Command in the 21st Century: An Introduction to Civil-Military Relations

by

Edward R. Taylor

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# Command in the 21st Century: An Introduction to Civil-Military Relations

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This thesis addresses the following: professionalism and its relationship to the study of civil-military relations, the roles of the military in society, civilian control and the various schools of thought associated with it, historical and legal precedents for the American civil-military relationship, the just war tradition, various issues affecting current and future civil-military relations in the United States, the impact of military operations other than war (MOOTW) on civil-military relations and the military ethos, and, finally, the applicability of the just war tradition to the MOOTW environment.

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COMMAND IN THE 21ST CENTURY:  
AN INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

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Submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of

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from the

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ABSTRACT

This thesis serves as an introduction to civil-military relations and the just war tradition for Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) students taking CC3000 or an equivalent course. The goal of this thesis is to provide the student with a broad understanding of these subjects. The author intends this thesis to be used as a supplementary reading in CC3000.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Because the Cold War has ended, and with it the threat from a single peer competitor, the American military, as it looks to the 21st century, finds that it must adjust to any number of significant changes. Threats, large and small, to American national security have emerged all over the globe. Challenges such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and exploding populations, among others, have taken a more prominent position in the nation's list of potential threats. At the same time, the culture and values of the United States continue to change. While the question of whether those changes are for the better or for the worse is open to debate, some scholars in the field of civil-military relations have argued that these changes, combined with what they see as an increasingly politicized and politically conservative military, represent a previously unseen and dangerous rift between the American military and the American civilian society.

This thesis presents the results of an extensive review of the literature in the fields of civil-military relations and the just war tradition. The author's goal is to provide an introduction to civil-military relations for the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) student enrolled in CC3000. The thesis will examine the effect, if any, that the changing nature of the 21st century has on the United States' military in terms of its role and responsibilities within our democracy.

In order to accomplish these goals, a number of topics are addressed. First, the concept of professionalism is introduced to the reader: What
constitutes a profession? What is a professional military and is the American military professional? Next, the reader is presented with the traditional schools of thought on the role of a military and its officer corps in a democracy as well as historical and legal precedents in the American experience of civil-military relations. Additionally, the just war tradition, including both just cause for war and just means in war, is covered. Finally, the thesis examines the current state of civil-military relations and the possibilities for the future, focusing on how changing missions and roles, combined with a potentially changing military professionalism and a different civilian elite all affect the civil-military equilibrium.

The student of Command must understand the basics of the American civil-military relationship because some understanding of "why we do what we do" is required before a technical solution to a command and control problem can be offered or assessed. Further, the C4I expert, as an officer in the United States Armed Forces, has an obligation to understand how his military relates to the civilian society it protects. He must appreciate the role of a military in a democracy. He must also appreciate why we wage war and what means are acceptable in achieving our nation's ends.

A graduate of the C4I curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School has the potential of being involved with national security issues on any number of levels. Whether working as a project officer acquiring a new communications system, serving as a staff officer planning the employment of a new technology or capability in a J-6 directorate, or commanding a communications unit, it is important that the C4I expert possess a basic understanding of the civil-military
relationship. It is even more so when one considers that new concepts such as information warfare mean that information/communication technologies are no longer just useful tools that enable command and control but rather are potential weapons in their own right, as well as high-value targets.

While introducing the Joint C4I student to the basics of civil-military relations and the just war tradition, this thesis also points toward an important issue. That issue is the long-term impact of continued reorientation of our military forces towards military operations other than war (MOOTW). Some have argued that a continued focus on MOOTW will be detrimental to the warfighting ability of our military. This issue deserves further attention and would be ideal for future thesis research.
I. INTRODUCTION

A. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this thesis is to provide to the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) student taking CC3000 an introduction to American civil-military relations. The United States' military, as it approaches the 21st century, finds itself adjusting to many profound changes. The Cold War has ended and there is no longer a single peer competitor. Rather, there are numerous threats from adversaries, large and small, from all over the globe. The nation's list of potential enemies no longer consists solely of uniformed soldiers with red stars on their helmets. Instead, challenges such as international terrorism, narcotics trafficking, international crime, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, and exploding populations, among others, have been added to this list. At the same time, the culture and values of the United States continue to change. One could argue over whether these changes are for better or worse, but some scholars in the field claim that the changes represent an unprecedented and ever-increasing rift between the American military and the American civilian society. This, coupled with the rapidly declining numbers of civilian leaders with military experience, gives those same scholars cause for concern.

This thesis will examine the effect, if any, that the changing nature of the 21st century threat has on the United States' military in terms of its role and
responsibilities within our democracy. To this end, a number of topics will be addressed. First, the concept of professionalism will be introduced to the reader: What constitutes a profession? What is a professional military and is the American military professional? The thesis will then present the traditional schools of thought on the role of a military and its officer corps in a democracy as well as historical and legal precedents in the American experience. Although it is not completely a part of the study of the civil-military relationship, the just war tradition will be presented, including both just cause for war and just means in war. Finally, the thesis will examine the current state of civil-military relations and the possibilities for the future, focusing on how changing missions and roles, combined with a potentially changing military professionalism and a different civilian elite all combine to affect the civil-military equilibrium.

B. CIVIL-MILIARY RELATIONS BRIEFLY DEFINED.

Civil-military relations can be understood as an aspect of national security policy. National security policy is established by heads of state to protect the nation's "social, economic, and political institutions" (Huntington, 1957, pg. 1) from any threats that may arise. Samuel Huntington, in his book The Soldier and the State, provides a useful model to explain national security policy. National security policy, according to Huntington's model, exists in three forms. The first of these three forms, military security policy, defines a method to protect against outside threats. The second form, internal security policy, focuses on
subversion—internal threats. The third form is situational security policy, which Huntington defines as being concerned with long-term changes in social, cultural, or political conditions which affect the state's ability to properly govern. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 1)

Each of these three forms of national security policy—military, internal, and situational—are further broken down into two levels: the operational level and the institutional level. The operational level concerns the policy regarding the immediate means to meet a particular threat to national security. Examples of operational level issues in military security policy include the quantitative issues of size, recruiting, and the proportion of the national budget dedicated to military needs as well as the qualitative issues of force structure, equipment, and deployment. Additionally, there are dynamic issues that largely have to do with answering the questions of when and under what circumstances is force to be used. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 1)

The institutional level is associated with the manner in which policy is formulated and executed. Civil-military relations provide the principal institutional level of the military form of national security policy. At the institutional level, two forces shape military organizations. The first of these forces is called the "functional imperative" and has to do with the manner in which a military organization changes how it formulates and executes policy based upon a changing external threat. The second force is called the "societal imperative." This has to do with how a military reacts to social forces, ideologies, dominant
institutions, etc., of its corresponding civilian society. An example of the role of a functional imperative might be how the U.S. military changed after World War II to deal with the new, relatively permanent threat of the Soviet Union. An example of the societal imperative at work on the military is the recent opening up to females of previously male-only billets and specialties. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 1-2)

It can be seen that these two imperatives have the capability to conflict with each other. The need to meet a new threat might push the military in a direction that is opposed by forces originating in the civilian society. The degree to which these two imperatives will conflict depends upon the intensity of the nation's identified security needs and the strength of the civilian society's value pattern. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 2) A balance must be struck, and where to strike this balance is perhaps the key issue of civil-military relations. According to Huntington, the beginning of the Cold War signified a fundamental change in how this conflict was approached. Prior to the onset of the Cold War, a greater nod was made toward the societal imperative. Since the security of the nation was basically a fact, the primary question asked was "What pattern of civil-military relations is most compatible with American liberal democratic values?" After the beginning of the Cold War, national security was a final goal of policy rather than a starting assumption, and the more appropriate question was "What pattern of civil-military relations will best maintain the nation's security?" The functional imperative began to be given more weight. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 2-3)
The end of the Cold War has caused a re-evaluation of the national security interests by the civilian elite as well as a re-evaluation by the Armed Forces as to how to maintain those interests. The changing picture has caused a shift in equilibrium between Huntington's functional and societal imperatives. Some scholars in the field of civil-military relations have labeled this shift in equilibrium a crisis while others have maintained that it merely signifies a transitional period. Whether one regards the rumbling noise and occasional sparks produced by the friction between the two imperatives as a crisis or a transition, what remains important is that the C4I student, as a professional officer, understand the basic principles and premises of the American civil-military relationship. This basic understanding will serve as a benchmark for evaluating how new threats affect the relationship. Additionally, this understanding will provide the officer with a basis for evaluation of the various military policies and courses of action that he might have some part in developing.

C. THE JUST WAR TRADITION BRIEFLY INTRODUCED.

One of the greatest questions plaguing decision-makers and those who support them has been "How can the use of force serve just ends?" The just war tradition—moral reasoning about the use of force—has had an important role for hundreds of years in finding a middle ground in the perpetual arguments between
idealists and realists in the realms of foreign affairs and warfare (Johnson, J., 1996, pg. 27).

The just war tradition basically addresses two issues. The first describes when it is right to resort to the use of armed force—*jus ad bellum*. The standards used to address this issue were largely developed in the thirteenth century by Saint Thomas Aquinas. According to these standards, war is permissible only when there exists just cause, when the war has been authorized by a competent authority, and when the decision to engage in warfare is motivated by right intention. Additionally, the prospective conflict must pass four tests: Those waging war must expect to achieve more good than evil. There must exist a reasonable chance of success. The war must be a last resort. Finally, the expected outcome must be peace. (Johnson, J., 1996, pg. 28)

The second issue addresses the acceptability of the means used once war is being waged—*jus in bello*. There are two characteristics that describe just means. First, force must be proportional, in that the warmaker must distinguish between necessary and gratuitous force (Johnson, J., 1996, pg. 28). Second, it must be discriminant: The force must distinguish between the guilty and the innocent (Johnson, J., 1996, pg. 28). Additionally, tenets of *jus in bello* dictate that genocide is prohibited and that the "positive law of laws" must be observed. (Toner, 1992, Sword, pp. 76-77)

As might be guessed, the two issues addressed by the just war tradition—just cause and just means—are related, but the first, *jus ad bellum*, takes priority.
The reason for this is that, logically, one must be right in waging war before one's means can even be examined. In other words, a nation might be using the most permissible and acceptable methods to wage her war, but if her causes for waging that war are unjust, those methods could never be considered moral. (Johnson, J., 1996, pg. 27)

D. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

It is important for any student of Command to understand the basics of the American civil-military relationship. Before a technical solution to a command and control problem can be offered, the problem solver must have some understanding of "why we do what we do." The C4I expert, as an officer in the United States Armed Forces, has an obligation to understand how his military relates to the civilian society it protects. He must appreciate the role of a military in a democracy. He needs to understand why we wage war and what means are acceptable to achieve our ends. If the Joint C4I expert is to be the via media between the warfighter and the engineer, he must understand how a new threat and any proposed reaction to it affect the above mentioned issues.

A graduate of the C4I curriculum at the Naval Postgraduate School has the potential of being involved with national security issues on a variety of levels. He could be responsible for acquiring a new communications device or technology. He might serve on a CINC's staff in the J-6 shop doing communications planning. He might participate in developing a plan of
employment for a new technology or capability. Especially when one considers that information/communication technologies are no longer just very useful tools with which a commander can command and control his forces but have the potential to be weapons in their own right, it is even more important that the C4I expert possess a basic understanding of the civil-military relationship. As Peter Feaver states, relating civil-military relations to all other national security issues, "The civil-military problematique is logically prior to all other national security issues...—they are appraised according to how they relieve or exacerbate the central civil-military challenge." (Feaver, 1996, pg. 155)

E. CHAPTER OVERVIEW.

Subsequent chapters in this thesis will address in detail the topics and concepts introduced here in Chapter I. Chapter II will discuss the concept of professionalism. The author will present the following: characteristics of a profession, military officership as a profession, and the relationship of professionalism to the study of civil-military relations. Chapter III will explore the roles of a military in a democracy and the nature of civilian control, emphasizing the American experience. Huntington's theory of objective control will be examined as will Morris Janowitz' theory of the constabulary force. Other theories will also be covered. Chapter IV will cover just war theory. Chapter V will be an examination of current and future civil-military relations in the United States as a function of the changing roles of the military within and the changing
relationships of the military with American society. Additionally, some of the historical and legal precedents for the American civil-military relationship as well as the challenges brought about by the end of the Cold War will be discussed. Chapter VI will consist of conclusions to be drawn. Important issues for the student to take away will be highlighted.
II. PROFESSIONALISM

A. PURPOSE.

This chapter's function is first to explain the relationship between professionalism and the study of civil-military relations. Second, the chapter will provide a working definition of professionalism, including distinguishing characteristics that may be used to evaluate whether or not a particular class of people constitutes a proper profession. Third, the military profession will be discussed. That discussion will examine how the military officer corps matches the distinguishing characteristics of a profession and will cover the development of an American military profession.

