivation is not likely to be focused on the needs of the nation ahead of the needs of their states or congressional districts. Politicians are patriotic to be sure, but they are primarily motivated by voters and the next election. That is not a winning formula for creating the best military force for the United States in the 21st Century.

The Secretary of the Army and the Army Chief of Staff have been avoiding additional force structure cuts for too long. The Army currently has more positions to fill than personnel authorized to fill them. Our limited budget, which is going to get smaller during the next several years, is being spent to maintain personnel accounts at the expense of research, development, and force modernization. Over the short term, that is not too
significant because our weapons systems are superior to our potential adversaries. But that situation may not continue indefinitely. “Robbing Peter to pay Paul” might become habit forming and we might find ourselves in another war in the future where we no longer hold the technological edge we have now. We have done that before. Two specific examples from W.W.II and Korea: the Army had a bazooka that could not penetrate German armored vehicles, or the tanks utilized by the North Koreans when they attacked in 1950; likewise Navy submarines had torpedoes that did not detonate properly early in the war. We do not need to relearn those lessons the hard way. We need to demonstrate that we have learned from those mistakes and recognize that we cannot hold our force modernization needs hostage to force structure that we can no longer afford. A tough decision for the Chief of Staff, but one that we need him to make.

Now is the prime time to resolve these long-standing roles, missions, and functions issues. We are not currently faced with any peer competitors. We have time to adjust our force structure if our plans do not turn out exactly the way we hope they will. We should experiment now, when we can afford to. Once the bullets start flying, it is too late for experiments that involve the sons and daughters of our nation.

Notes

**Glossary**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Full Form</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AADC</td>
<td>Area Air Defense Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ACA</td>
<td>Airspace Control Authority</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ADA</td>
<td>Air Defense Artillery</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AFOSI</td>
<td>Air Force Office of Special Investigations</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AWC</td>
<td>Air War College</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CINC</td>
<td>Commander in Chief</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CJCS</td>
<td>Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CONUS</td>
<td>Continental United States</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>CORM</td>
<td>Commission on Roles and Missions</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DCIS</td>
<td>Defense Criminal Investigation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DIS</td>
<td>Defense Investigative Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DOD</td>
<td>Department of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JFACC</td>
<td>Joint Force Air Component Commander</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JROC</td>
<td>Joint Requirements Oversight Council</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NCIS</td>
<td>Naval Criminal Investigation Service</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDAA</td>
<td>National Defense Authorization Act</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NDP</td>
<td>National Defense Panel</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OSD</td>
<td>Office of the Secretary of Defense</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PME</td>
<td>Professional Military Education</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QDR</td>
<td>Quadrennial Defense Review</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>UCP</td>
<td>Unified Command Plan</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>USACOM</td>
<td>U.S. Atlantic Command</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Bibliography


Department of Defense (DOD) Commission on Roles and Missions of the Armed Forces.


INTERNET DOCUMENT INFORMATION FORM

A. Report Title: Roles, Missions, Functions, and the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review: Now is the Time for the Services to recommend Real Change

B. DATE Report Downloaded From the Internet  April 1997

C. Report's Point of Contact: (Name, Organization, Address, Office Symbol, & Ph #)
Air War College
Air University
Maxwell AFB, Al 36112

D. Currently Applicable Classification Level: Unclassified

E. Distribution Statement A: Approved for Public Release

F. The foregoing information was compiled and provided by:
DTIC-OCA, Initials: JC  Preparation Date: 26 June 1998

The foregoing information should exactly correspond to the Title, Report Number, and the Date on the accompanying report document. If there are mismatches, or other questions, contact the above OCA Representative for resolution.