B. RELATIONSHIP TO THE STUDY OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

Before we can begin any discussion of American civil-military relations, we must first discuss the concept of professionalism and, more specifically, military professionalism. To put it bluntly, professionalism is central to the study of civil-military relations. The relationship of the officer corps to the state is, as Huntington wrote forty years ago, the principal focus of civil-military relations (Huntington, 1957, pg. 3). The two preeminent scholars of American civil-military relations, Morris Janowitz and Samuel P. Huntington, both concerned themselves greatly with the exposition of the character of American military
professionalism. Before advancing any theories of the soldier-state dynamic, each author sought first to get his arms around the "military mind" or "military ethic." Today, virtually every treatment, formally written and otherwise, of American civil-military relations involves a discussion about the condition of military professionalism in the United States and the conduciveness of that condition to maintaining proper civilian control.

C. THE PROFESSION.

As stated above, before we can discuss American civil-military relations, we first have to look at the professionalism of the American officer corps. The first step, of course, in studying the military profession is to determine what, exactly, a profession is and what it means to be a professional.

For the purposes of this thesis and any discussion of civil-military relations, we reject the popular usage of the words "profession" and "professional", referring to engaging for pay in a particular activity. It is in this sense that we refer to a "professional athlete." This simply means that the individual plays a particular sport for a living. It does not mean that the National Football League, for instance, is a professional body or that playing football constitutes, in the strict sense to be elaborated below, a profession.

If asked to give examples of professions, we would probably come up with two or three quick examples: law, medicine, the priesthood. Assuming these vocations are professions in some stricter sense, what characteristics do these
pursuits have that make them professions while playing football, for example, is not? Huntington provides a very good definition of a profession and its distinguishing characteristics. His model is used widely by other authors (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 5) and bears inclusion in this thesis.

According to Huntington, a profession is identified to a fairly great extent by three distinguishing characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. These three characteristics will provide us with a baseline for evaluating the professionalism of the military officer corps. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 8)

1. Expertise.

Expertise demands that a professional possess a specialized body of knowledge and skills in a significantly important area of endeavor. The specialized knowledge and skills provide the basis for objective standards by which the professional competence of an individual within the profession is measured. Professional knowledge is intellectual in nature. Indeed, a medical doctor is something more than simply a mechanic for the human body. Moreover, this professional knowledge can be preserved in scholarly writing that will, because of universal application, benefit future members of the profession. The body of professional knowledge and skills are bestowed upon an individual through a usually lengthy course of professional education. In general, this education can be divided into two phases. The first phase imparts to the individual a broad, liberal education. The purpose of this phase is to provide an
ethical and moral background which will enable the future professional to make ethical decisions and be able to make judgments as to the right and wrong applications of his or her professional skills. The second phase of the professional education process imparts the specialized knowledge and skills that belong to the particular profession in question. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 8)

An example that immediately comes to mind is the educational process through which one becomes a medical doctor: In the first phase of his professional education, an individual hoping to become a physician must first earn a baccalaureate degree. During the second phase, he or she must spend another four years in medical school followed by internships, residencies, etc. Additionally, the candidate must pass a difficult examination. Throughout the second phase, the prospective physician is educated in the specialized knowledge and skills of the medical profession, and his professional competence is subsequently evaluated against the objective standards developed from that same body of specialized knowledge and skills.

2. Responsibility.

While working in his or her profession, the professional is considered to be a practicing expert. He or she works in a social context and performs a service for which the client is society, either individually or collectively. In this context, the professional does not hold financial remuneration as his primary motivating factor. Rather, he feels a social responsibility to put his special knowledge and skills to work serving society. To ensure that society is, in fact, benefiting from
the application of its specialized knowledge and skills, a profession is counted on to largely police itself. The profession, as an organization, has self-imposed rules, standards, values, and ideals. These can be administered and maintained by the profession collectively and/or by sub-organizations, such as the bar associations, created specifically for that purpose. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 9)

3. Corporateness.

The third characteristic of a profession, corporateness, implies that the members of a profession see themselves as a distinct group, separate from the society the profession serves. This does not necessarily mean physical separation or isolation. Rather, it simply means that because they possess certain special skills and a particular body of knowledge and have the largely self-imposed responsibility to serve society in a manner which is consistent with their professional ethos, members of a profession "share a sense of organic unity and consciousness of themselves as a group apart from laymen." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 10) Corporateness manifests itself in professional organizations.

4. The Utility of this Model.

Huntington's definition of a profession and its distinguishing characteristics, presented above, is only a model. As such, it should be considered to be an ideal. In other words, no existing profession perfectly meets the standards of each characteristic. Examples abound, at least stereotypically, of doctors and lawyers who are motivated solely by money or who fail to utilize
their professional skills responsibly. However, this model serves as an excellent starting point for the discussion of the military officer corps as a profession.

D. THE OFFICER CORPS AS A PROFESSION.

How does the military officer corps measure up against the ideal definition and characteristics of a profession? Huntington obviously felt it measured up quite well indeed when he wrote that "[t]he modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 7) Nor was he the only scholar to feel that way. Sir John Winthrop Hackett agreed that the officer corps is professional because the military officer serves in:

...an occupation with a distinguishable corpus of specific technical knowledge and doctrine, a more or less exclusive group coherence, a complex of institutions peculiar to itself, an educational pattern adapted to its own needs, a career structure of its own and a distinct place in the society which has brought it forth. (Hackett, 1962, pg. 3)

The next section of this chapter will be an examination of the military officer corps as profession.

1. Military Expertise.

The student in CC3000, likely being a military officer himself, might wonder what particular skill it is that all officers possess that would constitute expertise vis-à-vis our definition of professionalism. After all, there are vast numbers of different military occupational specialties, designators, and warfare specialties across four services. Is there a distinct sphere of military competence
common to all officers? Huntington maintained that the unique, professionalizing skill practiced by all officers was the "management of violence," a phrase he attributed to Harold Lasswell. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 11) The duties of a military officer, regardless of military occupational specialty, can be summarized fairly comprehensively by the following:

- The organization, equipping, and training of his force.
- The planning of the force's activities.
- The direction of the force's operations, both in and out of combat.

The peculiar skill of the officer, then, is "[t]he direction, operation, and control of a human organization whose primary function is the application of violence..." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 11): the profession of arms.

Of course, there are individuals within the officer corps who are not members of the profession of arms, though they may be members of other professional bodies. These officers are not considered capable of the management of violence and typically are distinguished by special titles or insignia. Importantly, they are not allowed command of organizations that have the application of violence as their mission. These individuals belong to the officer corps in its function as an administrative organization but not in its function as a professional body. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 12)

Functioning as a military officer requires a great deal of expertise. Acceptable mastery of the profession of arms requires extensive education, training, and experience regardless of an officer's innate intelligence or the degree to which he possesses certain intangible qualities such as character,
courage, and leadership (Huntington, 1957, pg. 13). (Although given a particular level of experience, training, and education, an officer who is more intelligent, courageous, and a better leader would arguably be a more accomplished officer than one who possesses lesser amounts of these characteristics.)

The beginning of the educational process for most American military officers is the achievement of a baccalaureate degree, followed by some basic military training that serves as a rite of passage into the profession of arms. Subsequently, an officer is schooled, formally and informally, throughout his career in some sort of professional military education program. The officer is also evaluated by other members of his profession against the standards suggested by his basic duties. Each military service has its own version of a fitness report. However, regardless of the variance in methods and implementations, all the services seem interested in the answers to the following questions:

- How well does the officer organize, equip, and train his force?
- How well does the officer plan his force's activities?
- How well does the officer direct his force's operations, both in and out of combat?

Generally speaking, the larger and more complex the organizations that an officer can direct and the greater number of situations in which the officer can be effectively employed, the greater his professional competence is considered to be. Of course, the reader could, from his or her own service, easily come up with numerous examples of how, perhaps, the evaluation system in place failed to work properly. It seems that each service is constantly in the process of
revamping or fine-tuning its own process. A scholarly examination of a service's personnel evaluation system would likely make an excellent thesis topic in another academic department. However, it is not important for the purposes of this thesis to dwell on the shortcomings of a particular fitness report system. What is important is to understand the theoretical ideal of the military profession's self-maintenance of professional standards. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 12-13)


Like any other professional, the military officer does not use his expertise and his skills to his own advantage. The professional officer's primary motivator is not financial in nature. The military officer, like the lawyer and doctor, has society as his client. Society has a vested interest in the proper employment of the officer's military skills and the officer is responsible to that society for the effective use of his expertise for the purpose of enhancing the society's military security (Huntington, 1957, pg. 14). Additionally, the officer corps has a professional responsibility to society to do only what that society, through its established leaders, tells it to do. In fact, as the reader will see in Chapter III, Huntington's theory of civilian control is greatly dependent upon the professionalism of the officer corps and the subordination of the military to its civilian masters necessitated by the profession's deeply felt responsibility to society.

The military officer, like any other professional, is part of a corporate body distinct from laymen.

The professional world of the officer tends to encompass an unusually high proportion of his activities. He normally lives apart from the rest of society; physically and socially he probably has fewer nonprofessional contacts than most other professional men. The line between him and the layman or civilian is publicly symbolized by uniforms and insignia of rank. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 16)

The corporate character of the military profession is driven largely by the functional imperative of national military security. The demands of military security have brought about the development of distinct, military organizations and institutions that in turn have given rise to an officer corps that is an independent social unit. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 16)

Huntington maintained that the military profession is a bureaucratized profession (Huntington, 1957, pg. 16). Additionally, it is also a bureaucratic organization. In this case, the use of the word "bureaucratic" is not intended to be pejorative, as it so often is today. Rather, it simply refers to the presence and importance of hierarchy. Within the profession of arms, the hierarchy of ranks defines the levels of competence. Within any military organization duties and responsibilities are distributed by a hierarchy of office or billets. Although there is some kind of connection between the system of ranks and the system of billets, to a large extent they are independent of each other. A particular unit has a table...
of organization that provides for a billet structure independent of who is assigned to the unit. In the same way, an officer is not normally promoted simply to fill a particular billet. (Although that is less true at the flag level.) In other words, a particular officer is not a lieutenant colonel only because he is a battalion commander; nor is he a battalion commander only because he is a lieutenant colonel.

The military profession largely manages and polices itself. The military is subordinate to civilian control in the sense that civilians decide when, where, and why to apply force, but the day-to-day running of the profession comes from within. Subject to overarching guidance from legitimate civilian authority, the military itself controls a restricted entrance process. Officers are chosen for advancement to increased rank by other more senior officers. The military itself runs the corporate structure, which includes not just the official bureaucracy, but the various societies, associations, schools, journals, customs, and traditions as well. When a military officer has broken the rules of the profession, other members hold him accountable. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 16-17)

At this point, if not sooner, the reader may well wonder where the enlisted man fits into this discussion of professionalism. Huntington maintained that for the purposes of his definition and model, the enlisted soldier is not a professional. He did not question the enlistee's motivation for service, dedication, or competence. Rather, he asserted that enlisted servicemen are not professional because they do not have the same professional responsibility as
does the officer corps. The enlisted, according to Huntington, are specialists in the application of violence and not the management of it. Their vocation, therefore, is a trade and not a profession. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 17-18)

4. The "Military Mind."

An introduction to Huntington’s concept of the "Military Mind" is in order, as it will serve as a baseline for comparison with other models and characterizations of the military profession and the soldier-state dynamic. Huntington argued that the professional officer looks at the nation-state as having primacy over all other political organizations. The military man will almost always place the common good ahead of the individual. The military mind believes that man is essentially evil and therefore there are always threats to the security of the nation-state, even if those threats are not immediately visible. Conflict is inevitable. The professional soldier insists on always preparing for war, though he will never truly feel ready. Because the military man never feels prepared, he wants to avoid commitments to alliances. Further, although he recognizes the inevitability of war, he would just as soon avoid it because he, more than anyone, understands the horror of armed conflict (Huntington, 1957, pp. 65-72). The professional soldier’s ethic, then, can be described as what Huntington referred to as conservative realism: "The military ethic is thus pessimistic, collectivist, historically inclined, power-oriented, nationalistic, militaristic, pacifist, and instrumentalist in its view of the military profession." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 79)
Another aspect of the military mind, or ethic, must be considered as a jumping-off point for further discussion of the civil-military relationship: obedience. Obedience within the context of the military ethos is usually not difficult. But what about when the obedience is required in the face of seemingly non-military values? Huntington provides four cases of when this situation might occur; he also provides solutions that he feels are consistent with his view of professionalism. The first case is military obedience versus political wisdom. Here there really is no conflict for the statesman's superior political wisdom is, from the start, to be accepted as fact. Huntington's view, which will be explained in greater depth in a subsequent chapter, is that it is not the business of the military to decide "questions of war and peace." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 76)

The second case is military obedience versus professional competence. Since obedience is an important, if not the supreme, military virtue, how could it conflict with professional competence? Rigid obedience has the potential to stifle new tactics, technologies, and ideas. Should a junior disobey a senior to increase the body of professional knowledge? Fortunately, the corporate professional body has an outlet for such situations: professional journals. Publications such as U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings allow members of the naval branch of the profession of arms to seek to advance the body of professional knowledge in an open and scholarly atmosphere without behaving in a disloyal manner. Another manner in which obedience may conflict with professional competence is when that competence is threatened by what
Huntington sees as an intrusion into the military realm by the statesman. Although he recognizes the statesman's prerogative to do so, Huntington's model of civilian control provides for civilian masters who also recognize the boundaries between their sphere and that of the military. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 76-77)

In the question of military obedience versus legality, Huntington presumes that the military officer is only the servant of the legitimate, legal authorities of the state (Huntington, 1957, pg. 77). This, of course, is easily said but not so easily operationalized. The separation of powers between different government entities muddies the waters a bit. An officer who claims to maintain primary loyalty to the document that establishes the government, the Constitution, runs the risk of acting on his own necessarily flawed interpretation of that establishing document and not on the legal interpretation of it as defined by the governmental bodies that have that particular responsibility. Douglas MacArthur and Oliver North made that mistake.

The final case is that of military obedience versus basic morality. It is presumed that the soldier is the equal of the statesman in the ability to reason morally and apply ethical standards. A soldier has the obligation to disobey unlawful or immoral orders, but must understand that he may have to pay a price for that disobedience. Huntington argues that this dilemma is simply a burden of professionalism, and that only rarely will the officer have justification for following his conscience when it conflicts both with military obedience and the welfare of the state. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 78)
Finally, as a lead-in to the next chapter, which is on the various theories of civilian control of the military, it must be pointed out how the development of a professional officer class was seen by the power elite in both Europe and America. Understanding this relationship will help the student fathom the reasons, explained in following chapters, why the concept of a professional officer corps has conflicted with the ideals of American civil society. In Europe, as the officer class emerged as a truly distinct professional class, it was viewed as a threat to the monarchy and aristocracy. Prior to professionalization, membership in the officer corps was something to which one was entitled by birth or by purchase. The professional officer corps, then, was identified with "democracy." On the other hand, in the United States, because of the innate bias against standing armies as a result of the colonial experience, the professional officer corps was seen as a tool for kings and the nobility, and was therefore identified with "aristocracy." For example, De Tocqueville, visiting the United States and observing a budding professional officer corps, cited its emergence as consistent with American democracy. On the other hand, the Jacksonians, led by Andrew Jackson, tried very hard to destroy the profession on the grounds that it was indicative of latent aristocratic tendencies. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 35)
III. ROLES OF THE MILITARY IN SOCIETY

A. PURPOSE.

The purpose of Chapter III is to explore the roles of a military in society and examine the nature of civilian control over the military. To this end, there will first be a discussion of civilian control itself. Second, the chapter will present several theories on civilian control. The first two theories advanced, Huntington's and Janowitz', are considered to be the bedrock for scholarship in American civil-military relations and serve as the jumping-off point for virtually any discussion in this area. Other more recently developed theories, including the fusion theory and the concordance theory, will also be presented. Finally, there will be a discussion of some of the historical and legal precedents in American civil-military relations.

B. CIVILIAN CONTROL.

Civilian control of the military is the attempt of societies to find a solution to an old paradox: We create violent institutions to protect us from that which we fear, but, that being accomplished, we then fear the created institution itself because of its capacity for violence. In the condition of complete anarchy, in which each man is responsible for protecting his own interests or perishing, there is no problem because the one protected and the one protecting are the very
same. However, the natural human tendency is for humans to band together in an effort to accomplish more as a group than they might individually. Two issues immediately arise. The first issue, not central to our discussion of civilian control, concerns the transfer of some amount of decision-making power from the individuals to a decision-making person or body. The second issue sets up the tension of the civil-military relationship. (Feaver, 1996, pp. 150-151)

The second issue is the assignment of the responsibility for fighting to a certain subgroup. Even when such a subgroup is joined together only to meet specific threats and disbanded afterwards, the creation of this subgroup represents a potential threat to the rest of the group. Of course, as this group grows and develops, the skills that they all practiced collectively become more and more specialized. The group looks to specific subgroups to grow the crops and livestock that feed the group, make the products needed for daily life, and provide for the group's security. The subgroup making the last provision is the group's military. This military subgroup can be characterized in any number of ways, but regardless, it must be strong enough to meet the threats as defined by the group and subservient enough so as not to endanger the liberty of the group. (Feaver, 1996, pg. 151)

If the issue of civilian control of the military revolves around reconciling "...a military strong enough to do anything the civilians ask them to with a military subordinate enough to do only what civilians authorized them to do," (Feaver, 1996, pg. 149) how does this work in democracies such as the United States? In
short, the military is a servant of the people through the state, which is itself a democratically elected governing body or group of bodies. The state, as the agent of the people, evaluates the threat and makes appropriate national security decisions that the military, still under civilian supervision, then executes:

Democratic civilian control requires that national security policy decisions will be made by constitutionally authorized and politically responsible civilian officials, and that the means of executing or supporting these policies will also be under the control of politically responsible civilian officials. (Jesse, 1973, pg. 8)

One of the central questions of civil-military relations is, “Who gets to decide what?” One way to answer this question is to look at the issue in terms of means and ends. Kemp and Hudlin, in a 1992 paper, maintain that “the ends of government policy are to be set by civilians; the military is limited to decisions about means.” (Kemp and Hudlin, 1992, pg. 8) Frequently, of course, the line between means and ends is not so easily seen. Kemp and Hudlin go on to say that “it is for the civilian leadership to decide where the line between ends and means (and hence between civilian and military responsibility) is to be drawn.” (Kemp and Hudlin, 1992, pg. 9) Peter Feaver expressed the answer to the central question in terms of national security policy itself when he maintained that while "...the military may be best able to identify the threat and the appropriate responses to that threat for a given level of risk, ...only the civilian can set the level of acceptable risk for society." (Feaver, 1996, pg. 154)

Either answer to the above question serves to illustrate the fact that within our government, civilians and the military have both unique and complementary
roles to play. The challenge is that these roles change and the line between them change over time. The civil-military relationship tends to be calm when both civilians and the military understand and accept their appropriate roles. On the other hand, there are several possible occurrences that can muddy the waters. One possibility is that one group might perceive that the other group is either unable or unwilling to meet its responsibilities. A second catalyst for friction is the deliberate intrusion of one group into the other's sphere of responsibility. A third is the emergence of a new, previously unassigned area of responsibility. (Johnson and Metz, 1995, pg. 5) One might also add that "[c]ivil-military relations have also been tense when presidents used the armed forces as a tool of social changes." (Johnson and Metz, 1995, pg. 7)

Civilian control, then, is the proper subordination of a competent, professional military to the ends of policy as determined by civilian authority (Huntington, 1957, pg. 72). No one questions the centrality of civilian supremacy to the American democratic system. Rather, the scholarly debate surrounds how to go about achieving that end and the nature of the American military's professionalism. There is, as will be discussed in Chapter V, "no consensus on the changes that the evolution of the global security environment will bring, or on the risks of too much military involvement in policymaking." (Johnson and Metz, 1995, pg. v) Various theories have been advanced that attempt to explain both the theoretical ideal of American civil-military relations and the actual state of the relationship over the history of the United States. Figure 1 below provides a
graphic description of how the various components of the political-social system interrelate. This visual model can be used in conjunction with almost any civil-military theory. What varies from theory to theory is the degree of intersection between the different components.

![Diagram of the Civil-Military Relationship in the Political-Social System](image)

Figure 1: The Civil-Military Relationship in the Political-Social System (Snider and Carleton-Carew, 1995, pg. 5)

C. HUNTINGTON'S THEORY OF OBJECTIVE CIVILIAN CONTROL.

Samuel Huntington, in his 1957 book *The Soldier and the State*, offered the first modern theory of American civil-military relations. Although his work has been criticized as being perhaps too idealistic and therefore a bit impractical, it serves, even for his critics, as a "point of departure...in the study of American civil-military relations." (Feaver, 1996, pg. 158) As discussed in Chapter I,
Huntington recognized the tension between the functional imperative of military security requirements and the societal imperative of the prevailing cultural values and standards. Like all American scholars of the civil-military relationship, he also recognized the need for civilian control of the military. His solution focused on a politically neutral, autonomous, and professional officer corps and is known as *objective civilian control.* (Huntington, 1957, pp. 70-72)

It is useful to begin the discussion of objective control by introducing what Huntington considered to be its exact opposite: *subjective civilian control.* Subjective control is, according to Huntington, the simplest way to maximize the power of civilians relative to the military. However, the problem with this model is that maximizing civilian power inevitably means "maximizing...the power of some particular civilian group or groups." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 80) Subjective control revolves around the distribution of power among the civilian elites rather than between civil authority and the military. The separation of powers provided by the Constitution (which will be discussed later in this Chapter), provides us with the situation in which the Executive identifies civilian control with presidential power and the Legislative branch, of course, associates civilian control with congressional oversight (Huntington, 1957, pg. 81). At its core, subjective civilian control would deny the existence of a unique and independent military sphere (Huntington, 1957, pg. 83).

Objective civilian control, ensures proper civilian control by maximizing the professionalism of the officer corps of the armed forces. Where subjective
control provides for civilian control by civilianizing the military and making it the mirror of the state, objective control accomplishes the same goal by militarizing the military and making it the servant of the state (Huntington, 1957, pg. 83). In this context, perhaps the most important characteristic of this professional officer corps is its isolation from politics. Indeed, "[t]he antithesis of objective civilian control is military participation in politics: civilian control decreases as the military become progressively involved in institutional, class, and constitutional politics." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 83)

In fact, Huntington defines objective civilian control as "...that distribution of political power between military and civilian groups which is most conducive to the emergence of professional attitudes and behavior among the members of the officer corps." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 83) The goal is to minimize military power, but it must also be remembered that because the officer corps is to be an autonomous profession, the military must possess the minimum amount of power required for the existence of a profession. Any reduction of military power below the level at which military professionalism is maximized is accomplished only to the benefit of one or more particular civilian groups.

Huntington, in his discussion of objective civilian control, suggests that there are two levels of civil-military relations: power and ideological. The power level has to do with the power of the military officer corps relative to the civilian elites within society. Power itself has two forms: formal authority and informal influence. "Formal authority involves control of one person over the behavior of
another on the basis of their respective positions in a defined social structure.” (Huntington, 1957, pg. 86) This is the kind of authority a commanding officer has over his subordinates, for instance. To analyze the extent of an individual’s or group’s authority, Huntington provides three key criteria:

- Relative level
- Relative unity
- Relative scope

Relative level refers to the individual’s or group’s position in the hierarchy: a battalion commander has more authority than one of his platoon commanders. Relative unity describes the level of structural cohesiveness within the organization. The captain of a ship at sea, having all of his sailors aboard, might be said to have more authority than an officer of equivalent rank commanding the same number of sailors who are spread out over several geographic locations. Relative scope pertains to the “variety and type of values with respect to which the group is formally authorized to exercise power.” (Huntington, 1957, pg. 88)

In contrast to formal authority is informal influence. Rather than deriving from hierarchical position, influence comes from such traits and characteristics as personality, wealth, knowledge, prestige, friendship, relationships, etc. Influence allows control through non-positional means. The class troublemaker who always seems to command so much respect from his better behaved peers possesses a great deal of influence while possessing little or no authority.
Huntington provided four indices for evaluating the influence of the officer corps (Huntington, 1957, pp. 88-89):

- Group affiliations of the officer corps and its leaders
- Economic and human resources subject to the authority of the officer corps and its leaders
- Hierarchical impenetration of the officer corps into other groups
- Prestige and popularity of the officer corps and its leaders

Group affiliations come in three basic types: pre-service, in-service, and post-service. The type and scope of officer involvement in various nonmilitary organizations greatly affects the ability of the officer corps to exert influence. The officer corps' influence also increases as the numbers of people and dollars controlled by the officer corps increases. Military influence increases when officers assume positions of authority in non-military organizations. Finally, the influence of the officer corps obviously increases when the public possesses a favorable opinion of the military. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 88-89)

The second level of civil-military relations is the ideological. The key issue at this level is how the professional military ethic compares to the dominant political ideals in society. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 86) The challenging aspect at this level is that there is no single "civilian mind." It is quite possible to describe a "military mind" that transcends nationality and culture, but there are any number of civilian ideologies and belief systems. Even within a single country it can be difficult to characterize the "civilian mind," and the United States is no exception. However, some generalizations can be made which more or less accurately portray the mindset of an American. Americans come from the liberal democratic
tradition and therefore assign great value to personal liberties, freedoms, and rights while placing noticeably less emphasis on corporate responsibility. When this liberal democratic tradition is placed side by side with the "military mind" which was described in Chapter II, it is easy to see that friction might result. This friction, of course, is a key part of the soldier-state dynamic. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 89)

In fact, the compatibility between the dominant civilian ideology and the professional military ethic affects the particular "distribution of power between civilian and military groups which maximizes military professionalism and objective civilian control...." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 94) In a society which is inherently antimilitary, an officer corps may increase its political power only at the expense of its professionalism and by adopting the dominant social and cultural standards and values. In this society, "military professionalism and civilian control are maximized by the military's renouncing [its own attempts to increase] authority and influence and leading a weak, isolated existence, divorced from the general life of society." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 94) If, however, the society possesses an ideology that is essentially favorable to the military ethic, then military power may increased to a much higher level without compromising military professionalism. An "appropriate equilibrium between the power of the military and the ideology of society" (Huntington, 1957, pg. 94) thus leads to the achievement of objective civilian control.
The following quote may best summarize Huntington's views on the relationship between professionalism, power, and society; it certainly deserves reflection:

The concessions which the military make in order to acquire power in an unsympathetic society are just one example of the general phenomenon of the ameliorating and diluting effects of power. It is a truism that power melts principle and that those who hold to definite, dogmatic, and rigid value systems are excluded from power in a pluralistic society. Only he who is flexible, willing to adjust, and ready to compromise can win widespread support: power is always to be purchased for a price. The price which the military have to pay for power depends upon the extent of the gap between the military ethic and the prevailing ideologies of the society. The effect which the acquisition of power in a nonconservative society has upon military men is similar to the sobering effects that the acquisition of power has upon radicals. Michels remarks at one point in his *Political Parties* that "Socialists may triumph but never socialism." The same is true with the military in an unsympathetic society. The generals and admirals may triumph but not the professional military ethic. The taming effect of political power makes them good liberals, good fascists, or good communists, but poor professionals. The satisfactions of professional performance and adherence to the professional code are replaced by the satisfactions of power, office, wealth, popularity, and the approbation of nonmilitary groups. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 94-95)

The relationship between power, professionalism, and ideology is very dynamic and reflects changes in relative power as well as changes in public opinion and thought. The perceived intensity of threats to the national security play an important role, too. Maintaining the equilibrium that provides for objective civilian control is challenging, especially because of the tension between professional intents on one hand and extraneous politics on the other. This tension is especially heightened in the military because of its importance to society and the
incredible amounts of power it must wield when the nation does go to war. Huntington maintains that the professional and the politician exist to one degree or another in all of us and so the tension can never be made to go away; "it can only be ordered so as to make it more or less endurable." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 95)

Huntington's emphasis on the role of military professionalism in the maintenance of civilian control of the military is not misplaced. Virtually every scholarly treatment of the subject underscores the importance of professionalism. While some scholars, Janowitz, for instance, call for a broader definition of professionalism than Huntington would allow, none dispute its central role in healthy civil-military relations:

Professionalism requires of each officer a commitment to professional excellence—the observance of the highest technical standards in meeting the requirements of his or her chosen field. Hence, by definition, professionalism embraces the commitment to civilian control of the military. (Trask, 1997, pg. 4)

D. JANOWITZ’S "PRAGMATIC" PROFESSIONALISM AND THE CONSTABULARY FORCE.

The second major figure in the study of American civil-military relations is Morris Janowitz. His book, *The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait*, was published just three years after Huntington's *Soldier and the State*, and it, like Huntington's book, focuses on the officer corps and professionalism. However, Janowitz rejects Huntington's professional ideal and opts for a more "pragmatic professionalism." Janowitz argued that in the post World War II
world, some politicization of the officer was inevitable due to the new requirement for an incredibly capable, globally reaching, standing military force focused on meeting the Soviet threat. (Feaver, 1996, pg. 164) According to Janowitz, it would be unacceptable for the professional military officer to engage in partisan politics. However, it would be equally unacceptable not to acknowledge the fact that the officer corps is strongly linked to the state and the nation's political system. (Snider and Carleton-Carew, 1995, pg. 4)

It should be noted that Janowitz was not calling for a broader definition of professionalism to instigate change in the behavior of the officer corps. Rather, he wanted to revise the definition to more accurately describe the patterns of behavior that already existed. In his discussion of why a new definition was needed, Janowitz offered five trends, which he referred to as hypotheses, in the changing political behavior of the American officer corps.

First, he maintained that there was a change in the basis of authority and discipline brought about by something he called the Organizational Revolution. Janowitz felt at the time that "...the central concern of commanders is no longer the enforcement of rigid discipline, but rather the maintenance of high levels of initiative and morale." (Janowitz, 1960, pp. 8-9)

Second, Janowitz pointed to what he saw as a narrowing difference between the skills required for membership in the military and civilian elites. Janowitz maintained that the changing nature of warfare and the post-war military establishment required that military officers increasingly become more
civilian-like in orientation. As evidence he held out the increasing numbers of
technical specialties in the armed forces with direct civilian counterparts.
(Janowitz, 1960, pg. 9)

Third, Janowitz noticed a shift to a broader social base in the recruitment
of the officer corps brought about by the increasing manpower needs of a larger
standing army as well as changing attitudes in American society. Interestingly,
though, he makes a claim which will bear on the discussion in a later chapter of
the current state of civil-military relations: There is "reason to believe that
'democratization' of entrance...can carry with it potential tendencies to weaken
the 'democratization' of outlook and behavior." (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 11) This
seemingly counterintuitive statement is based on the argument that a more
heterogeneous officer corps, viewing service as less a profession and more a job
or entitlement, requires greater recognition by the at-large public. This is in
contrast to an officer corps drawn from a rather narrow, relatively high, social
stratum. These officers' "social prestige was regulated by...family origin and by
an ethos which prized heroism and service to the state." (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 11)

Fourth, there was a change in the significance of an officer's career path.
Janowitz noticed that there were increasing numbers of successful officers who
strayed from the traditionally prescribed career progression in ways that allowed
them to see the "bigger picture." Their successful ascent into the military elite in
spite of non-traditional career paths indicated to Janowitz an increased value
placed on the skills and orientations gleaned from those career paths. (Janowitz,
1960, pg. 11) One example would be Rickover. Another example from the more recent past is Colin Powell. A popular opinion of Powell's career maintains that it was rather short on meaningful command assignments and long on significant staff duty, including a tour as the National Security Advisor.

Janowitz' fifth hypothesis concerned trends in the political indoctrination of the professional military officer. He observed that military thinking emerging at the time of his writing emphasized initiative and innovation as well as the role of human factors in combat and in organizations.

The new doctrine seems to be designed to supply the military professional with opinions on many political, social, and economic subjects, opinions which he feels obliged to form as a result of his new role, and to which he was expected to be indifferent in the past. (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 13)

The above five trends all led Janowitz to conclude that the observable behavior of the American officer corps was not neatly captured by a strict, idealistic definition of professionalism, such as the one offered by Huntington. While his definition of professionalism may have differed from Huntington's, Janowitz was equally concerned about proper civilian control of the military, lest "the military profession...run the risk of confusing its technical and intellectual background with political expertise." (Janowitz, 1960, pg. viii) As a solution, Janowitz offered his concept of a constabulary force, a force that would be capable of meeting the national security threats of the Cold War world and remain amenable to the civilian control consistent with the American democratic tradition.
Janowitz believed that the nature of warfare had changed after the development of atomic weapons—another definition for victory was needed when each side possessed the capability to destroy much of the world. Additionally, nations would not have the luxury of months of preparation prior to engagement in hostilities. According to Janowitz, the nation's military establishment "becomes a constabulary force when it is continuously prepared to act, committed to minimum use of force, and seeks viable international relations, rather than victory...." (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 418) A strategy of deterrence and the limited wars of the Cold War era required that military advice contain some estimate of the intent of enemy leadership. Janowitz and his school argued that military officers could not remove themselves from policy formulation (Gard, 1973, pg. 3) "At the level of national security policy almost all military recommendations are based upon assumptions not entirely military, and all carry with them political and economic consequences." (Jesse, 1972, pg. 145) The ideal military career, then, would be one that allowed the officer to gain insight into the social and political consequences of the use of armed forces. Although the basic requirement laid on the officer corps was the same as it had always been—namely to provide capable forces ready to act on national policy—there was a new demand that officers "develop a greater appreciation of the relationship between means and objectives." (Gard, 1973, pg. 3)

How would this constabulary force be subject to the civilian control required in a liberal democratic society? Janowitz' answer to this question begins
with Huntington's answer: professional standards and tradition. However, he takes an additional step by offering that civilian control will be facilitated by the military's internalization of the dominant civilian values. The constabulary force will support the aims of democratic civilian control:

The constabulary officer performs his duties, which include fighting, because he is a professional with a sense of self-esteem and moral worth. Civilian society permits him to maintain his code of honor and encourages him to develop his professional skill. He is amenable to civilian political control because he recognizes that civilians appreciate and understand the tasks and responsibilities of the constabulary force. He is integrated into civilian society because he shares its common values. To deny or destroy the difference between the military and the civilian cannot produce genuine similarity, but runs the risk of creating new forms of tension and unanticipated militarism. (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 470)

It could be said that Huntington's model achieves civilian control by providing a civil-military system in which the components are segregated and different, marked by a military that is highly professional. On the other hand, Janowitz offers a system having integrated yet different parts. He relies on the professionalism of the officer corps, as does Huntington, but he also counts on the military's having internalizing the prevailing values of society, something that Huntington proscribed. As appealing as Janowitz' model might be, it does pose some challenges. The biggest issue is described by the following question: If the military is to internalize the prevailing civilian value system, how does it maintain the unique values and orientations necessary for success in battle while at the same time being sensitive and responsive to changes in the value system being internalized (Gard, 1973, pg. 4)?
E. OTHER THEORIES OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

As important as the works of Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz are to the field of civil-military relations, these men are not the only scholars to have dealt with the subject and offered models that attempted to address the soldier-state problem.

1. Concordance Theory.

One such theory is the Concordance Theory, advanced by Rebecca L. Schiff, a professor of political science from the University of Michigan, in an article appearing in *Armed Forces and Society* in 1995. She levies two main criticisms against the prevailing theories (meaning the work of Huntington and Janowitz and their derivations) of civil-military relations. First, she maintains that these theories are "historically and culturally bound to the American case," (Schiff, 1995, pg. 10) making them difficult to apply to nations other than the United States. As this thesis is about *American* civil-military relations, this criticism is perhaps not so relevant. Her second criticism is relevant, however. She argues that previous theories of civil-military relations overemphasize the institutional aspects—namely the government and the military—of the relationship and neglect cultural issues (Schiff, 1995, pg. 11).

Her contribution is, as mentioned above, the Theory of Concordance, which argues that there are three partners in the civil-military equation: the military, the political elites, and the citizens themselves. Appropriate civil-military relations for a particular state will be a function of that state's cultural and
institutional conditions, which are recognized by all three partners. In the Concordance Theory, proper civil-military relations, which Schiff says exists when the probability of domestic military intervention has been lowered to the maximum extent possible, are maintained when the above three partners agree on four key indicators. These indicators are the officer corps' social composition, the political decision-making process, the method of recruiting, and the military style. (Schiff, 1995, pp. 7-8) In a particular state, cultural and historical conditions will largely determine the manner of agreement between the military, the political leadership, and the citizenry on the four indicators. The nature of this agreement will in turn determine "whether relations among the military, the government, and the society take the form of separation, integration, or some other alternative." (Schiff, 1995, pg. 13) In other words, the prevailing cultural and historical factors in a state will influence whether appropriate civil-military relations for that state are marked by relatively rigid separation between the military and civilian institutions, as in the United States, complete integration of the two, or some other possibility.

2. Fusion Theory.

Unlike the Concordance Theory, the Fusion Theory was developed specifically to explain American civil-military relations. The Fusion Theory, though more recent than Janowitz' work, is based on many of the same observations. Like Janowitz, Fusion theorists believe that the stakes of modern warfare and the conditions under which the United States must use force
preclude a separation of the military from the political. The technology of today and the future, Fusionists maintain, means that there is no longer a skill or domain that belongs exclusively to the professional officer corps. Military portions of the national defense policy cannot in any way be separated from the social, political, and economic portions (Jesse, 1972, pg. 47). While Janowitz likely would have agreed with this last statement, he would disagree with the Fusionists conclusion drawn from it. Janowitz simply called for a military professionalism that incorporated a level of social, political, and economic sophistication within its definition that he felt was necessary for the military to perform their tasks competently. He maintained that, while the military need to internalize the prevailing cultural values, there was, as discussed above, a distinct code of honor and professional skill that society needs to let the military develop and maintain. In fact, he cautioned against the denial or destruction of the differences between the military and the civilian. Fusionists, on the other hand, would do just that. Their prescription for maintaining good civil-military relations is to "civilianize the military and militarize the civilians." (Jesse, 1972, pg. 47) Whether this school of thought would yield greater civilian control and a competent military is certainly open to debate. However, one certain consequence would be the total destruction of military professionalism as defined by Huntington, or even by Janowitz.
3. Other Theories.

The civil-military relations literature is overflowing with theories to explain the American soldier-state dynamic. In addition to the ones discussed above, the following were found to be particularly interesting and are included in an effort to round out the discussion. Peter D. Feaver, a professor of political science at Duke University, proffered that there emerged during the Cold War a set of four "political-military fault lines" which largely defined the friction in contemporary civil-military relations (Feaver, 1995, pg. 130). The first fault line is the issue of the primacy of force. This splits civilian hawks—those who likely do not know the terrible costs of war—and military doves—those who generally know first hand. The second is the question of how much is to be used, once a conflict starts. The military on one hand want quick, decisive, overwhelming force while civilians typically desire controlled, measured, graduated responses that always leave an opening for diplomatic action. Third is the issue the control over operations. The military generally desire to have autonomous control over all military aspects of an action while civilians would like to reserve the right to exercise direct supervision over even tactical-level operations. The fourth fault line is the issue of the clarity of the mission. Here, the military want clear, unambiguous objectives and goals, while the civilians prefer the politically and diplomatically desirous condition of vague, open-ended objectives. (Feaver, 1995, pg. 130)

Given his four fault lines, Feaver developed a dual-natured system of civil-military relations. On the one hand there is delegative civilian control, which is
similar to Huntington's objective civilian control. Delegative civilian control, its name might suggest, requires that the civilian elite delegate to the military autonomous control over all things military. Contrasted with delegative civilian control is Feaver's assertive military control. Assertive military control allows for direct civilian supervision of military matters, down to whatever level the civilian authorities might find necessary. (Feaver, 1995, pg. 123) Compared to Huntington's subjective civilian control, assertive military control does not assume that the military will have to conform to prevailing civilian cultural norms, nor will the military's professionalism be undermined. However, unlike objective civilian control, it does not recognize distinctive roles for the military and the civilian. Rather, assertive military control allows for overlapping roles and functions—similar to the overlapping roles and functions of the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. Finally, assertive military control assumes a pattern of civil-military relations that is marked by friction. (Feaver, 1995, pg. 124)

As can be seen in the previous discussion of the various theories of civil-military relations, and this observation will be further investigated by the discussions in the subsequent chapter on the present and future states of the same, there are conflicting forces at work in the soldier-state dynamic. The demands of a post Cold War operation such as those in Somalia or Bosnia would seem to require that soldiers become more like statesmen. Yet at the same time, the specter of a large-scale conflict against a future peer competitor necessitates
that our soldiers not become too much like statesmen. Charles Moskos, a much-published military sociologist, claims to have a solution for this dilemma. He argues for a "plural" military in which there are divisions between those "civilianized" components, closely linked to society, and those that are still fully military. The potential impacts of this idea on the cohesiveness of the military as a whole and each of the services are obviously highly objectionable. (Snider and Carleton-Carew, 1995, pg. 4)

F. HISTORICAL AND LEGAL PRECEDENTS FOR AMERICAN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS.

The purpose of this section of the thesis is to introduce the student to some of the historical trends in the development of the American civil-military relationship as well as a number of the significant institutional and legal factors affecting the same. An understanding of these areas is helpful in observing and evaluating the current and future state of the soldier-state dynamic within the United States.

The first focus is, of course, the Constitution of the United States. It is this document which serves as the basis for the American government and captures many of the ideals upon which this nation was founded. One thing that the Constitution does not do well, however, is to provide for effective civilian control of the military or even allow for particularly high military competence and professionalism. The Constitution actually yields a mixture of military and
political functions, an interjection of politics into military affairs and *vice versa*. The framers of the Constitution, having associated standing professional armies with aristocracy and the monarchy, were naturally distrustful of them. Moreover, they felt they could assume that the United States' geographic separation from Europe meant that their national security was a fact, rather than a goal of policy. The framers, therefore, did not envision a large standing army, if they even envisioned one at all. The main concern, then, of the Founding Fathers in their consideration of civil-military relations was the assurance that the military could not be used as a tool of one particular branch of the government at the expense of another (and, therefore, at the expense of the citizenry). "The Framers' concept of civilian control was to control the uses to which civilians might put military force rather than to control the military themselves." (Huntington, 1957, pp. 164-165) The result was a compromise between military effectiveness and political control. "[The framers] trusted balance, the diffusion of power, and shared responsibility—all basic elements of the new political system—to control the military." (Johnson and Metz, 1995, pg. 3)

In hindsight, considering the stability of the United States' form of government, it is easy to conclude that civilian control as we define it today would have been easier to create had the military been "limited in scope and relegated to a subordinate position in a pyramid of authority culminating in a single civilian head. The military clauses of the Constitution, however, provide for almost exactly the opposite." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 163) In accordance with the ideas
of "separation of powers" and "checks and balances", civilian responsibility for and authority over the military is divided. The militia clauses divide control over the militias between the state governments and the Federal government. "Separation of powers" divides control of national forces between the Executive and Legislative branches. The President is the Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces, but only Congress can declare war and control the purse strings. Even the Commander-in-Chief clause itself has a tendency to divide control between the President and his service secretaries. (Huntington, 1957, pp. 163-164) Civilian control under the Constitution is challenging because the military is accountable to two different (and sometimes competing) branches of the federal government. Huntington, in fact, cites the separation of powers as the "real constitutional stumbling block" to his objective civilian control. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 191) To achieve the highest levels of civilian control and military professionalism would require a revision of the Constitutional provision for the separation of powers, and Huntington argues that the price to be paid by the Republic would be too great. The framers' lack of anticipation of a large standing military and the fact that more important values than civilian control and military professionalism were at stake during the Constitutional Convention may be the reasons the Constitution does not provide for a more efficient means of ensuring either value. "A lesser measure of civilian control and lower standards of military professionalism are the continuing prices the American people will have to pay for the other benefits of the constitutional system." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 192)
During the years following the Civil War, up to World War I, the American officer corps developed into a professional body. The characterization of the officer corps in this period of history provides another interesting historical factor for consideration. It was during this time period that the officer corps recovered from the influences of Jeffersonian and Jacksonian democracy largely by being isolated, reduced in size and rejected by a society mostly concerned with business and industrial growth. However, these years were also some of the most intellectually creative and formative in the history of the American armed forces. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 229) As the officer corps retreated into itself and developed an extremely high level of military professionalism, it began to see itself as a body apart from the rest of society. Politics and the profession of arms did not mix. At that time, not one officer in five hundred voted (Huntington, 1957, pg. 258). In fact, there was a general suspicion of politics and those involved in it. Says Huntington, quoting an officer of that day: "If any convictions...were acquired by the cadet, they were generally of contempt for mere politicians and their dishonest principles of action." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 258) Impartial, nonpartisan, objective, and loyal career service to whichever party or administration might occupy the White House became the ideal standard to the newly professionalized officer corps and it prided itself on its level of attainment. Moreover, the military "compared themselves favorably with the more backward and still largely politics-ridden civil service." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 259)
As World War I approached,

[the military officers were not pleased by what they saw when they
looked out from their professional monastery on the bustling
America of their age. Those aspects of American society which
were most important were those which seemed most unmilitary.
The image of America in the military mind was a picture of jingoism,
individualism, and, most particularly, commercialism. (Huntington,
1957, pg. 266)

The professional officer of the day felt that Americans were too bellicose and
placed too much stock in the manifest destiny. National pride was thought to be
a threat to national security and individualism, directly opposed to military values,
was held to be the dominant cultural force in American society. Huntington,
quoting a general officer of the time:

'The trouble with us [the United States] is that under the modern
devil of sordid commercialism, which corrupts legislators and public
servants and dulls public conscience, the average man considers
that the state and the government exist for his sole personal
benefit; he does not realize that the rights, privileges, and
immunities resulting from citizenship have corresponding
responsibilities and duties' (Huntington, 1957, pg. 267)

Having been rejected by a commercial society with its utilitarian values, the
professional military were "contemptuous of the values of such a society and
sure of the superiority of their own creed." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 268) Whether
or not the military's possession of this outlook is good or bad is surely the subject
of great debate. Regardless, this history is important in the discussion of the
civil-military "crisis" in a subsequent chapter because it provides an historical
perspective on the issue of the military-societal fracture and its significance.
The World War II years were marked by an increased military involvement in policy-making and a corresponding decline in professionalism.\textsuperscript{1} The military, mainly in the persons of the Joint Chiefs (at this point an \textit{ad hoc} advisory body assembled by President Roosevelt and not codified by law), wielded unprecedented power in decision-making and accomplished this only through significant divergence from the traditional military mindset. President Roosevelt allowed his military chiefs exclusive access to himself and, because he fancied himself as the grand strategist, immersed himself in their advice, always at the expense of consultation with his civilian staff. Roosevelt's Secretary of State, for instance, was frequently excluded from the inner circle of power. Congress, driven by a desire to support the war effort, nearly always yielded to the advice and requests of Roosevelt's military chiefs.

After the cessation of hostilities between the Allies and the Axis powers in 1945, the United States entered into the nuclear age and the Cold War. Military requirements, driven by the threat posed by the Soviet Union, became an integral part of foreign policy and the functional imperative of defending the nation began to take on more force. A large standing army was seen as necessary to the survival of the nation and this conflicted with the liberalism dominant in society. Huntington, writing at a point a little over a decade into the Cold War, offered three theoretical solutions to this problem. First, the United States could follow its pre-war example and make deep cuts in the military and isolate it from

\textsuperscript{1} For an in-depth discussion of the role of the American military in World War II \textit{vis-à-vis} professionalism, see Huntington, \textit{The Soldier and the State}, Chapter 12, pp. 314 - 315.
society. In this way liberalism and military professionalism could coexist, but this solution would do little in the way of providing security against the Soviet threat. Second, the nation could accept a certain increase in the authority and influence of the military while demanding an abandonment of military professionalism, following the example of the war years. The military establishment would be reformed along liberal lines and thus liberalism would be maintained, as would the nation's security in the short term. However, over the long term, one could expect a serious decline in military effectiveness. Third, society could become more conservative and thus more sympathetic to the traditional military ethic. This, of course, would require a major change in American liberalism and would, therefore, be extraordinarily difficult and perhaps not worth the price. In actuality, all three possibilities came into play to varying degrees, with the first two being most common. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 346)

Since the end of World War II, there have been several key pieces of legislation that have played a role in the development of American civil-military relations. The National Security Act of 1947, in addition to creating a number of intelligence-related organizations and the Air Force and helping to define the roles and missions of the services, also codified the Joint Chiefs of Staff and created a Chairman, who it might be said, was to be a first among peers. The National Security Act of 1949 was also significant to civil-military relations because it exacerbated a problem already created by the separation of powers in the Constitution. In Section 202(c)(6), the law gives permission to any member
of the Joint Chiefs to present to Congress, "on his own initiative, after first informing the Secretary of Defense, any recommendation relative to the Department of Defense that he may deem proper." (Huntington, 1957, pg. 416)

The Constitutional imperative of serving two masters was reiterated in law. While contributing to friction on one hand, the National Security Acts actually provided to the Joint Chiefs of Staff an almost purely military character. The composition was completely military and only military responsibilities were assigned to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in contrast to the practices of World War II. The Joint Chiefs were placed within the defense establishment, which had the Secretary of Defense as its principal advisor to the President. (Huntington, 1957, pg. 433)

Another key piece of legislation affecting the soldier-state dynamic is the Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986. This act was a legislative answer to what was seen as the problem of interservice rivalry and bickering that resulted in wasted dollars, poor cooperation and interoperability, and, ultimately, lowered combat readiness. Goldwater-Nichols, among other things, required that the services become more "joint." The chain of command from the NCA to the warfighting commanders-in-chief, each responsible for some fraction of the world, was clarified and made more direct. The services were then required to organize, train, and equip the forces needed by these warfighters. A new emphasis was to be placed on joint service and education in career paths. Most importantly, though, the Act increased the power of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs, making him truly senior to the service chiefs. He no longer was required to represent the
views of the other Joint Chiefs in his advice to the President and his power relative to the Secretary of Defense was increased. The President may now get only one view from the Chairman, and that view need not necessarily be anyone's but his own. Goldwater-Nichols has been criticized on two fronts. First, by mandating the infallible orthodoxy of "jointness," its critics say, Goldwater-Nichols promotes a strategic monism and dangerously squashes the creative rivalry that stems from services each trying to provide a solution to a particular problem. Second, civilian control of the military is seriously undermined by placing unprecedented power into the hands of a single military czar. Some critics maintain that the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs is now dangerously too powerful, especially when the billet is filled by someone as politically savvy as Colin Powell.
IV.  JUST WAR TRADITION

A. PURPOSE.

The purpose of this chapter is to introduce the student to the basics of the just war tradition. Although this subject is not immediately related to civil-military relations, it is nevertheless important to the Joint C4I student as it provides a moral and ethical basis for making decisions concerning the ends and means of war. This is so, primarily because advances in technology have raised the possibility that the C4I expert may no longer be called upon only to facilitate command and control through the use of communications and computers. Rather, because of information warfare, for instance, his communications equipment and computers might themselves be used to prosecute acts of war against an adversary. Finally, as will be argued in a subsequent chapter, the just war tradition provides a baseline for the moral use of force in situations in which something less than national survival is at stake. The chapter will be divided into four sections. The first section will describe the history and development of the just war tradition. The second and third will be discussions of just cause—jus ad bellum—and just means—jus in bello—respectively. The final section will be a continuation of the discussion of the history and development of the just war tradition.
B. DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUST WAR TRADITION, PART I.

For centuries, wars have been fought despite an understanding of the evil nature of warfare. Wars kill, maim, and destroy. Civilizations have tried to figure out ways to mitigate the effects of, if not eliminate, warfare. Since the Middle Ages, one of the attempted solutions has been to develop rules of conduct that have, over the years, gradually assumed the characteristics of law. While the laws of war were largely developed by military men, the principles that concern the "moral or legal legitimacy" of war itself were developed by theologians, jurists, and statesmen. (Taylor, 1986, pg. 227) Indeed, "the question, How can the use of force serve just ends?...has been the centerpiece of Christian reflection on just war from the fifth century." (Johnson, 1996, pg. 27)

Because of the emphasis in the Gospels on ideas such as nonresistance and forgiveness, there emerged during the first three centuries of Christianity a strong tendency toward religious pacifism. Christians, moreover, were for the time being a persecuted minority in a pagan state. People holding higher ranks within the Roman military establishment were required to make sacrifices to the Emperor—something quite distasteful to Christians. Early Church fathers such as Tertullian and Origen condemned military service as a result. There were, however, many Christians in the Roman armies. When the Emperor Constantine first officially tolerated the faith (A.D. 312) and then finally converted to it (A.D. 337), Christianity was no longer the religion of a persecuted sect. At this point Christian attitudes about war began to change greatly. (Taylor, 1986, pg. 226)
Saint Augustine of Hippo (A.D. 354-430) first developed the doctrine of just and unjust wars. His distinction between the two referenced general ethical standards as opposed to the wants and desires of kings and other rulers. Just wars, said Augustine, "are usually defined as those which avenge injuries, when the nation or city, against which warlike action is to be directed has neglected to punish wrongs committed by its own citizens, or to restore what has been unjustly taken by it." (Taylor, 1986, pg. 228) He stressed that the true aim of the war must be peace: "after the resisting nations have been conquered, provision may more easily be made for enjoying in peace the mutual bond of piety and justice." (Taylor, 1986, pg. 228)

Saint Thomas Aquinas (1225-1274) approved of and elaborated on the Augustinian tenets in his work *Summa Theologiae*. Aquinas maintained that, in order for a war to be just, it must meet three criteria. First, the war must be ordered by right authority. Second, "those attacked must, by a fault, deserve to be attacked...." (Taylor, 1986, pg. 228) Third, those who would enter into war must "have peace as the object of their intention." (Taylor, 1986, pg. 228) The teachings of Saints Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are still the basis for just war theory.

Other names significant in the development of the just war tradition include Francisco de Vitoria (1480-1546), Francisco Suarez (1548-1617), and Hugo Grotius (1583-1645). De Vitoria and Suarez were both Spanish clergy and theologians. De Vitoria put emphasis on the care that rulers should take before
deciding that a war is just because of the potentially horrific consequences. Suarez felt that the right of Christian rulers to make war had at least something to do with natural law. It was, therefore, possible for non-Christian rulers to engage in just war as well. Defensive action was always legitimate and sometimes could be considered a duty, especially in defense of life or property, or in defense of someone unjustly attacked. Hugo Grotius was a layman and a diplomat. His work was largely taken from that of the clergy who had preceded him. However, he emphasized the individual conscience rather than the authority of the church. (Taylor, 1986, pg. 229)

The just war tradition, as suggested, stems from the belief that all human action, to include diplomacy and war, "is susceptible to moral scrutiny and judgment...." (Johnson, 1996, pg. 27) The just war tradition addresses two basic questions. The first is when it is right to use armed force—jus ad bellum. The second is what means are acceptable in the use of armed force—jus in bello. The two are related but the first must take precedence because one must be justified in going to war before the justness of one's means may even be examined. (Johnson, 1996, pg. 28)

C. JUST CAUSE—JUS AD BELLUM.

The standard of jus ad bellum requires that seven conditions be met before the use of force may be considered just. The first is the requirement of just cause. One may only resort to armed force in order to challenge a real and
certain danger. This would include the protection of innocent life, preserving conditions necessary for decent human existence, and securing basic human rights. Second, the war must be ordered by competent authority. Individuals may not wage war. Rather, only the appropriate, politically empowered authorities may decide to wage war. The third requirement is that of comparative justice. This means that war is only allowable after careful thought has been given and the decision-maker has concluded that the rights and values to be advanced by the war will outweigh or justify the death, destruction, and suffering certain to result during hostilities. The fourth condition is proportionality. This complements the third condition and simply means that the good expected from engaging in war must balance the damage caused and the costs incurred. The fifth condition is that war must be entered into with the right intention—ultimately peace and reconciliation. Sixth, the war must be a last resort. All possible peaceful solutions must be attempted before commencing hostilities. Seventh, there must exist a legitimate probability of success. This condition is an attempt to preclude a costly irrationality in the resort to armed force. (Toner, Sword, 1992, pp. 71-72)

D. JUST MEANS—JUS IN BELLO.

Given that the cause is just, Jus in bello sets conditions for determining the rightness of one's means in war. There are four conditions within jus in bello and the first of these is proportionality. Proportionality in this context means that
the amount and type of force used or threatened must be morally consistent with the ends being pursued. The second condition, discrimination, requires that force be applied in such a manner that noncombatants and innocents are not deliberately targeted by attack. In war, the only acceptable targets are combatants. The third condition is a prohibition of genocide. The fourth stipulates that general laws, such as treaties and conventions, must be observed. (Toner, Sword, 1992, pp. 76-77)

E. DEVELOPMENT OF THE JUST WAR TRADITION, PART II.

The just war tradition began to decline in influence not long after Hugo Grotius died. There were a number of reasons for this. One was the Reformation and the diminished temporal power of the Bishop of Rome. His ability to serve as a sort of supranational authority mediating and ending disputes was greatly reduced. Also a factor was the rise of the nation-state and the corresponding increase in national interests and national armies. Force, or the threat of it, became the only means to address international grievances because there was no higher authority to do it. International trade was growing at this time, too, and so the concept of neutrality became important. It was hard to maintain a stance of neutrality if one was engaged in judging the justness of belligerents, regardless of what standards one might use. (Johnson, 1996, pg. 27)
Further, in the wake of two horrible and costly world wars, the advent of the nuclear age presented us with the likelihood that any future war would be so destructive that there would be no evil for which global nuclear annihilation would be a proportionate response. Employing nuclear weapons against a city would be inevitably indiscriminant. So, while the leaders of nations were maintaining that the preservation of the state clearly justified war, there emerged in theological circles a "presumption against war." (Johnson, 1996, pg. 27) This is reflected in such works as the American Catholic Bishops' *The Challenge of Peace*.

Now that the likelihood of nuclear annihilation is greatly diminished, the standards of the just war tradition are increasingly relevant. The United States, for the foreseeable future anyway, is more likely to be involved in conflicts which fall short of all-out war in intensity and these military operations other than war (MOOTW) will be entered into for reasons that amount to something less than national survival. A case shall be made that the just war tradition provides decision-makers with a solid moral and ethical basis for evaluating the ends and means of the use of armed force.
V. PRESENT AND FUTURE CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS

A. PURPOSE.

The purpose of Chapter V is to examine the current and future state of American civil-military relations. This examination will be conducted primarily by presenting various challenges, brought about or exacerbated by the end of the Cold War, that are facing the United States and the American military and the implications these challenges have for the civil-military relationship. At its end, the chapter will explore the question of whether there exists a "crisis" in American civil-military relations, as has been argued by some scholars.

B. THE CHALLENGE OF NEW ROLES AND RESPONSIBILITIES: MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.

With the end of the Cold War, the United States, for the first time since the end of World War II, found that it was, some would say, without a peer competitor. The emphasis in our national security goals and policies shifted away from containing the Soviet threat and deterring nuclear war to, among other things, spreading democratic capitalism and maintaining some kind of order in the world. "When the primary purpose of the military seems irrelevant because the state faces no pressing threat, the secondary purposes can loom so large as to eclipse the security mission—hence the recent prominence of nontraditional
missions for the military." (Feaver, 1996, pg. 156) These "nontraditional missions" are currently referred to in Joint Doctrine as military operations other than war (MOOTW). MOOTW are, according to the Joint Staff, "activities where the military instrument of national power is used for purposes other than the large-scale combat operations usually associated with war." (Joint Staff, JP 3-0, pg. V-1) A large number of operations, including arms control efforts, counterterrorism, counternarcotics, nation assistance, noncombatant evacuation, humanitarian assistance, and peace operations (Joint Staff, JP 3-0, pp. V-7 - V-11), are described by the above definition and these types of operations seem increasingly likely as we look into the future.

Activities that can be characterized as MOOTW are symptomatic of a change in focus with regard to national security that resulted from the demise of our last peer competitor. The lack of a serious and purely military threat to the security of the United States combined with an administration that is decidedly inwardly focused (Gilroy, 1995, pg. 69) has given rise to the feeling amongst many in this country that "adverse social, economic, and environmental conditions at home and abroad can also result in a serious threat to national security." (Gilroy, 1995, pg. 68) Because the threats to national security are not entirely military, the responses to those threats will not be entirely military. Rather, any particular response will likely be a combination of warfighting, law enforcement, and social work. A big issue, of course, is whether the armed
forces' role in this will be expanded beyond the strictly military to include those areas of responsibility previously left to civilians.

At first glance, it might seem as though America's military forces are especially suited to assist in, or even take the lead in, meeting these new threats to national security. The armed forces of the United States possess unique assets (either in capability or quantity) such as lift and transportation, as well as maintenance and support facilities. Military personnel are trained and equipped to deal with stressful, sensitive, and demanding situations. Much of the military's logistics and organizational infrastructure is capable of being forward-deployed to wherever the problem might occur. Finally, and perhaps most importantly, in the wake of Desert Storm, the American public has a great deal of confidence in the military's ability to get the job done right. (Gilroy, 1995, pp. 74-75)

Academics are not the only ones who seem to think that America's military forces have something to offer besides the ability to fight and win wars. Legislation passed by Congress assigns non-warfighting responsibilities to the armed forces. For example, the Civil-Military Cooperative Action Program (10 USC 410), passed in 1993, requires that the military:

- Enhance individual and unit training and morale through meaningful community involvement
- Encourage cooperation between civilian and military sectors of society
- Enhance the ecological, environment, economic, and social conditions of the areas that are within reach of existing military base structures
• Advance equal opportunity and help alleviate racial tension, conflict, and misunderstanding
• Increase the opportunities for disadvantaged citizens to receive employment, training, education, and recreation (Gilroy, 1995, pg. 74)

So, in addition to making sure it is able to fight and win the next war, the American military is responsible for assisting in the social cause *du jour*.

One social ill that the military has become more and more involved in combating is the problem of illegal drug trafficking. It is instructive to use the progression of military involvement in the fight against illegal drugs in this country as an example of how the United States armed forces can become increasingly involved in what was traditionally considered to be a civilian matter: law enforcement. One must begin with the Posse Comitatus Act, passed in 1878 "in response to election abuses committed by civilian carpetbaggers with the aid of federal troops." (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 78) The Posse Comitatus Act prohibits the use of military forces for civilian law enforcement purposes. In 1981, the Congress decided that the massive flow of illegal drugs into this country constituted a grave enough threat to our national security that the use of military forces was warranted. In that year, a law, the Military Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials Act (MCwCLEO), was passed that amended the Posse Comitatus Act and allowed the military to support civil law enforcement in counternarcotics efforts (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 78). The MCwCLEO allowed the Secretary of Defense to provide law enforcement officials "with any information collected during the course of normal military operations that may be relevant to
violations of any federal or state law. (Section 371)" (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 81) Further, the Secretary was authorized to make equipment and facilities available for law enforcement purposes (Section 372). If necessary, military personnel could be provided to train law enforcement agents in the use of the loaned equipment and facilities (Section 373). If, because of the equipment's complexity, law enforcement agents could not reasonably be expected to be trained in the use of that equipment, military personnel could then operate the loaned equipment themselves (Section 374). Although the Act prohibited military personnel from "direct" participation in searches, seizures, arrests, etc. (Section 375), and proscribed military participation if it would negatively impact military readiness (Section 376), the law is, nevertheless, significant because it gave the military a regular and active role in an area of responsibility that had traditionally belonged exclusively to civilian law enforcement. (Jacobs, 1986, pp. 82, 84)

What effect, then, will this military excursion into civilian territory have on civil-military relations? James Jacobs, in his book *Socio-Legal Foundations of Civil-Military Relations*, advances the argument that "no core principles of civil-military relations" (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 86) are violated. He maintains that it only makes sense to use the military in counternarcotics efforts and argues that it would be hard to find another law enforcement effort that would be more appropriate for military intervention (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 86). Just as the relationship between the federal government and the states has adapted to
changing circumstances over time, so also must the civil-military relationship (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 77).

Not everyone agrees that the use of the military in domestic law enforcement missions, or other MOOTW for that matter, poses no concern. One negative consequence of continued military emphasis on MOOTW is the increased role in policy-making that the uniformed military would expect to play (Snider and Carleton-Carew, 1995, pg. 7; Johnson and Metz, 1995, pg. 16). The nature of MOOTW themselves raises a related concern. Military operations other than war tend to be long and protracted in nature and therefore subject to a loss of support from the public or Congress. The military, with a mindset still fairly accurately reflected by the Weinberger Doctrine (1984), would naturally oppose to involvement in such situations. The nature of that opposition and the extent to which it is made public could provide for a policy execution for the Executive (Johnson and Metz, 1995, pg. 16).

Don M. Snider, in a 1996 essay titled "U.S. Civil-Military Relations and Operations Other Than War," argues that the "first implication of continued involvement in [M]OOTW is short term in nature and focuses on the character and role of military advice giving." (Snider, 1996, pg. 4) The advice lawfully given to policy makers by military officers will be shaped by a fiscally constrained environment that essentially creates a zero-sum game and forces the officers to choose between MOOTW and more conventional roles. Additionally, many in the armed forces will argue that MOOTW really do not reflect the military's
essential reason for existence: to fight and win wars. Combined with the previously mentioned reluctance to become involved in "high risk, no win" enterprises, these factors give some indication as to why one could expect a natural bias in military advice given to the National Command Authority. (Snider, 1996, pp. 4-5)

The second implication of continued involvement in MOOTW, according to Snider, is "long term and focuses on the issue of building service capabilities for the future" (Snider, 1996, pg. 6), which is, in various ways, the responsibility of both the military and civilian leadership (Snider, 1996, pg. 6). Should we build forces to be used as warfighters or peacekeepers? Snider implies that this issue is, at least to a certain extent, an either/or proposition. Moreover, the problem runs deeper than systems acquisition or force organization. What are the consequences of the reorientation of outlook and readjustment of perspective and focus that is required for a military force to effectively operate as peacekeepers or police officers? Even James Jacobs, a proponent of military involvement in law enforcement efforts, offers the following words of caution: "No doubt there will be calls to deploy military personnel to patrol the Mexican border [in support of counternarcotics efforts]. The potential implications of such assistance, in terms of resources, personnel, and improper use of force are very sobering." (Jacobs, 1986, pg. 88) Considering that in 1997 a young Texan goat herder was shot to death by a Marine patrol along the Texas-Mexico border, Jacobs' words seem prophetic.
C. A RIFT BETWEEN THE MILITARY AND SOCIETY.

Another challenge facing the United States and her military now and in the future is the rift between the military and the American society that many claim has developed over the past decade. A gap should not be surprising. As Huntington and others have pointed out, the military ethic is at odds with "the basic tenor and the fundamental tenets of a progressively inclined, liberally concerned, democratically structured civil order." (Toner, *Meditation*, 1992, pg. 202) The differences between what is allowed in civilian society and what is required by the military ethic are obvious. Society focuses on the individual, emphasizes personal liberties, and is "characterized by debate, attempted reconciliation between conflicting freedoms, and inefficiency." (Flammer, 1986, pg. 158) On the other hand, necessity requires that the military be group-oriented and emphasize discipline and obedience.

The obvious differences in outlook and perspective aside, some scholars and authors have voiced concern over what they perceive to be a "widening gap between the military and society." (Ricks, 1997, pp. 66-67) These writers have argued "that the military has come to see itself as an organization with better values and more functional social behavior than civil society...." (Cohen, 1997, pg. 180) They argue that this reflects a break with the traditions of the "past" (Cohen, 1997, pg. 180; Ricks, 1997, pg. 70) and note with alarm that the services, most visibly the United States Marine Corps, have "changed" their boot camp, or basic training, process to "instill values in recruits that [they] believe
American society has failed to provide." (Cohen, 1997, pg. 180) Rites of passage such as The Crucible and talk of a "transformation process" occurring at the Recruit Depots certainly seem to validate the observation that the military thinks that it needs to take what society delivers and make it better. Of course, whether this reflects well or badly on the military is open to debate.

Not all criticism of the military in this regard comes from without. Retired Navy Admiral Stanley R. Arthur, in an essay entitled "The American Military: Some Thoughts on Who We Are and What We Are," echoes the concern that "the armed forces are growing more and more separate from American society." (Arthur, 1996, pg. 15) Admiral Arthur is additionally concerned because, as he sees it, the men and women of America's armed forces do not just see themselves as separate from society; they see themselves as superior to it, as members of an elite organization:

Today, the armed forces are no longer representative of the people they serve. More and more, enlisted as well as officers, are beginning to feel that they are special, better than the society they serve. This is not healthy in an armed force serving a democracy. (Arthur, 1996, pg. 19)

He goes on to argue that this dangerous feeling of elitism is, in part, due to the military's insistence on holding its members to higher ethical standards (Arthur, 1996, pg. 21). As an example of the military's growing insularity, Admiral Arthur cites the occasional involvement of military personnel with gangs and hate groups. He also argues that members of today's military spend more time with other members and correspondingly less time with civilians, pointing to

Suppose for a moment that the phenomenon described by these authors in fact exists. Further suppose that we accept their value judgment that this phenomenon is bad. What does it mean for American civil-military relations? First, the authors maintain that the growing schism between the military and society will produce a civilian elite that is increasingly militarily ignorant. Second, there is a fear that an increasingly arrogant and elitist military that has decided it is the champion of American values and culture may decide *en masse* that it owes primary allegiance to its own concept of constitutional freedom, for instance. The entire military might pull a "MacArthur": in other words, defy a President whose actions or demands are contrary to the armed forces' collective idea of what is best for the country (Ricks, 1997, pp. 77-78). A discussion of the validity of the suppositions at the beginning of this paragraph will be included in Section F.

D. A POLITICIZED MILITARY, A NEW ADMINISTRATION, AND JOINTNESS.

While the military is accused of becoming further estranged from American society, it is also accused of having become more politicized. Beginning with the elimination of the draft, the military has become, some say, not only more Washington-wise—and willing to play the game—but also more politically partisan. As mentioned in a previous chapter, after the Civil War, fewer
than one officer out of five hundred cast a vote. In contrast, military personnel over the past decade have been voting in higher percentages than the general population (Ricks, 1997, pg. 73). Richard Kohn, former Air Force historian, asserts that this voting pattern is mostly conservative and Republican (Kohn, 1994, pg. 7). Thomas Ricks seconds that observation: "Open identification with the Republican Party is becoming the norm.... The junior officer corps...appears to be overwhelmingly Republican and largely comfortable with the views of Rush Limbaugh." (Ricks, 1997, pg. 72) Indeed, according to a former Army researcher, quoted in Ricks' article, "to today's West Point cadets, being a Republican is becoming part of the definition of being a military officer." (Ricks, 1997, pg. 72) The conservatism in the military outlook manifested itself upon the election of the current President when the new Commander-in-Chief and his administration was the target of an "extraordinary display of open disdain and hostility" (Cohen, 1997, pg. 177) and a "remarkable degree of public vitriol." (Feaver, 1996, pg. 149) Examples of military willingness to publicly voice political opinions can be found in General Colin Powell's speaking out twice during the 1992 presidential campaign against candidate Bill Clinton's proposal to become militarily engaged in Bosnia and also in General John Shalikashvili's public condemnation of Pat Buchanan's isolationist and anti-immigration platform during the 1996 campaign (Ricks, 1997, pg. 73).

There is another problem associated with the separation of an increasingly politicized military from society and this problem was exacerbated by a new
administration that was largely focused on a domestic agenda and possessed of an otherwise inward orientation. As national involvement in MOOTW increases, military personnel are finding themselves to be "better prepared to deal with current and future decision making then are their civilian counterparts." (Snider, 1996, pg. 1) Thus, the military has taken charge of the "joint mission and political-military analyses" (Snider, 1996, pg. 2) that occur before nearly all MOOTW. Although military dominance at this level might provide cause for concern, there are legitimate reasons why this phenomenon has occurred. First, administrations are, relatively speaking, short lived and presidential personnel policies often "emphasize other criteria besides executive competence." (Snider, 1996, pg. 2) Top-quality candidates for important positions within government are frequently scared off by ever-increasing numbers of ethics investigations and there is also a gradual thinning of top-notch career civilians. Additionally, as the military grows more estranged from society, there are fewer members of the various civilian elites—academia, government, or business—who have military experience or understand military issues. At the same time, more officers are earning advanced degrees in the policy sciences at top universities. (Snider, 1996, pg. 2) The increased availability of and emphasis on professional military education (PME) with its focus on the relationship of policy, strategy and resources have helped forge a formidable and coherent military perspective on national policy-making. Advanced education and a corps of outstanding joint specialists spawned by Goldwater-Nichols have resulted in a situation in which
"better educated officers frequently compete with civilians who are technocrats rather than innovative thinkers, appointees whose jobs are repayment for political debts, and a Pentagon bureaucracy that is increasingly designed to 'look like America.'" (Owens, 1994-95, pg. 83) The danger of all of this is two-fold: the potential for a civilian elite with no appreciation for military needs and issues, who see military personnel only as stereotypes; and the possibility exists of a political class which always defers to military judgment without "critical but informed scrutiny." (Cohen, 1997, pg. 180) The problem posed by a deferential political civilian elite is compounded by the successive centralization of power in the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the Chairman by the National Security Act (1947), the Defense Department Reorganization Act (1958), and Goldwater-Nichols (1986). Some argue that the Chairman is now the de facto commander of American armed forces. Goldwater-Nichols impedes creative competition between the services by attempting to eliminate interservice rivalry. It further allows the Chairman to present only one view to the NCA: his own. He is not required to advance the opinions of the service chiefs if he does not want to do so. The net result is a reduction in the number of sources of military advice to the civilian leadership. (Cohen, 1997, pg. 181)

E. A CRISIS IN CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS?

Those who insist that there is or has recently been a crisis in American civil-military relations seem to align their arguments along two general points: a
military 1) that has become isolated from the society it protects and 2) that has become increasingly politicized and overaggressive in asserting its power and influence in the decision-making process.

In the first case, the crisis school would have one believe that the American military is dangerously isolated from America to an extent that is historically unprecedented. Further, they maintain that not only is the military isolated, but it increasingly feels itself to be superior to American society: a social and cultural elite. Some authors cite the emphasis on a "transformation" process in boot camp. They do not like it that the Marine Corps maintains that the "job of the drill instructor is to ‘undo eighteen years of cumulative selfishness and Me-ism.’" (Ricks, 1997, pg. 73) The argument that, historically, the military saw itself as a reflection of society as opposed to being apart from (and better than) society is true only if one looks back no further than the end of World War II for historical precedent. Chapter III presented the unflattering views of society held by the professional military in the years between the Civil War and World War I. In fact, military antipathy toward civilian society is not without precedent even in the draft-fed Cold War years.

Military ideology has maintained a disapproval of the lack of order and respect for authority which it feels characterizes civilian society. The military believe that the materialism and hedonism of American culture is blocking the essential military virtues of patriotism, duty, and self-sacrifice. ...The professional soldier has been preoccupied with increased military training, not only for technical reasons, but to overcome the social and moral disabilities and weaknesses generated by civilian society. (Janowitz, 1960, pg. 248)
Further, the argument of Admiral Arthur and others that military bases, "never-to-be-left islands of tranquility removed from the chaotic, crime-ridden environment outside the gates" (Dunlap, 1992-93, pg. 6) physically reinforce a social and cultural isolation from society is not supported by fact. "The Army mostly lives where everyone else in America lives, in houses and apartments." (Ciccone and Kirby, 1998) Less than twenty per cent of the Army lives on base (Ciccone and Kirby, 1998). So, the argument that an isolated, and morally and culturally elitist military is a new and dangerous development without historical precedent is a weak one.

The crisis school also desires that one believe that an increasingly politicized and Washington-sawy military has gone too far in asserting itself in policy formulation. Authors such as Kohn argue that General Powell, while Chairman, was setting national policy and making decisions for the Secretary of Defense and the President. He cites the gays-in-the-military issue and the question of intervention in Bosnia as examples. In reality, the "claim that Powell 'overrode' Clinton is absurd. On gays in the military and intervention in Bosnia, Powell gave advice to Clinton who, for whatever reason, took it." (Owens, 1994-95, pg. 81) In more general terms, these authors have not established that the military is generating an approach to national strategy and security that is inconsistent either with civilian approaches or with the precepts of civilian control of the military. Nor are they convincing in their arguments that some military
involvement in policy-making alters the results in a way that is not desirable. (Johnson and Metz, "Recent Literature," 1995, pg. 211)

As to the position held by the crisis school that the innate military reluctance to become quickly involved in murky situations such as Somalia, Bosnia, and Haiti has driven American foreign policy, "in none of these crises did military advice drive policy." (Avant, 1996, pg. 28) In fact, any role in policy formulation that military advice did play is the natural result of its typically conservative nature. When the civilian policy makers disagree, a conservative approach to the problem at hand tends to gain in stature (risk avoidance). The constitutionally imposed system of checks and balances and the separation of powers was designed to mitigate civilian indiscretion, something that the framers feared. (Avant, 1996, pg. 28) When there is no clear consensus, caution may not be a bad policy: The military's "conservatism makes sense as a response to the lack of consensus among the civilian leadership in the United States about the importance of low-level threats. ... When civilians disagree, the United States' institutional structure was designed to slow change." (Avant, 1996, pg. 30)

Is there, or was there recently, a crisis in American civil-military relations? Those who say that there is, or was, point to certain indicators such as an isolated military, or an increasingly conservative and politicized military, or a military that uses its influence to drive policy. While some of these assertions, on some level, might be true, the crisis school has failed, on the whole, to make the
case that all of these indicators, in sum, portend the assumption of civilian authority by the military. A more important issue concerns the effect that the continued participation in MOOTW will have on the warfighting focus of the American military and the intellectual capital of its officer corps. This issue will be addressed in the following chapter.
VI. CONCLUSIONS

A. PURPOSE.

The goal of this thesis was to provide to the Joint Command, Control, Communications, Computers, and Intelligence (C4I) student taking CC3000 a broad overview of American civil-military relations. In an attempt to accomplish this task, several topics were offered. First, the concept of professionalism was presented, along with a discussion of the American military as a professional body. Next, various schools of thought on the role of a military within a democracy were offered, emphasizing Huntington's objective control and Janowitz' pragmatic professionalism. The thesis then went on to cover the just war tradition as a moral and ethical basis for making decisions concerning the means and ends of warfare. Finally, the student was exposed to some of the historical and legal precedents in civil-military relations as well as a discussion of the current and future state of American civil-military relations.

In this final chapter two remaining topics will be covered. The next section will be a brief discussion on the impact of military operations other than war (MOOTW) on military professionalism and civil-military relations. The following section will address the application of the tenets of the just war tradition to MOOTW. The final section will be a reemphasis of why the study of civil-military relations is important to the Joint C4I student.
B. IMPACT OF MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.

Chapter V included a section on the potential challenges to good civil-military relations posed by the continued involvement in MOOTW by America's military forces. An additional important issue was raised in that discussion and merits further attention here. This issue, as stated in Chapter V, is "long term and focuses on the issue of building service capabilities for the future." (Snider, 1996, pg. 6) What happens to the intellectual capital and warfighting focus of a military that is required to spend more of its time and resources on MOOTW? Because the "principles of peace operations are fundamentally different than those of warfighting," (Alberts and Hayes, 1995, pg. 8) the requirements placed on a young Marine or soldier participating in MOOTW, as well as the standards to which he must train, are fundamentally different than those associated with real warfare. In a "perfect world", Marines and soldiers would be trained to be fully proficient warriors and policemen. However, the reality of finite budgets and twenty-four hour days dictates that hard choices must be made. Each dollar and hour invested in teaching a young Marine how to shoot bean bag guns and fire foaming goo projectiles represents a dollar and an hour not spent on training the young man to be a warfighter.

The problem, however, goes deeper still. Many have argued that "officers who concentrate on activities other than war eventually become something other than warriors." (Dunlap, 1996, pg. 3) What is meant by this is that a military member who has spent most of his or her time focusing on becoming better at
MOOTW reaches a point at which he or she is no longer mentally, morally, and, perhaps, even physically, prepared for war.

This is not necessarily to argue that the military forces of the United States should have no role to play in MOOTW. Rather, the Mission of the Armed Forces is combat, to deter and defeat enemies of the United States. The military must be recruited, organized, trained, and equipped for that purpose alone. Its capabilities can, and should, be used for humanitarian and other civilian activities, but the military should not be organized or prepared or trained to perform such roles.... All such uses should be spillover uses of the Armed Forces which can be performed because the services possess the organization, training, and equipment that are only maintained to defend the nation. (Huntington, 1993, pg. 43)

Huntington argues that the military, by virtue of their preparation for war, will, from time to time, have something to offer to MOOTW. This is in direct contrast to the school of thought that talks of "maintaining relevance in the 21st Century" by refocusing, reorganizing, reprioritizing, etc.

The dichotomy between preparing for MOOTW and preparing for war and the problems it raises have been recognized by many in government, academia, and the military. The solutions are varied, but all seem to follow a general theme: keep the military focused on fighting and winning the nation's wars. The variations have to do with how this goal might be accomplished. One author argues for a significant reduction in the size of our armed forces coupled with the requirement that the main mission remain warfighting (Desch, 1995, pg. 177). This is one step, but the proposal does not explicitly answer the question of who will perform peace operations. Don M. Snider calls on the civilian leadership of
DoD to "accept the currently perceived dichotomy...and designate a small...JTF dedicated solely to...peacekeeping." (Snider, 1996, pg. 8) This peacekeeping JTF would, incidentally, be supported by privatized logistics. U. S. Senator Charles S. Robb (D-Va) also offers a similar proposal in an article published in *Joint Forces Quarterly* (Robb, 1996-97, pg. 89). Other authors go even further, creating a separate MOOTW force, perhaps even a new service, that would focus exclusively on becoming professionally competent at MOOTW. This force would either be part of DoD or subordinate to another Department (an obvious choice would be the Department of State). (Walter, 1998, pp. 41-42)

Although the scope of this thesis prevents a more in-depth discussion of this issue, the long-term impact of continued reorientation towards MOOTW deserves additional thought and study. For that reason, it would provide an excellent topic for future thesis research in the C4I curriculum. At least two approaches are possible. The first is to study at greater length and depth the impact of MOOTW themselves on military preparedness, training, doctrine, ethos, etc. The second would be to develop and offer alternative force structures and other solutions to the problem.

C. APPLICATION OF THE JUST WAR TRADITION TO MILITARY OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR.

Prior to the collapse of the Soviet Union, the threat for which the American military prepared looked much different than it does now. In Europe, United States forces expected to engage the Red Army in a large-scale conventional
armored clash. The United States Navy looked to fight the Soviet fleets in blue water engagements which would involve multiple carrier battle groups and great numbers of Russian bombers launching even greater numbers of missiles at those same carrier battle groups. And last but not least, there were vast numbers of intercontinental ballistic missiles in each country pointing at targets in the other.

During the Cold War, justification for meeting the Soviets and engaging in an all-out war if necessary seemed clear: our national survival, along with the continuation of the western liberal democratic tradition, was at stake. At the same time, decision-makers faced an almost equally strong imperative of avoiding nuclear war through deterrence and varying degrees of mutually assured destruction. The just war tradition seemed to become increasingly irrelevant because no one could imagine an evil so great as to allow a global war and the inevitable worldwide destruction. However, now that nuclear annihilation is not as likely and operations such as Bosnia, Somalia, and Haiti are more so, the situation is different. James Turner Johnson makes the point well:

The key issues now relate to conventional, not nuclear arms; they involve low-intensity conflict and various forms of interventionary uses of military force, not superpower deterrence or war; the goals served are often defined by broadly held international values, not national interests narrowly construed; and the question of the rightness of the use of force encompasses not only cases in which unilateral action by the United States is at issue, but also cases in which the United States is a participant in groups of nations.... (Johnson, 1996, pg. 34)
Future uses of force are not likely to involve nuclear weapons or all-out war. Starving people in Somalia; ethnic oppression in Bosnia, Rwanda, and Iraq; and human rights violations in Haiti all provide examples in which the use of force "to prevent, punish, and remedy injustice" (Johnson, 1996, pg. 35) is certainly not the greatest of possible evils.

"With the fear of and focus on superpower nuclear tensions now subsided, world politics offers situation after situation in which one can imagine the use of proportionate and discriminate force serving just and prudential ends." (Johnson, 1996, pg. 27) The United States, in evaluating future operations, can use the standards of classic just war tradition to determine if the use of force is morally justified. The conditions of *jus ad bellum*—just cause, competent authority, comparative justice, proportionality, right intention, last resort, probability of success—and those of *jus in bello*—proportionality, discrimination, prohibition of genocide, observation of law—can serve as a model for determining when the United States, alone or with others, may used armed force and which means may be used to achieve our ends once we are engaged in a conflict. There is one shortcoming in the just war tradition, however. Using the standards of this tradition would allow national leaders to determine when they *may* go to war, not necessarily when they *ought*. Just war tradition tells us when we may go to war to correct an injustice and which means we may use to accomplish our goal. Unfortunately, it says little about our obligation in any particular case and the national leadership will continue to have to factor such considerations as popular
support, international support, and the cost in men and materiel into any decision to make war.

D. IMPORTANCE AND RELEVANCE OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS—A REPRISE.

A basic understanding of civil-military relations is, indeed, important to the Joint C4I student. He must understand the concept of professionalism and how his officer corps is a professional body. He must understand the role of a military in a democracy and how that military relates to the society that it protects. Further, he must understand how changes in the threat and in the missions assigned to his military affect the civil-military relationship. The increased emphasis on information warfare means that the C4I expert will potentially be something more than a mere command and control enabler, as important as that function is. Instead, communications equipment and computers may become weapons in their own right, such as in the active deterioration or destruction of enemy information infrastructure with C4 systems. If this is so, then the C4I expert needs to have an ethical and moral baseline for making decisions concerning the ends and means of war. The just war tradition can be just such a baseline. This thesis should have provided a basic level of understanding in all these areas as well as food for thought on issues such as roles and missions, and force structure and orientation.
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